Emilia R. Hernandez v. Atty. Venancio Padilla A.C. No. 9387, 9387, June 20, 2012, J. Sereno, Second Division Division
FACTS: Complainant Emilia Hernandez filed a disbarment case against her lawyer, Atty. Venacio Padilla for his alleged negligence in the handling of her case. She alleged that she engaged the services of Atty. Padilla on appeal on an ejectment case, and the latter filed a memorandum on appeal, instead of a notice of appeal, causing their [with her husband] appeal to be dismissed. No MR was also filed. She also alleges that respondent never informed them of the adverse decision on their case. Respondent explained that he was not the lawyer of the complainant and he only met her husband. According to him, complainant’s husband asked and pleaded him to prepare a memorandum on appeal because the appeal period would lapse within two or three days. Thus, he honestly believed that a memorandum on appeal is the required pleading. According to respondent, it is no more than a client needing a legal document and had it prepared by a lawyer for a fee, thus no client-lawyer relationship was established. In fact, as proof thereof, thereof, thereafter, the complainant’s husband never contacted him.
ISSUES: WON respondent is liable under the Code of Professional Responsibility. Responsibility.
RULING: Yes. A perusal of the Memorandum of Appeal filed in the appellate court revealed that respondent had signed as counsel for the defendant-appellants therein, including complainant and her husband. As to the alleged non-existence of lawyer-client relationship; acceptance of money from a client establishes an attorney-client relationship and gives rise to the d uty d uty of fidelity to the client’s cause. Once a lawyer agrees to handle a case, it is that lawyer’s duty to serve the client with competence and diligence. Respondent has failed to fulfill this duty. Moreover, regardless of the particular pleading his client may have believed to be necessary, it was respondent’s duty to know the proper pleading to be filed in appeals from RTC decisions Respondent as a litigator was expected to know the procedure. Canon 5 of the Code, carries with it the obligation to be well-informed of the existing laws and to keep abreast with legal developments, recent enactments and jurisprudence. It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legal principles. Moreover, under Rule 18.02 of the Code, a lawyer shall not handle any legal matter without adequate preparation. Thus, the supposed lack of time to acquaint himself with the facts of the case does not excuse his negligence. Respondent also violated Rule 18.04, which provides that a lawyer shall keep the client informed of the st atus atus of his case and shall respond within a reasonable time to the client’s request for information.
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If it were true that all attempts to contact his client proved futile, the least respondent could have done was to inform the CA by filing a Notice of Withdrawal of Appearance as counsel. He could have thus explained why he was no longer the counsel of complainant and her husband in the case and informed the court that he could no longer contact them. His failure to take this measure proves his negligence. Lawyers should not neglect legal matters entrusted to them [Rule 18.03], otherwise their negligence in fulfilling their duty would render them liable for disciplinary action. SUSPENDED 6 months and sternly warned.
[A.C. No. 5098 : April 11, 2012] JOSEFINA M. ANIÑON, COMPLAINANT, VS. ATTY. CLEMENCIO SABITSANA, JR., RESPONDENT. Facts: Josefina M. Aniñon (complainant ) had previously engaged the legal services of Atty. Sabitsana in the preparation and execution in her favor of a Deed of Sale over a parcel of land owned by her late common-law husband, Brigido Caneja, Jr. Atty. Sabitsana allegedly violated her confidence when he subsequently filed a civil case against her for the annulment of the Deed of Sale in behalf of Zenaida L. Cañete, the legal wife of Brigido Caneja, Jr. The complainant accused Atty. Sabitsana of using the confidential information he obtained from her in filing the civil case. Atty. Sabitsana admitted having advised the complainant in the preparation and execution of the Deed of Sale. However, he denied having received any confidential information. Atty. Sabitsana asserted that the present disbarment complaint was instigated by one Atty. Gabino Velasquez, Jr., the notary of the disbarment complaint who lost a court case against him (Atty. Sabitsana) and had instigated the complaint for this reason. In a resolution dated February 27, 2004, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve the Report and Recommendation of the IBP Commissioner after finding it to be fully supported supported by the evidence on record and Respondent was suspended from the practice of law for a period of one year. Atty. Sabitsana moved to reconsider the above resolution, but the IBP Board of Governors denied his motion.
The Issue Whether Atty. Sabitsana is guilty of misconduct for representing conflicting interests. The Court’s Ruling
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The SC agreed with the findings and recommendations of the IBP Commissioner and the IBP Board of Governors. The SC rules that the relationship between a lawyer and his/her client should ideally be imbued with the highest level of trust and confidence. This is the standard of confidentiality that must prevail to promote a full disclosure of the client’s most confidential information to his/her lawyer for an unhampered exchange of information between them. Needless to state, a client can only entrust confidential information to his/her lawyer based on an expectation from the lawyer of utmost secrecy and discretion; the lawyer, for his part, is duty-bound to observe candor, fairness and loyalty in all dealings and transactions with the client. Part of the lawyer’s duty in this regard is to avoid representing conflicting interests, a matter covered by Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility Jurisprudence has provided three tests in determining whether a violation of the above rule is present in a given case. One test is whether a lawyer is duty-bound to fight for an issue or claim in behalf of one client and, at the same time, to oppose that claim for the other client. Thus, if a lawyer’s argument for one client has to be opposed by that same lawyer in arguing for the other client, there is a violation of the rule. Another test of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyer’s duty of undivided
fidelity and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or doubledealing in the performance of that duty. Still another test is whether the lawyer would be called upon in the new relation to use against a former client any confidential information acquired through their connection or previous employment
On the basis of the attendant facts of the case, substantial evidence proved Atty. Sabitsanas violation of the above rule, as established by the following circumstances on record:
One, his legal services were initially engaged by the complainant to protect her interest over a certain property. The records show that upon the legal advice of Atty. Sabitsana, the Deed of Sale over the property was prepared and executed in the complainants favor.
Two, Atty. Sabitsana met with Zenaida Caete to discuss the latters legal interest over the property subject of the Deed of Sale. At that point, Atty. Sabitsana already had knowledge that Zenaida Caetes interest clashed with the complainants interests.
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Three, despite the knowledge of the clashing interests between his two clients, Atty. Sabitsana accepted the engagement from Zenaida Caete.
Four, Atty. Sabitsanas actual knowledge of the conflicting interests between his two clients was demonstrated by his own actions: first , he filed a case against the complainant in behalf of Zenaida Caete; second , he impleaded the complainant as the defendant in the case; and third , the case he filed was for the annulment of the Deed of Sale that he had previously prepared and executed for the complainant. By his acts, not only did Atty. Sabitsana agree to represent one client against another client in the same action; action; he also accepted a new engagement engagement that entailed him to contend and oppose the interest of his other client in a property in which his legal services had been previously retained.
WHEREFORE , premises considered, the Court resolves to ADOPT the findings and recommendations of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines. Atty. Clemencio C. Sabitsana, Jr. is found GUILTY of misconduct for representing conflicting interests in violation of Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is hereby SUSPENDED for one (1) year from the practice of law.
Engr. Gilbert Tumbokon vs. Pefianco [A.C. No. 6116, August 2012] Facts: Engr. Tumbokon referred a case to respondent attorney. In turn, respondent undertook to give the former 20% commission, later later reduced to 10% of the attorney’s fees the latter would receive in representing the Sps. Yap in an action for partition. Their agreement was reflected in a letter dated August 11, 1995.
Thereafter, respondent failed to pay the agreed commission notwithstanding receipt of attorney's fees amounting to 17% of the total estate or about P40 million. Engr. Tumbokon was informed through a letter dated July 16, 1997 that Sps. Yap assumed to pay the same after respondent had agreed to reduce his attorney's fees from from 25% to 17%. He then demanded the payment of of his commission which respondent ignored.
As a result, Engr. Tumbokon filed this disbarment case. Complainant further lleged that respondent has not lived up to the high moral standards required of his profession for having abandoned his legal wife, Milagros Hilado, with whom
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he has two children, and cohabited with Mae Flor Galido, with whom he has four children. He also accused respondent of engaging in money-lending business5 without the required authorization from the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas.
In his defense, respondent explained that he accepted Sps. Yap's case on a 25% contingent fee basis, and advanced all the expenses. He disputed the August 11, 1995 letter for being a forgery and claimed that Sps. Yap assumed to pay complainant's commission which he clarified in his July 16, 1997 letter. He, thus, prayed for the dismissal of the complaint
Issue: Whether or not respondent violated the CPR.
Ruling: Yes.
The practice of law is considered a privilege bestowed by the State on those who show that they possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications for the profession. As such, lawyers are expected to maintain at all times a high standard of legal proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing, and must perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms embodied in the Code.11Lawyers may, thus, be disciplined for any conduct that is wanting of the above standards whether in their professional or in their private capacity.
In the present case, respondent's defense that forgery had attended the execution of the August 11, 1995 letter was belied by his July 16, 1997 letter admitting to have undertaken the payment of complainant's commission but passing on the responsibility to Sps. Yap. Clearly, respondent has violated Rule 9.02, Canon 9 of the Code which prohibits a lawyer from dividing or stipulating to divide a fee for legal services with persons not licensed to practice law, except in certain cases which do not obtain in the case at bar.
Furthermore, respondent did not deny the accusation that he abandoned his legal family to cohabit with his mistress with whom he begot four children notwithstanding that his moral character as well as his moral fitness to be retained in the Roll of Attorneys has been assailed. The settled rule is that betrayal of the marital vow of fidelity or sexual relations outside marriage is considered disgraceful and immoral as it manifests deliberate disregard of the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws.13 Consequently, We find no reason to disturb the IBP's
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finding that respondent violated the Lawyer's Oath14 and Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code which proscribes a lawyer from engaging in “unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.”
However, We find the charge of engaging in illegal money lending not to have been sufficiently established. A “business” requires some form of investment and a sufficient number of customers to whom its output can be sold at profit on a consistent basis. The lending of money to a single person without showing that such service is made available to other persons on a consistent basis cannot be construed asindicia that respondent is engaged in the business of lending.
Nonetheless, while We rule that respondent should be sanctioned for his actions, We are minded that the power to disbar should be exercised with great caution and only in clear cases of misconduct that seriously affect the standing and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and as member of the bar, or the misconduct borders on the criminal, or committed under scandalous circumstance, which do not obtain here. Considering the circumstances of the case, We deem it appropriate that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year as recommended.
Fidela Bengco and Teresita Bengco, Complainants, v. Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo, Respondent A.C. No. 6368, 13 June 2012
FACTS: Fidela Bengco and Teresita Bengco filed a complaint for disbarment against Atty. Pablo S. Bernardo for deceit, malpractice, conduct unbecoming a member of the Bar, and violation of duties and oath as a lawyer. From 15 April 1997 to 22 July 1997, the respondent – with the connivance of Andres Magat – willfully and illegally committed fraudulent act with intent to defraud against the complainants by using false pretenses and deceitful words to the effect that he would expedite the titling of land belonging to the Miranda Family of Tagaytay City, who are the acquaintance of the complainants. It started when the respondent convinced the complainants to finance and deliver to him PhP 495,000.00 as advanced money to expedite the titling of the subject land. He further committed misrepresentation by presenting himself as the lawyer of William Gatchalian, the prospective buyer of the land. He also led complaints to believe that he has contracts at NAMRIA, DENR, CENRO and the Register of Deeds which representation he well knew were false, fraudulent and
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were only made to induce the complainants to give and deliver the said amount. Upon receipt of the money, he did not comply with his obligation to expedite the titling of the land but instead use the money for personal use. The complainants demanded the return of the money to no avail.
ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent violated the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility (CPR)?
HELD: The Supreme Court held that the respondent committed the acts complained of. He, himself, admitted in his answer that his legal services were hired by the complainants through Magat regarding the purported titling of land supposedly purchase. He used his position as a lawyer in order to deceive the complainants into believing that he can expedite the titling of the subject properties. He never denied that he did not benefit from the money given by the complainants in the amount of PhP 495,000.00. The Supreme Court finds the respondent in violation of the Rule 2.03, Canon 2 and Rule 3.01, Canon 3 of the CPR. The respondent was suspended from practice of law for one year and return the amount of PhP 200,000.00 to Fidela Bengco and Teresita Bengco with 10 days upon receipt of decision. The respondent is required to submit to the Supreme Court proof of compliance.
OFFICE OF THE COURT ADMINISTRATOR vs. JUDGE CADER P. INDAR FACTS: This case originated from reports by the Local Civil Registrars of Manila and Quezon City to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) that they have received an alarming number of decisions, resolutions, and orders on annulment of marriage cases allegedly issued by Judge Indar. The OCA conducted a judicial audit in RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15, where the Audit Team found that the list of cases submitted by the Local Civil Registrars of Manila and Quezon City do not appear in the records of cases received, pending or disposed by RTCShariff Aguak, Branch 15. Likewise, the annulment decisions did not exist in the records of RTC-Cotabato, Branch 14. In a Resolution dated 4 May 2010, the Court En Banc (1) docketed this administrative matter as A.M. No. RTJ-10-2232,4 and (2) preventively suspended Judge Indar pending investigation of this case. Justice Gacutan also sent a letter dated 23 July 2010 addressed to Atty. Umaima L. Silongan (Atty. Silongan), Acting Clerk of Court of RTC-Cotabato, directing her to serve the notice of hearing scheduled on 10 and 11 August 2010 to Judge Indar and to report the steps taken to effect service of the same. Atty. Silongan submitted a Return of Service,
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informing that the notices sent to Judge Indar had remained unserved, as the latter left Cotabato City in April 2010 and his location since then was unknown. This administrative matter was re-raffled to Justice Abraham B. Borreta (Justice Borreta). Justice Borreta set the hearing on 27 to 29 June 2011. The registered mails addressed to Judge Indar were returned for the following reasons: (1) addressee out of town, move to another place and (2) addressee unknown.
ISSUE: whether Judge Indar is guilty of gross misconduct and dishonesty. RULING: YES. It is settled that technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied to administrative proceedings. It is enough that the party is given the chance to be heard before the case against him is decided. In this case, Judge Indar was given ample opportunity to controvert the charges against him. While there is no proof that Judge Indar personally received the notices of hearing issued by the Investigating Justices, the first two notices of hearing were received by one Mustapha Randang of the Clerk of Court, RTC-Cotabato, while one of the notices was received by a certain Mrs. Asok, who were presumably authorized and capable to receive notices on behalf of Judge Indar. Further, Judge Indar cannot feign ignorance of the administrative investigation against him because aside from the fact that the Courts Resolution suspending him was mailed to him, his preventive suspension was reported in major national newspapers. Thus, there was due notice on Judge Indar of the charges against him. However, Judge Indar still failed to file his explanation and appear at the scheduled hearings. Public office is a public trust.20 This constitutional principle requires a judge, like any other public servant and more so because of his exalted position in the Judiciary, to exhibit at all times the highest degree of honesty and integrity.21 Judge Indar miserably failed to live up to these exacting standards. In this case, Judge Indar issued decisions on numerous annulment of marriage cases which do not exist in the records of RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15 or the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Cotabato City. There is nothing to show that (1) proceedings were had on the questioned cases; (2) docket fees had been paid; (3) the parties were notified of a scheduled hearing as calendared; (4) hearings had been conducted; or (5) the cases were submitted for decision. As found by the Audit Team, the list of case titles submitted by the Local Civil Registrars of Manila and Quezon City are not found in the list of cases filed, pending or decided in RTC, Branch 15, Shariff Aguak, nor in the records of the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Cotabato City. In other words, Judge Indar, who had sworn to faithfully uphold the law, issued decisions on the questioned annulment of marriage cases, without any showing that such cases underwent trial and complied with the statutory and jurisprudential requisites for voiding marriages. Such act undoubtedly constitutes gross misconduct. In this case, Judge Indar issued Decisions on numerous annulment of marriage cases when in fact he did not conduct any judicial proceedings on the 8
cases. Not even the filing of the petitions occurred. Judge Indar made it appear in his Decisions that the annulment cases complied with the stringent requirements of the Rules of Court and the strict statutory and jurisprudential conditions for voiding marriages, when quite the contrary is true, violating Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct which mandates that a judge perform official duties honestly. The Court notes that this is not Judge Indar’s first offense. In A.M. No. RTJ-051953,25 the Court imposed on him a fine of P10,000 for violating Section 5, Rule 58 of the Rules of Court, when he issued a preliminary injunction without any hearing and prior notice to the parties. In another case, A.M. No. RTJ-072069,26 the Court found him guilty of gross misconduct for committing violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct and accordingly fined him P25,000. Indisputably, Judge Indars gross misconduct and dishonesty likewise constitute a breach of the following Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility: CANON 1 - A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.
Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful act. CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION. In addition, Judge Indar’s dishonest act of issuing decisions making it appear that the annulment cases underwent trial and complied with the Rules of Court, laws, and established jurisprudence violates the lawyers oath to do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court. Such violation is also a ground for disbarment. Considering that Judge Indar is guilty of gross misconduct and dishonesty, constituting violations of the Lawyers Oath, and Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Judge Indar deserves disbarment. WHEREFORE , the Court finds respondent Judge Cader P. Indar, guilty of Gross Misconduct and Dishonesty for which he is DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all benefits due him, except accrued leave benefits, if any, with prejudice to re-employment in any branch of the government, including government-owned or controlled corporations. Judge Indar is likewise DISBARRED for violation of Canons 1 and 7 and Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and his name ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys.
STATE PROSECUTORS II JOSEF ALBERT T. COMILANG and MA. VICTORIA SUEGALAGMAN, - versus - JUDG E MEDE L ARN ALDO B. BEL EN, REG IONA L TRIA L COURT, BRANCH 36, CALAMBA CITY. EN BANC, A.M. No. RTJ-10-2216 , June 26, 2012
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Facts: State Prosecutor Comilang, by virtue of Office of the Regional State Prosecutor (ORSP) Order was designated to assist the Office of the City Prosecutor of Calamba City in the prosecution of cases. He appeared before Judge Belen of the RTC of Calamba City manifesting his inability to appear on Thursdays because of his inquest duties in the Provincial Prosecutors Office of Laguna. He moved that all cases scheduled for hearing on February 24, 2005 before Judge Belen be deferred because he was set to appear for preliminary investigation in the Provincial Prosecutor's Office on the same day.
Instead of granting the motion, Judge Belen issued his order requiring him to (1) explain why he did not inform the court of his previously-scheduled preliminary investigation and (2) pay a fine of P500.00 for the cancellation of all the scheduled hearings. In response, State Prosecutor Comilang filed his Explanation with Motion for Reconsideration, followed by a Reiterative Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration with Early Resolution . Judge Belen directed him to explain why he should not be cited for contempt and to pay the postponement. In his comment, State Prosecutor Comilang explained that the contents of his Reiterative Supplemental Motion were based on his personal belief made in good faith and with grain of truth. Nonetheless, Judge Belen rendered a Decision finding State Prosecutor Comilang liable for contempt of court and for payment of penalty. His motion for reconsideration having been denied, he filed a motion to post a supersedeas bond to stay the execution of the said Decision, which Judge Belen granted.
State Prosecutor Comilang filed with the CA a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for TRO and/or writ of preliminary injunction assailing Judge Belens Order and Decision which was granted. Notwithstanding the TRO, Judge Belen issued an Order requiring State Prosecutor Comilang to explain his refusal to file the supersedeas bond and to appear to explain why he should not be cited indirect contempt of court. In his Compliance , State Prosecutor Comilang cited the CAs injunctive writ. He also manifested that he was waiving his appearance on the scheduled hearing for the indirect contempt charge against him. Nevertheless, Judge Belen issued an Order directing State Prosecutor Comilang to explain his defiance of the subpoena and why he should not be cited for indirect contempt. Judge Belen likewise ordered the Branch Clerk of Court to issue a subpoena for him to appear regarding his failure to comply with previously-issued subpoenas for the hearing on the non-filing of his supersedeas bond. State Prosecutor Comilang movedto quash the subpoenas , and for the inhibition of Judge Belen. Judge Belen denied the motion to quash subpoenas, held State Prosecutor Comilang guilty of indirect contempt of court for his failure to obey a duly served subpoena, and sentenced him to pay a fine and to suffer two days' imprisonment. He was also required to post a supersedeas bond.
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Aggrieved, State Prosecutor Comilang filed a complaint-affidavit before the OCA charging Judge Belen with manifest partiality and malice, evident bad faith, inexcusable abuse of authority, and gross ignorance of the law in issuing the show cause orders, subpoenas and contempt citations , in grave defiance to the injunctive writ issued by the CA.
In its Report, the OCA found Judge Belen to have violated Section 4, Rule 71 of the Rules of Court by failing to separately docket or consolidate with the principal case the indirect contempt charge against State Prosecutor Comilang. It also found Judge Belen to have blatantly violated the injunctive writ of the CA when he issued the orders requiring State Prosecutor Comilang to explain why he failed to post a supersedeas bond which, given the antecedents of his administrative cases, showed manifest bias and partiality tantamount to bad faith and grave abuse of authority. Judge Belen was likewise found to have violated the following provisions of the Code of Judicial Conduct: Canon 2 A JUDGE SHOULD AVOID IMPROPRIETY AND THE APPEARANCE OF IMPROPRIETY IN ALL ACTIVITIES. Rule 2.01 A judge should so behave at all times as to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary. Canon 3 A JUDGE SHOULD PERFORM OFFICIAL DUTIES HONESTLY, AND WITH IMPARTIALITY AND DILIGENCE ADJUDICATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES. Rule 3.01 A judge shall be faithful to the law and maintain professional competence.OCA recommended, inter alia, that Judge Belen be adjudged guilty of manifest bias and partiality, grave abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law and accordingly, be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of all benefits except accrued leave credits, if any, and with prejudice to reemployment in the government or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned and controlled corporations and government financial institutions.
Issue: Whether or not Judge Belen's actuations showed manifest partiality and bias, evident bad faith, grave abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law warranting his dismissal from service as RTC Judge of Branch 36, Calamba City.
Ruling: The Court concurs with the findings and recommendations of the OCA, but only in part. Indirect contempt proceedings may be initiated only in two ways: (1) motu proprio by the court through an order or any other formal charge requiring the respondent to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt; or (2) by a verified petition and upon compliance with the requirements for initiatory pleadings. In the second instance, the verified petition for contempt shall be docketed, heard and decided separately unless the court in its discretion orders the contempt charge, which arose out of or related to the principal action, to be consolidated with the main action for joint hearing and decision. In this case, the
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contempt charge was commenced not through a verified petition, but by Judge Belen motu proprio through the issuance of an order requiring State Prosecutor Comilang to show cause why he should not be cited for indirect contempt. As such, the requirements of the rules that the verified petition for contempt be docketed, heard and decided separately or consolidated with the principal action find no application. Consequently, Judge Belen was justified in not directing the contempt charge against State Prosecutor Comilang to be docketed separately or consolidated with the principal action.
Judge Belen blatantly violated the injunctive writ issued by the CA enjoining the implementation of his Order and Decision. In requiring State Prosecutor Comilang to explain his non-filing of a supersedeas bond, in issuing subpoenas to compel his attendance before court hearings relative to the contempt proceedings, and finally, in finding him guilty of indirect contempt for his noncompliance with the issued subpoenas , Judge Belen effectively defeated the status quo which the writ of preliminary injunction aimed to preserve. Judges are expected to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance with statutes and procedural laws. They must know the laws and apply them properly in good faith as judicial competence requires no less. Moreover, refusal to honor an injunctive order of a higher court constitutes contempt.
Our conception of good judges has been, and is, of men who have a mastery of the principles of law, who discharge their duties in accordance with law. Hence, with the foregoing disquisitions and Judge Belens previous infractions, which are all of serious nature and for which he had been severely warned, the Court therefore adopts the recommendation of the OCA to mete the ultimate penalty of dismissal against Judge Belen for grave abuse of authority and gross ignorance of the law.
* Sorry if this is kind of long. There are comparative cases discussed here, so best if we will include that. Mendoza vs Deciembre Facts: Before the Court is the Petition filed by Eugenia Mendoza (complainant) dated September 19, 2000, seeking the disbarment of Atty. Victor V. Deciembre (respondent) for his acts of fraudulently filling up blank postdated checks without her authority and using the same for filing unfounded criminal suits against her. Complainant, a mail sorter at the Central Post Office Manila, averred that: On October 13, 1998, she borrowed from Rodela Loans, Inc., through respondent, the amount of P20,000.00 payable in six months at 20% interest, secured by 12 blank checks, drawn against the Postal Bank. Although she was unable to faithfully pay her obligations
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on their due dates, she made remittances, however, to respondent's Metrobank account from November 11, 1998 to March 15, 1999 in the total sum of P12,910.00. Claiming that the amounts remitted were not enough to cover the penalties, interests and other charges, respondent warned complainant that he would deposit Postal Check No. 47253 filled up by him on March 30, 1999 in the amount of P16,000.00. Afraid that respondent might sue her in court, complainant made good said check and respondent was able to encash the same on March 30, 1999. Thereafter, complainant made subsequent payments to the Metrobank account of respondent from April 13, 1999 to October 15, 1999, thereby paying respondent the total sum of P35,690.00. Complainant further claimed that, later, respondent filled up two of the postal checks she issued in blank, Check Nos. 47261 and 47262 with the amount of P50,000.00 each and with the dates January 15, 2000 and January 20, 2000 respectively, which respondent claims was in exchange for the P100,000.00 cash that complainant received on November 15, 1999. Complainant insisted however that she never borrowed P100,000.00 from respondent and that it was unlikely that respondent would lend her, a mail sorter with a basic monthly salary of less than P6,000.00, such amount. Complainant also claimed that respondent victimized other employees of the Postal Office by filling up, without authorization, blank checks issued to him as condition for loans. In his Comment dated January 18, 2000, respondent averred that his dealings with complainant were done in his private capacity and not as a lawyer, and that when he filed a complaint for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. (B.P. Blg.) 22 against complainant, he was only vindicating his rights as a private citizen. He alleged further that: it was complainant who deliberately deceived him by not honoring her commitment to their November 15, 1999 transaction involving P100,000.00 and covered by two checks which bounced for the reason account closed; the October 13, 1999 transaction was a separate and distinct transaction; complainant filed the disbarment case against him to get even with him for filing the estafa and B.P. Blg. 22 case against the former; complainant's claim that respondent filled up the blank checks issued by complainant is a complete lie; the truth was that the checks referred to were already filled up when complainant affixed her signature thereto; it was unbelievable that complainant would issue blank checks, and that she was a mere low-salaried employee, since she was able to maintain several checking accounts; and if he really intended to defraud complainant, he would have written a higher amount on the checks instead of only P50,000.00.
Issue: Whether or not Atty Deceimbre should be disbarred? Held: Yes, Atty Deciembre should be disbarred. The Court agrees with the findings of the IBP, but finds that disbarment and not just indefinite suspension is in order. The practice of law is not a right but merely a privilege bestowed by the State upon those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of such privilege. A high sense of morality, honesty and fair dealing is expected and required of members of the bar. They must conduct
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themselves with great propriety, and their behavior must be beyond reproach anywhere and at all times. The fact that there is no attorney-client relationship in this case and the transactions entered into by respondent were done in his private capacity cannot shield respondent, as a lawyer, from liability. A lawyer may be disciplined for acts committed even in his private capacity for acts which tend to bring reproach on the legal profession or to injure it in the favorable opinion of the public. Indeed, there is no distinction as to whether the transgression is committed in a lawyer's private life or in his professional capacity, for a lawyer may not divide his personality as an attorney at one time and a mere citizen at another. In this case, evidence abounds that respondent has failed to live up to the standards required of members of the legal profession. Specifically, respondent has transgressed provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility, to wit:
CANON 1 A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes. Rule 1.01. - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. CANON 7 A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession and support the activities of the integrated bar. Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. As correctly observed by IBP Investigating Commissioner Funa, respondent failed to mention in his Comment dated January 18, 2000, in his Position Paper dated October 8, 2001 and in his Motion for Reconsideration dated December 20, 2002, the P100,000.00 loan which complainant supposedly contracted on November 16, 1999. It is also questionable why the checks dated May 16, 2001, May 30, 2001 and June 15, 2001 which were supposedly issued to secure a loan contracted about 18 months earlier, i.e. November 16, 1999, were made without any interest. The same is true with the checks dated January 15 and 20, 2000 in the total sum of P100,000.00, which were supposed to secure a loan contracted on November 15, 1999, for the same amount. Considering these circumstances and the sequence of dates when respondent filed his criminal cases against complainant, and complainant her disbarment case against respondent, what truly appears more believable is complainant's claim that respondent was merely utilizing the blank checks, filling them up, and using them as bases for criminal cases in order to harass complainant. The Court also notes that the checks being refuted by complainant, dated January 15 and 20, 2000, May 16, 2001, May 30, 2001 and June 15, 20011 had its dates, amounts and payee's name all typewritten, while the blanks on the check for P16,000.00 dated
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March 30, 1999 which complainant used to pay part of her original loan, were all filled up in her handwriting. It is also observed that the present case was not the only instance when respondent committed his wrongful acts. In Olbes, complainants therein contracted a loan from respondent in the amount of P10,000.00 on July 1, 1999, for which they issued five blank checks as collateral. Notwithstanding their full payment of the loan, respondent filled up four of the blank checks with the amount of P50,000.00 each with different dates of maturity and used the same in filing estafa and B.P. Blg. 22 cases against complainants. The Court, in imposing the penalty of indefinite suspension on respondent, found his propensity for employing deceit and misrepresentation as reprehensible and his misuse of the filled up checks, loathsome. In Acosta, complainant therein also averred that on August 1, 1998, she borrowed P20,000.00 from respondent with an interest of 20% payable in six months and guaranteed by twelve blank checks. Although she had already paid the total amount of P33,300.00, respondent still demanded payments from her, and for her failure to comply therewith, respondent filed a case against her before the City Prosecutor of Marikina City, using two of her blank checks which respondent filled up with the total amount of P100,000.00. Unfortunately, the complaint was dismissed by IBP Investigating Commissioner Navarro on October 2, 2001 on the ground that the said transaction did not involve any lawyer-client relationship. As correctly observed by Commissioner Funa, such conclusion is erroneous, for a lawyer may be disciplined even for acts not involving any attorney-client relationship. As manifested by these cases, respondent's offenses are manifold. First, he demands excessive payments from his borrowers; then he fills up his borrowers' blank checks with fictitious amounts, falsifying commercial documents for his material gain; and then he uses said checks as bases for filing unfounded criminal suits against his borrowers in order to harass them. Such acts manifest respondent's perversity of character, meriting his severance from the legal profession. While the power to disbar is exercised with great caution and is withheld whenever a lesser penalty could accomplish the end desired, the seriousness of respondent's offense compels the Court to wield its supreme power of disbarment. Indeed, the Court will not hesitate to remove an erring attorney from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers where the evidence calls for it. This is because in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court, with the end in view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the proper and honest administration of justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an attorney. As respondent's misconduct brings intolerable dishonor to the legal profession, the severance of his privilege to practice law for life is in order.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Victor V. Deciembre is hereby found GUILTY of GROSS MISCONDUCT and VIOLATION of Canon 1, Rule 1.01 and Canon 7, Rule 7.03 of the Code
15
of Professional Responsibility. He is DISBARRED from the practice of law and his name is ordered stricken off the Roll of Attorneys effective immediately. Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant which shall forthwith record it in the personal files of respondent; all the courts of the Philippines; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, which shall disseminate copies thereof to all its Chapters; and all administrative and quasi-judicial agencies of the Republic of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED. Atty. Bonifacio T. Barandon, Jr. v Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer, Sr. DOCTRINE: All lawyers should take heed that they are licensed officers of the courts who are mandated to maintain the dignity of the legal profession, hence they must conduct themselves honorably and fairly. Atty. Ferrer's display of improper attitude, arrogance, misbehavior, and misconduct in the performance of his duties both as a lawyer and officer of the court, before the public and the court, was a patent transgression of the very ethics that lawyers are sworn to uphold.
FACTS: * Complainant Atty. Barandon filed a complaint-affidavit with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) seeking the disbarment, suspension from the practice of law, or imposition of appropriate disciplinary action against respondent Atty. Ferrer alleging that: 1.Atty. Ferrer filed a reply with opposition to motion to dismiss that contained abusive, offensive, and improper language which insinuated that Atty. Barandon presented a falsified document in court. 2. Atty. Ferrer filed a fabricated charge against Atty. Barandon for alleged falsification of public document when the document allegedly falsified was a notarized document executed on February 23, 1994, at a date when Atty. Barandon was not yet a lawyer nor was assigned in Camarines Norte. The latter was not even a signatory to the document. 3. On December 19, 2000, at the courtroom of Municipal Trial Court(MTC) Daet before the start of hearing, Atty. Ferrer, evidently drunk, threatened Atty. Barandon saying,”Laban kung laban, patayan kung patayan, kas ama anglahat ng pamilya. Wala na palang magaling na abogado sa Camarines Norte, ang abogado na rito ay mga tagaCamarines Sur, umuwi na kayo sa Camarines Sur, hindi kayo tagarito.” 4. Atty. Ferrer made his accusation of falsification of public document without bothering to check the copy with the Office of the Clerk of 16
Court and, with gross ignorance of the law, failed to consider that a notarized document is presumed to be genuine and authentic until proven otherwise. 5. The Court had warned Atty. Ferrer in his first disbarment case against repeating his unethical act; yet he faces a disbarment charge for sexual harassment of an office secretary of the IBP Chapter in Camarines Norte; a related criminal case for acts of lasciviousness; and criminal cases for libel and grave threats that Atty. Barandon filed against him. In October 2000, Atty. Ferrer asked Atty. Barandon to falsify the daily time record of his son who worked with the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems, Department of Justice. When Atty. Barandon declined, Atty. Ferrer repeatedly harassed him with inflammatory language.
In his defense, Atty. Ferrer stated the following in his answer with motion to dismiss: 1. Instead of having the alleged forged document submitted for examination, Atty. Barandon filed charges of libel and grave threats against him. These charges came about because Atty. Ferrer's clients filed a case for falsification of public document against Atty. Barandon. 2. The offended party in the falsification case, Imelda Palatolon, vouchsafed that her thumbmark in the waiver document had been falsified. 3. At the time Atty. Ferrer allegedly uttered the threatening remarks against Atty. Barandon, the MTC Daet was already in session. It was improbable that the court did not take steps to stop, admonish, or cite Atty. Ferrer in direct contempt for his behavior. 4. Atty. Barandon presented no evidence in support of his allegations that Atty. Ferrer was drunk on December 19, 2000 and that he degraded the law profession. The latter had received various citations that speak well of his character.
5. The cases of libel and grave threats that Atty. Barandon filed against Atty. Ferrer were still pending. Their mere filing did not make the latter guilty of the charges. Atty. Barandon was forum shopping when he filed this disbarment case since it referred to the same libel and grave threats subject of the criminal cases.
IBP Commissioner- Recommended the suspension for two years of Atty. Ferrer
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The Investigating Commissioner found enough evidence on record to prove Atty. Ferrer's violation of Canons 8.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He attributed to Atty. Barandon, as counsel in Civil Case 7040, the falsification of the plaintiffs affidavit despite the absence of evidence that the document had in fact been falsified and that Atty. Barandon was a party to it. The Investigating Commissioner also found that Atty. Ferrer uttered the threatening remarks imputed to him in the presence of other counsels, court personnel, and litigants before the start of hearing.
IBP Board of Governors- adopted Commissioner's Resolution but reduced the penalty of suspension to only one year. MR was denied. ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the IBP Board of Governors and the IBP Investigating Commissioner erred in finding respondent Atty. Ferrer guilty of the charges against him; and 2. If in the affirmative, whether or not the penalty imposed on him is justified.
HELD: The Court AFFIRMS the Resolution of the IBP Board of Governors and ORDERS the suspension of Atty. Edwin Z. Ferrer, Sr. from the practice of law for one year effective upon his receipt of this Decision.
Canon 8 of the Code of Professional Responsibility commands all lawyers to conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor towards their fellow lawyers and avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel. Specifically, in Rule 8.01, the Code provides: A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use
language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper. The evidence shows that he imputed to Atty. Barandon the falsification of the Salaysay Affidavit of the plaintiff in Civil Case 7040. He made this imputation with pure malice for he had no evidence that the affidavit had been falsified and that Atty. Barandon authored the same.
Moreover, Atty. Ferrer could have aired his charge of falsification in a proper forum and without using offensive and abusive language against a fellow lawyer.
The Court has constantly reminded lawyers to use dignified language in their pleadings despite the adversarial nature of our legal system.
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Atty. Ferrer had likewise violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which enjoins lawyers to uphold the dignity and integrity of the legal profession at all times. Rule 7.03 of the Code provides: A lawyer shall not
engage in conduct that adversely reflect on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life behave in scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession. Several disinterested persons confirmed Atty. Ferrers drunken invectives at Atty. Barandon shortly before the start of a court hearing. Atty. Ferrer did not present convincing evidence to support his denial of this particular charge. He merely presented a certification from the police that its blotter for the day did not report the threat he supposedly made. Atty. Barandon presented, however, the police blotter on a subsequent date that recorded his complaint against Atty. Ferrer.
Evidently, he uttered these with intent to annoy, humiliate, incriminate, and discredit Atty. Barandon in the presence of lawyers, court personnel, and litigants waiting for the start of hearing in court. These language is unbecoming a member of the legal profession. The Court cannot countenance it.
Though a lawyers language may be forceful and emphatic, it should always be dignified and respectful, befitting the dignity of the legal profession. The use of intemperate language and unkind ascriptions has no place in the dignity of judicial forum. Atty. Ferrer ought to have realized that this sort of public behavior can only bring down the legal profession in the public estimation and erode public respect for it. Whatever moral righteousness Atty. Ferrer had was negated by the way he chose to express his indignation.
Foodsphere vs Mauricio Foodsphere, Inc. (complainant), a corporation engaged in the business of meat processing and manufacture and distribution of canned goods and grocery products under the brand name CDO, filed a Verified Complaint [1] for disbarment before the Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) against Atty. Melanio L. Mauricio, Jr., popularly known as Batas Mauricio (respondent), a writer/columnist of tabloids including Balitang Patas BATAS, Bagong TIKTIK, TORO and HATAW!, and a host of a television program KAKAMPI MO ANG BATAS telecast over UNTV and of a radio program Double B-BATAS NG BAYAN aired over DZBB, for (1) grossly immoral conduct; (2) violation of lawyers oath and (3) disrespect to the courts and to investigating prosecutors.
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The facts that spawned the filing of the complaint are as follows:
On June 22, 2004, a certain Alberto Cordero (Cordero) purportedly bought from a grocery in Valenzuela City canned goods including a can of CDO Liver spread. On June 27, 2004, as Cordero and his relatives were eating bread with the CDO Liver spread, they found the spread to be sour and soon discovered a colony of worms inside the can.
Corderos wife thus filed a complaint with the Bureau of Food and Drug Administration (BFAD). Laboratory examination confirmed the presence of parasites in the Liver spread.
Pursuant to Joint DTI-DOH-DA Administrative Order No. 1, Series of 1993, the BFAD conducted a conciliation hearing on July 27, 2004 during which the spouses Cordero demanded P150,000 as damages from complainant. Complainant refused to heed the demand, however, as being in contravention of company policy and, in any event, outrageous.
Complainant instead offered to return actual medical and incidental expenses incurred by the Corderos as long as they were supported by receipts, but the offer was turned down. And the Corderos threatened to bring the matter to the attention of the media.
Complainant was later required by the BFAD to file its Answer to the complaint. In the meantime or on August 6, 2004, respondent sent complainant via fax a copy of the front page of the would-be August 10-16, 2004 issue of the tabloid Balitang Patas BATAS, Vol. 1, No. 12 [2] which complainant found to contain articles maligning, discrediting and imputing vices and defects to it and its products. Respondent threatened to publish the articles unless complainant gave in to the P150,000 demand of the Corderos. Complainant thereupon reiterated its counteroffer earlier conveyed to the Corderos, but respondent turned it down.
Respondent later proposed to settle the matter for P50,000, P15,000 of which would go to the Corderos and P35,000 to his BATAS Foundation. And respondent directed complainant to place paid advertisements in the tabloids and television program.
The Corderos eventually forged a KASUNDUAN [3] seeking the withdrawal of their complaint before the BFAD. The BFAD thus dismissed the complaint. [4]
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Respondent, who affixed his signature to the KASUNDUAN as a witness, later wrote in one of his articles/columns in a tabloid that he prepared the document.
On August 11, 2004, respondent sent complainant an Advertising Contract [5] asking complainant to advertise in the tabloid Balitang Patas BATAS for its next 24 weekly issues at P15,000 per issue or a total amount of P360,000, and a Program Profile [6] of the television program KAKAMPI MO ANG BATAS also asking complainant to place spot advertisements with the following rate cards: (a) spot buy 15-second TVC at P4,000; (b) spot buy 30-second TVC at P7,700; and (c) season buy [13 episodes, 26 spots] of 30-second TVC for P130,000.
As a sign of goodwill, complainant offered to buy three full-page advertisements in the tabloid amounting to P45,000 at P15,000 per advertisement, and three spots of 30-second TVC in the television program at P7,700 each or a total of P23,100. Acting on complainants offer, respondent relayed to it that he and his Executive Producer were disappointed with the offer and threatened to proceed with the publication of the articles/columns. [7]
On August 28, 2004, respondent, in his radio program Double B- BATAS NG BAYAN at radio station DZBB, announced the holding of a supposed contest sponsored by said program, which announcement was transcribed as follows:
OK, at meron akong pa-contest, total magpapasko na o ha, meron pa-contest si Batas Mauricio ang Batas ng Bayan. Ito yung ating pa-contest, hulaan ninyo, tatawag kayo sa telepono, 433-7549 at 433-7553. Ang mga premyo babanggitin po natin sa susunod pero ito muna ang contest, o, aling liver spread ang may uod? Yan kita ninyo yan, ayan malalaman ninyo yan. Pagka-nahulaan yan ah, at sasagot kayo sa akin, aling liver spread ang may uod at anong companya ang gumagawa nyan? Itawag po ninyo sa 433-7549 st 433-7553. Open po an[g] contest na ito sa lahat ng ating tagapakinig. Pipiliin natin ang mananalo, kung tama ang inyong sagot. Ang tanong, aling liver spread sa Pilipinas an[g] may uod? [8] (Emphasis and italics in the original; underscoring supplied)
And respondent wrote in his columns in the tabloids articles which put complainant in bad light. Thus, in the August 31- September 6, 2004 issue of Balitang Patas BATAS, he wrote an article captioned KADIRI ANG CDO LIVER SPREAD! In another article, he wrote IBA PANG PRODUKTO NG CDO SILIPIN! [9] which appeared in the same publication in its September 7-13, 2004 issue. And still in the same publication, its September 14-20, 2004 issue, he wrote another article entitled DAPAT BANG PIGILIN ANG CDO. [10]
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Respondent continued his tirade against complainant in his column LAGING HANDA published in another tabloid, BAGONG TIKTIK, with the following articles: [11] (a) Uod sa liver spread, Setyembre 6, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.276); [12] (b) Uod, itinanggi ng CDO, Setyembre 7, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.277); [13] (c) Pagpapatigil sa CDO, Setyembre 8, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.278); [14] (d) Uod sa liver spread kumpirmado, Setyembre 9, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.279); [15] (e) Salaysay ng nakakain ng uod, Setyembre 10, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.280); [16] (f) Kaso VS. CDO itinuloy, Setyembre 11, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.281); [17] (g) Kasong Kidnapping laban sa CDO guards, Setyembre 14, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.284); [18] (h) Brutalidad ng CDO guards, Setyembre 15, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.285); [19] (i) CDO guards pinababanatan sa PNP, Setyembre 17, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.287); [20] (j) May uod na CDO liver spread sa Puregold binili, Setyembre 18, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.288); [21] (k) Desperado na ang CDO, Setyembre 20, 2004 (Taon 7, Blg.290); [22] (l) Atty. R ufus Rodriguez pumadrino sa CDO, Setyembre 21, 2004 (Taon 7,Blg. 291); [23] (m) Kasunduan ng CDO at Pamilya Cordero, Setyembre 22, 2004 (Taon 7,Blg. 292); [24] (n) Bakit nagbayad ng P50 libo ang CDO, Setyembre 23, 2004 (Taon 7,Blg. 293). [25] In his September 8, 2004 column Anggulo ng Batas published in Hataw!, respondent wrote an article Reaksyon pa sa uod ng CDO Liver Spread. [26] And respondent, in several episodes in September 2004 of his television program Kakampi Mo ang Batas aired over UNTV, repeatedly complained of what complainant claimed to be the same baseless and malicious allegations/issues against it. [27] Complainant thus filed criminal complaints against respondent and several others for Libel and Threatening to Publish Libel under Articles 353 and 356 of the Revised Penal Code before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City and Valenzuela City. The complaints were pending at he time of the filing of the present administrative complaint. [28] In the criminal complaints pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City, docketed as I.S. Nos. V-04-2917-2933, respondent filed his Entry of Appearance with Highly Urgent Motion to Elevate These Cases to the Department of Justice, [29] alleging: xxxx 2.N. The question here is this: What gives, Honorable (???) Prosecutors of the Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City? xxxx 2.R. Can an ordinary person like Villarez simply be tossed around, waiting for miracles to happen?
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2.S. Why? How much miracle is needed to happen here before this Office would ever act on his complaint? xxxx 8. With a City Prosecutor acting the way he did in the case filed by Villarez, and with an investigating prosecutor virtually kowtowing to the wishes of his boss, the Chief Prosecutor, can Respondents expect justice to be meted to them? 9. With utmost due respect, Respondents have reason to believe that justice would elude them in this Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City, not because of the injustice of their cause, but, more importantly, because of the injustice of the system; 10. Couple all of these with reports that many a government office in Valenzuela City had been the willing recipient of too many generosities in the past of the Complainant, and also with reports that a top official of the City had campaigned for his much coveted position in the past distributing products of the Complainant, what would one expect the Respondents to think? 11. Of course, not to be lost sight of here is the attitude and behavior displayed even by mere staff and underlings of this Office to people who dare complain against the Complainant in their respective turfs. Perhaps, top officials of this Office should investigate and ask their associates and relatives incognito to file, even if on a pakunwari basis only, complaints against the Complainant, and they would surely be given the same rough and insulting treatment that Respondent Villarez got when he filed his kidnapping charge here; [30]
And in a Motion to Dismiss [the case] for Lack of Jurisdiction [31] which respondent filed, as counsel for his therein co-respondents-staffers of the newspaper Hataw!, before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City, respondent alleged: xxxx 5. If the Complainant or its lawyer merely used even a little of whatever is inside their thick skulls, they would have clearly deduced that this Office has no jurisdiction over this action. [32] (Emphasis supplied) xxxx Meanwhile, on October 26, 2004, complainant filed a civil case against respondent and several others, docketed as Civil Case No. 249-V-04, [33] before the Regional Trial Court, Valenzuela City and raffled to Branch 75 thereof.
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The pending cases against him and the issuance of a status quo order notwithstanding, respondent continued to publish articles against complainant [34] and to malign complainant through his television shows. Acting on the present administrative complaint, the Investigating Commissioner of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) came up with the following findings in his October 5, 2005 Report and Recommendation: [35] I. xxxx In Civil Case No. 249-V-04 entitled Foodsphere, Inc. vs. Atty. [Melanio] Mauricio, et al., the Order dated 10 December 2004 (Annex O of the Complaint) was issued by Presiding Judge Dionisio C. Sison which in part reads: Anent the plaintiffs prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order included in the instant plaintiffs motion, this Court, inasmuch as the defendants failed to appear in court or file an opposition thereto, is constrained to GRANT the said plaintiffs prater, as it is GRANTED, in order to maintain STATUS QUO, and that all the defendants, their agents, representatives or any person acting for and in behalf are hereby restrained/enjoined from further publishing, televising and/or broadcasting any matter subject of the Complaint in the instant case more specifically the imputation of vices and/or defects on plaintiff and its products. Complainant alleged that the above-quoted Order was served on respondent by the Branch Sheriff on 13 December 2004. Respondent has not denied the issuance of the Order dated 10 December 2004 or his receipt of a copy thereof on 13 December 2004. Despite his receipt of the Order dated 10 December 2004, and the clear directive therein addressed to him to desists [sic] from further publishing, televising and/or broadcasting any matter subject of the Complaint in the instant case more specifically the imputation of vices and/or defects on plaintiff and its products, respondent in clear defiance of this Order came out with articles on the prohibited subject matter in his column Atty. Batas, 2004 in the December 16 and 17, 2004 issues of the tabloid Balitang Bayan Toro (Annexes Q and Q-1 of the Complaint). The above actuations of respondent are also in violation of Rule 13.03 of the Canon of Professional Responsibility which reads: A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party. II. xxxx
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In I.S. No. V.04-2917-2933, then pending before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Valenzuela City, respondent filed his Entry of Appearance with Highly Urgent Motion to Elevate These Cases To the Department of Justice. In said pleading, respondent made the following statements: xxxx The above language employed by respondent undoubtedly casts aspersions on the integrity of the Office of the City Prosecutor and all the Prosecutors connected with said Office. Respondent clearly assailed the impartiality and fairness of the said Office in handling cases filed before it and did not even design to submit any evidence to substantiate said wild allegations. The use by respondent of the above-quoted language in his pleadings is manifestly violative of Canon 11 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which provides: A lawyer [s]hall [o]bserve and [m]aintain [t]he [re]spect [d]ue [t]o [t]he [c]ourts [a]nd [t]o [j]udicial [o]fficers [a]nd [s]hould [i]nsist [o]n [s]imilar [c]onduct [b]y [o]thers.
III. The Kasunduan entered into by the Spouses Cordero and herein complainant (Annex C of the Complaint) was admittedly prepared, witnessed and signed by herein respondent. xxxx In its Order dated 16 August 2004, the Bureau of Food and Drugs recognized that the said Kasunduan was not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order and policy, and this accordingly dismissed the complaint filed by the Spouses Cordero against herein complainant. However, even after the execution of the Kasunduan and the consequent dismissal of the complaint of his clients against herein complainant, respondent inexplicably launched a media offensive intended to disparage and put to ridicule herein complainant. On record are the numerous articles of respondent published in 3 tabloids commencing from 31 August to 17 December 2004 (Annexes G to Q1). As already above-stated, respondent continued to come out with these articles against complainant in his tabloid columns despite a temporary restraining order issued against him expressly prohibiting such actions. Respondent did not deny that he indeed wrote said articles and submitted them for publication in the tabloids. Respondent claims that he was prompted by his sense of public service, that is, to expose the defects of complainants products to the consuming public. Complainant claims that there is a baser motive to the actions of respondent.
25
Complainant avers that respondent retaliated for complainants failure to give in to respondents request that complainant advertise in the tabloids and television programs of respondent. Complainants explanation is more credible. Nevertheless, whatever the true motive of respondent for his barrage of articles against complainant does not detract from the fact that respondent consciously violated the spirit behind the Kasunduan which he himself prepared and signed and submitted to the BFAD for approval. Respondent was less than forthright when he prepared said Kasunduan and then turned around and proceeded to lambaste complainant for what was supposedly already settled in said agreement. Complainant would have been better of with the BFAD case proceeding as it could have defended itself against the charges of the Spouses Cordero. Complainant was helpless against the attacks of respondent, a media personality. The actuations of respondent constituted, to say the least, deceitful conduct contemplated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. [36] (Underscoring supplied)
The IBP Board of Governors, by Resolution No. XVIII-2006-114 dated March 20, 2006, adopted the findings and recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner to suspend respondent from the practice of law for two years. The Court finds the findings/evaluation of the IBP well-taken. The Court, once again, takes this occasion to emphasize the necessity for every lawyer to act and comport himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity of the legal profession, [37] which confidence may be eroded by the irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the bar. By the above-recited acts, respondent violated Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandates lawyers to refrain from engaging in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. For, as the IBP found, he engaged in deceitful conduct by, inter alia, taking advantage of the complaint against CDO to advance his interest to obtain funds for his BATAS Foundation and seek sponsorships and advertisements for the tabloids and his television program. He also violated Rule 13.02 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates: A lawyer shall not make public statements in the media regarding a pending case tending to arouse public opinion for or against a party. For despite the pendency of the civil case against him and the issuance of a status quo order restraining/enjoining further publishing, televising and broadcasting of any matter relative to the complaint of CDO, respondent continued with his attacks against complainant and its products. At the same time, respondent violated Canon 1 also of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which mandates lawyers to uphold the Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes. For he defied said status quo order, despite
26
his (respondents) oath as a member of the legal profession to obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities. Further, respondent violated Canon 8 and Rule 8.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which mandate, viz: CANON 8 - A lawyer shall conduct himself with courtesy, fairness and candor toward his professional colleagues, and shall avoid harassing tactics against opposing counsel. Rule 8.01 A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is abusive, offensive or otherwise improper, by using intemperate language. Apropos is the following reminder in Saberon v. Larong: [38] To be sure, the adversarial nature of our legal system has tempted members of the bar to use strong language in pursuit of their duty to advance the interests of their clients. However, while a lawyer is entitled to present his case with vigor and courage, such enthusiasm does not justify the use of offensive and abusive language. Language abounds with countless possibilities for one to be emphatic but respectful, convincing but not derogatory, illuminating but not offensive. On many occasions, the Court has reminded members of the Bar to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to th e honor and reputation of a party or witness, unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is charged. In keeping with the dignity of the legal profession, a lawyers language even in his pleadings must be dignified. [39] (Underscoring supplied)
By failing to live up to his oath and to comply with the exacting standards of the legal profession, respondent also violated Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which directs a lawyer to at all times uphold the integrity and the dignity of the legal profession. [40] The power of the media to form or influence public opinion cannot be underestimated. In Dalisay v. Mauricio, Jr., [41] the therein complainant engaged therein-herein respondents services as she was impressed by the pro-poor and pro-justice advocacy of respondent, a media personality, [42] only to later find out that after he demanded and the therein complainant paid an exorbitant fee, no action was taken nor any pleadings prepared by him. Respondent was suspended for six months.
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On reading the articles respondent published, not to mention listening to him over the radio and watching him on television, it cannot be gainsaid that the same could, to a certain extent, have affected the sales of complainant. Back to Dalisay, this Court, in denying therein-herein respondents motion for reconsideration, took note of the fact that respondent was motivated by vindictiveness when he filed falsification charges against the therein complainant. [43] To the Court, suspension of respondent from the practice of law for three years is, in the premises, sufficient. WHEREFORE, Atty. Melanio Mauricio is, for violation of the lawyers oath and breach of ethics of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility, SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three years effective upon his receipt of this Decision. He is WARNED that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt with more severely. Let a copy of this Decision be attached to his personal record and copies furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Office of the Court Administrator for dissemination to all courts.
AVELINO ANGELES v. ATTY. AMADO IBANEZ This is a complaint for disbarment for notarizing the "Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale" without a notarial commission and in the absence of the affiants.
Facts: Atty. Amado Ibañez allegedly notarized an "Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale" without having the authority to notarize such as he did not have a commission as notary public at that time. The petitioners further denied executing the said document or, that they ever appeared before respondent Atty. Ibañez for this purpose. He stated that his failure to require the presence of the parties to the "Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale" is wholly justified because of the assurance of complainant Rosalina Angeles that the signatures appearing in the said document were indeed those of her co-heirs. The respondent also alleged that almost all the complainants submitted their residence certificates, the numbers of which were recorded in the acknowledgement portion of the document.
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Issue: Whether or not respondent violated his oath as a lawyer and the Code of Professional Responsibility when he notarized the "Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale" in the absence of the affiants.
Ruling: The Supreme Court held that respondent violated his oath as a lawyer and the Code of Professional Responsibility when he notarized the "Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale" in the absence of the affiants. Respondent himself admits that he merely relied on the representation of Rosalina Angeles that the signatures appearing on the "Extrajudicial Partition with Absolute Sale" subject of the present complaint are those of her co-heirs. Respondent claims that he reposed confidence upon Rosalina Angeles because she is his confidential secretary. Unfortunately for respondent, he cannot exculpate himself from the consequences of his recklessness and his failure to comply with the requirements of the law by relying on his confidential secretary. Time and again, the Supreme Court have reminded lawyers commissioned as notaries public that the affiants must personally appear before them. The physical presence of the affiants enables the notary public to verify the genuineness of the signatures of the acknowledging parties and to ascertain that the document is the parties’ free act and deed. Under the facts and circumstances of the case, respondent’s notarial commission should not only be suspended but respondent must also be suspended from the practice of law.
Adm. Case No. 3066 October 26, 1999 J.K. MERCADO AND SONS AGRICULTURAL ENTERPRISES, INC., and SPOUSES JESUS and ROSARIO K. MERCADO, complainants, vs.
EDUARDO DE VERA and JOSE RONGKALES BANDALAN, respondents. Adm. Case No. 4438 October 26, 1999 ATTY. EDUARDO C. DE VERA, petitioner-complainant, vs.
ATTY. MERVYN G. ENCANTO, ATTY. NUMERIANO G. TANOPO, JR., ATTY. JOSE AGUILA GRAPILON, ATTY. BEDA G. FAJARDO, ATTY. RENE C. VILLA, THE INTEGRATED BAR OF THE PHILIPPINES, thru its COMMISSION ON BAR DISCIPLINE, as represented by ATTY. MERVYN G. ENCANTO, incumbent National President; ATTY. CARMEN LEONOR P. MERCADO-ALCANTARA; SPOUSES JESUS K. MERCADO and ROSARIO P. MERCADO; and J.K. MERCADO AND SONS AGRICULTURAL ENTERPRISES, INC., respondents. FACTS: The petition for disbarment filed by J.K. Mercado and Sons Agricultural Enterprises, Inc. ("Mercado and Sons"), and the spouses Jesus K. Mercado and
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Rosario P. Mercado against Atty. Eduardo C. De Vera is an offshoot of an action for "dissolution/liquidation of conjugal partnership, accounting, support with support pendente lite, annulment of contract, reconveyance or recovery of possession of conjugal share, partition, damages, and attorneys fees" filed by Rosario P. Mercado ("R. Mercado") against Jesus K. Mercado ("J. Mercado"), Mercado and Sons, and Standard Fruits Corporation ("Stanfilco"). The case was assigned to the sala of then Judge Bandalan. Representing R. Mercado was Atty. De Vera. Judge Bandalan decided the case in favor of R. Mercado. She was awarded the sum of a little over P9 million. J. Mercado and Mercado and Sons filed a timely notice of appeal. Stanfilco, for its part, filed a motion for reconsideration. Judge Bandalan granted the motion for execution pending appeal filed by Atty. De Vera. On even date, the judge likewise granted Atty. De Vera's "motion to note plaintiffs counsel's statement of claim of Attorney's lien (charging and retaining) and motion to direct Provincial Registry of Deeds of Davao to annotate such liens on the certificates of titles of the Mercado spouses." Later, a writ of execution was issued. Two days after, notices of garnishment under execution pending appeal were served by the sheriff on the respective managers of RCBC, Claveria, Davao City; RCBC, Tagum, Davao Del Norte, Traders Royal Bank, City Hall Drive, Davao City; and Traders Royal Bank, R. Magsaysay Ave., Davao City. It would appear that a total amount of P1,270,734.56 was garnished. Sometime later, R. Mercado terminated the services of Atty. De Vera, offering the amount of P350,000.00 by way of attorney's fees. She, at the same time, demanded an accounting and the turn-over of the money still in the possession of Atty. De Vera. The latter refused to heed the demand, claiming that pursuant to the decision, he should, in fact, be entitled to P2,254,217.00 by way of attorney's fees. Failing to recover what she had felt was lawfully due to her, R. Mercado filed disbarment proceedings against Atty. de Vera.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. de Vera should be held administratively liable.
RULING: Yes. Atty. de Vera should be held administratively liable. While, indeed, the practice of law is not a business venture, a lawyer, nevertheless, is entitled to be duly compensated for professional services rendered. So, also, he must be protected against clients who wrongly refuse to give him his just due. In Albano vs. Coloma, this Court has said: Counsel, any counsel, who is worthy of his hire, is entitled to be fully recompensed for his services. With his capital consisting solely of his brains and with his skill, acquired at tremendous cost not only in money but in the expenditure of time and energy, he is entitled to the protection of any judicial tribunal against any attempt on the part of a client to escape payment of his fees. It is indeed ironic if after putting forth the best that is in him to secure justice for the party he
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represents, he himself would not get his due. Such an eventuality this Court is determined to avoid. It views with disapproval any and every effort of those benefited by counsel's services to deprive him of his hard-earned honorarium. Such an attitude deserves condemnation. Correlatively, a lawyer is entitled to a "lien over funds, documents and papers of his client which have lawfully come into his possession. Under Canon 16, Rule 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility he may "apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client." In both cases, however, it is to be assumed that the client agrees with the lawyer in the amount of attorney's fees. In case of a disagreement, or when the client disputes the amount claimed by the lawyer for being unconscionable, the lawyer should not arbitrarily apply the funds in his possession to the payment of his fees; instead, it should behoove the lawyer to file, if he still deems it desirable, the necessary action or the proper motion with the proper court to fix the amount of his attorney's fees. If a lawyer were allowed to unilaterally apply the funds in his hands in payment of his claimed compensation even when there is a disagreement between him and his client would not only be violative of the trust relationship between them but can also open the door to possible abuse by those who are less than mindful of their fiduciary duty. The Court cannot ignore the findings made by the IBP Board of Governors, in its resolution, hereunder reproduced; viz: The records show that complainant Mrs. Mercado, assisted by her erstwhile counsel, respondent de Vera was able to withdraw garnished funds from the banks in the total amount of P1,270,734.56 on January 14, 1987 and January 16, 1987 (Exhs. "CC" and "DD", "30" and "31"). Said withdrawals were in consequence of an Order dated January 12, 1987 issued by Judge Bandalan (Exh. "K" or "15"). As prayed for by complainant Mrs. Mercado per motion for execution pending appeal (Exh. "G" or "14") filed in her behalf by respondent de Vera, she was almost 73 years old, in poor health and needed the amount for her daily subsistence and medical needs. There was an open admission by respondent de Vera as borne by his entire testimony, that he was with Mrs. Mercado in the banks to assist her to withdraw the garnished funds. Complainant Mrs. Mercado's testimony on June 13, 1989 that she was staying in a boarding house (TSN, June 13, 1989, page 14) and that the money, then about P911,374.95 out of the garnished amount of P1,223,874.95 after depositing P300,000.00 with Metro Bank and TRB (TSN, September 5, 1989, pages 31 to 36, Exhs. "MM" & "NN") are more than enough reasons not to withdraw or encash the garnished amounts in the form of Manager Checks. If not only for respondent de Vera's prodding and insistence, complainant Mrs. Mercado would not have withdrawn and encashed such a huge amount of money, only to bring it to an unsafe
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boarding house which understandably could not provide a guarded and safer depository of such huge amount of money, as in banks. Why would complainant Mrs. Mercado withdraw from the banks the whole amount of P1,223,873.95, and on the same day, deposit P300,000.00 in other banks and carry with her P911,374.95? The scheming plot of respondent de Vera is too obvious to escape notice. With so much money contained in six bags, respondent de Vera invited the aging complainant Mrs. Mercado to his house, convinced the old lady to leave the money with him as accordingly, she did not have a room in her boarding house and that it would be safe if she left the money with him. xxx xxx xxx That respondent de Vera was, upon his unilateral estimation, entitled to about P2.250 Million in attorney's fees, would not exculpate him from the condemnable act of infidelity in the custody of his client's funds. He was duty bound to turn over and render a full accounting of what he received in satisfaction of the judgment rendered in favor of complainant Mrs. Mercado in Civil Case No. 17215. The relation between client and attorney is one of trust and confidence. Regrettably, Atty. De Vera would appear to have indeed gone over the bounds of propriety when he refused to turn-over to his client the amount in excess of the P350,000.00 he was, in effect, allowed to retain. His disagreement with the client, of course, entitled him to take proper legal steps in order to recover what he might feel to be his just due but, certainly, it was not a matter that he could take into his own hands. The Court is not prepared to conclude, however, that the circumstances detailed by the IBP would create an impression, as so suggested in the resolution of 23 March 1993, that respondent lawyer somehow had much to be responsible for in the turn of events that led to his possession of the funds of his client. In any event, the proven actuations of Atty. De Vera, in the view of the Court, would sufficiently warrant a commensurate disciplinary action.
LIGAYA MANIAGO v. ATTY. DE DIOS A.C. No. 7472, March 30, 2010 Nachura, J. / En Banc
FACTS: Complainant filed a disbarment case against respondent for engaging in the practice of law despite having been suspended by the Court. Complainant alleged that she filed a criminal case against Hiroshi Miyata, a Japanese national, before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Olongapo City. The accused was represented by Atty. De Dios, with office address at 22 Magsaysay Drive, Olongapo City.
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Complainant then learned from the RTC staff that Atty. De Dios had an outstanding suspension order from the Supreme Court since 2001, and was, therefore, prohibited from appearing in court. In her Comment, Atty. De Dios admitted that there were cases filed against her client, Miyata. She, however, denied that she was under suspension when she appeared as his counsel in the cases. Respondent explained that an administrative case was indeed filed against her by Diana de Guzman, docketed as A.C. No. 4943, where she was meted the penalty of 6-month suspension. She served the suspension immediately upon receipt of the Courts Resolution on May 16, 2001 up to November 16, 2001. In a Manifestation filed on October 19, 2001, respondent formally informed the Court that she was resuming her practice of law on November 17, 2001, which she actually did. A problem arose when Judge Josefina Farrales, in her capacity as Acting Executive Judge of the RTC, Olongapo City, erroneously issued a directive on March 15, 2007, ordering respondent to desist from practicing law and revoking her notarial commission for the years 2007 and 2008. Knowing that the directive was rather questionable, respondent, nonetheless, desisted from law practice in due deference to the court order. Thereafter, respondent filed a Motion for Clarification with the Supreme Court on account of Judge Farrales letters to all courts in Olongapo City and to some municipalities in Zambales, which gave the impression that Atty. De Dios is not yet allowed to resume her practice of law and that her notarial commission for the years 2007 and 2008 is r evoked. On November 18, 2008, the OBC submitted its Memorandum for the Courts consideration. The OBC made it clear that the lifting of the suspension order was not automatic, following the pronouncement of the Court in J.K. Mercado and Sons Agricultural Enterprises, Inc. and Spouses Jesus and Rosario K. Mercado, complainants v. Atty. Eduardo de Vera and Jose Rongkales Bandalan, et al. and Atty. Eduardo C. de Vera v. Atty. Mervyn G. Encanto, et al., Thus, according to the OBC, a suspended lawyer must first present proof(s) of his compliance by submitting certifications from the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and from the Executive Judge that he has indeed desisted from the practice of law during the period of suspension. Thereafter, the Court, after evaluation, and upon a favorable recommendation from the OBC, will issue a resolution lifting the order of suspension and thus allow him to resume the practice of law. The OBC alleged that it was unfortunate that this procedure was overlooked in A.C. No. 4943, where Atty. De Dios was able to resume her practice of law without submitting the required certifications and passing through the OBC for evaluation. In order to avoid confusion and conflicting directives from the Court, the OBC recommended that the Court adopt a uniform policy on the matter of the lifting of the order of suspension of a lawyer from the practice of law.
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ISSUE: WON respondent should be disbarred for resuming her practice of law without submitting the required certifications and passing through the OBC for evaluation – a flagrant violation and disobedience to lawful orders of the Court. RULING: NO. The Court notes the Report and Recommendation of the OBC. As much as the Court will not hesitate to discipline an erring lawyer, it should, at the same time, also ensure that a lawyer may not be deprived of the freedom and right to exercise his profession unreasonably. The Court hereby RESOLVED that the following guidelines be observed in
the matter of the lifting of an order suspending a lawyer from the practice of law: 1)
After a finding that respondent lawyer must be suspended from the practice of law, the Court shall render a decision imposing the penalty;
2)
Unless the Court explicitly states that the decision is immediately executory upon receipt thereof, respondent has 15 days within which to file a motion for reconsideration thereof. The denial of said motion shall render the decision final and executory;
3)
Upon the expiration of the period of suspension, respondent shall file a Sworn Statement with the Court, through the Office of the Bar Confidant, stating therein that he or she has desisted from the practice of law and has not appeared in any court during the period of his or her suspension;
4)
Copies of the Sworn Statement shall be furnished to the Local Chapter of the IBP and to the Executive Judge of the courts where respondent has pending cases handled by him or her, and/or where he or she has appeared as counsel;
5)
The Sworn Statement shall be considered as proof of respondents compliance with the order of suspension;
6)
Any finding or report contrary to the statements made by the lawyer under oath shall be a ground for the imposition of a more severe punishment, or disbarment, as may be warranted.
RAMIENTAS VS REYALA Before Us are Manifestations[1] filed by the abovequoted parties in response to Supreme Court (SC) En Banc Resolution[2] dated 7 March 2006, wherein we resolved to require them to manifest, within ten (10) days from notice, whether they are willing to submit the case at bar for decision/resolution on the basis of the pleadings already on record. The present controversy stemmed from an Administrative Complaint[3] filed by Noriel Michael J. Ramientas on 16 February 2004 before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP), Commission on Bar Discipline, seeking the disbarment of
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respondent Atty. Jocelyn P. Reyala. The complaint was anchored on respondent Reyalas alleged violative acts: (1) submitting a pleading before the Court of Appeals bearing the forged signature of another lawyer; and (2) her continuous handling of a case while working in the Court of Appeals; both contrary to a) Articles 171,[4] 182,[5] 184[6] and 355[7] of the Revised Penal Code (RPC); b) the Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers; and c) conduct unbecoming of a lawyer. Hearing on the merits thereafter ensued. In its Resolution No. XVII-2005-171 passed on 17 December 2005, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt the recommendation of Atty. Edmund T. Espina, Investigating Commissioner, finding respondent Reyala guilty of the abovementioned violative acts. It, however, modified the recommended penalty to be imposed from six (6) months suspension (from the practice of law) to two (2) years, with the corresponding warning that a repetition of any breach of her professional duties will be dealt with more severely.[8] On 13 February 2006, the Office of the Bar Confidant, SC, received a letter dated 30 January 2006, from Atty. Rogelio A. Vinluan, Director for Bar Discipline of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, addressed to SC Chief Justice Artemio V. Panganiban, stating therein that:
We are transmitting herewith the following documents pertaining to the above[9] case pursuant to Rule 139-B: 1.
Notice of the Resolution;
2.
Records of the case consisting of Volume I 1-185 pages.
In the interregnum, however, respondent Reyala submitted[10] to the IBP an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the resolution suspending her. On 7 March 2006, the SC En Banc, acting on the letter and transmittal, resolved to require complainant Ramientas and respondent Reyala to manifest whether they are willing to submit the case for decision/resolution based on the pleadings and documents already on record. Both parties submitted their compliance thereto. In his Manifestation,[11] complainant Ramientas acceded to the submission of the case for decision/resolution based on the pleadings already on record. Respondent Reyala, on the other hand, demurred[12] to such submission for the meantime considering that the Motion for Reconsideration she earlier filed
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before the IBP remained unresolved to date. Further, she stated that when she scheduled said motion for hearing, she was informed[13] by the IBP that it was precluded from acting on the aforesaid motion as it had already transmitted to this Court the whole records of the particular case together with Resolution No. XVII-2005-171, which recommended that she be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years. Thus, she prayed that her motion for reconsideration be decided first by the IBP Board of Governors before submitting the case for decision/resolution to this Court. Prefatorily, a reading of the By-Laws of the IBP will reveal that a motion for reconsideration of its resolution or order is a prohibited pleading. 2 of Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline of the IBP provides that: SEC. 2. Prohibited Pleadings. The following pleadings shall not be allowed, to wit: xxxx c. Motion for new trial, or for reconsideration of
resolution
or order. xxxx
Parenthetically, at first glance, Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court, the rules governing the disbarment and discipline of attorneys, shows that there is no provision regarding motions for reconsideration of resolutions of the IBP Board of Governors suspending respondent lawyers. However, worth noting is the fact that neither does it particularly proscribe the filing of such motions. 12 (b) of Rule 139B of the Rules of Court reads: SEC. 12. Review and decision by the Board of Governors. x x x xxxx (b) If the Board, by the vote of a majority of its total membership, determines that the respondent should be suspended from the practice of law or disbarred, it shall issue a resolution setting forth its findings and recommendations which, together with the whole record of the case, shall forthwith be transmitted to the Supreme Court for final action. (Emphasis supplied.) xxxx
Hence, this impasse.
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A judicious review of our current jurisprudence will reveal that said impasse is more ostensible than real. Our pronouncement in the case of Halimao v. Villanueva,[14] promulgated close to two decades after the effectivity of the IBP By-Laws,[15] effectively amended the latter in so far as motions for reconsideration of IBP resolutions in disciplinary cases against lawyers are concerned. In the Halimao case, we took the occasion to articulate our stance respecting motions for reconsideration of resolutions of the IBP Board of Governors in disciplinary cases against lawyers. This Court was confronted therein with somewhat the same set of circumstance as the case at bar in that after the IBP Board of Governors transmitted to us its resolution adopting the recommendation of the investigating commissioner dismissing the disbarment complaint against respondent Villanueva for being barred by res judicata, complainant Halimao filed a motion for reconsideration. The latter opposed such motion on the ground that Rule 139-B of the Rules of Court does not provide for such a possibility of review. In resolving the issue, this Court, through Mr. Justice Mendoza, held that: Although Rule 139-B, 12 (c) makes no mention of a motion for reconsideration, nothing in its text or in its history suggests that such motion is prohibited. It may therefore be filed within 15 days from notice to a party. Indeed, the filing of such motion should be encouraged before resort is made to this Court as a matter of exhaustion of administrative remedies, to afford the agency rendering the judgment an opportunity to correct any error it may have committed through a misapprehension of facts or misappreciation of the evidence.[16] (Emphasis supplied.) Clearly, the aforequoted ruling amended the IBP By-Laws in that it effectively removed a motion for reconsideration from the roster of proscribed pleadings in the level of the IBP. It must be remembered that it is well within the Courts power to amend the By-Laws of the IBP 77 of the same vests in this Court the power to amend, modify or repeal it, either motu proprio or upon recommendation of the IBP Board of Governors. Prescinding from the above, though the aforequoted ruling involves 12 (c)[17] of Rule 139-B, nothing in the decision contradicts its application to 12 (b) of the same rule, thus, it now stands that a motion for reconsideration of IBP resolutions may be filed by an aggrieved party within the period stated. A point of clarification, however, is in order. While in the Halimao ruling we nevertheless treated the motion for reconsideration filed by Atty. Villanueva as his Petition for Review before this Court within the contemplation of Rule 139-B, 12 (c), such action on our part was necessitated by expediency. In the case at bar, acknowledging the raison d'tre for the allowance of motions for reconsideration
37
of resolutions of the IBP in disciplinary cases against lawyers, which is the exhaustion of administrative remedies as expressly recognized by the same Halimao ruling, the remand of the case at bar back to the IBP is in order. This course of action rests upon the presumption that when the grievance machinery is afforded a chance to pass upon the matter, it will decide the same correctly,[18] Certainly, prudence dictates that the IBP be given the opportunity to correct its mistakes, if any, by way of motions for reconsideration before this Court takes cognizance of the case. This is to further insure that the grievance procedure will be allowed to duly run its course a form of filtering process, particularly respecting matters within the competence of the IBP, before we step in. In fine, though such remand will hold back the advancement of the case, nevertheless, it bears emphasizing that it is equally important that the IBP be afforded the opportunity to set things as it should be. Observance of this basic principle is a sound practice and policy and should never be compromised at the altar of expediency. In concurrence with the above, now, therefore, BE IT RESOLVED, as it is hereby resolved, that in accordance with our ruling in Halimao v. Villanueva,[19] pertinent provisions of Rule III of the Rules of Procedure of the Commission on Bar Discipline, as contained in the By-Laws of the IBP, particularly 1 and 2, are hereby deemed amended. Accordingly, 1 of said rules now reads as follows: SECTION. 1. Pleadings. The only pleadings allowed are verified complaint, verified answer, verified position papers and motion for reconsideration of a resolution. [Emphasis supplied.]
And in 2, a motion for reconsideration is, thus, removed from the purview of the class of prohibited pleadings. Further, the following guidelines shall be observed by the IBP in respect of disciplinary cases against lawyers: 1. The IBP must first afford a chance to either party to file a motion for reconsideration of the IBP resolution containing its findings and recommendations within fifteen (15) days from notice of receipt by the parties thereon; 2. If a motion for reconsideration has been timely filed by an aggrieved party, the IBP must first resolve the same prior to elevating to this Court the subject resolution together with the whole record of the case;
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3. If no motion for reconsideration has been filed within the period provided for, the IBP is directed to forthwith transmit to this Court, for final action, the subject resolution together with the whole record of the case; 4. A party desiring to appeal from the resolution of the IBP may file a petition for review before this Court within fifteen (15) days from notice of said resolution sought to be reviewed; and 5. For records of cases already transmitted to this Court where there exist pending motions for reconsideration filed in due time before the IBP, the latter is directed to withdraw from this Court the subject resolutions together with the whole records of the cases, within 30 days from notice, and, thereafter, to act on said motions with reasonable dispatch. Consistent with the discussions hereinabove set forth, let the whole record of this case be immediately remanded to the IBP for the proper disposition of respondent Atty. Jocelyn P. Reyalas motion for reconsideration.
PETITION FOR LEAVE TO RESUME PRACTICE OF LAW, BENJAMIN M. DACANAY, petitioner. RESOLUTION CORONA, J.: This bar matter concerns the petition of petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay for leave to resume the practice of law. Petitioner was admitted to the Philippine bar in March 1960. He practiced law until he migrated to Canada in December 1998 to seek medical attention for his ailments. He subsequently applied for Canadian citizenship to avail of Canada’s free medical aid program. His application was approved and he became a Canadian citizen in May 2004. On July 14, 2006, pursuant to Republic Act (RA) 9225 (Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003), petitioner reacquired his Philippine citizenship.1 On that day, he took his oath of allegiance as a Filipino citizen before the Philippine Consulate General in Toronto, Canada. Thereafter, he returned to the Philippines and now intends to resume his law practice. There is a question, however, whether petitioner Benjamin M. Dacanay lost his membership in the Philippine bar when he gave up his Philippine citizenship in May 2004. Thus, this petition. In a report dated October 16, 2007, the Office of the Bar Confidant cites Section 2, Rule 138 (Attorneys and Admission to Bar) of the Rules of Court: SECTION 2. Requirements for all applicants for admission to the bar . – Every applicant for admission as a member of the bar must be a citizen of the Philippines , at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character, and a resident of the Philippines; and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.
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Applying the provision, the Office of the Bar Confidant opines that, by virtue of his reacquisition of Philippine citizenship, in 2006, petitioner has again met all the qualifications and has none of the disqualifications for membership in the bar. It recommends that he be allowed to resume the practice of law in the Philippines, conditioned on his retaking the lawyer’s oath to remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a member of the Philippine bar. We approve the recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant with certain modifications. The practice of law is a privilege burdened with conditions.2 It is so delicately affected with public interest that it is both a power and a duty of the State (through this Court) to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare.3 Adherence to rigid standards of mental fitness, maintenance of the highest degree of morality, faithful observance of the rules of the legal profession, compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement and payment of membership fees to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) are the conditions required for membership in good standing in the bar and for enjoying the privilege to practice law. Any breach by a lawyer of any of these conditions makes him unworthy of the trust and confidence which the courts and clients repose in him for the continued exercise of his professional privilege.4 Section 1, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court provides: SECTION 1. Who may practice law . – Any person heretofore duly admitted as a member of the bar, or thereafter admitted as such in accordance with the provisions of this Rule, and who is in good and regular standing, is entitled to practice law. Pursuant thereto, any person admitted as a member of the Philippine bar in accordance with the statutory requirements and who is in good and regular standing is entitled to practice law. Admission to the bar requires certain qualifications. The Rules of Court mandates that an applicant for admission to the bar be a citizen of the Philippines, at least twenty-one years of age, of good moral character and a resident of the Philippines.5 He must also produce before this Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character and that no charges against him, involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines.6 Moreover, admission to the bar involves various phases such as furnishing satisfactory proof of educational, moral and other qualifications;7 passing the bar examinations;8 taking the lawyer’s oath9 and signing the roll of attorneys and receiving from the clerk of court of this Court a certificate of the license to practice.10 The second requisite for the practice of law ― membership in good standing ― is a continuing requirement. This means continued membership and, concomitantly, payment of annual membership dues in the IBP;11 payment of the annual professional tax;12 compliance with the mandatory continuing legal education requirement;13 faithful observance of the rules and ethics of the legal profession and being continually subject to judicial disciplinary control.14
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Given the foregoing, may a lawyer who has lost his Filipino citizenship still practice law in the Philippines? No. The Constitution provides that the practice of all professions in the Philippines shall be limited to Filipino citizens save in cases prescribed by law.15 Since Filipino citizenship is a requirement for admission to the bar, loss thereof terminates membership in the Philippine bar and, consequently, the privilege to engage in the practice of law. In other words, the loss of Filipino citizenship ipso jure terminates the privilege to practice law in the Philippines. The practice of law is a privilege denied to foreigners.16 The exception is when Filipino citizenship is lost by reason of naturalization as a citizen of another country but subsequently reacquired pursuant to RA 9225. This is because "all Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of [RA 9225]."17 Therefore, a Filipino lawyer who becomes a citizen of another country is deemed never to have lost his Philippine citizenship if he reacquires it in accordance with RA 9225. Although he is also deemed never to have terminated his membership in the Philippine bar, no automatic right to resume law practice accrues. Under RA 9225, if a person intends to practice the legal profession in the Philippines and he reacquires his Filipino citizenship pursuant to its provisions "(he) shall apply with the proper authority for a license or permit to engage in such practice."18 Stated otherwise, before a lawyer who reacquires Filipino citizenship pursuant to RA 9225 can resume his law practice, he must first secure from this Court the authority to do so, conditioned on: (a) the updating and payment in full of the annual membership dues in the IBP; (b) the payment of professional tax; (c) the completion of at least 36 credit hours of mandatory continuing legal education; this is specially significant to refresh the applicant/petitioner’s knowledge of Philippine laws and update him of legal developments and (d) the retaking of the lawyer’s oath which will not only remind him of his duties and responsibilities as a lawyer and as an officer of the Court, but also renew his pledge to maintain allegiance to the Republic o f the Philippines. Compliance with these conditions will restore his good standing as a member of the Philippine bar. WHEREFORE , the petition of Attorney Benjamin M. Dacanay is hereby GRANTED, subject to compliance with the conditions stated above and submission of proof of such compliance to the Bar Confidant, after which he may retake his oath as a member of the Philippine bar.
SO ORDERED. IRENE RAYOS-OMBAC vs. ATTY. ORLANDO A. RAYOS FACTS:
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This is a disbarment case filed by Mrs. Irene Rayos-Ombac against her nephew, Atty. Orlando A. Rayos, a legal practitioner in Metro Manila, for "his failure to adhere to the standards of mental and moral fitness set up for members of the bar. In January 1985, respondent induced complainant who was then 85 years old to withdraw all her bank deposits and entrust them to him for safekeeping. Acting on respondent's suggestion, complainant preterminated all her time deposits with the Philippine National Bank and transferred them to UnionBank, where the respondent was working. Complainant made the deposit under the name of respondent’s wife and in trust for seven beneficiaries, including his son. Upon maturity of the time deposit, complainant made a demand on respondent to return the P588,000.00 plus interest but respondent could only return P400,000.00 to be paid on installment. Complainant acceded to respondent's proposal as she was already old and was in dire need of money. On the same date, respondent and complainant executed a memorandum of agreement stating that the money will be paid back in instalments through postdated checks. Complainant was only able to encash the check for P64,800.00 as the others were dishonoured for lack of funds. On November 15, 1985, complainant filed a complaint for estafa against respondent and a corresponding information was filed against him by the provincial fiscal. On September 15, 1997, respondent filed with this Court a Motion to Lift Suspension for Two Years, alleging that complainant has executed an affidavit withdrawing the complaint for disbarment.
Issue: Whether or not the respondent may be disbarred
Held: Yes. Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states: "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct." Rule 1.03 of the same Code, on the other hand, provides: "A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any man's cause." Respondent violated the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as his oath as an attorney when he deceived his 85-year old aunt into entrusting to him all her money, and later refused to return the same despite demand. Respondent's wicked deed was aggravated by the series of unfounded
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