Result is different from what was intended PEOPLE vs ILIGAN
FACTS: At around 2 in the morning Esmeraldo Quinones and his companions Zaldy Asis and Felix Lukban were walking home from barangay Sto. Domingo after attending a barrio fiesta. On the way they met the accused Fernando Iligan and his nephew Edmundo Asis and Juan Macandog. Edmundo Asis pushed them aside prompting Zaldy Asis to box him. Felix quickly said that they had no desire to fight. Upon seeing his nephew fall, Fernando Iligan drew from his back a bolo and hacked Zaldy but missed. Terrified the trio ran, pursued by the three accused. They ran for a good while and even passed the house of Quinones, when they noticed that they were no longer being chased the three decided to head back to Quinones house. On the way back the three accused suddenly emerged from the the road side, Fernando Iligan Iligan then hacked Quinones Jr. on the forehead with his bolo causing him to fall down. Felix and Zaldy ran. Upon returning they saw that Quinones Jr. was already dead with his head busted. The postmortem examination report and the death certificate indicates that the victim died of “ shock and massive cerebral hemorrhages due to vehicular accident.” ISSUE: Whether or not the accused are liable for the victim’s death given that it was due to a vehicular accident and not the hacking. HELD: YES. We are convinced beyond peradventure that indeed after Quinones, Jr. had fallen fallen from the bolo hacking perpetrated perpetrated by Iligan, Iligan, he was run over by a vehicle. vehicle. This finding, however, does not in any way exonerate Iligan from liability for the death of Quinones Jr. This being under ART 4 of the RPC which states that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended.
The essential requisites of Art 4 are: that an intentional felony has been committed and that the wrong done to the aggrieved party be the direct natural and logical consequence of the felony committed by the offender . It is held that the essential elements are present in this case. The intentional felony committed was the hacking of the head of Quinones the fact that it was considered superficial by the physician is immaterial. The location of the wound intended to do away with him. The The hack hackin ing g inci inciden dentt happe happene ned d on the the nati nation onal al high highway way where where vehi vehicl cles es pass pass any any moment, the hacking blow received by Quinones weakened him and was run over by a vehicle. The hacking by Iligan is thus deemed as the proximate cause of the victim’s death. Iligan is held liable for homicide absent any an y qualifying circumstances
Result is different from what was intended
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs. VALENTINA MANANQUIL Y LAREDO
FACTS: VALENTINA MANANQUIL y LAREDO was accused of PARRICIDE allegedly committed as follows: On March 6, 1965, at about 11:00 o'clock in the evening, appellant went to the NAWASA Building at Pasay City where her husband was then working as a security guard. She had just purchased ten (10) centavo worth of gasoline from the Esso Gasoline Station at Taft Avenue which she placed in a coffee bottle. She was angry of her husband, Elias Day y Pablo, because the latter had burned her clothing, was maintaining a mistress and had been taking all the food from their house. Upon reaching the NAWASA Building, she knocked at the door. Immediately, after the door was opened, Elias Day shouted at the appellant and castigated her saying, "PUTA BUGUIAN LAKAW GALIGAON" The appellant tired of hearing the victim, then got the bottle of gasoline and poured the contents thereof on the face of the victim (t.s.n., p. 14, Id ). Then, she got a matchbox and set the polo shirt of the victim a flame. The appellant was investigated by elements of the Pasay City Police to whom she gave a written statement where she admitted having burned the victim. Upon the other hand, the victim was taken first to the Philippine General Hospital and then to the Trinity General Hospital at Sta. Ana, Manila, when he died on March 10, 1965. due to pneumonia, lobar bilateral Burns 2 secondary. 3
ISSUES: (1) whether or not appellant's extrajudicial confession was voluntarily given;
(2) whether or not the burns sustained by the victim contributed to cause pneumonia which was the cause of the victim's death.
HELD: 1) YES. No denunciation of any sort was made nor levelled by her against the police investigators. Neither was there any complaint aired by her to the effect that she merely affixed her signatures thereto because of the promise by the police that she will be released later.
Furthermore almost all the recitals and narrations appearing in the said statement were practically repeated by her on the witness stand thus authenticating the truth and veracity of her declarations contained therein
2) YES. The cause of death as shown by the necropsy report is pneumonia, lobar bilateral. Burns 2' secondary. There is no question that the burns sustained by the victim as shown by The post-mortem findings immunity about 62% of the victim's entire body. The evidence shows that pneumonia was a mere complication of the burns sustained. While accepting pneumonia as the immediate cause of death, the court a quo held on to state that this could not litem resulted had not the victim suffered from second degree burns. It concluded, and rightly so, that with pneumonia having developed, the burns became as to the cause of death, merely contributory Appellant's case falls squarely under Art, 4, Par. 1 of the Revised Penal Code which provides: Art. 4. Criminal Liability. Criminal liability shall be incurred. 1. By any person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. The essential requisites of which are: (a) that an intentional felony has been committed; and (b) that the wrong done to the aggrieved party be the direct, natural and logical consequence of the felony committed by the offender
Result is different from what was intended THE UNITED STATES vs. JAMES L. BROBST
FACTS: The defendant, James L. Brobst, and another American named Mann, were engaged in work on a mine located in the municipality of Masbate, where they gave employment to a number of native laborers.
Mann discharged one of these laborers named Simeon Saldivar, warned him not to come back on the premises, and told the defendant not to employ him again, because he was a thief and a disturbing element with the other laborers. A few days afterwards, some time after 6 o'clock on the morning of the 10th of July, 1907, Saldivar, in company with three of four others, went to the mine to look for work. The defendant, caught sight of Saldivar, ordered him off the place, exclaiming in bad Spanish, "Sigue, Vamus!" (Begone). Saldivar made no move to leave, and although the order was repeated, merely smiled or grinned at the defendant, whereupon the latter became enraged, took three steps toward Saldivar, and struck him a powerful blow with his closed fist on the left side, just over the lower ribs, at the point where the handle of Saldivar's bolo lay against the belt from which it was suspended. On being struck, Saldivar threw up his hands, staggered. (dio vueltas � spun around helplessly) and without saying a word, went away in the direction of his sister's house, which stood about 200 yards away, and about 100 feet up the side of a hill. He died as he reached the door of the house, and was buried some two or three days later.
ISSUE: Whether or not Brobst is guilty of homicide and not homicide as a result of reckless negligence. HELD: YES.
We are satisfied that the evidence of record leaves no room for reasonable doubt that the defendant struck Saldivar a powerful body blow with his closed fist; and that was far in excess of such authority, and was, therefore, unlawful, and can not be excused or justified as an exercise of necessary force in the exercise of a right
We are satisfied also that the deceased came to his death as a result of the blow inflicted by the defendant. Two or three days prior to his death he was employed as a laborer in defendant's mine; his sister testified that on the morning of the day he died, he left her house in apparent good health and went to the mines to look for work; a short time afterwards he received a violent blow on his lower left side, a region of the body where many of the vital organs are located; and immediately thereafter, he stared up the short trail leading to his sister's house, and died as he reached the door. In the absence of evidence of any intervening cause, we think there can be no reasonable doubt that his death resulted from the blow.
In the case at bar the evidence conclusively establishes the voluntary, intentional, and unlawful infliction by the accused of a severe blow on the person of the deceased; and while it is true that the accused does not appear to have intended to take the life of his victim, there can no doubt that in thus striking the deceased, he intended to do him some injury, at least to the extent of inflicting some degree of physical pain upon him, and he is therefore, criminally responsible for the natural, even if unexpected results of his act, under the provisions of article 1 of the Penal Code, which prescribes that Any person voluntarily committing a crime or misdemeanor shall incur criminal liability, even though the wrongful act committed be different from that which he had intended to commit. In such cases the law in these Islands does not excuse one from liability for the natural consequences of hi illegal acts merely because he did not intend to produce such consequences, but it does take that fact into consideration as an extenuating circumstance, as did the trial judge in this case.
Impossible Crime THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, vs.RAFAEL BALMORES Y CAYA FACTS: Appellant, waiving the right to be assisted by counsel, pleaded guilty to the following information filed against him in the Court of First Instance of Manila:
The accused did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commence the commission of the crime of estafa through falsification of a security directly by overt acts, to wit; by then and there tearing off at the bottom in a cross-wise direction a portion of a genuine 1/8 unit Philippine Charity Sweepstakes ticket thereby removing the true and real unidentified number of same and substituting and writing in ink at the bottom on the left side of said ticket the figure or number 074000 thus making the said ticket bear the said number 074000, which is a prize-winning number. He presented the falsified ticket. exchanging the same for the corresponding cash that said number has won, fraudulently pretending in said office that the said 1/8 unit of a Philippine Charity Sweepstakes ticket is genuine and that he is entitled to the corresponding amount of P359.55 so won by said ticket the said accused failed to perform all the acts of execution which would have produce the crime of estafa through falsification of a security as a consequence by reason of some causes other than this spontaneous desistance, to wit: one Bayani Miller, an employee to whom the said accused presented said ticket in the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office discovered that the said ticket as presented by the said accused was falsified and immediately thereafter he called for a policeman who apprehended and arrested the said accused right then and there. ISSUE: whether or not said act constitutes an impossible crime HELD: NO. It may be that appellant was either reckless or foolish in believing that a falsification as patent as that which he admitted to have perpetrated would succeed; but the recklessness and clumsiness of the falsification did not make the crime impossible within the purview of paragraph 2, article 4, in relation to article 59, of the Revised Penal Code
Judging from the appearance of the falsified ticket in question, we are not prepared to say that it would have been impossible for the appellant to consummate the crime of estafa thru falsification of said ticket if the clerk to whom it was presented for the payment had not exercised due care. This being a complex crime of attempted estafa through falsification of an obligation or security of the Philippines,.Taking into consideration the mitigating circumstance of lack of instruction, and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum cannot be lower than prision mayor in its maximum period, which is 10 years and 1 day to 12 years. It results, therefore, that the penalty imposed by the trial court is correct.
Impossible Crime SULPICIO INTOD vs.HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS FACTS: In the morning of February 4, 1979, Sulpicio Intod, Jorge Pangasian, Santos Tubio and Avelino Daligdig went to Salvador Mandaya's house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental and asked him to go with them to the house of Bernardina Palangpangan. Thereafter, Mandaya and Intod, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig had a meeting with Aniceto Dumalagan. He told Mandaya that he wanted Palangpangan to be killed because of a land dispute between them and that Mandaya should accompany the four (4) men, otherwise, he would also be killed.
At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of the same day, Petitioner, Mandaya, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig, all armed with firearms, arrived at Palangpangan's house in Katugasan, Lopez Jaena, Misamis Occidental. At the instance of his companions, Mandaya pointed the location of Palangpangan's bedroom. Thereafter, Petitioner, Pangasian, Tubio and Daligdig fired at said room. It turned out, however, that Palangpangan was in another City and her home was then occupied by her son-in-law and his family. No one was in the room when the accused fired the shots. No one was hit by the gun fire. Petitioner and his companions were positively identified by witnesses. One witness testified that before the five men left the premises, they shouted: "We will kill you (the witness) and especially Bernardina Palangpangan and we will come back if ( sic) you were not injured ISSUE: Whether or not said act constitutes an impossible crime HELD: YES. The factual situation in the case at bar present a physical impossibility which rendered the intended crime impossible of accomplishment. And under Article 4, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, such is sufficient to make the act an impossible crime.
To be impossible under this clause, the act intended by the offender must be by its nature one impossible of accomplishment. There must be either impossibility of accomplishing the intended act in order to qualify the act an impossible crime. Legal impossibility occurs where the intended acts, even if completed, would not amount to a crime Factual impossibility occurs when extraneous circumstances unknown to the actor or beyond his control prevent the consummation of the intended crime. The case at bar belongs to this category.
In our jurisdiction, impossible crimes are recognized. The impossibility of accomplishing the criminal intent is not merely a defense, but an act penalized by itself. Furthermore, the phrase "inherent impossibility" that is found in Article 4(2) of the Revised Penal Code makes no distinction between factual or physical impossibility and legal impossibility To uphold the contention of respondent that the offense was Attempted Murder because the absence of Palangpangan was a supervening cause independent of the actor's will, will render useless the provision in Article 4, which makes a person criminally liable for an act "which would be an offense against persons or property, were it not for the inherent impossibility of its accomplishment . . ." In that case all circumstances which prevented the consummation of the offense will be treated as an accident independent of the actor's will which is an element of attempted and frustrated felonies.
Impossible Crime PEOPLE, vs. PABLITO DOMASIAN AND DR. SAMSON TAN FACTS: The evidence of the prosecution showed that in the morning of March 11, 1982, while Enrico was walking with a classmate along Roque street in the poblacion of Lopez, Quezon, he was approached by a man who requested his assistance in getting his father's signature on a medical certificate.
Enrico agreed to help and rode with the man in a tricycle to Calantipayan. Enrico became apprehensive and started to cry when, instead of taking him to the hospital, the man flagged a minibus and forced him inside, holding him firmly all the while. The man told him to stop crying or he would not be returned to his father. After that the man talked to a jeepney driver and handed him an envelope addressed to Dr. Enrique Agra, the boy's father. Then they rode a tricycle, the driver got suspicious and reported the matter to two barangay tanods. t he tanods went after the two, Somehow, the man managed to escape, leaving Enrico behind. Enrico was on his way home in a passenger jeep when he met his parents, who were riding in the hospital ambulance and already looking for him. At about 1:45 in the afternoon of the same day, after Enrico's return, Agra received an envelope containing a ransom note. The note demanded P1 million for the release of Enrico and warned that otherwise the boy would be killed. Agra thought the handwriting in the note was familiar. After comparing it with some records in the hospital, he gave the note to the police, which referred it to the NBI for examination. 3 The test showed that it bad been written by Dr. Samson Tan. 4 On the other hand, Enrico was shown a folder of pictures in the police station so be could identify the man who had detained him, and he pointed to the picture of Pablito Domasian. Domasian and Tan were subsequently charged with the crime of kidnapping with serious illegal detention in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon ISSUE:
1) whether or not the act constitutes a crime of kidnapping under art 267 2) whether or not the sending of the ransom note was an impossible crime HELD: 1) YES. Kidnapping may consist not only in placing a person in an enclosure but also in detaining him or depriving him in any manner of his liberty
2) NO. Even before the ransom note was received, the crime of kidnapping with serious illegal detention had already been committed. The act cannot be considered an impossible crime because there was no inherent improbability of its accomplishment or the employment of inadequate or ineffective means. The delivery of the ransom note after the rescue of the victim did not extinguish the offense, which had already been consummated when Domasian deprived Enrico of his liberty
Moreover the trial court correctly held that conspiracy was proved by the act of Domasian in detaining Enrico; the writing of the ransom note by Tan; and its delivery by Domasian to Agra. These acts were complementary to each other and geared toward the attainment of the common ultimate objective The motive for the offense is not difficult to discover. According to Agra, Tan approached him six days before the incident happened and requested a loan of at least P15,000.00. Agra said he had no funds at that moment and Tan did not believe him, angrily saying that Agra could even raise a million pesos if he really wanted to help. 19 The refusal obviously triggered the plan to kidnap Enrico and demand P1 million for his release.
Stages of commission THE UNITED STATE vs. PROTASIO EDUAVE FACTS: The accused rushed upon the girl suddenly and struck her from behind, in part at least, with a sharp bolo, producing a frightful gash in the lumbar region and slightly to the side eight and one-half inches long and two inches deep, severing all of the muscles and tissues of that part. Fortunately the girl was able to survive
The motive of the crime was that the accused was incensed at the girl for the reason that she had theretofore charged him criminally before the local officials with having raped her and with being the cause of her pregnancy. He was her mother's querido and was living with her as such at the time the crime here charged was committed The accused is charged with frustrated murder . We are satisfied that there was an intent to kill in this case. A deadly weapon was used. The blow was directed toward a vital part of the body. The aggressor stated his purpose to kill, thought he had killed, and threw the body into the bushes. When he gave himself up he declared that he had killed the complainant. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused is to be charged with frustrated murder. HELD: YES. The crime cannot be attempted murder. This is clear from the fact that the defendant performed all of the acts which should have resulted in the consummated crime and voluntarily desisted from further acts.
A felony is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which should produce the felony as a consequence, but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator. To put it in another way, in case of an attempt the offender never passes the subjective phase of the offense. On the other hand, attempted murder is defined as when the offender commences the commission of the felony directly by overt acts, and does not perform all the acts of execution which constitute the felony by reason of some cause or accident other than his own voluntarily desistance. Hence the subjective phase is completely passed. Subjectively the crime is complete. The subjective phase is that portion of the acts constituting the crime included between the act which begins the commission of the crime and the last act performed by the offender which, with the prior acts, should result in the consummated crime. From that time forward the phase is objective. It may also be said to be that period occupied by the acts of the offender over which he has control that period between the point where he begins and the points where he voluntarily desists. If between these two points the offender is stopped by reason of any cause outside of his own voluntary desistance, the subjective phase has not been passed and it is an attempt. If he is not so stopped but continues until he performs the last act, it is frustrated.
Rape THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. CEILITO ORITA FACTS: The accused, Ceilito Orita alias Lito, was charged with the crime of rape
The Pertinent information filed in the said case reads as follows: Complainant, Cristina S. Abayan arrived at her boarding house. Her classmates had just brought her home from a party Shortly after her classmates had left, she knocked at the door of her boarding house All of a sudden, somebody held her and poked a knife to her neck. She then recognized appellant who was a frequent visitor of another boarder. She pleaded with him to release her, but he ordered her to go upstairs with him. With the Batangas knife still poked to her neck, they entered complainant's room. He ordered her to lie down on the floor and then mounted her. He made her hold his penis and insert it in her vagina. She followed his order as he continued to poke the knife to her. At said position, however, appellant could not fully penetrate her. Only a portion of his penis entered her as she kept on moving Appellant then lay down on his back and commanded her to mount him. In this position, only a small part again of his penis was inserted into her vagina. At this stage, appellant had both his hands flat on the floor. Complainant thought of escaping Still naked, she darted to the municipal building. Pat. Donceras, the first policeman to see her, took off his jacket and wrapped it around her. Due to darkness, they failed to apprehend appellant Dr. Ma. Luisa Abude, the resident physician who examined complainant, issued a Medical Certificate (Exhibit "A") which states: PE Findings � Pertinent Findings only. Neck- � Circumscribed hematoma at Ant. neck. Breast Well developed, conical in shape with prominent nipples; linear abrasions below (L) breast.Back Multiple pinpoint marks.Extremities Abrasions at (R) and (L) knees.Vulva No visible abrasions or marks at the perineal area or over the vulva, errythematous ( sic) areas noted surrounding vaginal orifice, tender, hymen intact; no laceration fresh and old noted; examining finger can barely enter and with difficulty; vaginal canal tight; no discharges noted.
ISSUE: whether or not the accused’s conviction for frustrated rape is proper given that there was no penetration HELD: NO.
We have set the uniform rule that for the consummation of rape, perfect penetration is not essential.
There is no debate that the attempted and consummated stages apply to the crime of rape. Our concern now is whether or not the frustrated stage applies to the crime of rape. Frustrated felony are: (1) that the offender has performed all the acts of execution which would produce the felony and (2) that the felony is not produced due to causes independent of the perpetrator's will. Clearly, in the crime of rape, from the moment the offender has carnal knowledge defined by blacks dictionary the act of a man in having sexual bodily connections with a woman of his victim he actually attains his purpose and, from that moment also all the essential elements of the offense have been accomplished. Nothing more is left to be done by the offender, because he has performed the last act necessary to produce the crime. Thus, the felony is consummated
