Gulf Oil Corp. v. Gilbert 330 U.S. 501 10 March 1947 Justice Jackson Facts:
Respondent Gilbert resides in Virginia where he operates a public warehouse. Petitioner Gulf Oil Corp. is a gas company organized under the laws of Pennsylvania and qualified to do business in both Virginia and New York where it has agents to receive processes. Respondent filed an action in New York against Petitioner for the latter’s negligence in the delivery of gasoline to the former’s warehouse tanks and pumps that resulted to a fire destroying the building and all its contents. Gulf Oil invoked the doctrine of forum nonconveniens and claimed that Virginia is the appropriate venue for the trial because it is where Gilbert resides, the corporation does business, factual events took place, witness resides and both state and federal courts are available to Respondent and have jurisdiction over Petitioner. On the other hand, Gilbert justified his New York suit based on diversity of citizenship and the venue statutes of the United States authorizing the same. It further contended that the local jury is unaccustomed to damages amounting to USD 400,000.00 and it prevents local influences and preconceived notions. The District Court of New York rendered a decision in favour of Gulf Oil which the Circuit Court of Appeals later on reversed. Hence, the petition for certiorari. Issue/s: Whether the District Court abused its power to dismiss the case pursuant to the doctrine of forum non conveniens. Ruling: No. The principle of forum non conveniens enables a court to resist jurisdiction even when jurisdiction is authorized by law. The application of the doctrine lies in the discretion of the court which shall be based on the standpoint of litigants, relative ease of access to sources of proof, availability of compulsory process for attendance of unwilling witnesses, cost of obtaining attendance of willing witnesses, possibility of view of the premises, enforceability of a judgment, and all other practical problems that make trial of a case easy, expeditious, and inexpensive. In view of public interest, the doctrine aims to prevent clogging court dockets and burdening a community of jury duty which has no relation to the litigation. There can also be local interest over controversies decided at home, and some cases are better decided in a forum that is at home with the state law, avoiding unnecessary problems in conflict of laws.
In the case at bar, there is no interest for any party to have the litigation in New York, and the facts under consideration even weigh against it. The plaintiff cannot choose an inconvenient forum to harass the petitioner.
K.K. Shell Sekiyu Osaka Hatsubaisho and Fu Hing Oil Co., LTD., vs. Court of Appeals G.R. Nos. 90306-07 July 30, 1990 Justice Cortes
Facts:
On January 7,1987, Kumagai Kaiun Kaisha, Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as Kumagai), a corporation formed and existing under the laws of Japan, filed a complaint for the collection of a sum of money with preliminary attachment against Atlantic Venus Co., S.A. (hereinafter referred to as "Atlantic"), a corporation registered in Panama, the vessel MV Estella and Crestamonte Shipping Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "Crestamonte"), a Philippine corporation. Atlantic is the owner of the MV Estella. The complaint, docketed as Civil Case No. 8738930 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch XIV, Manila alleged that Crestamonte, as bareboat charterer and operator of the MV Estella, appointed N.S. Shipping Corporation (hereinafter referred to as "NSS"), a Japanese corporation, as its general agent in Japan. The appointment was formalized in an Agency Agreement. NSS in turn appointed Kumagai as its local agent in Osaka, Japan. Kumagai supplied the MV Estella with supplies and services but despite repeated demands Crestamonte failed to pay the amounts due. NSS and Keihin Narasaki Corporation (hereinafter referred to a Keihin filed complaintsin-intervention. On May 19,1987, petitioner Fu Hing Oil Co., Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as Fu Hing"), a corporation organized in Hong Kong and not doing business in the Philippines, filed a motion for leave to intervene with an attached complaint-in-intervention, alleging that Fu Hing supplied marine diesel oil/fuel to the MV Estella and incurred barge expenses for the total sum of One Hundred Fifty-two Thousand Four Hundred Twelve Dollars and Fifty-Six Cents (US$152,412.56) but such has remained unpaid despite demand and that the claim constitutes a maritime lien. The issuance of a writ of attachment was also prayed for. On July 16, 1987, petitioner K.K. Shell Sekiyu Osaka Hatsubaisho (hereinafter referred to as K.K. Shell"), a corporation organized in Japan and not doing business in the Philippines, likewise filed a motion to intervene with an attached complaint-in-intervention, alleging that upon request of NSS, Crestamonte's general agent in Japan, K.K. Shell provided and supplied marine diesel oil/fuel to the W Estella at the ports of Tokyo and Mutsure in Japan and that despite previous demands Crestamonte has failed to pay the amounts of Sixteen Thousand Nine Hundred Ninety-Six Dollars and Ninety- Six Cents (US$16,996.96) and One Million Yen (Y1,000,000.00) and that K.K. Shell's claim constitutes a maritime lien on the MV Estella. The complaint-in-intervention sought the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment. Issue:
Whether the court has acquired jurisdiction?
Ruling:
Private respondents have anticipated the possibility that the courts will not find that K.K. Shell is expressly bound by the Agency Agreement, and thus they fall back on the argument that even if this were so, the doctrine of forum non conveniens would be a valid ground to cause the dismissal of K.K. Shell's complaint-in-intervention. K.K. Shell counters this argument by invoking its right as maritime lienholder. It cites Presidential Decree No. 1521, the Ship Mortgage Decree of 1978, which provides: SEC. 21. Maritime Lien for Necessaries; person entitled to such lien-Any person furnishing repairs, supplies, to wage, use of dry dock or marine railway, or other necessaries, to any vessel, whether foreign or domestic, upon the order of the owner of such vessel, or of a person authorized by the owner, shall have a maritime lien on the vessel, which may be enforced by suit in rem, and it shall be necessary to allege or prove that credit was given to the vessel. Private respondents on the other hand argue that even if P.D. No. 1521 is applicable, K.K. Shell cannot rely on the maritime lien because the fuel was provided not exclusively for the benefit of the MV Estella, but for the benefit of Crestamonte in general. Under the law it must be established that the credit was extended to the vessel itself. Now, this is a defense that calls precisely for a factual determination by the trial court of who benefitted from the delivery of the fuel. Hence, again, the necessity for the reception of evidence before the trial court. In other words, considering the dearth of evidence due to the fact that the private respondents have yet to file their answer in the proceedings below and trial on the merits is still to be conducted, whether or not petitioners are indeed maritime lienholders and as such may enforce the lien against the MV Estella are matters that still have to be established. Neither are we ready to rule on the private respondents' invocation of the doctrine of forum non conveniens, as the exact nature of the relationship of the parties is still to be established. We leave this matter to the sound discretion of the trial court judge who is in the best position, after some vital facts are established, to determine whether special circumstances require that his court desist from assuming jurisdiction over the suit.
Communication Materials and Design vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 102223 August 22, 1996 Justice Torres, Jr. Facts:
COMMUNICATION MATERIALS AND DESIGN, INC., (CMDI, for brevity) and ASPAC MULTI-TRADE INC., (ASPAC, for brevity) are both domestic corporations, while petitioner Francisco S. Aguirre is their President and majority stockholder. Private Respondents ITEC, INC. and/or ITEC, INTERNATIONAL, INC. (ITEC, for brevity) are corporations duly organized and existing under the laws of the State of Alabama, United States of America. There is no dispute that ITEC is a foreign corporation not licensed to do business in the Philippines. On August 14, 1987, ITEC entered into a contract with petitioner ASPAC referred to as "Representative Agreement". Pursuant to the contract, ITEC engaged ASPAC as its "exclusive representative" in the Philippines for the sale of ITEC's products, in consideration of which, ASPAC was paid a stipulated commission. The agreement was signed by G.A. Clark and Francisco S. Aguirre, presidents of ITEC and ASPAC respectively, for and in behalf of their companies. 2 The said agreement was initially for a term of twenty-four months. After the lapse of the agreed period, the agreement was renewed for another twenty-four months. Through a "License Agreement" entered into by the same parties on November 10, 1988, ASPAC was able to incorporate and use the name "ITEC" in its own name. Thus , ASPAC Multi-Trade, Inc. became legally and publicly known as ASPAC-ITEC (Philippines). By virtue of said contracts, ASPAC sold electronic products, exported by ITEC, to their sole customer, the Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company, (PLDT, for brevity). To facilitate their transactions, ASPAC, dealing under its new appellation, and PLDT executed a document entitled "PLDT-ASPAC/ITEC PROTOCOL" which defined the project details for the supply of ITEC's Interface Equipment in connection with the Fifth Expansion Program of PLDT. One year into the second term of the parties' Representative Agreement, ITEC decided to terminate the same, because petitioner ASPAC allegedly violated its contractual commitment as stipulated in their agreements. ITEC charges the petitioners and another Philippine Corporation, DIGITAL BASE COMMUNICATIONS, INC. (DIGITAL, for brevity), the President of which is likewise petitioner Aguirre, of using knowledge and information of ITEC's products specifications to develop their own line of equipment and product support, which are similar, if not identical to ITEC's own, and offering them to ITEC's former customer. Issue:
Whether the court acquired jurisdiction?
Ruling:
Petitioner's insistence on the dismissal of this action due to the application, or non application, of the private international law rule of forum non conveniens defies well-settled rules of fair play. According to petitioner, the Philippine Court has no venue to apply its discretion whether to give cognizance or not to the present action, because it has not acquired jurisdiction over the person of the plaintiff in the case, the latter allegedly having no personality to sue before Philippine Courts. This argument is misplaced because the court has already acquired jurisdiction over the plaintiff in the suit, by virtue of his filing the original complaint. And as we have already observed, petitioner is not at liberty to question plaintiff's standing to sue, having already acceded to the same by virtue of its entry into the Representative Agreement referred to earlier. Thus, having acquired jurisdiction, it is now for the Philippine Court, based on the facts of the case, whether to give due course to the suit or dismiss it, on the principle of forum non convenience. Hence, the Philippine Court may refuse to assume jurisdiction in spite of its having acquired jurisdiction. Conversely, the court may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so; provided, that the following requisites are met: 1) That the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; 2) That the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and, 3) That the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision. The aforesaid requirements having been met, and in view of the court's disposition to give due course to the questioned action, the matter of the present forum not being the "most convenient" as a ground for the suit's dismissal, deserves scant consideration.
Bellis vs. Bellis G.R. No. L-23678. June 6, 1967 Facts:
Amos Bellis was a citizen and a resident of Texas when he died. Before his death, he executed a will in the Philippines wherein he directed that his net estate would be distributed in the following manner: (a) $240,000.00 to his first wife, Mary E. Mallen; (b) P120,000.00 to his three illegitimate children and the (c) the remainder shall go to his seven surviving children by his first and second wives. Among those surviving children are Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis, the oppositors. The People's Bank and Trust Company acted as executor of the will. Prior to the submission of final account, Maria Cristina Bellis and Miriam Palma Bellis filed their respective oppositions to the project of partition on the ground that they were deprived of their legitimes as illegitimate children and compulsory heirs of the deceased. They contend that although Article 16 and Article 1039 of the Civil Code provide that it is the national law of the decedent which governs the following: (a) the order of succession; (b) the amount of successional rights; (c) the intrinsic validity of the provisions of the will; and (d) the capacity to succeed , Article 17 par. 3 of the Civil Code, stating that — "Prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws, or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country." prevails as the exception. Furthermore, they argue that the decedent, in executing two wills, intended one to govern his Texas estate and the other his Philippine estate. Issue:
Whether or not Art. 17 of the Civil Code prevails as an exception to Art. 16 and Art. 1039 Ruling:
(1) No, Art. 16 par. 2 of the Civil Code which states that i ntestate and testamentar y “
successions, both wi th respect to th e order of succession an d to th e amoun t of succession al r igh ts and to t he in tr in sic vali dity of testamentar y provisions, shal l be regul ated by the nati onal law of the per son wh ose succession i s un der consider ation, whatever m ay be the natu re of the property and r egardl ess of th e countr y wherein said pr operty may be foun d" is a specific provision in itself which is applied in testate
and intestate successions. As further indication of this legislative intent, Congress added a new provision, under Art. 1039, which decrees that capacity to succeed is to be governed by the national law of the decedent. Accordingly, since the parties admit that the decedent, Amos G. Bellis, was a citizen of the State of Texas, U.S.A., and that under the laws of Texas, there are no forced heirs or
legitimates, the Philippine law on legitimes cannot be applied to the testacy of Amos G. Bellis. (2) Moreover, even assuming that in executing a separate Philippine will, the decedent intended that Philippine law govern his Philippine estate, such intention is illegal and void for his national law cannot be ignored in regard to those matters that Article 16 of the Civil Code states should be governed by the national of the decedent.
First Philippine International Bank v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 115849 January 24, 1996 Justice Panganiban Facts
Producers Bank (now called First Philippine International Bank), which has been under conservatorship since 1984, is the owner of 6 parcels of land. The Bank had an agreement with Demetrio Demetria and Jose Janolo for the two to purchase the parcels of land for a purchase price of P5.5 million pesos. The said agreement was made by Demetria and Janolo with the Bank’s manager, Mercurio Rivera. Later however, the Bank, through its conservator, Leonida Encarnacion, sought the repudiation of the agreement as it alleged that Rivera was not authorized to enter into such an agreement, hence there was no valid contract of sale. Subsequently, Demetria and Janolo sued Producers Bank. The regional trial court ruled in favor of Demetria et al. The Bank filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals. Meanwhile, Henry Co, who holds 80% shares of stocks with the said Bank, filed a motion for intervention with the trial court. The trial court denied the motion since the trial has been concluded already and the case is now pending appeal. Subsequently, Co, assisted by ACCRA law office, filed a separate civil case against Carlos Ejercito as successor-in-interest (assignee) of Demetria and Janolo seeking to have the purported contract of sale be declared unenforceable against the Bank. Ejercito et al argued that the second case constitutes forum shopping. Issue
Was there forum-shopping on the part of petitioner Bank? Ruling
Yes. We rule for private respondent. To begin with, forum-shopping originated as a concept in private international law, where non-resident litigants are given the option to choose the forum or place wherein to bring their suit for various reasons or excuses, including to secure procedural advantages, to annoy and harass the defendant, to avoid overcrowded dockets, or to select a more friendly venue. To combat these less than honorable excuses, the principle of forum non convenienswas developed whereby a court, in conflicts of law cases, may refuse impositions on its ju risdiction where it is not the most ―convenient‖ or available forum and the parties are not precluded from seeking remedies elsewhere. There is forum shopping because there is identity of interest and parties between the first case and the second case. There is identity of interest because both cases sought to have the agreement, which involves the same property, be declared unenforceable as against the Bank. There is identity of parties even though the first case is in the name of the bank as defendant, and the second case is in the name of Henry Co as plaintiff. There is still forum shopping here because Henry Co essentially represents the bank. Both cases aim to have the bank escape liability from the agreement it entered into with Demetria et al.
Manila Hotel Corp vs NLRC G.R. 1200077 13 October 2000 PARDO, J Facts In May, 1988, private respondent Marcelo Santos (hereinafter referred to as ―Santos‖) was an overseas worker employed as a printer at the Mazoon Printing Press, Sultanate of Oman. Subsequently, in June 1988, he was directly hired by the Palace Hotel, Beijing, People’s Republic of China.
MHICL is a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of Hong Kong. MHC is an ―incorporator‖ of MHICL, owning 50% of its capital stock. By virtue of a ―management agreement‖ with the Palace Hotel (Wang Fu Company Limited), MHICL trained the personnel and staff of the Palace Hotel at Beijing, China.
On August 10, 1989, the Palace Hotel informed respondent that his employment at the Palace Hotel print shop would be terminated due to business reverses brought about by the political upheaval in China. On February 20, 1990, respondent Santos filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Arbitration Branch, National Capital Region, National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). He prayed for an award of nineteen thousand nine hundred and twenty three dollars (US$19,923.00) as actual damages, forty thousand pesos (P40,000.00) as exemplary damages and attorney’s fees equivalent to 20% of the damages prayed for. The complaint named MHC, MHICL, the Palace Hotel and Mr. Shmidt (General Manager of Palace Hotel) as respondents. The Palace Hotel and Mr. Shmidt were not served with summons and neither participated in the proceedings before the Labor Arbiter.Petitioners appeal to the NLRC, arguing that the POEA, not the NLRC had jurisdiction over the case. Issue
Is the NLRC the proper forum Held
The NLRC was a seriously inconvenient forum. The main aspects of the case transpired in two foreign jurisdictions and the case involves purely foreign elements. The only link that the Philippines has with the case is that respondent Santos is a Filipino citizen. The Palace Hotel and MHICL are foreign corporations. Not all cases involving our citizens can be tried here. Santos was hired directly by the Palace Hotel, a foreign employer, through correspondence sent to the Sultanate of Oman, where respondent Santos was then employed. He was hired without the intervention of the POEA or any authorized recruitment agency of the government.
Under the rule of forum non conveniens, a Philippine court or agency may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so provided: (1) that the Philippine court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and (3) that the Philippine court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision.
Pacific Consultants International Asia, Inc. and Jens Henrichsen v. Klaus K. Schonfeld G.R. No. 166920 February 19, 2007 Callejo, Sr., J. Facts:
PPI is a Philippine corporation and a subsidiary of Pacific Consultants International of Japan aka PCIJ. Henrichsen was the president of PPI and also the director of PCIJ. Schonfeld is a Canadian citizen and resident, and worked as a consultant employed by PCIJ. In October 1997, PCIJ assigned Schonfeld as PPI sector manager in the Philippines. His salary was to be paid partly by PPI and PCIJ. On January 7, 1998, Henrichsen sent an employment letter to Schonfeld in Canada, asking him to accept employment and affix his conformity thereto. Schonfeld signed and sent a copy of the contract back to Henrichsen. Section 21 of the General Conditions of Employment which was appended to the letter of employment stated that “Any question arising between the Employee and the Company which is in consequence of or connected with his employment with the Company and which can not be settled amicably, is to be finally settled, binding to both parties through written submissions, by the Court of Arbitration in London.” Schonfeld assumed his post as PPI Sector Manager here in the Phils. and had the status of a resident alien. Pursuant to the Labor Code’s IRR’s, PPI applied for an Alien Employment Permit for Schonfeld with DOLE. The employment contract was appended to the application. DOLE granted the application and issued the said Permit to Schonfeld. It was stated in the Permit that Schonfeld’s employer was PPI, PPI also paid Schonfeld’s salaries and Schonfeld received instruction from Henrichsen. In May 1999, Henrichsen informed Schonfeld via letter that his employment had been terminated starting August 4, 1999 because PCIJ and PPI failed in business here. But on July 24, 1999, Henrichsen, by email asked Schonfeld to stay put in his job after August 5, 1999, until such time that he would be able to report on certain projects. So he continued his work with PPI until October 1, 1999. Schonfeld then sued PPI for several money claims, including unpaid salary, leave pay, etc. PPI partially settled some of his claims but refused to pay the rest. Subsequently, Schonfeld filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal against PPI and Henrichsen with the Labor Arbiter, alleging that PPI had not informed him and the DOLE of its decision to close one of its departments, resulting in his dismissal , and that he wasn’t informed that his employment was terminated after August 4, 1999. PPI and Hendrichsen filed a Motion to Dismiss the complaint on the following grounds: (1) the Labor Arbiter had no jurisdiction over the subject matter; and (2) venue was improperly laid. PPI had the following contentions: a.) that Schonfeld was a Canadian citizen, a transient expatriate who had left the Philippines. He was employed and dismissed by PCIJ, a Japanese corporation with principal office in Tokyo. Since respondent’s cause of action was based on his
employment letter executed in Tokyo, Japan dated January 7, 1998, under the principle of lex loci contractus, the complaint should have been filed in Tokyo, Japan. b.) that Schonfeld and PCIJ had agreed that any employment-related dispute should be brought before the London Court of Arbitration. Since even the Supreme Court had already ruled that such an agreement on venue is valid, Philippine courts have no jurisdiction. The Labor Arbiter granted the Motion to Dismiss. He found the contract controlling, the Philippines was only the "duty station" where Schonfeld was required to work under the General Conditions of Employment. PCIJ remained respondent’s employer despite his having been sent to the Philippines. Since the parties had agreed that any differences regarding employeremployee relationship should be submitted to the jurisdiction of the court of arbitration in London, this agreement is controlling. The NLRC affirmed the Labor Arbiter’s decision. The CA reversed and ruled in favor of Schonfeld. Applying the four-fold test of determining an employer-employee relationship, the CA declared that respondent was an employee of PPI. On the issue of venue, the CA ruled that the parties were not precluded from bringing a case in other venues; the venue is not exclusive, since there is no stipulation that the complaint cannot be filed in any other forum other than in the Philippines. Issues:
1. W/N there was an employer-employee relationship between Schonfeld and PPI therefore Philippine courts have jurisdiction over the subject matter? 2. W/N the venue for settling the matter can be here in Manila, contrary to the principle of forum non-conveniens? Ruling:
Yes to both issues. The instant petition is denied for lack of merit. CA’s decision is affirmed and the case is remanded to the Labor Arbiter for disposition of the case on the merits. 1. Petitioners are estopped from alleging that the PCIJ, not PPI, had been the employer of Schonfeld. PPI applied for the issuance of an Alien Employment Permit to Schonfeld before the DOLE. And PPI had averred in said application that Schonfeld is its employee. To show that this was the case, PPI attached a copy of Schonfelds employment contract, in compliance with the IRR’s of the Labor Code. Thus, as claimed by Schonfeld, he had an employment contract with PPI; otherwise, PPI would not have filed an application for a Permit with the DOLE. 2. An employer-employee relationship between PPI and Schonfeld was established using the four-fold ―control‖ test. It is settled that whenever the existence of an employment relationship is in dispute, four elements make up the standard for the said relationship (a) the selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the employer’s power to control the employee’s conduct. The most important index of the existence
of the employer-employee relationship is, whether the employer controls or has reserved the right to control the employee not only as to the result of the work to be done but also as to the means and methods by which the same is to be accomplished. This test was proven and passed through Schonfeld’s submission of substantial evidence. The power to control and supervise Schonfeld work performance devolved upon PPI. Also, the power to terminate the employment relationship was exercised by the President of PPI, Hendrichsen. It is not the letterhead used by PCIJ in the termination letter which controls, but the person who exercised the power to terminate the employee. An employer-employee relationship may indeed exist even in the absence of a written contract, so long as the four elements abovementioned are all present. 3. As regards venue, the Rules of Court and jurisprudence provide that if the parties intend to restrict venue, there must be accompanying language clearly and categorically expressing their purpose and design that actions between them be litigated only at the place named by them. In the case at bar, no restrictive words like "only," "solely," "nowhere else but/except — ," or words of equal import were stated in the contract. Therefore, it cant be said that the London arbitration court is the exclusive venue. The principle of forum non conveniens must be rejected and cannot be applied in the case at bar. The bare fact that respondent is a Canadian citizen and was a repatriate does not warrant the application of the principle because forum non conveniens is not a ground for the dismissal of the complaint under Philippine Labor laws, and the SC has held that: x x x [a] Philippine Court may assume jurisdiction over the case if it chooses to do so; provided, that the following requisites are met: (1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and, (3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its decision. x x x
In the matter of the testate estate of Edward E. Christensen, deceased. Adolfo C. Aznar, executor and Lucy Christensen, heir of the deceased, executor and heir-appellees, vs. Helen Christensen Garcia, oppositor-appellant. G.R. No. L-16749 31 January 1963 Justice Labrador Facts:
Edward was born in New York but later on resided in California for nine years. In 1913, he went to the Philippines where he became a domiciliary until his death. In his will, he left a legacy of PHP 3600.00 in favor of his alleged illegitimate child Helen and the rest of his estate to his legitimate daughter, Lucy. The estate was distributed by Aznar in accordance with the decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao. Helen opposed the approval of the project of partition claiming that California Civil Code should govern, particularly Sec. 946 which applies the law of domicile in the absence of any law to the contrary. Therefore, following the renvoi doctrine, the question pertaining to the provisions of the will should refer back to the law of Edward's domicile, that is the Philippines. The lower court ruled that Edward is a citizen of the United States and California Probate Code applies, allowing the testator the right to dispose of his property in the way he desires. Helen moved for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, the appeal. Issue/s: Whether Edward is an American citizen, whether the California Civil Code applies and whether the clause "if there is no law to the contrary in the place where the property is situated" in Sec. 946 of the said Code refers to the national law of the deceased under Art. 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. Ruling: Edward’s American citizenship was never lost by his stay in the Philippines because the latter was a territory of the United States until 1946. Moreover, the deceased appears to have considered himself as a citizen of California by the fact that when he executed his will in 1951, he declared that he was a citizen of that State. However, at the time of his death, he was domiciled in the Philippines.
Article 16 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides that the national law of the deceased shall govern his testamentary provisions. In the case at bar, there is no general American law on the matter; thus the national law refers to private law enforced within his state, that is California. There are two laws that govern the testamentary provisions of a will made by a deceased citizen of California – the California Probate Code and the California Civil Code. The former is the internal law which applies to Californians domiciled in California while the latter is the conflict rule for Californians domiciled in another jurisdiction. Moreover, Sec. 946 of the California Civil Code precisely refers back the case to the law of his domicile and not the other
way around. Thus, the court of domicile should not refer the case back to California; otherwise, it becomes a game of football wherein the case is tossed back and forth between two states, leaving the issue incapable of determination. The court of domicile must apply its own succession laws, specifically Arts. 887(4) and 894 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which make natural children legally acknowledged forced heirs of the parent recognizing them. In the case at bar, Edward was a domiciliary in the Philippines; thus, Philippine laws must be followed.
Caldin vs. POEAAdministrator G.R. No. L-104776 December 5, 1994 QUIASON, J.:
Facts:
Cadalin et al. are Filipino workers recruited by Asia Int’l Builders Co. (AIBC), a domestic recruitment corporation, for employment in Bahrain to work for Brown & Root Int’l Inc. (BRII) which is a foreign corporation with headquarters in Texas. Plaintiff instituted a class suit with the POEA for money claims arising from the unexpired portion of their employment contract which was prematurely terminated. They worked in Bahrain for BRII and they filed the suit after one year from the termination of their employment contract.
As provided by Art. 156 of the Amiri Decree aka as the Labor Law of the Private Sector of Bahrain: ―a claim arising out of a contract of employment shall not be actionable after the lapse of 1 year from the date of the expiry of the contract,‖ it appears that their suit has prescribed. Plaintiff contends that the prescription period should be ten years as provided by Art. 1144 of the Civil Code as their claim arise from a violation of a contract. The POEA Administrator holds that the ten year period of prescription should be applied but the NLRC provides a different view asserting that Art 291 of the Labor Code of the Phils with a three years prescription period should be applied. The Solicitor General expressed his personal point of view that the one year period provided by the Amiri Decree should be applied. Issue:
Whether procedural law of foreign country will be applicable to the Philippines?
Ruling:
The Supreme Court held that as a general rule a foreign procedural law will not be applied in our country as we must adopt our own procedural laws. Philippines may adopt foreign procedural law under the Borrowing Statute such as Sec. 48 of the Civil Procedure Rule stating ―if by the laws of the State or country where the cause of action arose the action is barred, it is also barred in the Philippines.‖ Thus, Bahrain law must be applied. However, the court contends that Bahrain’s law on prescription cannot be applied because the court will not enforce any foreign claim that is obnoxious to the forum’s public policy and the one year rule on prescription is against public policy on labor as enshrined in the Philippine Constitution.
The court ruled that the prescription period applicable to the case should be Art 291 of the Labor Code of the Philippines with a three years prescription period since the claim arose from labor employment.
