September 17, 2013
[CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASE DIGEST BY KEISHA L. ROJAS ] People vs Nitafan
FACTS: On January 9, 1992, three criminal informations for violation of Section 4 of Central Bank Circular No. 960, as amended, in relation to Section 34 of Republic Act No. 265 were f iled against private respondent Imelda R. Marcos before Branch 158 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig. Said Informations docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 90384-92, 90385-92 and 90386-92 were amended prior to arraignment. After arraignment, where private respondent pleaded not guilty, the RTC of Pasig granted the motion for consolidation. Before the Manila RTC, the three (3) informations were re-raffled and re-assigned instead to Branch 52-Manila presided by public respondent Judge Nitafan wherein the three informations (CriminalCases Nos. 9038492, 90385-92 and 90386-92) were re-numbered as Criminal Case Nos. 92-107942; 92-107943 and 92-107944.
Thereafter, without private respondent yet taking any action of filing any motion to quash the informations, respondent respondent judge issued an order requiring petitioners to show cause why criminal case number 92-107942 should not be dismissed on the ground that it violates private respondent's right against ex post facto law, and on the same day, respondent judge issued another order requiring the prosecution to show cause why the two other criminal informations (92-107943 and 92-107944) should not be dismissed on the ground that private respondent's right to double jeopardy was violated. It is respondent judge's posture that based on the Solicitor-General's allegations in its Motion for Consolidation filed on Branch 58-Pasig that the three cases form part of a series of transactions which are subject of the cases pending before Branch 26-Manila, all these cases constitute one continuous crime. Respondent judge further stated that to separately prosecute private respondent for a series of transaction would endow it with the "functional ability of a worm multiplication or amoeba reproduction". Thus, accused would be unduly vexed with multiple jeopardy. In the two orders, respondent judge likewise said that the dismissal of the three "seemingly unmeritorious" unmeritorious" and "d uplicitous" cases would help unclogged his docket in favor of more serious suits. The prosecution complied with the twin show cause orders accompanied by a motion to inhibit respondent respondent judge. However respondent judge denied motion for consolidation embodied in the prosecution's compliance with the show cause orders for some reasons. Thereafter, respondent judge issued an 8-page order dismissing criminal case no. 92-107942 on the ground that the subject CB Circular is an ex post facto law. In a separate17-page order dated August 10, 1992, respondent judge also dismissed the two remaining criminal cases (92-107943 & 92-107944) ruling that the prosecution of private respondent was "part of a sustained political vendetta" by some people in the government aside from what he considered as a violation of private respondent's right against double jeopardy. From his disquisition regarding continuing, continuous and continued offenses and his discussion of mala prohibita, respondent judge further ratiocinated ratiocinated his dismissal order in that the pendency of the other cases before Branch 26-Manila had placed private respondent respondent in double jeopardy because of the th ree cases before his sala. The prosecution filed two separate motions for reconsideration which respondent judge denied in a single order dated September September 7, 1992 containing containing 19 pages. Hence this petition for certiorari certiorari filed by the prosecution. ISSUE: Whether a judge can motu proprio initiate the dismissal and subsequently dismissed a criminal information or complaint without any motion to that effect being filed by the accused based on the alleged violation of the latter's right against ex post facto law and double jeopardy. HELD: The Supreme Court ruled in the negative. Section 1, Rule 117 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides:
Time to move to quash. — At any time before entering his plea, the accused may move to quash the complaint or information. information. (emphasis supplied). It is clear from the above rule that the accused may file a motion to quash an information at an information time before entering a plea or before arraignment. Thereafter, no motion to quash can be entertained by the court except under the circumstances mentioned in Section 8 of Rule 117 which adopts the omnibus motion to rule. In the case at at bench, private private respondent pleaded to the charges without filing any motion to quash. As such, she is deemed to have waived and abandoned her right to avail of any legal ground which she may have properly and
September 17, 2013
[CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASE DIGEST BY KEISHA L. ROJAS ]
timely invoke to challenge the complaint or information pursuant to Section 8 of Rule 1 17 which provides: Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefore — The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to qu ash or failed to allege the same in his motion, shall be deemed a waiver of the grounds of a motion to quash, except, the grounds of no offense charged, lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged, extinction of the offense or penalty and jeopardy, as provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (f) and (h) of section 3 of this Rule. (emphasis supplied) supplied) It is also clear from Section 1 that the right to file a motion to quash belongs only to the accused. There is nothing in the rules which authorizes the court or judge to motu proprio initiate a motion to quash if no such motion was filed by the accused. A motion contemplates an initial action originating from the accused. It is the latter who is in the best position to know on what ground/s he will based h is objection to the information. information. Otherwise, if the judge initiates the motion to quash, then he is not only pre-judging the case of the prosecution but also takes side with the accused. This would violate the right to a hearing before before an independent and impartial tribunal. That the initial act to quash an information is lodged with the accused is further supported by Sections 2, 3 and 8 of Rule 117. Sec. 2 requires that the motion must be signed by "accused" or "his counsel"; Section 3 states that "the accused" may file a motion, and; Section 8 refers to the consequence if "the accused" do not file such motion. Neither the court nor the judge was mentioned. Section 2 further ordains that the court is proscribed from considering any ground other than those stated in the motion which should be "specify(ied) distinctly" therein. Thus, the filing of a motion to quash is a right that belong to the accused who may waived it by inaction and not an authority for the court to assume. It is therefore clear that the only grounds which the court may consider in resolving a motion to quash an information or complaint are (1) those grounds stated in the motion and (2) the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged, whether or not mentioned in the motion. Other than that, grounds which have not been sharply pleaded in the motion cannot be taken cognizance of by the court, even if at the time of the filing thereof, it may be properly invoked by the defendant. Such proscription on considerations of other grounds than those specially pleaded in the motion to quash is premised on the rationale that the rights to these defenses are waivable on the part of the accused, and that by claiming to wave said right, he is deemed to have desired these matters to be litigated upon in a full-blown trial. Pursuant to the Rules, the sole exception is lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged which goes into the competence of the court to hear and pass judgment on the cause. On ex post facto law, law, suffice it to say that every laws carries with it the presumption of constitutionality until otherwise declared by this court. To rule that the CB Circular is an ex post facto law is to say that it is unconstitutional. However, neither private respondent nor the Solicitor-General challenges it. This Court, much more the lower courts, will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute or rule nor declare it void unless directly assailed in an appropriate action. With respect to the ground of double jeopardy invoked by respondent judge, the same is improper and has neither legal nor factual basis in this case. Double jeopardy connotes the concurrence of three requisites, which are: (a) the first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second, (b) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated, and (c) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof. In this case, it is manifestly clear that no first jeopardy has yet attached nor any such jeopardy terminated. Sec. 7, Rule 117 provides: When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
September 17, 2013
[CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASE DIGEST BY KEISHA L. ROJAS ]
timely invoke to challenge the complaint or information pursuant to Section 8 of Rule 1 17 which provides: Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefore — The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to qu ash or failed to allege the same in his motion, shall be deemed a waiver of the grounds of a motion to quash, except, the grounds of no offense charged, lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged, extinction of the offense or penalty and jeopardy, as provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (f) and (h) of section 3 of this Rule. (emphasis supplied) supplied) It is also clear from Section 1 that the right to file a motion to quash belongs only to the accused. There is nothing in the rules which authorizes the court or judge to motu proprio initiate a motion to quash if no such motion was filed by the accused. A motion contemplates an initial action originating from the accused. It is the latter who is in the best position to know on what ground/s he will based h is objection to the information. information. Otherwise, if the judge initiates the motion to quash, then he is not only pre-judging the case of the prosecution but also takes side with the accused. This would violate the right to a hearing before before an independent and impartial tribunal. That the initial act to quash an information is lodged with the accused is further supported by Sections 2, 3 and 8 of Rule 117. Sec. 2 requires that the motion must be signed by "accused" or "his counsel"; Section 3 states that "the accused" may file a motion, and; Section 8 refers to the consequence if "the accused" do not file such motion. Neither the court nor the judge was mentioned. Section 2 further ordains that the court is proscribed from considering any ground other than those stated in the motion which should be "specify(ied) distinctly" therein. Thus, the filing of a motion to quash is a right that belong to the accused who may waived it by inaction and not an authority for the court to assume. It is therefore clear that the only grounds which the court may consider in resolving a motion to quash an information or complaint are (1) those grounds stated in the motion and (2) the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged, whether or not mentioned in the motion. Other than that, grounds which have not been sharply pleaded in the motion cannot be taken cognizance of by the court, even if at the time of the filing thereof, it may be properly invoked by the defendant. Such proscription on considerations of other grounds than those specially pleaded in the motion to quash is premised on the rationale that the rights to these defenses are waivable on the part of the accused, and that by claiming to wave said right, he is deemed to have desired these matters to be litigated upon in a full-blown trial. Pursuant to the Rules, the sole exception is lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged which goes into the competence of the court to hear and pass judgment on the cause. On ex post facto law, law, suffice it to say that every laws carries with it the presumption of constitutionality until otherwise declared by this court. To rule that the CB Circular is an ex post facto law is to say that it is unconstitutional. However, neither private respondent nor the Solicitor-General challenges it. This Court, much more the lower courts, will not pass upon the constitutionality of a statute or rule nor declare it void unless directly assailed in an appropriate action. With respect to the ground of double jeopardy invoked by respondent judge, the same is improper and has neither legal nor factual basis in this case. Double jeopardy connotes the concurrence of three requisites, which are: (a) the first jeopardy must have attached prior to the second, (b) the first jeopardy must have been validly terminated, and (c) the second jeopardy must be for the same offense as that in the first or the second offense includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information, or is an attempt to commit the same or is a frustration thereof. In this case, it is manifestly clear that no first jeopardy has yet attached nor any such jeopardy terminated. Sec. 7, Rule 117 provides: When an accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
September 17, 2013
[CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASE DIGEST BY KEISHA L. ROJAS ]
xxx xxx xxx Under said Section, the first jeopardy attaches only (1) upon a valid indictment, (2) before a competent court, (3) after arraignment, (4) when a valid plea has been entered, and (5) when the defendant was convicted or acquitted, or the case was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused. Petition granted.
September 17, 2013
[CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASE DIGEST BY KEISHA L. ROJAS ] Garcia vs CA
FACTS: On 28 August 1991, petitioner Jose G. Garcia filed with the Quezon City Prosecutor's Office an "Affidavit of Complaint" charging his wife, private respondent Adela Teodora P. Santos alias "Delia Santos," with Bigamy, and Falsification of Public Documents. However, in his letter of 10 October 1991 to Assistant City Prosecutor George F. Cabanilla, the petitioner informed the latter that he would limit his action to bigamy. After appropriate proceedings, Assistant Prosecutor Cabanilla filed on 8 January 1992 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City an information, dated 15 November 1991, charging the private respondent with Bigamy the information was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-92-27272 and assigned to Branch 83 of the said court. On 2 March 1992, the private respondent filed a Motion to Quash alleging prescription of the offense as ground therefor. She contended that by the petitioner's admissions in his testimony given-on 23 January 1991 in Civil Case No. 90-52730, entitled "Jose G. Garcia v. Delia S. Garcia," and in his complaint filed with the Civil Service Commission (CSC) on 16 October 1991, the petitioner discovered the commission of the offense as early as 1974. Pursuant then to Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), the period of prescription of the offense started to run therefrom. Thus, since bigamy was punishable by prision mayor , an afflictive penalty which prescribed in fifteen years pursuant to Article 92 of the RPC, then the offense charged prescribed in 1989, or fifteen years after its discovery by the petitioner. The trial court granted the motion to quash. Petitioner raised the case to the Court of Appeals contending that (a) the trial court erred in quashing the information on the ground of prescription; and (b) the counsel for the accused was barred from filing the motion to quash the information against the accused. The Court of Appeals however affirmed the decision of the trial court granting the motion to quash. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari to annul and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals and to compel the respondent court to remand the case to the trial court for further proceedings. ISSUES: Whether the Court of Appeals committed reversible error in affirming the trial court's order granting the motion to quash the information for bigamy based on prescription. HELD: Petitioner's position is untenable. Denial then of this petition is all it merits. I It is true that bigamy is a public offense. But, it is entirely incorrect to state, as the petitioner does, that only the State is the offended party in such case, as well as in other public offenses, and, therefore, only the State's discovery of the crime could effectively commence the running of the period of prescription therefor. Article 91 of the RPC provides that "[t]he period of prescription shall commence to run from the day on which the crime is discovered by the offended party, the authorities, or their agents . . . ." This rule makes no distinction between a public crime and a private crime. In both cases then, the discovery may be by the "offended party, the authorities, or their agents." Article 91 does not define the term "offended party." We find its definition in Section 12, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court as "the person against whom or against whose property, the offense was committed." The said Section reads as follows: Name of the offended party . -- A complaint or information must state the name and surname of the SEC. 12. person against whom or against whose property the offense was committed, or any appellation or nickname by which such person has been or is known, and if there is no better way of identifying him, he must be described under a fictitious name.
More specifically, it is reasonable to assume that the offended party in the commission of a crime, public or private, is the party to whom the offender is civilly liable, in light of Article 100 of the RPC, which expressly provides that "[e]very person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable." Invariably then, the private individual to whom the offender is civilly liable is the offended party. This conclusion is strengthened by Section 1, Rule 111 of the Rules of Court Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33,
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[CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASE DIGEST BY KEISHA L. ROJAS ]
34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission of the accused. x x x It is settled that in bigamy, both the first and the second spouses may be the offended parties depending on the circumstances. The distinction he made between public crimes and p rivate crimes relates not to the discovery of the crimes, but to their prosecution. Articles 344 and 360 of the RPC, in relation to Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, are clear on this matter. II The petitioner's contention that a motion to quash cannot go beyond the information in Criminal Case No. Q-9227272 which states that the crime was discovered in 1989, is palpably unmeritorious. Even People v. Alagao, which he cites, mentions the exceptions to the rule as provided in paragraphs (f) and (h) of Section 2, and S ections 4 and 5 of the old Rule 117 viz., (a) extinction of criminal liability, and (b) double jeopardy. His additional claim that the exception of extinction can no longer be raised due to the implied repeal of the former Section 4, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court occasioned by its non-reproduction after its revision, is equally without merit. No repeal, express or implied, of the said Section 4 ever took place. While there is no provision in the new Rule 117 that prescribes the contents of a motion to quash based on extinction of criminal liability, Section 2 thereof encapsulizes the former Sections 3,4, and 5 of the old Rule 117. The said Section is clear that a motion to quash may be based on factual and legal grounds, and since extinction of criminal liability and double jeopardy are retained as among the grounds for a motion to quash in Section 3 of the new Rule 117, it necessarily follows that facts outside the information itself may be introduced to prove such grounds. III The petitioner likewise claims that the factual bases of the private respondent's motion to quash are inconclusive. This is a contemptible practice which can only mislead the courts and thereby contribute to injustice. Besides, he never denied having given the pert inent testimony. He did, however, term it vague in that it was not clear whether the prior marriage which Eugenia Balingit disclosed to him was that entered into by the private respondent with Reynaldo Quiroca. It is immaterial to whom the private respondent was first married; what is relevant in this case is that the petitioner was informed of a prior marriage contracted by the private respondent. Neither may the petitioner be heard to cast doubt on the meaning of his statements in his sworn complaint filed before the CSC. We find no hint of vagueness in them. In any event, he has not denied that he in fact discovered in 1974 that the private respondent had been previously married. Finally, the petitioner draws our attention to the private respondent's several trips abroad as enumerated in the certification of the Bureau of Immigration, and cites the second paragraph of Article 91 of the RPC, viz.: "[t]he term of prescription shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine Archipelago." We agree with the Court of Appeals that these trips abroad did not constitute the "absence" contemplated in Article 91. These trips were brief, and in every case the private respondent returned to the Philippines. Besides, these were made long after the petitioner discovered the offense and even if the aggregate number of days of these trips are considered, still the information was filed well beyond the prescriptive period. WHEREFORE, petition is denied.
September 17, 2013
[CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASE DIGEST BY KEISHA L. ROJAS ] Go vs. BSP
FACTS: An Information for violation of Section 83 of Republic Act No. 337 ( RA 337 ) or the General Banking Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1795, was filed against Go before the RTC. Go pleaded not guilty to the offense charged. After the arraignment, both the prosecution and accused Go took part in the pre-trial conference where the marking of the voluminous evidence for the parties was accomplished. After the completion of the marking, the trial court ordered the parties to p roceed to trial on the merits. Before the trial could commence, however, Go filed on February 26, 2003 a motion to quash the Information, which motion Go amended on March 1, 2003. Go claimed that the Information was defective, as the facts charged therein do not constitute an offense. In support of his motion to quash, Go averred that based on the facts alleged in the Information, he was being prosecuted for borrowing the deposits or funds of the Orient Bank and/or acting as a guarantor, indorser or obligor for the bank’s loans to other persons. The use of the word “and/or” meant that he was charged for being either a borrower or a guarantor, or for being both a borrower and guarantor. Go claimed that the charge was not only vague, but also did not constitute an offense. The RTC granted Go’s motion to quash the Information on May 20, 2003. It denied on June 30, 2003 the motion for reconsideration filed by the prosecution. The prosecution filed a petition for certiorari to question it before the CA. The Information, the prosecution claimed, was sufficient. The word “and/or” did not materially affect the validity of the Information, as it merely stated a mode of committing the crime penalized under Section 83 of RA 337. Thus, the prosecution prayed that the orders of the RTC quashing the Information be set aside and the criminal case against Go be reinstated. The CA rendered the assailed decision granting the prosecution’s petition for certiorari . Hence, this present appeal by certiorari filed by Go. ISSUE: Whether the CA erred in overturning the decision of the trial court granting the motion to quash on the ground that the facts charged does not constitute an offense. HELD: The Court does not find the petition meritorious and accordingly denies it. Assuming that the facts charged in the Information do not constitute an offense, we find it erroneous for the RTC to immediately order the dismissal of the Information, without giving the prosecution a chance to amend it. Section 4 of Rule 117 states: SEC. 4. Amendment of complaint or information.—If the motion to quash is based on an alleged defect of the complaint or information which can be cured by a mendment, the court shall order that an amendment be made. If it is based on the ground that the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the prosecution shall be given by the court an opportunity to correct the defect by amendment. The motion shall be granted if the prosecution fails to make the amendment, or the complaint or information still suffers from the same defect despite the amendment. Although an Information may be defective because the facts charged do not constitute an offense, the dismissal of the case will not necessarily follow. The Rules specifically require that the prosecution should be given a chance to correct the defect; the court can order the dismissal only upon the prosecution’s failure to do so. The RTC’s failure to provide the prosecution this opportunity twice constitutes an arbitrary exercise of power that was correctly addressed by the CA through the certiorari petition. This defect in the RTC’s action on the case, while not central to the issue before us, strengthens our conclusion that this criminal case should be resolved through full-blown trial on the merits. Petition denied, and the decision of the CA affirmed.
September 17, 2013
[CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASE DIGEST BY KEISHA L. ROJAS ] People vs Tabio
FACTS: Appellant Jimmy Tabio was charged with three (3) counts of rape in a single Information Appellant pleaded not guilty on arraignment before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora, Branch 96.Trial on the merits ensued. The victim, AAA testified that one night in June 2002, while she was alone in her home, appellant entered her house. He pressed a knife on AAA’s breast, removed her clothing, fondled her breast, undressed himself, and mounted her as she was seated on a bed. He inserted his penis in her vagina and ejaculated. AAA was able to recognize the appellant as her house was lighted with a gas lamp. AAA further testified that the appellant on two succeeding occasions again entered her home a nd repeated the same acts on her. Other witnesses for the prosecution presented testimony concerning AAA’s mental condition. A doctor who had trained with the National Center for Mental Health testified that he had examined AAA and concluded that while she was 23 years old at the time of the rape, she nonetheless had the mental age of a six-year old child. AAA’s mother and grand aunt also testified on her mental retardation and the occurrences after she had reported the rape to them. Appellant testified in his own behalf, denying that he had raped AAA and offering as alibi that he was up in the mountain at the time of the rape. Appellant’s wife and his brother-in-law, Jaime Bautista, tried to corroborate his alibi through their own testimony. The RTC handed down a decision finding appellant guilty and imposing the penalty of death on three (3) counts of qualified rape. The CA affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court. The appellate court found appellant guilty of all three (3) counts for simple rape only and not qualified rape. Hence, the case is now before the Supreme Court for final decision. ISSUE: 1.
Whether the RTC erred in finding him guilty of qualified rape with the penalty of death in view of the prosecution’s failure to allege a qualifying circumstance in the information;
HELD: In the case at bar, the appellant presented three errors, but in relation to Criminal procedure we will discuss only the first issue. The SC held, that the CA properly resolved the error, with modifications. Rule 110 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure is clear and u nequivocal that both qualifying and aggravating circumstances must be alleged with specificity in the information. The Court also observes that there is duplicity of the offenses charged in the information, which is a ground for a motion to quash. Three (3) separate acts of rape were charged in one information only. But the failure of appellant to interpose an objection on this ground constitutes waiver. Therefore, the effect of failure to move to quash or allege any of the ground therefore is deemed a waiver and the accused can be convicted as many offenses as alleged in the information. However, the Court acquitted the appellant in the second and third count of rape since it was not proven beyond reasonable doubt and modified the civil liabilities. Wherefore, the Appellant is found GUILTY of only ONE count of simple rape and ACQUITTED of the TWO other counts of qualified rape. Appellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty reclusion perpetua , and ordered to pay to the victim P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
September 17, 2013
[CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASE DIGEST BY KEISHA L. ROJAS ] Miranda vs Tuliao
FACTS: On 8 March 1996, two burnt cadavers were discovered in Purok Nibulan, Ramon, Isabela, which were later identified as the dead bodies of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao, son of private respondent Virgilio Tuliao who is now under the witness protection program. Two informations for murder were filed against five police officers including SPO2 Rodel Maderal, in the RTC of Santiago City. The venue was later transferred to Manila. The RTC of Manila convicted all of the accused and sentenced them to two counts of reclusion perpetua except SPO2 Maderal who was yet to be arraigned at that time, being at large. The case was appealed to this Court on automatic review and later all were, acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt. Sometime in September 1999, SPO2 Maderal was arrested. On 27 April 2001, he executed a sworn confession and identified four other persons responsible for the deaths of Vicente Bauzon and Elizer Tuliao. Tuliao immidiately filed a criminal complaint for murder against petitioners. Actingg Presiding Judge Wilfredo Tumaliuan issued warrants of arrest against petitioners and SPO2 Maderal. Thereafter, petitioners filed an urgent motion to complete preliminary investigation, to reinvestigate, and to recall and/or quash the warrants of arrest. Judge Tumaliuan noted the absence of petitioners and issued a Joint Order denying said urgent motion on the ground that, since the court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons, the motion cannot be properly heard by the court. In the meantime, petitioners appealed the resolution of State Prosecutor Leo T. Reyes to the Department of Justice. The new Presiding Judge named Judge Anghad took over the case and issued a Joint Order reversing the Joint Order of Judge Tumalian. He also ordered the cancellation of the warrant of arrest. Respondent Tuliao filed a petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition with a prayer for TRO seeking to enjoin Judge Anghad from further proceeding of the case and seeking to nullify the J oint Orders of the said Judge. The SC issued a resolution granting the prayer. Notwithstanding the said resolution, Judge Anghad issued a Joint Order dismissing thein formation against the petition. Respondent Tuliao filed a motion to cite Judge Anghad in contempt. The SC referred the said motion to the CA. The CA rendered the assailed decision granting the petition and ordering the reinstatement of the criminal cases in the RTC of Santiago City as well as the issuance of warrant of arrest. Hence, this petition ISSUE: Whether or not an accused cannot seek any judicial relief if he does not s ubmit his person to the jurisdiction of the court. HELD: Petition is dismissed and cost against the petitioners .It has been held that an accused cannot seek judicial relief is he does not submit his person to the jurisdiction of the court. Jurisdiction over the accused can be acquired either through compulsory process, such as warrant of arrest or through his voluntary appearance, such as when he surrender to the police or to the court. It is only when the court has already acquired jurisdiction over his person that an accused may invoke the processes of the court. Since, petitioner were not arrested or otherwise deprived of their liberty, they cannot seek judicial relief. On the issue on double jeopardy the Court ruled that, the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before arraignment does not constitute double jeopardy. Double jeopardy cannot be invoked where the accused has not been arraigned and it was upon his express motion that the case was dismissed. In effect, the first jeopardy did not attach to the second jeopardy therefore there is no double jeopardy in the reinstatement of a criminal case dismissed before arraignment.
September 17, 2013
[CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASE DIGEST BY KEISHA L. ROJAS ] People vs. Grafin
FACTS: On June 22, 2001, private respondent was charged with violation of Section 22(a) in relation to Sections 19(b) and 28(e) of Republic Act No. 8282, otherwise known as the Social Security Act. The information contains a certification signed by State Prosecutor Romulo SJ. Tolentino. The case was raffled to Branch 19 of the Regional Trial Court of Naga City presided by respondent judge Hon. Zeida Aurora B. Garfin. The accused Serafin Saballegue pleaded not guilty to the charge and the case was set for pre-trial. Three days thereafter, the accused filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the information was filed without the prior written authority or approval of the city prosecutor as required under Section 4, Rule 112 of the Revised Rules of Court. After considering the respective arguments raised by the parties, the Court believes and so resolves that the Information has not been filed in accordance with Section 4, par. 3 of Rule 112 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure; ‘Rule 112, Section 4 x x x x x x No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy.’ The Information will readily show that it has not complied with this rule as it has not been approved by the City Prosecutor. This Court holds that the defendant’s plea to the Information is not a waiver to file a motion to dismiss or to quash on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. By express provision of the rules and by a long line of decisions, questions of want of jurisdiction may be raised at any stage of the proceedings ISSUES: (1) Whether the city provincial prosecutor is no longer required? (2) Whether the lack of prior written approval of the city, provincial or chief state prosecutor in the filing of an information is a defect in the information that is waived if not raised as an objection before arraignment. HELD: (1) No. Under Presidential Decree No. 1275, the Regional State Prosecutor is clearly vested only with the power of administrative supervision. As administrative supervisor, he has no power to direct the city and provincial prosecutors to inhibit from handling certain cases. At most, he can request for their inhibition. Hence, the said directive of the regional state prosecutor to the city and provincial prosecutors is questionable to say the least. Petitioner argues that the word “may” is permissive. Hence, there are cases when prior written approval is not required, and this is one such instance. This is too simplistic an interpretation. Whether the word “may” is mandatory or directory depends on the context of its use. We agree with the OSG that the use of the permissive word “may” should be read together with the other provisions in the same section of the Rule. The paragraph immediately preceding the quoted provision shows that the word “may” is mandatory. It states: Sec. 4, Rule 112. – x x x Within five (5) days from his resolution, he (investigating prosecutor) shall forward the record of the case to the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor, or to the Ombudsman or his deputy in cases of offenses cognizable by the Sandiganbayan in the exercise of its original jurisdiction. They shall act on the resolution within ten (10) days from their receipt thereof and shall immediately inform the parties of such action. (emphasis supplied) (2) No. The provisions in the 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure that demand illumination are Sections 3 and 9 of Rule 117 in relation to paragraph 3, Section 4 of Rule 112, to wit: Rule 117, Section 3. Grounds.—The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds: “xxx (d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so.. ” Section 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor.—The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, either because he d id not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of section 3 of this Rule. ( emphasis supplied )
September 17, 2013
[CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASE DIGEST BY KEISHA L. ROJAS ]
Rule 112, Section 4, paragraph 3 provides, viz: No complaint or information may be filed or dismissed by an investigating prosecutor without the prior written authority or approval of the provincial or city prosecutor or chief state prosecutor or the Ombudsman or his deputy. (emphasis supplied ) Private respondent and the OSG take the position that the lack of prior authority or approval by the city or provincial prosecutor or chief state prosecutor is an infirmity in the information that prevented the court from acquiring jurisdiction over the case. Since lack of jurisdiction is a defect that may be raised as an objection anytime even after arraignment, the respondent judge did not err in granting the motion to dismiss based on this ground. In sum, we hold that, in the absence of a directive from the Secretary of Justice designating State Prosecutor Tolentino as Special Prosecutor for SSS cases or a prior written approval of the information by the provincial or city prosecutor, the information in Criminal Case No. RTC 2001-0597 was filed by an officer without authority to file the same. As this infirmity in the information constitutes a jurisdictional defect that cannot be cured, the respondent judge did not err in dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction. Petition denied.
September 17, 2013
[CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASE DIGEST BY KEISHA L. ROJAS ] RSP SANTIAGO M. TURINGAN vs. HON. ZEIDA AURORA B. GARFIN
FACTS: The case arose from an Information charging Apolinar for violation of RA 8282 for non-remittance of social security and employees’ compensationpremiums of his workers for the period January 1997 to December 1998, and non-payment of the 3% monthly penalty for late remittance. The Information, signed by state prosecutor Tolentino including the accompanying certification. Prior to his arraignment, Apolinar moved for the quashing of the Information on the ground that state prosecutor Tolentino lacked the authority to sign it. Thereafter, Tolentino opposed Apolinar’s motion. He contended that he was clothed with the authority to investigate, file the necessary Information and prosecute SSS cases in view of his designation as special prosecutor for SSS cases in Region V under Regional Order No. 97-024-A dated July 14, 1997. Respondent Judge Garfin dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. State prosecutor Tolentino moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied. ISSUE: Whether or not state prosecutor Tolentino had the authority to file the Information for violation of RA 8282 despite the absence of a written authority or approval of the provincial or state prosecutor? HELD: The petition must be dismissed.The Supreme Court, thru Mr. Justice (now Chief Justice) Puno, dismissed the petition contending that in the absence of a directive from the Secretary of Justice designating State Prosecutor Tolentino as Special Prosecutor for SSS cases or a prior written approval of the information by the provincial or city prosecutor, the information was filed by an officer without authority to file the same. As this infirmity in the information constitutes a jurisdictional defect that cannot be cured, the respondent judge did not err in dismissing the case for lack of ju risdiction. In this case, state prosecutor Tolentino lacked the authority to file the Information because there was neither a directive from the Secretary of Justice designating him as special prosecutor for SSS cases nor the written approval of the Information by the city prosecutor.
September 17, 2013
[CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASE DIGEST BY KEISHA L. ROJAS ] BINAY vs SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS: This case is a consolidated cases against petitioner Jejomar Binay(G.R. Nos. 120681-83) and petitioner Mario C. Magsaysay, et al ( G.R. No. 128136). In G.R. Nos. 120681-83, the Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan (SB) three separate informations against petitioner Jejomar Binay, one for violation of Article 220 of the Revised Penal Code, and two for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019.The informations, which were subsequently amended on September 15, 1994, all alleged that the acts constituting these crimes were committed in 1987 during petitioner’s incumbency as Mayor of Makati, then a municipality of Metro Manila. The petitioner filed a motion to quash alleging that the delay of more than 6 years constituted a violation of his constitutional right of due process. His arraignment therefore was held in abeyance pending the resolution of the motions. Subsequently, the SB issued a resolution denying petitioner’s motion to quash and further the latter’s motion for reconsideration. In the meantime, the prosecution filed a motion to suspend the accused ‘pendente lite’ which was later granted and ordered for a 90-day suspension. Petition for certiorari was filed by Mayor Binay in the SC praying that the resolution denying his motion for reconsideration be set aside and claimed that he was denied of his rights when the suspension was ordered even before he could file his reply to the petitioner’s opposition. Supreme Court then, directed the SB to permit petitioner to file said reply. The SB nonetheless reiterated its previous resolutions and order after the submission of the reply. Meanwhile, RA 7975 redefining the jurisdiction of SB took effect on May 1995 so much so that the petitioner filed befor e S B a motio n t o re fer his cases to the RTC o f Ma kati alleg ing that the SB has no jurisdiction over said cases when it issued its resolutions and suspension order on June 1995. The SB in a follow-up resolution denied the petitioner’s motion. Hence this present petition, prohibition and mandamus questioning the jurisdiction of SB over the criminal cases. In G.R. No. 128136, Petitioner Mario Magsaysay is the Mayor of the Municipality of San Pascual, Batangas. Save for petitioner Vicente dela Rosa, all of Mayor Magsaysay’s co -petitioners are officials of the same municipality were charged with violation of R.A. No. 3019, as amended. The complaint charged the respondent municipal officials of overpaying V icente de la Rosa of TDR Construction for the landscaping project of the San Pascual Central School. A resolution was subsequently issued by the Graft Investigation officer recommending the filing of the information against the petitioners with the Sandiganbayan. However, On August 11, 1995, an Information for violation of Section 3 (e) and (g) was filed against petitioners and Jovey C. Babago, not with the Sandiganbayan per the June 14, 1995 Resolution, but with the RTC of Batangas City. The information was signed by a Lourdes A. Alarilla, the same Graft Investigation Officer who recommended the filing of the information with the Sandiganbayan. On February 9, 1996, another Information for violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No. 3019, as amended, was filed against petitioners for the overpricing of the landscaping project, this time before the Sandiganbayan. The information was subsequently amended on May 17, 1996. Except for the date the alleged crime was committed, the information charged essentially the same inculpatory facts as the information filed in the RTC. accused filed with the Sandiganbayan a motion to quash the information in Crim. Case No. 22378 on the following grounds: that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over the case; that the accused were charged with the same offense in two informations; and that the proceedings in the Sandiganbayan would expose petitioners to double jeopardy. The Sandiganbayan denied the accused’s motion to quash in a Resolution dated June 21, 1996. The court, however, suspended proceedings in the case until the Supreme Court resolved the question of the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction involved in the Binay petition. Hence the case is now before the SC. ISSUES: 1. WON SB has jurisdiction over the case o f after the passage of RA 7975. 2. WON, the subsequent case f iled in Sandiganbayan constitutes double jeopardy? 3. WONthe filing of two (2) informations for the same offense violated the rule on duplicity of information?
September 17, 2013
[CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASE DIGEST BY KEISHA L. ROJAS ]
HELD: 1.
The Court rules that it is the Sandiganbayan which has jurisdiction over the subject cases. RA 7975 which was further amended by RA 8249 states that the SB shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving violations of Republic Act 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, RA No. 1379 and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII Book II of the Revised Penal Code where one o r m ore o f t he a c c u s e d a r e o f f i c i a l s o c c u p y i n g t h e f o l l o w i n g p o s i t i o n s i n t h e g o v e r n m e n t , w h e t h e r i n a permanent, acting or interim capacity at the time of the commission of the offense:1. Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified as grade "27" and higher of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989Under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989, mayors are "local officials classified as Grade ‘27’ and higher
2.
The filing of the information in the Sandiganbayan did not put petitioners in double jeopardy even though they had already pleaded “not guilty” to the information earlier filed in the RTC. The first jeopardy never attached in the first place, the RTC not being a court of competent jurisdiction. There can be no double jeopardy where the accused entered a plea in a court that had no jurisdiction. The remedy of petitioners, therefore, was not to move for the quashal of the information pending in the Sandiganbayan on the ground of double jeopardy . Their remedy was to move for the quashal of the information pending in the RTC on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
3.
The contention that the filing of the information in the Sandiganbayan violated the rule against duplicitous informations is patently unmeritorious. That rule presupposes that there is one complaint or information charging not one offense, but two o r more offenses. Thus, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court states: Sec. 13. Duplicity of offense. - A complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only in those cases in which existing laws prescribed a single punishment for various offenses. Non-compliance with this rule is a ground for quashing the duplicitous complaint or information under Rule 117: Sec. 3. Grounds. - The accused may move to quash the complaint or information on any of the following grounds: xxx (e) That more than one offense is charged except in those cases in which existing laws prescribe a single punishment for various offenses; xxx Here, petitioners are faced not with one information charging more than one offense but with more than one information charging one offense.
Petition dismissed.
September 17, 2013
[CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASE DIGEST BY KEISHA L. ROJAS ] People vs Magat
FACTS: Accused-appellant Antonio Magat y London was charged of two counts of rape by his daughter. Consequently, two informations were filed against appellant. Upon arraignment, he pleaded guilty but bargained for a lesser penalty for each case. The mother of the complainant and the public prosecutor agreed and an order was issued the same day imposing ten years imprisonment for each case. After three months, the cases were revived at the instance of the complainant on the ground that the penalty was too light. Appellant was re-arraigned and he entered a plea of not guilty. Two months later, he entered anew a p lea of guilty. The court then imposed the Penalty of death. Hence, this automatic review. Accused-appellant contends that the trial court erred in re-arraigning and proceeding into trial despite the fact that he was already convicted per Order of the trial court based on h is plea of guilt. He also argues that when the court rendered judgment convicting him, the prosecution did not appeal nor move for reconsideration or took steps to set aside the order. Consequently, the conviction having attained finality can no longer be set aside or modified even if the prosecution later realizes that the penalty imposed was too light. He now appeals on the ground that there was double jeopardy upon the re-arraignment and trial on the same information. ISSUE: Whether or not the first plea of guilty is valid hence second plea and arraignment tantamount to double jeopardy. HELD: The first order issued by the trial is void ab initio on the ground that the accused’s plea is not the plea bargaining contemplated by law and the rules of procedure. The only instance where a plea bargaining is allowed under the Rules is when the accused pleads guilty to a lesser offense. Here the reduction of the penalty is only a consequence of the plea of guilt to a lesser penalty. The appellant did not plead to a lesser offense but pleaded guilty to the rape charges and only bargained for a lesser penalty. He did not plea bargain but made conditions on the penalty to be imposed. This is erroneous because by pleading guilty to the offense charged, accused should be sentenced to the penalty to which he pleaded. It is the essence of a plea of guilty that that the accused admits absolutely and unconditionally hid guilt and responsibility for the offense imputed to him. Hence accused-appellant's plea of guilty is undoubtedly a conditional plea. The trial court should have vacated such a plea and entered a plea of not guilty for a conditional plea of guilty, or one subject to the proviso that a certain penalty be imposed upon him, is equivalent to a plea of not guilty and would, therefore, require a fullblown trial before judgment may be rendered. In effect, the judgment rendered by the trial court which was based on a void plea bargaining is also void ab initio and can not be considered to have attained finality for the simple reason that a void judgment has no legality from its inception. Since the judgment of conviction is void, double jeopardy will not lie. Whatever procedural infirmity in the arraignment of the accused was rectified when he was re-arraigned and entered a new plea. He did not question the procedural errors in the first arraignment and having failed to do so, waived the errors in procedure. Under the present rule, if the present rule, if accused enters a plea of guilty the trial courts are now enjoined to conduct searching inquiry into the voluntariness and full comprehension of the consequences of his plea, to require the prosecution to present evidence to prove the guilt and precise degree of culpability, and to ask if he so desires to present evidence in his behalf and allow him to do so.
September 17, 2013
[CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASE DIGEST BY KEISHA L. ROJAS ] Argel vs Pascua
FACTS: Complainant alleged in his complaint that respondent Judge rendered a Decision dated 19 August 1993 in Crim. Case No. 2999-V entitled People v. Miguel Argel convicting him of murder notwithstanding the fact that he had already been previously acquitted by respondent in her Decision dated 22 July 1993, promulgated on 13 August 1993. Complainant contends that respondent Judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law and of violating his constitutional right against double jeopardy. Respondent Judge alleged that she rendered the judgment of acquittal because she erroneously thought that there was no witness who positively identified the accused, herein complainant, as the perpetrator of the crime. However, when she re-read her notes after her attention was called by the lawyer of the private complainant that there was such an eyewitness, respondent confirmed that there was indeed one in the person of Tito Retreta. Hence she "revised" her previous decision and rendered the Decision dated 19 August 1993 finding the accused guilty of murder. Fully aware of her prior decision of acquittal, respondent nevertheless ordered the police to bring complainant Argel to court not for the purpose of having him incarcerated but only to inform him of her new decision so that he could be made to answer for his civil liabilities arising from the crime. Before she could explain the matter to complainant, the latter's brother already filed a petition for habeas corpus before the Court of Appeals. According to respondent, she decided to await the hearing of the petition before setting complainant free so that she could give him a copy of her new decision. ISSUE: WON a revision of the decision can still be made? HELD: The Court ruled in the negative. Too elementary is the rule that a decision once final is n o longer susceptible to amendment or alteration except to correct errors which are clerical in nature, to clarify any ambiguity caused by an omission or mistake in the dispositive portion, or to rectify a travesty of justice brought about by a moro-moro or mock trial. A final decision is the law of the case and is immutable and unalterable regardless of any claim of error or incorrectness. In criminal cases, a judgment of acquittal is immediately final upon its promulgation. It cannot be recalled for correction or amendment except in the cases already mentioned nor withdrawn by another order reconsidering the dismissal of the case since the inherent power of a court to modify its order or decision does not extend to a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case. Complainant herein was already acquitted of murder by respondent in a decision promulgated on 13 August 1993. Applying the aforestated rule, the decision became final and immutable on the same day. As a member of the bench who is always admonished to be conversant with the latest legal and judicial developments, more so of elementary rules, respondent should have known that she could no longer "revise" her decision of acquittal without violating not only an elementary rule of procedure but also the constitutional proscription against double jeopardy. When the law is so elementary, not to know it constitutes gross ignorance of the law. Wherefore, respondent judge guilty for gross ignorance of the law.
September 17, 2013
[CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASE DIGEST BY KEISHA L. ROJAS ] People vs Dela Torre
FACTS: Wilfredo dela Torre, appellee, has three children from a common-law relationship, the eldest of which is Mary Rose. When Mary Rose was 7 yearsold, her mother left them together with her youngest brother so she and her other brother were left to the care of her father. Mary Rose was the brightest in her class despite their poverty. However, in January 1997, a sudden change in Mary Rose’s behavior behavior was noticed. She was twelve years old at that time. She appeared sleepy, snobbish and she also urinated on her panty. When confronted by her head teacher, Mary Rose admitted that she was abused repeatedly by her father. Her father, however, denied vehemently the charges being imputed to him by her daughter. The RTC convicted appellee of two counts of acts of lasciviousness and four counts of murder. However, the RTC refused to impose the supreme penalty of death on appellee. It maintained that there were circumstances that mitigated the gravity of the offenses such as the absence of any actual physical violence or intimidation on the commission of the acts, that after the mother of Mary Rose left the conjugal home, for more than five years, Wilfredo, Mary Rose and her brother were living together as a family and Mary Rose was never molested by her father. The prosecution seeks to modify the RTC Decision by imposing the supreme penalty of death of the accused. It argues that it has proven that the victim is the daughter of the accused, and that she was below eighteen years old when the rapes took place. As a consequence, the trial court should have been imposed the penalty of death pursuant to Section 11 of R.A. 7659. . The prosecution now appeals the order issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iba, Zambales the assailed Decision convicted Wilfredo Dela Torre of two counts of acts of lasciviousness and four counts of rape, while the challenged Order denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by plaintiff (now appellant). ISSUE: WON the Court a quo erred in penalizing appellee with reclusion perpetua in each of the four indictments for rape, instead of imposing the supreme penalty of death as mandated by R.A. No. 7659. HELD: the prosecution argues it has proven that the victim is the daughter of the accused, and that she was below eighteen (18) years old when the rapes took place. As a consequence, the trial court should have imposed the penalty of death pursuant to Section 11 of RA 7659. Under Section 1, Rule 122 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, any party may appeal from a judgment or final order, unless the accused will be placed in double jeopardy. This provision is substantially the same as that provided by the 1985 Rules.The question now is whether an increase in the penalty imposed by the lower court will violate the right of the accused against double jeopardy. The Court cited the Kepner doctrine. It states that double jeopardy provides three related protections: (1) against a second prosecution for the same offense after acquittal, (2) against a second prosecution for the same offense after conviction, and (3) against multiple punishments for the same offense. The ban on double jeopardy is deeply rooted in jurisprudence. The doctrine has several avowed purposes. Primarily, it prevents the State from using its criminal processes as an instrument of harassment to wear out the accused by a multitude of cases with accumulated trials. It also serves the additional purpose of precluding the State, following an acquittal, from successively retrying the defendant in the hope of securing a conviction. And finally, it prevents the State, following conviction, from retrying the defendant again in the hope of securing a greater penalty. Being violative of the right against double jeopardy, the instant appeal filed by the prosecution cannot prosper. The rule is clear -- the prosecution cannot appeal on the ground that the accused should have been given a more severe penalty. The only way to nullify an acquittal or to increase the penalty is through a proper petition for certiorari to show grave abuse of discretion as explained in People v. CA and Maquiling. Wherefore, appeal is denied.
September 17, 2013
[CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASE DIGEST BY KEISHA L. ROJAS ] People vs. Rondero
When an accused appeals from the judgment of the trial court, he waives the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open for review of the appellate court, which is then called to render such judgment as law and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable. With this precept in mind, this Court as the ultimate dispenser of justice will not hesitate to render the proper imposable penalty, whenever it sees fit, even the supreme penalty of death. FACTS: The accused was seen by the victim’s father with an ice pick and washing his bloodied hands at the well. The 9 year old victim was later found dead and half naked with lacerations in her vagina but no sperm. Thereafter, five (5) policemen arrived at the scene and conducted a spot investigation. Maximo led the policemen to the artesian well where he had seen accused-appellant earlier washing his hands. The policemen found that the artesian well was spattered with blood. After the investigation, the policemen, together with Maximo, went back to their headquarters in Dagupan City. There, Maximo disclosed that before they found Mylene’s body, he saw accused-appellant washing his bloodstained hands at the artesian well. Acting on this lead, the policemen returned to Pugaro and arrested accused-appellant. Accused-appellant pleaded not guilty at his arraignment. At trial, accused-appellant resolved not to testify at the trial, opting instead to present his wife and his father as witnesses to account for his whereabouts on the night of the gruesome incident. The trial court rendered judgment convicting accused-appellant of the crime of murder and sentencing him to death. Subsequently, , the trial court issued an order modifying its earlier decision, convicting accused-appellant of the crime of homicide and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua instead, on the ground that under Section 10 of Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise known as the “Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act,” the penalty for homicide is reclusion perpetua when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age. For his conviction, several circumstantial pieces of evidence were submitted including strands of his hair for comparison with the strands of hair found in the victim’s right hand at the scene of the crime as well as blood stained undershirt and short pants taken from his house. The accused-appellant avers the acquisition of his hair strands without his express written consent and without the presence of his counsel, which, he contends is a violation of his Constitutional right against self-incrimination under Sections 12 and 17, Article III of the Constitution. ISSUE: Whether or not the accused can be convicted to a crime through an invalid warrantless arrest. HELD: Anent accused-appellant’s third assignment of error, it might be true that accused-appellant’s warrantless arrest was not lawful. The police officers who arrested him had no personal knowledge of facts indicating that he was the perpetrator of the crime just committed. The cour ruled that any irregularity attending the arrest of an accused is deemed waived when, instead of quashing the information for lack of jurisdiction over his person, the accused voluntarily submits himself to the court by entering a plea of guilty or n ot guilty during the arraignment and participating in the proceedings. We reiterate that when an accused appeals from the sentence of the trial court, he waives the constitutional safeguard against double jeopardy and throws the whole case open to the review of the appellate court, which is then called to render judgment as the law and justice dictate, whether favorable or unfavorable, and whether they are made the subject of assigned errors or not. This precept should be borne in mind by every lawyer of an accused who unwittingly takes the risk involved when he decides to appeal his sentence. Wherefore the decision of the RTC is modified convicting the accused with special complex crime of rape with homicide.
September 17, 2013
[CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASE DIGEST BY KEISHA L. ROJAS ] Ivler vs Modesto San Pedro
FACTS: A vehicular coolision in August 2004 transpired the case, where petition Jason Ivler was charged before th Metroplitan Trial Court of Pasig City (MeTC), with two separate offense to wit: (1) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries sustained by respondent Evangeline L. Ponce; and (2) Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property for the death of respondent Ponce’s husband Nestor C. Ponce and damage to the spouses Ponce’s vehicle. Petitioner posted bail for his temporary release in both cases. On 2004, petitioner pleaded guilty to the charge on the first delict and was meted out the penalty of public censure. Invoking this condition, petitioner move to quash the information for the second offense for placing him in jeopardy of second punishment for the same offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC refused quashal, finding no identity of offenses in the two cases. The petitioner ths, elevated the matter to the RTC of Pasig City, in a petition for certiorari while Ivler s ought from the MeTC the suspension of proceedings in criminal case, including the arraignment as prejudicial question. Without acting on petitioner’s motion, the MeTC proceeded with the arraignment and, because of petitioner’s absence, cancelled his bail and ordered his arrest. Seven days later, the MeTC issued a resolution denying petitioner’s motion to suspend p roceedings and postponing his arraignment until after his arrest. Petitioner sought for reconsideration but as of the filing of his petition, the motion remained unsolved. ISSUES: Whether or not the petitioner’s consititutional right under Double Jeopardy Clause bars further proceedings in case. HELD: The SC held in affirmative. The accused’s negative constitutional right not to be “twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense” protects him, among others, post-conviction prosecution for the same offense, with prior verdict rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction upon a valid information. Petitioner adopts the affirmative view, submitting that the two cases concern the same offense of reckless imprudence. The MeTC ruled otherwise, finding that Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Slight Physical Injuries is an entirely separate offense from Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide and Damage to Property “as the latter requires proof of an additionl fact which the other does not require.” The two charges against petitioner, arising from the same facts, were prosecuted under the same provision of the RPC, as amended namely Art. 365 defining and penalizing quasi-offenses. The provisions contained in this article shall not be applicable. Indeed, the notion that quasi-offenses, whether reckless or simple, are distinct species of crime, separately defined and penalized under the f ramework of our penal laws, is nothing new. The doctrine that reckless imprudence under Article 365 is a single quasi-offense by itself and not merely a means to commit other crimes such that conviction or acquittal of s uch quasi-offense bars subsequent prosecution for the same quasi-offense, regardless of its various resulting acts, undergirded this Court’s unbroken chain of jurisprudence on double jeopardy as applied to Article 365. These cases uniformly barred the second p rosecution as constitutionally impermissible under the Double Jeopardy Clause.
September 17, 2013
[CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASE DIGEST BY KEISHA L. ROJAS ]
Our ruling today secures for the accused facing an Article 365 charge a stronger and simpler protection of their constitutional right under the Double Jeopardy Clause. True, they are thereby denied the beneficent effect of the favorable sentencing formula under Article 48, but any disadvantage thus caused is more than compensated by the certainty of non-prosecution for quasi-crime effects qualifying as "light offenses" (or, as here, for the more serious consequence prosecuted belatedly). If it is so minded, Congress can re-craft Article 365 by extending to quasicrimes the sentencing formula of Article 48 so that only the most severe penalty shall be imposed under a single prosecution of all resulting acts, whether penalized as grave, less grave or light offenses. This will still keep intact the distinct concept of quasi-offenses. Meanwhile, the lenient schedule of penalties under Article 365, befitting crimes occupying a lower rung of culpability, should cushion the effect of th is ruling. WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. We REVERSE the Orders dated 2 February 2006 and 2 May 2006 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 157. We DISMISS the Information in Criminal Case No. 82366 against petitioner Jason Ivler y Aguilar pending with the Metropolitan Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 71 on the ground of double jeopardy.
September 17, 2013
[CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASE DIGEST BY KEISHA L. ROJAS ] Olague et al vs. Military Commission
FACTS: On December 24, 1979, the herein petitioners Eduardo B. Olaguer, Othoniel V. Jimenez, Ester MisaJimenez, Carlos Lazaro, Reynaldo Maclang, Magdalena De Los Santos Maclang, Teodorico N. Diesmos, Rene J. Marciano, Danilo R. De Ocampo and Victoriano C. Amado were arrested by the military authorities. They were all initially detained at Camp Crame in Quezon City. They were subsequently transferred to the detention center at Camp Bagong Diwa in Bicutan except for petitioner Olaguer wh o remained in detention at Camp Crame. Petitioner Mac Aceron voluntarily surrendered to the authorities sometime in June, 1980 and was, thereafter, also incarcerated at Camp Bagong Diwa. All of the petitioners are civilians. On May 30, 1980, the petitioners were charged for subversion 1 upon the recommendation of the respondent Judge Advocate General and the approval of the r espondent Minister of National Defense. On June 13. 1980, the respondent Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines 3 created the respondent Military Commission No 34 to try tile criminal case filed against the petitioners. 4 On July 30, 1980, an amended charge sheet was filed for seven (7) offenses, namely: (1) unlawful possession of explosives and incendiary devices; (2) conspiracy to assassinate President, and Mrs. Marcos; (3) conspiracy to assassinate cabinet members Juan Ponce Enrile, Francisco Tatad and V icente Paterno; (4) conspiracy to assassinate Messrs. Arturo Tangco, Jose Roño and Onofre Corpus; (5) arson of nine buildings; (6) attempted murder of Messrs. Leonardo Perez, Teodoro Valencia and Generals Romeo Espino and Fabian Ver; and (7) conspiracy and proposal to commit rebellion, and inciting to rebellion. 5 Sometime thereafter, trial ensued. On August 19, 1980, the petitioners went to this Court and filed the instant Petition for prohibition and habeas corpus. On December 4, 1984, pending the resolution of the Petition, the respondent Military Commission No. 34 passed sentence convicting the petitioners and imposed upon them the penalty of death by electrocution. On February 14, 1985, petitioners Olaguer, Maclang and Othoniel and Ester Jimenez went to this Court and filed the other instant Petition, this time for habeas corpus, certiorari, prohibition and mandamus. The second Petition seeks to enjoin the said respondents from taking any further action on the case against the petitioners, and from implementing the judgment of conviction rendered by the respondent Military Commission No. 34 for the reason that the same is null and void. ISSUE: Whether or not a military tribunal has the jurisdiction to try civilians while the civil courts are open and functioning. HELD: With martial law having been lifted in the country in 1981, all cases pending before the military tribunals should, as a general rule, be transferred to the civil courts. This policy meant that as many cases as possible involving civilians being tried by military tribunals as could be transferred to civil courts should be turned over immediately. In case of doubt, the presumption was in favor of civil courts always trying civilian accused. Due process of law demands that in all criminal prosecutions (where the accused stands to lose either his life or his liberty), the accused shall be entitled to, among others, a trial. 37 The trial contemplated by the due process clause of the Constitution, in relation to the Charter as a whole, is a trial by judicial process, not by executive or military process. Judicial power is vested by the Constitution exclusively in the Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as are duly established by law. Judicial power exists only in the courts, which have "exclusive power to hear and determine those matters which affect the life or liberty or property of a citizen. Following the principle of separation of powers underlying the existing constitutional organization of the Government of the Philippines, the power and the duty of interpreting the laws as when an individual should be considered to have violated the law) is primarily a function of the judiciary. To have it otherwise would be a violation of the constitutional right to due p rocess of the civilian concerned. The death penalty imposed upon the petitioners by the respondent Military Commission No. 34 appears to have been rendered too hastily to the prejudice to the petitioners, and in complete disregard of their constitutional right to adduce evidence on their behalf. According to the Manifestation submitted by the Solicitor General,
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“Despite their explanation that Othoniel Jimenez cannot proceed because the prosecution, which performs the duties and functions of clerk of court, failed to subpoena his witness, and that the other petitioners were not ready because it was not yet their turn to do so, the Commission abruptly decided that petitioners are deemed to have waived the presentation of evidence in their behalf, and considered the case submitted for resolution. After a recess of only twenty-five (25) minutes, the session was resumed and the Commission rendered its sentence finding petitioners guilty of all the charges against them and imposing upon them the penalty of death by electrocution. Thus, even assuming arguendo that the respondent Military Commission No. 34 does have the jurisdiction to try the petitioners, the Commission should be deemed ousted of its jurisdiction when, as observed by the Solicitor General, the said tribunal acted in disregard of the constitutional rights of the accused. Indeed, it is well-settled that once a deprivation of a constitutional right is shown to exist, the tribunal that rendered the judgment in question is deemed ousted of jurisdiction Thus, even assuming arguendo that the respondent Military Commission No. 34 does have the jurisdiction to try the petitioners, the Commission should be deemed ousted of its jurisdiction when, as observed by the Solicitor General, the said tribunal acted in disregard of the constitutional rights of the accused. Indeed, it is well-settled that once a deprivation of a constitutional right is shown to exist, the tribunal that rendered the judgment in question is deemed ousted of jurisdiction. Section 18, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution, to wit — “A state of martial law, does not suspend the operation of the Constitution, nor supplant the functioning of the civil courts or legislative assemblies, nor authorize the conferment of jurisdiction on military courts and agencies over civilians where civil courts are able to function, nor automatically suspend the privilege of the writ. No longer should military tribunals or commissions exercise jurisdiction over civilians for offenses allegedly committed by them when the civil courts are open and functioning. No longer may the exclusive judicial power of the civil courts, beginning with the Supreme Court down to the lower courts be appropriate by any military body or tribunal, or even diluted under the guise of a state of martial law, national security and other similar labels.”
September 17, 2013
[CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASE DIGEST BY KEISHA L. ROJAS ] People vs Balisacan
FACTS: Aurelio Balisacan was charged with homicide in the CFI of Ilocos Norte. On arraignment he pleaded guilty and with the assistance of his counsel was allowed to present evidence proving mitigating circumstance of self defense and voluntary surrender. On the basis of the testimony of the accused he w as acquitted, thus prosecution appealed. ISSUE: Whether or not appeal constitutes double jeopardy. HELD: No, it is settled that the existence of a plea is an essential requisite to double jeopardy. However, he testified, in the course of being allowed to prove mitigating circumstances that he acted in complete self-defense. The testimony had the effect of vacating his plea of guilty and the court a quo should have required him to plead a new on the charge, or at least direct that a new plea of not guilty be entered for him. This was not done. It follows that in effect there having been no standing plea at the time the court a quo rendered its judgment of acquittal; there can be no double je opardy with respect to the appeal herein. Furthermore, the court decided the case upon the merits without giving the prosecution any opportunity to present its evidence or even to rebut the testimony of the defendant. In doing so, it clearly acted without due process of law. And for lack of this fundamental prerequisite, its action is perforce null and void. The acquittal, therefore, being a nullity for want of due process, is no acquittal at all, and thus can not constitute a proper basis for a claim of former jeopardy. Wherefore, the case appealed is set aside and remanded to the lower court for further proceedings.
September 17, 2013
[CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASE DIGEST BY KEISHA L. ROJAS ] Tehankee vs Madayag
FACTS: Petitioner, herein Claudio Teehankee, Jr. was originally charged in an information for the crime of frustrated murder. After the prosecution had rested its case, petitioner was allowed to file a motion for leave to file a demurrer to evidence. However, before the said motion could be filed, Maureen Navarro Hultman died. Consequently, the private prosecutor filed an omnibus motion for leave of court to file and to admit said amended information to murder. Petitioner filed an opposition thereto, as well as a rejoinder to the reply of the prosecution. At the scheduled arraignment, petitioner refused to be arraigned on the amended information for lack of a preliminary investigation thereon. By reason of such refusal, respondent judge ordered that a plea of "not guilty" be entered for petitioner. Thereafter, respondent judge ordered the prosecution to present its evidence. When petitioner's counsel manifested that he would not take part in the proceedings because of the legal issue raised, the trial court appointed a counsel de oficio to represent herein petitioner. ISSUE: Whether or not the amendment from frustrated murder to murder a substantial amendment to the information thus requiring a preliminary investigation. HELD: The Court ruled that there is no merit in the petition. There are sufficient legal and jurisprudential moorings for the orders of the trial court. Section 14, Rule 110 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides: Sec. 14. Amendment . — The information or complaint may be amended, in substance or form, without leave of court, at any time before the accused pleads; and thereafter and during the trial as to all matters of form, by leave and at the discretion of the court, when the same can be done without p rejudice to the rights of the accused. If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in charging the proper offense, the court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging the proper offense in accordance with Rule 119, Section 11, provided the accused would not be placed thereby in double jeopardy and may also require the witnesses to give bail for their appearance at the trial. The first paragraph provides the rules for amendment of the information or complaint, while the second paragraph refers to the substitution of the information or complaint. In determining, therefore, whether there should be an amendment under the first paragraph of Section 14, Rule 110, or a substitution of information under the second paragraph thereof, the rule is that where the second information involves the same offense, or an offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the first information, and amendment of the information is sufficient; otherwise, where the new information charges an offense which is distinct and different from that initially charged, a substitution is in order. There is identity between the two offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for one offense would be sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other, or when the second offense is exactly the same as the first, or when the second offense is an attempt to commit or a frustration of, or when it necessarily includes or is necessarily included in, the offense charged in the first information. In this connection, an offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as this is alleged in the information, constitute the latter. And, vice-versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily included in another when the essential ingredients of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter. In the present case, therefore, there is an identity of offenses charged in both the original and the amended information. What is involved here is not a variance in the nature of different offenses charged, but only a change in the stage of execution of the same offense from frustrated to consummated murder. This is being the case, we hold that an amendment of the original information will suffice and, consequent thereto, the filing of the amended information for murder is proper. It consequently follows that since only a formal amendment was involved and introduced in the second information, a preliminary investigation is unnecessary and cannot be demanded by the accused. Petition dismissed for lack of merit.
September 17, 2013
[CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASE DIGEST BY KEISHA L. ROJAS ] People vs Adil
FACTS: On April 15, 1975, case No. 3335 was filed in the inferior court of January, charging Fama Jr. for slight physical injuries which according to the certification of the attending physician, the injuries suffered by the offended party Viajar, require medical attendance from 5 to 9. Apparently, only three days had passed since the incident in which the injuries were sustained took place, and there were yet no indications of a graver injury or consequence to be suffered by said offended party. It was only later, after Case No. 3335 had already been filed and the wound on the face of Viajar had already healed, that the alleged deformity became apparent. On June 8, 1975, complainant Viajar filed a letter-complaint with the Provincial Fiscal of Iloilo charging Atty. Alfredo Fama, Raul Fama and herein respondent Margarito Fama, Jr. with serious physical injuries arising from the same incident alleged in above Criminal Case No. 3335. After conducting a preliminary investigation, under date of July 28, 1975, the Fiscal filed in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo an information, but only against respondent Fama Jr., (Case No. 5241). Fama Jr. then filed an urgent motion to defer proceedings in Criminal Case No. 5241, claiming that since he was already charged and pleaded not guilty in Criminal Case No. 3335, he would be in double jeopardy, if Case No. 5241 were to be prosecuted. The fiscal opposed and sought for the dismissal of Case 3335 in view of the postponements he requested in order to await the resolution of the issue of double jeopardy in Case No. 5241. The trial court did not act on said motion but instead set the case for hearing and ordered its dismissal upon the petitioner’s vehement refusal for postponement. On September 22, 1975, respondent court issued the impugned order sustaining the contention of double jeopardy and dismissing Case No. 5241. The prosecution's motion for reconsideration was denied in the other assailed order of October 14, 1975 hence this petition for certiori. ISSUE: Whether or not the additional allegation of deformity in the information in Case No. 5241 constitutes a supervening element that constitutes double jeopardy. HELD: No, in the peculiar circumstances of this case, the plea of double jeopardy of private respondent Fama Jr., cannot hold. In the case of Melo vs. People, it was held that when the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for the accused during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that was then inexistent Thus, where the accused was charged with physical injuries and after conviction the injured dies, the charge of homicide against the same accused does not put him twice in jeopardy. So as with the case of People vs Yorac which held that stated differently, if after the first prosecution, a new fact supervenes on which defendant may be held liable, resulting in altering the character of the crime and giving rise to a new and distinct offense, 'the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense. It was, therefore, a grave error correctible by certiorari for respondent court to have dismissed Criminal Case No. 5241.
September 17, 2013
[CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASE DIGEST BY KEISHA L. ROJAS ] Melo vs. People
FACTS: Petitioner Conrado Melo was charged in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, on December 27, 1949, with frustrated homicide, for having allegedly inflicted upon Benjamin Obillo, with a kitchen knife and wi th intent to kill, several serious wounds on different parts of the body, requiring medical attendance for a period of more than 30 days, and incapacitating him from performing his habitual labor for the same period of time. On December 29, 1949, the accused pleaded not guilty to the offense charged, and in the evening of the same day Benjamin Obillo died from his wounds. On January 4, 1950, an amended information was filed charging the accused with consummated homicide. The accused filed a motion to quash the amended information alleging double jeopardy, motion that was denied by the respondent court; hence, the instant petition for prohibition to enjoin the respondent court from further entertaining the amended information. ISSUE: Whether or not there is a double jeopardy HELD: No double jeopardy, the petition is denied. According to Article III, section 1 (20) of our Constitution. “No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense, ” The rule of “double jeopardy” had a settled meaning in this jurisdiction at the time our Constitution was promulgated. It meant that when a person is charged with an offense and the case is terminated either by acquittal or conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the accused, the latter cannot again be charged with the same or identical offense. This principle is founded upon the law of reason, justice and conscience. It is embodied in the maxim of the civil law non bis in idem and undoubtedly in every system of jurisprudence, and instead of having specific origin it simply always existed. It found expression in the Spanish law and in the Constitution of the United States and is now embodied in our own Constitution as one of the fundamental rights of the citizens. It must be noticed that the protection of the Constitutional inhibition is against a second jeopardy for the same offense, the only exception being, as stated in the same Constitution, that “if an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act. ” The phrase same offense, under the general rule, has always been construed to mean not only that the second offense charged is exactly the same as the one alleged in the first information, but also that the two offenses are identical. There is identity between the two offenses when the evidence to support a conviction for one offense would be sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other. This so- called “same-evidence test” which was found to be vague and deficient was restated by the Rules of Court in a clearer and more accurate form. Under said Rules there is identity between two offenses not only when the second offense is exactly the same as the first, but also when the second offense is an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof, or when it necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information. In this connection, an offense may be said to necessarily include another when some of the essential ingredients of the former as alleged in the information constitute the latter. And vice-versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily included in another when all the ingredients of the former constitute a part of the elements constituting the latter (Rule 116, sec. 5.) In other words, one who has been charged with an offense cannot be again charged with the same or identical offense though the latter be lesser or greater than the former. The respondent court may proceed to the trial of the criminal case under the amended information.
September 17, 2013
[CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASE DIGEST BY KEISHA L. ROJAS ] People vs Buling
FACTS: Appeal from a judgment of the Court of First Instance of Leyte, Hon. Gaudencio Cloribel, presiding, finding the accused Buenaventura Buling guilty of serious physical injuries and sentencing him to imprisonment of four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one year of prision correccional, as maximum, and to indemnify the offended party. On December 7, 1956, the accused was charged in the Justice of the Peace Court of Cabalian, Leyte, with the crime of less serious physical injuries for having inflicted wounds on complaining witness Isidro Balaba, which according to the complaint would "require, medical attendance for a period from 10 to 15 days and will incapacitate the said Isidro Balaba from the performance of his customary labors for the game period of time." The accused pleaded guilty to the complaint and was on December 8, 1957 found guilty of the crime charged and sentenced to 1 month and 1 day of arresto mayor and to pay damages to the offended party in the sum of P20.00, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. On the same day he began to serve his sentence and has fully served the same. However, Balaba's injuries did not heal within the period estimated, and so on February 20, 1957, the Provincial Fiscal filed an information against the accused before the Court of First Instance of Leyte, charging him of serious physical injuries. The information alleges that the wounds inflicted by the accused on Isidro Balaba require medical attendance and incapacitated him for a period of from 1 ½ months to 2 ½ months. After trial the accused was found guilty of serious physical injuries and sentenced in the manner indicated in first paragraph hereof. This is the decision now sough to be set aside and reversed in this appeal. ISSUE: Whether the prosecution and conviction of Balaba for less serious physical injuries is a bar to the second prosecution for serious physical injuries. HELD: SC do not believe that a new fact supervened, or that a new fact has come into existence. Under the circumstances above indicated, SC are inclined to agree with the contention made on behalf of appellant that no new supervening fact has existed or occurred, which has transformed the offense from less serious physical injuries to serious physical injuries. But the Solicitor General cites the case of People vs. Manolong, supra, and argues that our ruling in said case should apply to the case at bar, for the reason that in the said case the first crime with which the accused was charged was less serious physical injuries and the second one was serious physical injuries and yet we held that there was no jeopardy. SC have carefully examined this c ase and have found that the first examination made of the offended party showed injuries which would take from 20 to 30 days to heal, whereas the subsequent examination disclosed that the wound of the offended party would require medical attendance and incapacitate him for labor for a period of 90 days, "causing deformity and the loss of the use of said member". No finding was made in the first examination that the injuries had caused deformity and the loss of the use of the right hand. As nothing was mentioned in the first medical certificate about the deformity and the loss of the use of the right hand, we presume that such fact was not apparent or could not have been discernible at the time the first examination was made. The course (not the length), of the healing of an injury may not be determined before hand; it can only be definitely known after the period of healing has ended. That is the reason why the court considered that there was a supervening fact occurring since the filing of the original information. But such circumstances do not exist in the case at bar. If the X-ray examination discloses the existence of a fracture on January 17, 1957, that fracture must have existed when the first examination was made on December 10, 1956. There is, therefore, no now or supervening fact that could be said to have developed or arisen since the filing of the original action, which would justify the application of the ruling enunciated by us in the cases of Melo vs. People and People vs. Manolong, supra. We attribute the new finding of fracture, which evidently lengthened the period of healing of the wound, to the very superficial and inconclusive examination made on December 10, 1956. Had an X-ray examination taken at the time, the fracture would have certainly been disclosed. The wound causing the delay in healing was already in existence at the time of the first examination, but said delay was caused by the
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very superficial examination then made. As we have stated, we find therefore that no supervening fact had occurred which justifies the application of the rule in the case of Melo vs. People and People vs. Manolong, for which reason we are constrained to apply the general rule of double jeopardy. SC take this opportunity to invite the attention of the prosecuting officers that before filing informations for physical injuries, thorough physical and medical examinations of the injuries should first be made to avoid instances, like the present, where by reason of the important Constitutional provision of double jeopardy, the accused cannot be held to answer for the graver offense committed.
September 17, 2013
[CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASE DIGEST BY KEISHA L. ROJAS ] People vs Yorac
FACTS: Rodrigo Yorac was charged with slight physical injuries before the City Court of Bacolod, the offended party being a certain Lam Hock who, according to the medical certificate issued in 10 April 1968 by a Dr. Rogelio Zulueta, a resident physician of the Occidental Negros Provincial Hospital, was confined "since 8 April 1968 up to the present time for head injury." Then came a plea of guilty by Yorac on 16 April 1968 resulting in his being penalized to suffer 10 days of arresto menor. He started serving his sentence forthwith. On 1 8 April 1968, the provincial fiscal filed an information, this time in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, charging Yorac with frustrated murder arising from the same act against Lam Hock upon another medical certificate dated 17 April 1968 issued by the same Dr. Zulueta. The later information for frustrated murder was based on a second medical certificate after the lapse of one week from the former previously given by the same physician who, apparently, was much more thorough the second time, to the effect that the victim did suffer a greater injury than was at first ascertained. The lower court, presided by the Honorable Judge Nestor B. Alampay, considering that there was no supervening fact that would negate the defense of double jeopardy, sustained the motion to quash (filed on 10 June 1968) in an order of 21 June 1968. The People appealed. ISSUE: Whether the new medical findings warrant the filing of the new information against the accused, without violating the rule against double jeopardy. HELD: "No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense." A defendant in a criminal case should be adjudged either guilty or not guilty and thereafter left alone in peace, in the latter case the State being precluded from taking an appeal. It is in that sense that the right against being twice put in jeopardy is considered as possessing many features in common with the rule of finality in civil cases. For the accused is given assurance that the matter is closed, enabling him to plan his future accordingly, protecting him from continued distress, not to mention saving both him and the state from the expenses incident to redundant litigation. There is likewise the observation that this constitutional guarantee helps to equalize the adversary capabilities of two grossly mismatched litigants, a poor and impecunious defendant hardly in a position to keep on shouldering the costs of a suit. As ruled in Melo vs. People, the rule of identity does not apply "when the second offense was not in existence at the time of the first prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case there is no possibility for the accused, during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an o ffense that was then inexistent." Stated differently, if after the first prosecution "a new fact s upervenes" on which defendant may be held liable, resulting in altering the character of the crime and giving rise to a new and distinct offense, "the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicted for the new offense." There i s then the indispensable requirement of the existence of "a new fact [which] supervenes for which the defendant is responsible" changing the character of the crime imputed to him and together with the facts existing previously constituting a new and distinct offense. Herein, if the X-ray examination discloses the existence of a fracture on 17 January 1957, that fracture must have existed when the first examination was made on 10 December 1956. There is, therefore, no new or supervening fact that could be said to have developed or arisen since the filing of the original action. The new finding of fracture, which evidently lengthened the period of healing of the wound, to the very superficial and inconclusive examination made on 10 December 1956. Had an X-ray examination been taken at the time, the fracture would have certainly been disclosed. The wound causing the delay in healing was already in existence at the time of the first examination, but said delay was caused by the very superficial examination then made. No supervening fact had occurred which justifies the application of the rule in the case of Melo vs. People and People vs. Manolong, for w hich reason the general rule of double jeopardy should be applied.
September 17, 2013
[CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASE DIGEST BY KEISHA L. ROJAS ] Galman vs Pamaran
FACTS: Assassination of former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. He was killed from his plane that had just landed at the Manila International Airport. His brain was smashed by a bullet fired point-blank into the back of his head by an assassin. The military investigators reported within a span of three hours that the man who shot Aquino (whose identity was then supposed to be unknown and was revealed only days later as Rolando Galman) was a communist-hired gunman, and that the military escorts gunned him down in turn. President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board to investigate due to large masses of people who joined in the ten-day period of national mourning yearning for the truth, justice and freedom. The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the military version stating that "the evidence shows to the contrary that Rolando Galman had no subversive affiliations. Only the soldiers in the staircase with Sen. Aquino could have shot him; that Ninoy's assassination was the product of a military conspiracy, not a communist plot. Only difference between the two reports is that the majority report found all the twenty-six private respondents above-named in the title of the case involved in the military conspiracy; " while the chairman's minority report would exclude nineteen of them. Then Pres. Marcos stated that evidence shows that Galman was the killer. Petitioners pray for issuance of a TRO enjoining respondent court from rendering a decision in the two criminal cases before it, the Court resolved by nine-to-two votes 11 to issue the restraining order prayed for. The Court also granted pet itioners a five-day period to file a reply to respondents' separate comments and respondent Tanodbayan a three-day period to submit a copy of his 84-page memorandum for the prosecution. But ten days later, the Court by the same nine-to-two-vote ratio in reverse, resolved to dismiss the petition and to lift the TRO issued ten days earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision. The same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for a new 5-day period counted from receipt of respondent Tanodbayan's memorandum for the prosecution (which apparently was not served on them). Thus, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the dismissal did not indicate the legal ground for such action and urging that the case be set for a full hearing on the merits that the people are entitled to due process. However, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the accused of the crime charged, declaring them innocent and totally absolving them of any civil liability. Respondents submitted that with the Sandiganbayan's verdict of acquittal, the instant case had become moot and academic. Thereafter, same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. Hence, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second motion for reconsideration alleging that respondents committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of justice and gross violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people of the Philippines to due process of law. ISSUE: Whether or not there was a violation of the double jeopardy clause. HELD: There was no double jeopardy. Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a void judgment for having been issued without jurisdiction. No double jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in legal effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are divested. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts and all claims flowing out of it are void. Motion to Disqualify/Inhibit should have been resolved ahead. In this case, petitioners' motion for reconsideration of the abrupt dismissal of their petition and lifting of the TRO enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision had been taken cognizance of by the Court which had required the respondents', including the Sandiganbayan's, comments. Although no restraining order was issued anew, respondent Sandiganbayan should not have precipitately issued its decision of total absolution of all the accused pending the final action of this Court. All of the acts of the respondent judge manifest grave abuse of discretion on his part amounting to lack of jurisdiction which substantively prejudiced the petitioner.
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With the declaration of nullity of the proceedings, the cases must now be tried before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor. Respondents accused must now face trial for the crimes charged against them before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor with all due process. The function of the ap pointing authority with the mandate of the people, under our system of government, is to fill the public posts. Justices and judges must ever realize that they have no constituency, serve no majority nor minority but serve only the public interest as they see it in accordance with their oath of office, guided only the Constitution and their own conscience and honor.
September 17, 2013
[CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASE DIGEST BY KEISHA L. ROJAS ] People vs CA
FACTS: Claudio Francisco, Rudy Pacao, Capt. Rodolfo Malbarosa, Pfc. Catalino Bonganay, Sgt. Roberto Cana, Sgt. Virgilio Azucena, Sgt. Nathaniel Interino, Pat. David Valenciano, Pat. Cesar Quiambao, Joseph Pellas, and Gabriel Alosan were charged with Murder for the fatal shooting of one Marcial "Boyet" Azada. All the accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. On demurrer to evidence, the trial court d ismissed the case against Pfc. Bonganay, Sgt. Cana, Sgt. Azucena, Sgt. Interino, Pat. Valenciano and Pat. Quiambao. Upon the death of Capt. Malbarosa, the case against him was likewise dismissed. Trial on the merits ensued. In a decision dated February 7, 1994, the court a quo exonerated accused Pellas and Alosan and convicted respondents Francisco Jr. and Pacao for homicide and attempted murder. The accused Claudio Francisco Jr., and Rudy Pacao, are credited in full for their preventive detention. On appeal, the trial court’s decision was reversed and respondents Francisco and Pacao were acquitted of the crime charged. ISSUE: Whether or not an appeal of the judgment of acquittal by the Court of Appeals violates the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution. HELD: While petitioner in the case at bar ostensibly alleges grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the discussions therein however ascribe to the Court of Appeals errors of judgment, not errors of jurisdiction. Specifically, petitioner delves on, among others, the testimonies relative to the positions of the victim vis-à-vis the accused, and the opinions of the expert witnesses in respect to certain physical evidence. Obviously, these are errors that goes deeply into the appellate court’s appreciation and assess ment of the evidence proffered by the parties. These are findings that impinge on errors of judgment and not errors of jurisdiction, correctible by a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court and not a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the said Rules. On this score alone, the dismissal of the instant petition is called for. Noteworthy is the case of People v. Velasco16 where the Court likewise dismissed a similar petition not only on the ground that the acquittal of the defendant by the lower court was not reviewable via the extraordinary writ of certiorari, but more importantly, the grant of said petition would constitute a violation of the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Constitution. In Velasco, we clarified that in the absence of a finding of mistrial, i.e. the criminal trial was a sham, as in Galman v. Sandiganbayan,17 a judgment of acquittal is final and unappealable on the ground of double jeopardy, whether it happens at the trial court level or at the Court of Appeals.18 We are not inclined to rule differently. Respondents Francisco and Pacao, after having been found not guilty by a court of competent jurisdiction, must be afforded rest and tranquility from repeated attempts by the State at conviction and their anxiety finally laid to rest. Their acquittal must therefore be accorded finality in faithful adherence to the rule against double jeopardy.
