BANTOLINO v. COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILS., INC. G.R. No. 153660 June 10, 2003 BELLOSILLO, J.: Procedural History: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated December 21, 2001 which affirmed with modification the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission promulgated 30 March 2001 wherein petitioners were denied to be reinstated because of failure to affirm the contents of their affidavits and to undergo crossexamination. Statement of facts: On February 25, 1995 sixty-two (62) employees of respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers, Bottlers, Inc., and its officers, Lipercon Services, Inc., People's Specialist Services, Inc., and Interim Services, Inc., filed a complaint against respondents for unfair labor practice through illegal dismissal, violation of their security of tenure and the perpetuation of the "Cabo System." They thus prayed for reinstatement with full back wages, and the declaration of their regular employment status. For failure to prosecute as they failed to either attend the scheduled mandatory conferences or submit their respective affidavits, the claims of fifty -two (52) complainant-employees were dismissed. Thereafter, Labor Arbiter Jose De Vera conducted clarificatory hearings to elicit information from the ten (10) remaining complainants (petitioners herein) relative to their alleged employment with respondent firm. On May 29, 1998 Labor Arbiter Jose De Vera rendered a decision ordering respondent company to reinstate complainants to their former positions with all the rights, privileges and benefits due regular employees, and to pay their full back wages which, with the exception of Prudencio Bantolino whose back wages must be computed upon proof of his dismissal as of 31 May 1998. On appeal, the NLRC sustained the finding of the Labor Arbiter that there was indeed an employer-employee relationship between the complainants and respondent company when it affirmed in toto the latter's decision. Respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers appealed to the Court of Appeals which, although affirming the finding of the NLRC that an employer-employee relationship existed between the contending parties, nonetheless agreed with respondent that the affidavits of some of the complainants, namely, Prudencio Bantolino, Nestor Romero, Nilo Espina, Ricardo Bartolome, Eluver Garcia, Eduardo Garcia and Nelson Manalastas, Manalastas, should not have been given probative value for their failure to affirm the contents thereof and to undergo cross-examination. As a consequence, the appellate court dismissed their complaints for lack of sufficient evidence. In the same Decision however, complainants Eddie Ladica, Arman Queling and Rolando Nieto were declared regular employees since they were the only ones subjected to cross-examination. Petitioners now pray for relief from the adverse Decision of the Court of Appeals; that, instead, the favorable judgment of the NLRC be reinstated.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing their complaints for failure to affirm the contents thereof and to undergo cross-examination Answer: Yes. Administrative bodies like the NLRC are not bound by the technical niceties of law and procedure and the rules obtaining in courts of law. Holding: Southern Cotabato Dev. and Construction Co. v. NLRC11 succinctly states that under Art. 221 of the Labor Code, the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law do not control proceedings before the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC. Further, it notes that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC are authorized to adopt reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law and procedure, all in the interest of due process. We find no compelling reason to deviate therefrom. The Revised Rules of Court and prevailing jurisprudence may be given only stringent application, i.e., by analogy or in a suppletory character and effect. The submission by respondent, citing People v. Sorrel,12 that an affidavit not testified to in a trial, is mere hearsay evidence and has no real evidentiary value, cannot find relevance in the present case considering that a criminal prosecution requires a quantum of evidence different from that of an administrative proceeding. Under the Rules of the Commission, the Labor Arbiter is given the discretion to determine the necessity of a formal trial or hearing. Hence, trial-type hearings are not even required as the cases may be decided based on verified position papers, with supporting documents and their affidavits. We cannot likewise accommodate respondent's contention that the failure of all the petitioners to sign the petition as well as the Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping in contravention of Sec. 5, Rule 7, of the Rules of Court will cause the dismissal of the present appeal. FIRST LEPANTO VS CA GR NO 110571 MARCH 10 1994 FACTS: BOI granted petitioner’s application to amend its BOI certificate of registration by changing the scope of its registered product from “glazed floor tiles” to “ceramic tiles”. Oppositor Mariwasa filed a petitioner for review with the CA. CA granted the preliminary injunction. Petitioner says that the CA has no jurisdiction as it is vested exclusively with the SC within 30 days from receipt of the decision pursuant to the Omnibus Investments Code and therefore, Mariwasa has lost its right to appeal. Mariwasa counters that whatever inconsistencies that the Omnibus Investment Code and the Judiciary Reorganization Act have been resolved by SC Circular 1 -91. ISSUES: W/n Mariwasa correctly filed its appeal with the CA.
RULING: YES. B.P. 129’s objective is providing a uniform procedure of appeal from decisions of all quasi judicial agencies for the benefit of the bench and the bar. The obvious lack of deliberation in the drafting of our laws could perhaps explain the deviation of some of our laws from the goal of uniform procedure which B.P. 129 sought to promote. Although a circular is not strictly a statute or law, it has, however, the force and effect of law according to settled jurisprudence The argument that Article 82 of E.O. 226 cannot be validly repealed by Circular 1-91 because the former grants a substantive right which is prohibited under the Constitution. These simply deal with procedural aspects which this Court has the power to regulate by virtue of its constitutional rule-making powers. Circular 1-91 simply transferred the venue of appeals from decisions of this agency to respondent Court of Appeals and provided a different period of appeal, i.e., fifteen (15) days from notice. It did not make an incursion into the substantive right to appeal. Circular 1-91 effectively repealed or superseded Article 82 of E.O. 226 insofar as the manner and method of enforcing the right to appeal from decisions of the BOI are concerned.
VILLA VS LAZARO G.R. NO. 69871 AUGUST 24, 1990 March 22, 2017
Facts: Anita Villa was granted a building permit to construct a funeral parlor at Santiago Boulevard in Gen. Santos City. In October of that same year, as the funeral parlor was nearing completion, a suit for injunction was brought against Villa by Dr. Jesus Veneracion, the owner of St. Elizabeth Hospital, standing about 132.36 meters from the funeral parlor. After appropriate proceedings and trial, judgment on the merits was rendered on November 17, 1981, dismissing Veneracion’s complaint as well as the counterclaim pleaded by Villa. The Trial Court found that there was afalsified Zoning Ordinance, containing a provision governing funeral parlors, which had been submitted to and ratified by the Ministry of Human Settlements, but that ordinance had never been passed by the Sangguniang Panlungsod and that the genuine Zoning Ordinance of General Santos City contained no prohibition whatever relative to such parlors’ “distance from hospitals, whether public or private”. Villa then resumed construction of her building and completed it. Veneracion did not appeal from this adverse judgment which therefore became final. Instead, he brought the matter up with the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission. He lodged a complaint with that commission praying “that the funeral parlor be relocated because it was near the St. Elizabeth Hospital and Villa failed to secure the necessary locational clearance” Two months after the rendition of the judgment against Veneracion, or more precisely on January 22, 1982, Villa received a telegram dated January 21 from Commissioner Raymundo R. Dizon of the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission
No doubt with no little discomfiture Villa received on June 2, 1982 a “Show Ca use” Order dated April 28,1982, signed by one Ernesto L. Mendiola in behalf of the Commission, requiring her to show cause why a fine should not be imposed on her or a cease-and-desist order issued against her for her failure to show proof of locational clearance If she thought the affair had thus been satisfactorily ended, she was sadly in error, of which she was very shortly made aware. On July 27, 1982, she received an Order of Commissioner Dizon dated June 29, 1982 imposing on her a fine of P10,000.00 and requiring her to cease operations until further orders from his office The petitioner filed for a motion for reconsideration but it was denied. Her appeals to the Commission, and subsequently to the Office of the President, were likewise denied. It must be stressed that neither the respondent nor the Commission ever made known the complaint ledged by the respondent to the petitioner until much later, after the Commissioner has rendered several adverse rulings against her. ISSUE:
Was the petitioner denied of due process against which the defense of failure of AV to take timely appeal will not avail?
HELD: All of the foregoing translate to a denial of due process against which the defense of failure to take timely appeal will not avail. Administrative proceedings are not exempt from the operation of certain basic and fundamental procedural principles, such as the due process requirements in investigations and trials. And this administrative process is recognized to include: (a0 the right to notice, be it actual or constructive, of the institution of the proceedings that may affect a person’s legal right; (b) reasonable opportunity to appear and defend his rights, introduce witnesses and relevant evidence in his favor; (c) a tribunal so constituted as to give him reasonable assurance of honesty and impartiality, and one of competent jurisdiction; and (d) a finding or decision by that tribunal supported by substantial evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the records or disclosed to the parties affected. And it being clear that some, at least, of those essential elements did not obtain or were not present in the proceedings complained of, any judgment rendered, or order issued, therein was null and void, could never become final and could be attacked in any appropriate proceeding. Also, an earlier judgment on the merits by a competent court cannot be negated by a result of administrative proceedings. What the record shows is that the petitioner responded promptly to orders and communications sent to her. At any rate, this court will not permit the result of an administrative proceeding riddled with serious defects already pointed out to negate an earlier judgment on the merits on the same matter regularly rendered by competent court.
PATEROK VS BUREAU OF CUSTOMS GR NO 90660-61 JANUARY 24 1991 FACTS: In March 1986, petitioner shipped from Germany to the Philippines two containers, one with used household goods and the other two used automobiles (one Bourgetti and one Mercedes Benz). The first container and the Bourgetti car were released by the BOC, but not the Mercedes Benz, which remained in custody of the Bureau. Petitioner then received a notice of hearing, informing him that seizure proceedings were being initiated against the said Mercedes Benz. While this case was pending, petitioner received a letter from the District Collector of Customs, informing her that a decision ordering the forfeiture of her Mercedes Benz had been rendered. Petitioner did not know that the same Mercedes Benz was subject to two different forfeiture proceedings. He only found out later that the Notice of Hearing for the forfeiture proceedings before the District Collector was posted on the bulletin board of the BOC, at Port Area, Manila. ISSUE: Whether or not the posting on the bulletin board of the public respondent was sufficient compliance with proper service of notice and procedural due process Whether or not seizure and forfeiture was proper in the instant case HELD: The Court held that there was no sufficient compliance with requirement of notice and hearing under the due process clause. But notwithstanding the procedural infirmity, the Court ruled that the petition cannot be granted. The seizure and forfeiture proceedings was based on a violation of B.P. 73, specifically a law that promotes energy conservation and prohibits the importation, manufacture or assembling of gasoline-powered passenger motor cars with engine displacement of over 2,800 cubic centimeters. The Mercedes Benz subject of this case has an engine displacement of over 2,800 cubic centimeters, which clearly falls within the prohibited importation and as such, is liable for seizure and forfeiture by the public respondents
LUMIQUED VS EXEVEA 282 SCRA 125 FACTS: Lumiqued was the Regional Director of DAR-CAR. He was charged by Zamudio, the Regional Cashier, for dishonesty due to questionable gas expenses under his office. It was alleged that he was falsifying gas receipts for reimbursements and that he had an unliquidated cash advance worth P116,000.00. Zamudio also complained that she was unjustly removed by Lumiqued two weeks after she filed the two complaints. The issue was referred to the DOJ. Committee hearings on the complaints were conducted on July 3and 10, 1992, but Lumiqued was not assisted by counsel. On the second hearing date, he moved for i ts resetting to July 17, 1992, to enable him to employ the services of counsel. The committee granted the motion, but neither Lumiqued nor his counsel appeared on the date he himself had chosen, so the committee deemed the case submitted for resolution. The Investigating Committee recommended the dismissal of Lumiqued. DOJ Sec Drilon adopted the recommendation. Fidel Ramos issued AO 52 dismissing Lumiqued. The latter invoke his right to due process, hence this petition. ISSUE: Does the due process clause encompass the right to be assisted by counsel during an administrative inquiry? HELD: The SC ruled against Lumiqued. The right to counsel, which cannot be waived unless the waiver is in writing and in the presence of counsel, is a right afforded a suspect or an accused during custodial investigation. It is not an absolute right and may, thus, be invoked or rejected in a criminal proceeding and, with more reason, in an administrative inquiry. In the case at bar, petitioners invoke the right of an accused in criminal proceedings to have competent and independent counsel of his own choice. Lumiqued, however, was not accused of any crime in the proceedings below. The investigation conducted by the committee created by Department Order No. 145 was for the purpose of determining if he could be held administratively liable under the law for the complaints filed against him. The right to counsel is not indispensable to due process unless required by the Constitution or the law. There is nothing in the Constitution that says that a party in a non-criminal proceeding is entitled to be represented by counsel and that, without such representation, he shall not be bound by such proceedings. The assistance of lawyers, while desirable, is not indispensable. The legal profession was not engrafted in the due process clause such that without the participation of its members, the safeguard is deemed ignored or violated. The ordinary citizen is not that helpless that he cannot validly act at all except only with a lawyer at his side. In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one’s sidE. Whatever irregularity attended the proceedings conducted by the committee was cured by Lumiqued’s appeal and his subsequent filing of motions for reconsideration
HAYDEE C. CASIMIRO, in her capacity as Municipal Assessor of San Jose, Romblon, Province of Romblon, petitioner, vs. FILIPINO T. TANDOG, in his capacity as the Municipal Mayor of San Jose, Romblon, respondent . G.R. No. 146137. June 08, 2005 FACTS: On 04 September 1996, Administrative Officer II Nelson M. Andres, submitted a report[2] based on an investigation he conducted into alleged irregularities in the office of petitioner Casimero. The report spoke of an anomalous cancellation of Tax Declarations No. 0236 in the name of Teodulo Matillano and the issuance of a new one i n the name of petitioner’s brother Ulysses Cawaling and Tax Declarations No. 0380 and No. 0376 in the name of Antipas San Sebastian and the issuance of new ones in favor of petitioner’s brother-in-law Marcelo Molina. Immediately thereafter, respondent Mayor Tandog issued Memorandum Order No. 13[3] dated 06 September 1996, placing the petitioner under preventive suspension for thirty (30) days. Three (3) days later, Mayor Tandog issued Memorandum Order No. 15, directing petitioner to answer the charge of irregularities in her office. In her answer,[4] petitioner denied the alleged irregularities claiming, in essence, that the cancellation of the tax declaration in favor of her brother Ulysses Cawaling was done prior to her assumption to office as municipal assessor, and that she issued new tax declarations in favor of her brother-in-law Marcelo Molina by virtue of a deed of sale executed by Antipas San Sebastian in Molina’s favor. On 23 October 1996, thru Memorandum Order No. 17,[5] respondent Mayor extended petitioner’s preventive suspension for another thirty (30) days effective 24 October 1996 to give him more time to verify and collate evidence relative to the alleged irregularities. On 28 October 1996, Memorandum Order No. 18[6] was issued by respondent Mayor directing petitioner to answer in writing the affidavit-complaint of Noraida San Sebastian Cesar and Teodulo Matillano. Noraida San Sebastian Cesar[7] alleged that Tax Declarations No. 0380 and No. 0376 covering parcels of land owned by her parents were transferred in the name of a certain Marcelo Molina, petitioner’s brother -in-law, without the necessary documents. Noraida Cesar further claimed that Marcelo Molina had not yet paid the full purchase price of the land covered by the said Tax Declarations. In response to Memorandum Order No. 18, petitioner submitted a letter[9] dated 29 October 1996, stating that with respect to the complaint of Noraida San Sebastian Cesar, she had already explained her side in the letter dated 26 September 1996. Not satisfied, respondent Mayor created a fact-finding committee to investigate the matter. After a series of hearings, the committee, on 2 2 November 1996, submitted its report[10] recommending petitioner’s separation from service, the dispositive portion ofwhich reads: Evaluating the facts above portrayed, it is clearly shown that Municipal Assessor Haydee Casimero is guilty of malperformance of duty and gross dishonesty to the prejudice of the taxpayers of San Jose, Romblon who are making possible the payments of her salary and other allowances. Consequently, we are unanimously recommending her separation from service.
Based on the above recommendation, respondent Mayor issued Administrative Order No. 1[11] dated 25 November 1996 dismissing petitioner. ISSUE: whether or not petitioner was afforded procedural and substantive due process when she was terminated from her employment as Municipal Assessor of San Jose, Romblon. HELD: SECTION 1. No person shall be deprived of l ife, liberty, or property without due process of law. In order to fall within the aegis of this provision, two conditions must concur, namely, that there is deprivation of life, liberty and property and such deprivation is done without proper observance of due process. When one speaks of due process, however, a distinction must be made between matters of procedure and matters of substance. The essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic requirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard.[18] In administrative proceedings, such as in the case at bar, procedural due process simply means the opportunity to explain one’s side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. “To be heard” does not mean only verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also th ru pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or pleadings, i s accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process In administrative proceedings, procedural due process has been recognized to include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent’s legal rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in one’s favor, and to defend one’s rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected In the case at bar, what appears in the record is that a hearing was conducted on 01 October 1996, which petitioner attended and where she answered questions propounded by the members of the fact-finding committee. Records further show that the petitioner was accorded every opportunity to present her side. She filed her answer to the formal charge against her. After a careful evaluation of evidence adduced, the committee rendered a decision, which was affirmed by the CSC and the Court of Appeals, upon a move to review the same by the petitioner. Indeed, she has even brought the matter to this Court for f inal adjudication. Well-
entrenched is the rule that substantial proof, and not clear and convincing evidence or proof beyond reasonable doubt, is sufficient basis for the imposition of any disciplinary action upon an employee. The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied where the employer has reasonable ground to believe that the employee is responsible for the misconduct and his participation therein renders him unworthy of trust and confidence demanded by his position Two alleged irregularities provided the dismissal from service of herein petitioner: 1. The cancellation of complainant Teodulo Matillano’s tax declaration and the issuance of a new one in favor of petitioner’s brothe r Ulysses Cawaling; and 2. The cancellation of the tax declaration in the name of complainant Noraida San Sebastian Cesar’s parent in favor of petitioner’s brother -in-law, Marcelo Molina. Dishonesty is considered as a grave offense punishable by dismissal for the first offense under Section 23, Rule XIV of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws. It is beyond cavil that petitioner’s acts displayed want of honesty.
Globe Telecom, Inc. v. National Telecommunications Commission [G.R. No.143964. July 26, 2004] 23 NOV FACTS Private respondent Smart Communications, Inc (Smart) filed with the NTC a Complaint to effect the interconnection of their SMS or texting services with petitioner Globe Telecom, Inc. (Globe). Globe pointed out procedural defects in Smarts complaints and moved to dismiss the case. I also pointed out that another network, Islacom, was allowed to provide such service without prior NTC approval. The National Telecommunications Commission (NTC) ruled that both Smart and Globe were “equally blameworthy” and issued an Order penalizing both on the ground of providing SMS under Value Added Services (VAS) without prior approval from the NTC. The Court of Appeals sustained the NTC Order. ISSUES Whether or not: (1) Globe may be required to secure prior NTC approval before providing SMS or texting services; (2) SMS is a VAS under Public telecommunications Act (PTA) of 1995; RULING (1) NO. The NTC may not legally require Globe to secure its approval for Globe to continue providing SMS. This does not imply though that NTC lacks authority to regulate SMS or to
classify it as VAS. However, the move should be implemented properly, through unequivocal regulations applicable to all entities that are similarly situated, and in an even-handed manner. This should not be interpreted, however, as removing SMS from the ambit of jurisdiction and review by the NTC. The NTC will continue to exercise, by way of its broad grant, jurisdiction over Globe and Smart’s SMS offerings, including questions of rates and customer complaints. Yet caution must be had. Much complication could have been avoided had the NTC adopted a proactive position, promulgating the necessary rules and regulations to cope up with the advent of the technologies it superintends. With the persistent advent of new offerings in the telecommunications industry, the NTC’s role will become more crucial than at any time before. (2) NO. There is no legal basis under the PTA or the memorandum circulars promulgated by the NTC to denominate SMS as VAS, and any subsequent determination by the NTC on whether SMS is VAS should be made with proper regard for due process and in conformity with the PTA. The Court realizes that the PTA is not intended to constrain the industry within a cumbersome regulatory regime. The policy as pre-ordained by legislative fiat renders the traditionally regimented business in an elementary free state to make business decisions, avowing that it is under this atmosphere that the industry would prosper. It is disappointing at least if the deregulation thrust of the law is skirted deliberately. But it is ignominious if the spirit is defeated through a crazy quilt of vague, overlapping rules that are implemented haphazardly.
