MARIA FATIMA JAPITANA v ATTY. SYLVESTER PARADO A.C. No. 10859, January 26, 2016 FACTS: In June 2006 respondent Atty. Parado notarized the real estate mortgage over a parcel of land on which family home was constituted. The mortgage was between RC Lending Investors, Inc. as mortgagee and the petitioner’s sisters as mortgagors. Respondent Parado also notarized the affidavit allegedly executed by the mortgagors. RC Lending eventually filed a petition for extrajudicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage, which was granted. Petitioner Fatima Japitana then filed a complaint, which was endorsed to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. The complaint assailed that the signatures in the real estate mortgage as well as the affidavit were forgeries. She alleged that: 1) Parado did not require the persons before him to present any valid identification; 2) her sister Theresa Japitana was a schizophrenic; and 3) Parado had no notarial authority. The IBP investigating commissioner noted that Parado had previously testified in court that the mortgagors and the witnesses personally appeared before him and there was no proof that he lied before the court. However, he was found to be dishonest when he testified that he was issued a notarial commission effective until 2008. This claim was belied by the certification issued by the Clerk of Court of RTC of Cebu City. The IBP resolved to revoke the notarial commission of respondent if presently commissioned. He was also disqualified from being commissioned as Notary Public for two (2) years and suspended from the practice of law for six (6) years.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Parado is liable for notarizing documents without notarial commission?
HELD: Yes. Under the 2004 Rules of Notarial Practice, a person commissioned as a notary public may perform notarial acts in any place within the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court for a period of two (2) years commencing the first day of January of the year in which the commissioning is made. Commission either means the grant of authority to perform notarial or the written evidence of authority. Without a commission, a lawyer is unauthorized to perform any of the notarial acts. Atty. Parado knowingly performed notarial acts in 2006 in spite of the absence of a notarial commission for the said period. Atty. Parado’s misdeed run afoul of his duties and responsibilities, both as a lawyer and a notary public. He was remiss in his professional duties and responsibilities. Even if Atty. Parado had a valid notarial commission, he should have required the presentation of competent evidence of identity instead of merely relying on the Certificate of Community Tax (CTC). Section 12, Rule II of the Rules of Notarial Practice defines competent evidence of identity as: 1) 2)
At least one current identification document issued by an official agency bearing the photograph and signature of the individual; or The oath or affirmation of one credible witness not privy to the instrument, document or transaction, who is personally known to the notary public and who personally knows the individual, or of two credible witnesses neither of whom is privy to the instrument, document or transaction who each personally knows the individual and shows to the notary public a documentary identification.
Apparently, CTCs are not competent evidence of identity. Atty. Parado is suspended from the practice of law for 2 years and permanently disqualified from being commissioned as a Notary Public.
ANGELITO RAMISCAL and MERCEDES ORZAME v. ATTY. EDGAR S. ORRO Facts: Complainants Spouses engaged the legal services of respondent Atty. Orro to handle a case in which they were the defendants seeking the declaration of the nullity of title to a parcel of land. Upon receiving the P10,000.00 acceptance fee from them, the respondent handled the trial of the case until the RTC decided it in their favor. As expected, the plaintiffs appealed to the CA, and they ultimately filed their appellants' brief. Upon receipt of the appellants' brief, the respondent requested from the complainants an additional amount of P30,000.00 for
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the preparation and submission of their appellees' brief in the CA. They obliged and paid him the amount requested. Later on, the CA reversed the decision of the RTC. The respondent did not inform the Ramiscals of the adverse decision of the CA which they only learned about from their neighbors. They endeavored to communicate with the respondent but their efforts were initially in vain. When they finally reached him, he asked an additional P7,000.00 from them as his fee in filing a motion for reconsideration in their behalf, albeit telling them that such motion would already be belated. Even so, they paid to him the amount sought. To their dismay, they later discovered that he did not file the motion for reconsideration; hence, the decision attained finality, eventually resulting in the loss of their property measuring 8.479 hectares with a probable worth of P3,391,600.00.
Issue: WON Atty. Orro violated the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility
Ruling: Yes. Atty. Orro violated the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Every lawyer, upon becoming a member of the Philippine Bar, solemnly takes the Lawyer's Oath, by which he vows, among others, that: "I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion, with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to my clients." If he should violate the vow, he contravenes the Code of Professional Responsibility, particularly its Canon 17, and Rules 18.03 and 18.04 of Canon 18, viz.: CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him. CANON 18 - A lawyer shall serve his client with competence and diligence. xxxx Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him. and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Rule 18.04 - A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client's request for information. It is beyond debate, therefore, that the relationship of the lawyer and the client becomes imbued with trust and confidence from the moment that the la wyer-client relationship commences, with the lawyer being bound to serve his clients with full competence, and to attend to their cause with utmost diligence, care and devotion. To accord with this highly fiduciary relationship, the client expects the lawyer to be always mindful of the former's cause and to be diligent in handling the former's legal affairs. As an essential part of their highly fiduciary relationship, the client is entitled to the periodic and full updates from the lawyer on the developments of the case. The lawyer who neglects to perform his obligations violates Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. As a member of the Law Profession in the Philippines, the respondent had the foregoing professional and ethical burdens. But he obviously failed to discharge his burdens to the best of his knowledge and discretion and with all good fidelity to his clients. By voluntarily taking up their cause, he gave his unqualified commitment to advance and defend their interest therein. Even if he could not thereby guarantee to them the favorable outcome of the litigation, he reneged on his commitment nonetheless because he did not file the motion for reconsideration in their behalf despite receiving from them the P7,000.00 he had requested for that purpose. He further neglected to regularly update them on the status of the case, particularly on the adverse result, thereby leaving them in the dark on the proceedings that were gradually turning against their interest. Updating the clients could have prevented their substantial prejudice by enabling them to engage another competent lawyer to handle their case. As it happened, his neglect in that respect lost for them whatever legal remedies were then available. His various omissions manifested his utter lack of professionalism towards them. We further underscore that the respondent owed it to hi mself and to the entire Legal Profession of the Philippines to exhibit due respect towards the IBP as the national organization of all the members of the Legal Profession. His unexplained disregard of the orders issued to him by the IBP to comment and to appear in the administrative investigation of his misconduct revealed his irresponsibility as well as his disrespect for the IBP and its proceedings.
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He thereby exposed a character flaw that should not tarnish the nobility of the Legal Profession. He should always bear in mind that his being a lawyer demanded that he conduct himself as a person of the highest moral and professional integrity and probity in his dealings with others. He should never forget that his duty to serve his clients with unwavering loyalty and diligence carried with it the corresponding responsibilities towards the Court, to the Bar, and to the public in general.
ACA v. ATTY. SALVADO A.C. No. 10952, January 26, 2016 En banc
FACTS: Engel Paul Aca filed an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Salvado for violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR). Complainant alleged, among others, that sometime in 2010, he met Atty. Salvado through Atty. Samuel Divina (Atty. Divina), his childhood friend; that Atty. Salvado introduced himself as a lawyer and a businessman engaged in several businesses including but not limited to the lending business; that on the same occasion, Atty. Salvado enticed the complainant to invest in his business with a guarantee that he would be given a high interest rate of 5% to 6% every month; and that he was assured of a profitable investment due by Atty. Salvado as the latter had various clients and investors. Because of these representations coupled by the assurance of Atty. Salvado that he would not place his reputation as a lawyer on the line, complainant made an initial investment in his business. This initial investment yielded an amount corresponding to the principal plus the promised interest. On various dates from 2010 to 2011, complainant claimed that he was again induced by Atty. Salvado to invest with promises of high rates of return. As consideration for these investments, Atty. Salvado issued several post-dated checks in the total amount of P6,107,000.00, representing the principal amount plus interests. Upon presentment, however, complainant was shocked to learn that the aforementioned checks were dishonored as these were drawn from insufficient funds or a closed account. Despite repeated demands, respondent fails to make good of his obligations with the complainant. The IBP Investigating Commissioner recommended that Atty. Salvado be meted a penalty of suspension from the practice of law for six ( 6) months for engaging in a conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law and for behaving in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. Atty. Salvado's act of issuing checks without sufficient funds to cover the same constituted willful dishonesty and immoral conduct which undermine the public confidence in the legal profession. The IBP-BOG, on the other hand, modified the period of suspension to two years.
ISSUE: WON Atty. Salvado should be held liable for violating the CPR. RULING: YES. The Court sustains the findings of the IBP-BOG and adopts its recommendation r ecommendation in part. A perusal of the records reveals that complainant's version deserves credence, not only due to the unambiguous manner by which the narrative of events was laid down, but also by the coherent reasoning the narrative has employed. The public is, indeed, inclined to rely on representations made by lawyers. As a man of law, a lawyer is necessarily a leader of the community, looked up to as a model citizen. A man, learned in the law like Atty. Salvado, is expected to make truthful representations when dealing with persons, clients or otherwise. Moreover, it must be pointed out that the denials proffered by Atty. Salvado cannot belie the dishonor of the checks. His strained explanation that the checks were mere securities cannot be countenanced. Of all people, lawyers are expected to fully comprehend the legal import of bouncing checks. Hence, the excuse of "gullibility and inadvertence" deserves scant consideration. Surely, Atty. Salvado is aware that promoting obedience to the Constitution and the laws of the land is the primary obligation of lawyers. When he issued the worthless checks,
he discredited the legal profession and created the public impression that laws were mere tools of convenience that could be used, bended and abused to satisfy personal whims and desires. His issuance of the subject checks display his doubtful fitness as an officer of the court. Clearly, he violated Rule 1.01 and Rule 7.03 of the CPR.
SPOUSES JONATHAN AND ESTER LOPEZ versus ATTY. SINAMAR E. LIMOS Facts:
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Complainants alleged that sometime in June 2006, and while living abroad, they secured the services of respondent as counsel in connection with their intention to adopt a minor child, Ethan Benedict Victore.In consideration therefor, complainants, through a representative, paid respondent the aggregate amount of P75,000.00, which was duly received by the latter. A few months later, or on October 6, 2006, they purposely came back to the Philippines for a two (2)-week stay to commence the filing of the adoption case before the proper court. However, despite payment and submission of all the required documents to respondent, no petition was filed during their stay. Sometime in May 2007, complainants, through Jonathan's employer, received respondent's letter dated March 6, 2007, requesting that complainants be allowed to come home to the Philippines to appear and testify in court for the adoption case she purportedly filed on behalf of complainants before the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando City, La Union, Branch 30 (RTC), docketed as Spl. Proc. Case No. 2890. Thus, complainants returned to the Philippines in June 2007, only to find out that: ( a) Spl. Proc. Case No. 2890 referred to a petition for the declaration of the presumptive death of another person filed by another lawyer; and (b) respondent had yet to file a petition for adoption on their behalf. Utterly dismayed, complainants withdrew all their documents from respondent's custody and hired another lawyer to handle the filing of the adoption case. Moreover, complainants demanded the return of the amount of P75,000.00 given as legal fees. However, respondent refused to return such money, retorting that as a standard operating procedure, she does not return "acceptance fees." In view of the foregoing, complainants filed the instant administrative case against respondent before this Court. Despite numerous directives to file a comment, respondent failed to do so; thus, the Court was constrained to dispense with the filing of the same and to impose a fine in the amount of P2,000.00 against her. The administrative case was then referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report, and recommendation, wherein respondent similarly disregarded the IBP's directives to participate in the Mandatory Conference and to submit her position paper despite due notice.
The IBP's Report and Recommendation - The IBP Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty of violating Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, as she neglected the legal matter entrusted to her by complainants - i.e., the filing of the adoption case - for almost a year until complainants finally withdrew their documents from respondent and opted to have the filing of the case handled by another lawyer. Worse, respondent refused to return the amount of P75,000.00 representing legal fees paid by complainants to her. In this relation, the Investigating Commissioner added that respondent's liability was further aggravated by the fact that she: ( a) deceived complainants by informing them that a petition for adoption had already been filed on their behalf, when in truth, there was none; and ( b) failed to file any comment when the Court required her to do so. In a Resolution dated October 10, 2014, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the aforesaid report and recommendation, without mentioning, however, of the IBP Investigating Commissioner's imposition of legal interest on the amount to be returned.
Issue: Whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable for violating the C PR. Held: A judicious perusal of the records reveals that sometime in June 2006, complainants secured the services of respondent in order to file a petition for adoption of a minor child named Ethan Benedict Victore, and in connection thereto, paid the latter the amount of P75,000.00 representing legal fees. However, despite the lapse of almost a year and for reasons unknown, respondent failed to perform anything in furtherance of the legal matter entrusted to her by complainants. As correctly pointed out by the IBP Investigating Commissioner, respondent's acts constitute a flagrant violation of Rule 18.03, Canon 18 of the CPR, to wit: CANON 18 - A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH C OMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE. Rule 18.03 - A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. Under the foregoing provisions, once a lawyer takes up the cause of his client, he is duty-bound to serve the latter with competence, and to attend to such client's cause with diligence, care, and devotion whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed upon him. Therefore, a lawyer's neglect of a legal matter entrusted to him by his client constitutes inexcusable negligence for which he must be held administratively liable, as in this case. In this relation, respondent also violated Rules 16.01 and 16.03, Canon 16 of the CPR when she failed to return the amount of P75,000.00 representing legal fees that complainants paid her, viz.: CANON 16 - A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME INTO HIS POSSESSION. Rule 16.01 - A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or f rom the client. Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. Verily, the relationship between a lawyer and his client is highly fiduciary and prescribes on a lawyer a great fidelity and good faith. The highly fiduciary nature of this relationship imposes upon the lawyer the duty to account for the
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money or property collected or received for or from his client. Thus, a lawyer's failure to return upon demand the funds held by him on behalf of his client - as in this case - gives rise to the presumption that he has appropriated the same for his own use in violation of the trust reposed in him by his client. Such act is a gross violation of general morality, as well as of professional ethics. Even worse, respondent misrepresented to complainants that she had already commenced an adoption proceeding on behalf of the latter, as evidenced by the letter dated March 6, 2007 she sent to Jonathan's employer requesting that he, together with her wife, Ester, be allowed to come home to the Philippines to appear a nd testify in court. She even provided them with a case number, Spl. Proc. Case No. 2890, which was purportedly pending before the RTC. Such misrepresentation resulted in complainants going through the trouble of coming back to the Philippines, only to find out that: ( a) Spl. Proc. Case No. 2890 referred to a petition for the declaration of the presumptive death of another person filed by another lawyer; and (b) respondent had yet to file a petition for adoption on their behalf. These deceitful acts of respondent clearly violate Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR, which provide: CANON 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes. Rule 1.01 — A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the CPR instructs that, as officers of the court, lawyers are bound to maintain not only a high standard of legal proficiency, but also of morality, honesty, integrity, and fair dealing. Indubitably, respondent fell short of such standard when she committed the afore-described acts of deception against complainants. Such acts are not only unacceptable, disgraceful, and dishonorable to the legal profession; they reveal basic moral flaws that make him unfit to practice law. To aggravate further respondent's administrative liability, the Court notes that it repeatedly required her to comment on complainants' petition, but respondent ignored such commands. Similarly, when the instant case was referred to the IBP for investigation, report, and recommendation, respondent again disregarded the directives of the Investigating Commissioner to attend the mandatory conference and to submit a position paper. Such audacity on the part of respondent - which caused undue delay in the resolution of the instant administrative case - contravenes Canon 11 and Rule 12.04, Canon 12 of the CPR, all of which read: CANON 11 - A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others. CANON 12 - A lawyer shall exert every effort and consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse court processes.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Sinamar E. Limos is found GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1, Canon 11, Rule 12.04 of Canon 12, Rules 16.01 and 16.03 of Canon 16, and Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, she is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years, effective upon the finality of this Decision, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely.
CHERYL E. VASCO-TAMARAY , Complainant , v. ATTY. DEBORAH Z. DAQUIS , Respondent . A.C. No. 10868 [Formerly CBD Case No. 07-2041] January 26, 2016 FACTS: Cheryl E. Vasco-Tamaray (Vasco-Tamaray) filed a Complaint-Affidavit before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines on July 30, 2007, alleging that respondent Atty. Deborah Z. Daquis (Atty. Daquis) filed, on her behalf, a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage without her consent and forged her signature on the Petition. 1 She also alleged that Atty. Daquis signed the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage as "counsel for petitioner," referring to Vasco-Tamaray. Vasco-Tamaray narrated that in December 2006, Atty. Daquis informed her "that a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City." 6 In February 2007, Atty. Daquis asked her to appear before the City Prosecutor's Office of Muntinlupa City. On March 5, 2007, Vasco-Tamaray appeared before the City Prosecutor's Office and met Atty. Daquis. She asked Atty. Daquis to give her a copy of the Petition but Atty. Daquis refused. Vasco-Tamaray stated that she obtained a copy of the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage from Branch 207 of the Regional Trial Court of Muntinlupa City. She was surprised to see that the Petition was allegedly signed and filed by her. Vasco-Tamaray alleged that she did not file the Petition, that her signature was forged by Atty. Daquis, and that her purported community tax certificate appearing on the jurat was not hers because she never resided in Muntinlupa City. 10 She attached a Certification issued by the Sangguniang Barangay of Putatan, Muntinlupa City
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stating that she was "never ... a resident of #9 Daang Hari Street, Umali Compound, Summitville Subdivision, Barangay Putatan." 11 She also attached a Certification issued by Barangay Talipapa stating that she has been a resident of "#484-J Saguittarius St., Solville Subd., Barangay Talipapa, Novaliches, Quezon City . . . from 2000 till present." Vasco-Tamaray also alleged that the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage was Atty. Daquis' idea, consented to by Leomarte Tamaray. She further alleged that she had never received any court process. The Petition states that her postal address is "09 Daang Hari St., Umali Comp., Summitville Subd., Putatan, Muntinlupa City[,]"14 which is the address of her husband's family. The return slips of the notices sent by the trial court were received by Encamacion T. Coletraba and Almencis Cumigad, relatives of Leomarte Tamaray. Atty. Daquis filed an Answer countering that her client was Vasco-Tamaray, complainant herself, and not complainant's husband. She alleged that Vasco-Tamaray knew of the Petition as early as October 2006, not December 2006. With regard to the community tax certificate, Atty. Daquis explained that when she notarized the Petition, the community tax certificate number was supplied by Vasco-Tamaray. Atty. Daquis' allegation was supported by the Joint Affidavit of her staff, Ma. Dolor E. Purawan (Purawan) and Ludy Lorena (Lorena). Purawan and Lorena detailed in their Joint Affidavit that they knew Vasco-Tamaray to be a client of Atty. Daquis and that they never saw Atty. Daquis forge Vasco-Tamaray's signature. Purawan stated that she typed the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and that the community tax certificate was provided by VascoTamaray. Atty. Daquis alleged that Vasco-Tamaray wanted her to call and demand money from Leomarte Tamaray but she refused to do so. Atty. Daquis argued that Vasco-Tamaray had a copy of the Petition. When Vasco-Tamaray requested another copy on March 5, 2007, Atty. Daquis was unable to grant her client's request because she did not have a copy of the Petition with her at that time. Atty. Daquis further alleged that Vasco-Tamaray conceived an illegitimate son with a certain Reuel Pablo Aranda. The illegitimate son was named Charles Dino Vasco. Reuel Pablo Aranda signed the Affidavit of Ack nowledgment/Admission of Paternity portion of the birth certificate. Vasco-Tamaray filed a complaint affidavit before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines on July 30, 2007. The Commission on Bar Bar Discipline required the parties to submit their position papers, but based on record, only Vasco-Tamaray complied. The Commission on Bar Discipline recommended the dismissal of the complaint because Vasco-Tamaray failed to prove her allegations. The Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Commission on Bar Discipline in the Resolution dated September 27, 2014.
ISSUE: Whether respondent Atty. Deborah Z. Daquis should be held administratively liable for making it appear that she is counsel for complainant Cheryl Vasco-Tamaray and for the alleged use of a forged signature on the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage.
RULING: This court finds that respondent violated Canons 1, 7, 10, and 17 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The charge against respondent for violation of Canon 15 is dismissed. 1.
CANON 1 — A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and for legal RULE 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.
processes.
Application In this case, respondent merely denied complainant's allegation that she was Leomarte Tamaray's counsel but was unable to rebut the other allegations against her. The records of this case also support complainant's allegation that she never received any court process because her purported address in the Petition is the address of Leomarte Tamaray. When respondent filed the Petition as counsel for complainant when the truth was otherwise, she committed a falsehood against the trial court and complainant.
2.
CANON 7 — A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession, and support the activities of the integrated bar. RULE 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. ... Application
The Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage was signed by a certain "CVasco." The records of this case show that complainant has used two signatures. In her identification cards issued
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by the University of the East, she used a signature that spelled out "CVasco." In her ComplaintAffidavit against respondent, complainant used a signature that spelled out "CTamaray." A comparison of the signatures appearing on the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and on complainant's identification cards show a difference in the stroke of the letters "c" and "o." Further, complainant's signatures in the documents 50 attached to the records consistently appear to be of the same height. On the other hand, her alleged signature on the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage has a big letter "c." 51 Hence, it seems that complainant's signature on the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage was forged. While there is no evidence to prove that respondent forged complainant's signature, the fact remains that respondent allowed a forged signature to be used on a petition she prepared and notarized. In doing so, respondent violated Canon 7, Rule 7.03 and Canon 10, Rule 10.01. 3.
CANON
10 — A lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court. RULE 10.01 - A lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice. Application Respondents act of allowing the use of a forged signature on a petition she prepared and notarized demonstrates a lack of moral fiber on her part. Furthermore, allowing the use of a forged signature on a petition filed before a court is tantamount to consenting to the commission of a falsehood before courts, in violation of Canon 10.
4.
CANON 15 — A lawyer shall observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all his dealings and transactions with his client. RULE 15.03 - A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts. Application This court notes that respondent may have violated Canon 15, Rule 15.03 when she entered her appearance as counsel for complainant 68 even though she was engaged as counsel by Leomarte Tamaray.
Respondent was engaged by Leomarte Tamaray to be his counsel. 74 When the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage was filed, respondent signed the Petition as counsel for complainant. 75 If respondent was indeed engaged as counsel by complainant, then there is conflict of interest, in violation of Canon 15, Rule 15.03. However, there is nothing on record to show that respondent was engaged as counsel by complainant. Hence, this court finds that respondent did not commit conflict of interest. 5.
CANON 17 - A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client and he shall be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed in him Application Respondent failed to protect the interests of her client when she represented complainant, who is the opposing party of her client Leomarte Tamaray, in the same case.
The penalty of DISBARMENT is imposed upon respondent Atty. Deborah Z. Daquis. The Office of the Bar Confidant is directed to remove the name of Deborah Z. Daquis from the Roll of Attorneys.
NEMESIO FLORAN and CARIDAD FLORAN vs. ATTY. ROY PRULE EDIZA , AC No. 5325, February 9, 2016
Doctrine: The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State - the administration of justice - as an officer of the court. To enjoy the privileges of practicing law, lawyers must adhere to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintain the highest degree of morality, and faithfully comply with the rules of the legal profession.
Facts:
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Spouses Floran filed a complaint against Atty. Ediza regarding the complainants’ 3.5525 hectare parcel of land in Misamis Oriental. The said land was not registered. The Court found that Atty. Ediza deceived complainants when he asked them to unknowingly sign a deed of sale transferring a portion of their land to him. When the sale of complainants' land pushed through, Atty. Ediza received half of the amount of the proceeds given by the buyer and falsely misled complainants into thinking that he would register, using the same proceeds, the remaining portion of their land. Such proceeds amounted to P125,463. These actions, which deprived complainants of their property, showed Atty. Ediza's behavior as unbecoming a member of the legal profession. In its 2011 resolution, the Court, (1) suspended Atty. Ediza from the practice of law for six months, effective upon receipt of the Decision; (2) directed him to return to complainants the two sets of documents that he misled them and Sartiga Epal into signing; and (3) ordered Atty. Ediza to pay complainants the amount of P125,463.38, representing the amount he deceived them into paying him, with legal interest. The Court further warned Atty. Ediza that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with more severely. Atty. Ediza was able to serve his suspension. However, he failed to return the documents and the money to the complainants. More than four years since the Court promulgated its Decision, Atty. Ediza has yet to comply with the Court's directives. As such, the complainants kept on sending the letters to the Chief Justice to follow up with the case. In response to the letters of the complainants, the Court kept on ordering Ediza to return the documents and the money. Despite repeated orders of the court, he still failed to deliver the documents and the money. Some of the reasons provided by Ediza everytime he was asked to show cause include: (1) vagueness of the description on the documents that should be returned; (2) finding new evidence to reopen the case and support his defense; and (3) demanding that he should not be ordered to return the same for already complying with the suspension.
Issue: Whether or not Ediza should be disbarred Held: Yes. The Court finds that E diza should be disbarred because he failed to obey the orders and processes of the Court. As a member of the legal profession, Atty. Ediza has the duty to obey the orders and processes of this Court without delay and resistance. Rule 12.04 of Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states: CANON 12
A LAWYER SHALL EXERT EVERY EFFORT AND CONSIDER IT HIS DUTY TO ASSIST IN THE SPEEDY AND EFFICIENT ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE. x
x
x
x
Rule 12.04 - A lawyer shall not unduly delay a case, impede the execution of a judgment or misuse Court processes.
In the present case, Atty. Ediza had previously been found guilty of violating the Code of Professional Responsibility and was suspended from the practice of law for six months. Despite the suspension, Atty. Ediza is once again demonstrating to this Court that not only is he unfit to stay in the legal profession for failing to protect the interests of his clients but is also remiss in following the dictates of the Court, which has administrative supervision over him. Section 5(5), Article VIII of the Constitution recognizes the disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar. Reinforcing the execution of this constitutional authority is Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court which gives this Court the power to remove or suspend a lawyer from the practice of law. The provision states: Section 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. — A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court , or for corruptly or willfully appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for
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the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid a gents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (Emphasis supplied)
In imposing the penalty of disbarment upon Atty. Ediza, we are aware that the power to disbar is one to be exercised with great caution and only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as a legal professional and as an officer of the Court. However, Atty. Ediza's stubborn attitude and unwillingness to comply with the Court's directives, which we deem to be an affront to the Court's authority over members of the Bar, warrant an utmost disciplinary sanction from this Court. The practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts, and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of the State - the administration of justice - as an officer of the court. To enjoy the privileges of practicing law, lawyers must adhere to the rigid standards of mental fitness, maintain the highest degree of morality, and faithfully comply with the rules of the legal profession. Clearly, Atty. Ediza's conduct has made him unfit to remain in the legal profession.chanrobleslaw
A.C. No. 9574, June 21, 2016 MYRNA M. DEVEZA v. ATTY. ALEXANDER M. DEL PRADO. FACTS: Myrna M, Deveza filed a disbarment case against respondent Atty. Alexander M. Del Prado for dishonesty and for acts unbecoming a lawyer. According to the complainant, respondent del Prado bought a land from the complainant which is located at Malvar St. Brgy. Camarin, Caloocan City for P1,500 per square meters on installment basis. To document the sale both parties executed a Contract to Sell wherein Atty. Del Prado took all the copies on the pretext that he will have the document notarized but he never gave a copy of the said document to the complainant. Eventually, Atty. Del Prado defaulted in his obligation by leaving a balance of P 565,950. Consequently, complainant sent a demand letter to the respondent for the payment of the unpaid obligation and/or rescission of the sale. Upon receipt of the demand letter, respondent called respondent and told her to meet at Jollibee, Munoz Branch for him to pay the unpaid balance. Respondent likewise asked complainant to bring the title of the property. In the meeting, respondent brought a completely filled up Deed of Sale where he asked the complainant to sign it before he will give the full payment. Afterwich, Atty. Del Prado gave the complainant only P 5,000 and told her that the complete payment will be given once the document has been notarized. However, Atty. Del Prado never paid the balance of the purchase price for the lot he bought from the complainant. Worst, Atty. Del Prado used the Deed of Sale he made the complainant sign by means of fraud as evidence in the civil case filed by the complainant against him for the rescission of the contract that misled the court. In a Resolution dated September 3, 2012 the Court required Atty. Del Prado to comment on the complaint but he failed to do so. Thus, the Court issued a Resolution on November 18, 2013 to refer the complaint to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation, report and recommendation. When the mandatory conference was set only the counsel of the complainant appeared despite due notice was given to the respondent. Atty. Del Prado did not heed to the order of the IBP. The IBP issued its Report and Recommendation stating that Atty. Del Prado’s failure to answer complaint despite
notices and his continuous absence on the scheduled hearings shows his flouting resistance to the lawful orders of the court and illustrates his dissiliency for his oath of office as a lawyer. The IBP-CBD recommended that Atty. Del Prado be suspended from practice of law and as member of the bar for a period of 2 years. The Court agrees with the findings and recommendation of the IBP.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent Atty. Alexander Del Prado is guilty of violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
HELD:
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Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility specifically mandates all lawyers to uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession. Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the same code prescribes a lawyer from engaging in any unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. They should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession. In the present case, Atty. Del Prado committed an act which fell short of the standard of the norm of conduct required of every lawyer. He deceived the complainant by mak ing her sign the deed of sale and making her believe that he would pay in full the balance of the purchase price after he had the document notarized. Complainant waited for Atty. Del Prado to make good his promise to pay but despite several demands, he continued reneging on
his
obligation
which
prompted
her
to
file
a
case
against
him.
Moreover, Atty. Del Prado wantonly disregarded the lawful orders of the Court and IBP-CBD to file his comment and position paper and to appear in the mandatory conference despite due notice. His continued defiance of the orders of the Court and the IBP-CBD is a deliberate and contemptuous affront on the court's authority which cannot be tolerated. Atty. Del Prado should bear in mind that he is a lawy er and an officer of the court who is duty bound to obey and respect the court processes. He must acknowledge, at all times, the orders of the Court and the IBP-CBD in deference to their authority over him as a member of the bar. Respondent Atty. Alexander Del Prado was found GUILTY of violating Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, hereby was suspended by the court from practice of law for Five (5) years effective upon receipt of the decision with a warning that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely. A.C. No. 11246, June 14, 2016
ARNOLD PACAO, Complainant, v. ATTY. SINAMAR LIMOS, Respondent. Principles: "[T]he practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State upon those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions."
FACTS: Sometime in March 2008, complainant's wife Mariadel Pacao, former vault custodian of BHF Pawnshop (BHF) branch in Mandaluyong City, was charged with qualified theft by BHF. Thereafter, the case was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City. To buy peace, the complainant initiated negotiation with BHF, through Atty. Limos, for a possible settlement. A meeting was then arranged between the complainant and Atty. Limos, where the latter represented that she was duly authorized by BHF. Atty. Limos relayed that BHF is demanding the sum of P530,000.00 to be paid in full or by installments. Further negotiation led to an agreement whereby the complainant would pay an initial amount of P200,000.00 to be entrusted to Atty. Limos, who will then deliver to the complainant a signed affidavit of desistance, a compromise agreement, and a joint motion to a pprove compromise agreement for filing with the court. On October 29, 2009, the complainant gave the initial amount of P200,000.00 to Atty. Limos, who in turn, signed an Acknowledgment Receipt recognizing her undertakings as counsel of BHF. However, Atty. Limos failed to meet the terms of their agreement. Thereafter, in June 2010, the complainant met BHF's representative, Camille Bonifacio, who informed him that Atty. Limos was no longer BHF's counsel and was not authorized to negotiate any settlement nor receive any money in behalf of BHF. This prompted the complainant to send a demand letter to Atty. Limos to return the P200 ,000.00 initial settlement payment, but the latter failed and refused to do so
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The complainant then filed a disbarment case against Atty. Limos before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) - Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD). The IBP-CBD required Atty. Limos to file an answer but she did not file any responsive pleading. On May 5, 2014, the Investigating Commissioner... found enough evidence on record to prove that Atty. Limos committed fraud and practiced deceit on the complainant to the latter's... prejudice by concealing or omitting to disclose the material fact that she no longer had the authority to negotiate and conclude a settlement for and on behalf of BHF, nor was authorized to receive the P200,000.00 from the complainant. On March 8, 2016, the IBP transmitted the notice of the resolution and the case records to the Court for final action pursuant to Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court.
ISSUES: Whether or not the instant disbarment complaint constitutes a sufficient basis to disbar Atty. Limos from the practice of law?
RULING: To begin with, the Court notes that this is not the first time that Atty. Limos is facing an administrative case, for she had already been twice suspended from the practice of law, by this Court, for three months each in Villaflores v. Atty. Limos and Wilkie v. Atty. Limos. Once again, for the third time, Atty. Limos is facing an administrative case before this Court for receiving the amount of P200,000.00 from the complainant purportedly for a possible amicable settlement with her client BHF. Her blunder is compounded by the fact that she did not turn over the money to BHF, nor did she return the same to the complainant despite due demand. Furthermore, she even tried to get the next installment knowing fully well that she was not authorized to enter into settlement negotiations with the complainant as her engagement as counsel of BHF had already ceased. The fact that this is Atty. Limos' third transgression exacerbates her offense. It is not too farfetched for this Court to conclude that from the very beginning, Atty. Limos had planned to employ deceit on the complainant to get hold of a sum of money. Such a conduct is unbecoming and does not speak well of a member of the Bar. The present case comes clearly under the grounds given in Section 27 Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court. The Court, however, does not hesitate to impose the penalty of disbarment when the guilty party has become a repeat offender. Considering the... serious nature of the instant offense and in light of Atty. Limos' pri or misconduct which grossly degrades the legal profession, the imposition of the ultimate penalty of disbarment is warranted. Indeed, Atty. Limos has disgraced the legal profession. The facts and evidence obtaining in this case definitely establish her failure to live up to her duties as a lawyer in accordance with the strictures of the lawyer's oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Canons of Professional Ethics, thereby making her unworthy to continue as a member of the bar. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Sinamar Limos, having violated the Code of Professional Responsibility by committing grave misconduct and willful insubordination, is DISBARRED and her name ordered STRICKEN OFF the Roll of Attorneys effective immediately. This Decision is immediately executory
A.C. No. 10373 [Formerly CBD Case No. 08-2280] FLORA C. MARIANO, Petitioner, vs. ATTY. ANSELMO ECHANEZ, Respondent. FACTS: Before us is a Complaint Affidavit for Disbarment dated August 25, 200 8 1 filed by Flora C. Mariano (Mariano) against respondent Atty. Anselmo Echanez (Atty. Echanez), for violation of the Notarial Law by performing notarial acts on documents without a notarial commission. In support of her complaint, Mariano attached several documents to show proof that Atty. Echanez has indeed performed notarial acts without a notarial commission.
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Also attached to the complaint is a document containing the list of those who were issued notarial commissions for the year 2006-2007 where Atty. Echanez's name was not included as duly appointed notary public . 6 The Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CED) ordered Atty. Echanez to submit his answer to the complaint against him .7 Atty. Echanez moved for extension to fi le his Answer but nevertheless failed to submit his Answer. Thus, the IBP-CBD, deemed Atty. Echanez to be in default .8 On July 24, 2009, during the mandatory conference, only Mariano appeared. The IBP-CBD directed the parties to submit their position papers but again only Mariano submitted her verified position paper. In its Report and Recommendation ,13 the IBP-CBD found Atty. Echanez liable for malpractice for notarizing documents without a notarial commission. The IBP-CBD further noted that Atty. Echanez ignored the processes of the Commission by failing to file an answer on the complaint, thus, it recommended that Atty. Echanez be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years and that he be permanently barred from being commissioned as notary public.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Enchanez committed unauthorized notarial acts which merit the imposition of disciplinary sanction.
RULING: YES. Time and again, this Court has stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless and routine act. It is invested with substantive public interest that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. It must be emphasized that the act of notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document making that document admissible in evidence without further proof of authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full faith and credit upon its face, and for this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements in the performance of their duties . 15 In the instant case, it is undisputable that Atty. Echanez performed notarial acts on several documents without a valid notarial commission. 16 The fact of his lack of notarial commission at the time of the unauthorized notarizations was likewise sufficiently established by the certifications issued by the Executive Judges in the territory where Atty. Echanez performed the unauthorized notarial acts . 17 Atty. Echanez, for misrepresenting in the said documents that he was a notary public for and in Cordon, Isabela, when it is apparent and, in fact, uncontroverted that he was not, he further committed a form of falsehood which is undoubtedly anathema to the lawyer's oath. This transgression also runs afoul of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."18 In a number of cases, the Court has subjected lawyers to disciplinary action for notarizing documents outside their territorial jurisdiction or with an expired commission. Atty. Echanez, despite notices, did not even attempt to present any defense on the complaint against him. He did not even attend the mandatory conference set by the IBP. He ignored the IBP's directive to file his answer and position paper which resulted in the years of delay in the resolution of this case. Clearly, this conduct runs counter to the precepts of the Code of Professional Responsibility and violates the lawyers oath which imposes upon every member of the Bar the duty to delay no man for money or malice. Atty. Echanez's failure to attend the mandatory conference and to submit his Answer and Position paper without any valid explanation is enough reason to make him administratively liable since he is duty-bound to comply with all the lawful directives of the IBP, not only because he is a member thereof but more so because IBP is the Courtdesignated investigator of this case . 24 As an officer of the Court, Atty. Echanez is expected to know that a resolution of this Court is not a mere request but anorder which should be complied with promptly and completely. This is also true of the orders of the IBP. WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Anselmo S. Echanez is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years and BARRED PERMANENTLY from being commissioned as Notary Public, effective upon his receipt of a copy of this decision with a stem warning that a repetition of the same shall be dealt with severely.
DIONNIE RICAFORT vs. ATTY. RENE O. MEDINA (A.C. No. 5179, May 31, 2016) FACTS: *The Complainant alleged his tricycle sideswiped respondent's car along Sarvida Street in Surigao City. Respondent alighted from his car and confronted complainant. Respondent allegedly snapped at complainant, saying: "Wa ka makaila sa aka?" ("Do you not know me?") Respondent proceeded to slap complainant, and then left. Manuel Cuizon, a traffic aide, informed complainant of the plate number of respondent's car. Complainant later learned that the driver of the car was the provincial board member of Surigao del Norte.
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The complainant alleged that respondent's act showed arrogance and disrespect for his oath of office as a lawyer. Complainant alleged that this act constituted gross misconduct. *A letter signed by Mayor Arlencita E. Navarro (Mayor Navarro), League of Mayors President of Surigao del Norte Chapter said that the respondent slapped complainant and ca used him great humiliation. Thus, respondent should be administratively penalized for his gross misconduct and abuse of authority. Attached to Mayor Navarro's letter were two (2) pages containing the signatures of 19 Mayors of different municipalities in Surigao Del Norte. *In his Report IBP Commissioner De La Rama recommended the penalty of suspension from the practice of law for 60 days from notice for misconduct and violation of Canon 7, Rule 7 .03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Commissioner found that contrary to respondent's claim, there was indeed a slapping incident. *The Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors issued the Resolution adopting and approving with modification Commissioner De La Rama's recommendation as to the suspension (30 days). ISSUE: Whether respondent shall be held administratively liable HELD: Yes. He shall be SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) months. It is true that this Court does not tolerate the unceremonious use of disciplinary proceedings to harass its officers with baseless allegations. This Court will exercise its disciplinary power against its officers only if allegations of misconduct are established. A lawyer is presumed to be innocent of the charges against him or her. He or she enjoys the presumption that his or her acts are consistent with his or her oath. Thus, the burden of proof still rests upon complainant to prove his or her claim. In administrative cases against lawyers, the required burden of proof is preponderance of evidence, or evidence that is superior, more convincing, or of "greater weight than the other.” In this case, complainant discharged this burden. The slapping incident was not only alleged by complainant in detail in his signed and notarized Affidavit; complainant's Affidavit was also supported by the signed and notarized Affidavit of a traffic aide present during the incident. It was even the traffic aide who informed complainant of respondent's plate number. In finding that complainant was slapped by respondent, Commissioner De La Rama gave weight to the letter sent by the League of Mayors and ruled that "the people's faith in the legal profession eroded" because of respondent's act of slapping complainant. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors correctly affirmed and adopted this finding. The League of Mayors' letter, signed by no less than 19 Mayors, strengthened complainant's allegations. Contrary to respondent's claim that it shows the political motive behind this case, the letter reinforced complainant's credibility and motive. The presence of 19 Mayors' signatures only reinforced the appalling nature of respondent's act. It reflects the public's re action to respondent's display of arrogance.
The purpose of administrative proceedings is to ensure that the public is protected from lawyers who are no longer fit for the profession. In this instance, this Court will not tolerate the arrogance of and harassment committed by its officers. Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides: Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. By itself, the act of humiliating another in public by slapping him or her on the face hints of a character that disregards the human dignity of another. Respondent's question to complainant, "Wa ka makaila sa ako?" ("Do you not know me?") confirms such character and his potential to abuse the profession as a tool for bullying, harassment, and discrimination. This arrogance is intolerable. It discredits the legal profession by perpetuating a stereotype that is unreflective of the nobility of the profession. As offic ers of the court and of the law, lawyers are granted the privilege to serve the public, not to bully them to submission. Good character is a continuing qualification for lawyers. This Court has the power to impose disciplinary sanctions to lawyers who commit acts of misconduct in either a public or private capacity if the acts show them unworthy to remain officers of the court. This Court has previously established that disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis . They are neither civil nor criminal in nature. They are not a determination of the parties' rights. Rather, they are pursued as a matter of public interest and as a means to determine a lawyer's fitness to continue holding the privileges of being a court officer. As in criminal cases, complainants in administrative actions against lawyers are mere witnesses. They are not indispensable to the proceedings. It is the investigative process and the finding of
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administrative liability that are important in disciplinary proceedings.Hence, complainant's absence during the hearings before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines is not a bar against a finding of administrative liability.
ARTHUR S. TULIO v. ATTY. GREGORY F. BUHANGIN
Facts: Petitioner sought his legal advice concerning a property owned by his mother who was then transferred in the names of third parties. Respondent prepared and notarized a Deed of Waiver of Rights signed by all of his siblings in his favor. Thereafter, petitioner engaged the services of respondent to represent him in filing a case for specific performance and damages. To petitioner’s surprise, respondent was the counsel of his siblings concerning the same subject property, filed a rescission of the waiver of rights that the Respondent himself prepared and notarized. Petitioner filed a motion to disqualify him. Subsequently, respondent filed a petition as counsel for the siblings of the petitioner for conflict of interest.
IBP in its Report and Recommendation recommended that Atty. Buhangin found Atty. Buhangin to have violated not only his lawyer’s oath but also the Code of Professional Responsibility, and recommended that he be meted the penalty of suspension for two (2) months. Issue: Whether or not the respondent violated the Lawyer’s Oath a nd Code of Professional Responsibility Ruling:The court ruled, respondent Atty. Gregory F. Buhangin is hereby held GUILTY of representing conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar ac ts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
Patrick Caronan v Richard Caronan a.k.a Patrick Caronan, July 12, 2016
Facts:
On 2013, a complaint was filed by the real Patrick A. Caronan against his brother Richard A. Caronan a.k.a. “Atty. Patrick A. Caronan” before the Integrated Bar of the Philippin es.
Patrick said he learned from Richard that the latter had enrolled at St. Mary’s University College of Law in Bayombong, Nueva Vizcaya using Patrick’s name and college records from the UM and that he passed the
Bar Exams in 2004. ( the complainant knew that his brother was using his name gyud)
In 2009, he said he was ordered to report to the head office of Philippine Seven Corporation, operator of 7-11, which informed him that the National Bureau of Investigation had requested his appearance in relation to its investigation of a certain “Atty. Patrick A. Caronan” for qualified theft and estafa. Aside from using his name, Patrick said that his brother was also facing charges for gun- running and violation of Batas Pambansa 22 (Bouncing Checks Law)
Complainant filed the present Complaint-Affidavit to stop respondent's alleged use of the former's name and identity, and illegal practice of law
In his Answer, respondent denied all the allegations against him and invoked res judicata as a defense. He maintained that his identity can no longer be raised as an issue as it had already been resolved in CBD Case No. 09-2362 where the IBP Board of Governors dismissed
[30]
the administrative case [31] filed by
Agtarap against him, and which case had already been declared closed and terminated by this Court in A.C. No. 10074
IBP found respondent guilty of illegally and falsely assuming complainant's name, identity, and academic record and recommended that respondent and the name "Richard A. Caronan" be barred from being admitted as a member of the Bar; and finally, for making a mockery of the judicial institution, the IBP was directed to institute appropriate actions against respondent.
Issues: 1. Whether or not the IBP erred in ordering that the name “Patrick Caronan be st ricken off the Roll of Attorneys; 2. Whether or not the IBP erred in ordering that the name “Richard Caronan” be barred from being admitted to
the Bar.
Ruling:
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No, the IBP did not err in both orders. The foregoing indubitably confirm that respondent falsely used complainant's name, identity, and school records to gain admission to the Bar. Since complainant - the real "Patrick A. Caronan" - never took the Bar Examinations, the IBP correctly recommended that the name "Patrick A. Caronan" be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. The IBP was also correct in ordering that respondent, whose real name is "Richard A. Caronan," be barred from admission to the Bar. Under Section 6, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, no applicant for admission to the Bar Examination shall be admitted unless he had pursued and satisfactorily completed a pre-law course, viz.: Section 6. Pre-Law. - No applicant for admission to the bar examination shall be admitted unless he presents a certificate that he has satisfied the Secretary of Education that, before he began the study of law , he had pursued and satisfactorily completed in an authorized and recognized university or college, requiring for admission thereto the completion of a four-year high school course, the course of study prescribed therein for a bachelor's degree in
arts or sciences with any of the following subject as major or field of concentration: political science, logic, english, Spanish, history, and economics. (Emphases supplied)
Here, respondent never completed his college degree. While he enrolled at the PLM in 1991, he left a year later and entered the PMA where he was discharged in 1993 without graduating. [56] Clearly, respondent has not completed the requisite pre-law degree. The Court does not discount the possibility that respondent may later on complete his college education and earn a law degree under his real name. However, his false assumption of his brother's name, identity, and educational records renders him unfit for admission to the Bar. The practice of law, after all, is not a natural, absolute or constitutional right to be granted to everyone who demands it. [57] Rather, it is a privilege limited to citizens of good
moral character (at least common honesty). Here, respondent exhibited his dishonesty and utter lack of moral fitness to be a member of the Bar when he assumed the name, identity, and school records o f his own brother and dragged the latter into controversies which eventually caused him to fear for his safety and to resign from PSC where he had been working for years. Finally, respondent made a mockery of the legal profession by pretending to have the necessary qualifications to be a lawyer.
GARCIA vs. SESBREÑO (A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457 | February 3, 201 5) DOCTRINE: A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended as attorney by this Court by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. This Court has ruled that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude. Moral turpitude is an act of baseness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes to his fellow men or to society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.
FACTS: Two complaints for disbarment were filed by Dr. Melvyn G. Garcia (Garcia) against Atty. Raul H. Sesbrefio (Sesbrefio). The two cases, docketed as A.C. No. 7973 and A.C. No. 10457, were consolidated in the Court's Resolution dated 30 September 2014. A.C. No. 7973 - On 30 July 2008, Garcia filed a complaint for disbarment against Sesbreño before the Office of the Bar Confidant. Garcia alleged that in 2005 while he was in Japan, Sesbreño, representing Maria Margarita and Angie Ruth, filed an action for support against him and his sister Milagros Garcia Soliman. At the time of the filing of the case, Maria Margarita was already 39 years old while Angie Ruth was 35 years old. The case was dismissed. In 2007, Garcia returned from Japan. When Sesbreño and G arcia’s children learned about his return, Sesbreño fil ed
a Second Amended Complaint against him. A.C. No. 10457 - Garcia alleged that Sesbreño is practicing law despite his previous conviction for homicide in Criminal Case No. CBU-31733, and despite the facts that he is only on parole and that he has not fully served his sentence. Garcia alleged that Sesbreño violated Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court by continuing to engage in the practice of law despite his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Upon the directive of the IBP-
CBD, Garcia submitted his verified complaint against Sesbreño alleging basically the same facts he alleged in A.C. No. 7973. In his answer to the complaint, Sesbreño alleged that his sentence was commuted and the phrase "with the inherent accessory penalties provided by law" was deleted. Sesbreño argued that even if the accessory penalty was not deleted, the disqualification applies only during the term of the sentence. Sesbreño further alleged that
15
homicide does not involve moral turpitude. Sesbreño claimed that Garcia’ s complaint was motivated by extreme malice, bad faith, and desire to retaliate against him for representing Garcia’s daughters in court.
The IBP-CBD ruled that conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment or suspension. Citing International Rice Research Institute v. National Labor Relations Commission, the IBPCBD further ruled that homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. The IBP-CBD reviewed the decision of this Court convicting Sesbreño for the crime of homicide, and found that the circumstances leading to the death of the victim in volved moral turpitude. Following the ruling of this Court in Soriano v. Atty. Dizon3 where the respondent was disbarred for having been convicted of frustrated homicide, the IBP-CBD recommended that Sesbreño be disbarred and his name stricken from the Roll of Attorneys. In its Resolution No. XX-2013-19 dated 12 February 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD.
ISSUES: whether conviction for the crime of homicide involves moral turpitude. RULING: YES The court adopted the findings and recommendation of the IBP-CBD and approve Resolution No. XX-2013-19 dated 12 February 2013 and Resolution No. XX-2014-31 dated 11 February 2014 of the IBP Board of Governors. This is not to say that all convictions of the crime of homicide do not involve moral turpitude. Homicide may or may not involve moral turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. Moral turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not shown by every known and intentional violation of statute, but whether any particular conviction involves moral turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends on all the surrounding circumstances. While x x x generally but not always, crimes mala in se involve moral turpitude, while crimes mala prohibitado not, it cannot always be ascertained whether moral turpitude does or does not exist by classifying a crime as malum in se or as malum prohibitum, since there are crimes which are mala in se and yet rarely involve moral turpitude and there are crimes which involve moral turpitude and are mala prohibita only. It follows therefore, that moral turpitude is somewhat a vague and indefinite term, the meaning of which must be left to the process of judicial inclusion or exclusion as the cases are reached. The IBP-CBD correctly stated that Amparado and Yapchangco were just at the wrong place and time. They did not do anything that justified the indiscriminate firing done by Sesbreño that eventually led to the death of Amparado. The court cannot accept Sesbreño’s argument that the executive clemency restored his full civil and political rights.
Sesbreño cited In re Atty. Parcasio to bolster his argume nt. In that case, Atty. Parcasio was granted “an absolute and unconditional pardon” which restored his “full civil and political rights,” a circumstance not present in these cases. Here, the Order of Commutation did not state that the pardon was absolute a nd unconditional. There are four acts of executive clemency that the President can extend: the President can grant reprieves, commutations, pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final judgment. In this case, the executive clemency m erely “commuted to an indeterminate prison term of 7 years and 6 months to 10 years imprisonment” the penalty imposed on Sesbrefio. Commutation is a mere reduction of penalty. Commutation only partially extinguished criminal liability. The penalty for Sesb refio’ s crime was never wiped out. He served the commuted or reduced penalty, for which reason he wa s released from prison. As regards Disbarment, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court states that a member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended as attorney by this Court by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. This Court has ruled that disbarment is the appropriate penalty for conviction by final judgment for a crime involving moral turpitude. Moral turpitude is an act of ba seness, vileness, or depravity in the private duties which a man owes to his fellow men or to society in general, contraryto justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals. Hence, Respondent Raul H. Sesbreno is DISBARRED.
JOY A. GIMENO, Complainant, vs. ATTY. PAUL CENTILLAS ZAIDE, Respondent. SECOND DIVISION, A.C. No. 10303, April 22, 2015, BRION, J. Facts: Joy A. Gimeno (Cimeno) filed a complaint with the IBP's Commission on Bar Discipline, charging Atty. Zaide with: (1) usurpation of a notary public's office; (2) falsification; (3) use of intemperate, offensive and abusive language; and (4) violation of lawyer-client trust. Gimeno alleged that even before Atty. Zaide's
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admissionhttps://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri2015/apr2015/ac_10303_2015.html - fnt4 to the Bar and receipt of his notarial commission, he had notarized a partial extrajudicial partition with deed of absolute sale on March 29, 2002. She also accused Atty. Zaide of making false and irregular entries in his notarial registers. Gimeno further submitted that she was Atty. Zaide's former cli ent. Despite their previous lawyer-client relationship, Atty. Zaide still appeared against her in the complaint for estafa and violation of RA 3019 that one Priscilla Somontan (Somontan) filed against her with the Ombudsman. Gimeno contended that Atty. Zaide’s statements constitute intemperate, offensive and abusive language, which a lawyer is proscribed from using in his dealings. In his answer, Atty. Zaide argued that he did not notarize the March 29, 2002 partial extrajudicial partition. As it appeared on the notarial page of this document, his notarial stamp and falsified signature were superimposed over the typewritten name of Atty. Elpedio Cabasan, the lawyer who actually notarized this document. Atty. Zaide claimed that Gimeno falsified his signature to make it appear that he notarized it before his admission to the Bar. On the alleged falsification of his notarial entries, Atty. Zaide contended that he needed to simultaneously use several notarial registers in his separate satellite offices in order to better cater to the needs of his clients and accommodate their growing number. This explains the irregular and non-sequential entries in his notarial registers. Atty. Zaide argued that Gimeno was never his client since she did not personally hire him as her counsel. Gimeno engaged the services of ZMZ where he previously worked as an associate. The real counsel of Gimeno and her relatives in their annulment of title case was Atty. Leo Montalban Zaragoza, one of ZMZ's partners. He denied that he used any intemperate, offensive, and abusive language in his pleadings. Commissioner Pedro A. Magpayo, Jr. (Commissioner Magpayo) found Atty. Zaide administratively liable for violating the Notarial Practice Rules, representing conflicting interests, and using a busive and insulting language in his pleadings. The IBP Board of Governors (Board) modified the recommended penalty and imposed instead the penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law, revocation of notarial commission, if existing, and two years suspension from being commissioned as a notary public.Atty. Zaide sought for the reconsideration of the Board's resolution but this was also denied in it s subsequent resolution.
Issue: Whether or not Atty. Zaide should be administratively liable. Ruling: The Court agrees with the IBP Board of Governors' findings and recommended penalty, and accordingly confirms them. Violation of the Notarial Practice Rules a. Usurpation of a notarial office This Court notes that at the time the document was purportedly notarized, Atty. Zaide's details as a lawyer and as
a notary public had not yet existed. He was admitted to the Bar only on May 2, 2002; thus, he could not have obtained and used the exact figures pertaining to his roll number, PTR number, IBP number and the expiration date of his notarial commission, prior to this date, particularly on March 29, 2002. Atty. Zaide could not have notarized the document before his Bar admission and receipt of his notarial commission. b. Maintaining different notarial registers in separate notarial offices We find that Atty. Zaide violated the Notarial Practice Rules by maintaining different notarial registers in several offices. Section 1(a), Rule VI of the Notarial Practice Rules provides that "a notary public shall keep, maintain, protect and provide for lawful inspection as provided in these Rules, a chronological official notarial register of notarial acts consisting of a permanently bound book with numbered pages." The same section further provides that "a notary public shall keep only one active notarial register at any given time." On this basis, Atty. Zaide's act of simultaneously keeping several active notarial registers is a blatant violation of Section 1, Rule VI. The Notarial Practice Rules strictly requires a notary public to maintain only one active notarial register and ensure that the entries in it are chronologically arranged. The "one active notarial register" rule is in place to deter a notary public from assigning several notarial registers to different offices manned by assistants who perform notarial services on his behalf. Representing conflicting interests One of these tests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of a lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity and loy alty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double -dealing in the performance of that duty. Another test is whether a lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use against a former client any confidential information acquired through their connection or previous employment. Applying these tests, we find no conflict of interest when Atty. Zaide appeared against Gimeno, his former law firm's client. The lawyer-client relationship between Atty. Zaide and Gimeno ceased when Atty. Zaide left ZMZ. Moreover, the case where Gimeno engaged ZMZ's services is an entirely different subject matter and is not in any way connected to the complaint that Somontan filed against Gimeno with the Ombudsman. Use of intemperate, offensive and abusive language in professional dealings
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As shown in the record, Atty. Zaide,in the reply that he drafted in the Ombudsman case, called Gimeno a "notorious extortionist." And in another case, Gimeno observed that Atty. Zaide used the following demeaning and immoderate language in presenting his comment against his opposing counsel: Her declaration in Public put a shame, DISGRACE, INDIGNITY AND HUMILIATION in the whole Justice System x x x This clearly confirms Atty. Zaide's lack of restraint in the use and choice of his words - a conduct unbecoming of an officer of the court. While a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, and illuminating but not offensive. Atty. Zaide is found GUILTY of violating the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice and for using intemperate, offensive and, abusive language in violation of Rule 8.01, Canon 8 and Rule 11.03, Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. A.C. No. 10187
July 22, 2015
[Formerly CBD Case No. 11-3053]
CELINA F. ANDRADA, Complainant, vs. ATTY. RODRIGO CERA, Respondent.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
This administrative case stemmed from an affidavit-complaint1 filed by Celina F. Andrada (complainant) against Atty. Rodrigo Cera (respondent) for allegedly engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, and deceitful conduct in violation of the Lawyer's Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR).
Antecedents
Sometime in late 2009, the complainant hired the respondent to represent her in an annulment of marriage case pending before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 59, Baguio City.
In order to file the annulment case, the complainant needed to submit National Statistics Office (NSO) copies of her children's birth certificates – documents which could not be obtained from the NSO because of her husband's failure to completely accomplish the certificates resulting in the non-registration of the births of their two children, Juliane Lourdes and Jose Sebastian. The complainant gave the respondent the amount of three thousand pesos (₱1,000.00) to process the registration and issuance of her children's birth certificates with the NSO . The complainant also gave the respondent, through a friend, the amount often thousand pesos (₱10,000.00) as advance payment for the hiring of a psychologist and/or the conduct of psychologist tests for herself and her children.
In July 2010 when the complainant herself followed up with the NSO the release of her children's birth certificates she was asked to present the corresponding receipt for her request. Knowing that the respondent had the receipt, the complainant called him up but she failed to get even the receipt number because the respondent allegedly did not have it in his possession at that time. However, the respondent reassured the complainant that the necessary payment had been made for the processing of the birth certificates.
The complainant repeatedly asked the respondent for the NSO receipt, but the latter would always give an excuse not to turn the receipt over to her.1âwphi1 This prompted the complainant to request confirmation of payment from the NSO. She found out that the respondent never paid nor filed applications for birth certificates.
On May 29, 2011, th e complainant, through her father Freddie J. Farres, wrote a demand letter2 to the respondent
18
for the surrender of the NSO receipt and the return of the ₱10,000.00 that was suppo sedly for the administration of the psychological tests, within two (2) days from receipt of the letter. The respondent received the demand letter on May 30, 2011.
On June 7, 2011, after the respondent refused to heed the complainant's demands, the complainant filed the present administrative complaint3 against him before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (JBP-CBD). The complainant alleged that the respondent's deceitful, irresponsible, and unprofessional conduct in handling her case - his failure to file the necessary application with the NSO for the issuance of her children's birth certificates, and to provide for a psychologist to administer psychological tests on herself and her children, as well as his tardiness or absence during hearings – resulted in the unwarranted delay of her case and forced her to file anew an annulment case against her husband.
The IBP-CBD called the case for mandatory conference where the complainant and her counsel appeared. However, despite due notice, the respondent failed to appear at the conference; he also failed to submit an answer to the affidavit-complaint.
In April 2012, the respondent returned to the complainant the amount of seventeen thousand two hundred and eighty pesos (₱17,280. 00), pursuant to a compromise agreement4 that the parties entered into in exchange for the dismissal of the criminal case for estafa filed by the complainant against the respondent. As part of the settlement, the respondent agreed to secure the birth certificates of the complainant's children, an obligation which the respondent has not yet fulfilled up to the present.
IBP's Recommendation
In a report and recommendation5 dated November 21, 2012, IBP Investigating Commissioner Eldrid C. Antiquiera found that the respondent had engaged in unlawful, dishonest, immoral, and deceitful conduct against his client's interest in violation of Canon 1 of the CPR. The Investigating Commissioner also found the respondent guilty of misappropriating the funds entrusted to him by his client and of failing to account for and to return his client's money upon demand, in violation of Canon 16 of the CPR. Commissioner Antiquiera recommended the imposition of three (3) years suspension from the practice of law.
In Resolution No. XX-2013-233 dated March 20, 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved Commissioner Antiquiera's findings of administrative liability but modified the recommended penalty of suspension from three (3) years to one (1) year.6
Our Ruling
We sustain the IBP Board of Governors' findings of administrative liability, as well as its recommended penalty of one (1) year suspension from the practice of law.
When a lawyer takes a case, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in protecting his client's rights. Failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention expected of a good father of a family makes the lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed by his client, and makes him answerable not just to his client but also to the legal profession, the courts, and society.7
It is apparent that the respondent did not exert any effort on his client's case and completely reneged on the obligations due his client. The respondent lied to the complainant that he had made the necessary application and payment with the NSO for the issuance of the birth certificates of the complainant's children. Despite the complainant's repeated requests, the respondent failed to comply with their agreement to provide a psychologist to administer the necessary psychological tests, thus causing further delay in the proceedings of the complainant's annulment case.
Clearly, these actions show the respondent's negligence and lack of zeal in handling the complainant's case, for which he should be made administratively liable. He violated not only Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the CPR, which
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prohibits a lawyer from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct, but also Rule 18.03 of Canon 18 of the same Code, which provides that "a lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable."
Moreover, the respondent failed to live up to his duties as a lawyer when he unlawfully withheld the complainant's money. The money given to the respondent was never used for its intended purposes, as could be gleaned from the NSO's non-issuance of birth certificates8 of the complainant's children, and by the non-administration of psychological tests on the complainant and her children. These omissions confirm the presumption that the respondent misappropriated the funds of his client, in violation of Canon 16 of the CPR that holds a lawyer in trust of all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession. The respondent, likewise, violated Rule 16.039 of Canon 16 (which provides that "a lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand") when he failed to return the complainant's money upon demand. We note that it was only af ter a year that the respondent, under threat of a criminal case filed against him, returned the complainant's money. The respondent's restitution cannot serve to mitigate his administrative liability as he returned the complainant's money not voluntarily but for fear of possible criminal liability.
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Rodrigo Cera is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for ONE (1) YEAR. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant to be entered into the respondent's personal record. Copies shall likewise be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts concerned.
PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE L. MADRID vs. ATTY. JUAN S. DEALCA [A.C. No. 7474, September 9, 2014]
Facts: Atty. Juan S.D ealca entered his appearance in criminal ca se then pending in Branch 51 of the RTC in Sorsogon City, presided by complainant Judge Jose L. Madrid. Aside from entering his appearance as counsel for the accused, Atty. Dealca also moved that the criminal case be re-raffled to another Branch of the RTC considering the adverse incidents between the incumbent Presiding Judge and the undersigned," where" he does not appear before the incumbent Presiding Judge, and the latter does not also hear cases handled by the undersigned." Judge Madrid denied denied the motion to re-raffle. Consequently, Judge Madrid filed a letter complaint in the Office of the Bar C onfidant citing Atty. Dealca’s unethical practice of entering his appearance and then moving for the inhibition of the presiding judge on the pretext of previous adverse incidents between them. The IBP Commissioner found out that Atty. Dealco had been filing filing several frivolous administrative and criminal complaints against judges and personnel of the court Atty. Dealca insists on the propriety of the administrative and criminal cases he filed against judges and court personnel, including Judge Madrid. He argues that as a vigilant lawyer, he was duty bound to bring and prosecute cases against unscrupulous and corrupt judges and court personnel. Atty. Dealca also maintains that Judge Madrid should have "in good grace inhibited himself" upon his motion to inhibit in order to preserve "confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary." Issues: (1) Did Atty. Dealca file frivolous administrative and criminal complaints against judges and court personnel in violation of the Lawyer’s Oath a nd the Code of Professi onal Responsibility?
(2) Was Atty. Dealca guilty of unethical practice in seeking the inhibition of Judge Madrid in Criminal Case No. 2006-6795? Ruling: 1. Yes. Although the Court always admires members of the Bar who are imbued with a high sense of vigilance to weed out from the Judiciary the undesirable judges and inefficient or undeserving court personnel, any acts taken in that direction should be unsullied by any taint of insincerity or self interest. The noble cause of cleansing the ranks of the Judiciary is not advanced otherwise. It is for that reason that Atty. Dealca’s complaint against Judge Madrid has failed our judicious scrutiny, for the Court cannot find any trace of
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idealism or altruism in the motivations for initiating it. Instead, Atty. Dealca exhibited his proclivity for vindictiveness and penchant for harassment, considering that, as IBP Commissioner Hababag pointed out,16 his bringing of charges against judges, court personnel and even his colleagues in the Law Profession had all stemmed from decisions or rulings being adverse to his clients or his side. He well knew, therefore, that he was thereby crossing the line of propriety, because neither vindictiveness nor harassment could be a substitute for resorting to the appropriate legal remedies. He should now be reminded that the aim of every lawsuit should be to render justice to the parties according to law, not to harass them . 17 The Lawyer’s Oath is a source of obligations and duties for every lawyer, and any violation thereof by an
attorney constitutes a ground for disbarment, suspension, or other disciplinary action .18 The oath exhorts upon the members of the Bar not to "wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit." These are not mere facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be upheld and keep inviolable. As a lawyer, therefore, Atty. Dealca was aware of his duty under his Lawyer’s Oath not to initiate groundless,
false or unlawful suits. The duty has also been expressly embodied in Rule 1.03, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility thus wise:
Rule 1.03 – A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man’s cause.
His being an officer of the court should have impelled him to see to it that the orderly administration of justice must not be unduly impeded. Indeed, as he must resist the whims and caprices of his clients and temper his clients’ propensities to litigate, so must he equally guard himself against his own impulses of initiating unfounded suits. While it is the Court’s duty to investigate and uncover the truth behind charges against judges and lawyers, it is equally its duty to shield them from unfounded suits that are intended to vex and harass them, among other things. 2.
Yes.
Canon 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to the judicial officers and should insist on similar conduct by others. xxxx Rule 11.04 — A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or have no materiality to the case. In light of the foregoing canons, all lawyers are bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts, and to promote confidence in the fair administration of justice. It is the respect for the courts that guarantees the stability of the judicial institution; elsewise, the institution would be resting on a v ery shaky foundation.34 The motion to inhibit filed by Atty. Dealca contained the following averment, to wit: Considering the adverse incidents between the incumbent Presiding Judge and the undersigned, he does not appear before the incumbent Presiding Judge, andthe latter does not also hear cases handled by the undersignedx x x. Atty. Dealca’s averment that Judge Madrid did not hear cas es being handled by him directly insinuated that
judges could choose the cases they heard, and could refuse to hear the cases in which hostility existed between the judges and the litigants or their counsel. Such averment, if true at all, should have been assiduously substantiated by him because it put in bad light not only Judge Madrid but all judges in general. Yet, he did not even include any particulars that could have validated the averment. Nor did he attach any document to support it. Worth stressing, too, is that the right of a party to seek the inhibition or disqualification of a judge who does not appear to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent in handling the case must be balanced with the latter’s sacred duty to decide cases wi thout fear of repression. Thus, it was incumbent upon Atty. Dealca to establish by clear and convincing evidence the ground of bias and prejudice in order to disqualify Judge Madrid from participating in a particular trial in which Atty. Dealca was participating as a counsel.36 The latter’s bare allegations of Judge Madrid’s partiality or hostility did not suffice,37 because the presumption that Judge Madrid would undertake his noble role to dispense justice according to law and the evidence and without fear or favor should only be overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the
21
contrary.38 As such, Atty. Dealca clearly contravened his duties as a lawyer as expressly stated in Canon 11 and Rule 11.04, supra. The Court suspended him from the practice of law for one year effective from notice of this decision, with a STERN WARNING that any similar infraction in the future will be dealt with more severely.
A.C. No. 7184, September 17, 2014 FELIPE B. ALMAZAN, SR. , Complainant , v. ATTY. MARCELO B. SUERTE-FELIPE , Respondent . FACTS: Complainant Felipe B. Almazan, Sr. (complainant) charged respondent, previously of the Public Attorney’s Office,2 for malpractice and gross negligence in the performance of his duty as a notary public and/or lawyer, alleging that the latter, despite not having been registered as a notary public for the City of Marikina , notarized the acknowledgment of the document entitled “Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate of the Deceased Juliana P. Vda. De Nieva”3 dated “25 th day of 1999” (subject document), stating that he is a “notary public for and in the City of Marikina.”4 Said document was one of the attachments to the Amended Complaint 5 dated August 14, 2003 filed in Civil Case No. 03-849-MK entitled “Esperanza Nieva Dela Cruz [(as represented by respondent)] v. Brita T. Llantada [(as represented by complainant)].” To prove his claim, complainant attached a Certification 6dated May 26, 2005 issued by the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Marikina City , certifying that per the court’s record, respondent is not a commissioned notary public for the City of Marikina from March 30, 1994 to the date of issuance. The Court required respondent to file his Comment 8 which he eventually submitted on February 13, 2007 after proper service. In said pleading, respondent admitted that he indeed notarized the acknowledgment of the subject document but denied that he was not commissioned as a notary public at that time. 9 Further, respondent, thru the comment, incorporated his own administrative complaint against complainant for malpractice and harassment of a fellow lawyer in view of the filing of the instant administrative case against him.
IBP Investigating Commissioner found respondent guilty for violating the Notarial Law and the lawyer’s oath,
reasoning that he could not notarize the acknowledgment of the subject document in Marikina City as it was outside the territorial limits of his ju risdiction. Moreover, respondent likewise violated the lawyer’s oath, specifically its mandate for lawyers, to obey the laws and do no falsehood. In view of the foregoing, it was thus recommended that respondent be suspended for a period of two (2) years from the practice of law. However, since it does not appear that he was still commissioned as a notary public, the Investigating Commissioner did not recommend that he be disqualified as such. The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner with modification, decreasing the penalty of suspension to one (1) year, with immediate revocation of notarial commission if presently commissioned, and disqualification from being commissioned as a notary public for two (2) years. On reconsideration, 21 the IBP Board of Governors, modified the penalty stated in its previous resolution, imposing, instead, the penalty of reprimand with warning, and disqualification from being commissioned as a notary public for the decreased period of one (1) year.
ISSUE: The essential issue in this case is whether or not respondent should be held administratively liable. RULING:
The
Court
concurs
with
the
findings
of
the
IBP
except
as
to
the
penalty.
As the Investigating Commissioner correctly observed, respondent, who himself admitted that he was commissioned as notary public only in the City of Pasig and the Municipalities of Taguig, Pateros, San Juan, and Mandaluyong for the years 1998-1999, could not notarize the subje ct document’s acknowledgment in the City of Marikina, as said notarial act is beyond the jurisdiction of the commissioning court, i.e., the RTC of Pasig. The territorial limitation of a notary public’s jurisdiction is crystal clear from Section 11, Rule II I of the 2004 Rules on Notarial Practice: 23cralawred
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Sec. 11. Jurisdiction and Term – A person commissioned as notary public may perform notarial acts in any place within the territorial jurisdiction of the commissioning court for a period of two (2) years commencing the first day of January of the year in which the commissioning court is made, unless either revoked or the notary public has resigned under these Rules and the Rules of Court. ( Emphasis supplied )
Said principle is equally echoed in the Notarial Law found in Chapter 12, Book V, Volume I of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917, a s amended, 24 of which Section 240, Article II states: Sec. 240. Territorial jurisdiction. – The jurisdiction of a notary public in a province shall be co-extensive with the province . The jurisdiction of a notary public in the City of Manila shall be co-extensive with said city. No notary shall possess authority to do any notarial act beyond the limits of his jurisdiction . (Emphases supplied ) For misrepresenting in the said acknowledgment that he was a notary public for and in the City of Marikina, when it is apparent and, in fact, uncontroverted that he was not, respondent further committed a form of falsehood which is undoubtedly anathema to the lawyer’s oath. Percepti bly, said transgression also runs afoul of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides that “[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.” In the case of Tan Tiong Bio v. Atty. Gonzales ,25 citing Nunga v. Atty. Viray ,26 the Court instructively expounded on infractions similar to that of respondent:ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary While seemingly appearing to be a harmless incident, respondent’s act of notarizing documents in a place
outside of or beyond the authority granted by his notarial commission, partakes of malpractice of law and falsification. While perhaps not on all fours because of the slight dissimilarity in the violation involved, what the Court said in Nunga v. Viray is very much apropos: Where the notarization of a document is done by a member of the Philippine Bar at a time when he has no authorization or commission to do so, the offender may be subjected to disciplinary action. For one, performing a notarial [act] without such c ommission is a violation of the lawyer’s oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it appear that he is duly commissioned when he is not, he is, for all legal intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate falsehood, w hich the lawyer’s oath similarly proscribes . These violations fall squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility , which provides: “A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful c onduct.” It cannot be over-emphasized that notarization is not an empty, meaningless, routinary act. Far from it. Notarization is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may act as notaries public. Hence, the requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public are treated with a formality definitely more than casual. 27 (Emphases supplied ) With respondent’s liability herein established, and considering further the attendant circumstances of t his case,
take for instance, that he is a first time offender and that he had already acknowledged his wrongdoings, 28 the Court finds that suspension for a period of six (6) months 29 from the practice of law would suffice as a penalty. In addition, he is disqualified from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of one (1) year and, his notarial commission, if currently existing, is hereby revoked. 30cralawred
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Marcelo B. Suerte-Felipe is found GUILTY of malpractice as a notary public, and violating the lawyer’s oath as well as Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six (6) months, effective upon his receipt of this Resolution,
with a STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. He is likewise DISQUALIFIED from being commissioned as a notary public for a period of one (1) year and his notarial commission, if currently existing, is hereby REVOKED.
FLORENCE
TEVES
MACARUBBO, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. EDMUNDO L. MACARUBBO, Respondent. RE: PETITION (FOR EXTRAORDINARY MERCY) OF EDMUNDO L. MACARUBBO. RESOLUTION
FACTS:
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For resolution is the Petition (For Extraordinary Mercy) filed by respondent Edmundo L. Macarubbo (respondent) who seeks to be reinstated in the Roll of Attorneys. Records show that in the Decisio n1 dated February 27, 2004, the Court disbarred respondent from the practice of law for having contracted a bigamous marriage with complainant Florence Teves and a third marriage with one Josephine Constantino while his first marriage to Helen Esparza was still subsisting, which acts constituted gross immoral conduct in violation of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Aggrieved, respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration/Appeal for Compassion and Mercy
3
which the
Court denied with finality in the Resolution dated June 1, 2004. Eight years after or on June 4, 2012, respondent filed the instant Petition (For Extraordinary Mercy) seeking judicial clemency and reinstatement in the Roll of Attorneys. The Court initially treated the present suit as a second motion for reconsideration and accordingly, denied it for lack of merit in the Resolution dated September 4, 2012. On December 18, 2012, the same petition was endorsed to this Court by the Office of the Vice President for re-evaluation, prompting the Court to look into the substantive merits of the case. In Re: Letter of Judge Augustus C. Diaz, Metropolitan Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 37, Appealing for Clemency, the Court laid down the following guidelines in resolving requests for judicial clemency, to wit: 1. There must be proof of remorse and reformation. These shall include but should not be limited to certifications or testimonials of the officer(s) or chapter(s) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, judges or judges associations and prominent members of the community with proven integrity and probity. A subsequent finding of guilt in an administrative case for the same or similar misconduct will give rise to a strong presumption of non-reformation. 2. Sufficient time must have lapsed from the imposition of the penalty to ensure a period of reform. 3. The age of the person asking for clemency must show that he still has productive years ahead of him that can be put to good use by giving him a chance to redeem himself. 4. There must be a showing of promise (such as intellectual aptitude, learning or legal acumen or contribution to legal scholarship and the development of the legal system or administrative and other relevant skills), as well as potential for public service. 5. There must be other relevant factors and circumstances that may justify clemency . 9 (Citations omitted) Moreover, to be reinstated to the practice of law, the applicant must, like any other candidate for admission to the bar, satisfy the Court that he is a person of good moral character.
ISSUE: Whether or not, in applying the foregoing standards to this case, the instant petition meritorious.
HELD: The Court finds the instant petition meritorious. Respondent has sufficiently shown his remorse and acknowledged his indiscretion in the legal profession and in his personal life. He has asked forgiveness from his children by complainant Teves and maintained a cordial relationship with them as shown by the herein attached pictures. Records also show that after his disbarment, respondent returned to his hometown in Enrile, Cagayan and devoted his time tending an orchard and taking care of his ailing mother until her death in 2008. In 2009, he was appointed as Private Secretary to the Mayor of Enrile, Cagayan and thereafter, assumed the position of Local Assessment Operations Officer II/ Office-In-Charge in the Assessor’s Office, which office he continues to serve to date. Moreover, he is a part-time instructor at the
University of Cagayan Valley and F.L. Vargas College during the School Year 2011-2012 .14 Respondent likewise took an active part in socio-civic activities by helping his neighbors and friends who are in dire need. The Court notes the eight (8) long years that had elapsed from the time respondent was disbarred and recognizes his achievement as the first lawyer product of Lemu National High School, and his fourteen (14) years of dedicated government service from 1986 to July 2000 as Legal Officer of the D epartment of Education, Culture and Sports; Supervising Civil Service Attorney of the Civil Service Commission; Ombudsman Graft Investigation Officer; and State Prosecutor of the Department of Justice. From the attestations and certifications presented, the Court finds that respondent has sufficiently atoned for his transgressions. At 58 years of age, he still has productive years ahead of him that could significantly contribute to the upliftment of the law profession and the betterment of
24
society. While the Court is ever mindful of its duty to discipline and even remove its errant officers, concomitant to it is its duty to show compassion to those who have reformed their ways, as in this case. Accordingly, respondent is hereby ordered .reinstated to the practice of law. He is, however, reminded that such privilege is burdened with conditions whereby adherence. to the rigid standards of intellect, moral uprightness, and strict compliance with the rules and the law are continuing requirements. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. Respondent Edmundo L. Macarubbo is hereby ordered REINSTATED in the Roll of Attorneys. SO ORDERED.
TEJANO vs. ATTY. BENJAMIN F. BATERINA A.C. No. 8235, January 27,2015
FACTS: Joselito F. Tejano filed an Affidavit-Complaint before the Office of the Court Administrator of the Supreme Court against his counsel, Atty. Baterina “miserably failed to advance [his]cause”, and Judge Dominador Arquelada of acting in conspiracy to take p ossession of his property, which was the subject matter of litigation in the judge’s court.
The Court required Atty. Baterinato file a Comment on the complaint to which he explained that he had been recuperating from a kidney transplant when he received a copy of the complaint. The Court, found Atty. Baterina’s explanation “not satisfactory” and admonished him “to be more heedful of the Court’s directives” and referred the case to the IBP for investigation, report and recommendation, which found sufficient ground for disciplinary action against Atty. Baterina.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Baterina liable for gross negligence in his duty as counsel to his client RULING: The Court adopts the IBP’s report and recommendation, with modification as to the penalt y. The Code of Professional Responsibility governing the conduct of lawyers states: CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE ANDDILIGENCE. RULE 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith shall render him liable. RULE 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client’s request for information. When a lawyer agrees to take up a client’s cause, he makes a commitment to exercise due diligence in protecting the latter’s rights. Once a lawyer’s services are engaged, “he is duty-bound to serve his client with competence, and to attend to his client’s cause with diligence, care and devotion regardless of whether he accepts it for a fee or for free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him.” A lawyer’s acceptance to take up a case “impliedly stipulates [that he will] carry it to its terminati on, that is, until the case becomes final and executory.” Atty. Baterina’s duty to his clients did not automatically cease with his suspension. At the very least, such suspension gave him a concomitant responsibility to inform his clients that he would be unable to attend to their case and advise them to retain another counsel.
A lawyer – even one suspended from practicing the profession – owes it to his client to not “sit idly by and leave the rights of his client in a state of uncertainty.” 27 The client “should never be left groping in the dark” and instead must be “adequately and fully informed about the developments in his case.” 28 Atty. Baterina practically abandoned this duty when he allowed the proceedings to run its course without any effort to sa feguard his clients’ welfare in the meantime. His failure to file the required pleadings on his clients’ behalf constitutes gross negligence in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility 29 and renders him subject to disciplinary action. 30 The pen alties for a lawyer’s failure to file the required brief or pleading range from warning, reprimand, fine, suspension, or in grave cases, disbarment. 31 Further, Atty. Baterina’s reckless disregard for orders and directives of the courts is unbecoming of a member of the Bar. His conduct has shown that he has little respect for rules, court processes, and even for the Court’s disciplinary authority. Not only did he fail to follow the trial court’s orders in his clients’ case, he even disregarded court orders in his own disciplinary proceedings.
25
Considering Atty. Baterina’s medical condition at that time, a simple explanation to the Court would have sufficed. Instead, however, he simply let the orders go unheeded, neglecting his duty to the Court.
Lawyers, as this Court has previously emphasized, “are particularly called upon to obey court orders and processes and are expected to stand foremost in complying with court directives being themselves officers of the court.” 32 As such, Atty. Baterina should “know th at a resolution of this Court is not a mere request but an order which should be complied with promptly and completely.” 33 Atty. Benjamin F. Baterina is found GUILTY of gross negligence. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for five (5) years. He is also STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or a similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
A.C. No. 5816, March 10, 2015 DR. ELMAR O. PEREZ, Complainant , v. ATTY. TRISTAN A. CATINDIG AND ATTY. KAREN E. BAYDO , Respondents . DECISION PER CURIAM: Before the Court is an administrative complaint 1 for disbarment filed by Dr. Elmar O. Perez (Dr. Perez) with the Office of the Bar Confidant on August 27, 2002 against Atty. Tristan A. Catindig (Atty. Catindig) and Atty. Karen E. Baydo (Atty. Baydo) (respondents) for gross immorality and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The Facts In her complaint, Dr. Perez alleged that she and Atty. Catindig had been friends since the mid- 1960’s when they were both students at the University of the Philippines, but they lost touch after their graduation. Sometime in 1983, the paths of Atty. Catindig and Dr. Perez again crossed. It was at that time that Atty. Catindig started to court Dr. Perez. 2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Atty. Catindig admitted to Dr. Perez that he was already wed to Lily Corazon Gomez (Gomez), having married the latter on May 18, 1968 at the Central Methodist Church in Ermita, Manila, which was followed by a Catholic wedding at the Shrine of Our Lady of Lourdes in Quezon City. 3 Atty. Catindig however claimed that he only married Gomez because he got her pregnant; that he was afraid that Gomez would make a scandal out of her pregnancy should he refuse to marry her, which could have jeopardized his scholarship in the Harvard Law School.4chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Atty. Catindig told Dr. Perez that he was in the process of obtaining a divorce in a foreign country to dissolve his marriage to Gomez, and that he would eventually marry her once the divorce had been decreed. Consequently, sometime in 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez obtained a divorce decree from the Dominican Republic. Dr. Perez claimed that Atty. Catindig assured her that the said divorce decree was lawful and valid and that there was no longer any impediment to their marriage. 5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Thus, on July 14, 1984, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the State of Virginia in the United States of America (USA). Their union was blessed with a child whom they named Tristan Jegar Josef Frederic.6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Years later, Dr. Perez came to know that her marriage to Atty. Catindig is a nullity since the divorce decree that was obtained from the Dominican Republic by the latter and Gomez is not recognized by Philippine laws. When she confronted Atty. Catindig about it, the latter allegedly assured Dr. Perez that he would legalize their union once he obtains a declaration of nullity of his marriage to Gomez under the laws of the Philippines. He also promised to legally adopt their son. 7chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Sometime in 1997, Dr. Perez reminded Atty. Catindig of his promise to legalize their union by filing a petition to nullify his marriage to Gomez. Atty. Catindig told her that he would still have to get the consent of Gomez to the said petition. 8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Sometime in 2001, Dr. Perez alleged that she received an anonymous letter 9 in the mail informing her of Atty. Catindig’s scandalous affair with Atty. Baydo, and that sometime later, she came upon a love letter 10 written and signed by Atty. Catindig for Atty. Baydo dated April 25, 2001. In the said letter, Atty. Catindig professed his love to Atty. Baydo, promising to marry her once his “impediment is removed.” Apparently, five months into their relationship, Atty. Baydo requested Atty. Catindig to put a halt to their affair until such time that he is able to
26
obtain the annulment of his marriage. On August 13, 2001, Atty. Catindig filed a petition to declare the nullity of his marriage to Gomez. 11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary On October 31, 2001, Atty. Catindig abandoned Dr. Perez and their son; he moved to an upscale condominium in Salcedo Village, Makati City where Atty. Baydo was frequently seen. 12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary In a Resolution 13 dated October 9, 2002, the Court directed the respondents to file their respective comments, which they separately did on November 25, 2002. 14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Atty. Catindig, in his Comment, 15 admitted that he married Gomez on May 18, 1968. He claimed, however, that immediately after the wedding, Gomez showed signs that she was incapable of complying with her marital obligations, as she had serious intimacy problems; and that while their union was blessed with four children, their relationship simply deteriorated. Eventually, their irreconcilable differences led to their de facto separation in 1984. They then consulted Atty. Wilhelmina Joven (Atty. Joven), a mutual friend, on how the agreement to separate and live apart could be implemented. Atty. Joven suggested that the couple adopt a property regime of complete separation of property. She likewise advised the couple to obtain a divorce decree from the Dominican Republic for whatever value it may have and comfort it may provide them. 16chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Thus, on April 27, 1984, Atty. Catindig and Gomez each executed a Special Power of Attorney addressed to a Judge of the First Civil Court of San Cristobal, Dominican Republic, appointing an attorney-in-fact to institute a divorce action under its laws. Atty. Catindig likewise admitted that a divorce by mutual consent was ratified by the Dominican Republic court on June 12, 1984. Further, Atty. Catindig and Gomez filed a Joint Petition for Dissolution of Conjugal Partnership before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 133, which was granted on June 23, 1984.17chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew of the foregoing, including the fact that the divorce decreed by the Dominican Republic court does not have any effect in the Philippines. Notwithstanding that she knew that the marriage of Atty. Catindig and Gomez still subsisted, Dr. Perez demanded that Atty. Catindig marry her. Thus, Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in July 1984 in the USA. 18chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Atty. Catindig claimed that Dr. Perez knew that their marriage was not valid since his previous marriage to Gomez was still subsisting, and that he only married Dr. Perez because he loved her and that he was afraid of losing her if he did not. He merely desired to lend a modicum of legitimacy to their relationship. 19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Atty. Catindig claimed that his relationship with Dr. Perez turned sour. Eventually, he left their home in October 2001 to prevent any acrimony from developing. 20chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary He denied that Atty. Baydo was the reason that he left Dr. Perez, claiming that his relationship with Dr. Perez started to fall apart as early as 1997. He asserted that Atty. Baydo joined his law firm only in September 1999; and that while he was attracted to her, Atty. Baydo did not reciprocate and in fact rejected him. He likewise pointed out that Atty. Baydo resigned from his firm in January 2001. 21chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary For her part, Atty. Baydo denied that she had an affair with Atty. Catindig. She claimed that Atty. Catindig began courting her while she was employed in his firm. She however rejected Atty. Catindig’s romantic overtures; she told him that she could not reciprocate his feelings since he was married and that he was too old for her. She said that despite being turned down, Atty. Catindig still pursued her, which was the reason why she resigned from his law firm. 22chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary On January 29, 2003, the Court referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation within 90 days from notice. 23chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary On June 2, 2003, the IBP’s Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) issued an Order 24 setting the mandatory conference of the administrative case on July 4, 2003, which was later reset to August 29, 2003. During the conference, the parties manifested that they were already submitting the case for resolution based on the pleadings already submitted. Thereupon, the IBP-CBD directed the parties to submit their respective position papers within 10 days from notice. Respondents Atty. Catindig and Atty. Baydo filed their position papers on October 17, 2003 25 and October 20, 2003,26 respectively. Dr. Perez filed her position paper 27 on October 24, 2003.
Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner On May 6, 2011, after due proceedings, the Investigating Commissioner of the IBP-CBD issued a Report and Recommendation,28 which recommended the disbarment of Atty. Catindig for gross immorality, violation of Rule
27
1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. The Investigating Commissioner pointed out that Atty. Catindig’s act of marrying Dr. Perez despite knowing fully well that his previous marriage to Gomez still subsisted was a grossly immoral and illegal conduct, which warrants the ultimate penalty of disbarment. The Investigating Commissioner further opined that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary In this case, the undisputed facts gathered from the evidence and the admissions of Atty. Catindig established a pattern of grossly immoral conduct that warrants fustigation and his disbarment. His conduct was not only corrupt or unprincipled; it was reprehensible to the highest degree. There is no dichotomy of morality. A lawyer and a professor of law, both in his official and personal conduct, must display exemplary behavior. Respondent’s bigamous marriage and his proclivity for extramarital adventurism have definitely caused damage to the legal and teaching professions. How can he hold his head up high and expect his students, his peers and the community to look up to him as a model worthy of emulation when he failed to follow the tenets of morality? In contracting a second marriage notwithstanding knowing fully well that he has a prior valid subsisting marriage, Atty. Catindig has made a mockery of an otherwise inviolable institution, a serious outrage to the generally accepted moral standards of the c ommunity. 29 On the other hand, the Investigating Commissioner recommended that the charge against Atty. Baydo be dismissed for dearth of evidence; Dr. Perez failed to present clear and preponderant evidence in support of the alleged affair between the respondents.
Findings of the IBP Board of Governors On December 10, 2011, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution, 30 which adopted and approved the recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner. Atty. Catindig sought a reconsideration 31 of the December 10, 2011 Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors, claiming that the Investigating Commissioner erred in relying solely on Dr. Perez’s uncorroborated allegations. He pointed out that, under Section 1 of Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, a complaint for disbarment must be supported by affidavits of persons having knowledge of the facts therein alleged and/or by such documents as may substantiate said facts. He said that despite the absence of any corroborating testimony, the Investigating Commissioner gave credence to Dr. Perez’ testimony. He also claimed that he had absolutely no intention of committing any felony; that he never concealed the status of his marriage from anyone. In fact, Atty. Catindig asserted that he had alway s been transparent with both Gomez and Dr. Perez. The IBP Board of Governors, in its Resolution 32 dated Decembe r 29, 2012, denied Atty. Catindig’s motion for reconsideration.
The Issue The issue in this case is whether the respondents committed gross immorality, which would warrant their disbarment.
Ruling of the Court After a thorough perusal of the respective allegations of the parties and the circumstances of this case, the Court agrees with the findings and recommendations of the Investigating Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary Rule 1.01 – A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral
or
deceitful
conduct.
Canon 7 – A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar. Rule 7.03 – A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.cralawred In Arnobit v. Atty. Arnobit ,33 the Court held:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary [T]he requirement of good moral character is of much greater import, as far as the general public is concerned, than the possession of legal learning. Good moral character is not only a condition precedent for admission to the legal profession, but it must also remain intact in order to maintain one’s good standing in that exclusive and honored fraternity. Good moral character is more than just the absence of bad character. Such character expresses itself in the will to do the unpleasant thing if it is right and the resolve not to do the pleasant thing if it is wrong.
28
This must be so because “vast interests are committed to his care; he is the recipient of unbounded trust and confidence; he deals with his client’s property, reputation, his life, his all.” 34 (Citation omitted) In this regard, Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides that a lawyer may be removed or suspended from the practice of law, inter alia , for grossly immoral conduct. Thus:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary Sec. 27. Attorneys removed or suspended by Supreme Court on what grounds. — A member of the bar may be removed or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct , or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a wilfull disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or willful appearing as an attorney for a party to a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice. (E mphasis ours) “A lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct showing any fault or deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor.” 35 Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that show a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the community. Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the community’s sense of decency. The Court makes these distinctions, as the supreme penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly immoral, not simply immoral, conduct.36chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Contracting a marriage during the subsistence of a previous one amounts to a grossly immoral conduct. The facts gathered from the evidence adduced by the parties and, ironically, from Atty. Catindig’s own admission, indeed establish a pattern of conduct that is grossly immoral; it is not only corrupt and unprincipled, but reprehensible to a high degree.
Atty. Catindig was validly married to Gomez twice – a wedding in the Central Methodist Church in 1968, which was then followed by a Catholic wedding. In 1983, Atty. Catindig started pursuing Dr. Perez when their paths crossed again. Curiously, 15 years into his first marriage and four children after, Atty. Catindig claimed that his first intimacy problems. marriage was then already falling apart due to Gomez’ seriou s A year after pursuing Dr. Perez, Atty. Catindig had a de facto separation from Gomez, dissolved their conjugal partnership of gains, obtained a divorce decree from a court in the Dominican Republic, and married Dr. Perez in the USA all in the same year. Atty. Catindig was so enchanted with Dr. Perez at that time that he moved heaven and earth just so he could marry her right away – a marriage that has at least a semblance of legality. From his own admission, Atty. Catindig knew that the divorce decree he obtained from the court in the Dominican Republic was not recognized in our jurisdiction as he and Gomez were both Filipino citizens at that time. He knew that he was still validly married to Gomez; that he cannot marry anew unless his previous marriage be properly declared a nullity. Otherwise, his subsequent marriage would be void. This notwithstanding, he still married Dr. Perez. The foregoing circumstances seriously taint Atty. Catindig’s sense of social propriety and moral values. It is a blatant and purposeful disregard of our laws on marriage. It has also not escaped the attention of the Court that Atty. Catindig married Dr. Perez in the USA. Considering that Atty. Catindig knew that his previous marriage remained valid, the logical conclusion is that he wanted to marry Dr. Perez in the USA for the added security of avoiding any charge of bigamy by entering into the subsequent marriage outside Philippine jurisdiction. Moreover, assuming arguendo that Atty. Catindig’s claim is tru e, it matters not that Dr. Perez knew that their marriage is a nullity. The fact still remains that he resorted to various legal strategies in o rder to render a façade of validity to his otherwise invalid marriage to Dr. Perez. Such act is, at the very least, so unprincipled that it is reprehensible to the highest degree. Further, after 17 years of cohabiting with Dr. Perez, and despite the various legal actions he resorted to in order to give their union a semblance of validity, Atty. Catindig left her and their son. It was only at that time that he finally decided to properly seek the nullity of his first marriage to Gomez. Apparently, he was then already entranced with the much younger Atty. Baydo, an associate lawyer employed by his firm. While the fact that Atty. Catindig decided to separate from Dr. Perez to pursue Atty. Baydo, in itself, cannot be considered a grossly immoral conduct, such fact forms part of the pattern showing his propensity towards immoral conduct. Lest it be misunderstood, the Cou rt’s finding of gross immoral conduct is hinged not on Atty. Catindig’s desertion of Dr. Perez, but on his contracting of a subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his previous marriage to Gomez.
29
“The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance, which makes ‘a mockery of the inviolable social institution of marriage.’” 37 In various cases, the Court has held that disbarment is warranted when a lawyer abandons his lawful wife and maintains an illicit relationship with another woman who has borne him a child. 38chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary Atty. Catindig’s subsequent marriage during the subsistence of his p revious one definitely manifests a deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. By his own admission, Atty. Catindig made a mockery out of the institution of marriage, taking advantage of his legal skills in the process. He exhibited a deplorable lack of that degree of morality required of him as a member of the bar, which thus warrant the penalty of disbarment.
The Court is not unmindful of the rule that the power to disbar must be exercised with great caution, and only in a clear case of misconduct that seriously affects the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the Court and as a member of the bar. Where a lesser penalty, such as temporary suspension, could accomplish the end desired, disbarment should never be decreed. Nevertheless, in this case, the seriousness of the offense compels the Court to wield its power to disbar, as it appears to be the most appropriate penalty. Atty. Catindig’s claim that Dr. Perez’s allegations against him are not credible since they are uncorroborated and not supported by affidavits contrary to Section 1, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, deserves scant consideration. Verily, Atty. Catindig himself admitted in his pleadings that he indeed married Dr. Perez in 1984 while his previous marriage with Gomez still subsisted. Indubitably, such admission provides ample basis for the Court to render disciplinary sanction against him.
There
is
insufficient
evidence
to
prove
the
affair
between
the
respondents.
The Court likewise agrees with the Investigating Commissioner that there is a dearth of evidence to prove the claimed amorous relationship between the respondents. As it is, the evidence that was presented by Dr. Perez to prove her claim was mere allegation, an anonymous letter informing her that the respondents were indeed having an affair and the purported love letter to Atty. Baydo that was signed by Atty. Catindig. The Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment proceedings against lawyers, the lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to prove the allegations in his complaint. The evidence required in suspension or disbarment proceedings is preponderance of evidence.39chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary The presentation of the anonymous letter that was received by Dr. Perez only proves that the latter indeed received a letter informing her of the alleged relations between the respondents; it does not prove the veracity of the allegations therein. Similarly, the supposed love letter, if at all, only proves that Atty. Catindig wrote Atty. Baydo a letter professing his love for her. It does not prove that Atty. Baydo is indeed in a relationship with Atty. Catindig.
WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the Court resolves to ADOPT the recommendations of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Atty. Tristan A. Catindig is found GUILTY of gross immorality and of violati ng the Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and is hereby DISBARRED from the practice of law. Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the records of Atty. Tristan A. Catindig in the Office of the Bar Confidant and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Likewise, copies of this Decision shall be furnished to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated by the Court Administrator to all appellate and trial courts. The charge of gross immorality against Atty. Karen E. Baydo is hereby DISMISSED for lack of evidence. This
Decision
takes
effect
immediately.
SO ORDERED.
TERESITA B. ENRIQUEZ , Complainant , v. ATTY. TRINA DE VERA , Respondent . RESOLUTION LEONEN, J.:
30
For resolution is an administrative complaint for disbarment or suspension filed by complainant Teresita B. Enriquez against Atty. Trina De Vera. We resolve whether Atty. Trina De Vera committed serious misconduct and should be held administratively liable for the issuance and dishonor of several post-dated checks. Teresita B. Enriquez (Teresita) filed her Complaint-Affidavit 1 on June 26, 2009 before this court. The Complaint prayed for Atty. Trina De Vera's (Atty. De Vera) disbarment or suspension in relation to the latter's issuance of worthless checks and non-payment of a loan. 2cralawred According to Teresita, she is a businesswoman involved in building cell site towers. She is acquainted with Atty. De Vera through the business by subcontracting the cell site acquisition to Atty. De Vera. 3cralawred Sometime in April 2006, Atty. De Vera borrowed P500,000.00 from Teresita with interest of P20,000.00 per month until fully paid. 4 Hbwever, Teresita did not have the full amount. Atty. De Vera persuaded her to borrow the amount from a common friend, Mary Jane D. Luzon (Mary Jane), by mortgaging her property located in Lucena City.5 Atty. De Vera issued IBank 6 Check No. 310571 post-dated July 31, 2006 for P500,000.00. Atty. De Vera also issued at least two more checks to cover the interest agreed upon. 7cralawred Teresita alleges that in June 2006, Atty. De Vera obtained another loan from Teresita's sister in the amount of P100,000.00. Teresita guaranteed the loan. Atty.De Vera issued IBank Check No. 317689 post-dated July 14, 2006 for P100,000.00 to Teresita. Teresita claimed that she paid her sister the amount borrowed by Atty. De Vera.8cralawred Upon maturity of the checks, Teresita presented the checks for payment. However, the checks "bounced" for being drawn against insufficient funds. Teresita attempted to encash the checks for a second time. However, the checks were dishonored because the account was closed. 9cralawred Teresita demanded payment from Atty. De Vera. However, she failed to settle her obligations, prompting Teresita to file complaints against Atty. De Vera for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code. 10cralawred The Quezon City Prosecutor's Office issued the Resolution dated March 4, 2008 finding probable cause for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 and Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code. On the same day, an Information for estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Subsequently, a warrant of arrest was issued by the trial court. 11cralawred In her administrative complaint, Teresita prays that Atty. De Vera be disbarred or suspended for violation of her oath under Rule 138, Section 27 of the Rules of Court. 12cralawred On July 29, 2009, this court required Atty. De Vera to comment on the Complaint. Atty. De Vera filed her Answer 14 dated June 24, 201 0.
13
cralawred
She presented her version of the facts.
According to Atty. De Vera, in February 2006, Teresita awarded a Site Acquisition and Permitting Project to Atty. De Vera's group. The project involved twenty-nine (29) Globe' Telecom sites across Northern and Southern Luzon.15cralawred Atty. De Vera alleges that Teresita could not pay the required 15% downpayment per site. Thus, they agreed that Atty. De Vera would advance the costs for mobilization and survey, while Teresita would cover the costs for application of building permits. Teresita, thus, owed her P195,000.00 per site. 16cralawred Teresita had not paid Atty. De Vera the downpayment by March 2006. 17 At that time, Teresita had to deliver at least five (5) cell sites to Globe Telecom. 18 However, Teresita did not have the funds required for the application of building permits that costs around P10,000.00 for each cell site. 19cralawred Teresita was constrained to borrow P500,000.00 from Mary Jane. Subsequently, Teresita approached Atty. De Vera and asked that the latter lend Teresita checks to guaranty the loan. The main reason Teresita gave was that she had been frequently arguing with her husband regarding the loan. 20cralawred Atty. De Vera denies the P100,000.00 loan from Teresita's sister. 21 She only lent Teresita another check as "additional guaranty for the five sites[.]" 22cralawred Atty. De Vera argues that the checks were not drawn, issued, and delivered to Teresita for value. The checks were not meant to be deposited. 23cralawred
31
Furthermore, Atty. De Vera claims that the present administrative case is baseless. She points out that the proceedings before the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office were under reinvestigation since she' did not have the opportunity to answer the criminal complaint. 24cralawred Moreover, "nowhere in both the affidavit-complaint for Estafa/BP 22 and the administrative complaint was there any proof that . . . [Atty. De Vera] had in any manner breached her oath as a lawyer [or] abused her position against the interests of the complainant." 25cralawred Atty. De Vera alleges that she was the one who was abused. 26 In addition, "[a] 11 the bare allegations that [Atty. De Vera] was the one who enticed [Teresita] to mortgage her property and that the checks issued by [Atty. De Vera] will be honored upon maturity do not constitute deceitful conduct on the part of [Atty. De Vera]."27cralawred On August 25, 2010, this court noted Atty. De Vera's Answer and referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for "investigation, report and recommendation or decision within ninety (90) days from receipt of [the] records[.]"28cralawred The Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines scheduled mandatory conferences where the parties defined the issues, stipulated on facts, and marked exhibits. 29 Upon the termination of the mandatory conferences, the parties were "directed to submit their respective verified position papers within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt of the Order." 30. Both
parties
failed
to
file
their
papers. 31cralawred
position
The Investigating Commissioner of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines found Atty. De Vera administratively liable for serious misconduct and recommended the penalty of suspension for one (1) year from the practice of law. 32 The Investigating Commissioner ruled:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary Respondent's assertion that the checks she issued to complainant were not security for the loans she obtained but mere guaranty checks and not for deposit deserves no credence; it is contrary to the ordinary experience. .
.
.
. . . [T]he pieces of evidenc[e] on reco[r]d substantially shows [sic] that indeed respondent incurred monetary obligations from complainant, and she issued postdated checks to 'the latter as security for the payment of the loans. Assuming . . . that respondent's version of facts were [sic] true, she is still guilty of serious misconduct. The gravamen of the offense punished by B.P. Blg. 22 is the act of making and issuing . . . worthless check[s]; that is, a check that is dishonored upon its presentation for payment. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. The thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making and circulation of worthless checks. . . . A check issued as an evidence of debt — though not intended to be presented for payment — has the same effect as an ordinary check and would fall within the ambit of B.P. Blg. 22. As a lawyer, respondent is deemed to know the law, especially B.P. Blg. 22. By issuing checks in violation of the provisions of the law, respondent is guilty of serious misconduct. .
.
.
[A] lawyer may be disciplined not only for malpractice in connection with his profession, but also for gross misconduct outside of his professional capacity[.] 33 (Citation omitted)cralawlawlibrary In issuing the worthless checks, Atty. De Vera did not only violate the law, but she also broke her oath as a lawyer and transgressed the Canons in the Code of Professional Responsibility. 34 The Investigating Commissioner found that Atty. De Vera violated the following provisions:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary Cannon [sic] 1 - A lawyer shall uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for the law and legal processes. Rule
1.01
-
A
lawyer
shall
not
engage
in
unlawful,
dishonest,
immoral
or
deceitful
conduct.
Canon 7 - A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
32
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.35cralawlawlibrary The dispositive portion of the Recommendation36 reads:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
Investigating
Commissioner's
Report
and
WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent is guilty of serious misconduct and it is recommended that she be suspended for a period of one (1) year from the practice of law. 37cralawred cralawlawlibrary In the Notice of Resolution No. XX-2013-612 38 dated May 11, 2013, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors resolved to adopt the Investigating Commissioner's recommendation:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the applicable laws and rules and considering that Respondent violated the B.P. 22 by issuing a worthless check, the Attorney's Oath and Canon 1, Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Trina De Vera is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one (1) year .39 (Emphasis in the original)cralawlawlibrary
Teresita filed the Partial Motion for Reconsideration 40 dated September 17, 2013 of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors' Resolution. Atty. De Vera filed the Motion for Reconsideration 41 dated September 21, 2013. In the Notice of Resolution No. XXI-2014-241 42 dated May 3, 2014, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors denied the parties' respective motions:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary RESOLVED to DENY respective Motions for Reconsideration of Complainant and Respondent, there being no cogent reason to reverse the findings of the Commission and the resolution .subject of the motion, they being a mere reiteration of the matters which had already been threshed out and taken into consideration. Moreover, respondent's Motion for Reconsideration was filed out of time pursuant to his Motion for Extension of Time which is a prohibited pleading under Rule 139-B of the Rules and resorted to by lawyers at times to delay proceeding. Thus, Resolution No. XX-2013-612 dated May 11, 2013 is hereby AFFIRMED.43 (Emphasis in the original) cralawlawlibrary
The main issue is whether Atty. De Vera committed serious misconduct and should be held administratively liable for the issuance and dishonor of worthless checks in violation of the Lawyer's Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility. After considering the parties' arguments and the records of this case, we resolve to adopt and approve the recommendations of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors. Atty. De Vera tries to free herself from liability by arguing that she did not incur the loans alleged by Teresita, and the checks were issued merely as a guaranty and not as payment for the loan. She also raises the prematurity of the administrative complaint in view of the pendency of the criminal proceedings considering that "the allegations of deceitful conduct [are] intimately intertwined with the criminal acts complained of." 44cralawred This is not a case of first impression. This court has ruled that the lawyer's act of issuing worthless checks, punishable under Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, constitutes serious misconduct. In De Jesus v. Collado, 45 this court found respondent lawyer guilty of serious misconduct for issuing post-dated checks that were dishonored upon presentment for payment:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary In the case at bar, no conviction for violation of B.P. Blg. 22 has as yet been obtained against respondent Collado.. We do not, however, believe that conviction of the criminal charges raised against her is essential, so far as either the administrative or civil service case or the disbarment charge against her is concerned. Since she had admitted issuing the checks when she did not have enough money in her bank account to cover the total amount thereof, it cannot be gainsaid that the acts with which she was charged would constitute a crime penalized by B.P. Blg. 22. We consider that issuance of checks in violation of the provisions of B.P. Blg. 22 constitutes serious misconduct on the part of a member of the Bar .46 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)cralawlawlibrary Misconduct involves "wrongful intention and not a mere error of judgment";
47
it is serious or gross when it is
33
