HERNANDEZ, LICSI, MARQUEDA, UY ADMIN LAW UNDER ATTY. GALLANT SORIANO
LUZON DEVELOPMEN DEVELOPMENT T BAN, petitioner, petitioner, vs. A!!O"#AT#ON O$ LUZON DEVELOPMENT BAN EMPLO%EE! &'( ATT%. E!TER E!TER !. GAR"#A )' *er c&+&c)t &- VOLUNTAR% ARB#TRATOR, ARB#TRATOR, respondents
its #osition #aper despite a letter from the 1oluntary *rbitrator reminding them to do so. No #osition #aper had been filed by L2. ithout L24s #osition #aper, the 1oluntary *rbitrator rendered a decision finding the an) has not adhered to the Collective argaining *greement provision nor the /emorandum of *greement on promotion.
DO"TR#NE The voluntary arbitrator, whether acting solely or in a panel, enjoys in law the status of a quasi-judicial agency but independent of, and apart from, the NLRC since his decisions are not appealable to the latter.
5ence, 5ence, this petition petition for certiorari certiorari and prohibition see)ing to set aside the decision of the 1oluntary *rbitrator and to prohibit her from enforcing the same.
The voluntary arbitrator no less performs a state function pursuant to a governmental power delegated to him under the provisions therefor in the Labor Code and he falls, therefore, within the contemplation of the term "instrumentality" in ec. ! of .#. $%!. The fact that his functions and powers are provided for in the Labor Code does not place him within the e&ceptions to said ec. ! since he is a 'uasi(judicial instrumentality as contemplated therein.
#--/e #--/e 6N the Court of *ppeals have jurisdiction over the petition for certiorari assailing the decision of the 1oluntary *rbitrator
G.R. No. 120319 October 6, 1995
The decision or award of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of arbitrators should li)ewise be appealable to the Court of *ppeals, in line with the procedure outlined in Revised *dministrative *dministrative Circular No. $(!+, just li)e those of the 'uasi(judicial agencies, boards and commissions enumerated therein.
e(
The state of our present law relating to voluntary arbitration provides that "7t8he award or decision of the 1oluntary *rbitrator . . . shall be final and e&ecutory after ten 7$98 calendar days from receipt of the copy of the award or decision by the parties," while the "decision, awards, or orders of the Labor *rbiter are final and e&ecutory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties parties within ten 7$98 calendar calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders." 5ence, while there is an e&press mode of appeal from the decision of a labor arbiter, Republic *ct No. :;$+ is silent with respect to an appeal from the decision of a voluntary arbitrator.
$&ct-
rom a submission agreement of petitioner and the respondent arose an arbitration case to resolve the following issue- hether or not the company has violat violated ed the Collec Collecti tive ve arga argaini ining ng *gree *greeme ment nt provis provision ion and the the /emorandum of *greement on promotion.
*t a conference, the parties agreed on the submission of their respective #osition #osition #apers. #apers. *tty *tty.. 0arcia, 0arcia, in her capacity capacity as 1olunta oluntary ry *rbitra *rbitrator tor,, received *L234s #osition #aper. L2, on the other hand, failed to submit
=n Volkschel Labor Union v. NLRC, on the settled premise that the judgments of courts and awards of 'uasi(judicial agencies must become final at some definite definite time, this Court ruled ruled that the awards awards of volunta voluntary ry arbitrato arbitrators rs
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HERNANDEZ, LICSI, MARQUEDA, UY ADMIN LAW UNDER ATTY. GALLANT SORIANO
determine the rights of parties> hence, their decisions have the same legal effect as judgments of a court. =n Oceanic ic !ivision v. Ro"ero, Ro"ero, this Court ruled that "a voluntary arbitrator by the nature of her functions acts in a 'uasi(judicial 'uasi(judicial capacity." capacity." ?nder these rulings, it follows that the o/'t&r &rb)tr&tor, *et*er &ct)'4 -oe or )' & +&'e, e'o- )' & the status of a quasi-judicial agency but independent of, and apart from, the NLRC since his decisions are not appealable to the latter. ection ! of .#. lg. $%!, as amended by Republic *ct No. ;!9%, provides that the "o/rt o A++e&- -*& e7erc)-e E7c/-)e &++e&te /r)-()ct)o' oer & )'& /(48e't-, /(48e't-, (ec)-)o'-, re-o/t)o'-, re-o/t)o'-, or(er- or &&r(- o Re4)o'& Re4)o'& Tr)& Tr)& "o/rt"o/rt- &'( /&-):/()c) /&-):/()c)& & &4e'c)e-, &4e'c)e-, )'-tr/8e't& )'-tr/8e't&)t)e-, )t)e-, bo&r bo&r((- or co88 co88))--) -)o' o'-, -, incl includ udin ing g the the ecu ecuri riti ties es and and 3&ch 3&chan ange ge Commissi Commission, on, the 3mploy 3mployees ees Compensa Compensation tion Commis Commission sion and the Civil Civil ervice Commission, e&cept those falling within the appellate jurisdiction of the upreme Court in accordance with the Constitution, the Labor Code of the #hilip #hilippin pines es under under #resid #resident ential ial 2ecree 2ecree No. No. @@%, @@%, as amend amended, ed, the provisions of this *ct, and of subparagraph 7$8 of the third paragraph and subparagraph 7@8 of the fourth paragraph of ection $; of the Audiciary *ct of $!@B. *ssumin *ssuming g arguendo arguendo that the voluntary arbitrator or the panel of voluntary arbitrators may not strictly be considered as a 'uasi(judicial 'uasi(judicial agency, board or commission, commission, still both he and the panel are comprehended comprehended within the concept of a "'uasi(judicial instrumentality." =t may even be stated that it was to meet the very situation presented by the 'uasi(judicial functions of the voluntary arbitrato arbitrators rs here, here, as well as the subse'u subse'uent ent arbitrato arbitratorarb rarbitra itrall tribunal tribunal operating under the Construction =ndustry *rbitration Commission, that the broader term "instrumentalities" "instrumentalities" was purposely purposely included in the above('uoted provision. provision. A' ;)'-tr/8e't&)t; ;)'-tr/8e't&)t; )- &'t*)'4 /-e( &- & 8e&'- or &4e'c. Thus, t*e ter8- 4oer'8e't& 4oer'8e't& ;&4e'c; ;&4e'c; or ;)'-tr/8e't ;)'-tr/8e't&)t; &)t; &re -'o'8o/-'o'8o/- )' t*e -e'-e t*&t e)t*er o t*e8 )- & 8e&'- b *)c* & 4oer'8e't &ct-, or
b *)c* & cert&)' 4oer'8e't &ct or /'ct)o' )- +eror8e(. The word "instrumentality "instrumentality," ," )t* re-+ect to & -t&te, co'te8+&te- &' &/t*or)t to *)c* t*e -t&te (ee4&te- 4oer'8e't& +oer or t*e +eror8&'ce o & -t&te /'ct)o'. *n individual person, li)e an administrator or e&ecutor, is a judicial instrumentality instrumentality in the settling of an estate, in the same manner that a sub(agent appointed appointed by a ban)ruptcy court is an instrumentality of the court, and a trustee in ban)ruptcy of a defunct corporation is an instrumentality of the state. T*e o/'t&r &rb)tr&tor 'o e-- +eror8- & -t&te /'ct)o' +/r-/&'t to & 4oer'8e't& +oer (ee4&te( to *)8 /'(er t*e +ro)-)o'- t*ereor )' t*e L&bor "o(e &'( *e &-, t*ereore, )t*)' t*e co'te8+&t)o' o t*e ter8 ;)'-tr/8e't&)t; in the afore'uoted ec. ! of .#. $%!. The fact that his functions and powers are provided for in the Labor Code does not place him within within the e&cepti e&ceptions ons to said said ec. ec. ! since since he is a 'uasi( 'uasi(jud judici icial al instrumentality as contemplated therein. =t will be noted that, although the 3mployees Compensation Commission is also provided for in the Labor Code, Circular No. $(!$, which is the forerunner of the present Revised *dmin *dminist istrat rative ive Circu Circular lar No. No. $(!+, $(!+, laid laid down down the proce procedur duree for the appealability of its decisions to the Court of *ppeals under the foregoing rational rationaliDat iDation, ion, and this was later later adopted adopted by Republic Republic *ct No. ;!9% in amending ec. ! of .#. $%!. A fortiori , t*e (ec)-)o' (ec)-)o' or &&r( o t*e o/'t&r o/'t&r &rb)tr&tor or +&'e o &rb)tr&tor- -*o/( )
This would be in furtherance of, and consistent with, the original purpose of Circular No. $(!$ to provide a uniform procedure for the appellate review of adjudications of all 'uasi(judicial entities not e&pressly e&cepted from the coverage of ec. ! of .#. $%! by either the Constitution or another statute. Nor will it run counter to the legislative legislative intendment intendment that decisions of the
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NLRC be reviewable directly by the upreme Court since, precisely, the cases within the adjudicative competence of the voluntary arbitrator are e&cluded from the jurisdiction of the NLRC or the labor arbiter. #' eect, t*)- e/&te- t*e &&r( or (ec)-)o' o t*e o/'t&r &rb)tr&tor )t* t*&t o t*e re4)o'& tr)& co/rt. Conse'uently, )' & +et)t)o' or certiorari ro8 t*&t &&r( or (ec)-)o', t*e "o/rt o A++e&- 8/-t be (ee8e( to *&e co'c/rre't /r)-()ct)o' )t* t*e !/+re8e "o/rt. A- & 8&tter o +o)c, t*)- "o/rt -*& *e'ceort* re8&'( to t*e "o/rt o A++e&- +et)t)o'- o t*)- '&t/re or +ro+er ()-+o-)t)o'. #RON AND !TEEL AUTOR#T% -. "A G.R. No. 1029=6. October 25, 1995 $A"T!
#.2. No. %;% initially created petitioner =* for a term of + years. hen =*4s original term e&pired, its term was e&tended for another $9 years by 36 No. +++. The National teel Corporation 7NC8 then a wholly owned subsidiary of the National 2evelopment Corporation which is itself an entity wholly owned by the National 0overnment, entered into an e&pansion program which included the construction of an integrated steel mill in =ligan City. #roclamation No. %%E! was issued by the #resident of the #hilippines withdrawing from sale or settlement a large tract of public land 7totalling about E9.%+ hectares in area8 located in =ligan City, and reserving that land for the use and immediate occupancy of NC. ince certain portions of the public land were occupied by a non(operational chemical fertiliDer plant, owned by private respondent /aria Cristina ertiliDer Corporation 7/CC8, a letter of instruction was issued directing the NC to negotiate with the owners of /CC for and on behalf of the 0overnment and that should NC and /CC fail to reach an agreement within a period of :9 days, =* was to e&ercise its power of eminent domain under #.2. No. %;% and to initiate e&propriation proceedings.
hen the negotiations failed, =* commenced eminent domain proceedings against /CC in RTC praying that =* be placed in possession of the property involved. Thereafter, a writ of possession was issued by the trial court in favor of =*. =* in turn placed NC in possession and control of the land occupied by /CC4s fertiliDer plant installation. 5owever, while the case was on(going, the statutory e&istence of =* e&pired. This prompted /CC to file a motion to dismiss contending that no valid judgment could be rendered because =* had ceased to be a juridical person. The trial court granted /CC4s motion to dismiss and did dismiss the case on the ground that under that Rules of Court, only natural or juridical persons or entities authoriDed by law may be parties in a civil case. =* moved for reconsideration contending that despite the e&piration of its term, its juridical e&istence continued until the winding up of its affairs could be completed. =n the alternative, =* urged that the Republic of the #hilippines, being the real party(in(interest, should be allowed to be substituted for petitioner =*. The /R was denied. The C* affirmed the dismissal holding that =*, did not have the same rights as an ordinary corporation because unli)e corporations organiDed under the Corporation Code, =* was not entitled to a period for winding up its affairs after e&piration of its legally mandated term. C* also ruled that the action for e&propriation could not prosper because the basis for the proceedings, the =*4s e&ercise of its delegated authority to e&propriate, had become ineffective as a result of the delegate4s dissolution, and could not be continued in the name of Republic of the #hilippines, represented by the olicitor 0eneral. The olicitor 0eneral argues that since =* initiated and prosecuted the action for e&propriation in its capacity as agent of the Republic of the #hilippines, the Republic, as principal of =*, is entitled to be substituted and to be made a party(plaintiff after the agent =*4s term had e&pired. 6n the other hand, /CC argues that the failure of Congress to enact a law further e&tending the term of =* evinced a "clear legislative intent to terminate the juridical e&istence of =*," and that the authoriDation issued by
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the 6ffice of the #resident to the olicitor 0eneral for continued prosecution of the e&propriation suit could not prevail over such negative intent. =t is also contended that the e&ercise of the eminent domain by =* or the Republic is improper, since that power would be e&ercised "not on behalf of the National 0overnment but for the benefit of NC." #!!UE hether or not the Republic of the #hilippines is entitled to be substituted for =* in view of the e&piration of =*4s term RUL#NG %E!. #arties to a civil action may be broadly categoriDed into %
groups7a8 those who are recogniDed as persons under the law whether natural, i.e., biological persons, on the one hand, or juridical persons such as corporations, on the other hand> and 7b8 entities authoriDed by law to institute actions 3&amination of the statute which created petitioner =* shows that =* falls under category 7b8 above. #.2. No. %;% contains e&press authoriDation to =* to commence e&propriation proceedings. =t should also be noted that the enabling statute of =* e&pressly authoriDed it to enter into certain )inds of contracts Ffor and in behalf of the 0overnment.G Clearly, =* was vested with some of the powers or attributes normally associated with juridical personality. 5owever, there is no provision in #.2. No. %;% recogniDing =* as possessing general or comprehensive juridical personality separate and distinct from that of the 0overnment. =n fact, =* appears to be a non( incorporated agency or instrumentality of the 0overnment of the Republic of the #hilippines. =t is common )nowledge that other agencies or instrumentalities of the 0overnment of the Republic are cast in corporate form, that is to say, are incorporated agencies o r instrumentalities, sometimes with and at other times without capital stoc), and accordingly
vested with a juridical personality distinct from the personality of the Republic. =* is properly regarded as an agent or delegate of the Republic of the #hilippines. The Republic itself is a body corporate and juridical person vested with full powers and attributes which are described as "legal personality." =t is worth noting that the term "*uthority" has been used to designate both incorporated and non(incorporated agencies or instrumentalities of the 0overnment. hen the statutory term of a non( incorporated agency e&pires, the powers, duties and functions as well as the assets and liabilities of that agency revert bac) to, and are re(assumed by, the Republic of the #hilippines, in the absence of special provisions of law specifying some other disposition thereof such as, e.g., devolution or transmission of such powers, duties, functions, etc. to some other identified successor agency or instrumentality of the Republic of the #hilippines. hen the e&piring agency is an incorporated one, the conse'uences of such e&piry must be loo)ed for, in the first instance, in the charter of that agency and, by way of supplementation, in the provisions of the Corporation Code. The procedural implications of the relationship between an agent or delegate of the Republic of the #hilippines and the Republic itself are, at least in part, spelled out in the Rules of Court . The general rule is, of course, that an action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party(in( interest. 7Rule E, ection %8 The Rules of Court at the same time e&pressly recogniDe the role of representative parties. =n the instant case, =* instituted the e&propriation proceedings in its capacity as an agent or delegate or representative of the Republic of the #hilippines pursuant to its authority under #.2. No. %;%. The present e&propriation suit was brought on behalf of and for the benefit of the Republic as the principal of =*. The principal or the real party in interest is thus the Republic of the #hilippines and not the National teel Corporation, even though the latter may be an ultimate user of the properties involved should the condemnation suit be eventually successful. =t follows that the Republic of the #hilippines is
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entitled to be substituted in the e&propriation proceedings as party(plaintiff in lieu of =*, the statutory term of =* having e&pired. #ut a little differently, the e&piration of =*4s statutory term did not by itself re'uire or justify the dismissal of the eminent domain proceedings. The C* declined to permit the substitution of the Republic of the #hilippines for the =* upon the ground that the action for e&propriation could not prosper because the basis for the proceedings, the =*4s e&ercise of its delegated authority to e&propriate, had become legally ineffective by reason of the e&piration of the statutory term of the agent or delegate, i.e., =*. ince, as we have held above, the powers and functions of =* have reverted to the Republic of the #hilippines upon the termination of the statutory term of =*, the 'uestion should be addressed whether fresh legislative authority is necessary before the Republic of the #hilippines may continue the e&propriation proceedings initiated by its own delegate or agent. hile the power of eminent domain is, in principle, vested primarily in the legislative department of the government, this Court believes and so holds that no new legislative act is necessary should the Republic decide, upon being substituted for =*, in fact to continue to prosecute the e&propriation proceedings. or the legislative authority, a long time ago, enacted a continuing or standing delegation of authority to the #resident of the #hilippines to e&ercise, or cause the e&ercise of, the power of eminent domain on behalf of the 0overnment of the Republic of the #hilippines. =n the present case, the #resident, e&ercising the power duly delegated under both the $!$; and $!B; Revised *dministrative Codes in effect made a determination that it was necessary and advantageous to e&ercise the power of eminent domain in behalf of the 0overnment of the Republic and accordingly directed the olicitor 0eneral to proceed with the suit. Goer'8e't o t*e Re+/b)c o t*e P*))++)'e- refers to the corporate governmental entity through which the functions of government are e&ercised throughout the #hilippines, including, save as the contrary appears from the conte&t, the various arms through which political authority is made effective in the #hilippines, whether pertaining to the autonomous regions,
the provincial, city, municipal or barangay subdivisions or other forms of local government. A4e'c o t*e Goer'8e't refers to any of the various units of the 0overnment, including a department, bureau,office instrumentality, or government(owned or controlled corporation, or a local government or a distinct unit therein. #'-tr/8e't&)t refers to any agency of the National 0overnment, not integrated within the department framewor), vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions and government(owned and controlled corporations. G.R. No. >?>11 A/4/-t 29, 19>9 !OL#D OME!, #N"., petitioner, vs. TERE!#TA PA%A@AL &'( "OURT O$ APPEAL!, respondents DO"TR#NE 6n the competence of the oard to award damages, we find that this is part of the e&clusive power conferred upon it by #2 No. $E@@ to hear and decide "claims involving refund and any other clai"s filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyers against the project owner, developer, dealer, bro)er or salesman."
tatutes conferring powers on their administrative agencies must be liberally construed to enable them to discharge their assigned duties in accordance with the legislative purpose. $&ct-
e are as)ed to reverse a decision of the Court of *ppeals sustaining the jurisdiction of the RTC over a complaint filed b y a buyer, the herein private
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respondent, against the petitioner, for delivery of title to a subdivision lot. The position of the petitioner, the defendant in that action, is that the decision of the trial court is null and void ab initio because the case should have been heard and decided by what is now called the 5ousing and Land ?se Regulatory oard. The complaint was filed by Teresita #ayawal against olid 5omes. The plaintiff alleged that the defendant contracted to sell to her a subdivision lot in /ari)ina for the agreed price of # %B,9B9.99, and that she had already paid the defendant the total amount of # EB,!@!.B; in monthly installments and interests. olid 5omes subse'uently e&ecuted a deed of sale over the land but failed to deliver the corresponding certificate of title despite her repeated demands because, as it appeared later, the defendant had mortgaged the property in bad faith to a financing company. The plaintiff as)ed for delivery of the title to the lot or, alternatively, the return of all the amounts paid by her plus interest. olid 5omes moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction, this being vested in the National 5ousing *uthority. The motion was denied. The defendant repleaded the objection in its answer, citing ection E of #.2. !+; providing that "the National 5ousing *uthority shall have e&clusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business in accordance with the provisions of this 2ecree." *fter trial, judgment was rendered in favor of the plaintiff and the defendant was ordered to deliver to her the title to the land or, failing this, to refund to her the sum paid plus interest from $!;+ and until the full amount was paid. olid 5omes appealed but the decision was affirmed by the respondent court, which also berated the appellant for its obvious efforts to evade a legitimate obligation, including its dilatory tactics during the trial. The petitioner was also reproved for its "gall" in collecting the further amount of # $,%EB.@; from the plaintiff purportedly for realty ta&es and registration e&penses despite its inability to deliver the title to the land.
=n holding that the trial court had jurisdiction, the respondent court referred to ection @$ of #2 No. !+; itself providing that Hthe rights and remedies provided in this 2ecree shall be in addition to any and all other rights and remedies that may be available under e&isting lawsG and declared that "its clear and unambiguous tenor undermine7d8 the 7petitioner4s8 pretension that the court a quo was bereft of jurisdiction." The decision also dismissed the contrary opinion of the ecretary of Austice as impinging on the authority of the courts of justice. #--/e hether the 5ousing and Land ?se Regulatory oard have jurisdiction over the complaint and not the regional trial court e( T*e &++)c&be & )- PD No. 95=, &- &8e'(e( b PD No. 13??, entitled "3mpowering the National 5ousing *uthority to =ssue rits of 3&ecution in the 3nforcement of =ts 2ecisions ?nder #residential 2ecree No. !+;." The language of this section 7sec.$8 leaves no room for doubt that "e&clusive jurisdiction" over the case between the petitioner and the private respondent is vested not in the Regional Trial Court but in the National 5ousing *uthority.
The private respondent contends that the applicable law is # No. $%!, which confers on regional trial courts jurisdiction to hear and decide 7$8 all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable of pecuniary estimation> 7%8 all civil actions which involve the title to, or possession of, real property, or any interest therein, e&cept actions for forcible entry into and unlawful detainer of lands or buildings...> 7B8 all other cases in which the demand, e&clusive of interest and cost or the value of the property in controversy, amounts to more than # %9,999.99. =t stresses, additionally, that # No. $%! should control as the later enactment, having been promulgated in $!B$, after #2 No. !+; was issued in $!;+ and #2 No. $E@@ in $!;B.
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This construction must yield to the familiar canon that in case of conflict between a general law and a special law, the latter must prevail regardless of the dates of their enactment. Thus, it has been held that the fact that one law is special and the other general creates a presumption that the special act is to be considered as remaining an e&ception of the general act, one as a general law of the land and the other as the law of the particular case. The circumstance that the special law is passed before or after the general act does not change the principle. =t is obvious that the general law in this case is # No. $%! and #2 No. $E@@ the special law. The argument that the trial court could also assume jurisdiction because of ection @$ of #2 No. !+;, earlier 'uoted, is also unacceptable. e do not read that provision as vesting concurrent jurisdiction on the Regional Trial Court and the oard over the complaint mentioned in #2 No. $E@@ if only because grants of power are not to be lightly inferred or merely implied. The only purpose of this section is to reserve to the aggrieved party such other remedies as may be provided by e&isting law, li)e a prosecution for the act complained of under the Revised #enal Code. O' t*e co8+ete'ce o t*e Bo&r( to &&r( (&8&4e-, e )'( t*&t t*)- )+&rt o t*e e7c/-)e +oer co'erre( /+o' )t b PD No. 13?? to *e&r &'( (ec)(e ;c&)8- )'o)'4 re/'( &'( any other claims )e( b -/b())-)o' ot or co'(o8)')/8 /')t b/er- &4&)'-t t*e +roect o'er, (eeo+er, (e&er, bro
uch claim for damages which the subdivisioncondominium buyer may have against the owner, developer, dealer or salesman, being a necessary conse'uence of an adjudication of liability for non( performance of contractual or statutory obligation, may be deemed necessarily included in the phrase "claims involving refund and any
other claims" used in the afore'uoted subparagraph C of ection $ of #2 No. $E@@. The phrase "any other claims" is, we believe, sufficiently broad to include any and all claims which are incidental to or a necessary conse'uence of the claimscases specifically included in the grant of jurisdiction to the National 5ousing *uthority under the subject provisions. The same may be said with respect to claims for attorney4s fees which are recoverable either by agreement of the parties or pursuant to *rt. %%9B of the Civil Code 7$8 when e&emplary damages are awarded and 7%8 where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff 4s plainly valid, just and demandable claim. esides, a strict construction of the subject #rovisions of $! No% &'(( )hich )ould deny the *+RC the authority to adjudicate clai"s for da"ages and for da"ages and for attorneys fees )ould result in "ulti#licity of suits in that the subdivision condo"iniu" buyer )ho )ins a case in the *+RC and )ho is thereby dee"ed entitled to clai" da"ages and attorneys fees )ould be forced to litigate in the regular courts for the #ur#ose, a situation )hich is obviously not in the conte"#lation of the la). A- & re-/t o t*e 4ro)'4 co8+e7)t o t*e 8o(er' -oc)et, )t *&beco8e 'ece--&r to cre&te 8ore &'( 8ore &(8)')-tr&t)e bo()e- to *e+ )' t*e re4/&t)o' o )t- r&8))e( &ct))t)e-. !+ec)&)e( )' t*e +&rt)c/&r )e(- &--)4'e( to t*e8, t*e c&' (e& )t* t*e +robe8- t*ereo )t* 8ore e7+ert)-e &'( ()-+&tc* t*&' c&' be e7+ecte( ro8 t*e e4)-&t/re or t*e co/rt- o /-t)ce. T*)- )- t*e re&-o' or t*e )'cre&-)'4 e-t/re o /&-):e4)-&t)e &'( /&-):/()c)& +oer- )' *&t )- 'o 'ot /'re&-o'&b c&e( t*e o/rt* (e+&rt8e't o t*e 4oer'8e't. !t&t/te- co'err)'4 +oer- o' t*e)r &(8)')-tr&t)e &4e'c)e- 8/-t be )ber& co'-tr/e( to e'&be t*e8 to ()-c*&r4e t*e)r &--)4'e( (/t)e- )'
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HERNANDEZ, LICSI, MARQUEDA, UY ADMIN LAW UNDER ATTY. GALLANT SORIANO &ccor(&'ce )t* t*e e4)-&t)e +/r+o-e. ollowing this policy in *ntipolo Realty Corp. v. N5*, the Court sustained the competence of the respondent administrative body, in the e&ercise of the e&clusive jurisdiction vested in it by #2 No. !+; and #2 No. $E@@, to determine the rights of the parties under a contract to sell a subdivision lot. "R#!T#AN GENERAL A!!EMBL%, #N". -. !+o/-e- #4'&c)o G.R. No. 16?=>9. A/4/-t 2=, 2009 $A"T!
Christian 0eneral *ssembly, =nc. 7 C.8entered into a Contract to ell a subdivision lot with the respondents spouses =gnacio the registered owners and developers of a housing subdivision )nown as Villa $riscilla +ubdivision% ?nder the Contract to ell, the parties mutually agreed to e&tend the payment period from three to five years on installment basis. *ccording to C0*, it religiously paid the monthly installments until its administrative pastor discovered that the title covering the subject property suffered from fatal flaws and defects. C0* learned that the subject property was actually part of two consolidated lots that spouses =gnacio had ac'uired from .driano and +ison, the former tenant(beneficiaries /"#erial whose property had been placed under $! No. %;Is 6peration Land Transfer. *ccording to C0*, =mperial applied for the retention of five hectares of her land under R* No. ::+;, which the !.R granted authoriDing =mperial to retain the farm lots previously awarded to the tenant(beneficiaries, including lot in 'uestion. *fter discovering these circumstances, C0* filed a complaint against the respondents before the RTC claiming that that spouses =gnacio fraudulently concealed the fact that the subject property was part of a property under litigation thus, the Contract to ell was a rescissible contract. =nstead of filing an answer, the respondents filed a motion to dismiss asserting that the RTC had no jurisdiction over the case. Citing #2 No. !+; and #2 No. $E@@, the respondents claimed that the case falls within the
e&clusive jurisdiction of the 5L?R since it involved the sale of a subdivision lot. The RTC denied the motion to dismiss stating that the action for rescission of contract and damages due to the respondentsI fraudulent misrepresentation that they are the rightful owners of the subject property that is free from all liens and encumbrances is outside the 5L?RIs jurisdiction. The C*, on the other hand, ruled in favor of the spouses =gnacio holding that 5L?R had e&clusive jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint since it involved a contract to sell a subdivision lot based on the provisions of #2 No. !+; and #2 No. $E@@. #!!UE hich of the twoJthe regular court or the 5L?RJhas e&clusive jurisdiction over C0*Is action for rescissionK RUL#NG LURB *&- e7c/-)e /r)-()ct)o' oer t*e c&-e. #2 No. !+; was intended to closely supervise and regulate the real estate subdivision and condominium businesses in order to curb the growing number of swindling and fraudulent manipulations perpetrated by unscrupulous subdivision and condominium sellers and operators. ection E of #2 No. !+; granted the National 5ousing *uthority 7 N*.8 the Fe&clusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business.G Thereafter, #2 No. $E@@ was issued to e&pand the jurisdiction of the N5* which includes to hear and decide cases of the following nature-
*.
?nsound real estate business practices>
. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, bro)er or salesman> and C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, bro)er or salesman.
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HERNANDEZ, LICSI, MARQUEDA, UY ADMIN LAW UNDER ATTY. GALLANT SORIANO
Thereafter, 0O 1(2 transferred the regulatory and 'uasi(judicial functions of the N5* to the 5uman ettlements Regulatory Commission 7 *+RC 8. #ursuant to 0O !9, the 5RC was renamed as the 5L?R. The surge in the real estate business in the country brought with it an increasing number of cases between subdivision ownersdevelopers and lot buyers on the issue of the e&tent of the 5L?RIs e&clusive jurisdiction. =n the cases that reached us, we have consistently ruled that the 5L?R has e&clusive jurisdiction over complaints arising from contracts between the subdivision developer and the lot buyer or those aimed atcompelling the subdivision developer to comply with its contractual and statutory obligations to ma)e thesubdivision a better place to live in. Rationale for HLURB’s extensive quasi-judicial poers! The e&tent to which the 5L?R has been vested with 'uasi(judicial authority must also be determined by referring to the terms of #.2. No. !+;, FThe ubdivision *nd Condominium uyersI #rotective 2ecree.G ection E of this statute provides- & & & National 5ousing *uthority now 5L?RM.J The National 5ousing *uthority shall have e&clusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business in accordance with the provisions of this 2ecree. The provisions of #2 !+; were intended to encompass all 'uestions regarding subdivisions and condominiums. The intention was aimed at providing for an appropriate government agency, the 5L?R, to which all parties aggrieved in the implementation of provisions and the enforcement of contractual rights with respect to said category of real estate may ta)e recourse. The business of developing subdivisions and corporations being imbued with public interest and welfare, any 'uestion arising from the e&ercise of that prerogative should be brought to the 5L?R which has the technical )now(how on the matter. =n the e&ercise of its powers, the 5L?R must commonly interpret and apply contracts and determine the rights of private parties under such contracts. This ancillary power is no longer a uni'uely judicial function, e&ercisable only by the regular courts. =n the case of .nti#olo Realty Cor#oration vs% N*., it was held that, in this era of clogged court doc)ets, the need for specialiDed administrative
boards or commissions with the special )nowledge, e&perience and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters or essentially factual matters, subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of discretion, has become well nigh indispensable. Thus, in $!B@, the Court noted that Hbetween the power lodged in an administrative body and a court, the unmista)able trend has been to refer it to the formerI. & & & =n general, the 'uantum of judicial or 'uasi(judicial powers which an administrative agency may e&ercise is defined in the enabling act of such agency. =n other words, the e&tent to which an administrative entity may e&ercise such powers depends largely, if not wholly on the provisions of the statute creating or empowering such agency. =n the e&ercise of such powers, the agency concerned must commonly interpret and apply contracts and determine the rights of private parties under such contracts, one thrust of the multiplication of administrative agencies is that the interpretation of contracts and the determination of private rights thereunder is no longer a uni'uely judicial function, e&ercisable only by our regular courts. The e&pansive grant of jurisdiction to the 5L?R does not mean, however, that all cases involving subdivision lots automatically fall under its jurisdiction. =n Ro3as v% C., the mere relationship between the parties, i%e., that of being subdivision ownerdeveloper and subdivision lot buyer, does not automatically vest jurisdiction in the 5L?R. or an action to fall within the e&clusive jurisdiction of the 5L?R, the decisive element is the nature of the action as enumerated in ection $ of #.2. $E@@. 6n this matter, we have consistently held that the concerned administrative agency, the N5* before and now the 5L?R, has jurisdiction over complaints aimed at compelling the subdivision developer to comply with its contractual and statutory obligations. & & & Note particularly pars. 7b8 and 7c8 as worded, where the 5L?RIs jurisdiction concerns cases commenced by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyers. *s to par. 7a8, concerning Funsound real estate practices,G it would appear that the logical complainant would be the buyers and customers against the sellers 7subdivision owners and developers or condominium builders and realtors8, and not vice versa%
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HERNANDEZ, LICSI, MARQUEDA, UY ADMIN LAW UNDER ATTY. GALLANT SORIANO
#ursuant to Ro3as, in $ilar !evelo#"ent Cor#oration v% Villar and +untay v% ocolay, 5L?R has no jurisdiction over cases filed by subdivision or condominium owners or developers against subdivision lot or condominium unit buyers or owners. The rationale behind this can be found in the wordings of ection $, #2 No. $E@@, which e&pressly 'ualifies that the cases cogniDable by the 5L?R are those instituted by subdivision or condomium buyers or owners against the project developer or owner . This is also in )eeping with the policy of the law, which is to curb unscrupulous practices in the real estate trade and business.
powers provided for in #2 !+;, N5* shall have e&clusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature- & & & . Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, bro)er or salesman.
=n the cases of 4ajardo 5r% v% 4reedo" to uild, /nc% and Cadi"as v% Carrion, the RTCIs jurisdiction was upheld even if the subject matter was a subdivision lot since it was the subdivision developer who filed the action against the buyer for violation of the contract to sell. The only instance that 5L?R may ta)e cogniDance of a case filed by the developer is when said case is instituted as a compulsory counterclaim to a pending case filed against it by the buyer or owner of a subdivision lot or condominium unit.
DO"TR#NE The rule is that the findings of fact of administrative bodies, if based on substantial evidence, are controlling on the reviewing authority. =t is settled that it is not for the appellate court to substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency on the sufficiency of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses. *dministrative decisions on matters within their jurisdiction are entitled to respect and can only be set aside on proof of grave abuse of discretion, fraud or error of law.
6bviously, where it is not clear from the allegations in the complaint that the property involved is a subdivision lot, the case falls under the jurisdiction of the regular courts and not the 5L?R. imilarly, the RTC had jurisdiction over a case where the conflict involved a subdivision lot buyer and a party who owned a number of subdivision lots but was not himself the subdivision developer. rom these allegations, the main thrust of the C0* complaint is clear Jto compel the respondents to refund the payments already made for the subject property because the respondents were selling a property that they apparently did not own. =n other words, C0* claims that since the respondents cannot comply with their obligations under the contract, i%e%, to deliver the property free from all liens and encumbrances, C0* is entitled to rescind the contract and get a refund of the payments already made. This cause of action clearly falls under the actions contemplated by par 7b8, ection $ of #2 No. $E@@, which reads- 3CT=6N $. =n the e&ercise of its functions to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition to its
G.R. No. 106?9> C/'e 2>, 1993 LOL#TA DADUBO, petitioner, vs. "#V#L !ERV#"E "OMM#!!#ON &'( t*e DEVELOPMENT BAN O$ TE P#L#PP#NE!, respondents
The standard of due process that must be met in administrative tribunals allows a certain latitude as long as the element of fairness is not ignored. The constitutional re'uirement to state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which a decision is based applies only to courts of justice and not to administrative bodies. $&ct-
#etitioner, enior *ccounts *nalyst and Rosario Cidro, Cash upervisor, of the 2evelopment an) of the #hilippines were administratively charged with conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service. The charges were based on reports on the unposted withdrawal of #:9,999.99 from a avings *ccount in the name of 3ric Tiu, 3dgar Tiu, andor #ilar Tiu.
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HERNANDEZ, LICSI, MARQUEDA, UY ADMIN LAW UNDER ATTY. GALLANT SORIANO
The formal investigations revealed that 3rlinda 1eloso, authoriDed representative of the Tius, presented an undated withdrawal slip. 2adubo, as acting teller, prepared the corresponding tic)et and voucher in the name of the cash supervisor, Cidro. 2adubo initialed the withdrawal slip, tic)et and voucher and passed on to Cidro all the documents on the said transaction. These were then forwarded to the accountant, 2orado, who signed the voucher ledger card of the Tius4 savings account and forwarded the documents to abaylon, boo))eeper, who was also acting as posting machine operator. *fter posting the amount of #:9,999.99 on the ledger card and passboo), abaylon initialed the withdrawal slip and returned the documents to 2orado, who approved the withdrawal and thereafter disbursed the #:9,999.99 to 1eloso. The Received #ay"ent portion of the withdrawal slip was signed 1eloso but Cidro, who disbursed the amount, failed to initial the passboo). *fter ban)ing hours, another withdrawal slip was presented by eliciano ugtas, Ar., also an employee of the Tius. This was the second #:9,999.99 withdrawal. 1eloso did not )now about it. The withdrawal slip was processed and approved on the same day. The space $osted by was initialed by abaylon but no posting was actually made because the passboo) was not presented. hile the withdrawal slip was dated *ugust $E, $!B;, all other supporting documents were dated *ugust $@, $!B;, this being a withdrawal after ban)ing hours. The following day, prior to the payment of the *5 withdrawal, 1eloso presented another undated withdrawal slip for #:9,999.99. This was the third #:9,999.99 withdrawal. The withdrawal slip was received by 2orado, who handed it to 2adubo. *t that time, Cidro was encashing the chec) at #N to satisfy the *5 withdrawal. hen she returned from the ban), she paid this withdrawal to 1eloso, who thought that what she was collecting was the #:9,999.99 corresponding to the withdrawal slip she presented that morning.
#:9,999.99 withdrawal, 1eloso came bac) and presented another withdrawal slip for #@9,999.99. The petitioner claimed she disbursed #$99,999.99 to 1eloso, covering the third #:9,999.99 and the #@9,999.99 withdrawals. 6n the other hand, 1eloso testified that she received only #@9,999.99 from the petitioner. he ac)nowledged receipt of the amount by signing the withdrawal slip and indicating opposite her signature the amount of #@9,999.99. That left the balance of #:9,999.99 unaccounted for and directly imputable to 2adubo. 6n the basis of these findings, 2# found 2adubo guilty of dishonesty for embeDDlement of ban) funds. he was penaliDed with dismissal from the service. Cidro was adjudged guilty of gross neglect of duty and fined in an amount e'uivalent to one month basic salary, payable through salary deductions in not more than $% installments. 2adubo appealed to the /erit ystems #rotection oard which affirmed the decision of the 2#. 5owever, 2# was reversed by the Civil ervice Commission in its Resolution which reduced 2adubo4s penalty to suspension for si& months on the ground that although 2adubo made alterations on the dates in the Ledger Card from *ugust $E to *ugust $@, the fact remains that the ban) was defrauded on account of said *5 withdrawal 7for8 which Cidro is held responsible and accordingly found guilty of 0ross Neglect of 2uty and =nefficiency and =ncompetence in the #erformance of 6fficial 2uty. =t was also 2adubo who reported on the irreconcilable #:9,999.99. The most that 2adubo could be charged with is willful violation of office regulation when she undertoo) reconciliation for under the an) /anual the tellers are not allowed access to the savings account ledger cards.
hen 2adubo informed Cidro about the third withdrawal, till money of #$99,999.99 was made to service it. #rior to the payment of the third
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HERNANDEZ, LICSI, MARQUEDA, UY ADMIN LAW UNDER ATTY. GALLANT SORIANO
Respondent 2# moved reconsideration. The Commission acting favorably on the motion, promulgated a resolution affirming the earlier findings of the 2# as to 2adubo guilt, thus J The records reveal that 2adubo admitted in her *nswer that she changed entry of the date *ugust $E to $@ in the ledger in the course of her reconciliation which she was advised not to do. This act of admission needs no further elaboration to prove that 2adubo is guilty of the charge. uch admission is however treated as a mitigating circumstance which is offset by the aggravating circumstance of ta)ing advantage of her official position. There is no reason for her to change or alter entries in the ledger unless she intends to benefit therefrom or to conceal some facts.
and the applicable law. The petitioner had admitted that she changed the entry of the dates in the subsidiary ledger card from *ugust $E to $@ in the course of her reconciliation wor) although she was not authoriDed to do this. This admission, along with the other evidence #resented during the investigation in the ban), proved 2adubo4s guilt. /oreover, the affidavit of *lbert allicud was inadmissible in evidence because he was never subjected to cross(e&amination. #--/e @ON t*e ")) !er)ce "o88)--)o'- re-o/t)o' &)e( to co8+ )t* t*e co'-t)t/t)o'& re/)re8e't to -t&te ce&r &'( ()-t)'ct t*e &ct- &'( t*e & o' *)c* t*e (ec)-)o' )- b&-e( e(
urther, it should be noted that the report was made only on eptember %B, $!B; 7the date the report on reconciliation was submitted to the Regional 6ffice8. =t should be emphasiDed as earlier stated that 2adubo was not authoriDed to reconcile the subsidiary ledger cards for the period ending *ugust %9, $!B;. 5ence, as emphatically stated in the /# decision, ". . . respondent 2adubo manipulated the ban) records to conceal the offense which constituted the act of dishonesty."
T*e r/e )- t*&t t*e )'()'4- o &ct o &(8)')-tr&t)e bo()e-, ) b&-e( o' -/b-t&'t)& e)(e'ce, &re co'tro)'4 o' t*e re)e)'4 &/t*or)t. #t )-ette( t*&t )t )- 'ot or t*e &++e&te co/rt to -/b-t)t/te )t- o' /(48e't or t*&t o t*e &(8)')-tr&t)e &4e'c o' t*e -/)c)e'c o t*e e)(e'ce &'( t*e cre()b))t o t*e )t'e--e-. A(8)')-tr&t)e (ec)-)o'- o' 8&tter)t*)' t*e)r /r)-()ct)o' &re e't)te( to re-+ect &'( c&' o' be -et &-)(e o' +roo o 4r&e &b/-e o ()-cret)o', r&/( or error o &. None of these vices has been shown in this case.
2adubo has brought her case to this Court in this petition for certiorari. he claims that the CC Resolution failed to comply with the constitutional re'uirement to state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which the decision is based> CC Resolution No. !%(B;B conflicts with the findings of fact in CC Resolution No. !$(:@%> the Commission manifestly overloo)ed or disregarded certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties> and it based its conclusions entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures.
The petitioner4s invocation of due process is without merit. 5er complaint that she was not sufficiently informed of the charges against her has no basis. hile the rules governing Audicial trials should be observed as much as possible, their strict observance is not indispensable in administrative cases. *s this Court has held, ;t*e -t&'(&r( o (/e +roce-- t*&t 8/-t be 8et )' &(8)')-tr&t)e tr)b/'&- &o- & cert&)' &t)t/(e &- o'4 &- t*e ee8e't o &)r'e-- )- 'ot )4'ore(.;
Re'uired to comment, the olicitor 0eneral argued that CC Resolution No. !%(B;B did not need to restate the legal and factual bases of the original decision in CC(/# No. @!; which already e&plained the relevant facts
The essence of due process is distilled in the immortal cry of Themistocles to 3urybiades- "tri)e, but hear me first" =t simply connotes an opportunity to be heard. The petitioner had several opportunities to be heard and to present
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HERNANDEZ, LICSI, MARQUEDA, UY ADMIN LAW UNDER ATTY. GALLANT SORIANO
evidence that she was not guilty of embeDDlement but only of failure to comply with the tellering procedure. Not only did she testify at her formal investigation but she also filed a motion for reconsideration with the 2#, then appealed to the /erit ystems #rotection oard, and later elevated the case to the Civil ervice Commission. 5aving been given all these opportunities to be heard, which she fully availed of, she cannot now complain that she was denied due process. A++rec)&t)o' o t*e e)(e'ce -/b8)tte( b t*e +&rt)e- &-, to re+e&t, t*e +rero4&t)e o t*e &(8)')-tr&t)e bo(, -/bect to reer-& o' /+o' & ce&r -*o)'4 o &rb)tr&r)'e--. The rejection of the affidavit of allicud, for e&le, was not improper because there was nothing in that document showing that the petitioner did not embeDDle the money.
=t is true that the petitioner was formally charged with conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the ban) and not specifically with embeDDlement. Nevertheless, the allegations and the evidence presented sufficiently proved her guilt of embeDDlement of ban) funds, which in un'uestionably prejudicial to the best interest of the ban). The charge against the respondent in an administrative case need not be drafted with the precision of an information in a criminal prosecution. =t is sufficient that he is apprised of the substance of the charge against him> what is controlling is the allegation of the acts complained of, not the designation of the offense. @e 8/-t &-o ()-8)-- t*e +et)t)o'er- co8+&)'t t*&t "!" Re-o/t)o' No. 92:>=> &)e( to co8+ )t* t*e co'-t)t/t)o'& re/)re8e't to -t&te ce&r &'( ()-t)'ct t*e &ct- &'( t*e & o' *)c* & (ec)-)o' )- b&-e(. @e *&e *e( t*&t t*)- +ro)-)o' &++)e- o' to co/rt- o /-t)ce &'( 'ot to &(8)')-tr&t)e bo()e- li)e the Civil ervice Commission. =n any event, there was an earlier statement of the facts and the law involved in the decision rendered by the /# which affirmed 2#4s decision to dismiss the petitioner. =n both decisions, the facts and the law on which they were based were clearly and distinctly stated.
=t is worth adding that inasmuch as Civil ervice Resolution No. !%(B;B was rendered only to resolve 2#4s motion for reconsideration, it was not really necessary to re(state the factual and legal bases for the said decisions. 3ven resolutions issued by this Court do not need to conform, to the first paragraph of *rticle 1===, ection $@, of the Constitution. L#ANGA BA% LOGG#NG, "O., #N" -. ON. MANUEL LOPEZ ENAGE G.R. No. L:3063=. C/ 16, 19>= $A"T!
The parties herein are both forest concessionaries whose licensed areas are adjacent to each other. The concession of petitioner Lianga ay Logging Corporation Co., =nc. is located in the #rovince of urigao while that of respondent *go Timber Corporation is located in the #rovince of *gusan. =t was a part of a forest area originally licensed to one Narciso Lansang. ince the concessions of petitioner and respondent are adjacent to each other, they have a common boundary J the *gusan(urigao #rovincial boundary. ecause of reports of encroachment by both parties on each other4s concession areas, the 2irector of orestry ordered a survey to establish on the ground the common boundary of their respective concession areas. orester Cipriano /elchor undertoo) the survey and fi&ed the common boundary. Respondent *go protested claiming that "its eastern boundary should be the provincial boundary line of *gusan(urigao as described in ection $ of *rt. $:!E of the #hilippine Commission as indicated in the green pencil in the attached s)etch" of the areas as prepared by the ureau of orestry. The 2irector of orestry ruled in favor of petitioner Lianga stating that the claim of the *go runs counter to the intentions of the ureau of orestry in granting the license of /r. Narciso Lansang and Lianga. *go appealed to the 2epartment of *griculture and Natural Resources 72*NR8 which then ecretary Aose <. eliciano set aside the
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HERNANDEZ, LICSI, MARQUEDA, UY ADMIN LAW UNDER ATTY. GALLANT SORIANO
decision and ruled that the common boundary line of *go and Lianga should be that indicated by the green line on the same s)etch. #etitioner Lianga elevated the case to the 6ffice of the #resident 76#8 wherein *ssistant 3&ecutive ecretary 0ilberto 2uavit reversed the 2*NR decision and reinstated that of the 2irector of orestry. * new action was commenced by *go in the Court of irst =nstance wherein the respondent judge issued a TR6 which enjoined the decision of the 6#. Lianga moved for the dismissal of the complaint stating that the court has no jurisdiction over the public officials and corporation but this was denied by the court.
#!!UE hether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over the case RUL#NG NO. Respondent Audge erred in ta)ing cogniDance of the complaint filed by respondent *go, as)ing for the determination anew of the correct boundary line of its licensed timber area, for the same issue had already been determined by the 2irector of orestry, the ecretary of *griculture and Natural Resources and the 6ffice of the #resident, administrative officials under whose jurisdictions the matter properly belongs. ection $B$: of the Revised *dministrative Code vests in the ureau of orestry, the jurisdiction and authority over the demarcation, protection, management, reproduction, reforestation, occupancy, and use of all public forests and forest reserves and over the granting of licenses for game and fish, and for the ta)ing of forest products, including stone and earth therefrom. The ecretary of *griculture and Natural Resources, as department head, may repeal or modify the decision of the 2irector of orestry when advisable in the public interests, whose decision is in turn appealable to the 6ffice of the #resident.
=n giving due course to the complaint, the respondent court would necessarily have to assess and evaluate anew all the evidence presented in the administrative proceedings, which is beyond its competence and jurisdiction. or the respondent court to consider and weigh again the evidence already
presented and passed upon by said officials would be to allow it to substitute its judgment for that of said officials who are in a better position to consider and weigh the same in the light of the authority specifically vested in them by law. uch a posture cannot be entertained, for it is a well(settled doctrine that the courts of justice will generally not interfere with purely administrative matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies and their e&pertise unless there is a clear showing that the latter acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion or when they have acted in a capricious and whimsical manner such that their action may amount to an e&cess or lac) of jurisdiction. * doctrine long recogniDed is that where the law confines in an administrative office the power to determine particular 'uestions or matters, upon the facts to be presented, the jurisdiction of such office shall prevail over the courts. The general rule, under the principles of administrative law in force in this jurisdiction, is that decisions of administrative officers shall not be disturbed by the courts, e&cept when the former have acted without or in e&cess of their jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. indings of administrative officials and agencies who have ac'uired e&pertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but at times even finality of such findings are supported by substantial evidence. *s recently stressed by the Court, "in this era of clogged court doc)ets, the need for specialiDed administrative boards or commissions with the special )nowledge, e&perience and capability to hear and determine promptly disputes on technical matters or essentially factual matters, subject to judicial review in case of grave abuse of discretion, has become well nigh indispensable." G.R. No. 112=?5 October 16, 199= AFU#L#NO T. LAR#N, petitioner, vs. TE EE"UT#VE !E"RETAR%, ET. AL., respondents. $A"T! * decision was rendered by the andiganbayan convicting herein petitioner, Revenue pecific Ta& 6fficer, then *ssistant Commissioner of the
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HERNANDEZ, LICSI, MARQUEDA, UY ADMIN LAW UNDER ATTY. GALLANT SORIANO
3&cise Ta& 2ivision of the ureau of =nternal Revenue and his co(accused of the crimes of violation of ection %:B 7@8 of the National =nternal Revenue Code and ection E 7e8 of R.*. E9$!. The fact of petitioner4s conviction was reported to the #resident of the #hilippines by the then *cting inance ecretary Leong through a memorandum. The memorandum states, inter alia- F=t is clear from the foregoing that /r. Larin has been found beyond reasonable doubt to have committed acts constituting grave misconduct. ?nder the Civil ervice Laws and Rules which re'uire only preponderance of evidence, grave misconduct is punishable by dismissal.G *cting by authority of the #resident, r. 2eputy 3&ecutive ecretary Ouisumbing issued /emorandum 6rder No. $:@ which provides for the creation of an 3&ecutive Committee to investigate the administrative charge against herein petitioner. Conse'uently, the Committee directed the petitioner to respond to the administrative charge leveled against him through a letter. =n compliance, petitioner submitted a letter which was addressed to *tty. Lagustan, the Chairman of the =nvestigating Committee. =n said latter, he asserts that, the case being sub(judice, he may not, therefore, comment on the merits of the issues involved for fear of being cited in contempt of Court. The position paper is thus limited to furnishing the Committee pertinent documents submitted with the upreme Court and other tribunal which too) cogniDance of the case in the past. =n the same letter, petitioner claims that the administrative complaint against him is already barred- a8 on jurisdictional ground as the 6ffice of the 6mbudsman had already ta)en cogniDance of the case and had caused the filing only of the criminal charges against him, b8 by res judicata, c8 by double jeopardy, and d8 because to proceed with the case would be redundant, oppressive and a plain persecution against him.
/eanwhile, the #resident issued the challenged 3&ecutive 6rder No. $E% which mandates for the streamlining of the ureau of =nternal Revenue. ?nder said order, some positions and functions are either abolished, renamed, decentraliDed or transferred to other offices, while other offices are also created. The 3&cise Ta& ervice or the pecific Ta& ervice, of which petitioner was the *ssistant Commissioner, was one of those offices that was abolished by said e&ecutive order. 6ne day after the promulgation of 3&ecutive 6rder No. $E%, the #resident appointed several =R *ssistant Commissioners. Conse'uently, the #resident, in the assailed *dministrative 6rder No. $9$, found petitioner guilty of grave misconduct in the administrative charge and imposed upon him the penalty of dismissal with forfeiture of his leave credits and retirement benefits including dis'ualification for reappointment in the government service. *ggrieved, petitioner filed directly with this Court the instant petition to 'uestion basically his alleged unlawful removal from office. hile the instant petition is pending, this Court set aside the conviction of petitioner in the Criminal Cases. =n his petition, petitioner challenged the authority of the #resident to dismiss him from office. 5e argued that in so far as presidential appointees who are Career 3&ecutive ervice 6fficers are concerned, the #resident e&ercises only the power of control not the power to remove. 5e also averred that the administrative investigation conducted is void as it violated his right to due process. *ccording to him, the letter of the Committee and his position paper are not sufficient for purposes of complying with the re'uirements of due process. 5e alleged that he was not informed of the administrative charges leveled against him nor was he given official notice of his dismissal.
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HERNANDEZ, LICSI, MARQUEDA, UY ADMIN LAW UNDER ATTY. GALLANT SORIANO
#etitioner li)ewise claimed that he was removed as a result of the reorganiDation made by the 3&ecutive 2epartment in the =R. Thus, he assailed 3&ecutive 6rder No. $E% and its implementing rules for being ultra vires. 5e claimed that there is yet no law enacted by Congress which authoriDes the reorganiDation by the 3&ecutive 2epartment of e&ecutive agencies, particularly the ureau of =nternal Revenue. 5e said that the reorganiDation sought to be effected by the 3&ecutive 2epartment is tainted with bad faith in apparent violation of ection % of R.*. ::+:, otherwise )nown as the *ct #rotecting the ecurity of Tenure of Civil ervice 6fficers and 3mployees in the =mplementation of 0overnment ReorganiDation. 6n the other hand, respondents contended that since petitioner is a presidential appointee, he falls under the disciplining authority of the #resident. They also contended that 3.6. No. $E% and its implementing rules were validly issued pursuant to R* ;:@+. *part from this, the other legal bases of 3.6. No. $E% as stated in its preamble are ection :E of 3.6. No. $%; 7ReorganiDing the /inistry of inance8, and ection %9, oo) === of 3.6. No. %!%, otherwise )nown as the *dministrative Code of $!B;. =n addition, it is clear that in ection $$ of R.*. No. ::+: future reorganiDation is e&pressly contemplated and nothing in said law that prohibits subse'uent reorganiDation through an e&ecutive order. ignificantly, respondents clarified that petitioner was not dismissed by virtue of 36 $E%. Respondents claimed that he was removed from office because he was found guilty of grave misconduct in the administrative cases filed against him. #!!UE 6N petitioner was validly dismissed from office
identified by the Career 3&ecutive ervice oard, are all appointed by the #resident. Concededly, petitioner was appointed as *ssistant Commissioner by then #resident *'uino. Thus, petitioner is a presidential appointee who belongs to career service of the Civil ervice. eing a presidential appointee, he comes under the direct disciplining authority of the #resident. This is in line with the well settled principle that t *e ;+oer to re8oe )- )'*ere't )' t*e +oer to &++o)'t; co'erre( to t*e Pre-)(e't b !ect)o' 16, Art)ce V## o t*e "o'-t)t/t)o'. Thus, it is ineluctably clear that Me8or&'(/8 Or(er No. 16? &- )--/e( +/r-/&'t to t*e +oer o re8o& o t*e Pre-)(e't. T*)- +oer o re8o&, *oeer, )- 'ot &' &b-o/te o'e *)c* &cce+t- 'o re-er&t)o'. =t must be pointed out that petitioner is a career service officer. ?nder the *dministrative Code of $!B;, career service is characteriDed by the e&istence of security of tenure, as contra(distinguished from non(career service whose tenure is co(terminus with that of the appointing authority or subject to his pleasure, or limited to a period specified by law or to the duration of a particular project for which purpose the employment was made. *s a career service officer, petitioner enjoys the right to security of tenure. No less than the $!B; Constitution guarantees the right of security of tenure of the employees of the civil service. pecifically, ection E: of #.2. No. B9;, otherwise )nown as Civil ervice 2ecree of the #hilippines, is emphatic that career service officers and employees who enjoy security of tenure may be removed only for any of the causes enumerated in said law. =n other words, the fact that petitioner is a presidential appointee does not give the appointing authority the license to remove him at will or at his pleasure for it is an admitted fact that he is li)ewise a career service officer who under the law is the recipient of tenurial protection, thus, may only be removed for a cause and in accordance with procedural due process.
ELD
The position of *ssistant Commissioner of the =R is part of the Career 3&ecutive ervice. ?nder the law, Career 3&ecutive ervice officers, namely, ?ndersecretary, *ssistant ecretary, ureau 2irector, *ssistant ureau 2irector, Regional 2irector, *ssistant Regional 2irector, Chief of 2epartment ervice and other officers of e'uivalent ran) as may be
as petitioner then removed from office for a legal cause under a valid proceedingK *lthough the proceedings ta)en complied with the re'uirements of procedural due process, this Court, however, considers that petitioner was not dismissed for a valid cause.
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HERNANDEZ, LICSI, MARQUEDA, UY ADMIN LAW UNDER ATTY. GALLANT SORIANO
=t should be noted that what precipitated the creation of the investigative committee to loo) into the administrative charge against petitioner is his conviction by the andiganbayan. *s admitted by the respondents, the administrative case against petitioner is based on the andiganbayan 2ecision. 5owever, it must be stressed at this juncture that the conviction of petitioner by the andiganbayan was set aside by this Court. e are emphatic in our resolution in said cases that there is nothing "illegal with the acts committed by the petitioner7s8." e also declare that "there is no showing that petitioner7s8 had acted irregularly, or performed acts outside of his 7their8 official functions." ignificantly, these acts which we categorically declare to be not unlawful and improper are the very same acts for which petitioner is held to be administratively responsible. *ny charge of malfeasance or misfeasance on the part of the petitioner is clearly belied by our conclusion in said cases. =n the light of this decisive pronouncement, we see no reason for the administrative charge to continue. e are not unaware of the rule that -)'ce &(8)')-tr&t)e c&-e- &re )'(e+e'(e't ro8 cr)8)'& &ct)o'- or t*e -&8e &ct or o8)--)o', t*e ()-8)--& or &c/)tt& o t*e cr)8)'& c*&r4e (oe- 'ot oreco-e t*e )'-t)t/t)o' o &(8)')-tr&t)e &ct)o' 'or c&rr )t* )t t*e re)e ro8 &(8)')-tr&t)e )&b))t. 5owever, the circumstantial setting of the instant case sets it miles apart from the foregoing rule and placed it well within the e&ception. Corollarily, *ere t*e er b&-)- o t*e &(8)')-tr&t)e c&-e &4&)'-t +et)t)o'er )- *)- co')ct)o' )' t*e cr)8)'& &ct)o' *)c* &- &ter o' -et &-)(e b t*)- "o/rt /+o' & c&te4or)c& &'( ce&r )'()'4 t*&t t*e &ct- or *)c* *e &- &(8)')-tr&t)e *e( )&be &re 'ot /'&/ &'( )rre4/&r, t*e &c/)tt& o t*e +et)t)o'er )' t*e cr)8)'& c&-e 'ece--&r) e't&)- t*e ()-8)--& o t*e &(8)')-tr&t)e &ct)o' &4&)'-t *)8, bec&/-e )' -/c* & c&-e, t*ere )- 'o 8ore b&-)- 'or /-t))&be re&-o' to 8&)'t&)' t*e &(8)')-tr&t)e -/)t.
6n the aspect of procedural due process, suffice it to say that petitioner was given every chance to present his side. The rule is well settled that t*e e--e'ce o (/e +roce-- )' &(8)')-tr&t)e +rocee()'4- )- t*&t & +&rt be &or(e( & re&-o'&be o++ort/')t to be *e&r( &'( to -/b8)t &' e)(e'ce *e 8& *&e )' -/++ort o *)- (ee'-e. The records clearly show that petitioner submitted his letter(response to the administrative charge filed against him. *side from his letter, he also submitted various documents attached as anne&es to his letter, all of which are evidences supporting his defense. #rior to this, he received a letter from the =nvestigation Committee re'uiring him to e&plain his side concerning the charge. Let us now e&amine 3&ecutive 6rder No. $E%. ?nder its preamble, 3.6. No. $E% lays down the legal bases of its issuance, namely- a8 ection @B and :% of R.*. No. ;:@+, b8 ection :E of 3.6. No. $%;, and c8 ection %9, oo) === of 3.6. No. %!%. ection @B of R.*. ;:@+ provides that- Fthe heads of departments, bureaus and offices and agencies are hereby directed to identify their respective activities which are no longer essential in the delivery of public services and which may be scaled do)n, #hased out or abolished , subject to civil service rules and regulations. . . . .ctual scaling do)n, #hasing out or abolition of the activities shall be effected pursuant to Circulars or 6rders issued for the purpose by the 6ffice of the #resident. F aid provision clearly mentions the acts of "scaling down, phasing out and abolition" of offices only and does not cover the creation of offices or transfer of functions. Nevertheless, the act of creating and decentraliDing is included in the subse'uent provision of ection :%, which provides thatF?nless otherwise created by law or directed by the #resident of the #hilippines, no organiDational unit of charges in )ey positions in any department or agency shall be authoriDed in their respective organiDation structures and be funded from appropriations by this *ct.G
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HERNANDEZ, LICSI, MARQUEDA, UY ADMIN LAW UNDER ATTY. GALLANT SORIANO
The foregoing provision evidently shows that the #resident is authoriDed to effect organiDational charges including the creation of offices in the department or agency concerned.
ninety days from the approval of this act within which to implement their respective reorganiDation plans in accordance with the provisions of this *ct.G
*nother legal basis of 3.6. No. $E% is ection %9, oo) === of 3.6. No. %!% which states- F?nless Congress provides otherwise, the #resident shall e&ercise such other #o)ers and functions vested in the $resident )hich are #rovided for under the la)s and which are not specifically enumerated above or which are not delegated by the #resident in accordance with law. 7residual powers8
3&ecutive 6rder No. $%; was part of the $!B; reorganiDation contemplated under said provision. 6bviously, it had become stale by virtue of the e&piration of the ninety day deadline period. =t cannot thus be used as a proper basis for the reorganiDation of the =R. Nevertheless, as shown earlier, there are other legal bases to sustain the authority of the #resident to issue the 'uestioned 3.6. N6. $E%.
This provision spea)s of such other powers vested in the #resident under the law. hat law then which gives him the power to reorganiDeK =t is #2 $;;% which amended #2 $@$:. T*e-e (ecree- e7+re-- 4r&'t t*e Pre-)(e't o t*e P*))++)'e- t*e co't)'/)'4 &/t*or)t to reor4&')e t*e '&t)o'& 4oer'8e't, *)c* )'c/(e- t*e +oer to 4ro/+, co'-o)(&te b/re&/- &'( &4e'c)e-, to &bo)-* o)ce-, to tr&'-er /'ct)o'-, to cre&te &'( c&--) /'ct)o'-, -er)ce- &'( &ct))t)e- &'( to -t&'(&r()e -&&r)e- &'( 8&ter)&-. The validity of these two decrees are un'uestionable. The $!B; Constitution clearly provides that "all laws, decrees, e&ecutive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other e&ecutive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revo)ed." o far, there is yet no law amending or repealing said decrees. ignificantly, the Constitution itself recogniDes future reorganiDations in the government as what is revealed in ection $: of *rticle P1===.
hile the #resident4s power to reorganiDe cannot be denied, this does not mean however that the reorganiDation itself is properly made in accordance with law. ell(settled is the rule that reor4&')&t)o' )- re4&r(e( &- &)( +ro)(e( )t )- +/r-/e( )' 4oo( &)t*. Thus, in !ario vs. 9ison, this Court has had the occasion to clarify that-
5owever, e can not consider 3.6. No. $%; as a legal basis for the reorganiDation of the =R. 3.6. $%; should be related to the second paragraph of ection $$ of Republic *ct No. ::+:. ection $$ provides inter alia- F=n the case of the &627 reorgani8ation of the e&ecutive branch, all departments and agencies which are authoriDed by e&ecutive orders promulgated by the #resident to reorganiDe shall have
*s a general rule, & reor4&')&t)o' )- c&rr)e( o/t )' ;4oo( &)t*; ) )t )- or t*e +/r+o-e o eco'o8 or to 8&
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HERNANDEZ, LICSI, MARQUEDA, UY ADMIN LAW UNDER ATTY. GALLANT SORIANO
The e&istence of any or some of the following circumstances may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the removals made as a result of the reorganiDation, giving rise to a claim for reinstatement or reappointment by an aggrieved partya8 here there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned> b8 here an office is abolished and another performing substantially the same functions is created> c8 here incumbents are replaced by those less 'ualified in terms of status of appointment, performance and merit> d8 here there is a reclassification of offices in the department or agency concerned and the reclassified offices perform substantially the same functions as the original offices> e8 here the removal violates the order of separation provided in ection E hereof. * reading of some of the provisions of the 'uestioned 3.6. No. $E% clearly leads us to an inescapable conclusion that there are circumstances considered as evidences of bad faith in the reorganiDation of the =R. ection $.$.% of said e&ecutive order is a clear illustration of the circumstance mentioned that an office is abolished and another one performing substantially the same function is created. *nother circumstance is the creation of services and divisions in the =R resulting to a significant increase in the number of positions in the said bureau as contemplated in paragraph 7a8 of ection % of R.*. No. ::+:. ?nder ection $.E of 3.6. No. $E%, the =nformation ystems 0roup has two newly created ystems ervices. *side from this, si& new divisions are also
created. ?nder ection $.%.$, three more divisions of the *ssessment ervice are formed. ith these newly created offices, there is no doubt that a significant increase of positions will correspondingly follow. urthermore, it is perceivable that the non(reappointment of the petitioner as *ssistant Commissioner violates ection @ of R.*. No. ::+:. ?nder said provision, officers holding permanent appointments are given preference for appointment to the new positions in the approved staffing pattern comparable to their former positions or in case there are not enough comparable positions to positions ne&t lower in ran). =t is undeniable that petitioner is a career e&ecutive officer who is holding a permanent position. 5ence, he should have been given preference for appointment in the position of *ssistant Commissioner. *s claimed by petitioner, #angilinan who was one of those appointed as *ssistant Commissioner, "is an outsider of sorts to the ureau, not having been an incumbent officer of the ureau at the time of the reorganiDation." e should not lose sight of the second paragraph of ection @ which e&plicitly states that no new employees shall be ta)en in until all permanent officers shall have been appointed for permanent position. DAR#O -. M#!ON $A"T!
Cory *'uino promulgated #roclamation No. E, "23CL*R=N0 * N*T=6N*L #6L=C< T6 =/#L3/3NT T53 R36R/ /*N2*T32 < T53 #36#L3...G, the mandate of the people to Completely reorganiDe the government. =n Aanuary $!B;, she promulgated 36 $%;, "R36R0*N=Q=N0 T53 /=N=TR< 6 =N*NC3". *mong other offices, 3&ecutive 6rder No. $%; provided for the reorganiDation of the ureau of Customs and prescribed a new staffing pattern therefor. =n ebruary $!B;, a brand new constitution was adopted. 6n Aanuary $!BB, incumbent Commissioner of Customs alvador /ison issued a /emorandum, in the nature of "0uidelines on the =mplementation of ReorganiDation 3&ecutive 6rders," prescribing the procedure in personnel placement. =t also provided that by ebruary $!BB, all employees
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covered by 36 $%; and the grace period e&tended to the ureau of Customs by the #resident on reorganiDation shall be- a8 informed of their re( appointment, or b8 offered another position in the same department or agency, or c8 informed of their termination. * total of E!@ officials and employees of the ureau of Customs were given individual notices of separation. They filed appeals with the CC. CC promulgated its ruling for reinstatement of the %;! employees. /ison, filed a motion for reconsideration, which was denied. Commissioner /ison instituted certiorari proceedings. #!!UE 6N ection $: of *rticle P1=== of the $!B; Constitution is a grant of a license upon the 0overnment to remove career public officials it could have validly done under an "automatic"(vacancy(authority and to remove them without rhyme or reason. ELD
N6. The tate can still carry out reorganiDations provided that it is done in good faith. Removal of career officials without cause cannot be done after the passing of the $!B; Constitution. ection $: *rticle P1===, of the $!B; ConstitutionFec. $:. Career civil service employees separated from the service not for cause but as a result of the reorganiDation pursuant to #roclamation No. E dated /arch %+, $!B: and the reorganiDation following the ratification of this Constitution shall be entitled to appropriate separation pay and to retirement and other benefits accruing to them under the laws of general application in force at the time of their separation. =n lieu thereof, at the option of the employees, they may be considered for employment in the 0overnment or in any of its subdivisions, instrumentalities, or agencies, including government(owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries. This provision also applies to career officers whose resignation, tendered in line with the e&isting policy.G
The above is a mere recognition of the right of the 0overnment to reorganiDe its offices, bureaus, and instrumentalities. ?nder ection @, *rticle P1=, of the $!E+ Constitution. Transition periods are characteriDed by provisions for "automatic" vacancies. They are dictated by the need to hasten the passage from the old to the new Constitution free from the "fetters" of due process and security of tenure. ince $!E+, transition periods have been characteriDed by provisions for "automatic" vacancies. e ta)e the silence of the $!B; Constitution on this matter as a restraint upon the 0overnment to dismiss public servants at a moment4s notice. =f the present Charter envisioned an "automatic" vacancy, it should have said so in clearer terms. #lainly the concern of ection $: is to ensure compensation for "victims" of constitutional revamps ( whether under the reedom or e&isting Constitution ( and only secondarily and impliedly, to allow reorganiDation. The canon for the removal or suspension of a civil service officer or employee is that it must be 6R C*?3. That means "a guarantee of both procedural and substantive due process. asically, procedural due process would re'uire that suspension or dismissal come only after notice and hearing. ubstantive due process would re'uire that suspension or dismissal be 4for cause4. The right granted by 36 $; to an employee to be informed of the ground for his separation must be deemed to have been revo)ed by the repealing clause of 36 $%; 7ection :;8 providing that "all laws, ordinances or parts thereof, which are inconsistent with this 3&ecutive 6rder, are hereby repealed and modified accordingly. BULOD NANG A@AN#NG E##B -. ZAMOR A $A"T!
The 3conomic =ntelligence and =nvestigation ureau 73==8 of the /inistry of inance was created on Aune E9, $!B; by 36 $%; 6n Aanuary ;, %999 then #resident Aoseph 3strada issued 36 $!$deactivating the 3==. =ts function was transferred to the newly created Tas) orce *duana which utiliDed the personnel, facilities and resources of e&isting departments, agencies and
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bureaus. Thus, no new employees were hired. =ts personnel came from other agencies and detailed with the Tas) orce. 6n /arch %!, %999, 36 %%E was issued separating all 3== personnel from the service effective *pril E9, %999. *ggrieved, petitioners, employees of the 3==, without e&hausting administrative remedies and the hierarchy of courts, resorted to this recourse challenging 3&ecutive 6rders Nos. $!$ and %%E as violative of their right to security of tenure and usurpation by the #resident of the power of Congress to abolish public office.
e that as it may, deactivation and abolition are both reorganiDation measures.
#rocedural flaws li)e the disregard of hierarchy of courts and non(e&haustion of administrative remedies may be ignored where the demands of public interest re'uires it as where the status and e&istence of public office is in issue.
#resident Aoseph 3strada 36 No. %!, entitled "/andating the treamlining of the National Tobacco *dministration 7NT*8," a government agency under the 2epartment of *griculture. The order was followed by 36 No. E:, amending 36 No. %!, insofar as the new staffing pattern was concerned, by increasing from @99 to not e&ceeding ;+9 the positions affected thereby. =n compliance therewith, the NT* prepared and adopted a new 6rganiDation tructure and taffing #attern 76#8 which was approved by the 2epartment of udget /anagement 72/8.
#!!UE 6N the president can reorganiDe the e&ecutive department. ELD <3. The general rule is that the power to create and abolish a public office lies with the Legislature. 5owever, the #resident by virtue of ection E$, oo) === of 36 %!% 7*dministrative Code of $!B;8 ection @B of R* ;:@+ ection %9, oo) === of 36 %!% and ection ;B of R*B;:9 may abolish, in good faith, bureaus, agencies or offices. =n this jurisdiction, reorganiDations have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good faith. ReorganiDation is carried out in 4good faith4 if it is for the purpose of economy or to ma)e bureaucracy more efficient.
DR#AN#TA BAGAO#!AN ADM#N#!TRAT#ON NTAH
-.
NAT#ONAL
TOBA""O
G.R. No. 152>?5. A/4/-t 5, 2003 $A"T!
5ence, where an office is abolished to achieve the ultimate purpose of economy, as in the case at bar, the same is made in good faith.
The petitioners ran) and file employees of NT* atac appealed with the Civil ervice Commission and sought its assistance in recalling the 6#. Thereafter, the petitioners received individual notices of termination of their employment with the NT*. #etitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, with prayer for preliminary mandatory injunction andor temporary restraining order with the RTC to declare the notice of termination and reorganiDation as null and void. The RTC then ordered the NT* to appoint petitioners in the new 6# to positions similar or comparable to their respective former assignments.
*lso, there e&ists a distinction between the words "deactivate" and "abolish." To "deactivate" means to render inactive or ineffective or to brea) up by discharging or reassigning personnel, while to "abolish" means to do away with, to annul, abrogate or destroy completely. =n essence, abolition denotes an intention to do away with the office wholly and permanently. Thus, while in abolition, the office ceases to e&ist, the same is not true in deactivation where the office continues to e&ist, albeit remaining dormant or inoperative.
The NT* appealed to the C* which reversed the RTCIs decision. The petitioners assail the the decision of the C* contending that respondent NT* was not guilty of bad faith in the termination of the services of petitioners and erred in upholding 3&ecutive 6rder Nos. %! and E: of the 6ffice of the #resident which are mere administrative issuances which do not have the force and effect of a law to warrant abolition of positions andor effecting total reorganiDation. #etitioners submitted a "/otion to *dmit #etition or
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3n anc Resolution" of the case allegedly to address a basic 'uestion, i.e., "the legal and constitutional issue on whether the NT* may be reorganiDed by an e&ecutive fiat, not by legislative action."
authority to evaluate each and every government agency, including the determination of the most economical and efficient staffing pattern, under the 3&ecutive 2epartment.
#!!UE hether or not the #resident, through the issuance of an e&ecutive order, can validly carry out the reorganiDation of the NT*
=n the recent case of Rosa Ligaya C. 2omingo, et al. vs. 5on. Ronaldo 2. Qamora, in his capacity as the 3&ecutive ecretary, et al., this Court has had occasion to also delve on the #resident4s power to reorganiDe the 6ffice of the #resident under ection E$7%8 and 7E8 of 3&ecutive 6rder No. %!% and the power to reorganiDe the 6ffice of the #resident #roper. The Court has there observed-
RUL#NG %E!. =n the case of u)lod ng awaning 3== vs. Qamora, the court ruled that the #resident, based on e&isting laws, had the authority to carry out a reorganiDation in any branch or agency of the e&ecutive department. The general rule has always been that the power to abolish a public office is lodged with the legislature. This proceeds from the legal precept that the power to create includes the power to destroy. * public office is either created by the Constitution, by statute, or by authority of law. Thus, e&cept where the office was created by the Constitution itself, it may be abolished by the same legislature that brought it into e&istence. The e&ception, however, is that as far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the e&ecutive department are concerned, the #resident4s power of control may justify him to inactivate the functions of a particular office, or certain laws may grant him the broad authority to carry out reorganiDation measures.
=t is important to emphasiDe that the 'uestioned 3&ecutive 6rders No. %! and No. E: have not abolished the National Tobacco *dministration but merely mandated its reorganiDation through the streamlining or reduction of its personnel. *rticle 1==, ection $;, of the Constitution, e&pressly grants the #resident control of all e&ecutive departments, bureaus, agencies and offices which may justify an e&ecutive action to inactivate the functions of a particular office or to carry out reorganiDation measures under a broad authority of law. ection ;B of the 0eneral #rovisions of Republic *ct No. B+%% 70eneral *ppropriations *ct of < $!!B8 has decreed that the #resident may direct changes in the organiDation and )ey positions in any department, bureau or agency pursuant to *rticle 1=, ection %+, of the Constitution, which grants to the 3&ecutive 2epartment the authority to recommend the budget necessary for its operation. 3vidently, this grant of power includes the
". . . ?nder ection E$7$8 of 36 %!%, the #resident can reorganiDe the 6ffice of the #resident #roper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units, or by transferring functions from one unit to another. =n contrast, under ection E$7%8 and 7E8 of 36 %!%, the #resident4s power to reorganiDe offices outside the 6ffice of the #resident #roper but still within the 6ffice of the #resident is limited to merely transferring functions or agencies from the 6ffice of the #resident to 2epartments or *gencies, and vice versa." The provisions of ection E$, oo) ===, Chapter $9, of 3&ecutive 6rder No. %!% 7*dministrative Code of $!B;8, above(referred to, reads thusly"3C. E$. Continuing *uthority of the #resident to ReorganiDe his 6ffice. J The #resident, subject to the policy in the 3&ecutive 6ffice and in order to achieve simplicity, economy and efficiency, shall have continuing authority to reorganiDe the administrative structure of the 6ffice of the #resident. or this purpose, he may ta)e any of the following actions"7$8 Restructure the internal organiDation of the 6ffice of the #resident #roper, including the immediate 6ffices, the #residential pecial *ssistants*dvisers ystem and the Common taff upport ystem, by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another>
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HERNANDEZ, LICSI, MARQUEDA, UY ADMIN LAW UNDER ATTY. GALLANT SORIANO
"7%8 Transfer any function under the 6ffice of the #resident to any other 2epartment or *gency as well as transfer functions to the 6ffice of the #resident from other 2epartments and *gencies> and "7E8 Transfer any agency under the 6ffice of the #resident to any other department or agency as well as transfer agencies to the 6ffice of the #resident from other departments and agencies." The first sentence of the law is an e&press grant to the #resident of a continuing authority to reorganiDe the administrative structure of the 6ffice of the #resident. The succeeding numbered paragraphs are not in the nature of provisos that unduly limit the aim and scope of the grant to the #resident of the power to reorganiDe but are to be viewed in consonance therewith. ection E$7$8 of 3&ecutive 6rder No. %!% specifically refers to the #resident4s power to restructure the internal organiDation of the 6ffice of the #resident #roper, by abolishing, consolidating or merging units hereof or transferring functions from one unit to another, while ection E$7%8 and 7E8 concern e&ecutive offices outside the 6ffice of the #resident #roper allowing the #resident to transfer any function under the 6ffice of the #resident to any other 2epartment or *gency and vice(versa, and the transfer of any agency under the 6ffice of the #resident to any other department or agency and vice( versa. =n the present instance, involving neither an abolition nor transfer of offices, the assailed action is a mere reorganiDation under the general provisions of the law consisting mainly of streamlining the NT* in the interest of simplicity, economy and efficiency. =t is an act well within the authority of #resident motivated and carried out, according to the findings of the appellate court, in good faith, a factual assessment that this Court could only but accept. G.R. No. 1?22>3 $ebr/&r 6, 2003 RO!A L#GA%A ". DOM#NGO, ET.AL., petitioners, vs. ZAMORA, ET. AL., res#ondents.
$A"T!
ormer #resident 3strada issued 3&ecutive 6rder No. B$ entitled "Transferring the ports #rograms and *ctivities of the 2epartment of 3ducation, Culture and ports to the #hilippine ports Commission and 2efining the Role of 23C in chool(ased ports." #ursuant to 36 B$, former 23C ecretary *ndrew 0onDales issued a /emorandum which temporarily reassigned, in the e&igency of the service, all remaining #3 7ureau of #hysical 3ducation and chool ports8 taff to other divisions or bureaus of the 23C. ecretary 0onDales issued another /emorandum reassigning the #3 staff named in the /emorandum to various offices within the 23C. #etitioners were among the #3 personnel affected by /emorandum. 2issatisfied with their reassignment, petitioners filed the instant petition. =n their #etition, petitioners argue that 36 B$ is void and unconstitutional for being an undue legislation by #resident 3strada. #etitioners maintain that the #residentIs issuance of 36 B$ violated the principle of separation of powers. #etitioners also challenge the 23C /emoranda for violating their right to security of tenure. #etitioners see) to nullify 36 B$ and the 23C /emoranda. #etitioners pray that this Court prohibit the #C from performing functions related to school sports development and that, upon filing of the petition, this Court issue TR6 against respondents to desist from implementing 36 B$. 2uring the pendency of the case, Republic *ct No. !$++ otherwise )nown as the "0overnance of asic 3ducation *ct of %99$", was enacted which e&pressly abolished the #3 and transferred the functions, programs and activities of the 23C relating to sports competition to the #C. #!!UE 6N 36 B$ and the 23C /emoranda are valid
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HERNANDEZ, LICSI, MARQUEDA, UY ADMIN LAW UNDER ATTY. GALLANT SORIANO ELD
e dismiss this petition for being moot and academic. The subse'uent enactment of R* !$++ has rendered the issues in the present case moot and academic. ince R* !$++ abolished the #3 and transferred the 23CI functions relating to sports competition to the #C, petitioners now admit that "it is no longer plausible to raise any ultra vires assumption by the #C of the functions of the #3." /oreover, since R* !$++ provides that #3 personnel not transferred to the #C shall be retained by the 23C, petitioners now accept that "the law e&plicitly protects and preserves" their right to security of tenure. *lthough the issue is already academic, its significance constrains the Court to point out that E7ec/t)e Or(er No. 292 e7+re-- 4r&'t- t*e Pre-)(e't co't)'/)'4 &/t*or)t to reor4&')e t*e O)ce o t*e Pre-)(e't. ection E$ of 36 %!% provides- 733 C62*L8 ince 36 B$ is based on the #residentIs continuing authority under ection E$ 7%8 and 7E8 of 36 %!%, 36 B$ is a valid e&ercise of the #residentIs delegated power to reorganiDe the 6ffice of the #resident. T*e & 4r&'tt*e Pre-)(e't t*)- +oer )' reco4')t)o' o t*e rec/rr)'4 'ee( o eer Pre-)(e't to reor4&')e *)- o)ce ;to &c*)ee -)8+)c)t, eco'o8 &'( e)c)e'c.; The 6ffice of the #resident is the nerve center of the 3&ecutive ranch. To remain effective and efficient, the 6ffice of the #resident must be capable of being shaped and reshaped by the #resident in the manner he deems fit to carry out his directives and policies. *fter all, the 6ffice of the #resident is the command post of the #resident. This is the rationale behind the #residentIs continuing authority to reorganiDe the administrative structure of the 6ffice of the #resident. ?nder 36 %!%, the 23C is indisputably a 2epartment of the 3&ecutive ranch. 3ven if the 23C is not part of the 6ffice of the #resident, 36 %!% clearly authoriDes the #resident to transfer any function or agency of the
23C to the 6ffice of the #resident. ?nder its charter, the #C is attached to the 6ffice of the #resident. Therefore, the #resident has the authority to transfer the "functions, programs and activities of 23C related to sports development" to the #C, ma)ing 36 B$ a valid presidential issuance. 5owever, t*e Pre-)(e't- +oer to reor4&')e t*e O)ce o t*e Pre-)(e't /'(er EO 292 -*o/( be ()-t)'4/)-*e( ro8 *)- +oer to reor4&')e t*e O)ce o t*e Pre-)(e't Pro+er. U'(er !ect)o' 31 1H o EO 292, t*e Pre-)(e't c&' reor4&')e t*e O)ce o t*e Pre-)(e't Pro+er b &bo)-*)'4, co'-o)(&t)'4 or 8er4)'4 /')t-, or b tr&'-err)'4 /'ct)o'ro8 o'e /')t to &'ot*er. #' co'tr&-t, /'(er !ect)o' 31 2H &'( 3H o EO 292, t*e Pre-)(e't- +oer to reor4&')e o)ce- o/t-)(e t*e O)ce o t*e Pre-)(e't Pro+er b/t -t) )t*)' t*e O)ce o t*e Pre-)(e't )- )8)te( to 8ere tr&'-err)'4 /'ct)o'- or &4e'c)e- ro8 t*e O)ce o t*e Pre-)(e't to De+&rt8e't- or A4e'c)e-, &'( )ce er-&. This distinction is crucial as it affects the security of tenure of employees. The abolition of an office in good faith necessarily results in the employeeIs cessation in office, but in such event there is no dismissal or separation because the office itself ceases to e&ist. 6n the other hand, the transfer of functions or agencies does not result in the employeeIs cessation in office because his office continues to e&ist although in another department, agency or office. =n the instant case, the #3 employees who were not transferred to #C were at first temporarily, then later permanently reassigned to other offices of the 23C, ensuring their continued employment. *t any rate, R* !$++ now mandates that these employees "shall be retained by the 2epartment." MAAT# !TO" E"ANGE -. !E" GR No. L:2300? C/'e 30, 1965 $A"T!
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HERNANDEZ, LICSI, MARQUEDA, UY ADMIN LAW UNDER ATTY. GALLANT SORIANO
/a)ati toc) 3&change was not able to register and operate as a toc) e&change company when its registration was denied by the 3C because it objected to the re'uirement of the 3C regarding "2ouble Listing( this is one wherein a new stoc) e&change company is not permitted to list for trading on its board, securities already listed in another toc) 3&change." /3 li)ewise contended that 3C has no power to impose such re'uirement. ut the 3C contends that it merely acted "in the public interest" because operation of two or more e&changes adversely affect the public interest. ?nder the law, no stoc) e&change may do business in the #hilippines unless it is previously registered with the Commission by filing a statement containing the information described in sec. $; of the ecurities act 7Commonwealth *ct BE, as amended8. =t is assumed that the Commission may permit registration if the section is complied with> if not, it may refuse. *nd there is now no 'uestion that the section has been complied with, or would be complied with, e&cept that the /a)ati toc) 3&change, upon challenging this particular re'uirement of the Commission 7rule against double listing8 may be deemed to have shown inability or refusal to abide by its rules, and thereby to have given ground for denying registration. #!!UE 6N the 3C has the power to promulgate rules ELD
None. =t is fundamental that an administrative officer has only such powers as are e&pressly granted to him by the statute, and these necessarily implied in the e&ercise thereof. *ccording to many court precedents, the general power to "regulate" which the Commission has 7ec. EE8 does not imply authority to prohibit. The Legislature has specified the conditions under which a stoc) e&change may legally obtain a permit 7sec. $;, ecurities *ct8> it is not for the Commission to impose others. =f the e&istence of two competing e&changes jeopardiDes public interest J which is doubtful J let the Congress spea). ?ndoubtedly, the opinion and recommendations of the Commission will be given weight by the Legislature, in judging whether or not to restrict individual enterprises and business opportunities. ut until otherwise
directed by law, the operation of e&changes should not be so regulated as practically to create a monopoly b y preventing the establishment of other stoc) e&changes, and thereby contravening. TAULE -. !E"RETAR% LU#! !ANTO! GR No. 90336 A/4. 12, 1991 $A"T!
6n Aune $B, $!B!, the ederation of *ssociations of arangay Councils 7*C8 of Catanduanes, composed of eleven 7$$8 members, in their capacities as #residents of the *ssociation of arangay Councils in their respective municipalities, convened in 1irac, Catanduanes with si& members in attendance for the purpose of holding the election of its officers. hen the group decided to hold the election despite the absence of five 7+8 of its members, the #rovincial Treasurer and the #rovincial 3lection upervisor wal)ed out. The election nevertheless proceeded and the result was #resident ( Ruperto Taule> 1ice(#resident ( *llan *'uino> ecretary ( 1icente *vila> Treasurer ( idel Aacob> *uditor (Leo ales. 6n Aune $!, $!B!, respondent Leandro =. 1erceles, 0overnor of Catanduanes, sent a letter to respondent Luis T. antos, the ecretary of Local 0overnment, protesting the election of the officers of the *C and see)ing its nullification in view of several flagrant irregularities in the manner it was conducted. =n compliance with the order of respondent ecretary, petitioner Ruperto Taule as #resident of the *C, filed his comment on the letter( protest of respondent 0overnor denying the alleged irregularities and denouncing said respondent 0overnor for meddling or intervening in the election of *C officers which is a purely non(partisan affair and at the same time re'uesting for his appointment as a member of the angguniang #anlalawigan of the province being the duly elected #resident of the *C in Catanduanes. 6n *ugust @, $!B!, respondent ecretary issued a resolution nullifying the election of the officers of the *C in Catanduanes held on Aune $B, $!B! and ordering a new one to be conducted as early as possible to
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HERNANDEZ, LICSI, MARQUEDA, UY ADMIN LAW UNDER ATTY. GALLANT SORIANO
be presided by the Regional 2irector of Region 1 of the 2epartment of Local 0overnment. #!!UE- 6N the ecretary of 2=L0 has jurisdiction over the election protestK ELD-
No. The ecretary of Local 0overnment has no jurisdiction to entertain any protest involving the election of officers of the *C. 5e is only vested with the power to promulgate rules and regulations and to e&ercise general supervision over the local government as provided in the Local 0overnment Code and in the *dministrative Code. =t is the e&clusive original jurisdiction of the inferior to hear election protest and the C6/3L3C have the appellate jurisdiction over it. The jurisdiction of the C6/3L3C does not cover protests over the organiDational set(up of the )atipunan ng mga barangay composed of popularly elected punong barangays as prescribed by law whose officers are voted upon by their respective members. The authority of the C6/3L3C over the )atipunan ng mga barangay is limited by law to supervision of the election of the representative of the )atipunan concerned to the sanggunian in a particular level conducted by their own respective organiDation. !OL#D OME!, #N". -. TERE!#TA PA%A@AL &'( "A G.R. No. >?>11. A/4/-t 29, 19>9 $A"T!
Teresita #ayawal filed a case against olid 5omes before the RTC alleging that the latter contracted to sell to her a subdivision lot in /ari)ina. *s #ayawal had already paid the monthly installments and interests, olid 5omes subse'uently e&ecuted a deed of sale over the land but failed to deliver the corresponding certificate of title despite her repeated demands because olid 5omes had mortgaged the property in bad faith to a financing company.
olid 5omes moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that the court had no jurisdiction, this being vested in the National 5ousing *uthority under #2 No. !+;. 5owever, the motion was denied. Thereafter, the trial court ruled in favor of #ayawal ordering olid 5omes to deliver the title to the land or to refund the money. olid 5omes appealed to the C* but the latter affirmed the decision of the trial court holding that the trial court had jurisdiction under ection @$ of #2 No. !+;. #!!UE hether or not the trial court has jurisdiction over the case RUL#NG NO. The applicable law is #2 No. !+;, as amended by #2 No. $E@@, entitled "3mpowering the National 5ousing *uthority to =ssue rits of 3&ecution in the 3nforcement of =ts 2ecisions ?nder #residential 2ecree No. !:;." ection $ of the latter decree provides as follows-
3CT=6N $. =n the e&ercise of its function to regulate the real estate trade and business and in addition to its powers provided for in #residential 2ecree No. !+;, the National 5ousing *uthority shall have e&clusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of the following nature*.
?nsound real estate business practices>
. Claims involving refund and any other claims filed by subdivision lot or condominium unit buyer against the project owner, developer, dealer, bro)er or salesman> an C. Cases involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lot or condominium unit against the owner, developer, dealer, bro)er or salesman. The language of this section leaves no room for doubt that "e&clusive jurisdiction" over the case between the petitioner and the private respondent
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HERNANDEZ, LICSI, MARQUEDA, UY ADMIN LAW UNDER ATTY. GALLANT SORIANO
is vested not in the Regional Trial Court but in the National 5ousing *uthority.
=t is obvious that the general law in this case is # No. $%! and #2 No. $E@@ the special law.
The private respondent contends that the applicable law # No. $%!, which confers on regional trial courts jurisdiction to hear and decide cases mentioned in its ection $!. =t stresses, additionally, that # No. $%! should control as the later enactment, having been promulgated in $!B$, after #2 No. !+; was issued in $!;+ and #2 No. $E@@ in $!;B.
The circumstance that the special law is passed before or after the general act does not change the principle. here the special law is later, it will be regarded as an e&ception to, or a 'ualification of, the prior general act> and where the general act is later, the special statute will be construed as remaining an e&ception to its terms, unless repealed e&pressly or by necessary implication.
d =n case of conflict between a general law and a special law, the latter must prevail regardless of the dates of their enactment. Thus, it has been held that J The fact that one law is special and the other general creates a presumption that the special act is to be considered as remaining an e&ception of the general act, one as a general law of the land and the other as the law of the particular case.
tatutes conferring powers on their administrative agencies must be liberally construed to enable them to discharge their assigned duties in accordance with the legislative purpose. ollowing this policy in *ntipolo Realty Corporation v. National 5ousing *uthority, the Court sustained the competence of the respondent administrative body, in the e&ercise of the e&clusive jurisdiction vested in it by #2 No. !+; and #2 No. $E@@, to determine the rights of the parties under a contract to sell a subdivision lot.
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