09 Admin Digests - Pg 1-28

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | B2015

Qua Chee Gan v. Deportation Board

country, and that the Board has no jurisdiction to entertain such charges. This was denied and so Chee Gan et al. filed with the court a petition for habeas corpus and/or prohibition. The court also issued a writ of preliminary injunction restraining the Deportation Board from hearing Deportation charges against them until after the petition of habeas corpus was resolved.

September 30, 1963 Barrera, J. Dave Anastacio

After trial, the court upheld the validity of the delegation by the president to the Deportation Board of his power to conduct investigations to determine the alien’s presence in this country would be injurious to the security, welfare and interest of the State. The court also sustained the power of the deportation Board to issue warrant of arrest and fix bonds for the alien's temporary release pending investigation of charges against him, since the power to arrest and fix the amount of the bond of the arrested alien is essential to and complement the power to deport aliens pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code. Chee Gan et al. appealed.

SUMMARY: Aliens were charged with violating the prohibition on purchasing dollars without proper license from the Central Bank of the Phils. Warrants for their arrest were issued. They sought to dismiss the charges against them on the grounds that the Deportation Board did not have jurisdiction to try the case. Lower court ruled that the Deportation Board had the authority to issue warrants and deport aliens. SC held that the Deportation Board has authority to deport, but not issue warrants of arrest. DOCTRINE: Under the express terms of our Constitution, it is doubtful whether the arrest of an individual may be ordered by any authority other than the judge if the purpose is merely to determine the existence of a probable cause, leading to an administrative investigation. The Constitution does not distinguish between warrants in a criminal case and administrative warrants in administrative proceedings. One suspected of a violation of an administrative nature is entitled to a determination of the probable cause against him, by a judge.

ISSUES: I. WON the charges constitute a ground to deport- YES II. WON the President has the power to deport- YES III. WON the President can delegate this power to the Deportation Board- YES IV. WON the Deportation Board has authority to issue warrants of arrest- NO RATIO:

FACTS: Special Prosecutor Emilio L. Galang charged Qua Chee Gan, James Uy, Daniel Dy alias Dee Pac, Chan Tiong Yu, Chua Chu Tian, Chua Lim Pao alias Jose Chua, and Basilio King before the Deportation Board, with having purchased U.S. dollars in the total sum of $130,000.00, without the necessary license from the Central Bank of the Philippines, of remitting them to Hongkong, and attempting to bribe officers of the Philippine and US Governments to evade prosecution. Following the deportation charges, a warrant for the arrest of said aliens was issued by the presiding member of the Deportation Board. Upon filing bond, Chee Gan et al. were provisionally set free.

I. WON the charges constitute a ground to deport- YES The charges constitute an act of profiteering, hoarding or blackmarketing of U.S. dollars, in violation of the Central Bank regulations — an economic sabotage — which is a ground for deportation under the provisions of Republic Act 503 amending Section 37 of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. The President may order the deportation of these petitioners if after investigation they are shown to have committed the act charged. II. WON the Deportation Board has the power to deportYES Under Commonwealth Act No. 613 (Immigration Act of

Chee Gan et al. filed a joint motion to dismiss in the Deportation Board based on the grounds that the charge does not constitute legal ground for deportation of aliens from this

1


1940), the Commissioner of Immigration was empowered to effect the arrest and expulsion of an alien, after previous determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of ground or grounds therefor (Sec- 37). This law, however, did not intend to delimit or concentrate the exercise of the power to deport on the Immigration Commissioner alone, because in its Section 52, it provides:.

the Board of Commissioners, under Section 37 of Commonwealth Act No. 613. III. WON the President can delegate this power to the Deportation Board- YES There is no doubt that the President's power of investigation may be delegated. Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code provides for a "prior investigation, conducted by said Executive (the President) or his authorized agent." Executive Order No. 33 of President Quezon created the Deportation Board to receive complaints against aliens charged to be undesirable, to conduct investigation, and make the corresponding recommendation. Since then, the Deportation Board has been conducting the investigation as the authorized agent of the President.

SEC. 52. This Act is in substitution for and supersedes all previous laws relating to the entry of aliens into the Philippines, and their exclusion, deportation, and repatriation therefrom, with the exception of section sixty-nine of Act Numbered Twenty-seven hundred and eleven which shall continue in force and effect: ..." (Comm. Act No. 613).

reads:.

Section 69 of Act No. 2711 (Revised Administrative Code)

IV. WON the Deportation Board has authority to issue warrants of arrest- NO Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, unlike Commonwealth Act No. 613, does not provide the President with specific power issue warrants of arrest. It must be why President Roxas for the first time, saw it necessary to issue his Executive Order No. 69, requiring the filing of a bond to secure appearance of the alien under investigation. It did not authorize the arrest of the respondent. It was only on when President Quirino reorganized the Deportation Board by virtue of his Executive Order No. 398, that the Board was authorized motu proprio or upon the filing of formal charges by the Special Prosecutor of the Board, to issue the warrant for the arrest of the alien complained of and to hold him under detention during the investigation.

SEC. 69 Deportation of subject to foreign power. — A subject of a foreign power residing in the Philippines shall not be deported, expelled, or excluded from said Islands or repatriated to his own country by the President of the Philippines except upon prior investigation, conducted by said Executive or his authorized agent, of the ground upon which Such action is contemplated. In such case the person concerned shall be informed of the charge or charges against him and he shall be allowed not less than these days for the preparation of his defense. He shall also have the right to be heard by himself or counsel, to produce witnesses in his own behalf, and to crossexamine the opposing witnesses."

While this did not expressly confer on the President the authority to deport undesirable aliens, unlike the express grant to the Commissioner of Immigration under Commonwealth Act No. 613, the fact that a procedure was provided for the President’s deportation of an alien-which was expressly exempted from the repealing effect of the Immigration Act of 1940-is a clear indication of the legislature’s recognition of the Executive’s power to deport. Many court decisions sanction this executive power as well.

Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, upon which the President's power to deport relies, does not provide for the power to arrest, but the Solicitor General argues that the law could not have denied to the Chief Executive acts which are absolutely necessary to carry into effect the power of deportation. In this connection, it must be remembered that the right of an individual to be secure in his person is guaranteed by the Constitution. (Sec 1, Art. III, Bill of Rights, Philippine Constitution). Under the express terms of our Constitution, it is doubtful whether the arrest of an individual may be ordered by any authority other than the judge if the purpose is merely to

The deportation of an undesirable alien may be effected in two ways: by order of the President, after due investigation, pursuant to Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, and by the Commissioner of Immigration, upon recommendation by

2


determine the existence of a probable cause, leading to an administrative investigation. The Constitution does not distinguish between warrants in a criminal case and administrative warrants in administrative proceedings. One suspected of a violation of an administrative nature is entitled to a determination of the probable cause against him, by a judge. The contention of the Solicitor General that the arrest of a foreigner is necessary to carry into effect the power of deportation is valid only when there is already an order of deportation.

JBL Reyes alycat SUMMARY: The Calacday boys came to the Philippines from Hong Kong, seeking Filipino citizenship. It was found that they were the sons of one Isaac Calacday, a Filipino. However, Isaac Calacday confessed that the boys were not his sons (although such confession was later retracted). Commissioner Vivo issued warrants of arrest against the Calacday boys, for them to be brought before the Commissioner so they may show cause why they should not be deported. The Calacday boys filed a civil case before the CFI (with Hon. Montesa as judge) to prohibit their deportation. The CFI ruled that the Commissioner could not summarily order the arrest and deportation of the Calacday boys without giving them a chance to be heard. The SC held that the CFI is without jurisdiction to restrain the deportation proceedings of the Calacday boys. Nevertheless, the issuance of warrants of arrest conflicts with Sec. 1 of the Bill of Rights.

The fact that the Constitution itself, as well as the statute relied upon, prescribe the manner by which the warrant may be issued, conveys the intent to make the issuance of such warrant dependent upon conditions the determination of the existence of which requires the use of discretion by the person issuing the same. The discretion of whether a warrant of arrest shall issue or not is personal to the one upon whom the authority devolves. And authorities are to the effect that while ministerial duties may be delegated, official functions requiring the exercise of discretion and judgment, may not be so delegated. Indeed, an implied grant of power that would serve the curtailment or limitation on the fundamental right of a person, such as his security to life and liberty, must be viewed with caution.

DOCTRINE: The power to determine probable cause for warrants of arrest is limited to judges exclusively. The Commissioner of Immigration has no power to authorize the arrest of the subjects of a deportation proceeding whose illegal entry or offense has not yet been established. FACTS:  Private respondents, seven males surnamed “Calacday” (Let’s call them the Calacday boys haha) arrived in the Philippines from Hong Kong in 1959. Upon their arrival, they sought admission as Filipino citizens.  A board of special inquiry found them to be the legitimate sons of Isaac Calacday, a Filipino. The Calacday boys were thus admitted into the country, the Bureau of Immigration issuing each an identification certification as a Filipino citizen.  Isaac Calacday confessed that the Calacday boys were not his sons. However, he later retracted his confession, claiming that he was only angry at them for not giving him money.  Commissioner of Immigration Vivo issued warrants of arrest against the Calacday boys, stating in their warrants their deportability under the Philippine Immigration Act. The warrants directed any immigration office/ officer to bring the Calacday boys before the Commissioner, for

RULING: IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, Executive Order No. 398, series of 1951, insofar as it empowers the Deportation Board to issue warrant of arrest upon the filing of formal charges against an alien or aliens and to fix bond and prescribe the conditions for the temporary release of said aliens, is declared illegal. As a consequence, the order of arrest issued by the respondent Deportation Board is declared null and void and the bonds filed pursuant to such order of arrest, decreed cancelled. With the foregoing modification, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed. No costs. So ordered.

Commissioner Vivo v. Hon. Montesa July 29, 1968

3




 



them to show cause why they should not be deported. One was arrested (Manuel), the others remained at large. The Calacday boys filed a civil case before the Court of First Instance (with Hon. Montesa as judge) a civil case praying for three principal reliefs: (1) to restrain the arrest of those who have not been arrested; (2) to release Manuel; (3) and to prohibit the deportation of the Calacday boys, as they are Filipinos. The Commissioner questioned the propriety of the remedy of prohibition, insisting that habeas corpus is the proper one. The CFI invoked its general jurisdiction, which includes prohibition, on the ground that habeas corpus would be proper only as to Manuel, who had only been arrested, but not the others. The CFI ruled that the Commissioner could not summarily order the arrest and deportation of the Calacday boys without giving them a chance to be heard.

citizenship or alienage of the Calacday boys. Therefore, there is nothing so far for the courts to review. The CFI misapprehended the import of the warrants issued. The warrants required that the Calacday boys be brought to the immigration authorities to show cause why they should not be deported, and not to be deported per se. There was no case of “summarily arresting and deporting.” The Calacday boys have submitted to the Court documents in support of their claim to Philippine citizenship, but the proper procedure would be for them to submit these documents as evidence to show cause why they should not be deported. Nevertheless, the issuance of warrants conflicts of arrest conflicts with Sec. 1 of the Bill of Rights. The power to determine probable cause for warrants of arrest is limited to judges exclusively. Qua Chee Gan v. Deportation Board – The EO prescribing the procedure for deportation of aliens only required the filing of a bond by an alien, but did not authorize his arrest. Morano v. Vivo – The Bill of Rights does not require judicial intervention in the execution of a final order of deportation. There is no reason why the cautionary bond requirement of the EO should not apply to deportation proceedings. Such notice and bonds suffice to ensure the subject’s appearance at the hearings. But as long as illegal entry or offense of the Calacday boys has not yet been established, their arrest upon administrative warrant violates the provisions of the Bill of Rights.

ISSUE: 1. Does the CFI have jurisdiction to restrain the deportation proceedings of the Calacday boys? NO 2. May the Commissioner of Immigration issue warrants of arrest? NO RATIO: The CFI is without jurisdiction to restrain the deportation proceedings of the Calacday boys. These proceedings are within the jurisdiction of the immigration authorities, due to the Philippine Immigration Act. Porta Perez v. Board of Special Inquiry – This case was not one where Philippine citizenship was admitted or conclusively appeared, to respondents were allowed to continue proceedings that had already begun by them until they have determined whether or not petitioners were aliens. Miranda v. Deportation Board – A mere plea of citizenship does not divest the Board of its jurisdiction over the case. When the petition for certiorari and prohibition was filed, deportation proceedings had already been started but not yet completed. The Board of Commissioners had not yet rendered any decision. The Calacday boys were then, not yet being deported. Before the Board reaches a decision as to deportation, it has to conduct a hearing where the main issue will be the

RULING: The writ prayed for is granted, and the order of the CFI set aside.

Santos v. Commissioner Bureau of Immigration November 29, 1976 Fernando, J. sai SUMMARY: Lucio Santos filed petition for habeas corpus because he was detained by virtue of the order of Commissioner. Lower Court granted his release. Commissioner appealed stating that lower court is

4


Commissioner also claimed that the lower Court is without jurisdiction because the subject matter of the action which is the deportation of Santos is vested by law upon the Board of Commissioners after due hearing and determination of the existence of grounds for deportation; and that petitioner failed to exhaust available administrative remedies.  Lower Court however ordered the release Santos upon posting of P5000 bond without passing on the issue of citizenship. The deportation proceeding was still pending at the time of this order and release was provisional.  Commissioner appealed

without jurisdiction because the subject matter of the action which is the deportation of Santos is vested by law upon the Board of Commissioners after due hearing and determination of the existence of grounds for deportation DOCTRINE: As in the case of Qua Chee Gan, Under the express terms of our Constitution, it is doubtful whether the arrest of an individual may be ordered by any authority other than the judge if the purpose is merely to determine the existence of a probable cause, leading to an administrative investigation. The Constitution does not distinguish between warrants in a criminal case and administrative warrants in administrative proceedings. . Commissioner could order the arrest of an alien only after "there is already an order of deportation."

ISSUE: Whether the power of the President to conduct an investigation leading to deportation carries with it the authority to order an arrest.

FACTS: Application for habeas corpus was filed by Lucio Santos, who was detained under a warrant of arrest issued by Commissioner of the Bureau of Immigration on the ground of his being a Chinese citizen who entered the country illegally. Lower Court issued a writ of habeas corpus commanding the Commissioner of Immigration to produce before it on January 19, 1966 at 8:30 A.M. the person of Lucio Santos; to explain under what circumstances he was arrested and is being detained; and to show cause why he should not be set at liberty. Commissioner asked the lower Court for 3 days within which to submit his written return which was granted and the hearing was set anew for January 25, 1966 January 21, 1966, Commissioner filed his return to the write of habeas corpus which stated that Santos is not a Filipino citizen but a Chinese subject whose real name is Ong Hiong King; that petitioner illegally entered this country from Hongkong and was detained by virtue of a warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration; that deportation proceedings against him were pending hearing before the Board of Special Inquiry; that he had confessed that he was an illegal entrant to this country; that based on his own application for registration with the Philippine Consulate General in Hongkong for documentation as a Filipino, it is evident that he is a Chinese because, even if he was born of a Filipino mother and a Chinese father, his election of Filipino citizenship was made much too late and thus he was in estoppel to claim or elect Filipino citizenship.

In the Qua Chee Gan whose ponente was Justice Barrera this was answered in the negative. Thus: "Under the express terms of our Constitution, it is therefore, even doubtful whether the arrest of an individual may be ordered by any authority other than the judge if the purpose is merely to determine the existence of a probable cause, leading to an administrative investigation. The Constitution does not distinguish between warrants in a criminal case and administrative warrants in administrative proceedings. And, if one suspected of having committed a crime is entitled to a determination of the probable cause against him, by a judge, why should one suspected of a violation of an administrative nature deserve less guarantee? Of course it is different if the order of arrest is issued to carry out a final finding of a violation, either by an executive or legislative officer or agency duly authorized for the purpose, as then the warrant is not that mentioned in the Constitution which is issuable only on probable cause. Such, for example, would be a warrant of arrest to carry out a final order of deportation, or to effect compliance of an order of contempt. The contention of the Solicitor General that the arrest of a foreigner is necessary to carry into effect the power of deportation is valid only when, as already stated, there is already an order of deportation. To carry out the order of deportation, the President obviously has the power to order the arrest of the deportee But, certainly, during the investigation, it is not indispensable that the alien be arrested."

5

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | B2015 their suspicion of the activities of the three petitioners that they are pedophiles, coupled with their association with other suspected pedophiles, are not valid legal grounds for their arrest and detention unless they are caught in the act. They further allege that being a pedophile is not punishable by any Philippine Law nor is it a crime to be a pedophile.

 It should not escape attention that under the present Constitution, a warrant of arrest may issue on a showing of "probable cause to be determined by the judge, or such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law, This case, however, is governed by the former Constitution. The conclusion reached by the lower court, therefore, finds support in Qua Chee Gan. Commissioner could order the arrest of an alien only after "there is already an order of deportation." Such was not the case here.

DOCTRINE: "The requirement of probable cause, to be determined by a Judge, does not extend to deportation proceedings." (Morano vs. Vivo, supra, citing Tiu Chun Hai vs. Commissioner, infra). There need be no "truncated" recourse to both judicial and administrative warrants in a single deportation proceeding.

DISPOSITIVE: LC affirmed

The foregoing does not deviate from the ruling in Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board that "under the express terms of our [1935] Constitution, it is therefore even doubtful whether the arrest of an individual may be ordered by any authority other than a judge if the purpose is merely to determine the existence of a probable cause, leading to an administrative investigation." For, as heretofore stated, probable cause had already been shown to exist before the warrants of arrest were issued.

Harvey v. Defensor-Santiago June 28, 1988 Melencio-Herrera Paolo Q. Bernardo

FACTS:

SUMMARY: Andrew Harvey, John Sherman, and Adrian Van

Petitioners Andrew Harvey, John Sherman (both American nationals residing at Pagsanjan, Laguna), and Adrian Van Elshout, (Dutch citizen also residing at Pagsanjan, Laguna) were apprehended from their respective residences by agents of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) by virtue of orders issued by respondent Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago of the CID.

Elshout were foreign naitonals who were apprehended from their respective residences in Pagsanjan, Laguna by agents of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) by virtue of orders issued by Commissioner Miriam Defensor Santiago of the CID. In a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, Harvey, Sherman and Elshout question the validity of their detention on the following grounds: 1) There is no provision in the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 nor under Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, which gives the Commissioner any authority to arrest and detain the three petitioners pending determination of the existence of a probable cause leading to an administrative investigation. 2) Defensor-Santiago violated Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures since the CID agents were not clothed with valid Warrants of arrest, search and seizure as required by the said provision. 3) Mere confidential information made to the CID agents and

Harvey, Sherman, and Elshout were three among 22 suspected alien pedophiles who were apprehended after three months of close surveillance by CID agents in Pagsanjan, Laguna. Two days after apprehension, the other 17 of the 22 arrested aliens opted for selfdeportation, leaving the country. One was released for lack of evidence; another was charged not for being a pedophile but for working without a valid working visa. Seized were rolls of photo negatives and photos of the suspected child prostitutes shown ing salacious poses as well as boys and girls engaged in the sex act. There were also posters and other literature advertising the child prostitutes.

6


ISSUES: WON the arrest of Harvey, Sherman, and Elshout were valid.

Warrants of Arrest were issued by Defensor-Santiago against the three for violation of Sections 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code On the same date, the Board of Special Inquiry III commenced trial against the latter.

RATIO:

1. Yes. The arrest of Harvey, Sherman, and Elshout were valid. a. The right against unreasonable searches and seizures guaranteed by Article III, Section 2 of the 1987 Constitution, is available to all persons, including aliens, whether accused of crime or not. i. One of the constitutional requirements of a valid search warrant or warrant of arrest is that it must be based upon probable cause.  Probable cause has been defined as referring to "such facts and circumstances antecedent to the issuance of the warrant that in themselves are sufficient to induce a cautious man to rely on them and act in pursuance thereof." ii. The 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedur further provides that an arrest without a warrant may be effected by a peace officer or even a private person (1) when such person has committed, actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense in his presence; and (2) when an offense has, in fact, been committed and he has personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it (Rule 113, Section 5) b. In this case, the arrest of petitioners was based on probable cause determined after close surveillance for three (3) months during which period their activities were monitored. The existence of probable cause justified the arrest and the seizure of the photo negatives, photographs and posters without warrant. i. Those articles were seized as an incident to a lawful arrest and, are therefore, admissible in evidence. ii. Even assuming arguendo that the arrest of petitioners was not valid at its inception, the records show that prior formal deportation charges have been filed against them, as undesirable aliens. Warrants of arrest were issued against them thereafter. A hearing is presently being conducted by a Board of Special Inquiry. The restraint against their persons, therefore, has become legal.  That the three petitioners were not "caught in the act" does not make their arrest illegal. They were found with young boys in their respective rooms, the ones with Sherman being naked. Under those circumstances the CID agents had reasonable

The three petitioners filed an Urgent Petition for Release Under Bond alleging that their health was being seriously affected by their continuous detention. Upon recommendation of the Board of Commissioners for their provisional release, Defensor-Santiago ordered the CID doctor to examine petitioners, who certified that the three petitioners were healthy. A Petition for Bail filed by the three was denied by respondent considering the certification by the CID physician that petitioners were healthy. Harvey filed a Manifestation/Motion stating that he had "finally agreed to a self-deportation" and praying that he be "provisionally released for at least 15 days and placed under the custody of Atty. Asinas before he voluntarily departs the country." The Board of Special Inquiry allowed provisional release of five days under certain conditions. However, it appears that on the same date that the Manifestation/ Motion was filed, Harvey and his co-petitioners had already filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. In the petition, Harvey, Sherman and Elshout question the validity of their detention on the following grounds: 4) There is no provision in the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 nor under Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code, which gives the Commissioner any authority to arrest and detain the three petitioners pending determination of the existence of a probable cause leading to an administrative investigation. 5) Defensor-Santiago violated Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution prohibiting unreasonable searches and seizures since the CID agents were not clothed with valid Warrants of arrest, search and seizure as required by the said provision. 6) Mere confidential information made to the CID agents and their suspicion of the activities of the three petitioners that they are pedophiles, coupled with their association with other suspected pedophiles, are not valid legal grounds for their arrest and detention unless they are caught in the act. They further allege that being a pedophile is not punishable by any Philippine Law nor is it a crime to be a pedophile.

7

c.

d.

e.

f.

g.

h.


grounds to believe that petitioners. had committed "pedophilia." iii. At any rate, the filing by the three petitioners of a petition to be released on bail is considered a waiver of any irregularity attending their arrest and estops them from questioning its validity. The Court noted that the specific constraints in both the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions contemplate prosecutions essentially criminal in nature. Deportation proceedings, on the other hand, are administrative in character. An order of deportation is never construed as a punishment. It is preventive, not a penal process. It need not be conducted strictly in accordance with ordinary Court proceedings. The ruling in Vivo vs. Montesa that "the issuance of warrants of arrest by the Commissioner of Immigration, solely for purposes of investigation and before a final order of deportation is issued, conflicts with paragraph 3, Section I of Article III of the [1935] Constitution" is not invocable herein. Commissioner Defensor-Santiago's Warrant of Arrest did not order the three petitioners to appear and show cause why they should not be deported. They were issued specifically "for violation of Sections 37, 45 and 46 of the Immigration Act and Section 69 of the Revised Administrative Code." Before that, prior deportation proceedings had been commenced against them as undesirable aliens and the arrest was a step preliminary to their possible deportation. "The requirement of probable cause, to be determined by a Judge, does not extend to deportation proceedings." (Morano vs. Vivo, supra, citing Tiu Chun Hai vs. Commissioner, infra). There need be no "truncated" recourse to both judicial and administrative warrants in a single deportation proceeding. The foregoing does not deviate from the ruling in Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board that "under the express terms of our [1935] Constitution, it is therefore even doubtful whether the arrest of an individual may be ordered by any authority other than a judge if the purpose is merely to determine the existence of a probable cause, leading to an administrative investigation." For, as heretofore stated, probable cause had already been shown to exist before the warrants of arrest were issued. What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien intended to be arrested and deported, that a fair hearing be conducted (Section 37[c]) with the assistance of counsel, if desired, and that the charge be substantiated by competent evidence.

RULING: The Writ of Habeas Corpus is denied. The warrants of arrest ordered by CID Commissioner Defensor-Santiago are valid.

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR HABEAS CORPUS OF: LUCIEN TRAN VAN NGHIA vs. HON. RAMON J. LIWAG, Acting Commissioner of the Commission on Immigration and Deportation (CID) and JOHN DOES, agents of the CID July 13, 1989 Fernan, C.J. Borile

SUMMARY: Lucien Tran Van Nghia, a French immigrant, was arrested because of a complaint filed by his landlord accusing him of being an undesirable alien for "committing acts inimical to public safety and progress." Commissioner Liwag ordered his arrest without a warrant of arrest. Nghia filed the case for Habeas Corpus questioning the legality of his detention and his arrest. SC ruled that his arrest was legal. Even if arrest was illegal subsequent events cured the illegality of his arrest such as his release and initiation of formal deportation proceedings. DOCTRINE: - The requirement of probable cause to be determined by a Judge, does not extend to deportation proceedings.' (Morano vs. Vivo, supra, citing Tiu Chun Hai vs. Commissioner, infra). There need be no 'truncated' recourse to both judicial and administrative warrants in a single deportation proceeding. - What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien intended to be arrested and deported, that a fair hearing be conducted (Section 37 [c] with the assistance of counsel, if desired, and that the charge be substantiated by competent evidence. FACTS: - Lucien Tran Van Nghia is a French national who came to the Philippines as a temporary visitor, but his status was later changed to that of an immigrant based on his representation that he is financially capable and will invest in the Philippines.

8




- On May 28, 1987, CID Commissioner Ramon Liwag received a sworn complaint from a certain Dionisio G. Cabrera, Jr., allegedly Nghia's landlord, accusing Nghia of being an undesirable alien for "committing acts inimical to public safety and progress." - Liwag issued a mission order to a team of 7 CID agents for them "to locate and bring subject to Intelligence Division for proper disposition" and "submit report." - CID agents went to Nghia's residence in Sta. Ana to “invite” the latter to the CID headquarters for verification of his status but Nghia and his then lady companion reportedly locked themselves inside their bedroom and refused to talk to the agents. - The immigration agents then sought the assistance of members of the WPD. Once again Nghia adamantly refused to be taken in and in the ensuing struggle, both petitioner and the lawmen were injured. Finally, Nghia was subdued and immediately taken to the CID Intelligence Office. - A warrant of arrest was issued by respondent Commissioner on the same day but there is nothing in the records to convince the SC that said warrant was served on Nghia prior to his apprehension. - Nghia's counsel filed a petition for habeas corpus questioning the validity of Nghia’s detention by respondent Commissioner ISSUES: 1. WON the arrest and detention of Nghia by the Immigration Commissioner preparatory to deportation proceedings legal. YES RATIO: 1. The SC held the arrest to be valid saying that the requirement of probable cause to be determined by a Judge, does not extend to deportation proceedings.  Argument of Nghia: Liwag has no power, authority or jurisdiction to cause his arrest because under the 1987 Constitution, it is provided that "no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce ... ."  SC Answer: (Note: I’m directly quoting the SC decision since the SC only quoted from another SC decision and I’m doubting the ratio of this case because its inconsistent with other cases. Compare Qua Chee, Vivo and Salazar case vs Harvey and this case.)





9

The aforesaid argument raised by petitioner has been resolved in the case of Harvey vs. Defensor-Santiago,G.R. No. 82544, June 28, 1988, where the Court, through Madame Justice Melencio-Herrera, said: o The requirement of probable cause to be determined by a Judge, does not extend to deportation proceedings.' (Morano vs. Vivo, supra, citing Tiu Chun Hai vs. Commissioner, infra). There need be no 'truncated' recourse to both judicial and administrative warrants in a single deportation proceeding. o The foregoing does not deviate from the ruling in Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board (G.R. No. 10280, September 30,1963, 9 SCRA 27 [1963] reiterated in Vivo vs. Montesa, supra, that 'under the express terms of our Constitution (the 1935 Constitution)), it is therefore even doubtful whether the arrest of an individual may be ordered by authority other than a judge if the purpose is merely to determine the existence of a probable cause, leading to an administrative investigation. o What is essential is that there should be a specific charge against the alien intended to be arrested and deported, that a fair hearing be conducted (Section 37 [c] with the assistance of counsel, if desired, and that the charge be substantiated by competent evidence. ... . The particular circumstances obtaining in the case at bar have seriously placed on doubt the legality and propriety of petitioner's apprehension by respondent Commissioner. For unlike in the Harvey case where the warrantless capture of two suspected alien pedophiles was based on probable cause ascertained only after close surveillance for a three-month period during which their activities were monitored, herein petitioner was "invited" by a combined team of CID agents and police officers at his apartment unit on the strength of a mission order issued by the Commissioner on Immigration based on a sworn complaint of a single individual. The essential requisite of probable cause was conspicuously absent.

BUT even assuming that the arrest of Nghia was not legal at the beginning, certain events have supervened to render his


petition moot and academic or to otherwise cure whatever defect there was at the inception of his arrest. o Firstly, Nghia was no longer under confinement because he was released upon the posting and approval of a personal bailbond during the pendency of the administrative proceedings by the CID or until further orders of the Court.  The general rule in a number of cases is that the release, whether permanent or temporary, of a detained person renders the petition for habeas corpus moot and academic, unless there are restraints attached to his release which precludes freedom of action, in which case the Court can still inquire into the nature of his involuntary restraint under the Villavicencio vs. Lukban rule.  This case is different from the case of Moncupa vs. Enrile, supra, where the Court granted the writ of habeas corpus inspite of the fact that petitioner Moncupa had been temporarily released from detention on orders of the defense minister because it was shown that attached to his discharge was the prohibition to travel, to change his abode and to grant interviews to members of the mass media without official permission. He was also ordered to report regularly to the military authorities. There was still restraint although not physically.  Nghia was not similarly restrained. o Secondly, records show that formal deportation proceedings have been initiated against Nghia before the Board of Special Inquiry of the CID. 10 The restraint (if any) against Nghia's person has therefore become legal. The writ of habeas corpus has served its purpose.

license to operate a recruitment agency, its Administrator Achacoso issued a Closure and Seizure Order. The team tasked to implement said Order went to Salazar’s residence and confiscated assorted costumes. Through a letter, Salazar was asking for the return of the confiscated items, alleging that the seizure was contrary to law for being a violation of her right to privacy, and for being done without giving her prior notice and hearing. Before the POEA could answer, Salazar filed a petition for prohibition. The SC held that the POEA (or the Sec. of Labor) may not validly issue search or arrest warrants. DOCTRINE: The Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. 1. Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no other, who may issue warrants of arrest and search: 2. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the President or the Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested, following a final order of deportation, for the purpose of deportation. FACTS: Rosalie Tesoro of Pasay City in a sworn statement filed with the POEA, charged petitioner Hortencia Salazar with illegal recruitment (Salazar was Tesoro’s manager. When she returned to the Phil. from Japan, Salazar allegedly failed to give her back her PECC Card.). Public respondent Atty. Ferdinand Marquez sent Salazar a telegram directing him to appear to the POEA regarding the complaint against him. On the same day, after finding out that Salazar had no license to operate a recruitment agency, public respondent Administrator Tomas Achacoso issued him the challenged Closure and Seizure Order. The Order informed Salazar of the closure of his recruitment agency and of the seizure of the documents and paraphernalia being used or intended to be used as the means of committing illegal recruitment, it having verified that Salazar has— (1) No valid license or authority from the DOLE to recruit and deploy workers for overseas employment; (2) Committed/are committing acts prohibited under Article 34 LC in relation to Article 38 of the same code. A team was then tasked to implement the said Order. The group, accompanied by mediamen and Mandaluyong policemen, went to Salazar’s residence (in Mandaluyong). They found that Salazar was operating Hannalie Dance Studio. Before entering, they served the order to a certain Mrs. Flora Salazar, who voluntarily let them

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED.

SALAZAR v. ACHACOSO March 14, 1990 Sarmiento, J Denn

SUMMARY: Tesoro, charged her manager Salazar with illegal recruitment. When the POEA found out the Salazar had no

10


in. Flora informed them that Hannalie was accredited with Moreman Development. However, when required to show credentials, she was unable to produce any. Inside the studio, the team chanced upon twelve talent performers — practicing a dance number and saw about 20 more waiting outside. The team confiscated assorted costumes, which were duly receipted for. Salazar filed with POEA a letter requesting for the return of the seized properties, on the ground that the seizure was contrary to law and against the will of the owner. She alleged that: (a) she was not given prior notice and hearing, (b) seizure violated sec 2 of the Bill of Rights, and (c) the properties were confiscated against her will and were done with unreasonable force and intimidation. Before POEA could answer, Salazar filed the instant petition (while the POEA filed a criminal complaint against her).

-

PRESENT CASE: for prohibition; concerns the validity of the power of the Sec. of Labor to issue warrants of arrest and seizure under Art. 38 LC (prohibiting illegal recruitment). Although the acts sought to be barred are already fait accompli, thereby making prohibition too late, the SC considered the petition as one for certiorari in view of the grave public interest involved.

ISSUE: May the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (or the Secretary of Labor) validly issue warrants of search and seizure (or arrest) under Article 38 of the Labor Code? - NO RATIO: - Under the new Constitution, it is only a judge who may issue warrants of search and arrest. (Art. III, Sec.2)1 - Ponsica v. Ignalaga: mayors may not exercise this power. This power which was previously given to mayors was abrogated by the 1987 Constitution.  The constitutional proscription has thereby been manifested that thenceforth, the function of determining probable cause and issuing, on the basis thereof, warrants of arrest or search warrants, may be validly exercised only by judges, this being evidenced by the elimination in the present

SC RULING: The Secretary of Labor, not being a judge, may no longer issue search or arrest warrants. Hence, the authorities must go through the judicial process. To that extent, SC declared Article 38(c) LC unconstitutional and of no force and effect.

1

"no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the person or things to be seized."

Constitution of the phrase, "such other responsible officer as may be authorized by law" found in the counterpart provision of said 1973 Constitution, who, aside from judges, might conduct preliminary investigations and issue warrants of arrest or search warrants. Presidential Anti-Dollar Salting Task Force v. CA: neither may it be done by a mere prosecuting body. Art. 38(c) LC, as now written, was entered as an amendment by PD Nos. 1920 and 2018 of Marcos, to PD 1693, in the exercise of his legislative powers. o PD 1693: the then Minister of Labor merely exercised recommendatory powers (to recommend the arrest and detention of any person engaged in illegal recruitment). o PD 1920 (May 1, 1984): with the avowed purpose of giving more teeth to the campaign against illegal recruitment, it gave the Minister of Labor arrest and closure powers (to cause the arrest and detention of such non-licensee or non-holder of authority if after proper investigation it is determined that his activities constitute a danger to national security and public order or will lead to further exploitation of job-seekers… shall order the closure of companies, establishment and entities found to be engaged in illegal recruitment). o PD 2018 (Jan. 26, 1986): gave the Labor Minister search and seizure powers as well (to order the search of the office or premises and seizure of documents, paraphernalia, properties and other implements used in illegal recruitment activities and the closure of companies, establishment and entities found to be engaged in illegal recruitment).

On SolGen's reliance on the case of Morano v. Vivo

11


SC: Reliance not well taken. Vivo involved a deportation case, governed by the defunct Revised Administrative Code and by the Immigration Law. SC has ruled that in deportation cases, an arrest (of an undesirable alien) ordered by the President or his duly authorized representatives, in order to carry out a final decision of deportation is valid. It is valid, however, because of the recognized supremacy of the Executive in matters involving foreign affairs. - The State has the inherent power to deport undesirable aliens. That power may be exercised by the Chief Executive "when he deems such action necessary for the peace and domestic tranquility of the nation." - Justice Johnson: when the Chief Executive finds that there are aliens whose continued presence in the country is injurious to the public interest, "he may, even in the absence of express law, deport them". - The right of a country to expel or deport aliens because their continued presence is detrimental to public welfare is absolute and unqualified.

respondents are ORDERED to return all materials seized as a result of the implementation of Search and Seizure Order No. 1205.

The power of the President to order the arrest of aliens for deportation is, obviously, exceptional. It (the power to order arrests) can not be made to extend to other cases, like the one at bar. Under the Constitution, it is the sole domain of the courts.

But 17 years after being readmitted, the NBI charged him with violations of the Immigration Act. Pursuant to this, the Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation issued an order commanding the arrest of Gatchalian. What is relevant in the SC’s decision is the propriety of the Commissioner’s issuance of the warrant of arrest. The SC declared the issuance of the warrant of arrest as unconstitutional and Gatchalian was declared a Filipino citizen.

BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS v. DELA ROSA May 31, 1991 Bidin, J Diwata SUMMARY: William Gatchalian’s grandfather was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen. A year after, William Gatchalian arrived in the Philippines. Upon his entry, there was an issue as to his exclusion as a Filipino Citizen and an order of exclusion and a warrant of arrest were issued. But not long after, his exclusion was reversed and he was reaffirmed as a Filipino citizen.

On the nature of the seizure order SC: The search and seizure order in question, assuming that it was validly issued, is clearly in the nature of a general warrant. A warrant must identify clearly the things to be seized, otherwise, it is null and void.

DOCTRINE: A warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, to be valid, must be for the sole purpose of executing a final order of deportation. A warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration for purposes of investigation only, as in the case at bar, is null and void for being unconstitutional

For the guidance of the bench and the bar, SC reaffirmed the following principles: 1. Under Article III, Section 2, of the l987 Constitution, it is only judges, and no other, who may issue warrants of arrest and search: 2. The exception is in cases of deportation of illegal and undesirable aliens, whom the President or the Commissioner of Immigration may order arrested, following a final order of deportation, for the purpose of deportation.

The constitution does not distinguish warrants between a criminal case and administrative proceedings. And if one suspected of having committed a crime is entitled to a determination of the probable cause against him, by a judge, why should one suspected of a violation of an administrative nature deserve less guarantee? It is not indispensable that the alleged alien be arrested for purposes of investigation. If the purpose of the issuance of the warrant of arrest is to determine the existence of probable cause, surely, it cannot pass the test of constitutionality for only judges can issue the same (Sec. 2, Art. III, Constitution).

RULING: Petition granted. Article 38, paragraph (c) of the Labor Code is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL and null and void. The

FACTS:

12

Santiago Gatchalian, grandfather of William Gatchalian, was recognized by the Bureau of Immigration as a native born Filipino citizen following the citizenship of natural mother Mariana Gatchalian. A year after, William, then twelve years old, arrived in Manila from Hongkong together with a daughter and a son of Santiago. They had with them certificate of registration and identity issued by the Philippine consulate in Hongkong based on a cablegram bearing the signature of the secretary of foreign affairs, Felixberto Serrano, and sought admission as Filipino citizens.

b.

A month after, the Board of Special Inquiry admitted the Gatchalians as Filipino citizens and issued an identification certificate to William. The board of commissioners was directed by the Secretary of Justice to Review all cases where entry was allowed on the ground that the entrant was a Filipino citizen. Such included the case of William. The Board of Commissioners then reversed and ordered the exclusion of William. A warrant of exclusion was issued and thereafter, a warrant of arrest. The case reached the Acting Commissioner who affirmed William as a Filipino citizen and recalled the warrants of arrest.

c.

Seventeen years after, upon request by the NBI, the Secretary of Justice charged William with violations of the Immigration Act of 1940. The Commissioner of Immigration and Deportation issued an order commanding the arrest of Gatchalian. William posted a cash bond for his release. William filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with injunction with the RTC to enjoin the deportation proceedings. The TRO was granted. d. ISSUES: 1. W/N RTC and not the CA has jurisdiction 2. W/N the arrest of Gatchalian follows as a matter of consequence based on the warrant of exclusion HELD: 1. YES, RTC has jurisdiction because Bureau of Immigration is not a quasi-judicial agency 2. NO, arrest does not follow the exclusion order RATIO: (There are several issues in the case which made it reach 68 pages on iPad. But I will skip the ratio on the irrelevant issue) 1. SKIPPED 2. NO, arrest does not follow the exclusion order a. Sec. 37 (a) of the Immigration Act of 1940 i. The following aliens shall be arrested upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration or of any other officer

e. f. g.

13

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | B2015 designated by him for the purpose and deported upon the warrant of the Commissioner of Immigration after a determination by the Board of Commissioner of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien Hence, in matters of implementing the Immigration Act insofar as deportation of aliens are concerned, the Commissioner of Immigration may issue warrants of arrest only after a determination by the Board of Commissioners of the existence of the ground for deportation as charged against the alien. In other words, a warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, to be valid, must be for the sole purpose of executing a final order of deportation. A warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration for purposes of investigation only, as in the case at bar, is null and void for being unconstitutional Qua Chee Gan vs. Deportation Board: "The constitution does not distinguish warrants between a criminal case and administrative proceedings. And if one suspected of having committed a crime is entitled to a determination of the probable cause against him, by a judge, why should one suspected of a violation of an administrative nature deserve less guarantee?" It is not indispensable that the alleged alien be arrested for purposes of investigation. If the purpose of the issuance of the warrant of arrest is to determine the existence of probable cause, surely, it cannot pass the test of constitutionality for only judges can issue the same (Sec. 2, Art. III, Constitution). A reading of the mission order/warrant of arrest issued by the Commissioner of Immigration, clearly indicates that the same was issued only for purposes of investigation of William Gatchalian. Paragraphs 1 and 3 of the mission order directs the Intelligence Agents/Officers to: xxx xxx xxx 1. Make a warrantless arrest under the Rules of Criminal Procedure, Rule 113, Sec. 5, for violation of the Immigration Act, Sec. 37, para. a; Secs. 45 and 46 Administrative Code; xxx xxx xxx 3. Deliver the suspect to the Intelligence Division and immediately conduct custodial interrogation, after warning the suspect that he has a right to remain silent and a right to counsel; . . . Argument of Commissioner: Arrest was based on the warrant of exclusion SC: The argument has no leg to stand on. The exclusion order wasn’t mentioned in the warrant of arrest In fact, the Board of Special Inquiry, submitted a memorandum to the then Acting Commissioner recommending the

h.

i. j.

k.

l.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | B2015 This is quite long but the relevant portion about arrest is here.

reconsideration of the decision excluding Gatchalian as Filipino citizen. The memorandum inferred that the "very basis of xxx reversing the decision of the Board of Special Inquiry was due to a forged cablegram by the then Secretary of Foreign Affairs, . . ., The Board of Special Inquiry concluded that "(i)f at all, the cablegram only led to the issuance of their Certificate(s) of Identity. It being so, even if the applicants could have entered illegally, the mere fact that they are citizens of the Philippines entitles them to remain in the country." Eventually, then Acting Commissioner admitted Gatchalian as Filipino citizens; recalled the warrant of arrest and revalidated their Identification Certificates. The above order admitting Gatchalian as a Filipino citizen is the last official act of the government on the basis of which William Gatchalian continually exercised the rights of a Filipino citizen to the present. Consequently, the presumption of citizenship lies in favor of William Gatchalian. Dissenting opinion of Davide and Feliciano proposed the reopening of the question of citizenship. Majority: The records of the Bureau of Immigration show that William’s grandfather had been declared to be a Filipino citizen. It is a final decision that forecloses a re-opening of the same 30 years later. The Commissioner do not even question the grandfather’s Philippine citizenship. It is the citizenship of William Gatchalian that is in issue and addressed for determination of the Court in this case. Furthermore, the Commissioner’s position is not enhanced by the fact that Gatchalian’s arrest came 28 years after the alleged cause of deportation arose. i. Section 37 (b) of the Immigration Act: deportation "shall not be effected . . . unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within five (5) years after the cause of deportation arises." In this case, the cause of action and deportation against Gatchalian arose in 1962. However, the warrant of arrest of respondent was issued by Commissioner only 28 long years after. It is clear that the cause of action has already prescribed and by their inaction could not now be validly enforced against William Gatchalian. Furthermore, the warrant of exclusion dated July 6, 1962 was already recalled and the Identification certificate of respondent, among others, was revalidated on March 15, 1973 by the then Acting Commissioner Nituda.

Said paragraph (b) of Section 37 reads in full as follows: (b) Deportation may be effected under clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 paragraph (a) of this section at any time after entry, but shall not be effected under any other clause unless the arrest in the deportation proceedings is made within five years after the cause of deportation arises. Deportation under clauses 3 and 4 shall not be effected if the court or judge thereof, when sentencing the alien, shall recommend to the Commissioner of Immigration that the alien be not deported. (As amended by Sec. 13, R.A. No. 503). Note that the five-year period applies only to clauses other than 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12 of paragraph (a) of the Section. In respect to clauses 2, 7, 8, 11 and 12, the limitation does not apply. (2) Any alien who enters the Philippines after the effective date of this Act, who was not lawfully admissible at the time of entry; Mr. Gatchalian is covered by clause (2); besides, the warrant for his exclusion was issued within a period of five years following his entry. Hence, Davide disagrees with the view advanced in the ponencia that the State can no longer enforce the warrant of exclusion because it is already barred by prescription FELICIANO’S DISSENTING OPINION This is also long but the relevant portions on arrest are the same points that Davide raises. The other importants points made are here. What was involved in 1961 when the supposed children and grandchildren of Santiago Gatchalian first descended upon the Philippines, was the right of a person claiming to be a Philippine citizen to enter for the first time and reside in the Philippines. On the part of the Government, what was at stake was the right to exclude from the country persons who had claimed the right to enter the country as Philippine citizens but who had failed to substantiate such claimed status. Aliens seeking entry into the Philippines do not acquire the right to be admitted into the country by the simple passage of time. Exclusion of persons found not to be entitled to admission as Philippine citizens, must be distinguished from the deportation of aliens, who, after having been initially lawfully admitted into the Philippines, committed acts which rendered them liable to deportation. Normally, aliens excluded are immediately sent back to their country of origin. This is so in cases where the alien has not yet gained a foothold into the country and is still seeking physical admittance. However, when the alien had already physically gained entry but such entry is later found unlawful or devoid of legal basis, the alien can be excluded any time after it is found that he was not lawfully admissible at the time of

DISPOSITIVE: Gatchalian is declared a Filipino Citizen. Commissioner is enjoined from continuing with the deportation proceedings. DAVIDE’S CONCURRING-DISSENTING OPINION

14


his entry. Technically, the alien in this case is being excluded; however, the rules on deportation can be made to apply to him in view of the fact that the cause for his exclusion is discovered only after he had gained physical entry.



Camara v. Municipal Court June 5, 1967 White, J. Jadd Dealino



SUMMARY: Inspectors of the San Francisco Dept. of Public Health’s Division of Housing Inspection sought to examine Camara’s premises due to it being used for residential purposes despite the building’s occupancy permit not allowing such use. The inspectors were never armed with a search warrant. Eventually, Camara was charged with refusal to permit a lawful inspection in violation of the City’s Housing Code. Camara filed a petition for a writ of prohibition. The California Superior Court denied the petition. The District Court of Appeal affirmed the Superior Court’s denial. The Supreme Court of California denied Camara’s petition. The US SC vacated the judgment of the Supreme Court of California.

 



DOCTRINE: 1) Generally, a search of private property without proper consent is "unreasonable" unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant (Stoner v. California, etc.) a. Exception: Frank v. Maryland (The Court upheld the conviction of one who refused to permit a warrantless inspection of private premises for the purposes of locating and abating a suspected public nuisance.) 2) Warrantless administrative searches are significant intrusions upon interests protected by the 4th Amendment, and will be subjected to scrutiny by the Court, particularly as to reasonableness and whether there is an emergency or not.



November 6, 1963: An inspector of the San Francisco Dept. of Public Health’s Division of Housing Inspection entered an apartment to make a routine annual inspection (for possible violations of the City’s Housing Code.) o The building’s manager informed the inspector about Camara’s residential use of a portion of the building. o The inspector sought to make an examination of Camara’s premises on the ground that the building’s occupancy permit did not allow residential use. Camara refused on the ground that the inspector did not have a search warrant. November 8, 1963: The inspector returned (again, with no search warrant.) Camara refused to allow an inspection. Subsequently, a citation was mailed ordering Camara to appear at the District Attorney’s Office. Camara failed to appear. November 22, 1963: 2 inspectors returned to Camara’s apartment, informing him that he was required by law (Sec. 503 of the Housing Code) to permit an inspection. Again, Camara refused to allow them to conduct an inspection as they did not have a search warrant with them. Subsequently, a complaint was filed against Camara, charging him with refusing to permit a lawful inspection in violation of Sec. 507 Camara was arrested and eventually released on bail. He sought to interpose a demurrer, but this was denied. He filed a petition for a writ of prohibition.

ISSUES: 1) WON the arrest of Camara due to his refusal to allow warrantless inspection of his apartment is contrary to the 4th and 14th Amendment 2) WON inspections should only be conducted when the inspector has probable cause to believe that there is a violation. ARGUMENTS OF CAMARA: Sec. 503 is contrary to the 4th and 14th Amendments.

FACTS:

15


1) It authorizes municipal officials to enter a private dwelling without a search warrant and without probable cause to believe that a violation of the Housing Code exists. 2) Therefore, Camara may not be prosecuted under Sec. 507 for refusing an inspection that is unconstitutionallyauthorized by Sec. 503.

ii. The majority in that case upheld the conviction as, in its view, municipal fire/health/housing inspections, at most, touch upon the periphery of interests safeguarded by the 14th Amendment’s protection against official intrusion. 1. Such inspections merely determine whether physical conditions exist which do not comply with the minimum standards in local ordinances. 2. The inspector does not ask the property owner to allow a search for evidence of criminal action, so what is only involved is the right to be secure from intrusion into personal privacy (i.e., less hostile.) 3. Such inspections are designed to be as non-demanding as possible, and that the standard of reasonableness will always guide the inspector. These relate to policy, so those granting warrants should act as “rubber stamps” at most. 4. Finally, public interest demands that such inspections are allowed. iii. The Court agrees that a routine inspection of the physical condition of private property is a less hostile intrusion than a policeman’s search for evidence, but the 4th Amendment interests at stake in such cases are not “merely peripheral.” 1. Even the most law-abiding citizen could have their security threatened by criminal entry masquerading as an officially-sanctioned search. 2. These inspections jeopardize “selfprotection” interests of property owners. a. Criminal processes are used to enforce most regulatory laws, both with regard to refusal to comply and refusal to permit inspections.

DISTRICT COURT OF APPEALS: Used the cases of Frank v. Maryland and Eaton v. Price: 1) Sec. 503 does not violate the 4th Amendment as it is part of a regulatory scheme that is essentially civil, not criminal in nature. 2) It creates a right of inspection that is limited in scope and may not be exercised under unreasonable conditions. RATIO: 1) Yes. The arrest of Camara due to his refusal to allow warrantless inspection of his apartment is contrary to the 4th and 14th Amendment a. The Court discussed the 4th Amendment’s. i. It safeguards the privacy and security of individuals against arbitrary invasions by government officials. ii. It expresses a right which is “basic to a free society” (Wolf v. Colorado). iii. The 4th Amendment is enforceable against the States through the 14th Amendment (Ker v. California) iv. The general rule is that a search of private property without proper consent is "unreasonable" unless it has been authorized by a valid search warrant (Stoner v. California, etc.) v. Generally, the right to privacy and when it must yield is to be determined by a judicial officer (Johnson v. US) b. The Court discussed the case of Frank v. Maryland which was relied upon by the District Court of Appeals. i. Frank v. Maryland: The Court upheld the conviction of one who refused to permit a warrantless inspection of private premises for the purposes of locating and abating a suspected public nuisance.

16


iv. The Court states that the arguments of inspections being non-demanding and being guided by the standard of reasonableness “unduly discount” the purpose of the warrants. 1. Presently, when the inspector demands entry, the occupant has no way of knowing thing such as the necessity of the inspection, the lawful limits, and the authorization. The only way to contest these is by refusing entry. 2. Practically, the occupant is left to the discretion of the person conducting the inspection. v. The argument of public interest begs the question of whether such inspections may be made without a warrant. The threshold question is whether the authority to search should be evidenced by a warrant, which in turn depends in part upon whether the burden of obtaining a warrant is likely to frustrate the governmental purpose behind the search (Schmerber v. California). There has been no showing that fire/health/housing code inspections cannot be made without a warrant. 2) No. Inspections do not have to be conducted only when the inspector has probable cause to believe that there is a violation. a. The standard of reasonableness is what is tested against the standard of probable cause in issuing a warrant under the 4th Amendment. b. Therefore, it is important to look at the government interest being advanced. c. In this case, city-wide compliance with minimum physical standards is the objective, to prevent the unintentional development of conditions detrimental to public health and safety. i. There is strong opinion that the best way to achieve universal compliance is through periodic inspections. This is where the probable cause aspect might appear, since the agency’s decision to inspect is

unavoidably based on its appraisal of conditions in the area as a whole. d. Several factors support the reasonableness of area code enforcement inspections. i. Judicial and public acceptance ii. Public interest demands that dangerous conditions be dealt with, yet the effectiveness of other area canvassing procedures is doubtful. Some conditions cannot be seen from outside, necessitating an inspection. iii. There is a limited invasion of privacy since the inspections are neither personal in nature nor aimed at discovering evidence of a crime. e. When public health and safety are involved, the nature of probable cause is different from that in criminal cases. f. Area inspections are reasonable searches of private property within the 4th Amendment. Probable cause takes the form of legislative/administrative standards. 3) Despite what has been said, there are exceptions to the need for warrants as to searches, such as unwholesome food, compulsory smallpox vaccination, summary destruction of tubercular cattle, etc. Routine area inspections do not fall within this exception of “emergency.” RULING: Judgment VACATED.

SEE v. SEATTLE June 5, 1967 Mr. Justice White Krissy SUMMARY: See refused to allow access to his commercial warehouse without a warrant a representative of the City of Seattle Fire Department for inspection pursuant to Seattle’s Fire Code. He then was charged and convicted under 8.01.050 of said Code. The US SC reversed his conviction and held as violative of the 4th Amendment said entry without a warrant. DOCTRINE: The 4th Amendment bars prosecution of a person who has refused to permit a warrantless code-enforcement inspection of his

17

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | B2015 business. 8.01.050, which includes the interiors of dwellings, establishes a reasonable scheme for the warrantless inspection of commercial premises pursuant to the Seattle Fire Code.

personal residence. This rule applies to similar inspections of commercial structures which are not used as private residences. The businessman, like the occupant of a residence, has a constitutional right to go about his business free from unreasonable official entries upon his private commercial property. When an administrative agency subpoenas corporate books or records, the 4th Amendment requires that the subpoena be sufficiently limited in scope, relevant in purpose, and specific in directive so that compliance will not be unreasonably burdensome. Administrative entry, without consent, upon the portions of commercial premises which are not open to the public may only be compelled through prosecution or physical force within the framework of a warrant procedure. The agency’s particular demand for access will be measured, in terms of probable cause to issue a warrant, against a flexible standard of reasonableness that takes into account the public need for effective enforcement of the particular regulation involved.

SC: There is no justification for relaxing 4th Amendment safeguards where the official inspection is intended to aid enforcement of laws prescribing minimum physical standards for commercial premises. A search of private houses is presumptively unreasonable if conducted without a warrant. The businessman, like the occupant of a residence, has a constitutional right to go about his business free from unreasonable official entries upon his private commercial property. Such right is placed in jeopardy if the decision to enter and inspect for violation of regulatory laws can be made and enforced by the inspector in the field without official authority evidenced by a warrant. Official entry upon commercial property is a technique commonly adopted by administrative agencies at all levels of government to enforce a variety of regulatory laws; thus, entry may permit inspection of the structure in which a business is housed, of business products, or a perusal of financial books and records. Another common investigative technique is the administrative subpoena of corporate books and records, wherein warrants are a necessary and a tolerable limitation on the right to enter upon and inspect commercial premises.

FACTS: An inspection of appellant See’s locked commercial warehouse was conducted by a representative of the City of Seattle Fire Department as part of a routine, periodic city-wide canvass to obtain compliance with Seattle’s Fire Code. Appellant refused the inspector access thereto, hence he was arrested and charged with violating 8.01.050 of the Code: “INSPECTION OF BUILDING AND PREMISES. It shall be the duty of the Fire Chief to inspect and he may enter all buildings and premises, except the interiors of dwellings, as often as may be necessary for the purpose of ascertaining and causing to be corrected any conditions liable to cause fire, or any violations of the provisions of this Title, and of any other ordinance concerning fire hazards."

When an administrative agency subpoenas corporate books or records, the 4th Amendment requires that the subpoena be sufficiently limited in scope, relevant in purpose, and specific in directive so that compliance will not be unreasonably burdensome. The agency has the right to conduct all reasonable inspections of such documents which are contemplated by the statute, but it must delimit the confines of a search by designating the needed documents in a formal subpoena. In addition, while the demand to inspect may be issued by the agency, in the form of an administrative subpoena, it may not be made and enforced by the inspector in the field, and the subpoenaed party may obtain judicial review of the reasonableness of the demand prior to suffering penalties for refusing to comply.

Appellant: 8.01.050, if interpreted to authorize warrantless inspection of his warehouse, would violate his rights under the 4 th and 14th Amendments. RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT OF WASHINGTON: Convicted Appellant for refusing to permit the representative of the City of Seattle Fire Department to enter and inspect his locked commercial warehouse without a warrant and without probable cause to believe that a violation of any municipal ordinance existed therein.

Minimal limitations on administrative action are constitutionally required in the case of investigative entry upon commercial establishment. The agency’s particular demand for access will be measured, in terms of probable cause to issue a warrant, against a flexible standard of reasonableness that takes into account the public need for effective enforcement of the particular regulation involved.

ISSUES: WON the inspection of appellant’s warehouse without a warrant is violative of his 4th Amendment Rights.  YES RATIO: Camara v. Municipal Court (applicable): The 4 th Amendment bars prosecution of a person who has refused to permit a warrantless code-enforcement inspection of his personal residence. This rule applies to similar inspections of commercial structures which are not used as private residences.

Administrative entry, without consent, upon the portions of commercial premises which are not open to the public may only be compelled through prosecution or physical force within the framework of a warrant procedure. The basic component of a reasonable search under the 4 th

SC of Washington: The US Supreme Court has applied different standards of reasonableness to searches of dwellings than to places of

18


Amendment – that it not be enforced without a suitable warrant procedure – is applicable to business as well as to residential premises. Therefore, appellant may not be prosecuted for exercising his constitutional right to insist that the fire inspector obtain a warrant authorizing entry upon appellant’s locked warehouse.

All of the doubts raised by the court could be resolved very quickly. Inspectors all have identification cards which they show the occupant and the latter could easily resolve the remaining questions by a call to the inspector’s superior or, upon demand, receive a written answer thereto. These cases were based on the 4th Amendment, not on any of the circumstances surrounding the attempted inspection. Inspections of this type may be made without a warrant. This has been done so for over a century and a half and it is a little late to impose a death sentence on such procedures now. In most instances, the officer could not secure a warrant – such as in See’s case – thereby insulating large and important segments of our cities form inspection for health and safety conditions.

RULING: Supreme Court of Washington reversed.

Mr. Justice Clark, Dissenting: Frank v. Maryland: … the power to inspect dwelling places, either as a matter of systematic area-by-area search or, as here, to treat a specific problem, is of indispensable importance to the maintenance of community health; a power that would be greatly hobbled by the blanket requirement of the safeguards necessary for a search of evidence of criminal acts. The need for preventive action is great, and city after city has seen this need and granted the power of inspection to its health officials; and these inspections are apparently welcomed by all but an insignificant few.

In entry-to-inspect situations where consent is necessary, inspections are most likely going to be denied and would place an intolerable burden on the inspection service. The economics of the situation (immediate prospects for costly repairs to correct possible defects) will force this result. Majority: As to the propriety of warrantless area inspections, the basis for the probable cause for area inspection warrants begins with the 4th Amendment’s reasonableness requirement; in determining whether an inspection is reasonable, the need for the inpsection must be weighed in terms of these reasonable goals of code enforcement. There are a number of persuasive factors: long acceptance historically, great public interest in health and safety, and the impersonal nature of the inspections – not for evidence of crime – but for the public welfare. Probable cause exists if reasonable legislative or administrative standards for conducting an area inspection are satisfied with respect to a particular dwelling. These standards will vary according to the code program and the condition of the area with reference thereto rather than the condition of a particular dwelling. Warrants may be obtained after a refusal of initial entry.

The Majority set up a new test for the long-recognized and enforced 4th Amendment’s probable-cause requirement for the issuance of warrants. They would permit the issuance of paper warrants in area inspection programs with probable cause based on area inspection standards as set out in municipal codes and with warrants issued by the rubber stamp of a willing magistrate… this degrades the 4th Amendment. Reasonable inspections are constitutionally permissible and in fact imperative for the protection of health, safety and welfare of the millions who inhabit the cities and towns. The inspection in this case meets the 4th Amendment’s test of reasonableness and is consistent with its commands. Nothing suggests that the inspection was unauthorized, unreasonable, for any improper purpose, or designed as a basis for criminal prosecution; nor is there any indication of any discriminatory, arbitrary, or capricious action affecting the appellant in either case.

Why the ceremony, the delay, the expense, the abuse of the search warrant? This will not only destroy its integrity but will degrade the magistrate issuing them and soon bring disrepute not only upon the practice but upon the judicial process. It will be very costly to the city in paperwork incident to the issuance of the paper warrants, in loss of time of inspectors and waste of the time of magistrates and will result in more annoyance to the public. It will also be more burdensome to the occupant of the premises to be inspected. Under a search warrant the inspector

The Majority says that under the present system, the occupant has no way of knowing the necessity for the inspection, the limits of the inspector’s power, or whether the inspector is authorized to perform the search.

19


can enter any time he chooses. Under the existing procedures he can enter only at reasonable times and invariably the convenience of the occupant is considered. It destroys the health and safety codes as they apply to individual inspections of specific problems as contrasted to area ones. While the latter are important, the individual inspection is often more so.

impose appropriate obligations and sanction their enforcement by reasonable money penalties, giving to executive officers the power to enforce such penalties without the necessity of invoking the judicial power.

FACTS: Ocean Steam Navigation Company sought the recovery of money paid to the collector of customs of the port of New York which was exacted by that official under an order of the Secretary of Commerce and Labor. The money was paid under protest, and involuntarily because if it did not pay, the collector would refuse a clearance to its steamships which would have caused not only grave public inconvenience from the nonfulfilment of mail contracts and entailed serious pecuniary loss consequent on its failure to carry out many other contracts. Both the Secretary and the collector were expressly authorized by Section 9 of the Act entitled “An Act to Regulate the Immigration of Aliens into the United States.” The act excludes from admission into the United States those afflicted with a loathsome or with a dangerous contagious disease.

Ocean Steam Navigation Company v. Stranahan June 1, 1909 White, J. Francis

SUMMARY: Ocean Steam paid the collector of customs the fine established in Section 9 of the Alien Immigration Act. Ocean Steam challenged the constitutionality of such provision arguing that it defines a crime and gives executive officials the power decide whether it has been committed and inflict punishment without judicial trial against due process of law.

Section 9 provides: 'That it shall be unlawful for any person, including any transportation company other than railway lines entering the United States from foreign contiguous territory, or the owner, master, agent, or consignee of any vessel, to bring to the United States any alien afflicted with a loathsome or with a dangerous contagious disease; and, if it shall appear to the satisfaction of the Secretary of the Treasury( now Secretary of Commerce and Labor) that any alien so brought to the United States was afflicted with such a disease at the time of foreign embarkation, and that the existence of such disease might have been detected by means of a competent medical examination at such time, such person or transportation company, or the master, agent, owner, or consignee of any such vessel, shall pay to the collector of customs of the customs district in which the port of arrival is located the sum of one hundred dollars for each and every violation of the provisions of this section; and no vessel shall be granted clearance papers while any such fine imposed upon it remains unpaid, nor shall such fine be remitted.”

DOCTRINE: When Congress sees fit to further promote the U.S. policy to forbid aliens or classes of aliens from coming within their borders, and expel aliens or classes of aliens from their territory by subjecting the persons of such aliens to infamous punishment at hard labor, or by confiscating their property, such legislation, to be valid, must provide for a judicial trial to establish the guilt of the accused. When the section is enlightened by an analysis of the context of the act and by a consideration of the report of the Senate committee, its various sections accurately distinguish between those cases where it was intended that particular violations of the act should be considered as criminal and be punished accordingly, and those where it was contemplated that violations should not constitute crime, but merely entail the infliction of a penalty, enforceable in some cases by purely administrative action and in others by civil suit. By a consideration of the report of the Senate committee, it no doubt that the sole purpose of Section 9 was to impose a penalty, based upon the medical examination for which the statute provided. Congress has power to deal with the admission of aliens and to confide the enforcement of laws in regard thereto to administrative officers. It is within the competency of Congress, when legislating as to matters exclusively within its control, to

Ocean Steam Navigation Company argues that Section 9 of the immigration act of 1903 violates the Constitution relating to the judiciary and violates the Constitutional provision relating to the

20


taking of property without due process of law because it authorizes the taking of property without judicial trial. It is also argued that such Act is repugnant to the Constitution because it defines a criminal offense, and authorizes a purely administrative official to determine whether the defined crime has been committed, and, if so, to inflict punishment.

But, in so far as the case of Wong Wing held that the trial and punishment for an infamous offense was not an administrative, but a judicial, function, it is wholly irrelevant to this case, since, on the face of the section which authorizes the Secretary of Commerce and Labor to impose the exaction, it is apparent that it does not purport to define and punish an infamous crime, or indeed any criminal offense. When the section is enlightened by an analysis of the context of the act and by a consideration of the report of the Senate committee, its various sections accurately distinguish between those cases where it was intended that particular violations of the act should be considered as criminal and be punished accordingly, and those where it was contemplated that violations should not constitute crime, but merely entail the infliction of a penalty, enforceable in some cases by purely administrative action and in others by civil suit. By a consideration of the report of the Senate committee, it no doubt that the sole purpose of Section 9 was to impose a penalty, based upon the medical examination for which the statute provided, thus tending, by the avoidance of controversy and delay, to secure the efficient performance by the steamship company of the duty to examine in the foreign country, before embarkation, and thereby aid in carrying out the policy of Congress to exclude from the United States aliens afflicted with loathsome or dangerous contagious diseases as defined in the act.

ISSUES: Whether or not the power conferred upon Secretary and the collector was consistent with the Constitution. RATIO: Yes. Resting, as the statute does, upon the authority of Congress over foreign commerce and its right to control the coming in of aliens into the United States, and to regulate that subject in the fullest degree, it may not be doubted that it is not open to discussion that the statute, was within the power of Congress to enact Repeated decisions of the U.S. SC have determined that Congress has the power to exclude aliens from the United States; to prescribe the terms and conditions on which they may come in; to establish regulations for sending out of the country such aliens as have entered in violation of law, and to commit the enforcement of such conditions and regulations to executive officers; that the deportation of an alien who is found to be here in violation of law is not a deprivation of liberty without due process of law, and that the provisions of the Constitution securing the right of trial by jury have no application.

Congress has power to deal with the admission of aliens and to confide the enforcement of laws in regard thereto to administrative officers. It is within the competency of Congress, when legislating as to matters exclusively within its control, to impose appropriate obligations and sanction their enforcement by reasonable money penalties, giving to executive officers the power to enforce such penalties without the necessity of invoking the judicial power.

We regard it as settled by our previous decisions that the United States can, as a matter of public policy, by congressional enactment, forbid aliens or classes of aliens from coming within their borders, and expel aliens or classes of aliens from their territory, and can, in order to make effectual such decree of exclusion or expulsion, devolve the power and duty of identifying and arresting the persons included in such decree, and causing their deportation, upon executive or subordinate officials.

The authority, given by Congress in the Alien Immigration Act to the Secretary of Commerce and Labor to impose an exaction on a transportation company bringing to the United States an alien immigrant afflicted with a loathsome contagious disease when the medical examination establishes that the disease existed, and could have been detected by medical examination at the time of embarkation, does not purport to define and punish any criminal offense, but merely entails the infliction of a penalty enforceable by civil suit, and it is within the power of Congress to

When Congress sees fit to further promote the U.S. policy to forbid aliens or classes of aliens from coming within their borders, and expel aliens or classes of aliens from their territory by subjecting the persons of such aliens to infamous punishment at hard labor, or by confiscating their property, such legislation, to be valid, must provide for a judicial trial to establish the guilt of the accused.

21


provide for such imposition by an executive officer, and the enforcement is not necessarily governed by the rules controlling the prosecution of criminal offenses.

carriers to desist from wanton disregard of existing rules, regulations or requirements of the government regulating agency. FACTS: Philippine Airlines is the grantee of a legislative franchise (Public Act No. 4271, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 2360 and 2667) to provide domestic and international air service. In its domestic service, PAL provides, among others, services between Tuguegarao and Manila (Flight 213) and between Baguio and Manila (Flight 205).

The imposition of a penalty by an executive officer when authorized by Congress in a matter wholly within its competency, such as alien immigration, is not unconstitutional under the Fifth Amendment as taking property without due process of law. Where Congress has power to sanction a prohibition by penalties enforceable by executive officers without judicial trial on the ascertainment in a prescribed manner of certain facts, the person upon whom the penalty is imposed is not entitled to any hearing in the sense of raising an issue and tendering evidence as to the facts so ascertained, and is not therefore denied due process because the time which the executive officer allows him after notice of the ascertainment and imposition to produce evidence as to certain facts on which the fine might be remitted is too short. RULING: Judgment AFFIRMED. Immigration Act is Constitutional.

Section

9

of

the

On May 12, 1970, PAL had an excess of twenty (20) passengers from Baguio to Manila who cannot be accommodated in its regular flight. To accommodate these twenty passengers, PAL required the aircraft operating Flight 213 (Tuguegarao to Manila) to pass Baguio City on its way to Manila and pick up these passengers. Flight 213 at that time was carrying only five (5) passengers. In addition to these facts, it is undisputed by the Civil Aeronautics Board that “The expenses incurred by the PAL in operating the flagstop at Baguio City far exceeded the revenue that it derived from the twenty passengers that it fetched at Baguio City. The flagstop, therefore, was motivated not by profit but solely by PAL's desire to meet a public need for additional service between Baguio and Manila on that date.” and that no one filed any complaints against PAL except the Chairman of the CAB.

Alien

Civil Aeronautics Board vs PAL

The CAB claims that PAL should have first obtained the permission of the CAB before operating the flagstop and that such failure to obtain permission is a violation of Republic Act No. 776. Thus, the CAB imposed a fine of P5,000 on PAL through a resolution, quoted below.

April 30, 1975 Esguerra, J. Victor Galura

“Considering that operation of flag-stops are not authorized and must be operated only with prior approval by the Board and considering further that Philippine Air Line, Inc. has conducted such flagstop for its Flight 212/213 on May 12, 1970 and on previous occasions prior thereto, the board, after conducting hearings thereon and after due deliberations on the explanations of PAL's counsel, resolves, as it is hereby resolved to impose a fine of P5,000.00 against PAL to be paid within ten (10) days from receipt hereof, pursuant to the provisions of Section 42(k) of Republic Act 776.

SUMMARY: The CAB imposed a fine on PAL for having its flight from Tugegarao to Manila to make a stop in Baguio without first obtaining the permission of the CAB. DOCTRINE: The fine imposed upon PAL is not in the nature of fines as contemplated by the RPC. It is in the nature of an administrative penalty which administrative officers are empowered to impose without criminal prosecution. The imposition of the fine is not so much on exacting penalty for the violation committed as the need to stress upon the air

22


The Board further resolves to warn PAL that a repetition of the same will be dealt with more severely. Considering, however, that flagstops may have to be undertaken with as short notice as possible, the carriers may notify the technical staff thru the Executive Director of the CAB of their desire to operate such flagstops citing the reasons therefor and the Executive Director may give initial approval thereto, but the same has to be confirmed immediately by the Board at its next regular meeting.”

impose, remit, mitigate, increase, or compromise, such fine and civil penalties, as the case may be." It is clear that the fine imposed upon PAL by the CAB is the fine contemplated under these powers granted to CAB. It is not the fine contemplated under the RPC. The imposition of the fine is not so much on exacting penalty for the violation committed as the need to stress upon the air carriers to desist from wanton disregard of existing rules, regulations or requirements of the government regulating agency. In other words, it is an administrative penalty which administrative officers are empowered to impose without criminal prosecution. The CAB is fully authorized to impose fines in the nature of civil penalty for violations of its rules and regulations. To deprive the CAB of that power would amount to an absurd interpretation of the pertinent legal provision because the CAB is given full power on its own initiative to determine whether to "impose, remit, mitigate, increase or compromise" "fines and civil penalties", a power which is expressly given to the Civil Aeronautics Administrator whose orders or decision may be reviewed, revised, reversed, modified or affirmed by the CAB.

Upon PAL’s Motion for Reconsideration, the fine was reduced to P 2,500. ISSUES: Does the CAB have the authority to impose fines? -> YESSSssss RATIO: RA 776, which created the CAB, imposed upon it the standard that in the exercise and performance of its powers and duties, it shall consider among other things, "as being in the public interest, and in accordance with the public convenience and necessity" certain declared policies which include (c) The regulation of air transportation in such manner as to recognize and preserve the inherent advantage of, assure the highest degree of safety in, and foster sound economic condition in, such transportation and to improve the relation between, and coordinate transportation by, air carriers; and (f) To promote safety of flight in air commerce in the Philippines.

RULING: Resolution appealed from is MODIFIED by reducing the administrative fine imposed on the appellant PAL to ONE HUNDRED PESOS

The CAB has the power to "investigate, upon complaint or upon its own initiative, whether any individual or air carrier, domestic or foreign, is violating any provision of this act, or the rules and regulations issued thereunder, and shall take such action, consistent with the provisions of this Act, as may be necessary to prevent further violation of such provisions, or rules and regulations so issued Likewise, the CAB has the power to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal any administrative decision or order" of the Civil Aeronautics Administrator on matters pertaining to "imposition of civil penalty or fine in connection with the violation of any provision of this Act or rules and regulations issued thereunder." It has the power also "either on its own initiative or upon review on appeal from an order or decision of the Civil Aeronautics Administrator, to determine whether to

23

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | B2015 membership, and thus (3) they had interfered with their right to organize.

Scoty's Dept. Store v. Micaller

CIR DECISION: The CIR found the employers guilty of unfair labor practice, and ordered payment o a fine of P100, reinstatement, and backwages. On appeal, they assail the findings of fact as well as the legality of the imposition of a fine of P100.

August 25, 1956 Bautista Angelo, J. SUMMARY: CIR imposed, in an unfair labor practice case, imposed a fine of P100 upon the employers, pursuant to the penal provisions of Section 25, Industrial Peace Act. The provision did not specify which court may impose the penalty, but Section 2(a) of the same states that "court" refers to the CIR, unless otherwise specified. The SC, however, ruled that the "court" therein cannot refer to the CIR since (1) it would violate the right of the accused, and (2) comparing the jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations and the CIR, they were intended to have exclusive jurisdiction over civil matters, not criminal. DOCTRINE: The power to impose the penalties provided for in Section 25 of RA 875 is lodged in ordinary courts, notwithstanding the definition of the word "court" contained in Section 2(a).

ARGUMENTS OF THE EMPLOYERS: Section 25, Industrial Peace Act, on penalties for unfair labor practice, being penal in character, should be strictly construed in favor of the accused, such that guilt can only be established by clear and positive evidence, not merely presumptions. The evidence against the other owners are not clear enough to serve as basis for their conviction. ISSUES: [1] Did the employers commit unfair labor practice? YES. [2] Can the CIR legally impose upon the employers the fine of P100? NO. RATIO: [1] The law on this point is a recent enactment, such that what constitutes unfair labor practice may be difficult to determine for lack of precedents. However, American cases, with similar circumstances, may be resorted to, such as NLRB v. Harris-Woodson Co., which, citing another case, held that "questioning of employees as to membership in the union and of anti-union expressions by the company's superintendent made is such a way as to discourage union membership" is unfair labor practice [the citation said it is "condemned as a violation of the Act"]. Given the binding findings of fact of the CIR, the employers did commit unfair labor practice. [2] Section 25 does not specify which court may impose the penalties provided. While Section 2(a) states that "court" refers to the CIR, unless otherwise specified, it cannot be so under Section 25. Otherwise, it would violate the constitutionally-guaranteed rights of the accused. The provisions laid down by law to be observed by the CIR in dealing with unfair labor practice cases negates those rights, since, among others, they provide that "the rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be controlling" and "all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively and without regard to technicalities of law and procedure" shall be used. Also, CIR is not bound solely by the evidence presented during the hearing. These are against due process. Requiring the CIR to strictly observe the applicable rules is no remedy, for it would be tantamount to amending the law. Compared to RA 1267, which provides for the jurisdiction of the Court of Agrarian Relations (CAR), stating that "[c]riminal proceedings should be prosecuted as in ordinary cases," RA 875 is silent as to the

FACTS: Nena Micaller was employed as a salesgirl in the Scoty's Department Store, owned and operated by Yu Ki Lam, Richard Yang, Yu Si Kiao, and Helen Yang. She was earning P4.80 a day. After every new year, she was given from P180 to P200 as bonus. Other employees were only given P60. She was also given the first prize for being the best seller, most cooperative, and most honest employee for 3 consecutive years. On October 1953, she organized a union, later affiliated with the National Labor Union (NLU), which then sent a petition to the employers containing 10 demands. Micaller was then called for questioning, and was asked who the members of the union were. She pretended no to know them Later, Yang and Kiao went to Micaller's house to question her again regarding her union membership. Still later, she was brought to the counsel for the employers and questioned about her union activities. She was made to sign a paper of withdrawal from the union. Lam, on the other hand, questioned asked each and every employee of their union membership and threatened to close the store if they would not dissolved the union. The union thus gave a notice of strike to the management, which then hired temporary employees affiliated with another union. Soon after, an informations for threats and slander were filed against Micaller. Then she was dismissed from work for "insulting the owner xxx and for talking to the girls inside the store during business hours." She filed charges of unfair labor practice, under Section 5, Industrial Peace Act (RA 875), alleging that (1) she was dismissed because of her membership in the National Labor Union, (2) prior to her dismissal, her employers had been questioning their employees regarding their union

24

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | B2015 LAW: Section 19 of Act No. 355 (AN ACT TO CONSTITUTE THE CUSTOMS SERVICE OF THE PHILIPPINE ARCHIPELAGO AND TO PROVIDE FOR THE ADMINISTRATION THEREOF)

procedure. This is a clear indication that, had the Congress intend to confer criminal jurisdiction upon an administrative court, it would have expressly provided so. Again, Congress expressed its intention when it repealed, through RA 1409, this criminal jurisdiction of CAR. The legislative record of this repeal show that the intent, in eliminating the criminal jurisdiction, is to place CAR on the same footing as the Public Service Commission and the CIR, that is, their jurisdiction is confined exclusively to civil matters. In conclusion, the power to impose the penalties is lodged in ordinary courts.

1. A complaint for lighter Maude was filed against the accused, as the accused was “moving her and directing her movement, when heavily laden with hemp, in the Pasig River, by bamboo poles in the hands of the crew, and without steam, sail, or any other external power.” Said act was violative of Pars. 70 and 83 of the Circular. 2. The accused attacked the validity of par. 70 of the Circular on two grounds: a) It is not authorized by Sec. 19 of Act No. 355 (the content of the said section was not in the case); b) the interpretation of authorizing the Collector to promulgate such a law, is void, as constituting an illegal delegation of legislative power. 3. The Attorney-General argued that the accused must be discharged on the first ground, citing that the rule of the Collector was unauthorized and illegal,

RULING: The imposition of fine is illegal. The CIR decision was modified.

US V. Barrias 24 September 1908 Justice Tracey

CFI RULING: CONVICTION. SUMMARY: Accused was convicted under Circular 397 promulgated by the Insular Collector of Customs. The accused’s vessel, heavily laden with hemp, was navigating the Pasig River, without steam, sail, or any other external power. The regulation required heavily loaded cargo to be towed by steam or any adequate power. Counsel for the accused assailed the conviction, arguing that the said Circular was invalid for the Collector cannot fix the penalty of the law. The Supreme Court upheld the conviction, NOT on the basis of the said Circular, but on the basis of a valid Act (Act 1136) that declared that any act, which violated the rules and regulations, promulgated by the Collector would be considered a misdemeanor.

CA RULING: n/a ISSUES: IS THE RULE VALID? NO. The Collector cannot fix the penalty of the law. RATIO: I.

DOCTRINE: One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power conferred upon the legislature to make laws can not be delegated by that department to any body or authority. Where the sovereign power of the State has located the authority, there it must remain; only by the constitutional agency alone the laws must be made until the constitution itself is changed.

If the Court will base the accused’s prosecution on Sections 54 and 85 of Act No. 1136,then the regulation of the Collector of Customs is valid. Under this statute, which was not referred to on the argument, or in the original briefs, there is no difficulty in sustaining the regulation of the Collector as coming within the terms of section 5. Lighterage, mentioned in the Act, is the very business in which this vessel was engaged. The necessity confiding to some local authority the framing, changing, and enforcing of harbor regulations is recognized throughout the

4

SEC. 5. The Collector of Customs for the Philippine Islands is hereby authorized, empowered, and directed to promptly make and publish suitable rules and regulations to carry this law into effect and to regulate the business herein licensed.

FACTS: RULE: Paragraphs 702 and 833 of Circular No. 397 of the Insular Collector of Customs

5

SEC. 8. Any person who shall violate the provisions of this Act, or of any rule or regulation made and issued by the Collector of Customs for the Philippine Islands, under and by authority of this Act, shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor, and upon conviction shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than six months, or by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars, United States currency, or by both such fine and imprisonment, at the discretion of the court; Provided, That violations of law may be punished either by the method prescribed in section seven hereof, or by that prescribed in this section or by both.

2

No heavily loaded casco, lighter, or other similar craft shall be permitted to move in the Pasig River without being towed by steam or moved by other adequate power. 3

For the violation of any part of the foregoing regulations, the persons offending shall be liable to a fine of not less than P5 and not more than P500, in the discretion of the court.

25

II.

A.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | B2015 B. If the prosecution would base its complaint on the aforesaid Circular, the accused must be exculpated. HOWEVER, there is another law wherein the accused may be convicted, and that is Act No. 1136. The reference to the said Circular is not material. Where an offense is correctly described in the complaint an additional reference to a wrong statute is immaterial.

world, as each region and each a harbor requires peculiar use more minute than could be enacted by the central lawmaking power, and which, when kept within the proper scope, are in their nature police regulations not involving an undue grant of legislative power. However, the complaint was based on violations of Act. No. 355, as amended by Act Nos. 1235 and 1480. Under Act No. 1235, the Collector is not only empowered to make regulations, but also to fix penalties for violation thereof, not exceeding a fine of P 500. This fact presents a serious question. PRINCIPLE: One of the settled maxims in constitutional law is, that the power conferred upon the legislature to make laws can not be delegated by that department to any body or authority. (Cooley's Constitutional limitations, 6th ed., p. 137.) This doctrine is based on the principle that a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the delegate by the instrumentality of his own judgment acting immediately upon the matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of another. 1. In US V. Breen, an Act of Congress allowing the Secretary of War to make such rules and regulations as might be necessary to protect improvements of the Mississipi River, and providing that a violation thereof should constitute a misdemeanor, was sustained on the ground that the misdemeanor was declared not under the delegated power of the Secretary of War, but in the Act of Congress, itself. 2. In US V. Ormsbee, an Act of Congress allowing the Secretary of War to prescribe rules for the use of the canals was upheld, but a law authorizing the said Secretary to require alteration of bridge and to impose penalties for vilations of his rules was invalid. 3. In In re Kollock, it was held that the criminal offense is fully and completely defined by the Act and the designation by the Commissioner of the particular marks and brands to be used was a mere matter of detail. 4. In Martin v. Witherspoon, it was held that the legislature may delegate to the governer the power to make pilot regulations. 5. In The Board of Harbor Commissioners V. Excelsior, the Court held that “Conceding that the legislature could delegate to the plaintiff the authority to make rules and regulation with reference to the navigation of Humboldt Bay, the penalty for the violation of such rules and regulations is a matter purely in the hands of the legislature.”

RULING: The judgment of CFI, convicting the accused based on Act. 355 and 1235 us REVOKED. However, the accused is CONVICTED of a misdemeanor punished by Act 1136.

RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC (RCPI) v BOARD OF COMMUNICATIONS November 29, 1977 Martin, J. Ana

SUMMARY: The case is a consolidation of two petitions regarding the jurisdiction of the Board of Communications over claims for damages suffered by private respondents Diego Morales and Pacifico Innociencio due to the failure of RCPI to send them the corresponding telegrams sent to them by their relatives. After hearing, the Board of Communications imposed upon petitioner a disciplinary fine of P200 pursuant to Sec. 21 of Commonwealth Act 146, as amended by PD 1 and Letter of Implementation No. 1. The Board found that the services rendered by petitioner was inadequate and unsatisfactory. RCPI filed a petition for review by certiorari with the Supreme Court regarding the decision of the Board of Communications. DOCTRINE: 1. The Public Service Commission and its successor-ininterest, the Board of Communications, “being a creature of the legislature and not a court, can exercise only such jurisdiction and powers as are expressly or by necessary implication…conferred upon it by statute”. 2. The power of the Board to issue certificates of public

26


6. RCPI filed a petition for review by certiorari with the Supreme Court regarding the decision of the Board of Communications.

convenience does not carry with it the power of supervision and control over matters not related to the issuance of certificate of public convenience. 3. Damages arising from breach of contractual obligation must be ventilated in the regular courts. 4. The payment of fine under Sec. 21 of the Public Service Act is imposed only for violations or failure to comply with the terms and conditions of any certificate or any orders, decisions, regulations of the Commission. It does not include breach of contractual obligation.

ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the Board of Communications has the power to impose a fine for the breach committed by RCPI? 2. Whether or not the Board of Communications has jurisdiction over the claim of damages for RCPI’s breach of contractual obligations?

FACTS: 1. The case is a consolidation of two petitions regarding the jurisdiction of the Board of Communications over claims for damages suffered by private respondents Diego Morales and Pacifico Innociencio due to the failure of RCPI to send them the corresponding telegrams sent to them by their relatives. 2. In the case of Diego Morales, he claims that his daughter sent him a telegram from Santiago, Isabela informing him of the death of his wife. He did not receive the said telegram and had to be informed personally about the death of his wife. He had to take the trip by airplane to Isabela. According to RCPI, the signal became intermittent when they were relaying the telegram from Isabela to Cubao, QC, which made the copy unreadable and unintelligible. 3. On the other hand, Pacifico Innocencio claims that he never received the telegram sent by Lourdes Innocencio for the purpose of informing him about the death of their father. The telegram was sent in Paniqui, Tarlac and was supposed to be delivered to Innocencio in Cavinti, laguna. He was not able to attend the interment of their father at Tarlac and he was shocked when he learned about the death of his father and claims that he suffered mental anguish and personal inconveniences. 4. Both private respondents (Morales and Innocencio claims for moral damages. 5. After hearing, the Board of Communications imposed upon petitioner a disciplinary fine of P200 pursuant to Sec. 21 of Commonwealth Act 146, as amended by PD 1 and Letter of Implementation No. 1. The Board found that the services rendered by petitioner was inadequate and unsatisfactory.

RATIO: 1. NO a. Under Sec. 21 of the Public Service Act, a fine shall be imposed if the public service violates or failures to comply with the terms and conditions of any certificate or any orders, decisions, or regulations of the Commission. b. In the two cases, RCPI is not charged with violating or failing to comply with any orders, decisions, or regulations of the Commissions. There are also no complaints regarding the terms and conditions of the certificate of public convenience issued to RCPI. Rather, private respondents are asking for damages for breach of contractual obligations through negligence under the Civil Code. c. Likewise, the charges does not relate toe the management of the facilities and systems of transmission of messages by petitioner in accordance with its certificate of public convenience. 2. NO

27

a. The Public Service Commission and its successorin-interest, the Board of Communications, “being a creature of the legislature and not a court, can exercise only such jurisdiction and powers as are expressly or by necessarily implication conferred upon it by statute” b. The jurisdiction and functions of the Board of Communications are those provided for in the Public Service Act, which created its successor-in-interest. c. The Public Service Act confers upon the Board the power to issue certificate of public convenience

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | B2015 BP 33 also sets the monetary penalty for violators to a minimum of P20,000 and a maximum of P50,000. In implementation of BP 33, the DOE issued Circular No. 2000-06-10. Here is a breakdown of the penal provisions: 1. Sec. 4 – No price display board 2. Sec. 5 – No weighing scale 3. Sec. 6 – No tare weight or incorrect tare weight markings 4. Sec. 7 – No appropriate or authorized LPG seal 5. Sec. 8 – No trade name, unauthorized LPG cylinders, no serial number, no distinguishing color, no embossed identifying markings on cylinder or distinctive collar design 6. Sec. 9 – Underfilled LPG cylinders 7. Sec. 10 – Tampering, altering, or modifying of LPG cylinder thru any means by any person or entity other than the legitimate and registered owner of the same 8. Sec. 11 – Unauthorized decanting or refilling of LPG cylinders 9. Sec. 12 – Hoarding of petroleum products including LPG 10. Sec. 13 – Refusal to allow or cooperate with duly authorized inspectors of the Energy Administration Bureau of the DOE 11. Sec. 14 – Refusal or failure to pay fine

but it does not carry with it the power of supervision and control over matters not related to the issuance of certificate of public convenience or in the performance therewith in a manner suitable to promote public interest. d. The claim for damages must be ventilated in the proper courts and not through the Board. RULING: The decisions of respondent Board of Communications in both cases are hereby reversed, set aside, declared null and void for lack of jurisdiction to take cognizance of both cases.

PEREZ v. LPG REFILLERS ASSOC. OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC.

LPG Refillers Association of the Philippines, Inc. asked the DOE to set aside the Circular for being contrary to law. The DOE denied.

June 26, 2006 Quisumbing, J Luciano, Noel Christian

PETITION OF LPG REFILLERS: LPG Refillers filed a petition for prohibition and annulment with prayer for TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction with the RTC.

SUMMARY: BP 33 penalizes illegal trading, hoarding, overpricing, adulteration, underdelivery, and underfilling of petroleum products and of underfilled LPG cylinders. It also sets the minimum and maximum monetary penalty for violators. In implementation of BP 33, the DOE issued Circular No. 2000-06-10. LPG Refillers Association of the Philippines, Inc. asked the DOE to set aside the Circular for being contrary to law. The RTC invalidated the Circular. The SC reversed, and held that the Circular is VALID.

RTC DECISION: The RTC nullified the Circular. It held that: 1. The Circular introduced new offenses not included in the law 2. The Circular, in providing penalties on a per cylinder basis for each violation, might exceed the maximum penalty under BP 33 DOE Secretary Perez filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC denied. Hence, this petition.

DOCTRINE: For and administration regulation to have the force of penal law, the following requisites must be complied with: 1. The violation of the administrative regulation must be made a crime by the delegating statute itself, 2. The penalty for such violation must be provided by the statute itself BP 33, which defines what constitute punishable acts involving petroleum products and which set the minimum and maximum limits for the penalties. The Circular merely implements the said law. Albeit it is silent on the maximum pecuniary penalty for the refillers, marketers, and dealers. Nothing in the Circular contravenes the law.

ARGUMENTS OF SEC. PEREZ: 1. The penalties for the acts and omissions enumerated in the Circular are sanctioned by Sec. 1 and 3-A of BP 33 and Sec. 23 of RA 8479 (An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry, and for Other Purposes) 2. Sec. 5(g) and 21 of RA 7638 (An Act Creating the DOE) also authorize the DOE to impose the penalties provided in the Circular ARGUMENTS OF LPG REFILLERS: 1. The enabling laws, BP 33 and RA 8479, do not expressly penalize the acts and omissions enumerated in the Circular 2. The Circular is not supported by RA 7638 since the said law does not pertain to LPG traders

FACTS: Batas Pambansa Blg. 33 penalizes illegal trading, hoarding, overpricing, adulteration, underdelivery, and underfilling of petroleum products and of underfilled LPG cylinders.

28

3.

The Circular is not in conformity with the law it seeks to implement

a. b.

ISSUE: WON the RTC erred in declaring the provisions of the Circular null and void, and prohibiting the Circular’s implementation.

IV.

Note also that the enabling laws on which the Circular is based were specifically intended to provide the DOE with increased administrative and penal measures with which to effectively curtail rampant adulteration and shortselling which are inimical to public interest

V.

To nullify the Circular would be to render inutile government efforts to protect the general consuming public against the nefarious practices of some unscrupulous LPG traders

HELD: YES, the Circular is VALID. RATIO: I. For and administration regulation to have the force of penal law, the following requisites must be complied with: 3. The violation of the administrative regulation must be made a crime by the delegating statute itself, 4. The penalty for such violation must be provided by the statute itself II.

III.

ADMINISTRATIVE LAW | B2015 Albeit it is silent on the maximum pecuniary penalty for the refillers, marketers, and dealers Nothing in the Circular contravenes the law

DISPOSITIVE: Wherefore, petition is granted. The assailed DOE Circular is declared VALID. The RTC decision is REVERSED.

The Circular complies with the First Requisite A. BP 33, as amended, criminalizes illegal trading, adulteration, underfilling, hoarding, and overpricing of petroleum products B. Under the general description under BP 33, the Circular merely lists the various modes by which the said criminal acts may be perpetrated 1. The specific acts and omissions are obviously within the contemplation of the law, a. The law seeks to curb the pernicious practices of some petroleum merchants

Public Hearing Committee of the LLDA v. SM Prime Holding Inc. September 22, 2010 Peralta, J. Arn Summary: In an inspection held by LLDA on the water samples from SM Manila, it found that the effluent waters of the establishment failed to conform to the standard impose by law. Because of this, LLDA issued an order imposing a fine on SM Manila. SM Manila now assails the authority of LLDA to impose fines. CA reversed the order of LLDA and held that there is no law specifically granting LLDA the power to impose fines and penalties. SC reversed the CA and held that LLDA has the power to impose fines pursuant to an earlier decision and its charter, RA 4850.

The Circular complies with the Second Requisite A. Under BP 33, the monetary penalty for any person who commits any of the acts is limited to a minimum of P20,000 and a maximum of P50,000 B. Under the Circular: 1. The maximum pecuniary penalty for retail outlets is P20,000 a. This amount is WITHIN the contemplation of the law 2. However, for the REFILLERS, MARKETERS, and DEALERS, the Circular is SILENT as to any maximum monetary penalty a. But this silence DOES NOT amount to a violation 3. The mere fact that the Circular provides penalties on a per cylinder basis does not itself run counter to the law a. Note that all BP 33 prescribes are the minimum and maximum limits of penalties C. It is thus clear that: 1. BP 33, which defines what constitute punishable acts involving petroleum products and which set the minimum and maximum limits for the penalties 2. The Circular merely implements the said law

(Not explicitly stated) In general, an administrative agency cannot impose fines or penalties Doctrine:

FACTS: The instant petition arose from an inspection conducted by the Pollution Control Division of the Laguna 29


Lake Development Authority(LLDA) of the wastewater collected from SM City Manila branch. The results of the laboratory tests showed that the sample collected from the said facility failed to conform with the effluent standards for inland water imposed in accordance with law.

impose fines for violations of effluent standards set by law. Thus, the CA held that the assailed Orders of petitioner, which imposed a fine on respondent, are issued without jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion.

The LLDA informed SM Manila of its violation, directing the same to perform corrective measures to abate or control the pollution caused by the said company and ordering the same to pay a penalty of P1,000 per day of discharging pollutive wastewater until full cessation of discharging pollutive wastewater.”

ISSUES: 1. WON the petition for certiorari filed by SM with the CA is premature? YES. The Court agrees with LLDA that SM did not exhaust administrative remedies before filing a petition for certiorari with the CA. Also, the Court is not persuaded by respondent's contention that the special civil action for certiorari it filed with the CA involved only purely legal questions and did not raise factual issues. A perusal of the petition for certiorari filed by respondent readily shows that factual matters were raised. Since the matters raised by respondent involve factual issues, the questioned Orders of the LLDA should have been brought first before the DENR which has administrative supervision of the LLDA.

In a letter, SM’s Pollution Control Officer requested the LLDA to conduct a re-sampling of their effluent, claiming that they already took measures to enable their sewage treatment plant to meet the standards set forth by the LLDA. Later, in an Order to Pay, LLDA required SM to pay a fine of P50,000 which represents the accumulated daily penalty. In two follow-up letters which were treated by the LLDA as a motion for reconsideration, SM asked for a waiver of the fine assessed by the LLDA on the ground that they immediately undertook corrective measures and that the pH levels of its effluent were already controlled even prior to their request for re-sampling leading to a minimal damage to the environment.

2. WON the CA has jurisdiction over the case at bar? YES. Rule 43 refers to appeals from judgments or orders of quasi-judicial agencies in the exercise of their quasi-judicial functions. On the other hand, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court specifically governs special civil actions for certiorari, Section 4 of which provides that if the petition involves acts or omissions of a quasi-judicial agency, and unless otherwise provided by law or the rules, the petition shall be filed in and cognizable only by the CA. Thus, it is clear that jurisdiction over acts or omissions of the LLDA belong to the CA.

LLDA issued an Order denying respondent's request for a waiver of the fine imposed on the latter. SM filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. CA rendered its Decision granting the petition of SM and reversing and setting aside the assailed Orders of the LLDA. Ruling that an administrative agency's power to impose fines should be expressly granted and may not be implied, the CA found that under its charter, RA 4850, the LLDA is not expressly granted any power or authority to

3. WON SM is stopped from assailing LLDA’s power to impose fines? YES. 30


The Court agrees with petitioners that respondent is already estopped from questioning the power of the LLDA to impose fines as penalty owing to the fact that respondent actively participated during the hearing of its water pollution case before the LLDA without impugning such power of the said agency. In fact, respondent even asked for a reconsideration of the Order of the LLDA.

compensation for damages resulting from failure to meet established water and effluent standards. Section 4-A provides, thus: Sec. 4-A. Compensation for damages to the water and aquatic resources of Laguna de Bay and its tributaries resulting from failure to meet established water and effluent quality standards and from such other wrongful act or omission of a person, private or public, juridical or otherwise, punishable under the law shall be awarded to the Authority to be earmarked for water quality control management.

4. WON LLDA has in fact the power to impose fines in the exercise of its function as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region? YES. In Pacific Steam Laundry, Inc. v. Laguna Lake Development Authority, the SC held that LLDA has the power to impose fines in the exercise of its function as a regulatory and quasi-judicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region. The Court held that the adjudication of pollution cases generally pertains to the Pollution Adjudication Board (PAB), except where a special law, such as the LLDA Charter, provides for another forum. The Court further ruled that although the PAB assumed the powers and functions of the National Pollution Control Commission with respect to adjudication of pollution cases, this does not preclude the LLDA from assuming jurisdiction of pollution cases within its area of responsibility and to impose fines as penalty.

Dispositive: WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals, and the Resolution are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders of the Laguna Lake Development Authority, are hereby REINSTATED and AFFIRMED.

In the earlier case of The Alexandra Condominium Corporation v. Laguna Lake Development Authority, this Court affirmed the ruling of the CA which sustained the LLDA's Order requiring the petitioner therein to pay a fine representing penalty for pollutive wastewater discharge. In that case, the Court acknowledged the power of the LLDA to impose fines holding that under Section 4-A of RA 4850, as amended, the LLDA is entitled to 31


32

09 Admin Digests - Pg 1-28

Recommend Documents