Carlito D. Lazo v. Judge Antonio V. Tiong (300 SCRA 214) Facts: Judge Tiong was accused accused of failing to inhibit himself himself in a criminal case because he was related within the fourth degree of affinity to the accused. The judge claims he did so in the hopes that his presence would allow the parties to settle amicably. Held: Judge reprimanded. A judge should take no part in a proceeding where his impartiality might reasonably be questioned. Also, Rule 137, Rules of Court, provides that no judge or judicial officer shall sit in any case in which he, inter alia, is related to either party within the sixth degree pf consanguinity or affinity, or to counsel within the fourth degree computed according to the rules of the civil law. Under this provision, the Presiding Judge is mandated to disqualify himself from sitting in a case. He cannot exercise exercise his discretion whether to inhibit himself himself or not. [A.M. No. RTJ-04-1833. June 28, 2005] 2005] ALEXANDER B. ORTIZ v s . JUDGE IBARRA B. JACULBE, JR., REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF DUMAGUETE CITY, BRANCH 42. Facts: In a verified letter-complaint, Ortiz averred the following: That he is a respondent in a case filed before the sala of Judge Jaculbe; that Atty. Richard Enojo, who is the son-in-law of Judge Jaculbe, represents the plaintiff in the same case; that a compromise agreement was entered into by the parties; that pursuant to the compromise agreement, plaintiff filed a motion for the issuance of a writ of execution; and that the motion was hastily granted by Judge Jaculbe without holding a hearing to prove the failure of defendants to comply with the compromise agreement. Judge Jaculbe does not dispute the fact that Atty. Richard Enojo is his son-in-law and is, therefore, related to him by affinity in the fi rst degree. Held: The prohibition against the Judge’s sitting in the case is found in the Rule 3.12 of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct as quoted above and in Section 1 of Rule 137 of the Rules of Court. In Garcia v. De la Peña, Peña, we explained the rationale for this disqualification: The rule on compulsory disqualification of a judge to hear a case where, as in the instant case, the respondent judge is related to either party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity rests on the salutary principle that no judge should preside in a case in which he is not wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent. A judge has both the duty of rendering a just decision and the the duty of doing it in a manner completely free from suspicion as to his fairness and as to his integrity. The law conclusively presumes that a judge cannot objectively objectively or impartially sit in such a case and, for that reason, prohibits him and strikes at his authority to hear and decide it, in the t he absence of written consent of all parties concerned. The purpose is to preserve the people's faith and confidence in the courts of justice.
The disqualification is mandatory, and respondent has no option other than to inhibit himself from the criminal case. The appropriate step for respondent to t ake would have been to immediately desist from hearing the case, even at the preliminary investigation stage. His failure to do so is a glaring violation not only of the Rules of Court but also of the Code of Judicial Conduct, which mandates in Canon 3, Rule 3.12: Rule 3.12 — A judge should take no part in a proceeding where the judge's impartiality might reasonably be questioned. These cases include, among others, proceedings where: ... (d) the judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the sixth degree or to counsel within the fourth degree; ... Even in Perez v. Suller , which respondent cites in support of his arguments, we ruled that respondent Judge Suller should have refrained from handling t he preliminary investigation of the case involving his nephew, a relative by consanguinity within the sixth degree and thus covered by the prohibition in Rule 137 of the Rules of Court. We further held: While conducting preliminary investigation may not be construed strictly as "sitting in a case," the underlying reason behind disqualification under Rule 3.12 [of Canon 3] of the Code of Judicial Conduct and Section 1 of Rule 137 is the same. We have time and again reminded judges of their obligation to keep the image of the judiciary unsullied and worthy of the people's trust. Section 9 of Rule 140 of the Rules of Court provides that a violation of Supreme Court rules falls under a Less Serious Charge. Section 11 of the same rule states that the following sanctions may be imposed for Less Serious Charges: “1. Suspension from office without salary and other benefits for not less than one (1) nor more than three (3) months; or 2. A fine of more than P10,000.00 but not exceeding P20,000.00.” G.R. No. 171765
March 21, 2012
THE INCORPORATORS OF MINDANAO INSTITUTE INC. and THE BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF MINDANAO INSTITUTE INC., represented by ENGR. VICTORIOSO D. UDARBE vs.THE UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST IN THE PHILIPPINES, acting through AGUSAN DISTRICT CONFERENCE UNITED CHURCH OF CHRIST IN THE PHILIPPINES, represented by REV. RODOLFO BASLOT.
Facts: At the scheduled joint hearing of Special Civil Action Case No. 03-02 and Civil Case No. 09-2003 to determine the propriety of the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the Law Office of Bernabe, Doyon, Bringas and Partners entered its appearance16 as collaborating counsel for UCCP. Incidentally, Atty. Roy Doyon (Atty. Doyon), the son of Executive Judge Orlando F. Doyon (Judge Doyon), was one of the partners in the said law firm. This prompted Atty. Nelbert T. Poculan, UCCP’s lead counsel, to move for the inhibition of Judge Doyon from the case. On the other hand, Atty. Rolando F. Carlota, MI Incorporators’ counsel, expressed no objection to the continued participation of Judge Doyon in the proceedings of the case despite the said development. Held: A judge should take no part in a proceeding where the judge’s impartiality might reasonably be questioned. These cases include, among others, proceedings where: xxx (d) the judge is related by consanguinity or affinity to a party litigant within the sixth degree or to counsel within the fourth degree. [Underscoring supplied] The disqualification is mandatory and gives the judicial off icer concerned no discretion but to inhibit himself from trying or sitting in a case. The rationale, therefore, is to preserve the people's faith and confidence in the judiciary's f airness and objectivity. While the Court finds it ludicrous that it was the counsel of UCCP, Atty. Poculan, who sought the inhibition of Judge Doyon, considering that the law firm of the latter’s son is his collaborating counsel, still the mandatory prohibition applies. Judge Doyon should have immediately inhibited himself from the case upon learning of the entry of appearance of his son’s law firm. Where the disqualifying fact is indubitable and the parties to the case make no waiver of such disqualification, as in the case at bench, Section 1, Rule 137 of the Rules of Court forthwith completely strips the judge of authority to proceed. A.M. No. RTJ-98-1402 April 3, 1998 ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ vs. JUDGE PRISCILLA C. MIJARES REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 108, PASAY CITY. Facts: Judge Mijares took cognizance of and decided a petition for correction of entry in the birth record of her grandson, Joshua Anthony M. Gurango, the child of her daughter Ma Pilita M. Gurango, notwithstanding such close relationship; and this notwithstanding the fact that even if said petition had regularly been raffled off to her sala, should have made her refuse the assignment and procure the transfer of the case to any of the five other branches of the Court equally qualified to take over and decide the case; and she also dispensed with the required publication of the petition
which sought to correct the entry of the subject's citizenship from the stated "Filipino" to "American." Held: Being related within the sixth degree of consanguinity to one of the parties, it was mandatory for respondent to have inhibited herself from hearing the case. While respondent or her daughter may not have pecuniary interest in the case as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise, which is her contention for her exculpation, what is violated in Section 1 of Rule 137 was her taking cognizance of the case despite her relationship to a party within the sixth degree of consanguinity or affinity. Apart from the rules already cited, respondent violated Rule 2.03, Canon 2 of Code of Judicial Conduct which states that: "A Judge shall not allow family, social or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or tent to advance the private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge." Even on the assumption that the petition for correction of entry of respondent's grandson is not controversial in nature, this does not detract from the fact that she cannot be free from bias or partiality in resolving the case by reason of her c lose blood relationship to him. In fact, bias was clearly demonstrated when she waived the requirement of publication of the petition on the dubious ground of enabling the patents of the minor (her daughter and son-in-law) to save the publication fee as they were then just "starting to have a family."
