Hans Felber Charbonneau Carleton University
28 October 2009 EURR 5107
Briefing Paper: Russian Influence in Crimea
Summary
Russia is increasingly influential in Crimea, using the Black Sea Fleet in Sevastopol and the adjoining presence of military personnel and security services to its advantage. Moscow enhances its influence by distributing passports, supporting nationalist Russian groups and through intelligence activities. Ukraine’s response to Russian influence has not been successful. been successful.
Introduction
1. Russia is reaffirming its political influence in the former-Soviet Union, as its part in the Orange Revolution and the 2008 war in Georgia show. This briefing paper will examine the situation in Crimea, where Russian influence has grown, propelled by the presence of the Russian Black Sea Fleet (BSF) in Sevastopol. It will provide a brief background on tensions; examine the various levers of Russian influence in the region and Kyiv’s Kyiv’s response to Russian actions. Background
2. The Crimean peninsula was an integral part of Russia from its conquest in the 18th Century to 1954, when it was handed over to Ukraine by Nikita Khrushchev. This caused little debate at the time because Ukraine itself was a component of the Soviet Union. However, this changed when Kyiv achieved independence in 1991. Although this dynamic falls outside the scope of the present paper, it should be noted that tensions over Ukraine’s foreign policy have existed since independence and were exacerbated by the 2004 Orange Revolution. Levers of Russian influence
3. Russia exercises its influence in Crimea through a number of levers. The following section will provide an overview of some of these. 4. Crimea’s population is predominantly of Russian origin. origin. Many of these are former members of the Soviet security service and retired Red Army officers who stayed in the 1 peninsula after the collapse of the USSR. It is interesting to note that according to a 2008 study by the Razumkov Center in Kyiv, while 63.8% of Crimeans wish to leave Ukraine and join 1
“Ukr aine – aine – industrial industrial and common espionage” Jane’s espionage” Jane’s Intelligence Digest , 15 April 2008
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Russia, no more than 25% are willing to act. Nevertheless, this population has provided fertile ground for separatist movements. 5. The Soviet Black Sea Fleet was divided between Ukraine and Russia following the dissolution of the USSR. The majority of the BSF stayed under Russian control. However, Russia did not have the necessary infrastructure to support the fleet. Following years of tense negotiations, complicated by the fact that the Ukrainian constitution does not allow foreign military presence on its soil, an agreement was reached. In 1997, a 20 years lease was agreed upon by both countries and to this day, the naval base in Sevastopol is the largest Russian naval 3 installation abroad. However, the BSF is aging and the 1997 lease treaty prohibits the introduction of new ships to the naval base, leading many to conclude that in its present state, the 4 fleet’s presence has a more symbolic than military value to Russia’s presence in the Crimea. Nevertheless, the presence of the BSF BS F remains the main driver of Russian influence in the area, due to its size and accompanying features, such as military installations and security services personnel. 6. A number of Russian security service (FSB) officers are based in Sevastopol to ensure 5 the security of the fleet and its installations. In addition to these security service officers, there have been claims by the Ukrainian security service (SBU) that other Russian intelligence services also operate in the peninsula. As Ukraine increased its cooperation with the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the SBU alleged that the Russian foreign intelligence service (SVR) increased its activity in Crimea following the first joint NATO-Ukraine naval exercise in 1997. The SBU director has claimed that Russian organizations are definitely behind Crimean separatist groups, but that their capacities are far from reaching those of similar groups in South 6 Ossetia and Abkhazia before the 2008 conflict. In addition to SVR FSB, it can be safely assumed that Russian military intelligence (GRU) is also active in Crimea. 7. Ukrainian intelligence noticed an increase in SVR activity, along with increasing 7 agitation by nationalist groups in the lead up to the conflict with Georgia. The agitation in Crimea sent a clear message to Kyiv that what happened in Georgia could very well happen in Ukraine. 8. Officially, Russia does not support separatist groups in Ukraine. However, a number of signs point otherwise. Prime Minister Vladimir Putin met the head of a Russian motorcycle gang that promoted Russia’s Russia’s presence in Crimea and led protests against Ukraine’s rapprochement 8 with NATO in July 2009. A number of Russian politicians, notably Moscow Mayor Yuriy Luzhkov, have played a vocal role in promoting Russian nationalism in the peninsula. Duma member Konstantin Zatouline, who was refused access to Simferopol on 6 June 2009, even 9 called for Crimea’s annexation. annexation. 9. Ukrainian officials have also protested the practice of consular officials who distribute Russian passports to local ethnic Russians. This practice is seen as a potential security threat 2
“Russian subversion in Ukraine's strategic regions” Jane’s regions” Jane’s Intelligence Digest , 31 March 2009 “Russia drags feet over Black Sea Fleet” Jane’s Fleet” Jane’s Intelligence Digest Digest , 19 June 2009. 4 Ibid 5 “All FSB Officers working at Russian Black Sea Fleet must leave Ukraine” Unian, Unian, 17 June 2009 6 Jane’s Intelligence Digest Digest , 31 March 2009 7 “Russo-Georgian Russo-Georgian War : The Ukraine Factor” Jane’s Factor” Jane’s Intelligence Digest , 12 August 2008 8 S. Saradzhyon, “Stirring Things Up in the Crimea” ISN Crimea” ISN Security Watch Watch, 15 July 2009 9 “Crimée: un député russe appelle Kyive à restituer la presqu’île la presqu’île à la Russie” RIA Russie” RIA Novosti, Novosti, 9 June 2009. 3
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because an increasing number of citizens in Crimea could provide Moscow with a pretext to 10 intervene in the peninsula. To counter this, the SBU has tried to stop the distribution of 11 passports by Russian consular officials. This is a potential threat to Ukraine, especially when one considers the precedent set by b y Abkhazia and South Ossetia, where similar ploys were used. Kyiv’s response
10. Kyiv has used a number of methods to counter Russian influence in Crimea, including an increased presence of Ukrainian security services, military and police units. The Tartar minority strongly supports Ukrainian sovereignty over the peninsula, leading to increasing tensions and 12 clashes with Russian nationalists in the Crimea. 11. The Ukrainian security services have also been more active, following orders issued in October 2006 to intensify efforts in the peninsula and neutralize activities that can undermine 13 Ukraine. In June 2009, the SBU called for the removal of FSB officers from Ukrainian territory, stating that it could assume the security of the Black Sea Fleet. The Russian Foreign Ministry answered that bilateral agreements allow the presence of FSB personnel and that they 14 would not be leaving Ukrainian territory. 12. The Russo-Georgian conflict had a negative impact on relations between the two states. On 12 August 2008, a few days into the conflict, Ukrainian President Yushchenko issued a 15 decree demanding Russian military units request permission before moving on Ukrainian soil. On 8 July 2009, Ministry of the Interior forces intercepted a Russian military convoy transporting anti-ship missiles through Sevastopol and forced it back to the military base, 16 claiming permission had not been granted. Conclusion
13. Russian influence in Crimea grows thanks to its large military presence and support for separatist groups. While these actions could be interpreted as a prelude to a Russian takeover, this is not necessarily the case. Russia will keep its leverage on Kyiv as long it keeps its fleet in Sevastopol. Annexing the Crimean peninsula would cause outrage in the west and remove this advantage. As such, the constant threat of escalating tensions between the two states remains a more powerful tool than outright annexation. 14. The introduction of new legislation authorizing the use of military forces to defend Russian minorities and military personnel in the Near Abroad has added pressure on Ukraine, but does not necessarily mean that a military invasion is imminent. The forecast for relations between the two countries will become clearer after the Ukrainian presidential elections, scheduled for 17 January 2010. The results will largely Russia’s course Russia’s course of action.
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T.Kuzio, T.Kuzio, “Russian Passports as Moscow’s Geopolitical Tool” Eurasia Tool” Eurasia Daily Monitor, Vol.5, Vol.5, Iss. 176, September 176, September 15 2008, “SBU stirs domestic and international tension” Jane’s tension” Jane’s Intelligence Intelligence Weekly, Weekly, 22 July 2009 12 B. Judah, “Tatrs: Kiev’s AntiAnti-Russian Allies” ISN Allies” ISN Security Watch, Watch, 24 July 2009 13 “Russian Subversion in Crimea” Jane’s Crimea” Jane’s Intelligence Intelligence Digest , 6 November 2006 14 “Russia says FSB to stay in Crimea” Unian, Unian, 18 June 2009 15 S. Woehrel, “Ukraine: Current Issues and U.S. Policy” Congressional Research Service Report, 2009 16 Jane’s Intelligence Weekly Weekly,, 22 July 2009 11
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