1. KMU vs Garcia G.r No. 115381 Dec 23 1994 FACTS: The Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC) and the Land Transportation Franchising Franchising and Regulatory Board (LTFRB) released memoranda allowing provincial bus operators to charge passengers rates within 15% above and below the official LTFRB rate for a period of one year. Provincial Bus Operators Association of the Philippines applied for fare rate increase. This was opposed by the Philippine Consumer Foundation, Inc. and Perla Bautista as they were exorbitant and unreasonable. ISSUE: Whether or not the provincial bus operators have authority to reduce and increase fare rates based on the order of the LTFRB L TFRB HELD: The Legislature delegated to the defunct Public Service Commission the power of fixing rates of public services and the LTFRB is likewise vested with the same. Such delegation is permitted in order to adapt to the increasing complexity of modern life. The authority given by the LTFRB to the provincial bus operators to set a fare range is illegal and invalid as it is tantamount to an undue delegation of legislative authority. Potestas delegata non delegari protest. What has been delegated cannot be delegated. A further delegation of power would constitute a negation of the duty in violation of the trust reposed in the delegate mandated to discharge it directly. The policy of allowing the provincial bus operators to change their fares would lead to a chaotic situation and would leave the riding public at the mercy of transport operators. 2. PASEI vs Torres GR No. 101279 August 6 1992
Title : PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC. (PASEI) vs. HON. RUBEN D. TORRES, SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT, Citation : G.R. No. 98472 August 19, 1993 Ponente : BELLOSILLO, J.: Facts : DOLE Secretary Ruben D. Torres issued Department Order No. 16 Series of 1991 temporarily suspending the recruitment by private employment agencies of “Filipino domestic helpers going to Hong Kong”. As a result of
the department order DOLE, through the POEA took over the business of deploying Hong Kong bound workers. The petitioner, PASEI, the largest l argest organization of private
employment and recruitment agencies duly licensed and authorized by the POEA to engage in the business of obtaining overseas employment for Filipino land-based workers filed a petition for prohibition to annul the aforementioned order and to prohibit implementation. Issue: Whether or not respondents acted with grave abuse of discretion and/or in excess of their rule-making authority in issuing said circulars; Whether or not the assailed DOLE and POEA circulars are contrary to the Constitution, are unreasonable, unfair and oppressive; and Whether or not the requirements of publication and filing with the Office of the National Administrative Register were not complied with Held: FIRST, the respondents acted well within in their authority and did not commit grave abuse of discretion. This is because Article 36 (LC) clearly grants the Labor Secretary to restrict and regulate recruitment and placement activities, to wit: Art. 36. Regulatory Power. —
The Secretary of Labor shall have the power to restrict and regulate the recruitment and placement activities of all agencies within the coverage of this title [Regulation of Recruitment and Placement Activities] and is hereby authorized to issue orders and promulgate rules and regulations to carry out the objectives and implement the provisions of this title. SECOND, the vesture of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers in administrative bodies is constitutional. It is necessitated by the growing complexities of the modern society. THIRD, the orders and circulars issued are however, invalid and unenforceable. The reason is the lack of proper publication and filing in the Office of the National Administrative Registrar as required in Article 2 of the Civil Code to wit: Art. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen (15) days following the completion of their publication in the Official Gazatte, unless it is otherwise provided; Article 5 of the Labor Code to wit: Art. 5. Rules and Regulations. —
The Department of Labor and other government agencies charged with the administration and enforcement of this Code or any of its parts shall promulgate the necessary implementing rules and regulations. Such rules and regulations shall become effective fifteen (15) days after announcement of their adoption in newspapers of general circulation; and Sections 3(1) and 4, Chapter 2, Book VII V II of the Administrative Code of 1987 which provide: Sec. 3. Filing. —
(1) Every agency shall file with the University of the Philippines Law Center, three (3) certified copies of every rule adopted by it. Rules in force on the date of effectivity of this Code which are not filed within three (3) months shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party or persons. (Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987.) Sec. 4. Effectivity. —
In addition to other rule-making requirements provided by law not inconsistent with this Book, each rule shall become effective fifteen (15) days from the date of filing as above provided unless a different date is fixed by law, or specified in the rule in cases of imminent danger to public health, safety and welfare, the existence of which must be expressed in a statement accompanying the rule. The agency shall take appropriate measures to make emergency rules known to persons who may be affected by them. (Chapter 2, Book VII of the Administrative Code of 1987). Prohibition granted 3. Santiago vs comelec Miriam Defensor- Santiago vs. COMELEC G.R No. 127325 March 19, 1997
FACTS:
On December 6, 1996, Atty. Jesus S. Delfin, founding member of the Movement for People's Initiative, filed with the COMELEC a "Petition to Amend the Constitution, to Lift Term Limits of Elective Officials, by People's Initiative" citing Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution. Acting on the petition, the COMELEC set the case for hearing and directed Delfin to have the petition published. After the hearing the arguments between petitioners and opposing parties, the COMELEC directed Delfin and the oppositors to file their "memoranda and/or oppositions/memoranda" within five days. On December 18, 1996, Senator Miriam Defensor Santiago, Alexander Padilla, and Maria Isabel Ongpin filed a special civil action for prohibition under Rule 65 raising the following arguments, among others:
1.) That the Constitution can only be amended by people’s i nitiative if there is an enabling law passed by Congress, to which no such law has yet been passed; and 2.) That R.A. 6735 does not suffice as an enabling law on people’s initiative on the Constitution, unlike in the other modes of initiative. ISSUE:
WON R.A. No. 6735 sufficient to enable amendment of the Constitution by people’s initiative. WON RA 6735 was intended to include initiative on amendments to the Constitution, and if so WON the Act as worded adequately covers such initiative. WON COMELEC Res. No. 2300 regarding the conduct of initiative on amendments to the constitution is valid, considering the absence in the law of specific provisions on the conduct of such initiative? WON the lifting of term limits of elective national and local official, as proposed in the draft petition would constitute a revision of , or an amendment of the constitution. WON the COMELEC can take cognizance of or has jurisdiction over the petition.
WON it is proper for the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the petition when there is a pending case before the COMELEC. HELD:
NO. R.A. 6735 is inadequate to cover the sys tem of initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Under the said law, initiative on the Constitution is confined only to proposals to AMEND. The people are not accorded the power to "directly propose, enact, approve, or reject, in whole or in part, the Constitution" through the system of initiative. They can only do so with respect to "laws, ordinances, or resolutions." The use of the clause "p roposed laws sought to be enacted, approve d or rejected, amended or repealed" denotes that R.A. No. 6735 excludes initiative on amendments to the Constitution. Also, while the law provides subtitles for National Initiative and Referendum and for Local Initiative and Referendum, no subtitle is provided for initiative on the Constitution. This means that the main thrust of the law is in itiative and referendum on national and local laws. If R.A. No. 6735 were intended to fully provide for the im plementation of the initiative on amendments to the Constitution, it could have provided for a subtitle therefor, considering that in the order of things, the primacy of interest, or hierarchy of values, the right of the people to directly propose amendments to the Constitution is far more important than the initiative on national and local laws. While R.A. No. 6735 specially detailed the process in i mplementing initiative and referendum on national and local laws, it intentionally did not do so on the system of initi ative on amendments to the Constitution. COMELEC Resolution No. 2300 is hereby declared void and orders the respondent to forthwith dismiss the Delfin Petition . TRO issued on 18 December 1996 is made permanent. WHEREFORE, petition is GRANTED.
4. U.s. vs ang tang ho US VS ANG TANG HO G.R. No. 17122
43 Phil 1
February 27, 1922
THE UNITED STATES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. ANG TANG HO, defendant-appellant. Facts: During a special session, the Philippine Legislature passed and approved Act No. 2868 entitled An Act Penalizing the Monopoly and Hoarding of Rice, Palay and Corn. The said act under extraordinary circumstances authorizes the Governor General to issue the necessary Rules and Regulations in regulating the distribution of such products. Pursuant to this Act, the Governor General issued Executive Order 53 fixing the price at which rice should be sold. Ang Tang Ho, a rice dealer, voluntarily, criminally and illegally sold a ganta of rice to Pedro Trinidad at the price of eighty centavos. The said amount was way higher than that
prescribed by the Executive Order. He was charged in violation of the said Executive Order and was found guilty as charged and was sentenced to 5 months imprisonment plus a P500.00 fine. He appealed the sentence countering that there was an undue delegation of power to the Governor General.
Issues: Whether or not there was an undue delegation of power to the Governor General.
Discussions: By the terms of the Organic Act, subject only to constitutional limitations, the power to legislate and enact laws is vested exclusively in the Legislative, which is elected by a direct vote of the people of the Philippine Islands. As to the que stion here involved, the authority of the Governor-General to fix the maximum price at which palay, rice and corn may be sold in the manner power in violation of the organic law. Act No. 2868, as analysed by the Court, wholly fails to provide definitely and clearly what the standard policy should contain, so that it could be put in use as a uniform policy required to take the place of all others without the determination of the insurance commissioner in respect to matters involving the exercise of a legislative discretion that could not be delegated, and without which the act could not possibly be put in use. The law must be complete in all its terms and provisions when it leaves the legislative branch of the government and nothing must be left to the judgment of the electors or other appointee or delegate of the legislature, so that, in form and substance, it is a law in all its details in presenti, but which may be left to take effect in future, if necessary, upon the ascertainment of any prescribed fact or event.
Rulings: Yes. When Act No. 2868 was analyzed, it is the violation of the proclamation of the Governor-General which constitutes the crime. Without that proclamation, it was no crime to sell rice at any price. In other words, the Legislature left it to the sole discretion of the
Governor-General to say what was and what was not “any cause” for enforcing the act, and what was and what was not “an extraordinary rise in the price of palay, rice or corn,” and
under certain undefined conditions to fix the price at which r ice should be sold, without regard to grade or quality, also to say whether a proclamation should be issued, if so, when, and whether or not the law should be enforced, how long it should be enforced, and when the law should be suspended. The Legislature d id not specify or define what was “any cause,” or what was “an extraordinary rise in the price of rice, palay or corn,” Neither did it
specify or define the conditions upon which the proclamation should be issued. In the absence of the proclamation no crime was committed. The alleged sale was made a crime, if at all, because the Governor-General issued the proclamation. The act or proclamation does not say anything about the different grades or qualities of rice, and the defendant is charged with the sale “of one ganta of rice at the price of eighty centavos (P0.80) which is a price greater than that fixed by Executive order No. 53.”
5. Ynot vs iac YNOT v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT G.R. No. 74457. March 20, 1987 (CASE DIGEST) CONSTITUTIONAL LAW II FUNDAMENTAL POWERS OF THE STATE POLICE POWER
RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner, v. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC NUEVO, ILOILO and the REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO CITY, respondents. G.R. No. 74457. March 20, 1987 CRUZ, J.:
FACTS: Petitioner in this case transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo for the violation of E.O. No. 626-A which prohibits the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. Petitioner sued for recovery, and the trial Court of Iloilo issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond of twelve thousand pesos (P 12, 000.00). After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the said carabaos and, since they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the constitutionality of the E.O, as raised by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity.
ISSUE: Whether or not the said Executive Order is unconstitutional.
RULING: Yes, though police power was invoked by the government in this case for the reason that the present condition demand that the carabaos and the buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of the small farmers who rely on them for energy needs, it does not however, comply with the second requisite for a valid exercise of the said power which is, "that there be a lawful method." The reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure is missing. The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of Police power because the method employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly oppressive. To justify the State in the imposition of its authority in behalf of the public, it must be: 1) The interest of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such interference; 2) that the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. 6. Dar vs Sutton Department of Agrarian Reform, represented by Secretary Jose Mari B. Ponce (OIC) vs. Delia T. Sutton, Ella T. Sutton-Soliman and Harry T. Sutton G.R. No. 162070 (October 19, 2005) FACTS: Respondents herein inherited a land which has been devoted exclusively to c ow and calf breeding. Pursuant to the then existing agrarian reform program of the government, respondents made a voluntary offer to sell (VOS) their landholdings to petitioner DAR to avail of certain incentives under the law. a new agrarian law, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 6657, also known as the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law (CARL) of 1988, took effect. It included in its coverage farms used for raising livestock, poultry and swine. Thereafter, in an en banc decision in the case of Luz Farms v. Secretary of DAR this Court ruled that lands devoted to livestock and poultry-raising are not included in the definition of agricultural land. Hence, we declared as unconstitutional certain provisions of the CARL insofar as they included livestock farms in the coverage of agrarian reform. Thus, respondents filed with petitioner DAR a formal request to withdraw their VOS as their landholding was devoted exclusively to cattle-raising and thus exempted from the coverage of the CARL. However, DAR issued A.O. No. 9, series
of 1993 which provided that only portions of private agricultural lands used for the raising of livestock, poultry and swine as of June 15, 1988 shall be excluded from the coverage of the CARL. The DAR Secretary issued an Order partially granting the application of respondents for exemption from the coverage of CARL but applying the retention limits outlined in the DAR A.O. No. 9. Respondents moved for reconsideration. They contend that their entire landholding should be exempted as it is devoted exclusively to cattle-raising and appealing that the DAR A.O. No. 9 be declared unconstitutional. ISSUE: Whether or not DAR Administrative Order No. 09, Series of 1993 which prescribes a maximum retention for owners of lands devoted to livestock raising is constitutional? HELD: The A.O. sought to regulate livestock farms by including them in the coverage of agrarian reform and prescribing a maximum retention limit for their ownership is i nvalid as it contravenes the Constitution. . The Court clarified in the Luz Farms case that livestock, swine and poultryraising are industrial activities and do not fall within the definition of “agriculture” or “agricultural activity.”
The raising of livestock, swine and poultry is different from crop or tree farming. It is an industrial, not an agricultural activity. DAR has no power to regulate livestock farms which have been exempted by the Constitution from the coverage of agrarian reform. It has exceeded its power in issuing the assailed A.O. The assailed A.O. of petitioner DAR was properly stricken down as unconstitutional as it enlarges the coverage of agrarian reform beyond the scope intended by the 1987 Constitution
7. Sol. Gen vs MMA Solicitor General vs. Metropolitan Manila Authority GR NO 102782 Dec 11 1991 Facts: On July 13, 1990 the Court held in the case of Metropolitan Traffic Command,West Traffic District vs. Hon. Arsenio M. Gonong, that the confiscation of the licenseplates of motor vehicles for traffic violations was not among the sanctions thatcould be imposed
by the Metro Manila Commission under PD 1605 and waspermitted only under the conditions laid down by LOI 43 in the case of stalledvehicles obstructing the public streets. Even the confiscation of driver’s licenses fortraffic violations was not directly prescribed or allowed by the decree. After nomotion for reconsideration of the decision was filed the judgment became final andexecutor.Withstanding the Gonong decision still violations of the said decisiontranspired, wherein there were several persons who sent complaint letters to theCourt regarding the confiscation of driver’s licenses and
removal of license platenumbers.On May 24, 1990 the MMA issued Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991,authorizing itself “to detach license plate/tow and impoundattended/unattended/abandoned motor vehicles illegally parked or obstructing theflow of traffic in Metro Manila.”On July 2, 1991, the Court issued a
resolution regarding the matter whichstated that the Ordinance No. 11, Section 2 appears to be in conflict with thedecision of the Court, and that the Court has received several complaints againstthe enforcement of such ordinance. Issue:W/N Ordinance No. 11 Series of 1991 and Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1998 arevalid in the exercise of such delegated power to local government acting only asagents of the national legislature? Held:No, the Court rendered judgment: 1) declaring Ordinance No. 11, Series of 1991, of the MMA and Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1998, of the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Null and Void; and 2) enjoining all law-enforcement authorities inMetropolitan Manila from removing the license plates of motor vehicles (exceptwhen authorized under LOI43) and confiscating driver’s licenses for traffic violationswithin the said area. To test the validity of said acts the principles governing municipalcorporations was applied, according to Elliot for a municipal ordinance to be validthe following requisites should be complied: 1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute; 2) must not be unfair or oppressive; 3) must not bepartial or discriminatory; 4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade; 5) must notbe unreasonable; and 6) must be general and consistent with public policy.In the Gonong decision it was shown that the measures under considerationdid not pass the first criterion because it did not conform to existing law. PD 1605does not allow either the removal of license plates or the confiscation of driver’slicenses for traffic violations
committed in Metropolitan Manila. There is nothing inthe decree authorizing the MMA to impose such sanctions. Thus Local politicalsubdivisions are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislativepower from the national legislature (except only that the power to create their ownsources of revenue and to levy taxes is conferred by the Constitution itself). Theyare mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate legislation. Asdelegates of the Congress, the local government unit cannot contravene but mustobey at all times the will of the principal. In the case at bar the enactments inquestion, which are merely local in origin, cannot prevail against the decree, whichhas the force and effect of a statute
8. BOIE-Takeda vs Dela Serna
G.R. No. 92174 December10, 1993 Boie- Takeda Chemicals, Inc. vs. Hon. Dionisio De La Serna G.R. No. L-102552 December 10, 1993 Philippine Fuji Xerox Corp. vs. Cresenciano B. Trajano and Philippine Fuji Xerox Employees Union FACTS: Presidential Decree No. 851, the Thirteenth Month Pay Law, defines “Basic Salary”as which shall include all renumerations or earnings paid by an employer to an employee for services rendered but may not include cost of living allowances profit sharing payments, and all allowances and monetary benefits which are not considered or integrated as part of the regular basic salary of the employee. On the other hand, the Revised Guidelines on the Implementation of the 13th Month Pay Law promulgated by then Labor Secretary Franklin Drilon included these salary-related benefits as part of the basic salary in the computation of the 13th month pay. Both petitioners in this case were found by the labor officer not to have been including the commissions earned by their employees in the computation of their 13 th month pay. Petitioners contended P.D. 851, the 13 th month pay is based solely on basic salary. As defined by the law itself and clarified by the implementing and Supplementary Rules as well as by the Supreme Court in a long line of decisions, remunerations which do not form part of the basic or regular salary of an employee, such as commissions, should not be considered in the computation of the 13 th month pay. This being the case, the Revised Guidelines on the Implementation of the 13th Month Pay Law issued by then Secretary Drilon providing for the inclusion of Commissions in the 13thmonth pay, were issued in excess of the statutory authority conferred by P.D. 851. ISSUE: Whether or not the Revised Guidelines on the Implementation of the 13th Month Pay Law issued by then Secretary Drilon providing for the inclusion of commissions in the 13 th month pay were issued in excess of the statutory authority conferred by P.D. 851. HELD: In including commissions in the computation of the 13th month pay, the second paragraph of Section 5(a) of the Revised Guidelines on the Implementation of the 13th Month Pay Law unduly expanded the concept of “basic salary”
as defined in P.D. 851. It is a fundamental rule that implementing rules cannot add to or detract from the provisions of the law it is designed to implement. Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law they are intended to carry into effect. They cannot widen its scope. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress.
9. United BFHA vs BF Homes UNITED BF HOMEOWNER'S ASSOCIATION, ET AL. vs. BF HOMES, INC. G.R. No. 124873 July 14, 1999. Administrative case. digested by C Y the great. UNITED BF HOMEOWNER'S ASSOCIATON, ET AL. vs. BF HOMES, INC. G.R. No. 124873 July 14, 1999 Facts. 1.In 1988 because of financial difficulties, the Securities and exchange commission place respondent under receivership to undergo a10 year rehabilitation program appointing attorney Orendain as receiver. 2. Preliminary to the rehabilitation, attorney Orendain entered in to tripartite agreement with the Bf Paranyake homes owners association and the confideration homes owners association which resulted in the creation of the united home owners association and was registered with the Home insurance guaranty corporation. 3. Respondent through its receiver turn over to the petitioner the administration and operation of the subdivision clab house at 37 Pilar street and a strip of open space in Concha Cruz garden row. 4. On 1994, the first receiver was relief and a new committee of receivers was appointed and based on the Bfi’s title on the main road, the newly appointed
committee of receivers sent a letter to the different Home owners association informing them that they are now responsible for the security of the subdivision as a basic requirements. For its rehabilitation. 5.Petitioner filed a petition for mandamus with a preliminary injunction with the Higc against the respondent who issue a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondent from taking over the clubhouse at 37 Pilar street. 6. Respondent filed a petition for prohibition for the issuance of the temporary restraining order and to enjoin the Higc from proceeding with the case Before the Court of Appeals who grant the petition and all denied the motion for reconsideration of the petitioner. 7. Petitioner filed a petition for certitorari before the supreme court. Issue: Whether or not, the Higc was correct in promulgating the rules of procedure in the settlements of the home owner’s dispute.
According to the Supreme court, the Home insurance guaranty corporation went beyond its authority as provided for by the law when it promulgated the revised rules of procedure because an administrative agency cannot amend An act of congress. 10. Lupangco vs CA Lupangco vs. CA (G.R. No. 77372) Facts:
On or about October 6, 1986, herein respondent Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) issued Resolution No. 105 as parts of its "Additional Instructions to Examinees," to all those applying for admission to take the licensure examinations in accountancy: No examinee shall attend any review class, briefing, conference or the like conducted by, or shall receive any hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center or the like or any reviewer, lecturer, instructor official or employee of any of the aforementioned or similar institutions during the three days immediately proceeding every examination day including examination day. Any examinee violating this instruction shall be subject to the sanctions prescribed by Sec. 8, Art. III of the Rules and Regulations of the Commission. On October 16, 1986, herein petitioners, all reviewees preparing to take the licensure examinations in accountancy schedule on October 25 and November 2 of the same year, filed on their own behalf of all others similarly situated like them, with the Regional Trial Court of Manila a complaint for injunction with a prayer with the issuance of a writ of a preliminary injunction against respondent PRC to restrain the latter from enforcing the above-mentioned resolution and to declare the same unconstitutional. Respondent PRC filed a motion to dismiss on October 21, 1987 on the ground that the lower court had no jurisdiction to review and to enjoin the enforcement of its resolution. In an Order of October 21, 1987, the lower court declared that it had jurisdiction to try the case and enjoined the respondent commission from enforcing and giving effect to Resolution No. 105 which it found to be unconstitutional. Not satisfied therewith, respondent PRC, on November 10, 1986, an appeal with the Court of Appeals. The petition was granted. Issue: Whether or not Resolution No. 105 is constitutional. Held: CA stated as basis its conclusion that PCS and RTC are co-equal branches. They relied heavily on the case of National Electrification Administration vs. Mendoza where the Court held that a Court of First Instance cannot interfere with the orders of SEC, the two being a co-equal branch. SC said the cases cited by CA are not in point. It is glaringly apparent that the reason why the Court ruled that the Court of First Instance could not interfere with the orders of SEC was that this was provided for by the law. Nowhere in the said cases was it held that a Court of First Instance has no jurisdiction over all other government agencies. On the contrary, the ruling was specifically limited to the SEC. The respondent court erred when it place he SEC and PRC in the same category. There is no law providing for the next course of action for a party who wants to question a ruling or order of the PRC.
What is clear from PD No. 223 is that PRC is attached to the Office of the President for general direction and coordination. Well settled in our jurisprudence the view that even acts of the Office of the President may be reviewed by the RTC. In view of the foregoing, SC rules that RTC has jurisdiction to entertain the case and enjoin PRC from enforcing its resolution. As to the validity of Resolution No. 105, although the resolution has a commendable purpose which is to preserve the integrity and purity of the licensure examinations, the resolution is unreasonable in that an examinee cannot even attend and review class, briefing, conference or the like or receive hand-out, review material, or any tip from any school, college or university, or any review center. The unreasonableness is more obvious in that one who is caught committing the prohibited acts even without ill motives will be barred from taking future examinations. Resolution No. 105 is not only unreasonable and arbitrary, it also infringes on the examinees’ right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution. PRC has no authority to dictate on the reviewees as to how they should prepare themselves for the licensure examinations specially if the steps they take are lawful. Another evident objection to Resolution No. 105 is that it violates the academic freedom of the schools concerned. PRC cannot interfere with the conduct of review that review schools and centers believe would best enable their enrollees to pass the examination. Unless the means and methods of instruction are clearly found to be inefficient, impractical, or riddled with corruption, review schools and centers may not be stopped from helping out their students. The enforcement of Resolution No. 105 is not a guarantee that the alleged leakages in the licensure examinations will be eradicated or at least minimized. What is needed to be done by the respondent is to find out the source of such leakages and stop it right there. 11. People vs Que Po Lay People vs Que Po Lay TITLE: People of the Phils v Que Po Lay CITATION: 94 Phil 640 | GR No. 6791, March 29, 1954 FACTS: The appellant was in possession of foreign exchange consisting of US dollars, US checks and US money orders amounting to about $7000 but failed to sell the same to the Central Bank as required under Circular No. 20. Circular No. 20 was issued in the year 1949 but was published in the Official Gazette only on Nov. 1951 after the act or omission imputed to Que Po Lay.
Que Po Lay appealed from the decision of the lower court finding him guilty of violating Central Bank Circular No. 20 in connection with Sec 34 of RA 265 sentencing him to suffer 6 months imprisonment, pay fine of P1,000 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.
ISSUE: Whether or not publication of Circular 20 in the Official Gazette is needed for it to become effective and subject violators to corresponding penalties.
HELD: It was held by the Supreme Court, in an en banc decision, that as a rule, circular and regulations of the Central Bank in question prescribing a penalty for its violation should be published before becoming effective. This is based on the theory that before the public is bound by its contents especially its penal provisions, a law, regulation or circular must first be published for the people to be officially and specifically informed of such contents including its penalties. Thus, the Supreme Court reversed the decision appealed from and acquit the appellant, with costs de oficio. 12. Tanada vs Tuvera TAÑADA VS. TUVERA 146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986) FACTS: This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise” as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become
effective immediately upon their approval. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not as to their publication; 2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation. HELD:
The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to
the requirement of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its previous publication. “Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly
speaking, all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law without any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole. All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of the law. Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical. The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible. J. Cruz: Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot faint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn 13. People vs Maceran GR No L-32166 October 18 1977 PEOPLE V. MACEREN | Aquino, J. October 18, 1977 Facts:
The five accused, charged for violation of Fisheries Administrative Order No. 841, resorted to electro fishing in the waters in Sta. Cruz by using their own motor banca, equipped with motor; with a generator attached with dynamo; and with an electrocuting device locally known as 'senso' --> with the use of these devices catches fish thru electric current, which destroy any aquatic animals within its current reach, to the detriment and prejudice of the populace. The municipal court quashed the complaint. CFI AFFIRMED. Lower court held that electro fishing cannot be penalized because electric current is not an obnoxious or poisonous substance as contemplated in Sec 11 of the Fisheries Law and that it is not a substance at all. It further held that since the law does not clearly prohibit electro fishing, the exlusive and judicial departments cannot consider it unlawful. The Fisheries Law does not expressly punish “electro fishing.” However, the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, upon the recommendation of the Fisheries Commission, promulgated Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84 prohibiting electro fishing in all Philippine waters. Subsequently, the Secretary of Agriculture and National Resources, upon the recommendation of the Fisheries Commission, issued Fisheries Administrative Order No. 84-1, amending AO 84, by restricting the ban against electro fishing to fresh water fisheries. ISSUE WoN the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing Fisheries Administrative Orders Nos. 84 and 84-1. YES The Fisheries Law does not expressly prohibit electro fishing. As electro fishing is not banned under that law, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries are powerless to penalize it. Hence, AO 84 and 84-1, in penalizing electro fishing, are devoid of any legal basis. Had the lawmaking body intended to punish electro fishing, a penal provision to that effect could have been easily embodied in the old Fisheries Law. AO 84, in punishing electro fishing, does not contemplate that such an offense falls within the category of “other violations” in the Fisheries Law because the penalty
for electro fishing is the penalty next lower to the penalty for fishing with the use of obnoxious or poisonous substances, fixed in Sec 76, and is not the same as the penalty for “other violations” of the law and regulations fixed in Sec 83.
The lawmaking body cannot delegate to an executive official the power to declare what acts should constitute a criminal offense. It can authorize the issuance of regulations and the imposition of the penalty provided for in the law itself. AO 84 punished electro fishing in all waters. Later, the ban against electro fishing was confined to fresh water fisheries. The amendment created the impression that electro fishing is not condemnable per se. it could be tolerated in marine waters.
WoN the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Commissioner of Fisheries exceeded their authority in issuing the Administrative Orders despite PD 704 expressly punishing electro fishing in fresh water and salt water areas. YES At present, electro fishing is punishable under the Fisheries Law and that it cannot be penalized by executive regulation because PD 704 expressly punishes electro fishing in all Philippine waters. An examination of the rule-making power of executive officials and administrative agencies and, in particular, of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources under the Fisheries Law sustains the view that he exceeded his authority in penalizing electro fishing by means of an administrative order. Administrative regulations adopted under legislative authority by a particular department must be in harmony with the provisions of the law, and should be for the sole purpose of carrying into effect its general provisions. By such regulations, the law itself cannot be extended. An administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress. The rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the mode or proceeding to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted. The power cannot be extended to amending or expanding the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by the statute. Rules that subvert the statute cannot be sanctioned. The regulation penalizing electro fishing is not strictly in accordance with the Fisheries Law, under which the regulation was issued, because the law itself does not expressly punish electro fishing. A penal statute is stictly construed. While an administrative agency has the right to make rules and regulations to carry into effect a law already enacted, that power should not be confused with the power to enact a criminal statute. An administrative agency can have only the administrative or policing powers expressly or by necessary implication conferred upon it. The rules of administrative officers and boards, which have the effect of extending, or which conflict with the authority-granting statute, do not represent a valid exercise of the rule-making power but constitute an attempt by an administrative body to legislate. In a prosecution for a violation of an administrative order, it must clearly appear that the order is within the scope of the authority conferred upon the administrative body, and the order will be scrutinized with special care.
14. US vs Panlilio GR NO L-9876 December 8 1914 US VS. PANLILIO The orders (rules and regulations) of an administrative officers or body issued pursuant to a statute have the force of law but are not penal in nature and a violation of such orders is not an offense punishable by law unless the statute expressly penalizes such violation.
FACTS: The accused was convicted of violation of Act 1760 relating to the quarantining of animals suffering from dangerous communicable or contagious diseases and sentencing him to pay a fine of P40 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs of trial. It is alleged that the accused illegally and without being authorized to do so, and while quarantine against the said carabaos exposed to rinder pest was still in effect, permitted and ordered said carabaos to be taken from the corral in which they were quarantined and drove them from one place to another. The accused contends that the facts alleged in the information and proved on the trial do not constitute a violation of Act No. 1760 ISSUE: Whether accused can be penalized for violation of the order of the Bureau of Agriculture? HELD: NO. Nowhere in the law is the violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture prohibited or made unlawful, nor is there provided any punishment for a violation of such orders. Section 8 of Act No. 1760 provides that any person violating any of the provisions of the Act shall, upon conviction, be punished. However, the only sections of the Act which prohibit acts and pronounce them as unlawful are Sections 3, 4 and 5. This case does not fall within any of them. A violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, as authorized by paragraph, is not a violation of the provision of the Act. The orders of the Bureau of Agriculture, while they may possibly be said to have the force of law, are statutes and particularly not penal statutes, and a violation of such orders is not a penal offense unless the statute itself somewhere makes a violation thereof unlawful and penalizes it. Nowhere in Act No. 1760 is a violation of the orders of the Bureau of Agriculture made a penal offense, nor is such violation punished in any way therein. However, the accused did violate Art. 581, ¶2 of the Penal Code which punishes any person who violates regulations or ordinances with reference to epidemic disease among animals.
15. People vs Santos G.R. No. L-44291
August 15, 1936
Facts: The Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, by virtue of the authority vested in him by section 4 of Act No.4003 issued Administrative Order No. 2 Section 28 relative to fish and game provides as follows: "28. Prohibited fishing areas. collect, gather, take, or remove fish and other sea products from Philippine waters shall be allowed to fish, loiter, or anchor within 3 kilometers of the sore line of islands and reservations over which jurisdiction is exercised by naval or military authorities of the United States, particularly Corregidor, Pulo Caballo, La Monja, El Fraile, and Carabao, and all other islands and detached rocks lying between Mariveles Reservation on the north side of the entrance to Manila Bay and Calumpan Point Reservation on the south side of said entrance: Provided, That boats not subject to license under Act No. 4003 and this order may fish within the areas mentioned above only upon receiving written permission therefor, which permission may be granted by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce upon recommendation of the military or naval authorities concerned.
"A violation of this paragraph may be proceeded against under section 45 of the Federal Penal Code." The herein accused and appellee Augusto A. Santos is charged with having ordered his fishermen to manage and operate the motor launches Malabon II and Malabon III registered in his name and to fish, loiter and anchor within three kilometers of the shore line of the Island of Corregidor over which jurisdiction is exercised by naval and military authorities of the United States, without permission from the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce. Issues: Whether or not violation of section 28 of administrative order No. 2 can give rise to criminal prosecution. Held: Act No. 4003 does not contain a provision prohibiting boats not subject to license to fish within the stipulated areas without the written permission of the Secretary. Since the act itself does not contain such prohibition, the rules and regulations promulgated by the Secretary of Agriculture to carry into effect the provisions of the law cannot incorporate such prohibition. For the foregoing considerations, we are of the opinion and so hold that the conditional clause of section 28 of Administrative Order No. 2, issued by the Secretary of Agriculture and Commerce, is null and void and without effect, as constituting an excess of the regulatory power conferred upon him by sect ion 4 of Act No. 4003 and an exercise of a legislative power which has not been and cannot be delegated to him. Wherefore, inasmuch as the facts with the commission of which Augusto A. Santos is charged do not constitute a crime or a violation of some criminal law within the jurisdiction of the civil courts, the information filed against him is dismissed, with the costs de oficio. So ordered.
16. SEC vs LPG Refillers Perez v LPG Refillers (2006) Quisumbing, J. FACTS: BP Blg. 33 was enacted to penalize illegal trading, hoarding, overpricing, adulteration, underdelivery, and underfilling of petroleum products, as well as possession for trade of adulterated petroleum products and of underfilled liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) cylinders. • The law sets a minimum of P20,000 and a maximum of P50,000 as penalties. • The Department of Energy issued Circular No. 2000-06-010 to implement the law. •
Respondent LPG Refillers Association of the Philippines asked the DOE to set aside the Circular for being contrary to law but to no avail, hence they filed an action before the RTC to nullify the circular. • RTC granted the petition and nullified the Circular on the ground that it introduced new offenses not included in the statute. o Moreover, in providing penalties on a per cylinder basis for each violation, there is a possibility that the P50,000 maximum penalty might be exceeded. o The Circular has a range of P1,000-5,000/cylinder for first offenses and a range of P5,000-10k/cylinder for third offenses. For retails outlets, the max penalty is 20k. o Aside from the monetary fines, some offenses also include the recommendation the closure of the business to the proper LGU. • Meanwhile, petitioner Sec. Perez of the DOE argues that DOE is empowered by the ff. provisions to penalize the acts it enumerated in the circular: •
o
BP Blg. 33, as amended: “SEC. 3-A. Rules and Regulations; Administrative sanctions for violation thereof. – The Bureau of Energy Utilization shall issue such rules and regulations as are necessary to carry into effect the provisions of this Act, subject to the approval of the Minister of Energy, after consultation with the affected industry sectors. Said rules and regulations shall take effect fifteen (15) days from the date of its publication in two (2) newspapers of general circulation. “The Bureau of Energy Utilization is empowered to impose in an administrative
proceeding, after due notice and hearing, upon any person who violates any provision of such rules and regulations, a fine of not more than ten thousand pesos (P10,000.00) or to suspend or remove the license or permit of a hauler, marketer, refiller, dealer, subdealer or retail outlet: Provided, That hearing in any administrative proceedings may be waived by respondent. Provided, Further, That during the pendency of such administrative proceeding, the Bureau may suspend the business operations of such hauler, marketer, refiller, dealer, sub-dealer or retailer or retail outlet operator when the suspension is consistent with public interest. …
xxxx “The administrative sanction that may be imposed shall be without prejudice to the filing of a criminal action as the case may warrant.”
o §23 of RA 8479 (Downstream Oil Industry Deregulation Act of 1998): Section 23. Implementing Rules and Regulations. – The DOE, in coordination with the Board, the DENR, DFA, Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), Department of Health (DOH), DOF, DTI, National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) and TLRC, shall formulate and issue the necessary implementing rules and regulations within sixty (60) days after the effectivity of this Act. o
§5(g) and §21 of RA 7638 (Department of Energy Act of 1992):
(g) Formulate and implement programs, including a system of providing incentives and penalties, for the judicious and efficient use of energy in all energy-consuming sectors of the economy; xxx Subject to existing rules and regulations, the funds and monies collected or which the otherwise come into the possession of the Department and its bureaus from fees, surcharges, fines, and penalties which the Department and its bureaus may impose and collect under this Act ISSUES + RULING: WoN the Circular is valid/legal. YES. For an administrative regulation, to have the force of penal law, the following must concur: o the violation of the administrative regulation must be made a crime by the delegating statute itself; and o the penalty for such violation must be provided by the statute itself As for the first requirement: • o BP Blg 33 only states merely lists the various modes by which the said criminal acts may be perpetrated, namely: no price display board, no weighing scale, no tare weight or incorrect tare weight markings, no authorized LPG seal, no trade name, unbranded LPG cylinders, no serial number, no distinguishing color, no embossed identifying markings on cylinder, underfilling LPG cylinders, tampering LPG cylinders, and unauthorized decanting of LPG cylinders. o The acts and omissions stated in the circular are well within the modes contemplated by the law and serve the purpose of curbing pernicious practices of LPG dealers. As for the second requirement: • o The statute provides a minimum and maximum amount as penalties. o The maximum pecuniary penalty for retail outlets is P20,000, an amount within the range allowed by law. While the circular is silent as to the max penalty for refillers, marketers, and dealers, such does not amount to violation of the statutory maximum limit. o The mere fact that the Circular provides penalties on a per cylinder basis does not in itself run counter to the law since all that B.P. Blg. 33 prescribes are the minimum and the maximum limits of penalties. The law was intended to provide the DOE with increased administrative and • penal measures with which to effectively curtail rampant adulteration and shortselling, as well as other acts involving petroleum products, which are inimical to public interest. •
