Article 11 paragraphs 1 and 2 People of the Philippines vs Jose Mediado G.R. No. 169871 – February 2, 2011 Bersamin, J.
Facts: -
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On March 20, 1997, Jose Mediado fatally assaulted Jimmy Llorin with a bolo at a dancing hall in Pulang Daga, Balatan, Camarines Sur. Mediado fled and later surrendered to the PNP station in Balatan. Mediado confessed to the killing but claimed that he did so only to defend himself and his father (Rodolfo). He related that he had passed the barangay hall on his way to work and had observed Llorin punch Rodolfo (accused’s father) and hit him with a stone; that Llorin then picked up a stone and threw it at him (Jose); that to fend of the attack, he (Jose) unsheathed his bolo and hacked Jimmy until he fell to the ground; and that he remained in the place for ten minutes and later yielded to the police authorities. Both the RTC and the CA rejected Jose Mediad o’s claim of self -defense -defense and defense of relative, and found that treachery was employed by Mediado when he attacked Llorin from behind.
Issue: -defense and defense of relative? Did the RTC and the CA err in rejecting Mediado’s claim of self -defense Held: No. The RTC and the CA correctly rejected Mediado’s claim of self -defense -defense and defense defense of a relative because because he did not substantiate it with clear and convincing evidence. Upon invoking the justifying circumstance of self-defense, Jose assumed the burden of proving the justification of his act with clear and convincing evidence. This is because his having admitted the killing required him to rely on the strength of his own evidence, not on the weakness of the Prosecution’s evidence, which, even if i t were weak, could not be disbelieved in view of his admission. Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance of self-defense and defense of a relative. There 7 can be no self-defense unless the victim committed unlawful aggression against the person who resorted to self-defense. self-defense. As the CA pointed out, however, Jose did not support his claim that Jimmy had committed aggression by punching Rodolfo and by 8 throwing stones at him and his father. father. In fact, he and his father were not able to identify any weapon used by Jimmy aside from the stone that he supposedly picked up from the ground. Even that testimony was contrary, for Jose testified that he had unsheathed his bolo and hacked Jimmy after dodging the stone thrown at him. Plainly, he did not establish with clear and convincing proof that Jimmy had assaulted him or his father as to pose to either of them an imminent threat of great harm before he mounted his own attack on Jimmy. Moreover, the post- mortem examination showed that the nature, number, and gravity of Jimmy’s wounds spoke not of 13 defense on the part of Jose but of a criminal intent to kill Jimmy. Jimmy. They indicated beyond doubt the treacherous manner of the assault, that is, that Jose thereby ensured that the killing would be without risk and would deny to Jimmy any opportunity to 14 defend himself . Article 11 paragraph 1 Ladislao Espinosa vs People of the Philippines G.R. No 181071 – March 15, 2010
Perez, J
Facts: On August 6, 2010, private com[plainant Andy metro went to the house of Ladeslao Espinosa in Sta. Cruz, Zambales. While standing outside, Merto shouted violent threats, challenging petitioner to face him outside. Fearing for the safety of his family, Espinosa went out of his house and confronted Merto. However, as soon as he drew closer to the private complainant, the latter drew and hurled a stone at Espinosa. Espinosa was able to duck to avoid getting hit and instinctively retaliated by hitting the leg of Merto with a bolo scabbard. Merto fell to the ground. Espinosa continued to maul the victim with the bolo scabbard until he was restrained. The victim sustained two bone fractures which took six months to completely heal. Espinosa was charged with frustrated homicide but was found guilty for the crime of serious physical injuries noting that the prosecution had failed to prove the element of “intent to kill” which is necessary to a conviction for Frustrated Homicide. On appeal, the CA affirmed the judgement of conviction with modification that the penalty imposed be lowered by one degree in accordance with the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense. Issue: Should the justifying circumstance of self-defense be appreciated in favour of the petitioner? Held: No. While the existence of the first (unlawful aggression) and third (lack of sufficient provocation) are without question, the argumentation is on the existence of the second element which is the reasonable necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel the attack.
The continuous hacking by petitioner constitutes force beyond what is reasonably required to repel the private complainant’s attack- and is therefore unjustified. Nowithstanding the fact that the petitioner merely used a bolo scabbard in fending off the unlawful aggression – the circumstances show that after the aggressor was taken down to the ground, the petitioner ceased to be motivated with the lawful desire of defending himself. He was then acting with intent to harm the private complainant shoes aggression had already ceased.
Article 11 paragraph 1 People of the Philippines vs Hemiano De Jesus and Rodelo Morales G.R. No. 186528 – Jauary 26, 2011 Velasco, Jr., J
Facts: On July 9, 1992, at about 9pm in Brgy. Libato, San Juan, Batangas, herein petitioners, Heminiano De Jesus and Rodelo Morales, each armed with a small bolo (gulukan), hacked and stabbed Armando Arasula resulting to his instantaneous death. Santiago Arasula, younger brother of the victim, witnessed the killing and positively identified herein petitioners as the assailants. Rodelo Morales claimed that he was at home, cooking dinner at the time of the attack and that he had no bad blood with the victim. On the other hand, Heminiano de Jesus admitted that he killed the victim, but raised the circumstance of self-defense. He claimed that he insisted on accompanying Armando Arasula as the latter was already drunk when they left a birthday party together. While they were walking, Arasula got mad at him as he did not wish to be accompanied. As de Jesus insisted, Armando drew his bolo and attacked him. De Jesus stated that he was able to parry the first blow and grappled with Armando for the bolo. He claimed that he was not aware that Armando was dead when he left him. He also claimed that Rodelo Morales was not with him at during the said incident. The RTC found both accused guilty for the murder of Armando Arasula. On appeal, the accused-appellants attempted to cast doubt on the testimony of Santiago Arasula, claiming that the witness’ identification of the accused lacked credibility, considering the circumstances that the area was dark and the Santiago was the only one to respond to the alleged cries for help of the victim. The appeal was denied by the CA. Issue: Is Heminiano de Jesus entitled to the justifying circumstance of self-defense? Held: No. Even if events had transpired as de Jesus related, he still failed to show that there was unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, or the other elements of the justifying circumstance of self-defense. In fact, he stated it was after he got possession of the bolo that he stabbed Armando. Thus, the aggression on the part of Armando, if it existed, would have already ceased. As there was no longer any unlawful aggression on the part of the victim, the justifying circumstance of self-defense is absent
Another telling sign of de Jesus’ guilt is his flight from the scene. Had events occurred as per his version, he should have been ready to face the consequences of his action, and let the truth come out. There was no reported bad blood between him and the victim, no motive for him to kill Armando. The question that must be asked is, why then was he so afraid, that he went into hiding for eight years, for what he claims is a justified killing? Self-defense is not credible in the face of the flight of the accused 35 from the crime scene and his or her failure to inform the authorities about the incident. .
Article 11 paragraph 5 Satiago Paera vs People of the Philippines G.R. No. 181626 – May 30, 2011 Carpio, J. As punong barangay of Mampas, Bacong, Negros Oriental, petitioner Santiago Paera allocated his constituents’ use of communal water coming from a communal tank by limiting distribution to the residents of Mampas, Bacong. Despite petitioner’s scheme, Indalecio continued drawing water from the t ank. Petitioner reminded Indalecio of the water distribution scheme and cut Indalecio’s access. The following day, petitioner inspected the tank after constituents complained of water supply interruption. Petitioner discovered a tap from the main line which he promptly disconnected. To stem the flow of water from the ensuing leak, petitioner, using a borrowed bolo, fashioned a wooden plug. It was at this point when Indalecio arrived. What happened next is contested by the parties. According to the prosecution, petitioner, without any warning, picked-up his bolo and charged towards Indalecio, shouting “I will kill you!”. Indalecio ran for safety, passing along the way his wife, Diosetea Darong who had followed him to the water tank. Upon seeing petitioner, Diosetea inquired what was the matter. Instead of replying, petitioner shouted "I don’t spare anyone, even if you are a woman, I will kill you!”. Diosetea similarly scampered and sought refuge in the nearby house of a relative. Unable to pursue Diosetea, petitioner turned his attention back to Indalecio. As petitioner chased Indalecio, he passed Vicente, and, recognizing the latter, repeatedly thrust his bolo towards him, shouting "Even if you are old, I will crack open your skull!" According to petitioner, however, it was Indalecio who threatened him with a bolo, angrily inquiring why petitioner had severed his water connection. This left petitioner with no choice but to take a defensive stance using the borrowed bolo, prompting Indalecio to scamper. The justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or exercise of office was invoked by the petitioner. The Municipal Circuit Trial Court (MCTC) found petitioner guilty of the three counts of Grave Threats, rejecting his claim of self-defense. On appeal to the RTC, petitioner was again denied on account of the testimonies of the Darongs and other pr osecution witnesses. Issue: Is the petitioner entitled to the justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or exercise of office? Held: No. The justifying circumstance of fulfillment of duty or exercise of office under the 5th paragraph of Article 11 of the RPC lies upon proof that the offense committed was the necessary consequence of the d u e performance of duty or 25 the l a w f u l exercise of office. Arguably, petitioner acted in the performance of his duty to "ensure delivery of basic 26 services" when he barred the Darongs’ access to the communal water tank. Nevertheless, petitioner exceeded the bounds of his office when he successively chased the Darongs with a bladed weapon, threatening harm on their persons, for violating his order. A number of options constituting lawful and due discharge of his office lay before 27 petitioner and his resort to any of them would have spared him from criminal liability. His failure to do so places his actions outside of the ambit of criminally immune official conduct. Petitioner ought to know that no amount of concern for the delivery of services justifies use by local elective officials of violence or threats of violence.
Article 11 paragraph 1 SPO2 Lolito T. Nacnac vs People of the Philippines G.R. No. 191913 – March 21, 2012 Velasco, Jr., J Facts: On the day of the incident, accused- appellant, the victim, and a number police of other officers. Shortly before 10:00 in the evening, the victim, together with then SPO1 Eduardo Basilio, took the patrol tricycle from the station grounds to go to Laoag City to settle a previous disagreement with a security of a local bar. Being the highest ranking officer during the shift, accusedappellant stopped the victim and his colleague from using the tricycle. He told the victim that he is needed at the station and, at any rate, he should stay at the station because he was drunk. This was not received well by the victim. He told accusedappellant in Ilocano: "Iyot ni inam kapi" (Coitus of your mother, cousin!). The victim alighted from the tricycle. SPO1 Eduardo Basilio did the same, went inside the office, and left the accused-appellant and the victim alone. The victim took a few steps and drew his .45 caliber gun which was tucked in a holster on the right side of his chest. Accused-appellant then fired his M-16 armalite upward as a warning shot. Undaunted, the victim still drew his gun. Accused-appellant then shot the victim on the
head, which caused the latter’s instantaneous death. Accused-appellant later surrendered to the station’s Chief of Police. The RTC found the accused guilty of the crime charged. The RTC held that the claim of self-defense by the accused was unavailing due to the absence of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. On appeal, the CA affirmed the f indings of the RTC. It held that the essential and primary element of unlawful aggression was lacking. It gave credence to the finding of the trial court that no one else saw the victim drawing his weapon and pointing it at accused Senior Police Officer 2 (SPO2) Lolito T. Nacnac. Petitioner argues that he did not receive a just and fair judgment based on the following: (1) the trial court did not resort to expert testimony and wrongly interpreted a photograph; (2) the trial court ignored the evidence proving unlawful aggression by the victim; (3) the trial court ignored the two gun reports and two empty shells found at the crime scene which support the claim that petitioner fired a warning shot; and (4) the trial court failed to appreciate petitioner’s act of self -defense. Petitioner also claims that the CA gravely erred in not giving proper weight and due consideration to the Comment of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which averred that petitioner was entit led to an acquittal, or at the very least. Ot one but two mi tigating circumstances. Issue: Is the petitioner entitled to the justifying circumstance of self-defense? Held: Yes. The victim here was a trained police officer. He was inebriated and had disobeyed a lawful order in order to settle a score with someone using a police vehicle. A warning shot fired by a fellow police officer, his superior, was left unheeded as he reached for his own firearm and pointed it at petitioner. Petitioner was, therefore, justified in defending himself from an inebriated and disobedient colleague. Even if We were to disbelieve the claim that the victim pointed his firearm at petitioner, there would still be a finding of unlawful aggression on the part of the victim. To successfully invoke self-defense, another requisite is that the means employed by the accused must be reasonably 18 commensurate to the nature and the extent of the attack sought to be averted . . Supporting petitioner’s claim of self -defense is the lone gunshot wound suffered by the victim.1âwphi1 The nature and number of wounds inflicted by the accused are constantly and unremittingly considered as important indicia.
The last requisite for self-defense to be appreciated is lack of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself or herself. As gleaned from the findings of the trial court, petitioner gave the victim a lawful order and fired a warning shot before shooting the armed and drunk victim. Absent from the shooting incident was any evidence on petitioner sufficiently provoking the victim prior to the shooting.
Article 12 paragraph 1 People of the Philippines vs Edwin Isla G.R. No. 199875 – November 21, 2012 Mendoza, J.: On July 21, 1997, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, with intent to kill, with t reachery and with evident premeditation, with abuse of superior strength, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and 3 employ personal violence upon the person of AAA by then and there stabbing her with a k itchen knife, hitting her twice below the chest, thereby inflicting upon said AAA serious and mortal wounds, the offender thus performing all the acts of execution which would produce death, which, however, was not produced by reason of cause independent of the will of the perpetrator, that is, the timely medical intervention, to the damage and prejudice of the said offended party. The said accused by means of force and intimidation, to wit: by then and t here wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously undress h er and put himself on top of her, and thereafter have carnal knowledge with the undersigned complainant against her will and without her consent. Isla never denied that he raped AAA on July 21, 1997. Invoking the defense of insanity, he t estified that before the incident , he and AAA had an illicit relationship for about two months until t hey broke up. He had to use a knife to be able to have sexual intercourse with her. It was the first time that he and AAA had sex. After raping her, he admitted stabbing AAA twice, first on 6 her left breast and then on her lower right breast "for reason he c annot understand." He also punched her several times when she attempted to grab the knife from him. As a defense, Isla claimed the exempting circumstance of insanity.Dr. Villacorta and Dr. Gomez of the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH) were presented as qualified expert witnesses. Dr. Villacorta testified that Isla was suffering from a major depressive disorder with psychotic features; that he ma nifested psychosis on account of his hallucinat ions, poor impulse control, poor judgment, and low frustration tolerance; and that he exhibited such behavioral pattern immediately prior to being jailed. Dr. Villacorta, however, could not say with definite certainty or not Isla was suffering from such mental disorder on the 7 said date as there was no examination conducted on Isla on the said date. On April 26, 2004, the RTC convicted Isla of the crimes of rape and frustrated murder. It did not give credence to his defense of insanity because it noted that Isla c ommitted the crimes charged during a lucid i nterval. He knew that what he was doing was unlawful. Aggrieved, Isla interposed an appeal with the CA. On December 17, 2010, the CA denied the a ppeal and affirmed the RTC decision which found Isla to have acted with discernment when he committed the crimes. Issue: Is the petitioner entitled to the exempting circumstance of insanity? Held: No. The defense failed to overcome the presumption of sanity. The respective testimonies of Dr. Villacorta and Dr. Gomez of the NCMH, as qualified expert witnesses, failed to support its claim of insanity. As observed by the CA, the mental examination on Isla taken four to six years after the incident happened in July 1997, in effect, showed that it could not be concluded with certainty that he was suffering from such psychosis immediately before or simultaneous to the commission of the crimes. The expert witnesses themselves opined that their fi ndings were not conclusive as to whether Isla was insane on that fateful day of July 21, 1997, as no examination was made on said day or for lack of information from other informants during that time.
Article 12 paragraph 4 People of the Philippines vs Susan Latosa G.R. No. 185843 – March 3, 2010 Nachura, J Facts: On February 5, 2002, at around 2:00 in the afternoon, appellant and her husband Major Felixberto Latosa, Sr. (Felixberto) together with two (2) of their children, Sassymae Latosa (Sassymae) and Michael Latosa (Michael), were at their house in Fort 4 Bonifacio. Felixberto, Sr. was then asleep when Sassymae saw appellant take Felixberto Sr.’s gun from the cabinet and leave. Appellant then gave her children mo ney and told them to buy food. Moments lat er, a certain Sgt.Ramos arrived and asked about what happened which lead to the discovery of the deceased with a bullet wound on his head and a gun near his left hand. Appellant, testifying on her own behalf, on th e other hand claimed that when Felixberto, Sr. woke up, he asked her to get his service pistol from the cabinet adjacent to their bed. As she was handing the pistol to him it suddenly fired, hitting Felixberto, Sr. who was still lying down. Shocked, she ran quickly to Felixberto, Sr.’s office and asked for help. Felixberto Lato sa, Jr., one (1) of the legitimate sons of appellant and the victim, also testified that sometime in December 2001, their father told him and his siblings over dinner about a threat to their lives by a certain E fren Sta. Inez.10 Appellant also denied her children’s 15 testimony that she was having an affair with a certain Col. Efren Sta. Inez (Sta. Inez), a policeman. The RTC denied appellant’s claim of accidental shooting and found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt for kil ling her husband Felixberto, Sr. On appeal, the CA upheld the decision o f the RTC. Issue: Is the appellant entitled to the exempting circumstance of accident? Held: No. Appellant’s version that she "accidentally shot" her husband is not credible. Appellant’s manner of carrying the caliber .45 pistol negates her claim of "due c are" in the performance of an act. T he location of the wound sustained by the victim shows that the shooting was not merely accidental. The victim was lying down and the fact that the gun was found near his left hand was not directly disputed by her. W e find it contrary to human nature that a newly awakened military man would suddenly ask his wife for his firearm, and even patiently wait for her return to the house, when the said firearm was just inside the cabinet which, according to appellant, was just about two meters away from his bed. Appellant held the gun in one ha nd and extended it towards her husband who was still lying in bed. Assuming arguendo that appellant has never learned how to fire a gun and was merely handing the firearm o ver to the deceased, the muzzle is never pointed to a person, a basic firearms safety rule which appellant is deemed to have already known since she admitted, during trial, that she sometimes handed over the gun to her husband. Assuming further that s he was not aware of this basic rule, it needed explaining why the gun would accidentally fire, when it should not, unless there was pressure on the trigger.
Article 12 paragraph 4 People of the Philippines vs Victoriano Dela Cruz G.R. No. 187683 – February 11, 2010 Nachura, J Facts: On August 18, 2002, in Malolos, Bulacan, the accused-appellant Victoriano Dela Cruz with intent to k ill his wife Anna Liza Caparas-dela Cruz, with whom he was united in lawful wedlock, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, use personal violence and stab the said A nna Liza Caparas-dela Cruz, hitting the latter on her trunk and on t he different parts of her body, thereby inflicting upon her serious physical injuries which directly caused her death. Joel Song, a neighbour who was playing cards near the accused’ house, saw Victoriano punching and kicking his wife, herein victim Anna ,in front of their house. Victoriano then dragged Anna inside the house by pulling the latter's hair, then slammed 8 the door. Joel overheard the couple s houting while they were already inside the house. Suddenly, Victoriano and Anna came out of the house, together with their young daughter. He asked for Joel’s help. Joel noticed blood spurting out of Anna’s mouth. He took the couple’s daughter and gave her to Victoriano's aunt. He then went with them to the Bulacan Provincial Hospital (hospital) on board a tricycle. However, Anna died. Vitoriano testified that the death of his wife was the result of an accident; that he consumed hard liquor at the time of the incident; that Anna was not immediately treated i n the hospital; that he loved his wife; and that he did not intentionally hu rt 13 her. The RTC rendered a Decision convicting accused-appellant for the crime of Parricide. On appeal, the CA affirmed the findings of the RTC with some modifications as to civil indemnity. Issue: Is the appellant entitled to the exempting circumstance of accident? Held: No. Even if, for the sake of argument, the Court considesr Victoriano’s claim that the injury sustained by his wife was caused by an accident, without fault or intention of causing it, it is clear that Victoriano was not performing a lawful act at the time of the incident. Before an accused may be exempted from criminal liability by the invocation of Article 12 (paragraph 4) of the RPC, the following elements must concur: (1) a person is performing a lawful act (2) with due care, and (3) he causes an injury to another by mere accident and (4) without any fault or intention of causing it. For an accident to become an exempting 24 circumstance, the act that causes the injury has to be lawful . Victoriano's act of physically maltreating his spouse is definitely not a lawful act.
Article 12, paragraph 4 and Article 11, paragraph 1 People of the Philippines vs Marcial Malicdem G.R. No. 184601 – November 12, 2012 Lenoardo – De Castro, J. Facts: On the night of August 11, 2002, as it was their practice after dinner, they met with Wilson near the artesian well. A t around 9:00 p.m., while they were seated on the septic tank, appellant arrived asking if they knew the whereabouts of his godson, 6 Rogelio Molina (Rogelio). They answered in the negative. T hey noticed that appellant was reeking of alcohol and was drunk. Appellant asked again for the whereabouts of Rogelio. As they stood to leave, appellant suddenly embraced Wilson and l unged a six-inch knife to the left part of his chest. When appellant moved to strike again, Wilson was able to deflect this blow which resulted to a cut on his rig ht arm. Intending to help his fr iend, Bernardo was hit by the knif e in his stomach. In the course of aiding Wilson, Joel boxed the appellant. During the brawl, Francisco Molina, Rogelio’s father, arrived at the scene, but was stabbed in the stomach by appellant. Appellant then ran away. Afterwards, Joel brought Wilson aboard a police patrol car to 7 the Region I Medical Center in Dagupan City where Wilson was declared dead on arrival. The RTC, after observing inconsistencies in the testimonies of the appellant and his wife, found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder. On appeal, the CA affirmed said decision with modifications, The petitioner relied on Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code in the trial and appellate courts, but adopted in this Court two divergent theories – (1) that he killed the victim to defend himself against his unlawful aggression; hence, is justified under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the R evised Penal Code; (2) that his bolo accidentally hit the victim and is, thus, exempt from criminal liability under Article 12, paragraph 4 of the Revised Penal Code. Issue: Is the appellant entitled to both the justifying circumstance of self-defense and exempting circumstance of accident? Held: No. Self-defense under Article 11, paragraph 1 of the R evised Penal Code necessarily implies a deliberate and positive overt act of the accused to prevent or repel an unlawful aggression of another with the use of reasonable means. The accused has freedom of action. He is aware of the consequences of his deliberate acts. On the other hand, the basis of exempting circumstances under Article 12 of the Revised Penal Code is the complete absence of intelligence, freedom of action, or intent, or the absence of negligence on the part of the accused. In the case at bench, the defense has failed to prove the existence of the requisites necessary for the appellant to successfully invoke self-defense or accident. It is an aberration for the petitioner to invoke the two defenses at the same time because the said defenses are intrinsically antithetical. There is no such defense as accidental self-defense in the realm of criminal law.
Article 12, paragraphs 4 and 5 People of the Philippines vs RENE BARON et Al. G.R. No. 185209 - June 28, 2010 Del Castillo, J. Facts: At about 9 o’clock in the evening of June 28, 1995 at Hda. Sta. Ana, Brgy. Burgos, Cadiz City, Negros Occidental, Philippines, the accused Rene Baron, Rey Villatima, and alias “Dedong” bargo, conspiring, confederating and helping o ne another with evident premeditation and treachery and with intent to kill, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and stab to death one Jua nito Berallo in order to rob, steal and take away the latter’s sidecar and motorcycle, wallet, and wristwatch; and inflicted multiple stabbed wounds which directly c aused the victim’s death. Appellant, Rene Baron, denied any participation in the crime. He claimed that on June 28, 1995, at around 7 o’clock in the evening, he bought rice and other necessities for his family and proceeded to the public transport terminal to get a ride home where he chanced upon the deceased and his two passengers who insisted that he came along f or the trip. During said trip, t he two passengers announced a hold- up and thereafter tied the driver’s hands and drag ged him towards the sugarcane fields while Baron stayed in the tricycle. B aron was then accompanied by the two passengers back to his house where he and his wife were threatened at gunpoint not to report the incident to the authorities. 2
On February 12, 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex crime of robbery with homicide. Before the appellate court, appellant alleged that the trial court erred in finding him guilty as charged and in not appreciating in his favor the exempting circumstance of irresistible force and/or uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury. However, the same was disregarded by the CA holding that all the requisites for said circumstances were lacking. Issue: Is the appellant entitled to the exempting circumstances of irresistible force and/or uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury? Held: No. The appellant’s attempt to evade criminal liability by insisting that he acted under the i mpulse of an uncontrollable fear of an equal or greater injury fails to impress. To avail of this exempting circumstance, the evidence must establish: (1) the existence of an uncontrollable fear; (2) that the fear must be real and imminent; and (3) the fear of an injury is greater than or 13 at least equal to that committed. A threat of future injury is insufficient. The compulsion must be of such a character as to leave no opportunity for the accused to escape.
We find nothing in the records to substantiate appellant’s insistence that he was und er duress from his co-accused in participating in the crime. In fact, t he evidence is to the contrary. Villatima and Bargo dragged the victim to wards the sugarcane field and left the appellant i nside the tricycle that was parked by t he roadside. While all alone, he had every opportunity to escape since he was no longer subjected to a real, imminent or reasonable fear. Surprisingly, he opted to wait for his co accused to return and even rode with t hem to Kabankalan, Negros Occidental to hide the vict im’s motorcycle in the house of Villatima’s aunt. The appellant had other opportunities to escape since he traveled with his co -accused for more than 10 hours and passed several transportation terminals. However, he never tried t o escape or at least request fo r assistance from the people aro und him. From the series of proven circumstantial evidence, the inescapable and natural conclusion is the three accused were in conspiracy with one another to kill the victim and cart away the motorcycle.
Article 13, paragraph 3 People of the Philippines vs Jay Mandy Magilan G.R. No. 189843 РMarch 20, 2011 Velasco, Jr.,J Facts On January 4, 2000, the accused and Mary Jay were having dinner at their home in Dasmari̱as, Cavite when t hey got into an argument. The accused did not want Mary Jay to attend a party, causing them to fight. Incensed, the accused collected the clothes that MAry Joy had given him for Chirstmas and told her he would burn them all and started pouring kerosene on the clothes. Mary tried to wrestle the can of kerosene from him and, at the same time, warned him not to pour it on her. Despite his wife's plea, the accused still poured gas on her, thus setting both the clothes and his wife on fire. The accused brought Ma Jay to the De la Salle University Medical Center Das Mari̱as. The victim was then transferred to three other hospitals but she was unable to recover and subsequently died. Before she expired, she told her mother what had happened to her, declaring, " Si Jay Mandy angnagsunogsa akin . (Jay Mandy burned me.)" The accused, in his defense, said the burning i ncident was completely accidental. Accused-appellant contends that his late wife's dying declaration as told to t he defense witnesses Atty. Duque and PO3 San Jose effectively absolved him from any wrongdoing. However, it is the dying declaration presented by the prosecution that satisfies all the requisites provided in the Rules. In contrast, the dying declaration for the defense did not show that Mary Jay's death at the time of said declaration appeared to be imminent and that she was under a co nsciousness of impending death. The RTC rendered its Decision on May 8, 2006 finding the accused guilty of the crime of Parricide. On appeal, the CA upheld the ruling of the trial court. The dying declaration made by Mary Jay to her mother Lourdes and laundrywoman Norma had all the essential requisites and could t hus be used to convict accused-appellant. Issue: Is the accused-appellant entitled to the mitigating circumstances of no intention to commit so grave a wrong?
Held: No. The court is convinced that the deceased did not take possession of the gallon container with kerosene. The accused had full control and possession of the same. He is a bulky and very muscular person while the deceased was of light built, shorter, smaller and weaker. When a demonstration was made in open court about the struggle for possession of the container, it was shown that the contents of the same did not spill owing to the little amount of liquid and its narrow opening. To be able to wet 90 percent of the body surface the kerosene content of the gallon container must have been poured over the head of the [ deceased. This explains why when she got ignited, the flames rose up to the ceiling and burned her from head to toe. It is extremely far-fetched that acc used-appellant could accidentally pour kerosene on his wife and likewise accidentally light her up and cause third degree burns to 90% of her body. We, thus, agree with the trial court's finding that accused-appellant knew the fatal injuries that he could cause when he poured kerosene all over his wife and lit a match to ignite a fire. There was no disparity between the means he used in injuring his wife and the resulting third degree burns on her body. He is, thus, not entitled to the mitigating circumstance under Art. 13(3) of the Code.
Article 13, paragraph 7 People of the Philippines vs Noel Sales G.R. No. 177218 - October 3, 2011 Del Castillo, J. Facts: On September 19, 2002, brothers Noemar and Junior, then nine and eight years old, respectively, left their home to attend the fluvial procession of Our Lady of Peñafrancia without the permission of their parents. Having not returned that night, their mother, Maria Sales, looked for them the next day and found them in the nearby barangay. When the two children reached their home in the evening of September 20, 2002, a furious appellant confronted them. Appellant then whipped them with a stick which was later broken so that he brought his kids outside their house. With Noemar's and Junior's hands and feet tied to a coconut tree, appellant continued beating them with a thick piece of wood. After the said beating, Noemar collapsed and lost consciousness. Maria tried to revive him and when Noemar remained motionless despite her efforts, she told appellant that their son was already dead. However, appellant refused to believe her. Maria then told appellant to call a quack doctor who instructed them to bring the child to the hospital. As there was no vehicle and upon the advice of another quack doctor that Noemar was already dead, appellant took the body back to their house. Noemer’s wake only lasted for a night and his body was never examined by a doctor. Appellant denied that his son died from his beating since no parent could kill his or her child. He claimed that Noemar died as a result of difficulty in breathing. In fact, he never complained of the whipping done to him. Besides, appellant recalled that Noemar was brought to a hospital more than a year before September 2002 and diagnosed with having a weak heart. The death of Noemar was reported to the police by the barangay captain.[11] Thereafter, appellant surrendered voluntarily.[12] In a Joint Decision, [13] the trial court held that the evidence presented by the prosecution was sufficient to prove that appellant was guilty of committing the crimes of parricide and slight physical injuries in the manner described in the informations. The appellate court denied the appeal and affirmed the ruling of the trial court. Issue: Is the appellant entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender?
Held: Yes. The trial court correctly appreciated the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender in favor of appellant since the evidence shows that he went to the police station a day af ter the barangay captain reported the death of Noemar. The presentation by appellant of himself to the police officer on duty in a spontaneous manner is a manifestation of his intent "to save the authorities the trouble and expense that may be incurred for his search and capture"[25] which is the essence of voluntary surrender.
Article 13, paragraph 1 (incomplete self-defense) People of the Philippines vs Allan Gabrino G.R. No. 189981 – March 9, 2011 Velasco, Jr., J. Facts:
On the 30th day of December, 1993 in the Municipality of La Paz, Province of Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction o f this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident premeditation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and wou nd one JOSEPH BALANO with the use of bladed weapon locally known as pisaw which said accused had purposely provided himself, thereby causing and inflicting upon the said JOSEPH BALANO wounds on his body which caused his death shortly thereafter. Two witnesses, Bartolome Custodio and Ismael Moreto, positively identified herein accused as the assailant during t he night Balano was stabbed. The appellant stated that he went outside of the house to urinate when Tap-ing threw a stone at him, which hit him on the forehead and caused him to fall down. And when he saw Balano rushing towards him with an ice pick, he immediately stabbed him and then ran away. After trial, the RTC convicted the accused for the murder of Balano. The CA affirmed the judgement of the RTC in toto. Issue: Is the appellant entitled to the privileged mitigating circumstance of incomplete self-defense? Held: No. In order that incomplete self- defense could prosper as a privileged miti gating circumstance, unlawful aggression must exist. In this case, accused-appellant failed to demonstrate the existence of unlawful aggression that would warrant an incomplete self-defense. To justify an incomplete self-defense, the unlawful aggression must come from the victim himself against the 34 person who resorted to self-defense. In this case, if there was any, the unlawful aggression came from Tap-ing, who was the one who threw a stone and hit accusedappellant. The mere fact that Balano was alleged to be approaching accused-appellant with an ice pick does not constitute a real and imminent threat to one’s life sufficient to create an unlawful aggression. There was not even any attempt o n the part of Balano to strike or stab accused-appellant. If at all and assuming to be true, Balano’s demeanor could be deemed as an intimidating attitude that is certainly short of the imminence that could give rise to the existence of unlawful aggression.
Article 13, paragraph 7 People of the Philippines vs Rex Nimuan G.R. No. 182458 – March 21, 2011 Brion, J. In the afternoon of July 22, 2004, Alfredo Ruiz witnessed the brutal slaying of his brother, Jun Ruiz at the hands of accusedappellant Rex Niuman. Jun was talking with friends, he saw the victim, the appellant and a certain Boy Nieva drinking in a 6 neighborhood store . Later that afternoon, as Alfredo was walking home along a path inside a mango plantation in the barangay, he spotted the appellant and the victim about 30 meters ahead of him, walking i n the same trail leading to their 7 respective houses. Unaware of his presence, the appellant – who was walking a meter behind the v ictim – suddenly hacked the 8 9 latter with a bolo. Alfredo ran away to seek help when he saw the victim fall to the gr ound after the attack. The postmortem report revealed that the vi ctim died from massive lo ss of blood due to multiple hack wounds on his right forearm, face and head. The appellant, interposing alibi, claimed that between 3:00 and 5:00 p.m. of July 22, 2004, he was watching television at the house of his uncle, Manuel Dulay, at San Benito Sur when a certain Barangay Captain Cariño, along with a barangay kagawad, arrived and informed him that he was a suspect in the death of the victim. The appellant and his mother went with the barangay officials to the police st ation of Aringay, La Union, where he was detained. In its December 29, 2004 Decision, the RTC found the appellant guilty of murder qualified by treachery. However, it appreciated in the appellant’s favor the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender.
On intermediate appellate review, the CA affirmed the R TC’s judgment, giving full respect to the R TC's assessment of the testimony and the credibility of the eyewitnesses. Issue: Is the appellant entitled to the mitigating circumstance of voluntary surrender? Held: No. Although the appellant, together with his mot her, went with the barangay officials to t he police station, the records indicate that the appellant did not intend to assume responsibility for the death of the victim. Such i ntention was made clear when the appellant resorted to his alibi throughout the proceedings.
Article 15 People of the Philippines vs Andres Fontillas G.R. No. 184177 – December 15, 2010 Leonardo-De Castro, J. Facts: That on or about the 8th day o f December 2001 at [Barangay] Bamban, Municipality of Masinloc, P rovince of Zambales, Philippines, accused Andres Fontillas, with lewd design and with gr ave abuse of authority, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, have sexual intercourse with and carnal knowledge of his own daughter, 13-year old [AAA], without her consent and against her will, to the damage and prejudice of said [AAA]. The prosecution presented the testimonies of A AA, the private offended party; Dr. Liezl dela Llana Edaño (Dr. Edaño), the medico-legal who physically examined AAA for signs of sexual abuse; and Narcisa Cubian, a social worker from the Department of Social Welfare and Development, formerly assigned at the Home for Girls in Olongapo City, who testified that AAA was referred and placed under the protective custody of said institution. The defense, on the other hand, presented the test imonies of accused-appellant who deni ed AAA’s accusation; and EEE, accused-appellant’s relative and neighbor, who testified that at around 8:30 p.m. on December 8, 2001, he saw accused appellant under a tamarind tree, drunk, with his head bowed down. In its Decision dated October 28, 2005, the RTC found the accused Andres Fontillas GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Incestuous Rape and is hereby sentenced to suffer the supreme penalty of DEATH. The CA later affirmed said decision with modifying the sentence to reclusion perpetua. Issue: Should the extreme intoxication of the appellant be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance? Held: No. The Court of Appeals correctly rejected the accused-appellant’s assertion that his extreme intoxication from alcohol on the night of the rape should be appreciated as a mitigating circumstance. The intoxication of the offender shall be taken into consideration as a mitigating circumstance when the offender has committed a felony in a state of intoxication, if the same is not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit said felony; but when the intoxication is habitual or intentional, it shall be considered as an aggravating circumstance. Accused appellant did not present any evidence that his intoxication was not habitual or subsequent to the plan to commit the rape. The person pleading intoxication must lik ewise prove that he took such quantity of alcoholic beverage, prior to the 24 commission of the crime, as would blur his reason. Accused-appellant utterly failed to present clear and convincing proof of the extent of his intoxication on the night of December 8, 2001 and that the amount of liquor he had taken was of such quantity as to affect his mental faculties. Not one of accused-appellant’s drinking buddies testified that they, in fact, consumed eight bottles of gin prior to the rape incident.
Article 14, paragraph 20 People of the Philippines vs Cesar Concepcion G.R. No. 200922 – July 18, 2012 Carpio, J. Facts:
At around 11:00 o’clock a.m. of May 25, 2004, while private complainant Jennifer Acampado was at the corner of Mother Ignacia Street, Quezon City and at another street a male person riding at the back of the driver of a motorcycle whom she later identified in open court as accused Cesar Concepcion, snatched her brown Avon bag with black strap which at that time, was placed on her left shoulder. The black motorcycle with white covering at t he back side and with plate number which is not visible to the eye, came from behind her. As the motorcycle sped away, the accused even raised and waved the bag that he snatched from Jennifer who was unable to do anything but just cry and look at the snatcher so much so that she recognized him in the process. Meanwhile, while prosecution witness Joemar de Felipe was driving his R & E Taxi, in the same vicinity, he witnessed the subject snatching incident. As the accused was waving the bag at Jennifer, he blew his horn. Ogardo drove faster so that de Felipe gave a chase and kept on bl owing his horn. Eventually, Ogardo lost control of the motorcycle and it crashed in front of his taxi, sending its two occupants to the pavement. De Felipe immediately alighted from the taxi with the intention to arrest the snatchers. At that juncture, some policemen arrived an d brought the two accused to a nearby hospital where the East Avenue 3 Medical Center, Quezon City where the co-accused and driver of the motorcycle Rosendo Ogardo later expired . 2
The Regional Trial Court (RT C) of Quezon City, Branch 81, in its Decision dated 1 August 2006 (RTC Decision), f ound Concepcion guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of robbery with homicide. The CA affirmed the conviction of Concepcion. Issue: Is there an aggravating circumstance in the case at bench? Held: Yes. The crime committed by the appellant is theft with the presence of a generic aggravating circumstance of use of a motor vehicle in the commission of the crime. As such, the penalty to be imposed is arresto mayor in its maximum period, or 6 months, to prision correccional in its medium period, or 4 years and 2 month.
Article 15 People of the Philippines vs Jonie Dominguez G.R. No. 191065 – June 13, 2011 Sereno, J. Facts: The appeal stems from nine (9) criminal Informations filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Bulan, Sorsogon, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 02-582 to 02-590. In the Informatio ns, Jonie Dominguez was accused of committing multi ple counts of the crime of rape -- under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8353 in relation to R.A. No. 7610 -- against two minor female relatives, hereinafter called AAA and BBB. AAA was allegedly raped twice: first in 2001 when she was only nine years old, and second on 12 July 2002. The first instance of rape was allegedly done by the accused’s insertion o f his two fingers into AAA's sex organ under the circumstance of intimidation with a knife. BBB, on the other hand, was allegedly raped seven times: first on 15 June 2000 when she was 12 y ears old; and again on 20 April 2001, 1 June 2001, 13 April 2001; and finally on 2, 8, and 12 J une 2002. The first instance of rape was allegedly by carnal 7 knowledge through force, violence and intimidation, and moral ascendancy. The subsequent instances of rape were allegedly committed by the insertion of a finger into BBB's sex organ, also through f orce, violence and intimidation, and moral 8 ascendancy. The RTC found the accused JONIE DOMINGUEZ GUILTY of two (2) counts of Statutory Rape under par. (2) of Article 266- A in relation to Article III, Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610 and six (6) other counts of Simple Rape under pars. (1) and (2) pf Article 266-A in relation to Article III, Sec. 5(b) of RA 7610. This decision was subsequently affirmed by the CA. Issue: Is relationship an aggravating circumstance in the case at bench? Held:
No. Contrary to the claim of the prosecution, the accused’s relationship to the victims c annot be considered as an aggravating circumstance. For relationship to aggravate or qualify the crime of rape committed against a minor, the accused must be a 36 relative of the victim within the third civil degree. As a brother of the victi m's paternal grandmother, he is but a relative within the fourth civil degree. This relationship cannot qualify the crime as to merit the punishment of reclusion perpetua to death under Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code as amended. Thus, the rape of BBB by means of carnal knowledge was simple rape, and the amount of civil indemnity should be decreased from P75,000 to P 50,000.
Article 14, paragraph 6 People of the Philippines vs Nelson Palma G.R. No. 189279 – March 9, 2010 Nachura, J. Facts: On December 7, 2004, at approximately 7:00 in the evening, AAA, while walking along the C-5 Bridge in BagongIlog, Pasig City, noticed that a man had followed her after she passed the talipapa. Suddenly, the man placed his ar m over her shoulder, poked a sharp object on the left side of her body, then instructed her to go with him. When she turned her head towards the man, she recognized the assailant (although then, she did not know his name) as she regularly saw him at the bridge every t ime she and 4 her co-workers would pass by. cЃa Appellant forcibly brought AAA to a dark place under the bridge, covered by big stones that blocked the view of passersby. There, he asked if she had a cellular phone and some money. She replied in the affirmative. He also asked what AAAs phone model was, and she answered that it was a Nokia 3315. Then, appellant hit her on the sto mach and told her to undress. But she r efused. He thus pushed her towards the sofa ( found 6 under the bridge), slashed her clothes and underwear and threat ened her with the knife. cЃa When AAA was already naked, appellant lowered his own short pants and briefs, and fo rcibly inserted his penis into her vagina and continued pushing it in for about two (2) to three (3) minutes.7cЃa After satisfying his lust, he withdrew his penis and fixed himself. AAA wanted to run 8 away, but she could not do so as she was th en totally naked. cЃa Appellant denied liability and insisted t hat he only saw AAA in t he precinct. He claimed that, on December 7, 2004, he was vending cigarettes at the corner of Crossing and Mandaluyong, and that he slept in Mandaluyong afterwards. On October 17, 2007, the RTC rendered a decision fin ding appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Robbery with Rape, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Appellant was, likewise, ordered to payP50,000.00 as civil 15 indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P50,000.00 as exemplary damages . cЃa On appeal, the appellate court affirmed the RTC decision in its entirety. Issue: Is the aggravating circumstance of nighttime present? Held: Yes. As testified to by AAA, she easily recognized appellant as she regularly saw him standing at the C-5 Bridge every morning. In choosing to commit the crime in the evening and in bringing AAA under the bridge, nighttime facilitated the commission of the crime with impurity. As correc tly stated by the CA, the cover of darkness aided appellant in order to ensure that the 21 execution of his criminal action would go unnoticed. cЃa
Article 14, paragraph 6 People of the Philippines vs. Ngano Sugan et. al G.R. No. 192789 - March 23, 2011 Brion, J. Facts: At around 6:45 p.m. of February 8, 1998, Gaga, Saligo, Ngano Sugan, Nga Ben Latam and one a lias Francing, all armed with guns, entered Fortunato Delos Reyes’ residence in Purok Roxas 1, Lamsugod, Surallah, South Cotabato, and declared a hold up. Kamison and Cosme Latam stayed outside and acted as lookouts. Once inside, the armed men ordered Fortunato, his wife T helma Delos Reyes, and their son Nestor Delos Reyes, to drop to the floor. The armed men inquired from them where the money and other valuables were hidden. Nga no then brought Nestor outside the house, and shot him. The RTC, in its Decision of September 25, 2008, found the appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide committed by a band, and se ntenced them to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. It also ordered them to pay the victim’s heirs the amounts of P75,000.00 and P24,000.00 as civil indemnity and burial e xpenses, respectively; and P17,800.00 representing the value of the cash and other stolen items. On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision in toto. The CA held that Fortunato and Thelma positively identified the appellants as among the persons who robbed their house; Fortunato, in fact, saw Ngano shoot Nestor. Reggie corroborated their testimonies on material points. Issue: Is the aggravating circumstance of committing a crime by a band present? Held: No. The Court points out that the lower courts found the appellants guilt y of robbery with homicide commi tted by a band. This is an erroneous denomination of the crime committed, as there is no crime of robbery with homicide committed by a band. If robbery with homicide is committed by a band, the indictable offense would still be d enominated as robbery with homicide under Article 294(1) of the Revised P enal Code. The element of band would be appreciated as an ordinary aggravating 12 circumstance. Under Article 294(1) of the Revised Penal Code, the crime of robbery with homicide carries the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death. Considering the presence of the aggravating circumstance of commission by a band, the proper imposable penalty would have been death, conformably with Article 63, paragraph 1 of the Penal Code. In view, however, of the enactment on June 24, 2006 of Republic Act No. 9346 which prohibits the imposition of the death penalty in the Philippines, the lower courts correctly imposed on the appellants the penalty of reclusion perpetua
Article 14, paragraph 3 People of the Philippines vs Arnold Agcanas G.R. No. 174476 - October 11, 2011 Sereno, J. Facts:
The trial court found that on 4 May 2000, at about nine o’clock in the evening while the victim Warlito Raguirag was having dinner at home, herein accused Arnold Agcanas entered t he former's house through the kitchen doo r. The accused pointed a gun at the back of the left ear of the victim and shot him point-blank. Beatriz Raguirag, the victim’s wife, shouted, "We were 3 invaded [sinerrek] by Arnold Agcanas." Under the 50-watt light bulb and with only a meter between them, the wife was able to identify the accused, who was the son of her cousin. Around 9:15 in the evening, Senior Police Officer (SPO) 1 Jessie Malvar, SPO4 Bonifacio Valenciano, SPO1 Marlon Juni and Police Officer (PO) 2 Ramil P. Belong arrived at the scene of the crime and were informed by Beatriz Raguirag that Arnold Agcanas was the assailant. The police were also informed by several people that the accused had a relative in Barangay Naiporta, Sarrat, Ilocos Norte. Thereafter, around ten o’clock in the evening, the police found the accused in the house of his brother, Alejandro Agcanas, who was actually residing in Barangay San Miguel, Sarrat, Iloco s Norte. The accused then went willingly with the police officers to the police station. On September 30, 2004, the trial court found the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, qualified by treachery and attended by the aggravating circumstances of dwelling and the use of an il legally possessed firearm. On intermediate appellate review by the Court of Appeals, the conviction was affirmed. However, the award of damages was modified based on prevailing jurisprudence. Issue: Is the aggravating circumstance of dwelling present in the case at bench? Held: Yes. The trial court was correct in ruling that dwelling was an aggra vating circumstance. It has been held in a long line of cases that dwelling is aggravating because of the sanctity of privacy which the l aw accords to human abode. He who goes to another's house to hurt him or do him wrong is more guilty than he who offends him elsewhere.
