PEOPLE vs. JUMAWAN31 SCRA 825G.R. No. L-28060, February 27, 1970 Teehankee, J. FACTS: This case refers to the trial Court’s judgment on June 5, 1967, it was shown that theaccused collected amounts from customers of the business firms, namely; MontelDiscount Center, the Iloilo Enterprises and the Piamonte, Bros. for being an agent onc o m m i s s i o n b a s i s . T h e s a i d c o l l e c t i o n s w e r e r e t u r n e d t o t h e f i r m s , b u t o n o n e instance, he refused to turn over the coll collec ecti tion ons s for for July July and and Augu August st 1965 1965 to the the Mon-te Mon-te l D i s c o u n t C e n t e r . H e also rejected the demand letter of the company for thepayment of Fifty Five (Php55.00) pesos. The accused contended that he did not return the money because Mr. ManuelPia mon te, his rea l or igi nal pri nci pal , ha s no t pa id an d re fu se s to pa y hi m hi s commi mmission, on accou count of business losses. He further alleged that he should haveb e e n p a i d b y t h e c o m p l a i n a n t t h e a m o u n t o f P 1 . 5 0 p e r d a y a s h i s e a r n e d commissions. Supposedly, the amount he withheld which constitutes his accruedcommissions is equivalent to or more than what he should receive from Mr. Piamonteas payment considering that he was able to turn over the full amount of Php65.00 toh tohim. im. Thus, the City Court of San Carlos City (Negros Occidental) in its judgment find theaccused-appellant guilty of estafa under Article 315, paragraph 1 (b) of the RevisedP e n a l C o d e , f o r h a v i n g r e t a i n e d i n h i s p o s s e s s i o n e v e n a f t e r d e m a n d , h i s l a s t collections in the amount of P55.00, due to non-payment of his accrued commissionsin the larger amount of P65.00 earned on previous collections actually turned over, aswell as non-payment of his expense allowance of P1.50 per day, day, the trial court basedit basedi t s verdict solely on its rejection of appellant’s defense that he h a d s u c h r i g h t o f rete retent ntio ion n und under er Arti Articl cles es 1912 1912 to 1914 1914 of the the Civ Civil il Code. ISS ISSUE:Whether UE:Whether or not the accused should be held liable for estafa under Article 315, par. 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code? HELD:Appellant contended that there was an error when the trial Court made ma de no ruli ru ling ng onhis on his lack lack of of crimina criminal l intent intent and and the the absence absence of damage damage or prejudice to his principal.Likewise, it was not even established that there was a damage or prejudice as anessential element of estafa. estafa. Appellant’ Appellant’s s principal principal could could not claim an any y such damage damage orpre orpreju judi dice ce, , for appellant had retained and set off merely in part what was justly andlong an dlong due to h him, im, with with a balance balance still still owing owing to him.A him.Al ll these factors, the absence of cri minal intent on app ellant’s part a nd lack of dama damage ge or prejudice caused to the principal, besides the appellant’s proven good go odfaith faith, , entitl entitle e appell appellant ant to a verdict verdict of acquittal.AC acquittal.ACCO CORD RDIN INGL GLY, Y, the th e judgment appealed from was set aside; the trial Court’s convictionof
Tomas Jumawan was reversed and he was acquitted of the crime of estafa, withcosts de oficio.
People vs. Tomotorgo (April 30, 1985) Post un Post unde der r cas case e dig diges ests ts, , Cri Crimi mina nal l La Law w at at Posted by Schizoph Schizophrenic renic Mind Facts: Plaintiff was was the husband husband of the the victi victim m – Magd Magdale alena na de los los Santos. Magdalena had been persistently asking her husband to sell their conjugal home in Camarines Sur in order for them to transfer to the house of her husband’s in-laws. Plaintiff didn’t want to abandon their house because the improvements that he made to the land since this is where he farms. Said lot had a lot of plants and was very far from his in-laws place. Upon returning home from his farm one day, he found his wife and three-month old baby already baby already gone. He went out to look for them and caught up with them 200 meters from their house. He saw his wife with their kid and a bundle of clothes. Plaintiff begged for his wife to surr urrende nder and and when she refus fused, they got into a scur curry when the plain plainti tiff ff trie tried d to take take their their child child from from his his wife wife. . The The wife wife aroused the ire of the plaintiff when she threw their child onto the grassy grassy portion portion of the trail. trail. Plaintif Plaintiff f picked picked up a wood and began began hitt itting his wif wife. She fell to the grou round and compl mplaine ined of severe chest pains. pains . Realizing what he had done, he brought her home but she died despite plaintiff’s effort to alleviate her pain. Plaintiff brought the piece of wood and wood and reported the incident to the baran barangga ggay y capta captain in who who broug brought ht him him to the the polic police. e. He was char charged ged with parricide parricide and and pleaded not guilty. Upon realizing the gravity of his offens offense, e, he chang changed ed his plea plea to guil guilty. ty. The court court foun found d him him guil guilty ty of parr parric icid ide e but but with with thre three e miti mitiga gati ting ng circ circum umst stan ance ces s – voluntary surrender, plea of guilty and that he acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have produced passion and obfuscation. He was given the penalty of reclusion perpetua perpetua. . Appellant claims that the court court hande handed d him the the wron wrong g punis punishme hment nt. . Appel Appellan lant t claim claims s that that article 49 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the proper applicable penalty when the crime committed is different from what was intended. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed is higher than the offense which the accused wanted to commit, the penalty corresponding to the later shall be imposed as the maximum period. Appellant avers that the penalty for the felony committed by him – parricide – was higher than that which he intended to commit – physical injuries. Issue: Whether the court imposed the wrong penalty
Held: The judgment judgment is affirme affirmed d but the court court would would recomme recommend nd that executive clemency be extended to the accused Article 4 of the RPC states that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing committing a felony (delito) although although the wrongful act be different from that which he intended and that accused is liable for all the consequences of his felonious act. Arti Articl cle e 49 of the the RPC RPC does does not not apply to case cases s where where more more seri serious ous consequences not intended by the offender result from his felonious act because under Article 4. Par. 1 of the same code, he is liable for all the direct and natural consequences consequences of his unlawful act. His lack of intention to commit a grave wrong is at best mitigating.
People vs Francisco AbarcaG.R. No. 74433September 14, 1987Facts: This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Palo, Leyte, sentencingthe accused-appellant Francisco Abarca to death for the complex crime of murder withdouble frustrated murder.The case was elevated to this Court in view of the death sentence imposed. With theapproval of the new Constitution, abolishing the penalty of death and commuting allexisting death sentences to life imprisonment, we required the accused-appellant toinform us whether or not he wished to pursue the case as an appealed case. In compliancetherewith, he filed a statement informing us that he wished to continue with the case byway of an appeal.On 15 July 1984 in Tacloban City, the accused, Francisco Abarca with deliberate intentto kill and with evident premeditation, and with treachery, armed with an unlicensedfirearm (armalite), M-16 rifle, shot several times Khingsley Paul Koh on the different parts of his body inflicting upon gunshot wounds which caused his instantaneous deathand as a consequence of which also caused gunshot wounds to Lina Amparado andArnold Amparado on the different parts of their bodies which have have caused caused the death death of said said spouses. spouses. Issue: W/O accused-appellant is liable for the crime of complex crime of murder with doublefrustrated murder? Held: The case at bar requires distinctions. Here, the accused-appellant was not committingmurde committingmurder r when he he discharged discharged his his rifle upon the the
deceased. Inflicting death under exceptional circumstances is not murder. We cannot therefore hold the appellant liablefor frustrated murder for the injuries suffered by the Amparados.For the separate injuries suffered by the Amparado spouses, we therefore impose uponthe accused-appellant arresto mayor (in its medium and maximum periods) in itsmaximum period, arresto to being the graver penalty (than destierro).The decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED. The accused-appellant is sentenced tofour months and 21 days to six months of arresto mayor. The period within which he has been in confinement shall be credited in the service of these penalties. He is furthermoreordered to indemnify Arnold and Lina Amparado in the sum of P16,000.00 as and for hospitalization expense and the sum of P1,500.00 as and for Arnold Amparado's loss of earning capacity. No special pronouncement as to costs
People vs Francisco AbarcaG.R. No. 74433September 14, 1987Facts: This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Palo, Leyte, sentencingthe accused-appellant Francisco Abarca to death for the complex crime of murder withdouble frustrated murder.The case was elevated to this Court in view of the death sentence imposed. With theapproval of the new Constitution, abolishing the penalty of death and commuting allexisting death sentences to life imprisonment, we required the accused-appellant toinform us whether or not he wished to pursue the case as an appealed case. In compliancetherewith, he filed a statement informing us that he wished to continue with the case byway of an appeal.On 15 July 1984 in Tacloban City, the accused, Francisco Abarca with deliberate intentto kill and with evident premeditation, and with treachery, armed with an unlicensedfirearm (armalite), M-16 rifle, shot several times Khingsley Paul Koh on the different parts of his body inflicting upon gunshot wounds which caused his instantaneous deathand as a consequence of which also caused gunshot wounds to Lina Amparado andArnold Amparado on the different parts of their bodies which have have caused caused the death death of said said spouses. spouses. Issue: W/O accused-appellant is liable for the crime of complex crime of murder with doublefrustrated murder? Held: The case at bar requires distinctions. Here, the accused-appellant was not committingmurde committingmurder r when he he discharged discharged his his rifle upon the the deceased. Inflicting death under exceptional circumstances is not murder. We cannot therefore hold the appellant liablefor frustrated murder for the injuries suffered by the Amparados.For the separate injuries suffered by the Amparado spouses, we therefore impose uponthe accused-appellant arresto mayor (in its medium and maximum periods) in itsmaximum period, arresto to being the graver penalty
(than destierro).The decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED. The accused-appellant is sentenced tofour months and 21 days to six months of arresto mayor. The period within which he has been in confinement shall be credited in the service of these penalties. He is furthermoreordered to indemnify Arnold and Lina Amparado in the sum of P16,000.00 as and for hospitalization expense and the sum of P1,500.00 as and for Arnold Amparado's loss of earning capacity. No special pronouncement as to costs People vs. Cabalhin (1994)Cabalhin was convicted by the RTC of parricide, homicide, and frustrated homicide for,respectively, killing his wife, killing his wife’s paramour, and almost killing the paramour’smother who survived. C. claims that he caught his wife and her paramour in the act of sexualintercourse while in the paramour’s house (he claims he saw her with her legs apart and theman on top of her), then stabbed the both of them and then stabbed the paramour’s motherwhen she tried to stop him. On appeal, C. claims that the exceptional circumstances of Article247 should apply to him. The RTC, however, greatly considered the testimony of the prosectionwitness, the barangay tanod who testified that when he saw the wife and the paramour on thatday, all bloodied, the wife was fully dressed while the paramour was wearing khaki pants andno shirt. Held: Decision affirmed. Guilty of parricide, homicide and frustrated homicide. The principalquestion is whether or not appellant killed his wife and her paramour in the act of committingthe sexual act or immediately thereafter. Findings of fact of the trial courts are given greatweight on appeal, and the Court finds that there is no reversible error committed by the trialcourt in appreciating the barangay tanod’s testimony. Under Article 247, the killing of the wifeby the husband (or vice versa) is justified if the husband kills her while engaged in sexualintercourse with another man or immediately thereafter. Clearly, in the present case, C. failedto prove that he killed them while in the act or immediately after. He cannot invoke Article247; hence he is guilty of parricide for killing his wife, homicide for killing her paramour, andfrustrated homicide for the paramour’s mother. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. CAMILO FERRER and ROMEO REYES, accused-appellants. D E C I S I O N PANGANIBAN, J.: In resolving this case, this Court finds occasion to differentiate between a state witness and a prosecution witness. It also
reiterates some well-settled doctrines in appreciating the generic aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and cruelty. This is an appeal from the Decision [1] dated May 15, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas, Isabela, Branch 23, finding appellants Camilo Ferrer and Romeo Reyes guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder for the fatal assault upon Florante Agtang and imposing on each of them the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the joint and several payment to the heirs of the victim of the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, plus costs. Originally charged in the Information filed before the then Court of First Instance of Isabela on February 18, 1977 were Tomas Agnir or Agner and appellants Ferrer alias Milo and Reyes alias Romy. The Information alleged as follows: “That on or about the 27th day of April, 1976, in the municipality of Quirino, province of Isabela, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the herein accused, together with Juan Galasi, who is already dead, and four (4) John Does, whose real identities are still unknown, armed with three (3) firearms, boloes and pointed knives, conspiring and confederating together and all helping one another, with evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, suddenly and unexpectedly and without giving him chance to defend himself, assault, attack and stab with sharppointed knives one Florante Agtang, inflicting upon the latter multiple stab wounds on the different parts of his body which directly caused him instantaneous death due to acute hemorrhage. CONTRARY TO LAW.” [2] Arraigned on July 22, 1977 in the Ilocano dialect which they speak and understand, the three accused pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.[3]
The Facts
The facts of the case as summarized [4] by the trial court are as follows: “The prosecution presented four (4) witnesses, including one of the accused Tomas Agner who was subsequently discharged as a state witness (p. 160, records). The defense presented the two accused, Camilo Ferrer and Romeo Reyes,
Merlita Cajalne, wife of accused Romeo Reyes, and the parents of Camilo Ferrer, Pedro Ferrer and Quintina Francisco. From the combined testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, it appears that in the evening of April 27, 1976, Florante Agtang, Apolonio Villanueva and Oscar Viernes, three young men from Dolores, Quirino, Isabela, went together to barangay Vintar of the same municipality and a neighboring barrio, to visit ladies of their court - Florante Agtang to the house of one Ester Galasi and Oscar Viernes to the house of one Leticia Gambalan. Apolonio Villanueva preferred to go with Oscar Viernes and stayed in the house of Leticia after they conducted Agtang to the house of Ester. At about 10:00 o’clock that same evening, Florante Agtang dropped by the house of Leticia where his companions were and bade the duo for all of them to go home. They all went together homebound when upon reaching the outskirts of barangay Vintar, after they had just passed an Independent Church not far from the house of Leticia, they heard a whistle and two men emerged from nowhere and warned them not to run away. The trio stopped and identified themselves. The two unidentified persons approached and frisked them for hidden weapons with one of the two pointing a long firearm at them. Apolonio and Oscar were found to be carrying knives while Florante was divested of a homemade-gun known as “paltik.” Proceeding further as they were ordered to follow, they came upon a place near a cornfield where four (4) more persons emerged, one of whom was identified as the accused Tomas Agner. Apolonio was able to flee as he was frightened by their captors that they would use the knife confiscated from his possession to kill them. Running as fast as he could, he was shot at but they missed him. Infuriated because of Apolonio’s escape, they started beating Florante and Oscar before they reached a river bank. They were ferried across the river and upon reaching the Magsaysay-Quirino boundary near the proposed railroad, the two were again ordered to remove their clothes with which they used to tie them. After they were tied a certain Doming hit Florante with a butt of the gun felling him to the ground as a result. Florante lying fallen, Camilo Ferrer and Romeo Reyes took turns in stabbing their hapless victim. They waylaid Florante and the group left him where he was slain, including Oscar Viernes who was released but was forewarned not to reveal what happened to anyone. The following morning, the incident was reported by Oscar Viernes despite the warning to the barangay captain of Dolores who in turn reported the same to the police authorities of Quirino, Isabela. Acting on said report the police found the dead body at the place pointed to by Oscar where they were maltreated. The body bore multiple stab wounds. Brought to their house the body of Florante was autopsied by Dr. Luis R. Tamayo, Municipal Health Officer of Roxas,
isabela. The findings of Dr. Tamayo confirmed the presence of several stab wounds and the cause of death was attributed to acute hemorrhage resulting from said injuries.” The star witness for the prosecution was Tomas Agnir (or Agner) who, upon motion of the fiscal, was discharged from the Information by the trial court in order that he could be a state witness. He testified thus: Agner was the brother-in-law of Juan Galasi, the latter’s sister being the former’s wife. He and Galasi co-owned a boat which Agner himself used in ferrying people across the river. [5] In the evening of April 27, 1976, Galasi, Romeo Reyes, Camilo Ferrer and a certain Domingo or Ding went to his house and asked him to take them across the river. They warned him that should he refuse to obey them, they would kill him.[6] Acceding to the group’s demand, Agner went westward with them to the river. Along the way, they met Oscar Viernes, Florante Agtang (Actang or Florendo Agtang [7]) and Apolonio Villanueva. Reyes, Domingo and Ferrer searched the bodies of the three. They got two knives from each of Villanueva and Viernes and a paltic firearm from Agtang. Near the banana plants, as all of them had resumed walking to the river, three other persons who were strangers to Agner, joined them. Suddenly, Villanueva ran away. Domingo shot at but missed Villanueva. Consequently; Domingo, Ferrer and Reyes tied Agtang and Viernes with what looked like a plastic rope. All of them went to the river where Agner ferried them across. They went northward to the proposed railroad. There, Agner was segregated from the group at a distance of around four (4) meters. From that distance, Agner watched as Domingo struck Agtang’s mouth with a gun butt, causing him to fall to the ground while Ferrer and Reyes stabbed the victim several times as he lay helpless. All these happened in the presence of Galasi. Domingo then ordered Viernes to go home. Agner himself was told by the three unidentified persons to go home with instructions not to reveal to anyone what had happened otherwise, he too would be killed. According to Agner, Agtang was assaulted by the group because Galasi, whose daughter was to be married to Agtang, did not want the marriage to take place as he preferred someone from Magsaysay to be his daughter’s groom. Domingo was from Aggad, Magsaysay, Isabela. [8] Villanueva, who was 21 years old when the incident happened, corroborated Agner’ s story. He testified that, at around 7:00 o’clock in the evening of April 27, 1976, he, together with Viernes
and Agtang, left their place in Dolores, Quirino, Isabela for Vintar (Bintar), another barrio in Quirino. Negotiating the distance between the two barrios on foot, he and his companions arrived in Vintar at around 9:00 o’clock that night. They proceeded to the Galasi residence where Agtang visited Ester Galasi. Then Villanueva accompanied Viernes while the latter visited Leticia Gambalan. After around two hours, Agtang fetched them and the three of them proceeded home. Along the way, someone whistled at them. When they came to a halt, two persons approached and told them not to run. The three young men were told to follow them northward. When they reached a banana plantation, the two persons, who turned out to be Reyes and Ferrer, whistled and four other persons came out from hiding. These four men asked the three young men to follow them to the fields. Of these four men, Villanueva recognized only Agner whom he used to see in Vintar. When they reached the fields, one of them, whom Villanueva identified later as Ferrer, approached him and asked for his small bolo (imuco), saying that they would use the bolo in killing him. Frightened, Villanueva fled into the tobacco field and hid there the whole night. In the morning, he went home and checked on his companions. He found Viernes but learned that Agtang’s dead body had been found on the other side of the Mallig River. [9] Twenty-one-year-old Agtang sustained seven (7) stab wounds on the left chest, right chest, epigastrium and abdomen. These wounds injured the lungs, heart and stomach and produced massive hemorrhage. He had four (4) puncture wounds on the right iliac region and two (2) other stab wounds on the right and left axilla which injured the lungs and also produced extensive hemorrhage. [10] Based on the sworn statements executed by Villanueva and Viernes on May 4, 1976, [11] Sgt. Doroteo Villegas filed a complaint for murder against Agner and five (5) John Does before the Municipal Court of Quirino.[12] It was from Agner, who executed a sworn statement on June 19, 1976, [13] that Sgt. Villegas learned the identities of Reyes and Ferrer. [14] Accordingly, Sgt. Villegas filed an amended complaint naming therein as accused, aside from Agner and Galasi, “Romy Reyes, Milo Perel (sic), Doming Doe, John Doe (sic), Peter Doe and Bernard Doe.” [15] On August 6, 1976, the Municipal Court of Quirino [16] ordered the issuance of warrants for the arrest of all the accused but dismissed the case as regards Galasi who had died.[17] After due investigation, the aforequoted Information was filed.
The Defense: Denial and Alibi
In their defense, appellants interposed denial and alibi, swearing that they were both at home when the crime was committed. Merlita Cajalne, the wife of Reyes, testified that April 27, 1976 was their wedding anniversary, having been married on April 27, 1971. After taking their supper with their five children at 6:00 o’clock that night, they went to bed. She woke up at 6:00 o’clock the following morning and found her husband still asleep. She was sure that her husband did not leave home during the night because she got up six (6) times that night to answer the call of nature. [18] Appellant Reyes testified that he did not even go out of his home in Aga, Delfin Albano, Isabela that fateful day, much less that evening. He denied having been to Vintar. He was able to go to Quirino only when he was arrested. The police of Quirino took him from the municipal jail of Delfin Albano. They rode a jeep from Delfin Albano up to Santiago from where they walked to Quirino. According to Reyes, Agner implicated him in the murder case because he had not paid Agner for services rendered in planting and harvesting his (Reyes’) palay. [19] For his part, appellant Ferrer, who used to farm the land of Antonio Gambalan in Aga, Magsaysay (now Delfin Albano), testified that he could not have gone to Vintar on April 27, 1976 because his sister, Margarita, was lying in state at their home. She had died at dusk of April 26, 1976 after she failed to deliver the child she was carrying.[20] Pedro Ferrer, appellant’s father, testified that he and his son Camilo, had gone to bed at the same time in the evening of “a certain day in April, 1976” when they served coffee to some visitors who attended the wake of his dead daughter, Margarita. On crossexamination, however, Pedro Ferrer declared that on that day, they were celebrating the death anniversary of their grandmother. [21] Appellant Ferrer’s 70-year-old mother, Quintina Francisco, could not remember the date of the death of her daughter Margarita. However, she insisted that on April 27, 1976, her son Camilo was in their house. On cross-examination, she declared that her daughter Margarita died in the early evening of April 27, 1976. [22] As stated above, the trial court held appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. It found that of the two qualifying circumstances alleged in the information, namely, evident
premeditation and treachery, only the latter was duly proven. Evident premeditation had no factual basis whereas treachery was sufficiently established by the fact that Agtang was struck with the butt of a gun and stabbed repeatedly, that he sustained twelve (12) wounds (should be thirteen [13] wounds) while he was tied and therefore in a defenseless position. Appellants’ notice of appeal was filed by their counsel of record, Atty. Edwin C. Uy. [23] On September 2, 1992, the Court required him to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for his failure to file appellants’ brief within the required period of time.[24] He did file a four-page brief [25] but failed to explain its late filing. Thus, on November 11, 1992, the Court imposed upon Atty. Uy a fine of P500 or a 5-day imprisonment for his failure to explain why he did not file the brief within the prescribed 10-day period. The Court also dismissed him as counsel for the appellants and appointed the Public Attorney’s Office of the Department of Justice as counsel de oficio. [26] The Solicitor General filed the appellee’s brief of the brief filed by Atty. Uy for the appellants. Attorney’s Office filed its own appellants’ brief on Solicitor General filed a second appellee’s brief contentions of the appellants. [28]
[27] upon receipt Since the Public May 6, 1993, the to traverse the
In this appeal, appellants allege through the Public Attorney’s Office that the trial court erred in convicting them of the crime charged notwithstanding the prosecution’s failure to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Appellants assert that they should not have been convicted on the testimony of their former co-accused which was not materially corroborated and therefore insufficient, coming as it did from someone who had his own interest to protect. In so contending, appellants quote [29] the portion of testimony wherein he described the participation of each perpetrators of the crime as follows:
Agner’s of the
“Q. After you were segregated and brought to a distance of more or less 4 meters what happened, if any? A.
Camilo Ferrer and Romeo Reyes stabbed Florante Agtang.
Q. About Din/Doming, did he do any from the person of Florante Agtang? (sic) A. sir.
Ding struck with the firearm the mouth of Florante Agtang,
Q.
Where was Juan Galasi when Agtang was body harmed (sic) by
the persons you mentioned? A. Juan Galasi was with the group of Romeo Reyes, Camilo Ferrer or a certain Doming, sir.” [30] Citing Barretto vs. Sandiganbayan [31] wherein the Court held that the testimony of a state witness which is not materially corroborated is not sufficient for conviction, appellants state that “x x x although state that he witness Apolonio Villanueva testified recognized the Accused-Appellants on the night of April 27, 1976, his testimony is however ineffective and incredible considering that when he was confronted with his sworn statement (Exh. ‘C’) taken by Cpl. Doroteo Villegas and subscribed before the Municipal Mayor of Quirino, he could hardly explain the inconsistency between his testimony and his sworn statement.” [32]They then quote that portion of Apolonio Villanueva’ s testimony wherein he was confronted with his sworn statement. Apolonio Villanueva was a prosecution witness but not a state witness. Under Section 9 of Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, a state witness is one of two or more persons jointly charged with the commission of a crime but who is discharged with his consent as such accused so that he may be a witness for the State. He shall only be discharged after the court has required the prosecution to present evidence and his sworn statement at a hearing in support of the discharge and the court is satisfied that the requirements of Section 9 are present. [33] In this case, Apolonio Villanueva was not an accused. Having been in the company of Agtang when he was killed, Villanueva was presented by the prosecution as a witness. It was Tomas Agner who was originally included as an accused in the information, but before the start of the hearing, he was discharged as an accused upon the motion of the prosecution in order that he could testify for the state. While the procedure undertaken in discharging him may be questioned because the trial court ordered his discharge even before the prosecution had started presenting evidence, it is safe to assume that said court, in the exercise of its sound discretion, [34] considered as basis for his discharge the sworn statement Agner executed before the police. Moreover, his discharge was effected upon the motion of the trial fiscal who, being in possession of evidence ahead of the court and even the defense, was best qualified to determine who among the accused should be discharged to be a state witness.[35] Be that as it may, any legal deficiency attending Agner’s discharge from the information may not affect the admissibility and
credibility of his testimony in the absence of proof to the contrary. [36] The trial court, upon which is vested the task of assigning probative value to the testimony of a witness, affixed the stamp of credibility upon the testimony of Agner while treating it with “extreme caution.” [37] In the absence of any clear showing that it overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight or substance which could have affected the result of the case, the trial court’s findings on the credibility of witnesses are entitled to the highest degree of respect and will not be disturbed on appeal.[38] Although it is true that Apolonio Villanueva failed to witness the actual assault upon Agtang as he fled before it transpired, Agner’s sole testimony on that fact stands unaffected. The testimony of a single witness, if positive and credible, is sufficient to sustain a conviction even in the absence of corroboration [39] unless such corroboration is expressly required by law. [40] Truth is established not by the number of witnesses but by the quality of their testimonies. [41] Agner’s testimony is in fact materially corroborated by the wounds sustained by Agtang as reflected in the certification [42] executed by Dr. Luis R. Tamayo who autopsied the corpse, as well as by the testimony of Dr. Tamayo. The defense attempted to taint Agner’s testimony by imputing to him a motive for testifying against the appellants. Through appellant Reyes, the defense hinted that Agner had an axe to grind against Reyes because the latter failed to pay Agner for manual work performed in Reyes’ farm. Like the trial court, [43] we find such alleged motive altogether too insignificant to impel any person to implicate an accused in so grave a crime as murder. For appellant Ferrer’ s part, he himself admitted that while Agner was an acquaintance, their relationship did not extend beyond that. [44] This clearly implies that Agner had no reason to testify against appellants other than to tell the truth. The trial court’s assessment of Agner is illuminative: “x x x While his testimony should be treated with extreme caution because he was originally indicted, the same must be analyzed carefully for its probative worth. It is well-settled in our jurisprudence that where the testimony of one of the accused is credible and corroborated by other witness, the same cannot be totally discarded by the mere fact that said accused was discharged to be utilized as a government witness (People vs. Cutura, L-12702, 4 SCRA 663). The narration made by Agner in his affidavit and his testimony in court is corroborated by witness Apolonio Villanueva.’ The latter identified Tomas Agner as one of the group of his tormentors and this must have led to the solution of the crime
because Tomas Agner when investigated made a clean breast of what happened (Exhibit “A”, prosecution, p-17, records), to the extent that he named his co-defendants in the commission of the crime charged. He pointed to the accused Camilo Ferrer and Romeo Reyes who stabbed Florante Agtang. His identification of the two could not be said to be tainted with doubt because without hesitation and with spontaneity he fingered the two accused who stabbed mercilessly the deceased victim. It could not even be pointed out why Agner had to implicate them to (sic) this gory crime. In short, he had no known motive to drag them into this case. The claim of accused Ferrer that he did not pay the wages of Agner during the latter’s brief stint in the ricefield of Ferrer as a farm helper must have motivated him to point him, is too shallow a pretense, if not puerile, to be given even the most scant consideration. Absent (sic) of any motive on the part of Agner to include accused Reyes is also worthy of note. No person worth his salt would in conscience point to a person without any known motive as in the case of other accused, Romeo Reyes.” [45] With respect to the alleged inconsistencies between the testimony and the sworn statement of Apolonio Villanueva or between his testimony and the sworn statement of Viernes which, appellants assert, rendered Villanueva’s credibility doubtful, the Court has time and again held that discrepancies between sworn statements or affidavits and testimonies made at the witness stand do not necessarily discredit the witnesses, since ex-parte affidavits are generally incomplete. [46] As a general rule, an inconsistency between two statements of a witness should be determined, not by resort to individual words or phrases, but by the whole impression or effect of what has been said or done. [47] Appellants point out that while Villanueva admitted in his sworn statement that he did not recognize -”not even one” of - the companions of Agner, on the witness stand, he claimed that he did recognize appellants although he did not know their names. The Solicitor General correctly points out that the alleged discrepancy was clarified during the redirect examination of Villanueva when he testified that he recognized appellants as the ones who first whistled at his group but that he could not recognize the companions of Agner who emerged from the banana plantation. [48] In view of the positive identification of appellants as the perpetrators of the crime, their alibi crumbled. [49] Besides, they had not strictly complied with the requirements of time and place in said defense. It should have been established that appellants were somewhere else when the crime happened and that it was physically impossible for them to be at the crime scene at the crucial time. [50] Worth noting is the fact that the distance between appellants’
respective residences in Aga, Magsaysay (Delfin Albano), Isabela and Vintar, Quirino, Isabela was established by the defense only through the manifestation in court of their counsel, Atty. Melanio T. Singson, that there is no road connecting the two places which he estimated to be 70 to 80 kilometers apart “in a straight line.” [51] The trial court correctly held that treachery qualified the killing of Agtang and that appellants shall be held responsible for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code. There is treachery because Agtang, was tied and therefore in a helpless condition before he was killed. [52]
Aggravating Circumstances: Nocturnity, Cruelty
However, the trial court improperly considered nocturnity as a separate aggravating circumstance. While it correctly stated that nighttime must be deliberately sought in the perpetration of the crime, a close examination of the records shows no factual support that the appellants indeed deliberately considered the cover of darkness as an indispensable factor in assaulting Agtang. The prosecution established no more than the simple fact that the crime was committed at night. Neither may cruelty be appreciated against the appellants. This aggravating circumstance is present when the wrong done in the commission of the crime is “deliberately augmented by causing other wrong not necessary for its commission.” [53] The test in appreciating cruelty as an aggravating circumstance is “whether the accused deliberately and sadistically augmented the wrong by causing another wrong not necessary for its commission or inhumanly increased the victim’ suffering or outraged or scoffed at his person or corpse.”[54] In People vs. Dayug and Bannaisan, [55] the Court said: “x x x. There is cruelty when the culprit enjoys and delights in making his victim suffer slowly and gradually, causing him unnecessary moral and physical pain in the consummation of the criminal act which he intends to commit. The mere fact of inflicting various successive wounds upon a person in order to cause his death, no appreciable time intervening between the infliction of one wound and that of another to show that he had wanted to prolong the suffering of his victim, is not sufficient for taking this aggravating circumstance into consideration.” Thus, where the victim suffered twenty-one (21) wounds or injuries, eight (8) of which were fatal, the Court did not appreciate
cruelty as a generic aggravating circumstance in the absence of positive proof that the wounds were inflicted while the victim was still alive to prolong unnecessarily his physical suffering. [56] In another case, where the victim sustained thirteen (13) wounds, only one of which was mortal, this Court similarly did not take into account cruelty as an aggravating circumstance as there was no showing that appellant deliberately and inhumanly increased the suffering of the deceased. [57] In the case at bench, the prosecution failed to prove that the appellants inflicted the thirteen (13) wounds upon the victim in such a way that he was made to agonize before they rendered any of the blows which snuffed out his life. By Agner’s account, the appellants and Domingo dealt the victim successive blows [58] so that he must have died instantaneously, considering that nine (9) of his wounds were fatal.[59]As a matter of fact, the trial court appreciated cruelty only because it considered the number of wounds on the victim to be “not necessary to consummate the crime of murder.” [60] The penalty for the crime of murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death. In the absence of any aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the imposable penalty is the medium period of said penalty or reclusion perpetua. [61] The appellants must all bear this penalty in view of the duly proven conspiracy among the perpetrators of the crime. Their cooperative acts towards the common criminal objective of taking the life of Agtang proved that they were parties to a conspiracy. [62] WHEREFORE, the herein appealed Decision convicting appellants Camilo Ferrer and Romeo Reyes of the crime of murder and imposing on each of them the penalty of reclusion perpetua and the solidary payment to the heirs of Florante Agtang of civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00, is hereby AFFIRMED. No costs. SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-40294 July 11, 1986 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. TOBIAS RIBADAJO, ROEO !ORP"#, FEDERI!O BASAS, ROSENDO ANOR $%& RODOLFO TORRES,defendants-appellants.
ELEN!IO-HERRERA, J.: The death penalty having been imposed by the then Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal in Criminal
Case No. CCC-V-!"#$-Rizal for %urder, the case is no& before us for automatic revie&. There &ere originally si' ()* accused+ Tobias Ribadao, Romeo Corpuz, ederico asas, Rosendo /nor, Rodolfo Torres and 0oreto Rivera, all inmates of the Ne& ilibid Prison at %untinlupa, Rizal 1ne of the ho&ever, 0oreto Rivera, died during the pendency of the case. 2e find the facts of the case, as narrated in the 3ecision of the trial Court, home by the evidence thus+ rom the evidence on record, it is clear that on November !4, !$5!, at about 5+6) o7cloc8 in the evening, prisoners from brigade "-C, %untinlupa, Rizal succeeded in opening the door of their dormitory by means of a false 8ey (tin can* and attac8ed the inmates from dormitory "-a, &hile the latter &ere then getting their food rations from the delivery truc8 &herein the victim &as among them. Records further sho& that &hile the victim ernardo Cutamora, &as getting his ration he &as sand&iched by the accused &ho rushed to&ards the door and stabbed the victim simultaneously &hereby the latter sustained multiple stab &ounds on the different parts of his body &hich &ounds caused his death as evidenced by Necropsy Report mar8ed 9'hibit 7/7. To gain e'it from their brigade, accused Tobias Ribadao used a false 8ey (tin can* and immediately the door &as opened and his co-accused rushed to&ards the place &here the prisoners of brigade "-a &ere &aiting for their ration and &ith respective matalas on their hands they stabbed the victim to death. /ll the assailants confessed participation in the 8illing claiming that they did it because they &ere being moc8ed by the inmates of "-a &ho &ere members of the 1:1 there &as a time &hen these inmates thre& human &aste on their brigade shouting that 7you Commando members could not do anything7, and then they &ould laugh at them; that in order to avenge this moc8ery the accused headed by Tobias Ribadao called up a meeting in the afternoon of November !4, !$5!, at around !+<<, and they planned to 8ill any prisoner from brigade "-a in the evening and they &ould do the 8illing at the time they (inmates from "-a* &ere &aiting for their 7rancho7. =oon their plan &as consummated and the victim, ernardo Cutamora &as the unluc8y guy overcome by their respective bladed &eapons. 1 n an investigation conducted by the nvestigation =ection of the Ne& ilibid Prisons on November #<, !$5!, all the accused e'ecuted statements admitting their participation in the slaying of ernardo Cutamora. 2 Conse>uently, an nformation for %urder &as filed against them on /pril #?, !$5" &ith the then Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal. The delay in filing &as due to the separation from the service of a principal investigator. @pon arraignment on Auly 6, !$5", accused Tobias Ribadao, Romeo Corpuz, 0oreto Rivera (&ho died on /ugust !6, !$5?, p. ?), Rollo*, and Rodolfo Torres, all &ith the assistance of counsel de officio, pleaded Builty, &hile the other t&o accused ederico asas and Rolando /unor, alias Rolando /mor, alias Rolando /nor, alias Tagalog, entered pleas of Not Builty. ' The nformation &as amended to correct the name of Rolando /unor to Rosendo /nor, alias Negro, alias Tagalog. Thereafter, evidence &as adduced. /t the presentation of evidence for the defense, accused Tobias Ribadao, Romeo Corpuz, and Rodolfo Torres &ithdre& their pleas of Builty. 4 /ccused Corpuz and Ribadao also denied their participation in the 8illing of ernardo Cutamora, and repudiated their confessions, claiming that they had signed the same under duress. /ccused ederico asas and Rodolfo Torres admitted having e'ecuted their respective confessions, ( &hile accused Rosendo /nor changed his plea of Not Builty to Builty of the lesser offense of omicide. 6 1n November #4, !$5?, the Trial Court pronounced a verdict of guilty, as follo&s+
29R91R9, after determining the degree of culpability of all the accused, namely+ Tobias Ribadao, Romeo Corpuz, ederico asas, Rosendo /nor and Rodolfo Torres, the Court finds them B@0TD, beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of %urder, as defined under /rticle #?4 of the Revised Penal Code, as charged in the information, and hereby sentences each one of them to suffer the penalty of 39/T; to indemnify the heirs of the victim the amount of P!#,<<<.<<, ointly and severally; to pay moral damages in the amount of P!<,<<<.<< and another P!<,<<<.<<, as e'emplary damages, ointly and severally, and to pay their proportionate shares of the costs. ) /ppellants claim infirmity of the Trial Court 3ecision on the follo&ing grounds+ The Trial Court erred in admitting as evidence, and in giving &eight to the supposed e'traudicial confession of the accused. The Trial Court erred in finding the presence of the aggravating circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation and recidivism. The Trial Court erred in convicting the accused and in imposing the death penalty. /ppellants submit that their e'traudicial confessions &ere e'tracted by force; that they had been e'posed for more or less one day to the heat of the sun and the &etness and coldness of the rain, and had been subse>uently beaten up and placed in a Ebartolina E 1n their face, ho&ever, the individual confessions do not sho& any suspicious circumstance Casting doubt on their integrity. 1n the contrary, they are replete &ith details only appellants could have supplied. n those statements, they called their co-accused by their nic8names, not 8no&ing their true names, li8e E0ilatE for asas, E%ano8E for /nor and Eu8idE for Torres. The investigators could not have concocted that on November !4, !$5!, at around !+<< P.%., appellants had planned to 8ill any prisoner from rigade "-a during the distribution of the EranchoE; that they are members of the =igue=igue Commando Bang and their leader is accused Ribadao; that, as planned, on the same date at around 4+<< P.%., Ribadao using a false 8ey tin can opened the door of their dormitory and an the accused rushed to&ards the place &here the inmates from rigade "-a &ere &aiting for their food; that they stabbed the victim &ith their EmatalasE; and their motive &as to avenge the thro&ing of human &aste on them by inmates of rigade "-a. 2hat is more, during the presentation of evidence by the defense, they &ere all admitting their guilt but for the lesser offense of omicide, as manifested by their de officio counsel. /tty. Balvan Dour onor, inasmuch as have also conferred &ith all the accused and that having appointed me as counsel de oficio before &hen iscal Buerrero &as here and after a long conference &ith the accused, and if the iscal &ill not obect if all the accused &ill change their former plea of not guilty to that of guilty, as that &as their proposal and they &ere very insistent, that if the Court &ill allo& them to &ithdra& their former plea of not guilty and substitute &ith a plea of guilty to a lesser of homicide, your onor. 8 3espite counsel7s appeal for Ehumanity sa8e,E the prosecution, ho&ever, opposed the change of plea
because it had already finished &ith the presentation of its evidence. 2e find no sufficient basis, therefore, to destroy the presumption of voluntariness of appellants7 confessions. The presumption of the la& is in favor of the spontaneity and voluntariness of an e'traudicial confession of an accused in a criminal case, 9 for no sane person &ould deliberately confess to the commission of a crime unless prompted to do so by truth and conscience. 10 The burden of proof is upon the declarant to destroy this presumption. 11 %ere repudiation of confession by the accused at the trial is not sufficient to disregard his confession. 12 Concrete evidence of compulsion or duress must be presented to sustain their claim of maltreatment. No such evidence has been put for&ard. No report of such maltreatment &as made to the prison authorities nor to the iscal &ho conducted the preliminary investigation. 3uring cross-e'amination, Corpuz admitted that he &as not maltreated. 1' Ribadao himself did not protest &hen he &as brought to 9'e>uiel =antos, /dministrative 1fficer , ureau of Prisons, &ho, in his o&n &ords, &as Eli8e a father to me.E 14 /s to appellants7 claim that they have not been informed of their right to silence and to counsel during custodial investigation, suffice it to state that the proscription against the admissibility of confessions obtained from an accused during the period of custodial interrogation, in violation of procedural safeguards, applies to confessions obtained after the effectivity of the !$5" Constitution. 1( No la& gives the accused the right to be so informed before the enactment of the !$5" Constitution, 16 even if presented after Aanuary !5, !$5". 1) That Constitutional guaranty relative to confessions obtained during custodial investigation does not have any retroactive effect. 18 The Trial Court committed no reversible error either in finding the e'istence of the aggravating circumstance of treachery, evident premeditation and recidivism. Treachery &as present because the attac8 on the victim &as sudden and une'pected. 19 2hen the inmates from rigade "-a &ent out to get their food ration appellants immediately rushed out of their o&n cell and attac8ed, &ith their improvised &eapon, the unsuspecting victim. There &as a collective effort on appellants7 part, &ho &ere all armed, in assaulting the victim &ho &as unarmed, 20 and &ho &as completely deprived of an opportunity to prepare for the attac8 or to defend himself, 21 or to prepare for a fight or retreat. 22 9vident premeditation &as also present because the plan to 8ill any prisoner from rigade "-a &as hatched around !+<< o7cloc8 in the afternoon of November !4, !$5!, and the plan &as consummated at about 4+<< in the evening of the same day. 9vident premeditation is present &hen murder &as contemplated at least one hour prior to its e'ecution. 2' /ppellants had ample time to desist from the e'ecution of the offense but they clung to their determination to achieve their criminal intent. The aggravating circumstance of recidivism has to be considered because all the accused at the time of the commission of the offense, &ere serving their respective sentences by virtue of a final udgment for other crimes embraced in the same Title of the Revised Penal Code (Corpuz for omicide; Ribadao for %urder; asas for %urder; /nor for %urder; and Torres for omicide*. No error either &as committed by the Trial Court in imposing the death penalty. The penalty for murder isreclusion temporal in its ma'imum period to death. 24 Considering that appellants committed the present felony after having been convicted by final udgment and &hile serving their respective sentences, they should be punished by the ma'imum period of the penalty prescribed by la& for the ne& felony. 2( Biven this circumstance, /nor7s change of plea from Builty to Not Builty &ill not change his liability besides the fact that it &as made after the prosecution had rested its case. 26 The defense contention that appellants should be held guilty only for E3eath Caused in a Tumultuous /ffrayE and sentenced to prision mayor under /rticle #6! of the Revised Penal Code, upon the allegation that the commotion &as spontaneous, lac8s merit. There &as no confusion and tumultuous >uarrel or affray, nor &as there a reciprocal aggression bet&een both parties. 2) /ppellants rushed out
of their cell &ith the common purpose of attac8ing the victim of a rival group, &hich unity of purpose indicates appellants7 common responsibility for the conse>uences of their aggression. 28 29R91R9, the udgment of conviction is hereby /R%93. o&ever, for lac8 of the necessary votes, the penalty to be imposed on all the accused-appellants is reduced to reclusion perpetua . The indemnity to be paid to the heirs of the deceased is hereby raised to P"<,<<<.<<. Proportionate costs against the accused. =1 1R39R93. Abad Santos, Feria, Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Alampay, Cruz and Paras, JJ., concur. Gutierrez, Jr., J., too! no part.
S*+$$* O+%o%/
TEEHANEE, CJ., concurring+ concur in the result, there being sufficient evidence other than the challenged e'traudicial confession for affirmation of the udgment of conviction. &rite this brief concurrence to maintain my dissenting vie& in the case of "a#toto vs. "an#uera ()" =CR/ ?, #5* and subse>uent cases that E(T*here is no room for interpretation and the plain mandate of the Constitution e'pressly adopting the e$clusionary rule as the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional inunction against such confessions obtained in violation of one7s constitutional rights by outla&ing their admission and thereby removing the incentive on t%e part of state and police officers to disre#ard suc% ri#%ts (in the same manner that the e'clusionary rule bars admission of illegally seized evidence* should be strictly enforced,7 and 7(T*he outla&ing of an such confessions is plain, un>ualified and &it%out distinction &hether the invalid confession be obtained before or after the effectivity of the Constitution.E ta8e e'ception to the statement in the main opinion that no la& gives the accused the right to be so informed of his right to silence and to counsel before the enactment of the !$5" Constitution, &hich does not have any retroactive effect. maintain, as in "a#toto, that such a la& &as enacted as of Aune !6, !$6? &hen Republic /ct !<4", authored by the late =enator %ariano Aesus Cuenco, inserted the second paragraph of /rticle !#6 of the Revised Penal Code authorizing the right of a detained person to counsel in any custodial investigation, thus+ En every case the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his detention and shall be allo&ed upon his re>uest to communicate and confer at any time &ith his attorney or counsel. E had e'pressly oined the vigorous dissent of the late Chief Austice (then /ssociate Austice* red Ruiz Castro in "a#toto that Ethe maority of my brethren are of the literal vie& that the only right granted by the said paragraph to a detained person &as to be informed of the cause of his detention,7 and that a detained person 7must ma8e a re>uest for him to be able to claim the right to communicate and confer &ith counsel at any time.7 regard this interpretation as abhorrent because it gravely offends against the provisions of the !$"6 Constitution as &ell as of the !$5" Constitution that guarantee e>ual protection of the la&s to every person in the realm. ... /n accurate paraphrase of the maority vie& may be stated in the follo&ing &ords+ 7f this detained &retch asserts his right to counsel, &ill allo& him to communicate and confer &ith a la&yer of his choice. ut if he says none because he is unlettered or uninformed, am under no moral or legal obligation to help him because, standing mute, he has no right to counsel.7 The absurdity so implicit in these &ords stri8es terror in me at the same time that it saddens me, for it not only denies the poor and the unschooled the e>ual protection of the la&s but also
inflicts a horrendous indignity on them solely because of their poverty, ignorance or illiteracy. The cogent remar8 of the late =enator %ariano Aesus Cuenco, truly a man of &isdom and e'perience, &hen Republic /ct !<4" as a bill &as under discussion in the =enate, that a detained person in every custodial interrogation should, under the proposed amendment, be informed beforehand of his right to counsel, &as therefore not a mere &isp of &ind, but &as indeed a &arning most pregnant &ith meaning. E t seems clear that the second paragraph of /rticle !#6 of the Revised Penal Code as inserted by Republic /ct !<4" ma8es it the duty on the part of any police or military officer to inform the person detained of his right to counsel at the start of any custodial interrogation and that this duty &as made a statutory one as early as !$6? upon the enactment of the aforesaid /ct.
S*+$$* O+%o%/ TEEHANEE, CJ., concurring+ concur in the result, there being sufficient evidence other than the challenged e'traudicial confession for affirmation of the udgment of conviction. &rite this brief concurrence to maintain my dissenting vie& in the case of "a#toto vs. "an#uera ()" =CR/ ?, #5* and subse>uent cases that E(T*here is no room for interpretation and the plain mandate of the Constitution e'pressly adopting the e$clusionary rule as the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional inunction against such confessions obtained in violation of one7s constitutional rights by outla&ing their admission and thereby removing the incentive on t%e part of state and police officers to disre#ard suc% ri#%ts (in the same manner that the e'clusionary rule bars admission of illegally seized evidence* should be strictly enforced,7 and 7(T*he outla&ing of an such confessions is plain, un>ualified and &it%out distinction &hether the invalid confession be obtained before or after the effectivity of the Constitution.E ta8e e'ception to the statement in the main opinion that no la& gives the accused the right to be so informed of his right to silence and to counsel before the enactment of the !$5" Constitution, &hich does not have any retroactive effect. maintain, as in "a#toto, that such a la& &as enacted as of Aune !6, !$6? &hen Republic /ct !<4", authored by the late =enator %ariano Aesus Cuenco, inserted the second paragraph of /rticle !#6 of the Revised Penal Code authorizing the right of a detained person to counsel in any custodial investigation, thus+ En every case the person detained shall be informed of the cause of his detention and shall be allo&ed upon his re>uest to communicate and confer at any time &ith his attorney or counsel. E had e'pressly oined the vigorous dissent of the late Chief Austice (then /ssociate Austice* red Ruiz Castro in "a#toto that Ethe maority of my brethren are of the literal vie& that the only right granted by the said paragraph to a detained person &as to be informed of the cause of his detention,7 and that a detained person 7must ma8e a re>uest for him to be able to claim the right to communicate and confer &ith counsel at any time.7 regard this interpretation as abhorrent because it gravely offends against the provisions of the !$"6 Constitution as &ell as of the !$5" Constitution that guarantee e>ual protection of the la&s to every person in the realm. ... /n accurate paraphrase of the maority vie& may be stated in the follo&ing &ords+ 7f this detained &retch asserts his right to counsel, &ill allo& him to communicate and confer &ith a la&yer of his choice. ut if he says none because he is unlettered or uninformed, am under no moral or legal obligation to help him because, standing mute, he has no right to counsel.7 The absurdity so implicit in these &ords stri8es terror in me at the same time that it saddens me, for it not only denies the poor and the unschooled the e>ual protection of the la&s but also inflicts a horrendous indignity on them solely because of their poverty, ignorance or illiteracy. The cogent remar8 of the late =enator %ariano Aesus Cuenco, truly a man of &isdom and e'perience, &hen
Republic /ct !<4" as a bill &as under discussion in the =enate, that a detained person in every custodial interrogation should, under the proposed amendment, be informed beforehand of his right to counsel, &as therefore not a mere &isp of &ind, but &as indeed a &arning most pregnant &ith meaning. E t seems clear that the second paragraph of /rticle !#6 of the Revised Penal Code as inserted by Republic /ct !<4" ma8es it the duty on the part of any police or military officer to inform the person detained of his right to counsel at the start of any custodial interrogation and that this duty &as made a statutory one as early as !$6? upon the enactment of the aforesaid /ct. .R. No. L-50884 March 30, 1988 –CASE OF COMPLEX CRIME THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. FILOMENO SALUFRANIA, defendant-appellant. FACTS: On 7 May 1976, Filomeno Salufrania y Aleman was charged before the CFI of Camarines Norte,with the complex crime of parricide with intentional abortion. It was alleged that on the 3rd day of December, 1974, the accused Filomeno Salufrania y Aleman did then and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously attack, assault and use personal violence on his wife, MARCIANA ABUYO-SALUFRANIA by then and there boxing and stranging her, causing upon her injuries which resulted in her instantaneous death; and by the same criminal act committed on the person of the wife of the accused, who was at the time 8 months pregnant, the accused caused the death of the unborn child,committing both crimes of PARRICIDE and INTENTIONAL ABORTION as defined and punished under Art. 246 and Art. 256, paragraph I, of the Revised Penal Code. At the trial court, Dr. Juan L. Dyquiangco Jr., Pedro Salufrania testified that,he was called upon by the Municipal Judge of Talisay to examine the corpse of Marciana Abuyo-Salufrania that was exhumed from its grave in which the cause of death was cardiac arrest. Dr. Dyquiangco testified that after conducting the post mortem examination, he issued a certification thereof (Exhibit "A"); that he issued a death certificate (Exhibit "B") for the deceased Marciano Abuyo-Salufrania, bearing the date of 5 December 1974, made on the basis of the information relayed by a certain Leonila Loma to his nurse before the burial, without mentioning the cause of death; that the cause of death, as cardiac arrest, was indicated on said death certificate only after the post mortem examination on 11 December 1974. The lower court allowed the son of the accused, Pedro Salufrania, The lower court stated that, by reason of interest and relationship, before Pedro Salufrania was allowed to testify against his father-accused Filomeno Salufrania, after careful examination by the prosecuting officer and the defense counsel under the careful supervision of the court a quo, to determine whether, at his age of 13 years old, he was already capable of receiving correct impressions of facts and of relating them truly and, also, whether he was
compelled and/or threatened by anybody to testify against his fatheraccused.He stated that his father Filomeno Salufrania and his mother Marciana Abuyo quarrelled at about 6:00 o'clock in the evening of 3 December 1974, he saw his father box his pregnant mother on the stomach and, once fallen on the floor, his father strangled her to death; that he saw blood ooze from the eyes and nose of his mother and that she died right on the spot where she fell. His brother,Eduardo Abuyo and had refused and still refused to live with his father-accused, because the latter has threatened to kill him and his other brothers and sister should he reveal the true cause of his mother's death.The brother in law and sister of the deceased victim,Narciso Abuyo also declared that after the burial of Marciana Abuyo, the three (3) children of his deceased sisterrefused to go home with their father Filomeno Salufrania; that when asked why, his nephew Alex Salufra ña told him that the real cause of death of their mother was not stomach ailment and headache, rather, she was boxed on the stomach and strangled to death by their father; that immediately after learning of the true cause of death of his sister, he brought the matter to the attention of the police authorities . The CFI found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt, of the complex crime of Parricide with Intentional Abortion, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of DEATH, to indemnify the heirs of the deceased Marciano Abuyo in the sum of P12,000.00 and to pay the costs. "For unselfish, valuable and exemplary service rendered by counsel de oficio, Atty. Marciano C. Dating, Jr., a compensation of P500.00 is hereby recommended for him subject to the availability of fund. Since the accused was sentenced to death, this becomes an automatic review before the Supreme Court. The defense had for witnesses Geronimo Villan, Juanito Bragais, Angeles Liling Balce and the accused Filomeno Salufrania.Geronimo Villan testified that he was a neighbor of Filomeno Sulfrania whio tried to help him administer a native treatment around 6am in the morning of December 4, 1974, but she died around 7am. Witness Juanita Bragais testified that he was fetched by Felipe Salufrania, another son of Filomeno Salufrania Marciana Abuyo was already dead so he just helped Filomeno Salufrania in transferring the body of his wife to the house of the latter's brother-in—law.Angeles Liling Balce, who claimed to be a former resident she arrived in the house of Filomeno Salufrania at about 6:00 o'clock in the morning Marciana still in a coma lying on the lap of her husband who informed her that Marciana was suffering from an old stomach ailment. The accused admitted that he was that lawful husband of the deceased Marciana Abuyo; that he sent r Juanito Bragais but the latter was not able to cure his wife, that there was no quarrel between him and his wife that preceded the latter's death, and that during the lifetime of the deceased, they
loved each other; that after her burial, his son Pedro Salufrania was taken by his brother-in-law Narciso Abuyo and since then, he was not able to talk to his son until during the trial; and that at the time of death of his wife, aside from the members of his family, Geronimo Villan Francisco Repuya and Liling Angeles Balce were also present.Appellant alleges that the trial court failed to determine the competence of Pedro Salufrania before he was allowed to testify. He also questions the competence of Dr. Dyquiangco as an expert witness, and alleges that the findings of Dr. Dyquiangco and the testimony of Pedro Salufrania do not tally. But this contention is without merit. The Court notes, first of all, that appellant did not even bother to discuss his defense in order to refute the massive evidence against him. This is tantamount to an admission that he could not adequately support his version of Marciana Abuyo's death.Lastly, appellant alleges that, assuming he indeed killed his wife, there is no evidence to show that he had the intention to cause an abortion. In this contention, appellant is correct. He should not be held guilty of the complex crime of Parricide with Intentional Abortion but of the complex crime of Parricide with Unintentional Abortion. The elements of Unintentional Abortion are as follows: 1. That there is a pregnant woman. 2. That violence is used upon such pregnant woman without intending an abortion. 3. That the violence is intentionally exerted. 4. That as a result of the violence the foetus dies, either in the womb or after having been expelled therefrom. ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in its ruling of complex crime with parricide and intentional abortion? HELD: According to the Supreme Court, “Trial judges are in the best position to ascertain the truth and detect falsehoods in the testimony of witnesses. This Court will normally not disturb the findings of the trial court on the credibility of witnesses, in view of its advantage in observing first hand their demeanor in giving their testimony. Such rule applies in the present case. The Solicitor General's brief makes it appear that appellant intended to cause an abortion because he boxed his pregnant wife on the stomach which caused her to fall and then strangled her. We find that appellant's intent to cause an abortion has not been sufficiently established. Mere boxing on the stomach, taken together with the immediate strangling of the victim in a fight, is not sufficient proof to show an intent to cause an abortion. In fact, appellant must have merely intended to kill the victim but not necessarily to cause an abortion. The evidence on record, therefore, establishes beyond reasonable doubt that accused Filomeno Salufrania
committed and should be held liable for the complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion. The abortion, in this case, was caused by the same violence that caused the death of Marciana Abuyo, such violence being voluntarily exerted by the herein accused upon his victim. It has also been clearly established (a) that Marciana Abuyo was seven (7) to eight (8) months pregnant when she was killed; (b) that violence was voluntarily exerted upon her by her husband accused; and (c) that, as a result of said violence, Marciana Abuyo died together with the foetus in her womb. In this afternoon, Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code states that the accused should be punished with the penalty corresponding to the more serious came of parricide, to be imposed in its maximum period which is death. However, by reason of the 1987 Constitution which has abolished the death penalty, appellant should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. “ In the present case, the Supreme Court modified, the judgment appealed from was AFFIRMED. Accused-appellant was sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The indemnity of P12,000. 00 awarded to the heirs of the deceased Marciana Abuyo is increased to P30,000.00 in line with the recent decisions of the Court. With costs. People vs. Mangalino 182 SCRA 329 (February 15, 1990)Facts: Semion Mangalino inserted his finger and later on forcibly introducedhis sexual organ into Marichelle’s, six yr old, undeveloped genitalia. Physicalexam in NBI concluded that bruises on Marichelle’s vagina: caused by a hardobject like an erected penis and an indication of an unsuccessful penetration. They discounted the probability of an accident since there was no contusionon the labia . Semio n denie d the charges and argu ed th at br ui se s ma y be self-inflicted. She was constantly running and might have bumped her pelvisagainst a chair which explained the absence of contusions on the labia. Ruling: He is guilty of statutory rape. For r a p e t o b e c o m m i t t e d , f u l l penetration is not required. It is enough that there is proof of entrance of themale or ga n wi th in th e labia or pude ndum o f the female organ. Even th eslightest penetration is sufficient to consummate the crime of rape. Accordingto the NBI report, rape could have been perpetrated. Dr. Garcia certified theexistence of indications of recent genital trauma. Vestibular mucosa was darkred and normally, it was supposed to be pinkish. The forcible attempt of anerected penis caused the 3.5 cm contusion prior to the hymen. The penile-va gi na l co nt ac t wi th ou t pe ne tr at io n wa s du e to 1 cm di am et er op en in g of Marichelle’s hymen. The victim being young, the penetration could
only go asdeep as the labia. Offender and victim being neighbors explain the absenceof visible signs of physical injuries. The reason why Marichelle did not crywas that she did not feel any pain during the attempted sexual intercourse. Doctrine: The victim being young, the penetration could only go as deep ast he labia. For rape to be committed, full penetration is not re qu ir ed . It is enough that there is proof of entrance of the male organ within the labia or the pudendum of the female organ People vs. Atento 196 SCRA 357 (April 26, 1991)Facts: Glenda Aringo, a 16 yr old developmentally-challenged person, claimsthat Cesar Atento, her neighbor, raped her 5x. from April 1986. She said shewas raped 4 more times. It was at this time that she felt tickled and described the act as “masarap”. She could not anymore conceal her condition becauseshe was al ready 5 mon ths pr egnant. Ruling: Glenda has the intellectualcapacity of a 9 and 12 yr old and is wi th in a me nt al ly de fe ct iv e le ve l. He r ju dg me nt un so un d and her capacity for higher perceptual processes isunsatisfactory. Although it is not clear the Cesar employed force, he is stillguilty under Paragraph 2 (when the woman is deprived of reason or isotherwise unconscious) because Glenda is deprived of re as on by be in gmentally deficient. He is also liable under par. 3 (when the victim is under 12)because she has the mentality of a girl less than 12 yrs old at the time shewas raped. The absence of will determines the existence of the rape. Suchlac k of wi ll ma y exist not only when the victim is unconscious or totallydeprived of reason, but also when she is suffering some mental deficiencyimpa irin g h er reas on or free will . The deprivation of reason need not becomplete. Mental deficiency or abnormality is sufficient. Doctrine: Paragraph 3 does not only refer to chronological age but also tomental age.Note: SC might have been confused. Par 2 refers to a situation wherein thewoman is drugged or drunk, etc People vs. Campuhan 329 SCRA 270 (March 30, 2000)Facts: Corazon Pamintuan heard her 4 yr old daughter, Crysthel, cry andshe rushed to the bedroom where she saw Primo Campuhan kneeling beforeCrysthel whose jogging pants were already removed while his short pantswere already down to his knees. According to Corazon, Primo was forcing hispenis into Crysthel’s vagina. According to the physical exam, there was noevident sign of extra-genital physical injury. Her hymen was intact and her ori fi ce wa s on ly .
05 in diameter. Ruling: Me re tou chi ng of the ext ern al genitalia by the penis is sufficient to constitute carnal knowledge. But the actof touching should be understood as inherently part of the entry of the penisinto th e labias and not the mere touching alone of the mons pubis or thepudendum. There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penisindeed touched the labias or slid into the female organ, and not merelystroked the external surface thereof, for th e accu sed to be convi cted of consummated rape. Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of thefemale organ, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness.Primo’s kneeling position rendered an unbridled observation impossible.Pros ecu tio n w as not abl e t o p rov e t h at any int er- gen ita l con tac t was achieved. All the elements for attempted rape are present; hence, theaccused should be punished only for it. Doctrine: Mere touching does not mean stroking. There must be intent topenetrate
the act as “masarap”. She could not anymore conceal her condition becauseshe was al ready 5 mon ths pr egnant. Ruling: Glenda has the intellectualcapacity of a 9 and 12 yr old and is wi th in a me nt al ly de fe ct iv e le ve l. He r ju dg me nt un so un d and her capacity for higher perceptual processes isunsatisfactory. Although it is not clear the Cesar employed force, he is stillguilty under Paragraph 2 (when the woman is deprived of reason or isotherwise unconscious) because Glenda is deprived of re as on by be in gmentally deficient. He is also liable under par. 3 (when the victim is under 12)because she has the mentality of a girl less than 12 yrs old at the time shewas raped. The absence of will determines the existence of the rape. Suchlac k of wi ll ma y exist not only when the victim is unconscious or totallydeprived of reason, but also when she is suffering some mental deficiencyimpa irin g h er reas on or free will . The deprivation of reason need not becomplete. Mental deficiency or abnormality is sufficient. Doctrine: Paragraph 3 does not only refer to chronological age but also tomental age.Note: SC might have been confused. Par 2 refers to a situation wherein thewoman is drugged or drunk, etc. People vs. Campuhan 329 SCRA 270 (March 30, 2000)Facts: Corazon Pamintuan heard her 4 yr old daughter, Crysthel, cry andshe
rushed to the bedroom where she saw Primo Campuhan kneeling beforeCrysthel whose jogging pants were already removed while his short pantswere already down to his knees. According to Corazon, Primo was forcing hispenis into Crysthel’s vagina. According to the physical exam, there was noevident sign of extra-genital physical injury. Her hymen was intact and her ori fi ce wa s on ly . 05 in diameter. Ruling: Me re tou chi ng of the ext ern al genitalia by the penis is sufficient to constitute carnal knowledge. But the actof touching should be understood as inherently part of the entry of the penisinto th e labias and not the mere touching alone of the mons pubis or thepudendum. There must be sufficient and convincing proof that the penisindeed touched the labias or slid into the female organ, and not merelystroked the external surface thereof, for th e accu sed to be convi cted of consummated rape. Absent any showing of the slightest penetration of thefemale organ, it can only be attempted rape, if not acts of lasciviousness.Primo’s kneeling position rendered an unbridled observation impossible.Pros ecu tio n w as not abl e t o p rov e t h at any int er- gen ita l con tac t was achieved. All the elements for attempted rape are present; hence, theaccused should be punished only for it. Doctrine: Mere touching does not mean stroking. There must be intent topenetrate. People vs. Gallo 315 SCRA 461 (September 29, 1999)Facts : In 1998, an RTC decision found Romeo Gallo guilty of the crime of qualified rape with the penalty of death. In 1999- Gallo filed a Motion to Re-Open the Case seeking modifica tion of the death se nt en ce to re cl us io nperpetua in line with the new court rulings on the attendant circumstances inSec 11 of RA 7659. According to People vs. Garcia: the additional attendantci rcum st an ce s introduc ed in RA 765 9 shou ld be consider ed as special qualifying circumstances distinctly applicable to the crime of rape and if notp l e a d e d a s s u c h , c o u l d o n l y b e a p p r e c i a t e d a s g e n e r i c ag gr av at in g circumstances. The information filed against Gallo does not allege hisrelationship with the victim Marites Gallo (his daughter), thus it CANNOT beconsidered as a qualifying circumstance. Ruling : Judicial decisions applyingor interpreting the law or the constitution form part of the legal system of theland and so the doctrine forms part of the penal statutes and therefore maybe applied retroactively being favorable to the accused who is not a habitualcriminal, notwithstanding that final sentence has already been pronouncedagainst him. The doctrine of People vs. Garcia may be
retroactively appliedas it is favorable to him. The case is reopened and the judgment is modifiedfrom death to reclusion perpetua. Doctrine: Special qualifying circumstances have to be alleged in th e information for it to be appreciated. People vs. Berana 311 SCRA 664 (July 29, 1999)Facts: Early morning, 14 yr old Maria Elena Jarcia was awakened by h er b r o - i n - l a w , R a u l B e r a n a . H e p o i n t e d a “ b u n t o t p a g e ” ( l o n g w i t h s o m e protruding parts and with long and pointed tip) at her neck and warned her not to make any noise or else she will be killed. She was made to lie downand Berana raised her duster and removed her shorts and underwear. Hemas he d her bre ast s and lai d on top of her. He inse rte d hi s pe nis to h er vagina and she felt much pain. He kissed her and made several push andpu ll mo ve me nt s and then, Maria Elena felt something liquid in her organ.After this, Berana sat down and told Maria Elena not to tell anyone. He thendid it again. Accused claims he was seduced by Elena. Ruling: Physicalresistan ce need not be e stablish ed in r ape case s wh en in ti mi da ti on is exercised upon her and she submits herself against her will to the rapist’slust because of fear for life and personal safety. Relationship qualifies thecrime from reclusion perpetua to death under RA 7659. To effectivelyprosecute Berana for the crime of rape committed by a relative by affinitywithin the 3rd civil degree, it must be established that:1.he is lega lly marr ied to Elen a’s sister 2.Elena and Berana’s wife are full or halfbloodsiblingsProsecution established relationship by the testi mo ni es of El en a(saying that he knows Berana because he is the husband of my sister) andher mother (saying that he knows Berana because he is the husband of her daughter, Rosa Jarcia). It based its conviction on Berana’s letter addressingElena’s parents as “mama at papa” and his use of the phrase “any inyongmanugang, Raul”. Since relationship qualifies the crime of rape, there mustbe clearer proof of relationship and in this case, it was not adequatelysubstantiated. Evidence presented is not sufficient to dispel doubts about thetr ue rel at ion shi p. Alt hou gh he claims that Elena initiate d th e ac t, he n ever mentioned this on his letters and instead, unceasingly asks for forgiveness,admitting categorically the offense charged. Doctrine: Relationship must be proven for it to be appreciated as a specialqualifying circumstance. Notes: The letters may show remorse for a completely different thing (like“I’m sorry I gave in to the seduction”) and not an apology for
rape REPUBLIC ACT No. 9262 (Anti VAWC) AN ACT DEFINING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN,P R O V I D I N G F O R P R O T E C T I V E M E A S U R E S F O R V I C T I M S , PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFORE, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSESWhat constitutes violence against women and children ? 1. causing physical harm 2. threatening to cause physical harm 3. attempting to cause physical harm 4. placing them in fear of imminent physical harm 5. attempting to compel or compelling them to engage in conductwhich they have a right to desist from or desist from conductwhich they have a right to engage in or attempting to restrict or restric tin g thei r free dom of move ment or conduct by force or threat of force or other harm or threat of physical or other harm or intimidation directed against the woman or child which includes: a. threatening to d e p r i v e o r a c t u a l l y d e p r i v i n g t h e m o f custody to his/her family b. depriving or threatening to deprive them of financialsupport or deliberately providing insufficient financialsupport c. depriving or threatening to deprive them of a legal right d. preventing the woman in en ga gi ng in an y le gi ti ma te profession, etc or controlling
the victim’s own money or properties, or solely controlling the conjugal or commonmoney or properties 6. inflicting or threatening to inflict physical harm on oneself for thepurposes of controlling the woman 7. causing or attempting to cause them to engage in any sexualactivity which does not constitute rape , by force or threat of force,phys ica l har m, or th rou gh intimidation directed at them or her/hisimmediate family 8. engaging in p u r po s e fu l , k no w i ng , o r r ec k le s s c on d u ct , p e r s o n a l l y o r t h r o u g h a n o t h e r , t h a t a l a r m s o r c a u s e s substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or child. This includes: a. stalking them in public or private places b. peering in the window or lingering outside the residence c. entering or remaining in their dwelling or on their property against her/his will d. destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to animals or pets of the woman or her child e. engaging in any form of harassment or violence 9. causing m e n t a l o r e m o t i o n a l a n g u i s h , p u b l i c r i d i c u l e o r h u m i l i a t i o n t o t h e m , i n c l u d i n g r e p e a t e d v e r b a l a b u s e a n d emotion al abuse, and denial of financial support or custody of minor children of access to the woman’s child/childrenWhat relationships are included ? 1. married relationship 2.
dating relationship – the parties live as husband and wife without thebenefit of marriage OR are romantically involved over time and on acontinuing basis during the course of the relationship. A ca su al acquaintance or ordinary socialization between two individuals in abusiness or social context is NOT a dating relationship 3. sexual relations – single sexual act which may or may not result inthe bearing of a common childWhat is a protection order ?It is an order issued for the purpose of preventing further acts of violenceagainst a woman or her child and granting other necessary relief . Th erelief granted under a protection order serve the purpose of safeguardingthe victim from further harm, minimizing any disruption in the victim’sdaily life, and facilitating the opportunity and ability of the victim toindependently regain control of her life.Who can file a petition for a protection order? 1. the offended party 2. parents or guardian of the offended party 3. ascendants, descendants or collateral relatives within the 4 th civil degree of consanguinity or affinity 4. officers or social workers of the DSWD or social workers of LGUs 5. police officers , preferably those in charge of women and children’sdesks 6.Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad 7. lawyer, counselor, therapist or healthcare provider o f t h e petitioner 8. at least 2 concerned responsible citizens o f t h e c i t y o r municipality w h o h a s p e r s o n a l k n o w l e d g e of the offensecommitted
Where can you file for a protection order?RTC, MTC, MCTC with territorial jurisdiction or in a family court if available inthe area.Note: Th e pr ot ec ti on order takes the shape of a penalty and violates th econstitutional right of presumption of innocence. It presumes the perpetrator is guilty even before he is heard OLIVAREZ VS CA FACTS: Isidro Olivares was charged with violation of RA 7610 for touching the breast and kissing the lips of Cristina Elitiong, a 16-year old high school student employed by the former in making sampaguita garlands during weekends. The trial court found him guilty; affirmed by the CA. Petitioner now alleges that his right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him was violated for failure to allege in the information the essential elements of the offense for which he is being charged. Issue: WON Olivares can be charged with violation of RA 7610. Held: Yes. The elements of sexual abuse under Section 5, Article III of R.A. 7610 are as follows:
1. The accused or lascivious conduct.
commits
the
act
of
sexual
2. The said act is performed with a child prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse. 3. age.
intercourse exploited
in
The child, whether male or female, is below 18 years of
The first element obtains in this case. It was established beyond reasonable doubt that petitioner kissed Cristina and touched her breasts with lewd designs as inferred from the nature of the acts themselves and the environmental circumstances. The second element, i.e., that the act is performed with a child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse, is likewise present. Thus, a child is deemed subjected to other sexual abuse when the child indulges in lascivious conduct under the coercion or influence of any adult. In this case, Cristina was sexually abused because she was coerced or intimidated by petitioner to indulge in a lascivious conduct. Furthermore, it is inconsequential that the sexual abuse
occurred only once. As expressly provided in Section 3 (b) of R.A. 7610, the abuse may be habitual or not. It must be observed that Article III of R.A. 7610 is captioned as “Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse” because Congress really intended to cover a situation where the minor may have been coerced or intimidated into lascivious conduct, not necessarily for money or profit. The law covers not only child prostitution but also other forms of sexual abuse. As to the contention that the minority of Cristina was not properly alleged in the information, the SC ruled that: Petitioner was furnished a copy of the Complaint which was mentioned in the information, hence he was adequately informed of the age of the complainant. G.R. No. 147913 January 31, 2007 CLEMENT JOHN FERDINAND M. NAVARRETE, Petitioner,vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.This petition for review on certiorari 1 assails the decision 2 and resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA)which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to convict petitioner of acts of lasciviousness.BBB, five years old, went to petitioner¶s house to watch television, which was something she oftendid. 9 BBB testified that it was on this occasion that petitioner sexually abused her, "placed his penis[in her] vagina" twice, poked her vagina with a "stick with cotton" 11 and boxed her on the right side of her eye. 12 Then, petitioner brought her to the comfort room and pointed a knife to her throat. 13 Afterwards, she and petitioner watched a pornographic movie 14 together. 15 AAA, BBB¶s mother, testified that around 10:30 p.m., BBB went out of petitioner¶s house. Whiletrembling and crying, BBB embraced her mother and told her that "
KuyaFerdiesinundot ako. " 16 Petitioner denied the accusation against him and claimed that AAA merely concocted the chargeagainst him. He alleged that she had ill feelings against the Navarrete¶s due to the separation of her (AAA¶s) son from the Philippine Postal Corporation and their refusal to allow her to place a "jumper"on their electrical connection. 18 The RTC absolved petitioner of statutory rape however, it convicted petitioner for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) in relation to Section 5(b), ArticleIII of RA 7610.On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC.Issue: WON petitioner cannot be convicted of acts of lasciviousness, a crime not specifically allegedin the information.Decision: Petitioner was found guilty of violating Article 336 of the RPC in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610:Sec. 5.Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. ² Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicateor group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited inprostitution and other sexual abuse.The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed uponthe following:xxxxxxxxx(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited inprostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse: Provided, That when the victim is under twelve (12)years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, [or] the [RPC], for rape or lascivious conduct as the case
G.R. No. 147913 January 31, 2007 CLEMENT JOHN FERDINAND M. NAVARRETE, Petitioner,vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.This petition for review on certiorari 1 assails the decision 2 and resolution 3 of the Court of Appeals (CA)which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) to convict petitioner of acts of lasciviousness.BBB, five years old, went to petitioner¶s house to watch television, which was something she oftendid.
9 BBB testified that it was on this occasion that petitioner sexually abused her, "placed his penis[in her] vagina" twice, poked her vagina with a "stick with cotton" 11 and boxed her on the right side of her eye. 12 Then, petitioner brought her to the comfort room and pointed a knife to her throat. 13 Afterwards, she and petitioner watched a pornographic movie 14 together. 15 AAA, BBB¶s mother, testified that around 10:30 p.m., BBB went out of petitioner¶s house. Whiletrembling and crying, BBB embraced her mother and told her that " KuyaFerdiesinundot ako. " 16 Petitioner denied the accusation against him and claimed that AAA merely concocted the chargeagainst him. He alleged that she had ill feelings against the Navarrete¶s due to the separation of her (AAA¶s) son from the Philippine Postal Corporation and their refusal to allow her to place a "jumper"on their electrical connection. 18 The RTC absolved petitioner of statutory rape however, it convicted petitioner for acts of lasciviousness under Article 336 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) in relation to Section 5(b), ArticleIII of RA 7610.On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC. Issue: WON petitioner cannot be convicted of acts of lasciviousness, a crime not specifically allegedin the information. Decision: Petitioner was found guilty of violating Article 336 of the RPC in relation to Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610:Sec. 5.Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. ² Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicateor group, indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children exploited inprostitution and other sexual abuse.The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed uponthe following:xxxxxxxxx(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct with a child exploited inprostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse: Provided, That when the
victim is under twelve (12)years of age, the perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, [or] the [RPC], for rape or lascivious conduct as the case may be. Provided..
G.R. No. 186469 Ju%* 1', 2012 THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee, vs. JOER ATIAS y DELA F"ENTE, /ccused-appellant. R9=10@T1N PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: This resolves the appeal from the /ugust !$, #<<4 3ecision 1 of the Court of /ppeals (C/* in C/-B.R. CR-.C. No. <#54! filed by appellant Aover %atias y 3ela uente &hich affirmed his conviction for the crime of ErapeE under =ec. 6 (b*, /rticle of Republic /ct (R/* No. 5)!<. 2 T* F$3u$l A%*3*&*%/ /ppellant Aover %atias y 3ela uente and private complainant /// 3 &ere neighbors at =to. NiFo =t., arangay =an /ntonio, Guezon City. n the evening of Aune ), #<uently, appellant &as charged &ith rape under /rticle #))-/ of the Revised Penal Code (RPC* in an /mended nformation 4 dated Auly !), #<
n its assailed 3ecision, 6 the C/ affirmed the RTC 3ecision in toto, finding no compelling reason to depart from its findings and conclusions. The appellate court held that if the RTC found ///7s testimony to be credible, logical and consistent, then it should be given great respect, as the RTC had the ability to observe firsthand the demeanor and deportment of the &itnesses on stand. %oreover, for appellant7s alibi to prosper, he should be able to sho& that he &as a great distance a&ay from the place of the incident and that it &as impossible for him to be there or &ithin its immediate vicinity at the time of the commission of the crime. The C/ ruled that it is highly unli8ely for a young girl to fabricate a story that &ould destroy her reputation and her familyKs life and endure the discomforts of trial. I//u* B*5o* T* !ou The sole issue to be resolved in this appeal is &hether the C/ committed reversible error in affirming in toto the 3ecision of the RTC, &hich convicted appellant of ErapeE under =ec. 6 (b*, /rticle of R/ 5)!<. T* !ou/ Rul% =ec. 6 (b*, /rticle of R/ 5)!< provides+ =ection 6. Child Prostitution and 1ther =e'ual /buse. - Children, &hether male or female, &ho for money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in se'ual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to be children e'ploited in prostitution and other se'ual abuse. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the follo&ing+ (a* ' ' ' (b* Those &ho commit the act of se'ual intercourse or lascivious conduct &ith a child e'ploited in prostitution or subect to other se'ual abuse; ''' 7 n the case of People v. Pan#ilinan,8 &hich affirmed the doctrines enunciated in the cases of People v. 'a%ili#9and People v. Abay,10 the Court e'plained+ @nder =ection 6 (b*, /rticle of R/ 5)!< in relation to R/ 4"6", if the victim of se'ual abuse is belo& !# years of age, the offender should not be prosecuted for se'ual abuse but for statutory rape under /rticle #))-/(!*(d* of the Revised Penal Code and penalized &ith reclusion perpetua. 1n the other hand, if the victim is !# years or older, the offender should be charged &ith either se'ual abuse under =ection 6(b* of R/ 5)!< or rape under /rticle #))-/ (e'cept paragraph !IdJ* of the Revised Penal Code. o&ever, the offender cannot be accused of both crimes for the same act because his right against double eopardy &ill be preudiced. / person cannot be subected t&ice to criminal liability for a single criminal act. 0i8e&ise, rape cannot be comple'ed &ith a violation of =ection 6(b* of R/ 5)!<. @nder =ection ?4 of the Revised Penal Code (on comple' crimes*, a felony under the Revised Penal Code (such as rape* cannot be comple'ed &ith an offense penalized by a special la&. n this case, the RTC, as affirmed by the C/, convicted appellant for ErapeE under =ec. 6 (b*, /rticle of R/ 5)!< and sentenced him to reclusion perpetua, upon a finding that /// &as a minor belo& !# years old at the time of the commission of the offense on Aune ), #<
la&s differ+ the penalty for se$ual abuse under =ec. 6 (b*, /rticle of R/ 5)!< is reclusion temporal medium to reclusion perpetua, &hile rape under /rticle #))-/ of the RPC is penalized &ithreclusion perpetua. 1n this score, it is &orth noting that in its /pril !$, #<<5 3ecision, 12 the RTC concluded that /// &as the Evictim of se'ual abuse labeled 7rape7,E 13 considering the established fact that there &as se'ual intercourse bet&een him and ///. Thus, appellant7s conviction &as clearly under =ec. 6 (b*, /rticle of R/ 5)!< or se$ual abuse and not for rape under /rticle #))-/ of the RPC . n the light of all the foregoing, there is a need to modify the penalty imposed upon appellant.()&p%i( ollo&ing the pronouncement in the case of "alto v. People14 for se$ual abuse, and in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the Court finds it appropriate to impose the penalty of reclusion temporal in its ma'imum period, &hich has the range of !5 years, ? months and ! day to #< years. /pplying the ndeterminate =entence 0a&, 15 therefore, the ma'imum term of the indeterminate penalty shall be that &hich could be properly imposed under the la&, &hich is !5 years, ? months and ! day to #< years of reclusion temporal, &hile the minimum term shall be &ithin the range ne't lo&er in degree, &hich is prision mayorin its medium period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period, or a period ranging from 4 years and ! day to !? years and 4 months. =imilarly, the a&ard of moral damages is increased from P"<,<<<.<< to P6<,<<<.<<, pursuant to the "alto case. 7HEREFORE, the appeal is DISISSED. The /ugust !$, #<<4 3ecision of the Court of /ppeals in C/-B.R. CR-.C. No. <#54! finding appellant Aover %atias y 3ela uente guilty beyond reasonable doubt of se$ual abuse under =ection 6 (b*, /rticle of Republic /ct No. 5)!< is AFFIRED &ith ODIFI!ATIONS as to penalty and the amount of damages a&arded. /ppellant is sentenced to suffer the penalty of !# years of prision mayoras minimum to !5 years, ? months and ! day of reclusion temporal as ma'imum, and ordered to pay the private complainant the amount of P6<,<<<.<< as moral damages. The rest of the assailed 3ecision stands. People vs. Ladjaalam G.R. Nos. 136149-51. September 19, 2000 Appellee: People of the Philippines Appellant: Walpan Ladjaalam alias “Warpan” Ponente: J. Panganiban FACTS: Four Informations were filed against appellant Walpan Ladjaalam in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Zamboanga City (Branch 16), three of which he was found guilty, to wit: 1) maintaining a drug den in violation of Section 15-A, Article III, of Republic Act No. 6425 (Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972); 2) illegal possession of firearm and ammunition in violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 as amended by Republic Act. No. 8294; and 3) direct assault with multiple attempted homicide. The following information was provided by the prosecution: 1) In the afternoon of September 24, 1997, more than thirty (30) policemen proceeded to the house of appellant and his wife to serve the search warrant when they were met by a volley of gunfire coming from the second floor of the said house. They saw that it was the
appellant who fired the M14 rifle towards them. 2) After gaining entrance, two of the police officers proceeded to the second floor where they earlier saw appellant firing the rifle. As he noticed their presence, the appellant jumped from the window to the roof of a neighboring house. He was subsequently arrested at the back of his house after a brief chase. 3) Several firearms and ammunitions were recovered from appellant’s house. Also found was a pencil case with fifty (50) folded aluminum foils inside, each containing methamphetamine hydrochloride. 4) A paraffin test was conducted and the casts taken both hands of the appellant yielded positive for gunpowder nitrates. 5) Records show that appellant had not filed any application for license to possess firearm and ammunition, nor has he been given authority to carry firearms. ISSUE: Whether or not such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. HELD: No. Section 1 of RA 8294 substantially provides that any person who shall unlawfully possess any firearm or ammunition shall be penalized, “unless no other crime was committed”. Furthermore, if homicide or murder is committed with the use of an unlicensed firearm, such use of an unlicensed firearm shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. Since the crime committed was direct assault and not homicide or murder, illegal possession of firearms cannot be deemed an aggravating circumstance. Criminal Law; Special Penal Laws: CELINO v. CA, G.R. No. 170562 June 29, 2007 Brief Facts: Two separate Information were filed against the petitioner, Angel Celino: one for violation of the Comelec gun ban; the other, for Illegal Possession of Firearm under R.A. 8294. After pleading not guilty to the former, he filed a Motion to Quash on the latter contending that he “cannot be prosecuted for illegal possession of firearms x x x if he was also charged of having committed another crime of [ sic] violating the Comelec gun ban under the same set of facts xx x.” Issue:
Whether the mere filing of an information for gun ban violation against him necessarily bars his prosecution for illegal possession of firearm because of the provision of the law
