[RULE 126, SEC. 13] Rule 126, Section 13 of the Rules of Court allows for searches incidental to a lawful arrest. For there to be a lawful arrest, there should be either a warrant of arrest or a lawful warrantless arrest as enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court. PEOPLE VS. COGAED June 30, 2014, G.R. No. 200334 LEONEN, J. FACTS: Victor Cogaed was riding a jeepney with a bag from Barangay Lun-Oy and during a checkpoint, the driver of the jeepney he rode made a signal to the police telling that Cogaed was carrying marijuana inside Cogaed’s bag; the police officer then approached Cogaed and asked the accused about the contents of his bags. Cogaed replied that he did not know what was inside and that he was just transporting the bag in favor of Marvin, a barriomate. Cogaed subsequently opened the bag revealing the bricks of marijuana inside. He was then arrested by the police officers. ISSUE: Whether there was a valid search and seizure; and, whether the marijuana confiscated is admissible as evidence. HELD: NO. There is no valid search and seizure; thus, the marijuana confiscated shall not be admissible as evidence. As a general rule, searches conducted with a warrant that meets all the requirements of Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution are reasonable. This warrant requires the existence of probable cause that can only be determined by a judge. However, there are instances when searches are reasonable even when warrantless. The known jurisprudential instances of reasonable warrantless searches and seizures are: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Warrantless search incidental to a lawful arrest Seizure of evidence in “plain view,” Search of a moving vehicle; Consented warrantless search; Customs search; Stop and frisk; and Exigent and emergency circumstances.
The search involved in this case was initially a “stop and frisk” search, but it did not comply with all the requirements of reasonability required by the Constitution. “Stop and frisk” searches (sometimes referred to as Terry searches) are necessary for law enforcement. That is, law enforcers should be given the legal arsenal to prevent the commission of offenses. However, this should be balanced with the need to protect the privacy of citizens in accordance with Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. The balance lies in the concept of “suspiciousness” present in the situation where the police officer finds himself or herself in. This may be undoubtedly based on the experience of the police officer. It does not have to be probable cause, but it cannot be mere suspicion. It has to be a “genuine reason to serve the purposes of the “stop and frisk” exception. The “stop and frisk” search was originally limited to outer clothing and for the purpose of detecting dangerous weapons.
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There was not a single suspicious circumstance in this case, and there was no approximation for the probable cause requirement for warrantless arrest. The person searched was not even the person mentioned by the informant. The informant gave the name of Marvin Buya, and the person searched was Victor Cogaed. Even if it was true that Cogaed responded by saying that he was transporting the bag to Marvin Buya, this still remained only as one circumstance. This should not have been enough reason to search Cogaed and his belongings without a valid search warrant. Likewise, the facts of the case do not qualify as a search incidental to a lawful arrest. The apprehension of Cogaed was not effected with a warrant of arrest. None of the instances enumerated in Rule 113, Section 5 of the Rules of Court were present when the arrest was made. At the time of his apprehension, Cogaed has not committed, was not committing, or was about to commit a crime. There were no overt acts within plain view of the police officers that suggested that Cogaed was in possession of drugs at that time. Also, Cogaed was not an escapee prisoner that time; hence, he could not have qualified for the last allowable warrantless arrest. There can be no valid waiver of Cogaed’s constitutional rights even if we assume that he did not object when the police asked him to open his bags. Appellant’s silence should not be lightly taken as consent to such search. The implied acquiescence to the search, if there was any, could not have been more than mere passive conformity given under intimidating or coercive circumstances and is thus considered no consent at all within the purview of the constitutional guarantee. The Constitution provides that any evidence obtained in violation of the right against unreasonable searches and seizures shall be inadmissible for any purpose in any proceeding. Otherwise known as the exclusionary rule or the fruit of the poisonous tree doctrine, this rule prohibits the issuance of general warrants that encourage law enforcers to go on fishing expeditions. Evidence obtained through unlawful seizures should be excluded as evidence because it is “the only practical means of enforcing the constitutional injunction against unreasonable searches and seizures.” It ensures that the fundamental rights to one’s person, houses, papers, and effects are not lightly infringed upon and are upheld. Considering that the prosecution and conviction of Cogaed were founded on the search of his bags, a pronouncement of the illegality of that search means that there is no evidence left to convict Cogaed.
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[RULE 110, SEC. 8] In a criminal case, an appeal throws open the entire case wide open for review, and the appellate court can correct errors, though unassigned, that may be found in the appealed judgment. PEOPLE VS. DIONALDO, ET AL. July 23, 2014, G.R. No. 207949 PERLAS-BERNABE, J. FACTS: Edwin Navarro, had been kidnapped by four men from Health Is Wealth Gym. The kidnappers, including Dionaldo, demanded from Edwin’s brother 15 million as a ransom. After negotiations, the ransom has been lowered to P110,000. However, the payment of the ransom and subsequent rescue operations with the police failed. The dead body of Edwin was later on found by the police and the kidnappers was later on identified and arrested by the police. Thus, accused-appellants as well as Virgilio were charged in an Information which reads: That on or about the 16th day of May, 2003 in Caloocan City, Metro Manila and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together and mutually helping one another, being then private persons, did then and there by force and intimidation willfully, unlawfully and feloniously with the use of motor vehicle and superior strength take, carry and deprive EDWIN NAVARRO Y ONA, of his liberty against his will, for the purpose of extorting ransom as in fact a demand of P15,000,000.00 was made as a condition of the victim’s release and on the occasion thereof, the death of the victim resulted. The RTC and CA convicted the four kidnappers of the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention sentencing each of them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. ISSUE: Whether the RTC and CA erred in convicting the kidnappers with the crime of Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention HELD: YES. The court held that it was constrained to modify the ruling of the RTC and the CA, as the crime does not, as the records obviously bear, merely constitute Kidnapping and Serious Illegal Detention, but that of the special complex crime of Kidnapping for Ransom with Homicide. This is in view of the victim's (i.e., Edwin's) death, which was (a) specifically charged in the Information, and (b) clearly established during the trial of this case. Notably, while this matter was not among the issues raised before the Court, the same should nonetheless be considered in accordance with the settled rule that in a criminal case, an appeal, as in this case, throws open the entire case wide open for review, and the appellate court can correct errors, though unassigned, that may be found in the appealed judgment.
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[RULE 110, SEC. 5] As a general rule, the Court does not interfere with the Office of the Ombudsman’s exercise of its investigative and prosecutorial powers, and respects the initiative and independence inherent in the Office of the Ombudsman. ARAULLO VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN July 30, 2014, G.R. No. 194157 REYES, J. FACTS: Araullo, who was illegally dismissed by the Club Filipino, filed a criminal complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman for the issuance of unjust interlocutory order under Art. 206 of the Revised Penal Code against Labor Arbiter Arden S. Anni. The Office of the Ombudsman found no probable cause for the complaint given Araullo's failure to establish that the LA Anni and the other labor arbiters gave undue advantage to Club Filipino, or that they acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross and inexcusable negligence. Araullo then filed a petition for certiorari to assail the Office of the Ombudsman's dismissal of his criminal complaint. ISSUES: Whether the Ombudsman committed grave abuse of discretion when it dismissed the criminal complaint of Araullo. HELD: NO. The Supreme Court ruled that there was no probable cause in the unjust interlocutory order complaint of Araullo. Upon review, the Court has determined that the Office of the Ombudsman did not commit grave abuse of discretion because explained clearly in the assailed resolution were the grounds that supported its finding of lack of probable cause, and which then justified the dismissal of the criminal complaints filed by Araullo. As a general rule, the Court does not interfere with the Office of the Ombudsman’s exercise of its investigative and prosecutorial powers, and respects the initiative and independence inherent in the Office of the Ombudsman which, “beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and the preserver of the integrity of the public service.” (Casing v. Ombudsman, 2012) Probable cause is defined as such facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the persons being charged are probably guilty thereof. "[It] can only find support in facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonable mind to believe that the person being charged warrants a prosecution." To establish probable cause, Araullo, being the complainant, then should have proved the elements of the crimes alleged to have been committed. In addition, there should have been a clear showing of the respective participation of the respondents, to at least support a ruling that would call for their further prosecution. Specifically for the charge of violation of Article 206 of the RPC which penalizes the issuance of unjust interlocutory orders, it was necessary to show that, first, the orders issued by the respondents to his complaint were unjust, and second, the said orders were knowingly rendered or rendered through inexcusable negligence or ignorance. On this matter, the Office of the Ombudsman correctly held that LA Anni's order for the quashal of the writ of execution, and the NLRC's resolution affirming it, were not unjust. Page | 4
[RULE 116, SEC. 11] The suspension of arraignment of an accused, while authorized under Section 11, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, is only for a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. Its own failure to act for seven (7) months without arraigning the accused cannot be an excuse to dismiss the case. ROBERT KUA, ET AL. VS. GREGORIO SACUPAYO, ET AL. September 24, 2014, G.R. No. 191237 PEREZ, J. FACTS: [Petitioners] are members of the Board of Directors and the officers of Vicmar Development Corporation. [Respondents] Gregorio G. Sacupayo and Maximiniano Panerio were VICMAR employees. As required by law, Vicmar, deducted the Social Security System (SSS) contributions of [respondents] from their wages. It also deducted (Php468.00) per month from the wage of Sacupayo as his monthly amortization for a ten thousand peso (Php10,000.00) loan he obtained from the SSS on November 14, 2002. Vicmar remitted the deductions to the SSS at first. Sometime in 2003 and 2004, unknown to [respondents] and despite the continued SSS deductions from their wages, Vicmar stopped remitting the same to the SSS. On August 7, 2004 and August 9, 2004 respectively, Sacupayo and Panerio were dismissed from employment. Both filed complaints for illegal dismissal. Panerio was thereafter afflicted with Chronic Persistent Asthma on September 28, 2004. But when he applied for sickness benefits before the SSS in October 2004, the same was denied for the reason that no contributions or payments were made for twelve (12) months prior to the semester of confinement. Sacupayo, for his part, filed another loan application before the SSS. But this was also denied outright for nonpayment of a previous loan which should have been fully paid if not for the failure of Vicmar to remit the amounts due to the SSS. [respondents] filed complaints before the Office of the City Prosecutor in Cagayan de Oro City. Vicmar then remitted to SSS the contributions and loan payments of [respondents] sometime thereafter. Nevertheless, probable cause was found and three (3) separate Informations all dated June 6, 2005 were filed against [petitioners] officers of Vicmar for violation of Section 22(a) in relation to Section 28(e) of RA 8282 otherwise known as the Social Security Act of 1997. [Petitioners] appealed the finding of probable cause against them before the Office of the Regional State Prosecutor (RSP). This was granted by the RSP in a Resolution dated July 14, 2005, which ordered the City Prosecutor to desist from filing the case or to withdraw the cases if one has already been filed for the following reason: Section 28 of RA 8282 above cited merely lays down a disputable presumption that the members’ contribution to the SSS is deemed misappropriated if the employer fails to remit the same to the SSS within 30 days from the date they became due. The full payment and remittance of the same destroys this presumption.
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Pursuant to the Resolution of the RSP reversing the finding of probable cause by the City Prosecutor, [petitioners] filed a Motion to Dismiss dated February 13, 2006 before [the] RTC. The City Prosecutor likewise filed a Comment manifesting agreement to the withdrawal of the criminal cases pending resolution of the appeal with the DOJ. RTC granted the Motion of [petitioners] and ordered the withdrawal of the criminal cases.
Respondents filed a Petition for Certiorari and Mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the appellate court to annul and set aside the trial court’s withdrawal of Criminal Case Nos. 2006-072, 2006-073 and 2006-074 from its docket. As stated at the outset, the Court of Appeals granted respondents’ petition, reversed and set aside the RTC’s ruling, and reinstated the criminal cases against petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the appellate court committed grave abuse of discretion when it reinstated the criminal cases against the petitioners
HELD: NO. The Supreme Court agreed with the findings of the Court of Appeals (CA) that: (1) the lapse of almost seven (7) months without any action taken by the DOJ; and, (2) the manifestation to withdraw the case by the Public Prosecutor, were flawed and insufficient to effect a withdrawal of the criminal cases. The suspension of arraignment of an accused, while authorized under Section 11, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, is only for a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. Its own failure to act for seven (7) months without arraigning the accused cannot be an excuse to dismiss the case, especially when the rules dictate that the deferment of arraignment in such case may only be done for a period of 60 days. The controlling case of Crespo v. Mogul teaches us that, while the prosecution of criminal actions is under the discretion and control of the public prosecutor, once a complaint or information is filed, any disposition of the case, be it a dismissal or a conviction or acquittal of an accused, rests in the sound discretion of the court. Well-settled in jurisprudence is the principle that trial judges ought to make its own independent assessment of the merits of the case and not abdicate its judicial power and act as a mere surrogate of the Secretary of Justice.
In any event, there exists probable cause to indict petitioners for violation of Sections 22 (a) and (d), in relation to Section 28 (e), of the SS Law. R.A. No. 8282, a special law, requires employers to: (a) register its employees with the SSS; (b) deduct employee contributions from their salaries; and (3) remit these contributions to the SSS within a given period. The case in point is Tan, et al. v. Ballena, et al. where good faith and absence of malicious intent of the accused and the subsequent remittance of the SSS contributions and loan amortizations, held no sway over the accused’s criminal liability under the SS Law for failure to remit SSS contributions and loan amortizations of accused’s employees.
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[RULE 110, SEC. 16] Section 16 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly allows an offended party to intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense for the recovery of civil liability where the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is instituted with the criminal action. LEONARDO A. VILLALON, ET AL. VS. AMELIA CHAN September 24, 2014, G.R. No. 196508 BRION, J. FACTS: The respondent Amelia Chan married Leon Basilio Chua. The respondent claimed that her husband Leon Basilio Chua and the present petitioner, Leonardo A. Villalon, are one and the same person. During the subsistence of his marriage to Amelia, Leon Basilio Chua, this time under the name of Leonardo A. Villalon, allegedly contracted a second marriage with Erlinda Talde that took place on June 2, 1993. Amelia, who was then living in the United States and could not personally file a case for bigamy in the Philippines, requested Benito Yao Chua and Wilson Go to commence the criminal proceedings against the petitioners. On September 13, 2003, a verified complaint-affidavit alleging the commission of the crime of bigamy was filed with the Office of the City Prosecutor in Antipolo During the pretrial (or on February 6, 2006), Atty. Apollo V. Atencia appeared in behalf of Amelia. Leonardo filed an omnibus motion with the RTC seeking to disqualify Atty. Atencia. He argued that Amelia could not be represented in the bigamy case because she was not a party to the case, as she did not file the complaint-affidavit. He also argued that Amelia had already waived her right to file a civil and criminal case against him and his codefendant Erlinda. In a resolution dated March 3, 2006, the RTC granted Leonardo’s omnibus motion. Trial of the case ensued thereafter. Leonardo filed a demurrer to evidence. In an order dated September 5, 2006, the RTC dismissed the bigamy case for failure of the prosecution to prove the petitioners’ guilt. In her petition for certiorari and prohibition before the CA, Amelia alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of the RTC when it issued its March 3, 2006 resolution and proceeded with the bigamy case without permitting the participation of Atty. Atencia as private prosecutor. In a decision dated July 30, 2010, the CA granted Amelia’s petition and annulled the RTC’s March 3, 2006 resolution disqualifying Atty. Atencia from participation in the case, and its September 5, 2006 order that dismissed the bigamy case against the petitioners. The CA ruled that the crime of bigamy, being public in nature, can be denounced by anyone, not only by the offended party, before the prosecuting authorities without the offended party losing her right to recover damages. Thus, the CA concluded that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it did not allow Atty. Atencia to intervene and represent Amelia in the bigamy case and that the trial court denied Amelia her right to due process. Also, the CA ruled that the offended party could be deprived of the right to intervene in the criminal case only when he or she expressly waives the civil action or reserves the right to institute one. The Page | 7
CA found no such waiver from Amelia and held that Atty. Atencia’s appearance as private prosecutor was proof enough of Amelia’s determination to enforce her claim for damages in the bigamy case
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Atencia’s is disqualified to intervene in the bigamy case as private prosecutor.
HELD: NO. Section 16 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure expressly allows an offended party to intervene by counsel in the prosecution of the offense for the recovery of civil liability where the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged is instituted with the criminal action. The civil action shall be deemed instituted with the criminal action, except when the offended party waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action. The petitioners argue that the CA gravely erred when it ruled that: the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing its March 3, 2006 resolution disqualifying Atty. Atencia as private prosecutor, and that Atty. Atencia’s disqualification violated the respondent’s rights to intervene and be heard in the bigamy case. They contend that, even with Atty. Atencia’s disqualification, the respondent was never denied her right to participate in the proceedings and was even called to stand as a witness but the respondent never appeared before the court because she was out of the country during the whole proceedings on the bigamy case. In this case, the CA found no such waiver from or reservation made by the respondent. The fact that the respondent, who was already based abroad, had secured the services of an attorney in the Philippines reveals her willingness and interest to participate in the prosecution of the bigamy case and to recover civil liability from the petitioners. Thus, the RTC should have allowed, and should not have disqualified, Atty. Atencia from intervening in the bigamy case as the respondent, being the offended party, is afforded by law the right to participate through counsel in the prosecution of the offense with respect to the civil aspect of the case.
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[RULE 113, SEC. 5] Even if Comerciante and his companion were showing "improper and unpleasant movements,” the same would not have been sufficient in order to effect a lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. ALVIN COMERCIANTE VS. PEOPLE July 22, 2015, G.R. No. 205926 PERLAS-BERNABE, J. FACTS: On July 31, 2003, an Information was filed before the RTC charging Comerciante of violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165. According to the prosecution, at around 10 o'clock in the evening of July 30, 2003, Agent Eduardo Radan (Agent Radan) of the NARCOTICS group and PO3 Bienvy Calag II (PO3 Calag) were aboard a motorcycle, patrolling the area while on their way to visit a friend at Private Road, Barangay Hulo, Mandaluyong City. Cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers per hour along Private Road, they spotted, at a distance of about 10 meters, two (2) men - later identified as Comerciante and a certain Erick Dasilla. Standing and showing "improper and unpleasant movements," with one of them handing plastic sachets to the other. Thinking that the sachets may contain shabu, they immediately stopped and approached Comerciante and Dasilla. At a distance ofaround five (5) meters, PO3 Calag introduced himself as a police officer, arrested Comerciante and Dasilla, and confiscated two (2) plastic sachets containing white crystalline substance from them. A laboratory examination later confirmed that said sachets contained methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu. After the prosecution rested its case, Dasilla filed a demurrer to evidence, which was granted by the RTC, thus his acquittal. However, due to Comerciante's failure to file his own demurrer to evidence, the RTC considered his right to do so waived and ordered him to present his evidence. In his defense, Comerciante averred that P03 Calag was looking for a certain "Barok", who was a notorious drug pusher in the area, when suddenly, he and Dasilla, who were just standing in front of a jeepney along Private Road, were arrested and taken to a police station. There, the police officers claimed to have confiscated illegal drugs from them and were asked money in exchange for their release. When they failed to accede to the demand, they were brought to another police station to undergo inquest proceedings, and thereafter, were charged with illegal possession of dangerous drugs. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly affirmed Comerciante's conviction for violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165. HELD: NO. The petition is meritorious. The Court finds it highly implausible that PO3 Calag, even assuming that he has perfect vision, would be able to identify with reasonable accuracy - especially from a distance of around 10 meters, and while aboard a motorcycle cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers per hour - miniscule amounts of white crystalline substance inside two (2) very small plastic sachets held by Comerciante. The Court also notes that no other overt act could be properly attributed to Comerciante as to rouse suspicion in the mind of PO3 Calag that the former had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a crime. Verily, the acts of standing around with a companion and handing over something to the latter cannot in any way be considered criminal acts. In fact, even if Comerciante and his companion were showing "improper and unpleasant movements" as put by PO3 Calag, the same would not have been sufficient in order to effect a lawful warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. Page | 9
Section 2, Article III of the Constitution mandates that a search and seizure must be carried out through or on the strength of a judicial warrant predicated upon the existence of probable cause; in the absence of such warrant, such search and seizure becomes, as a general rule, "unreasonable" within the meaning of said constitutional provision. The exclusionary rule is not, however, an absolute and rigid proscription. One of the recognized exceptions established by jurisprudence is a search incident to a lawful arrest. In this instance, the law requires that there first be a lawful arrest before a search can be made - the process cannot be reversed. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure lays down the rules on lawful warrantless arrests, as follows: xxx (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; xxx For a warrantless arrest under Section 5 (a) to operate, two (2) elements must concur, namely: (a) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and (b) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer. On the other hand, Section 5 (b) requires for its application that at the time of the arrest, an offense had in fact just been committed and the arresting officer had personal knowledge of facts indicating that the accused had committed it. In both instances, the officer's personal knowledge of the fact of the commission of an offense is absolutely required. Under Section 5 (a), the officer himself witnesses the crime; while in Section 5 (b), he knows for a fact that a crime has just been committed. The factual backdrop of the instant case failed to show that PO3 Calag had personal knowledge that a crime had been indisputably committed by Comerciante. Verily, it is not enough that the arresting officer had reasonable ground to believe that the accused had just committed a crime; a crime must, in fact, have been committed first, which does not obtain in this case. Gonzales must be acquitted.
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[RULE 117, SEC. 7] As a general rule, an order granting the accused’s demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal. There are certain exceptions, however, as when the grant would not violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. For instance, this Court ruled that when there is a finding that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in dismissing a criminal case by granting the accused’s demurrer to evidence, its judgment is considered void; and the right of the accused against double jeopardy is not violated. PEOPLE VS. GO August 6, 2014, 732 SCRA 216 DEL CASTILLO, J. FACTS: Orient Commercial Banking Corporation (OCBC) was placed under the receivership of the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC). PDIC began collecting on OCBC’s past due loans receivable by sending demand letters to its borrowers for the immediate settlement of their outstanding loans. Allegedly among these borrowers of OCBC are Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. A representative of Timmy’s, Inc. denied being granted any loan by OCBC and insisted that the signatures on the loan documents were falsified. A representative of Asia Textile Mills, Inc. denied having applied, much less being granted, a loan by OCBC. The PDIC conducted an investigation and allegedly came out with a finding that the loans purportedly in the names of Timmy’s, Inc. and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. were released in the form of manager’s checks in the name of Philippine Recycler’s and Zeta International, Inc. These manager’s checks were then allegedly deposited to the savings account of the private respondent Jose C. Go with OCBC and, thereafter, were automatically transferred to his current account in order to fund personal checks issued by him earlier. The RTC found the Demurrer to Evidence to be meritorious, dismissing the criminal case and acquitting all of the accused. The CA also affirmed the order; and, notably, in dismissing the Petition, the appellate court held that the trial court has already become final since the prosecution failed to move for the reconsideration thereof, and thus double jeopardy attached. ISSUE: Whether or not the granting of the Demurrer to Evidence was proper. HELD: NO. A demurrer to the evidence is an objection by one of the parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue. The party demurring challenges the sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain a verdict. The grant or denial of a demurrer to evidence is left to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its ruling on the matter shall not be disturbed in the absence of a grave abuse of such discretion." As to effect, "the grant of a demurrer to evidence amounts to, as a general rule, an acquittal and cannot be appealed because it would place the accused in double jeopardy. The order is reviewable only by certiorari if it was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction." When grave abuse of discretion is present, an order granting a demurrer becomes null and void. There are certain exceptions, however, as when the grant would not violate the constitutional proscription on double jeopardy. For instance, the Court ruled that when there is a finding that there was grave abuse of discretion on the part of the trial court in dismissing a criminal case by granting the accused’s demurrer to evidence, its judgment is considered void. In this case, the prosecution has presented competent evidence to sustain the indictment for the crime of estafa through falsification of commercial documents, and that respondents appear to be the perpetrators thereof. In evaluating the evidence, the trial court effectively failed and/or refused to weigh the prosecution’s evidence against the respondents. Page | 11
[RULE 110, SEC. 6] The trial court was precluded from considering the attendance of such qualifying or aggravating circumstances, i.e., minority of the victim, in the judgment because of the failure to properly allege them; The date or the time of the commission of the rape need not be stated in the complaint or information with absolute accuracy. PEOPLE VS. RUDY NUYOK June 15, 2015, G.R. No. 195424 BERSAMIN, J. FACTS: The accused in this case is the paternal uncle of the victim who filed rape cases against him. It was alleged that the crimes were committed last June, July, August and September of 2005. The accused overpowered the victim while raping her and he also threatened to kill the victim and her family if she reveals the incident to anyone. The victim was only 13 years old when the crimes were committed. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not the CA gravely erred in not appreciating the minority of the offended party (when the same was not indicated in the information) (2) Whether or not the RTC erred in finding him guilty of rape despite the fatal defects of the information which did not specify the dates of commission of the rapes? HELD: (1) NO. According to the Supreme Court, the RTC correctly convicted the accused with only 4 counts of simple rape instead of qualified rape (which the CA affirmed). Although the minority under 18 years of AAA at the time of the rapes, and the fact that the accused was her paternal uncle were established during the trial, the RTC nonetheless correctly convicted him only of four counts of simple rape instead of qualified rape because the special qualifying circumstance of minority was not alleged in the informations. The circumstances of minority of the victim and her relationship to the offender must concur to qualify the crime of rape, but only her relationship to the accused was alleged and proved. The trial court was precluded from considering the attendance of such qualifying or aggravating circumstances in the judgment because of the failure to properly allege them. This conforms to Section 8 and Section 9, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. (2) NO. It is not necessary for the information to allege the date and time of the commission of the crime with exactitude unless such date and time are essential ingredients of the offenses charged. It is sufficient that the information states that the crime was committed at any time as near as possible to the date of its actual commission, pursuant to Section 11, Rule 110 of Rules of Court. In this case, the failure to specify the exact date or time when the rapes were committed did not ipso facto render the informations defective. Neither the date nor the time of the commission of rape is a material ingredient of the crime, for the essence of the crime is carnal knowledge of a female against her will through force or intimidation. Precision as to the time when the rape is committed has no bearing on its commission. Consequently, the date or the time of the commission of the rape need not be stated in the complaint or information with absolute accuracy, for it is sufficient that the complaint or information states that the crime was committed at any time as near as possible to the date of its actual commission.
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[RULE 112, SEC. 3] The trial court is not bound to adopt the resolution of the Secretary of Justice to withdraw the informations for lack of probable cause since it is mandated to independently evaluate or assess the merits of the case; in the exercise of its discretion, it may agree or disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice.
SR. REMY ANGELA JUNIO, ET AL. VS. JUDGE MARIVIC A. CACATIANBELTRAN January 13, 2014 A.M. No. RTJ-14-2367 BRION, J. FACTS: Claire Ann Campos, a 17-year old student, filed an affidavit complaint for violation of Republic Act No. 7610 (the Child Abuse Law) and R.A. No. 7277 (the Magna Carta for the Disabled) before the Tuguegarao City Prosecution Office against Sr. Remy Angela Junio and Dr. Josephine D. Lorica, the President and the Dean of the School of Health Services, respectively, of St. Paul University of the Philippines (SPUP). Claire alleged that she was refused enrolment by SPUP for the B.S. Nursing course in her sophomore year because of her cleft palate; she alleged that the refusal was made despite her completion of SPUP’s College Freshmen Program Curriculum. The prosecutor’s office in its resolution found probable cause to indict Junio and Lorica of the crimes charged, and recommended the filing of the corresponding informations against them. Junio and Lorica appealed the resolution of the prosecutor’s office, but Undersecretary Jose Vicente Salazar of the Department of Justice (DOJ) denied their petition for review. Afterward, DOJ Secretary Leila de Lima granted Junio and Lorica’s motion for reconsideration and set aside the resolution of Undersecretary Salazar. Accordingly, in her resolution dated August 8, 2011, she directed the Cagayan Provincial Prosecutor to immediately cause the withdrawal of the informations for violations of R.A. Nos. 7610 and 7277 against Junio and Lorica for lack of probable cause. Subsequently, the prosecutor’s office still filed two informations against Junio and Lorica for violations of Section 10(a), Article VI, in relation with Article 3(a) and (b) of R.A. No. 7610, and Section 12 of R.A. No. 7277 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Tuguegarao City presided by Judge Marivic A. Cacatian-Beltran. This prompted the accused to file a joint motion to withdraw informations in view of Secretary De Lima’s resolution. They also filed an administrative complaint before the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) alleging that Judge Beltran "arrogated unto herself the role of a prosecutor and a judge" when she insisted that they stand for trial although she did not find any grave abuse of discretion on the part of Justice Secretary De Lima.
ISSUE: Page | 13
(1) Whether the respondent arbitrarily denied the joint motion to withdraw informations. (2) Whether the respondent arrogated unto herself the role of a prosecutor and a judge.
HELD: (1) NO. The trial court is not bound to adopt the resolution of the Secretary of Justice since it is mandated to independently evaluate or assess the merits of the case; in the exercise of its discretion, it may agree or disagree with the recommendation of the Secretary of Justice. Reliance on the resolution of the Secretary of Justice alone would be an abdication of the trial court's duty and jurisdiction to determine a prima facie case. We stress that once a criminal complaint or information is filed in court, any disposition of the case (whether it be a dismissal, an acquittal or a conviction of the accused) rests within the exclusive jurisdiction, competence, and discretion of the trial court; it is the best and sole judge of what to do with the case before it. In the present case, the evidence provides that the respondent judge does not appear to have arbitrarily denied the joint motion to withdraw informations. She explained the basis of her denial. No proof whatsoever exists in all these, showing that bad faith, malice or any corrupt purpose attended the issuance of her order. It is also important to note in this regard that the issue of whether Judge Cacatian-Beltran correctly denied the joint motion to withdraw informations, despite the finding of Secretary De Lima of lack of probable cause, is judicial in nature: Junio and Lorica’s remedy under the circumstances should have been made with the proper court for the appropriate judicial action, not with the OCA by means of an administrative complaint. (2) NO. The court find unmeritorious Junio and Lorica’s argument that Judge Cacatian-Beltran “arrogated unto herself the role of a prosecutor and a judge” when she insisted that the accused stand trial although she did not find any grave abuse of discretion on the part of Justice Secretary de Lima. When a court acts, whether its action is consistent or inconsistent with a prosecutor’s recommendation, it rules on the prosecutor’s action and does not thereby assume the role of a prosecutor.
[RULE 126, SEC. 2] An application for a search warrant is not a criminal action; thus, conformity Page | 14
of the public prosecutor (under Rule 110, Sect. 5) is not necessary to give the aggrieved party personality to question an order quashing search warrants. [RULE 126, SEC. 4] The requirement of particularity in the description of things to be seized is fulfilled when the items described in the search warrant bear a direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is sought. It need not describe the items to be seized in precise and minute detail. WORLDWIDE WEB CORPORATION, ET AL. VS. PEOPLE AND PHILIPPINE LONG DISTANCE TELEPHONE (PLDT) COMPANY January 13, 2014, G.R. No. 161106 SERENO, C.J. FACTS: Police Chief Inspector Napoleon Villegas of the Regional Intelligence Special Operations Office (RISOO) of the Philippine National Police filed applications for warrants3 before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 78, to search the office premises of petitioner Worldwide Web Corporation (WWC)4 located at the 11th floor, IBM Plaza Building, No. 188 Eastwood City, Libis, Quezon City, as well as the office premises of petitioner Planet Internet Corporation (Planet Internet) located at UN 2103, 21/F Orient Square Building, Emerald Avenue, Barangay San Antonio, Pasig City. The applications alleged that petitioners were conducting illegal toll bypass operations, which amounted to theft and violation of Presidential Decree No. 401 (Penalizing the Unauthorized Installation of Water, Electrical or Telephone Connections, the Use of Tampered Water or Electrical Meters and Other Acts), to the damage and prejudice of the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company (PLDT). On 25 September 2001, the trial court conducted a hearing on the applications for search warrants. The applicant and Jose Enrico Rivera (Rivera) and Raymund Gali (Gali) of the Alternative Calling Pattern Detection Division of PLDT testified as witnesses. Over a hundred items were seized, including 15 central processing units (CPUs), 10 monitors, numerous wires, cables, diskettes and files, and a laptop computer. Planet Internet notes that even personal diskettes of its employees were confiscated; and areas not devoted to the transmission of international calls, such as the President’s Office and the Information Desk, were searched. Voltage regulators, as well as reserve and broken computers, were also seized.
ISSUES: (1) Whether the CA erred in giving due course to PLDT’s appeal to question the quashal of the search warrants without the conformity of the public prosecutor had no personality to question the quashal of the search warrants (NO) (2) Whether the assailed search warrants were issued upon probable cause (considering that the acts complained of allegedly do not constitute theft) (YES) (3) Whether the CA seriously erred in holding that the assailed search warrants were not general warrant (NO) HELD: (1) NO. Petitioners contend that PLDT had no personality to question the quashal of the search warrants without the conformity of the public prosecutor. They argue that it violated Section 5, Rule 110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, to wit: SEC. 5. Who must prosecute criminal actions.—All criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information shall be prosecuted Page | 15
under the direction and control of the prosecutor. The provision states the general rule that the public prosecutor has direction and control of the prosecution of “all criminal actions commenced by a complaint or information.” However, a search warrant is obtained, not by the filing of a complaint or an information, but by the filing of an application therefor. Clearly then, an application for a search warrant is not a criminal action; thus, conformity of the public prosecutor is not necessary to give the aggrieved party personality to question an order quashing search warrants. (2) YES. A trial judge’s finding of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is accorded respect by reviewing courts when the finding has substantial basis. In the issuance of a search warrant, probable cause requires "such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed and the objects sought in connection with that offense are in the place to be searched." There is no exact test for the determination of probable cause in the issuance of search warrants. It is a matter wholly dependent on the finding of trial judges in the process of exercising their judicial function. Here, the applications for search warrants were instituted as principal proceedings and not as incidents to pending criminal actions. When the search warrants issued were subsequently quashed by the RTC, there was nothing left to be done by the trial court. Thus, the quashal of the search warrants were final orders, not interlocutory, and an appeal may be properly taken therefrom. (3) NO. The requirement of particularity in the description of things to be seized is fulfilled when the items described in the search warrant bear a direct relation to the offense for which the warrant is sought. It need not describe the items to be seized in precise and minute detail. The warrant is valid when it enables the police officers to readily identify the properties to be seized and leaves them with no discretion regarding the articles to be seized. A general warrant is defined as “(a) search or arrest warrant that is not particular as to the person to be arrested or the property to be seized.” It is one that allows the “seizure of one thing under a warrant describing another” and gives the officer executing the warrant the discretion over which items to take. Such discretion is abhorrent, as it makes the person, against whom the warrant is issued, vulnerable to abuses. Our Constitution guarantees our right against unreasonable searches and seizures, and safeguards have been put in place to ensure that people and their properties are searched only for the most compelling and lawful reasons. In furtherance of this constitutional provision, Sections 3 and 4, Rule 126 of the Rules of Court, amplify the rules regarding the following places and items to be searched under a search warrant. In this case, PLDT was able to establish the connection between the items to be searched as identified in the warrants and the crime of theft of its telephone services and business. Prior to the application for the search warrants, Rivera conducted ocular inspection of the premises of petitioners and was then able to confirm that they had "utilized various telecommunications equipment consisting of computers, lines, cables, antennas, modems, or routers, multiplexers, PABX or switching equipment, and support equipment such as software, diskettes, tapes, manuals and other documentary records to support the illegal toll bypass operations.”
[RULE 111, SEC. 1] It is well settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability Page | 16
[RULE 122, SEC. 1] The judgment that may be appealed by the aggrieved party envisaged in the Rule is a judgment convicting the accused, and not a judgment of acquittal. (Rule 45, Section 1 must be read together with Rule 122, Section 1) DENNIS T. VILLAREAL VS. CONSUELO C. ALIGA January 12, 2014 G.R. No 166995 PERALTA, J. FACTS: An Information was filed against respondent Aliga for the crime of Qualified Theft thru Falsification of Commercial Document. During arraignment, respondent Aliga pleaded not guilty. After the RTC resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for issuance of a hold departure order against respondent Aliga and the latter’s motion to suspend proceedings, trial on the merits ensued. Both the prosecution and the defense were able to present the testimonies of their witnesses and their respective documentary exhibits. Challenged in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the acquittal of the CA of the accused which reversed and set aside the decision of the RTC. ISSUE: (1) Whether the petitioner took a procedural misstep when he filed the present petition without the representation of the Office of the Solicitor General (YES) (2) Whether the petitioner correctly filed the correct petition (NO) HELD: (1) YES. Petitioner took a procedural misstep when he filed the present petition without the representation of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). In criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case against him can only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State. It is well settled that in criminal cases where the offended party is the State, the interest of the private complainant or the private offended party is limited to the civil liability. Thus, in the prosecution of the offense, the complainant's role is limited to that of a witness for the prosecution. If a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, an appeal therefrom on the criminal aspect may be undertaken only by the State through the Solicitor General. However, the said offended party or complainant may appeal the civil aspect despite the acquittal of the accused. In the case at bar, the petition filed essentially assails the criminal, not the civil, aspect of the CA Decision. (2) NO. A petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules should have been filed instead of herein petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45. If the petition, regardless of its nomenclature, merely calls for an ordinary review of the findings of the court a quo, the constitutional right of the accused against double jeopardy would be violated.. A petition under Rule 45 brings up for review errors of judgment, while a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 covers errors of jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction. Grave abuse of discretion is not an allowable ground under Rule 45. A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is a mode of appeal. Section 1 of Rule 45 should be read in relation to Section 1, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that any party may appeal from a judgment or final order "unless the accused will thereby be placed in double jeopardy." The judgment that may be appealed by the aggrieved party envisaged in the Rule is a judgment convicting the accused, and not a judgment of acquittal. The State is barred from appealing such judgment of acquittal by a petition for review. The instant petition is dismissed, and the acquittal of the accused was affirmed by the Supreme Court.
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[RULE 110, SEC. 8, 9] The averments in the two (2) sets of Information against petitioner and Rusillon clearly stated facts and circumstances constituting the elements of the crime of estafa as to duly inform them of the nature and cause of the accusation, sufficient to prepare their respective defenses.
SILVERINA E. CONSIGNA VS PEOPLE April 2, 2014, GR No. 175750-51 PEREZ, J. FACTS: Petitioner, the Municipal Treasurer of General Luna, Surigao del Norte, together with Jose Herasmio, obtained as loan from private respondent Hermelina Moleta, the sum of P320,000.00, to pay for the salaries of the employees of the municipality and to construct the municipal gymnasium as the municipality’s Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) had not yet arrived. As payment, petitioner issued 3 Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP) checks signed by Jaime Rusillon (Rusillon), the incumbent mayor of the Municipality of General Luna. In several attempts on different occasions, Moleta demanded payment from petitioner and Rusillon, but to no avail.
Thus, Moleta deposited the 3 LBP checks to her account in Metrobank-Surigao Branch. Upon presentation for payment, Metrobank returned the checks to Moleta as the checks had no funds. The following day, Moleta again deposited the checks. This time, however, she deposited the checks to her LBP account. Upon presentation for payment, the checks were again returned for the reason, "Signature Not on File." Upon verification, LBP informed Moleta that the municipality’s account was already closed and transferred to Development Bank of the Philippines, and that petitioner, the municipal treasurer, has been relieved from her position.
Hence, Moleta filed with the Sandiganbayan 2 sets of Information against petitioner, in the latter’s capacity as Municipal Treasurer and Rusillon, in his capacity as Municipal Mayor of General Luna, Surigao del Norte.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court a quo committed a reversible error for finding petitioner guilty of estafa, based on information which does not specifically designate the provision allegedly violated HELD: NO. Entrenched in jurisprudence is the dictum that the real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the information, or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, which are mere conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of the facts in the complaint or information. As held in People v. Dimaano: Page | 18
For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed. What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charge or the particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited. Every element of the offense must be stated in the information.
As early in United States v. Lim San, this Court has determined that:
From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the accused what is the technical name of the crime of which he stands charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the merits. x x x. That to which his attention should be directed, and in which he, above all things else, should be most interested, are the facts alleged. The real question is not did he commit a crime given in the law some technical and specific name, but did he perform the acts alleged in the body of the information in the manner therein set forth. The designation of the crime by name in the caption of the information from the facts alleged in the body of that pleading is a conclusion of law made by the fiscal. In the designation of the crime the accused never has a real interest until the trial has ended...”
Petitioner’s argument is as outdated as it is erroneous. The averments in the two (2) sets of Information against petitioner and Rusillon clearly stated facts and circumstances constituting the elements of the crime of estafa as to duly inform them of the nature and cause of the accusation, sufficient to prepare their respective defenses.
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[RULE 118, SEC. 2] All agreements or admissions made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and counsel. In this case, while it appears that the pre-trial agreement was signed only by the prosecution and defense counsel, the same may be admitted given that the defense failed to object to its admission. PEOPLE VS. LIKIRAN June 4, 2014, 725 SCRA 217 REYES, J. FACTS: Jenny Likiran (accused-appellant) was convicted of the crime of Murder for the death of Rolando Sareno, Sr. (Sareno). It was the eve of the town fiesta and a dance was being held at the basketball court. After a few hours, while Prescado Mercado (Mercado) and Constancio Goloceno (Goloceno) were inside the dance area, Jerome Likiran (Jerome), the accused-appellant’s brother, punched Mercado on the mouth. Jerome was armed with a short firearm while accused-appellant was holding a hunting knife. Jerome approached Sareno and shot him several times. With Sareno fallen, the accused-appellant stabbed him on the back. Celso Dagangon (Dagangon) was able to bring Sareno to the hospital only after Jerome and the accused-appellant left, but Sareno was already dead at that point. The accused-appellant denied any involvement in the crime. While he admitted that he was at the dance, he did not go outside when the commotion happened. The RTC found that the prosecution was able to establish the accused-appellant’s culpability. Prosecution witness Dagangon’s positive identification of the accused-appellant was held sufficient by the RTC to convict the latter of the crime of murder. The RTC also rejected the accused–appellant’s defense of denial as it was not supported by evidence. It also ruled that alibi cannot favor the accusedappellant since he failed to prove that it was impossible for him be at the scene of the crime. The CA sustained the findings of the RTC. The accused-appellant asserted that the information charged him of murder committed by attacking, assaulting, stabbing and shooting Sareno, thereby causing his instantaneous death. The accused-appellant argued that the evidence on record established that Sareno Page | 20
was in fact shot by some other person. The CA disregarded the accused-appellant’s contention and ruled that “the cause of death was not made an issue in the court a quo” and the Certificate of Death was admitted during the pre-trial conference as proof of the fact and cause of death. ISSUE: Whether or not there is sufficient basis for the CA’s disregard of the accused-appellant’s argument HELD: YES. The pre-trial agreement issued by the RTC states that one of the matters stipulated upon and admitted by the prosecution and the defense was that the Certificate of Death issued by Dr. Dael of Bukidnon Provincial Hospital and reviewed by the Rural Health Physician of Malaybalay City “is admitted as proof of fact and cause of death due to multiple stab wound scapular area.” Stipulation of facts during pre-trial is allowed by Rule 118 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Section 2 of Rule 118, meanwhile, prescribes that all agreements or admissions made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and counsel; otherwise, they cannot be used against the accused. In this case, while it appears that the pre-trial agreement was signed only by the prosecution and defense counsel, the same may nevertheless be admitted given that the defense failed to object to its admission. Moreover, a death certificate issued by a municipal health officer in the regular performance of his duty is prima facie evidence of the cause of death of the victim. The accused-appellant, therefore, is bound by his admission of Sareno’s cause of death. The Court of Appeals’ decision is AFFIRMED. [RULE 113, SEC. 5] Tancinco was arrested while attempting to conceal a firearm and could not produce a license to carry thereof when asked by the police officers. Immediately thereafter, as an incident to a lawful warrantless arrest, Tancinco was searched and found to have three (3) sachets of shabu in his possession. The search was lawful under Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. PEOPLE VS. DENNIS TANCINCO June 18, 2014, 726 SCRA 659 PEREZ, J. FACTS: A team of police officers was on roving patrol along M.J. Cuenco Avenue, Cebu City when SPO1 Mendranos received a call from a member of the Barangay Intelligence Network (BIN) who gave information of an ongoing pot session by an unidentified alleged armed man and his companion. They proceeded to the location of where the armed person and his companions were supposedly holding their pot session. They did not find the alleged armed man. The BIN informant approached SPO1 Mendranos and told him that the alleged armed man had been spotted playing a bingo machine at a nearby house. The alleged armed man turned out to be accused-appellant Tancinco. Since Tancinco was unable to produce a license to carry a firearm, PO2 Abatayo consfiscated the firearm and arrested Tancinco without a warrant. Incident to the warrantless arrest, SPO1 Mendranos instructed PO2 Dio to make a body search of Tancinco. The body search of Tancinco produced three (3) medium plastic sachets, which were positive to be shabu. Subsequently, separate Informations for violation of R.A. No. 9165, specifically illegal possession of dangerous drugs, and for illegal possession of firearm were filed by the arresting police officers against Tancinco. The trial court found Tancinco guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165, specifically illegal possession of a dangerous drug. On appeal, the appellate court rejected Tancinco’s claim of frame-up as against the straightforward, direct and positive testimony of the police officers. ISSUE: Whether or not there was a valid search.
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HELD: YES. Tancinco was searched as an incident to a lawful warrantless arrest. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. – A peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person. (a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense; (b) When an offense has just been committed and he has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it; and xxx In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b) above, the person arrested without a warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest police station or jail and shall be proceeded against in accordance with Section 7 of Rule 112. The testimony of the police officers, including PO2 Dio, as to what went down when they arrested Tancinco was direct, straightforward and positive. PO2 Dio’s statement that he did not clearly see Tancinco holding the firearm does not detract from the prosecutions’ evidence and story that Tancinco was arrested while attempting to conceal a firearm and could not produce a license to carry thereof when asked by the police officers. Immediately thereafter, as an incident to a lawful warrantless arrest, Tancinco was searched and found to have three (3) sachets of shabu in his possession. [RULE 110, SEC. 15] While petitioners raised this jurisdictional defect for the first time in the present petition, they are not precluded from questioning the same. Indeed, jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or the law and cannot be acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the omission of the parties or conferred by the acquiescence of the court. RICARDO L. ATIENZA AND ALFREDO A. CASTRO VS. PEOPLE February 12, 2014, G.R. No. 188694 PERLAS–BERNABE, J. FACTS: Ricardo Atienza requested Atibula (Records Officer I and Custodian of the CA Original Decisions in the CA Reporter’s Division) to take out Volumes 260, 265 and 267 which the latter rejected even despite the offer of P50,000 for Volume 260. Subsequently, Volume 266 was subsequently discovered to be missing and which access to the missing volume appears to have been acquired by entering through an opening because the air conditioning unit occupying the space thereat was taken out for repair earlier. A Clerk IV then handed to Atibula a bag containing a gift–wrapped package which turned out to be the missing Volume 266. Volume 266 bore badges of tampering evidenced by the “non–continuity of the front and the back cover flaps x x x and the pages of the book/volume differences in the cutting marks on the sides of the volume and the presence of artificial aging on [its] sides” and two (2) new documents which materially amended the original decision and resolution in the Fernando case were inserted in the said volume. After investigation, the charges involving the pertinent provisions of RAs 3019 and 6713 were dismissed for insufficiency of evidence, but it was contrarily determined that there existed probable cause to charge Atienza, et al. for the crimes of Robbery under Article 299(a)(1) of the Revised Penal Code and of Falsification of Public Document under Article 172(1)54 in relation to Article 171(6)55 of the same
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code. Thus, the corresponding Informations were filed before the RTC. The RTC found them guilty which the CA affirmed in toto. ISSUE: Whether there was lack of jurisdiction HELD: YES. The RTC did not have jurisdiction to take cognizance of the falsification case since Falsification of Public Document under Article 172(1)90 of the RPC, which is punishable by prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods (or imprisonment for 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 6 years91 ) and a fine of not more than P5,000.00, falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts pursuant to Section 32(2) of the “Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980,” as amended by RA 7691. While petitioners raised this jurisdictional defect for the first time in the present petition, they are not precluded from questioning the same. Indeed, jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred only by the Constitution or the law and cannot be acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the omission of the parties or conferred by the acquiescence of the court. The rule is well–settled that lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter may be raised at any stage of the proceedings. Hence, questions of jurisdiction may be cognizable even if raised for the first time on appeal. The accused were subsequently acquitted for reasonable doubt.
[RULE 110, SEC. 15] Although the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction was never raised as an issue in any part of the proceedings and even until it reached the Supreme Court, the SC applied the general rule that jurisdiction is vested by law and cannot be conferred or waived by the parties. [RULE 111, SEC. 1] The civil liability ex delicto is impliedly instituted with the criminal offense. When the trial court’s decision was appealed as to its criminal aspect in the petition for certiorari before this court, the civil aspect thereof is deemed included in the appeal. ANTONIO M. GARCIA VS. FERRO CHEMICALS, INC. October 1, 2014, 737 SCRA 252 LEONEN, J. FACTS: Antonio Garcia, as seller, and Ferro Chemicals, Inc., through Ramon Garcia, as buyer, entered into a deed of absolute· sale and purchase of shares of stock in July 1988 (including stocks in Alabang Country Club, Inc. and in Manila Polo Club, Inc.). However, this were sold in public auction. He was charged with estafa under Article 318 (Other Deceits) of the Revised Penal Code for allegedly misrepresenting to Ferro Chemicals, Inc. that the shares subject of the contracts entered into were free from all liens and encumbrances. ISSUES: (1) Does the RTC have jurisdiction? (NO) (2) Is filing a separate case for civil action forum shopping? (NO) HELD: (1) NO. When the information was filed on September 3, 1990, the law in force was Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (Judicial Reorganization Act) before it was amended by Republic Act No. 7691. Under Section 32 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, the Metropolitan Trial Court had jurisdiction over the Page | 23
case. The RTC did not have jurisdiction to hear and decide the case. This lack of jurisdiction resulted in voiding all of the trial court’s proceedings and the judgment rendered. Although the trial court’s lack of jurisdiction was never raised as an issue in any part of the proceedings and even until it reached this court, we apply the general rule that jurisdiction is vested by law and cannot be conferred or waived by the parties. Even on appeal and even if the reviewing parties did not raise the issue of jurisdiction, the reviewing court is not precluded from ruling that the lower court had no jurisdiction over the case. (2) NO. The appeal before the CA is purely on the civil aspect of the trial court’s decision while the petition for certiorari before this court is allegedly only on the criminal aspect of the case. Ferro Chemicals, Inc. did not reserve the right to institute the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto or institute a separate civil action prior to the filing of the criminal case. For this reason, the civil liability ex delicto is impliedly instituted with the criminal offense. When the trial court’s decision was appealed as to its criminal aspect in the petition for certiorari before this court, the civil aspect thereof is deemed included in the appeal. However, that private complainants in criminal cases are not precluded from filing a motion for reconsideration and subsequently an appeal on the civil aspect of a decision acquitting the accused. An exception to the rule that only the Solicitor General can bring actions in criminal proceedings before the Court of Appeals or this court is "when the private offended party questions the civil aspect of a decision of a lower court." The private complainant or offended party may not undertake such motion for reconsideration or appeal on the criminal aspect of the case. However, if the state pursues an appeal on the criminal aspect of a decision of the trial court acquitting the accused and private complainant/s failed to reserve the right to institute a separate civil action, the civil liability ex delicto that is inherently attached to the offense is likewise appealed. Private complainant cannot anymore pursue a separate appeal from that of the state without violating the doctrine of non-forum shopping. On the other hand, the conclusion is different if private complainant reserved the right to institute the civil action for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto before the RTC or institute a separate civil action prior to the filing of the criminal case in accordance with Rule 111 of the Rules of Court. In these situations, the filing of an appeals to the civil aspect of the case cannot be considered as forum shopping. This is not the situation here.
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[RULE 110, SEC. 6] Her last chance to pose the challenge was prior to the time she pleaded to the information through a motion to quash on the ground that the information did not conform substantially to the prescribed form, or did not charge an offense. FELINA ROSALDES VS. PEOPLE October 8, 2014, 737 SCRA 252 FACTS: In February 1996, 7 y/o Michael Ryan Gonzales (Grade 1 pupil in Iloilo), hurriedly entered the classroom and bumped into his teacher, petitioner Rosaldes, who was then asleep on a bamboo sofa. Rosaldes asked for an apology but when Michael didn’t want to apologize, she pushed and repeatedly slammed Michael on the floor. The medical examination after the incident showed contusions and pain; thus, Rosaldes was charged with child abuse in the RTC, and found her guilty which the CA affirmed but modified for her “to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correctional, as the minimum of it, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor.” ISSUE: (1) Whether information is sufficient? (2) Should civil liability be granted even if not proof of actual expenses or testimony of victim’s feelings? HELD: (1) YES. Under Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, the information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the proximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed. The information explicitly averred the offense of child abuse charged against the petitioner in the context of the statutory definition of child abuse found in Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 7610, supra, and Page | 25
thus complied with the requirements of Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. Moreover, the Court should no longer entertain the petitioner's challenge against the sufficiency of the information in form and substance. Her last chance to pose the challenge was prior to the time she pleaded to the information through a motion to quash on the ground that the information did not conform substantially to the prescribed form, or did not charge an offense. She did not do so, resulting in her waiver of the challenge. (2) YES. Even without proof of the actual expenses, or testimony on the victim's feelings, the lower courts still had the authority to define and allow civil liability arising from the offense and the means to fix their extent. The child abuse surely inflicted on Michael Ryan physical and emotional trauma as well as moral injury. It cannot also be denied that his parents necessarily spent for his treatment. Indeed, as the Court pointed out in Bacolod v. People, it was "imperative that the courts prescribe the proper penalties when convicting the accused, and determine the civil liability to be imposed on the accused, unless there has been a reservation of the action to recover civil liability or a waiver of its recovery. The victim was likewise entitled to exemplary damages, considering that Article 2230 of the Civil Code authorizes such damages if at least one aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the crime. The child abuse committed by the petitioner was aggravated her being a public schoolteacher, a factor in raising the penalty to its maximum period pursuant to Section 31(e) of Republic Act No. 7610. [RULE 110, SEC. 5] Even granting that an irregularity had intervened in the Barangay Captain’s issuance of the Certification to File and Action, we note that this irregularity is not a jurisdictional flaw that warrants the dismissal of the criminal cases before the MTC. FEDERICO SABAY VS. PEOPLE October 1, 2014, 737 SCRA 423 BRION, J. FACTS: In June 2001, while the petitioner and his daughter were busy laying wood and water pipes in the yard of Godofredo Lopez, the latter confronted the petitioner about their alleged intrusion into his property. A verbal altercation ensued between them. Petitioner’s daughter hit Godofredo on the head with a hard object; while petitioner threw a stone at his face breaking Godofredo’s eyeglasses. One Jervie Lopez intervened but was hit in the hand with a bolo. Soon after, the neighbors intervened not long after and pacified the parties. The petitioner was accordingly charged before the MTC with the crime of Physical Injuries under two (2) Informations for inflicting physical injuries upon Godofredo and Jervie, “which required and will require medical attendance for not more than 7 days or incapacitated or will incapacitate said victim from performing his habitual work for the same period of time.” This was despite a Kasunduan because it was not implemented as the building inspector failed to make the promised recommendation to resolve the boundary dispute between the parties. Thus, the Office of the Barangay Captain issued a Certificate to File an Action. The MTC, RTC, and CA held the petitioner guilty for 2 counts of slight physical injuries. ISSUE: Does the MTC have jurisdiction over the criminal cases in view of the alleged inadmissibility of the Certification to File Action? HELD: YES. Although they initially agreed to settle their case, the Kasunduan that embodied their agreement was never implemented; no actual settlement materialized as the building inspector failed to make his promised recommendation to settle the dispute. The Barangay Captain was thus compelled to Page | 26
issue a Certification to File an Action, indicating that the disputing parties did not reach any settlement. The CA correctly observed and considered the situation: the settlement of the case was conditioned on the recommendation of the building inspector; with no recommendation, no resolution of the conflict likewise took place. The present case was indisputably referred to the Barangay Lupon for conciliation prior to the institution of the criminal cases before the MTC. Even granting that an irregularity had intervened in the Barangay Captain’s issuance of the Certification to File and Action, we note that this irregularity is not a jurisdictional flaw that warrants the dismissal of the criminal cases before the MTC. As we held in Diu v. Court of Appeals: Also, the conciliation procedure under Presidential Decree No. 1508 is not a jurisdictional requirement and non-compliance therewith cannot affect the jurisdiction which the lower courts had already acquired over the subject matter and private respondents as defendants therein. Moreover, even though the Certification was not formally offered in evidence, it was marked as Exhibit “1” and attached to the records of the case. Significantly, the petitioner never objected to Godofredo’s testimony, particularly with the identification and marking of the Certification. In these lights, the Court sees no reason why the Certification should not be admitted. [RULE 113, SEC.5] Adriano was arrested pursuant to Section 5(a), which provides that a person may be arrested without a warrant if he "has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." PEOPLE VS. EDWARD ADRIANO Y SALES October 8, 2014, 738 SCRA 68 PEREZ, J. FACTS: Adriano was caught in a buy-bust operation pursuant to a report received from a barangay official and an informant that Adriano was selling drugs in North Daang Hari, Taguig City. The RTC convicted him under the crime of illegal sale of shabu punishable under Section 5, Article II of the Republic Act No. 9165 (R.A. No. 9165), otherwise known as Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act. The CA affirmed the RTC decision. Adriano files before the Supreme Court with the issue that his warrantless arrest was illegal. ISSUE: Whether or not his warrantless arrest was illegal HELD: NO. The defense's contention that the buy-bust team should have procured a search warrant for the validity of the buy-bust operation is misplaced. However, warrantless arrests are allowed in three (3) instances as provided by Section 5 of Rule 113 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure. Based on the above provision, Adriano was arrested pursuant to Section 5(a), which provides that a person may be arrested without a warrant if he "has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." In the case at bar, Adriano was caught in the act of committing an offense, in flagrante delicto, when Adriano was caught selling illegal shabu through a buy-bust operation, within the plain view of the arresting officers. A buy-bust operation is "a form of entrapment, in which the violator is caught in flagrante delicto and the police officers conducting the operation are not only authorized but duty-bound to apprehend the violator and to search him for anything that may have been part of or used in the commission of the Page | 27
crime. It has been, in recent years, accepted as a valid and effective mode of apprehending drug pushers. In a buy-bust operation, the idea to commit a crime originates from the offender, without anybody inducing or prodding him to commit the offense. If carried out with due regard for constitutional and legal safeguards, a buy-bust operation deserves judicial sanction.
[RULE 111] The acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case. LEONORA B. RIMANDO VS. SPOUSES ALDABA and PEOPLE October 13, 2014, 738 SCRA 232 PERLAS-BERNABE, J. FACTS: Rimando allegedly enticed Sps. Aldaba to invest in her business under the assurance that it is stable and that their money would earn 8% monthly interest. Convinced by Rimando’s proposal and taking into consideration their long friendship, Sps. Aldaba gave Rimando a check in the amount of P500,000 as investment in her business and invested the same to Mulitel (as evidenced by a signed Investment Contract). In turn, Rimando gave Sps. Aldaba three (3) postdated checks (amounting to P540,000); but upon maturity of the checks, they were dishonored due to insufficient funds. This prompted Sps. Aldaba to file a criminal complaint for estafa and BP 22 against her. The RTC acquitted Rimando of the crime of estafa, but found her civilly liable to Sps. Aldaba in the amount of P500,000. Meanwhile, in the BP 22 case, she was acquitted on the ground of reasonable doubt, with a declaration that the act or omission from which liability may arise does not exist. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA correctly upheld Rimando’s civil liability in the estafa case despite her acquittal and exoneration from civil liability in the BP 22 cases HELD: YES. At the outset, the Court notes that Rimando’s acquittal in the estafa case does not necessarily absolve her from any civil liability to private complainants, Sps. Aldaba. It is well-settled that "the acquittal of the accused does not automatically preclude a judgment against him on the civil aspect of the case. The extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil liability where: (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused is acquitted. In this case, Rimando’s civil liability did not arise from any purported act constituting the crime of estafa as the RTC clearly found that Rimando never employed any deceit on Sps. Aldaba to induce Page | 28
them to invest money in Multitel. Rather, her civil liability was correctly traced from being an accommodation party to one of the checks she issued to Sps. Aldaba on behalf of Multitel. In lending her name to Multitel, she, in effect, acted as a surety to the latter, and assuch, she may be held directly liable for the value of the issued check. Moreover, while the filing of the two sets of Information under the provisions of BP No. 22 and under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, on estafa, may refer to identical acts committed by the petitioner, the prosecution thereof cannot be limited to one offense, because a single criminal act may give rise to a multiplicity of offenses and where there is variance or differences between the elements of an offense is one law and another law as in the case at bar there will be no double jeopardy because what the rule on double jeopardy prohibits refers to identity of elements in the two (2) offenses. Otherwise stated, prosecution for the same act is not prohibited. What is forbidden is prosecution for the same offense. Essentially, while a BP 22 case and an estafa case may be rooted from an identical set of facts, they nevertheless present different causes of action. Both cases can proceed to their final adjudication – both as to their criminal and civil aspects – subject to the prohibition on double recovery. [RULE 117, SEC. 3; RULE 110, SEC. 6] The motion to quash is the mode by which an accused, before entering his plea, challenges the complaint or information for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects apparent on its face. However, the information in this case was already sufficient . GODOFREDO ENRILE and DR. FREDERICK ENRILE VS. HON. DANILO A. MANALASTAS October 22, 2014, 739 SCRA 49 BERSAMIN, J. FACTS: Petitioners were charged with less serious physical injuries by the MTC after finding probable cause against them and set their arraignment. Petitioners moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, arguing that the complainants has not presented proof of their having been given medical attention lasting 10 days or longer. The MTC denied their MR because their case was governed by the Rules of Summary Procedure which prohibited MRs. Thereafter, the petitioners presented a manifestation with motion to quash and a motion for the deferment of the arraignment; but was again denied. Unsatisfied, the petitioners commenced a special civil action for certiorari assailing the denial for both the MR and Motion to Quash before the RTC presided by private respondent. This was also denied. The petitioners next went to the CA via a petition for certiorari and prohibition to nullify the orders issued by the RTC, but was also dismissed for being the improper remedy. ISSUE: Was the dismissal of the Motion to Quash proper? (Despite an alleged clear and patent showing of a lack of an essential element of the crime less serious physical injuries) HELD: YES. The motion to quash is the mode by which an accused, before entering his plea, challenges the complaint or information for insufficiency on its face in point of law, or for defects apparent on its face. (Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court enumerates the grounds for the quashal of the complaint or information). However, the information in this case was already sufficient (Section 6, Rule 110). As the MTC and RTC rightly held, the presentation of the medical certificates to prove the duration of the victims’ need for medical attendance or of their incapacity should take place only at the trial, not Page | 29
before or during the preliminary investigation. According to Cinco v. Sandiganbayan, the preliminary investigation, which is the occasion for the submission of the parties’ respective affidavits, counteraffidavits and evidence to buttress their separate allegations, is merely inquisitorial, and is often the only means of discovering whether a person may be reasonably charged with a crime, to enable the prosecutor to prepare the information. It is not yet a trial on the merits, for its only purpose is to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty thereof. What is required is only that the evidence be sufficient to establish probable cause that the accused committed the crime charged, not that all reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused be removed. The Court also further agrees that “the issues raised in the motion to quash are matters of defense that could only be threshed out in a full blown trial on the merits. Indeed, proof of actual healing period of the alleged injuries of the private complainant could only be established in the trial of the cases filed against herein petitioners by means of competent evidence. [RULE 111, SEC. 4] Upon the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal action. PEOPLE VS. DEMOCRITO PARAS October 3, 2014, 739 SCRA 179 LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. FACTS: The accused-appellant Democrito Paras was charged with one count of rape before the RTC of Toledo City allegedly committed against AAA who was 17 years old at the time of the incident in March 1996. In 2005, the RTC found the accused guilty of rape. The CA affirmed but modified the amount of indemnity/ damages. In January 2013, the accused died at the New Bilibid Prison Hospital in Muntinlupa City due to pulmonary tuberculosis, during the pendency of his appeal before the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether his death extinguished both criminal and civil liability. HELD: YES. Under Article 89, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, the death of an accused pending his appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil liability ex delicto. Thus, upon the death of the accused pending appeal of his conviction, the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand as the accused; the civil action instituted therein for the recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal action. In this case, when the accused-appellant died on January 24, 2013, his appeal to this Court was still pending. The Decision dated June 4, 2014 was thereafter promulgated as the Court was not immediately informed of the accused-appellant's death. The death of the accused-appellant herein, thus, extinguished his criminal liability, as well as his civil liability directly arising from and based solely on the crime committed. Accordingly, the Court's Decision dated June 4, 2014 had been rendered ineffectual and the same must therefore be set aside. The criminal case against the accused-appellant must also be dismissed. Page | 30
[RULE 110, SEC. 6] By reason of the abbreviated nature of preliminary investigations, a dismissal of the charges as a result thereof is not equivalent to a judicial pronouncement of acquittal. In this case, there is no question that the Information filed against the respondents was sufficient to hold them liable for the crime of Theft because it was compliant with Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. PEOPLE VS. ENGR. RODOLFO YECYEC, ET AL. November 12, 2014, 739 SCRA 719 MENDOZA, J. FACTS: Pioneer Amaresa, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged in the buying and selling of rubber (in Bukidnon). Calixto Sison was their supervisor. In August 2002, Sison was approached by several officers of FARBECO Multi-purpose Cooperative (FARBECO) and 2 police officers. Upon their inspection, the group informed Sison that six tons of the rubber lumps/coagulum that were previously sold to him were earlier stolen from them. Rodolfo Yecyec, manager of FARBECO, arrived at his place on board a "weapons carrier truck." Yecyec, together 35 men, demanded that Sison give them the rubber lumps/coagulum. But before Yecyec and his men could completely load all the rubber cup lumps inside the truck, Sison arrived together with police officer and a barangay kagawad. He subsequently charged Yecyec with Robbery with Intimidation of Persons before the 1st Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC). The MCTC found probable cause; while the Provincial Prosecutor affirmed the finding of probable cause but change robbery to theft, and filed the information (in violation of Articles 308 and 309 of the RPC). Subsequently, the RTC arrived at that they failed to establish probable cause absent two (2) of the essential elements of the crime (“said property belongs to another” and “intent to gain”) and so dismissed the case. The CA affirmed the dismissal. ISSUE: Whether or not the RTC and the CA erred in dismissing the information against the respondents for the crime of Theft for want of probable cause HELD: YES. To determine whether probable cause exists and to charge those believed to have committed the crime as defined by law, is a function that belongs to the public prosecutor. It is an executive function. Thus, in the oft-cited case of Crespo v. Mogul, it was stated that: It is a cardinal principle that all criminal actions either commenced by complaint or by information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the fiscal. The institution of a criminal action depends upon the sound discretion of the fiscal. He may or may not file the complaint or information, follow or not follow that presented by the offended party, according to whether the evidence, in his opinion, is sufficient or not to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. x x x The primary Page | 31
objective of a preliminary investigation is to free respondent from the inconvenience, expense, ignominy and stress of defending himself/herself in the course of a formal trial, until the reasonable probability of his or her guilt. Such investigation is not part of the trial. A full and exhaustive presentation of the parties' evidence is not required, but only such as may engender a well-grounded belief than an offense has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. By reason of the abbreviated nature of preliminary investigations, a dismissal of the charges as a result thereof is not equivalent to a judicial pronouncement of acquittal. In this case, there is no question that the Information filed against the respondents was sufficient to hold them liable for the crime of Theft because it was compliant with Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court. The information was thus reinstated and the case remanded to the RTC to proceed with the case. [RULE 113, SEC. 5] Under Rule 113, Sect. 5, even though the police officer has not seen someone actually fleeing, he could still make a warrantless arrest if, based on his personal evaluation of the circumstances at the scene of the crime, he could determine the existence of probable cause that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime. However, the determination of probable cause and the gathering of facts or circumstances should be made immediately after the commission of the crime in order to comply with the element of immediacy. JOEY M. PESTILOS VS. MORENO GENEROSO November 10, 2014, 739 SCRA 337 BRION, J. FACTS: On February 2005, at around 3:15 in the morning, an altercation ensued between the petitioners and Atty. Moreno Generoso. Atty. Generoso called the Central Police and when they arrived, they saw him badly beaten. Atty. Generoso then pointed to the petitioners as those who mauled him. This prompted the police officers to "invite" the petitioners to go to Batasan Hills Police Station for investigation. The petitioners went with the police officers to Batasan Hills Police Station.9 At the inquest proceeding, the City Prosecutor of Quezon City found that the petitioners stabbed Atty. Generoso with a bladed weapon. Atty. Generoso fortunately survived the attack. In an Information dated February 22, 2005, the petitioners were indicted for attempted murder. Petitioners filed an Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation on the ground that they had not been lawfully arrested. They alleged that no valid warrantless arrest took place since the police officers had no personal knowledge that they were the perpetrators of the crime. They also claimed that they were just "invited" to the police station. Thus, the inquest proceeding was improper, and a regular procedure for preliminary investigation should have been performed pursuant to Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. The RTC denied the Urgent Motion and the CA also denied such. ISSUES: (1) Whether petitioners were validly arrested without a warrant (YES) (2) Whether petitioners were lawfully arrested when they were merely invited to the police precinct (YES) (3) Whether the order denying the motion for preliminary investigation is void for failure to state the facts and the law upon which it was based (YES) HELD: (1) YES. For purposes of this case, the Court shall focus on the history of Section 5(b). The provision has undergone changes through the years not just in its phraseology but also in its interpretation in our jurisprudence. Under the 1940 and the 1964 Rules of Court, the Rules required that there should be Page | 32
actual commission of an offense, thus, removing the element of the arresting officer's "reasonable suspicion of the commission of an offense." The 1940 and 1964 Rules of Court restricted the arresting officer's discretion in warrantless arrests under Section 6(b), Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court. Section 6, Rule 113 of the 1964 Rules of Court again underwent substantial changes and was reworded and re-numbered when it became Section 5, Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. As amended, Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Court retained the restrictions introduced under the 1964 Rules of Court. More importantly, however, it added a qualification that the commission of the offense should not only have been "committed" but should have been "just committed." This limited the arresting officer's time frame for conducting an investigation for purposes of gathering information indicating that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure was further amended with the incorporation of the word "probable cause" as the basis of the arresting officer's determination on whether the person to be arrested has committed the crime. From the current phraseology of the rules on warrantless arrest, it appears that for purposes of Section 5(b), the following are the notable changes: first, the contemplated offense was qualified by the word "just," connoting immediacy; and second, the warrantless arrest of a person sought to be arrested should be based on probable cause to be determined by the arresting officer based on his personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it. It is clear that the present rules have objectified" the previously subjective determination of the arresting officer as to the (1) commission of the crime; and (2) whether the person sought to be arrested committed the crime. As presently worded, the elements under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure are: first, an offense has just been committed; and second, the arresting officer has probable cause to believe based on personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person to be arrested has committed it. The purpose of a preliminary investigation is to determine whether a crime has been committed and whether there is probable cause to believe that the accused is guilty of the crime and should be held for trial. On the other hand, probable cause in judicial proceedings for the issuance of a warrant of arrest is defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances that would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent person to believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. Hence, before issuing a warrant of arrest, the judge must be satisfied that based on the evidence submitted, there is sufficient proof that a crime has been committed and that the person to be arrested is probably guilty thereof. At this stage of the criminal proceeding, the judge is not yet tasked to review in detail the evidence submitted during the preliminary investigation. In contrast, the arresting officer's determination of probable cause under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is based on his personal knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime. These facts or circumstances pertain to actual facts or raw evidence, i.e., supported by circumstances sufficiently strong in themselves to create the probable cause of guilt of the person to be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore must be founded on probable cause, coupled with good faith on the part of the peace officers making the arrest The phrase covers facts or, in the alternative, circumstances. According to the Black's Law Dictionary, "circumstances are attendant or accompanying facts, events or conditions." Circumstances may pertain to events or actions within the actual perception, personal evaluation or observation of the police officer at the scene of the crime. Thus, even though the police officer has not seen someone actually Page | 33
fleeing, he could still make a warrantless arrest if, based on his personal evaluation of the circumstances at the scene of the crime, he could determine the existence of probable cause that the person sought to be arrested has committed the crime. However, the determination of probable cause and the gathering of facts or circumstances should be made immediately after the commission of the crime in order to comply with the element of immediacy. In other words, the clincher in the element of "personal knowledge of facts or circumstances" is the required element of immediacy within which these facts or circumstances should be gathered. This required time element acts as a safeguard to ensure that the police officers have gathered the facts or perceived the circumstances within a very limited time frame. This guarantees that the police officers would have no time to base their probable cause finding on facts or circumstances obtained after an exhaustive investigation. Hence, for purposes of resolving the issue on the validity of the warrantless arrest of the present petitioners, the question to be resolved is whether the requirements for a valid warrantless arrest under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure were complied with, namely: 1) has the crime just been committed when they were arrested? 2) did the arresting officer have personal knowledge of facts and circumstances that the petitioners committed the crime? and 3) based on these facts and circumstances that the arresting officer possessed at the time of the petitioners' arrest, would a reasonably discreet and prudent person believe that the attempted murder of Atty. Generoso was committed by the petitioners?
(2) YES. The term "invited" in the Affidavit of Arrest is construed to mean as an authoritative command. After the resolution of the validity of the warrantless arrest, the discussion of the petitioners' second issue is largely academic. Arrest is defined as the taking of a person into custody in order that he may be bound to answer for the commission of an offense. An arrest is made by an actual restraint of the person to be arrested, or by his submission to the custody of the person making the arrest.91 Thus, application of actual force, manual touching of the body, physical restraint or a formal declaration of arrest is not required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of one of the parties to arrest the other and the intent of the other to submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary. (3) YES. The Order denying the motion for preliminary investigation is valid. There is no impropriety or grave abuse of discretion in this Order. The RTC, in resolving the motion, is not required to state all the facts found in the record of the case. Detailed evidentiary matters, as the RTC decreed, is best reserved for the full-blown trial of the case, not in the preliminary incidents leading up to the trial. Additionally, no less than the Constitution itself provides that it is the decision that should state clearly and distinctly the facts and the law on which it is based. In resolving a motion, the court is only required to state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor. A contrary system would only prolong the proceedings, which was precisely what happened to this case. Hence, we uphold the validity of the RTC's order as it correctly stated the reason for its denial of the petitioners' Urgent Motion for Regular Preliminary Investigation.
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[RULE 113, SEC. 5] The fact of the matter is that the accused-appellant was caught in flagrante delicto of selling illegal drugs to an undercover police officer in a buy-bust operation. His arrest, thus, falls within the ambit of Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure when an arrest made without warrant is deemed lawful. PEOPLE VS. USMAN Y GOGO February 4, 2015, G.R. No. 201100 PEREZ, J. FACTS: In December 2013, Mhods Usman y Gogo was charged of selling shabu under Sec. 5, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165 (R. A. No. 9165) or the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, following a buy-bust operation. For Usman’s part, the accused denied the allegations of the police officers and countered as a defense that he was framed up by the arresting officers. Subsequently, the RTC rendered a judgment of conviction which the CA affirmed. The appellate court ruled that accused-appellant’s arrest was valid because he was caught in flagrante delicto. Usman elevated the case before the Supreme Court claiming that his warrantless arrest was illegal (among other issues). ISSUE: Whether Usman arrest was illegal HELD: NO. First and foremost, accused-appellant can no longer question the legality of his arrest. In People v. Vasquez the Court reiterated the rule that any objection, defect or irregularity attending an arrest must be made before the accused enters his plea on arraignment, and having failed to move for the quashal of the Information before arraignment, accused-appellant is now estopped from questioning the legality of his arrest. Moreover, any irregularity was cured upon his voluntary submission to the RTC’s jurisdiction. Be that as it may, the fact of the matter is that the accused-appellant was caught in flagrante delicto of selling illegal drugs to an undercover police officer in a buy-bust operation. His arrest, thus, falls within the ambit of Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure when an arrest made without warrant is deemed lawful. In People v. Loks, the Court acknowledged that a buy-bust operation is a legally effective and proven procedure, sanctioned by law, for apprehending drug peddlers and distributors. Since accusedappellant was caught by the buy-bust team in flagrante delicto, his immediate arrest was also validly made. The accused was caught in the act and had to be apprehended on the spot. Accused-appellant’s arrest being valid, we also hold that the subsequent warrantless seizure of the illegal drugs from his person is equally valid. The legitimate warrantless arrest also cloaks the arresting police officer with the authority to validly search and seize from the offender those that may be used to prove the commission of the offense. Lastly, as to accused-appellant’s claim of frame-up, suffice it to say that in People v. Bartolome, we held that the fact that frame-up and extortion could be easily concocted renders such defenses hard to Page | 35
believe. Thus, although drug-related violators have commonly tendered such defenses to fend off or refute valid prosecutions of their drug-related violations, the Court has required that such defenses, to be credited at all, must be established with clear and convincing evidence. [RULE 126, SEC. 13] Having established the validity of the warrantless arrest in this case, the Court holds that the warrantless seizure of the illegal drugs from the appellant is likewise valid. PEOPLE VS. DONALD VASQUEZ January 15, 2014, 714 SCRA 78 LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. FACTS: P/Insp. Fajardo testified that, a confidential informant went to their office and reported that a certain Donald Vasquez was engaged in illegal drug activity. This alias Don supposedly claimed that he was an employee of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). According to the informant, alias Don promised him a good commission if he (the informant) would present a potential buyer of drugs. P/Insp. Fajardo relayed the information to Police Superintendent (P/Supt.) Pepito Domantay, the commanding officer of their office. P/Insp. Fajardo was then instructed to form a team and conduct a possible buy-bust against alias Don. She formed a team and with the help of the informant, she was able to set up a meeting with alias Don. The buy-bust operation took place. P/Insp. Fajardo further testified that the six plastic bags of shabu seized during the buy-bust operation were actually contained in a self-sealing plastic envelope placed inside a brown envelope. When the brown envelope was confiscated from the appellant, she put her initials “JSF” therein and signed it. ISSUE: Whether the warrantless seizure was valid HELD: YES. Having established the validity of the warrantless arrest in this case, the Court holds that the warrantless seizure of the illegal drugs from the appellant is likewise valid. This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures, however, is not absolute and such warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by jurisprudence in instances of (1) search of moving vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view, (3) customs searches, (4) waiver or consented searches, (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search), and search incidental to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize permissible warrantless arrest, to wit: (1) arrest in flagrante delicto, (2) arrest effected in hot pursuit, and (3) arrest of escaped prisoners. To secure a conviction for the crime of illegal sale of regulated or prohibited drugs, the following elements should be satisfactorily proven: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor. In a prosecution of illegal sale of drugs, “what is material is proof that the accused peddled illicit drugs, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti.” The Supreme Court thus affirmed the conviction.
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[RULE 110, SEC. 6] Treachery, which was alleged in the information, was duly proven by the prosecution (despite that the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength was not alleged in the criminal information filed against them). PEOPLE VS. DADAO January 22, 2014, 714 SCRA 524 LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. FACTS: That on or about the 11th day of July 1993, at 7:30 in the evening more or less at barangay Salucot, municipality of Talakag, province of Bukidnon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with (sic) one another, with intent to kill, by means of treachery, armed with guns and bolos, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and criminally attack, assault and shoot Pionio Yacapin, hitting his back and left leg, inflicting wounds that caused his death thereafter. The appellants were arraigned. All four (4) accused pleaded “Not Guilty” to the charge leveled against them. After trial was concluded, a guilty verdict was handed down by the trial court finding appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murdering Pionio Yacapin. ISSUE/S: Whether the Court erred convicting the appellant despite failure to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt and appreciating the qualifying circumstance not alleged in the information. HELD: NO. Appellants maintain that the qualifying circumstance of abuse of superior strength should not have been appreciated as it was not alleged in the criminal information filed against them. However, the Court has declared that treachery is present when the offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing means, methods, or forms in the execution, which tend directly and specially to insure its execution, without risk to the offender arising from the defense which the offended party might make. Moreover, the essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate and without warning, done in a swift and unexpected manner, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no chance to resist or escape. In the case at bar, the manner by which Pionio Yacapin was killed carried all the indubitable hallmarks of treachery. The Court of Appeals found that: Treachery, which was alleged in the information, was duly proven by the prosecution. The Court notes, in particular, the testimony of Nenita Yacapin who declared that when the victim was making a fire in the kitchen, she heard shots and she saw the barrel of the gun inserted on the bamboo split walling of their house. Exhibit "B", the anatomical chart certified by the Philippine National Police (PNP) personnel, shows the relative location of the gunshot wounds sustained by the victim. The chart indicates that the victim was shot from behind. Clearly, the execution of the attack made it impossible for the victim to defend himself or to retaliate.
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[RULE 110, SEC. 5]Generally, the prosecutor should have been the one who filed the motion to revive because it is the prosecutor who controls the trial. But in this particular case, the defect, if there was any, was cured when the public prosecutor later actively participated in the denial of the accused motion for reconsideration when she filed her Comment/Objection. ROBERTA SALDARIEGA VS HON. ELVIRA PANGANIBAN January 15, 2015, G.R. NO. 211933 & 211960 PERALTA, J. FACTS: On November 8, 2011, the Office of the City Prosecutor, Quezon City filed two (2) Informations against petitioner Roberta S. Saldariega for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article 2, Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002. Said cases were raffled to Branch 227, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, presided by herein respondent Judge Elvira D.C. Panganiban. On June 5, 2013, PO2 Villas filed a Motion to Re-open the Case against petitioner. PO2 Villas explained that his failure to appear during the hearings of the cases was due to the untimely death of his father-in-law. He further averred that PO3 Rionaldo Sabulaan, one of the arresting officers, is no longer assigned at the Cubao Police Station and had been transferred at the Batasan Police Station since November 2012, thus, could not have received his subpoena which is directed at his former place of assignment. In the disputed Order dated June 14, 2013, respondent Judge granted the motion and ordered the re-opening of the cases against petitioner and set the cases for continuation of hearing. Petitioner moved for reconsideration. She argued that the provisional dismissal of the criminal cases is considered an aquittal and PO2 Villas had no personality to file the motion to re-open the case. In an Order dated February 18, 2014, respondent denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration. On April 29, 2014, the Court resolved to require respondents to comment on the instant petition. The Office of the Solicitor General, through then Solicitor General Francis H. Jardeleza, maintained that respondent judge committed no grave abuse of discretion in issuing the assailed Orders dated It argued that petitioner did not expressly object to the motion to revive the criminal cases. ISSUE: Whether the witness can file a motion to re-open provisionally dismissed case without the participation of a Public Prosecutor and the absence is considered as waiver. HELD: YES. Generally, the prosecutor should have been the one who filed the motion to revive because it is the prosecutor who controls the trial. But in this particular case, the defect, if there was any, was cured when the public prosecutor later actively participated in the denial of the accused motion for reconsideration when she filed her Comment/Objection thereto. In the Order denying the motion, the trial court stated that “in her Comment/Objection, the Public Prosecutor begged to disagree primarily on the ground that double jeopardy has not set in, because the provisional dismissal of the case was with the express consent of the accused.” The court even went further when it stated that “although the Motion to Re-open the case was filed by the witness without securing the conformity of the Public Prosecutor, in effect, the prosecutor has conformed to the re-opening of the case because she (the prosecutor) finds that the failure of the witness to appear on two (2) hearings was due to the death of the father in law and the death of his aunt, as substantiated by the respective Certificates of Death of the said relatives.” Moreover, in the case at bar, it must be noted that the accused is charged with a public crime; hence, it is a victim-less crime. Thus, petition was denied. Page | 38
[RULE 113, SEC. 5] There was no overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise that could be properly attributed to the accused to rouse suspicion in the mind of the arresting officers that the accused had just committed, was actually committing, or was attempting to commit a crime. Thus, there was no valid warrantless arrest. PEOPLE VS. OLIVER RENATO EDAÑO July 7, 2014, 729 SCRA 255 BRION, J. FACTS: Accused was charged with violation of Section 11, Article II of RA 9165 wherein he entered a plea of not guilty. Members of Metro Manila Drugs Enforcement Group conducted an entrapment operation against a certain alias Nato. The accused while on board a vehicle, was approached by the informant and talked to him inside the vehicle; then the informant waved at the arresting officer, when he approached, the accused went outside the vehicle and ran away. The arresting officer chased and caught him and brought him to the police station for investigation. Upon trial, the accused was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal possession of shabu. On appeal, the accused argues that his warrantless arrest was illegal since he was not committing any crime when the police arrested him. The CA affirmed in toto the decision of RTC, further, CA also found the warrantless arrest of the accused valid. ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest was valid. HELD: NO, the warrantless arrest in is invalid. For a warrantless arrest of an accused to be valid, there are two requisites which must concur: 1) the person arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he had just committed, is committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; 2) such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer (Sec. 5 Rule 113 of Rules on Criminal Procedure). There was no overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise that could be properly attributed to the accused to rouse suspicion in the mind of the arresting officers that the accused had just committed, was actually committing, or was attempting to commit a crime. The arresting officer testified that the informant and the accused were just talking with each other when he approached them. The attempt of the accused to run away is irrelevant and cannot by itself be considered as adequate personal knowledge of the arresting officer that the accused was actually committing a crime. Thus, the decision of the CA was reversed and set aside; and the accused was acquitted.
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[RULE 110, Sect. 14] The change and/or addition of the branches of the petitioner’s business in the information does not constitute substantial amendment because it does not change the prosecution’s theory that the petitioner failed to file his income tax return. MENDEZ VS. PEOPLE June 11, 2014, G.R. No. 179962 BRION, J. FACTS: The Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) filed a complaint alleging that petitioner failed to file his income tax returns for taxable years 2001 to 2003 and, consequently evaded his obligation to pay the correct amount of taxes due. After a preliminary investigation, State Prosecutor Juan Pedro Navera found probable cause against petitioner for non-filing of income tax returns for taxable years 2001 and 2002 and for failure to supply correct and accurate information as to his true income for taxable year 2003, in violation of the National Internal Revenue Code. Accordingly, an information was filed with the CTA charging the petitioner with violation of Section 255 of Republic Act No. 8424 (Tax Reform Act of 1997). The information alleged that petitioner had been operating as a single proprietor business of “Weigh Less Center” with principal office in Quezon City and several branches in Quezon City, Makati, San Fernando and Dagupan City. The accused was arraigned and pleaded not guilty. The prosecution filed a “Motion to Amend Information with Leave of Court” changing the name of petitioner’s business to include the phrase “Mendez Medical Group” and changing in the branches of his business. CTA granted the said motion ruling that such amendment was merely a formal one. Petitioner opposed, claiming that the amendment was a substantial one prohibited under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court because its additional allegations would cause surprise to him and affect his defense. ISSUE: Whether the prosecution’s amendments are substantial in nature. HELD: NO. The change and/or addition of the branches of the petitioner’s operation in the information does not constitute substantial amendment because it does not change the prosecution’s theory that the petitioner failed to file his income tax return. The amendment sought did not alter the crime charged. According to jurisprudence, substantial matters in the complaint or information consists of the recital of facts constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. To be sure, the jurisprudential test on whether a defendant is prejudiced by the amendment of an information pertains to the availability of the same defense and evidence that the accused previously had under the original information. This test, however, must be read together with the characteristic thread of formal amendments, which is to maintain the nature of the crime or essence of the offense charged. In the present case, this thread remained consistently under the amended information, alleging the petitioner’s failure to file his return and consequently to pay the correct amount of taxes. Accordingly, the petitioner could not have been surprised at all. The petition was dismissed.
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[RULE 122] The acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case against him can only be appealed by the Solicitor General (but in this case the defect has been cured when the OSG filed its Comment). [RULE 117, SEC. 3] Non-compliance with this rule (i.e., prohibition of duplicitous complaints) is a ground for quashing the duplicitous complaint or information under Rule 117 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and the accused may raise the same in a motion to quash before he enters his plea, otherwise, the defect is deemed waived. PEOPLE AND AAA VS. COURT OF APPEALS February 25, 2015, G.R. No. 183652 PERALTA, J. FACTS: In a Second Amended Information dated June 23, 2004, private respondents Carampatana, Oporto and Alquizola were charged, together with Christian John Lim, Emmanuel dela Cruz, Samuel Rudinas, Jansen Roda, Harold Batoctoy, and Joseph Villame, for allegedly raping AAA, to wit: That on or about 10:30 o’clock in the evening of March 25, 2004 at Alson’s Palace, Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with lewd designs forcefully drunk AAA, a 16-year-old minor, with an intoxicating liquor and once intoxicated, brought said AAA at about dawn of March 26, 2004 at Alquizola Lodging house, Maranding, Lala, Lanao del Norte and also within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, and once inside said lodging house, accused RAYMUND CARAMPATANA and JOEPHEL OPORTO took turns in having carnal knowledge against the will of AAA while accused MOISES ALQUIZOLA, with lewd designs, kissed her against her will and consent. CONTRARY TO LAW. The RTC found private respondents guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape. The private respondents brought the case to the CA and subsequently rendered the assailed Decision reversing the trial court’s ruling which acquitted private respondents. AAA filed petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Supreme Court. ISSUES: (1) May the private complainant appeal the criminal aspect by Rule 65? (NO) (2) Can a single Information accuse of several counts of rape? (YES) HELD: (1) NO. Private respondents argue that the action should have been filed by the State through the OSG. True, in criminal cases, the acquittal of the accused or the dismissal of the case against him can only be appealed by the Solicitor General, acting on behalf of the State. Here, AAA filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, albeit at the instance of her private counsel, primarily imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the CA when it acquitted private respondents. In any event, the OSG joins petitioner’s cause in its Comment, thereby fulfilling the requirement that all criminal actions shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of the public prosecutor. Despite acquittal, however, either the offended party or the accused may appeal, but only with respect to the civil aspect of the decision. (2) YES. As a general rule, a complaint or information must charge only one offense, otherwise, the same is defective. The rationale behind this rule prohibiting duplicitous complaints or informations is Page | 41
to give the accused the necessary knowledge of the charge against him and enable him to sufficiently prepare for his defense. The State should not heap upon the accused two or more charges which might confuse him in his defense. Non-compliance with this rule is a ground for quashing the duplicitous complaint or information under Rule 117 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure and the accused may raise the same in a motion to quash before he enters his plea, otherwise, the defect is deemed waived. The accused herein, however, cannot avail of this defense simply because they did not file a motion to quash questioning the validity of the Information during their arraignment. Thus, they are deemed to have waived their right to question the same. Also, where the allegations of the acts imputed to the accused are merely different counts specifying the acts of perpetration of the same crime, as in the instant case, there is no duplicity to speak of. The Supreme Court reversed the CA decision and held the private respondents guilty for four (4) counts of rape.
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[RULE 110, SEC. 6] Although the Information below does not allege that the accused-appellant raped AAA while she was unconscious, the prosecution however alleged and proved the use of force and violence against her (for the accused to be convicted under Art. 266-A(1)(b) of the RPC). PEOPLE VS. RONALD NICAL February 18, 2015, G.R. No. 210430 REYES, J. FACTS: The Information dated August 28, 2007 charged the accused-appellant with the crime of rape, as follows: That on or about the 23rd day of August, 2007, in the Municipality of Dasmariñas, Province of Cavite, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with lewd design and actuated by lust, by means of force, violence and intimidation, did, then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge to one [AAA], by inserting his [p]enis into her genital organ (vagina), against her will and consent, to the latter’s damage and prejudice. CONTRARY TO LAW. AAA worked as a maid for a certain “Ate Michelle”, who owned two adjacent houses, in Dasmariñas, Cavite. At around 1:00 p.m, AAA was folding laundry in a room inside the big house when the accused-appellant, who was also a household helper, suddenly entered the room and immediately proceeded to embrace her. She tried to run but the accused-appellant grabbed her and pushed her so hard against the concrete wall of the room that she hit her head against it and became dizzy. The accused-appellant gave chase and caught up with her in the sala, where again he embraced her. At that point, AAA lost consciousness, and when she woke up, she was back inside the room she had fled, lying naked with the accused-appellant on top of her and half naked. The RTC gave full credence to AAA’s narration of her ordeal and found the accused-appellant guilty as charged. The appellate court rendered judgment affirming the guilt of the accused-appellant. ISSUE: Does the Information fatally fail to allege that he raped AAA while she was unconscious, as required under Article 266-A(1)(b) of the RPC? HELD: NO. While the Information does not allege that the victim was unconscious when the accusedappellant raped her, it nevertheless alleges the element of use of force and violence by the accusedappellant which facilitated the commission of the rape. It is an elementary rule in criminal procedure that an accused cannot be convicted of an offense unless it is clearly charged in the complaint or information. If the prosecution in this case sought to convict appellant by proving that complainant was violated while in a state of unconsciousness, as provided under the 2nd paragraph of Article 355, the information should have stated so. Although the Information below does not allege that the accused-appellant raped AAA while she was unconscious, the prosecution however alleged and proved the use of force and violence against her. Article 266-A(1)(a) of the RPC was satisfied because accused-appellant grabbed and pulled AAA by her shorts and then pushed her hard against the concrete wall, and the impact of her head bouncing against the wall made her dizzy, weak, and then unconscious. Her unconsciousness resulted directly from the force and violence employed by the accused-appellant against her.
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What is clear is that sufficient force was used which facilitated the consummation of the accusedappellant's lewd design when AAA became weak and momentarily unconscious. The CA decision finding the accused guilty was thus affirmed. [RULE 126, SEC. 2(b)] The wordings of the provision is of a mandatory nature, requiring a statement of compelling reasons if the application is filed in a court which does not have territorial jurisdiction over the place of commission of the crime. PILIPINAS SHELL VS. ROMARS INTERNATIONAL February 16, 2015, G.R. No. 189669 PERALTA, J. FACTS: Petitioners received information that respondent was selling, offering for sale, or distributing liquefied petroleum gas (LPG) by illegally refilling the steel cylinders manufactured by and bearing the duly registered trademark and device of respondent Petron. Petitioners requested the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to investigate said activities of respondent which acts constitute a violation of Section 168, in relation to Section 1704 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8293, and/or Section 25 of R.A. No. 623. The NBI proceeded with their investigation and reportedly found commercial quantities of Petron Gasul and Shellane cylinders stockpiled at respondent's warehouse. Thus, the NBI, in behalf of Petron and Shell, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Naga City (RTCNaga), two separate Applications for Search Warrant against respondent and/or its occupants. The RTC-Naga City issued an Order granting said Applications and Search Warrants were issued. However, respondent raised for the first time, the issue of the impropriety of filing the Application for Search Warrant at the RTC-Naga City when the alleged crime was committed in a place within the territorial jurisdiction of the RTC-Iriga City. RTC-Naga issued an Order granting respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, thereby quashing Search Warrants, which was later on affirmed by the Court of Appeals. ISSUE: Whether the application filed with the RTC-Naga failed to state any compelling reason to justify the filing of the same in a court which does not have territorial jurisdiction over the place of the commission of the crime. HELD: YES. Petitioner’s application for search warrant failed to state any compelling reason required under Rule 126, Section 2 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure: SEC. 2. Court where applications for search warrant shall be filed. An application for search warrant shall be filed with the following: xxx (b) For compelling reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where the crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced. xxx Under paragraph (b), the application for search warrant in this case should have stated compelling reasons why the same was being filed with the RTC-Naga instead of the RTC-Iriga City, considering that it is the latter court that has territorial jurisdiction over the place where the alleged crime was committed and also the place where the search warrant was enforced. The wordings of the provision is of a mandatory nature, requiring a statement of compelling reasons if the application is filed in a court which does not have territorial jurisdiction over the place of commission of the crime. Since Section 2, Article III of the 1987 Constitution guarantees the right of persons to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures, and search warrants constitute a limitation on this right, then Section 2, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure should be construed strictly against state authorities who would be enforcing the search warrants. On this point, then, petitioner's application for a search Page | 44
warrant was indeed insufficient for failing to comply with the requirement to state therein the compelling reasons why they had to file the application in a court that did not have territorial jurisdiction over the place where the alleged crime was committed. [RULE 110, SEC. 6] With or without the phrase (“not necessarily mortal”) what is important is that all the elements of attempted murder are still alleged in the Information [RULE 117, SEC. 9] It is now too late for petitioners to assail the sufficiency of the Information on the ground that the elements of the crime of attempted murder are lacking. FANTASTICO VS. MALICSE January 12, 2015, G.R. No. 190912 PERALTA, J. FACTS: A case for Attempted Murder under Article 248, in relation to Article 6 of the Revised Penal Code, was filed against Salvador Iguiron, Titus Malicse Iguiron, Saligan Malicse Iguiron, Tommy Ballesteros, Nestor Ballesteros, Eugene Surigao and petitioners Gary Fantastico and Rolando Villanueva. The Information reads: That on or about June 27, 1993, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused conspiring and confederating together and helping one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill and with treachery and taking advantage of superior strength, commence the commission of the crime of murder directly by overt acts, to wit: by then and there hitting the head of Elpidio Malicse, Sr. y de Leon with a piece of rattan, axe, pipe and a piece of wood and mauling him, but the said accused did not perform all the acts of execution which should have produced the crime of murder, as a consequence, by reason of causes other than their own spontaneous desistance, that is, the injuries inflicted upon Elpidio Malicse, Sr. y de Leon are not necessarily mortal. The trial court acquitted Titus Iguiron, Saligan Iguiron and Tommy Ballesteros but found Gary Fantastico and Rolando Villanueva guilty beyond reasonable doubt for Attempted Murder. Petitioners appealed the case to the CA, but the latter court affirmed the decision of the RTC. ISSUE: Does the inclusion of the phrase “not necessarily mortal” in the information make it fatal. HELD: NO. Petitioners question the inclusion of the phrase “not necessarily mortal” in the allegations in the Information. According to them, the inclusion of that phrase means that there is an absence of an intent to kill on their part. Intent to kill is a state of mind that the courts can discern only through external manifestations. All of these, were proven during the trial. Needless to say, with or without the phrase, what is important is that all the elements of attempted murder are still alleged in the Information. Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure states: Sec. 6. Sufficiency of complaint or information. – A complaint or information is sufficient if it states the name of the accused; the designation of the offense by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the commission of the offense; and the place wherein the offense was committed. In any case, it is now too late for petitioners to assail the sufficiency of the Information on the ground that the elements of the crime of attempted murder are lacking. Section 9, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court provides: SEC. 9. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor.- The failure of the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the complaint or information, Page | 45
either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to allege the same in said motion, shall be deemed a waiver of any objections except those based on the grounds provided for in paragraphs (a), (b), (g), and (i) of section 3 of this Rule. [RULE 112] The preliminary investigation proper, the investigating prosecutor, and ultimately, the Secretary of the DOJ, is afforded wide latitude of discretion in the exercise of its power to determine probable cause to warrant criminal prosecution. But where the findings of the investigating prosecutor or the Secretary of the DOJ as to the existence of probable cause are equivalent to a gross misapprehension of facts, certiorari will lie to correct these errors. SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMISSION VS. SANTOS March 19, 2014, 719 SCRA514 PEREZ, J. FACTS: This case is a criminal complaint for violation of Section 28 of Republic Act No. 8799, the Securities Regulation Code, filed by petitioner Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) against respondent Oudine Santos. Sometime in 2007, yet another investment scam was exposed with the disappearance of its primary perpetrator, Michael H.K. Liew, Chairman of the Board of Directors of Performance Investment Products Corporation (PIPC–BVI), a foreign corporation registered in the British Virgin Islands. To do business in the Philippines, PIPC–BVI incorporated herein as Philippine International Planning Center Corporation (PIPC Corporation). Because the head of PIPC Corporation had gone missing and with it the monies and investment of a significant number of investors, the SEC was flooded with complaints from 31 individuals against the Corporation. Soon thereafter, the SEC, through its Compliance and Endorsement Division, filed a complaint– affidavit for violation of Sections 8, 26 and 28 of the Securities Regulation Code before the Department of Justice (DOJ). Among the respondents in the complaint–affidavit were the principal officers of PIPC. The DOJ panel based its finding of probable cause on the collective acts of the majority of the respondents therein, including herein respondent Santos, which consisted in their acting as employees– agent and/or investor–agents of PIPC Corporation and/or PIPC–BVI. Specifically alluding to Santos as Investment Consultant of PIPC Corporation, the DOJ found probable cause to indict her for violation of Section 28 of the Securities Regulation Code for engaging in the business of selling or offering for sale securities, on behalf of PIPC Corporation and/or PIPC–BVI (which were found to be an issuer of securities without the necessary registration from the SEC) without Santos being registered as a broker, dealer, salesman or an associated person. Santos filed a petition for review before the Office of the Secretary of the DOJ and was granted. ISSUE: Can the Secretary of the Department of Justice determine probable cause to warrant criminal prosecution? HELD: YES. Generally, at the preliminary investigation proper, the investigating prosecutor, and ultimately, the Secretary of the DOJ, is afforded wide latitude of discretion in the exercise of its power to determine probable cause to warrant criminal prosecution. The determination of probable cause is an executive function where the prosecutor determines merely that a crime has been committed and that the accused has committed the same. The rules do not require that a prosecutor has moral certainty of the guilt of a person simply for preliminary investigation purposes. However, the authority of the prosecutor and the DOJ is not absolute; it cannot be exercised arbitrarily or capriciously. Where the findings of the investigating prosecutor or the Secretary of the DOJ as to the existence of probable cause are equivalent to a gross misapprehension of facts, certiorari will lie to correct these errors. Page | 46
While it is our policy not to interfere in the conduct of preliminary investigations, we have, on more than one occasion, adhered to some exceptions to the general rule: 1. when necessary to afford adequate protection to the constitutional rights of the accused; 2. when necessary for the orderly administration of justice or to avoid oppression or multiplicity of actions; 3. when there is a prejudicial question which is sub judice; 4. when the acts of the officer are without or in excess of authority; 5. where the prosecution is under an invalid law, ordinance or regulation; 6. when double jeopardy is clearly apparent; 7. where the court has no jurisdiction over the offense; 8. where it is a case of persecution rather than prosecution; 9. where the charges are manifestly false and motivated by the lust for vengeance; 10. when there is clearly no prima facie case against the accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied. In excluding Santos from the prosecution of the supposed violation of Section 28 of the Securities Regulation Code, the Secretary of the DOJ, as affirmed by the appellate court, debunked the DOJ panel’s finding that Santos was prima facie liable for either: (1) selling securities in the Philippines as a broker or dealer, or (2) acting as a salesman, or an associated person of any broker or dealer on behalf of PIPC Corporation and/or PIPC–BVI without being registered as such with the SEC. Thus, the Supreme Court directed that Santos be included in the Information for violation of Section 28 of the Securities and Regulation Code.
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[RULE 112] It is well–settled that courts of law are precluded from disturbing the findings of public prosecutors and the DOJ on the existence or non–existence of probable cause for the purpose of filing criminal informations, unless such findings are tainted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. BARRY LANIER VS. PEOPLE March 19, 2014, 719 SCRA 477 PEREZ, J. FACTS: SPO1 Gorion and PO2 Remaneses attested that Task Force Roulette of the Aklan Police Provincial Office (APPO) and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) received information from an asset that petitioners Barry Lanier and Perlita Lanier were engaged in selling illegal drugs in Boracay Island. The police operatives conducted a test–buy at petitioners’ residence in Barangay Balabag, Boracay Island where they were able to purchase P5,000.00 worth of shabu and P1,000.00 worth of marijuana from petitioners. They were able to secure a search warrant from the RTC of Aklan. Subsequently, the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Kalibo, Aklan filed an Information charging petitioners of violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. The accused fled a petition for review before the Department of Justice (DOJ). The Secretary of Justice acted on the petition favorably and directed the withdrawal of the Information. The Secretary of Justice gave more credence to the version of petitioners that the illegal drugs seized were planted. The Secretary of Justice took note of the testimony of SPO1 Gorion during the clarificatory hearing that the raiding team arrived ahead of the search team bolstered petitioners’ assertion that the illegal drugs seized were planted by the raiding team. The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari seeking to annul the DOJ Resolutions directing the withdrawal of the Information against petitioners. ISSUE: Did the Secretary of Justice err in directing the withdrawal of the Information, in this case? HELD: YES. The elements of illegal possession of prohibited drugs are: (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object, which is identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and, (3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the drug. The presence of these elements was attested to by evidence such as the Joint Affidavit of Arrest and the Receipt of the Properties seized. Moreover, the finding of a dangerous drug in the house or within the premises of the house of the accused is prima facie evidence of knowledge or animus possidendi.
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When the Secretary of Justice concluded that there was planting of evidence based on the lone fact that the raiding team arrived ahead of the search team, he, in effect went into the merits of the defense. When he made a determination based on his own appreciation of the pieces of evidence for and against the accused, he effectively assumed the function of a trial judge in the evaluation of the pieces of evidence and, thereby, acted outside his jurisdiction. It is well–settled that courts of law are precluded from disturbing the findings of public prosecutors and the DOJ on the existence or non–existence of probable cause for the purpose of filing criminal informations, unless such findings are tainted with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. The rationale behind the general rule rests on the principle of separation of powers, dictating that the determination of probable cause for the purpose of indicting a suspect is properly an executive function; while the exception hinges on the limiting principle of checks and balances, whereby the judiciary, through a special civil action of certiorari, has been tasked by the present Constitution to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government. [RULE 110] Private respondent's act of posting bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation vests the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over his person [despite that he was a private person and the public official is already deceased). PEOPLE VS. HENRY GO March 25, 2014, 719 SCRA 704 PERALTA, J. FACTS: In July 1997, Arturo Enrile, then Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC), was alleged to commit conspire with Henry Go (then Chairman and President of the Philippine International Air Terminals, Co., Inc. or PIATCO) in entering into a Concession Agreement, after the project for the construction of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport International Passenger Terminal III (NAIA IPT III) was awarded to Paircargo Consortium, and in which terms were more beneficial to PIATCO while being grossly disadvantageous to the Government. Subsequent to the finding of the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon of probable cause to indict respondents for the violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019, the Sandiganbayan issued an Order, to wit: The prosecution is given a period of ten (10) days from today which to show cause why this case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused considering that the accused is a private person and the public official Arturo Enrile, his alleged co-conspirator, is already deceased, and not an accused in this case. The prosecution complied that the SB has already acquired jurisdiction over the person of respondent by reason of his voluntary appearance, when he filed a motion for consolidation and when he posted bail. However, the Sandiganbayan granted the dismisal of the Information; which prompted the filing before th Supreme Court. ISSUE: Does the act of the accused of posting bail or in filing motions is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court? HELD: YES. Respondent should be reminded that prior to this Court's ruling in G.R. No. 168919, he already posted bail for his provisional liberty. The Court agrees with petitioner's contention that private respondent's act of posting bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation vests the SB with jurisdiction over his person. The rule is well settled that the act of an accused in posting bail or in filing motions seeking affirmative relief is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court. Page | 49
Thus, it has been held that: When a defendant in a criminal case is brought before a competent court by virtue of a warrant of arrest or otherwise, in order to avoid the submission of his body to the jurisdiction of the court he must raise the question of the court’s jurisdiction over his person at the very earliest opportunity. If he gives bail, demurs to the complaint or files any dilatory plea or pleads to the merits, he thereby gives the court jurisdiction over his person. (State ex rel. John Brown vs. Fitzgerald, 51 Minn., 534) Respondent did not make any special appearance to question the jurisdiction of the SB over his person prior to his posting of bail and filing his Motion for Consolidation.
[RULE 126, SEC. 13] A person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant. PEOPLE VS. MEDARIO CALANTIAO June 18, 2014, G.R. No. 203984 LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J. FACTS: Upon a complaint filed by Edwin Lojera regarding a shooting incident, PO1 Nelson Mariano and PO3 Eduardo Ramirez proceeded to Caloocan City where they found the white taxi reported by Lojera. While approaching said vehicle, two armed men alighted, fired their guns towards them and ran away. PO1 Mariano and PO3 Ramirez chased them but they were subdued. PO1 Mariano recovered from Calantiao a black bag containing 2 bricks of dried marijuana fruiting tops. Calantiao was charged before the RTC of violation of Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. 9165. However, Calantiao questions the admissibility of the marijuana found in his possession as evidence against him on the ground that it was discovered via an illegal search. ISSUE: Whether the marijuana is admissible as evidence. HELD: YES. The marijuana is admissible as evidence since earches and seizure incident to a lawful arrest are governed by Section 13, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, which states that a person lawfully arrested may be searched for dangerous weapons or anything which may have been used or constitute proof in the commission of an offense without a search warrant. The purpose of allowing a warrantless search and seizure incident to a lawful arrest is "to protect the arresting officer from being harmed by the person arrested, who might be armed with a concealed weapon, and to prevent the latter from destroying evidence within reach. A valid arrest allows the seizure of evidence or dangerous weapons either on the person of the one arrested or within the area of his immediate control. In the case at bar, the marijuana was found in a black bag in Calantiao's possession and within his immediate control. He could have easily taken any weapon from the bag or dumped it to destroy the evidence inside it. As the black bag containing the marijuana was in Calantiao's possession, it was within the permissible area that the apprehending officers could validly conduct a warrantless search.
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[RULE 117, SEC. 8] The essential requisites of the first paragraph of Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, are conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the second paragraph. In this case, there is no notice of any motion for the provisional dismissal or of the hearing which was served on the private complainant. CO VS. NEW PROSPERITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS June 30, 2014, G.R. No. 183994 PERALTA, J. FACTS: Respondent New Prosperity Plastic Products, represented by Elizabeth Uy, filed a complaint for violation of B.P. 22 against petitioner William Co. In the absence of Uy and the private counsel, the cases were provisionally dismissed on June 9, 2003 in open court pursuant to Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure. Uy received a copy of the June 9, 2003 Order on July 2, 2003, while her counsel-of-record received a copy a day after. On July 2, 2004, Uy, through counsel, filed a Motion to Revive the Criminal Cases which was granted. Co filed a petition challenging the revival of the criminal cases. He argues that the June 9, 2003 Order provisionally dismissing the criminal cases should be considered as a final dismissal on the ground that his right to speedy trial was denied. Assuming that the criminal cases were only provisionally dismissed, Co further posits that such dismissal became permanent one year after the issuance of the June 9, 2003 Order, not after notice to the offended party. He also insists that both the filing of the motion to revive and the trial court's issuance of the order granting the revival must be within the one-year period. Even assuming that the one-year period to revive the criminal cases started on July 2, 2003 when Uy received the June 9, 2003 Order, Co asserts that the motion was filed one day late since year 2004 was a leap year. ISSUE: Whether or not the provisional dismissal of the criminal case has become permanent (NO) HELD: NO. The essential requisites of the first paragraph of Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules of Court, which are conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the second paragraph thereof are: (1) the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution and the accused move for a provisional dismissal of the case; (2) the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case; (3) the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally; (4) the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of the case. In this case, there is no notice of any motion for the provisional dismissal or of the hearing which was served on the private complainant at least 3 days before said hearing as mandated by Section 4, Rule 15 of the Rules. Furthermore, the second paragraph of the new rule should be construed to mean that Page | 51
the order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after service of the order of dismissal on the public prosecutor who has control of the prosecution without the criminal case having been revived. Correlatively, when a party is represented by a counsel, notices of all kinds emanating from the court should be sent to the latter at his/her given address pursuant to Section 2, Rule 13 of the Rules. The public prosecutor cannot be expected to comply with the timeline unless he is served with a copy of the order of dismissal. Also, the contention that both the filing of the motion to revive the case and the court order reviving it must be made prior to the expiration of the one-year period is not found in the Rules. Further, the fact that year 2004 was a leap year is inconsequential to determine the timeliness of Uy's motion to revive the criminal cases. Even if the Court will consider that 2004 is a leap year and that the one-year period to revive the case should be reckoned from the date of receipt of the order of provisional dismissal by Uy. [RULE 110, SEC. 14] Section 5(a) of Rule 112 grants the trial court three options upon the filing of the criminal complaint or information. He may: a) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable cause; b) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; or, c) order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from notice in case of doubt on the existence of probable cause. [RULE 112, SEC. 5(a)] Simple estafa is a crime necessarily included in syndicated estafa. Under this legal situation, only a formal amendment of the filed information under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court is necessary. [RULE 116, SEC. 11(c)] After the expiration of the 60-day period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment. MA. GRACIA HAO AND DANNY HAO VS. PEOPLE September 17, 2014, G.R. No. 183345 BRION, J. FACTS: Private complainant Manuel Dy filed a criminal complaint against the petitioners and Victor Ngo for syndicated estafa penalized under Article 315(2)(a) of the RPC in relation with PD No. 1689. Dy initially invested in State Resources and increased his investments through several issued checks. In return, Gracia also issued several checks to Dy representing his earnings for his investment. All these checks were subsequently dishonored when Dy deposited them. He eventually learned that Gracia invested his money in the construction and realty business of Garcia’s husband, Danny Hao (Danny). Despite repeated demands and their promises to pay, petitioners never returned Dy’s money. Dy filed a supplemental affidavit and, on the basis thereof, the public prosecutor filed an information for syndicated estafa against the petitioners and their six coaccused. Judge Placido Marquez subsequently issued warrants of arrest for syndicated estafa. Petitioners immediately filed a motion to defer arraignment and motion to lift warrant of arrest. The RTC denied the twin motions, as well as the CA. In addition, the CA opined that the affidavits only show probable cause for the crime of simple estafa, not syndicated estafa. ISSUES: (1)Whether the warrants of arrest for syndicated estafa were valid (when the CA opined that there is only probable cause for simple estafa) (YES) (2) Whether the denial of the petitioners’ motion to defer arraignment was proper even after the 60-day period (YES) Page | 52
HELD: (1)YES. Under the Constitution and the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, a judge is mandated to personally determine the existence of probable cause after his personal evaluation of the prosecutor’s resolution and the supporting evidence for the crime charged. Section 5(a) of Rule 112 grants the trial court three options upon the filing of the criminal complaint or information. He may: a) dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly failed to establish probable cause; b) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; or, c) order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from notice in case of doubt on the existence of probable cause. In the present case, the trial court chose to issue warrants of arrest to the petitioners and their coaccused. To be valid, these warrants must have been issued after compliance with the requirement that probable cause be personally determined by the judge. Notably at this stage, the judge is tasked to merely determine the probability, not the certainty, of guilt of the accused. Simple estafa and syndicated estafa are not two entirely different crimes. Simple estafa is a crime necessarily included in syndicated estafa. Under this legal situation, only a formal amendment of the filed information under Section 14, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court is necessary. Thus, the warrants of arrest issued against the petitioners should not be nullified since probable cause exists for simple estafa. (2) YES. Under Section 11(c), Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, an arraignment may be suspended if there is a petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor pending at either the DOJ, or the Office of the President. However, such period of suspension should not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. As the petitioners alleged, they filed a petition for review with the DOJ on November 21, 2003. Since this petition had not been resolved yet, they claimed that their arraignment should be suspended indefinitely. We emphasize that the right of an accused to have his arraignment suspended is not an unqualified right. In Spouses Trinidad v. Ang, we explained that while the pendency of a petition for review is a ground for suspension of the arraignment, the Rules limit the deferment of the arraignment to a period of 60 days reckoned from the filing of the petition with the reviewing office. It follows, therefore, that after the expiration of the 60-day period, the trial court is bound to arraign the accused or to deny the motion to defer arraignment. Since the suspension of the petitioners’ arraignment was already beyond the period allowed by the Rules, the petitioners’ motion to suspend completely lacks any legal basis. Thus, the warrants of arrest issued stand.
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The existence of probable cause is a question of fact, and cannot be reviewed via a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 where only questions of law are raised. MICROSOFT CORPORATION AND ADOBE SYSTEMS INCORPORATED VS. SAMIR FARAJALLAH, ET AL. September 10, 2014, G.R. No. 205800 CARPIO, Acting C.J. FACTS: Petitioners Microsoft and Adobe (corporations organized in the United States) claim that they were informed that Respondents (directors and officers of New Fields, Inc.) were unlawfully reproducing and using unlicensed versions of their software. Padilla, Serrano, and Moradoz (employes and trained to detect unauthorized copies of Adobe and Microsoft software) went to the office of respondents in the Philippine Stock Exchange Center in Ortigas City. Using a legitimate business pretext, they were able to use two computers owned by New Fields. An application for search warrants was filed before the RTC and was issued the same day. The warrants were served on respondents on 24 May 2010. New Fields employees witnessed the search conducted by the authorities. Several items were seized, including 17 CD installers and 83 computers containing unauthorized copies of Microsoft and/or Adobe software. The RTC issued an Order quashing both warrants and directing that "all the items seized from the respondents be returned.” Petitioners filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 on 8 November 2010 before the Court of Appeals. Petitioners alleged that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion in granting the Motion to Quash despite: (1) respondents’ failure to comply with the three-day notice requirement; and (2) the existence of probable cause, and personal knowledge of the warrant applicant. Subsequently, the CA denied their petition for certiorari. ISSUE: (1) Whether the three-day notice rule to submit comments on the motion to quash (NO) (2) Whether the existence of probable cause may be reviewed via Rule 45 (NO) HELD: (1) NO. The three day notice rule is not absolute. The purpose of the rule is to safeguard the adverse party’s right to due process. Thus, if the adverse party was given a reasonable opportunity to study the motion and oppose it, then strict compliance with the three day notice rule may be dispensed with. In the instant case, when the court a quo ordered petitioners to submit their comment on the motion to quash, it was, in effect, giving petitioners their day in court. Thus, while the [three]-day notice rule was Page | 54
not strictly observed, its purpose was still satisfied when respondent judge did not immediately rule on the motion giving petitioners x x x the opportunity to study and oppose the arguments stated in the motion. (2) NO. Under Section 1 of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitions for review by certiorari "shall raise only questions of law." A question of fact exists when there is a doubt as to the truth of certain facts, and it can only be resolved through a reexamination of the body of evidence. In Microsoft Corporation v. Maxicorp, Inc., the Court has ruled that the existence of probable cause is a question of fact.
[RULE 113, SEC. 5] Having been caught in flagrante delicto, the police officers were not only authorized but were even duty-bound to arrest her even without a warrant. PEOPLE VS. MARISSA MARCELO August 18, 2014, G.R. No. 181541 DEL CASTILLO, J. FACTS: There were reports that the accused and her husband were engaged in selling shabu. P/Insp. Rabulan thus ordered a surveillance of the area where the transaction would take place and coordinated the matter with the Barangay Chairperson of Brgy. Punta Waling-Waling. He subsequently formed a buy-bust team and requested Tarog to participate in the operation. Subsequent to the buy-bust operation, the accused were arrested and charged with an information for violation of RA 9165 (The Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002). During the arraignment, appellant entered a plea of not guilty, thus the trial ensued. The RTC rendered a Decision convicting appellant for violation of Section 5, Article II of RA9165, as amended. The CA Affirmed RTC Judgment ISSUE: Whether or not the accused may be arrested even without a warrant HELD: YES. The prosecution proved that the accused was apprehended after she exchanged the shabu in her possession for the marked money of the poseur-buyer. Having been caught in flagrante delicto, the police officers were not only authorized but were even duty-bound to arrest her even without a warrant.
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[RULE 110, SEC. 8, 9] The character of the crime is not determined by the caption or preamble of the information nor by the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, but by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or information. PEOPLE VS. SAMUEL “TIWTIW” SANICO August 13, 2014, G.R. No. 208469 REYES, J. FACTS: Two separate criminal offense were charged against the accused. One for acts of lasciviousness, and one for rape. Accused was a butcher and an ice cream vendor who rented a room on the house where AAA lives and her family. AAA claimed that she was raped around 2:00pm while she was washing the dishes. He succeeded in removing her clothes and undergarments and pushing her against the wall. He took off his short pants and briefs and inserted his penis into her vagina for two to three minutes. She felt pain. The accused-appellant then pulled up his short pants and laid down in the sofa. AAA alleged that she was again raped for six or seven times. As to the acts of lasciviousness, AAA alleged that the accused was touching her breast against her will. The RTC rendered judgment convicting accused appellant of one count of rape and acts of lasciviousness. The CA affirmed with modification. ISSUE: Whether or not the case should be dismissed for not specifying the specific provision penalizing the act. HELD: NO. Although the Information specifically charged petitioner with Acts of Lasciviousness under the RPC, without stating therein that it was in relation to R.A. No. 7610, the failure to designate the offense by statute or to mention the specific provision penalizing the act, or an erroneous specification of the law violated, does not vitiate the information if the facts alleged therein clearly recite the facts constituting the crime charged. The character of the crime is not determined by the caption or preamble of the information nor by the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, but by the recital of the ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or information. In the case at bench, the commission of lascivious conduct was admitted by the accused-appellant in his testimony. No issue regarding his conviction for lascivious conduct had been raised in his appeal before the CA as well. The body stated in no uncertain terms that what was being assailed was merely the conviction for rape. Hence, the penalty imposed by the RTC for lascivious conduct should not be disturbed anymore.
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[RULE 124, SEC. 13] The Rules of Court provide that when the CA imposes a penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, an accused may: (1) File a notice of appeal under Section 13(c), Rule 124 to avail of an appeal as a matter of right before the Court and open the entire case for review on any question xxx [RULE 110, SEC. 9] The Information need not use the exact language of the statute in alleging the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. The test is whether it enables a person of common understanding to know the charge against him, and the court to render judgment properly. DANDY L. DUNGO AND GREGORIO A. SIBAL, JR. VS. PEOPLE July 1, 2015, G.R. No. 209464 MENDOZA, J. FACTS: The accused were alleged to be involved in an initiation rite last January 2006 on one Marlon Villanueva as a condition for his admission to the Alpha Phi Omega (APO) fraternity based in UP Los Baños. He was brought to the hospital but Dr. Masilungan, the attending physician observed that Villanueva was motionless and had no heartbeat. Villanueva did not respond to the resuscitation and was pronounced dead. Dr. Masilungan noticed a big contusion hematoma on the left side of the victim’s face and several injuries on his arms and legs. The RTC found the accused guilty in violation of Section 4 of the Anti-Hazing Law, which the CA affirmed. The sole assignment of error before the Supreme Court was that their constitutional right to be informed of the accusations against them was violated, as the offense found and proved was different from that charged in the information. ISSUES: (1) Whether or not an appeal by certiorari via Rule 45is proper in this case (NO) (2) Whether the RTC and CA judgments violated accused’s right to be informed of the accusations against them (NO) HELD: (1) NO. The Rules of Court provide that when the CA imposes a penalty of reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, an accused may: (1) File a notice of appeal under Section 13(c), Rule 124 to avail of an appeal as a matter of right before the Court and open the entire case for review on any question; or (2) File a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 to resort to an appeal as a matter of discretion and raise only questions of law. In this case, the CA affirmed the RTC decision imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua upon the petitioners. The petitioner opted to appeal the CA decision via a petition for certiorari under Rule 45. Consequently, they could only raise questions of law. Oddly, the petitioners began to assail the existence of conspiracy in their reply, which is a question of fact. However, in the interest of justice, the Court deems it proper to open the whole case for review. Page | 57
(2) NO. On the manner of how the Information should be worded Section 9 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court is enlightening. It is evident that the Information need not use the exact language of the statute in alleging the acts or omissions complained of as constituting the offense. The test is whether it enables a person of common understanding to know the charge against him, and the court to render judgment properly. The Court agrees with the OSG that the "planned initiation rite" as stated in the information included the act of inducing Villanueva to attend it. The hazing would not have been accomplished were it not for the acts of the petitioners that induced the victim to be present. [RULE 124, SEC. 14] Sec. 14 of rule 124 of the Rules of Court provides that a sheriff make a report to the court every thirty days until the judgment is satisfied in full. In the present case, Padua failed to report to the court and state the reason why the judgment was not satisfied in full within 30 days after his receipt of the writ. He only made a partial report after 2 years. ATTY. AURORA P. SANGLAY VS. EDUARDO E. PADUA II July 1, 2015, A.M. No. P-14-3182 CARPIO, J. FACTS: The accused Padua, Sheriff IV in the RTC of San Fernando, La Union , wass ordered "to execute the x x x dispositive portion of the Decision and make a return of [his] proceeding unto [the] Court within thirty (30) days from the date of receipt [of the writ] and every thirty (30) days thereafter until [the] Writ shall have been fully satisfied.” Padua failed to make the reports as ordered. Thus, Atty. Sanglay filed with the RTC a motion to direct Padua to enforce the writ of execution and render a report. Padua made a partial report but failed to make any other report. The Office of the Court Administration (OCA) found Padua to be guilty of simple neglect of duty. ISSUE: Whether or not Padua was guilty of simple neglect of duty. HELD: YES. Sec. 14 of rule 124 of the Rules of Court provides that a sheriff make a report to the court every thirty days until the judgment is satisfied in full: SEC. 14. Return of writ of execution. — The writ of execution shall be returnable to the court issuing it immediately after the judgment has been satisfied in part or in full. If the judgment cannot be satisfied in full within thirty (30) days after his receipt of the writ, the officer shall report to the court and state the reason therefor. Such writ shall continue in effect during the period within which the judgment may be enforced by motion. The officer shall make a report to the court every thirty (30) days on the proceedings taken thereon until the judgment is satisfied in full, or its effectivity expires. The returns or periodic reports shall set forth the whole of the proceedings taken, and shall be filed with the court and copies thereof promptly furnished the parties. In the present case, Padua failed to report to the court and state the reason why the judgment was not satisfied in full within 30 days after his receipt of the writ. Despite the March 9, 2010; July 4, 2010; and, January 20, 2011 motions filed by Atty. Sanglay, Padua failed to make a report to the court every 30 days on the proceedings taken. In fact, Padua made a partial report only after almost two years and only after Atty. Sanglay filed the present administrative complaint. Therefore, Padua is guilty of simple neglect of duty.
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[RULE 112, SEC. 6] Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that the judge "may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause." The CA should have denied the People's petition for special civil action of certiorari that assails the correctness of the order of dismissal. [RULE 122, SEC. 1] It is a final order since it disposes of the case, terminates the proceedings, and leaves the court with nothing further to do with respect to the case against petitioner HPG officers. CAJIPE VS. PEOPLE April 23, 2014, 723 SCRA 615 ABAD, J. FACTS: Lilian De Vera alleged that the PNP Special Action Force (SAF) and Highway Patrol Group (HPG) conspired to carry out a plan to shoot and kill her husband Jun and daughter Lia. In December 2008, Lilian called her husband to meet them in Pasay. She got to the place but her husband and daughter did not show up. Their housekeeper called her to inform her that her husband and daughter was involved in a shoot out in their village. Jun was shot dead on the head and Lia, the 7-year old daughter died in the hospital as she was rushed due to a head wound caused by a gunshot. In December 2009, the DOJ found probable cause to indict all the police officers involved in the shoot out. The RTC dismissed the case against the HPG officers for lack of probable cause; while the court issued a warrant of arrest for the SAF officers for finding a probable cause. Before the CA, the court appreciated the affidavits of witnesses stating that the HPG officers joined the SAF officers in pursuing and shooting of Jun while bringing Lia to a safer place. Thus, it issued warrants of arrest for the HPG officers. The CA denied the motions to quash these warrants, hence this petition. ISSUE: Whether or not the CA erred in issuing the warrants of arrest for the HPG officers. HELD: YES. The CA clearly erred in not denying the petition for being a wrong remedy. The fact, is that Section 1, Rule 122 of the same rules provides that an appeal may be taken in a criminal action from a judgment or final order like the RTC's order dismissing the case against petitioner HPG officers for lack of probable cause. It is a final order since it disposes of the case, terminates the proceedings, and leaves the court with nothing further to do with respect to the case against petitioner HPG officers. Since the OSG filed its petition for certiorari under Rule 65 on behalf of the People 112 days from receipt of the dismissal order by the city prosecutor of Parañaque, the petition was filed out of time. The order of dismissal is thus beyond appellate review. Of course, the People may refile the case if new evidence adduced in another preliminary investigation will support the filing of a new information against them. But that is another matter. The RTC judge was within his powers to dismiss the case against petitioner HPG officers. Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that the judge "may immediately dismiss the Page | 59
case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause." The CA should have denied the People's petition for special civil action of certiorari that assails the correctness of the order of dismissal since Section 1 of Rule 65 provides that such action is available only when "there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law."
[RULE 122, SEC. 3, 8, 9] The RTC ignored Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, which specifically governed appeals in criminal cases. The failure to file the memorandum on appeal is a ground for the RTC to dismiss the appeal only in civil cases. The same rule does not apply in criminal cases, because Section 9(c) imposes on the RTC the duty to decide the appeal “on the basis of the entire record of the case and of such memoranda or briefs as may have been filed” upon the submission of the appellate memoranda or briefs, or upon the expiration of the period to file the same. JOSE “PEPE” SANICO VS. PEOPLE March 25, 2015, G.R. No. 198753 BERSAMIN, J. FACTS: The petitioner and Marsito Batiquin were criminally charged for trespassing and theft of minerals in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Catmon-Carmen-Sogod, Cebu (MCTC). In due course, the MCTC rendered its judgment on April 2, 2009, convicting the accused for violation of Section 103 of Republic Act No. 7942 otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995. On April 26, 2010, one Atty. Dennis Cañete, another lawyer acting for Sanico, filed a motion for reconsideration vis-à-vis the dismissal of the appeal, stating that Sanico had not filed the memorandum on appeal because he had been beset with problems due to his wife’s debilitating illness which eventually claimed her life, as well as his counsel, Atty. Baring’s own medical condition which caused her to forget how she got this case and whom to contact as principal counsel. This was denied by the RTC. Subsequently, the accused filed a petition for review in the CA, contesting his conviction, and assailing the dismissal of his appeal for failure to file the memorandum on appeal. The CA denied the petition for review. ISSUE: Whether the CA committed reversible error in not nullifying the RTC’s order dismissing the appeal for failure to file a memorandum. HELD: YES. The RTC was guilty of the prejudicial error of misapplying the Rules of Court in its dismissal of the appeal timely made by the petitioner. In dismissing the appeal for the sole reason that he did not file the memorandum on appeal, the RTC wrongly relied on Section 7, Rule 40 of the Rules of Court. The RTC thereby ignored Rule 122 of the Rules of Court, which specifically governed appeals in criminal cases. The failure to file the memorandum on appeal is a ground for the RTC to dismiss the appeal only in civil cases. The same rule does not apply in criminal cases, because Section 9(c), supra, imposes on the RTC the duty to decide the appeal “on the basis of the entire record of the case and of such memoranda or briefs as may have been filed” upon the submission of the appellate memoranda or briefs, or upon
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the expiration of the period to file the same. Hence, the dismissal of the petitioner’s appeal cannot be properly premised on the failure to file the memorandum on appeal. Having timely perfected his appeal by filing the notice of appeal in the MCTC, the petitioner was entitled to expect that the RTC would resolve his appeal in due course, whether he filed his memorandum on appeal or not. The unwarranted dismissal of the appeal by the RTC was, therefore, an outright denial of due process.
[RULE 110, SEC. 6; RULE 116, SEC. 9] An Information may be sufficient to withstand a motion to quash, and yet insufficiently inform the accused of the specific details of the alleged offenses. In such instances, the Rules of Court allow the accused to move for a bill of particulars to enable him properly to plead and to prepare for trial. JUAN PONCE ENRILE V. PEOPLE August 11, 2015, G.R. No. 213455 BRION, J. FACTS: On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman filed an Information for plunder against Enrile, Jessica Lucila Reyes, Janet Lim Napoles, Ronald John Lim, and John Raymund de Asis before the Sandiganbayan. Enrile motioned for a Bill of Particulars but was denied by the Sandiganbayan Presiding Justice Amparo Cabotaje-Tang. ISSUE: Whether a Bill of Particular should be granted despite the sufficiency of the Information and therefore enabling the accused to prepare his defense. HELD: YES. An Information is an accusation in writing charging a person with an offense, signed by the prosecutor and filed with the court. The requirement aims to enable the accused to properly prepare for his defense since he is presumed to have no independent knowledge of the facts constituting the offense charged. To be considered as sufficient and valid, an information must state the name of the accused; the designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate date of the commission of the offense; and the place where the offense was committed. The Rules do not require the Information to exactly allege the date and place of the commission of the offense, unless the date and the place are material ingredients or essential elements of the offense, or are necessary for its identification. An Information only needs to state the ultimate facts constituting the offense; the evidentiary and other details (i.e., the facts supporting the ultimate facts) can be provided during the trial. “Ultimate facts” is defined as “those facts which the expected evidence will support. The term does not refer to the details of probative matter or particulars of evidence by which these material elements are to be established.” It refers to the facts that the evidence will prove at the trial. Ultimate facts has also been defined as the principal, determinative, and constitutive facts on whose existence the cause of action rests; they are and without which the judgment would lack support in essential particulars Evidentiary facts, on the other hand, are the facts necessary to establish the ultimate facts; they are the premises that lead to the ultimate facts as conclusion. They are facts supporting the existence of some Page | 61
other alleged and unproven fact. While it is fundamental that every element of the offense must be alleged in the Information, matters of evidence – as distinguished from the facts essential to the nature of the offense – do not need to be alleged. The procedural due process mandate of the Constitution requires that the accused be arraigned so that he may be fully informed as to why he was charged and what penal offense he has to face, to be convicted only on showing that his guilt is shown beyond reasonable doubt with full opportunity to disprove the evidence against him. During arraignment, the accused is granted the opportunity to fully know the precise charge that confronts him and made fully aware of possible loss of freedom, even of his life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him. Oftentimes, this is achieved when the Information alleges the material elements of the crime charged. If the Information fails to comply with this basic standard, it would be quashed on the ground that it fails to charge an offense. Of course, an Information may be sufficient to withstand a motion to quash, and yet insufficiently inform the accused of the specific details of the alleged offenses. In such instances, the Rules of Court allow the accused to move for a bill of particulars to enable him properly to plead and to prepare for trial. A reading of the Information filed against Enrile in the present case shows that the prosecution made little or no effort to particularize the transactions that would constitute the required series or combination of overt acts. In fact, it clustered under paragraph (a) of the Information its recital of the manner Enrile and his co-accused allegedly operated, thus describing its general view of the series or combination of overt criminal acts that constituted the crime of plunder. Thus, thus the Supreme Court directed the People of the Philippines to submit (within a non-extendible period of 15 days), a bill of particulars containing, specifically, the overt act/s alleged to constitute the “combination or series of overt criminal acts” charged in the Information.
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[RULE 112, SEC. 6] Although courts must respect the executive determination of probable cause, the trial courts may still independently determine probable cause. They are not irrevocably bound to the determination of probable cause by the prosecutor and the DOJ. ANLUD METAL RECYCLING CORPORATION VS. JOAQUIN ANG August 17, 2015, G.R. No.182157 SERENO, CJ. FACTS: San Miguel Packaging Products-Metal Closures Lithography Plant (SMC-MCLP) allegedly awarded petitioner an exclusive contract to purchase its aluminum- and tin-based scrap materials. Based on the narration of petitioner, Dela Cruz pretended to be an agent of Anlud Metal Recycling Corporation when she arranged for the transport of the scrap materials. She had allegedly coordinated the hauling with Alday, who was then working for SMC-MCLP. Alday purportedly allowed the trucks driven by Paniergo and Bagaua to enter the plant and load the scrap materials in the cargoes based on a false representation that the transaction was authorized by petitioner. Fortunately, the two trucks was not able to leave the premises of SMC-MCLP. Petitioner lodged a Complaint for attempted estafa through falsification of commercial/private document against dela Cruz, et al. An information was filed and the RTC issued a Warrant of Arrest. ISSUE: Did the RTC have jurisdiction to determine probable cause? HELD: YES. Petitioner explains that there are two determinations of probable cause: the first is for the purpose of filing a criminal information in the court, and the second is for the issuance of a warrant of arrest. Petitioner submits that since the first kind is executive in nature, then the RTC had absolutely no jurisdiction to determine the existence of probable cause to hold respondent as an accused in the crime of estafa. Petitioner's interpretation of the rules on the determination of probable cause is inaccurate. Although courts must respect the executive determination of probable cause, the trial courts may still independently determine probable cause. They are not irrevocably bound to the determination of probable cause by the prosecutor and the DOJ. The trial court actually has the following options upon the filing of a criminal information: (1) immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on record clearly fails to establish probable cause; (2) issue a warrant of arrest if it finds probable cause; and (3) order the prosecutor to present additional evidence within five days from notice in case of doubt as to the existence of probable cause. These options are provided in Rule 112, Section 6 (a) of the Rules of Court. Indeed, the RTC is allowed to dismiss the charge of estafa against Ang (one of those originally charged) notwithstanding the executive determination of probable cause by the prosecutor. If we were to construe otherwise, we would be contradicting the basic principle that "once an information is filed in RTC, any disposition of the case rests already in the sound discretion of the court.”
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[RULE 114] In now granting Enrile’s petition for certiorari, the Court is guided by the earlier mentioned principal purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the court. The Court is further mindful of the Philippines’ responsibility in the international community arising from the national commitment under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those charged in criminal proceedings but also to extraditees upon a clear and convincing showing: (1) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances. JUAN PONCE ENRILE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN August 17, 2015, G.R. No.182157 BERSAMIN, J. FACTS: On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman charged Enrile and several others with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of their purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of appropriations under the Priority Development Assistance Fund (PDAF). Enrile respectively filed his Omnibus Motion and Supplemental Opposition, praying, among others, that he be allowed to post bail should probable cause be found against him. On July 3, 2014, the Sandiganbayan issued its resolution denying Enrile’s motion, particularly on the matter of bail, on the ground of its prematurity considering that Enrile had not yet then voluntarily surrendered or been placed under the custody of the law. Accordingly, the Sandiganbayan ordered the arrest of Enrile. Thereafter, Enrile filed his Motion for Detention at the PNP General Hospital, and his Motion to Fix Bail. In support of the motions, Enrile argued that he should be allowed to post bail because: (a) the Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his guilt was strong; (b) although he was charged with plunder, the penalty as to him would only be reclusion temporal, not reclusion perpetua; and (c) he was not a flight risk, and his age and physical condition must further be seriously considered. This was denied by the Sandiganbayan; thus, a petition for certiorari before the Supreme Court. ISSUE: Whether Enrile should be entitled to bail. HELD: YES. Bail acts as a reconciling mechanism to accommodate both the accused’s interest in his provisional liberty before or during the trial, and the society’s interest in assuring the accused’s presence at trial. The general rule is, therefore, that any person, before being convicted of any criminal offense, shall be bailable, unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Hence, from the moment he is placed under arrest, or is detained or restrained by the officers of the law, he can claim the guarantee of his provisional liberty under the Bill of Rights, and he retains his right to bail unless he is charged with a capital offense, or with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, and the evidence of his guilt is strong. Once it has been established that the evidence of guilt is strong, no right to bail shall be recognized. Page | 64
As a result, all criminal cases within the competence of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, or Municipal Circuit Trial Court are bailable as matter of right because these courts have no jurisdiction to try capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment. Likewise, bail is a matter of right prior to conviction by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for any offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, or even prior to conviction for an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment when evidence of guilt is not strong. On the other hand, the granting of bail is discretionary: (1) upon conviction by the RTC of an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment; or (2) if the RTC has imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding six years, provided none of the circumstances enumerated under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present. For purposes of admission to bail, the determination of whether or not evidence of guilt is strong in criminal cases involving capital offenses, or offenses punishable with reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment lies within the discretion of the trial court. It is axiomatic, therefore, that bail cannot be allowed when its grant is a matter of discretion on the part of the trial court unless there has been a hearing with notice to the Prosecution. The hearing, which may be either summary or otherwise, in the discretion of the court, should primarily determine whether or not the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong. We first note that Enrile has averred in his Motion to Fix Bail the presence of two mitigating circumstances that should be appreciated in his favor, namely: that he was already over 70 years at the time of the alleged commission of the offense, and that he voluntarily surrendered. In now granting Enrile’s petition for certiorari, the Court is guided by the earlier mentioned principal purpose of bail, which is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at the trial, or whenever so required by the court. The Court is further mindful of the Philippines’ responsibility in the international community arising from the national commitment under the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. This national commitment to uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person has authorized the grant of bail not only to those charged in criminal proceedings but also to extraditees upon a clear and convincing showing: (1) that the detainee will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and (2) that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances. In our view, his social and political standing and his having immediately surrendered to the authorities upon his being charged in court indicate that the risk of his flight or escape from this jurisdiction is highly unlikely.
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