UPDATES IN CIVIL PROCEDURE AND SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS - Outline Justice Magdangal Magdangal M. de Leon Leon CIVIL PROCEDURE What is civil prce!ure" The method of conducting a judicial proceeding to resolve disputes involving private parties for the purpose of enforcing private rights or obtaining redress for the invasion of rights. #a$ a prce!ural rule %e &iven retractive e''ect" Yes, inasmuch as there are no vested rights i n rules of procedure. The fresh 15-day period (decreed in Neypes vs. !" #ithin #hich to file notice of appeal appeal counted from notice of the denial of the motion for reconsideration reconsideration may be applied to petitioners$ case inasmuch as rules of procedure may be given retroa retroacti ctive ve effect effect to actions actions pendin pending g and undeter undetermin mined ed at the time time of their their passage. (Sumaway vs. Urban Bank, Inc ..,, 493 SCRA 99 [June 27, 2006]). STAGES IN CIVIL PROCEDURE %. &')*' %+%N %+%N T' !T%)N !T%)N !. !ctions in general 1. ause of action /. *ight of action &. 0arties 1. 0arties in general /. inds of parties 2. *e3uirements a. legal capacity b. real party in interest c. standing to sue 4. oinder of parties a. joinder of initial parties 1" compulsory /" permissive b. third (fourth, etc." party c. special joinder modes 1" class suit /" intervention 2" interpleader . *eferral *eferral to barangay barangay conciliation 6. 7election of court 1. inds of civil actions a. )rdinary and special b. 0ersonal, real c. %n personam, in rem, 3uasi-in rem d. +ocal and transitory /. ierarchy of courts 2. urisdiction 4. 8enue 5. 7ummary procedure '. 0leadings, motions and notice 1. 0leadings in general
/ a. ormal re3uirements 1" 8erification 8erification /" ertification of non-forum shopping b. 9anner of ma:ing allegations in pleadings /. omplaint a. oinder of causes of action 1" 0ermissive /" ompulsory 2. iling and service of pleadings and other papers %%. %+%N ) T' !T%)N !. ommencement of the action &. 6oc:et fees . *affle of cases 6. 0rovisional remedies, if necessary %%%. );*T !<;%*'7 ;*%76%T%)N )8'* T' 0!*T%'7 !. 7ummons 1. 9odes of 7ervice of 7ummons a. personal service b. substituted service c. constructive service (by publication" d. e=traterritorial service &. 8oluntary appearance %8. %N%6'NT7 !T'* );*T !<;%*'7 ;*%76%T%)N )8'* T' 0!*T%'7 !. 0laintiff$s notice and motions 1. notice of dismissal of the complaint under *ule 1>, 7ection 1 /. amended complaint under *ule 1, 7ection / 2. motion for leave to file a supplemental complaint under *ule 1, 7ection ? 4. motion to declare defendant in default under *ule @, 7ection 2 &. 6efendant$s motions 1. motion to set aside order of default under *ule @, 7ection 2 /. motion for e=tension of time to file responsive pleading under *ule 11, 7ection 11 2. motion for bill of particulars under *ule 1/ 4. motion to dismiss dismiss complaint complaint under under *ule 1? 8. )%N6'* ) %77;'7 !. 0laintiff$s motions and pleadings 1. 9otions a. To dismiss complaint under *ule 1>, 7ec. / b. To amend or supplement complaint under *ule 1>, 7ecs. 2 and ? c. or judgment on the pleadings under *ule 24 e. or summary judgment under *ule 25 f. To set pre-trial pre-tria l /. 0leadings a. *eply b. !ns#er to counterclaim 2. )thers a. 0re-trial brief &. 6efendant$s motion and pleading 1. 9otion a. 9otion to dismiss complaint due to fault of plaintiff under under *ule 1>, 7ec. 2
2 /. 0leading a. !ns#er #ith or #ithout counterclaim 2. )thers a. 0re-trial brief 8%. 0*'-T*%!+ !. 0laintiff$s motions 1. To present evidence e= parte and render judgment &. 6efendant$s motion 1. 9otion to dismiss . ommon motions 1. To postpone /. or consolidation or severance 2 or trial by commissioner 6. oinder 1. oinder of claims or causes of action /. oinder of parties 8%%. 6'0)7%T%)N7 !N6 6%7)8'*Y !. 6epositions &. %nterrogatories to parties . !dmission by adverse party 6. 0roduction or inspections of documents or things '. 0hysical and mental e=amination of persons 8%%%. T*%!+ !. !mendment to conform to or authoriAe presentation of evidence under *ule 1, 7ec. 5 %B. !T'* T*%!+ &;T &')*' ;69'NT !. ommon motion 1. To submit memorandum &. 6efendant$s motion 1. or judgment on demurrer to evidence B. ;69'NT B%. !T'* ;69'NT !. ommon motions 1. or reconsideration /. or ne# trial B%%. !00'!+ !N6 *'8%'C !. &efore finality 1. )rdinary appeal /. 0etition for revie# 2. 0etition for revie# on certiorari &. !fter finality 1. 0etition for certiorari /. 0etition for relief from judgment 2. 0etition for annulment of judgment B%%%. 'B';T%)N !N6 7!T%7!T%)N ) ;69'NT !. %n general 1. inds of e=ecution a. 9andatory
4 b. 6iscretionary &. 0rocedure for e=ecution 1. %n case of death of party /. )f judgments for money 2. )f judgments for specific act 4. )f special judgments . '=ecution sales 1. 7ales on e=ecution /. onveyance of property sold on e=ecution 2. *edemption of property sold on e=ecution '. 7atisfaction of judgment B%%%. 70'%!+ %8%+ !T%)N7 ACTIONS IN GENERAL (asic rule in 'ilin& ' actin (*ule /, 7ecs. 2-4" 1. or one cause of action (one delict or #rong", file only )N' !T%)N or suit. enerally, N) 70+%TT%N ! 7%N+' !;7' ) !T%)N. *easonsD a. to avoid multiplicity of suitsE b. to minimiAe e=penses, inconvenience and harassment. /. *emedy against splitting a single cause of action (t#o complaints separately filed for one action" - defendant may fileD a. motion to dismiss on the ground of (1" litis pendentia, if first complaint is still pending (*ule 1?, 7ec. 1 FeG" (/" res judicata, if first complaint is terminated by final judgment (*ule 1?, 7ec. 1 FfG" b. ans#er alleging either of above grounds as affirmative defense (*ule 1?, 7ec. ?" %f defendant fails to raise ground on time, he is deemed to have C!%8'6 them. 7plitting must be 3uestioned in the trial courtE cannot be raised for the first time on appeal. What are the re)uisites 'r *in!er ' causes ' actin" (*ule /, 7ec. 5" 1. ompliance #ith the rules on joinder of parties under *ule 2, 7ec. ?. /. ! party cannot join in an ordinary action any of the special civil actions. H *easonD special civil actions are governed by special rules. 2. Chere the causes of action are bet#een the 7!9' 0!*T%'7 but pertain to 6%'*'NT 8'N;'7 )* ;*%76%T%)N7, the joinder may be allo#ed in the *T, provided )N' ) T' !;7'7 ) !T%)N falls #ithin the jurisdiction of the *T and the venue lies therein. !cepti"nD ejectment case may not be joined #ith an action #ithin the jurisdiction of the *T as the same comes #ithin the e=clusive jurisdiction of the 9T. #"$e%er , if a party invo:es the jurisdiction of the court, he cannot thereafter challenge the court$s jurisdiction in the same case. e is barred by estoppel from doing so. & Hinog vs. Melicor , '.R. (". 409*4, April 2, 200*) N.&. !s to joinder in the 9T, it must have jurisdiction over !++ T' !;7'7 ) !T%)N and must have common venue. 4. Chere the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of money, jurisdiction is determined by the !*'!T' )* T)T!+ !9);NT claimed (ttalit$ rule". N.&. The totality rule applies only to the 9T H totality of claims cannot e=ceed the jurisdictional amount of the 9T.
5 There is no totality rule for the *T because its jurisdictional amount is #ithout limit. '=c. %n ta= cases #here the limit is belo# 01 million. !mounts of 01 million or more fall #ithin the jurisdiction of the T!. An r!inar$ civil actin an! petitin 'r issuance ' +rit ' pssessin ,a$ %e cnsli!ate! Chile a petition for a #rit of possession is an e! parte proceeding, being made on a presumed right of o#nership, #hen such presumed right of o#nership is contested and is made the basis of another action, then the proceedings for #rit of possession #ould also become groundless. The entire case must be litigated and if need must be consolidated #ith a related case so as to thresh out thoroughly all related issues. & PSB vs. Ss. Ma!alac, Jr., '.R. (". 4*44, April 26, 200*). PARTIES Lac. ' le&al capacit$ t sue H plaintiff$s general disability to sue, such as on account of minority, insanity, incompetence, lac: of juridical personality or any other general dis3ualifications of a party. 0laintiff$s lac: of legal capacity to sue is a ground for motion to dismiss (*ule 1?, 7ec. 1FdI". '=. ! foreign corporation doing business #ithout a license lac:s legal capacity to sue. Lac. ' persnalit$ t sue H the fact that plaintiff is not the real party in interest. 0laintiff$s lac: of personality to sue is a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the fact that the complaint, on its face, states no cause of action (*ule 1?, 7ec. 1 FgG" & "vangelista vs. Santiago , 4*7 SCRA 744 [200*]) %n a case involving constitutional issues, JstandingK or locus standi means a personal interest in the case such that the party has sustained or #ill sustained 6%*'T %N;*Y as a result of the government act that is being challenged. To have legal standing, the petitioner must have 6%*'T, 0'*7)N!+ and 7;&7T!NT%!+ %NT'*'7T to protect. ere, petitioners, retired )! hairmen and ommissioners, have not sho#n any direct and personal interest in the )! )rganiAational *estructuring 0lan. There is no indication that they have sustained or are in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its implementation. learly, they have no legal standing to file the instant suit (#omingo vs. $arague , 45? 7*! 45 F/5G". /OINDER O0 PARTIES Prce!ure 'r !is,issal i' in!ispensa%le part$ is nt i,plea!e! a. The responsibility of impleading all the indispensable parties rests on the plaintiff. To avoid dismissal, the remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. b. %f plaintiff *';7'7 to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the complaint may be dismissed upon motion of defendant or upon the court$s o#n motion. c. )nly upon unjustified failure or refusal to obey the order to include is the action dismissed & #omingo vs. Sc%eer , 42 SCRA 46+ [2004]). Chenever it appears to the court in the course of the proceeding that an indispensable party has not been joined, it is the duty of the court to 7T)0 T' T*%!+ and to )*6'* T' %N+;7%)N of such party. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subse3uent actuations of the court N;++ and
? 8)%6, for #ant of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties, but even as to those present (Uy vs. $&, 494 SCRA *3* [Jul , 2006]). Interventin (*ule 1@, 7ec. 1" ;nder this *ule, intervention shall be allo#ed #hen a person has (1" a legal interest in the matter in litigationE (/" or in the success of any of the partiesE (2" or an interest against the partiesE (4" or #hen he is so situated as to be adversely affected by a distribution or disposition of property in the custody of the court or an officer thereof. & &l'elor vs. Halasan , '.R. (". 6*9+7, -arc 3, 2006). *e3uirementsD FaG legal interest in the matter in litigationE and FbG consideration must be given as to #hether the adjudication of the original parties may be delayed or prejudiced, or #hether the intervenorLs rights may be protected in a separate proceeding or not. +egal interest must be of such 6%*'T and %99'6%!T' character that the intervenor #ill either gain or lose by direct legal operation and effect of the judgment. 7uch interest must be actual, direct and material, and not simply contingent and e=pectant. & Pere( vs. $& , '.R. (". 62*+0. Januar 27, 2006) The allo#ance or disallo#ance of a motion for leave to intervene and the admission of a complaint-in-intervention is addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court. The discretion of the court, once e=ercised, cannot be revie#ed by certiorari save in instances #here such discretion has been e=ercised in an arbitrary manner. ( &ngeles vs. )eublic , '.R. (". 662+, /ct"er 27, 2006) What is the e''ect ' nn-su%stitutin ' a !ecease! part$" Non-compliance #ith the rule on substitution #ould render the proceedings and judgment of the trial court infirm because the court ac3uires N) ;*%76%T%)N over the persons of the legal representatives or of the heirs on #hom the trial and the judgment #ould be binding. Thus, proper substitution of heirs must be effected for the trial court to ac3uire jurisdiction over their persons and to obviate any future claim by any heir that he #as not apprised of the litigation against &ertuldo or that he did not authoriAe !tty. 0etalcorin to represent him. No formal substitution of the parties #as effected #ithin thirty days from date of death of &ertuldo, as re3uired by 7ection 1?, *ule 2 of the *ules of ourt. Needless to stress, the purpose behind the rule on substitution is the protection of the right of every party to due process. %t is to ensure that the deceased party #ould continue to be properly represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal representative of his estate. ( Hinog vs. Melicor , 4** SCRA 460 [200*]) The Rules re)uire the le&al representatives ' a !ea! liti&ant t %e su%stitute! as parties t a liti&atin This re)uire,ent is necessitate! %$ !ue prcess Thus, #hen the rights of the legal representatives of a decedent are actually recogniAed and protected, noncompliance or belated formal compliance #ith the *ules cannot affect the validity of the promulgated decision. !fter all, due process had thereby been satisfied. Chen a party to a pending action dies and the claim is not e=tinguished, the *ules of ourt re3uire a substitution of the deceased. The procedure is specifically governed by 7ection 1? of *ule 2. & #ela $ru( vs. Joa*uin , '.R. (". 627++, Jul 2+, 200*).
> SELECTION O0 COURT What is hierarch$ ' curts" 0ursuant to this doctrine, direct resort from the lo#er courts to the 7upreme ourt #ill not be entertained unless the appropriate remedy cannot be obtained in the lo#er tribunals. *ationaleD (a" to prevent inordinate demands upon the 7$s time and attention #hich are better devoted to those matters #ithin its e=clusive jurisdiction, and (b" to prevent further overcro#ding of the 7$s doc:et. Thus, although the 7, ! and the *T have )N;***'NT jurisdiction to issue #rits of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, 3uo #arranto, habeas corpus and injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. The 7 #ill N)T 'NT'*T!%N 6%*'T *'7)*T to it unless the redress desired cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and 'B'0T%)N!+ !N6 )90'++%N %*;97T!N'7, such as cases of national interest and of serious implications, justify the e=traordinary remedy of #rit of certiorari, calling for the e=ercise of its primary jurisdiction. ( Hinog vs. Melicor, 4** SCRA 460 [200*]) VENUE The venue of the action for the nullification of the foreclosure sale is properly laid #ith the 9alolos *T although t#o of the properties together #ith the &ulacan properties are situated in Nueva 'cija. The venue of real actions affecting properties found in different provinces is determined by the 7%N;+!*%TY or 0+;*!+%TY of the transactions involving said parcels of land. Chere said parcels are the object of one and the same transaction, the venue is in the court of any of the provinces #herein a parcel of land is situated ( United +verseas Bank P%ils. 'ormerly -estmont Bank vs. )osemoore Mining / #eveloment $or ., '.R. ("s. *9669 1 63*2, -arc 2, 2007 ". PLEADINGS In +hat +a$s ,a$ 'ru, shppin& %e c,,itte!" 1. iling multiple cases based on the same cause of action and #ith the same prayer, the previous case not having been resolved yet 1litis pen!entia2 /. iling multiple cases based on the same cause of action and the same prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved (res *u!icata" 2. iling multiple cases based on the same cause of action but #ith different prayers (splittin& causes ' actin" #here the ground for dismissal is also either litis pendentia or res judicata. E''ect ' 'ru, shppin& 1. %f the forum shopping is N)T considered C%+;+ and 6'+%&'*!T', the subse3uent cases shall be 6%79%77'6 C%T);T 0*';6%' on one of the t#o grounds mentioned above /. %f the forum shopping is C%+;+ and 6'+%&'*!T', both (or all, if there are more than t#o actions" shall be 6%79%77'6 C%T 0*';6%' ( &o0&s vs. $&, 49 SCRA 3*3 [2006]) What are the re)uire,ents ' 'ru, shppin& certi'icate 'r a crpratin" )nly individuals vested #ith authority by a valid board resolution may sign the certificate of non-forum shopping in behalf of a corporation. %n addition, the ourt has re3uired that proof of said authority must be attached. ailure to provide a certificate of non-forum shopping is sufficient ground to dismiss the
M petition. +i:e#ise, the petition is subject to dismissal if a certification #as submitted unaccompanied by proof of the signatoryLs authority. & P%iliine &irlines, Inc. vs. 1lig%t &ttendants and Stewards &ssociation o' t%e P%iliines 1&S&P , '.R. (". 430++. Januar 24, 2006) o#ever, subse3uent submission of 7ecretary$s ertificate is substantial compliance #ith the re3uirement that a &oard *esolution must authoriAe the officer e=ecuting the non-forum certification on behalf of the corporation. & International $onstruction Inc. vs. 1eb Leasing and 1inancing $or., '.R. (". *79*, April 22, 200*) Nn-'ru, shppin& certi'icatin is nt re)uire! in a petitin 'r issuance ' +rit ' pssessin %ecause it is nt an initiatr$ plea!in& The certification against forum shopping is re3uired only in a complaint or other initiatory leading. The e20arte petition for the issuance of a #rit of possession filed by the respondent is not an initiatory pleading. !lthough the private respondent denominated its pleading as a petition, it is, nonetheless, a motion. Chat distinguishes a motion from a petition or other pleading is not its form or the title given by the party e=ecuting it, but rather its purpose. The office of a motion is not to initiate ne# litigation, but to bring a material but incidental matter arising in the progress of the case in #hich the motion is filed. (Ss. &r*ui(a vs. $ourt o' &eals, et. al., '.R. (". 60479, June +, 200*)
Litis endentia is nt present %et+een a petitin 'r +rit ' pssessin an! actin 'r annul,ent ' 'reclsure The issuance of the #rit of possession being a ministerial function, and summary in nature, it cannot be said to be a judgment on the merits, but simply an incident in the transfer of title. ence, a separate case for annulment of mortgage and foreclosure sale cannot be barred by litis pendentia or res judicata. Thus, insofar as 7pec. 0roc. No. @@-@MM-6 and ivil ase No. @@-21?@-6 pending before different branches of *T 6agupan ity are concerned, there is no litis pendentia. & 3u vs. P$IB , '.R. (". 47902. -arc 7, 2006) The pen!enc$ ' a SEC case ,a$ %e inv.e! as psin& a pre*u!icial )uestin t an RTC civil case . 7ince the determination of the 7' as to #hich of the t#o factions is the de jure board of N;% is crucial to the resolution of the case before the *T, #e find that the trial court should suspend its proceedings until the 7' comes out #ith its findings. & &bacan, Jr., et. al. vs. 4ort%western University, Inc., '.R. (". 40777, April +, 200*) What is *u!icial curtes$" There are instances #here even if there is no #rit of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order issued by a higher court, it #ould be proper for a lo#er court or court of origin to suspend its proceedings on the precept of judicial courtesy. !s the 7upreme ourt e=plained in ternal 'ardens -e"rial ar %. C"urt "5 Appeals, 1?4 7*! 4/1, 4/>-4/M (1@MM"D #ue resect 'or t%e Sureme $ourt and ractical and et%ical considerations should have prompted the appellate court to #ait for the final determination of the petition before ta:ing cogniAance of the case and trying to render moot e=actly #hat #as before this court = = =. This ourt e=plained, ho#ever, that the rule on Jjudicial courtesyK applies #here Jthere is a 7T*)N 0*)&!&%+%TY that the issues before the higher court #ould be rendered 9))T !N6 9)*%&;N6 as a result of the continuation of the proceedings in the lo#er court or court of origin.K ( )eublic vs. Sandigan , 492 SCRA 74+ [June 26, 2006])
@
A c,pulsr$ cunterclai, !es nt re)uire a certi'icate ' nn-'ru, shppin& %ecause a c,pulsr$ cunterclai, is nt an initiatr$ plea!in& The *ule distinctly provides that the re3uired certification against forum shopping is intended to cover an initiatory pleading, meaning an incipient application of a party asserting a claim for relief. ertainly, respondent ban:Ls !ns#er #ith ounterclaim is a responsive pleading, filed merely to counter petitionersL complaint that initiates the civil action. %n other #ords, the rule re3uiring such certification does not contemplate a defendantLsOrespondentLs claim for relief that is derived only from, or is necessarily connected #ith, the main action or complaint. %n fact, upon failure by the plaintiff to comply #ith such re3uirement, 7ection 5, 3uoted above, directs the dismissal of the case #ithout prejudice, not the dismissal of respondentLs counterclaim. & $ario vs. )ural Bank o' Sto. 5omas Batangas, Inc. , '.R. (". *37. -a 4, 2006) What are the tests r criteria t !eter,ine c,pulsr$ r per,issive nature ' speci'ic cunterclai,s" The criteria or tests by #hich the compulsory or permissive nature of specific counterclaims can be determined are as follo#sD 1. !re the issues of fact and la# raised by the claim and counterclaim largely the sameP /. Could res judicata bar a subse3uent suit on defendant$s claim absent the compulsory counterclaim ruleP 2. Cill substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff$s claim as #ell as defendant$s counterclaimP 4. %s there any logical relation bet#een the claim and the counterclaimP The evidence of the petitioner on its claim in its complaint, and that of the respondents on their counterclaims are thus different. There is, li:e#ise, no logical relation bet#een the claim of the petitioner and the counterclaim of the respondents. ence, the counterclaim of the respondents is an initiatory pleading, #hich re3uires the respondents to append thereto a certificate of nonforum shopping. Their failure to do so results to the dismissal of their counterclaim #ithout prejudice. & 6orea "2c%ange Bank vs. Hon. 7on(ales, etc., et. al., '.R. ("s. 422+6+7, April *, 200*) A &run! raise! in a ,tin t !is,iss ,a$ nt %e the su%*ect ' preli,inar$ hearin& as special an! a''ir,ative !e'ense in the ans+er3 e4cept +hen there are several !e'en!ants %ut nl$ ne 'ile! a ,tin t !is,iss. 7ection ?, *ule 1? of the *ules of ourt is e=plicit in stating that the defendant may reiterate any of the grounds for dismissal provided under *ule 1? of the *ules of ourt as affirmative defenses but that a preliminary hearing may no longer be had thereon if a motion to dismiss had already been filed. This section, ho#ever, does not recontemplate a situation, such as the one obtaining in this case, e=cept #here there are several defendants but only one filed a motion to dismiss. & &bra8ano vs. Salas, Jr. , '.R. (". *++9*. eruar 6, 2006) NOTICE O0 DIS#ISSAL O0 CO#PLAINT under *ule 1>, 7ec. 1 The trial court has no discretion or option to deny the motion, since dismissal by the plaintiff under 7ection 1, *ule 1> is guaranteed as a matter of right to the plaintiffs. 'ven if the motion cites the most ridiculous of grounds for dismissal,
1 the trial court has no choice but to consider the complaint as dismissed, since the plaintiff may opt for such dismissal as a matter of right, regardless of ground (+.B. Jovenir $onstruction and #eveloment $or. vs. Macamir )ealty and $&3 '.R. (". 3*+03, -arc 2+, 2006). #OTION TO DIS#ISS CO#PLAINT DUE TO PLAINTI005S 0AULT under *ule 1>, 7ec. 2. 7ec. 2, *ule 1> enumerates the instances #here the complaint may be dismissed due to plaintiff$s faultD (1" if he fails to appear on the date for the presentation of his evidence in chiefE (/" if he fails to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of timeE or (2" if he fails to comply #ith the rules or any order of the court. Once a case is !is,isse! 'r 'ailure t prsecute3 this has the e''ect ' an a!*u!icatin n the ,erits an! is un!erst! t %e +ith pre*u!ice t the 'ilin& ' anther actin unless ther+ise prvi!e! in the r!er ' !is,issal. %n other #ords, unless there be a 3ualification in the order of dismissal that it is #ithout prejudice, the dismissal should be regarded as an adjudication on the merits and is #ith prejudice. ( $ru( vs. $ourt o' &eals , '.R. (". 64797, eruar 3, 2006) %n situations contemplated in 7ection 2, *ule 1> of the *ules of ourt, #here a complaint is dismissed for 'ailure ' the plainti'' t c,pl$ +ith a la+'ul r!er ' the curt, such dismissal has the effect of an adjudication upon the merits. ! dismissal for failure to prosecute has the effect of an adjudication on the merits, and operates as res judicata, particularly #hen the court did not direct that the dismissal #as #ithout prejudice. ($ourt o' &eals vs. , '.R. (". 42439, 8eceer 3, 2006 " &lvare( ;nder 7ection 2, *ule 1> of the 1@@> *ules of ivil 0rocedure, the dismissal of the complaint due to the fault of plaintiff does not necessarily carry #ith it the dismissal of the counterclaim, compulsory or other#ise. %n fact, the !is,issal ' the c,plaint is +ithut pre*u!ice t the ri&ht ' !e'en!ants t prsecute the cunterclai,. & Pinga vs. Santiago , '.R. (". 703*4, June 30, 2006). Re,e!$ 'r, r!er ' !is,issal 'r 'ailure t prsecute 6 r!inar$ appeal !n order of dismissal for failure to prosecute has the effect of an adjudication on the merits. 0etitioners$ counsel should have filed a notice of appeal #ith the appellate court #ithin the reglementary period. %nstead of filing a petition under *ule 45 of the *ules of ourt, the proper recourse #as an ordinary appeal #ith the ourt of !ppeals under *ule 41. ( 6o vs. P4B , 479 SCRA 29+, Januar 20, 2006) E''ect ' !eclaratin ' !e'ault The mere fact that a defendant is declared in default does not automatically result in the grant of the prayers of the plaintiff. To #in, the latter must still present the same 3uantum of evidence that #ould be re3uired if the defendant #ere still present. ! party that defaults is not deprived of its rights, e=cept the ri&ht t %e hear! an! t present evi!ence to the trial court. %f the evidence presented does not support a judgment for the plaintiff, the complaint should be dismissed, even if the defendant may not have been heard or allo#ed to present any countervailing evidence (7a8udo vs. 5raders )oyal Bank , '.R. (". *09+, -arc 2, 2006 ". ! defendant party declared in default retains the right to appeal from the
11 judgment by default on the ground that the plaintiff failed to prove the material allegations of the complaint, or that the decision is contrary to la#, even #ithout need of the prior filing of a motion to set aside the order of default ( Martine( , '.R. (". 60+9*, /ct"er 30, 2006 ". vs. )eublic Prce!ure trial curt ,ust ta.e +hen a !e'en!ant 'ails t 'ile an ans+er ;nder 7ec. 2 of *ule @, the court shall proceed to render judgment granting the claimant such relief as his pleading may #arrant, subject to the court$s discretion on #hether to re3uire the presentation of evidence e= parte. The same provision also sets do#n guidelines on the nature and e=tent of the relief that may be granted. %n particular, the court$s judgment shall not e=ceed the amount or be different in :ind from that prayed for nor a#ard unli3uidated damages. (7a8udo vs. 5raders )oyal Bank , supra" A,en!,ent ' a c,plaint ,a$ %e all+e! even i' an r!er 'r its !is,issal has %een issue!3 as ln& as the ,tin t a,en! is 'ile! %e're the !is,issal r!er %ec,es 'inal. The reason for allo#ing the amendment on this condition is that, upon finality of the dismissal, the court loses jurisdiction and control over the complaint. Thus, it can no longer ma:e any disposition on the complaint in a manner inconsistent #ith the dismissal. !fter the order of dismissal #ithout prejudice becomes final, and therefore falls outside the court$s po#er to modify, a party #ho #ishes to reinstate the case has no remedy other than to file a ne# complaint. & )odrigue( Jr. vs. &guilar, Sr., .*. No. 15@4M/, !ugust 2, /5" DISCOVER7 PROCEDURES The importance of discovery procedures is #ell recogniAed by the ourt. %t approved !.9. No. 2-1-@-7 on uly 12, /4 #hich provided for the guidelines to be observed by trial court judges and cler:s of court in the conduct of pre-trial and use of deposition-discovery measures. ;nder !.9. No. 2-1-@7, trial courts are directed to issue orders re3uiring parties to avail of interrogatories to parties under *ule /5 and re3uest for admission of adverse party under *ule /? or at their discretion ma:e use of depositions under *ule /2 or other measures under *ule /> and /M #ithin 5 days from the filing of the ans#er. The parties are li:e#ise re3uired to submit, at least 2 days before the pre-trial, pre-trial briefs, containing among others a manifestation of the parties of their having availed or their intention to avail themselves of discovery procedures or referral to commissioners. (Hyatt Industrial Manu'acturing $or. vs. Ley $onstruction and #eveloment $or., '.R. (". 4743, -arc 0, 2006) /UDG#ENT ON T8E PLEADINGS *ule 24, 7ection 1 of the *ules of ourt, provides that a *u!&,ent n the plea!in&s is prper +hen an ans+er 'ails t ten!er an issue r ther+ise a!,its the ,aterial alle&atins ' the a!verse part$9s plea!in&. The essential 3uestion is #hether there are issues generated by the pleadings. ! judgment on the pleadings may be sought only by a claimant, #ho is the party see:ing to recover upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claimE or to obtain a declaratory relief. (Meneses vs. Secretary o' &grarian )e'orm , '.R. (". *6304, /ct"er 23, 2006 " SU##AR7 /UDG#ENT
1/
or summary judgment to be proper, t#o (/" re3uisites must concur, to #itD (1" there must be no genuine issue on any material fact, e=cept for the amount of damagesE and (/" the moving party must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of la#. Chen, on their face, the pleadings tender a genuine issue, summary judgment is not proper. !n issue is genuine if it re3uires the 0*'7'NT!T%)N ) '8%6'N' as distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim. The trial court$s decision #as merely denominated as summary judgment. &ut in essence, it is actually e3uivalent to a judgment on the merits, ma:ing the rule on summary judgment inapplicable in this case. & +ntimare vs. "le , '.R. (". *9224, Januar 20, 2006). Chen the facts as pleaded appear uncontested or undisputed, then there is no real or genuine issue or 3uestion as to the facts, and summary judgment is called for. The party #ho moves for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the complaint is patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue for trial. Trial curts have li,ite! authrit$ t ren!er su,,ar$ *u!&,ents an! ,a$ ! s nl$ +hen there is clearl$ n &enuine issue as t an$ ,aterial 'act. Chen the facts as pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested, proceedings for summary judgment cannot ta:e the place of trial & &sian $onstruction and #eveloment $or. vs. P$IB , '.R. (". *3+27, April 2*, 2006). The trial curt cannt ,tu prpri !eci!e that su,,ar$ *u!&,ent n an actin is in r!er ;nder the applicable provisions of *ule 25, the defending party or the claimant, as the case may be, must invo:e the rule on summary judgment by filing a motion. The adverse party must be notified of the motion for summary judgment and furnished #ith supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions before hearing is conducted. 9ore importantly, a summary judgment is permitted only if there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and a moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of la# . & Pineda vs. 7uevara , '.R. (". 43++, eruar 4, 2007). TRIAL Lac. ' cause ' actin ,a$ %e cure! %$ evi!ence presente! !urin& the trial an! a,en!,ents t cn'r, t the evi!ence !mendments of pleadings are allo#ed under *ule 1 of the 1@@> *ules of ivil 0rocedure in order that the actual merits of a case may be determined in the most e=peditious and ine=pensive manner #ithout regard to technicalities, and that all other matters included in the case may be determined in a single proceeding, thereby avoiding multiplicity of suits. 7ection 5 thereof applies to situations #herein evidence not #ithin the issues raised in the pleadings is presented by the parties during the trial, and to conform to such evidence the pleadings are subse3uently amended on motion of a party. & Swagman Hotels / 5ravel, Inc. vs. $&, '.R. (". 63*, April +, 200*). DE#URRER TO EVIDENCE Upn the !is,issal ' the !e,urrer in the appellate curt3 the !e'en!ant lses the ri&ht t present his evi!ence and the appellate court shall then proceed to render judgment on the merits on the basis of plaintiff$s evidence. The rule, ho#ever, imposes the condition that if his demurrer is granted by the trial
12 court, and the order of dismissal is reversed on appeal, the movant loses his right to present evidence in his behalf and he shall have been deemed to have elected to stand on the insufficiency of plaintiff$s case and evidence. %n such event, the appellate court #hich reverses the order of dismissal shall proceed to render judgment on the merits on the basis of plaintiff$s evidence & )eublic vs. 5uvera , '.R. (". 4+246, eruar 6, 2007). Distinctin %et+een ,tin t !is,iss 'r 'ailure t state a cause ' actin3 &verne! %$ Rule :;3 Sec : 1&22 an! ,tin t !is,iss %ase! n lac. ' cause ' actin3 &verne! %$ Rule << ! motion to dismiss based on lac: of cause of action is filed by the defendant after the plaintiff has presented his evidence on the ground that the latter has sho#n no right to the relief sought. Chile a motion to dismiss under *ule 1? is based on preliminary objections #hich can be ventilated before the beginning of the trial, a motion to dismiss under *ule 22 is in the nature of a demurrer to evidence on the ground of insufficiency of evidence and is presented only after the plaintiff has rested his case & 5%e Manila Banking $or. vs. University o' Baguio, Inc ., '.R. (". *9+9, eruar 2, 2007. APPEAL AND REVIEW
The Supreme Court may review factual findings of the trial court and the Court of Appeals The petitioner admits that the issues on appeal are factual. ;nder *ule 45 of the *ules of ourt, only 3uestions of la# may be raised, for the simple reason that the ourt is not a trier of facts. The findings of the trial court as affirmed by the ! are conclusive on this ourt, absent proof of any of the recogniAed e=ceptional circumstances such asD (1" the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or conjecturesE (/" the inference is manifestly mista:en, absurd or impossibleE (2" there is grave abuse of discretionE (4" the judgment is based on a misapprehension of factsE (5" the findings of fact are conflictingE (?" there is no citation of specific evidence on #hich the factual findings are basedE (>" the finding of absence of facts is contradicted by the presence of evidence on recordE (M" the findings of the ! are contrary to those of the trial courtE (@" the ! manifestly overloo:ed certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered, #ould justify a different conclusionE (1" the findings of the ! are beyond the issues of the caseE and (11" the findings are contrary to the admissions of both parties. & &sian $onstruction / #ev9t. $or. vs. 5ulabut, '.R. (". 6904, April 26, 200*) Ce stress that regional trial courts have jurisdiction over complaints for recovery of o#nership or accion reivindicatoria. Sectin =3 Rule >? ' the Rules n Civil Prce!ure nnetheless all+s the RTC t !eci!e the case %ru&ht n appeal 'r, the #TC +hich3 even +ithut *uris!ictin ver the su%*ect ,atter3 ,a$ !eci!e the case n the ,erits %n the instant case, the 9T of 9ambajao should have dismissed the complaint outright for lac: of jurisdiction but since it decided the case on its merits, the *T rendered a decision based on the findings of the 9T. & Provost vs. $&, '.R. (". 60406, June 26, 2006). The *T should have ta:en cogniAance of the case. I' the case is trie! n the ,erits %$ the #unicipal Curt +ithut *uris!ictin ver the su%*ect ,atter3 the RTC n appeal ,a$ n ln&er !is,iss the case i' it has ri&inal *uris!ictin there' 9oreover, the *T shall no longer try the case on the merits, but shall decide the case on the basis of the evidence presented
14 in the lo#er court, #ithout prejudice to the admission of the amended pleadings and additional evidence in the interest of justice. & "ncarnacion vs. &migo , '.R. (". 69793, Septeer *, 2006). As the la+ n+ stan!s3 in'erir curts have *uris!ictin t reslve )uestins ' +nership +henever it is necessar$ t !eci!e the )uestin ' pssessin in an e*ect,ent case orollarily, the *T erred #hen it agreed #ith the 9T$s decision to dismiss the case. !t first glance, it appears that based on the 012,2. assessed value of the subject property as declared by respondents, the *T #ould have no jurisdiction over the case. &ut the above-3uoted provision refers to the ri&inal *uris!ictin ' the RTC 7ection // of &0 1/@ vests upon the *T the e=ercise of appellate jurisdiction over all cases decided by the 9etropolitan Trial ourts, 9unicipal Trial ourts, and 9unicipal ircuit Trial ourts in their respective territorial jurisdictions. learly then, the amount involved is immaterial for purposes of the *T$s appellate jurisdiction. !ll cases decided by the 9T are generally appealable to the *T irrespective of the amount involved & Serrano vs. 7utierre(, '.R. (". 62366 , ("%eer 0, 2006). ;nder *ule 4, full payment of the appellate doc:et fees #ithin the prescribed period is mandatory, even jurisdictional. )ther#ise, the appeal is deemed not perfected and the decision sought to be appealed from becomes final and e=ecutory. ()eublic vs Luri( , '.R. (". *+992, Januar 26, 2007). Appeal 'r, RTC !ecisin ren!ere! in the e4ercise ' its appellate *uris!ictin 6 petitin 'r revie+ un!er Rule >@ 7ince the unla#ful detainer case #as filed #ith the 9T and affirmed by the *T, petitioners should have filed a 0etition for *evie# #ith the ourt of !ppeals under *ule 4/ and not a Notice of !ppeal #ith the *T. o#ever, #e consider this to have been remedied by the timely filing of the 9otion for *econsideration on the follo#ing day. 7ection 2, *ule 5 of the *ules of ourt allo#s the #ithdra#al of appeal at any time, as a matter of right, before the filing of the appellee$s brief. !pplying this rule conte=tually, the filing of the 9otion for *econsideration may be deemed as an effective #ithdra#al of the defective Notice of !ppeal. )oss )ica Sales $enter, Inc. vs. +ng, '.R. (". 3297, Auust 6, 200*) RELIE0 0RO# /UDG#ENT 0er 7ec. 2, *ule 2M, The ?-day period is rec:oned from the time the party ac)uire! .n+le!&e of the order, judgment or proceedingsK and not from the date he actually read the same & "scueta vs. Lim , '.R. (". 3762, Januar 24, 2007). ANNUL#ENT O0 /UDG#ENT *ule 4> applies only to annulment by the ourt of !ppeals of judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil cases of Re&inal Trial Curts H it does not apply to criminal actions (Peole vs. Bitanga , '.R. (". *9222, June 26 2007): final judgments or orders of 3uasi-judicial tribunals or administrative bodies such as the National +abor *elations ommission, the )mbudsman, the ivil 7ervice ommission, the )ffice of the 0resident, and the 0!*!6 & 1raginal , '.R. (". *0207, eruar 223, 2007). or to nullification of vs. Paranal decisions of the ourt of !ppeals (7rande vs. University o' t%e P%iliines , '.R. (". 4+4*6, Septeer *, 2006).
15 EBECUTION E4ecutin pen!in& appeal applies t electin cases. 6espite the silence of the )9'+' *ules of 0rocedure as to the procedure of the issuance of a #rit of e=ecution pending appeal, there is no reason to dispute the )9'+'$s authority to do so, considering that the suppletory application of the *ules of ourt is e=pressly authoriAed by 7ection 1, *ule 41 of the )9'+' *ules of 0rocedure #hich provides that absent any applicable provisions therein the pertinent provisions of the *ules of ourt shall be applicable by analogy or in a suppletory character and effect. & Bala8onda vs. $+M"L"$ , '.R. (". 66032, eruar 2+, 200*). When title has %een cnsli!ate! in na,e ' ,rt&a&ee3 +rit ' pssessin is a ,atter ' ri&ht )nce a mortgaged estate is e=trajudicially sold, and is not redeemed #ithin the reglementary period, no separate and independent action is necessary to obtain possession of the property. The purchaser at the public auction has only to file a petition for issuance of a #rit of possession pursuant to 7ection 22 of *ule 2@ of the *ules of ourt. ( #BP vs. , '.R. (". 3+*67, -arc 4, 200*). Souses 7atal E4ecutin ' ,ne$ *u!&,ents un!er Rule <3 Sec 6 pr,issr$ nte nt all+e! The la# mandates that in the e=ecution of a money judgment, the judgment debtor shall pay either in cash, certified ban: chec: payable to the judgment obligee, or any other form of payment acceptable to the latter. No#here does the la# mention promissory notes as a form of payment. The only e=ception is #hen such form of payment is acceptable to the judgment debtor. &ut it #as obviously not acceptable to complainant, other#ise she #ould not have filed this case against respondent sheriff. %n fact, she objected to it because the promissory notes of the defendants did not satisfy the money judgment in her favor. ( #agooc vs. "rlina , A.-. (". 04+*7 &5"rerl /CA ;..;. (". 02429), -arc 6, 200*) SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS !lthough the *T has the authority to annul final judgments, such authority pertains only to 'inal *u!&,ents ren!ere! %$ in'erir curts an! )uasi *u!icial %!ies ' e)ual ran.in& +ith such in'erir curts. iven that 6!*!& decisions are appealable to the !, the inevitable conclusion is that the 6!*!& is a co-e3ual body #ith the *T and its decisions are beyond the *T$s control & Sring'ield #eveloment $or. vs. Presiding Judge o' )5$ o' Misamis +riental, Branc% :; , '.R. (". 4262+, eruar 6, 2007). The +rit ' prhi%itin !es nt lie a&ainst the e4ercise ' a )uasile&islative 'unctin 7ince in issuing the 3uestioned %** of *.!. No. @/>, the National overnment !dministration ommittee #as not e=ercising judicial, 3uasi-judicial or ministerial function, #hich is the scope of a petition for prohibition under 7ection /, *ule ?5 of the 1@@> *ules of ivil 0rocedure, the instant prohibition should be dismissed outright. Chere the principal relief sought is to invalidate an %**, petitioners$ remedy is an ordinary action for its nullification, an action #hich properly falls under the jurisdiction of the *egional Trial ourt. (Holy Sirit Homeowners &ssociation vs. #e'ensor , '.R. (". 639+0, Auust 3, 2006).
1? ! #rit of mandamus commanding the respondents to re3uire 0;8s to use N is unavailing. #an!a,us is availa%le nl$ t c,pel the !in& ' an act speci'icall$ en*ine! %$ la+ as a !ut$ ere, there is no la# that mandates the respondents +T*& and the 6)T to order o#ners of motor vehicles to use N. !t most the +T*& has been tas:ed by '.). No. /@ in par. 4.5 (ii", 7ection 4 Jto grant preferential and e=clusive ertificates of 0ublic onvenience (0" or franchises to operators of N8s based on the results of the 6)T surveysK & Henares, Jr. vs. Land 5ransortation 1ranc%ising and )egulatory Board , '.R. (". *+290, /ct"er 23, 2006). !ctions of 3uo #arranto against persons #ho usurp an office in a corporation, #hich #ere formerly cogniAable by the 7ecurities and '=change ommission under 06 @/-!, have been transferred to the courts of general jurisdiction. &ut, this does not change the fact that Rule ;; ' the : Rules ' Civil Prce!ure !es nt appl$ t )u +arrant cases a&ainst persns +h usurp an ''ice in a private crpratin & $alle8a vs. Panday , '.R. (". 6+696. eruar 2+, 2006). EBPROPRIATION Rep Act N => ,an!ates i,,e!iate pa$,ent ' the initial *ust c,pensatin prir t the issuance ' the +rit ' pssessin in 'avr ' the Gvern,ent *ep. !ct No. M@>4 represents a significant change from previous e=propriation la#s such as *ule ?>, or even 7ection 1@ of the +ocal overnment ode. *ule ?> and the +ocal overnment ode merely provided that the overnment deposit the initial amounts antecedent to ac3uiring possession of the property #ith, respectively, an authoriAed overnment depositary or the proper court. %n both cases, the private o#ner does not receive compensation prior to the deprivation of property. ;nder the ne# modality prescribed by *ep. !ct No. M@>4, the private o#ner sees immediate monetary recompense #ith the same degree of speed as the ta:ing of hisOher property. ()eublic vs. 7ingoyon , '.R. (". 66429, 8eceer 9, 200*) #tin t !is,iss is nt per,itte! in a c,plaint 'r e4prpriatin . 7ignificantly, the *ule allo#ing a defendant in an e=propriation case to file a motion to dismiss in lieu of an ans#er #as amended by the 1@@> *ules of ivil 0rocedure, #hich too: effect on uly 1, 1@@>. 7ection 2, *ule ?> no# e=pressly mandates that any objection or defense to the ta:ing of the property of a defendant must be set forth in an ans#er. & Masiki vs. $ity o' Pasig , '.R. (". 36349. Januar 23, 2006) 0ORECLOSURE O0 #ORTGAGE A +rit ' pssessin is a +rit ' e4ecutin e,pl$e! t en'rce a *u!&,ent t recver the pssessin ' lan!. %t commands the sheriff to enter the land and give possession of it to the person entitled under the judgment.K ! #rit of possession may be issued under the follo#ing instancesD (1" in land registration proceedings under 7ection 1> of !ct 4@?E (/" in a judicial foreclosure, provided the debtor is in possession of the mortgaged realty and no third person, not a party to the foreclosure suit, had intervenedE (2" in an e=trajudicial foreclosure of a real estate mortgage under 7ection > of !ct No. 2125, as amended by !ct No. 411ME and (4" in e=ecution sales (last paragraph of 7ection 22, *ule 2@ of the *ules of ourt". The present case falls under the third instance. ;nder 7ection > of !ct No. 2125, as amended by !ct No. 411M, a #rit of possession may be issued either
1> (1" #ithin the one-year redemption period, upon the filing of a bond, or (/" after the lapse of the redemption period, #ithout need of a bond. & P4B vs. Sanao Marketing $ororation , '.R. (". *39*, Jul 29, 200*) ! #rit of preliminary injunction is issued to prevent an e=trajudicial foreclosure, only upon a clear sho#ing of a violation of the mortgagor$s unmista:able right. ;nsubstantiated allegations of denial of due process and prematurity of a loan are not sufficient to defeat the mortgagee$s unmista:able right to an e=trajudicial foreclosure. & S elegna Management and #eveloment $ororation vs. U$PB , '.R. (". 6*662, -a 3, 2006) An actin t invali!ate the ,rt&a&e r the 'reclsure sale is nt a vali! &run! t ppse issuance ' +rit ' pssessin. !s a rule, any 3uestion regarding the validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure cannot be a legal ground for refusing the issuance of a #rit of possession. *egardless of #hether or not there is a pending suit for annulment of the mortgage or the foreclosure itself, the purchaser is entitled to a #rit of possession, #ithout prejudice of course to the eventual outcome of said case. & Ss. &r*ui(a vs. $ourt o' &eals, '.R. (". 60479, June +, 200*) 0ORCI(LE ENTR7 AND UNLAW0UL DETAINER %n forcible entry or unla#ful detainer cases, the only damage that can be recovered is the 'air rental value r the reasna%le c,pensatin 'r the use an! ccupatin ' the lease! prpert$. The reason for this is that the only issue raised in ejectment cases is that of rightful possessionE hence, the damages #hich could be recovered are those #hich the plaintiff could have sustained as a mere possessor, or those caused by the loss of the use and occupation of the property, and not the damages #hich he may have suffered but #hich have no direct relation to his loss of material possession. & #umo vs. "sinas , '.R. (". 4962, Januar 2*, 2006) The judgment rendered in an action for unla#ful detainer shall be conclusive #ith respect to the pssessin nl$ and shall in no #ise bind the title or affect the o#nership of the land or building. 7uch judgment #ould not bar an action bet#een the same parties respecting title to the land or building. 7ection 1M, *ule > of the *ules of ourt provides that #hen the defendant raises the defense of o#nership in his pleadings and the 3uestion of possession cannot be resolved #ithout deciding the issue of o#nership, the issue of o#nership shall be resolved only to determine the issue of possession. & )oberts vs. Paio , '.R. (". 6674, eruar 9, 2007) E4pan!e! *uris!ictin ' 'irst level curts in real actins ! complaint for reconveyance of a parcel of land #hich involves title to or interest in real property should allege assessed value of the land. The complaint specified only the mar:et value or estimated value #hich is 015,.. %n the absence of an assessed value, or in lieu thereof, the estimated value may be alleged. 7ec. // of &0 1/@ as amended by *.!. No. >?@1 (#here the assessed value of the real property does not e=ceed 0/,. or 05,. in 9etro 9anila" grants the 9T e=clusive jurisdiction over subject case. The nature of an action is determined not by #hat is stated in the caption of the complaint but its allegations and the reliefs prayed for. Chere the ultimate objective of the plaintiff is to obtain title to real property, it should be filed in the
1M proper court having jurisdiction over the assessed value of the property subject thereof. & Barangay Piai vs . 5ali , 469 SCRA 409 [200*]). What are the .in!s ' actin t recver pssessin ' real prpert$" ;nder e=isting la# and jurisprudence, there are three :inds of actions available to recover possession of real propertyD (a" accion interdictalE (b" accion publicianaE and (c" accion reivindicatoria. Acci"n interdictal comprises t#o distinct causes of action namely, forcible entry (detentacion" and unla#ful detainer (desahuico". %n forcible entry, one is deprived of physical possession of real property by means of force, intimidation, strategy, threats, or stealth #hereas in unla#ful detainer, one illegally #ithholds possession after the e=piration or termination of his right to hold possession under any contract, e=press or implied The jurisdiction of these t#o actions, #hich are summary in nature, lies in the proper ,unicipal trial curt r ,etrplitan trial curt &oth actions must be brought #ithin one year from the date of actual entry on the land, in case of forcible entry, and from the date of last demand, in case of unla#ful detainer. The issue in said cases is the right to physical possession. Acci"n puliciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession #hich should be brought in the proper re&inal trial curt #hen dispossession has lasted for more than one year. %t is an ordinary civil proceeding to determine the better right of possession of realty independently of title. %n other #ords, if at the time of the filing of the complaint more than one year had elapsed since defendant had turned plaintiff out of possession or defendant$s possession had become illegal, the action #ill be, not one of the forcible entry or illegal detainer, but an acci"n puliciana. )n the other hand, acci"n rei%indicat"ria is an action to recover o#nership also brought in the proper re&inal trial in an ordinary civil proceeding. What !eter,ines *uris!ictin in unla+'ul !etainer" To vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant, it is necessary that the complaint should embody such a statement of facts as brings the party clearly #ithin the class of cases for #hich the statutes provide a remedy, as these proceedings are summary in nature. The complaint must sho# enough on its face the court jurisdiction #ithout resort to par"l testimony. The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. Chen the complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unla#ful detainer, as #here it does not state ho# entry #as effected or ho# and #hen dispossession started, the remedy should either be an acci"n puliciana or an acci"n rei%indicat"ria in the proper re&inal trial curt. &
&ccion ubliciana is one for the recovery of possession of the right to possess. %t is also referred to as an ejectment suit filed after the e=piration of one year after the occurrence of the cause of action or from the unla#ful #ithholding of possession of the realty. & Hilario, etc., et. al. vs. Salvador, et. al., '.R. (". 603+4, April 29, 200*) Pssessin %$ tlerance %ec,es unla+'ul 'r, the ti,e ' !e,an! t vacate. 0etitioner$s cause of action for unla#ful detainer springs from respondents$ failure to vacate the 3uestioned premises upon his demand sometime in 1@@?.
1@ Cithin one (1" year therefrom, or on November ?, 1@@?, petitioner filed the instant complaint. %t bears stressing that possession by tolerance is la#ful, but such possession becomes unla#ful #hen the possessor by tolerance refuses to vacate upon demand made by the o#ner. & Santos vs. Ss. &yon, '.R. (". 3703, -a 6, 200*) Where the peri! ' the lease has e4pire! an! several !e,an!s +ere sent t the lessee t vacate3 +hen shul! the ne $ear peri! t 'ile unla+'ul !etainer %e rec.ne!" 0r, the !ate ' the ri&inal !e,an! r 'r, the !ate ' the last !e,an!" rom the date of the original demand if the subse3uent demands are merely in the nature of reminders or reiterations of the original demand. 6emand or notice to vacate is not a jurisdictional re3uirement #hen the action is based on the e=piration of the lease. !ny notice given #ould only negate any inference that the lessor has agreed to e=tend the period of the lease. The la# re3uires notice to be served only #hen the action is due to the lessee$s failure to pay or the failure to comply #ith the conditions of the lease. The one-year period is thus counted from the date of first dispossession. To reiterate, the allegation that the lease #as on a month-to-month basis is tantamount to saying that the lease e=pired every month. 7ince the lease already e=pired midyear in 1@@5, as communicated in petitioners$ letter dated uly 1, 1@@5, it #as at that time that respondent$s occupancy became unla#ful. ()aca(a vs. 7o(um , 4@ 7*! 212 Fune M, /?G"
SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS RULE < The determination of #hich court e=ercises jurisdiction over matters of probate depends upon the *)77 8!+;' of the estate of the decedent. & Lim vs. $& , 323 SCRA 02 [2000]) *ule >2, 7ec. 1 is deemed a,en!e! by &0 1/@, as amended by *! >?@1. RULE > *espondent, believing rightly or #rongly that she #as the sole heir to 0ortugal$s estate, e=ecuted on ebruary 15, 1@MM the 3uestioned !ffidavit of !djudication under the second sentence of *ule >4, 7ection 1 of the *evised *ules of ourt. 7aid rule is an e=ception to the general rule that #hen a person dies leaving a property, it should be judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a 3ualified administrator, in the order established in 7ec. ?, *ule >M in case the deceased left no #ill, or in case he did, he failed to name an e=ecutor therein. Portugal vs. Portugal0Beltran, '.R. (". *****, Auust 6, 200*) 7ince osefa 6elgado had heirs other than uillermo *ustia, uillermo could not have validly adjudicated osefa$s estate all to himself. *ule >4, 7ection 1 of the *ules of ourt is clear. !djudication by an heir of the decedent$s entire estate to himself by means of an affidavit is allo#ed only if he is the sole heir to the estate. & In t%e Matter o' t%e Intestate "state o' #elgado , '.R. (". **733, Januar 27, 2006)
/ The procedure outlined in 7ection 1 of *ule >4 is an e= parte proceeding. The rule plainly states, ho#ever, that persns +h ! nt participate r ha! n ntice ' an e4tra*u!icial settle,ent +ill nt %e %un! there%$. The publication of the settlement does not constitute constructive notice to the heirs #ho had no :no#ledge or did not ta:e part in it because the same #as notice after the fact of e=ecution. & $ua vs. ?, *ules of ourtG ! perusal of the #ill sho#s that respondent #as instituted as the sole heir of the decedent. 0etitioners, as nephe#s and nieces of the decedent, are neither compulsory nor testate heirs #ho are entitled to be notified of the probate proceedings under the *ules. *espondent had no legal obligation to mention petitioners in the petition for probate, or to personally notify them of the same. & &laban vs. $& , '.R. (". *602, Septeer 23, 200*) RULE Chile foreign la#s do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authoriAed to ta:e judicial notice of themE ho#ever, petitioner, as ancillary administrator of !udrey$s estate, #as duty-bound to introduce in evidence the pertinent la# of the 7tate of 9aryland. 0etitioner admitted that he failed to introduce in evidence the la# of the 7tate of 9aryland on 'states and Trusts, and merely relied on the presumption that such la# is the same as the 0hilippine la# on #ills and succession. Thus, the trial court peremptorily applied 0hilippine la#s and totally disregarded the terms of !udrey$s #ill. The obvious result #as that there #as no fair submission of the case before the trial court or a judicious appreciation of the evidence presented. & &nc%eta vs. 7uersey0#alaygon , '.R. (". 39+6+, June +, 2006) RULE = )n the matter of appointment of administrator of the estate of the deceased, the surviving spouse is preferred over the ne=t of :in of the decedent. F;nder 7ec. ?(b", *ule >M, *ules of ourt, the administration of the estate of a person #ho dies intestate shall be granted to the surviving husband or #ife, as the case may be, or ne=t of :in, or both, in the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or #ife, or ne=t of :in, re3uests to have appointed, if competent and #illing to serve.G Chen the la# spea:s of Jne=t of :inK, the reference is to those #ho are entitled, under the statute of distribution, to the decedent$s propertyE one #hose relationship is such that he is entitled to share in the estate as distributed, or, in short, an heir. %n resolving, therefore, the issue of #hether an applicant for letters of administration is a ne=t of :in or an heir of the decedent, the probate court perforce has to determine and pass upon the issue of filiation. ! separate action #ill only result in a multiplicity of suits. ;pon this consideration, the trial court acted #ithin bounds #hen it loo:ed into and pass upon the claimed relationship of respondent to the late rancisco !ngeles. & &ngeles vs. Maglaya , '.R. (". *379+, Septeer 2, 200*) 'ven assuming that elicisimo #as not capacitated to marry respondent in 1@>4, nevertheless, #e find that the latter has the legal personality to file the subject petition for letters of administration, as she may be considered the co-
/1 o#ner of elicisimo as regards the properties that #ere ac3uired through their joint efforts during their cohabitation. !n Jinterested personK has been defined as one #ho #ould be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one #ho has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be material and direct, and not merely indirect or contingent. %n the instant case, respondent #ould 3ualify as an interested person #ho has a direct interest in the estate of elicisimo by virtue of their cohabitation, the e=istence of #hich #as not denied by petitioners. & San Luis vs. San Luis , '.R. (". 33743, eruar 6, 2007) RULE =; 7ection 5 of *ule M? of the *ules of ourt e=pressly allo#s the prosecution of money claims arising from a contract against the estate of a deceased debtor. 'vidently, those claims are not actually e=tinguished. Chat is e=tinguished is only the obligee$s action or suit filed before the court, #hich is not then acting as a probate court. %n the present case, #hatever monetary liabilities or obligations 7antos had under his contracts #ith respondent #ere not intransmissible by their nature, by stipulation, or by provision of la#. ence, his death did not result in the e=tinguishment of those obligations or liabilities, #hich merely passed on to his estate. 6eath is not a defense that he or his estate can set up to #ipe out the obligations under the performance bond. onse3uently, petitioner as surety cannot use his death to escape its monetary obligation under its performance bond. & Strong%old Insurance $omany, Inc. vs. )eublic &sa%i 7lass $ororation , '.R. (". 47*6, June, 2006) Cith regard to respondents$ monetary claim, the same shall be governed by 7ection / (then 7ection /1", *ule 2 of the *ules of ourt #hich providesD 7'. /. !ction on contractual money claims. H Chen the action is for recovery of money arising from contract, e=press or implied, and the defendant dies before entry of final judgment in the court in #hich the action #as pending at the time of such death, it shall not be dismissed but shall instead be allo#ed to continue until entry of final judgment. ! favorable judgment obtained by the plaintiff therein shall be enforced in the manner provided in these *ules for prosecuting claims against the estate of a deceased person. (/1a" %n relation to this, 7ection 5, *ule M? of the *ules of ourt statesD 7'. 5. laims #hich must be filed under the notice. %f not filed, barredE e=ceptions. H !ll claims for money against the decedent arising from contract, e=press or implied, #hether the same be due, not due, or contingent, ... and judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed #ithin the time limited in the noticeE other#ise they are barred forever, e=cept that they may be set forth as counterclaims in any action that the e=ecutor or administrator may bring against the claimantsQ Thus, in accordance #ith the above *ules, the money claims of respondents must be filed against the estate of petitioner 9elencio abriel. & 7abriel vs. Bilon , '.R. (". 469+9, eruar 7, 2007) RULE :?@
// The #rit of habeas corpus applies to all cases of illegal confinement or detention in #hich individuals are deprived of liberty. %t #as devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unla#ful restraintE or, more specifically, to obtain immediate relief for those #ho may have been illegally confined or imprisoned #ithout sufficient cause and thus deliver them from unla#ful custody. %t is therefore a #rit of in3uiry intended to test the circumstances under #hich a person is detained. The #rit may not be availed of #hen the person in custody is under a judicial process or by virtue of a valid judgment. o#ever, as a post-conviction remedy, it may be allo#ed #hen, as a conse3uence of a judicial proceeding, any of the follo#ing e=ceptional circumstances is attendantD (1" there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a personE (/" the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentenceE or (2" the imposed penalty has been e=cessive, thus voiding the sentence as to such e=cess. & 7 o vs. #imagiba , '.R. (". *+76, June 2, 200*) rom the foregoing, it is evident that Te is not entitled to bail. *espondent judge contends that under 7ection 14, *ule 1/ of the *ules of ourt, he has the discretion to allo# Te to be released on bail. o#ever, the ourt reiterates its pronouncement in its *esolution of ebruary 1@, /1 in .*. Nos. 145>151M that 7ection 14, *ule 1/ of the *ules of ourt applies only to cases #here the applicant for the #rit of habeas corpus is restrained by virtue of a criminal charge against him and not in an instance, as in the case involved in the present controversy, #here the applicant is serving sentence by reason of a final judgment. (-11/@, 2?>4-11M>, and 2?11-11?5. %n accordance #ith the last sentence of 7ection 4 above, the #rit cannot be issued and unting cannot be discharged since he has been charged #ith a criminal offense. &ernarte v. ourt of !ppeals holds that Jonce the person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer 3uestion his detention by a petition for the issuance of a #rit of habeas corpus.K ( In t%e
/2
Matter o' t%e Petition 'or Habeas $orus o' 6unting , '.R. (". 6793, April 9, 2006) abeas corpus may be resorted to in cases #here rightful custody is #ithheld from a person entitled thereto. ;nder !rticle /11 of the amily ode, respondent +oran and petitioner 9arie !ntonette have joint parental authority over their son and conse3uently joint custody. urther, although the couple is separated de facto, the issue of custody has yet to be adjudicated by the court. %n the absence of a judicial grant of custody to one parent, both parents are still entitled to the custody of their child. %n the present case, private respondent$s cause of action is the deprivation of his right to see his child as alleged in his petition. ence, the remedy of habeas corpus is available to him. %n a petition for habeas corpus, the child$s #elfare is the supreme consideration. The hild and Youth Celfare ode une3uivocally provides that in all 3uestions regarding the care and custody, among others, of the child, his #elfare shall be the paramount consideration. ( Salientes vs. &banilla , '.R. (". 62734, Auust 29, 2006) RULE :?= 7ubstantial corrections or cancellations of entries in civil registry records affecting the status or legitimacy of a person may be effected through the institution of a petition under *ule 1M of the *evised *ules of ourt, #ith the proper *egional Trial ourt. &eing a proceeding in rem, ac3uisition of jurisdiction over the person of petitioner is therefore not re3uired in the present case. %t is enough that the trial court is vested #ith jurisdiction over the subject matter. The service of the order at No. 41M !r3uiAa 7t., 'rmita, 9anila and the publication thereof in a ne#spaper of general circulation in 9anila, sufficiently complied #ith the re3uirement of due process, the essence of #hich is an opportunity to be heard. 9oreover, the publication of the order is a notice to all indispensable parties, including !rmi and petitioner minor, #hich binds the #hole #orld to the judgment that may be rendered in the petition. ( &lba vs. $& , '.R. (". 6404, Jul 29, 200*) The petition for annulment and cancellation of the birth certificate of *osilyn, alleging material entries in the certificate as having been falsified, is properly considered as a special prcee!in& pursuant to 7ection 2(c", *ule 1 and *ule 1M of the *ules of ourt. The eruilas did not comply #ith the re3uirements of *ule 1M. ;nder 7ec. 2, *ule 1M of the *ules of ourt, not only the civil registrar but also all persons #ho have or claim any interest #hich #ould be affected by a proceeding concerning the cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register must be made parties thereto. !s enunciated in *epublic vs. &enemerito, unless all possible indispensable parties #ere duly notified of the proceedings, the same shall be considered as falling much too short of the re3uirements of the rules. ere, it is clear that no party could be more interested in the cancellation of *osilyn$s birth certificate than *osilyn herself. er filiation, legitimacy, and date of birth are at sta:e. The lac: of summons on *osilyn #as not cured by the publication of the order of the trial court setting the case for hearing for three consecutive #ee:s in a ne#spaper of general circulation. 7ummons must still be served, not for the purpose of vesting the courts #ith jurisdiction, but to comply #ith the re3uirements of fair play and due process. ( $eruila vs. #elantar, '.R. (". 4030*, 8eceer 9, 200*)
