UNITED ENERGY PAKISTAN LTD. NAIMAT PHASE V PROJECT
HAZID REPORT Feb 2014 Revision: A
REV
DATE
DESCRIPTION
PREPARED
CHECKED
APPROVED
A
22/02/2014
Issued for Review
MSA
Sheraz (MSG)
MSZ
0
10/02/2014
Issued for distribution
MSA
Sheraz (MSG)
MSZ
CONTENTS ABBREVIATIONS
3
DEFINITIONS
4
HOLDS
6
1.0
INTRODUCTION
7
1.1
7
2.0
Workshop Scope
PROCESS DESCRIPTION
8
2.1
8
Background
3.0
METHODOLOGY
4.0
MEETING DETAILS
10
5.0
HAZID FINDINGS
11
5.1
Recommendations:
11
5.2
HAZID Comments
13
6.0
HAZID FOLLOWUP
APPENDICES
9
16
NO TABLE OF CONTENTS ENTRIES FOUND.ABBREVIATIONS BLEVE
Boiling liquid expanding vapour explosion.
BOP
Blowout preventer.
CVP
Capital value process.
DCS
Distributed control system.
EA
Engineering authority.
FEED
Front end design.
HAZID
Hazard identification.
HAZOP
Hazard and operability (study).
HSSE
Health, safety, security, and environmental.
HSSE&O
Health, safety, security, environmental, and operational.
IPL
Independent protection layer.
ISD
Inherently safer design.
LNG
Liquefied natural gas.
LPG
Liquefied petroleum gas.
MOC
Management of change.
OMS
Operating management system.
P&ID
Piping and instrumentation diagram.
PFD
Process flow diagrams.
PHSSER
Project HSSE review.
TOR
Terms of reference.
DEFINITIONS Cause Event, situation, or condition that results, or could result, directly or indirectly in an accident or incident. Competent Describes an individual with knowledge and skills deemed acceptable by the engineering authority (EA) to perform a task. Appropriate knowledge and skill may be acquired through training, experience, qualifications, or some combination of these. Consequences Direct, undesirable result of an accident sequence usually involving a fire, explosion, or release of toxic material. Consequence descriptions may be qualitative or quantitative estimates of the effects of an accident in terms of factors such as health impacts, economic loss, and environmental damage. Hazard Condition or practice with the potential to cause harm to people, the environment, property, or reputation. Hazard identification (HAZID) Brainstorming approach used to identify possible hazards. HAZID studies are very broad in their scope. The HAZID is sometimes called a Preliminary Hazard Analysis. Hazard and operability (HAZOP) Systematic qualitative technique to identify and evaluate process hazards and potential operating problems, using a series of guidewords to examine deviations from normal process conditions. Independent protection layer (IPL) Device, system, or action that is capable of preventing a postulated accident sequence from proceeding to a defined, undesirable endpoint. An IPL is (1) independent of the event that initiated the accident sequence and (2) independent of any other IPLs. IPLs are normally identified during layer of protection analyses. Initiating cause A failure, error, situation, or condition that results or may result in the propagation of a hazardous event. Risk A measure of loss / harm to people, the environment, compliance status, Group reputation, assets or business performance in terms of the product of the probability of an event occurring and the magnitude of its impact. Throughout this Practice the term “risk” is used to describe health, safety, security, environmental, and operational (HSSE&O) undesired events. Node A discrete area or portion of an activity, plant, or system that permits a stepwise approach towards progressing through the HAZID. Safeguards Device, system, or action that would likely interrupt the chain of events following an initiating cause or that would mitigate loss event impacts.
What If analysis Scenario based hazard evaluation procedure using a brainstorming approach in which typically a team that includes one or more persons familiar with the subject process asks questions or voices concerns about what could go wrong, what consequences could ensue, and whether the existing safeguards are adequate.
HOLDS No holds.
1.0
INTRODUCTION United Energy Pakistan commissioned HAZID study for Naimat Phase-V Gas treatment and LPG extraction project. The project is in FEED stage. Detailed design (EPCC) will be initiated soon, a Tender Document has been prepared by FEED which will form basis of design for detailed engineering. HAZID looked into generic project and process hazards associated with the project. A two days session was conducted at UEPL head office in Bahria Complex-1 on 17th & 18th of Feb 2014.
1.1
Workshop Scope The HAZID will look into Naimat Phase-V scope only. Existing on-going projects, Phase-IV and TAP will not be subject of this HAZID however hazards due to SIMOPSs and any interconnectivity between existing and new units will be considered in this HAZID scope. The purpose of HAZID is to: •
Identify potential hazards as defined in the TOR for the HAZID study.
•
Consider consequences of the hazards.
•
Identify safeguards that are in place to provide hazard prevention or mitigation.
•
Propose recommendations, as needed, to eliminate, prevent, control, or mitigate hazards.
•
Provide assistance to facility management in its efforts to manage risks.
•
Support objectives of ISD.
2.0
PROCESS DESCRIPTION
2.1
Background Naimat Facility is a gas treatment and LPG recovery plant which consists of four (04) phases. Each phase consists of Amine Sweetening unit and Glycol Dehydration unit along with their utilities. There is a refrigerated LPG unit and Condensate stabilization unit. Within this plant there is condensate and LPG storage and loading area.
2.1.1
New facilities (PHASE-V) Naimat Phase-V will be adjacent to and fed from Naimat Facility which consists of Separation unit, Amine Sweetening unit, Glycol Dehydration unit, Molecular Sieve Dehydration unit, Turbo-Expander LPG Recovery Unit, Condensate Stabilization unit and Sales Gas Compression along with their utilities and offsites. It is decided that this phase will be a stand-alone and will process Naimat West gas whereas 40 and 85 MMSCFD additional gas from existing Naimat Phases can be processed in Glycol dehydration unit and LPG unit respectively. There is also provision given in condensate stabilization unit to process condensate from existing Naimat Phases. Utilities for Naimat Phase-V will consist of Hot Oil system, Instrument and utility Air system, Fuel Gas system, Power Generation system, Firewater system, Warm and Cold Flare system. RO (Reverse Osmosis) system for this phase will be installed along with Naimat Phase-IV RO system. Storage and Loading facilities will be provided for condensate and LPG. Produced water system will be installed for disposal of produced water. LP/HP drain systems will also be provided to handle drains generated during maintenance and shutdown. Storm water pit is provided at the area where flare stack is situated and have enough capacity to handle large amount of water generated due to rain fall.
3.0
METHODOLOGY HAZID was carried out as per industry standard practices. HAZID looked into Major Accidents as well as HSSE hazards during construction as well as commissioning and operation stage. A set of guidewords or brainstorming reference list was used during the session. HAZID team was encouraged to consider more deviations / hazards which may be missing in generic list. For each guideword team did brainstorming, identifying potential consequences and list existing safeguards and generate recommendations for further mitigation as required. A risk Matrix (8x8) was used to risk rank all the identified hazards. The purpose of risk ranking was to prioritize the findings on a scale. Risk ranking should not be interpreted as Qualitative or Quantitative risks of the project as at the FEED stage limited technical details were available to assess the risks accurately hence only relative ranking of findings was done. HAZID identified a number of actions which were categorized either as Recommendations or Comments, former being actions to be addressed at FEED to EPCC stage and later (comments) to be either incorporated in Tender Document or actions already in place but need completion or verification.
4.0
MEETING DETAILS
Workshop Attendees Name
Designation
17/02/2014
18/02/2014
Muhammad Saim Ahmed
Facilitator
√
√
Muhammad Sheraz Goraya
Process Engineer / HAZID Scribe
√
√
Jamal uddin
Field Production Engineer
√
√
Abduallah Sheikh Muhammad
Engineering Manager
√
√
Syed Fraz Rizvi
FOE-MKK
√
√
Mansoor Ahmed Khan
Mechanical Engineer
Mansoor Ali Khan
Engineering Consultant
Yasir Mahdi
FOE-Central & South
√
Iqbal Sahto
Facility Manager-MKK
√
Masood Sarwar
HSE
√
Muhammad Hani
Process Engineer (ZEL)
√
Ahsan Nasir
Project Engineer (ZEL)
Muhammad Mudassir Mirza
Sr. Electrical Engineer (ZEL)
√
Irfan Khokhar
Sr. Instrumentation Engineer (ZEL)
√
√ √
√
√ √
√
5.0
HAZID FINDINGS HAZID identified a number of actions to be addressed in Tender Document, during detailed engineering or management actions addressing issues like regulatory compliance and organization related actions. Some actions need to be closed before issuing tender document for EPCC others require closure during detailed engineering (EPCC), some management actions need to be closed during the course of project e.g. resourcing and development of operating staff, preparation of Emergency Response Plans etc. These actions and comments are listed below:
5.1
Recommendations:
1.2.2.1 Evaluate flare foundation design in storm water pit considering long residence time for storm water 1.2.2.2 Consider facility drain system in design for heavy rains case (no option available for storm water drainage out of facility at present) 2.4.1 Verify that transport protocol for contractor is included in tender documents
UEP & EPCC
UEP
3.3.1 Verify that Tender Document clearly states that plant and equipment layout shall be based on Fire & Explosion Hazard Analysis and applicable NFPA, API Codes and standards, define basis for layout and spacing. 3.3.2 Consider QRA for entire Naimat facility to finalize the layout w.r.t to risks posed by the project to on-site and offsite population.
UEP & EPCC
3.3.3/20.3 Noise survey to be included in EPCC scope, ensure that noise in occupied buildings area and adjacent community residential areas does not exceed NEQS limits 4.1.1 Include the updation of Naimat SOP incorporating Phase-V operations in project scope 4.1.2 Identify and provide communication infrastructure needed for safe and efficient plant operation.
UEP
4.2.2 Communication protocol between EPCC ERP and UEP ERP shall be defined 4.2.3 Identify and provide communication infrastructure needed during emergencies (including onsite and remote command posts etc.)
UEP
6.1.1 It is recommended to include following studies in project scope: 1) Emergency Evacuation and Response study 2) QRA 3) SIMOPS 4) Dispersion modeling 5) SCEs identification report
UEP
6.3.1 Develop and maintain project hazard and effects register during the course of project and follow project MoC system
UEP & EPCC
6.4.1 Project MoC system shall be established for change control. 6.4.2 Green field construction work permit system shall be agreed with EPCC and shall be in line with UEP work permit system.
UEP & EPCC
7.1.2/7.2.2 It is recommended that provision of resources (equipment/man power) for ER such as Ambulances, trained Emergency Responders etc. as required, shall be part of Project deliverables considering major impact of project on MKK ERP
UEP
8.1.1/8.2.1/8.3.1/13.1.1 Project organogram shall include Operation tag for training need analysis and developing training program. 8.1.2/8.2.2/8.3.2/13.1.3 Staffing requirement to be identified and hiring to be completed before plant commissioning.
UEP
11.1.1 Verify that ITP (Inspection & Testing Plan) is defined in Tender Document.
UEP & EPCC
13.1.2 Conduct SIMOPs study 13.1.4/4.2.1/7.1.1/7.2.1 Include the updation of Naimat ERP, incorporating Phase-V scenarios, in project scope. 14.1.1 Confirm that UEP health and Hygiene standards is included Tender Document and EPCC shall comply during the construction activities/camp. 14.1.2 Safe drinking water supply at contractor's camp and work site to be ensured.
UEP & EPCC
16.1.1 As per API-521, Rupture disc to be installed at u/s of PSVs on corrosive/choking environment especially at CO2 route. (refer 2010/11 Naimat Phase-2 over pressure incident report & MKK HAZOP recommendations related to this)
UEP & EPCC
16.12.1/17.3.1 Consider self-contained fire suppression system such as Inergen etc. for critical buildings for e.g. DCS room, switchgear room etc. as per governing NFPA 16.13.1 Tender Document defines blow down time as 25 min, this is a deviation from API-521 15 min depressurization requirement. FEHA shall determine escalation potentials due to delayed blow down. A cost-benefit analysis shall be carried out to make decision on savings on flare header size due to increasing blow down time vs. potential escalation. 17.6.1 Fire response strategy to be defined in Tender Document and EPCC should provide fire response plan as per philosophy.
UEP
UEP & EPCC
20.3.1 Noise survey to be included in EPCC scope, ensure that noise in occupied buildings area and adjacent community residential areas does not exceed NEQS limits 22.1.1 Identify firewater source meeting NFPA guidelines 22.7.1 Review drain system design avoiding any connection of HP/LP drains open to atmosphere 22.12.1 Identify potable water source for facility
UEP & EPCC
UEP
UEP & EPCC
UEP
22.16.1 Communication protocol (for normal & emergencies) shall be prepared by UEP and provision of communication system /hardware for conformance to UEP protocol shall be included in tender document
UEP & EPCC
22.23.1 Flare exclusion zone shall be isolated/barricaded as per API-521
EPCC
23.2.1 Review LPG spheres location with respect to FEHA results to minimize impact of fire, dispersions and BELEVE on adjacent equipment and surrounding population (consider future population growths along the facility fence where UEP has no control). Adequate distance from plant fence to be maintained. 23.2.2 Review LPG storage drain impoundment area design considering flooding in case of fire water application 23.9.1 Implement condensate storage tank overfilling safeguards recommended by Buncefield incident investigation report.
5.2
UEP & EPCC
EPCC
HAZID Comments
1.2.3.1/7.1.1 Ensure that Tender Document contains instructions related to establishment of onsite medical facilities (by EPCC during construction period) approved by UEP-HSE
UEP
1.2.5.1 Confirm Earthquake zoning given in Tender Document, is it 2A or 2B.
UEP
1.2.7.1 Ensure lightning protection is being considered in Tender Document
UEP
3.2.1/10.1 .1 Refer Naimat Phase-IV and TAP Lesson Learned document for Transport related and other project lessons.
UEP
3.3.1 Verify that tender document contains requirement of modeling for acid gas (H2S in acid gas) release scenarios.
UEP & EPCC
3.6.1/15.1.1 IEE initiated with 3rd party consultant, discussion in-progress with SEPA for study scope. Need to be closed at earliest and obtain NoC. 3.6.2/15.1.2 Address the issue of H2S emissions NEQS non-compliance with SEPA.
UEP
3.7.1 Consult Legal, PSCM, LMS, C&EA to identify and address social issues that may arise during construction
UEP
7.2.1 Ensure that Tender document contains instructions that EPCC shall submit ERP for handling Major accident scenarios during construction phase for UEP approval.
UEP
10.3.2 QRA shall include LPG + Condensate bowzer movement scenario 10.3.3 Consider separate entrance for loading bowzers and normal plant entrance 10.3.4/11.1.1 Detailed shipment and inland transport plan to be developed at Detailed Engineering stage by EPCC, approved by UEP
UEP & EPCC
12.1.1 EPCC shall submit lifting plans for UEP approval
UEP & EPCC
13.1.1 Ensure that Tender document contains requirement for submission of Maintenance plans by EPCC to UEP for incorporation into MAXIMO 13.1.2 Verify that tender document clearly defines independence between control and ESD systems to be verified as per required SIL levels 14.2.1 EPCC shall Follow confined space working procedures approved by UEP
EPCC
16.2.1/16.7.1/18.1.1 EPCC to carry out FEHA and consider minimizing congestion to optimize the plot plan with respect to blast overpressure contours. 16.2.2/18.1.2 OPBs to be located out of blast overpressure contours or designed to withstand overpressure.
UEP & EPCC
16.3.1 EPCC to carry out FEHA and update plot plan as necessary. 16.3.2 OPBs to be located out of fire radiation contours of concern as per API-521 or design as shelter in place.
UEP & EPCC
16.7.2 Plot plan is preliminary layout. EPCC to finalize the plant boundaries based on FEHA
UEP & EPCC
16.9.1 SIL study to be done by EPCC. Specifications of SIF, reliability, survivability, availability and maintenance intervals to be defined on the basis of SIL study.
EPCC
17.4.1 Location of fired heaters to be finalized based on FEHA results considering flammable gas dispersion contours and wind directions.
EPCC
17.6.1 FEHA shall provide basis for fire prevention and control engineering, fire response plan shall be developed accordingly.
UEP & EPCC
22.1.1/22.12.1 SEPA permission required for utilization of groundwater as potable water or fire water
UEP
22.4.1 Ensure that diesel storage meets OGRA regulations
UEP
22.9.1 Hazop to evaluate the requirement of ESD on IA low pressure
EPCC
22.15.1 Requirement of HVAC for control room and security room to be established based on dispersion modeling
EPCC
22.17.1 Evaluate R134A as a refrigerant in place of propane, compare cost and safety aspects for both options.
UEP
22.22.1 Evaluate facility drain system for heavy rains case
UEP
22.24.1 Ensure that sewerage and septic pit scope is included in Tender Document
UEP
23.4.1 Ensure that diesel storage meets OGRA regulations
UEP
23.9.1 Propane filling arrangement for refrigeration loop for black start to be kept in design
EPCC
23.10.1 Provision of recycling of off-spec LPG from storage back to recovery unit to be kept in design
EPCC
24.1.1 Review requirement of BTEX monitoring for heaters and incorporate provisions for monitoring BTEX in design.
UEP
24.13.1 Evaluate relief requirement on heat exchangers where tube side operating pressures exceeds 1.5 times of shell side design pressure. Fast acting relief devices are required on some heat exchanger shell sides.
UEP & EPCC
6.0
HAZID FOLLOWUP HAZID recommendations are very broad in nature covering various aspects of project from concept to commissioning and operations. Some recommendations and comments are to be addressed at FEED stage before issuing tender document, most action are to be taken during EPCC and some management action have to be taken independent of EPCC but before commissioning. As has been recommended with HAZID a project Hazard Register shall be established and HAZID findings shall be added to it (later HAZOP and other studies’ findings to be added). It is further recommended to re-validate HAZID at a suitable time during detailed engineering such as upon completion of process engineering and finalization of plant layout.
Annex-I HAZID Worksheet
NAIMAT PHASE-V (FEED) HAZID WORKSHEET Category/Node
Guideword
Hazard Description
Consequence
Safeguards
R Safety
1.1 Seismic.
1.1 .1 Uneven settling of Plot, foundation damage
1.1.1 Piping and equipment failure leading to loss of containment, fires, explosion, fatalities, asset damage
1.1.1 Soil Investigation is in progress to be made part of Tender Document 1.1.2 No Seismic activities (exploration) planned in area
D2=6
1.2.1.1 Damage to tall equipment/ columns
1.2.1.1 Piping and equipment failure leading to loss of containment, fires, explosion, fatalities, asset damage
1.2.1.1 Plant design for 100 mph which is sufficient based on available historical data
D2=6
1.2.2.1 No threat from river floods. 1.2.2.2 Heavy rains
1.2.2.1 Piping and equipment failure leading to loss of containment, fires, explosion, fatalities, asset damage 1.2.2.2 Facility flooding due to heavy rains and no drainage
1.2.2.1 Facility is designed for 250 mm rain in 24 hr
F3=5
1.2 Weather:
1.2.1 High winds.
1.2.2 Floods. 1. Natural and Environmental Hazards
En Re
2. Security
1.2.5 Earthquake.
1.2.5.1 Earthquake leading to buildings/ equipment damage
1.2.6 Hurricane.
1.2.6.1 No threat of hurricane
1.2.7 Lightning.
1.2.7.1 Lightning strike on equipment or person
1.3 Marine life impacts on equipment.
1.3.1 Not Applicable
1.4 Subsidence.
1.4.1 Uneven settling of Plot, foundation damage
1.5 Geological conditions for structural support.
1.5.1 Uneven settling of Plot, foundation damage
2.1 Assault 2.2 Sabotage 2.3 Crisis (military action, civil disturbances, terrorism)
1.2.5.1 Piping and equipment failure leading to loss of containment, fires, explosion, fatalities, asset damage
1.2.5.1 Design for Earthquake zone 2A upper moderate as per area classification issued by Geological survey of Pakistan
1.2.7.1 Piping and equipment failure leading to loss of containment, fires, explosion, fatalities, asset damage
1.4.1 Piping and equipment failure leading to loss of containment, fires, explosion, fatalities, asset damage 1.5.1 Piping and equipment failure leading to loss of containment, fires, explosion, fatalities, asset damage
D2=6
E3=6
1.4.1 Soil Investigation is in progress to be made part of Tender Document
D2=6
1.5.1 Soil Investigation is in progress to be made part of Tender Document
D2=6
2.1.1 Not in UEP Experience 2.2.1 Not in UEP Experience
2.3.1 Not in UEP Experience
2.4.1 Existing UEP
3.3 Proximity to Populationduring operations
3.3.1 Vapor cloud explosion and dense gas dispersion 3.3.2 High H2S conc ( >10 ppm) in Acid gas Stream 3.3.3 High noise 3.3.4 Heavy vehicle movements see section 10
3.4 Adjacent Land Use
3.4.1 Flare radiations affecting crops
3.5 Proximity to Transport Corridors
3.5.1 No major issues
3.6 Environmental Issues
3.6.1 H2S at cold vent tip exceeding NEQS limits for atmospheric release.
3.3.1 Injuries and fatalities to onsite/offsite population, equipment failure 3.3.2 Exposure to H2S due to acid gas dispersion at grade level, complains of odors n possible minor health effects to neighbors 3.3.3 Health n social issues due to high noise
3.3.1 Acid gas vent design to ensure less than 10 ppm grade level H2S conc.
3.4.1 Social issues
3.4.1 Flare height to be evaluated as per API 521 not to exceed 500 BTU/hr-ft2 at facility battery limits
3.6.1 Environmental damage, Non Compliance with regulations
3.6.1 Cold vent height to be such that on ground concentration of H2S does not exceed 10 ppm.
D3=7
4.2 Communications for Contingency planning
4.2.1 Inefficient communication during emergency
4.3 Supply Support
4.3.1 No concerns
4.2.1 Delay in emergency response and medical care, escalation of event
E4=7
Project Implementation Issues
5. Contracting Strategy
5.1 Prevailing influence 5.2 Legislation 5.3 External Standards 5.4 External Environmental Constraints
6.1 Hazard Studies
6.1.1 Unsafe design due to unidentified hazards
6.1.1 Major accident leading to safety/ environment asset and reputation damage
6.1.1 Following studies have been listed in EPCC scope in tender Document: HAZID, Hazop, SIL, FEHA and Plant Layout Study, Hazardous Area
D3=7
7.1 Geographical Infrastructure
7.1.1 No major medical facility for immediate medical response
7.1.1 Delay in medical treatment to critically ill or injured person
7.2 Recovery Measures
7.2.1 Inadequate emergency response
7.2.1 Escalation of event
7.1.1 First aid and primary care facilities will be provided at Naimat along with qualified medical doctor and ambulance will be on standby 24/7. For secondary and tertiary treatment patient will be mobilized to Hyderabad and onwards to Karachi if needed.
7. Contingency Planning
E4=7
8.3 Level of Technology
9. Construction/ Existing Facilities
9.1 Tie-ins (shutdown requirements) 9.2 Concurrent Operations 9.3 Reuse of Material 9.4 Common Equipment Capacity 9.5 Interface Shutdown/blowd own/ 9.6 ESD 9.7 Skid Dimensions (weight handling/equipm ent (congestion) 9.8 Soil Contamination (existing facilities) 9.9 Mobilization/ demobilization
8.3.1 Unavailability of competent/trained staff for DCS, no prior experience of DCS at UEP
9.1.1 See comment
8.3.1 Unsafe/inefficient operation leading to process upset, production loss or incident may happen
D3=7
10.4 Helicopter incidents
11. Fabrication/installati on
10.4.1 Not Applicable
11.1 Complexity.
11.1.1 Complex construction process
11.2 Modularization.
11.2.1 Not Applicable
11.3 Transportation.
11.3.1 Transportation of large equipment
11.1.1 Project delays
11.1.1 No complex construction activity involved, extensive experience of similar projects within company
11.3.1 limitation at Port or inland transport of large equipment causing project delays
11.4 Overseas fabrication
12. Lifting equipment
12.1 Dropped/swingin g loads.
12.1.1 Objects falling over live equipment or personnel working below
12.2 Collapse of lifting equipment (cranes, draw works, etc.).
12.2.1 Objects falling over live equipment or personnel working below
12.1.1 Loss of containment, fire hazards, injuries , fatalities, asset damage 12.2 Loss of containment, fire hazards, injuries , fatalities, asset damage 12.3.1 Injuries,
12.1.1 No heavy lifting over live equipment involved 12.1 No heavy lifting over live equipment involved
Maintenance philosophy 13.6 Control philosophy 13.7 Manning levels 13.8 Concurrent Operations 13.9 Emergency Response
14. Health Hazards
14.1 Disease Hazards
14.1.1 Malaria, Food Poisoning and other water borne diseases
14.1.1 Health issues in camp, Project delays
G5=6
14.2 Asphyxiation hazards
14.2.1 Activities inside closed equipment/ confined space
14.2.1 Injuries/Fatalities
E3=6
14.3 Carcinogenic 14.4 Toxic 14.5 Physical 14.6 Mental
14.4.1 No additional issues identified 14.5.1 No additional issues identified 14.6.1 No additional issues identified
14.7 Working Hazards
14.7.1 Snake bite, high temperature in summer
14.8 Transport
14.8.1 No additional issues identified
14.3.1 No additional issues identified
14.7.1 Injuries, fatalities
14.7.1 Snake bite kit available at site
E5=8
15.5 Contaminated Ground
15.5.1 Not Applicable
15.6 Facility Impact
15.6.1 Facility to be constructed on agricultural land/ orchids.
15.7 Waste Disposal Options 15.8 Timing of Construction
16. Inherently safer design characteristics
15.6.1 Minor ecological damage
15.7.1 No Concern 15.8.1 No Concern
16.1 Sufficient equipment design pressure for all high pressure scenarios.
16.1.1 Equipment expose to pressures exceeding design pressure e.g. SIWHP is 4800 psig approx.
16.1.1 Mechanical failure, loss of containment
16.2 Maximize spacing between blast source and buildings and equipment of concern.
16.2.1 OPBs located within blast overpressure contour
16.2.1 Building damage leading to injuries/fatalities
16.1.1 Equipment are design on 1200 psig and protected by PSVs and ESDVs.
E5=8
D4=8
16.5 Minimize inventories of hazardous materials.
16.5.1 Condensate & LPG inventories
16.6 Use less toxic, reactive, flammable, explosive materials, radioactive.
16.6.1 No Concerns
16.7 Reduce size of “congested volume” that can hold a vapor cloud.
16.7.1 See comment
16.8 Simplify plant design and operation.
16.8.1 No Concern
16.9 High equipment or instrumentation reliability.
16.9.1 Protective equipment failure to meet reliability specifications
16.10 Design occupied buildings to withstand a
16.10.1 No additional concern
16.5.1 Major fire & BLEVE Hazard, Loss of life and asset damage
16.9.1 Failure to perform upon demand leading to accidents
16.5.1 Spill containment and Fire protection system provided on condensate and LPG storage
D3=7
16.13 Minimize time exposed to a hazard.
17.1 Pool.
17. Fire
16.13.1 Equipment/ structural failure due to extended exposure to fire, delayed blow down
17.1.1 LPG, Condensate, NGLs
16.13.1 Escalation of event
17.1.1 Pool fire at Condensate storage, loading area and separator area, BLEVE of LPG vessels, Propane tanks Leading to asset damage, injuries and fatalities
D3=7
17.1.1 LPG facility design as per API 2510/ NFPA-58 17.1.2 Condensate facility design as per NFPA-30 in line with OGRA directives 17.1.3 Fire protection on overall plant as per NFPA guidelines 17.1.4 As per Tender Document, fire protection layout and design requirements to be developed based on FEHA 17.2.1 LPG facility design as per API 2510/ NFPA-58 17.2.2 Condensate facility design as per NFPA-30 in line with OGRA directives
E3=6
18. Explosion
17.4 Sources of ignition
17.4.1 Ignition of released hydrocarbon
17.5 Equipment layout
17.5.1 No additional concern
17.6 Fire Protection & response
17.7.1 See comment
18.1 Operator protection
18.1.1 No additional concern, see comment
18.2 BLEVE
18.2.1 No additional concern, see comment
18.3 Vapor cloud explosion
18.3.1 No additional concern, see comment
18.4 Confined space 18.5 Dust
18.4.1 No additional concern, see comment 18.5.1 No Concern
18.6 Other (detonation, etc.)
18.6.1 No Concern
19.1 Hot process.
19.1.1 Amine, Glycol, Hot Oil, Debutanizer Waste heat recovery
17.4.1 Fire & explosion leading to asset damage and injuries/fatalities
17.4.1 Hazardous area classification to be done by EPCC 17.4.2 Open flames eg. Hot oil burners are located outside classified area
D3=7
18.2.1 BLEVE of LPG Vessels to be avoided by design as per API-2510 18.3.1 Control room is blast resistant as per API-752
19.1.1 Personnel injuries on contact with hot surfaces
19.1.1 Personal protection insulation is provided where process
H6=6
20.3.1 Tender Document defines noise limits 85 dB as per NEQS. 20.3 Noise
20.4 Stored energy. 20.5 Electrical shock 20.6 High voltage/low voltage electrical hazards. 20.7 Static electrical hazards 20.8 Ionizing radiation 21.1 Earthquake 21.2 Foundations (subsidence, scour) 21.3 Corrosion
21. Structural Failures
21.4 Fatigue 21.5 Weight control 21.6 Primary structure
20.3.1 Noise in plant residential and adjacent population exceeding NEQS limit
20.3.1 Health issues, social unrest
20.3.2 Tender Document states requirement for NEQS in general (including noise level in residential areas).
H6=6
20.4.1 Not Applicable 20.5.1 Not Applicable
20.6.1 No Concerns 20.7.1 Ignition during sampling, loading bowzers
20.7.1 Ignition of hydrocarbon releases, fire, fatalities, asset loss
20.7.1 Grounding requirement for bowzer loading and sampling included in Tender Document
E3=6
20.8.1 No Concern 21.1.1 No additional concern 21.2.1 No additional concern
21.3.1 Loss of containment due to corrosion 21.4.1 No concerns
21.3.1 Fire & explosion leading to asset damage and injuries/fatalities
21.3.1 Tender Document defines corrosion control design and management as per UEP practices 21.4 No cyclic load
21.5.1 No Concerns 21.6.1 Soil investigation
D3=7
22.2 Fuel Gas
22.2.1 See comment
22.3 Heating Medium / hot oil
22.3.1 No additional Concern
22.4 Diesel Fuel
22.4.1 See comments
22.5 Power Supply 22.6 Steam
22.5.1 No Concern 22.6.1 Not Applicable
22.7 Drains
22.7.1 Open to atmosphere HP drains connection
22.8 Inert Gas / Nitrogen
22.8.1 Not Applicable
22.9 Instrument Air
22.9.1 See comment
22.10 Waste Storage and Treatment 22.11 Chemical/fuel Storage
22.10.1 Not Applicable
22.11.1 Not Applicable
22.12 Potable Water
22.12.1 See comments
22.13 Demineralized water
22.13.1 No additional concern
22.7.1 Loss of containment, fire hazards
E3=6
22.17 Refrigeration System 22.18 HP Drains - Amine 22.19 HP drains - Glycol 22.20 HP drains - Hydrocarbon 22.21 HP drains - LPG
22.17.1 See comment
22.18.1 No additional concern 22.19.1 No additional concern 22.20.1 No additional concern 22.21.1 No additional concern
22.22 Plant drains / storm drains
22.22.1 See comment
22.23 Flares
22.23.1 Personnel exposure to flare radiations within flare exclusion zone
22.24 Sewerage
22.24.1 See comments
23.1 Inventory
23.1.1 No additional concern
22.23.1 Injuries, burn
H5=5
23.5 Hot Oil 23.6 Pyrophoric (pigging mud) 23.7 Over Pressure 23.8 Over/under Temperature
24. Loss of
23.5.1 No additional concern 23.6.1 Not Applicable 23.7.1 No additional concern 23.8.1 No concerns
23.9 Excess/zero Level
23.9.1 See recommendation/comment
23.10 Wrong Composition/Ph ase
23.10.1 See comment
24.1 Hazardous chemicals (including hydrocarbons).
24.1.1 See comment
24.2 Extremes of design operating envelopes, process, and utilities. 24.3 Potential for deviation outside design conditions. 24.4 Air ingress.
24.2.1 No additional concern
24.3.1 No concern 24.4.1 No concern
vessel failures.
24.13 Heat exchanger tube leak or rupture
24.13.1 See comment
24.14 Process line failures
24.14.1 No additional concern
Annex-II
Risk Framework – HSE Impact Levels
A
B
C
Levels A-C maintain the visibility of risks with the potential for catastrophic impact even if their probability of occurrence is extremely low. The upper level of this framework is defined by the most severe level of impact ever seen in industry.
SEVERITY
HEALTH AND SAFETY
ENVIRONMENTAL •
Future impact, e.g., unintended release, with widespread damage to any environment and which remains in an "unsatisfactory" state for a period > 5 years.
•
Future impact with extensive damage to a sensitive environment and which remains in an "unsatisfactory" state for a period > 5 years.
•
Future impact with widespread damage to a sensitive environment and which can only be restored to a "satisfactory"/agreed state in a period of more than 1 and up to 5 years.
•
Future impact with extensive damage to a non-sensitive environment and which remains in an "unsatisfactory" state for a period > 5 years.
•
Future impact with extensive damage to a sensitive environment and which can only be restored to a "satisfactory"/agreed state in a period of more than 1 and up to 5 years.
•
Future impact with widespread damage to a non-sensitive environment and which can only be restored to a "satisfactory"/agreed state in a period of more than 1 and up to 5 years.
•
Future impact with widespread damage to a sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of around 1 year.
Catastrophic health/ safety incident causing widespread fatalities within or outside a facility.
•
Future impact with extensive damage to a non-sensitive environment and which can only be restored to a "satisfactory"/agreed state in a period of more than 1 and up to 5 years.
The potential for 10 or more fatalities (or onset of life threatening health effects) shall always be classified at this level.
•
Future impact with widespread damage to a non-sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of around 1 year.
•
Future impact with extensive damage to a sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of around 1 year.
•
Future impact with widespread damage to a sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of months.
Comparable to the most catastrophic health/ safety incidents ever seen in industry. The potential for 100 or more fatalities (or onset of life threatening health effects) shall always be classified at this level. Catastrophic health/ safety incident causing very widespread fatalities within or outside a facility. The potential for 50 or more fatalities (or onset of life threatening health effects) shall always be classified at this level.
BP's commitment to health, safety and the environment is paramount; this is reflected in BP’s HSE goal of "No Accidents, No Harm to People, and No Damage to the Environment". No accident, injury, or loss of containment causing damage to the environment is ever “acceptable” to BP. BP is using this framework (equivalents of which are used throughout industry) to support the consistent prioritization of actions to eliminate or mitigate HSE risk and as part of BP's Performance Improvement Cycle to deliver continuous risk reduction. Very major health/ safety incident
D
The potential for 3 or more fatalities (or onset of life threatening health effects) shall always be classified at this level. 30 or more injuries or health effects, either permanent or requiring hospital treatment for more than 24 hours.
•
Future impact with extensive damage to a non-sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of around 1 year.
•
Future impact with localized damage to a sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of around 1 year.
•
Future impact with widespread damage to a non-sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of months.
•
Future impact with extensive damage to a sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of months.
SEVERITY
E
HEALTH AND SAFETY
ENVIRONMENTAL
Major health/ safety incident
•
1 or 2 fatalities, acute or chronic, actual or alleged.
Future impact with localized damage to a non-sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of around 1 year.
•
Future impact with extensive damage to a non-sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of months.
•
Future impact with localized damage to a sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of months.
•
Future impact with extensive damage to a sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of days or weeks.
•
Future impact with localized damage to a non-sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of months.
•
Future impact with immediate area damage to a sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of months.
•
Future impact with extensive damage to a non-sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of days or weeks.
•
Future impact with localized damage to a sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of days or weeks.
Medium impact health/ safety incident
•
Future impact with immediate area damage to a non-sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of months.
Single or multiple recordable injury or health effects from common source/event.
•
Future impact with localized damage to a non-sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of days or weeks.
•
Future impact with immediate area damage to a sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of days or weeks.
Low impact health/ safety incident
•
Future impact with immediate area damage to a non-sensitive environment and which can be restored to an equivalent capability in a period of days or weeks.
10 or more injuries or health effects, either permanent or requiring hospital treatment for more than 24 hours.
High impact health/ safety incident Permanent partial disability(ies)
F
G
Several non-permanent injuries or health impacts. Days Away From Work Case (DAFWC)
First aid
H
Single or multiple over-exposures causing noticeable irritation but no actual health effects
Risk Framework – Business Impact Levels
SEVERITY*
A
Non-Financial Impact
Public or investor outrage on a global scale. Threat of global loss of license to operate.
Financial Impact (EQUIPMENT DAMAGE, BUSINESS VALUE LOST) >$20 billion
Loss of license to operate a major asset in a major market – US, EU, Russia.
B
Intervention from major Government – US, UK, EU, Russia. Public or investor outrage in major western markets – US, EU.
$5 billion - $20 billion
Damage to relationships with key stakeholders of benefit to the Group.
C
Loss of license to operate other material asset, or severe enforcement action against a major asset in a major market. Intervention from other major Government.
$1 billion - $5 billion
Public or investor outrage in other material market where we have presence or aspiration. Severe enforcement action against a material asset in a non-major market, or against other assets in a major market. Interventions from non-major Governments.
D
Public or investor outrage in a non-major market, or localised or limited “interest-group” outrage in a major market.
$100 m to $1 billion
Prolonged adverse national or international media attention. Widespread adverse social impact. Damage to relationships with key stakeholders of benefit to the Segment. Other adverse enforcement action by regulators.
E
Limited “interest-group” outrage in non major market. Short term adverse national or international media coverage.
$5m -$100 m
Damage to relationships with key stakeholders of benefit to the SPU. Regulatory compliance issue which does not lead to regulatory or other higher severity level consequence Prolonged local media coverage.
F
Local adverse social impact.
$500k-$5m
Damage to relationships with key stakeholders of benefit to the Performance Unit (PU).
Short term local media coverage.
G
Some disruption to local operations (e.g., loss of single road access less than 24 hours).
$50k -$500k
H
Isolated and short term complaints from neighbours (e.g., complaints about specific noise episode).
<$50k
The colours in the above table are for use on a Risk Management Matrix (RMM). This is a tool used by BP group leadership to report and manage SPU, segment and BP group risk. For those risk events which are included in the RMM, the following guidance applies: Risks with Impact levels C and above are recorded on the BP group RMM. Risks with Impact levels D and above are recorded on the segment RMM. Risks with Impact levels H and above are recorded on the SPU RMM. In some cases, Level D impacts may be elevated to BP group impact. For risks in category D, the segment Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Chief Operating Office (COO) or Strategic Performance Unit Leader (SPUL) will determine whether a particular risk should be elevated.
Risk Matrix
The numbers (1-15) in the above matrix reflect the relative levels of risk (risk rating) with 1 being the lowest level of risk and 15 the highest. The colours in the table relate to reporting and endorsement levels for action plans (see Annex 4). Where data exists to support a quantitative estimate of probability / frequency, or a reasonable estimate of probability / frequency can be made, use of the numerical probability / frequency criteria is preferred. If not, the qualitative descriptions can be used. However, the verbal descriptors are based on the following assumptions and if any of these are not met, this needs to be taken into consideration when estimating likelihood. Life of a facility is around 30 years. There are around 100 facilities across the BP group where a similar event could occur. BP represents around 1-10% of the whole industry. When positioning a risk event on the matrix, it is not usually possible to precisely determine the likelihood and severity of an event in advance of it happening. Reflecting this uncertainty, the position on the matrix is therefore, only approximate.
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