AQUILINO LARIN vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY [G.R. No. 112745. October 16, 1997]
Decree of the Philippines, is emphatic that career service officers and employees who enjoy security of tenure may be removed only for any of the causes enumerated in said law. In other words, the fact that the petitioner is a presidential appointee does not give the appointing authority the license to remove him at will or at his pleasure, for he is under the law, the recipient of tenurial protection. Thus, may only be removed for a cause and in accordance with procedural due process.
FACTS: DARIO vs. MISON A decision was rendered by the Sandiganbayan convicting Aquilino Larin, Revenue Specific Tax Officer, then Assistant Commisioner of the BIR and his co-accused (Teodoro Pareno, Justino Galban and Potenciana Evangelista) of the crimes of violation of R.A. 3019 imposing upon them the penalty of dismissal from service. This conviction was reported to the President through a memorandum.
[G.R. No. 81954. August 8, 1989] FACTS:
Sr. Deputy Exec. Secretary Quisumbing issued M.O. No. 164 which created an Executive Committee to investigate the administrative charge. Larin asserts that, his case being sub-judice (under judgment), he may not, therefore, comment on the merits of issues involved for fear of being cited in contempt of Court. Larin claims that the administrative complaint against him is already barred: a) since the Office of the Ombudsman had already taken cognizance of the case; b) by res judicata; c) double jeopardy; and d) because to proceed with the case would be redundant and oppressive persecution against him. The President issued E.O. No. 132 wherein BIR positions and functions were either abolished, reorganized or created. The Excise Tax Service, of which Larin was the Asst. Comm., was one of those offices that were abolished. The president, in Adm. Order No. 101 found petitioner guilty of grave misconduct and imposed upon him the penalty of dismissal. Aggrieved, Larin filed directly with the S.C. a petition questioning his alleged unlawful removal from office. While the petition is pending, the S.C. set aside the conviction in the Criminal Case. Larin challenged the authority of the President to dismiss him from office. He argued that in so far as presidential appointees who are Career Executive Service Officers are concerned, the President exercises only the power of control not the power to remove. Petitioner likewise claimed that he was removed as a result of the reorganization. He assailed E.O. No. 132 for being ultra vires, claiming that there is yet no law enacted by Congress which authorizes the reorganization by the Executive Department of executive agencies. He said that the reorganization is tainted with bad faith in apparent violation of his Security of Tenure as Civil Service Officer. Respondents contended that since Larin is the presidential appointee, he falls under the disciplining authority of the President. They also contended that E.O. No. 132 and its implementing rules were validly issued pursuant to the General Appropriations Act. In addition, it is clear that R.A No.6656 future reorganization is expressly contemplated and does not prohibit subsequent reorganization through an executive order. Respondents claimed that he was removed from office because he was found guilty of grave misconduct in the administrative cases filed against him. ISSUE: Whether or not, the President may validly reorganize a government agency. HELD: It is a settled principle that the “power to remove is inherent in the power to appoint .” Mem. Mem. Order No. 164, was pursuant to the power of removal of the President. This power of removal, however, is not an absolute. It must be pointed out that petitioner is a career service officer. Under the Administrative Code, career service is characterized by the existence of security of tenure, as distinguished from non-career service whose tenure is: (1) co-terminus with that of the appointing authority; or (2) limited to a period specified by law or (3) limited to the duration of a particular project. As a career service officer, petitioner enjoys the right to security of tenure. The Civil Service
Pres. Aquino promulgated Proc. No. 3 granting authority to completely reorganize the government inorder to eradicate graft and corruption. The President called upon "all appointive public officials to submit their courtesy resignations." Since then, the President has issued a number of executive orders reorganizing various other government offices, a number of which have been questioned. The President promulgated E.O. No. 127, "REORGANIZING THE MINISTRY OF FINANCE," providing for the reorganization of the Bureau of Customs. Incumbent Commissioner of Customs Salvador Mison sent notices to various Customs officials declaring their service with the BOC terminated. The recipients of the notice are the petitioners. Several of the petitioners sent their complaint to the Reorganization Appeals Board created by Commissioner Mison, some to the CSC, the others to the SC. The CSC ordered the reinstatement of the private respondent employees. The CSC applied the same ruling to those who appealed to the Reorganization Appeals Board. Cesar Dario, Deputy Commissioners of the BOC, contends that neither the Executive Order nor the staffing pattern proposed abolished the office of Deputy Commissioner of Customs, but, rather, increased it to three. He maintains that he had not been "reappointed" because "reappointment presupposes that the position to which it refers is a new one in lieu of that which has been abolished." Vicente Feria was also a Deputy Commissioner until his separation. He claims that under the 1987 Constitution, he has acquired security of tenure and that he cannot be said to be covered by EO 127. ISSUE: Whether or not, the petitioners should be dismissed from service without reason. HELD: Reorganizations in this jurisdiction have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good faith. As a general rule, a reorganization is carried out in "good faith" if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. In that event, no dismissal (in case of a dismissal) or separation actually occurs because the position itself ceases to exist. Be that as it may, if the "abolition," which is nothing else but a separation or removal, is done for political reasons or purposely to defeat sty of tenure, or otherwise not in good faith, no valid "abolition' takes place and whatever "abolition' is done, is void ab initio. initio. There is an invalid "abolition" as where there is merely a change of nomenclature of positions, or where claims of economy are belied by the existence of ample funds. BUKLOD NG KAWANING EIIB vs. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY [G.R. Nos. 142801-802. July 10, 2001] FACTS:
Pres. C. Aquino issued E.O. No. 127 establishing the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) as part of the structural organization of the Ministry of Finance. She issued M.O. No. 225 providing that the EIIB "shall be the agency of primary responsibility for anti-smuggling operations in all land areas and inland waters and waterways outside the areas of sole jurisdiction of the Bureau of Customs." Eleven years after, Pres. Estrada issued E.O. No. 191 entitled " Deactivation of the Economic Intelligence and Investigation Bureau" and E.O. No. 196 creating the Presidential Anti-Smuggling Task Force " Aduana." Pres. Estrada issued E.O. No. 223 providing that all EIIB personnel occupying positions specified therein shall be deemed separated from the service. Petitioners went before the Supreme Court for judicial review of E.O. Nos. 191 and 223 arguing that the President has no authority to abolish the EIIB thereby: (a) a violation of their right to security of tenure; (b) tainted with bad faith as they were not actually intended to make the bureaucracy more efficient but to give way to Task Force "Aduana," the functions of which are essentially and substantially the same as that of EIIB; and (c) a usurpation of the power of Congress to decide whether or not to abolish the EIIB. The Solicitor General contends that: the President enjoys the totality of the executive power provided under Article VII of the Constitution, thus, he has the authority to issue Executive Order Nos. 191 and 223 and the EIIB was not " abolished ," it was only "deactivated ." ISSUE:
ISSUE: Whether or not, Executive Orders have the force and effect of law to warrant the abolition of positions and/or effecting total reorganization. HELD: Reorganizations have been regarded as valid provided they are pursued in good faith. Reorganization is carried out in `good faith’ if it is for the purpose of economy or to make bureaucracy more efficient. Pertinently, Republic Act No. 6656 provides for the circumstances which may be considered as evidence of bad faith in the removal of civil service employees made as a result of reorganization, to wit: (a) where there is a significant increase in the number of positions in the new staffing pattern of the department or agency concerned; (b) where an office is abolished and another performing substantially the same functions is created; (c) where incumbents are replaced by those less qualified in terms of status of appointment, performance and merit; (d) where there is a classification of offices in the department or agency concerned and the reclassified offices perform substantially the same functions as the original offices, and (e) where the removal violates the order of separation. The Court of Appeals has found no evidence of bad faith on the part of the NTA. CRISOSTOMO vs. CA
Whether or not, the President has the authority to reorganize the executive department.
[G.R. No. 106296. July 5, 1996]
HELD: The general rule has always been that the power to abolish a public office is lodged with the legislature. This proceeds from the legal precept that the power to create includes the power to destroy. A public office is either created by the Constitution, by statute, or by authority of law. Thus, except where the office was created by the Constitution itself, it may be abolished by the same legislature that brought it into existence. The exception, however, is that as far as bureaus, agencies or offices in the executive department are concerned, the President's power of control may justify him to inactivate the functions of a particular office, or certain laws may grant him the broad authority to carry out reorganization measures. BAGAOISAN vs. NATIONAL TOBACCO ADMINISTRATION
FACTS: Crisostomo was appointed as President of the Philippine College of Commerce (PCC) by the President of the Philippines. During his incumbency, two administrative charges were filed against him for illegal use of government vehicles, misappropriation of construction materials, oppression and harassment, grave misconduct, nepotism and dishonesty. Charges of violations of R.A. No. 3019 (AntiGraft and Corrupt Practices Act) and R.A. No. 992 and R.A. No. 733 were likewise filed against him with the Office of Tanodbayan (now Ombudsman). As such, he was preventively suspended. Dr. Pablo T. Mateo, Jr. was designated as the officer-in-charge in his place. Meanwhile, P.D. No. 1341 was issued by the then President Ferdinand E. Marcos converting the PCC into a Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP), defining its objectives, organizational structure and functions, and expanding its curricular offerings and Mateo continued as the head of the new University.
[G.R. No. 152845. August 5, 2003] FACTS: President Joseph Estrada issued E.O. No. 29, entitled "Mandating the Streamlining of the National Tobacco Administration (NTA)," and E.O. No. 36, amending the former, insofar as the new staffing pattern was concerned, by increasing from 400 to not exceeding 750 the positions affected thereby. In compliance therewith, the NTA adopted a new Organization Structure and Staffing Pattern. The employees of NTA Batac (petititoners) filed a letter-appeal with the CSC and sought its assistance in recalling the OSSP. The NTA created a placement committee to assist the appointing authority in the selection and placement of permanent personnel in the revised OSSP. The results of the evaluation on the qualifications of applicants to the positions in the new OSSP were disseminated at the offices of the NTA. Petitioners, occupying different positions at the NTA office in Batac, Ilocos Norte, received notices of termination. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari , prohibition and mandamus with the RTC. The RTC ordered the NTA to appoint petitioners in the new OSSP to positions similar or comparable to their respective former assignments. The NTA filed an appeal with the CA. The appellate court reversed the orders of the trial court.
Subsequently, Mateo was acquitted. The cases filed before the Tanodbayan were likewise dismissed on the ground that they had become moot and academic. On the other hand, the administrative cases were dismissed for failure of the complainants to prosecute them. ISSUE: Whether or not the conversion of the PCC into PU abolished the PCC. HELD: No. If the law had intended the PCC to lose its existence, it would have specified that the PCC was being “abolished” and that if the law intends the PUP as a new institution, the law would have said the PUP was being “created.”
P.D. No 1341 did not abolish, but only changed the former PCC into what is now the PUP, in the same way that earlier in 1952, R.A. No. 778 had converted what was then the Philippine School of Commerce into the Philippine College of Commerce. What took place was a change in academic status of the educational institution, not in its corporate life. Hence the change in its name, the expansion of its curricular offerings, and the changes in its structure and organization. Also, the law does not state that the lands, buildings and equipment owned by the PCC were being transferred to the PUP, but only that they stand transferred to it. “Stand transferred” simply means, for example, that lands transferred to the PCC were to be understood as transferred to the PUP as the new name of the institution. DOMINGO vs. ZAMORA [G.R. No. 142283. February 6, 2003] FACTS: Pres. Estrada issued E.O. No. 81 entitled "Transferring the Sports Programs and Activities of DECS to the PSC." Pursuant to which, DECS Sec. Andrew Gonzales issued Memorandum No. 01592 temporarily reassigned all remaining BPESS Staff to other divisions or bureaus of the DECS. Secretary Gonzales issued Memorandum No. 01594 reassigning the Bureau of Physical Education and School Sports (BPESS) staff to various offices within the DECS. Petitioners were among the BPESS personnel affected by the reassignment. Dissatisfied, petitioners filed the instant petition. Petitioners argue that EO 81 is void and unconstitutional for being an undue legislation by the President, thus, a violation of the principle of separation of powers. During the pendency of the case, (R.A. No. 9155) the "Governance of Basic Education Act of 2001", was enacted. The statute expressly abolished the BPESS and transferred the functions, programs and activities of the DECS relating to sports competition to the PSC. The personnel of the BPESS, detailed with the PSC, were transferred to the PSC without loss of rank, including the plantilla (permanent member of the staff) positions they occupy. All other BPESS personnel were retained by the Department. ISSUE: Whether or not, there was undue legislation in the issuance of E.O. No. 81. HELD: The President’s power to reorganize the Office of the President under Section 31 (2) and (3) of the Revised Administrative Code (E.O. No. 292) should be distinguished from his power to reorganize the Office of the President Proper. Under Section 31 (1) of EO 292, the President can reorganize the Office of the President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units, or by transferring functions from one unit to another. In contrast, under Section 31 (2) and (3) of EO 292, the President’s power to reorganize offices outside the Office of the President Proper but still within the Office of the President is limited to merely transferring functions or agencies from the Office of the President to Departments or Agencies, and vice versa. This distinction is crucial as it affects the security of tenure of employees. The abolition of an office in good faith necessarily results in the employee’s cessation in office, but in such event there is no dismissal or separation because the office itself ceases to exist. On the other hand, the transfer of functions or agencies does not result in the employee’s cessation in office because his office continues to exist although in another department, agency or office.
