HE PRESIDENTIAL ANTI-DOLLAR SALTING TASK FORCE vs. COURT OF APPEALS G.R. No. 83578 March 16, 1989 FACTS: On March 12, 1985, State Prosecutor Jose B. Rosales, who i s assigned with the Presidential AntiDollar Salting Task Force hereinafter referred to as PADS Task Force for purposes of convenience, issued search warrants Nos. 156, 157, 158, 159, 160 and 161 ag ainst the private respondents. The application for the issuance of said search warrants was filed by Atty. Napoleon Gatmaytan of the Bureau of Customs who is a deputized member of the PADS Task Force. Attached to the said application is the affidavit of Jo sefin M. Castro who is an operative and investigator of the PADS Task Force. Said Josefin M. Castro is li kewise the sole deponent in the purported deposition to support the application for the issuance of the 6 search warrants involved in this case. The application filed by Atty. Gatmaytan, the affidavit and deposition of Josefin M. Castro are all dated March 12, 1985. Shortly thereafter, the private respondent went to the Regional Trial Court on a petition to enjoin the implementation of the search warrants in question. On March 13, 1985, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order [effective "for a period of five days notice"] and set the case for hearing on March 18, 1985. The lower court declared Search Warrant Nos. 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, and 161 to be null and void. Presidential AntiDollar Salting Task Force went to the respondent Court of Appeals to contest. Appellate Court held that petitioner is a special quasi-judicial body with express powers enumerated under PD 1936 to prosecute foreign forei gn exchange violations defined and punished under P.D. No. 1883. Further, the petitioner, in exercising its quasi-judicial powers, ranks with the Regional Tri al Courts, and the latter in the case at bar had no jurisdiction to declare the search warrants in question null and void. ISSUES: (a) Whether or not the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force a quasi-judicial body and it is one co-equal in rank and standing with the Regional Trial Court, and accordingly, beyond the latter's jurisdiction; and (b) Whether or not such presidential body be said to be "such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law" to issue search warrants warrants under the 1973 Constitution. HELD: (a) No. It is the basic function of quasi-judicial bodies to adjudicate claims and/or to determine rights, and unless its decisions are seasonably appealed to the proper reviewing authorities, the same attain finality and become executory. A perusal of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting
Case #3 2 Task Force's organic act, Presidential Decree No. 1936, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002, convinces the Court that the Task Force was not meant to exercise quasi -judicial
functions, that is, to try and decide claims and execute its judgments. The Presidential AntiDollar Salting Task Force has the following powers and authority: a) Motu proprio or upon complaint, to investigate and prosecute all dollar salting activities, including the overvaluation of imports and the undervaluation of exports; b) To administer oaths, summon persons or issue subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses or the production of such books, papers, contracts, records, statements of accounts, agreements, and other as may be necessary in the conduct of investigation; c) To appoint or designate experts, consultants, state prosecutors or fiscals, investigators and hearing officers to assist the Task Force in the discharge of its duties and responsibilities; gather data, information or documents; conduct hearings, receive evidence, oath oral and documentary, in all cases involving violation of foreign exchange laws or regulations; and submit reports containing findings and recommendations for consideration of appropriate authorities; d) To punish direct and indirect contempts with the appropriate penalties therefor under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court; and To adopt such measures and take such actions as may be necessary to implement this Decree. xxx xxx xxx "f. After due investigation but prior to the filing of the appropriate criminal charges with the fiscal's office or the courts as the case may be, to impose a fine and/or administrative sanctions as the circumstances warrant, upon any person found committing or to have committed acts constituting blackmarketing or salting abroad of foreign exchange, provided said person voluntarily admits the facts and circumstances constituting the offense and presents proof that the foreign exchange retained abroad has already been brought into the country. Thereafter, no further civil or criminal action may be instituted against said person before any other judicial regulatory or administrative body for violation of Presidential Decree No. 1883. The amount of the fine shall be determined by the Chairman of the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force and paid in Pesos taking into consideration the amount of
Case #3 3 foreign exchange retained abroad, the exchange rate differentials, uncollected taxes and duties thereon, undeclared profits, interest rates and such other relevant factors. The fine shall be paid to the Task Force which shall retain Twenty percent (20%) thereof. The informer, if any, shall be entitled to Twenty percent (20%) of the fine. Should there be no informer, the Task Force shall be entitle to retain Forty percent (40%) of the fine and the balance shall accrue to the general funds of the National government. The amount of the fine to be retained by the Task Force shall form part of its Confidential Fund and be utilized for the operations of the Task Force." The Court sees nothing in the provisions (except with respect to the Task Force's powers to issue search warrants) that will reveal a legislative intendment to confer it with quasi-judicial responsibilities relative to offenses punished by Presidential Decree No. 1883. As the President's arm called upon to combat the vice of "dollar salting" or the blackmarketing and salting of foreign exchange, it is tasked alone by the Decree to handle the prosecution of such activities, but nothing more. It cannot be said to be co-equal or coordinate with the Regional Trial Court. There is nothing in its enabling statutes that would demonstrate its standing at par with the said court. (b) No. It must be observed that under the present Constitution, the powers of arrest and search are exclusive upon judges. Since the 1973 Constitution took force
and effect and until it was so unceremoniously discarded in 1986, its provisions conferring the power to issue arrest and search warrants upon an officer, other than a judge, by fiat of legislation have been at best controversial. In a case decided by the Court, the "responsible officer" referred to by the fundamental law should be one capable of approximating "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge." The Court agree that the Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force exercises, or was meant to exercise, prosecutorial powers, and on that ground, it cannot be said to be a neutral and detached "judge" to determine the existence of probable cause for purposes of arrest or search. Unlike a magistrate, a prosecutor is naturally interested in the success of his case. Although his office "is to see that justice is done and not necessarily to secure the conviction of the person accused," he stands, invariably, as the accused's adversary and his accuser. To permit him to issue search warrants and indeed, warrants of arrest, is to make him both judge and jury in his own right, when he is neither. That makes Presidential Decree No. 1936 as amended by Presidential Decree No. 2002, unconstitutional.
Cojuangco vs PCGG 190 SCRA 226 Facts: President Corazon C. Aquino directed the Solicitor General to prosecute allpersons involved in the misuse of coconut levy funds. Pursuant to the above directivethe Solicitor General created a task force to conduct a thorough study of the possibleinvolvement of all persons in the anomalous use of coconut levy funds. Upon thecreation of the PCGG under EO. 1 issued by President Aquino, the PCGG was chargedwith the task of assisting the President not only in the recovery of illgotten wealth orunexplained wealth accumulated by the former President, his immediate family,relatives, subordinates and close associates but also in the investigation of such cases ofgraft and corruption as the President may assign to the Commission from time to timeand to prevent a repetition of the same in the future.Petitioner alleges that the PCGG may not conduct a preliminary investigation ofthe complaints filed by the Solicitor General without violating petitioner's rights to dueprocess and equal protection of the law, and that the PCGG has no right to conduct suchpreliminary investigation .Issue: WON the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) has the powerto conduct a preliminary investigation of the anti-graft and corruption cases filed by theSolicitor General against Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and other respondents for the allegedmisuse of coconut levy funds. Held: the court ruled in the negative. Considering that the PCGG, li ke the courts, isvested with the authority to grant provisional remedies of (1) sequestration, (2) freezingassets, and (3) provisional takeover, it is indispensable that, as in the case of attachmentand receivership, there exists a prima facie factual foundation, at least, for thesequestration order, freeze order or takeover order, an adequate and fair opportunity tocontest it and endeavor to cause its negation or nullification. Both are assured under theforegoing executive orders and the rules and regulations promulgated by the PCGG.The general power of investigation vested in the PCGG may be divided into twostages.The first stage of investigation which is called the criminal investigation stage isthe fact finding inquiring which is usually conducted by the law
enforcement agentswhereby they gather evidence and interview witnesses after which they assess theevidence and if they find sufficient basis, file the complaint for the purpose ofpreliminary investigation. The second stage is the preliminary investigation stage of thesaid complaint. It is at this stage, as above discussed, where it is ascertained if there issufficient evidence to bring a person to trial.It is in such instances that we say one cannot be "a prosecutor and judge at thesame time." Having gathered the evidence and filed the complaint as a law enforcer, hecannot be expected to handle with impartiality the preliminary investigation of his owncomplaint, this time as a public prosecutor. 7 The Court holds that a just and fair administration of justice can be promoted ifthe PCGG would be prohibited from conducting the preliminary investigation of thecomplaints subject of this petition and the petition for intervention and that the recordsof the same should be forwarded to the Ombudsman, who as an independentconstitutional officer has primary jurisdiction over cases of this nature, to conduct suchpreliminary investigation and take appropriate action
2 performance of the executive or administrative duty entrusted to it. In carrying out their quasi judicial functions, the administrative officers or bodies arerequired to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts, hold hearings,weigh evidence, and draw conclusions from them as basis for their officialaction and exercise of discretion in a judicial nature.
Santiago, Jr. vs Bautista 32 SCRA 188 Facts: The appellant was a grade 6 pupil in a certain public elementary school. As theschool year was then about to end, the "Committee On the Rating Of Students ForHonor" was constituted by the teachers concerned at said school for the purpose ofselecting the "honor students" of its graduating class. With the school Principal, aschairman, and the members of the committee deliberated and finally adjudged SocorroMedina, Patricia Liñgat and Teodoro C. Santiago, Jr. as first, second and third honors,respectively. The school's graduation exercises were thereafter set for May 21, 1965; butthree days before that date, the "third placer" Teodoro Santiago, Jr., represented by hismother, and with his father as counsel, sought the invalidation of the "ranking of honorstudents" thus made, by instituting the above-mentioned civil case in the Court of FirstInstance of Cotabato, committee members along with the District Supervisor and theAcademic Supervisor of the place. Issue: WON the committee committed grave abuse of discretion Held: "'NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION”
"Allegations relating to the alleged 'grave abuse of discretion' on the part of teachersrefer to errors, mistakes, or irregularities rather than to the real grave abuse of discretionthat would amount to lack of jurisdiction. Mere commission of errors in the exercise of jurisdiction may not
be corrected by means of certiorari.WHAT ARE JUDICIAL OR QUASI JUDICIAL ACTS? It is difficult, if not impossible,precisely to define what are judicial or quasi judicial acts, and there i s considerableconflict in the decisions in regard thereto, in connection with the law as to the right to awrit of certiorari. it is clear, however, that it is the nature of the act to be performed,rather than of the office, board, or body which performs it, that determines whether ornot it is the discharge of a judicial or quasi-judicial function. It is not essential that theproceedings should be strictly and technically judicial, in the sense in which that word isused when applied to courts of justice, but it is sufficient if they are quasi judicial. It isenough if the officers act judicially in making their decision, whatever may be theirpublic character. The precise line of demarkation between what are judicial and what areadministrative or ministerial functions is often difficult to determine.Theexercise of judicial functions may involve the performance of legislative oradministrative duties, and the performance of administrative or ministerialduties, may, in a measure, involve the exercise of judicial functions. It may besaid generally that the exercise of judicial functions is to determine what the law is, and what the legal rights of parties are, with respect to a matter incontroversy; and whenever an officer is clothed with that authority, andundertaes to determine those questions, he acts judicially Smart Communications vs NTC G.R. No. 151908 12 August 2003 Facts: Petitioners Isla Communications Co., Inc. and Pili pino Telephone Corporationfiled against the National Telecommunications Commission, an action for declaration ofnullity of NTC Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 (the Billing Circular). Petitionersallege that the NTC has no jurisdiction to regulate the sale of consumer goods such as theprepaid call cards since such jurisdiction belongs to the Department of Trade andIndustry under the Consumer Act of the Philippines; that the Billing Circular isoppressive, confiscatory and violative of the constitutional prohibition againstdeprivation of property without due process of law; that the Circu lar will result in theimpairment of the viability of the prepaid cellular service by unduly prolonging thevalidity and expiration of the prepaid SIM and call cards; and that the requirements ofidentification of prepaid card buyers and call balance announcement are unreasonable.Hence, they prayed that the Billing Circular be declared null and void ab initio. Issue :WON the RTC has jurisdiction over the case Held: Petitions are granted. The issuance by the NTC of Memorandum Circular No. 13-6-2000 and its Memorandum dated October 6, 2000 was pursuant to its quasi-legislativeor rule-making power. As such, petitioners were justified in invoking the judicial powerof the Regional Trial Court to assail the constitutionality and validity of the saidissuances. What is assailed is the validity or constitutionality of a rule or regulationissued by the administrative agency in the performance of its quasi-legislativefunction, the regular courts have jurisdiction to pass upon the same. Thedetermination of whether a specific rule or set of rules issued by an administrativeagency contravenes the law or the constitution is within the jurisdiction of the regularcourts.
Indeed, the Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power todeclare a law, treaty, international or executive agreement, presidential decree, order,instruction, ordinance, or regulation in the courts, including the regional trial courts. 25 This is within the scope of judicial power, which includes the authority of the courts todetermine in an appropriate action the validity of the acts of the political departments. 26 Judicialx power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversiesinvolving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determinewhether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. Not to be confused with the quasi-legislative or rule-making power of anadministrative agency is its quasi-judicial or administrative adjudicatory power.This is the power to hear and determine questions of fact to which the legislativepolicy is to apply and to decide in accordance with the standards laid down bythe law itself in enforcing and administering the same law. The administrativebody exercises its quasi-judicial power when it performs in a judicial manneran act which is essentially of an executive or administrative nature, where thepower to act in such manner is incidental to or reasonably necessary for the Guerzon vs Court of Appeals 164 SCRA 182 Extent of Judicial or Quasi-Judicial Powers of Administrative Agencies
FACTS: Petitioner Pedro Guerzon executed with Basic Landoil Energy Corporation, which was later acquired by respondent Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation, a contract denominated as "Service Station Lease" for the use and operation of respondent SHELL's properties, facilities and equipment. Petitioner likewise executed with the same Corporation a "Dealer's Sales Contract" for the sale by petitioner of respondent SHELL's petroleum and other products in the leased service station. Respondent Bureau of Energy Utilization approved the Dealer's Sales Contract and issued a certificate of authority in petitioner's favor, which had a 5-year period of validity, in line with the terms of the contract. Paragraph 9 of the Service Station Lease Contract provides: The cancellation or termination of the Dealer's Sales Contract executed between the COMPANY and the LESSEE on January 7,1981 shall automatically cancel this Lease. As early as January 2, 1986 respondent SHELL wrote to petitioner informing him that the Company was not renewing the Dealer's Sales Contract which was to expire on April 12, 1986. A copy of this letter was furnished respondent BEU.
In view of failure or petitioner to surrender ths station premises and all the respondent's equipment, BEU ordered petitioner to immediately vacate the service station, and turn it over to Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corporation and to show cause in writing, under oath within ten (10) days from receipt of the order why no administrative and/or criminal proceedings shall be instituted against him for the violation of BEU's laws, rules and regulations. Respondent SHELL, accompanied by law enforcement officers, was able to secure possession of the gasoline station in question. Petitioner filed this petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals upholding the decision of the Regional Trial Court wich dismissed his complaint "for lack of jurisdiction to annul the order of a quasi-judicial body of equivalent category as the Regional Trial Court. The The Solicitor General contends that since petitioner's license to sell petroleum products expired on April 12,1986, when his dealership and lease contracts expired, as of the following day, April 13, 1986 he was engaged in illegal trading in petroleum products in violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 33, which includes the "sale or or distribution of petroleum products for profit without license or authority from the Government." Thus, concludes the Solicitor General, the Bureau of Energy nation had the power to issue, and was justified in issuing, the order to vacate pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 1206, which confers, among others, to BEU the power to impose and collect a f ine for every violation or non-compliance with any term or condition of any certificate, license, or permit issued by the Bureau or of any of its orders, decisions, rules and regulations. ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals err i n holding that the respondent BEU has jurisdiction to eject the petitioner from the gasoline service station leased RULING: Yes. The order merely makes a vague reference to a "violation of BEU laws, rules and regulations," without stating the specific provision violated. That petitioner had engaged in illegal trading in petroleum products cannot even be implied from the wording of the assailed order. Even if petitioner was indeed engaged in illegal trading in petroleum products, there was no basis under B.P. Blg. 33 to order him to vacate the service station and to turn it over to respondent Shell. Illegal trading in petroleum products is a criminal act wherein the injured party is the State. Respondent Shell is not even alleged by the Solicitor General as a private party prejudiced and, therefore, it can claim no relief if a criminal case is instituted. Under Section 7 of P.D. No. 1206, BEU may (1) impose a fine not exceeding P1,000.00; and (2) in case of failure to pay the fine imposed or to cease and discontinue the violation or noncompliance, order the suspension, closure or stoppage of operations of the establishment of the guilty party. Its authority is limited to these two (2) options. It can do no more, as there is nothing in P.D. No. 1206, as amended, which empowers the Bureau to issue an order to vacate in case of a violation.
As it is, jurisdiction to order a lessee to vacate the leased premises is vested in the civil courts in an appropriate case for unlawful detainer or accion publiciana. There is nothing in P.D. No. 1206, as amended, that would suggest that the same or similar jurisdiction has been granted to the Bureau of Energy Utilization. It is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly granted to it by l aw and those that are necessarily implied in the exercise thereof. That issuing the order to vacate was the most effective way of stopping any illegal trading in petroleum products is no excuse for a deviation from this rule. Otherwise, adherence to the rule of law would be rendered meaningless. Moreover, contrary to the Solicitor General's theory, the text of the assailed order leaves no room for doubt that it was issued in connection with an adjudication of the contractual dispute between respondent Shell and petitioner. But then the Bureau of Energy Utilization, like its predecessor, the defunct Oil Industry Commission, has no power to decide contractual disputes between gasoline dealers and oil companies, in the absence of an express provision of law granting to it such power. As explicitly stated in the law, in connection with the exercise of quasi-judicial powers, the Bureau's jurisdiction is limited to cases involving violation or noncompliance with any term or condition of any certificate, license or permit issued by it or of any of its orders, decisions, rules or regulations. RATIO: Grant of particular power must be found in the law itself. Where there is nothing in the law that would suggest that a particular power has been granted, such as the power to decide contractual disputes, the same cannot be exercised.
ANTIPOLO REALTY CORPORATION vs. NATIONAL HOUSING AUTHORITY 153 SCRA 399 Origin and Development of Administrative Law Growth and Utilization of Administrative Agencies FACTS: Jose Hernando acquired prospective and beneficial ownership over Lot. No. 15, Block IV of the Ponderosa Heights Subdivision in Antipolo, Rizal, from the petitioner Antipolo Realty Corporation under a Contract to Sell. On 28 August 1974, Hernando transferred his rights over the said lot to private respondent Virgilio Yuson, embodied in a Deed of Assignment and Substitution of Obligor. However, for failure of Antipolo Realty to develop the subdivision project in accordance with its undertaking under Clause 17 of the Contract to Sell (subdivision beautification), Mr. Yuson paid only the arrearages pertaining to the period up to, and including, the month of August 1972 and stopped all monthly installment payments falling due thereafter. On 14 October 1976, the president of Antipolo Realty sent a notice to private respondent Yuson advising that the required improvements in the subdivision had already been completed, and requesting resumption of payment of the monthly installments on Lot No. 15. For his part, Mr. Yuson replied that he would conform with the request as soon as he was able to verify the truth
of the representation in the notice. In a second letter dated 27 November 1976, Antipolo Realty reiterated its request, citing the decision rendered by the National Housing Authority (NHA) on 25 October 1976 in Case No. 252 (entitled "Jose B. Viado Jr., complainant vs. Conrado S. Reyes, respondent") declaring Antipolo Realty to have "substantially complied with its commitment to the lot buyers pursuant to the Contract to Sell. A formal demand was made for full and immediate payment of the amount of P16,994.73, representing installments which, Antipolo Realty alleged, had accrued during the period while the improvements were being completed — i.e., between September 1972 and October 1976. Yuson refused to pay the September 1972 - October 1976 monthly installments but agreed to pay the post October 1976 installments. Antipolo Realty responded by re scinding the Contract to Sell, and claiming the forfeiture of all installment payments previously made by Mr. Yuson. Yuson brought his dispute with Antipolo Realty before NHA. Antipolo Realty filed a motion to dismiss, which NHA denied. After hearing, the NHA rendered a decision on 9 March 1978 ordering the reinstatement of the Contract to Sell. A motion for reconsideration of Antipolo Realty was also denied. ISSUE: Whether or not in hearing the complaint of Yuson and i n ordering the reinstatement of the Contract to Sell between the parties NHA assumed the performance of judicial or quasi judicial functions which it was not authorized to perform RULING: No. It is by now commonplace learning that many administrative agencies exercise and perform adjudicatory powers and functions, though to a limited extent only. Limited delegation of judicial or quasi-judicial authority to administrative agencies (e.g., the Securities and Exchange Commission and the National Labor Relations Commission) is well recognized in our jurisdiction, basically because the need for special competence and experience has been recognized as essential in the resolution of questions of complex or specialized character and because of a companion recognition that the dockets of our regular courts have remained crowded and clogged. The Court held that under the law creating NHA it is empowered to regulate the real estate trade and business involving specific performance of contractual and statutory obligations filed by buyers of subdivision lots or condominium units against the owner, developer, dealer, broker or salesman. The Court held that under the "sense-making and expeditious doctrine of primary jurisdiction, the courts cannot or will not determine a controversy involving a question which is within the jurisdiction of an administrative tribunal where the question demands the exercise of sound administrative discretion requiring the special knowledge, experience, and services of the administrative tribunal to determine technical and intricate matters of fact, and a uniformity of ruling is essential to comply with the purposes of the regulatory statute administered." RATIO: In general, the quantum of judicial or quasi-judicial powers which an administrative agency may exercise is defined in the enabling act of such agency. In other words, the extent to
which an administrative entity may exercise such powers depends largely, if not wholly, on the provisions of the statute creating or empowering such agency. In the exercise of such powers, the agency concerned must commonly interpret and apply contracts and determine the rights of private parties under such contracts. One thrust of the multiplication of administrative agencies is that the interpretation of contracts and the determination of private rights thereunder is no longer a uniquely judicial function, exercisable only by our regular courts.
