1.) ANCHETA VS. ANCHETA FACTS: Petitioner and respondent were spouses, wherein the latter intended to marry again filed a petition w/ the RTC, for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with the petitioner on the ground of psychological incapacity. Although the respondent knew that the petitioner was already residing at the resort Munting Paraiso in Bancal, Carmona, Cavite, he, nevertheless, alleged in his petition that the petitioner was residing at No. 72 CRM Avenue corner CRM Corazon, BF Homes, Almanza, Las Piñas, Metro Manila, "where she may be served with summons." The clerk of court issued summons to the petitioner at the address stated in the petition. The sheriff served the summons and a copy of the petition by substituted service on June 6, 1995 on the petitioners son, Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III, at his 9 residence in Bancal, Carmona, Cavite.
over the person of the defendant/respondent or over the nature or subject of the action, the petitioner need not allege in the petition that the ordinary remedy of new trial or reconsideration of the final order or judgment or appeal there from are no longer available through no fault of her own. This is so because a judgment rendered or final order issued by the RTC without jurisdiction is null and void and may be assailed any time either collaterally or in a direct action or by resisting such judgment or final order in any action or 22 proceeding whenever it is invoked, unless barred by laches. In this case, the original petition and the amended petition in the Court of Appeals, in light of the material averments therein, were based not only on extrinsic fraud, but also on lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over the person of the petitioner because of the failure of the sheriff to serve on her the summons and a copy of the complaint. She claimed that the summons and complaint were served on her son, Venancio Mariano B. Ancheta III, who, however, failed to give her the said summons and complaint. 24
The petitioner failed to file an answer to the petition. On June 22, 1995, the respondent filed an "Ex-Parte Motion to Declare Defendant as in Default". During the hearing on the said date, there was no appearance for the petitioner. The trial court granted the motion and declared the petitioner in default, and allowed the respondent to adduce evidence ex-parte. Thereafter, the trial court issued an Order granting the petition and declaring the marriage of the parties void ab initio. The petitioner filed a verified petition against the respondent with the Court of Appeals under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, as amended, for the annulment of the order of the RTC of Cavite in Special Proceedings , on her claim that the summons and the copy of the complaint in Sp. Proc. No. NC-662 were not served on her. Thus, according to the petitioner, the order of the trial court in favor of the respondent was null and void (1) for lack of jurisdiction over her person; and (2) due to the extrinsic fraud perpetrated by the r espondent
In Paramount Insurance Corporation v. Japzon, we held that jurisdiction is acquired by a trial court over the person of the defendant either by his voluntary appearance in court and his submission to its authority or by service of summons. The service of summons and the complaint on the defendant is to inform him that a case has been filed against him and, thus, enable him to defend himself. He is, thus, put on guard as to the demands of the plaintiff or the petitioner. Without such service in the absence of a valid waiver renders the 25 judgment of the court null and void. Jurisdiction cannot be acquired by the court on the person of the defendant even if he knows of the case against him 26 unless he is validly served with summons.
2.) FACTS: y
ISSUE: W/N the court acquired jurisdiction over the person of the accused. RULING: No In a case where a petition for the annulment of a judgment or final order of the RTC filed under Rule 47 of the Rules of Court is grounded on lack of jurisdiction
BARCO VS. CA
y
Private respondent Nadina Maravilla ("Nadina") married Francisco Maravilla. Later on, the spouses decided to live separately and they obtained an ecclesiastical annulment of marriage. Nadina gave birth to a daughter named June Salvacio. Junes birth certificate listed Francisco Maravilla as the father but despite of the notation of her daughters birth certificate, Nadina subsequently claimed that the real
y
y
y
y
y
y
y
y
father of her child was Armando Gustilo, a former Congressman with whom she maintained a relationship. At the time of Junes birth, Gustilo was married to Caraycong, who would later perish in the naval accident of 1981. Later, Nadina and Gustilo were married in the United States after two and a half years of Nadinas marriage to Francisco was alleged to have been annulled in the Philippines. On 17 March 1983, Nadina filed in her own name a Petition for Correction of Entries in the Certificate of Birth of her daughter June with the RTC. She prayed that the Local Civil Registrar of Makati be directed to correct the birth certificate of June that she will carry the surname of her alleged real father Gustilo. Notably, Francisco affixed his signature to the Petition signifying his conformity thereto. On 20 March 1983. Gustilo filed a "Constancia," wherein he acknowledged June as his daughter with Nadina, and that he was posing no objection to Nadinas petition. On 7 September 1983, Nadina filed an Amended 12 Petition, this time impleading Francisco and Gustilo as respondents. The Office of the Sol. Gen. filed a Motion to Dismiss the petition on the ground that the RTC . "had no jurisdiction over the subject matter They cited various jurisprudence holding that only innocuous or clerical errors may be corrected under a Rule 108 petition for correction of entries. Later on Motion to dismiss was denied by the RTC and thereafter issued an order granting the petition and ordering the requested corrections to be effected. Gustilo died in 19 December 1986. Two estate proceedings arose from his death. Jose Vicente Gustilo ("Jose Vicente"), allegedly a biological child of Gustilo, he filed with the 23 Court of Appeals a Petition seeking the annulment of the RTC Order of 7 January 1985 which had effected changes in the civil status of June.. After the Court of Appeals commenced hearings on the petition, petitioner Milagros Barco ("Barco"), on 11 January 1994, filed in her capacity as the natural guardian and/or guardian ad litem of her daughter, Mary Joy Ann Gustilo, a Motion for Intervention with a Complaint-in-Intervention attached thereto. Barco alleged that Mary Joy had a legal interest
y
y
in the annulment of the RTC Order as she was likewise fathered by Gustilo. The appellate court held that neither Jose Vicente nor Barco were able to establish the existence of lack of jurisdiction and extrinsic fraud, the two grounds that would justify the 32 annulment of a final judgment. It ruled that while Jose Vicente and Barco had not been made parties in the Petition for Correction, the subsequent notice and publication of the Order setting the case for hearing served as constructive notice to all parties who might have an interest to participate in the case. The publication of the Order conferred upon the RTC the jurisdiction to try and decide the case Before this Court, Barco assails that RTC Order on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.
ISSUE: 1.) W/n the court acquires jurisdiction over the parties due to the failure of impleading Barco as a party to the petition for correction. RULING: YES Undoubtedly, Barco is among the parties referred to in Section 3 of Rule 108. Her interest was affected by the petition for correction, as any judicial determination that June was the daughter of Armando would affect her wards share in the estate of her father. It cannot be established whether Nadina knew of Mary Joys existence at the time she filed the petition for correction. Indeed, doubt may always be cast as to whether a petitioner under Rule 108 would know of all the parties whose interests may be affected by the granting of a petition. For example, a petitioner cannot be presumed to be aware of all the legitimate or illegitimate offsprings of his/her spouse or paramour. The fact that Nadina amended her petition to implead Francisco and Gustilo indicates earnest effort on her part to comply with Section 3 as quoted above. Yet, even though Barco was not impleaded in the petition, the Court of Appeals correctly pointed out that the defect was cured by compliance with Section 4, Rule 108, which requires notice by publication. The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to the subsequent judgment on the petition. The sweep of the decision would cover even parties who should have been impleaded under Section 3, Rule 108, but were inadvertently left out.
Verily, a petition for correction is an action in rem , an action against a thing and not against a person. 46 The decision on the petition binds not only the parties 47 48 thereto but the whole world. An in rem proceeding is 49 validated essentially through publication. Publication is notice to the whole world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make an objection of any sort against the right sought to be established. It is the publication of such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court with jurisdiction to hear and decide it.
ISSUE: 2.) W/n the court acquires jurisdiction over the nature of the action or the subject matter. RULING: Section 2, Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure explicitly provides only two grounds for annulment of judgment, namely: extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Assuming arguendo that Nadinas petition for correction had prescribed and/or that the action seeking the change of name can only be filed by the party whose name is sought to be changed, this does not alter the reality that under the law the Makati RTC had jurisdiction over the subject matter of the petition for correction. The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, the applicable law at the time, clearly conferred on the Makati RTC exclusive original jurisdiction in all civil actions in which the subject of the litigation is incapable 62 of pecuniary estimation. In complementation of grant of jurisdiction, Section 1 of Rule 108 provides that the verified petition to the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto should be filed with the Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located. Barco in this case posed defenses of prescription and lack of capacity to bring action to the extent that a finding that any of these grounds exist will be sufficient to cause the dismissal of the action. Yet, the existence of these grounds does not oust the court from its power to decide the case. Jurisdiction cannot be acquired through, waived, enlarged or diminished by any act or omission of the parties. Contrariwise, lack of capacity to sue and prescriptions as grounds for dismissal of an action may generally be rendered unavailing, if not 6 raised within the proper period. It thus follows that assuming that the petition for correction had prescribed, or that Nadina lacked the
capacity to file the action which led to the change of her daughters name, the fact that the RTC granted the Order despite the existence of these two grounds only characterizes the decision as erroneous. The RTCs possible misappreciation of evidence ( RTC erred in directing that the na me of Nadinas daughter be changed from "June Salvacion Maravilla" to "June Salvacion Gustilo." Following the trial courts deter mination that Gustilo was the father of June, but prescinding fro m the conclusive presu mption of legiti macy for the nonce assu ming it could be done, the child would obviously be illegiti mate. ) is again at most, an error in the exercise of jurisdiction, which is different from lack of jurisdiction. These purported errors do not extend to the competence of the RTC to decide the matter and as such does not constitute a valid ground to annul the final order.
3.)
RTC RAPID CITY VS. VILLA
FACTS: Sometime in 2004, Rapid City Realty and Development Corporation (petitioner) filed a complaint for declaration of nullity of subdivision plans . . . mandamus and damages against several defendants including Spouses Orlando and Lourdes Villa (respondents). After one failed attempt at personal service of summons, court process server resorted to substituted service by serving summons upon respondents househelp who did not acknowledge receipt thereof and refused to divulge their names. Despite substituted service, respondents failed to file their Answer, prompting petitioner to file a "Motion to Declare Defendants[-herein respondents] in Default" which the trial court granted by Order of May 3, 2005. More than eight months thereafter respondents filed a 3 Motion to Lift Order of Default, claiming that on January 27, 2006 they "officially received all pertinent papers such as Complaint and Annexes. And they denied the existence of two women helpers who allegedly refused to sign and acknowledge receipt of the summons. In any event, they contended that assuming that the allegation were true, the helpers had 4 no authority to receive the documents.
By Order the trial court set aside the Order of Default and gave herein respondents five days to file their Answer. Respondents just the same did not file an Answer, drawing petitioner to again file a Motion to declare them in default, which the trial court again granted.. So, respondents filed an Omnibus Motion for reconsideration of the second order declaring them in default and to vacate proceedings, this time claiming that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over their persons due to invalid service of summons. The trial court denied respondents Omnibus Motion by Order and proceeded to receive ex- parte evidence for petitioner. Petitioners motion for reconsideration having been denied by the appellate court by Resolution of August 12, 2008, it comes to the Court via petition for review on certiorari, arguing in the main that respondents, in filing the first Motion to Lift the Order of Default, voluntarily submitted themselves to the jurisdiction of the court.
ISSUE: W/n the court acquires jurisdiction over the persons of the defendants [respondents]. RULING: YES The petition is impressed with merit. It is settled that if there is no valid service of summons, the court can still acquire jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by virtue of the latters voluntary appearance. Thus Section 20 of Rule 14 of the Rules of Court provides:
seeks an affirmative relief is deemed to have submitted to the jurisdiction of the court. It is by reason of this rule that we have had occasion to declare that the filing of motions to admit answer, for additional time to file answer, for reconsideration of a default judgment, and to lift order of default with motion for reconsideration, is considered voluntary submission to the courts jurisdiction. This, however, is tempered by the concept of conditional appearance, such that a party who makes a special appearance to challenge, among others, the courts jurisdiction over his person cannot be considered to have submitted to its authority. Prescinding from the foregoing, it is thus clear that: (1) Special appearance operates as an exception to the general rule on voluntary appearance; (2) Accordingly, objections to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant must be explicitly made, i.e., set forth in an unequivocal manner; and (3) Failure to do so constitutes voluntary submission to the jurisdiction of the court, especially in instances where a pleading or motion seeking affirmative relief is filed and submitted to the court for resolution. Respondents did not, in said motion, allege that their filing thereof was a special appearance for the purpose only to question the jurisdiction over their persons. Clearly, they had acquiesced to the jurisdiction of the court.
4.) TACAY VS. RTC TAGUM Sec. 20. V oluntary a ppearance. The defendants voluntary appearance in the action shall be equivalent to service of summons. The inclusion in a motion to dismiss of other grounds aside from lack of jurisdiction over the person shall not be deemed a voluntary appearance. And Phili ppine Commercial International Bank v. S pouses Wilson Dy Hong Pi and Lolita Dy, et al. enlightens: Preliminarily, jurisdiction over the defendant in a civil case is acquired either by the coercive power of legal processes exerted over his person, or his voluntary appearance in court. As a general proposition, one who
FACTS: These were 2 separate cases originally filed by Godofredo Pineda at the RTC of Tagum for recovery of possession (acciones publiciana) against 3 defendants, namely: Antonia Noel, Ponciano Panes, and Maximo Tacay. Pineda was the owner of 790 sqm land evidenced by TCT No. T-46560. The previous owner of such land has allowed the 3 defendants to use or occupy the same by mere tolerance. Pineda, having himself the need to use the property, has demanded the defendants to vacate the property and pay reasonable rentals therefore, but such were refused.
The complaint was challenged in the Motions to Dismiss filed by each defendant alleging that it did not specify the amounts of actual, nominal, and exemplary damages, nor the assessed value of the property, that being bars the determination of the RTCs jurisdiction in deciding the case. The Motions to Dismiss were denied but the claims for damages in the complaint were expunged for failure to specify the amounts. Thus, the defendants filed a Joint Petition for certiorari, mandamus, prohibition, and temporary restraining order against the RTC.
ISSUE: Whether or not the amount of damages claimed and the assessed value of the property are relevant in the determination of the courts jurisdiction in a case for recovery of possession of property? RULING: Determinative of the courts jurisdiction in a recovery of possession of property is the nature of the action (one of accion publiciana) and not the value of the property, it may be commenced and prosecuted without an accompanying claim for actual, nominal or exemplary damages and such action would fall within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the RTC. The court acquired jurisdiction upon the filing of the complaint and payment of the prescribed docket fees. Where the action is purely for the recovery of money or damages, the docket fees are assessed on the basis of the aggregate amount claimed, exclusive only of interests and costs. In this case, the complaint or similar pleading should, according to Circular No. 7 of this Court, "specify the amount of damages being prayed for not only in the body of the pleading but also in the prayer, and said damages shall be considered in the assessment of the filing fees in any case." Two situations may arise. One is where the complaint or similar pleading sets out a claim purely for money or damages and there is no precise statement of the amounts being claimed. In this event the rule is that the pleading will "not be accepted nor admitted, or shall otherwise be expunged from the record." In other words, the complaint or pleading may be dismissed, or the claims as to which the amounts are unspecified may be expunged, although as aforestated the Court may, on motion, permit amendment of the complaint and payment of the fees provided the claim has not in the meantime become time-barred. The other is where the
pleading does specify the amount of every claim, but the fees paid are insufficient; and here again, the rule now is that the court may allow a reasonable time for the payment of the prescribed fees, or the balance thereof, and upon such payment, the defect is cured and the court may properly take cognizance of the action, unless in the meantime prescription has set in and consequently barred the right of action. Where the action involves real property and a related claim for damages as well, the legal fees shall be assessed on the basis of both (a) the value of the property and (b) the total amount of related damages sought. The Court acquires jurisdiction over the action if the filing of the initiatory pleading is accompanied by the payment of the requisite fees, or, if the fees are not paid at the time of the filing of the pleading, as of the time of full payment of the fees within such reasonable time as the court may grant, unless, of course, prescription has set in the meantime. But where-as in the case at bar-the fees prescribed for an action involving real property have been paid, but the amounts of certain of the related damages (actual, moral and nominal) being demanded are unspecified, the action may not be dismissed. The Court undeniably has jurisdiction over the action involving the real property, acquiring it upon the filing of the complaint or similar pleading and payment of the prescribed fee. And it is not divested of that authority by the circumstance that it may not have acquired jurisdiction over the accompanying claims for damages because of lack of specification thereof. What should be done is simply to expunge those claims for damages as to which no amounts are stated, which is what the respondent Courts did, or allow, on motion, a reasonable time for the amendment of the complaints so as to allege the precise amount of each item of damages and accept payment of the requisite fees therefore within the relevant prescriptive period.
5.) RSBRDC VS. FORMARAN Note: This case is consistent w/ the principle laid down in Sun Insurance - liberal
FACTS: Petitioner filed before the RTC a Complaint against respondents Tan, Obiedo, and Atty. Reyes, for declaration of nullity of deeds of sales and damages. Upon filing its Complaint with the RTC on 16 March 2006, petitioner paid the sum of P13,644.25 for docket and other legal fees, as assessed by the Office of the Clerk of Court. The Clerk of Court initially considered Civil Case as an action inca pable of
pecuniary esti mation and computed the docket and
other legal fees due thereon according to Section 7(b)(1), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court.
Then, Respondent Tan, thus, sought not just the dismissal of the Complaint of petitioner, but also the grant of his counterclaim. Thereafter, respondent Tan filed before the RTC an Omnibus Motion in which he contended that Civil Case No. 2006-0030 involved real properties, the docket fees for which should be computed in accordance with Section 7(a), not Section 7(b)(1), of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC which took effect on 16 August 2004. Since petitioner did not pay the appropriate docket fees for Civil Case No. 2006-0030, the RTC did not acquire jurisdiction over the said case. Hence, respondent Tan asked the RTC to issue an order requiring petitioner to pay the correct and accurate docket fees pursuant to Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended. As required by the RTC, the parties submitted their Position Papers on the matter. On 24 March 2006, 17 the RTC issued an Order granting respondent Tans Omnibus Motion. In holding that both petitioner and respondent Tan must pay docket fees in accordance with Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended. In a letter dated 19 April 2006, the RTC Clerk of Court computed, upon the request of counsel for the petitioner, the petitioner must still pay the amount of P720,392.60 as docket fees. Petitioner did not concede so it was elevated to CA, however, CA affirmed RTCs order.
ISSUE: W/n the court is correct in ordering app ropriate docket fees be based on Sec. 7(a), Rule 141 which involves a real action rather than Sec. 7(b)(1) an action incapable of pecuniary estimation. RULING: YES Well-settled is the rule "[t]he court acquires jurisdiction over any case only upon the payment of the prescribed docket fee." Hence, the payment of docket fees is not only mandatory, but also jurisdictional. The docket fees under Section 7(a), Rule 141, in cases involving real property depend on the fair market value of the same: the higher the value of the real property, the higher the docket fees due. In contrast, Section
7(b)(1), Rule 141 imposes a fixed or flat rate of docket fees on actions incapable of pecuniary estimation. In the Petition at bar, the RTC found, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, that petitioner did not pay the correct amount of docket fees for Civil Case No. 2006-0030. According to both the trial and appellate courts, petitioner should pay docket fees in accordance with Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended. Consistent with the liberal tenor of Sun Insurance, the RTC, instead of dismissing outright petitioners Complaint in Civil Case No. 2006-0030, granted petitioner time to pay the additional docket fees. Despite the seeming munificence of the RTC, petitioner refused to pay the additional docket fees assessed against it, believing that it had already paid the correct amount before, pursuant to Section 7(b)(1), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended. The docket fees under Section 7(a), Rule 141, in cases involving real property depend on the fair market value of the same: the higher the value of the real property, the higher the docket fees due. In contrast, Section 7(b)(1), Rule 141 imposes a fixed or flat rate of docket fees on actions incapable of pecuniary estimation. As this Court has previously discussed herein, the nature of Civil Case No. 2006-0030 instituted by petitioner before the RTC is closer to that of Serrano, rather than of Spouses De Leon, hence, calling for the application of the ruling of the Court in the former, rather than in the latter. It is also important to note that, with the amendments introduced by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, which became effective on 16 August 2004, the paragraph in Section 7, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, pertaining specifically to the basis for computation of docket fees for real actions was deleted. Instead, Section 7(1) of Rule 141, as amended, provides that "in cases involving real property, the FAIR MARKET value of the REAL property in litigation STATED IN THE CURRENT TAX DECLARATION OR CURRENT ZONAL VALUATION OF THE BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE, WHICH IS HIGHER, OR IF THERE IS NONE, THE STATED VALUE OF THE PROPERTY IN LITIGATION x x x" shall be the basis for the computation of the docket fees. Would such an amendment have an impact on Gochan, Siapno, and Serrano? The Court rules in the negative. A real action indisputably involves real property. The docket fees for a real action would still be determined in accordance with the value of the real property
involved therein; the only difference is in what constitutes the acceptable value. In computing the docket fees for cases involving real properties, the courts, instead of relying on the assessed or estimated value, would now be using the fair market value of the real properties (as stated in the Tax Declaration or the Zonal Valuation of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, whichever is higher) or, in the absence thereof, the stated value of the same. In sum, the Court finds that the true nature of the action instituted by petitioner against respondents is the recovery of title to and possession of real property. It is a real action necessarily involving real property, the docket fees for which must be computed in accordance with Section 7(1), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended. 6.)
GODINEZ VS. CA
FACTS: Delfina Village Subdivision Homeowners Association (DVSHA), respondent, filed with the Regional Trial Court Tagum, an amended complaint for injunction and damages against spouses Godinez and their son Edwin, petitioners. The complaint alleges that petitioners were operating a mineral processing plant in the annex of their residential house located within Delfina Village. Petitioners filed their answer raising the following affirmative defenses: a) the complaint states no cause of action; b) respondent DVSHA has no capacity to sue; c) it is not a real party in interest; d) the complaint fails to implead the real parties in interest; and e) respondent failed to refer the case for conciliation to the barangay before filing its complaint. Thereafter, the trial court issued an Order directing respondent to amend its complaint and attach thereto proofs showing that it is a juridical person with capacity to sue and that it is the re al party in interest. Then, respondent submitted its amended complaint impleading, as additional plaintiffs, its officers and members, and attaching thereto its Certificate of Registration with the Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation, as well as its Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws. The Court of Appeals held that the trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in directing respondent to
amend its complaint. In sum, its intention was to ensure respondents compliance with the procedural rules.
ISSUE: W/n the court CA erred in sustaining the trial courts April 3, 2001 Order directing respondent to amend its complaint. RULING: NO In resolving this issue, we are guided by two principles. First , there is nothing sacred about processes or pleadings and their forms or contents, their sole purpose being to facilitate the application of justice to the rival claims of contending parties. Hence, pleadings as well as procedural rules should be construed liberally. Second , the judicial attitude has always been favorable and liberal in allowing amendments to a pleading in order to avoid multiplicity of suits and so that the real controversies between the parties are presented, their rights determined, and the case decided on the merits without unnecessary delay. Here, we find no reason to deviate from the foregoing dicta. It is on record that in its first amended complaint, respondent DVSHA alleged that it is a registered association. However, it failed to attach to its complaint the supporting certificate of registration, as well as its articles of incorporation and by-laws. In their answer, petitioners promptly assailed respondents lack of personality to sue. The trial court, desiring to determine if indeed respondent has the capacity to sue, directed respondent to amend its complaint anew by attaching thereto the necessary documents.
7.)
BIACO
VS. PCRB
FACTS: ISSUE: RULING:
8.) LAPANDAY VS. ESPITA FACTS: ISSUE: RULING:
9.)
OPOSA VS. FACTORAN
10.)NOCUM VS. TAN
FACTS: The petitioners, all minors, sought the help of the Supreme Court to order the respondent, then Secretary of DENR, to cancel all existing Timber License Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing or approving new TLAs. They alleged that the massive
FACTS: ISSUE: RULING:
commercial logging in the country is causing vast abuses on
rainforest.
11.) MARIANO VS. JUDGE NACIONAL
They furthered the rights of their generation and the rights of the generations yet unborn to a balanced and healthful ecology.
FACTS: ISSUE:
ISSUE: W/n the case constituted as a class suit. RULING: YES Petitioners instituted Civil Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original defendant and the present respondents did not take issue with this matter. Nevertheless, We hereby rule that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it, becomes impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them before the court. We likewise declare that the plaintiffs therein are numerous and representative enough to ensure the full protection of all concerned interests. Hence, all the requisites for the filing of a valid class suit under Section 12, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present both in the said civil case and in the instant petition, the latter being but an incident to the former. This case, however, has a special and novel element. Petitioners minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations yet unborn. We find no difficulty in ruling that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology is concerned. Such a right, as hereinafter expounded, considers
RULING:
