Cudia vs pma
Issue: Does the power of the Commission on Human Rights to investigate include the power to adjudicate?
Ruling: The findings of fact and the conclusions of law of the CHR are merely recommendatory and, therefore, not binding to this Court. The reason is that the CHR’s constitutional mandate extends only to the investigation of all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. 224 As held in Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights 225 and a number of subsequent cases,226 the CHR is only a fact-finding body, not a court of justice or a quasi-judicial agency. It is not empowered to a djudicate claims on the merits or settle actual case or controversies. The power to investigate is not the same as adjudication:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary adjudication:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact-finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be provided by law . This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have. x
x
x
x
[i]t cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the popular or the technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings. "Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of
“investigate” is "to observe or study closely: inquire into systematically: "to search or inquire into: x x x to subject to an official probe x x x: to conduct an official inquiry;" The purpose of investigation, of course, is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry.
The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition; examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" "to inquire; to make an investigation," investigation," "investigation" being in turn described as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L Sec. 257; x x x an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or matters." " Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: xx to pass judgment on: settle judicially: x x x act as judge." And "adjudge" means "to decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: xx to award or grant judicially in a case of controversy x x x." In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. x x x Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment."
SPCMB vs. AMLC, G.R. No. 216914, Dec. 6, 2016
Mangune vs. Ermita, G.R. No. 182604, September 27, 2016
Issue: Is AMLC an administrative body with quasi-judicial powers?
Issue: Is E.O. No. 567 constitutional? Ruling: E.O. No. 567 is constitutional. E.O. No. 567 is within the constitutional power of the President to issue. The President may, by executive or administrative order, direct the reorganization of government entities under the executive department. This is sanctioned under the Constitution, as well as other statutes
Ruling: In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves: (a) taking and evaluation of evidence; (b) determining facts based upon the evidence presented; and (c) rendering an order or decision supported by the facts proved. Inquisitorial power, which is also known as examining or investigatory power, is one of the determinative powers of an administrative body which better enables it to exercise its quasi-judicial authority. This power allows the administrative body to inspect the records and premises, and investigate the activities, of persons or entities coming under its jurisdiction, or to require disclosure of information by means of accounts, records, reports, testimony of witnesses, production of documents, or otherwise.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution. 39 Thus, to be valid, an administrative issuance, such as an executive order,40 must comply with the following requisites:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary (1)
Its promulgation must be authorized by the legislature;
Nowhere from the text of the law nor its Implementing Rules and Regulations can we glean that the AMLC exercises quasi-judicial functions whether the actual preliminary investigation is done simply at its behest or conducted by the Department of Justice and the Ombudsman.
(2)
It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure;
(3)
It must be within the scope of the authority given by the legislature; and
Plainly, the AMLC's investigation of money laundering offenses and its determination of possible money laundering offenses, specifically its inquiry into certain bank accounts allowed by court order, does not transform it into an investigative body exercising quasi-judicial powers. Hence, Section 11 of the AMLA, authorizing a bank inquiry court order, cannot be said to violate SPCMB's constitutional right to procedural due process.
(4)
It must be reasonable.41
E.O.
No.
567
satisfies
all
of
the
above
requisites.
First, E.O. No. 567 itself identifies its statutory and constitutional basis.
E.O. No. 567 was issued pursuant to Section 17 of the Local Government Code expressly devolving to the local government units the delivery of basic services and facilities, including health services, to wit:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary Basic Services and Facilities . Sec. 17. (a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the powers and discharging the duties and functions currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the functions and responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local government units shall likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provisions of the basic services and facilities enumerated herein.
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, the following: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary xxx (2) For a Municipality:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary xxx (iii) Subject to the provisions of Title Five, Book I of this Code, health services which include the implementation of programs and projects on primary health care, maternal and child care, and communicable and noncommunicable disease control services, access to secondary and tertiary health services; purchase of medicines, medical supplies, and equipment needed to carry out the services herein enumerated; xxx (4)
For
a
City:
chanRoblesvirtualLawlibraryAll the services and facilities of the municipality and province. x x x xxx (e) National agencies or offices concerned shall devolve to local government units the responsibility for the provision of basic services and facilities enumerated in this Section within six (6) months after the effectivity of this Code. As used in this Code, the term "devolution" refers to the act by which the national government confers power and authority upon the various local government units to perform specific functions and 42 responsibilities. chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary It is the policy of the Local Government Code to provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure through a system of decentralization.43 Thus, E.O. No. 567 merely implements and puts into operation the policy and directive set forth in the Local Government Code. Similarly, E.O. No. 567 is within the constitutional power of the President to
issue. The President may, by executive or administrative order, direct the reorganization of government entities under the executive department. This is sanctioned under the Constitution, as well as other 44 statutes. chanrobleslaw In Tondo Medical Center Employees Association v. Court of Appeals ,45 petitioners questioned the validity of Executive Order No. 10246 (E.O. No. 10246 issued by then President Joseph Ejercito Estrada which, also pursuant to Section 17 of the Local Government Code, provided for the changes in the roles, functions, and organizational processes of the DOH. Petitioners alleged that E.O. No. 102 was void on the ground that it was issued in excess of the President's authority, as the structural and functional reorganization of the DOH is a legislative function. 47 In rejecting petitioners' argument, we held that the issuance of E.O. No. 102 is an exercise of the President's constitutional power of control over the executive department, supported by the provisions of the Administrative Code, recognized by other statutes, and consistently affirmed by this Court. 48 Similarly, in Malaria Employees and Workers Association of the Philippines, Inc. v. Romulo ,49 where the issue is also the validity of E.O. No. 102, we reiterated that the President has the authority to carry out a reorganization of the DOH under the Constitution and other statutory laws. Our ruling in the above cases applies squarely in this case. The transfer of the administration and supervision of TPDH from the DOH to the City of Taguig is a result of the President's exercise of her power of control over the executive department, including the DOH. The Constitution declares it a policy of the State to ensure the autonomy of local governments while Section 17 of the Local Government Code secures to the local governments the genuine and meaningful autonomy that would develop them into self-reliant communities and effective partners in the attainment of national goals.50 Therefore, in issuing E.O. No. 567, the President was actually carrying out the provisions of the Constitution and the Local Government Code. She was performing her duty to ensure the faithful execution of the laws.51chanrobleslaw As regards the second requisite, that the order must be issued or promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure, petitioners do not question the procedure by which E.O. No. 567 was issued. In the absence of strong evidence to the contrary, acts of the other branches of
the government are presumed to be valid, and there being no objection from the respondents as to the procedure in the promulgation of E.O. No. 567, the presumption is that the executive issuance duly complied with the procedures and limitations imposed by law. 52chanrobleslaw The third requisite provides that an administrative issuance must not be ultra vires or beyond the limits of the authority conferred. It must not supplant or modify the Constitution, its enabling statute and other existing laws, for such is the sole function of the legislature which the other branches of the government cannot usurp.53chanrobleslaw In assailing E.O. No. 567, petitioners argue that it violates Section 17(e) of the Local Government Code. Section 17(e) partly reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary (e) National agencies or offices concerned shall devolve to local government units the responsibility for the provision of basic services and facilities enumerated in this Section within six (6) months after the effectivity of this Code. xxx For petitioners, the provision limits the devolution of services to a period of only six (6) months from the effectivity of the Local Government Code. Any devolution after the expiration of such period can only be done through a statutory act. Thus, the issuance of E.O. No. 567, which was well-beyond such period, is a clear usurpation of legislative functions. In order to ascertain whether the six-month period bars devolution after its expiration, we bear in mind that we must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that giveth life. 54 Thus, we revisit the Declaration of Policy of the Local Government Code, which provides:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary Declaration of Policy. Sec. 2. (a) It is hereby declared the policy of the State that the territorial and political subdivisions of the State shall enjoy genuine and meaningful local autonomy to enable them to attain their fullest development as self-reliant communities and make them more effective partners in the attainment of national goals. Toward this end, the State shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization whereby local government units shall be given
more powers, authority, responsibilities, and resources. The process of decentralization shall proceed from the national government to the local government units. (b) It is also the policy of the State to ensure the accountability of local government units through the institution of effective mechanisms of recall, initiative and referendum. (c) It is likewise the policy of the State to require all national agencies and offices to conduct periodic consultations with appropriate local government units, non governmental and people's organizations, and other concerned sectors of the community before any project or program is implemented in their respective jurisdictions.55chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary The foregoing provision echoes Section 3, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, which reads:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary Sec. 3. The Congress shall enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization with effective mechanisms of recall, initiative, and referendum, allocate among the different local government units their powers, responsibilities, and resources, and provide for the qualifications, election, and appointment and removal, term, salaries, powers and functions and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and operation of the local units.56chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Decentralization is the devolution of national administration, not power, to local governments. 57 One form of decentralization is devolution, 58 which involves the transfer of powers, responsibilities, and resources for the performance of certain functions from the central government to the LGUs.59 It has been said that devolution is indispensable to decentralization.60chanrobleslaw Based on the foregoing, there is no question that the law favors devolution. In fact, as mentioned earlier, Section 5(a) of the Local Government Code explicitly states that in case of doubt, any question on any provision on a power of a local government shall be resolved in favor of devolution of powers and of the LGU. Considering the same, petitioners' restrictive interpretation of Section 17(e) is inconsistent with the Constitution and the Local Government Code. It limits the devolution intended by both the Constitution and the Local
Government
Code
to
an
unduly
short
period
of
time.
The more reasonable understanding of the six-month period is that the framers of the law provided for the period to prompt the national government to speedily devolve the existing services to the LGUs. However, it was not intended as a prescriptive period, as to absolutely prohibit the national government from devolving services beyond the period. Most especially so in this case because the TPDH was created long after the lapse of the six-month period, thus making its devolution within such period impossible. Notably, there is nothing in Section 17(e) or in the Local Government Code which provides for what would happen after the six-month period. Therefore, it cannot be said that the law clearly and unequivocally prohibits devolution after the six-month period. In support of their position that devolution can only be done within said period, petitioners quote a portion of the Transcript of the Session Proceedings for the Local Government Code. 61 However, a reading of the quoted transcript indicates that what the legislators considered was when the law and devolution will commence and not their intent to prohibit devolution after the end of the six-month period. Notably, in Tondo Medical Center Employees Association, we upheld the validity of E.O. No. 102 which also sought to implement the devolution of services under the Local Government Code, even if it was issued long after the lapse of the six-month period. Petitioners also posit that E.O. No. 567 violates the IRR promulgated by the DOH pursuant to Article 25 of the IRR of the Local Government Code as it excludes district health offices and hospitals in the NCR, including TPDLI, from devolution. We emphasize that under the Local Government Code, it is the Oversight Committee, composed of representatives from both the executive and the legislative branches of government, which was tasked to formulate the implementing rules and regulations of the law.62 The Local Government Code did not delegate to any other entity the formulation of its implementing rules and regulations. Thus, on February 21, 1992, President CorazoniC. Aquino approved the Oversight Committee's draft of the implementing rules and regulations and issued Administrative Order No.
27063
(A.O.
No.
270).
Petitioners' position that Article 25 of the IRR of the Local Government Code further delegated to the DOH the task of formulating another set of implementing rules and regulations is without any basis. The Local Government Code and its IRR do not contain any provision directing the DOH to promulgate implementing rules and regulations on the devolution of health services. The pertinent portion of Article 25 of the IRR of the Local Government Code actually states:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary Art. 25. Responsibility for Delivery of Basic Services and Facilities. - The LGUs shall, in addition to their existing functions and responsibilities, provide basic services and facilities devolved to them covering, but not limited to, the following: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary xxx Municipality
xxx (c)
Subject to the provisions of Rule XXIII on local health boards and in accordance with the standards and criteria of the Department of Health (DOH), provision of health services through:
(1)
Implementation of programs and projects on primary health care, maternal and child care, and communicable and noncommunicable disease control services;
(2)
Access to secondary and tertiary health services; and
(3)
Purchase of medicines, medical supplies, and equipment needed to carry out the devolved health services.
xxx Based from the above, Article 25 mandates that the health services to be provided by the LGUs must comply with the standards and criteria given by
the DOH. It does not direct the DOH to create rules on how devolution of health services must be implemented. Indeed, petitioners' failure to explain why there would be two (2) implementing rules and regulations for a single law and its basis proves that their position is without any merit. More, their failure to provide important details regarding the supposed DOH IRR such as its title and number, date of issuance and series number signifies the falsity of petitioners' claim. Even assuming that the DOH was directed to promulgate a subsequent IRR, and that the DOH issued the IRR, said IRR does not exempt district health offices, including hospitals in the NCR from devolution. The quoted sections of the alleged DOH IRR read:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary Sec. 17. General Provisions . (a)
The DOH shall devolve to LGUs concerned public health programs and projects and such health and medical packages as currently in place at the Integrated Provincial Health Offices, District Health Offices, City Health Offices, and Municipal Health Offices, including the barangay health stations as follows:
xxx
(3)
Secondary health services are medical health services provided by some rural health units, infirmaries, district hospitals and outpatient departments of provincial hospitals. x x x
Sec. 18. Specific Provisions. - The devolution prescribed in the preceding section shall include the following: chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary (a)
Province
(1)
The Integrated Provincial Health Office including the provincial hospital, district health offices including district hospitals, Medicare and municipal hospitals. However, the district health
offices in the National Capital Region including its district hospitals are not included in the devolution as prescribed herein. x x x64 Section 18 (a)(l) merely excludes district hospitals in the NCR from the process of devolution as prescribed in Section 17. The former does not entirely prohibit devolution of health services in district hospitals in the NCR. At any rate, we emphasize that the DOH is subject to the power of control of the President. Therefore, E.O. No. 567 issued by the President shall prevail over any issuance made by the DOH and not the other way around. The fourth requisite pertains to the reasonableness of an administrative issuance. It is an axiom in administrative law that administrative authorities should not act arbitrarily and capriciously in the issuance of rules and regulations. To be valid, such rules and regulations must be reasonable and fairly adapted to secure the end in view. If shown to bear no reasonable relation to the purposes for which they were authorized to be issued, then they must be held to be invalid.65 Specific to a reorganization, it is regarded as valid provided it is pursued in good faith. As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in good faith if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient .66chanrobleslaw E.O. No. 567 meets the test of reasonableness. The transfer of the administration and supervision of TPDH from the DOH to the City of Taguig aims to provide the City of Taguig the genuine and meaningful autonomy which would make it an effective and efficient partner in the attainment of national goals and providing basic health services and facilities to the community. It implements and breathes life to the provisions of the Constitution and the Local Government Code on creating a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a system of decentralization. Petitioners complain that E.O. No. 567 violated their rights because they were transferred to other public health facilities without being afforded with the necessary provisions for expenses relative to their transfer and reassignment, as required by Section 6 of R.A. No. 7305. Similar to our ruling in Tondo Medical Center Employees Association, we
hold that petitioners' allegations are too general and unsubstantiated by the records for us to pass upon. The persons affected are not specified; details of their appointments and transfers—such as position, salary grade, and the date they were appointed—are not given; and the circumstances which attended the alleged violations are not identified. 67 Further, while we recognize the inconvenience which may be suffered by petitioners as a result of E.O. No. 567, the need to make t he delivery of health services more efficient and more compelling is far from being unreasonable or arbitrary. Be that as it may, we stress that E.O. No. 567 only lays down the directive to transfer the administration and supervision of TPDH from the DOH to the City of Taguig. The details and particulars of its implementation are set forth in the subsequent issuances of the City of Taguig, i.e., E.O. No. 053 and E.O. No. 001, as well as the MOA dated October 23, 2006 between the DOH and the City of Taguig. Considering the validity of E.O. No. 567, the subsequent Executive Orders issued by Mayor Tinga, as well as the MOA between the DOH and the City of Taguig, implementing E.O. No. 567 are likewise valid. In sum, we find that the petition failed to show any constitutional infirmity or grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in President Arroyo's issuance of E.O. No. 567.
Republic vs. Drugmakers Laboratories, G.R. No. 190837
1989, including those covering the BA/BE testing requirement, consistent with and pursuant to RA 3720.43Therefore, the FDA has sufficient authority to issue the said circulars and since they would not affect the substantive rights of the parties that they seek to govern – as they are not, strictly speaking, administrative regulations in the first place – no prior hearing, consultation, and publication are needed for their validity. Issue: Do the assailed circulars partake of administrative rules and regulations and, as such, must comply with the requirements of prior hearing, consultation and publication? Ruling: In general, an administrative regulation needs to comply with the requirements laid down by Executive Order No. 292, s. 1987, otherwise known as the "Administrative Code of 1987," on prior notice, hearing, and publication in order to be valid and binding, except when the same is merely an interpretative rule. This is because "[w]hen an administrative rule is merely interpretative in nature, its applicability needs nothing further than its bare issuance, for it gives no real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed. When, on the other hand, the administrative rule goes beyond merely providing for the means that can facilitate or render least cumbersome the implementation of the law but substantially increases the burden of those governed, it behooves the agency to accord at least to those directly affected a chance to be heard, and thereafter to be duly informed, before that new issuance is given the force and effect of law."36
Issue: Who has the power to validly issue and implement Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s. 1997: the Secretary of Health or the FDA? Ruling: Circular Nos. 1 and 8, s. 1997 cannot be considered as administrative regulations because they do not: (a) implement a primary legislation by providing the details thereof; (b) interpret, clarify, or explain existing statutory regulations under which the FDA operates; and/or (c) ascertain the existence of certain facts or things upon which the enforcement of RA 3720 depends. In fact, the only purpose of these circulars is for the FDA to administer and supervise the implementation of the provisions of AO 67, s.
since the circulars would not affect the substantive rights of the parties that they seek to govern – as they are not, strictly speaking, administrative regulations in the first place – no prior hearing, consultation, and publication are needed for their validity.
Cawad vs. Abad, G.R. No. 207145, July 28, 2015
Issue: Is DBM-DOH Joint Circular No. 1 reasonable and within the scope of authority granted to the respondents? Ruling: Yes. With respect to the infirmities of the DBM-DOH Joint Circular raised in the petition, they cannot be said to have been issued with grave abuse of discretion for not only are they reasonable, they were likewise issued well within the scope of authority granted to the respondents. In fact, as may be gathered from prior issuances on the matter, the circular did not make any substantial deviation therefrom, but actually remained consistent with, and germane to, the purposes of the law.
Issue: Is DBM-DOH Joint Circular No. 1 null and void for its failure to comply with Section 3523 of RA No. 7305 on publication in a newspaper of general circulation, as well as its failure to file a copy of the same with the UP Law Center-ONAR?
Ruling: Anent petitioners' contention that the DBM-DOH Joint Circular is null and void for its failure to comply with Section 3523 of RA No. 7305 providing that its implementing rules shall take effect thirty (30) days after publication in a newspaper of general circulation, as well as its failure to file a copy of the same with the University of the Philippines Law Center-Office of the National Administrative Register (UP Law Center-ONAR), jurisprudence as well as the circumstances of this case dictate otherwise. Indeed, publication, as a basic postulate of procedural due process, is required by law in order for administrative rules and regulations to be effective.24 There are, however, several exceptions, one of which are interpretative regulations which "need nothing further than their bare issuance for they give no real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed."25 These regulations need not be published for they add nothing to the law and do not affect substantial rights of any person.26 Thus, in Association of Southern Tagalog Electric Cooperatives, et. al. v. Energy Regulatory Commission (ERC),27 wherein several orders issued by
the ERC were sought to be invalidated for lack of publication and nonsubmission of copies thereof to the UP Law Center - ONAR, it has been held that since they merely interpret RA No. 7832 and its IRR, particularly on the computation of the cost of purchased power, without modifying, amending or supplanting the same, they cannot be rendered ineffective, to wit: When the policy guidelines of the ERC directed the exclusion of discounts extended by power suppliers in the computation of the cost of purchased power, the guidelines merely affirmed the plain and unambiguous meaning of "cost" in Section 5, Rule IX of the IRR of R.A. No. 7832."Cost" is an item of outlay, and must therefore exclude discounts since these are "not amounts paid or charged for the sale of electricity, but are reductions in rates. xxxx Thus, the policy guidelines of the ERC on the treatment of discounts extended by power suppliers "give no real consequence more than what the law itself has already prescribed." Publication is not necessary for the effectivity of the policy guidelines. As interpretative regulations, the policy guidelines of the ERC on the treatment of discounts extended by power suppliers are also not required to be filed with the U.P. Law Center in order to be effective. Section 4, Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987 requires every rule adopted by an agency to be filed with the U.P. Law Center to be effective. However, in Board of Trustees of the Government Service Insurance System v. Velasco, this Court pronounced that "not all rules and regulations adopted by every government agency are to be filed with the UP Law Center." Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature are not required to be filed with the U.P. Law Center. Paragraph 9 (a) of the Guidelines for Receiving and Publication of Rules and Regulations Filed with the U.P. Law Center states: 9. Rules and Regulations which need not be filed with the U.P. Law Center, shall, among others, include but not be limited to, the following: a. Those which are interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the personnel of the Administrative agency and not the public.
Issue: Is Sec. 6.5 of DBM-CSC Joint Circular, insofar as it provides that “an official or employee authorized to be granted longevity pay under an existing law is not eligible for the grant of step increment due to length of service”, valid and constitutional? Ruling: Moreover, insofar as the DBM-DOH Joint Circular similarly withholds the Step Increment due to length of service from those who are already being granted Longevity Pay, the same must likewise be declared unenforceable
Soriano vs. Sec. of Finance, G.R. No. 184450. Jan. 24, 2017 Issue: Whether or not Sections 1 and 3 of RR 10-2008 are consistent with the law in declaring that “an MWE who receives other benefits in excess of the statutory limit of P30,000 is no longer entitled to the exemption provided by R.A. 9504”, consistent with the l aw?
Ruling: sec. 1 and 3 of the RR add a requirement not found in the law. A. Nowhere in the provisions of ra 9504 would one find the qualifications prescribed by the assailed provisions of rr 10 -2008. B. Minimum wage is mandated; employers may not freely choose on their own to designate in which way. The min wage exempted by ra 9504 is that which is referred to in the labor code C. Ra 9504 is explicit as to the coverage of the exemption: the wages that are not in excess of the minimum wage as determined by the wage boards, including the corresponding holiday, overtime, night diff, and hazard pays D. The proper interpretation of RA 9504 is that it imposes taxes only on the taxable income received in excess of the minimum wage, but the MWEs will not lose their exemption as such. Workers who receive the statutory min wage their basic pay remain MWEs. The receipt of any other income during the year does not disqualify them as MWEs. They remain mwes, entitled to exemption as such, but the taxable income they receive other than as MWEs may be subjected to appropriate taxes.
Purisima vs. Phil. Tobacco Institute, G.R. No. 210251, Apr. 17, 2017 Issue: Is Section 11 of Revenue Regulation No. 17-2012 issued on authority of R.A. No. 10351, otherwise known as the Sin Tax Reform Law of 2012?
Ruling: it can be gleaned that the lawmakers intended to impose the excise tax on every pack of cigarettes that come in 20 sticks. Individual pouches or packaging combinations of 5'sand l0's for retail purposes are allowed and will be subjected to the same excise tax rate as long as they are bundled together by not more than 20 sticks. Thus, by issuing Section11of RR172012 andAnnex"D-1"on Cigarettes Packed by Machine of RMC90-2012, the BIR went beyond the express provisions of RA10351. It is an elementary rule in administrative law that administrative rules and regulations enacted by administrative bodies to implement the law which they are entrusted to enforce have the force of law and are entitled to great weight and respect. However, these implementations of the law must not override, supplant,or modify the law but must remain consistent with the law they intend to implement. It is only Congress which has the power to repeal or amend the law. In this case, Section 11 of RR17-2012 and Annex"D-1" on Cigarettes Packed by Machine of RMC90-2012 clearly contravened the provisions of RA10351.1âwphi1 It is a well-settled principle that are venue regulation cannot amend the law it seeks to implement. In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Seagate Technology (Philippines), 14 we held that a mere administrative issuance, like a BIR regulation, cannot amend the law; the former cannot purport to do any more than implement the latter. The courts will not countenance an administrative regulation that overrides the statute it seeks to implement. In the present case, area ding of Section 11 of RR17-2012 and Annex"D-1" on Cigarettes Packed by Machine of RMC 90-2012 reveals that they are not simply regulations to implement RA10351. They are amendatory provisions which require cigarette manufacturers to be liable to pay for more tax than the law, RA10351, allows. The BIR, in issuing these revenue regulations, created an additional tax liability for packaging combinations smaller than
20 cigarette sticks. In so doing, the BIR amended the law, an act beyond the power of the BIR to do. In sum, we agree with the ruling of the RTC that Section 11 of RR17-2012 and Annex"D-1" on Cigarettes Packed by Machine of RMC 90-2012 are null and void.
Quezon City PTCA vs. DepEd, G.R. No. 188720, Feb. 23, 2016 Issue:
Is DepEd Order No. 54, s. 2009, an invalid exercise of the rule-making power delegated to the Secretary of Education?
and prevent the delegation from running riot. These two tests are both intended to prevent a total transference of legislative authority to the delegate, who is not allowed to step into the shoes of the legislature and exercise a power essentially legislative." 19 Also, these two tests ensure that administrative agencies, in the exercise of their power of subordinate legislation, create rules and regulations that are germane to the objects and purposes of the law they implement; and are not in contradiction, but in full conformity with the standards prescribed by this law.
Issue:
Ruling: Department Order No. 54, Series of 2009 was validly issued by the Secretary of Education pursuant to his statutorily vested rule-making power and pursuant to the purposes for which the organization of parent-teacher associations is mandated by statute. Likewise, there was no fatal procedural lapse in the adoption of Department Order No. 54, Series of 2009. Delegation of powers is a rule that is widely recognized especially in the legislative branch of government. With the increasing complexity of the government's functions and the growing inability of the legislature to address the myriad of problems demanding its attention, Congress found it necessary to delegate its powers to administrative agencies. This is the subordinate legislation. power of
For its non-publication and in the absence public consultations, was the issuance of DepEd Order No. 54 violative of petitioner’s right to due process?
"With this power, administrative bodies may implement the broad policies laid down in a statute by 'filling in' the details which the Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to provide." 13 On this basis, administrative agencies may promulgate supplementary regulations which have the force and effect of law. 14 In order for a valid delegation to exist, two basic tests must be complied with: the completeness test, and the sufficient standard test.
MPSTA vs. Garcia, G.R. No. 192708, Oct. 2, 2017 Issue:
"Under the first test, the law must be complete in all its terms and conditions when it leaves the legislature, such that, when it reaches the delegate, the only thing he would have to do is enforce it. On the other hand, under the sufficient standard test, there must be adequate guidelines or stations in the law to map out the boundaries of the delegate's authority
Ruling: This does not invalidate the Department Order. As is evident from the previously quoted provisions of Book VII, Chapter 2 of the Administrative Code, all that is required for the validity of rules promulgated by administrative agencies is the filing of three (3) certified copies with the University of the Philippine Law Center. Within 15 days of filing, administrative rules become effective.
Considering that the parties participated in the public consultation of GSIS’ policy resolutions on PBP, APL and CLIP was it non-publication validly dispensed with? Ruling: The policies are invalid due to lack of publication. While GSIS filed copies of the subject resolutions with the office of the national administrative register (ONAR), it only did so after the claims of the retirees and beneficiaries had already been lodged. The resolutions were not published in either the official gazette or a newspaper of general circulation of the country.
