UNITED ENRGY PAKITAN LTD. NAIMAT PHASE V PROJECT
HAZID TERMS OF REFERENCE Feb 2014 Revision: A
REV
DATE
DESCRIPTION
PREPARED
CHECKED
APPROVED
A
13/02/2014
Issued for Review
MSA
Sheraz
MSZ
QA
CONTENTS ABBREVIATIONS
3
DEFINITIONS
4
HOLDS
6
1.0
INTRODUCTION
7
1.1
7
2.0
3.0
PROCESS DESCRIPTION
8
2.1
Background
8
2.2
New Facilities
8
METHODOLOGY 3.1
4.0
Workshop Scope
9
HAZID
MEETING DETAILS
10
4.1
Meeting Arrangements
10
4.2
Workshop Attendees
10
4.3
Documentation & Materials
10
4.4
Recording and Reporting
10
4.5
Action Tracking
11
APPENDICES APPENDIX I HAZARD CHECKLIST APPENDIX II RISK ASSESSMENT MATRIX
ABBREVIATIONS BLEVE
Boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion.
BOP
Blowout preventer.
CVP
Capital value process.
DCS
Distributed control system.
EA
Engineering authority.
FEED
Front end design.
HAZID
Hazard identification.
HAZOP
Hazard and operability (study).
HSSE
Health, safety, security, and environmental.
HSSE&O
Health, safety, security, environmental, and operational.
IPL
Independent protection layer.
ISD
Inherently safer design.
LNG
Liquefied natural gas.
LPG
Liquefied petroleum gas.
MOC
Management of change.
OMS
Operating management system.
P&ID
Piping and instrumentation diagrams.
PFD
Process flow diagrams.
PHSSER
Project HSSE review.
TOR
Terms of reference.
DEFINITIONS Cause Event, situation, or condition that results, or could result, directly or indirectly in an accident or incident. Competent Describes an individual with knowledge and skills deemed acceptable by the engineering authority (EA) to perform a task. Appropriate knowledge and skill may be acquired through training, experience, qualifications, or some combination of these. Consequences Direct, undesirable result of an accident sequence usually involving a fire, explosion, or release of toxic material. Consequence descriptions may be qualitative or quantitative estimates of the effects of an accident in terms of factors such as health impacts, economic loss, and environmental damage. Hazard Condition or practice with the potential to cause harm to people, the environment, property, or reputation. Hazard identification (HAZID) Brainstorming approach used to identify possible hazards. HAZID studies are very broad in their scope. The HAZID is sometimes called a Preliminary Hazard Analysis. Hazard and operability (HAZOP) Systematic qualitative technique to identify and evaluate process hazards and potential operating problems, using a series of guidewords to examine deviations from normal process conditions. Independent protection layer (IPL) Device, system, or action that is capable of preventing a postulated accident sequence from proceeding to a defined, undesirable endpoint. An IPL is (1) independent of the event that initiated the accident sequence and (2) independent of any other IPLs. IPLs are normally identified during layer of protection analyses. Initiating cause A failure, error, situation, or condition that results or may result in the propagation of a hazardous event. Risk A measure of loss / harm to people, the environment, compliance status, Group reputation, assets or business performance in terms of the product of the probability of an event occurring and the magnitude of its impact. Throughout this Practice the term “risk” is used to describe health, safety, security, environmental, and operational (HSSE&O) undesired events. Node A discrete area or portion of an activity, plant, or system that permits a stepwise approach towards progressing through the HAZID. Safeguards Device, system, or action that would likely interrupt the chain of events following an initiating cause or that would mitigate loss event impacts.
What If analysis Scenario based hazard evaluation procedure using a brainstorming approach in which typically a team that includes one or more persons familiar with the subject process asks questions or voices concerns about what could go wrong, what consequences could ensue, and whether the existing safeguards are adequate.
HOLDS No holds.
1.0
INTRODUCTION United Energy Pakistan is conducting a HAZID review of Naimat Phase-V Gas treatment and LPG extraction project. The project is in FEED stage. HAZID inputs will become pat of basis for Detailed Design. A two days session is planned to be conducted at UEPL head office in Bahria Complex-1 on 17th & 18th of Feb 2014.
1.1
Workshop Scope The HAZID will look into Naimat Phase-V scope only. Existing on-going projects, Phase-IV and TAR will not be subject of this HAZID however hazards due to SIMOPSs and any interconnectivity between existing and new units will be considered in this HAZID scope. The purpose of HAZID is to:
Identify potential hazards as defined in the TOR for the HAZID study.
Consider consequences of the hazards.
Identify safeguards that are in place to provide hazard prevention or mitigation.
Propose recommendations, as needed, to eliminate, prevent, control, or mitigate hazards.
Provide assistance to facility management in its efforts to manage risks.
Support objectives of ISD.
2.0
PROCESS DESCRIPTION
2.1
Background SHERAZ TO PROVIDE DETAILS OF EXISTING OPERATIONS AS WELL AS OF ON_GOING EXPANSION PROJECTS (PHASE 3, 4 TAR etc.)
2.1.1
New facilities (PHASE-V) SHERAZ TO FILL THIS SECTION.
3.0
METHODOLOGY HAZID will be carried out as per industry standard practices. HAZID will look into Major Accidents as well as HSSE hazards. A set of guidewords or brainstorming reference list will be used during the session. HAZID team will be encouraged to consider more deviations / hazards which may be missing in generic list. For each guideword team will brainstorm potential consequences and list existing safeguards and generate recommendations for further mitigation if required. A risk Matrix (8x8) will be used to risk rank all the identified harzards. HAZID Proceedings will be recorded on a worksheet. Draft worksheet is attached (SHERAZ TO ATTACH UPDATED HAZID WORKSHEET)
4.0
MEETING DETAILS
4.1
Meeting Arrangements The workshop will be conducted in Karachi at UEPL head office Bahria Complex-1 on 17th - 18th Feb 2014.
4.2
Workshop Attendees The workshops will be facilitated by an independent chairperson from SHEPHERED RISK, with attendees made of construction team members, engineers, design & operations representatives. The following personnel from UEPL AND ZEL are required to participate:
4.3
Project Representative (Project Manager or Project Engineer);
Process Engineer;
Piping/Layouts Engineer;
Electrical Engineer;
Controls & Instrument Engineer;
Construction Manager;
Representative from Operations/Commissioning;
Corrosion Engineer
Civil Engineer (part time)
Other engineers/specialists will be requested as and when is required
Documentation & Materials (SHERAZ TO PROVIDE COPIES) The following documentation should be made available during the workshop in advance to avoid the likelihood of interruptions to the session: 1. Process Flow Diagrams (PFDs) - with possibly Piping & Instrumentation Diagrams (P&IDs) at block diagram level; 2. Overall Plant layout (latest revision); 3. Process description including all planned operating cases; 4. Project description including all options, life cycle issues and planned plant flexibility; 5. Safety philosophy; 6. Preliminary operating philosophy.
4.4
Recording and Reporting The discussion and actions raised during the workshop review will be recorded on a standard Microsoft Word/Excel worksheet format. The scribe is responsible for taking a record of the meeting with direction from the Chairman.
4.5
Action Tracking Following the workshop, a HAZID report with worksheets will be produced. The Project Manager will be responsible for distributing the report to appropriate parties and tracking Action items and follow up action responses to close out.
Annex-I HAZARD CHECKLIST (SHERAZ TO UPDATE)
Annex-II
Risk Framework – HSE Impact Levels HEALTH AND SAFETY
Levels A-C maintain the visibility of risks with the potential for catastrophic impact even if their probability of occurrence is extremely low. The upper level of this framework is defined by the most severe level of impact ever seen in industry.
SEVERITY
Comparable to the most catastrophic health/ safety incidents ever seen in industry.
A
The potential for 100 or more fatalities (or onset of life threatening health effects) shall always be
ENVIRONMENTAL
Future impact, e.g., unintended release, with widespread damage to any environment and which remains in an "unsatisfactory" state for a period > 5 years.
Future impact with extensive damage to a sensitive environment and which remains in an "unsatisfactory" state for a period > 5 years.
Future impact with widespread damage to a sensitive environment and which can only be restored to a "satisfactory"/agreed state in a period of more than 1 and up to
SEVERITY
HEALTH AND SAFETY
ENVIRONMENTAL
classified at this level.
Future impact with extensive damage to a non-sensitive environment and which remains in an "unsatisfactory" state for a period > 5 years.
Future impact with extensive damage to a sensitive environment and which can only be restored to a "satisfactory"/agreed state in a period of more than 1 and up to 5 years.
Future impact with widespread damage to a non-sensitive environment and which can only be restored to a "satisfactory"/agreed state in a period of more than 1 and up to 5 years.
Future impact with widespread damage to a sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of around 1 year.
Catastrophic health/ safety incident causing widespread fatalities within or outside a facility.
Future impact with extensive damage to a non-sensitive environment and which can only be restored to a "satisfactory"/agreed state in a period of more than 1 and up to 5 years.
The potential for 10 or more fatalities (or onset of life threatening health effects) shall always be classified at this level.
Future impact with widespread damage to a non-sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of around 1 year.
Future impact with extensive damage to a sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of around 1 year.
Future impact with widespread damage to a sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of months.
Catastrophic health/ safety incident causing very widespread fatalities within or outside a facility. The potential for 50 or more fatalities (or onset of life threatening health effects) shall always be classified at this level.
B
C
5 years.
BP's commitment to health, safety and the environment is paramount; this is reflected in BP’s HSE goal of "No Accidents, No Harm to People, and No Damage to the Environment". No accident, injury, or loss of containment causing damage to the environment is ever “acceptable” to BP. BP is using this framework (equivalents of which are used throughout industry) to support the consistent prioritization of actions to eliminate or mitigate HSE risk and as part of BP's Performance Improvement Cycle to deliver continuous risk reduction. Very major health/ safety incident
D
E
The potential for 3 or more fatalities (or onset of life threatening health effects) shall always be classified at this level.
Future impact with extensive damage to a non-sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of around 1 year.
Future impact with localized damage to a sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of around 1 year.
30 or more injuries or health effects, either permanent or requiring hospital treatment for more than 24 hours.
Future impact with widespread damage to a non-sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of months.
Future impact with extensive damage to a sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of months.
Major health/ safety incident
1 or 2 fatalities, acute or chronic, actual or alleged.
Future impact with localized damage to a non-sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of around 1 year.
Future impact with extensive damage to a non-sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of months.
Future impact with localized damage to a sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of months.
Future impact with extensive damage to a sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of days or weeks.
Future impact with localized damage to a non-sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of months.
Future impact with immediate area damage to a sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of months.
Future impact with extensive damage to a non-sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of days or weeks.
Future impact with localized damage to a sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of days or weeks.
10 or more injuries or health effects, either permanent or requiring hospital treatment for more than 24 hours.
High impact health/ safety incident Permanent partial disability(ies)
F
Several non-permanent injuries or health impacts. Days Away From Work Case (DAFWC)
SEVERITY
G
HEALTH AND SAFETY Medium impact health/ safety incident
Future impact with immediate area damage to a non-sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of months.
Single or multiple recordable injury or health effects from common source/event.
Future impact with localized damage to a non-sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of days or weeks.
Future impact with immediate area damage to a sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of days or weeks.
Low impact health/ safety incident
Future impact with immediate area damage to a non-sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of days or weeks.
First aid
H
ENVIRONMENTAL
Single or multiple over-exposures causing noticeable irritation but no actual health effects
Risk Framework – Business Impact Levels
SEVERITY*
A
Non-Financial Impact
Public or investor outrage on a global scale. Threat of global loss of license to operate.
Financial Impact (EQUIPMENT DAMAGE, BUSINESS VALUE LOST) >$20 billion
Loss of license to operate a major asset in a major market – US, EU, Russia.
B
Intervention from major Government – US, UK, EU, Russia. Public or investor outrage in major western markets – US, EU.
$5 billion - $20 billion
Damage to relationships with key stakeholders of benefit to the Group.
C
Loss of license to operate other material asset, or severe enforcement action against a major asset in a major market. Intervention from other major Government.
$1 billion - $5 billion
Public or investor outrage in other material market where we have presence or aspiration. Severe enforcement action against a material asset in a non-major market, or against other assets in a major market. Interventions from non-major Governments.
D
Public or investor outrage in a non-major market, or localised or limited “interest-group” outrage in a major market.
$100 m to $1 billion
Prolonged adverse national or international media attention. Widespread adverse social impact. Damage to relationships with key stakeholders of benefit to the Segment. Other adverse enforcement action by regulators.
E
Limited “interest-group” outrage in non major market. Short term adverse national or international media coverage.
$5m -$100 m
Damage to relationships with key stakeholders of benefit to the SPU. Regulatory compliance issue which does not lead to regulatory or other higher severity level consequence Prolonged local media coverage.
F
Local adverse social impact.
$500k-$5m
Damage to relationships with key stakeholders of benefit to the Performance Unit (PU).
Short term local media coverage.
G
Some disruption to local operations (e.g., loss of single road access less than 24 hours).
$50k -$500k
H
Isolated and short term complaints from neighbours (e.g., complaints about specific noise episode).
<$50k
The colours in the above table are for use on a Risk Management Matrix (RMM). This is a tool used by BP group leadership to report and manage SPU, segment and BP group risk. For those risk events which are included in the RMM, the following guidance applies: Risks with Impact levels C and above are recorded on the BP group RMM. Risks with Impact levels D and above are recorded on the segment RMM. Risks with Impact levels H and above are recorded on the SPU RMM. In some cases, Level D impacts may be elevated to BP group impact. For risks in category D, the segment Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Chief Operating Office (COO) or Strategic Performance Unit Leader (SPUL) will determine whether a particular risk should be elevated.
Risk Matrix
1. 2.
The numbers (1-15) in the above matrix reflect the relative levels of risk (risk rating) with 1 being the lowest level of risk and 15 the highest. The colours in the table relate to reporting and endorsement levels for action plans (see 0). Where data exists to support a quantitative estimate of probability / frequency, or a reasonable estimate of probability / frequency can be made, use of the numerical probability / frequency criteria is preferred. If not, the qualitative descriptions can be used. However, the verbal descriptors are based on the following assumptions and if any of these are not met, this needs to be taken into consideration when estimating likelihood.
Life of a facility is around 30 years.
There are around 100 facilities across the BP group where a similar event could occur.
BP represents around 1-10% of the whole industry. When positioning a risk event on the matrix, it is not usually possible to precisely determine the likelihood and severity of an event in advance of it happening. Reflecting this uncertainty, the position on the matrix is therefore, only approximate.
