Lopez vs. Esquivel Jr., G.R. No. 168734 , 24 April 2009
Facts: Hermogenes Lopez (Hermogenes) was the father of the Lopez siblings. During Hermogenes lifetime, he applied with the Bureau of Lands for a homestead patent over a parcel of land in Antipolo After ascertaining that the land was free from claim of any private person, the Bureau of Lands approved Hermogenes application. Hermogenes submitted his final proof of compliance with the residency and cultivation requirements of the Public Land Act. As a matter of course, the aforesaid parcel of land was surveyed by a government surveyor and the resulting plan H -138612 was approved by the Director of Lands The Director of Lands, thereafter, ordered the issuance of the homestead patent in Hermogenes name. The patent was subsequently transmitted to the Register of Deeds of Rizal for transcription and issuance of the corresponding certificate of title title[9] in Hermogenes name. Unaware that he had already been awarded a homestead patent, Hermogenes sold the same to Ambrocio Aguilar (Aguilar) by virtue of a Deed of Absolute Sale Years later, it was allegedly discovered that the subject property was erroneously included in survey plan H-138612 of Hermogenes property. The subject property supposedly formed part of the land owned by Lauro Hizon (Hizon), which adjoined that of Hermogenes. Hermogenes executed a Quitclaim over his rights and interests to the subject property property[14] in Hizons favor. Hizon, in turn, sold the subject property to Esquivel and Talens, as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land Hermogenes died
The Lopez siblings, as Hermogenes heirs, filed an action with the RTC for the cancellation of the Deed of Absolute Sale xecuted between Hermogenes and Aguilar In a Decision Decision[17] dated 5 February 1985, the RTC declared the aforesaid Deed of Absolute Sale null and void ab initio as it was made in violation of Section 118 of Commonwealth Act No. 141, otherwise known as the Public Land Act RTC Decision was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in its Decision Decision[18] dated 18 August 1987 in CA-G.R. CV No. 06242 . In a Resolution Resolution[19] dated 13 April 1988, this Court denied Aguilars appeal, docketed as G.R. No. 81092, for being filed late. on the basis of the Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land executed by Hizon in their favor, Esquivel and Talens filed an Application for Registration of the subject property with the RTC of Antipolo he Lopez siblings filed an opposition to the application in LRC Case No. 931211, asserting, among other grounds, t hat: (1) they did not know the persons and personal circumstances of Esquivel and Talens who were not the formers adjoining property owners; (2) the subject property, which Esquivel and Talens sought to have registered, was already titled under the Torrens system and covered by Transfer Certificates of Title (TCT) No. 207990 to No. 207997 20799 7[20] in the names of the Lopez siblings; and (3) Tax Declaration No. 04-10304 of Esquivel and Talens covering the subject property was spurious. The Lopez siblings also moved for the dismissal of LRC Case No. 93-1211 invoking the final and executory Decision Decisio n[21] dated 5 February 1985 of the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 71, in Civil Case No. 463-A, which affirmed Hermogenes title to the 19.4888-hectare land, that included the subject property. RTC rendered its Decision[ on 4 April 1995 in LRC Case No. No. 93-1211, granting the Application for Registration of the subject property filed by Esquivel and
Talens. Accordingly, the Lopez siblings filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said RTC judgment. Acting on the Motion of the Lopez siblings, the RTC issued an Order[23] dated 23 May 1996 in which it corre cted several errors in its earlier decision The RTC also stated in the same Order that it could not direct the amendment of the TCTs in the names of the Lopez siblings, to exclude therefrom the subject property which was adjudged to Esquivel and Talens, as the RTC was sitting only as a land registration court. The RTC, thus, advised Esquivel and Talens to file an action for reconveyance of the subject property and only when Esquivel and Tales succeed in such action can they subsequently cause the registration of the subject property in their names. Following the advice of the RTC, Esquivel and Talens filed with the RTC of Antipolo a Complaint[24] for Reconveyance and Recovery of Possession of the subject property against the Lopez siblings. In their Complaint, Esquivel and Talens alleged that when the Lopez siblings had the land they inherited from Hermogenes registered, they included the subject property, which Hermogenes already conveyed to Hizon in the Quitclaim Hence, the subject property was erroneously included in TCTs No. 207990 to No. 207997, issued by the Register of Deeds of Marikina, Metro Manila, in the names of the Lopez siblings. The subject property is presently occupied and in the physical possession of the Lopez siblings. In their Answer with Compulsory Counterclaim, the Lopez siblings denied all the allegations of Esquivel and Talens. As their special defenses, the Lopez siblings called attention to the non-compliance by Esquivel and Talens with Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, on non-forum shopping, considering that there was another case before the RTC of Antipolo also involving the subject property and the issues on the genuineness and validity of the Deed of Absolute Sale of Unregistered Land he Lopez siblings further averred that the cause of action of Esquivel and Talens was already barred by the statute of limitations and laches since they failed to assert their alleged rights to the subject property for 25
years.[27] The Lopez siblings additionally interposed that the Quitclaim involving the subject property, invoked by Esquivel and Talens, was ineffective, because by the time it was executed by Hermogenes in favor of Hizon on 29 November 1965, Hermogenes had already sold his entire 19.4888-hectare land, of which the subject property was part, to Aguilar on 31 July 1959. The Lopez siblings finally argued that the said Quitclaim was a nullity as it contravened Section 17[28] of the Public Land Act, as amended.[29] RTC rendered a Decision in Civil Case 96-4193, granting the prayer of Esquivel and Talens for the reconveyance and recovery of possession of the subject property. The RTC held that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated 31 July 1959 between Hermogenes and Aguilar was already declared null and void ab initioby a court of competent jurisdiction. Therefore, the Lopez siblings were estopped from asserting said Deed to defeat the rights of Esquivel and Talens to the subject property. The RTC also ruled that Esquivel and Talens were not guilty of laches because as early as 1986, they had declared the subject property in their names for taxation purposes. Moreover, in 1993, Esquivel and Talens filed before the RTC an application for registration of the subject property, LRC Case No. 93-1222, where they obtained a favorable judgment. The RTC lastly found that the action for reconveyance of Esquivel and Talens was not yet barred by prescription as it was instituted within the 30-year prescriptive period. The Lopez siblings filed an appeal of the aforementioned RTC Decision to the Court of Appeals the Court of Appeals rendered its Decision dismissing the appeal of the Lopez siblings and affirming in toto the RTC Decision. The appellate court ruled that the Lopez siblings are barred by the doctrine of estoppel in pais from challenging the Quitclaim executed by Hermogenes over the subject property in favor of Hizon on the ground that Hermogenes no longer owned the subject property at that time. The Motion for Reconsideration of the aforesaid Decision filed by the Lopez siblings was denied by the Court of Appeals
The Lopez siblings are presently before this Court seeking the resolution The Lopez siblings aver that a deeper analysis of the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals will reveal the latters utter disregard for or deviation from the law of the case set by this Court in its Decisions in Santos v. Court of Appeals,[33] Group Commander, Intelligence & Security Group, Philippine Army v. Dr. Malvar ,[34] andLopez v. Court of Appeals,[35] where the issue on the validity of the homestead patent granted to Hermogenes, father of the Lopez siblings, was already passed upon. In these three Decisions, the Court already declared the homestead patent awarded to Hermogenes valid. Therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in applying the rule on estoppel in disregard of the doctrine of law of the case.
Issue: Whether or not the court is correct Held: Yes. Law of the case has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal . It is a term applied to an established rule that when an appellate court passes on a question and remands the case to the lower court for further proceedings, the question there settled becomes the law of the case upon subsequent appeal. It means that whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule or decision between the same parties in the same case continues to be the law of the case , whether correct on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the case before the court.[38] Thus, the court reviewing the succeeding appeal will not re-litigate the case but instead apply the ruling in the previous appeal. This enables the appellate court to perform its duties satisfactorily and efficiently which would be impossible if a question, once considered and decided by it, were to be litigated anew in the same case and upon any and subsequent appeal.[39] Given the foregoing, it is apparent that the Decisions of this Court in Santos, Cabuay , and Lopez, cited by the Lopez siblings in their instant Petition, cannot be regarded as the law of the case herein. The law of the case applies only when (1) a question is passed upon by an appellate court, and (2) the appellate court remands the case to the lower court for further
proceedings; the lower court and even the appellate courts on subsequent appeal of the case are, thus, bound by how such question had been previously settled. It must be emphasized, therefore, that the law of the case finds application only in the same case between the same parties . The Petition at bar is without question separate and distinct from Santos , Cabuay , and Lopez, although they may all involve, in varying degrees, the homestead patent granted to Hermogenes over the 19.8222hectare land, which included the subject property. First, Santos, Cabuay , and Lopez, directly tackled the validity of the homestead patent granted to Hermogenes over the 19.8222-hectare land; while, in the instant case, the validity of the homestead patent thus granted to Hermogenes is no longer in issue, but it is alleged herein that said patent erroneously included the subject property. Second, to recall, the instant Petition originated from Civil Case No. 96-4193, the Complaint for Reconveyance and Recovery of the subject property filed by Esquivel and Talens against the Lopez siblings before the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 73. In no instance was a question or issue in Civil Case No. 96-4193 ever been previously raised to an appellate court. Santos, Cabuay , and Lopez, did not pass upon any question or issue raised before this Court from Civil Case No. 96-4193. And thirdly, despite the fact that all these cases may have common antecedent facts and sometimes involved the same personalities, the Lopez siblings (herein petitioners) and Esquivel and Talens (herein respondents) were not parties in Santos, Cabuay , and Lopez. Noel Rubber VS Esquivel (di ‘to kasama sa case list pero consolidated case kasi ‘to sa Lopez case)
Facts: A Petition for Annulment of Judgment was filed with the Court of Appeals by Nordec Phil., a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines; and Dr. Malvar, President and General Manager of petitioner Nordec Phil The Lopez siblings, Esquivel, and Talens, were named respondents in CAG.R. CV No. 91428 (and also herein), being the parties in Civil Case No. 964193, wherein the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal, rendered the Decision dated 11 January 2001, which Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar was seeking to have annulled by the Court of Appeals. Atty. Sergio Angeles (Atty. Angeles) and
Atty. George A. Ang Cheng (Atty. Ang Cheng) were similarly impleaded as respondents in said petition before the appellate court on account of their involvement as counsels for the parties in Civil Case No. 96-4193. In its Decision dated 11 January 2001 in Civil Case No. 96-4193, the RTC granted the action for reconveyance of the subject property to Esquivel and Talens. The subject property, however, was already supposedly sold by Lopez siblings to Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar. Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar alleged in their Petition for Annulment of Judgment that the Lopez siblings, the successors-in-interest of Hermogenes, were the registered owners of 15 parcels of land situated at Overlooking, Sumulong Highway Beginning 20 April 1994, Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar purchased the aforementioned lots from the Lopez siblings and their assigns, namely, Atty. Angeles and Rogelio Amurao (Amurao),[49] as evidenced by several Deeds of Absolute Sale and Deeds of Conditional Sale. Immediately after making such purchases, Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar introduced large scale improvements on the subject property, among which were several business establishments[50] with a cost of no less than P50,000,000. when the subject property was involved in Civil Case No. 96-4130 heard before the RTC of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 74, entitled Heirs of Elino Adia v. Heirs of Hermogenes Lopez, it was Atty. Angeles who represented and protected the interest of Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar in said case by filing a Motion to Dismiss. In Cabuay, Jr., wherein Dr. Malvar and the Lopez siblings were named the respondents in the Petition Seeking for Clarification as to the Validity and Forceful Effect of the Two (2) Final and Executory but Conflicting Decisions of this Court involving the subject property, it was also Atty. Angeles who appeared for Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar. Atty. Angeles again informed Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar that there was another case filed against the Lopez siblings involving the subject property. The said case was the action for reconveyance filed by Esquivel and Talens, docketed as Civil Case No. 96-4193 before RTC of Antipolo,
Rizal, Branch 73, but which was already, by then, the subject of an appeal before the Court of Appeals Atty. Angeles, however, belittled this most recent case involving the subject property, and even showed to Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar the Motion to Resolve Appeal dated 2 August 2004, which he filed in CA-G.R. CV No. 70200, together with the Brief for the Lopez siblings. Yet, Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar conducted their own inquiry, and were surprised to discover that the Decision rendered by the RTC on 11 January 2001 in Civil Case No. 96-4193 was actually adverse to their rights and interest; and despite this, they were neither impleaded nor represented therein. Even Atty. Angeles, the supposed counsel for Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar, did not lift a finger to protect their rights in said case. Further intensive investigation revealed to Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar that the 11 January 2001 Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 96-4193 was rendered under circumstances amounting to extrinsic fraud and lack or denial of due process, insofar as said Decision adversely affected their rights and interests to the subject property. Among the circumstances which allegedly amounted to extrinsic fraud and lack or denial of due process, were described by Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar as follows: (1) when Esquivel and Talens instituted Civil Case No. 96-4193, they personally and through their caretakers, already knew that Nordec Phils. and Malvar already bought and took possession of the subject property, but Esquivel and Talens, through their counsel Atty. Ang Cheng deliberately failed to implead Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar; and (2) Atty. Angeles, who was supposed to protect the rights and interests of Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar, as their counsel, had an adverse personal interest in the subject property as he unconscionably taken, by way of champertous attorneys fees, almost the whole of the 19.4888-hectare land inherited by the Lopez siblings from Hermogenes. Given the foregoing circumstances and the unsuccessful attempt of Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar to intervene in CA-G.R. No. 70200, Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar opted to file with the Court of Appeals a Petition to annul the Decision dated 11 January 2001 of the RTC in Civil Case No. 96-4193, granting the reconveyance of the subject property to Esquivel and Talens.
Court of Appeals issued its assailed Resolution dismissing the Petition of Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar. According to the said Resolution, the RTC Decision dated 11 January 2001 in Civil Case No. 96-4193 could not be the proper subject of the said Petition for Annulment of Judgment given that the very same decision was still pending appeal before this Court in G.R. No. 168734 and, thus, was not yet final and executory. In addition, should the Court of Appeals take cognizance of such a Petition, it could result in contrary and inconsistent rulings by the appellate court and this Court. Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar filed a Motion for Amendment and/or Reconsideration of the dismissal of their Petition in CA-G.R. SP No. 91428, but it was denied by the Court of Appeals in a Resolution Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar then filed the instant Petition assailing the Resolutions of the CA Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar insist that since Rules 37, 38 and 41 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure on motion for new trial, petition for relief, and appeal, respectively, simply mention judgments or final orders, without making any distinction as to whether or not the same is final and executory; it should follow that where only the words judgments or final orders are similarly used in Rule 47 on annulment of judgments, then such words should be understood to also refer to all judgments or final orders, regardless of whether they are final and executory. Issue: whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing their Petition for Annulment of Judgment for being premature since the judgment sought to be annulled is still the subject of a Petition for Review before this Court, docketed as G.R. No. 168734, and is not yet final and executory. Held: No. The ordinary remedies of a motion for new trial or reconsideration and a petition for relief from judgment are remedies available only to parties in the proceedings where the assailed judgment is rendered. In fact, it has been held that a person who was never a party to the case, or even summoned to appear therein, cannot make use of a petition for relief from judgment. [52] Indubitably, Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar cannot avail themselves of the aforesaid ordinary remedies of motion for new trial, petition for relief from judgment, or appeal, because
they were not parties to the proceedings in Civil Case No. 96-4193 in which the RTC Decision dated 11 January 2001 sought to be annulled was rendered. Nordec Phils. and Dr. Malvar also cannot seek the annulment of the 11 January 2001 Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 96-4193. An action for annulment of judgment is a remedy in law independent of the case where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered. The purpose of such action is to have the final and executory judgment set aside so that there will be a renewal of litigation. It is resorted to in cases where the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief from judgment, or other appropriate remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner, and is based on only two grounds: extrinsic fraud, and lack of jurisdiction or denial of due process. A person need not be a party to the judgment sought to be annulled, and it is only essential that he can prove his allegation that the judgment was obtained by the use of fraud and collusion and he would be adversely affected thereby.[53] An action to annul a final judgment on the ground of fraud lies only if the fraud is extrinsic or collateral in character. Fraud is regarded as extrinsic where it prevents a party from having a trial or from presenting his entire case to the court, or where it operates upon matters pertaining not to the judgment itself but to the manner in which it is procured. The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing litigant prevented a party from having his day in court.[54] It is, thus, settled that the purpose of a Petition for Annulment of Judgment is to have the final and executory judgment set aside so that there will be a renewal of litigation. If the judgment sought to be annulled, like in this case, is still on appeal or under review by a higher court, it cannot be regarded as final, and there can be no renewal of litigation because the litigation is actually still open and on-going. In this light, the arguments of Nordec Phil. and Dr. Malvar that the judgments or final orders need not be final and executory for it to be annulled must fail. This Court, therefore, finds no error in the dismissal by the Court of Appeals of the Petition for Annulment of Judgment filed by Nordec Phil. and
Dr. Malvar, on the ground of prematurity. Given that the 11 January 2001Decision of the RTC in Civil Case No. 96-4193 was still pending appeal before this Court, the Court of Appeals could not take cognizance of the Petition for annulment of the same judgment, for if it had done so, then it would risk promulgating a ruling which could be contrary to and inconsistent with the ruling of this Court on the appeal of the judgment.
Triumph International vs. Apostol and Opulencia, G.R. No. 164423, 16 June 2009
Facts: Ramon L. Apostol (Apostol) was hired as assistant manager by petitioner Triumph International was holding the same position until TIPIs termination of his employment Ben M. Opulencia (Opulencia) was hired as a warehouse helper by TIPI and was the companys warehouse supervisor at the time of the termination of his employment Apostol was the immediate superior of Opulencia. TIPI conducted an inventory cycle count of its direct and retail sales in its Muoz warehouse. The inventory cycle count yielded discrepancies between its result and the stock list balance Consequently, Leonardo T. Gomez (Gomez), TIPIs Comptroller, issued a memorandum addressed to Virginia A. Sugue (Sugue), TIPIs Marketing Services Manager Direct, and R.S. Silva, Marketing and Sales ManagerRetail, requesting for a reconciliation of the discrepancies. Sugue issued a memorandum addressed to Gomez, explaining that the discrepancy could be attributed to pilferage of finished goods at the warehouse of Opulencia, TIPIs Warehouse Supervisor. Two days later, Sugue sent a show-cause letter to Apostol, TIPIs Assistant Manager-Warehouse and Distribution, requiring him to explain in writing
the negative variance based on the inventory cycle count. The letter also placed Apostol on leave with pay, pending the investigation being conducted by TIPI. Sugue issued a similar letter to Opulencia. Apostol sent a letter-memorandum to Sugue, explaining that the negative variance was due to pilferage of finished goods by Alfred Hernandez, a security consultant of TIPI. Apostol also objected to his being placed on leave with pay. On the same day, Gomez issued a memorandum addressed to Sugue, stating that in the reconciliation of stock development report against stock list, he noted that significant adjustments were made by Opulencia and approved by Apostol .[ Gomez asked Sugue if she approved such adjustments, [5] and at the same time, requested the latter to direct Opulencia and Apostol to explain the adjustments. Apostol issued a memorandum [6] addressed to Sugue, copy furnished Gomez, explaining the significant adjustments or his part, Opulencia explained in another memorandum of the same date that the adjustments were made to address the problem of variances between the stocklist balance and the actual stocks. These were covered by the usual stock adjustment reports which were approved by the Asst. Manager-Warehouse and Distribution [i.e., Apostol].[7] Opulencia wrote Sugue a separate letter-memorandum objecting to his being placed on leave with pay. Sugue also required Apostol to show cause, within 24 hours, why he should not be terminated by TIPI for loss of confidence. TIPI conducted administrative investigations TIPI, through Sugue, served notices to Apostol and Opulencia, stating that their employment had been terminated for committing infractions of the companys rules and regulations. Specifically, Apostol was found to have committed Offense No. 3 (Fraud or willful breach by an employee of the trust reposed in him by the Company) and Offense No. 25 (Using, uttering or saying profane, indecent, abusive, derogatory and/or indecorous words or language
against the employer or supervisor), while Opulencia was found to have committed Offense No. 3 only. Apostol and Opulencia filed with the Labor Arbiter a complaint for illegal dismissal and non-payment of salaries and other benefits against TIPI. the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision dismissing the Complaint for lack of merit. On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the Decision of the Labor Arbiter. Apostol and Opulencia filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was denied by the NLRC.[14] Apostol and Opulencia filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, assailing the Decision of the NLRC. the Court of Appeals rendered judgment, reversing and setting aside the NLRC Decision. TIPI filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but this was denied by the Court of Appeals Hence, this appeal. TIPI contends that a reevaluation of the factual findings of the NLRC is not within the province of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. TIPI asserts that the Court of Appeals can only pass upon such findings if they are not supported by evidence on record, or if the impugned judgment is based on misapprehension of facts which circumstances are not present in this case. TIPI also emphasizes that the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter concurred in their factual findings which were based on substantial evidence and, therefore, should have been accorded great weight and respect by the Court of Appeals. Respondents, on the other hand, contend that the Court of Appeals neither exceeded its jurisdiction nor committed error in reevaluating NLRCs factual
findings since such findings are not in accord with the evidence on record and the applicable law or jurisprudence.
Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals exceeded its jurisdiction when it reversed the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC by reevaluating the evidence on record Held: we held that the proper vehicle for such review is a Special Civil Action for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, and that the case should be filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine of the hierarchy of courts.[20]Moreover, it is already settled that under Section 9 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by Republic Act No. 7902,[21] the Court of Appeals pursuant to the exercise of its original jurisdiction over petitions for certiorari is specifically given the power to pass upon the evidence, if and when necessary, to resolve factual issues. [ However, equally settled is the rule that factual findings of labor officials, who are deemed to have acquired expertise in matters within their jurisdiction, are generally accorded not only respect but even finality by the courts when supported by substantial evidence, i.e., the amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.[23] But these findings are not infallible. When there is a showing that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on record, they may be examined by the courts.[ In this case, the NLRC sustained the factual findings of the Labor Arbiter. Thus, these findings are generally binding on the appellate court, unless there was a showing that they were arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence on record. Questioned in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, these factual findings were reexamined and reversed by the Court of Appeals for being not in accord with the evidence on record and the applicable law or jurisprudence.[25] To determine if the Court of Appeals reexamination of factual findings and reversal of the NLRC decision are proper and with sufficient basis, it is incumbent upon this Court to make its own evaluation of the evidence on record.
Heirs of Maura So vs. Obliosca 542 SCRA 406, 28 January 2008
Facts: Pantaleon Jomoc was the owner of a parcel of land Upon his death, the property was inherited by his wife, brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces (collectively referred to as the Jomoc heirs). The respondents, Lucila Jomoc Obliosca and Abundia Jomoc Balala, sisters of the deceased, and Elvira Jomoc, a niece, were among those who inherited the property. the Jomoc heirs executed a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Absolute Sale of Registered Land2 in favor of petitioner, Maura So, over the property for P300,000.00. However, the three respondents and Maura So failed to affix their signatures on this document. Moreover, the document was not notarized. Nonetheless, petitioner made a partial payment of P49,000.00 petitioner demanded the execution of a final deed of conveyance but the Jomoc heirs ignored the demand. petitioner filed a Complaint3 for specific performance against the Jomoc heirs to compel them to execute and deliver the proper registerable deed of sale over the lot. The Jomoc heirs, except for the respondents, were impleaded as defendants. the Jomoc heirs executed again a Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Absolute Sale of Registered Land4 in favor of the spouses Lim Liong Kang and Lim Pue King for P200,000.00. The spouses Lim intervened as defendants trial court decided the case in favor of the petitioner. On appeal, the CA affirmed the decision with the modification that the award of damages, attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation was deleted. The defendant heirs and the spouses Lim filed separate petitions for review with the Supreme Court which petitions were later consolidated.
The Court rendered a Decision 5 in these consolidated cases upholding petitioner’s better right over the property. 6 The decision became final and executory petitioner filed a motion for execution of the said decision. The respondents opposed the motion on the ground that they did not participate in the execution of the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Absolute Sale of Registered Land and they were not parties to the case. Despite the opposition, the trial court granted the motion for execution. The respondents filed a motion for reconsideration but the trial court denied the same. the trial court issued an Order granting the motion for execution and divesting all the Jomoc heirs of their titles over the property. 7 Accordingly, the Register of Deeds cancelled the title of the Jomoc heirs and issued a transfer certificate in favor of the petitioners All the Jomoc heirs filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, assailing the said order of the RTC. They alleged that herein respondents were not parties to the case, therefore, they should not be bound by the decision therein and be deprived of their right over the property. the CA dismissed the petition, holding that respondents were bound by the said decision. The CA ratiocinated that respondents were aware of the pendency of the case, yet they did not intervene, and that the case is barred by res judicata. Respondents elevated the case to this Court through a petition for review on certiorari. The court denied the petition on the ground: the contract of sale between the heirs of Pantaleon Jomoc and the private respondent Maura So, even if not complete in form, so long as the essential requisites of consent of the contracting parties, object and cause of the obligation concur, and they were clearly established to be present, is valid and effective between the parties. As for the issue of res judicata, this Court had occasion to rule that herein private respondent had the right to compel the heirs of Pantaleon Jomoc
to execute the proper public instrument so that a valid contract of sale of registered land can be duly registered and can bind third persons. In effect, this Court had already determined the right of private respondent to a proper registerable deed of sale which petitioners seek to challenge again in this Petition. A party cannot avoid the application of the principle of bar by prior judgment by simply varying the form of the action or by adopting a different mode of presenting its case or by adding or dropping a party The resolution became final and executory respondents also filed a complaint for legal redemption against petitioner with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Misamis Oriental. Respondents posited therein that, since they did not sell their shares in the property to petitioner, they remained co-owners, who have the right to redeem the shares sold by the other heirs. They prayed that they be allowed to exercise their right to redeem their co- heirs’ shares and that petitioner execute all papers, documents and deeds to effectuate the right of legal redemption.
CA denied the petition, holding that the remedy of a petition for annulment of judgment is no longer available since petitioner Maura So had already filed a petition for review with this Court assailing the same orders of the trial court. Apparently, prior to the filing of the petition for annulment of judgment with the CA, petitioner Maura So filed a petition for review on certiorar i13 with this Court assailing the same RTC Order and Resolution. In a Minute Resolution the Court denied the petition for failure to sufficiently show that the questioned judgment is tainted with grave abuse of discretion and for being the wrong remedy. The court denied the motion for reconsideration. Thus, the Minute Resolution became final and executory on September 1, 1998. 16 the CA denied petitioners’ motion for recons ideration of its decision denying the petition for annulment of judgment. 17 Petitioners then filed this petition for review
RTC resolved the case in favor of the respondents (APRIL 27 DECISION) Issue: Whether on not there should be annulment of judgment RTC granted petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.
the RTC issued an Order10 granting respondents’ motion for reconsideration and reinstating the April 27, 1994 Resolution which was resolved in favor of respondents. acting jointly on petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration and respondents’ Compliance/Motion for the Issuance of a Writ of Execution, the RTC rendered a Resolution,11 denying petitioner’s motion for reconsideration and granting respondents’ motion for execution.
petitioner, later substituted by her heirs, filed with the CA a petition for annulment of judgment, particularly the September 7, 1994 Order, which reinstated the RTC’s April 27, 1994 and November 14, 1994 Resolutions, which denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsi deration.
Held: Yes. annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed only in exceptional cases as where there is no available or other adequate remedy. Thus, it may not be invoked (1) where the party has availed himself of the remedy of new trial, appeal, petition for relief, or other appropriate remedy and lost; or (2) where he has failed to avail himself of those remedies through his own fault or negligence. We, therefore, agree with the CA that the remedy of a petition for annulment of judgment is no longer available to petitioners since their predecessor-in-interest, Maura So, had already availed herself of a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.
Further, none of the grounds for annulment of judgment, namely, extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction, is present in this case. Petitioners argue that the RTC acted without jurisdiction when it rendered the Resolution which recognized respondents’ right to redeem the property because this, in effect, amended the Decision of the Supreme Court in G.R. Nos. 92871 and 92860, and the Resolution in G.R. No. 110661, which sustained the sale of the property to Maura So. Petitioners clearly confused lack of jurisdiction with error in the exercise of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is not the same as the exercise of jurisdiction. As distinguished from the exercise of jurisdiction, jurisdiction is the authority to decide a case, and not the decision rendered therein. Where there is jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter, the decision on all other questions arising in the case is but an exercise of such jurisdiction. And the errors which the court may commit in the exercise of jurisdiction are merely errors of judgment which are the proper subject of an appeal.21 The error raised by petitioners pertains to the trial court’s exercise of its jurisdiction, not its lack of authority to decide the case. In a petition for annulment of judgment based on lack of jurisdiction, petitioner must show not merely an abuse of jurisdictional discretion but an absolute lack of authority to hear and decide the case. On this basis, there would be no valid ground to grant the petition for annulment of judgment.
judgment of courts and the award of quasi-judicial agencies must become final on some definite date fixed by law.24 The only exceptions to the general rule are the correction of clerical errors, the so-called nunc pro tunc entries which cause no prejudice to any party, void judgments, and whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision which render its execution unjust and inequitable.25 Again, none of these exceptions is present in this case. Notwithstanding these principles, however, the higher interests of justice and equity demand that we brush aside the procedural norms. After all, rules of procedure are intended to promote rather than defeat substantial justice, and should not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense. Rules of procedure are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice; they are promulgated to aid the court in the effective dispensation of justice. The Court has the inherent power and discretion to amend, modify or reconsider a final judgment when it is necessary to accomplish the ends of justice.26 If the rigid application of the Rules would frustrate rather than promote justice, it is always within the Court’s power to suspend the Rules or except a particular case from its operation.27 The power to suspend or even disregard rules can be so pervasive and compelling as to alter even that which this Court itself has already declared to be final. 28
well-settled is the principle that a decision that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, and may no longer be modified in any respect even if the modification is meant to correct erroneous conclusions of fact or law and whether it will be made by the court that rendered it or by the highest court of the land. 22 The reason for this is that litigation must end and terminate sometime and somewhere, and it is essential to an effective and efficient administration of justice that, once a judgment has become final, the winning party, through a mere subterfuge, be not deprived of the fruits of the verdict.
The present case is peculiar in the sense that it involves three final and executory judgments. The first is this Court’s Decision in G.R. Nos. 92871 and 92860 which upheld the sale of the whole property by the Jomoc heirs, including the herein respondents, to petitioner Maura So. The second is the Court’s Resolution in G.R. No. 110661, which sustained the order of execution of the said decision against the herein respondents despite the fact that they were not party-defendants in the first case. And the third is the Court’s Minute Resolution in G.R. No. 118050 which denied Maura So’s petition for review of the RTC Decision granting respondents’ right to redeem the property.
doctrine of finality of judgment is grounded on the fundamental principle of public policy and sound practice that, at the risk of occasional error, the
It is the third judgment that is apparently in conflict with the two previous judgments. It rendered final and executory the April 27, 1994 Resolution of
the RTC which recognized the right of respondents, as co-owners, to redeem the disputed land from Maura So. To recall, the RTC premised its decision on its finding that respondents did not actually sell their shares in the property to Maura So because they did not sign the Deed of Extrajudicial Settlement with Absolute Sale of Registered Land in favor of So; hence, they remained co-owners. This ruling is patently erroneous because this Court had already pronounced in the first two final and executory judgments (in G.R. Nos. 92871 and 92860, and G.R. No. 110661) that the whole property had already been sold to Maura So. The RTC was barred from holding otherwise under the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment. The doctrine of "conclusiveness of judgment" precludes the re-litigation of a particular fact or issue already passed upon by a court of competent jurisdiction in a former judgment, in another action between the same parties based on a different claim or cause of action.29 Obviously, the complaint for legal redemption was deliberately filed by the respondents with the RTC to circumvent this Court’s previous decisions sustaining the sale of the whole property to Maura So. The Court cannot condone this ploy, even if it failed to uncover the same when the case was erroneously elevated to it directly from the trial court (G.R. No. 118050). The matter is again before this Court, and this time, it behooves the Court to set things right in order to prevent a grave injustice from being committed against Maura So who had, for 15 years since the first decision was executed, already considered herself to be the owner of the property. The Court is not precluded from rectifying errors of judgment if blind and stubborn adherence to the doctrine of immutability of final judgments would involve the sacrifice of justice for technicality.
