CRIM - Case Digest (Batch 6)

CRIMINAL LAW REVIEW [Prosec. Victoria C. Garcia]

Case Digests

Article 89 – 113 PEOPLE vs. BAYOT G.R. No. 200030 April 18, 2012

FACTS: Appellant Nelson Bayot was charged with rape. rape. The Information filed against him states that on September 17, 1997, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge of and/or sexual intercourse with [AAA], 44 years old, against her will.

RTC: In RTC: In its July 31, 2000 Decision, convicted appellant of the crime c rime of rape and rape and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay AAA the amount of P40,000.00 as indemnity with costs. CA: In its Decision dated May 9, 2006, 2006, affirmed appellant’s conviction with the modification increasing the award of indemnity from P40,000.00 to P50,000.00. It likewise awarded moral damages in favor of AAA in the amount of P50,000.00. However, However, in a letter dated May 29, 2006, 2006, the Penal Pen al Superintendent of the New Bilibid Prison, informed the Court of Appeals that appellant died at the New Bilibid Prison Hospital on December 4, 2004. 2004.

Nonetheless, the Public Attorney’s Office still appealed, on behalf of appellant, the aforesaid Court of Appeals Decision to this Court (Supreme Court) dated May 31, 2006, 2006, which was given due course by the Court of Appeals per Resolution dated January 19, 2007. The Court of Appeals also directed the Chief of the Judicial Records Division to forward the entire records of the case to this Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not appellant’s death on December 4, 2004, 2004 , during the pendency of his appeal before the Court of Appeals, extinguished his criminal liability for the crime of rape and his civil liability solely arising from or based on said crime (YES)

HELD: YES, the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, liability, as well as the civil liability ex delicto. Article 89(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides Code provides for the effect of death of the accused on his criminal, as well as civil, liability. It reads: SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Arr iero. Bongalon. Bose. Candelaria. Cand elaria. De Leon. Dizon. Feliciano. Feli ciano. Hermogenes. Hermogenes . Maranan. Navarez. Oliva. Ongoco. Sison. Symaco. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte. Viray.

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ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. – Criminal liability is totally extinguished: (1) By the death of death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment ; x x x Applying the foregoing provision, People vs. Bayotas had laid down the following guidelines: guidelines: 1) Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. thereon . As opined by Justice Regalado, Regalado, in this regard, “the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore." 2) Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused, if the same may also be predicated predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission: law, contracts, quasi ccontracts, ontracts, and quasi delict . 3) Where the civil liability survives, as survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action subject to the Rules on Criminal Procedure. Procedure . This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above. 4) Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably case, conformably with the provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription. From the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as the civil liability ex delicto. delicto. The rationale, therefore, is that the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused, the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is delicto is ipso facto extinguished, facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case. Evidently, it is already unnecessary to rule on appellant’s appeal. Appellant’s appeal was still pending and no final judgment had been rendered against him at the time of his death. Thus, whether or not appellant was guilty of the crime charged had become irrelevant because even assuming that appellant did incur criminal liability and civil liability ex delicto, delicto, these were totally extinguished by his death. death .

SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Arr iero. Bongalon. Bose. Candelaria. Cand elaria. De Leon. Dizon. Feliciano. Feli ciano. Hermogenes. Hermogenes . Maranan. Navarez. Oliva. Ongoco. Sison. Symaco. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte. Viray.

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Case Digests

PEOPLE vs. AMISTOSO G.R. No. 201447 August 28, 28, 2013 2013

FACTS: Accused-appellant Anastacio Amistoso y Amistoso y Broca Broca (Amistoso) was charged before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Masbate City, with the rape of his daughter, AAA, alleged to be 12 years old at the time of the incident.

Crime charged: statutory rape under Article under Article 266-A, paragraph (1)(d) of the Revised R evised Penal Code, as amended RTC: guilty, guilty, not of statutory rape, but of qualified rape under rape under Article Article 266-A CA: affirmed Amistoso’s conviction for qualified rape but modified the penalties imposed in accordance with Republic Act No. 9346 and the latest jurisprudence on awards of damages d amages Insisting upon his innocence, Amistoso appealed appealed to the Supreme Court . In its Decision dated January 9, 2013, 2013, the Court affirmed with modification the judgment of conviction against Amistoso, Amistoso, expressly making him liable for interest on the amounts of damages awarded. However, in a letter dated February 7, 2013, 2013 , Ramoncito D. Roque, OIC, Inmate Documents and Processing Division of the Bureau of Corrections, informed the Court that Amistoso had died on December 11, 2012 at 2012 at the New Bilibid Prison. Roque attached to his letter a photocopy of the Death Report stating stating that Amistoso, 62 years old, died at about 5:00 p.m. on December 11, 2012 of cardio respiratory arrest . Roque’s letter was received by the Court on February 12, 2013. 2013. Penal Institution Supervisor (PIS) Fajardo R. Lansangan, Sr. (Lansangan), OIC, Maximum Security Compound, NBP, wrote another letter, likewise informing the Court of Amistoso’s death. PIS Lansangan appended to his letter a photocopy of Amistoso’s Death Certificate. Certificate. The Court received PIS Lansangan’s letter on February 18, 2013. 2013. Yet, on February 22, 2013, the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO), which represented Amistoso and which was apparently also unaware of its client’s demise, still filed a MR of MR of the Court’s Decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not accused-appellant’s death on December 11, 2012, during the pendency of his appeal before the Supreme Court, extinguished his criminal liability for the crime of qualified rape and his civil liability solely arising from or based on said crime notwithstanding the Court’s Decision affirming his conviction conviction dated January 9, 2013 (YES)


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HELD: YES, accused-appellant’s accused-appellant’s death on December 11, 2012, during the pendency of his appeal before the Supreme S upreme Court, extinguished his criminal liability , as well as his civil liability ex delicto. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code provides: Code provides: ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. – Criminal liability is totally extinguished: (1) By the death of death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment ; x x x Applying the foregoing provision, in People vs. Bayotas, Bayotas, the Court laid down the rules in case the accused dies prior to final judgment : judgment : 1) Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability based solely thereon. thereon . As opined by Justice Regalado, Regalado, in this regard, “the death of the accused prior to final judgment terminates his criminal liability and only the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore." 2) Corollarily, the claim for civil liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused, if the same may also be predicated predicated on a source of obligation other than delict. Article 1157 of the Civil Code enumerates Code enumerates these other sources of obligation from which the civil liability may arise as a result of the same act or omission: law, contracts, quasi ccontracts, ontracts, and quasi delict . 3) Where the civil liability survives, as survives, as explained in Number 2 above, an action for recovery therefor may be pursued but only by way of filing a separate civil action subject to the Rules on Criminal Procedure. Procedure . This separate civil action may be enforced either against the executor/administrator or the estate of the accused, depending on the source of obligation upon which the same is based as explained above. 4) Finally, the private offended party need not fear a forfeiture of his right to file this separate civil action by prescription, in cases where during the prosecution of the criminal action and prior to its extinction, the private-offended party instituted together therewith the civil action. In such case, the statute of limitations on the civil liability is deemed interrupted interrupted during the pendency of the criminal case, conformably case, conformably with the provisions of Article 1155 of the Civil Code, Code, that should thereby avoid any apprehension on a possible privation of right by prescription. Given the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as the civil liability ex delicto. delicto. Since the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused , the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case. SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Arr iero. Bongalon. Bose. Candelaria. Cand elaria. De Leon. Dizon. Feliciano. Feli ciano. Hermogenes. Hermogenes . Maranan. Navarez. Oliva. Ongoco. Sison. Symaco. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte. Viray.

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Undeniably, Amistoso’s death on December 11, 2012 preceded the promulgation by the Court of its Decision on January 9, 2013. 2013 . When Amistoso died, his appeal before the Court was still pending and unresolved. unresolved. The Court ruled upon Amistoso’s appeal only because it was not immediately informed of his death. Amistoso’s death Amistoso’s death on December 11, 2012 renders the Court’s Decision dated January 9, 2013, even though affirming Amistoso’s conviction, conviction, irrelevant and ineffectual. ineffectual . Moreover, said Decision has not yet become final, and the Court still has the jurisdiction to set it aside.


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Case Digests

PEOPLE vs. CONSORTE G.R. No. 194068 November 26, 2014

FACTS: Benjie Consorte y Consorte y Franco Franco (appellant) was a former conductor of Elizabeth Palmar’s jeepney. p ersonal belongings, Sometime in June 2000, Elizabeth’s residence was robbed and several personal including cash, were taken. Appellant was the only one who had access to the house, aside from Elizabeth’s family. So Elizabeth’s brother tailed appellant and found out that that the latter pawned her TV set to Frederic Francisco. She then sued appellant for robbery. robbery. A hearing was scheduled on January 23, 2001, but on the night of January 22, 2001, Elizabeth was murdered. murdered .

On January 22, 2001, Jose Palmar, Elizabeth’s husband, instructed Rolando Visbe to haul feeds from Morong, Rizal and deliver them to their piggery in Binangonan, Rizal. As he was driving the jeepney, Rolando saw Elizabeth together with her 14-year old daughter Myrna and her 3-year old nephew “Big Boy.” They went with him to deliver the feeds. On their way back to Morong, Rolando noticed appellant, who was wearing a hat. When they got near him, Rolando slowed down and asked appellant where he was going. Appellant did not reply. Rolando veered to the right to avoid hitting appellant. In the process, the jeepney ran over a stone, lost its balance, and rolled into a ditch. While struggling to release the vehicle, Rolando heard a gunshot. He looked around and saw appellant standing near the jeepney’s left rear, holding a handgun. Appellant immediately fled. He (Rolando) then heard Myrna shouting “Ninong, may dugo si Nanay!” They rushed Elizabeth to Angono District Hospital. But due to her fatal gunshot wound on the forehead, she died. Aneline Mendoza, a resident of Greenpark, Cainta, Rizal, testified that on January 22, 2001, around 8:45 pm while on her way home, a stranger greeted her “magandang gabi po.” He was carrying something wrapped in a black cloth which looked like a gun. She was somewhat frightened so she let him walk ahead of her. She saw him turn to a corner. Immediately after she entered her house, she heard a gunshot. She opened her window and saw the stranger, standing by the side of the jeepney. The stranger immediately ran toward the direction of Elizabeth’s house. She also heard the driver saying “Putang ina, sinong bumaril?”

Crime charged: murder RTC: found RTC: found appellant guilty of murder, murder , sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and directed him to indemnify the heirs of Elizabeth Palmar the amounts of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and and P29,500.00 as actual damages CA: affirmed the judgment of the trial court with modification as to damages ; in addition to actual damages, damages , appellant was further directed to pay moral and exemplary damages in damages in the amounts of P50,000.00 and P25,000.00, respectively SC (July 9, 2014): affirmed the Decision of the CA with the following modifications: 1) the amount of civil indemnity is is increased from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00; and 2) the amount of exemplary damages is damages is increased from P25,000.00 to P30,000.00. SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Arr iero. Bongalon. Bose. Candelaria. Cand elaria. De Leon. Dizon. Feliciano. Feli ciano. Hermogenes. Hermogenes . Maranan. Navarez. Oliva. Ongoco. Sison. Symaco. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte. Viray.

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Accused-appellant Benjie Consorte y Franco thereafter filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above-mentioned Decision dated July 9, 2014. 2014. He raises the incredibility of his identification as the perpetrator of the crime. Meanwhile, in a Letter dated September 21, 2014, the Officer-in-Charge of the New Bilibid Prison (NBP) informed the Court that accused-appellant accused-appellant died on July 14, 2014.

ISSUE: Whether or not the criminal and civil liability ex delicto of accused-appellant are extinguished by his death prior to final judgment (YES)

HELD: YES, the criminal and civil liability ex delicto of delicto of accused-appellant Benjie Consorte y Franco are extinguished by his death prior to final judgment. The judgment or conviction against him is therefore set aside. Article 89 (1) of the Revised Penal Code Code is illuminating: ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal liability is totally extinguished: (1) By the death of death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary penalties, penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender occurs before final judgment ; x x x x Death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction extinguishes his extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the offense committed, i.e., civil liability ex delicto in senso strictiore. strictiore . In the case at bar, accused-appellant died before final judgment , as in fact, his motion for reconsideration is still pending resolution by the Court. As such, it therefore becomes necessary for the Court to declare his criminal liability as well as his civil liability ex delicto delicto to have been extinguished by his death prior to final judgment.


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Case Digests

PEOPLE vs. BAUTISTA G.R. No. 168641 April 27, 2007

FACTS: On June 12, 1999, 1999, a dispute arose between respondent and his co-accused Leonida Bautista, on one hand, and private complainant Felipe Goyena, Jr., on the other. Private complainant filed a Complaint with the Office of the Barangay of Malate, Manila, but no settlement was reached. The barangay chairman then issued a Certification to file action dated August 11, 1999. On August On August 16, 1999, 1999 , private complainant filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor (OCP) a Complaint for slight physical injuries injuries against herein respondent and his co-accused. After conducting the preliminary investigation, Prosecutor Jessica Junsay-Ong issued a Joint Resolution dated November 8, 1999 recommending the filing of an Information against herein respondent. Such recommendation was approved by the City Prosecutor, represented by First Assistant City Prosecutor Eufrocino A. Sulla, but the date of such approval cannot be found in the records. The Information was, however, filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila, Branch 28 only on June 20, 2000. Respondent sought the dismissal of the case against him on the ground that by the time the Information was filed, the 60-day period of prescription from the date of the commission of the crime, that is, on June 12, 1999 had already elapsed. MeTC: ruled that the offense had not yet prescribed Respondent elevated the issue to the RTC via a Petition for Certiorari. Certiorari. RTC: denied said petition and concurred with the opinion of the Me TC Respondent then filed a Petition for Certiorari with Certiorari with the CA. CA: CA: On June 22, 2005, the CA rendered its Decision wherein it held that, the 60-day prescriptive period was interrupted when the offended party filed a Complaint with the OCP of Manila on August 16, 1999. Nevertheless, the CA concluded that the offense had prescribed by the time the Information was filed with the MeTC , reasoning that even if the 10-day period for the CP or ACP Sulla, to act on the resolution is extended up to the utmost limit, it ought not have been taken as late as the last day of the year 1999. Yet, the information was filed with the MeTC only on June 20, 2000, or already nearly six (6) months into the next year. To use once again the language of Article 91 of the RPC , the proceedings at the CPO was unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him (the accused) for a time very much more than the prescriptive period of only two (2) months. The offense charged had, therefore, already prescribed when filed with the court on June 20, 2000.


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Petitioner now comes before the Supreme Court seeking the reversal of the foregoing CA Decision.

ISSUE: Whether or not the prescriptive period began to run anew after the investigating prosecutor’s recommendation to file the proper criminal information against respondent was approved by the City Prosecutor (NO)

HELD: The answer is in the negative. negative. It is not disputed that the filing of the Complaint with the OCP effectively interrupted the running of the 60-day prescriptive period for instituting the criminal action for slight physical injuries. Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code provides thus: ART. 91. Computation of prescription of offenses. - The period of prescription shall prescription shall commence to run run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents, and shall be interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information, and shall and shall commence to run again when again when such proceedings terminate without the accused being convicted or acquitted, or are unjustifiably stopped for any reason not imputable to him. The term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philipppine Archipelago. The CA and respondent are of the view that upon approval of the investigating prosecutor's recommendation for the filing of an Information against respondent, the period of prescription began to run again. again . The Court does not agree. It is a well-settled rule that the filing of the complaint with the fiscal’s office suspends office suspends the running of the prescriptive period . The proceedings against respondent were not terminated upon the City Prosecutor's approval of the investigating prosecutor's recommendation that an Information be filed with the court. The prescriptive period remains tolled from the time the complaint was filed with the Office of the Prosecutor until such time that respondent is either convicted or acquitted by the proper court. The Office of the Prosecutor miserably incurred some delay in filing the Information In formation but such mistake or negligence should s hould not unduly prejudice the interests of the State and the offended party. party . The constitutional right of the accused to a speedy trial cannot be invoked by the petitioner in the present petition considering that the delay d elay occurred not in the conduct of preliminary SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Arr iero. Bongalon. Bose. Candelaria. Cand elaria. De Leon. Dizon. Feliciano. Feli ciano. Hermogenes. Hermogenes . Maranan. Navarez. Oliva. Ongoco. Sison. Symaco. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte. Viray.

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investigation or trial in court but in the filing of the Information after the City Prosecutor had approved the recommendation of the investigating prosecutor to file the Information. The Office of the Solicitor General does not offer any explanation as to the delay in the filing of the Information. The Court will not be made as an unwitting tool in the deprivation of the right of the offended party to vindicate a wrong purportedly inflicted on him by the mere expediency of a prosecutor not filing the proper information in due time. The Court will not tolerate the prosecutor’s apparent lack of a sense of urgency in fulfilling their mandate. Under the circumstances, the more appropriate course of action should be the filing of an administrative administrative disciplinary action against the erring public officials . The Petition is hereby granted and granted and the Decision of the RTC is hereby reinstated.


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Case Digests

ABELLANA vs. PEOPLE G.R. No. 174654 August 17, 17, 2011 2011

FACTS: In 1985, petitioner extended a loan to private respondents spouses Diaga and Saapia Alonto (spouses Alonto), secured by a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over Mortgage over Lot Nos. 6471 and 6472 located at Pardo, Cebu City. Subsequently, or in July 9, 1987, petitioner prepared a Deed of Absolute Sale conveying said lots to him for a consideration of P130,000.00. The Deed of Absolute Sale was Sale was signed by spouses Alonto in Manila. However, it was notarized in Cebu City allegedly without the spouses Alonto appearing before the notary public. Thereafter, petitioner caused the transfer of the titles to his name and sold the lots to third persons. On August 12, 1999, an Information was filed charging petitioner with estafa through falsification of public document.

Crime charged: estafa through falsification of public document RTC: guilty of Falsification of a Public Document by a private individual individual Petitioner did not intend to defraud the spouses Alonto; that after the latter failed to pay their obligation, petitioner prepared a Deed of Absolute Sale which Sale which spouses Alonto actually signed; but that the Deed of Absolute Sale was Sale was notarized without the spouses Alonto personally appearing before the notary public. From these, the trial court concluded that petitioner can only be held guilty of falsification of a Public Document by a private individual under Art. 172(1) in relation to Art. 171(2) of the RPC and not and not estafa through falsification of public document as charged in the Information. Information . Petitioner is also directed to institute reconveyance proceedings to t o restore ownership and possession of the real properties in question in favor of private complainants or to pay them P1,103,000.00 representing the value of the properties in case of failure to restore the properties. CA: acquitted the petitioner but nonetheless affirmed the RTC’s finding with respect to petitioner’s civil liability (No criminal liability, only civil liability) CA acquitted him of Falsification of Public Document by a Private Individual because the Information charged him with a different offense which is estafa through falsification of a public document . Petitioner who was charged with and arraigned for estafa through falsification of public document under Art. 171(1) of the RPC could not be convicted of falsification of public document by a private individual under Art. 172(1) in relation to Art. 171(2) . The falsification committed in Art. 171(1) requires 171(1) requires the counterfeiting of any handwriting, signature or rubric while the falsification in Art. 171(2) occurs 171(2) occurs when the offender caused it to appear in a document that a person participated in an act or proceeding when in fact such person did not so participate. Thus, the conviction of the petitioner for an offense not alleged in the Information or one not necessarily included in the offense charged violated his constitutional right to be informed


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of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. Nonetheless, the CA affirmed the trial court’s finding with respect to petitioner’s civil liability.

ISSUE: Whether or not Petitioner Felixberto A. Abellana could still be held civilly liable notwithstanding his acquittal (NO)

HELD: It is an established rule in criminal procedure that a judgment of acquittal shall state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist . exist . When the exoneration is merely due to the failure to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the court should award the civil liability in favor of the offended party in the same criminal action. In other words, the “ extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability liability unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist .” Civil liability arises when one, by reason of his own act or omission , omission , done intentionally or negligently, causes damage to another. Hence, another. Hence, for petitioner to be civilly liable to spouses Alonto, it must be proven that the acts he committed had caused damage to the spouses. However, based on the records of the case, the Court finds that the acts allegedly committed by the petitioner did not cause any damage to spouses Alonto. Alonto . First, First, the Information charged petitioner with fraudulently making it appear that the spouses Alonto affixed their signatures in the Deed of Absolute Sale thereby Sale thereby facilitating the transfer of the subject properties in his favor. However, after the presentation of the parties’ respective evidence, the RTC found that the charge was without basis as the spouses Alonto indeed signed the document and that their signatures were genuine and not forged. Second, even assuming that the spouses Alonto did not personally appear before the notary public for the notarization of the Deed of Absolute Sale, the same does not necessarily nullify or render void ab initio the parties’ transaction. Such non-appearance is not sufficient to overcome the presumption of the truthfulness of the statements contained in the deed. The defective notarization does not ipso facto facto invalidate the Deed of Absolute Sale, Sale, the transfer of said properties from spouses Alonto to petitioner remains valid. Hence, when on the basis of said Deed of Absolute Sale, petitioner caused the cancellation of spouses Alonto’s title and the issuance of new ones under his name, and thereafter sold the same to third persons, no damage resulted to the spouses Alonto. Alonto. Moreover, the Court cannot sustain the alternative sentence imposed upon the petitioner, petitioner, to wit : to institute an action for the recovery of the properties of spouses Alonto or to pay them actual and other kinds of damages. damages . First , it has absolutely no basis in view of the trial court’s finding that the signatures of the spouses Alonto in the Deed of Absolute Sale are Sale are genuine and not SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Arr iero. Bongalon. Bose. Candelaria. Cand elaria. De Leon. Dizon. Feliciano. Feli ciano. Hermogenes. Hermogenes . Maranan. Navarez. Oliva. Ongoco. Sison. Symaco. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte. Viray.

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forged. Second , “sentences should not be in the alternative.” There There is nothing in the law which permits courts to impose sentences in the alternative. While a judge has the discretion of imposing one or another penalty, he cannot impose both in the alternative. “He must fix positively and with certainty the particul ar ar penalty.” There is absolutely no basis for the RTC and the CA to hold petitioner civilly liable to restore ownership and possession of the subject properties to the spouses Alonto or to pay them P1,103,000.00 representing the value of the properties and damages. (SC affirmed the judgment of acquittal, however, it deleted the civil liabilities for lack of factual and legal basis)


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PEOPLE vs. PANGILINAN G.R. No. 152662 June 13, 2012

FACTS: On September 16, 1997, 1997, private complainant Virginia Malolos filed with filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor an affidavit-complaint affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against respondent Ma. Theresa Pangilinan alleging that respondent issued 9 checks in favor of private complainant which were dishonored upon presentment for payment. Respondent filed a civil case for accounting, recovery of commercial documents, enforceability enforceability and effectivity of contract and specific performance performance against private complainant with the RTC, followed by "Petition to Suspend Proceedings on the Ground of Prejudicial Question" before Question" before the Office of the City Prosecutor. The City Prosecutor approved the petition for suspension. Private complainant raised the matter before the Secretary of Justice Justice who reversed the reversed the resolution of the City Prosecutor and ordered the filing of Informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against 22 against respondent in connection with her issuance of 2 checks. The 7 other checks included in the affidavit-complaint filed on September S eptember 16, 1997 were, however, dismissed . Consequently, two counts for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, 22, were filed against respondent Pangilinan on February 3, 2000 before 2000 before the Office of the Clerk of Court, MeTC. Respondent filed an "Omnibus Motion to Quash the Information and to Defer the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest" alleging Arrest" alleging that her criminal liability has been extinguished by reason of prescription. prescription.

MeTC: granted the granted the motion in an order Private complainant filed a notice of appeal. RTC: reversed the reversed the order of MeTC ruling that inasmuch as the Informations were filed on February 3, 2000 although received by the Court itself only on June 7, 2000, they are covered by the Rule as Rule as it was worded before the latest amendment. The criminal action on action on two counts for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, had, had, therefore, not yet prescribed when the same was filed with the court a quo considering the appropriate complaint that started the proceedings having been filed with the Office of the Prosecutor on September 16, 1997 yet . RTC in reversing the said decision, directed to proceed with the hearing of the criminal cases. CA: reversed reversed the decision of RTC, thereby dismissing the criminal cases for the reason that the cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 22 had already prescribed. It held that it reckons the commencement of the period of prescription for violations of B.P. Blg. 22 22 imputed to respondent sometime in the latter part of 1995 , as it was within this period that the she was notified by the private complainant of the fact of dishonor of the subject checks and, the 5-day grace period granted by law had elapsed. The private respondent then had, had , pursuant to Section 1 of Act SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Arr iero. Bongalon. Bose. Candelaria. Cand elaria. De Leon. Dizon. Feliciano. Feli ciano. Hermogenes. Hermogenes . Maranan. Navarez. Oliva. Ongoco. Sison. Symaco. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte. Viray.

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3326, 3326, four years therefrom or until the latter part of 1999 1999 to file her complaint or information against the petitioner before the proper court. The Informations against the petitioner having been filed on February 3, 2000, the said cases had therefore, clearly prescribed. prescribed. Pursuant to Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended , prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person . It was held in the case of Zaldivia of Zaldivia vs. Reyes that Reyes that the proceedings proceedings referred to in Section 2 of Act No. 3326, as amended , are ‘judicial proceedings’ , which means the filing of the complaint or information with the proper court. Otherwise stated, the running of the prescriptive period shall be stayed on the date the case is actually filed in court and not on any date before that , that , which is in consonance with Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended . While the aforesaid case involved a violation of a municipal ordinance, the SC, considering that Section 2 of Act 3326, as amended , governs the computation of the prescriptive period of both ordinances and special laws, finds that the ruling likewise applies to special laws, such as Batas Pambansa Blg. 22. The OSG sought relief to the Supreme Court in the instant petition for review contending that, while it admits that Act No. 3326, as amended by Act No. 3585 and further amended by Act No. 3763, 3763, governs the period of prescription for violations of special laws , it is the institution inst itution of criminal actions, whether filed with the court or with the Office of the City Prosecutor , that interrupts the period of prescription of the offense charged. It submits that the filing of the complaint-affidavit by private complainant on September 16, 1997 interrupted the running of the prescriptive period of the subject B.P. Blg. 22 cases. 22 cases. Petitioner submits that the CA erred in erred in its decision when it relied on the doctrine laid down by this Court in the case of Zaldivia vs. Reyes, Jr. Jr . that the filing the filing of the complaint with the Office of the City Prosecutor is not the "judicial proceeding" that could have interrupted the period of prescription, prescription, contending that in a catena of cases, the SC ruled that the filing of a complaint with the Fiscal’s Office for preliminary investigation suspends the running of the prescriptive period. It therefore concluded that the filing of the Informations with the MeTC of Quezon City on February 3, 2000 was still within the allowable period of four years within which to file the criminal cases for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 in 22 in accordance with Act with Act No. 3326, as amended . Respondent reiterates the ruling of the CA that the filing of the complaint before the City Prosecutor’s Office did not interrupt the running of the prescriptive period considering that the offense charged is a violation of a special law, thus, claiming that the cases relied upon by petitioner involved felonies punishable under the RPC and and are therefore covered by Article by Article 91 of the RPC and RPC and Section 1, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Procedure . Respondent pointed out that the crime imputed against her is for violation of B.P. Blg. 22, 22, which is indisputably a special law and as such, is governed by Act No. 3326, as amended . She submits that a distinction should thus be made between offenses covered by municipal ordinances or special laws, laws , as in this case, and offenses covered by the RPC .


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ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of the affidavit-complaint for estafa and violation of B.P. Blg. 22 against respondent with the Office of the City Prosecutor on September 16, 1997 interrupted the period of prescription of such offense (YES)

HELD: The Court finds that the CA reversively erred in ruling that the offense committed by respondent had already prescribed. prescribed . Indeed, Act Indeed, Act No. 3326 entitled "An Act to Establish Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide When Prescription Shall Begin," as amended , is the law applicable to B.P. Blg. 22 cases 22 cases.. The law reads: SECTION 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts, prescribe acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a) xxx; (b) after four years for years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less than two years; (c) xxx. SECTION 2. Prescription shall begin to run run from the day of the commission of the violation of the law , and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and punishment. The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty person, and shall begin to run again again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not constituting jeopardy. Since B.P. Blg. 22 is 22 is a special law that that imposes a penalty of imprisonment of not less than 30 days but not more than one year or by a fine for its violation , it therefore prescribes in four (4) years in accordance with Act No. 3326. 3326. The running of the prescriptive period, however, should be tolled upon the institution of proceedings against the guilty person. person . It has been held in a previous case that the filing of the complaint in the Municipal Court even if it be merely for purposes of preliminary examination or investigation, should, and thus, interrupt the period of prescription of the criminal responsibility, even if the court where the complaint or information is filed cannot try the case on the merits. Moreover, another case broadened such rule that the filing of the complaint with the Fiscal’s Office also suspends the running of the prescriptive period of a criminal offense. There is no more distinction between cases under the RPC and those covered by special laws with laws with respect to the interruption of the period of prescription. The ruling in Zaldivia in Zaldivia vs. Reyes, Jr. is not controlling in special laws. It has been held in a number of cases involving special laws that the institution of proceedings for preliminary investigation against the accused interrupts the period of prescription. The Court has even ruled that investigations conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission for violations of the Revised Securities Act and the Securities Regulations Code Code effectively interrupts the prescription period because it is equivalent to the preliminary investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Arr iero. Bongalon. Bose. Candelaria. Cand elaria. De Leon. Dizon. Feliciano. Feli ciano. Hermogenes. Hermogenes . Maranan. Navarez. Oliva. Ongoco. Sison. Symaco. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte. Viray.

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cases. In a case which is in all fours with the present case, the Court ruled that commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused before the Office of the City Prosecutor effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under B.P. Blg. 22. 22. In the same case it was held that aggrieved parties, especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond their control, like the accused’s delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the investigating agencies. The Court follows the factual finding of the CA that "sometime in the latter part of 1995" is the reckoning date of the commencement of presumption for violations of B.P. Blg. 22, 22, such being the period within which herein respondent was notified by private complainant of the fact of dishonor of the checks and the five-day grace period granted by law elapsed. The affidavit-complaints affidavit-complaints for the violations were w ere filed against respondent on September 16, 1997. 1997. The cases reached the MeTC of Quezon City only on February 13, 2000 2000 because in the meanwhile, respondent filed a civil case for accounting followed by a petition before the City Prosecutor for suspension of proceedings on the ground of "prejudicial question" . The matter was raised before the Secretary of Justice after the City Prosecutor approved the petition to suspend proceedings. proceedings. It was only after the Secretary of Justice so ordered that the Informations for the violation of B.P. Blg. 22 were filed with the MeTC of Quezon City. Clearly, it was respondent’s own motion for the suspension of the criminal proceedings that caused the filing in court of the 1997 initiated proceedings only in 2000. 2000 . As laid down in jurisprudence, it is unjust to deprive the injured party of the right to obtain vindication on account of delays that are not under his control . The only thing the offended party must do to initiate the prosecution of the offender is to file the requisite complaint. Therefore, DOJ is ordered to re-file the Informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 22 against the respondent.


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LUMANTAS vs. CALAPIZ G.R. No. 163753 January 15, 15, 2014 2014

FACTS: On January 16, 1995, Spouses Hilario Calapiz, Jr. and Herlita Calapiz brought their 8-yearold son, Hanz Calapiz (Hanz), to the Misamis Occidental Provincial Hospital, Oroquieta City, for an emergency appendectomy . Hanz was attended to by the petitioner, who suggested to the parents that Hanz also undergo circumcision circumcision at no added cost to spare him the pain. With the parents’ consent, the petitioner performed the coronal type of circumcision on circumcision on Hanz after his appendectomy . On the following day, Hanz complained of pain in his penis, which exhibited blisters. His testicles were swollen. The parents noticed that the child urinated abnormally after the petitioner forcibly removed the catheter, but the petitioner dismissed the abnormality as normal. On January 30, 1995, Hanz was discharged from the hospital over his parents’ protestations, protestations, and was directed to continue taking antibiotics. On February 8, 1995, Hanz was confined in a hospital because of the abscess formation between the base and the shaft of his penis. Presuming that the ulceration was brought about by appendicitis, the petitioner referred him to Dr. Henry Go, an urologist, who diagnosed the Hanz’s appendicitis, boy to have a damaged urethra. Thus, Hanz underwent cystostomy , and thereafter was operated on three times to repair his damaged urethra. When his damaged urethra could not be fully repaired and reconstructed , Hanz’s parents brought a criminal charge against charge against the petitioner for reckless imprudence resulting resulting to serious physical injuries. injuries .

Crime charged: serious physical injuries injuries originally in the MTC but was transferred to the RTC pursuant to Supreme Court Circular No. 11-99 Prosecution They presented Dr. Rufino Agudera as an expert witness and as the physician who had operated on Hanz twice to repair the damaged urethra. Dr. Agudera testified that Hanz had been diagnosed to have urethral stricture stricture and cavernosal injury left secondary to trauma trauma that had necessitated the conduct of two operations to strengthen and to lengthen the urethra. Although satisfactorily explaining that the injury to the urethra had been caused by trauma, trauma, Dr. Agudera could not determine the kind of trauma that trauma that had caused the injury. Defense Petitioner denied the charge. He contended that at the time of his examination of Hanz on January 16, 1995, he had found an accumulation of pus at the vicinity of the appendix two to three inches from the penis that had required immediate surgical operation; that after performing the appendectomy , he had circumcised Hanz with his parents’ consent by using a congo instrument, thereby debunking the parents’ claim that their child had been cauterized; that he had then cl eared Hanz on January 27, 1995 once his fever had subsided; that he had found no complications when SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Arr iero. Bongalon. Bose. Candelaria. Cand elaria. De Leon. Dizon. Feliciano. Feli ciano. Hermogenes. Hermogenes . Maranan. Navarez. Oliva. Ongoco. Sison. Symaco. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte. Viray.

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Hanz returned for his follow up check-up on February 2, 1995; and that the abscess formation between the base and the shaft of the penis had been brought ab out by Hanz’s burst appendicitis. appendicitis. RTC: acquitted the acquitted the petitioner of the crime charged for insufficiency of the evidence. evidence . Nonetheless, the RTC ruled that the petitioner was liable for moral damages and and was ordered to pay P50,000 because there was a preponderance of evidence showing that Hanz had received the injurious trauma from his circumcision by circumcision by the petitioner. p etitioner. CA: affirmed the affirmed the RTC

ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in affirming petit ioner’s civil liability despite his acquittal of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries (NO)

HELD: NO, NO, CA is correct in affirming petitioner’s civil liability despite his acquittal of the crime of charged. It is axiomatic that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. liable. Nevertheless, the acquittal of an accused of the crime charged does not necessarily extinguish his civil lliability. iability. Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, acquittal , with different effects on the civil liability of the accused. First is is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or omission complained of . This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act or omission. There omission. There being no delict, civil liability ex delicto is delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict complained of. The second The second instance is instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused . In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only . The Rules of Court requires requires that in case of an acquittal, the judgment shall state "whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist." Conformably with the foregoing, therefore, the acquittal of an accused does not prevent a judgment from still being rendered against him on the civil aspect of the criminal case


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unless the court finds and declares that the fact from which the civil liability might arise did not exist.

Although it found the Prosecution’s evidence insufficient to sustain a judgment of conviction against the petitioner for the crime charged, the RTC did not err in determining and adjudging his civil liability for the same act complained of based on mere preponderance of evidence. In this connection, the Court reminds that the acquittal for insufficiency of the evidence did not require that the complainant’s recovery of civil liability should be through the institu tion of a separate civil action for that purpose. The petitioner’s contention that he could not be held civilly liable because there was no proof of his negligence deserves scant consideration. The failure of the Prosecution to prove his criminal negligence with moral certainty did not forbid a finding against him that there was preponderant evidence of his negligence to hold him civilly liable . With the RTC and the CA both finding that Hanz had sustained the injurious trauma from trauma from the hands of the petitioner on the occasion of or incidental to the circumcision, circumcision, and that the trauma trauma could have been avoided, the Court must concur with their uniform findings. Every person is entitled to the physical integrity of his body. Although the Court has long advocated the view that any physical injury, like the loss or diminution of the use of any part of one’s body, is not equatable to a pecuniary loss, and is not susceptible of exact monetary estimation, civil damages should be assessed once that integrity has been violated. The assessment is but an imperfect estimation of the true value of one’s body. The usual practice is to award moral damages for the physical injuries sustained. In Hanz’s case, the undesirable outcome of the circumcision performed by the petitioner forced the young child to endure several other procedures on his penis in order to repair his damaged urethra. Surely, urethra. Surely, his physical and moral sufferings properly warranted the amount of P50,000.00 awarded as moral damages. Many years have gone by since Hanz suffered the injury. Interest of 6% per annum should then be imposed on the award as a sincere means of adjusting the value of the award to a level that is not only reasonable but just and commensurate. commensurate.


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DALURAYA vs. OLIVA G.R. No. 210148 December 08, 2014

FACTS: One afternoon, Marina Oliva was crossing the street when a Nissan Vanette, bearing plate number UPN-172 and traversing EDSA near the Quezon Avenue flyover in Quezon City, ran her over. While Marina Oliva was rushed to the hospital to receive medical attention, she eventually died, prompting her daughter, herein respondent Marla Oliva (Marla), to file a criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide against Daluraya, Daluraya, the purported driver of the vehicle. The prosecution presented as witness Shem Serrano (Serrano), an eye-witness to the incident, who testified that on said date, he saw a woman crossing EDSA heading towards the island near the flyover and that the latter was bumped by a Nissan Vanette bearing plate number UPN172. The prosecution also offered the testimonies of (a) Marla, who testified as to the civil damages sustained by her family as a result of her mother’s death; (b) Dr. Paul Ortiz (Dr. Ortiz), who presented his findings on the autopsy conducted upon the body of Marina Oliva; and (c) Police Senior Inspector Lauro Gomez (PSI Gomez), who conducted the investigation following the incident and claimed that Marina Oliva was hit by the vehicle being driven by Daluraya, albeit he did not witness the incident. However, Daluraya filed an Urgent Motion to Dismiss (demurrer) asserting that he was not positively identified by any of the prosecution witnesses as the driver of the vehicle that hit the victim, and that there was no clear and competent evidence of how the incident transpired.

Crime charged: reckless imprudence resulting in homicide MeTC: granted Daluraya’s demurrer and dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence . It found that the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses were wanting in material details and that they failed to sufficiently establish that Daluraya committed the crime imputed upon him. As to the civil aspect of of the case, the MeTC likewise denied the denied the same, holding that no civil liability can be awarded absent any evidence proving that Daluraya was the person responsible for Marina Oliva’s demise. RTC: dismissed RTC: dismissed the appeal and affirmed the MeTC’s ruling, ruling , declaring that “the act from which the criminal responsibility may spring did not at all exist ” CA: reversed the RTC Decision, Decision , ordering Daluraya to pay Marla the amounts of P152,547.00 as actual damages, damages, P50,000.00 as civil indemnity , and P50,000.00 as moral damages. damages. It also held that the MeTC’s Order showed that Daluraya’s acquittal was based on the fact that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt . As such, Daluraya was not exonerated from civil liability. liability. Hence, this petition. SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Arr iero. Bongalon. Bose. Candelaria. Cand elaria. De Leon. Dizon. Feliciano. Feli ciano. Hermogenes. Hermogenes . Maranan. Navarez. Oliva. Ongoco. Sison. Symaco. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte. Viray.

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ISSUE:

Whether Whether or not the t he CA was correct in finding Daluraya civilly liable for Marina Oliva’s death despite his acquittal in the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in homicide on the ground of insufficiency of evidence (NO)

HELD: The petition is meritorious. Every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable. The acquittal of an accused of the crime charged, however , does not necessarily extinguish his civil liability. In Manantan vs. CA, the Court expounded on the two kinds of acquittal recognized acquittal recognized by our law and their concomitant effects on the civil liability of the accused, as follows: First is is an acquittal on the ground that the accused is not the author of the act or omission complained of . This instance closes the door to civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission cannot and can never be held liable for such act or omission. There omission. There being no delict , civil liability ex liability ex delicto is delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted must be based on grounds other than the delict complained complained of. This is the situation contemplated in Rule 111 of the Rules of Court . The second The second instance is instance is an acquittal based on reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused . In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only . The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where: 1) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; 2) the court declares that declares that the liability of the accused is only civil ; and 3) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted . However, the However, the civil action based on delict may may be deemed extinguished if extinguished if there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist or where the accused did not commit the acts or omission imputed to him. him. Thus, if demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused has the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the court also declares that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. This is because when the accused files a demurrer to evidence, he has not yet adduced evidence both on the criminal and civil aspects of the case. The only evidence on record is the evidence for the prosecution.


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In case of an acquittal, acquittal, the Rules of Court requires that the judgment state “whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which which the civil liability might arise did not exist.” Daluraya’s acquittal was based on the conclusion that the that the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist, given that the prosecution was not able to establish that he was the author of the crime imputed against him. Such conclusion is clear and categorical when the MeTC declared that “the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses are wanting in material details and they did not sufficiently establish that the accused precisely committed the crime charged against him.” Furthermore, him.” Furthermore, when Marla sought reconsideration of the MeTC’s Order acquitting Daluraya, said court reiterated and firmly clarified that “the prosecution was not able to establish that the accused was the driver of the Nissan Vanette which bumped Marina Oliva” and that “there is no competent evidence on hand which proves that the accused was the person responsible for the death of Marina Oliva.” Hence, the CA erred erred in construing the findings of the MeTC, as affirmed by the RTC, that Daluraya’s acquittal was anchored on reasonable doubt , which would necessarily call for a remand of the case to the court a quo for the reception of Daluraya’s evidence on the civil aspect. Records disclose that Daluraya’s acquittal was based on the fact that “the act or omission from which the civil in view of the failure of the prosecution to sufficiently establish that liability may arise did not exist” in he was the author of the crime ascribed against him. Consequently, his civil liability should be deemed as non-existent by the nature of such acquittal.


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SOLIDUM vs. PEOPLE G.R. No. 192123 March 10, 2014

FACTS: FACTS: Gerald Albert Gercayo (Gerald) was born on June 2, 1992 with an imperforate anus. anus . Two days after his birth, Gerald underwent colostomy , a surgical procedure to bring one end of the large intestine out through the abdominal wall, enabling him to excrete through a colostomy bag attached to the side of his body . On May 17, 1995, Gerald, then three years old, was admitted at the Ospital ng Maynila for Maynila for a pull-through operation. Dr. Leandro Resurreccion headed the surgical team, and was assisted by Dr. Joselito Luceño, Dr. Donatella Valeña and Dr. Joseph Tibio. The anesthesiologists anesthesiologists included Dr. Marichu Abella, Dr. Arnel Razon and petitioner Dr. Fernando Solidum (Dr. Solidum). Solidum). During the operation, Gerald experienced bradycardia, bradycardia, and went into a coma. coma . His coma lasted for two weeks, but he regained consciousness only after a month. He could no longer see, hear or move.

Agitated by her son’s helpless and unexpected condition, Ma. Luz Gercayo (Luz) lodged a complaint for reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries with the City Prosecutor’s Prosecutor’s Office of Manila against the attending physicians.

Crime charged: charged: reckless imprudence resulting in serious physical injuries RTC: guilty as charged; also held the Ospital ng Maynila civilly Maynila civilly liable jointly liable jointly and severally with the petitioner CA: affirmed CA: affirmed

ISSUE: 1) Whether or not the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was was applicable herein (NO); (NO); 2) Whether or not Dr. Solidum was liable for criminal negligence (NO) 3) Whether or not Ospital ng Maynila could be held civilly liable jointly and severally with Dr. Solidum (NO)

HELD: HELD: RES IPSA LOQUITOR NOT APPLICABLE In order to allow resort to the doctrine, therefore, the following essential requisites must requisites must first be satisfied, to wit : SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Arr iero. Bongalon. Bose. Candelaria. Cand elaria. De Leon. Dizon. Feliciano. Feli ciano. Hermogenes. Hermogenes . Maranan. Navarez. Oliva. Ongoco. Sison. Symaco. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte. Viray.

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1) the accident was of a kind that does not ordinarily occur unless someone is negligent ; 2) the instrumentality or agency that caused the injury was under the exclusive control of the person charged; charged ; and 3) the injury suffered must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution of the person injured. injured. The Court considers the application here of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur inappropriate loquitur inappropriate.. Although it should be conceded without difficulty that the second and third elements were present, considering that the anesthetic agent and the instruments were exclusively within the control of Dr. Solidum, and that the patient, being then unconscious during the operation, could not have been guilty of contributory negligence, the first element was undeniably wanting. wanting . Luz delivered Gerald to the care, custody and control of his physicians for a pull-through operation. Except for the imperforate anus, Gerald was then of sound body and mind at the time of his submission to the physicians. Yet, he experienced bradycardia during bradycardia during the operation, causing loss of his senses and rendering him immobile. Hypoxia, Hypoxia, or the insufficiency of oxygen supply to the brain that caused the slowing of the heart rate, scientifically termed as bradycardia, bradycardia, would not ordinarily occur in the process of a pull-through operation, or during the administration of anesthesia to the patient , patient , but such fact alone did not prove that the negligence of any of his attending physicians, including the anesthesiologists, had caused the injury . In fact, the anesthesiologists attending to him had sensed in the course of the operation that the lack of oxygen could have been triggered by the vago-vagal reflex , prompting them to administer atropine to atropine to the patient. NO CRIMINAL NEGLIGENCE Dr. Solidum was criminally charged for "failing to monitor and regulate properly the levels of anesthesia administered to said Gerald Albert Gercayo and using 100% halothane and other anesthetic medications." However, medications." However, the foregoing circumstances, taken together, did not prove beyond reasonable doubt that that Dr. Solidum had been recklessly imprudent in administering the anesthetic agent to Gerald . Indeed, Dr. Vertido’s findings did not preclude the probability that other other factors related to Gerald’s major operation, which could or could not necessarily be attributed to the administration of the anesthesia, had caused the hypoxia and hypoxia and had then led Gerald to experience bradycardia. bradycardia. Dr. Vertido revealingly concluded in his report, instead, that "although the anesthesiologist followed the normal routine and precautionary procedures, still hypoxia and its corresponding side effects did occur." The existence of the probability about other factors causing the hypoxia has hypoxia has engendered in the mind of the Court a reasonable doubt as to Dr. Solidum’s guilt , guilt , and moves us to acquit him of him of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to serious p hysical injuries. The Court has to clarify that the acquittal of Dr. Solidum would not immediately exempt him from civil liability. But it cannot now find and declare him civilly liable because the circumstances that have been established here do not present the factual and legal bases for validly doing so. His acquittal did not derive only from reasonable doubt. There was really no firm and competent showing how the injury to Gerard had been caused. That meant that the manner of administration of the anesthesia by Dr. Solidum was not necessarily the cause of the hypoxia that hypoxia that caused the bradycardia experienced bradycardia experienced by Gerard. Consequently, to adjudge Dr. Solidum SY 15-16 | Acosta. Arriero. Arr iero. Bongalon. Bose. Candelaria. Cand elaria. De Leon. Dizon. Feliciano. Feli ciano. Hermogenes. Hermogenes . Maranan. Navarez. Oliva. Ongoco. Sison. Symaco. Tolentino. Valentin. Villafuerte. Viray.

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civilly liable would be to speculate on the cause of the hypoxia. hypoxia. The Court is not allowed to do so, for civil liability must not rest on speculation but on competent evidence. LIABILITY OF OSPITAL NG MAYNILA Although the result now reached has resolved the issue of civil liability, we have to address the unusual decree of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, of expressly holding Ospital ng Maynila civilly Maynila civilly liable jointly and severally with Dr. Solidum. The decree was flawed in logic and in law. In criminal prosecutions, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability that is deemed instituted with the criminal action refers only to that arising from the offense charged. It is puzzling is puzzling,, therefore, how the RTC and the CA could have adjudged Ospital ng Maynila Maynila jointly and severally liable with Dr. Solidum for the damages despite the obvious fact that Ospital ng Maynila, Maynila , being an artificial entity, had not been charged along with Dr. Solidum . The lower courts thereby acted capriciously and whimsically, which rendered their judgment against Ospital ng Maynila void as void as the product of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Moreover, Ospital ng Maynila Maynila could be held civilly liable only when subsidiary liability would be properly enforceable pursuant to Article to Article 103 of 103 of the Revised Penal Code. Code . But the subsidiary liability seems far-fetched here. The conditions for subsidiary liability to attach to Ospital ng Maynila Maynila should first be complied with. Firstly , pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, Code, Ospital ng Maynila must Maynila must be shown to be a corporation "engaged in any kind of industry ." ." The term industry means industry means any department or branch of art, occupation or business, especially one that employs labor and capital, and is engaged in industry. However, Ospital ng Maynila, Maynila , being a public hospital, hospital , was not engaged in industry conducted for profit but purely in charitable and humanitarian work. Secondly, assuming that Ospital ng Maynila Maynila was engaged in industry for profit, Dr. Solidum must be shown to be an employee of Ospital ng Maynila Maynila acting in the discharge of his duties during the operation on Gerald. Yet, he definitely was not such employee but a consultant of the hospital. And, thirdly , assuming that civil liability was adjudged against Dr. Solidum as an employee (which did not happen here), the execution against him must have been unsatisfied due to his being insolvent . Petition granted. granted.


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CRIM - Case Digest (Batch 6)

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