purely administrative official to determine whether the defined crime has been committed! and! if so! to inflict punishment 8.9ven though it be conceded that Congress may! in some cases! impose penalties for the violation of a statutory duty! and provide for their enforcement by civil suit instead of by criminal prosecution! nevertheless that doctrine does not warrant the conclusion that a penalty may be authori$ed! and its collection committed to an administrative officer without the necessity of resorting to the :udicial power. "n all cases of penalty or punishment! enforcement must depend upon the exertion of :udicial power! either by civil or criminal process! since the distinction between :udicial and administrative functions cannot be preserved consistently with the recognition of an administrative power to enforce a penalty without resort to :udicial authority. +.he fines which constituted the exactions were repugnant to the ; th &mendment! because amounting to a taking of property without due process of law! since! as asserted! the fines were imposed! in some cases! without any previous notice! and in all cases without any ade7uate notice or opportunity to defend.
c. IMPOSITION OF FINES AND PENALTIES OCEANIC STEAM NAVIGATION CO. v STRANAHAN 214 US 320; Whi!; "#$! 1% 1&0& F'c() -
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Oceanic Steam Navigation Co sought the recovery of money paid to the collector of customs of the port of New York which was exacted by that official under an order of the Secretary of Commerce and Labor. he findings of the court showed that the money was paid to the collector under protest! and involuntarily. "t was established that the company was coer ced by the cert ainty that! if it did not pay! the collector would refuse a clearance to its steamships plying between New York City and foreign ports at periodical and definite sailings. #oth the Secretary and collector were expressly authori$ed by law! entitled %&n &ct to 'egulate the "mmigration of &liens into the (nited States)! enacted on *arch +! ,-+. Section - of said &ct! under which the Secretary and collector acted! provides/ hat it shall be unlawful for any person! including any transportation company other than railway lines entering the (nited States from foreign contiguous territory! or the owner! master! agent! or consignee of any vessel! to bring to the (nited States any alien afflicted with a loathsome or with a dangerous contagious disease0 and if it shall appear to the satisfaction of the Secretary of reasury 1Secretary of Commerce and Labor2 that any alien so brought to the (nited States was afflicted with such a disease at the time of foreign embarkation! and that the existence of such disease might have been detected by means of a competent medical examination at such time! such person or transportation company! or the master! agent! owner! or consignee of any such vessel! shall pay to the collector of customs of the customs district in which the port of arrival is located the sum of one hundred dollars 34,5 for each and every violation of the provisions of this section0 and no vessel shall be granted clearance papers while any such fine imposed upon it remains unpaid! nor shall such fine be remitted. Oceanic Steam argues that/ ,.6owever complete may be the power of Congress to legislate concerning the exclusion of aliens! and to entrust the enforcement of legislation of that character to administrative officers! nevertheless the particular legislation here in 7uestion is repugnant to the Constitution because it defines a criminal offense! and authori$es a
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H!*+) ,ES -
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he exaction which the section authori$es the Secretary of Commerce and Labor to impose! when considered in the light afforded by the context of the statute! is clearly but a power given as a sanction to the duty which the statute places on the owners of all vessels! to sub:ect all alien emigrants! prior to bringing them to the (nited States! to medical examination at the point of embarkation! so as to exclude those afflicted with the prohibited diseases. "n other words! the power to impose the exaction which the statute confers on the Secretary is lodged in that officer only when it results from the official medical examination at the point of arrival not only that an alien is afflicted with one of the prohibited diseases! but that the stage of the malady! as disclosed by the examination! establishes that the alien was suffering with the disease at the time of embarkation! and that such fact would have been then discovered had the medical examination been then made by the vessel or its owners! as the stature re7uires. he power thus lodged in the officers was intended to be exclusive and that its exertion was authori$ed as the result of the probative force attributed to the official medica l examination for which the statute provides! and that the power to refuse clearance to vessels was lodged
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for the express purpose of causing both the imposition of the exaction and its collection to be acts of administrative competency! not re7uiring a resort to :udicial power for their enforcement. he report of the Senate committee on immigration is considered/ %Section , 1which became Section -2 therefore imposes a penalty of 4,! to be imposed by the 1Secretary of Commerce and Labor2 for each case brought to an &merican port! provided! in his :udgment! the disease might have been detected by means of medical examination at the port of embarkation. his sufficiently guards the transportation lines from an un:ust and hasty imposition of the penalty! insures a careful observance of the law! and leaves in their own hands the power to escape even a risk of the fine being imposed! since they can refuse to take on board even the most doubtful case until certified by competent medical authority to be entirely cured.) Court=s discussion on Oceanic Steam=s arguments/ ,.he various sections of the &ct accurately distinguish between those cases where it was intended that particular violations of the &ct should be considered as criminal and be punished accordingly! and those where it was contemplated that violations should not constitute crime! but merely entail the infliction of penalty! enforceable in some cases by purely administrative action and in others by civil suit. he sole purpose of Section - was to impose a penalty! based upon the medical examination for which the statute provided! thus tending! by the avoidance of controversy and delay! to secure the efficient performance by the steamship company of the duty re7uired by the statute! and thereby aid in carrying out the policy of Congress. 8.he interference of the courts with the performance of the ordinary duties of the executive departments of the government would be productive of nothing but mischief. > he legislation of Congress from the beginning has proceeded on the conception that it was within the competency of Congress! when legislating as to matters exclusively within its control! to impose appropriate obligations! and sanction their enforcement by reasonable money penalties! giving to executive officers the power to enforce such penalties without the necessity of invoking the :udicial power. +.Court did not think it necessary to entertain the controversy! as it is evident that the statute unambiguously excludes the conception that the steamship company was entitled to be heard! in the sense of raising an issue and tendering evidence concerning the condition of the alien immigrant upon arrival at the point of disembarkation! as the plain purpose of the statute was to exclusively commit that sub:ect to the medical officers for which the statute provided.
CIVIL AERONAUTICS -OARD v PHIL. AIRLINES INC. 3 SCRA /24 ESGUERRA; APRIL 30% 1&/ N'#!)&ppeal from 8 resolutions of the Civil &eronautics #oard 3C F'c() > On *ay ,8! ,-?! @&L had an excess of 8 passengers from #aguio to *anila who could not be accommodated in its regular flight. o accommodate these 8 passengers! @&L re7uired the aircraft operating Alight 8,+ 3uguegarao to *anila5 to pass #aguio on its way to *anila and pick up these passengers. > Claiming that @&L should have first obtained the permission of the C&# before operating the flagstop and that such failure is a violation of '& ??B! the C&#! through the first 7uestioned resolution! imposed a fine of @; upon @&L. (pon @&L =s *A'! the C&#! through the second 7uestioned resolution! reduced the fine to @8;. "t also stated that %@ublic &ct 8?,! as amended! re7uires the grantee 3of a legislative franchise for air service5! @&L "nc. to comply with the provisions of '& ??B! and regulations promulgated thereunder from time to time.) > @&L claims that there is nothing in '& ??B which expressly empowers the C&# to impose a fine and order its payment in the manner pursued in this case. %he power and authority to impose fines and penalties is a :udicial function exercised through the regular courts of :ustice! and that such power and authority cannot be delegated to the C&# by mere implication or interpretation.)
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H!*+) Y9S. Ratio he C&# is empowered to impose administrative penalties or
those violations punishable by a fine or civil penalty for violations of its rules and regulations but no power to impose fines in the nature of a criminal penalty. Reasoning '& ??B created the C&# and the C&& 3Civil &eronautics &dministration5 so that in the exercise and performance of their powers and duties! they shall consider among other things! %as being in the public interest! and in accordance with the public convenience and necessity) certain declared policies which include/ %D the regulation of air transportation in such manner as Eto recogni$e and preserve the inherent advantage of! assure the highest degree of
safety in! and foster sound economic condition in! such transportation! and to improve the relation between! and coordinate transportation by! air carriers0 Dto promote safety of flight in air commerce in the @hilippines0) 3Sec. ! '& ??B5 %D the general supervision and regulation of! and :urisdiction and control over! air carriers as well as their property! property rights! e7uipment! facilities! and franchise! in so far as may be necessary for the purpose of carrying out the provisions of this &ct) 3Sec. , '& ??B5 %D power to issue! deny! amend! revise! alter! modify! cancel! suspend or revoke! in whole or in part! upon petition or complaint! or upon its own initiative! any temporary operating permit or Certificate of @ublic Convenience and Necessity) 3Sec. ,3c5 3,5 '& ??B5 %Dpower to investigate! upon complaint or upon its own initiative! whether any individual or air carrier! domestic or foreign! is violating any provision of this act! or the rules and regulations issued thereunder! and shall take such action! consistent with the provisions of this &ct! as may be necessary to prevent further violation of such provision! or rules and regulations so issued.) 3Section ,3F5 '& ??B5 %Dpower to review! revise! reverse! modify or affirm on appeal any administrative decision or order of the Civil &eronautics &dministrator on matters pertaining to imposition of civil penalty or fine in connection with the violation of any provision of this &ct or rules and regulations issued thereunder. "t has the power also either on its own initiative or upon review on appeal from an order or decision of the Civil &eronautics &dministrator! to determine whether to impose! remit! mitigate! increase! or compromise! such fine and civil penalties! as the case may be. 3Sec. ,3A5 3G5 '& ??B5 %Dpower to impose fines andHor civil penalties and make compromise in respect thereto is expressly given to the Civil &eronautics &dministrator 3Sec. +83,?5 '& ??B5 > he fine imposed on @&L by C&# is that fine or civil penalty contemplated in the provisions of '& ??B and not a fine in the nature of a criminal penalty as contemplated in the '@C! because the %fine) in this case was imposed by C&# because of @&L=s violation of C&# rules on flagstops without previous authority. he C&# explained in its resolution that the %imposition of the fine is not so much on exacting penalty for the violation committed as the need to stress upon the air carriers to desist from wanton disregard of existing rules! regulations or re7uirements of the government regulating agency.) > here exists but an insignificant doubt in Our mind that the C.&.#. is fully authori$ed by law 3'& ??B5 to impose fines in the nature of civil penalty for violations of its rules and regulations. o deprive the C&# of
that power would amount to an absurd interpretation of the pertinent legal provision because the C&# is given full power on its own initiative to determine whether to %impose! remit! mitigate! increase or compromise) %fines and civil penalties!) a power which is expressly given to the C&& whos e orders or decision may be reviewed! revis ed! reversed! modified or affirmed by the C&#. #esides! to deprive the C&# of its power to impose civil penalties would negate its effective general supervision and control over air carriers if they can :ust disregard with impunity the rules and regulations designed to insure public safety and convenience in air transportation. "f everytime the C&# would like to impose a civil penalty on an erring airline for violation of its rules and regulations it would have to resort to courts of :ustice in protracted litigations then it could not serve its purpose of exercising a competent! efficient and effective supervision and control over air carriers in their vital role of rendering public service by affording safe and convenient air transit. > 6owever! @&L committed the violation of the C&# regulation against flagstops without malice and with no deliberate intent to flout the same. Aor this reason! the penalty imposed by the C&# may be mitigated and reduced to a nominal sum. Disposition 'esolution appealed from is modified by reducing the administrative fine imposed on the appellant @&L to @,.
SCOT,S DEPARTMENT STORE v MICALLER && Phi* 2; -AUTISTA ANGELO; A##( 2/% 1&/ N'#!)@etition for review F'c() > Nena *icaller was employed as a salesgirl in the ScotyEs Fept Store > his store was owned and operated by Yu Ii Lam! 'ichard Yang! Yu Si Iiao and 6elen Yang. > @ursuant to section ;3b5 of the "ndustrial @eace &ct! Nena *icaller filed charges of unfair labor practice against her above employers alleging that she was dismissed by them because of her membership in the National Labor (nion and that! prior to her separation! said employers had been 7uestioning their employees regarding their membership in said union and had interfered with their right to organi$e under the law. > he employers denied the charge. hey claim that the complainant was dismissed from the service because of her misconduct and serious disrespect to the management and her co>employees so much so that several criminal charges were filed against her with the city fiscal of
*anila who! after investigation! filed the corresponding informations against her and the same are now pending trial in court. > the court found the following facts/ Nena *icaller was earning @.J a day. &fter every New Year! she was given from @,J to @8 as bonus whereas the other employees were only given @B. Aor three consecutive years! she was given a first pri$e for being the best seller! the most cooperative and most honest employee. She organi$ed a union among the employees of the store which was latter affiliated with the National Labor (nion. Later! the National Labor (nion sent a petition to the store containing ten demands and Nena was called by the management for 7uestioning and! in the managerEs office! she was asked who the members of the union were! but she pretended not to know them. > 'ichard Yang and Yu Si Iiao! together with a brother>in law! went to Nena=s house and 7uestioned her regarding her union membership. > Nena was brought by her employers to the house of their counsel! &tty. Koa7uin Yuseco! and there she was again 7uestioned regarding her union activities and was even made to sign a paper of withdrawal from the union. > the manager of the Store! Yu Ii Lam asked each the every employee whether they were members of the union. > the union gave notice to strike to the management. (pon receipt of the notice! the management hired temporary employees e7ual in number to the old. he new employees were affiliated with another labor union. > an information for threats was filed against Nena *icaller before the municipal court. his was dismissed. ¬her information was filed against Nena *icaller for slander. & third information for slander was filed against her before the same court. &nd on November +! she was dismissed for insulting the owner of the store and for taking to the girls inside the store during business hours. &nd on the strength of these facts the court found respondents! now petitioners! guilty of unfair labor practice and ordered them to pay a fine of @,. > @etitioners contend that section 8; of 'epublic &ct No. J?; being penal in character should be strictly construed in favor of the accused and in that sense their guilt can only be established by clear and positive evidence and not merely be presumptions or inferences as was done by the industrial court. "n other words! it is contended that the evidence as
HELD NO.
regards unfair labor practice with reference to the three above>named petitioners is not clear enough labor practice and the fine imposed upon them is un:ustified.
speedily and ob:ective and without regards to technicalities of law of procedure. > legislative record containing the deliberations made on the bill eliminating the criminal :urisdiction of the Court of &grarian 'elation show that the real intent of congress was to place that court on the same
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Ratio he power to impose the penalties provided for in section 8; of '&
J?; is lodged in ordinary court s! and not in the Court of "ndustrial 'elations! notwithstanding the definition of the word Court contained in section 83a5 of said &ct. 6ence! the decision of the of the industrial court in so far as it imposes a fine of @, upon petitioners is illegal and should be nullified. Reasoning
S9C. 8;. @enalties.> &ny person who violates the provisions of section three this act shall be punished by a fine of not less than one hundred pesos nor more than one thousand pesos! or by imprisonment of not less than one month nor more than one year! or both by such free and imprisonment! in the discretion of the Court. &ny other violation of this &ct which is declared unlawful shall be punished by a fine of not less than fifty nor more than five hundred pesos for each offense. > he above provision is general in nature for its does not specify the court that may act when the violation charged calls for the imposition of the penalties therein provided. "t merely states that they may be imposed in the discretion of the court. > he word %court) cannot refer to the Court of "ndustrial 'elations for to give that meaning would be violative of the safeguards guaranteed to every accused by our Constitution.
he procedure laid down by law to be observed by the Court of "ndustrial 'elations in dealing with the unfair labor practice cases negates those constitutional guarantees to the accused. &nd this is so because! among other things! the law provi des that the rules of evidence prevailing in court for the courts of law or e7uity cannot be controlling and it is the spirit and intention of this act that the Court 3of "ndustrial 'elations5 and its members and its 6earing 9xaminers shall use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case
footing as the @ublic Service Commission and the Court of "ndustrial relations by confining their :urisdiction exclusively to civil matters. > on the issue of employees to a series of 7uestioning regarding their membersh ip in the union or their union activities which in contemplation of law are deemed acts constituting unfair labor practice. his finding is binding upon this Court following well>known precedents. Disposition decision appealed from is modified by eliminating the fine of @, imposed upon petitioners.
punished by imprisonment for not more than six months! or by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars! (nited States currency! or by both such fine and imprisonment! at the discretion of the court0 Provided! hat violations of law may be punished either by the method prescribed in section seven hereof! or by that prescribed in this section or by both. > Counsel for the appellant attacked the validity of paragraph ? on two grounds/ Airst that it is unauthori$ed by section ,- of &ct No. +;;0 and! second! that if the acts of the @hilippine Commission bear the interpretation of authori$ing the Collector to promulgate such a law! they are void! as constituting an illegal delegation of legislative power.
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U.S. VS -ARRIAS 11 Phi* 32; T'c!; S!5 24 1&06 F'c() > he defendant was charged in CA" *anila with violation of paragraphs ? and J+ of Circular No. +-? of the "nsular Collector of Customs. &fter a demurrer to the complaint of the lighter Maude! he was moving her and directing her movement! when heavily laden! in the @asig 'iver! by bamboo poles in the hands of the crew! and without steam! sail! or any other external power. @aragraph ? of Circular No. +-? reads as follows/ %No heavily loaded casco! lighter! or other similar craft shall be permitted to move in the @asig 'iver without being towed by steam or moved by other ade7uate power. > @aragraph J+ reads! in part! as follows/Aor the violation of any part of the foregoing regulations! the persons offending shall be liable to a fine of not less than @; and not more than @;! in the discretion of the court. > #y sections ,! 8! and + of &ct No. ,,+B! passed &pril 8-! ,-! the Collector of Customs is authori$ed to license craft engaged in the lighterage or other exclusively harbor business of the ports of the "slands! and! with certain exceptions! all vessels engaged in lightering are re7uired to be so licensed. Sections ; and J read as follows/ S9C. ;. he Collector of Customs for the @hilippine "slands is hereby authori$ed! empowered! and directed to promptly make and publish suitable rules and regulations to carry this law into effect and to regulate the business herein licensed. S9C. J. &ny person who shall violate the provisions of this &ct! or of any rule or regulation made and issued by the Collector of Customs for the @hilippine "slands! under and by authority of this &ct! shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor! and upon conviction shall be
H!*+) ,ES > he necessity confiding to some local authority the framing! changing! and enforcing of harbor regulations is recogni$ed throughout the world! as each region and each a harbor re7uires peculiar use more minute than could be enacted by the central lawmaking power! and which! when kept within the proper scope! are in their nature polic e regulations not involving an undue grant of legislative power. he complaint in this instance was framed with reference! as its authority! to secti ons +,, and +,- 1,- and +,,2 at No. +;; of the @hilippine Customs &dministrative &cts! as amended by &ct Nos. ,8+; and ,J. (nder &ct No. ,8+;! the Collector is not only empowered to make suitable regulations! but also to fix penalties for violation thereof! not exceeding a fine of @;. > his provision of the statute does! indeed! present a serious 7uestion. One of the settl ed maxims in constitutional law is! that the power conferred upon the legislature to make laws can not be delegated by that department to any body or authority. his doctrine is based on the ethical principle that such a delegated power constitutes not only a right but a duty to be performed by the
delegate by the instrumentality of his own :udgment acting immediately upon the matter of legislation and not through the intervening mind of another. "n the case of the (nited States vs. #reen 3 Aed. @hil. 'ep. 85! an &ct of Congress allowing the Secretary of "n the cas e of The Board of Harbor Commissioners of the Port of Eureka vs. Excelsior Redwood Compan 3JJ Cal. -,5! it was ruled that harbor commissioners can not impose a penalty under statues authori$ing them to do so! the court saying/ Conceding that the legislature could delegate to the plaintiff the authority to make rules and regulation with reference to the navigation of 6umboldt #ay! the penalty for the violation of such rules and regulations is a matter purely in the hands of the legislature. Disposition :udgment of the CA" as convicts the defendant of a violation of &cts Nos. +;; and ,8+; is revoked! and is hereby convicted of a misdemeanor and punished by a fine of 48;
> his involves 8 cases consolidated by the Court for decision. > "n the first case! Fiego *orales claims that while he was in *anila his daughter sent him a telegram on October ,;! ,-? from Santiago ! "sabela! informing him of the death of his wife! *rs. Fiego . *orales. he telegram sent thru the petitioner 'C@" however never reached him. 6e had to be informed personally about the death of his wife and so to catch up with the burial of his wife! he had to take the trip by airplane to "sabela. "n its answer petitioner 'C@" claims that the telegram sent by respondent was transmitted from Santiago! "sabela to its *essage Center at Cubao! Mue$on City but when it was relayed from Cubao! the radio signal became intermittent making the copy received at Sta. Cru$! *anila unreadable and unintelligible. #ecause of the failure of the 'C@" to transmit said telegram to him! respondent allegedly suffered inconvenience and additional expenses and prays for damages. > "n the second case! @acifico "nnocencio claims that on Kuly ,+! ,-?; Lourdes "nnocencio sent a telegram from @ani7ui! arlac! thru the facilities of the petitioner 'C@" to him at #arrio Lomot! Cavinti! Laguna for the purpose of informing him about the death of their father. he telegram was never received by @acifico "nnocencio. "nspite of the non> receipt andHor non>delivery of the message sent to said address! the sender 3Lources "nnocencio5 has not been notified about its non>delivery. &s a conse7uence @acifico "nnocencio was not able to attend the internment of their father at *oncada! arlac. #ecause of the failure of 'C@" to deliver to him said telegram he allegedly was shocked when he learned about the death of their father when he visited his hometown *oncada! arlac on &ugust ,! ,-?;! and thus suffered mental anguish and personal inconveniences. Likewise! he prays for damages. > &fter hearing! the respondent #oard in both cases held that the service rendered by petitioner was inade7uate and unsatisfactory and imposed upon the petitioner in each case a disciplinary fine of @8 pursuant to Section 8, of Commonwealth &ct ,B! as amended! by @residential Fecree No. , and Letter of "mplementation No. ,. 6ence! this appeal I((#!)
H!*+) NO. RATIOhe #oard exceeded its authority when it imposed a fine on 'C@" RADIO COMMUNICATIONS OF THE PHILIPPINES% INC. 7RCPI8% v since its enabling law does not authori$e it to do so. "ts power is limited only to management of the facilities and system of transmission of -OARD OF COMMUNICATIONS messages by radio companies. G.R. N9. L:43/3; MARTIN; N9v 2&% 1& REASONING he charge does not relate to the management of the facilities and system of transmission of messages by petitioner in N'#!)@etition for review by certiorari F'c()
accordance with its certificate of public convenience. "f in the two cases before (s complainants Fiego *orales and @acifico "nnocencio allegedly
suffered in:ury due to petitionerEs breach of contractual obligation arising from negligence! the proper forum for them to ventilate their grievances for possible recovery of damages against petitioner should be in the courts and not in the respondent #oard of Communications. *uch less can it impose the disciplinary fine of @8 upon the petitioner. > "n Arancisco Santiago vs. 'C@" 3G.'. No. L>8-8+B5 and Constancio Langan vs. 'C@" 3G.'. No. L>8-8?5! this Court speaking thru Kustice 9nri7ue Aernando! ruled/ !There can be no "ustification then for the Public #ervice Commission $now the Board of Communications as successor in interest% imposin& the fines in these two petitions. The law cannot be an clearer. The only power it possessed over radio companies as noted was fix rates. It could not take to task a radio company for any negligence or misfeasance. It was not vested with such authority. What it did then in these two petition lacked the impress of validity.
8st (ffense 9 5nd (ffense 9 :rd (ffense 9 the proper local &overnment unit
4ine of P:;<<< for each clinder 4ine of P=;<<< for each clinder Recommend business closure to
> "t is alleged that Circular No. 8>B>, 3the %assailed Circular)5 listed prohibited acts and punishable offenses which are brand>new or which were not provided for by #.@. #lg. ++! as amended0 and that #.@. #lg. ++ enumerated and specifically defined the prohibitedHpunishable acts under the law and that the punishable offenses in the assailed Circular are not included in the law.
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> Aor an administrative regulation! such as the Circular in this case! to have the force of penal law! 3,5 the violation of the administrative regulation must be made a crime by the delegating statute itself0 and 385 $9hi$ i$ S!ci9$ 21 h!!9 V LPG REFILLERS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES% INCperpetrated! namely/ no price display board! no weighing scale! no tare weight or incorrect tare weight markings! no authori$ed L@G seal! no 4&2 SCRA 36 trade name! unbranded L@G cylinders! no serial number! no ?UISUM-ING; A# 26% 200 distinguishing color! no embossed identifying markings on cylinder! underfilling L@G cylinders! tampering L@G cylinders! and unauthori$ed F'c() decanting of L@G cylinders. hese specific acts and omissions are > #atas @ambansa #lg. ++! as amended! penali$es illegal trading! obviously within the contemplation of the law! which seeks to curb the hoarding! overpricing! adulteration! underdelivery! and underfilling of pernicious practices of some petroleum merchants. petroleum products! as well as possession for trade of adulterated 8.&s for the second re7uirement! we find that the Circular is in accord petroleum product s and of underfilled li7uefied petroleum gas 3L@G5 with the law. (nder #.@. #lg. ++! as amended! the monetary penalty for cylinders. he said law sets the monetary penalty for violators to a any person who commits any of the acts aforestated is limited to a minimum of @8! and a maximum of @;!. minimum of @8! and a maximum of @;!. (nder the Circular! > On Kune -! 8! Circular No. 8>B>, was issued by the FO9 to the maximum pecuniary penalty for retail outlets is @8!! an amount implement #.@. #lg. ++! which provides among others 3pls see srcinal for within the range allowed by law. 6owever! for the refillers! marketers! list of offenses and penalties5 > "n the face of the provision itself! it is rather apparent that the #oard lacked the re7uired power to proceed against petitioner. Th! ! i(
#ECT'() *. )( T+RE ,E'-HT (R ')C(RRECT T +RE ,E'-HT M+R')-#. $RE/0'REME)T () E)-R+1E2T+RE ,E'-HT #H+33 T+E E44ECT T,( $5% 6E+R# +4TER E44ECT'1'T6 (4 TH'# C'RC03+R% +. 3P- Refiller7Marketer
and dealers! the Circular is silent as to any maximum monetarry penalty. his mere silence! nonetheless! does not amount to violation of the aforesaid statutory maximum limit. Aurther! the mere fact that the Circular provides penalties on a per cylinder basis does not in itself run counter to the law since all that #.@. #lg. ++ prescribes are the minimum and the maximum limits of penalties.
> Clearly! it is #.@. #lg. ++! as amended! which defines what constitute punishable acts involving petroleum products and which set the minimum and maximum limits for the corresponding penalties. he Circular merely implements the said law! albeit it is silent on the maximum pecuniary penalty for refillers! marketers! and dealers . Nothing in the Circular contravenes the law.
PU-LIC HEARING COMMITTEE OF THE LAGUNA LA@E DEVELOPMENT AUTHORIT, V. SM PRIME HOLDINGS >. PER+3T+
F'c()) 1. he instant petition arose from an inspection conducted on
2.
3.
4.
/.
Aebruary ! 88 by the @ollution Control Fivision of the LLF& of the wastewater collected from herein respondentEs S* City *anila branch. he results of the laboratory tests showed that the sample collected from the said facility failed to conform with the effluent standards for inland water imposed in accordance with law On *arch ,8! 88! the LLF& informed S* City *anila of its violation! directing the same to perform corrective measures to abate or control the pollution caused by the said company '$+ ordering the latter to pay a penalty of One housand @esos 3@,!.5 per day of discharging pollutive wastewater to be computed from Aebruary 88! the date of inspection! until full cessation of discharging pollutive wastewater 'espondentEs @ollution Control Officer re7uested the LLF& to conduct a re>sampling of their effluent! claiming that they already took measures to enable their sewage treatment plant to meet the standards set forth by the LLF&. @etitioner! however! re7uired respondent to pay a fine of Aifty housand @esos 3@;!.5 which represents the accumulated daily penalty computed from Aebruary ! 88 until *arch 8;! 88. "n two follow>up letters dated Kuly 8! 88 and November 8-! 88! which were treated by the LLF& as a motion for reconsideration! respondent asked for a waiver of the fine assessed by the LLF& in its *arch ,8! 88 Notice of iolation and Order of October 8! 88 on the ground that they immediately undertook corrective measures and that the p6 levels of its effluent were already controlled even prior to their
re7uest for re>sampling leading to a minimal damage to the environment. 'espondent also contended that it is a responsible operator of malls and department stores and that it was the first time that the wastewater discharge of S* City *anila failed to meet the standards of law with respect to inland water denied *' also denied . &ggrieved! respondent filed a petition for certiorari with the C& praying for the nullification of the Orders of the LLF& dated October 8! 88! Kanuary ,! 8+ and *ay 8?! 8+. . On Kune 8J! 8! the C& rendered its Fecision granting the petition of herein respondent and reversing and setting aside the assailed Orders of the LLF&. 'uling that '$ '+=i$i('iv!
'!$c( 59
6. H!$c! % hi ( 5! ii 9$. I((#!) WON THE LLDA HAS THE POWER TO IMPOSE FINES AND PENALTIES -ASED ON THE PROVISIONS OF RA 46/0 AND EO &2 YE. ,. 'espondent is already estopped from 7uestioning the power of the LLF& to impose fines as penalty owing to the fact that respondent actively participated during the hearing of its water pollution case before the LLF& without impugning such power of the said agency. "n fact! respondent even asked for a reconsideration of the Order of the LLF& which imposed a fine upon it as evidenced by its letters dated Kuly 8! 88 and November 8-! 88! wherein respondent! through its pollution control officer! as well as its counsel! re7uested for a waiver of the fine3s5 imposed by the LLF&. #y asking for a reconsideration of the fine imposed by the LLF&! the Court arrives at no conclusion other than that respondent has impliedly admitted the authority of the latter to impose such penalty. 6ence! contrary to respondentEs claim in its Comment and *emorandum! it is
2.
already barred from assailing the LLF&Es authority to impose fines. P+C'4'C #TE+M 3+0)2R6 ')C. 1. 332+?the LLF& has the power to impose fines in the exercise of its function as a regulatory and 7uasi>:udicial body with respect to pollution cases in the Laguna Lake region. "n expounding on this issue! the Court held that the ad:udication of pollution cases generally pertains to the @ollution &d:udication #oard 3@! except where a special law! such as the LLF& Charter! provides for another forum. 'epeated in The +lexandra Condominium Corporation v.
Lake 'egion from the deleterious effects of pollutants emanating from the discharge of wastes from the surrounding areas. . he intendment of the law! as gleaned from Section 3i5 of 9.O. No. -8?! is to clothe the LLF& not only with the express powers granted to it! but also those which are implied or incidental but! nonetheless! are necessary or essential for the full and proper implementation of its purposes and functions. @9""ON G'&N9F. C& F9C"S"ON RE1ER#E2 and #ET +#'2E.
8
3.
332+. 332+ 1. C+? "t must be recogni$ed in this regard that the LLF&!
as a speciali$ed administrative agency! is specifically mandated under 'epublic &ct No. J; and its amendatory laws 1@F J,+ and 9O -8?2! to carry out and make effective the declared national policy of promoting and accelerating the development and balanced growth of the Laguna Lake area and the surrounding @rovinces of 'i$al and Laguna and the cities of San @ablo! *anila! @asay! Mue$on and Caloocan with due regard and ade7uate provisions for environmental management and control! preservation of the 7uality of human life and ecological systems! and the prevention of undue ecological disturbances! deterioration and pollution. (nder such a broad grant of power and authority! the LLF&! by virtue of its special charter! obviously has the responsibility to protect the inhabitants of the Laguna Sec. 4-A. Compensation for damages to the water and aquatic resources of Laguna de Bay and its tributaries resulting from failure to meet established water and efluent quality standards and from such other wrongful act or omission of a person pri!ate or public "uridical or otherwise punishable under the law shall be awarded to the Authority to be earmar#ed for water quality control management. ,
$n addition Section 4%d& of '.(. )o. *+, which further deines certain functions and powers of the LLA pro!ides that the LLA has the power to ma#e alter or modify orders requiring the discontinuance of pollution specifying the conditions and the time within which such discontinuance must be accomplished. Li#ewise Section 4%i& of the same '.(. states that the LLA is gi!en authority to e/ercise such powers and perform such other functions as may be necessary to carry out its duties and responsibilities under this '/ecuti!e (rder. Also Section 4%c& authori0es the LLA to issue orders or decisions to compel compliance with the pro!isions of this '/ecuti!e (rder and its implementing rules and regulations only after proper notice and hearing.
C. "UDICIAL DETERMINATION OF SUFFICIENC, OF STANDARDS 1. INTEREST OF LAW AND ORDER RU-I% ET AL. v 1; THE MALCOLM% PROVINCIAL -OARD%OF MINDORO 3& PHIL ".)M'ch 1&1& N'#!/ &n application for habeas corpus in favor of 'ubi and other *anguianes of the @rovince of *indoro.
F'c(/ > "t is alleged that the *aguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. 'ubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at igbao! *indoro! against their will! and one Fabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away form the reservation. : &dministration Code authori$es the establishment of settlement area for non>Christians. & 'esolution was passed by the @rovincial #oard of *indoro providing a selected public Land in igbao as site for permanent sewttlement of the *angyans. >he resolution was approved by the Secretary of "nterior and it was ordered that *angyans who refuses to comply shall be imprisoned. 'ubi and other *angyans were arrested0 thus! they applied for 6abeas Corpus.
I((#!
HELD NO > here is distinction between delegation of power to make law which
necessarily involves discretion as to what it shall be and conferring authority or discretion as to its execution to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. he Legislature merely conferred upon the @rovincial Government with approval of the @rovincial #oard the power to execute the law. he @rovincial Government and the @rovincial #oard are best fitted to select the most favorable site for improving the lives of the *angyans. he Government must guarantee peace and order to encourage immigrants to invest in *indoro and to protect crops and persons of settlers of *indoro from predatory men. / @etitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of Di(59(ii9$ their liberty. 6abeas corpus can! therefore! not issue. his is the true ruling of the court. Costs shall be taxes against petitioners.
2. PU-LIC INTEREST PEOPLE V ROSENTHAL AND OSMEA 6 Phi* 326; LAUREL; "#$! 12% 1&3& N'#!)&ppeal from :udgment of the CA" F'c() > 'osenthal and Osmea 3appellants5 were charged and found guilty of violating &ct 8;J,! commonly known as the #lue Sky Law! in the CA". hey both appealed to the "&C! but since the appeal also 7uestions the constitutionality of &ct 8;J,! the case was referred to the SC > the law essentially re7uires corporations who want to offer securities 3shares of stocks5 to obtain a certificate or license from the "nsular reasurer. he reasurer is to issue the same if! upon his examination of documents! he deems it advisable and satisfactory that the stocks be sold in the @hilippines. he &ct also gives the reasurer the authority! whenever in his :udgment it is in the public interest! to cancel the permit. he decision of the reasurer was appealable to the Sec. of Ainance > the acts complained of consisted in buying and selling of the stocks at high and speculative prices 3they bought at @;Hshare and sold at @,> @+Hshare5. &lso! they allegedly were not licensed to sell stocks. > on appeal! the appellants contend that the law was unconstitutional on + grounds/ undue delegation of legislative power 3for although it empowers the treasurer to issue and cancel certificates or permits! no standard or rule was fixed which can guide said official in determining the cases in which a certificate or permit ought to be issued! thereby making his opinion the sole criterion in the matter of its issuance! with the result that! legislative powers being unduly delegated to the reasurer50 does
not afford e7ual protection before the law0 and that it is vague and ambiguous
I((#!)
exercise of discretion! violating e7ual protection of laws! nor for being vague and ambiguous. Reasoning (n fixin& no standard to &uide issuance7 cancellation of permits?
> he &ct furnishes a sufficient standard for the reasurer to follow in reaching a decision regarding the issuance or cancellation of a certificate or permit. he certificate or permit to be issued under the &ct must recite that the person! partnership! association or corporation applying therefor %has complied with the provisions of this &ct)! and this re7uirement! construed in relation to the other provisions of the law! means that a certificate or permit shall be issued by the "nsular reasurer when the provisions of &ct 8;J, have been complied with. (pon the other hand! the authority of the "nsular reasurer to cancel a certificate or permit is expressly conditioned upon a finding that such cancellation %is in the public interest.) "n view of the intention and purpose of &ct 8;J, to protect the public against %speculative schemes which have no more basis than so many feet of blue sky) and against the %sale of stock in fly> by>night concerns! visionary oil wells! distant gold mines! and other like fraudulent exploitations)! we hold that %public interest) in this case is a sufficient standard to guide the "nsular reasurer in reaching a decision on a matter pertaining to the issuance or cancellation of certificates or permits. > &ct 8;J, allows appeal from the decision of the reasurer to the Sec of Ainance. 6ence! it cannot be contended that the reasurer can act and decide without any restraining influence. > he theory of the separation of powers is designed by its srcinators to secure action and at the same time to forestall over action which necessarily results from undue concentration of powers! and thereby obtain efficiency and prevent despotism. hereby! the %rule of law) was established which narrows the range of governmental action and makes it sub:ect to control by certain legal devices. &s a corollary! we find the rule prohibiting delegation of legislative authority! and from the earliest time &merican legal authorities have proceeded on the theory that legislative power must be exercised by the legislative alone. "t is frankness! however! to confess that as one delves into the mass of :udicial pronouncements! he finds a great deal of confusion.
> the maxim % dele&atus non potest dele&are or dele&ata potestas non potest dele&are@ has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern governments! giving rise to the adoption! within certain limits! of the principle of %subordinate legislation)! in practically all modern governments. Fifficulty lies in fixing the limit and extent of the authority. 6all v Geiger>Kones/ it is well>settled principle of law in this state that by legislative act a commission or board may be empowered to ascertain the existence of facts! upon the finding of which may depend the right to continue in the practice of a profession or a regulated business. (n denial of eAual protection of the law?
> ¬her contention is that the &ct denies e7ual protection of the laws because the law discriminates between an owner who sells his securities in a single transaction and one who disposes of them in repeated and successive transactions. > 6all v Geiger>Kones/ "f a class is deemed to present a conspicuous example of what the legislature seeks to prevent! the ,th &mendment allows it to be dealt with although otherwise and merely logically not distinguishable from others not embraced in the law. (n va&ueness and uncertaint of the law?
@eople v Aernande$ and rinidad/ &n &ct will be declared void and inoperative on the ground of vagueness and uncertainty only upon a showing that the defect is such that the courts are unable to determine! with any reasonable degree of certainty! what the legislature intended. > &n &ct will not be declared inoperative and ineffectual on the ground that it furnishes no ade7uate means to secure the purpose for which it is passed! if men of common sense and reason can devise and provide the means! and all the instrumentalities necessary for its execution are within the reach of those intrusted therewith. Disposition Fecision affirmed with modifications 3lower penalty5.
> Kune 8! ,-+- P the Secretary of Labor certified to the Court of "ndustrial 'elations that an industrial dispute existed between the 6&'F September ,-! ,-+- P F9C"S"ON &F"C"ON&L of Leopoldo 'ovira of the C"' he agreement! the Court said in part :ustified claims under 8 and that affect the type of day laborers! and in conse7uence ordered the company to appea l to pay wages to their worke rs as a fair and reasonable amount not lower @, daily for work in the mountains! and for those who conduct their work in the plains an amount not get off of @.- per day! based on eight 3J5 hours per day! excluding overtime no less than twenty>five 38;5 percent on the day laborers as shall be fixed... > October ,?! ,-+- P *A' filed with C"' of the F9C"S"ON &F"C"ON&L > November 8J! ,-+- P while *A' pending! 6&'F Fecember 8+! ,-+- P C"' by resolution in banc! denied the *A' as well as the motion of November 8J
ISSUES 3. "USTICE% E?UIT, AND SU-STANTIAL MERITS OF THE CASE INTERNATIONAL HARDWOOD AND VENEER CO v PANGIL FEDERATION OF LA-OR 0 PHIL 02; LAUREL; N9v!=! 2/% 1&40 N'#!)@etition for a writ of certiorari to review the resolution of C"'
,.
HELD ,. Y9S Reasoning
F'c()
> Sec C&,+ is designed to provide for compulsory arbitration in order to prevent non>pacific methods in the determination of industrial and
agricultural disputes. his bill! thus begins the explanatory statement of #ill No. ?! creating a #oard of "ndustrial 'elations... @rovides compulsory arbitration... "n accordance with &rticle B! itle R""" of the Constitution! which provides thatE he state may establish binding arbitration. "ncorporating the conclusion reached by a committee appointed a year or so before! it was observed that under the current legislation evidently referri ng to &ct no. ;; there is no suitable instrument to avoid strikes.) he Fepartment of Labor merely occupies the role of peacemaker between the parties in dispute and its decisions are not binding for either employers or workers. he people have reached a level of industrial development! which makes it imperative that the governmentEs intervention in these conflicts to be more effective. . . 3&ng ibay v C"'5 &nd in order that this declaration of policy may not :ust be an empty gesture! C& ,+! in various sections thereof! has provided the means towards its reali$ation. hus in Sec ! the C"' is empowered to take cogni$ance for purposes of prevention! arbitration! decision! and settlement! of any industrial or agricultural dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout! arising from differences as regard wages! shares or compensation! dismissals! lay>offs! or suspensions of employees or laborers! tenants or farm>laborers! hours of labor! or conditions of tenancy or employment! between employers and employees or laborers and between landlord s and tenants or farm> laborers. > he petitioner suggests that if an industrial dispute between an employer and its employees causes a strike or lockout arising from differences as regards a minimum wage! C"' would be without authority to take cogni$ance of the dispute for arbitration and settlement unless the @resident! under Sec ; of C&,+! directs it to investigate and study all pertinent facts related to the industry concerned! with a view to determining the necessity and fairness of fixing a minimum wage which shall apply generally to all the employers engaged in such industry. o adopt such a narrow construction would be to set at naught the plenary powers conferred upon the Court to enable it to settle all 7uestion! matters! controversies! or disputes arising between! andHor affecting employers and employees and to frustrate the very ob:ective of the law! namely! to create an instrumentality through which the intervention of the Government could be made effective in order to prevent non>pacific methods in the determination of industrial or agricultural disputes. "t is fundamental that the intention and policy of the National &ssembly! as expressed in the enactment! should be effectuated! and the &ct should receive a construction that will lead to this result. 8. NO Reasoning
> he contention that Sec C& ,+ is unconstitutional as constituting an undue delegation of legislative power to the court and depriving 6&'F Sec 8 C&,+ prescribes that in the hearing! investigation and determination of any 7uestion or controversy and in exercising any duties and power under this &ct! the court shall act according to :ustice and e7uity and substantial merits of the case! without regard to technicalities or legal forms. he National &ssembly has by this section furnished a sufficient standard by which the court will be guided in exercising its discretion in the determination of any 7uestion or controversy before it! and we have already ruled that the discretionary power thus conferred is :udicial in character and does not infringe upon the principle of separation of powers! the prohibition against the delegation of legislative function! and the e7ual protection clause of the Constitution. 3&ntamok Gold Aields *ining Company v C"'! Kune 8J! ,-.5 Disposition @etition for certiorari is denied
4. WHAT IS MORAL% EDUCATIONAL OR AMUSING MUTUAL FILMS v INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 23 U.S. 230; Mc@!$$'% ".; F!#' 23% 1&1/ N'#!)&ppeal from an order F'c() > Complainant is engaged in the business of purchasing! selling! and leasing films! the films being produced in other states than Ohio! and in 9uropean and other foreign countries. Complainant has on hand at its Fetroit exchange at least 8!; reels of films which it intends to and will exhibit in Ohio! and which it will be impossible to exhibit unless the same shall have been approved by the board of censors. he board has demanded of complainant that it submit its films to censorship! and threatens! unless complainant complies with the demand! to arrest any and all persons who seek to place on exhibition any film not so censored or approved by the censor congress on and after November ! ,-,+! the date to which the act was extended. "t is physically impossible to comply with such demand and physically impossible for the board to censor the films with such rapidity as to enable complainant to proceed with its
business! and the delay conse7uent upon such examination would cause great and irreparable in:ury to such business! and would involve a multiplicity of suits.
ISSUES ,.
H!*+) ,. NO. "t seems not to have occurred to anybody in the cited cases that freedom of opinion was repressed in the exertion of the police power of the State. he rights of property were only considered as involved. "t cannot be put out of view that the exhibition of moving pictures is a business! pure and simple! srcinated and conducted for profit! like other spectacles! not to be regarded! nor intended to be regarded by the Ohio Constitution! we think! as part of the press of the country! or as organs of public opinion. hey are mere representations of events! of ideas and sentiments published and known0 vivid! useful! and entertaining! no doubt! but! as we have said! capable of evil! having power for it! the greater because of their attractiveness and manner of exhibition. "t was this capability and power! and it may be in experience of them! that induced the state of Ohio! in addition to prescribing penalties for immoral exhibitions! as it does in its Criminal Code! to re7uire censorship before exhibition! as it does by the act under review.
leaving it to the different views which might be entertained of the effect of the pictures! permitti ng the Epersonal e7uationE to enter! resulting Ein un:ust discrimination against some propagandist film!E while others might be approved without 7uestion. #ut the statute by its provisions guards against such variant :udgments! and its terms! like other general terms! get precision from the sense and experience of men! and become certain and useful guides in reasoning and conduct. he exact specification of the instances of their application would be as impossible as the attempt would be futile. (pon such sense and experience! therefore! the law properly relies. > he next contention of complainant is that the Ohio statu te is a delegation of legislative power! and void for that if not for the other reasons charged against it! which we have discussed.
/. WHAT IS SACRILEGIOUS "OSEPH -URST,N% INC. v WILSON 343 U.S. 4&/ CLAR@; M' 2% 1&/2
N'#!)&ppeal from decision of C& of New York F'c() > & statute makes it unlawful to exhibit! or to sell! lease or lend for exhibition at any place of amusement for pay or in connection with any business in the state of New York! any motion picture film or reel! unless there is at the time in full force and effect a valid license or permit therefor of the education department . . . . he statute further provides/ he director of the 1motion picture2 division 1of the education department2 or! when authori$ed by the regents! the officers of a local office or bureau shall cause to be promptly examin ed every motion picture film submitted to them as herein re7uired! and unless such film or a part thereof is obscene! indecent! immoral! inhuman! sacrilegious! or is of such a character that its exhibition would tend to corrupt morals or incite to crime! shall issue a license therefor. "f such director or! when so authori$ed! such officer shall not license any film submitted! he shall furnish to the applicant therefor a written report of the reasons for his refusal and a description of each re:ected part of a film not re:ected in toto. > &ppellant is a corporation engaged in the business of distributing motion pictures. "t owns the exclusive rights to distribute throughout the (nited States a film produced in "taly entitled he *iracle. > &fter having examined the picture! the motion picture division of the New York educati on department! acting under the statute! issued to appellant a license authori$ing exhibition of he *iracle! with 9nglish subtitles! as one part of a trilogy called Aor a period of approximately eight weeks! he New York State #oard of 'egents! which by statute is made the head of the education department! received hundreds of letters! telegrams! post cards! affidavits and other communications both protesting against and defending the public exhibition of he *iracle. > he Chancellor of the #oard of 'egents re7uested three members of the #oard to view the picture and to make a report to the entire #oard. &fter viewing the film! the committee reported that in its opinion there was basis for the claim that the picture was sacrilegious. > &ppellant brought the present action in the New York courts to review the determination of the 'egents. &mong the claims advanced by appellant were 3,5 that the statute violates the Aourteenth &mendment as a prior restraint upon freedom of speech and of the press0 385 that it is invalid under the same &mendment as a violation of the guaranty of
separate church and state and as a prohibition of the free exercise of religion0 and! 3+5 that the term sacrilegious is so vague and indefinite as to offend due process. > he &ppellate Fivision re:ected all of appellantEs contentions and upheld the 'egentsE determination. he New York Court of &ppeals! two :udges dissenting! affirmed the order of the &ppellate Fivision.
I((#!)
H!*+) NO. > o hold that liberty of expression by means of motion pictures is guaranteed by the Airst and Aourteenth &mendments! however! is not the end of our problem. "t does not follow that the Constitution re7uires absolute freedom to exhibit every motion picture of every kind at all times and all places. #ut the basic principles of freedom of speech and the press! like the Airst &mendmentEs command! do not vary. hose principles! as they have fre7uently been enunciated by this Court! make freedom of expression the rule. here is no :ustification in this case for making an exception to that rule. > he statute involved here does not seek to punish! as a past offense! speech or writing falling within the permissible scope of subse7uent punishment. On the contrary! New York re7uires that permission to communicate ideas be obtained in advance from state officials who :udge the content of the words and pictures sought to be communicated. his Court recogni$ed many years ago that such a previous restraint is a form of infringement upon freedom of expression to be especially condemned. > New YorkEs highest court says there is nothing mysterious about the statutory provision applied in this case/ "t is simply this/ that no religion! as that word is understood by the ordinary! reasonable person! shall be treated with contempt! mockery! scorn and ridicule . . . . his is far from the kind of narrow exception to freedom of expression which a state may carve out to satisfy the adverse demands of other interests of society. > "n seeking to apply the broad and all>inclusive definition of sacrilegious given by the New York courts! the censor is set adrift upon a boundless sea amid a myriad of conflicting currents of religious views! with no charts but those provided by the most vocal and power ful orthodoxies. New York cannot vest such unlimite d restraining control over motion pictures in a censor. (nder such a standard the most careful and tolerant censor would find it virtually impossible to avoid favoring one religion over another! and he would be sub:ect to an inevitable tendency to ban the expression of unpopular sentiments sacred to a religious minority.
> &pplication of the sacrilegious test! in these or other respects! might raise substantial 7uestions under the Airst &mendmentEs guaranty of separate church and state with freedom of worship for all. 6owever! from the standpoint of freedom of speech and the press! it is enough to point out that the state has no legitimate interest in protecting any or all religions from views distasteful to them which is sufficient to :ustify prior restraints upon the expression of those views. "t is not the business of government in our nation to suppress real or imagined attacks upon a particular religious doctrine! whether they appear in publications! speeches! or motion pictures. > Since the term sacrilegious is the sole standard under attack here! it is not necessary for us to decide! for example! whether a state may censor motion pictures under a clearly drawn statute designed and applied to prevent the showing of obscene films. hat is a very different 7uestion from the one now before us.
of any basis or condition to ascertain what is Eade7uate instruction to the public.E Nowhere in this &ct is there any statement of conditions! acts! or factors! which the Secretary of 9ducation must take into account to determine the Eefficiency of instruction. +. @&C( further argued that the permit re7uisite was only introduced to the &ct 8?B on ,-+B in Commonwealth &ct ,J.
general ac7uiescence of the public. @&C( argues that the act is teacher ration! etc. unconstitutional as/ +. Foes the provision grant unlimited power and discretion to the ,. "t deprives owner and teachers of schools and parents of liberty Secretary of Labor No. and property without due process of law. 'e7uiring a permit he provisions are not vague and sub:ect to unlimited discretion. here before a person can exercise a right is censorship. Specifically! are fixed standards to ensure ade7uate and efficient instruction! as they refer to Sec + of the &ct which re7uires a permit in order to shown by the memoranda fixing or revising curricula! the school open a private school. calendars! entrance and final examinations! admission and accreditation 8. "t deprives parents of their natural rights and duty to rear their of students etc.0 and the syste m of private education has been in children for civic efficiency operation for +? years.
statute does not per se demonstrate the unconstitutionality of such statute. &de7uate and efficient instruction should be considered sufficient! in the same way as public welfare necessary in the interest of law and order public interest and :ustice and e7uity and substantial merits of the case have been held sufficient as legislative standards :ustify ing delegation of authority to regulate.
. REASONA-LENESS AS AN IMPLIED STANDARD WISCONSIN INSPECTION -UREAU v WHITMAN 1& Wi( 42 WISCONSIN INSPECTION -UREAU ET AL. v. WHTMAN% STATE COMMISSIONER OF COMMERCE3'easonableness as an implied standard5
1 "#* 1&26; R9(!$!% ". F'c())
his case resolves the 7uestion of constitutionality of the 'ating Law! being chapter B, of the Laws of ,-,? and the 7uestion of the power of the commissioner of insurance under such act. &n insurer is re7uired to be a member of a rating bureau. Sub:ect to certain supervisory powers of the commissioner of insurance! the bureau was charg ed with the management of its own affairs! including the publishing of its rates in the manner provided. &ll rates were re7uired to be reasonable. he commissioner was authori$ed to review any rate for the purpose of determining whether the same is unreasonable or discriminatory. he checking power of the commissioner ensures protection for the insured! since the rating bureau is given the rule>making power over its member insurers. he
A. G!$!'*( !5*) he power exercised by the Commissioner is
administrative! and not legislative in nature. he legislature fixed the standard of reasonableness and Commissioner finds only fact. he standards prescribed by the rating law is sufficiently definite! and legislative power is not delegated to the commissioner by reason of there being no enumeration or definition of factors which the commissioner may consider in finding the fact of whether a rate is reasonable or otherwise. L9
ISSUE HELD RATIO) "t is void as to the rates. WN h! 9+! 9 h! c9==i((i9$! i( v'*i+. he statute itself provides that the orders fixing rates are to be based upon evidence which is to be preserved! and since there was no hearing and finding by the commissioner that indeed the rates are unreasonable! then the presumption of validity which attaches to the rates must be sustained.
WN h!! i( '$ #$*'<#* +!*!'i9$ 9 *!i(*'iv! 59
WN h! ('# ! 59vi+ !( ('$+'+(
their statutory powers! but in a reasonable and orderly manner. he rule of reasonableness inheres in every law and the action of those charged with its enforcement must in the nature of things be sub:ect to the test of reasonableness. L9c'* G9v!$=!$ -9'+ v. A*i+!) :udicial power could be delegated to an administrative body0 that it might be exercised in accordance with the rules made by the administrative body and need not be exercised according to the course of the common law E*ih# R99)&s any comm unity passes from simple to complex conditions! the only way in which government can deal with the increased burdens thrown upon it is by the delegation of power to be exercised in detail by subordinate agents! sub:ect to the general directions prescribed by superior authority. he old doctrine prohibiting the delegation of legislative power has virtually retired from the fieldD such agencies furnish protection to rights and obstacles to wrongdoing which under our new social and industrial conditions cannot be practically accomplished by the old and simple procedure of Legislatures and courts as in the last generation. H'=59$ v. U$i! + S'!( / D Congress has found it fre7uently necessary to use officer of the executive branch within defined limits! to secure the exact effect intended by its acts of legislation! by vesting discretion in such officers to make public regulations interpreting a statue and directing the details of its execution! even to the extent of providing for penali$ing a breach of such regulation. "n determining what it may do in seeking assistance from another branch! the extent and character of that assistance must be fixed according to common sense and the inherent necessities of the governmental co> ordination. Ci$ci$$'i% W. > R. C9. v. C*i$9$ C9#$ C9==() he true distinction! UUU is between the delegation of power to make the law! which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be! and conferring an authority or discretion as to its execution! to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. he first cannot be done0 to the latter! no valid ob:ection can be made. S'!( !B !*. -#!** v. F!') No provision of the act! directly or indirectly by implication! authori$es any rule to be made that can add to or in any way alter or amend the regulations made by the law. Only such rules are authori$ed as serve to provide the detai ls for the exec ution of the provisions of the law in its actual administration! to fix the way in the re7uirements of the statute are to be met! and to secure obedience to its mandates. Dic!% D!v!*95=!$ 9 A+=i$i('iv! L'< i$ E$*'$+) here will remain two checks upon the abuse of power by administrative agencies.
"n the first place! every such agency must conform precisely to the statute which grants the power0 secondly! such delegated powers must be exercised in a spirit of :udicial fairness and e7uity and not oppressively and unreasonably.
6. TO PROMOTE SIMPLICIT,% ECONOM, OR EFFICIENC, CERVANTES v(. THE AUDITOR GENERAL &1 SCRA 3/& RE,ES; M' 2% 1&/2 N'#!)@etition to review a decision of the &uditor General. F'c() > Cervantes is the man ager of the N&ACO wit h a salary of @,;! a year. #y a resolution of the #oard of Firectors! grant to him of 7uarters allowance of not exceeding @ a month was approved. Submitted to the Control Committee of the Government 9nterprises Council for approval! the said resolution was disapproved by the said Committee on the strength of the recommendation of the N&ACO auditor! concurred in by the &uditor General! 3,5 that 7uarters allowance constituted additional compensation prohibited by the charter of the N&ACO! which fixes the salary of the general manager thereof at a sum not to exceed @,;! a year! and 385 that the precarious financial condition of the corporation did not warrant the granting of such allowance. > N&ACO is a government controlled corporation! therefore sub:ect to the provisions of '& ;, and 9O -+. '& ;, was approved authori$ing the @resident of the @hilippines! among other things! to effect such reforms and changes in government>owned and controlled corporations for the purpose of promoting simplicity! economy and efficiency in their operation. @ursuant to this authority! the @resident! promulgated 9O -+ creating the Government 9nterprises Council. he council was to advise the @resident in the exercise of his power of supervision and control over these corporations and to formulate and adopt such policy and measures as might be necessary to coordinate their functions and activities. > he peti tioner fil ed this peti tion for revi ew after his moti on for reconsideration was denied for the same reasons.
ISSUES ,.
8.
#ank...) and '& 8B; which prescribes the penalty for the violation of Circular 8,. Koliffe was sentenced , year imprisonment! a fine of @8! and the costs! as well as forfeiture of in favour of Govt the gold and travellers= check. 6e now assails his conviction and the validity of the said circular.
H!*+) ,. NO.
I((#! H!*+)
Ratio So long as the Legislature lays down a policy and a standard is
established by the statute there is no undue delegation. Reasoning 'epublic &ct No. ;, in authori$ing the @resident of the @hilippines! among others! to make reforms and changes in government> controlled corporations! lays down a standard and policy that the purpose shall be to meet the exigencies attendant upon the establishment of the free and independent Government of the @hilippines and to promote simplicity! economy and efficiency in their operations. he standard was set and the policy fixed. he @resident had to carry the mandate. his he did by promulgating the executive order in 7uestion which! tested by the rule above cited! does not constitute an undue delegation of legislative power. 8. Ratio 'egardless of whether 7uarters allowance should be considered as compensation or not! the resolution of the board of directors authori$ing payment thereof to the petitioner cannot be given effect since it was disapproved by the Control Committee in the exercise of the powers granted to it by 9xecutive Order No. -+. DISPOSITION@etition dismissed.
&. MAINTAIN MONETAR, STA-ILIT,% PROMOTE RISING LEVEL OF PRODUCTION AND REAL INCOME PEOPLE v "OLIFFE F'c() Koliffe carried bullions gold underneath his shirt0 he was accosted at the airport in violation of Circul ar 8, which re7uires that %&ny person desiring to export gold in any form including :ewellery! whether for refining abroad or otherwise! must obtain a license from the Central
R'i9) "t is a valid delegation because '& 8B; furnished reasonable standard which %sufficiently marks the field within which the &dministrator is to act so that it may be known whether he has kept within it in compliance with the legislative will). '& 8B; provided the following standards/ ,. *onetary #oard and the @resident is given power to sub:ect to licensing all transactions in gold V foreign currencies so as to protect the international reserve of the Central #ank during an exchange crisis and to give the #oard V the Govt time in which to take constructive measures to combat such crisis and 8. #oard is authori$e to take such appropriate remedial measures as are appropriate to protect the international stability of the peso whenever the international reserve is falling as a result of payment or remittances abroad which in the opinion of the #oard are contrary to the national welfare hese standards are sufficiently concrete and definite to vest in the delegated authority the character of administrative details in the enforcement of law and to place the grant of said authority beyond the category of a delegation of legislative powers.
IV. ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE A. -OO@ VII% ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1&6 ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE CHAPTER 1 GENERAL PROVISIONS S!ci9$ 1.#cope. > his #ook shall be applicable to all agencies as defined in the next succeeding section! except the Congress! the Kudiciary! the Constitutional Commissions! military establishments in all matters relating exclusively to &rmed Aorces personnel! the #oard of @ardons and @arole! and state universities and colleges.
S!ci9$ 2.2efinitions. > &s used in this #ook/ 3,5 &gency includes any department! bureau! office! commission! authority or officer of the National Government authori$ed by law or executive order to make rules! issue licenses! grant rights or privileges! and ad:udicate cases0 research institutions with respect to licensing functions0 government corporations with respect to functions regulating private right! privileges! occupation or business0 and officials in the exercise of disciplinary power as provided by law. 385 'ule means any agency statement of general applicability that implements or interprets a law! fixes and describes the procedures in! or practice re7uirements of! an agency! including its regulations. he term includes memoran da or statements concerning the internal administ ration or management of an agency not affecting the rights of! or procedure available to! the public. 3+5 'ate means any charge to the public for a service open to all and upon the same terms! including individual or :oint rates! tolls! classifications! or schedules thereof! as well as commutation! mileage! kilometerage and other special rates which shall be imposed by law or regulation to be observed and followed by any person. 35 'ule making means an agency process for the formulation! amendment! or repeal of a rule. 3;5 Contested case means any proceeding! including licensing! in which the legal rights! duties or privileges asserted by specific parties as re7ui red by the Const itution or by law are to be determined after hearing. 3B5 @erson includes an individual! partnership! corporation!
association! public or private organi$ation of any character other than an agency. 3?5 @arty includes a person or agency named or admitted as a party! or properly seeking and entitled as of right to be admitted as a party! in any agency proceeding0 but nothing herein shall be construed to prevent an agency from admitting any person or agency as a party for limited purposes. 3J5 Fecision means the whole or any part of the final disposition! not of an interlocutory character! whether affirmative! negative! or in:unctive in form! of an agency in any matter! including licensing! rate fixing and granting of rights and privileges. 3-5 &d:udication means an agency process for the formulation of a final order. 3,5 License includes the whole or any part of any agency permit! certificate! passport! clearance! approval! registration! charter! membership! statutory exemption or other form of permission! or regulation of the exercise of a right or privilege. 3,,5 Licensing includes agency process involving the grant! renewal! denial! revocation! suspension! annulment! withdrawal! limitation! amendment! modification or conditioning of a license. 3,85 Sanction includes the whole or part of a prohibition! limitation or other condition affecting the liberty of any person0 the withholding of relief0 the imposition of penalty or fine0 the destruction! taking! sei$ure or withholding of property0 the assessment of damages! reimbursement! restitution! compensation! cost! charges or fees0 the revocation or suspension of license0 or the taking of other compulsory or restrictive action. 3,+5 'elief includes the whole or part of any grant of money! assistance! license! authority! privilege! exemption! exception! or remedy0 recognition of any claim! right! immunity! privilege! exemption or exception0 or taking of any actio n upon the application or petition of any person. 3,5 &gency proceedi ng means any agency process with respect to rule>making! ad:udication and licensing. ,. &gency action includes the whole or part of every agency rule! order! license! sanction! relief or its e7uivalent or denial thereof.
CHAPTER 2 RULES AND REGULATIONS S!ci9$ 3.4ilin&. >
3,5 9very agency shall file with the (niversity of the @hilippines Law Center three 3+5 certified copies of every rule adopted by it. 'ules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three 3+5 months from that date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons. 385 he records officer of the agency! or his e7uivalent functionary! shall carry out the re7uirements of this section under pain of disciplinary action. 3+5 & permanent register of all rules shall be kept by the issuing agency and shall be open to public inspection.
of the @resident! Congress! all appellate courts and the National Library. he bulletin and the codified rules shall be made available free of charge to such public officers or agencies as the Congress may select! and to other persons at a price sufficient to cover publication and mailing or distribution costs.
S!ci9$ 6.>udicial )otice. > he court shall take :udicial notice of the certified copy of each rule duly filed or as published in the bulletin or the codified rules.
S!ci9$ &.Public Participation. > S!ci9$ 4. Effectivit. > "n addition to other rule>making re7uirements provided by law not inconsistent with this #ook! each rule shall become effective fifteen 3,;5 days from the date of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law! or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public health! safety and welfare! the existence of which must be expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. he agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected by them.
S!ci9$ /.Publication and Recordin&. > he (niversity of the @hilippines Law Center shall/ 3,5 @ublish a 7uarter bulletin setting forth the text of rules filed with it during the preceding 7uarter0 and 385 Ieep an up>to>date codification of all rules thus published and remaining in effect! together with a complete index and appropriate tables.
3,5 "f not otherwise re7uired by law! an agency shall! as far as practicable! publish or circulate notices of proposed rules and afford interested parties the opportunity to submit their views prior to the adoption of any rule. 385 "n the fixing of rates! no rule or final order shall be valid unless the proposed rates shall have been published in a newspaper of general circulation at least two 385 weeks before the first hearing thereon. 3+5 "n case of opposition! the rules on contested cases shall be observed.
CHAPTER 3 AD"UDICATION S!ci9$ 10.Compromise and +rbitration. > o expedite administrative proceedings involving conflicting rights or claims and obviate expensive litigations! every agency shall! in the public interest! encourage amicable settlement! comprise and arbitration.
S!ci9$ .(mission of #ome Rules. > 3,5 he (niversity of the @hilippines Law Center may omit from the bulletin or the codification any rule if its publication would be unduly cumbersome! expensive or otherwise inexpedient! but copies of that rule shall be made available on application to the agency which adopted it! and the bulletin shall contain a notice stating the general sub:ect matter of the omitted rule and new copies thereof may be obtained. 385 9very rule establishing an offense or defining an act which! pursuant to law! is punishable as a crime or sub:ect to a penalty shall in all cases be published in full text.
S!ci9$ .2istribution of Bulletin and Codified Rules. > he (niversity of the @hilippines Law Center shall furnish one 3,5 free copy each of every issue of the bulletin and of the codified rules or supplements to the Office
S!ci9$ 11.)otice and Hearin& in Contested Cases. > 3,5 "n any contested case all parties shall be entitled to notice and hearing. he notice shall be served at least five 3;5 days before the date of the hearing and shall state the date! time and place of the hearing. 385 he parties shall be given opportunity to present evidence and argument on all issues. "f not precluded by law! informal disposition may be made of any contested case by stipulation! agreed settlement or default. 3+5 he agency shall keep an official record of its proceedings.
S!ci9$ 12.Rules of Evidence. > "n a contested case/ 3,5 he agency may admit and give probative value to evidence commonly accepted by reasonably prudent men in the conduct
of their affairs. 385 Focumentary evidence may be received in the form of copies or excerpts! if the srcinal is not readily available. (pon re7uest! the parties shall be given opportunity to compare the copy with the srcinal. "f the srcinal is in the official custody of a public officer! a certified copy thereof may be accepted. 3+5 9very party shall have the right to cross>examine witnesses presented against him and to submit rebuttal evidence. 35 he agency may take notice of :udicially cogni$able facts and of generally cogni$able technical or scientific facts within its speciali$ed knowledge. he parties shall be notified and afforded an opportunity to contest the facts so noticed.
S!ci9$ 13.#ubpoena. > "n any contested case! the agency shall have the power to re7uire the attendance of witnesses or the production of books! papers! documents and other pertinent data! upon re7uest of any party before or during the hearing upon showing of general relevance. (nless otherwise provided by law! the agency may! in case of disobedience! invoke the aid of the 'egional rial Court within whose :urisdiction the contested case being heard falls. he Court may punish contumacy or refusal as contempt.
S!ci9$ 14.2ecision. > 9very decision rendered by the agency in a contested case shall be in writing and shall state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. he agency shall decide each case within thirty 3+5 days following its submission. he parties shall be notified of the decision personally or by registered mail addressed to their counsel of record! if any! or to them.
S!ci9$ 1/.4inalit of (rder. > he decision of the agency shall become final and executory fifteen 3,;5 days after the receipt of a copy thereof by the party adversely affected unless within that period an administrative appeal or :udicial review! if proper! has been perfected. One motion for reconsideration may be filed! which shall suspend the running of the said period.
S!ci9$ 1.Publication and Compilation of 2ecisions. > 3,5 9very agency shall publish and make available for public inspection all decisions or final orders in the ad:udication of contested cases. 385 "t shall be the duty of the records officer of the agency or his e7uivalent functionary to prepare a register or compilation of those decisions or final orders for use by the public.
S!ci9$ 1.3icensin& Procedure. > 3,5
S!ci9$ 16.)onexpiration of 3icense. >
CHAPTER 4 ADMINISTRATIVE APPEAL IN CONTESTED CASES S!ci9$ 1&.+ppeal. > (nless otherwise provided by law or executive order! an appeal from a final decision of the agency may be taken to the Fepartment head.
S!ci9$ 20.Perfection of +dministrative +ppeals. > 3,5 &dministrative appeals under this Chapter shall be perfected within fifteen 3,;5 days after receipt of a copy of the decision complained of by the party adversely affected! by filing with the agency which ad:udicated the case a notice of appeal! serving copies thereof upon the prevailing party and the appellate agency! and paying the re7uired fees. 385 "f a motion for reconsideration is denied! the movant shall have the right to perfect his appeal during the remainder of the period for appeal! reckone d from receipt of the resolution of denial. "f the decision is reversed on reconsideration! the aggrieved party shall have fifteen 3,;5 days from receipt of the resolution of reversal within which to perfect his appeal. 3+5 he agency shall! upon perfection of the appeal! transmit the records of the case to the appellate agency.
S!ci9$ 21. Effect of +ppeal. > he appeal shall stay the decision appealed from unless otherwise provided by law! or the appellate agency directs execution pending appeal! as it may deem :ust! considering the nature and circumstances of the case.
S!ci9$ 22.+ction on +ppeal. > he appellate agency shall review the records of the proceedings and may! on its own initiative or upon motion! receive additional evidence.
S!ci9$ 23.4inalit of 2ecision of +ppellate +&enc. > "n any contested case! the decision of the appellate agency shall become final and executory fifteen 3,;5 days after the receipt by the parties of a copy thereof.
S!ci9$ 24.Hearin& (fficers. > 3,5 9ach agency shal l have such number of 7ualified and competent members of the base as hearing officers as may be necessary for the hearing and ad:udication of contested cases. 385 No hearing officer shall engaged in the perfo rmance of prosecuting functions in any contested case or any factually related case.
S!ci9$ 2/.>udicial Review. > 3,5 &genc y decisions shall be sub:ect to :udicial review in accordance with this chapter and applicable laws. 385 &ny party aggrieved or adversely affected by an agency decision may seek :udicial review. 3+5 he action for :udicial review may be brought against the agency! or its officers! and all indispensable and necessary parties as defined in the 'ules of Court. 35 &ppeal from an agency decision shall be perfected by filing with the agency within fifteen 3,;5 days from receipt of a copy thereof a notice of appeal! and with the reviewing court a petition for review of the order. Copies of the petition shall be served upon the agency and all parties of record. he petition shall contain a concise statement of the issues involv ed and the grounds relied upon for the review! and shall be accompanied with a true copy of the order appealed from! together with copies of such material portions of the records as are referred to therein and other supporting papers. he petition shall be under oath and shall how! by stating the specific material dates! that it was filed within the period fixed in this chapter. 3;5 he petition for review shall be perfected within fifteen 3,;5 days from receipt of the final administrative decision. One 3,5 motion for reconsideration may be allowed. "f the motion is denied! the movant shall perfect his appeal during the remaining period for appeal reckone d from receipt of the resolution of denial. "f the decision is reversed on reconsideration! the
appellant shall have fifteen 3,;5 days from receipt of the resolution to perfect his appeal. 3B5 he review proceeding shall be filed in the court specified by statute or! in the absence thereof! in any court of competent :urisdiction in accordance with the provisions on venue of the 'ules of Court. 3?5 'eview shall be made on the basis of the record taken as a whole. he findings of fact of the agency when supported by substantial evidence shall be final except when specifically provided otherwise by law.
S!ci9$ 2.Transmittal of Record. >
-. IN RULE:MA@ING% PRICE% WAGE OR RATE FIING
I((#!)
and compulsory arbitration in order to determine specific controversies between labor and capital industry and in agriculture. here is in reality here a mingling of executive and :udicial functions! which is a departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental powers. he C"' is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure! and the &ct re7uires it to act according to :ustice and e7uity and substantial merits of the case! without regard to technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem :ust and e7uitable. "t shall not be restricted to the specific relief claimed or demands made by the parties to the industrial or agricultural dispute! but may include in the award! order or decision any matter or determination which may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or of preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes. &nd in the light of this legislative policy! appeals to this Court have been especially regulated by the rules recently promulgated by the rules recently promulgated by this Court to carry into the effect the avowed legislative purpose. he fact! however! that the C"' may be said to be free from the rigidity of certain procedural re7uirements does not mean that it can! in :ustifiable cases before it! entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential re7uirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. here are primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character/ 3,5 The first of these rights is the right to a hearing! which includes
H!*+) NO.
the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and su"mit eviden ce in support thereof. he liberty and property of
C. IN AD"UDICATION OF CASES 1. RULES OF PROCEDURE 2. DUE PROCESS '. CARDINAL PRIMAR, RIGHTS ANG TI-A, v COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS & Phi* 3/; LAUREL; F!#' 2% 1&40 F'c() > he respondent National Labor (nion! "nc. prayed for the vacation of the :udgment rendered by the ma:ority of this Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of "ndustrial 'elations for a new trial. he union avers that/ eodoroEs claim that there was shortage of leather soles in &NG "#&Y making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off the members of the union is entirely false and unsupported by the records of the #ureau of Customs and the #ooks of &ccounts of native dealers in leather0 that the National
he C"'! a special court created under C& ,+! is more an administrative than a part of the integrated :udicial system of the nati on. "t is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the Government. (nlike a court of :ustice which is essentially passive! acting only when its :urisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant! the function of the C"' is more active! affirmative and dynamic. "t not only exercises :udicial or 7uasi>:udicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions in the determination of disputes between employer s and employees but its functions are far more comprehensive and expensive. "t has :urisdiction over the entire @hilippines! to consider! investigate! decide! and settle any 7uestion! matter controversy or dispute arising between! andHor affecting employers and employees or laborers! and regulate the relations between them. "t may appeal to voluntary arbitration in the settlement of industrial disputes0 may employ mediation or conciliation for that purpose! or recur to the more effective system of official investigation
the citi$en shall be protected by the rudimentary re7uirements of fair play. 385 #ot only must the party "e given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to esta"lish the rights which he asserts "ut the tri"unal must consider the evidence presented. 3+5 While the duty to deli"erate does not impose the o"ligation to decide right! it does imply a necessity which cannot "e disregarded! namely! that of having something to support it is a nullity! a place when directly attached. his principle emanates from
the more fundamental is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power. 35 #ot only must there "e some evidence to support a finding or conclusion! "ut the evidence must "e su"stantial. "t means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept as ade7uate to support a conclusion. *ere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence.
3;5 The decision must "e rendered on the evidence presented at the
with the 'espondent #oard of 9xaminers for Surveyors. &llegedly! 6ernande$ and &sprec entered into an agreement wherein &sprec would survey 6ernande$= lot in Camarines Sur and would deliver to the latter a evidence disclosed to the parties! can the latter be protected in their right plan approved by the Firector of Lands wHn + months after completion of to know and meet the case against them. "t should not! however! detract the survey! and procure the issuance of a CC to the lot wHn B months from their duty actively to see that the law is enforced! and for that after the plan=s approval. 6owever! even if 6ernande$ paid the agreed purpose! to use the authori$ed legal methods of securing evidence and amount! &sprec did not deliver the plan! and the alleged plan duly informing itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy. #oards delivered and approved was for one Famian &lhambra! and the plan of in7uiry may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and submitted was merely a certified copy of the plan. "t should also be noted determining the facts in any given case! but their report and decision are that during the proceedings in the #oard of 9xaminers! &sprecHhis only advisory. 3B5 Th! CIR 9 '$ 9 i( #+!(% h!!9!% =#( 'c 9$ counsel had many times been absent! late! sickDwhich caused the delay i( 9 hi( 9<$ i$+!5!$+!$ c9$(i+!'i9$ 9 h! *'< '$+ 'c( 9 h! of the proceedings. c9$9v!(% '$+ $9 (i=5* 'cc!5 h! vi!<( 9 ' (#9+i$'! i$ >'espondent #oard/ Aor 6ernande$/ 3,5 no actual survey of the land made0 385 money was paid0 A(5!c <'( #i* 9 +!c!i '$+ h#( 'ivi$ ' ' +!ci(i9$. 3?5 Th! CIR (h9 #*+ % i$ '** c9$ 9 v! (i' * J#! (i 9$( % !$ +! i( vi9*' !+ h! C9+! 9 Eh ic( 9 (# v! 9( % hi( c!i ic' ! 9 hearing! or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. Only by confining the administrative tribuna l to the
+!ci(i9$ i$ (#ch ' ='$$! h' h! 5'i!( 9 h! 59c!!+i$ c'$ !i('i9$ '( 5iv'! *'$+ (#v!9 REVO@ED '$+ !J#i!+ 9 ! K$9< h! v'i9#( i((#!( i$v9*v!+% '$+ h! !'(9$( 9 h! +!ci(i9$ (#!$+!!+. >&sprec filed petition with the CA" of Camarines Sur for certiorari to annul !$+!!+.he performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it. > "n the right of the foregoing fundamental principles! except as to the alleged agreement between the &ng ibay and the National his result! however! does not now preclude the concession of a new trial prayed for the by respondent National Labor (nion! "nc. he interest of :ustice would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main issue involved. he legislation which created the C"' is new. he failu re to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result. &ccordingly! the motion for a new trial is granted! and the entire record of the case shall be remanded to the C"'.
the orders revoking his surveyor=s certificate of registration0 mandamus to compel the #oard to conduct a formal hearing of the complaint against him0 and prohibition! to stop execution of the orders to surrender said certificate. he preliminary in:unction prayed for was re:ected below >CA"/ dismiss with costs
ISSUES ,. criminal in nature! was valid granted &sprec absented himself from it +.
H!*+) 1. NO Ratio. @resence of a party at a trial is not always the essence of due
ASPREC V ITCHON 1/ SCRA &21; SANCHE>% A5i* 30% 1& NATURE)@etition for review F'c() >@rivate respondent Kacinto 6ernande$ 36ernande$5 filed an administrative complaint against Cleto &sprec for unprofessional conduct
process. 'eally all that the law re7uires to satisfy adherence to this Constitutional precept is that the parties be given notice of the trial! an opportunity to be heard. Reasoning. @etitioner has had more than ample opportunity to defend himself before the #oard. &s he and counsel did not appear at the last and stipulated date of hearing! he cannot look to the law or to a :udicial tribunal to whipsaw the #oard into giving him a new one. 6e cannot raise his voice in protest against the act of the #oard in proceeding in his and
his counselEs absence. &nd this because without cause or reason! without any excuse at all! counsel and client have chosen to shy away from the trial. 8. Y9S Ratio. up of the manifestation :ust adverted to. &s the trial court well
Disposition. (pon the view we take of this case! the decision is hereby
observed! counsel for respondent 6ernande$ did not present a motion for :udgment on the pleadings in the strict sense of the word! but a motion which for lack of another expression! he called a motion for :udgment on the pleadings. Lack of observance of this technicality which does not 7uarrel with a fair concept of :ustice should be overlooked.
H!*+) ,. NO
affirmed. Costs against petitioner.
VINTA MARITIME V NLRC 7-'(c9$ci**98 264 SCRA /; PANGANI-AN; "'$#' 3% 1&&6 N'#!)Special civil action of certiorari F'c() > Leonides C. #&SCONC"LLO! filed a complaint with the @hilippine Overseas 9mployment &dministration 3@O9&5 he employers alleged that he was dismissed for his gross negligence and incompetent performance as chief engineer of the M71 Boraca. hey claim that he was iv!$ 'i <'$i$ '$+ !$9#h 9559#$i 9 !B5*'i$ hi( (i+! ! not to mention all the chances given to him to improve his substandard work performance before he was dismissed. > he employee denied the allegations against him0 contrary to his employer=s claim! he was actually surprised when he was told of his dismissal. his occurred after he had a verbal altercation with a #ritish national! regarding the lack of discipline of the Ailipino crew under the engineer=s supervision. N9 i$J #i 9 i$v !( i' i9 $% h9< !v! %
!'+i$ hi( (#559 (!+ i$c9=5!! $c! 9 $!*i !$c! <'( !v! c9$+#c!+0 neither was private respondent furnished with a notice or memorandum regarding the cause of his dismissal. > @O9& considered the case submitted for resolution
b mutual a&reement of the parties after submission of their respective position papers and supportin& documents. POEA A+=i$i('9 Ach'c9(9
#*!+ h' 5iv'! !(59$+!$ <'( i**!'** +i(=i((!+ . > On appeal! the NL'C affirmed the @O9&.
ISSUES ,.
administrative agencies exercising 7uasi>:udicial powers are nonetheless free from the rigidity of certain procedural re7uirements.
DUE PROCESS: C'+i$'* Pi=' Rih( > "n labor cases! this Court has consistently held that due process does
not necessarily mean or re7uire a hearing! but simply an opportunity or a right to be heard. he re7uirements of due process are deemed to have been satisfied when parties are given the opportunity to submit position papers. he holding of an adversarial trial is discretionary on the labor arbiter and the parties cannot demand it as a matter of right. > hese rules eAuall appl to cases filed with the Philippine (verseas Emploment +dministration +d"udication (ffice . @roceedings before a @O9& hearing officer are non>litigious! although they are still sub:ect to the re7uirements of due process. Reasoning @etitioners were given the ir chance to be heard. heir answer! position paper and supporting documents had become parts of the records and were considered by the @O9& and by the NL'C. 8. Y9S Ratio Fue process! the second element for a valid dismissal! re7uires NO"C9 and 69&'"NG. he employer must furnish the worker with two written notices before termination can be legally effected/ 3,5 notice which apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought and 385 subse7uent notice which informs the employee of the employer=s decision to dismiss him. Disposition @etition is 2'#M'##E2.
property and in:uries to third parties! the latest of which resulted in the total destruction of bus ,? of the company. >he 'ural ransit 9mployee s &ssociation denied the charges and alleged that the last incident was due to a mechanical defect of the bus which was beyond the control of the driver Kacob >Furing the hearing of Bachrachs petition! *r. Koseph Iaplin! general manager of 'ural ransit! was presented as the lone witness >&fter *r. Iaplin concluded his direct testimony! the hearing was scheduled for another date for purposes of cross>examination of the witness. he case was reset on various dates but *r. Iaplin failed to appear because he had left for abroad. >he employeeEs association filed a motion praying that/ 3a5 the testimony of *r. Koseph Iaplin be stricken from the records 3b5 the petition of the Company for authority to dismiss *aximo Kacob from the service be denied/ and 3c5 the Company be ordered to reinstate *aximo Kacob immediately with backwages from Kune -! ,-B, up to the date of his actual reinstatement. >he C"' dismissed the companyEs petition! lifted the suspension of driver Kacob! and ordered his reinstatement with backwages >BachrachDs motion for reconsideration having been denied! it filed the instant @etition for certiorari
I( (# !)
H!*+) NO -ACHRACH MOTOR CO.% INC. V CIR 7 RURAL TRANSIT EMPLO,EES ASSOCIATION 8 6 SCRA 2; MUO>:PALMA; Oc9! 30% 1&6 N'#!)@etition for certiorari
Ratio
he right of a party to confront and cross>examine opposing witnesses in a :udicial litigation! be it criminal or civil in nature! or in proceedings before administrative tribunals with 7uasi>:udicial powers! is a fundamental right which is part of due process. Reasoning
F'c() >"n ,-;J the #achrach *otor Co.! "nc. was in the transportation business and operated what was then known as the 'ural ransit. >"n that year! the 'ural ransit 9mployees &ssociation went on strike and the dispute between the management and the union reached the Court of "ndustrial 'elations! which immediately ordered the strikers to return to work and the management to take them back under the terms and conditions existing before the dispute arose. >
>C"' did not err in order ing the dismi ssal of BachrachDs petition to discharge *aximo Kacob. @etitioner presented only one witness! Koseph Iaplin! to prove its case against driver Kacob. he witness failed however to appear at the scheduled hearings for his cross>examination for the simple reason that he left for abroad. 6aving been deprived! without fault on its part! of its right to cross>examine Iaplin! respondent association was entitled to have the direct testimony of the witness stricken off the record. >"n (rti&as >r. v. 3uftansa -erman +irlines ! ,-?;! this Cour t held inter alia/ (ral testimon ma be taken into account onl when it is complete; that is; if the witness has been wholl crossexamined b the adverse
part or the ri&ht to crossexamine is lost wholl or in part thru the fault of such adverse part . #ut when cross>examination is not and cannot be
done or completed due to causes attributable to the party offering the witness! the uncompleted testimony is thereby rendered incompetent. >he right of a party to cross>examine the witness of his adversary is invaluable as it is inviolable in civil cases! no less than the right of the accused in criminal cases. he express recognition of such right of the accused in the Constitution does not render the right thereto of parties in civil cases less constitutionally based! for it is an indispensable part of the due process guaranteed by the fundamental law. ... (ntil such cross> examination has been finished! the testimony of the witness cannot be considered as complete and may not! therefore! be allowed to form part of the evidence to be considered by the court in deciding the case. >"nasmuch as the testimony of Koseph Iaplin is stricken off the record and the contents of 9xhibits , to J>A are hearsay! and there is no other evidence which substantiates the charges against *aximo Kacob! the dismissal of the companyEs petition to discharge Kacob from its service is in order. Disposition @etition is dismissed.
UP -OARD OF REGENTS V. CA 7ARO@IASWAM, WILLIAM MARGARET CELINE8 G.R. N9. 1342/; MENDO>A; A##( 31% 1&&& N'#!)@etition for review
F'c()
@rivate respondent &rokiaswamy
private respondent had finished her dissertation and was ready for her oral defense. She was allowed to give an oral defense. &fter going over private respondent=s dissertation! Fr. *edina informed CSS@ Fean Consuelo Koa7uin@a$ that there was a portion in private respondent=s dissertation that was lifted! without proper acknowledgment! from #alfour=s Cyclopaedia of "ndia and 9astern and Southern &sia 3,-B?5 and from Kohn 9dye=s article entitle d Fescription of the arious Classes of essels Constructed and 9mployed by the Natives of the Coasts of Coromandel! *alabar! and the "sland of Ceylon for their Coasting Naviga tion in the 'oyal &siatic Society of Great #ritain and "reland Kournal. Nonetheless! private respondent was allowed to defend her dissertation. Aour 35 out of the five 3;5 panelists gave private respondent a passing mark for her oral defense by affixing their signatures on the approval form. he CSS@ College Aaculty &ssembly approved private respondent=s graduation pending submission of final copies of her dissertation. he (niversity Council met to approve the list of candidates for graduation for the second semester of school year ,--8,--+. he list! which was endorsed to the #oard of 'egents for final approval! included private respondent=s name. Fean @a$ sent a letter to Fr. *ilagros "be! ice Chancel lor for &cademic &ffairs! re7uesting the exclusion of private respondent=s name from the list of candidates for graduation! pending clarification of the problems regarding her dissertation. Fean @a$=s lette r did not reach the #oard of 'egents on time! because the next day! the #oard approved the (niversity Council=s recommendation for the graduation of 7ualified students! including private respondent. wo days later! private respondent graduated with the degree of Foctor of @hilosophy in &nthropology. Fr. *edina formally charged private respondent with plagiarism and recommended that the doctorate granted to her be withdrawn. Fean @a$ formed an ad hoc committee to investigate the plagiarism charge against private respondent. *eanwhile! she recommended to (.@. Filiman Chancellor! Fr. 9merlinda 'oman! that the @h.F. degree conferred on private respondent be withdrawn.
"n a letter Fean @a$ informed private respondent of the charges against her. he CSS@ College &ssembly unanimously approved the recommendation to withdraw private respondent=s doctorate degree and forwarded its recommendation to the (niversity Council. he (niversity Council! in turn! approved and endorsed the same recommendation to the #oard of 'egents on &ugust ,B! ,--+.
has availed of the opportunity to present his position cannot tenably claim to have been denied due process. "n this case! private respondent was informed in writing of the charges against her and afforded opportunities to refute them. She was asked to submit her written explanation! which she forwarded. @rivate respondent then met with the (.@. chancellor and the members of the Xafaralla committee to discuss her case. "n addition! she sent several letters to the (.@. authorities explaining her position. "t is not tenable for private respondent to argue that she was entitled to have an audience before the #oard of 'egents. Fue process in an <'( (ch!+#*!+ # 5iv'! !(59$+!$ +i+ $9 '!$+ i% '**!i$ administrative context does not re7uire trial>type proceedings similar to h' h! -9'+ 9 R!!$( h'+ '*!'+ +!ci+!+ h! c'(! !9! those in the courts of :ustice. "t is noteworthy that the (.@. 'ules do not re7uire the attendance of persons whose cases are included as items on (h! c9#*+ ! #** h!'+. the agenda of the #oard of 'egents. #O' withdrew degree *eanwhile! in a letter! (.@. Filiman Chancellor 9merlinda 'oman summoned private respondent to a meeting on the same day and asked her to submit her written explanation to the charges against her. Furing the meeting! Chancellor 'oman informed private respondent of the charges and provided her a copy of the findings of the investigating committee. @rivate respondent! on the other hand! submitted her written explanation in a letter. ¬her meeting was held between Chancellor 'oman and private respondent to discuss her answer to the charges. A hi+ =!!i$
C dismissed petitio n for mandamus filed by &rokiaswamy. C& reversed ordering #O' to restore her doctoral degree.
I((#!)
petition precisely on grounds of academic freedom but the Court of &ppeals reversed holding that private respondent was denied due process. "t said/ "t is worthy to note that during the proceedings taken by the College &ssembly culminating in its recommendation to the (niversity Council for the withdrawal of petitioner=s @h.F. degree! petitioner was not given the chance to be heard until after the withd rawal of the degre e was consummated. @etitioner=s subse7uent letters to the (.@. @resident proved unavailing. &s the foregoing narration of facts in this case shows! however! various committees had been formed to investigate the charge that private respondent had committed plagiarism and! in all the investigations held! she was heard in her defense. "ndeed! if any criticism may be made of the university proceedings before private respondent was finally stripped of her degree! it is that there were too many committee and individual investigations conducted! although all resulted in a finding that private respondent committed dishonesty in submitting her doctoral dissertation on the basis of which she was conferred the @h.F. degree. "ndeed! in administrative proceedings! the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one=s side of a controversy or a chance to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. & party who
Di(59(ii9$@etition for mandamus F"S*"SS9F >AM-ALES CHROMITE MINING CO. V. CA 7SEC. OF AGRI AND NATURAL RESOURCES8 G.R. N9. L:4&11. A?UINO; N9v!=! % 1&& N'#!)@etition for review F'c() >his is a mining case. he petitioners appealed from the second decision of the Court of &ppeals! reversing its first decision and holding that it was improper for #en:amin *. Go$on! as Secretary of &griculture and Natural 'esources! to affirm his own decision as Firector of *ines. >he Court of &ppeals further held that the trial courtEs :udgment! confirming the SecretaryEs decision! should be (! '(i+!and that the *inister of Natural 'esources should review anew the decision of the Firector of *ines and! thereafter! further proceedings will be taken in the trial court. he antecedental proceedings are as follows/ 3,5 "n *ines &dministrative Case No. >88?! Firector Go$on issued an order dated October ;! ,-B wherein he dismissed the case filed by the petitioners or protestants 3Xambales Chromite *ining Co.! "nc. or the group of Gon$alo @. Nava5. "n that case! they sought to be declared the rightful and prior locators and possessors of sixty>nine mining claims located in Santa Cru$! Xambales. On the basis of petitionersE evidence 3the private respondents did not present any evidence and they filed a demurrer to the evidence or motion to dismiss the protest5! Firector Go$on found that the petitioners did not
discover any mineral nor staked and located mining claims in accordance with law. "n that same order! Firector Go$on ruled that the mining claims of the groups of Gregorio *artine$ and @ablo @abiloa! now the private respondents>appellees! were duly located and registered 3pp. 88>8+,! 'ecord on &ppeal5. 385 he petitioners appealed fr om th at or der to th e Secretary of &griculture and Natural 'esources.
the officer whose decision is under review0 otherwise! there could be no different view or there would be no real review of the case. he decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased view0 inevitably! it would be the same view since being human! he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case. hat is the obvious! elementary reason behind the dis7ualification of a trial :udge! who is promoted to the appellate court! to sit in any case wherein his decision or ruling is the sub:ect of review 3Sec. ,! 'ule ,+?! 'ules of Court0 secs. - and 8?! Kudiciary Law5. & sense of proportion and consideration for the fitness of things should have deterred Secretary Go$on from reviewing his own decision as Firector of *ines. 6e should have asked his (ndersecretary to undertake the review.@etitioners>appellants were deprived of due process! meaning fundamental fairness. Di(59(ii9$Order of the Secretary of &griculture and Natural 'esources S9 &S"F9
I((#!)
H!*+) NO. Reasoning Secretary Go$on acted with grave abuse of discretion in
reviewing his decision as Firector of *ines. he palpably flagra nt anomaly of a Secretary of &griculture and Natural 'esources reviewing his own decision as Firector of *ines is a mockery of administrative :ustice. he *ining Law! Commonwealth &ct No. ,+?! provides/ S9C. B,. Conflicts and disputes ari sing ou t of mi ning lo cations shall be submitted to the Firector of *ines for decision/ @rovided! hat the decision or order of the Firector of *ines may be appealed to the Secretary of &griculture and Natural 'esources within thirty days from the date of its receipt. "n case any one of the parties should disagree from the decision or order of the Firector of *ines or of the Secretary of &griculture and Natural 'esources! the matter may be taken to the court of competent :urisdiction within thirty days from the receipt of such decision or order0 otherwise the said decision or order shall be final and binding upon the parties concerned. 3&s amended by 'epublic &ct No. ?B approved on Kune ,J! ,-;85. (ndoubtedly! the provision of section that the decision of the Firector of *ines may be appealed to the Secretary of &griculture and Natural 'esources contemplates that the Secretary should be a person different from the Firector of *ines. "n order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn out to be a farce! the reviewing officer must perforce be other than
N'#!)@etition for review on certiorari F'c() > @etitioner 'ivera was the *anager of Corporate #anking (nit " of the Land #ank of the @hilippines 3L#@5. On the basis of the affidavits of Lao and @ere$! petitioner was charged by the L#@ @resident with having committed the following offenses/ 3,5 Fishonesty0 385 'eceiving for personal use of fee! gift or other valuable thing! in the course of official duties or in connection therewith when such fee! gift! or other valuable thing is given by any person in the hope or expectation of receiving a favor or better treatment than that accorded other persons0 3+5 Committing acts punishable under the &nti>Graft laws0 35 @ursuit of pri vate bus iness vocation or profession with out the permission re7uired by Civil Service 'ules and regulations0 3;5 iolation of 'es. J?>&! '.&. No. ++?0 resulting to misconduct and conduct pre:udicial to the best interest of the service. > 'ivera allegedly told @ere$! the *arketing *anager of
received a @8!. commission out of the @+!!. loan proceeds from the L#@. Arom Lao! who had substantial investments in 'ivera was further charged with! among other things! having served and acted! without prior authority re7uired by Civil Service 'ules and *emorandum Circular No. ,8; of the Office of the @resident of the @hilippines! as the personal consultant of Lao and as consultant in various companies where Lao had investments. 6e drew and received salaries and allowances approximately @8!. a month evidenced by vouchers of 9dge &pparel! "nc.! K V * Clothing Corporation! and K*9 rading Corporation. > Once the charges were filed! 'ivera was placed under preventive suspension. &fter a formal investigation! the L#@ held 'ivera guilty of grave misconduct and acts pre:udicial to the best interest of the service in accepting employment from a client of the bank and in thereby receiving salaries and allowances in violation of Section ,8! 'ule R"""! of the 'evised Civil Service 'ules. 6e was also found to have transgressed the prohibition in Section +! paragraph 3d5! of the &nti>Graft and Corrupt @ractices &ct 3'epublic &ct No. +,-! as amended5. he penalty of forced resignation! without separation benefits and gratuities! was ther eupon impos ed on 'ivera. On appe al! the decis ion was modified by the *erit Systems @rotection #oard 3*S@#5 which held 'ivera guilty only of committing acts pre:udicial to the best interest of the service. he L#@ filed a motion for the reconsideration of *S@#Es decision. "n its resolution! the *S@# denied the motion. > 'ivera and the L#@ both appealed to the CSC. he CSC dismissed the appeal of 'espondent George 'ivera! finding him guilty of Grave *isconduct for which he is meted out the penalty of dismissal from the service. 'ivera filed a motion for reconsideration! which the CSC denied in its 'esolution No. ->,8?B. > @etitioner averred that the CSC committed grave abuse or discretion in imposing the capital penalty of dismissal on the basis of unsubstantiated finding and conclusions. he SC Court resolved to dismiss the petition for petitionerEs failure to sufficiently show that CSC acted with grave abuse of discretion in issuing its 7uestioned resolution. 'ivera filed a motion for reconsideration of the CourtEs dismissal of the petition! now strongly asserting that he was denied due process when Gaminde! who earlier participated in her capacity as the #oard Chairman of the *S@# when the latter had taken action on L#@Es motion for reconsideration!
also took part! this time as a CSC Commissioner! in the resolution of petitionerEs motion for reconsideration with the CSC.
I(( #!)
H!*+) Y9S. > "n Xambales Chromi te *ining Company vs. Court of &ppeals ! the decision of the Secretary of &griculture and Natural 'esources was set aside by this Court after it had been established that the case concerned an appeal from the SecretaryEs own previous decision he handed down while he was yet the incumbent Firector of *ines. Calling the act of the Secretary a mockery of administrative :ustice! the Court said/ %"n order that the review of the decision of a subordinate officer might not turn out to be a farce! then reviewing officer must perforce be other than the officer whose decision is under review0 otherwise! there could be no different view or there would be no real review of the case. he decision of the reviewing officer would be a biased view0 inevitably! it would be the same view since being human! he would not admit that he was mistaken in his first view of the case. > Given the circumstances in the case at bench! it should have behooved Commissioner Gaminde to inhibit herself totally from any participation in resolving 'iveraEs appeal to CSC if we are to give full meaning and conse7uence to a fundamental aspect of due process. he argument that Commissioner Gaminde did not participate in *S@#Es decision of 8&ugust ,-- is unacceptable. "t is not denied that she did participate! indeed has concurred! in *S@#Es resolution of + *arch ,--! denying the motion for reconsideration of *S@#Es decision of 8- &ugust ,--. cdrep Dispositive Resolution set aside ! case remanded to C#C
AMERICAN INTER:FASHION CORPORATION v. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT% GARMENTS TETILE EPORT -OARD GLORIOUS SUN FASHION GARMENTS MANUFACTURING CO. 7PHILS.8% INC. 16 SCRA 40&; GUTIERRE>% "R.; M' 23% 1&&1 N'#!) A55!'* F'c()
> GLO'"O(S was found guilty of dollar>salting and misdeclaration of importations by the G9# and! as a result of which! the export 7uotas allocated to it were cancelled. Soon after the rendition of the G9# decision! GLO'"O(S filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court! contending that its right to due process of law was violated! and that the G9# decision was not supported by substantial evidence. > Giving credence to the allegations of respondent GLO'"O(S! the Court issued a resolution ordering G9# to conduct further proceedings in the administrative case against respondent GLO'"O(S. > 6owever! GLO'"O(S filed a manifestation of its intention to withdraw the petition which the Court granted > GLO'"O(S filed another motion to dismiss with pre:udice! which was duly noted by the Court in a resolution. > *ore than 8 years later! GLO'"O(S filed with the G9# a petition for the restitution of its export 7uota allocation and re7uested for a reconsideration of the G9# decision dated &pril 8?! ,-J. > GLO'"O(S again alleg ed that the charg es against it were not supported by evidence. > *oreover! it alleged that the G9# decision canceling its export 7uotas was rendered as a result of duress! threats ! intimidation and undue influence exercised by former *inister 'oberto . Ongpin in order to transfer GLO'"O(SE export 7uotas to *arcos crony>owned corporations Fe Soleil &pparel *anufacturing Corporation 1FS&2 and &"AC. > GLO'"O(S further alleged that it was coerced by *r. 'oberto Ongpin to withdraw its petition and to enter into :oint venture agreements paving the way for the creation of FS& and petitioner &"AC which were allowed to service GLO'"O( SE export 7uotas and to use its plant facilities! machineries and e7uipment. > G9# denied the petition of GLO'"O(S. &n appeal was then taken to the Office of the @resident. > &t this point! &"AC sought to intervene in the proceedings and filed its opposition to GLO'"O(SE appeal claiming that the G9# decision has long become final! and that a favorable action on the appeal would result in the forfeiture of the export 7uotas which were legally allocated to it. > he Office of the @resident ruled in favor of GLO'"O(S! finding the proceedings before the G9# in ,-J irregular! and remanded the case
8.
to G9# for further proceedings. > he *' of &"AC was subse7uently denied.
subse7uent cases. > he documents used by the G9# in its ,-J decision and referred to in the ,-J? decision as being intact relates to what the G9# labeled as Focuments used by G9# and &dditional Focuments which! as earlier discussed! were either not disclosed to &ppellant for being privileged or unmarked as exhibits or not presented in evidence.
I((#!(/ ,.
H!*+) 1. NO. "n finding that G9# proceedings were irregular! the O@ didn=t commit G&F as G9# indeed viol ated the righ t to due proc ess of Glorious. G9# failed to disclose evidence used by it in rendering the resolution against Glorious Sun. he decision penned by Feputy 9xecutive Secretary *agdangal #. 9lma and the resolution penned by &cting Feputy 9xecutive Secretary *ariano Sarmiento "" are not tainted in the slightest by any grave abuse of discretion. hey outline in detail why the private respondent was denied due process when its export 7uotas were cancelled by G9# he findings are supporte d by the records.
RATIO) Evi+!$c! 9$ !c9+ =#( ! #** +i(c*9(!+ 9 h! 5'i!(. 2 . N O. > he dism issal of the firs t petition was clear ly based on a technical matter rather than on the merits of the petition. 6ence! the dismissal of the petition with the factual issues hanging in mid>air cannot! under the circumstances! constitute res :udicata. R!'(9$i$/ > Aor a :udgment to be a bar to a subse7uent case! the following re7uisites must concur/ . . . 3,5 it must be a final :udgment0 385 the court which resolved it had :urisdiction over the sub:ect matter and the parties0 3+5 it must be a :udgment on the merits0 and 35 there must be identity between the two cases! as to the parties! sub:ect matter and cause of action. > he well>entrenched principle is that a :udgment on the merits is one rendered after a determination of which party is right! as distinguished from a :udgment rendered upon preliminary or final or merely technical point. 3Feang v. "&C5. > he protestation of Glorious Sun of non>disclosure of evidence had been effectively remedied by the subse7uent accommodation by the G9# of its re7uest for copies of the relevant documents. > he petitioner claims that the subse7uent disclosure of the documents by G9# to Glorious Sun in ,-J? cured the defect of non>disclosure of evidence in ,-J under the constitutional provision of due process enunciated in the landm ark case of &ng ibay v. C"' and other
> &t any rate! the conclusions of G9# as to the excessiveness of &ppellantEs import prices drew a controverting statement from its own 'aw *aterials "mportation 'egulation Fivision! > Aindings of administrative agencies are accorded respect and finality! and generally should not be disturbed by the courts. his general rule! however! is not without exceptions. > &s recently reiterated! it is :urisprudentially settled that absent a clear! manifest and grave abuse of discretion amount to want of :urisdiction! the findings of the administrative agency on matters falling within its competence will not be disturbed by the courts. > Specifically with respect to factual findings! they are accorded respect! if not finality! because of the special knowledge and expertise gained by these tribunals from handling the specific matters falling under their :urisdiction. > Such factual findings may be disregarded only if they are not supported by evidence0 where the findings are initiated by fraud! imposition or collussion0 where the procedures which lead to the factual findings are irregular0 when palpable errors are committed0 or when grave abuse of discretion arbitrarines or capriciousness is manifest. 3*apa v. &rroyo! ,?; SC'& ?B 1,-J-25 > "n the case at bar! the petitioner was never given the chance to present its side before its export 7uota allocations were revoked and its officers suspended. Ainally! &merican "nter>Aashion is hardly the proper party to 7uestion the *alacaang decision. "t was incorporated after the incidents in this case happened. "t was created obviously to be the recipient of export 7uotas arbitrarily removed from the rightful owner. "t was se7uestered precisely because of the allegation that it is a crony corporation which profited from an act of in:ustice inflicted on another private corporation. Dispositive/ *A' is G'&N9F. he instant petition is F"S*"SS9F. he 7uestion decision and resolution of the Office of the @resident are hereby &AA"'*9F. eparate $pinion
FELICIANO>concurring/ " concur in the resul t reached by the Court ! that is! that petitioner &merican "nter>fashion Corporation has failed to show any grave abuse
of discretion or act without or in excess of :urisdiction on the part of the public respondent Office of the @resident in rendering its decision in O@ Case No. +?J, dated ? September ,-J-.
PEFIANCO V. MORAL 322 SCRA 43&; -ELLOSILLO; "'$ 1&% 2000 N'#!)@etition for review of decision of C& F'c() > Sec @efianco of F9CS seeks to nullify C& decision. > 9x>Sec Gloria filed complaint against *oral! Chief Librarian of National Library for dishonesty! grave misconduct and conduct pre:udicial to the best interest of the service. he complaint charged respondent *oral with the pilferage of some historical documents. > FoK Special @rosecutor represented Sec Gloria in the administrative case. *oral was represented by her private counsel. Sec Gloria issued resolution finding *oral guilty. She was ordered dismissed. > *oral did not appeal but filed a @etition for @rodu ction of F9CS "nvestigation Committee 'eport. 6er petition was twice denied. > *oral instituted an action for mandamus and in:unction before regular courts against Sec Gloria praying that she be furnished a copy of the F9CS "nvestigation Committee 'eport and that the F9CS Secretary be en:oined from enforcing the order of dismissal until she received a copy of the said report. > Secretary Gloria moved to dismiss the mandamus case principally for lack of cause of action! but the trial court denied his motion. hus! he elevated the case to the Court of &ppeal s on certiorari. C& sustained C. > Sec Gloria file d instant petition. Sec Gloria was replaced by Sec @efianco.
ISSUES ,.
H!*+) ,. NO. > Section +! 'ule ,B! of the 8F Rules of Civil Procedure mandatorily re7uires that the resolution on a motion to dismiss should clearly and distinctly state the reasons therefor. > he challenged Order of the trial court dated 8+ &pril ,--? falls short of
the re7uirements prescribed in 'ule ,B. he Order merely discussed the general concept of mandamus and the trial court=s :urisdiction over the rulings and actions of administrative agencies without stating the basis why petitioner=s motion to dismiss was being denied. > Kudges should take pains in crafting their orders! stating therein clearly and comprehensively the reasons for their issuance! which are necessary for the full understanding of the action taken. Mandamus is employed to compel the performance! when refused! of a ministerial duty! this being its main ob:ective. "t does not lie to re7uire anyone to fulfill a discretionary duty. "t is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that petitioner should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act re7uired. > "n he r petition fo r mandamus! respondent miserably failed to demonstrate that she has a clear legal right to the 2EC# 'nvesti&ation Committee Report and that it is the ministerial duty of petitioner F9CS Secretary to furnish her with a copy thereof. > @rimarily! respondent did not appeal to the Civil Service Commission the F9CS resolution dismissing her from the service. #y her failure to do so! nothing prevented the F9CS resolution from becoming final. > *oreover! there is no law or rule which impos es a legal duty on petitioner to furnish respondent with a copy of the investigation report. On the contrar y! it was held in RuiG v. 2rilon that a respondent in an administrative case is not entitled to be informed of the findings and recommendations of any investigating committee created to in7uire into charges filed agai nst him. 6e is entitled only to the admini strative decision based on substantial evidence made of record! and a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and the evidence presented against her during the hearings of the investigation committee. 'espondent no doubt had been accorded these rights. > *ore importantly! the F9CS resolution is complete in itself for purposes of appeal to the Civil Service Commission! that is! it contains sufficient findings of fact and conclusion of law upon which respondent=s removal from office was grounded. Disposition @etition is granted.
NAPOLCOM V POLICE CHIEF INSPECTOR LEONARDO -ERNA-E G.R. N9. 12&&14; PARDO; M' 12% 2000 N'#!)&ppeal from the Fecision of the Court of &ppeals F'c() > & newspaper published an article saying that #ernabe headed a syndicate encashing treasury warrants of @C soldiers! policemen! firemen and :ail personnel who were already dead! on awol! suspended and separated from the service. > @resident 'amos instructed the F"LG Secretary to conduct an investigation and prosecute respondent if necessary. he Secretary referred the directive to the @N@ Firector General! who ordered the Criminal "nvestigation Service Command to investigate the charges. > 'espondent was informed of the article and SHSupt. 'omeo &cop ordered him to explain through affidavit. > 'espondent submitted his affidavit alleging that all the cases against him were either dismissed by the Ombudsman or pending resolution! except one which was pending before the Sandiganbayan involving the encashment of ? treasury warrants. C"CS Firector &ngel Mui$on submitted to the Chief! @N@! a memorandum confirming respondent=s allegations. > #y command of the @olice Feputy Firector General! respondent was suspended from the police service for - days. Subse7uently! he was given notice of complaintHcharge and order to answer within ; days from receipt of the complaint. > 'espondent filed a motion for bill of particulars. > he C"CS submitted a manifestation asserting that the technical procedures obtained in the regular courts are strictly applica ble to administrative proceedings0 hence! the allegations in the complaint are sufficient to enable respondent to file an intelligent answer. > he Summary Fismissal 6earing Officer issued a resolution recommending for respondentEs dismissal from the @N@ service. he @N@ "nspector General concurred with the recommendation of the Summary Fismissal Officer. > he Chief @N@ ordered the dismissal of respondent from the police service because of heading a payroll syndicate! unexplained assets or wealth! and falsification of public documents 3falsified his transcript of records with @(@5 > 'espondent appealed to the N&@OLCO* National &ppellate #oard! which sustained the summary dismissal of respondent from the @N@.
> 'espondent filed with the Court of &ppe als a petition for revie w challenging his dismissal from the police service on the ground of lack of due process and the unconstitutionality of Section 8! '. &. B-?;. > &fter due proceedings! the C& promulgated its decision upholding the constitutionality of Section 8! '. &. B-?;! but setting aside the decision of the National &ppellate #oard for failure to comply with the due process re7uirement of the Constitution.
I((#!)
H!*+) Y9S! the re7uirements of due process were sufficiently complied with. Ratio Fue process as a constitutional precept does not always and in all
situations re7uire a trial>type proceeding. Fue process is satisfied when a person is notified of the charge against him and given an opportunity to explain or defend himself. he essence of due process is simply to be heard! or as applied to administrative proceedings! an opportunity to explain oneEs side! or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. Reasoning
> 'ecord shows that respondent was given notice of the complaintsHcharges against him and an opportunity to answer. 6e submitted an affidavit answering point by point the charges against him. 6e even appealed from the decision of the Chief! @N@ dismissing him from the police service to the National &ppellate #oard! and submitted a memorandum. Conse7uently! he was given more than ade7uate opportunity to explain his side. 6ence! there was no violation of his right to procedural and substantive due process. Disposition @etition G'&N9F.
accused 9F"LLO *ON9*&YO'! then O"C>'egional Firector! 'egion """! of the F@<6! of accumulating unexplained wealth. *ontemayor and his wife purchased a house and lot in California! making a down payment of (S4,!. 6is in>laws in California had a poor credit standing due to a number of debts and they could not have purchased such an expensive property. "t accused *ontemayor of amassing wealth from lahar funds and other public works pro:ects. > *ontemayor submitted his counter>affidavit before the @hilippine Commission &gainst Graft and Corruption 3@C&GC5 alleging that the real owner of the property was his sister>in>law 9stela Aa:ardo. hey were advised by an immigration lawyer 3they wanted to emigrate5 that it would be an advantage if they had real property in the (S. 6e claimed that Aa:ardo offered to buy the #urbank property and put the title in the names of *ontemayor and his wife to support their emigration plans and to enable her at the same time to circumvent a provision in her mortgage contract prohibiti ng her to purchase another property pending full payment of a real estate she earlier ac7uired in @almdale! Los &ngeles. 6e also attached a Consolidated "nvestigation 'eport of the Ombudsman dismissing similar charges for insufficiency of evidence. > ,--5! "ncome ax 'eturns 3"'s5 and @ersonal Fata Sheet. 6e ignored these directives and submitted only his Service 'ecord. > he Office of the @resident! concurring with the findings and adopting the recommendation of the @C&GC! ordered *ontemayor=s dismissal from service with forfeiture of all government benefits. 6is *A' was denied and his appeal to the C& was dismissed.
ISSUES ,.
MONTEMA,OR V -UNDALIAN GR N9. 14&33/ PUNO; "#* 1% 2003 N'#!)@etition for review on certiorari F'c() > &n unverified letter>complaint! was received from L("S #(NF&L"&N by the @hilippine Consulate General in San Arancisc o! California. "t
H!*+) ,. NO. Ratio he essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the
opportunity to explain one=s side or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. &s long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before :udgment is rendered! the demands of due process are sufficiently met. Reasoning he @C&GC exerted efforts to notify #unda lian of the proceedings but his @hilippine residence could not be located. #e that as
it may! *ontemayor cannot argue that he was deprived of due process because he failed to confront and cross>examine the complainant. 6e voluntarily submitted to the :urisdiction of the @C&GC by participating in the proceedings before it. 6e was duly represented by counsel. 6e filed his counter>affidavit! submitted documentary evidence! attended the hearings! moved for a reconsideration of the &dministrative Order issued by the @resident and eventually filed his appeal before the C&. 6is active participation in every step of the investigation effectively removed any badge of procedural deficiency! if there was any! and satisfied the due process re7uirement. > he lack of verification of the administrative complaint and the non> appearance of the complainant did not divest the @C&GC of its authority. (nder Section + of 9O ,;, creating the @C&GC! complaints involving graft and corruption may be filed before it in any form or manner against presidential appointees in the executive department. "t is not uncommon that a government agency is given wide latitude in the scope and exercise of its investigative powers. he Ombudsman! under the Constitution! is directed to act on any complaint likewise filed in any form and manner concerning official acts or omissions. he Court &dministrator of this Court investigates and takes cogni$ance of! not only unverified! but even anonymous complaints filed against court employees or officials for violation of the Code of 9thical Conduct. his policy has been adopted in line with the serious effort of the government to minimi$e! if not eradicate! graft and corruption in the service. > "n administrative proceedings! technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied. &dministrative due process cannot be fully e7uated with due process in its strict :udicial sense for it is enough that the party is given the chance to be heard before the case against him is decided. Disposition @etition is F"S*"SS9F.
SHOPPES MANILA INC v NLRC 41& SCRA 3/4
F'c(
SHOPPES MANILA% INC. vs.
THE HON. NLRC% LA-OR AR-ITER ERMITA A-RASALDO:CU,UCA '$+ LORIE TORNO C+33E>(; #R.; >.? >anuar 8; 5<< Petition for certiorari under Rule = for the nullification of the resolution of the C+
he petitioner corporation is a domestic corporation engaged in garments manufacturing using the brand name +M'#ET+@. *ay B! ,-- > @rivate 'espondent Lorie orino was hired as a trimmer with a salary of @ JHday which was later increased to @,J;Hday 3&pril ,--?5. he private respondent and a co>employee! *aricar #uan! were tasked to handle the inventory of finished products. Sometime later! the petitioner started to receive information from the head of its production department that! according to other employees! the private respondent had been stealing +M'#ET+ items from the factory so an investigation was conducted on Kuly +,! ,--? where two witnesses gave their account 3one of finding numerous I&*"S9& clothing in respondent=s home and the other of the respondent encouraging her to steal a belt from the stocks5. On the same day! the respondent was made aware of the allegations against her and she had her home inspected. Furing the course of the inspection! various I&*"S9& clothing and wallpapers were found in her home. On the basis of the said report! the petitioner issued a disciplinary action form suspending the private respondent indefinitely without pay. On &ugust 8;! ,--?! a notice of dismissal was addressed to the private respondent specifying the charge against her! the factual basis thereof and the imposable penalties for the said charge if proven and was called to the 6ead Office in order to explain herself. he private respondent failed to appear during the scheduled hearing. Conse7uently! the petitioner decided to dismiss the private respondent from her employment. he private respondent then filed a case for illegal dismissal. he case was raffled to L& umanong! however despite various mandatory conferences they didn=t reach an amicable settlement and the petitioner filed for the conduct of a full blown hearing which was granted by L& umanong and set for hearing. 6owever! the hearing failed to materiali$e because of the absences of either the private respondent or her counsel. *eanwhile! L& umanong was replaced by L& Cuyuca who ordered the case submitted for decision and redered a decision stating that respondent was ille gally dismi ssed awarding her with full backwages and separation pay since reinstatement was not feasible due to the strained relations between employer and employee.
@etitioner appealed to the NL'C which affirmed the ruling of the L&. Fissatisfied the petitioner filed a petition for certiorari to the C& via 'ule B; of the 'oC he C& likewise affirmed the NL'C ruling and denied the petitioner=s *'. 6ence! the present petition.
I((#!(H!*+ 3,5
assistance of his representative! if he so desires0 3b5 if the employer decides to terminate the services of the employee! the employer must notify him in writing of the decision to dismiss him! stating clearly the reason therefore. hus! the SC affirms the C&=s holding of an illegal dismissal. Aurther! the SC refused to entertain 7uestions of fact because the SC is not a trier of facts so these 7uestions are for the labor tribunals to resolve and in this respect! the findings of the NL'C and the C& are accorded with great respect.
AUTENCIO V MANARA 44& SCRA 4 PANGANI-AN; "'$#' 1&% 200/
R'i9 1. Contrary to petitioner=s contention! the C& correctly held that it did not have a vested right to a formal hearing simply and merely because L& umanong granted its motion and set the case for hearing. @ursuant to Section ;! 'ule of the New 'ules of @rocedure of the NL'C! the labor arbiter has the authority to determine whether or not there is a necessity to conduct formal hearings in cases brought before him for ad:udication. he holding of a formal hearing or trial is discretionary with the labor arbiter and is something that the parties cannot demand as a matter of right. "t is entirely within his authority to decide a labor case before him! based on the position papers and supporting documents of the parties! without a trial or formal hearing. he re7uirements of due process are satisfied when the parties are given the opportunity to submit position papers wherein they are supposed to attach all the documents that would prove their claim in case it be decided that no hearing should be conducted or was necessary. he order of L& umanong granting the petitioner=s motion for a hearing of the case was not conclusive and binding on L& Cuyuca who had the discretion either to hear the case before deciding it! or to forego with the hearing if! in her view! there was no longer a need therefor as the case could be resolved on its merits based on the records.
N'#!)@etition for 'eview under 'ule ; F'c() > *anara lodged a complaint against &utencio for dishonesty and misconduct in office. > after hearing! the Office for Legal Services of the City of Cotobato declared &utencio guilty of misconudct in office for allowing irregularities to happen which led to illegal payment of salaries to casuals. > petitioner appealed to the Civil Service Commission! which modified the decision to grave misconduct! and imposed the penalty of dismissal for cause with all its accessories > petitioner! in her motion for reconsideration! alleged that she had waived her right to present her evidence at a formal hearing to submit the case for resolution! only because of the manifestation of the complainant and the hearing officer that she could be held liable only for the lesser offense of simple negligence. > petitioner elevated the case to the C&! which affirmed the CSC resolutions0 C& denied reconsideration.
2. Aor a valid dismissal! the law re7uires that 3a5 there be :ust and valid
ISSUES
cause as provided under &rticle 8J8 of the Labor Code0 and 3b5 that the employee be afforded an opportunity to be heard and to defend himself.
,.
"n the case! as held by the C&! the petition er had failed to show that it had complied with the two>notice re7uirement/ 3a5 a written notice containing a statement of the cause for the termination to afford the employee ample opportunity to be heard and defend himself with the
H!*+) ,. NO Reasoning On the formal charge against her! petitioner had received
sufficient information which! in fact! enabled her to prepare her defense.
She filed her &nswe r controverting the charges against her and submitted &ffidavits of personnel in the &ssessor=s Office to support her claim of innocence. & pre>hearing conference was conducted by the legal officer! during which she >> assisted by her counsel >> had participated. Ainally! she was able to appeal the ruling of City *ayor #adoy to the CSC! and then to the C& "n administrative cases! a fair and reasonable opportunity to explain one=s side suffices to meet the re7uirements of due process. & formal or trial>type hearing is not always necessary. Aor the purpose of ascertaining the truth! an investigation will be conducted! during which technical rules applicable to :udicial proceedings need not always be adhered to. &nd where the party has the opportunity to appeal or seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of! defects in procedural due process may be cured. Settled is the rule in our :urisdiction that the findings of fact of an administrative agency must be respected! so long as they are supported by substantial evidence. "t is not the task of this Court to weigh once more the evidence submitted before the administrative body and to substitute its own :udgment for that of the latter in respect of the sufficiency of evidence. "n any event! the Fecisions of the CSC and the Court of &ppeals finding petitioner guilty of the administrative charge prepared against her are supported by substantial evidence. Disposition @etition is denied and the assailed Fecision and 'esolution affirmed.
SAMALIO V CA 7CSC% DO"% -UREAU OF IMMIGRATION8 4/4 SCRA 42 CORONA; M'ch 31% 200/ for review on certiorari under 'ule ; of the 'ules of N'#! @etition ) Court assailing the *ay 8! ,--- decision! as well as the September ,! ,--- resolution! of the Court of &ppeals 3C&5 in C&>G.'. S@ No. J?8+ which in turn affirmed the November 8B! ,--? resolution of the Civil Service Commission 3CSC5. he aforementioned CSC resolution upheld the &ugust +! ,--B , st "ndorsement of then Kustice Secretary eofisto . Guingona confirming the penalty of dismissal from service imposed by
> @etitioner was formerly an "ntelligence Offic er of the #ureau of "mmigration and Feportation. > "n 'esolution No. >-+>88 dated Aebruary ! ,--+! the City @rosecutor s office of @asay City recommended that petitioner Samalio be prosecuted for the crimes of 'obbery and iolation of Section B of the "mmigration Law before the Sandiganbayan under the following facts/ ’
x x x that on 8 Aebruary ,--+! *s.
accompanied the arrival hereafter! 'espondent!area. with *s. hen #"F Commissioner! Xafiro L. 'espicio! issued @ersonnel Order No. -+>,?->-+ commencing an administrative case against petitioner &ugusto '. Samalio for iolation of CS*C No. B! 'ule 8! Section ,! for dishonesty! oppression! misconduct! disgraceful and immoral conduct! inefficiency and incompetence in the performance of official duties! violation of reasonable office rules and regulations and conduct pre:udicial to the best interest of the service. > Furing the pendency of the administrative case! petitioner was convicted of robbery before the Sandiganbayan regarding the same incident. : @etitioner filed motion to dismiss admin case. Fenied. "ndorsement mentioned 3S99 NATURE5 was issued.
the #ureau ofmisconduct "mmigrationand upon petitioner on thepre:udicial ground of to dishonesty! oppression! conduct grossly the best interest of the service in connection with his act of extorting money from *s.
ISSUES
F'c()
H!*+) ,. NO.
,.
law and procedure and the rules obtaining in courts of law. &dministrative tribunals exercising 7uasi>:udicial powers are unfettered by the rigidity of certain procedural re7uirements! sub:ect to the observance of fundamental and essential re7uirem ents of due process in :usticiable cases presented before them. "n administrative proceedings! technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied and administrative due process cannot be fully e7uated with due process in its strict :udicial sense. Reasoning Fue process in an administrative context does not re7uire trial>type proceedings similar to those in courts of :ustice. type hearing is not at all times and in all inst ances essential. he re7uirements are satisfied where the parties are afforded fair and reasonable opportunity to explain their side of the controversy at hand. he standard of due process that must be met in administrative tribunals allows a certain degree of latitude as long as fairness is not ignored. "n other words! it is not legally ob:ectionable for being violative of due process for an administrative agency to resolve a case based solely on position papers! affidavits or documentary evidence submitted by the parties as affidavits of witnesses may take the place of their direct testimony. he CSC decision and resolution which upheld the resolution of the Secretary of Kustice confirming the decision of the Commissioner of the #"F are supported by substantial evidence. he CSC! as well as the Secretary of Kustice and the Commissioner of the #"F! decided the case on the basis of the pleadings and papers submitted by the parties! and relied on the records of the proceedings taken. "n particular! the decision was based on the criminal complaint filed by
not deny that the testimony of -+>88 of the City @rosecutor=s Office of @asay City! the very same resolution used by Commissioner 'espicio as basis for filing the administrative complaint. 6ence! the issue testified to by examine his accuser
MEDINA V. COA LORNA MEDINA% P!ii9$! % vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT 7COA8% !5!(!$!+ h! A#+i T!'= 9 EUFROCINIA MAWA@% SUSAN PALLERNA% '$+ MA. DOLORES TEPORA% R!(59$+!$(. N'#!)@etition for review on certiorari under 'ule ; D'!) Aebruary ! 8J P9$!$!)inga! K. 39n #anc decision5 F'c()
his petition srcinated from the audit conducted by respondent CO& on the cash and accounts handled by petitioner in her official capacity as *unicipal reasurer of General *ariano &lvare$! Cavite. "n the Koint affidavit executed by *awak and her team members @allerna! epora and &lvare$! who were all state auditors of the @rovincial &uditor=s Office of Cavite! they stated that they had examined petition er=s financial records from &ugust ,-! ,--- to September 8B! 8 and disco vered a total cash shortage of @!J!B+,. hey directed petitioner to restitute shortage within ?8 hours. hey also sent a report asking for the relief of petitioner from her post as municipal treasurer and the filing of criminal charges against her. CO& filed an administrative case before the Office of the Feputy Ombudsman for Lu$on charging petitioner with grave misconduct
and dishonesty. @etitioner filed a counter>affidavit and @osition paper raising the following defenses/ ,5 audit team was not independent and competent0 85 computation of her accountabilities was overstated and erroneous0 +5 audit team failed to verify documents such as bank statements etc0 5 documents in support of the audit report were not signed! hence! self>serving0 ;5 cash shortage in the amount of @+?-!BB unfer the S9A and rust fund as well as amount of @;J;!J+ had no basis as the same pertained to previous audit thus! should have been excluded from computation0 B5 cash items amounting to @JJ+!-;8 in the form of reimbursement expense receipts should not have been disallowed because they were received by individual payees0 ?5 petitioner=s cash on hand accountability was overstated because a collection was not immediately recorded0 and J5 audit team erroneou sly credited petitioner=s accounts to another cashier. November J! 8 T Feputy Ombusman ictor Aernande$ approved the recommendation to dismiss petitioner from service based on the existence of substantial evidence of discrepancy on petitioner=s account totaling @ *. Said decision noted petitioner=s supposed failure to file a counter>affidavit and position paper despite due notice. November 8-! 8 T petitioner filed urgent motion stating she complied with the directive to file a counter>affidavit and position paper and praying the defenses therein be considered. his motion was treated as a motion for reconsideration of the Nov J decision. Kanuary +,! 8; T Feputy Ombudsman Aernande$ issued the first assailed Order denying petitioner=s urgent motion. he order acknowledged the erroneous statement in the Nov J decision but nevertheless affirmed the resolution and decision in said decision. Aernande$ ruled that petitioner=s counter>affidavit and position paper did not present exculpatory arguments that would negate allegation of discrepancy. 6e also held that petitioner=s concerns relating to conduct of the audit should have been raised at the time of the audit or immediately thereafter and that petitioner=s failure to produce the amount of cash shortage created a presumption that she appropriated public funds under her custody for personal use. @etitioner sought reconsideration on grounds of newly discovered and material evidence and grave errors of fact andHor law pre:udicial to her own interest. he new evidence consis ted of petitioner=s re7uest for reconsideration of audit report filed and still pending before the office of the audit team head. *arch 88! 8; 38 nd assailed order5 T Feputy Ombudsman Aernande$ denied petitioner=s motion for reconsideration. 6e said
that petitioner=s allegations as regards the incompetence of the audit team and the errors of audit report were matters which may be properly ventilated during trial. 6e also said that petitioner=s failure to produce the missing funds created a presumption that the same were appropriated for personal use and such findings warranted the filing of criminal charges against petitioner. 6e denied petitioner=s re7uest on the ground that petitioner=s re7uest for re>audit could not be considered newly discovered evidence and that she was afforded due process. @etitioner elevated matter to Court of &ppeals via @etition for 'eview 7uestioning the denial of her re7uest for a formal investigation. C& dismissed the petition and held that petitioner was not entitled to a formal investigation and it affirmed the deputy ombudsman=s factual finding that petitioner was guilty of grave misconduct and dishonesty. C& also denied her *'.
I((#!(H!*+)
,.
R'i9) ,. @etitioner insists that she is entitl ed to a formal inves tigation! citing &dministrative Code of ,-J?! #ook ! itle "! Subtitle &! Section J385 and 3+5. 8 'espondent CO&! through the OSG! relies on 2
S9C. J. Procedure in +dministrative Cases +&ainst )onPresidential +ppointees. T xxx 385 "n the case of a complaint filed by any other persons! the complainant shall submit sworn statem ents covering his testimony and those of witnesses together with his documentary evidence. "f on the basis of such papers a prima facie case is found not to exist! the disciplining authority shall dismiss the case. "f a prima facie case exists! he shall notify the respondent in writing of the charges against the latter! to which shall be attached copies of the complaint! sworn statem ents and other documents submitted! and the respondent shall be allowed not less than seventy>two hours after receipt of the complaint to answer the charges in writing under oath! together with supporting sworn statements and documents! in which he shall indicate whether or not he elects a formal investigation if his answer is not considered satisfactory. "f the answer is found satisfactory! the disciplinary authority shall dismiss the case. S9C. J. Procedure in +dministrative Cases +&ainst )onPresidential +ppointees. T xxx 3+5 <hough a respondent does not re7uest a formal investigation! one shall nevertheless be conducted when from the allegations of the complaint and the answer of the respondent! including the supporting documents! the merits of the case cannot be decided :udiciously
&dministrative Order No. ?! as amended by &dministrative Order No. ,?! 'ule """! Section ;! governing the procedure in administrative cases filed before the Office of the Ombudsman. @etitioner argues that the &dmi n. Order No.? is inferior to the provi sion in the &dministrative Code which entitles respondent to a formal investigation if he so desires. &dmin Order No. ? particularly governs the procedure in administrative proceedings before the Office of the Ombusman. he 'ules of @rocedure of the Office of the Ombudsman was issued pursuant to the authority vested in the office under '& B?? or the Ombudsman &ct of ,-J-. 'ules and regulations when promulgated in pursuance of the procedure or authority conferred upon the administrative agency by law! partake of the nature of a statute. @rovisions in the &dministrative Code cited by petitioner apply only to administrative cases filed before the Civil Service Commission. he administrative complaint filed against petitioner was filed before the Office of the Ombusman! therefore! rules of procedure in &dmin Order No ? must be followed. he SC has ruled on the primacy of special laws and of their implementing regulations over the &dmin Code of ,-J? in settling controversies specifically sub:ect of these special laws. Hon. >oson vs Exec. #ec. Torres/ Loc Gov Code of ,--,! its "'' and
&dmin Order No. 8+ govern administrative disciplinary proceedings against elective local officials whereas the 'OC and the &dmin Code of ,-J? apply in a suppletory character to all matters not provided in &dmin Order No. 8+. S&CON/
petitioner was charged under the Ombudsman &ct! it is this law alone which should govern the case. 8. he deni al of petitioner=s re7u est for a formal inv estigation is not tantamount to a denial of her right to due process. he essence of due process in administrative proceedings is the opportunity to explain one=s side or seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. &s long as the parties are given the opportunity to be heard before the :udgment is rendered! the demands of due process are sufficiently met. &lso! it appears that petitioner sought a reinvestigation only as an afterthought! that is! after the deputy ombudsman had already rendered a decision. he findings of fact in administrative decisions must be respected as long as they are supported by substantial evidence. "t has been held that substantial evidence is all that is needed to support an administrative finding of fact which means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept to support a conclusion. he SC is not a trier of facts. +. he penalty of dismissal is proper. @etitioner argues that the mitigating circumstances of this being her first offense and the unreasonable length of time in filing the administrative case should be considered in her favor. Kurisprudence is replete with cases declaring that a grave offense cannot be mitigated by the fact that the accused is a first time offender or by the length of service of the accused. Civil #ervice Commission v CorteG / the grav ity of the offe nse
committee is also the reason why we cannot consider the first offense circumstance as invoked by respondent. 9ven though the offense respondent was found guilty of was her first offense! the gravity outweighs the fact that it was her first offense.
3apid vs Court of +ppeals / he SC upheld the applicability of the
Concerned Emploees v )uestro / a court employee charged and
Ombudsman &ct of ,-J- and its "'' to the exclusion of the Loc Gov Code and &dmin Code of ,-J? on the issue of the execution of the Ombudsman=s decision pending appeal. SC/ here is nothing in the Ombudsman &ct which provides for the suppletory application of the
found guilty of dishonesty for falsification was meted the penalty of dismissal notwithstanding the length of her service in view of the gravity of the offense.
LocGov Code and the &dmin Code of ,-J?. "n the present case! the acts attributed to petitioner could have been the sub:ect of administrative disciplinary proceedings before the Office of the @resident under the LocGov Code. Considering however! that the without conducting such an investigation.
Fishonesty and grave misconduct have always been and should remain anathema in the civil service. hey inevitably reflect on the fitness of a civil servant to continue in office.
of the public service and the preservation of the public=s faith and confidence in the government.
DOMINGO V. RA,ALA Fate/ Aebruary ,J! 8J @onente/ N&C6('&! K./ Aacts/ Lourdes Fomingo! then Stenographic 'eporter """ at the NL'C! filed a Complaint for sexual harassment on the basis of &O 8;! 'ules and 'egulations "mplementing '& ?J?? T &nti>Sexual 6arassment &ct against 'ayala before FOL9 Secretary. FOL9 Secretary referred the Complaint to the Office of the @res! 'ayala being a presidential appointee. he O@! through then 9xecutive Secretary 'onaldo Xamora! ordered Secretary Laguesma to investigate the allegations in the Complaint and creat e a committee for such purpose. he Committee found 'ayala guilty of the offense charged and recommended the imposition of the minimum penalty provided under &O 8;. Secretary Laguesma submitted to the O@ a copy of the Committee 'eport and 'ecommendation that the penalty should be suspension for six 3B5 months and one 3,5 day! in accordance with &O 8;. O@! through 9xecutive Secretary Xamora! issued &O that concur with the findings of the Committee as to the culpability of the 'ayala and latter is F"S*"SS9F from the service.
Y9S. "n administrative proceedings! due process has been recogni$ed to include the following/ 3,5 the right to actual or constructive notice of the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondent=s legal rights0 385 a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance of counsel! to present witnesses and evidence in one=s favor! and to defend one=s rights0 3+5 a tribunal vested with competent :urisdiction and so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality0 and 35 a finding by said tribunal which is supported by substantial evidence submitted for consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made known to the parties affected. he records of the case indicate that 'ayala was afforded all these procedural due process safeguards. <hough in the beginning he 7uestioned the authority of the Committee to try him! he appeared! personally and with counsel! and participated in the proceedings. Fesignation of the offense is also not controlling. (nder &O 8;! sexual harassment amounts to disgraceful and immoral conduct. hus! any finding of liability for sexua l harassment may also be the basis of culpability for disgraceful and immoral conduct.
A. >. ARNAI> REALT,% INC. ! 5 !( !$ ! + CARMEN >. ARNAI>! petitioner ! vs. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT; DEPARTMENT OF AGRARIAN REFORM; REGIONAL DIRECTOR% DAR REGION V% LEGASPI CIT,; PROVINCIAL AGRARIAN REFORM OFFICER% DAR PROVINCI AL OF FI CE% MAS-ATE% MAS-ATE; MU NI CIPAL AGRARI AN REFORM OF FI CER% DAR MUNI CI PAL OF FI CE% ! respondents. MAS-ATE% MAS-ATE G' No. ,?B8+! Kuly -! 8,
'ayala filed a *otion for 'econsideration! which the O@ denied. @etition for Certiorari and @rohibition with @rayer for emporary 'estraining Order was dismissed for disregarding the hierarchy of courts. he C& dismissed petition and held that 'ayala=s dismissal was proper. 6owever in its 'esolution! the C& modified its earlier Fecision/ the penalty of dismissal is F9L99F and instead the penalty of suspension from service for the maximum period of one 3,5 year is 69'9#Y "*@OS9F upon the petitioner. "SS(9/
F'c()) &. X. &rnai$ 'ealty! "nc.! filed a petition for exclusion from the Comprehensive &grarian 'eform @rogram 3C&'@5 coverage dated &pril 8;! ,-- before the 'egional Firector of &grarian 'eform 3F&'5 a parcel of land situated at #rgy. &sid! Sinalugan! *asbate! *asbate since the land has been devoted to cattle>ranching purposes since time immerorial! not tenanted and has more than ,JQ slopes. 6owever the petition was deni ed and order ed to be still in the cove rage of the ac7uisition of the properties under the coverage of C&'@. "t was established that a portion of land was leased to *onterey Aarm for , years. @etitioner sold its entire herd of cattle to *onterey Aarms Corporation before the expiration of lease agreement. "t was also
established that said land is not owned by the petitioner but rather by Nuestra Senora del Carmen *arble! "nc with a new C number. @etitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied in Fecember J! ,--;. @etitioner appealed again the Order to the Sec. of &grarian 'eform for two separate motions for ocular inspection. he Sec. of &grarian 'eform dismissed for lack of merit on Oct. 8+! ,--B. Ordering C&'@ to identify portions and areas not suited for agriculture and be excluded from the program and do the necessary notices. @etitioner filed another motion for reconsideration but was denied on Aebruary ,+! ,--J. @etitioner then sought recourse before the Office of the @resident 3O@5 on Sept. ,-! 8, but dismissed the appeal. @etitioner again filed for motion for reconsideration on the argument that O@ seriously erred but C& rendered that petition for review is F9N"9F F(9 CO('S9 and was F"S*"SS9F on &ugust ,,! 8;. C& ratiocinated that F&' were supported that substantial evidence which the petitioner failed to established. On a petition for motion for reconsideration which was again denied on Nov. 8! 8;! @etitioner argued and insists that they were not given due process! and that sub:ect lands are not suitable for agriculture if they contain slope more than ,JQ. @etitioner also added that F&' should allow for the ocular inspection to be conducted invoking the Lu$ Aarms v Secretary of Fepartment of &gri and Fepartment of &gri v Sutton that the petitioner=s property should be excluded from the coverage of the C&'@. "SS(9/
to be heard on hi motion for reconsideration. he court generally accord great respect! if not finality! to factual findings of administrative agencies because of their special knowledge and expertise on matters within its specific and speciali$ed :urisdiction.
of F&' and the O@ were baslesess and un:ustifiable. No! it was consistently established and held that the essence of due process is simply to be heard! or as applied to administrative proceedings! and opportunity to explain one=s side or an opportunity to seek for reconsideration of the acting or ruling complained of. he denial of due process cannot be invoked by someone who had the opportunity
Subse7uently!National @olice Commission 3N&@OLCO*5 *emorandum was issued! and a summary hearing on the complaint was conducted.
WHEREFORE! premises considered! the petition is DENIED. he Fecision dated &ugust ,,! 8; of the Court of &ppeals in C&>G.'. S@ No. ?+BJ?! and the 'esolution dated November 8! 8;! are AFFIRMED.
G'$$'5'9 v. CSC VILLARAMA% "R.%" G.R. N9. 160141 M' 31% 2011 F'c()) "n &pril ,--;! (<C started operating **Cs buses. &t about the same time! petitioner was allegedly employed by &tty. Gironella! the general manager appointed by the #oard of Firectors of (<C! as his personal bodyguard. 'espondents further alleged that upon orders of &tty. Gironella! the buses regularly driven by them were confiscated by a group led by petitioner.&rmed with deadly weapons petitioner and his group intimidated and harassed respondents. #arien! et al. thus prayed for the preventive suspension of petitioner! the confiscation of his firearm and his termination. he complaint passed an investigation with he "nspector General! "nternal &ffairs Office 3"G>"&O5 of the @N@. "n his answer! petitioner denied the allegations of the complaint and averred that it was his twin brother! 'eynaldo Gannapao! who worked as messenger at (<C."n a memorandum! it was recommended that the complaint be dismissed.
@etitioner moved to dismiss the complaint. he same was denied. @N@ Chief Sarmiento rendered his Fecision finding petitioner guilty as
charged and suspending him for three months from the police service without pay. @etitioners *' was likewise denied! thus! he elevated the case to the N&@OLCO* National &ppellate #oard.6is appeal! however! was dismissed. &ggrieved! petitioner brought his case to the F"LG but his appeal was denied. @etitioner then appealed to the CSC! it was dismissed but the penalty of suspension was increased to dismissal from service. @etitioner thus filed with the C& a @etition for 'eview but it was later on denied because petitioner cannot claim denial of due process since he was given ample opportunity to present his side. C& denied petitioners motion for reconsideration. 6ence! this petition.
83Guidelines in the &pplication of @enalties in @olice &dministrative Cases5! the following acts of any member of the @N@ are considered Grave Offenses/ x x x C.he following are Grave Offenses/ x x x x Serious "rregularities in the @erformance of Futies. his is incurred by any member of the @N@ who shall/ x x x x c.act as bodyguard or security guard for the person or property of any public official! orprivate person unless approved by the proper authorities concerned. x x x x he CSC found that petitioner indeed worked for &tty. Gironella as the latters bodyguard>> at least during the relevant period! from &pril ,--; up to Fecember ,--; when #arien! et al. filed their verified complaint before the "nspectorate Fivision
'##0E?
INC SHIPMANAGEMENT v MORADAS
$8% ,hether petitioner was denied due process;
Kanuary ,;! 8, Z @erlas>#ernabe! K. Z @etition for 'eview on Certiorari Z Fue @rocess
$5% ,hether the C+ correctl affirmed the C#Cs decision modifin& the penalt from suspension to dismissal from service.
PETITIONER)"NC Shipmanagement! "nc.! Captain Sigfredo *onterroyo
HELD) Th! 5!ii9$ =#( 'i*. DUE PROCESS AS OPPORTUNIT, TO -E HEARD
MOONLIGHTING AS -OD,GUARD% GRAVE OFFENSE% DISMISSAL WAS PROPER
andHor "nterorient Navigation Limited RESPONDENT)&lexander *oradas SUMMAR,)*oradas was a seaman of the petitioner=s vessel. 6e suffered deep burns while in the vessel. 6e claimed that it was due to an explosion rendering him permanently incapable of working. 6e demanded payment of his full disability benefits. @etitioners claimed that his in:ury was self>inflicted and presented affidavits and statements SC v!((!*( 9ic!( '$+ c!< =!=!( 9 (#559 h!i c*'i=. affirmed NL'C! ruling that there was substantial evidence to establish that the in:ury of respondent was self>inflicted.
DOCTRINE)One of the guid elines in &ng ibay is that there be substantial evidence. "n this case! petitioners were able to establish substantial evidence that respondent=s in:ury was directly attributable to him
F'c() 'espondent *oradas was employed as a wiper for the vessel * Commander by petitioner "NC Shipmanagement. 'espondent suffered
deep burns when certain chemicals splashed all over his body because of an explosion. Claiming that the burns rendered him permanently incapable of working again as a seaman! he demanded for the payment of his full disability benefits.
&lso! petitioner had a motive as he was caught pilfering the vesselEs supplies for which he was told that he was to be relieved from his duties. "t was natural for him to brood over feelings of resentment considering his impending dismissal.
"n their position paper! petitioners denied respondentEs claim! contending that his in:ury was self>inflicted as he burned himself by pouring paint thinner on his overalls and set himself on fire. Th! 5!(!$!+ 'i+'vi(
C9$c#i$ 95i$i9$ 9 -i9$% ".
'$+ ('!=!$( v!((!*( 9ic!( '$+ c!< =!=!( 9 (#559 h!i c*'i=.
3#rion agrees that *orada is not entitled to the disability benefits but disagrees with how the pieces of evidence were interpreted.5
"n his reply to the position paper! respondent denied burning himself! contending that such act was contrary to human nature and logic. L& decided in petitionersE favor! giving more credence to the corroborating testimonies of the petitionersE witnesses. NL'C affirmed L&. C& ruled in favor of respondent because petitioners weren=t able to establish or substantiate their claim that the respondentEs in:ury was caused by his willful act.
&s the C& did! " do not see any logical or causal connection between the charges of stealing and the acts of sabotage! on one hand! and the self> inflicted burning that *oradas allegedly committed! on the other hand. "t is simply contrary to human nature and experience for *oradas to set himself abla$e because he was caught stealing the shipEs supplies. "t is not true that *oradas failed to rebut the witnessE claim that he saw *oradas go to the paint room and soak his hands in a can full of thinner.
M9'+'( 'c#'** ='+! ' (5!ciic +!$i'* 9 h' c*'i= i$ hi( 59(ii9$ 5'5! !9! h! LA. ISSUES)
RATIO) ,. NL'C had cogent legal bases to conclude that petitioners have successfully discharged the burden of proving by substantial evidence that responde nt=s in:ury was directly attributable to him. 'espondent failed to successfully controvert a witnessE testimony that he soaked his hands in a can full of thinner. &lso! respondentEs version that the burning was caused by an accident is hardly supported by evidence on record. estimonies show that there was no fire in the incinerator room at the time respondent got burned and there were no signs of explosion.
he ponencia also explained that the corroborating affidavits of the other crew members and officers cannot be dismissed as self>serving in the absence of any showing that they were lying when they made their statements. he problem with this explanation is that h! 9h! c!<
=!=!( inflicted.
'espondent contended that the affidavits and statements of the vessel=s officers and his fellow crew members should not be given probative value
as they were biased! self>serving! and mere hearsay. 6owever! he failed to present any evidence to substantiate his own theory. C999'i$
corroborate Chief Officer #e:ada=s claim.
'i+'vi( '$+ ('!=!$( 9 h! v!((!*( 9ic!( '$+ c!< =!=!( =#( ! 'K!$ '( ' serving absent any showing that they were lying when they made the statements therein.
AGUILAR V. OPALLIC@ G.'. NO. ,J88J! K(LY 8-! 8,+
G&&C9LO FOC'"N9/ he principle that a person cannot be pre:udiced by a ruling rendered in an action or proceeding in which he was not made a party conforms to the constitutional guarantee of due process of law. Aacts// Contract to Sell was executed between @rimetown @roperty Group! "nc. 3@@G"5 and @oblete V illanueva over a unit in *akati @rime Citadel Condominium. @oblete and illanueva executed in favor of OE@allick a Feed of &ssignment covering the unit. Later! @@G" issued a Feed of Sale in favor of OE@allick after the latter paid the purchase price in full. <hough OE@allick took possession of the unit! the Feed of Sale in his favor was never registered nor annotated. *eanwhile! in a case between @@G" and &guilar before 6L('#! the latter was able to obtain a final and executory Fecision in her favor! thus levying the sub:ect condominium unit. he sale at public auction was scheduled to be held on *arch +! 8. #ut before the scheduled auction sale! OE@allick filed an &ffidavit of hird>@arty Claim. 9ventually! though! &guilar was declared the highest bidder and became the owner since @@G" failed to redeem the property. Subse7uently! OE@allick instituted an action to 7uiet title and to set aside the levy on execution of the sub:ect unit! to annul the certificate of sale issued in favor of &guilar! as well as to recover the unit. OE@allick claimed that when @@G" executed a Feed of Sale in his favor! all rights and interests over the unit were transferred to him! and the subse7uent levy and sale thereof to &guilar created a cloud on his title. @etitioners sought the dismissal of the case! arguing that @@G" remained the registered owner of the unit and the title covering the same remained clean and free of annotations indicating claims by third persons. 'C/ "t had no :urisdiction to annul the levy and sale on execution ordered by the 6L('#! an agency under the Office of the @resident! because said Office is a co>e7ual body. C&/ "t sustained OE@allickEs argument that since he was not a party to the 6L('# case! he could not be bound by its disposition as well as the incidents and actions taken therein0 thus! he had the right to file a separate action to protect and vindicate his claim.
Yes. his CourtEs pronouncement in a former case 1case decided by the SC involving &guilar and @@G" wherein the Court ruled that the foreclosure proceeding already vested ownership to &guilar2 can in no way constitute a final determination of OE@allickEs claim. "n his &mended Complaint! OE@allick averred that &guilar obtained her title through unlawful means. Clearly! therefore! although captioned as one for Muieting of itle! OE@allickEs suit is actually a suit for annulment of title. #asic is the rule that 1t2he cause of action in a 1C2omplaint is not determined by the designation given to it by the parties. he allegations in the body of the 1C2omplaint define or describe it. he designation or caption is not controlling more than the allegations in the 1C2omplaint. "t is not even an indispensable part of the 1C2omplaint.
he principle that a person cannot be pre:udiced by a ruling rendered in an action or proceeding in which he was not made a party conforms to the constitutional guarantee of due process of law. hus! we agree with the C&Es pronouncement that since O[@allick was not impleaded in the 6L('# case! he could not be bound by the decision rendered therein. #ecause he was not impleaded in said case! he was not given the opportunity to present his case therein. #ut! more than the fact that OE@allick was not impleaded in the 6L('# case! he had the right to vindicate his claim in a separate action! as in this case. &s a prior purchaser of the very same condominium unit! he had the right to be heard on his claim.
RA, PETER O. VIVO v(. PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENT AND GAME CORPORATION G.'. No. ,J?J; Z November ,8! 8,+
F'c()
ISSUE)
HELD)
#y petition for review on certiorari the petitioner seeks the review and reversal of the decision! whereby the Court of &ppeals C&5 reversed and set aside the resolutions of the Civil Service Commission 3CSC5 he petitioner was employed by respondent @hilippine &musement and Gaming Corporation 3@&GCO'5! and was @&GCO'=s *anaging 6ead of its Gaming Fepartment at the time of his dismissal from office .6e received a letter from the Senior *anaging 6ead of @&GCO'=s 6uman 'esources Fepartment! advising that he was being administratively charged with gross misconduct! rumor> mongering! conduct pre:udicial to the interest of the company! and loss of trust and confidence0B that he should submit a written
explanation of the charges0 and that he was at the same time being placed under preventive suspension. ? @etitioner=s counsel assailed the propriety of the show>cause memorandum as well as the basis for placing the petitioner under preventive suspension. @etitioner received the summons to attend an administrative in7uiry! re7uiring him to appear before @&GCO'=s Corporate "nvestigation (nit 3C"(5.J &t the petitioner=s re7uest! however! the in7uiry was conducted at his residence. 6e was furnished the memorandum of charges that recited the accusations against him and indicated the acts and omissions constituting his alleged offenses. he memorandum of charges was based on the statements of @&GCO' personnel who had personal knowledge of the accusations against him. 6owever! when his counsel re7uested to be furnished copies of the statements! @&GCO' re:ected the re7uest on the ground that he had already been afforded the sufficient opportunity to confront! hear! and answer the charges against him during the administrative in7uiry. he &d:udication Committee summoned the petitioner to appear in order to address 7uestions regarding his case. 6is counsel moved for the re>scheduling of the meeting because he would not be available on said date! but the &d:udication Committee denied the re7uest upon the reason that the presence of counsel was not necessary in the proceedings. @&GCO' dismissed the petitioner from the service.,,& motion for reconsideration was filed! however! denied. @etitioner appealed his dismissal to the CSC which ruled that @&GCO' had violated the petitioner=s right to due process! and accordingly set aside his dismissal from the service. "n fine! the Commission finds that the right of ivo to due process was violated when he was ousted from his office without the corresponding #oard 'esolution that should have set out the collegial decision of the @&GCO' #oard of Firectors. @&GCO' elevated the case to the C&. C& promulgated its decision reversing and setting aside the decision of the CSC upon its finding that the petitioner had been accorded procedural due process. he C& remanded the case to the CSC for the determination of the appeal of the petitioner on the merits! specifically the issue of whether the dismissal had been for cause.
"SS(9/ ,..
8.
HELD) ,. No.. he Court ruled that the petitioner was not denied due process of law! for he was afforded the fair and reasonable opportunity to explain his side. hat was sufficient to meet the re7uirements of due process.8- "n Casimiro v. andog!+ the Court pronounced/ he essence of procedural due process is embodied in the basic re7uirement of notice and a real opportunity to be heard. "n administrative proceedings! such as in the case at bar! procedural due process simply means the opportunity to explain one=s side or the opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. o be heard does not mean only verbal arguments in court0 one may be heard also thru pleadings.
E+'$! v. A5#i**9 G.'. No. 8,?8 Z Fecember -! 8,; Z @erlas>#ernabe Kuanito '. &lama! F@<6 &ssistant 6ead of the #&C>echnical inclusion in the list of 'egistered Construction Airms 3'CA5 which were 7ualified to bid. &lama sent a ,st indorsement letter to petitioner &tty. Oliver . 'odulfo! F@<6 6ead of "nternal &ffairs Office! stating that under Fepartment Order No. 8! Series of 8,! only contractors duly registered in the 'CA and holding a valid ContractorEs 'egistration Certificate issued by the #&C> Fistrict 9ngineering Office 3F@<6 Sub>Fistrict Office5! to answerHcomment on the anonymous complaint and! accordingly! submit the documents in relation to the award of the sub:ect pro:ect. 6e proceeded to investigate on the matter and forwarded his "nvestigation 'eport to &cting Sec. 9bdane! finding that '*@# was indeed not a duly registered contractor at the time of the bidding. &tty. 'odulfo! thus! recommended that the officials of the F@<6 Sub>Fistrict Office be administratively charged with Gross *isconduct and that they be placed on preventive suspension for a period of ninety 3-5 days. &cting Sec. 9bdane issued the Aormal Charge against respondents! who were then F@<6 Officials and #&C *embers! for Grave *isconduct. "n the said issuance! respondents were/ $a% directed to file their answer! together with supporting evidence0 $b% given the option to elect or waive the condu ct of a formal inves tigation0 and $c% placed under preventive suspension for a period of ninety 3-5 days. "n their &nswer with *otion to Fismiss and to Lift Order of @reventive Suspension respondents argued that they were not in any position to answer the Aormal Charge against them due to lack of basis. hey
pointed out that aside from the fact that '*@# had firmly expressed in its duly sworn letter of intent that it was a registered contractor with the F@<6! it was not their duty to determine whether a contractor is a registered contractor with the F@<6 Notarial 'egistry of Civil issued the same Aormal Charge! to which they filed their &nswer with *anifestation reiterating their previous statements! and further alleging that the F@<6 Sub>Fistrict Office never re7uired them to submit a counter>affidavitHcomment! as in fact! it was only 9ngr. #aldos who had been issued a Subpoena to submit an answerHexplanation regarding the alleged irregularities in the bidding for the sub:ect pro:ect. hey averred that the Aormal Charge served upon them did not state the nature and substance of the chargeHs hurled against them. Aor these reasons! respondents demanded that a formal investigation be conducted. exhaustion of administrative remedies and failure to state a cause of action! but was denied. 'C set aside the Aormal Charge holding respondentsE rights to administrative due process were violated when they were deprived of the opportunity to file their commentHmemorandum prior to! or during the preliminary or fact>finding investigation conducted by &tty. 'odulfo! which violation was deemed to involve a purely legal 7uestion! an exception to the rule on exhaustion of administrative remedies. 'C! however! clarified that its ruling was not intended to prevent or avert the F@<6 from pursuing any separate
administrative action against respondents! pointing out that they have not been absolved from any administrative liability. C& affirmed the 'C 'esolution holding that the issuance of the Aormal Charge! without complying with the mandated preliminary investigation! or at least giving respondents the opportunity to comment or submit their counter>affidavits! violated their due process rights. C& found that Section ,,! 'ule "" of the (niform 'ules on &dministrative Cases in the Civil Service 3('&CCS5 re7uires that respondents be given the opportunity to comment and explain their side during a preliminary investigation conducted prior to the issuance of a Aormal Charge and that such comment is different from the &nsw er that respondents may file thereafter. C& pronounced that a violation of the right to due process is an admitted exception to the rule of exhaustion of administrative remedies.
I((#!)
H!*+) '(ic . "n !J#i!=!$ 9 $9ic! '$+ ' !'* 9559#$i 9 ! h!'+ he essence of procedural due process is embodied in the
administrative proceedings! as in the case at bar! procedural due process simply =!'$( h! 9559#$i 9 !B5*'i$ 9$!( (i+! 9
h! 9559#$i 9 (!!K ' !c9$(i+!'i9$ 9 h! 'ci9$ 9 #*i$ . o be heard does not mean only verbal arguments c9=5*'i$!+ 9 in court0 one may also be heard thru pleadings.
you may desire to present in support of your defense. "n your answer! you should state whether you elect to have a formal investigation of the charge against you or waive your right to such an investigation. "f you fail to submit your answer within the period aforestated! you will be deemed in default and the case against you will be decided on the basis of the available records. 'espondents filed their '$(
<'iv!+ h!i ih( 9 ' 9='* h!'i$% '( h! (9#h i$(!'+% h' h! c'(! ''i$( h!= ! +!ci+!+ '(!+ 9$ h! !c9+( (#=i!+
GOSS V LOPE> 41& U.S. // WHITE; "'$#' 22% 1&/ F'c()) >for various reasons! - high school students were suspended by their respective school administrators. hey mostly participated in demonstrations in their schools. Fue to this! school administrators suspended them for ten days.
>Ohio law provides for free education to all children between the ages of six and 8,. Section ++,+.BB of the Code empowers the principal of an Ohio public school to suspend a pupil for misconduct for up to , days or to expel him. "n either case! he must notify the studentEs parents within 8 hours and state the reasons for his action. & pupil who is expelled! or his parents! may appeal the decision to the #oard of 9ducation and in connection therewith shall be permitted to be heard at the board meeting. No such procedure is available for cases of suspension. >he nine named appellees! each of whom alleged that he or she had been suspended from public high school in Columbus for up to , days without a hearing pursuant to \ ++,+.BB! filed an action under 8 (. S. C. \ ,-J+ against the Columbus #oard of 9ducation and various administrators of the C@SS. he complaint sought a declaration that \ ++,+.BB was unconstitutional in that it permitted public school administrators to deprive plaintiffs of their rights to an education without a hearing of any kind! in violation of the procedural due process component of the Aourteenth &mendment. "t also sought to en:oin the public school officials from issuing future suspensions pursuant to \ ++,+.BB and to re7uire them to remove references to the past suspensions from the records of the students in 7uestion.
interest at stake. & , day educa tional suspe nsion bears a lot of conse7uences for students. >when it is determined that due process is applicable! what has to be known then is what process should be due. >in this case! to impose a standard process for suspension of , days might well overwhelm administrative facilities in many places and! by diverting resources! cost more than it would save in educational effectiveness. *oreover! further formali$ing the suspension process and escalating its formality and adversary nature may not only make it too costly as a regular disciplinary tool but also destroy its effectiveness as part of the teaching process. >he Court held that a standard should be available only in cases exceeding , days.
Di((!$i$% P9 he decision unnecessarily opens avenues for :udicial intervention in the operation of our public schools that may affect adversely the 7uality of education. *oreover! to the extent that there may be some arguable infringement! it is too speculative! transitory! and insubstantial to :ustify imposition of a constitutional rule...
I((#!)
HELD/ Y9S. >"t is true that \ ++,+.BB of the Code permits school principals to suspend students for up to , days0 but suspensions may not be imposed without any grounds whatsoever. &ll of the schools had their own rules specifying the grounds for expulsion or suspension. ><hough Ohio may not be constitutionally obligated to establish and maintain a public school system! it has nevertheless done so and has re7uired its children to attend. hose young people do not shed their constitutional rights at the schoolhouse door. . he Aourteenth &mendment! as now applied to the States! protects the citi$en against the State itse lf and all of its creat ures >> #oards of 9ducation not excepted. > &ppellants proceed to argue that even if there is a right to a public education protected by the Fue @rocess Clause generally! the Clause comes into play only when the State sub:ects a student to a severe detriment or grievous loss. he loss of , days! it is said! is neither severe nor grievous and the Fue @rocess Clause is therefore of no relevance. >in determining
F'c()) > Cash benefits are provided to workers during periods in which they are completely disabled under the disability insurance benefits program created by the ,-;B amendments to itle "" of the Social Security &ct. > 'espondent 9ldridge was first award ed benefits in Kune ,-BJ. "n *arch ,-?8! he received a 7uestionnaire from the state agency charged with monitoring his medical condition. 9ldridge completed the 7uestionnaire! indicat ing that his condition had not improved and identifying the medical sources! including physicians! from whom he had received treatment recently. he state agency then obtained reports from his physician and a psychiatric consultant. &fter considering these reports and other information in his file the agency informed 9ldridge by letter that it had made a tentative determination that his disabili ty had ceased in *ay ,-?8. he letter include d a statement of reasons for the proposed termination of benefits! and advised 9ldridge that he might re7uest reasonable time in which to obtain and submit additional information pertaining to his condition.
> "n his written respon se! 9ldridge disputed one characte ri$ation of his medical condition and indicated that the agency already had enough evidence to establish his disability. $2 1 2 he state agency then made its final determination that he had ceased to be disabled in *ay ,-?8. his determination was accepted by the Social Security &dministration 3SS&5! which notified 9ldridge in Kuly that his benefits would terminate after that month. he notification also advised him of his right to seek reconsideration by the state agency of this initial determination within six months. > "nstead of re7uesting reconsideration 9ldridge commenced this action challenging the constitutional validity of the administrative procedures established by the Secretary of 6ealth! 9ducation! and he Secr etary moved to dismiss on the grounds that 9ldridgeEs benefits had been terminated in accordance with valid administrative regulations and procedures and that he had failed to exhaust available remedies. "n support of his contention that due process re7ui res a pretermination hearing! 9ldridge relied exclusively upon this CourtEs decision in Goldberg v. Ielly ! which estab lished a right to an evidentiary hearing prior to termination of welfare benefits. he Secretary contended that Goldberg was not controlling since eligibility for disability benefits! unlike eligibility for welfare benefits! is not based on financial need and since issues of credibility and veracity do not play a significant role in the disability entitlement decision! which turns primarily on medical evidence. > he Fistrict Court concluded that the administrative procedures pursuant to which the Secretary had terminated 9ldridgeEs benefits abridged his right to procedural due process.
additional or substitute procedural safeguards0 and finally! the GovernmentEs interest! including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute procedural re7uirement would entail. > Only in Gold berg has the Court hel d that due process re7u ires an evidentiary hearing prior to a temporary deprivation. "t was emphasi$ed there that welfare assistance is given to persons on the very margin of subsistence/ he crucial factor in this context a factor not present in the case of . . . virtually anyone else whose governmental entitlements are ended is that termination of aid pending resolution of a controversy over eligibility may deprive an eligible recipient of the very means by which to live while he waits. > 9ligibility for disability benefits! in contrast! is not based upon financial need. "ndeed! it is wholly unrelated to the workerEs income or support from many other sources! such as earnings of other family members! workmenEs compensation awards! tort claims awards! savings! private insurance! public or private pensions! veteransE benefits! food stamps! public assistance! or the many other important programs! both public and private! which contain provisions for disability payments affecting a substantial portion of the work force . . . . &s Goldberg illustrates! the degree of potential deprivation that may be created by a particular decision is a factor to be considered in assessing the validity of any administrative decision>making process. he potential deprivation here is generally likely to be less than in Goldberg! although the degree of difference can be overstated. &s the Fistrict Court emphasi$ed! to remain eligible for benefits a recipient must be unable to engage in substantial gainful activity.
. NOTICE AND HEARING 1. WHEN RE?UIRED
ISSUE)
NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT CO. V COLLECTOR G.R. N9. L:1&160 -AUTISTA ANGELO; Oc9! 31% 1&3
that prior to the termination of Social Security disability benefit payments the recipient be afforded an opportunity for an evidentiary hearing.
HELD) NO% h! 5!(!$ 59c!+#! i$ c*'i=i$ !$!i( #$+! h! S9ci'*
N'#!)Special civil action of certiorari with preliminary in:unction
S!c#i i( (#ici!$ 9 =!! h! +#! 59c!(( !J#i!=!$
F'c()
Reasoning
> he specific dictates of due process generally re7uires consideration of three distinct factors/ Airst! the private interest that will be affected by the official action0 second! the risk of an erroneous deprivation of such interest through the procedures used! and the probable value! if any! of
> he Collector of Customs sent a notice to C. A. Sharp V Company informing it that a vessel it operates was apprehended and found to have committed a violation of the customs laws and regulations and that it carried an unmanifested cargo consisting of one 'C& ictor set 8, in violation of Section 8;8, of the ariff and Customs Code.
> C. A. Sharp V Company! not being the agent or operator of the vessel! referred the notice to &. . 'ocha! the agent and operator thereof! who answered the notice stating! among other things! that the television set referred to therein was not a cargo of the vessel and! therefore! was not re7uired by law to be manifested. 'ocha stated further/ "f this explanation is not sufficient! we re7uest that this case be set for investigation and hearing in order to enable the vessel to be informed of the evidence against it to sustain the charge and to present evidence in its defense. > he Collector of Customs replied to 'ocha stating that the television set in 7uestion was a cargo on board the vessel and that he does not find his explanation satisfactorily enough to exempt the vessel from liability for violating Section 8;8, of the ariff and Customs Code. "n said letter! the collector imposed a fine of @;!. on the vessel and ordered payment thereof within J hours with a threat that he will deny clearance to said vessel and will issue a warrant of sei$ure and detention against it if the fine is not paid. > @etitioner filed a special civil action of certiorari with preliminary in:unction before the Court of Airst "nstance! which was granted. 'espondent interposed present appeal.
I((#!)
H!*+) NO > 'ocha was not given an opportunity to prove that the television set complained of is not a cargo that needs to be manifested as re7uired by Section 8;8, of the ariff and Customs Code. (nder said section! in order that an imported article or merchandise may be considered a cargo that should be manifested it is first necessary that it be so established for the reason that there are other effects that a vessel may carry that are excluded from the re7uirement of the law! among which are the personal effects of the members of the crew. he fact that the set in 7uestion was claimed by the customs authorities not to be within the exception does not automatically make the vessel liable. "t is still necessary that the vessel! its owner or operator! be given a chance to show otherwise. his is precisely what petitioner 'ocha has re7uested in his letter. Not only was he denied this chance! but respondent collector immediately imposed upon the vessel the huge fine of @;!.. his is a denial of the elementary rule of due process. > rue it is that the proceedings before the Collector of Customs insofar as the determination of any act or irregularity that may involve a violation of any customs law or regulation is concerned! or of any act arising under
the ariff and Customs Code! are not :udicial in character! but merely administrative! where the rules of procedure are generally disregarded! but even in the administrative proceedings due process should be observed because that is a right enshrined in our Constitution. he right to due process is not merely statutory. "t is a constitutional right. hat this principle applies with e7ual force to administrative proceedings was well elaborated upon by this Court in the &ng ibay case. Disposition he decision appealed from is affirmed.
-AUTISTA V WOR@MENS COMPENSATION 66 SCRA 121; MA@ASIAR; "'$#' 31% 1&& N'#!) @etition for review on certiorari of the decision of respondent
F'c()
> @etitioner Consolacion #autista is the surviving spouse and the only heir of the late &ndres #autista! who died while his disability compensation claim was pending review by the respondent "n &ugust ,-?! &ndres #autista filed a notice of in:ury or sickness and claim for compensation dated Kuly 8-! ,-? with the Fepartment of Labor in Fagupan City all that he is sick of @# and 'heumatism that the date of accident was &ugust ,! ,-?+! that he stopped working on &ugust ,B! ,-?+ and that he orally named his employer of the fact of his sickness. 6e attached to the claim for compensation a physicianEs report dated Kuly 8J! ,-? with a diagnostic finding that claimant was suffering from @#! far advanced0 prognosis @oor! which re7uired hospitali$ation. 6is employer filed its 9mployerEs 'eport of &ccident or Sickness. > 6earing officer dismissed the compensation claim of claimant for the reasons that/ "n view of the repeated nonappearance of the claimant and counsel durin& the scheduled hearin&s of this case despite due notice to the and it appearin& that the evidence adduced was not enou&h to warrant an immediate award in favor of the claimant let this case be dismissed and respondent @N' is absolved from any liability
> Counsel for claimant #autista filed *A' saying that the hearing of the case was delayed by reason of the repeated non>ap pearance and motions for postponement on the part of counsels for employer @N' and
the conse7uent withdrawal of the srcinal counsel 0 that his failure to appear at the last 8 scheduled hearings was excusable for the reason that he received the notice of hearing 8 days after the scheduled date of hearing and he informed the clerk of the hearing officer of this fact0 that the couns el of employer @N' was likew ise not present at the last scheduled hearing. Counsel also informed hearing officer of the fact that claimant is already dead without however stating the date and cause of death. > *A' was denied but hearing officer ordered the elevation of the entire records of the case to the respondent Commission for review. 'espondent Commission! on the basis of the evidence on record! affirmed the order of dismissal. 6ence! this petition! which the Court subse7uently treated as a special civil action
I( (# !)
H!*+) Y9S $)(TE? (n discussion on the merits; see (ri&inal case% > 'espondent he very rules of the Commission re7uire the giving of reasonable notice of hearing to each party interested by service upon him personally or by registered mail of a copy thereof at his last known post office address or if he is represented by a counsel! through the latter! so as to ensure observance and protection of an interested partyEs right to a hearing. @atent therefore is the failure of the hearing officer to observe these rules. > (nder the circumstances! claimant was clearly deprived of his day in court. Conse7uently! the dismissal of the claim premised on claimant and his counselEs repeated non>appearance at the said hearings cannot stand. > he hearing officer tilted his discretion in favor of the employer and to the pre:udice of the laborer! the late claimant &ndre s #autista! as demonstrated by his obdurate handling of claimantEs excusable non> appearances at scheduled hearings! on one hand! and his mild treatment of respondent employerEs repeated failure to appear at scheduled hearings and its motions for postponement! on the other. he records clearly show that while respondent had asked for and was granted at least ; postponements0 claimant! on the other hand! only moved for postponement once and that was even on a :oint motion with respondent employer Disposition @etition is granted.
E?UITA-LE -AN@ING CORP v. NLRC 23 SCRA 3/2; Vi# ; "#$! 13% 1&& N'#!)Special civil action of certiorari F'c( >Sadac was appointed @ for the Legal Fepartment of 97uitable. >Nine lawyers + of the bankEs Legal Fepartment under 97uitable! addressed a letter>petition to the Chairman of the #oard of Firectors! accusing Sadac of abusive conduct! inefficiency! mismanagement! ineffectiveness and indecisiveness. @rivate respondent was furnished with a copy of the letter. >*orales! Chairman of the #oard of Firectors! called the contending lawyers to a conference in his office in an attempt to resolve their differences! it failed. #oard of Firectors! apprise d of the situation! adopted a resolution directing one of its directors! #anico! to look further into the matter and to determine a course of action for the best interest of the bank. #anico met with the complaining nine lawyers! he was warned that if private respondent were to be retained in his position! the lawyers would resign en masse. >*r. #anico submitted a report to the #oard of Firectors and said that there was abusive conduct and mismanagement and was inefficient and ineffective.he #oard asked Sadac to voluntarily resign. hey emphasi$ed that they are :ust saying that the #oard has lost its confidence on him and they are waiting for his voluntary resignation. Sadac again made a re7uest for a full hearing and cautioned that! under Section +, of the Corporation Code! individual members of the #oard could be held accountable for voting or assenting to patently unlawful acts of the corporation. >Sadac persisted in his re7uest for a formal investigation. (nheeded he filed a complaint in the NL'C for illegal dismissal and damages. >#oard of Firectors terminated Sadac and reiterated that it was one between client and lawyer. 6e also is disentitled from his compensation. he #oard instructed management to take the necessary steps to defend itself and all the members of the #oard of Firectors from private respondentEs complaint. >Labor>&rbited sided with 97uitable! the involved lawyer was a mere legal assistant tasked with certain duties not all that related to the practice of law. he Labor &rbiter concluded that the complaint stated no cause of action because a lawyer>client relationship should instead be governed by Section 8B! 'ule ,+J! of the 'ules of Court. &lso! there
were valid grounds and he was not denied due process! holding that private respondent was heard exhaustively on the matter of the charge lodged against him and that! for valid practical reasons! petitioners were not in a position to accede to the demand for a formal hearing. >NL'C concluded differently. he NL'C ruled that private respondent was denied the right to due process. >97uitable filed a motion for reconsideration of the resolution.
I((#!( ,. employee relation ship re7uirin g the procedural re7uirements 8.
H!*+) ,.Yes! there was. & lawyer! like any other professional! may very well be an employee of a private corporation or even of the government. "t is not unusual for a big corporation to hire a staff of lawyers as its in>house counsel! pay them regular salaries! rank them in its table of organi$ation! and otherwise treat them like its other officers and employees. &t the same time! it may also contract with a law firm to act as outside counsel on a retainer basis. he two classes of lawyers often work closely together but one group is made up of employees while the other is not. & similar arrangement may exist as to doctors! nurses! dentists! public relations practitioners! and other professionals. he existence of an employer>employee relationship! between the bank and private respondent brings the case within the coverage of the Labor Code. (nder the Code! an employee may be validly dismissed if these re7uisites are attendant/ 3,5 the dismissal is grounded on any of the causes stated in &rticle 8J8 of the Labor Code! and 385 the employee has been notified in writing and given the opportunity to be heard and to defend himself as so re7uired by Section 8 and Section ;! 'ule R"! #ook ! of the "mplementing 'ules of the Labor Code. &rticle 8J83c5 of the Labor Code provides that willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer is a cause for the termination of employment by an employer. Ordinary breach of trust will not suffice! it must be willful and without :ustifiable excuse. his ground must be founded on facts established by the employer who must clearly and convincingly prove by substantial evidence the facts and incidents upon which loss of confidence in the employee may fairly be made to rest0 otherwise! the dismissal will be rendered illegal. @etitionersE stated loss of trust and confidence on private respondent was spawned by the complaints leveled against him by the lawyers in his department.
>he act complained of must be related to the performance of the duties of the employee such as would show him to be thereby unfit to continue working for the employer. 6ere! the grievances of the lawyers! in main! refer to what are perceived to be certain ob:ectionable character traits of private respondent. <hough petitioners have charged private respondent with allegedly mishandling two cases in his long service with the bank! it is 7uite apparent that private respondent would not have been asked to resign had it not been for the letter>complaint of his associates in the Legal Fepartment. Confident that no employer>employee existed between the bank and private respondent! petitioners have put aside the procedural re7uirements for terminating oneEs employment! i.e.! 7' 8 ' $9 i c!
'55i(i$ h! !=5*9!! 9 h! 5'ic#* ' 'c( 9 9=i((i9$( 9
U, V COA G.R. N9. 1306/ PUNO; M'ch 21% 2000 N'#!)Special civil action for certiorari F'c() > @etitioners were among the employees of the @rovincial 9ngineering Office who were dismissed by Gov. @aredes! allegedly to scale down operations. > @etitioners filed a petition for reinstatement to the *erit Systems @rotection #oard 3*S@#5. *S@# found that the reduction in work force was not done in accordance with civil service rules and regulations! and ordering the reinstatement of petitioners. "t held that while reduction in force due to lack of funds is a valid ground for termination! employees to be terminated must be determined after being found to be the least 7ualified 3in terms of relative fitness! efficiency and length of service5 > *S@# later issued an order directing the @rovincial Government of &gusan del Sur pay petitioners their back salaries and other money benefits. > &t first! the Governor did not want to comply with said orders. he matter was brought up to the CSC! wherein indirect contempt proceedings were held. his prompted the Governor to finally comply with the order of reinstatement. he provincial treasurer also partially released some of the backwages. > #ut the problems did not stop there. Later! the @rovincial &dministrator! for and in behalf of Governor @la$a! wrote a letter to respondent Commission on &udit. "t claims that CO& is the proper authorit y to determine disbursement as regards the backwages. "n its decision! CO& ruled that the payment of backwages has become the personal liability of former Governor @aredes! it appearing that the illegal dismissal was done in bad faith. > @ursuant to the ruling of CO&! the provincial treasurer stopped the payment of backwages.
ISSUES
> Airst! CO& based its ruling on the *S'# decision. & careful perusal of said Fecision will disclose that the *S@# never made a categorical finding of fact that former Governor @aredes acted in bad faith and hence! is personally liable for the payment of petitionersE back wages. "ndeed! the *S@# even found that there was lack of funds which would have :ustified the reduction in the workforce were it not for the procedural infirmities in its implementation > $important accordin& to the sllabus% Second! the fundamental re7uirements of procedural due process were violated in proceedings before the CO&. "n the case at bar! former Governor @aredes was never made a party to nor served a notice of the proceedings before the CO&. :udicial powers are not hide bound by technical procedures! nonetheless! they are not free to disregard the basic demands of due process. Notice to enable the other party to be heard and to present evidence is not a mere technicality or a trivial matter in any administrative proceedings but an indispensable ingredient of due process. "t would be unfair for CO& to hold former Governor @aredes personally liable for the claims of petitioners amounting to millions of pesos without giving him an opportunity to be heard and present evidence in his defense. Our rulings holding that public officials are personally liable for damages arising from illegal acts done in bad faith are premised on said officials having been sued both in their official and personal capacities > hird! the *S'# decision became final and executory. Ainal :udgments may no longer be reviewed or in any way modified directly or indirectly by a higher court! not even by the Supreme Court! much less by any other official! branch or department of Government Disposition Fecision of CO& set aside
2. WHEN NOT RE?UIRED SUNTA, v PEOPLE G.R. N9. L:&430 PADILLA%%.; "#$! 2&% 1&/ N'#!)@etition for a writ of certiorari
,.
H!*+) ,. NO. Reasoning
F'c()
> Fr. &ntonio Nubla! father of &licia Nubla! a minor of ,B years! filed a verified complaint against 9milio Suntay in the Office of the City &ttorney of Mue$on City! as follows/ he accused took &licia Nubla from St. @aulEs Colleges in Mue$on City with lewd design and took her to somewhere
near the (.@. compound in Filiman! Mue$on City and was then able to have carnal knowledge of her. &licia Nubla is a minor of ,B years. > @etitioner applied for and was granted a passport by the FA&. @etitioner left the @hilippines for San Arancisco where he is at present enrolled in school. he offended girl subscribed and swore to a complaint charging the petitioner with seduction which was filed in the CA" of Mue$on City after preliminary investigation had been conducted. he private prosecutor filed a motion praying the Court to issue an order directing such government agencies as may be concerned! particularly the N#" and the FA&! for the purpose of having the accused brought back to the @hilippines so that he may be dealt with in accordance with law. he Court granted the motion. > 'espondent Secretary cabled the &mbassador to the (nited States instructing him to order the Consul General in San Arancisco to cancel the passport issued to the petitioner and to compel him to return to the @hilippines to answer the criminal charges against him. he 9mbassy was likewise directed to make representation with the State Fepartment that 9milio SuntayEs presence outside the @hilippines is considered detrimental to the best interest of this Government! that his passport has been withdrawn! and that he is not considered under the protection of the @hilippines while abroad. 6owever! this order was not implemented or carried out in view of the commencement of this proceedings in order that the issues raised may be :udicially resolved. Counsel for the petitioner wrote to the respondent Secretary re7uesting that the action taken by him be reconsidered! and filed in the criminal case a motion praying that the respondent Court reconsider its order. he respondent Secretary denied counselEs re7uest and the Court denied the motion for reconsideration. > @etitioner contends that as the order of the respondent Court may be carried out only through the cancellation of his passport! the said order is illegal because while a Court may review the action of the Secretary of Aoreign &ffairs in cancelling a passport and grant relief when the SecretaryEs discretion is abused! the court cannot! in the first instance! take the discretionary power away from the Secretary and itself order a passport to be cancelled. > @etitioner further contends that while the Secretary for Aoreign &ffairs has discretion in the cancellation of passports! such discretion cannot
,.
be exercised until after hearing! because the right to travel or stay abroad is a personal liberty within the meaning and protection of the Constitution and hence he cannot be deprived of such liberty without due process of law.
F'c()
ISSUES
H!*+) ,. NO Ratio
all auxiliary writs! processes and other means necessary to carry it into effect may be employed by such court or officer0 and if the procedure to be followed in the exercise of such :urisdiction is not specifically pointed out by these rules! any suitable process or mode of proceeding may be adopted which appears most conformable to the spirit of said rules. 3Section B! 'ule ,8.5 *oreover! the respondent Court did not specify what step the respondent Secretary must take to compel the petitioner to return to the @hilippines to answer the criminal charge preferred against him. "n issuing the order in 7uestion! the respondent Secretary was convinced that a miscarriage of :ustice would result by his inaction and as he issued it in the exercise of his sound discretion! he cannot be en:oined from carrying it out. 8. NO Ratio 6earing would have been proper and necessary if the reason for the withdrawal or cancellation of the passport were not clear but doubtful. #ut where the holder of a passport is facing a criminal a charge in our courts and left the country to evade criminal prosecution! the Secretary for Aoreign &ffairs! in the exercise of his discretion to revoke a passport already issued! cannot be held to have acted whimsically or capriciously in withdrawing and cancelling such passport. Fue process does not necessarily mean or re7uire a hearing. Disposition @etition is denied
DE -ISSCHOP V GALANG 6 SCRA 244 RE,ES; M' 31% 1&3 N'#!)&ppeal from an order of CA". > &merican citi$en George de #isschop 3petitioner>appellee5 was allowed to stay in the @hilippines for + years as a prearranged employee of the #issmag @roduction! "nc.! of which he is president and general manager. > 6e applied for extension of stay with the #ureau of "mmigration. his was denied when "mmigration Officer #en:amin de *esa discovered that
#issmag "nc. was a gambling front! and that de #isschop is suspect of evading payment of his income tax. "n a letter dated September ;! ,-;-! the #oard of Commissioners advised him to depart within ; days. Fe #isschop re7uested for a copy of the decision! but the legal officer of #ureau of "mmigration replied that no formal decision! order or resolution is promulgated by the #oard for reasons of practicability and expediency. > o forestall his arrest and the filing of the corresponding deportation proceedings! de #isschop filed the present case.
ISSUES
Oi! @rohibition is not favored by the Courts. "t will issue only if there is no other plain! speedy ! and ade7uate remedy. he use of habeas corpus to test the legality of aliens= confinement and proposed expulsion from the @hilippines is now a settled practice. 6abeas corpus affords prompt relief from unlawful imprisonment of any kind! and under all circumstances. he exis tence of habeas corp us will bar the issuance of a writ of prohibition. DISPOSITIONhe order appealed from is reversed. he petition for prohibition is dismissed.
,.
POLLUTION AD"UDICATION -OARD V CA 7S9*' T!Bi*! Fi$i(hi$ C958 1&/ SCRA 112 FELICIANO; M'ch 11% 1&&1 N'#!)@etition to review
Reasoning
> Courts have no :urisdiction to review the purely administrative practice of immigration authorities of not granting formal hearings in certain cases as the circumstances may warrant! for reasons of practicability and expediency. > his is not a violation of the due process clause0 the letter advising #isschop to depart in ; days was a mere formality! and far from final! because the re7uirement to leave before the start of the deportation proceedings is only an advice to party unless he departs voluntarily! the State will be compelled to take steps for his expulsion. > "t is a settled rule that a day in court is not a matter of right in administrative proceedings. &s per "#+! C99*!) +#! 59c!(( 9 *'<
F'c()
>88 Sept ,-JJ/ the #oard issued an ex parte Order! signed by #oard Chairman Aulgencio Aactoran! Kr.! directing Solar immediately to cease and desist from utili$ing its wastewater pollutio n source installations which were discharg ing untreated wastewa ter directly into a canal leading to the ad:acent ullahan>ine:eros 'iver. >Said order! issued pursuant to Sec? of @.F. -J and Sec+J of its "''! was based on findings of several inspections of SolarEs plant/ a. inspections conducted on ; November ,-JB and ,8 November ,-JB by the National @ollution Control Commission 3N@CC5! the predecessor of the #oard0 and i( $9 $!c!(('i* #+ici'* 59c!((; =#ch 9 h! 59c!(( =!'$( b. the inspection conducted on B September ,-JJ by the Fepartment of 9 & copy of the above Order was received by Solar on 8B Sept ,-JJ. & +# ! 5 9c !( ( 9 *' <% '( i( # +i ci '* 5 9c !( (. B B I$ c! 'i $ &cting on this motion! the #oard issued an Order dated 8 &pril ,-J8. NO allowing Solar to operate temporarily! to enable the #oard to conduct Ratio Fecision as employed in the law refers to the number of %votes) another inspection and evaluation of SolarEs wastewater treatmen t necessary to constitute the decision of the said #oard. facilities. "n the same Order! the #oard directed the 'egional 9xecutive Reasoning here is nothing in immigration law which provides that the Firector of the F9N' NC' to conduct the inspection and evaluation #oard of Commissioners must render decisions on petitioners for within thirty 3+5 days. extension of stay.
>8, &pril ,-J-/ Solar went to 'C MC on petition for certiorari with preliminary in:unction against the #oard. 'C dismissed SolarEs petition upon two 385 grounds/ that appeal and not certiorari from the 7uestioned Order of the #oard as well as the Solar went on appeal to the C&. C& reversed the Order of dismissal of C and remanded the case to that court for further proceedings. C& also declared the C&! in so ruling! held that certiorari was a proper remedy since the Orders of the #oard may result in great and irreparable in:ury to Solar0 and that while the case might be moot and academic! larger issues demanded that the 7uestion of due process be settled. he #oard=s *A' was dismissed. 6ence! this petition for certiorari.
Th! -9'+( '#!()
>that its ex parte Order dated 88 Sept ,-JJ and the that the ex parte Order and the
I((#!)
H!*+) NO.
>Section ?3a5 of @.F. No. -J + authori$ed the #oard to issue ex parte cease and desist orders 3a5 whenever the wastes discharged by an establishment pose an immediate threat to life! public health! safety or welfare! or to animal or plant life! or 3b5 whenever such discharges or wastes exceed the allowable standards set by the 1N@CC2. >"t is not essential that the #oard prove that an immediate threat to life! public health! safety or welfare! or to animal or plant life exists before an ex parte cease and desist order may be issued. "t is enough if the #oard finds that the wastes discharged do exceed the allowable standards set by the 1N@CC2. >Sec; of the 9ffluent 'egulations of ,-J8 sets out the max permissible levels of physical and chemical substances which effluents from domestic wastewat er treatment plants and industrial plants must not exceed when discharged into bodies of water classified as Class &! #! C! F! S# and SC in accordance with the ,-?J N@CC 'ules and 'egulations. ullahan>ine:eros 'iver is classified as inland waters Class F 3for agriculture! irrigation! live stock watering! industrial cooling and processing5 >Note/ the plant under its previous owner! Aine ouch Ainishing Corporation! was issued a Notice of iolation on 8 Fec ,-J; directing same to cease and desist from conducting dyeing operation until such time the waste treatment plant is already completed and operational. he new owner Solar extile Corporation! after informing the Commission of the plant ac7uisition! was summoned to a hearing held on ,+ October ,-JB based on the adverse findings during the inspectionHwater sampling test conducted on J &ugust ,-JB. >he inspection reports of November ,-JB and September ,-JJ make clear that there was at least prima facie evidence before the #oard that the effluents emanating from SolarEs plant exceeded the max allowable levels of physical and chemical substances set by the N@CC and that accordingly there was ade7uate basis supporting the ex parte cease and desist order issued by the #oard. >he #oard refrained from issuing an ex parte cease and desist order until after the November ,-JB and September ,-JJ re>inspections were conducted and the violation of applicable standards was confirmed. he 3
@.F. -J! Section ?! paragraph 3a5! provides/ 3a5 @ublic 6earing . . . @rovided! hat whenev er the Commission finds prima facie evidence that the discharged sewage or wastes are of immediate threat to life! public health! safety or welfare! or to animal or plant life! or exceeds the allowable standards set by the Commission! the Commissioner may issue an ex>parte order directing the discontinuance of the same or the temporary suspension or cessation of operation of the establishment or person generating such sewage or wastes without the necessity of a prior public hearing. he said ex>parte order shall be immediately executory and shall r emain in force until said establishment or person prevents or abates the said pollution within the allowable standards or modified or nullified by a competent court..
#oard appears to have been remarka bly forbearing in its efforts to enforce the applicable standards vis>a>v is Solar. Solar! on the other hand! seemed very casual about its continued discharge of untreated! pollutive effluents into the ullahan>ine:eros 'iver! presumably loath to spend the money necessary to put its "n Technolo& 2evelopers; 'nc. v. C+ ! the SC upheld the summary closure ordered by the &cti ng *ayor of Sta. *aria! #ulac an! of a pollution>causing establishment. "n the instant case! the ex parte cease and desist Order was issued not by a local government official but by the @ollution &d:udication #oard! the very agency of the Government charged with the task of determining whether the effluents of a particular industrial establishment comply with or violate applicable anti>pollution statutory and regulatory provisions. >9x parte cease and desist orders are permitted by law and regulations in situations like that here presente d precisely because stoppin g the continuous discharge of pollutive and untreated effluents into the rivers and other inland waters of the @hilippines cannot be made to wait until protracted litigation over the ultimate correctness or propriety of such orders has run its full course! including multiple and se7uential appeals such as those which Solar has taken! which of course may take several years. "t is a constitutional common place that the ordinary re7uirements of procedural due process yield to the necessities of protecting vital public interests like those here involved! through the exercise of police power.
c. FORM OF AND PROMULGATION OF "UDGMENT INDIAS v PHILIPPINE IRON MINES% INC. 10 PHIL 2& -AUTISTA ANGELO; A5 2&% 1&/ NATURE @etition for review of a decision of the Court of "ndustrial 'elations
F'c() > & complaint was filed by petitioner alleging that respondent has engaged in unfair labor practice > 6earings were conducted by the hearing examiner ! &tty. 9miliano abigne! at which both parties! represented by counsel! appeared. > &fter the presentation of the evidence! the hearing examiner rendered his report statin g that the charge of unfair labor practice has not been
substantiated by the evidence and recommending its dismissal. 6e also found that the dismissal of petitioner was for sufficient cause. > he court approved the hearing examinerEs recommendation and rendered the following order/ 6earing 9xaminer *r. abigne recommends the dismissal of this case on the ground that the evidence by the complainant did not support the charges of unfair labor practice. he facts are stated in the 6earing 9xaminerEs dated *ay ,B! ,-;;. &fter a perusal of the record of the case! the Court finds no sufficient :ustification for modifying said recommendation! findings and conclusions! and conse7uently! this case is hereby dismissed. SO O'F9'9F. > @etitioner filed a motion for reconsideration! which was denied by the court en banc. > 6ence this petition for review. > "t is contended that the afore 7uoted order runs counter to the Constitution which provides that No decision shall be rendered by any court of record without expressing therein clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based 3&rtic le """! section ,850 and to 'ule +;! Section ,! of the 'ules of Court! which provides that a court decision shall state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. &nd the claim is made in view of the fact that the order does not contain either a discussion of the evidence or any finding of fact based on said evidence! which counsel claims does not meet the re7uirements of the law and the Constitution.
ISSUE
HELD Y9S > he order! it is true! does not make its own discussion of the evidence or its own findings of fact! but such is not necessary if the court is satisfied with the report of its examiner or referee which already contains a full discussion of the evidence and the findings of fact based thereon. he situation differs if the court disagrees with the report in which case it should state the reasons for its disagreement. "f it is in full accord with the report! it is purposeless to repeat what the referee or examiner has already found in it. > Such is the present situation. he court approved the report of the hearing examiner after a perusal of the recor d of the case. his presupposes that it has examined the evidence and found no :ustification
for modifying his findings and conclusions. his is a substantial compliance with the law. >
SERRANO v PSC 24 SCRA 6 FERNANDO; A# 30% 1&6 N'#!)@etition for review of a decision of the @ublic Service Commission.
F'c() > Serrano filed an application with the @ublic Service Commission re7uesting authority to operate a taxicab automobile service within the City of *anila and from said city to any place in Lu$on open to motor vehicle traffic and vice versa. Aifty units of taxicabs were to be used. > Serrano was a public service bus operator in the City of *anila and was the holder of several certificates of public convenience. > 6is application was heard by &ssociate Commissioner @anganiban. Serrano completed the presentation of his evidence! but the oppositors and no evidence was presented to rebut his claims as to his 7ualification and financi al capacity. he @ublic Service Commission denied application > & motion for reconsideration was filed and denied by the @SC. > Serrano alleged that the @ublic Service Commi ssion erred in failing to make a statement of facts as to each case regarding the 7ualification and financial ability of the applicant and the other factors constituting the criterion used as basis in granting the application! in whole or in part! on the one hand! and dismissing or denying the application on the other. 6e relies on the constitutional provision that no decision shall be rendered by any court of record without expressing clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based.
I((#!):udicial tribunals! including the @ublic Service Commission!
should! in all controversial 7uestions! render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved! and the reasons for the decisions rendered. Reasoning
> he obligation to state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which the decision is based is incumbent on a court of record. he @ublic Service Commission is not a court of record within the meaning of the above constitutional provision. > he @SC is not a :udicial tribunal and its functions are limited and administrative in nature. he @SC is not a court 3 citin& 2a&da& vs. P#C and 4ilipino Bus Co. vs Philippine Railwa5. > "t does not mean! however! that the non>inclusion of the administrative tribunal within the scope of the above constitutional provision :ustifies the summary disposition of petitionerEs application in the manner followed by respondent @ublic Service Commission. > "n +n& Tiba v. Court! speaking of the Court of "ndustrial 'elations! which is likewise an administrative tribunal possessed of 7uasi>:udicial powers like the @SC! the Court made clear that while it 3the C"'5 is free from the rigidity of certain procedural re7uirements! it does not mean that it can! in :usticiable cases coming before it! entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential re7uirement of due process.) > he failure to respect such cardinal primary right of petitioner to have his application decided in such a manner as to inform him not only of the issues involved but the reasons for the decision! which necessarily would likewise re7uire a finding of facts! cannot receive :udicial approval. > he denial of Serrano=s petition was plain and palpable error. here is a need then to remand the matter to the @ublic Service Commission so that it could consider the evidence and discharge the function committed to it by law. Only after it has rendered its decision setting forth the facts on which it is based does the power of review on the part of this Court come into play. Disposition Fecision set aside! case remanded to @S C.
SOLID HOMES% INC. VS. LASERNA 720068 P9$!$!)Chico>Na$ario! K.
F'c() Laserna and Ca:ipe! as buyers! entered into a Contract to Sell with Solid 6omes over a parcel of land located in Loyola Grand illas! Mue$on City. payment! Solid 6omes considered the Contract to Sell abandoned and rescinded in accordance with the provisions of the same contract. 6L('# &rbiter/ buyers= prayer for the issuance of the Feed of Sale and the delivery of the C F9N"9F. Solid 6omes directed to execute and deliver the same the moment that the purchase price is fully settled as well as to cease and desist from charging andHor collecting fees from the buyers other than those authori$ed by @F -;?. 6L('# #oard of Commissioners/ modified 6L('# &rbiter=s decision by directing the buyers to pay the balance within + days from finality of its decision. Office of the @resident/ affirmed in toto the decision of the 6L('# #oard of Commissioners. 'ts decision merel adopted b reference the findin&s of fact and conclusions of law contained in the appealed decision.
C&/ affirmed the decision of the Office of the @resident.
I((#!() 8.
,7) the decision of the (ffice of the President is in accordance with the mandate of the Constitution that the decision should be based on the findin&s of facts and law to arrive at a decision $topical%
8.
H!*+R'i9) ,. Y9S. he constitutional mandate does not preclude the validity of memorandum decisions! a specie of succinctly written decisions by appellate courts! on the grounds of expediency!
practicality! convenience and docket status of our courts. "n Arancisco vs. @ermskul! the Court laid down the conditions for the validity of memorandum decisions! to wit/ a. "t c'$$9 i$c959'! h! i$+i$( 9 'c '$+ h!
c9$c*#(i9$( 9 *'< 9 h! *9
' c9=5*'i$ 9 9559(ii9$ i*!+ !9! h! HLUR- Ai! 9$ h! 9#$ + 9 *'c K 9 #i(+ ic i9$ 9 c'# (! 9 'c i9$ i( (i=5* 5!=i((iv!and not directive. he 6L('# &rbiter has the discretion of whether to dismiss immediately the complaint or opposition filed before him for lack of :urisdiction or cause of action! or to still proceed with the hear ing of the case for presentation of evidence. *ore importantly! the complaint of the buyers does not totally lack cause of action because of their right against the cancellation of the contract to sell and the forfeiture of their payments due to non>payment of their monthly amorti$ation. Lastly! notwithstanding such failure to pay the monthly amorti$ation! Solid 6omes cannot consider the contract as cancelled and the payments made as forfeited in view of the provisions of @F -;? in relation to '& B;;8.
+. NO. I h! c!+i9 !#(!( h! !$+! 9 5'=!$
#( c'#(!% h! +!9( '! +i(ch'!+ 9= h! 9*i'i9$ h! c9$(i$'i9$ 9 h! (#= +#!. C9$(i$'i9$ i( ='+! +!59(ii$ h! 595! '=9#$ 9den *opia >
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH v CAMPOSANO% ! '*. G.R. N9. 1/64 PANGANI-AN; A5 2% 200/ N'#!)@etition for 'eview F'c() >Camposano was the Ainance and *gt Officer! &gustin was an &ccountant ! and @ere$ was the &cting Supply Officer of Fept of 6ealth NC' 3FO6>NC'5 > a complaint was filed before the FO6 'esident Ombudsman against Fir. *a:arais! &cting &dmin Officer Cabrera! and respondents! for an alleged anomalous purchase by FO6>NC' of ,!; bottles of Aerrous Sulfate 8; mg. with it # Complex and Aolic &cid capsule s worth @++!. >the 'esident Ombudsman submitted an investigation report to the Sec of 6ealth recommending the filing of a formal administrative charge. Sec of 6ealth filed a formal charge against the respondents and their co> respondents for Grave *isconduct! Fishonesty! and iolation of '& +,-. >9xec Sec 'uben orres issued &O 8-J creating an ad>hoc committee to investigate the administrative case filed against the FO6>NC' employees. he said &O was indorsed to the @residential Commission &gainst Graft and Corruption 3@C&GC5 >the @C&GC took over the investigation from the FO6. &fter the investigation! it issued a resolution finding *a:arais! Camposan o! Cabrera! &gustin! and @ere$ guilty as charged and recommended to @res 'amos that they be dismissed from government service. >@res 'amos issued &O +- finding *a:arais guilty and dismissed from
service and remanded records of case to Sec of 6ealth for appropriate action. >Sec of 6ealth issued an Order disposing of the case against respondents and Cabrera. he dispositive portion said/ pursuant to the 'esolution rendered by the @C&GC! respondents Camposano! Cabrera! &gustin! @ere$ are hereby dismissed from the service. >'espondents filed *A' of the said Order. Sec of 6ealth denied. hey filed appeal wH the CSC. CSC denied. 'espondents went to the C&. >C& held that the @C&GC=s :urisdiction over administrative complaints pertained only to presidential appointees. hus! the Commission had no power to investigate the charges against respondents. *oreover! in simply and completely relying on the @C&GC=s findings! the secretary of health failed to comply with administrative due process.
I((#!)
> &dministrative due process re7uires that! prior to imposing disciplinary sanctions!the disciplining authority must make an independent assessment of the facts and the law. On its face! a decision imposing administrative sanctions must show the bases for its conclusions. Fue process in administrative proceedings re7uires compliance with the following cardinal principles/ 718 the respondents= right to a hearing! which includes the right to present one=s case and submit supporting evidence! must be observed0 728 the tribunal must consider the evidence presented0 738 the decision must have some basis to support itself0 748 there must be substantial evidence0 7/8 the decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing! or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affect ed0 78 in arriving at a decision! the tribunal must have acted on its own consideration of the law and the facts of the controversy and must not have simply accepted the views of a subordinate0 and 78 the decision must be rendered in such manner that respondents would know the reasons for it and the various issues involved. >he C& correctly ruled that administrative due process had not been observed in the present fact ual milieu. Noncompliance with the sixth re7uisite is e7ually evident from the health secretary=s Order dismissing
the respondents. he decision of Secretary 'eodica should have contained a factual finding and a legal assessment of the controversy to enable respondents to know the bases for their dismissal and thereafter prepare their appeal intelligently! if they so desired. >o support its position! petitioner cites &merican obacco Co. v. Firector of @atents. 6owever! this case merely authori$ed the delegation of the power to investigate! but not the authority to impose sanctions. erily! in re7uiring the disciplining authorit y to exercise its own :udgment and discretion in deciding a case! &merican obacco supports the present respondents= cause. "n that case! the petit ioners ob:ected to the appointment of hearing officers and sought the personal hearing of their case by the disciplining authority. he Court! however! sustained the right to delegate the power to investigate! as long as the ad:udication would be made by the deciding authority. > 3Solicitor General insists that respondents are guilty of the charges and deserve dismissal from the service. Suffice it to stress that the issue in this case is not the guilt of respondents! but solely due process. Guilt cannot be pronounced nor penalty imposed! unless due process is first observed. 5 Disposition @etition is @&'LY G'&N9F
AMERICAN TO-ACCO CO v THE DIRECTOR OF PATENTS SCRA 26; ANTONIO; Oc. 14% 1&/ F'c()) > petitioners are challenging the validity of 'ule ,BJ of the 'evised 'ules of @ractice before the @hilippine @atent Office in rademark Cases as amended! authori$ing the Firector of @atents to designate any ranking official of said office to hear !inter partes! proceedings. Said 'ule likewise provides that all :udgments determining the merits of the case shall be personally and directly prepared by the Firector and signed by him. hese proceedings refer to the hearing of opposition to the registration of a mark or trade name! interference proceeding instituted for the purpose of determining the 7uestion of priority of adoption and use of a trade>mark! trade name or service>mark! and cancellation of registration of a trade>mark or trade name pending at the @atent Office. > (nder the rade>mark Law 3'epublic &ct No. ,BB 5! the Firector of @atents is vested with :urisdiction over opposition! interference and cancellation cases filed by petitioners. Likewise! the 'ules of @ractice in rade>mark Cases contains a similar provision! thus/ ,BJ. (ri&inal "urisdiction over inter partes proceedin& . > he Firector of @atents shall have original :urisdiction over inter partes
proceedings. "n the event that the @atent Office should be provided with an 9xaminer of "nterferences! this 9xaminer shall have the srcinal :urisdiction over these cases! instead of the Firector. "n the case that the 9xaminer of "nterferences takes over the srcinal :urisdiction over inter partes proceedings! his final decision sub:ect to appeal to the Firector of @atents within three months of the receipt of notice of decisions. Such appeals shall be governed by sections 8! +! ! B! ?! J! ,! ,,! ,8! ,+! ,! ,; and 88 of 'ule , of the 'ules of Court insofar as said sections are applicable and appropriate! and the appeal fee shall be @8;.. > he 'ules of @ractice in rade>mark Cases were drafted and promulgated by the Firec tor of @atents and appro ved by the then Secretary of &griculture and Commerce. > Subse7uently! the Firector of @atents! with the approval of the Secretary of &griculture and Commerce! amended the afore>7uoted 'ule ,BJ to read as follows/ ,BJ. (ri&inal >urisdiction over inter partes proceedin&s . > he Firector of @atents shall have srcinal :urisdiction over inter partes proceedings! 1"n the event that the @atent Office is provided with an 9xaminer of "nterferences! this 9xaminer shall then have the srcinal :urisdiction over these cases! instead of the Firector. "n the case that the 9xaminer of "nterferences takes over the srcinal :urisdiction over inter partes proceedings! his final decisions shall be sub:ect to appeal to the Firector of @atents within three months of the receipt of notice decision. Such appeals shall be governed by Sections 8! +! ! B! ?! J!,! ,,! ,8! ,+! ,! ,;! and 88 of 'ule , of the 'ules of Court insofar as said sections are applicable and appropriate! and the appeal fee shall be 1@8;..2 Such inter partes proceedings in the @hilippine @atent Office under this itle shall be heard before the Firector of @atents! any hearing officer! or an rankin& officia l desi&nated b the 2irector; but all "ud&ments determinin& the merits of the case shall be personall and directl prepared b the 2irector and si&ned b him. 39mphasis supplied.5
> "n accordance with the amend ed 'ule! the Firec tor of @atents delegated the hearing of petitionersE cases to hearing officers! specifically! &ttys. &mando *ar7ue$! eofilo elasco! 'ustico Casia and 6ector #uenalu$! the other respondents herein. > @etitioners filed their ob:ections to the authority of the hearing officers to hear their cases! alleging that the amendment of the 'ule is illegal and void because under the law the Firector must personally hear and decide inter partes cases . Said ob:ections were overruled by the Firector of @atents! hence! the prese nt petition for mandamus! to compe l he
Firector of @atents to personally hear the cases of petitioners! in lieu of the hearing officers.
ISSUE)
HELD) NO. > he power conferred upon an administrative agency to which the administration of a statute is entrusted to issue such regulations and orders as may be deemed necessary or proper in order to carry out its purposes and provisions may be an ade7uate source of authority to delegate a particular function! unless by express provisions of the &ct or by implication it has been withheld. > he nature of the power and authority entrusted to he Firector of @atents suggests that the aforecited laws 3'epublic &ct No. ,BB! in relation to 'epublic &ct No. ,B;5 should be construed so as to give the aforesaid official the administrative flexibility necessary for the prompt and expeditious discharge of his duties in the administration of said laws. &s such officer! he is re7uired! among others! to determine the 7uestion of priority in patent interference proceedings! decide applications for reinstatement of a lapsed patent! cancellations of patents under 'epublic &ct No. ,B;! inter partes proceedings such as oppositions! claims of interference! cancellation cases under the rade>mark Law and other matters in connection with the enforcement of the aforesaid laws. "t could hardly be expected! in view of the magnitude of his responsibility! to re7uire him to hear personally each and every case pending in his Office. his would leave him little time to attend to his other duties. he remedy is a far wider range of delegations to subordinate officers. > hus! while the power to decide resides solely in the administrative agency vested by law! this does not preclude a delegation of the power to hold a hearing on the basis of which the decision of the administrative agency will be made. > he rule that re7uires an administrative officer to exercise his own :udgment and discretion does not preclude him from utili$ing! as a matter of practical administrative procedure! the aid of subordinates to investigate and report to him the facts! on the basis of which the officer makes his decisions. "t is sufficient that the :udgment and discretion finally exercised are those of the officer authori$ed by law. Neither does due process of law nor the re7uirements of fair hearing re7uire that the actual taking of testimony be before the same officer who will make the decision in the case. &s long as a party is not deprived of his right to
present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof! and the decision is supported by the evidence in the record! there is no 7uestion that the re7uir ements of due process and fair trial are fully met. 1/ "n short! there is no abnegation of responsibility on the part of the officer concerned as the actual decision remains with and is made by said officer. 1 "t is! however! re7uired that to give the substance of a hearing! which is for the purpose of making determinations upon evidence the officer who makes the determinations must consider and appraise the evidence which :ustifies them. > "n the case at bar! while the hearing officer may make preliminary rulings on the myriad of 7uestions raised at the hearings of these cases! the ultimate decision on the merits of all the issues and 7uestions involved is left to the Firector of @atents. &part from the circumstance that the point involved is procedural and not :urisdictional! petitioners have not shown in what manner they have been pre:udi ced by the proceedings. Di(59(ii9$@etition is dismissed
AL-ERT v GANGAN 3/3 SCRA 3; -UENA; M'ch 0% 2001 N'#!)@etition for certiorari F'c() > @etitioner 'amon &lbert! president of the National 6ome *ortgage Ainance Corp 3N6*AC5 approved loans taken out to finance several pro:ects in pursuance of its Community *ortgage @rogram 3C*@5! a low> cost home financing scheme. One of the pro:ects under this program was the &*&IO pro:ect for which @+B!?-B!?,,.;; was released and approved by petitioner. > (pon petitioner=s instruction! an inspection of the said pro:ect was conducted and it was found that the pro:ect was + months in arrears in their amorti$ation. #ecause of this finding! petition er ordered other investigations be conducted. &fter investigation! the Co& 'esident &uditor of N6*AC disallowed the loan granted to the &*&IO pro:. for the following reasons/ 3a5 non>submission of documentary re7uirementsHnon>complying or defective documents as re7uired under N6*AC Corporate Circular No. C*@>,0 and 3b5 irregularHexcessive expenditures per CO& Circular No. J;>;;& > *onths later! petitioner filed with the Ombudsman a letter>complaint against his subordinate employees who appeared to be responsible for the fraud with respect to the &*&IO loan transaction. @etitioner also
filed a civil case for sum of money! annulment! damages and attorney=s fees with preliminary attachment! against S6GCC"! &*&IO! Sapang @alay V Fevelopment Aoundation! "nc.! and other persons responsible for the misrepresentation! tortious and fraudulent acts in connection with the loan granted to &*&IO pro:ect. > he Commission on &udit 3CO&5! after investigation! later found petitioner as among the persons liable for the amount representing payment of loan proceeds obtained by &*&IO. he CO& disallowed the plan payment because it found the payment irregular and an excessive expenditure! and held petitioner primarily liable pursuant to sec. ,+ of @F ,;! which states! %expenditures of government funds or uses of government property in violation of law or regulations shall be a personal liability of the official or employee found to be directly respon sible therefor.) > "n his *A'! which was later denied! &lbert=s defense was that he cannot and should not be held personally liable for the amount of the loan as he acted only in the performance of his official duties and that there was no clear showing of bad faith! malice or gross negligence on his part. > he CO& in dismissing said *A' stated thus/ &lbert himself was the final approving authority of the transaction in 7uestion and that the officersHemployees who processed the same were directly under his supervision. 6e could have conclusively determined the validity of a transaction involving such a large amount. &lbert=s claim of good faith and exercise of due diligence are disputable presumptions! and these presumptions are overcome by evidence of specific acts constituting an offense! as where there exists the fact that loss of government funds resulted from official action. Lastly! it stated that Sec+. 3-5 of '& +,3&nti>Graft Law5 declares to be unlawful the act of %entering! in behalf of the government! into a contract or transaction manifestly or grossly disadvantageous to the same! whether or not the public officer profited or will profit thereby. : &ggrieved! petitioner filed this case contending that he can=t be held personally liable for the amount of @+B! ?-B!?,,.;; representing the loan proceeds to &*&IO! because the 7uestioned CO& decisions don=t have any findings that he has knowingly participated in the alleged fraudulent transaction. 6e claims that there is no clear showing that he acted in bad faith! with malice! or gross negligence when he approved the loan transaction.
I(( #!)
H!*+) Y9S. Ratio he decision of a government agency must state the facts and the
law on which the decision is based. Reasoning he assailed decision failed to mention petitioner=s direct participation in the fraudulent scheme. "t merely held that petitioner be immediately and primarily held responsible for the disallowance! for the simple reason that! as the approving officer! any transaction presented to him for approval is sub:ect to his discretion. he CO& decision merely stated conclusions of law. Aacts and circumstances 3the why=s! what=s and how=s of the disallowance5! were patently missing! inaccurate or incomplete. he CO& cannot :ust perform its constitutional function of disallowing expenditures of govt funds at sheer discretion. here has to be factual basis why the expenditure is alleged to be fraudulent or why there was a misrepresentation. Liability depends upon the wrong committed and not solely by reason of being the head of govt agency. he CO& even mentioned the anti>graft law which imputes liability for a grossly disadvantageous contract entered into by a govt functionary but as to why and how the disbursement of funds in this case was considered disadvantageous must be duly supported by findings of facts. Disposition Fecision of CO& '99'S9F and S9 &S"F9.
AROCHA VS VIVO GR N9.24644; RE,ES% ".-.L; Oc 2% 1& F'c() > @edro Gatchalian! a minor! arrived at the *anila "nternational &irport together with four other persons supposedly his father 3Kose Gatchalian5! an aunt and two brothers! and sought entry as Ailipino citi$en. Not satisfied with his papers! the immigration officer referred the case of @edro to the Special #oard of "n7uiry. his body! after due hearing! rendered decision admitting @edro and seven others! as Ailipino citi$ens. > @edro Gatchalian was issued an identification certificate by the immigration authorities! attesting to his admission as citi$en of the @hilippines > the Secretary of Kustice! as department head! issued a memorandum order directing the "mmigration Commissioners to review all cases where entry was allowed on the ground that the entrant was a citi$en of the @hilippines. > the #oard of Commissioners reversed the decision of the #oard of Special "n7uiry and ordered the exclusion of @edro Gatchalian for being improperly documented. @edro was accordingly. #ut! although the
warrant for his exclusion was issued in Kuly! ,-B8! @edro Gatchalian was taken into custody by the immigration authorities only Kune B! ,-B;. > *acario &rocha! on behalf of @edro! petitioned the CA" for a writ of habeas corpus! claiming that the detention of @edro! a Ailipino by the "mmigration Commissioner is violative of said petitionerEs constitutional rights. 'espondents immigration officials countered that the exclusion order was issued pursuant to the decision of the #oard of Commissioner! finding @edro to have failed in proving the allegation that he is a Ailipino citi$en. > "n its decision! the court sustained petitionerEs theory that the decision of reversal of the #oard of Commissioners was antedated and issued beyond the prescribed one>year period. 6olding that the decision of the Special #oard of "n7uiry! admitting the @hilippine citi$enship of @edro Gatchalian had already become final! the Court ordered his immediate release from detention and en:oined respondents! permanently! from arresting! deporti ng and otherwise depriving of his liberty. On the strength of a writ of habeas corpus issued by the Court! @edro Gatchalian was released from custody of the immigration authorities at oEclock in the evening of &ugust +! ,-B;. > he cause of petitioner and appellant Commissioner of "mmigration in this Court hinges on the issue of the correct date of promulgation of the decision of the #oard of Commissioners reversing that of the Special #oard of "n7uiry. Aor if! indeed! the reversal was made on Kuly 8! ,-B8! as asserted by @edro! instead of Kuly B! ,-B8! as maintained by ivo 3the Commissioner of "mmigration5! then the admission on Kuly B! ,-B, by the Special #oard of "n7uiry of the fact of @edroEs @hilippine citi$enship would have become final and! therefore his detention by the immigration authorities would be unlawful. > pursuant to Section 8? 3b5 of Commonwealth &ct B,+! as amended by '& ;+! the decision of the #oard of Special "n7uiry shall become final unless reversed on appeal by the #oard of Commissioners! or in the absence of an appeal! unless reversed by the #oard of Commissioners after a review by it! motu proprio! of the entire proceedings within one year from the promulgation of the said decision.
ISSUES ,.year prescriptive period. 8. reviewable since ,-B, because of its confirmation by the ma:ority of the preceding #oard of Commissioners.
H!*+) ,. Y9S. Ratio he mere fact of a retyping of dates on the face of the documents!
without further evidence of record! does not suffice to convict the three members of the #oard of "mmigration Commissioners of maliciously antedating their decision! considering the presumption of regularity in official actuations! and the serious implications of the charge! which amounts to no less than a falsification of official documents. Such an offense cannot be lightly inferred! but must be clearly proved beyond reasonable doubt. he operative date of the CommissionersE action is that when the resolution of exclusion was voted and adopted by them as a #oard! regar dless of the date when the decis ion in extenso was prepared! written and signed. Reasoning
> the decision of the #oard of Commissioners! the notification to appelleeEs counsel that such decision was rendered! and the warrant of exclusion! bear the date Kuly B! ,-B8! or within one year from the reviewed decision of the #oard of Special "n7uiry. "t is contended! however! that in all of these documents! the date of promulgation of the decision appeared to have been srcinally written as Kuly 8! ,-B8! but the number 8 was erased and superimposed by B. > ivo insists that these erasures and substitutions were corrections made only to rectify clerical mistakes. > the accusation of @edro is negatived by the official minutes of the #oardEs proceedings! which clearly show that the resolution to exclude was adopted on Kuly B! ,-B8. No alteration in dates appears in these. "n fact! the alterations observed are susceptible of the explanation that the date Kuly 8 was srcinally placed by the stenographer or typist because it was then that the reasoned and extended decision was typewritten in final form! but that it was corrected to Kuly B! the date it was voted! because the decis ion in extenso must relate back to the day the resolution to exclude was actually adopted. > the Court below erred in finding and declaring that the decision of the #oard of Special "n7uiry in the case of petitioner>appellee had become final and unreviewable! and that its review and revocation by the Commissioners of "mmigration was null and void. 8. NO. Ratio "ndividual action by members of a board plainly renders nugatory the purpose of its constitution as a #oard. he Legislature organi$ed the #oard of Commissioners precisely in order that they should deliberate collectively and in order that their views and ideas should be exchanged and examined before reaching a conclusion. he powers and duties of boards and commissions may not be exercised by the individual members separately. heir acts are official only when done by the
members convened in session! upon a concurrence of at least a ma:ority and with at least a 7uorum present. Secondly! the aforementioned *emorandum Order! issued in the exercise of his powers of control and supervision as Fepartment 6ead! expressly declares that the public interest so re7uiring! it is ordered that all decisions purporting to have been rendered by the #oard of Commissioners on appeal from or on review motu proprio of decisions of the #oard of Special "n7uiry! are set aside and this nullification included the alleged ,-B, decision. Dispostion decision and order of CA" reversed! nullified and set aside.
NERIA v THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION G.R. NO. 24600; CASTRO; M' 2 1&6 F'c() > On Kuly -! ,-B, the petitioner! with three other persons! supposedly his widowed mother 3Folores Neria5 and two younger brothers 3Aelix and *anuel Neria5! arrived at the *anila "nternational &irport from 6ongkong on board a Cathay @acific &irways plane. he immigration inspector at the airport! not satisfied with the petitionerEs travel documents and those of his companions upon primary inspection thereof! referred the matter of their admission to the #oard of Special "n7uiry for investigation to determine filiation and paternity to a Ailipino citi$en. &ccordingly! the #oard of Special "n7uiry No. , conducted a hearing on Kuly ,! ,-B,! at which time the petitioner offered oral and documentary evidence to support his claim for admission as a Ailipino citi$en &fter the conclusion of the investigation! the said board on &ugust 8! ,-B, deliberated on the case and unanimously voted for petitionerEs admission. he board on the
same date rendered its decision! declaring Folores Neria a Ailipino citi$en! and the petitioner a Ailipino citi$en as he is an illegitimate son of Folores! and allowing his admission into the @hilippines. his written decision was subse7uently submitted to the members of the #oard of "mmigration Commissioners. he "mmigration authorities issued "dentification Certificate ,B+B to the petitioner! attesting that he was admitted as a citi$en of the @hilippines per decision of the #oard of Special "n7uiry No. , dated &ugust 8! ,-B,. > On Kanuary 8! ,-B8! the Secretary of Kustice issued *emorandum Order - 3exh. ?5! directing that 1i2t appearing that for the past several years! the #oard of Commissioners of "mmigration has not met collectively to discuss and deliberate on the cases coming befor e it!D it is hereby order ed that all decisions purporting to have been rendered by the #oard of Commissioners on &ppeal from! or on review motu proprio of! decisions of the #oard of Special "n7uiry are set aside. he #oard of Commissioners is directed to review! in accordance with S!ci9$ 2 78 9 C9==9$ "n compliance with the above directiv e! the #oard of "mmigration Commissioners! proceeded to review motu proprio the entire proceedings had before the #oard of Special "n7uiry No. , relative to the petitionerEs case and that of his supposed relatives. & hearing officer of the #ureau of "mmigration was directed to conduct an investigation of the entire proceedings of and the evidence presented before the #oard of Special "n7uiry No. ,. On the basis of a memorandum of the hearing officer! the new #oard of "mmigration Commissioners found that the petitioner had not satisfactorily established his claim for admission as a Ailipino citi$en and! conse7uently! reversed the decision of the #oard of Special "n7uiry No. ,! and ordered that the petitioner be excluded from the @hilippines as an alien not properly documented for admission and be returned to the port from whence he came or to the country of which he is a national. he petitioner moved for a reconsideration of said decision. his motion was denied by the new #oard.
> he petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition praying the Court of Airst "nstance of *anila to restrain the Commissioner of "mmigration and the #oard of "mmigration Commissioners from arresting and expelling him! and prohibit them from taking any further steps or actions contrary to the decision rendered by the #oard of Special "n7uiry No. ,. his petition was given due course! and a writ of preliminary in:unction was issued as prayed for. #ut this petition was dismissed. > On &pril +! ,-B; the present petition for habeas corpus was filed! the petitioner claiming that the respondentEs agents picked him up at 'osario St.! *anila! in the evening of the previous &pril 8+ on the supposed claim that he was not properly documented for admission as a Ailipino citi$en when he entered the @hilippines0 and that since then he has been unlawfully and illegally confined! restrained and deprived of his liberty in the #ureau of "mmigration Fetention Station in the 9ngineering "sland! *anila. On the same date! the lower court re7uired the respondent to bring the petitioner before the court on *ay +! ,-B; at J/+ OEclock in the morning. he clerk of court issued the corresponding writ of habeas corpus directing the respondent to submit his return. he latterEs written return of *ay B! ,-B; states! among other things! that the petitioner was under lawful custody on a valid process commanding his exclusion from the @hilippines and ordering his return to the port where he came from or to the country of which he is a national. > On Kune ,J! ,-B; the lower court dismissed the petition stating that the petitioner is legally detained on a warrant issued by the respondent Commissioner of "mmigr ation. On Kuly 8! ,-B; the lower court set aside its decision of Kune ,?! ,-B;! and! on the same date! rendered an amended decision completely reversing its decision of Kune ,?! granted the writ of habeas corpus and ordered the immediate release of the petitioner. he lower court held that the decision rendered by the new #oard of Commissioners is null and void for lack of :urisdiction! and no administrative action being possible because the 7uestion involved in this case is purely a legal 7uestion! the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies has no application in this case. On Kuly 88 the clerk of court issued the corresponding writ of habeas corpus.
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HELD ,ES
RATIOComm. &ct B,+! as amended! provides in part that /%1t2he decision of any two members of the #oard 1of Special "n7uiry2 shall prevail and shall be final unless reversed on appeal by the #oard of Commissioners as hereafter stated! or! in the absence of an appeal! unless reversed by the #oard of Commissioners after a review by it! motu propio of the entire proceedings within one year from the promulgation of said decision....) > he resolution of this issue! in turn! depends upon the determination of the date when the decision of the #oard of Special "n7uiry No. , was promulgated! &ugus t 8! ,-B, when it was actually rendered! or September ! ,-B, when the petitioner was actually notified thereof and a copy received by his counsel. he date of promulgation is important. "t is from that date that the one>year period commenced within which the #oard of "mmigration Commissioners could review motu proprio the entire proceedings of #oard of Special "n7uiry No. ,. > &ccording to the Solicitor General! the correct date of promulgation is September ! ,-B,! because under the "mmigration 'ules and 'egulations! the decision of a #oard of Special "n7uiry shall be rendered in writing!; and under section 8? 3b5! supra! the written decision shall be promulgated0 that the words rendition 3from rendered5 and promulgation 3from promulgated5 connote two separate and distinct acts re7uired to be accomplished by the #oard of Special "n7uiry! for rendition is the date when a :udge signs his decision and files it with the clerk of court! whereas promulgation is the date when such decision is published! officially announced! is made known to the public! or delivered to the clerk of court for filing! coupled with notice to the parties or to their counsel0 and that in this case! rendition was accomplished on &ugust 8! ,-B, when the #oard of Special "n7uiry No. , concluded its hearing on the petitionerEs case! deliberated thereon! voted for his admission into the @hilippines and rendered its written decision! and promulgation was accomplished on September ! ,-B, when the petitioner was actually notified of the decision! copy of which was received by his counsel. > No amount of hair>splitting in regard to the words rendition and promulgation would convey different meanings. his Court defined promulgation as the delivery of the decision to the Clerk of Court for filing and publication. he word promulgate was viewed by the ma:ority in @eople vs. Finglasan 3?? @hil. ?B5 as the entry made by the clerk of a :udgment or order in the book of entries of :udgments made by said clerk. > he petitionerEs argument! at all events! is without merit. Section 8? 3b5! supra! provides that proceedings of the #oard of Special "n7uiry its appraisal of a case on the merit s! the resul t of its delib eration! its decision and notice thereof to an alien! and the time when an appeal may be brought therefrom shall be conducted under rules of procedure to be prescribed by the Commissioner of "mmigration.
> "n this case! &ugust 8! ,-B, was the date when the #oard of Special "n7uiry No. , concluded its hearing of petitionerEs case 3".C. B,>8+,8>C5! deliberated on it! and voted for his admission as a citi$en of the @hilippines. &ugust 8! ,-B, was also the date when the decision in extenso was rendered. hat date and not September ! ,-B,! therefore! is the date of promulgation of the decision of the #oard of Special "n7uiry No. ,! which decision should prev ail and shall be final ... unles s reversed by the #oard of Commissioners after a review by it! motu proprio of the entire proceedings within one year from the promulgation of said decision. , Computing the one>year period from &ugust 8! ,-B,! the #oard of "mmigration Commissioners had until &ugust 8! ,-B8 within which to review the proceedings motu proprio. > he case of the petitioner was included in the agenda of the #oard of "mmigration Commissioners for review motu propio for Kuly 8! ,-B8. he case was referred to the "mmigration hearing officer! who! on Kuly +! ,-B8! submitted his memorandum to the said board. he case was again included in the agenda of the said board for &ugust 8! ,-B8! the date it was considered submitted for decision. he minutes of the meeting of the #oard of "mmigration Commissioners presented by its Secretary @io Noche and read into the records of this case! however! reveal that the petitionerEs case was actually acted upon and decided! not on &ugust 8! ,-B8! as the decision and the warrant of exclusion would tend to show! but on &ugust J! ,-B8 > he minutes of the meeting of the new #oard of Commissioners and! the testimony of its Secretary show that as late on &ugust J! ,-B8! the new #oard of Commissioners was! only deliberating on the case of the petitioner. he admission of the Secretary of the new #oard of Commissioners that the case of the petitioner was not acted upon on &ugust 8! ,-B8! shows that the alteration of the date of the decision of the new #oard of Commissioners from &ugust J! ,-B8 to &ugust 8! ,-B8 was deliberate. he fact that the case of the petitioner was submitted to the new #oard of Commissioners for its resolution on &ugust 8! ,-B8! is no excuse for ante>dating its decision which was actually rendered after that date. On &ugust 8! ,-B8! it did not reverse the decision of the #oard of Special "n7uiry No. ,! because having actually deliberated on the case of the petitioner on &ugust J! ,-B8! it could not have on &ugust 8 resolved to reverse the decision of the #oard of Special "n7uiry. > he alteration of the true date of the decision of the new #oard of Commissioners! made upon instruction of the respondent Commissioner of "mmigration! is revealing/ it shows that the respondent Commissioner knew that the one>year period was to be computed from &ugust 8! ,-B,0 it shows also that he knew that if the decision of the #oard of Special
"n7uiry No. , had to be reversed! the new #oard of Commissioners had to act not later than &ugust 8! ,-B8. &s it was on &ugust J! ,-B8 when the #oard of "mmigration Commissioners as a body deliberated on and voted for the reversal of the decision of the #oard of Special "n7uiry No. ,! the review motu proprio was effected B days beyond the one>year period fixed by section 8? 3b5! supra. he said decision of the #oard of "mmigration Commissioners! and the warrant of exclusion issued on the strength of such decision! are therefore! as correctly found by the lower court! null and void! for lack of :urisdiction! since the decision of the #oard of Special "n7uiry No. , by that time had already become final. > he respondent also contends that the petitionerEs petition for habeas corpus was prematurely filed! because he did not first appeal the decision of the #oard of "mmigration Commissioners to the Secretary of Kustice! who! by law! is vested with power of control and supervision over the said #oard.
GO ,U TA@ WAI v VIVO G.R. N9. L:222/; A?UINO; M' 2/% 1& NATURE &ppeal from the decision of CA"H'C.
F'c() > he controversy arose when Go Yu ak 6owever! #OCEs decision in extenso 3extended opinion5 was not immediately rendered and promulgated. "t appears that the draft of the #OC decision was signed by the Commissioners during the period A##( 13:2 . he decision was mailed on A##( 2hto *rs. GO!
who received the same the following day. (pon *rs. GO=s complaint! CA" held that #OC=s decision was void because it was promulgated after the statutory one>year period.
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> Section 8?3b5 specifies that the decision of #S" shall be promulgatedD not later than two days from the date of the deliberation. he absence of such a re7uirement with respect to the decision of #OC supports the view that such decision need not be promulgated within the one>year period. I (#ic!( h' -OC (h9#*+ !vi!< h! +!ci(i9$ 9 -SI '$+
of #S" and adopted within one year from the promulgation of #S"=s decision is sufficient
+!* i! ' ! #59 $ i
H!*+) ,ES. REASONING#OC is empowered to reverse motu proprio the decision of #S" within one year from promulgation of said decision. he @hilippine "mmigration &ct of ,-! Commonwealth &ct No. B,+! as amended provides/ S9C. 8?. xxx 3b5 & board of special in7uiry shall have authority 3,5 to determine whether an alien seeking to enter or land in the @hilippines shall be allowed to enter or land or shall be excludedD Th! +!ci(i9$ 9 h! -SIQ (h'** ! i$'* unless reversed on appeal by the #oard of CommissionersD or! in the abse nce of an appeal! #$*!((
!v!(!+ h! -9'+ 9 C9==i((i9$!( '! ' !vi!< i% motu proprio 9 h! !$i! 59c!!+i$( his Court had already held that h ! 95! ' iv! +' ! 9 h!
action which they took within the said statutory period. > *oreover! section 8?3c5 expressly re7uires that the decision of #OC in case of an appeal from the decision of #S" should be put in writing and promulgated not less than seven days from the time the case is submitted for decision. "n contrast! no such re7uirement is provided for in section 8?3b5 with respect to the CommissionersE decision in case they motu proprio review the decision of #S". Disposition for lack of necessary votes to reverse the trial courtEs decision! the same is considered affirmed. 1only B Kustices 3Aernando! *akasiar! *uo$ @alma! Concepcion Kr.! *artin! KK. and the writer5 voted for reversal. K. eehankee filed a dissenting opinion in which the Chief Kustice 3Castro5 and K. &ntonio concurred. K. #arredo also dissented.2
-ARREDO% ".% +i((!$i$) he operative date of the decision of #OC is the date of promulgation! if not the date of notice to the party aggrieved.
TEEHAN@EE% "% +i((!$i$)
> he &ctEs provisions as well as public policy support a construction that re7uires that a resolution or decision of #OC on a review motu proprio must be in writing and promulgated with due notice on the party affected within the one>year period. > Section 8? 3b5 provides that the decision 1of #S"2 shall be promulgatedD not later than two days from the date of deliberation. C9==i((i9$!( 'ci9$ i( h'
h ! +!ci(i 9$in extenso =#( !*'! 'cK 9 h! +'
h! +!ci(i9$ 9$ ' !vi!< motu proprio -OC =#( ! $9 *!(( h'$ ' +!ci(i9$ 9$ '55!'* by either party0 it must be duly put in writing and
and )eria vs. Commissioner of 'mmi&ration 5. Conse7uently! the Commissioners were :ustified in using *arch ,,! ,-B+ as the date of their written decision although it was actually drafted on &ugust ,+th and mailed to *rs. GO on &ugust 8?th. he decision related back to the date when the Commissioners deliberated on the decision of #S" and resolved to reverse it.
promulgated within the more than ade7uate one>year period fixed by the &ct. >
decision. Wh!! h!! h'( !!$ $9 '55!'* '$+ -OC c9$+#c( '
preference to all cases where entry has been permitted on the ground
!vi!< motu proprio 9 @ursuant to *emorandum Order No. -! a committee examined the c'(! Such a view is in consonance with lawEs policy of a definite date of fixed finality of the #S"Es decision and to reduce occasion for anomalies and irregularities in the admission or exclusion of aliens and applicants for admission! under the procedures for appeal or review motu proprio established by the &ct.
SICHANGCO v -OARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF IMMIGRATION G.R. N9. L:23/4/; MA@ASIAR; N9v % 1&& F'c() > Sy e! whose name was changed to #enito Sichangco was recogni$ed by the #ureau of "mmigration as a Ailipino citi$en by birth in an order dated Aebruary ,-! ,-B .Sychangco is married to Cheng Yok 6a. hree sons were born in China allegedly out of their marriage! namely! Si #eng! Si Son and Si Luna. > On &ugust 8J! ,-B, arrived in the @hilippines and sought admiss ion claiming to be the children of #enito Sichangco. &n investigation was conducted by the #oard of Speci al "n7uiry No. , of the #ureau of "mmigration. &fter hearing! the said #oard rendered a decision on September ,,! ,-B, 39xh. C5 admitting these minors into the @hilippines as citi$ens thereof! being the children of the petitioner . said decision was submitted to the then members of the #oard of Commissioners who noted the decision on different dates. > On Kanuary 8! ,-B8! then Secretary of Kustice Kose <. Fiokno issued *emorandum Order No. -! wherein he found that for the past several years! the #oard of Commissioners of "mmigration has not met collectively to discuss and deliberate on the cases coming before it! for which reason he set aside all decisions purporting to have been rendered by the #oard of Commissioners on appeal from! or on review motu propio of! decisions of the #oards of Special "n7uiry! and directed the #oard of Commissioners to review in accordance with Section 8?3b5 of Commonwealth &ct No. B,+! as amended! all decisions of the #oards of Special "n7uiry admitting entry of aliens into this country and give
of the order declaring Sy e or #enito Sichangco a Ailipino citi$en! and the filing of deportation proceedings against him.& copy of this decision was received by the minors on October 8B!,-B8. > #enito Sichangco! in behalf of the minors Si #eng! Si Son and Si Luna! filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary in:unction on November 8! ,-B8 before the Court of Airst "nstance of *anila! to annul the decision of the #oard of Commissioners of "mmigration excluding the abovenamed minors from the @hilippines. > CA" declared that the decision of the #oard of Commissioners dated September ! ,-B8! reversing the decision of the previous #oard of Commissioners dated September ,,! ,-B,! to have been rendered on October 8B! ,-B8! more than a year from the first decision! and therefore illegal and null and void! and the in:unction earlier issued was made permanent! with costs against respondent #oard.
ISSUE/
H!*+) NO > he #oard of Commissioners rendered on September ! ,-B8 its decision reversing that of the #oard of Special "n7uiry No! , dated September ,,! ,-B,! well within the one>year period re7uired by law. > "t is true that the copy of the decision of the #oard of Commissioners dated September ! ,-B8 was sent by mail to the petitionerEs minor children herein only on October 8B! ,-B8! and received by the said minors on the same date. his fact! however! does not work to vitiate said decision. &ll that the "mmigration Law re7uires is that the decision of reversal of the #oard of Commissioners be promulgated within one year from the rendition of the decision of the #oard of Special "n7uiry. Notice of said decision of reversal may be sent even after the one>year period has elapsed. "n the case of Neria vs. Commissioner of "mmigration 3L> 8J! *ay 8?! ,-BJ! 8+ SC'& J?! citing &rocha vs. ivo! supra5! the Supreme Court ruled that the operative date of the CommissionersE
action is that when the resolution 3of exclusion5 was noted and adopted by them as a # oard! regardless of the date when the decision in extenso was prepared! written and signed! and with more reason! as in this case! regardless of the date when such decision is mailed! because the decision in extenso must relate back to the day the resolution to exclude was actually adopte d. Necessarily the extended opinio n had to be posterior to the day when the Commissioners voted and resolved to reverse the findings of the #oard of Special "n7uiry. he SecretaryEs certificate shows that the #oard of "mmigration Commissioners acted upon not less than eight "mmigration cases 3including that of the Gatchalians5 on Kuly B! ,-B80 and it was of course impracticable to prepare and sign fully reasoned decisions in all these cases.
in favor of private respondent and ordered petitioners to continue with the sale of the house and lot and to pay private respondent @;! as moral damages! @;! as exemplary damages and @B! as attorneyEs fees and costs of the suit. &n appeal from this decision was taken to the 6L('# O&&L& &rbiter! which affirmed the #oardEs decision. he decision of the O&&L& &rb iter was appealed to the Offi ce of the @resident! herein public respondent. > On Kanuary ?! ,--+! the public respond ent rendered its decision dismissing the petitionersE appeal. *otion for reconsideration of the decision was denied by the public respondent on Kanuary 8B! ,--+. Conse7uently petitioners come before this Court! in this petition.
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REALT, ECHANGE VENTURE CORP v SENDINO 233 SCRA /; @APUNAN% %.& "#* /% 1&&4 F'c()) > @rivate respondent Lucina C. Sendino entered into a reservation agreement with 'ealty 9xchange enture! "nc. 3'9"5 for a ,8>s7uare meter lot in 'aymondville Subdivision in Sucat! @arana7ue for @+?!J. as its purchas e price. She paid @,!. as partial reservation fee on Kanuary ,;! ,-J- and completed payment of this fee on Kanuary 8! ,-J- by paying @!.. > On Kuly ,J! ,-J-! private respondent paid '9" @,B!B. as full downpayment on the purchase price. 6owever! she was advised by '9" to change her co>maker! which she agreed! asking for an extension of one month to do so. > Aor alleged non>compliance with the re7uirement of submission of the appropriate documents under the terms of the srcinal agreement! '9"! through its ice>@resident for *arketing! informed respondent of the cancellation of the contract on the +,st of Kuly ,-J-. > On &pril 8! ,--! private respondent filed a complaint for Specific @erformance against '9" with the office of &ppeals! &d:udication and Legal &ffairs 3O&&L&5 of the 6ousing and Land (se 'egulatory #oard 36L('#5 asking that respondent be ordered/ o comply and continue with the sale of the house and lot! #lock ! Lot ,? at the 'aymondville Subdivision! Sucat 'oad! @arana7ue! *etro *anila0 > his petition was amended on &ugus t ,?! ,-- by impleading petitioners *agdiwang 'ealty Corporation 3*'C5 which appeared to be the registered owner of the sub:ect lot as per C No. ?B8+. > On &pril +! ,--, the 6L('#! whose authori ty to hear and decide the complaint was challenged by '9" in its answer! rendered its :udgment
H!*+) Yes. > (nder section ; of 9.O. BJ which defines the powers and duties of the commission! the board is specifically mandated to %adopt rules of procedure for the conduct of its business) and to perform such functions necessary for the accomplishment of its above mentioned function s. Since nothing in the provisions of either 9.O. - or 9.O. BJ denies or withholds the power or authority to delegate ad:udicatory functions to a division! we cannot see how the #oard! for the purpose of effectively carrying out its administrative responsibilities and 7uasi>:udicial powers as a regulatory body should be denied the power! as a matter of practical administrative procedure! to constitute its ad:udicatory boards into various divisions. > &fter all! the power conferred upon an administrative agency to issue rules and regulations necessary to carry out its functions has been held to be an ade7uate source of authority to delegate a particular function! unless by express provision of the &ct or by implication it has been withheld. he practical necessity of establishing a procedure whereby cases are decided by three 3+5 Commissioners furthermore assumes greater significance when one notes that the 6L('#! as constituted! only has four 35 full time commissioners and five 3;5 part time commissioners to deal with all the functions! administrative! ad:udicatory! or otherwise! entrusted to it. > &s the Office of the @resident noted in its Aebruary 8B! ,--+ 'esolution denying petitionersE *otion for 'econsideration! it is impossible and very impractical to gather the four 35 full time and five 3;5 part time commissioners 3together5 :ust to decide a case. Considering that its part time commissioners act mere ly in an exofficio capacity! re7uiring a
ma:ority of the #oard to sit en banc on each and every case brought before it would result in an administrative nightmare.
