Vivarium - Vol Xl, No 2, 2002

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VIVARIUM AN INTERNATIONALJOURNAL FOR THE PHILOSOPHY AND INTELLECTUAL LIFE OF THE MIDDLE AGES AND RENAISSANCE vivarium inparticular isdevoted totheprofane sideofmediaeval philosophy andtheintellectual lifeoftheMiddle AgesandRenaissance. - H.A.G.Braakhuis, - C.H. Kneepkens, EDITORS L.M. de Rijk,(Leiden) (Nijmegen) - W.J.Courtenay, - E.P. Bos,(Leiden) - D. Perler, (Madison) (Groningen) M.G.M. van der Poel, (Basel) (Nijmegen). oftheEditorial Board: Prof. C.H.Kneepkens. Secretary Allcommunications, thoseofa business should be addressed nature, except toC.H.Kneepkens, Faculteit derLetteren, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, Vakgroep P.O.Box716,9700AS Groningen, TheNetherlands. Mediaevistiek, - Albert - J.E.Murdoch, ADVISORY TullioGregory, Zimmermann, (Rome) (Cologne) COMMITTEE (Cambridge, MA). PUBLISHERS Brill, TheNetherlands. Leiden, PUBLISHED Twiceyearly. SUBSCRIPTION Volume XLI (2003)(320pp.):EUR 125(USD 145)forinstitutions, andEUR 64(USD74)forprivate inclusive andpacking. Price includes subscribers, ofpostage online subscription. orders areaccepted forcomplete volumes orders Subscription only, taking effect with thefirst issueofanyyear. Orders onanautomayalsobeentered ifthey matic basis. Cancellations willonly beaccepted arereceived continuing before October 1stoftheyearpreceding theyearinwhich thecancellation ifmade istotakeeffect. Claims formissing issues willbemet, free ofcharge, within three ofdispatch forEuropean customers andfivemonths for months customers outside Europe. orders orsubscription Subscription maybe madeviaanybookseller agency, ordirect tothepublisher. OFFICES U.SA. TheNetherlands Brill Academic Publishers Inc. Brill Academic Publishers Ste.400 112Water P.O.Box9000 Street, MA02109 PALeiden NL-2300 Boston, Tel. 1-800-962-4406 Tel.+31-71-53.53.566 (tollfree) Fax(617)2632324 Fax+31-71-53.17.532 Email:[email protected] E-mail: [email protected] Allpricesandpostage & handling areexclusive ofVAT in EU-countries charges outside theEU). (VATnotapplicable

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Alternatives toAlternatives: toAristotle's Approaches Arguments per impossibile TANELI KUKKONEN

1. Introduction : Indirect Premises Arguments, Impossible Aristotleshows a predilectiontowardsindirectargumentationin natural sciphilosophy.This does not correspondto the model of demonstrative ence presentedin the Posterior More in this Analytics. enlightening regard is Aristotle'sintroduction to the art and typesof deductionat the beginning of the Topics: A deduction is an argument inwhich, certain , then, things beingsupposed, something different from thesuppositions result ofnecessity them.It is a demonstration through ifthededuction is from which either arethemselves trueandprimary orhave things attained thestarting-point ofknowledge aboutthemselves someprimary and through A dialectical truepremises. on theother deduces from deduction, hand,is onewhich whatis acceptable.1 Aristotelian deductions,then,appear to be conceivedof as synthetic arguments:theyproduce a novel resultout of previouslyaccepted premises. The difference betweendemonstrations and dialecticalarguments,meanwhile, comes down to a differencebetween scientificand contestable of true (demonstrative) science are seen as premises.The starting-points in and of In themselves. dialectics,by contrast,initialpremises acceptable are accepted on the basis of, e.g., authority.As such, theycan be contested;theycan also turnout to be untrue(100a30-101a4). Furtheron, Aristotleremarksthat one of the applicationsof dialecticalargumentation is where there is appreciable differenceof opinion (104b1-5). It is no wonderthatAristodeshouldfinduse forthistypeof argumentin natural philosophy,where a large body of contrasting views had been accumulatingever since the time of the Ionian philosophers.Aristotlealso makes a furtherpoint. Sometimesan opinion is investigatedforits own of such knowledgeonlybecomesapparS2ike;at othertimes,the usefulness 1 Topics tr.byRobinSmith in:Aristotle. I andMil, Oxford 1997 , 1.1,100a25-30; Topics (translator's emphases retained). © Koninklijke BrillNV,Leiden, 2002 Alsoavailable online- www.brill.nl

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as proent later (104b8-12). Aristotleenvisionsdialecticalargumentation in demonstration much the same accumulative way knowledge ducing does (cf.the citationabove): the conclusionof one argumentcan become a premisein the next.2 The refutationof some well-knownposition,togetherwith the conseis an obvious case of dialectical quent acceptance of its contradictory, in the studyof nature,as well, as a useful one argumentation;3 evidently tool of eliminationand narrowingdown of options.4An indirectrefutatakesthe followingskeletalform.We firstassume tionin Aristodetypically that what is claimed (say, ťp') is true.We then posit a valid conditional relationof the form"if p, then q". If q now turnsout to be impossible, or manifesdyfalse,thenit seems evidentp was falseas well: for"a falsehood is always concluded throughfalsehoods"(Top. 8.12, 162b13-14). And fromthe factthatp cannot reasonablybe held, not-pfollows.This called in the Topics(8.2, 157b34-158a2) methodof indirectargumentation, - this time in an argument"throughthe impossible",is also presented (1.26; cf. also An. Pr. 1.44), where Analytics garb in the Posterior syllogistic it is called a "demonstration leading to the impossible".The procedure can be looselyformalisedas follows: (P1) P a, b, c . . .) q (P2) p (+ auxiliary premises (Cl) q (P3) ~Mq (C2) ~Mp Premises(PI) and (P2) lead to the acceptance of conclusion(Cl), a conclusionwhich,however,is shown to be impossibleby the mutualaccepthat we in the end come to this impossibility tance of (P3); it is through conclude in step (C2) the opposite of our originalhypothesis(PI). The two appellationsreferto one and the same type of argument. 2 Aristotle outthatin in thesamecontext, hisfamous alsomentions pointing aporiai matter forbothsidesofthecontested areconvincing somecases,there (104b12arguments be very has someusagehere,too,evenifitsusecan hardly dialectic 17).Apparently, . straightforward 3 According thiswouldseemtobe theonlywaytoarguedialecEl., 2, 165b3-4, toSoph. whatareherecalled"dialecwouldconflate butas weshallsee,thelatertradition tically; underdialectics. tical"and"examinational" arguments 4 Fortheuse ofdialectic DoesAristotle's in science, see E. Berti, ofDialectic Conception Problems andProspects in:W. Wians(ed.),Aristotle's , Lanham Development. Philosophical Develop? 1996,105-30.

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As Robin Smith has noted, Aristotle'sper impossibile argumentsdiffer in thatAristotle frommodernconceptionsof reductio ad absurdum significantly in the does not thinkthatone need necessarily pointto a self-contradiction in him All order to refute or her.5 one has to do is opponent'spremises demonstratethat fromthe opponent'spremisessomethingfollowswhich is falsein the opinion of all, the majorityof, or- at the veryleast- the mostreasonablepeople. The significance of thislies in thefactthatAristotle does not thinkin termsof model theory,when he presentshis theoryof dialecticalargumentation.When showingup the opponent'serrors,one need not refersolelyto the set of propositionsput forwardby the opponent; the ultimatepoint of referenceis the (one and only) actual world. Aristotledoes distinguishbetweena false suppositionand an impossible one in the De cáeloon the groundsthat "it is not the same to make a false hypothesisas to make an impossiblehypothesis;an impossibility [only]followsfromwhatis impossible"(1.12, 28 lb 15-16). He also remarks that absolutefalsehoodsand impossibilities differfromhypotheticalones, with the latteronly obtaining"if certainconditionsare fulfilled"(b3-8). But his distinctions again have nothingto do withmodel theoreticalreaAristode's soning. example of a possiblefalsehoodis the claim thatsomeone is singingwhen he or she is in factplayingthe lyre(and not singing). The example takeson a temporalaspect,when Aristotleevokeswhat we presumeis a parallel case: sittingand standing,he says, are only relatively,not absolutelycontradictory qualitiesin a man, fortheycannot be assumed to be true at the same time, only successively.(28 lb9- 10, 1214, 16-18.) It is not immediatelyapparenthow thesevarious distinctions relateto the generalframework of indirectargumentation, althoughclearly Aristotlesees the two as being connected. Anotherqualificationhas more immediaterelevance. It is obviously only rarelythat the opponent's stated assumptionsparade a manifest impossibility up front.(Otherwisetherewould be littleneed forargument.) Indeed, the simplefactthat the opponentstandsbehind his suppositions may be enoughto dissuadehim,her,or the generalpublicfromendorsing the truth:"unless it is extremelyobvious that it is false,people will say that it is not impossible,so that questionersdo not get what theywant" Aristotlerecommendsthatone [Top.8.2, 158a2-3,tr.Smith).Accordingly, use affirmative deductionratherthan indirectrefutation wheneverpossible. (Cf. An. Post. 1.26.) If, however,an indirectrefutationis necessary, 5 Cf.Smith 1997{op.cit., n. 1),inhiscommentary onAristotle, I andVIII,120. above, Topics

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one musttypically add one or more auxiliarypremisesto get at an impossible conclusion:hence "a, b, c, etc." in our originalschématisation(cf. Top. 7.1, 152b17-24). But the introductionof such additionalpostulatesbringswithit complications,forthe simplereason that theyare indeed somethingnot put forwardby the opponenthim/herself. It is entirelypossiblethatthe opponent will simplydeny one of the postulates,or that the conclusionfollows fromthe premises,especiallyif it has taken a lot of argumentative steps to get there.6Or, alternativelyand this possibilitycarrieswith it farmore potentialfordamage- the defendantmay claim thatthe (impossible)conclusionindeed follows:not,however,fromthe originalpremises, but fromthe ones added by the interrogator. This, in a word,was Galen's line of argumenton behalfof the Platonists and againstAristotle,when the philosopherphysiciancame to examine of self-motion. the latter'salleged refutation Accordingto Galen, Aristotle in the firstchapterof the seventhbook of the Physics slipsin an impossible eliminate the his when he tries to of own, only alternativeto supposition in motion is moved by something his famousprinciplethat everything But froman impossiblepremise, tokinournenon kineisthai). {pan ananke hypotinos Aristotle'sargumentfails.7 therefore further follow; only impossibilities Galen's briefstatementis betterunderstoodifwe borrowyetanotherleaf fromAristode'sTopics.If one merelyrejectsone of the premisesthatled Aristotlesays,one has yetto accomto a falseconclusionindiscriminately, One must specificallytarget"that because of which the plish anything. falsehoodcame about" (cf. Top. 2.10): one must show why it was this This is what Galen premiseand no other that led to the impossibility. fromAristotle's.8 evidentlyclaimsto have done onlywithresultsdifferent The line of criticisminitiatedby Galen provokeda long and manyfaceteddiscussionamong commentatorson Aristotle.The commentators soon founda parallelcase in chapter6.2 of the Physics', ; here,too, Aristode, when outliningthe initial conditionsto one of his indirectarguments, 6 Forexample, withe entails entaild, andifd together ifa, b, andc together f,and is themanifestly withp which ifitis f takentogether q, thenthere impossible produces from whichtheopponent relations andentailment ofsuppositions an abundance already maychooseto denyanyone. 7 See thereport libros in Simplicius, InAristotelů commentario,, posteriores quattuor Physicorum toas be referred willhenceforth Thisedition ed.H. Diels,Berlin1895,1039.13-1040.12. ." In Phys "Simplicius, 8 It is noteworthy as in Aristotle thatSmith1997{op.cit.,above,n. 1),135-6portrays that hesaysatonepoint intheTopics thistypeofcounterargument factrecognising , where was towhat butnotonerelevant conclusion toa [valid] "comes onekindoffalseargument to theimpossible)." mostto thoseleading Top.,2.12,162b5-7. (which happens proposed

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apparentlysays somethingcontraryto his usual assumptionsof what is and what isn't possible in the naturalworld. The second passage was in turnused to model severalsimilarargumentselsewherein Aristotle'snatural philosophy. When arguing fromimpossiblepremises,what was Aristotle'srationale? Is therea way to salvage all of thesepurportedarguments"through the impossible"?In this article,I wish to examine some of the answers offeredby commentators on AristotlerangingfromAlexanderto Buridan. We shall see that withinthe discussion,a more systematicpicture of Aristotle'sintentionsslowlyemerged.WhetherthispictureaccuratelyrepresentsAristotleis arguable. Because the cited examples arose in connectionwith some of Aristotle'suniversallyheld natural principles,the discussionwas seen to tie in with cosmologicalissues of centralimportance. The various solutionsput forwardthereforeserve to reveal what the discussantstook to be the limitsto the world's conceptualisation.It is not quite a case of assessing'possible worlds'; this systematicnotion only entersthe discussionin the early 14th century.Rather,what is at stake is what the possible featuresof the one and only world are. and Simplicius 2. Galen on Physics7.1 , Alexander, Aristotle'saim at the outsetof Physics 7 is to establishthe principlewhich in Latin took the formulationomnequod movetur necesseab aliquo moveri. Aristotledoes thisby puttingforwardwhat looks to be a thought-experimentof sorts.Aristotleasks us to imaginethat a part CB of a body AB is at restwhile the whole is in motion in itsownright andprimarily autokmproton). Butexhypothesi AB is in motion (kat/i' initsownright andprimarily. ifCB is notin motion Therefore AB willbe at rest. Butwehaveagreed thatthatwhich is at restifsomething elseis notinmotion must be moved thatis inmotion mustbe moved bysomething. Consequently, everything . . (Physics 7.1,242a10-14,tr.R.P. Hardie& R.K. Gaye.) bysomething. Now as, e.g., Thomas Aquinas testifies, "This proofof Aristotle'shas been in to In of the whole objected many ways".9 fact,the value and integrity of Physics 7 was challengedalreadyin antiquity.10 We shall not enterinto 9 Thomas Inocto libros Aristotelis Aquinas, , Rome1884(= vol.2 oftheLeonine Physicorum omnia : henceforth InPhys istaautem Opera "Aquinas, ."),bk.7,cap. 1,lect.1,n. 4: "Contra Aristotelis obiicitur". likewise disprobationem multipliciter Simplicius reports widespread satisfaction (InPhys., 1039.13-14). 10 knewthattheworkwastransmitted in twoversions Already Simplicius (cf.In Phys. on thetopicsee further W.D. Ross,"Introduction", 11-9ofAristotle, 1036.4-6; , Physics

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a discussionof the exegeticalproblemssurroundingthe book, nor shall we pause to considereven its notoriouslydifficult firstchapter.We shall focusexclusivelyon what in Aristotle'sargumentation caughtGalen's eye, and subsequentlythe imaginationof later generationsof commentators.11 Though the exact wordsof Galen's objectionare lostto us in theGreek hismainclaimis knownthroughSimplicius'monumental original, Commentary on thePhysics. The imaginarypremiseAristotlewants to build on- that a part of somethingmovingessentiallyand primarilyshould be at rest is simplyimpossible.(In Phys.1039.13-15.) Simplicius'terse reportis supplementedby anothersecond-handsource,a refutationof Galen by the esteemed PeripateticcommentatorAlexander of Aphrodisias(fl. in the From Alexander's early 3rd cent.) only extantin an Arabic translation.12 we learn Galen own that recalls Aristotle's claim that froman , Refiitation The impossiblething nothingfollowsexcept for another impossibility. impliedconclusionis that Aristotlehimselfin introducingan impossible auxiliarypremiseis responsiblefor the impossibleconclusionof the syllogism:the argumentdoes not accomplishits statedtask of refutingselfabouttheworld.13 motion,in factit does notconveyany relevantinformation The Arabic version of Alexander's refutationfurtherclues us in on certainexegeticalmoveson Galen's part.Accordingto Alexander'sreport, Galen assumedthatby "thingsmoved essentiallyand primarily"Aristotle meantthingswhosesourceof motionis in themselves, thesebeingidentified withsimpleprimarybodies (
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In orderthatthediscussion withwhich theargument is resumed is clear,letus then thethings whosesourceofmotion is present within themthatthese sayregarding moveaccording tothefirst andregarding thethings thatlacksucha source intention, thatthesebasically movein an accidental to thefirst intenwayandnotaccording tion.It is clearthatwhenwe saythata thing we haveindicated no more moves, thanthatitmoves tothefirst Thisis because boththeseexpresintention. according sionsmerely refer to thethings in themandwhose whosesourceofmotion exists motion is notbasically dueto anything from theoutside.14 Once the distinctionis made, it is of course not difficult to prove that the coming to rest of a part logicallyentailsthat the whole comes to a halt as well: "For", as Galen puts it, "the part in thesethingsis no other than the whole."15Hence the impossibility of even positingthe premise. Galen's reputedclaim thatthe heartis a self-mover allowsus a glimpse into his motivationsfor challengingAristode'sproof. For it has seemed clear to many commentatorsthatone of Aristode'smain targetsin arguis the Platonic doctrineof soul as ing forhis principleomnequodmovetur If this is how Galen perceivedthe situation,then indivisibleself-mover. his long-termgoal may have been to pave the way for the re-introduction of self-moving Even if nothspiritswithina Peripateticframework.16 ing can be said withcertaintybased on the excerptsleftto us, it is good to noticethatthe notionof souls as self-movers hoversin the background of the discussionof Physics7.1. Alexandertakesa comprehensiveapproach to addressingthe challenge some philosophical,some posed by Galen. He producesseveralarguments, of a more rhetoricalcharacter,in defenceof Aristode.(1) Alexanderclaims thatPlato, too, would have accepted the principlethateverymoved thing is moved by something.17 As for Aristotle,(2) Alexander points to the 14Alexander, Contra Gal.,62b21-63al, tr.Rescher & Marmura 1965(op.cit., above,n. 12), twounnecessary additions to thetext. omitting 15". . . al-jaz* fìhadhihi al-kull." 63a17(similarly, 63a15). Ibid., '1-ashya* laysahuwaghayr 16Cf.theanalysis ofGalen'sargument offered & Marmura 1965(op.cit., byRescher ofthesoulin Galen'sphilosophy is currendy above,n. 12),7-9.The status undergoing withsomescholars thatGalenwas a kindof reductionist, so re-examination, arguing Galen'sargument should notnecessarily be viewed as constituting a straightforward reversalbacktothePlatonic intheArabic Galen'smedical claims However, tradition, position. weregivena non-literal The physician can talkas ifthesoul (Platonic) interpretation. wouldconsist ofnothing butthemovement ofspirits (thehumours, etc.);yetthephilosoknows thatin factitis a separate substance. pher 17Contra translation 66b23-67al Rescher & Marmura Gal.,Carullah manuscript (English 1965(op.cit.,above,n. 12),15-6).Alexander's anddisingenuous claim,rhetorical though it maybe,givessomeindirect to oursuspicion thatthestatus ofPlatonic selfsupport motion Aristotle. Theclaimis laterpicked layat theheartofGalen'sprotests against up andThomasAquinas: all threecontend thatPlatois "intruth Averroes, bySimplicius, notfarfrom Aristotle".

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wider use of "essentiallymoved beings" in Aristotlethan what Galen allowsfor.Accordingto Alexander,theseare not restricted to beingswith internalmovers (ContraGal., Escurial MS 63a25-b4). (3) What is more, animals,too, have an internalmoverin the Aristotelianscheme,not only Alexander simple(i.e.,homogeneous)bodies(63b4-15).(4) Most importantly, claims thatAristotledid not even put forwardas a premisethat a thing would move essentiallyonce a part has ceased to move. This of course would sufficeto deflectGalen's charge about one of Aristode'spremises Alexanderis carebeing impossible(67b27-68a5). In the Arabic Refiitation, ful to say that althoughthe parallel proofin Physics 8.4 is demonstrative and thus more properlyscientific,the statementsin book 7 "are not remote fromshowingthis thing set down, nor are they of the nature describedin the chaptersof this book that attack them [i.e., Galen's], even thoughthe proofthat followsnecessarilyfromthem is [more] suitable to dialecticalaffirmations."18 He goes on to treat Aristotle'sarguin the firstfigure(Cf. also Simplicius, mentin book 7 as a simplesyllogism In Phys.1041.5-11). If successful,this move would obviate the need forfurtherdiscussion. For if thereis only one impossiblepremise(the Platonist's),then thereis no problem. However, there is mention of yet another argumentin Simplicius,one that does not seem to square with the one given above. Simpliciusreportsthat (5) Alexanderalso forthepurposes ofhypothesis to hyposthechoseto claimthatitis notimpossible in itsownright sisethatpartofa thing andprimarily comesto a halt. moving of hypothesis destructive of one 'Because',he says,'forthepurposes onlythings rock'.19 another areimpossible, as,forexample, sailing through Argument(4) says thatAristotledoes not assume that the part comes to a halt whilstthe whole moves in its own rightand primarily;argument (5) would seem to imply that he does. Are the two reportsmutually Alexander incompatible,and is one or the otherspurious?Not necessarily. of the same argumentin an may have chosen to give two interpretations that both are maintainable. to show attempt Regardlessof the textualbackgroundthe questionmay be put: What does it mean for two thingsto be "destructiveof one another"?The that most readilysuggestsitselfis that what is meant is a interpretation the subject"man" precludesthe predicate"irraconceptualcontradiction: 18Carullah has account MS 61bll-62a7.Simplicius' Escurial MS 67a33-35; similarly here(InPhys., 'morelogical'instead of'dialectical' 1036.12-13). 19Simplicius, OnAristotle translation InPhys., 1039.16-19; byCharles Hagen,in:Simplicius to theGreekindicated. 7,London1994,withpagination Physics

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is part of the essence tional",forinstance(and vice versa),since rationality of man.20The other option is to treatAlexander'sexample as denoting somethingmore like a physicalimpossibility. Sailing througha rock is two because cannot the same spatialposition.21 impossible, things occupy Aristotledid not reallydistinguishbetweenlogical and physicalmodalities,however,and the ambivalencecame to troublelater commentators; what we seem to have here is an attempt,even if none too successful, to distinguishbetween different kinds of impossibility. While we cannot ascertain this from the exact line of Alexander's reasonreliably excerpt ing, the importantthingto notice is that only an explicitcontradiction is disallowedin hypotheticalreasoning.22 Simpliciuswas not satisfiedwithAlexander'sanswers.He himselfproposed to analyse Aristotle'sproof in two parts. In the firstpart, when Aristotletalks of thingsmoving of themselves(kath}auto),he is talking about simpleundividedentities.Now, all thingsmovingin theirown right divisible.But when these (here: simple bodies qua bodies) are potentially divisionsare made actual we have a different , propositionaltogether, kindsof entities. accordingto Simplicius.We are talkingabout different Aristotle'sargumentthereforeinvolvesno impossibility, nor does it beg the question.The shiftfrompotentiallydivisibleto actuallydividedbodies is not accidental,nor is it unwarranted.Instead, it is used to clue readers in on the fact that the impossibility of self-motion hence, the - in 7.1 to divided proof Physics pertainsspecifically actually things,which is to say, compositebodies. The presumedoppositionto (Platonic)selfmoving souls is in the final analysis unreal. (In Phys. 1041.22-1042.6.) Simplicius'exegesistakes considerablelibertieswith the source text;evidently,it is stronglyPlatonicallymotivated.Like Alexander's argument (4), it aims to disprovethatAristotlewould reallyhave introducedanother impossiblepremisein additionto the one he wanted to refute. 20Galen,in Alexander, Contra Gal., Escurial MS 65a27ff. claimsthata conevidently contradiction is whatwe havehere. ceptual 21Wearethenleft witha problem thatresembles thefamous Stoicpuzzleabouttherock thatforever liesatthebottom oftheocean.Is itinvisible intheweakorinthestrong sense? 22Perhaps whatAlexander Ifweattempt means isthis. toconstruct hypothetical argumentative thatbothp and~p aretruedestroys attheoutset chains, assuming right anychance ofmeasured Forifbothp and~p, thenall theconclusions from bothp argumentation. and~p mayalsobe drawn: andthisgetsus botheverywhere andnowhere at once(ceritleadsus to all manner offurther The purpose ofhyposthetising tainly, contradictions). is defeated, ifthereareno controls fortheresults itwillbring. Ifthisanalysis is correct, thenAlexander seemstohavecomeclosetoanother devellogical onlyexplicitly principle that"from a contradiction follows". In thediscussion opedin the12thcentury: anything is explicitly 7, thisprinciple surrounding Physics brought (cf.§7 below). up byBuridan

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3. Alexander and Simplicias on Physics6.2 Alexanderseems to have raised a questionof his own, similarenough to the one we have been discussingto be consideredan extensionof the same problematic.The source thistime is Physics6.2, where Aristotlein fora continuum-related argumentstatesthat layingdown the groundwork than it does. in faster and slower" motion both can move "everything

[Phys.6.2, 232b21.) "But this propositionappears to be false", as, e.g., Thomas Aquinas complains:"forin nature,the velocitiesof motionsare determined".How so? Aquinas reasons that all motionsare determinedby referenceto the fastest:"for thereis a motion of such velocitythat none can be faster, namelythe motionof the primemobile [object]."23Albertthe Great puts To him,it is the forcesof all naturalmovers the pointslightly differently. that are determinedand "likewise,none of the heavens can be moved fasterthan it is". Albertexplicitlyattributesthis objectionto Alexander Both Albertand Aquinas relyon Averroesfortheirexpoof Aphrodisias.24 sitionof the problem. They seem to have jumped to conclusionshere, for Averroesnowhere indicates that Alexander would have raised the problem merelythathe proposedto solve it.25The two Catholic doctors we can ascertain are nonethelesscorrect.For fromSimplicius'testimony that the problem about the celestialmotionscan indeed be ascribed to Alexander.Accordingto Simplicius,"Alexanderposes well the puzzle [of] how movingfasterand sloweris true in the case of the revolvingbody, which moves evenly".26 23ThomasAquinas, videtur bk.6, cap.2, lect.3, n. 9: "Sedhaecpropositio In Phys., in natura: estenimaliquismotus motuum enimsuntvelocitates essefalsa.Determinatae mobilis." scilicet motus esseeo velocior, itavelox,quodnullus primi potest 24"... sicutobicitAlexander, et idea suntvirtutum, naturales determinatum motores Alberti velocius nullum caelorum , ed.P. Hossfeld, moveri, Magni Physica, quammovetur." potest omnia Aschendorff 1993,bk.6, tract.1,cap.4 (= Opera 4.2:453.61-63). 25Averroes ofAristotle's to notethatthepremise seemsto havebeenthefirst proof libriocto.CumAverrois auditu dePhysico Cf.Aristotelis be thought to be impossible. might dicente de hacpropositione, 45:"Etquaeritur commentariis ineosdem Cordubensis , bk.6,comm. motus est Nam declaratum suo motu. velociori moveri motum omne quod potest quod estut etcoelum invelocitate ettarditate: estterminatus motorům naturalium impossibile estimpossibilis." utpostdeclarabitur: sitvelocius, quaeponithicpossibilis, ergopropositio, inea opera Cordubensis Averrois omnia Aristotelis omnes, quiad Opera. quaeextant Quotedfrom a.M. 1962),9 vols., Frankfurt Commentari haecusque i,Venice1562-74 (repr. tempora pervenere, ." andthiscomIn Phys be abbreviated 4:fol.2551(Thisworkwillhenceforth "Averroes, "AOACC edition, ".). piled 26In Phys., in: OnAristotle translation o, London Physics 941.25-27; byDavidKonstan to theGreekindicated. 1989,withpagination

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of the problemdifferin theirspecifics.With The variouspresentations the passage of time, it seems, different aspects of Alexander's original foreach of the above But confirmation to be came highlighted. problem with in To found Aristotle. claims can be Aquinas' line of reabegin soning,each typeof corporealcreaturehas setlimitsto itspossiblemotions. the heavens only move at a fixedvelocity(Cf. De cáelo More specifically, and 8.8-9; Met. 12.7, 1072b3-10).And the 223bl2-224a2 2.6; Phys.4.14, outermostheavenlysphere,movingacrossthe greatestdistance,mustnecessarilymove at the most rapid rate of all {De cáelo2.4, 287a23-26). Yet one mightwonder about the strongmodal language involved.Even if nothingcould move fasterthan the outermostsphere, why could the fast,to be sure (videDe cáelo sphereitselfnot move faster not infinitely 2.6, 288b27-289a4), but stillfasterthan it does? And why can the other sphereslikewisenot move fasteror slowerthan theydo, so long as their velocitydoes not exceed that of the outermostsphere? and Firstwe mustset apart the questionof actual heavenlyacceleration Both are consideredsimplyimpossiblewithinthe confinesof deceleration. Aristoteliancosmology.The heavens rotate in a completelysteady and even fashion,because as separate bodies made out of aether (whichhas with theirmotion(Cf. De cáelo no contrary)thereis nothingto interfere 1.2-4). This also makes the velocitiesof theirmotionsnecessaryin a certain sense. Given that the heavens have fromall eternityassumed a certain velocity,theycannot (anymore)assume another.This ties in with a technicalmodal theoreticalissue, which seems to have formedthe main focus of Alexander'sattention.If "in the case of the eternalthereis no differencebetween being possible and being" (Phys.3.4, 203b30), then one would assume thatshould the eternalheavensbe able to move faster of slower,then at some point theywould do so. But thereare no genuine unrealisedpossibilitiesin the eternal,as Aristotlehad argued in the famouschapter 12 of the firstbook of De cáeloet mundo.Hence, what is eternalis necessaryand what is necessary,eternal.27 What factorfixed the celestial velocitiesfrom all eternity;and why could these "global presets" not be other than what they are? One 27Cf.Degen.etcon to ofAlexander's strict adherence ., 2.11,338al-3,andforevidence inAristotelem Graeca. vol.II/2, theseprinciples, 1.18,in: Commentario, Supplemento e.g.,Aporiai, R.W.Sharpies, Alexander ed. I. Bruns, Berlin1895,30.25-32.18. Cf.further ofAphrodisias: oftheInstitute ofClassical 30 (1983),99about Studies, //,in:Bulletin problems possibility withAristode's modal 110; forfurther comments on theproblems associated historically Modalities andtheso-called ofplenitude" alluded tohere,S. Knuuttila, thought "principle inMedieval , London& NewYork1993. Philosophy

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approach to the question one which would have been attractiveto Alexander- would be to point to the providentiality of the currentcelestial arrangement.Alexanderwas the firstto distilfromscatteredhintsin Aristotlethe view thatthe variegatedrotationsof all the heavenstogether produce the cyclesof generationand corruptiontakingplace in the sublunaryworld.The way the spheresdraw forwardand push back the elementscorrespondto the steadinesswithwhichgenerationand corruption occur.28Thus it mightbe thoughtthat should the currentarrangement of the heavenlymotionsbe altered,this order would be disruptedand the sublunaryworld fall into chaos and disrepair.29 This servesto establish at least the relativenecessityof the velocitiesof the various celestial spheres,if not quite theirabsolute necessity.30 The two concernsoutlinedabove correspondto the two ways in which : "that without necessityis spoken of in book Lambda of the Metaphysics whichthe good is impossible,and thatwhichcannotbe otherwisebutcan existonlyin a singleway" (12.7, 1072b12-13). But it was the thirdinterpretationof necessitymentionedby Aristotlein the same contextthat was to troublecommentators the most,thatof the necessarybeing something thatgoes contraryto nature(bl4). For ifeverynaturalbody has a capacity formovingfasterand slower,and if natureis the principleof motionand restin a body (as in Phys.2.1, 192b14-15), are the uniformand unceasing rotationsof the heavens then somethingimposed on them violentlyand fromtheoutside?The issue,via Aristotle's famous'infinite power'argument in Physics8, ch. 10, was seen to tie in with the ongoing disputeabout celestialanimationand naturalvs. voluntarymotionin the heavens.31The 28Aristotle in De gen.etcorr. and the 2.10-11, onlyspeaksaboutthesun'sinfluence ingeneral forthegerms ofa sysaboutthe"upper terms; Meteorology (1.2)speaks region" inAristotle, Aristotle's tematic notion ofcelestial influence cf.F. Solmsen, ofthe System Physical in andinfluence areexpertly tracked World Alexander's innovations , Ithaca1960,279ff. circle andinal-Kindt's S. Fazzo& H. Wiesner, Alexander intheKindx , Cosmology ofAphrodisias andPhilosophy, 3 (1993),119-53. in:ArabicSciences 29See C. Genequand, Alexander ontheCosmos , Leiden2001,84, 11-15;cf. ofAphrodisias and 129.3-12. Averroes, , ed. M. Bouyges, Tahãfut al-tahãfut S.J.,Beirut1930,44.13ff. 30Onecouldstillwonder notbe spedup orslowed downinequal whyeverything might correofthevarious characters as in thecaseofa filmreel,wheretheactions measure, Thenagain:ifthis instituded (See§5 below.) bythefilm projector. spondtothetime-line ofthe"cosmic whocouldeverobserve shouldhappen, clock", it,sincewe,as followers Bothpoints weredulynotedbyNicholas wouldcontinue toperceive things justas before? tr. ducieletdumonde Oresme , ed.A.D. Menut& A.J.Denomy, (d. 1382):seehisLeLivre A.D. Menut, Milw.& London1968,bk.2, ch. 14,11.32-48. Madison, 31See H.A.Wolfson, Commentaries theByzantine Theproblem ofthesoulsofthespheres from in theHistory toKepler in: Studies toAristotle theArabs andSt. Thomas , reprinted of through Mass.1973,22-59. andReligion Vol.1, Cambridge, Philosophy

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same kindsof questionsthatconcernedthe heavens' eternalmotionwere also raisedover theircontinuedexistence.32 In thisway,the celestialproblematic came to be viewed as having a bearing on the issue of how exactlythe necessityof the eternalwas supposed to be interpreted.33 (1) Afterthis lengthyintroductionto the largerdebate, we are better equipped to understandSimplicius'assessmentof Alexander'sproblemat Physics6.2. Accordingto Simplicius,Alexander resolved the puzzle he himselfhad presentedin two ways: ina weakway,I think, First thatAristotle didnotsaythatthesamething claiming movesfaster andslower, butthatit can [so]move,which, he says,is a [actually] oftherevolving accordproperty [body]toobecauseit movesthus[i.e.uniformly] or as though alsoin a ingto itsownwill,and notunderanynecessity moving different 'Forgoodmen',he says,'do notdo wayhasbeenprevented bysomeone. eveniftheyalways do them, buttheyhavethepowerof good[deeds]bynecessity, theopposite as well.'(InPhys. tr.Konstan.) 941.27-942.2, [doing] Alexander'scontentionthat the heavenlymotionsare to be considered voluntarywas to attracta good deal of attention.In Islamic thought, Avicennaand Averroeswould draw upon [Ps.-] Alexander'saccount and ) but go on to state that the heavens exercisenot only "volition"(íirãdah also "choice" (¡ikhtiyãr ).34But the fact that Alexanderlaid stresson how volitionentailspossibilitiesfor contrariesbroughtup problemsimmediatelypertinentto our subject.Are we to take it that at some point the heavenlybodies could trulymove at different speedsor even stop?35Surely not, accordingto Simplicius: I think, to havenotedfirst thatgoodmenaresaidto havethe [Alexander] ought, thecontrary, becausesometimes toit.Buthow powerof[doing] theyactaccording couldthings thatareheavenly and eternal havea powerthatneveremerges into In Phys., withminor 942.2-5;tr.Konstan, actuality? (Simplicius, alterations.) Since theheavensplainlyneverdo move fasteror slower,it wouldbe wrong to positin thema potencyfordoing so. What is said here is on the lines 32NotehowSimplicius switches between "source ofmotion" and"source ofbeing"in thecontext ofPhysics 7.1:In Phys., 1040.18. 33See,e.g.,the author's andplenitude. Twotraditions onthenecessity present Infinite power of theeternal andtheClassical Tradition inIslam, , in:J.Inglis , and (ed.),Medieval Philosophy Judaism Christianity , Richmond, Surrey 2002,183-201. 34SeeGenequand 2001(op.cit., inAvicenna above,n. 29),50,1-3;andcf.thediscussions ed.M.Y.Müssä,S. Dunyã& S. Zäyid, Cairo1960,381ff. (980-1037), Al-Shifö3: Al-ilãhiyyãt, andcritique ofAvicenna in Tahãfiit (cf.382.10);al-Ghazälr, , in: The summary al-falãsifah Incoherence A parallel tr.M.E. Marmura, Provo1997, ofthePhilosophers. text, English-Arabic andAverroes, in turnresponding to al-Ghazälr, in: Tahãfut 471.5ff. 147ff.; al-tahãfut, (for andirãdah , also 189.12-13). ikhtiyãr 35Cf.herenotably Alexander MS 68a15-16. Galen,in Contra Gal.,Escurial quoting

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of Phys . 3.4, 203b30, that no possibilityin the eternalis leftunrealised. The same kind of argumentSimpliciususes here went throughseveral in late antiquity.Proclusused it to argue thattherecan be permutations no real potentialfordestructionor restin the heavens; Philoponuscounteredby statingthat since thereis,36it cannot go unrealisedforever;and Simpliciuscame in defenceof eternalcelestialexistenceand motion by statingthat the never-realised possibilityof the heavens' destructionindicates no real potency,but ratherthe lack of one.37Simpliciuscompletes his account with a distinctionbetween perfectand imperfectpotencies. Alexanderought to have noted thatnecessity is oftwokinds, one [kind] to whichit beingmoredivine, according is necessary thatgodbe goodandthatuntainted soulsnever be corrupted, theother towhich bad mentooareconstrained [kind] beingforcible, according bylawsnot toerr.Powertoois oftwokinds, onebeingperfect, theother andrather imperfect inpotential. bothareunderthemoredivine Heavenly things, accordingly, necessity ofalways in thesamewayandhavea willthatis determined in thegood moving andcompletely fordivine soulsdo perfect wayandpureofanyambivalent power; notpossess thegoodin a waysimilar to humansouls,butrather thelatter[have thegoodas] a finite andonethatsometimes intoitscontrary, while thing changes theformer andforever settled in thesame [haveit as] an infinitely powerful thing condition. In Phys., tr.Konstan, withminor 942.5-14; (Simplicius, alterations.) The passage presentsus with a confusingjumble of ideas. The distinctionbetweenperfectand imperfect reflects a stipulation in Aristotle. dynameis states actualisations of whichby Normally,perfect represent potentialities, the same token again have to lapse into a state of potentiality at some point. However, in the case of eternalbeings and states that have no in the celestial contraries thiscannotbe the case. Consequently, potentiality can be as Alexander had put spheres only predicated"by homonymy", it. The heavens' actualityconsistsin activity rather than , actualisation;the of theirmotionslies in theirexecution.So we have the heavens' perfection doubly divine natureto thankfor theirblessed and unturmoiledstate.38 36Sincetheheavens' formoving (and,ontheNeoplatonic interpretation, contrary potency is finite: seePhysics , 8.10. sustenance) 37SeeProcli commentario, 3 vols., Diadochi InPiatonis Timaeum , ed.E. Diehl,Leipzig1903-6, InPhys., andSimplicius, 1333.24-30; 1:293.14-294.8; e.g., bySimplicius, Philoponus, quoted InPhys., 1331.30-33 Kukkonen 2002{op.cit., discussion, above,n. 33).Proclus (forfurther creation. Theprocession from theOnemustbe a similar putsforward pointindiscussing towards sincea willwouldlapseatsomepointandturn notdeliberative natural, bynature, in:Procli ed. V. Cousin, thecontrary. See In Platonis Parmenidem commentarium, inédita, opera Paris1864,786-8. 38See Aristotle, forthereference to Alexander, Met.12.6,1071b3-1072a4; Simplicius, TheActivity andff.,andA. Kosman, Cf.alsoIn Phys., In Phys. 1358.18-26 1327.35-38. of andM.L.Gill(eds),Unity, D. Charles inAristotle's in:T. Scaltsas, Identity, Being Metaphysics, The distinction mirrors to andExplanation inAristotle's Oxford 1994,195-213. Metaphysics,

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But the "divine"and "compulsory"necessitiescorrespondwith"theproducts of reason" and "the worksof necessity"of the Timaeuseven more closelythan theydo withanythingfoundin Aristotle.Simplicius5 explanationin factexhibitsseveralof the (Platonic)revisionsmade to Aristotelian cosmologyin late ancient school philosophy.Even thoughthe material natureof the heavens makes the heavens destructibleand exhaustiblein to being kept in themselves,theirmatteris uniquelysuited (epitëdeiotêtos) existenceand moved in a circlead infinitum a that neveradds up , process an to actual infinite(cf. In Phys. 1327.30ff.).In analogous fashion,the celestialsouls are disposedinfinitely and in a discursivemanner,and without any interruption or distortion,to receive the goodness of intelligible The tripartitedivisionbetween materialbody, discursivesoul, reality.39 and immutableintellect,the allusion to the divine apeirodynamos , and the technicaluse of suitability(«epitëdeiotës ) are all late ancient staples.40 However, Aristotle'scosmologyas a whole aims at supersedingthe Platonic one, and we should thereforeexpect to run into seriousproblems reconcilingthe two accounts. The only way for a Neoplatonistto talk about mutability in the celestialrealm is by reducingit to an inherent but latent defectin the materialprincipleand then by statingthat the superioractive principle(the mover,the source of being) will never let this defectbe realised.Divine necessitiesand naturalnecessities,and likewisedivinelydispersedas opposed to naturallyoscillatingdynameis are rather than notions.41 This leads to an unexcompeting, complementary, pected conclusion. Things possible by their own nature are rendered impossibleby divine decree. Ultimately,it is the metaphysicalperfection of God thatshutsoffcertainpossibilities.42 This is one possibleapproach to the ontological status of counterfactualpossibilities.Other physical worldsare imaginable,but theyhave no actualiser,since the Good only createsin the most perfectfashion. an extent thedifference between andpoiesis; it reflects a viewwhereentelekhda is praksis seenas a specialandsuperior caseofenergeia. Forthehappiness ofpureintellection see alsoEJV, and 10.7. 10.3,1073a29-b7 39Cf.the Plutarch's viewsin [Ps.]-Philoponus, Ioannis in report concerning Philoponi Aristotelů deAnima libros commentario, ed. M. Hayduck, Berlin1897,596.15-34. , 40On incosmology Proclus onPlenitude see,e.g.,theauthor's apeirodynamis , in:Dionysius, 18(2000),115ff.; ontheemergence ofepitëdeiotës as a technical term inlateancient school S. Sambursky, ThePhysical World LateAntiquity London1962,104-10. philosophy, , of 41Cf.theremarks in S. Gersh, Kinesis akinêtos. A study motion inthephilosophy ofspiritual Proclus From Iamblichus toEriugena , Leiden1973,27-48;bythesameauthor, of , Leiden1978, 2000[op.cit., 2002(op.cit., 27-45;andKukkonen above,n. 40)& Kukkonen above,n. 33). 42Thecontention back tothepromise oftheDemiurge in Timaeus 41B-Cto rengoes dertheminor their natural In cosmology, thenotion godsimmortal despite corruptibility. canbe traced Avicenna at leastas faras Leibniz. through

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(2) Simpliciusapprovesof Alexander'ssecond explanation,sayingthat is it 'good': itoccurs; overwhich as themagnitude hasthesameinterval he saysthata motion toaccomhavethepower anda slower faster botha thing thing moving accordingly, 607ft.]oroverone overa stade[approx. thatoccurs ofa motion plishtheinterval ofthezodiac,buttheone [hasthepowerto do so] in lesstime,theother section in more.43 The two examples can be interpretedin two different ways. If we take two thingstraversinga stadium'slength,one faster,one slower,then it amountsof time. In is clear that the two span the distancein different the case of the zodiac, what can also be meant is that two different spheresspan the same sectionof the heaven measured in degrees in the same time,yettheymove at different speeds,because theyhave a diffurther one ferentdistancesto cross,the away from,the othercloser being to the Earth'score (thecentreof the universe).In both cases, the implications are roughlythe same. Instead of meaning to say that everyexistent thinghas a real potencyto span a certaindistancefasteror slower (whichin the case of the heavens has all mannerof unacceptableimplican be spanned cations),whatAristodemeantto say was thateverydistance This a slower a faster or providesa neat interpretation movingthing. by solutionto the exegeticalproblem and indeed, it looks as though this needsforthepurposesof his argument. wereall thatAristotle Unfortunately, thisis not all that he says; and at any rate, the solutionholds littlefurtherinterestwithregardto the questionconcerningimpossiblepremises. * * * had to explainhowthe on Aristotle FollowingGalen, ancientcommentators bothuntrueand from could premisesostensibly argueindirectly philosopher this.(1) One to do different three ways impossible.There were (at least) could posit a readingof the textthat would eradicate the problem.We of Physics6.2, as see this happeningin the last mentionedinterpretation 7.1 could be dividedinto well as in Simplicius'idea thattheproofin Physics two independentparts.These explanationsmightbe ad hoc; at any rate, theydo not touch upon the more generalproblem(if,of course,thereis one: the interpreter mightdenythis).(2) Anotheroptionwould be to posit 43In Phys Averroes tr.Konstan. ., bk.6, comm.15,in:AOACC, (InPhys ., 942.14-18, doesnotappear claimwhich aninteresting toEudemus, thissolution 4:fol. 255M)attributes in Simplicius.

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that the impossibility of the postulatedconditionis not due to the thing when consideredin itself,but to some otherpresupposition.The 'more divinenecessity'Simpliciusevokes is an example of this.The outermost heaven cannot move fasterthan it does because the firstmover is the most powerfulone; the heavens (or a part of them)cannot stop, because the divineperfectionof the celestialsouls precludesthisfromhappening.In thesekindsof explanations, theimpossibility in questionis typically referred back to previousmembersin the causal chain to actualisingagentsand theirpowers. (3) A thirdpossible solutionis hintedat by Alexander.In statingthatonlymutuallydestructive hypothesesare impossible,Alexander a of to assume that level somehowstricter than only impossibility appears the one we associatewiththe naturalorderof thingscan harmthe applicabilityof indirectarguments.What this means is not yet clear. 4. Avempace andAverroes on Physics6.2 Continuingwith Physics6.2, we move next to the Arabic tradition.The firsthintsof scholarlyawarenessof an exegeticalproblemat 232b21 are containedin theverymanuscript we possessof HunaynIbn Ishäq's Arabic translationof the Physics. This translationwas used in the Baghdäd school of the ChristianphilosopherYahyä Ibn cAdI (d. 973). Accordingly,the manuscriptcontainscomments,sometimesextensive,by both Yahyä Ibn cAdfand his pupil Abü cAlíIbn al-Samh (d. 1027).44The latterfurnished a note to the passage under consideration.Ibn al-Samh is asked- apparentlyby a pupil whetherthereis not somethingwrongwithAristotle's argument.How fromthe fact that motion occurs over a certain time does it followthatthereis also a quickerand a slowerone forthattime?45 Ibn al-Samh answersthatAristotlecannot have meant anythingelse but thatwe can imagine (yawhumu ) a fasteror slowermotion.For the purpose of the argumentwe need not assume thata fasteror slowermotionactuallyexists,merelythatit is possibleforit to exist.46 Althoughthe comment is interesting in its own right,it seems the speakeris obliviousto the finer 44See theintroduction to theinvaluable P. Lettinck, Aristotle's anditsReception Physics inthe Arabic World. With anEdition Parts s Commentary on the oftheUnpublished ofAvempace' Leiden1994. Physics, 45SeeAristotle, Al-tabVah Cairo1964,2 vols.,2:624.18, tr.H.I. Ishãq,ed.CA.Badawí, 23. Becauseofthefirst-person to thenote("I askedofAbücAlr . . ."),Lettinck beginning 1994(op.cit., thespeaker withtheeditor oftheArabic above,n. 44),4-5associates Physics al-Basrï MS,Abü'1-Husayn (d. 1044). 46Ibid.,624.24-625.3 andff.

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points of the ancient controversy.The special nature of the celestial motionsis not acknowledged,nor are imaginability and genuine (physiin from one another. cal) possibility any way distinguished The situationis different with the AndalusianphilosopherAvempace , we find (Ibn Bãjjah, d. 1138). In Avempace's commentaryon the Physics unmistakable thoughanonymous referenceto the problemsraised in the earlierdiscussion.What is more,we encounterforthe firsttime the formulation thatis to crop up laterin Aquinas. The problem,Avempace avers,is that apparently"thereexistsa fastestmotion,i.e. that which is In Avempace's actual daily";thatis, the rotationof the outermostsphere.47 a would Aristode's seriouslydamage argueyes, single counterexample mentin Physics 6, since a maximumand minimumvelocitywould entail His point is thereforenot a minimumtime and minimumextension.48 thatfromimpossiblepremisesimpossibleconclusionsfollow,but thatconclusionsotherthan what Aristotlehad wanted appear to be warranted. The questionforAvempaceis whetherthereis a minimaland/ormaximal extensionof timeand/or space afterall; it would seem to have little to do withthe matterof indirectargumentation. Nevertheless, Avempace's commentsproved to be both inspiringand importantfroman historical perspective.Avempace contendsthat time is indivisiblenot insofaras it is time,but only insofaras it is connectedto motion.49Is motion itself then somethingdiscrete?This would be hard to believe,since time and motion in the Aristoteliananalysisare treatedequivalendythroughout. Rather,we must interpretAvempace as sayingthat it is the specifically thathave ascertained movements of thevariouskindsof existents determined limits.Accordingto Avempace,timeand motionwhenconsideredin themselvescould alwaysbe fasteror slower,sincetheiraccelerationor retardation ad infinitum always amountsto merelya potential,not an actual infinite. The distinction betweengenericpossibilitiesand specificimpossibilities hinted at by Avempace is given a more elaborate treatmentby Abü '1-Walrd Ibn Rushd (theLatinAverroes,1126-1198).Whatis more,Averroes 47Avempace, Beirut1978,80.6.(Thetext ed. M. Ziyãdah, Shuruhãt al-samãc al-tabï'ï, is richly useofAvempace noteadloc.)Albert's here:seeZiyädah's corrupt maybe slightly so in this oftheoutermost bearsno mention buthiscommentary documented, sphere, Albert forhimself, either readAvempace case(1)Aquinas by (2) heardofhisviewsfrom motion ofthedaily theexample or(3)cameacross oforalcommunication, independently. way 48Itis notaltogether sincetheheavens tofollow, clearhowthisis supposed onlyassign "wherever to themaxim subscribes tovelocity. an upperlimit simply Perhaps Avempace there is alsoa minimum." is a maximum, there 49Avempace, al-samac Shuruhat 81.1-2andff. al-tabicii

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treatsthe problemsof Physics 6.2 and 7.1 together,claimingthat explicitly Aristotleused the same kind of argumentin both. Averroes'habit of systematisingAristotlemakes him a key figurein the ongoingdebate. , Averroesmentionsthe Alreadyin the early Compendium of thePhysics raised with to His solutionat first 232b21. exegeticalproblem regard 6.2, sightlooks to be influencedby Avempace. Accordingto Averroes,with regard to the thingbeingmovedeverymotion could be fasteror slower, since thereis nothingin the natureof body itselfthatwould preventthis. But thenAverroesconcursthat it is the factthat thereis no more powin existencethan the Prime mover which makes the prime erfulmover mobile's assumed velocitythe fastestone and a fastervelocityan acciIn keepingwithSimplicius dental- thoughnot an essential impossibility.50 and the Neoplatonictraditionin general,Averroesconcursthatit is always the prior and active component(mind, soul, actuality)that determines the limitsin relationto the posteriorand more passive (matter,elemental motion,or- as here- celestialaether). Averroesmakes it clear that to As for Physics7.1, in the Compendium him that argumentpresupposesthe conclusionsreached in book 6. The firstpremisein Aristotle'sargument,thatwhich concernedthe divisibility of themovedbody,refersback to the divisibility 113.9of motion.[Epitome, It is this that makes the premiseinitiallyplausible.Averroesadmits 11.) to some puzzlementover the formof Aristotle'spurportedproofin Physics 7.1 and the "doubts expressedwith regardto thispassage" (115.19): Ifitis shown thatthereis something whichis prohibited from to rest,as coming - werethatI Aristotle thenhow bodies, [tobe thecase]withtheheavenly thought - can theimpossible knew! herebe posited If thisis so, ifrestis as thepossible? forsomemovedthings, ... itis an imaginary rather thana impossible [then] proof, demonstration. [true] (116.2-6.) This recallsa questionraisedin Avempace'scommentary, wherethe more precise claim is made that for the heavens it is impossiblethat a part shouldcome to rest,(iShurühät , 118.3-9.)Avempace solvesthe problemby in recourse abstraction: it is truethat "it is not possibleforfireto taking be cold, but this [is so only] on account of it being fire,not on account of it being a body or on account of it being [something]moved" (119.23). Similarlythe heavens. Admittedly,a part of them cannot come to rest,but this is not due to them being moved objects. Instead, "if we posit a body moved in a circle,it cannot come to rest due to the fact 50See Averroes, inPhysicorum libros , ed.J. Puig,Madrid1983,92.13ff. Epitome

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that we [at once also] posit that its motion has no contrary"(119.4-5). The conclusionthat the circularbody has an externalmover necessarily follows.Averroes'solutionfollowsalong similarlines: from it is notprois prohibited We saythatifa movedbodysomewhere resting, as itis movedin a specific as itis moved, butinsofar hibited from doingso insofar - I [might] "insofar as itsmover is eternal" or "insofar as fashion say,forinstance, Asfaras itsbeingmovedis concerned, itcouldbe at ithasno contrary". however, as it is hereis assumed insofar as it is possible, notinsofar rest.Thusthepossible 116.7-11.) impossible. (Epitome, The two examples account for the immaterial(active) and the material (passive)componentsin eternalmotionand thus furnishus with a comof celestialrest.Again the immeprehensiveargumentforthe impossibility But Averroes claims thatAvempace's diate parallelsare with Simplicius. of this passage, too, agrees with his own; and indeed, at interpretation least the contrastingof the more general with the more specificagrees withwhat we findin Avempace. At this stage Averroesclearlybelieved thatthe "abstraction"solutionand the idea of metaphysicalnecessitation converge,at least when talk is of eternalthings.51 remarksthat "the volIn an interestingaside, Averroesoffhandedly umes of existentsare definite"(114.9). This puts us in mind of Aquinas' claim in the contextof Physics6.2 that the motionsof thingsare determined.What was said in that contextcould easilybe extrapolatedon to the question about volume. For just as there can be no motion faster than the one executedby the outermostsphere,so therecan be no volume greaterthan thatof the outermostheaven,whichcontainsthe whole worldwithinitself.However,one could also raise a questionhere,namely, how should we understandAristotle'sremarksthatwe can alwaysimagAverroes'state?52In my understanding, ine, e.g., a largerman ad infinitum an explanation a from ment is best construedas followingas corollary given "in the abstractsense" similarto what Avempace had proposed. divisible(just as motion in itselfis Though body in itselfis infinitely 51Averroes in explaining from Aristode fordeviating seesfitto reprimand Avempace hadcorsinceAvempace finds thisallthemoreastonishing, Averroes , 6.2,232b21. Physics corIfI understand Averroes thequestion solved , 7.1(116.13-16). Physics concerning rectly does work is duetothefactthatAvempace intheearly hisquarrel withAvempace rectly, of in hisexplanation motions ofcelestiali thecausaldetermination stress notsufficiently 232b21. 6.2, , Physics 52Physics thanitis theworldcouldbe larger ofwhether , 3.8,208a16-17.Thequestion on thepagesoftheTahãfiit andAverroes al-Ghazâlï between fired up a heatedexchange andtheTahäßit al-tahäßit (87ff.). (37.17ff.) al-falãsifah

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infinitely divisible),all particularbodies even those of the elements(cf. 114.3-11) have a maximum and minimumvolume; and likewisethe motionsof thosebodies. The cases of motion,time,and extensioncan be handledequivalendy.Here as in othercontexts,the allusionto existenceor "being" (iwujüd ) in Averroes is not accidental. While extensionin the abstractsense is indefinite (it can be anythingbut infinite), any truebeing is by definitiondeterminate.To relyon thinkingin these kindsof cases is absurd,as Aristotlemighthave put it (cf. Phys.3.8, 208a 15): what we need to thinkabout when assessingtruepossibilities is what the real world is like and what the limitationspertainingto its actual existentsare.53 In the later, more extensiveCommentary on Aristotle's , Averroes Physics stateshis case more carefully when it comes to explainingAristode'schoice it is now clear that Averroeshas of words in Physics6.2. Furthermore, recourseto Alexander'scommentary,for he reproducesthe exact same two explanationsas Simpliciusdoes (bk. 6, comm. 15, in: AOACC 4:fol. 255L-256A). As Averroesnow explainsthe situation: we saythatevery in so faras it is movedcanbe movedbya faster movedthing motion thantheoneitpossesses in so faras [this] is a motion. The causeforthis is thatmotion is of[a] continuous andvelocity, which is inmotion, is sim[nature] ilar[inrespect ofbeing]continuously divisible. continuJustas divisibility proceeds so alsovelocity in motion. . . . [Aristotle's] therefore, ouslyuntoinfinity, proposition is possible in itself, thatis to say,as occurswhenmotion impossible accidentally: takesplacein natural, i.e.material things.54 We should take Aristotle'sreasoningin the passage to concernmotionin the mostgeneral,most abstractsense; not thisor thatmotion,but rather motion considered simplyas motion.55Only when we proceed to the specificmovementsof a certain type of materialbody (like man, or a specificcelestialsphere) can we begin to assign upper and lower limits to the velocityit may assume. But thenwe are alreadyhandlingmatters 53See R. Glasner, IbnRushd's in: ArabicSciencesand naturalia, ofminima theory 11,1 (2001),9-26. Philosophy, 54"... dicamus secundum estutmoueaquodomnemotum quodestmotum possibile turmotuvelociori suo motusecundum Et causain hocest,quoniam quodestmotus. motus estde continuo, etvelocitas, estsimilis in continuo. diuisibilitati quaeestin motu, diuisibilitas in continuo in infinitum, similiter in velocitas Quemadmodum igitur procedit motu. . . . istapropositio estpossibilis scilicet perse,impossibilis peraccidens, quiaaccidit idestmaterialibus." In Phys., bk.6, comm.15,in: motui, quodfuitin rebusnaturalibus, AOACC , 4:fol.255K-L. 55Cf.InPhys., bk.5,comm. estinCaeloet 45,in:AOACC, 4,fol.235C:". . . declaratum coelestis nullam habetinsediuersitatem. Etad hocdicendum Mundo, quodmotus corporis estcorporis secundum noninquantum est,quodhocproprium coelestis, quodcoeleste, motum. Etsermo inhoclocoestdemotu, nonsecundum alicuius quodestmotus corporis."

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on the species,not on the genus level. Similarly,certainpossibilitiesthat could be said to apply to the species (forinstanceman, who qua man of may sit or stand) mightnot be applicable to a certainrepresentative thatspecies (say Zayd, who qua sittingcannot be standing).In each case, narrowdown the scope of possibilities.On the materialconditionsfurther this model we can handle certaingeneral philosophicalnotionson the of physicalexisconceptuallevel withoutever bringingthe particularities tence into the equation; and thisis just what Aristotledoes in the probcould also lematicpassages in the Physics. However,just thischaracteristic do not be broughtup againstthe explanation.If the proofsin the Physics talk about actual mobile objects,what do theytalk about? andAverroes on Physics7.1 5. Avicenna With this,we shiftonce more fromPhysics6.2 to 7.1 and at the same time fromAverroes,via Aquinas, to Avicenna. In commentingon how Aristotle's prooffrompartsrestingand the whole movingshouldbe interon thePhysics firstanonymouslyrecounts preted,Aquinas in his Commentary we have a solutionthat looks like a dead ringerfor the interpretation to Avempace and Averroes:"even ifit is impossiblethata part attributed be at restwithrespectto some determinatenature- insofaras it is a body - thisis nevertheless of a certainspecies,forexample the heavens or fire not impossible,if the common nature of body is considered.For body as body is not prohibitedfrombeing at restor moving."56 bothof which Aquinas thenreportstwo objectionsto thisinterpretation, he creditsto Ibn Smä (Avicenna,980-1037). The firstobjectionis simple and to the point. If Aristotlehad in mind anythinglike the genusspecies distinction,then he would have had no need for the further concerningparts and wholes, "because it can just as mind-experiment well be said that the whole body is not preventedfrombeing at rest". The "speakingin the abstract"line of defencethusrendersthe argument of Physics7.1 superfluous(it need not affectour reading of 6.2).57 The 56"Huicautem sitpartem obviare obiectioni dicendo, quodlicetimpossibile aliquis posset utputa estcorpustalisspeciei, determinatam secundum naturam, inquantum quiescere consideretur: si ratiocommunis velignis, nonesttarnen caelum quia corporis impossibile, InPhys velmoveri." nonprohibetur ., bk.7, Aquinas, quiescere corpus, corpus, inquantum cap. 1,lect.1,n. 5. 57"Primo quodnonprohibetur possetdicide totocorpore, quidemquiapariratione fuitassumere de parte;et itasuperfluum ex hocquodcorpus est,sicutdicitur quiescere In Phys mobilis et quietem divisionem ad probationem ., bk.7, cap. 1, partis." propositi lect.1,n. 5.

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second objection cuts right across the board. According to Aquinas, Avicenna is dissatisfied with the whole practiceof thispurportedgenuslevel talk of possibilities:for a proposition is simply reduced to impossibility ifthepredicate is repugnant to the becauseofa specific evenifit is notrepugnant to it becauseof difference, subject itsgenus.Foritis impossible that"man"be irrational, eventhough he is notprefrom vented becausehe is an animal. Henceitis simply beingirrational impossible thata partofa moving forthisis contrary tothenature bodybe at rest[by]itself: ofsucha body,evenifitis notcontrary ofbody.58 to thecommon nature The way Aquinas talksabout predicates"being repugnantto the subject" lends the analysisa logical flavour.59 Bracketingfromthe argumentits what we features, get is this. An account of motion in context-specific the abstractpurportsto speak about motionconsideredsimplyas motion. But thereis reallyno such thing;one can only findin existencethis or thatmovingbody. And no matterwhat movingbody one takes,the rule applies that for it to move essentially,a part of it cannot be at rest.It is altogetherfutileto speak about motion- about anything,forthatmatter- in general or "in the abstract",if these abstractionshave no conceivableinstantiation. 7 purportsto talkabout movingbodies. But Physics since one cannot apply the suggestedpropositionto anymovingbodythereis so to speak no conceivable model of the world that one could constructwhich would make the hypothesisreasonable- the premiseis indeed impossibleand Aristotle'sproof(thusunderstood)self-defeating. What followsnext in Aquinas' commentaryis equally remarkable. Aquinas contendsthat it was Avicenna's objectionsthat led Averroesto with regard to Physics7.1.60 This calls for posit another interpretation immediatecomment. First,it is clear that the objections recorded by Aquinas are indeed pertinentwithregardto the solutionchampionedby Averroes,especiallyifwe considerhow centralexistencewas forAverroes in the scheme of scientificexplanation.But of course, Avicenna cannot have been objectingto Averroes(an impressionAquinas, for his part, triesto avoid);neitherdoes AverroesevokeAvicennain any of his accounts 58"Secundoquia redditur si praedicatum aliquapropositio simpliciter impossibilis, subiecto ratione differentiae nonrepugnei ei ratione repugnet specificae, quamvis generis. Estenimimpossibile nonimpediatur irrationalis esse quodhomositirrationalis, quamvis ex hocquodestanimal. Sic igitur estquodparscorporis moventis simpliciter impossibile rationem taliscorporis, licetnonsitcontra rationem seipsum quiescat, quiahocestcontra communem In Phys ., bk.7, cap. 1,lect.1,n. 5. corporis." Aquinas, 59It alsoreminds us ofthe"mutually destructive introduced hypotheses" byAlexander. Whenreadin thisway,onecouldalmost in words saythattheLatinAvicenna, phrased is in factresponding to a suggestion madebyAlexander. Thomas, by60 originally In Phys., bk.7, cap. 1,lect.1,n. 6. Aquinas,

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of Physics7.1. It would thus seem naturalto treatAquinas' account as a construction ratherthan a reconstruction of a debate among the Arabs.61 One mightalso be temptedto doubt the authenticity of the attribution of the objectionsreportedby Aquinas to Avicenna. However, the Arabic editionof the Physics of Avicenna'sShiß' allows us to observethat frombook 2, ch. 1 of that work. A Aquinas is quoting almost verbatim considerationof motionas motionwould applyjust as well to the whole as to any one of its parts; for what is the whole, but the sum of its ), parts?62As for the possibilityof consideringmotion in itself(ibi-dhãti-hi Avicenna anonymouslypresentsone possible interpretation of the proof whichcorrespondscloselyto the one foundin Aquinas againstself-motion (or Avempace, or Averroes): . . . perhaps couldbe movedessentially, andwecanimagine itspartrestsomething as it is partofsomeas it is a body,whilethisis notpossible insofar inginsofar evenifitis possible that movedessentially andaccording toitsnature. thing Again, this[happen] to itinsofar as itis a natural body,it mayyetbe thatit is notpos- itsassumption This as itis a particular is evenimpossible. sibleforitinsofar body is notprohibited insofar as he is an aniresembles thecaseofman,whoseflying insofar as he is a man.63 mal,butis prohibited But Avicenna is not satisfied:for "when somethingis prohibited,then fromsupposingan impossibility anotherimpossiblesuppositionfollows". of Physics 7.1, after Consequently,thiscannotbe the correctinterpretation all. Imaginingsomethingto be the case has no use for us, if the imagined thingcannot actuallycome to pass; in thisparticularcase, imagining somethingto come to a halt is inadmissible"insofaras it is impossible forit to restin actual reality".64 should be thought By Avicenna's account, a refutationof self-motion kind of counterfactual than the one the to employan altogetherdifferent or what he should have said (since What Aristotle said, Peripateticsposit. 61Aquinas' infactreveal awareofwhatheis doing. thatheis fully strategies expository forward the"abstraction" in other Averroes withputting Although placescredits Aquinas thatsolution After to first herehe hasto resort this, solution, anonymously. presenting thiscanAverroes andonlyafter counter withhistwoobjections; hasAvicenna Aquinas somemorerefined comments. topresent arrive on thescenein hisownperson, 3 al-tabi'i, 62Avicenna, Cairo1983,88.12ff. ed. S. Zãyid& I. Madkür, Al-sama 3 al-tabïcï, 63Avicenna, is more Al-samã 89.2-5.We maynotethatAquinas'argument - whole in scopethanAvicenna's: whileAquinasholdsthatthe"partresting universal that Avicenna's is impossible forall moving bodies, suggests example moving" hypothesis bodies. forcertain itis onlyimpossible moving 64"... inna-mã Al-samã3 al-tabïcï fì'1-wujüd": sukünu-hu , 88.16.The Avicenna, yastahïl thathe withwhich theterm suggests (yawhumu ) cropsup inAvicenna imagine frequency in YahyãIbncAdr's school. in response to thediscussion is writing

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Avicenna'sPhysics is a systematic workand not properlyspeakinga comon it is to determinewhetherhe means to difficult mentary Aristotle, attributethis superiorargumentto Aristotle)is that if a thingwith no externalimpedimentto its motionscould move itself,then therewould be no way forit to stop. But as it is in fact conceivableforeverybody to come to a halt (the corporeal creature'sontologicalimperfection is allow in to for it follows that motion is moved this), enough everything by somethingelse, and that eternal motionsmust be implementedby immaterialeternalmovers.65The argumentis thus effectively turnedon its head. Instead of therebeing a problemwiththe apparentimplication that the heavens mightact otherwisethan they do, that is the whole is used to demonstratethe corporeal point. The prooffromself-motion heavens' reliance on more divine principles.The interpretation reflects even as it ties the self-motion Neoplatonicsensibilities, argumentagainst in withthe infinite 8.10. Simpliciushad earlier power argumentof Physics put forwarda similarsuggestion,and in the Arabic commentarytradition thissolutionis recommendedby Abü '1-FaräjIbn al-Tayyib(d. 1044).66 What are we to make of all this? Some general observationspresent themselves.In lightof the fact that the words "genus" and "species" do not occur in the Arabic at thispoint in eitherAvicenna or Averroes,we may surmisethat Aquinas independentlycompared the accounts of the and Averroes'Commentary and set them in a systematicframeSufficientia work.But thena moreinteresting questionarises.How was it thatAquinas could compile his textualevidence in thismanner?If Avicenna knew of the "motionin the abstract"defencewell enough to refuteit already a centurybeforeAvempace (a centuryand a half beforeAverroeswrote his long Commentary ), thenone would assumethata commonsourceunderlies both accounts.Althoughthe mattercannot be pursued here in any length,a recentstudyby ChristopherMartinwould seem to indicatethat of thisapproachin naturalphilosophy.67 Philoponusis theultimateinstigator 3 ()5Avicenna, Al-sama in a morestraightforward alal-tabici, 89.6ff.; fashion, similarly Cairo 108.6-109.5. 1938, JVajãh, 66See InPfys., 1040.16-1041.4 andAristotle, I owethelatter ref2:741. 24ff. Al-tabicah, erence to Lettinck 1994(op.cit.,above,n. 44),514-15. 67Although thepreserved ofthefourlastbooksofPhiloponus' (inArabic) fragments onthePhysics reveal thatwouldresemble the"abstraction" commentary nothing approach, Martin hasuncovered hints towards intheCorollary onthe intriguing justsucha procedure Void : seeC.J.Martin, theImpossible: Non-Reductive Thinking from Arguments Impossible Hypotheses inBoethius andPhiloponus Studies inAncient Thesub, in:Oxford , 17(1999),279-302. Philosophy further jectmerits study.

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7.1 clearlytroubled of Physics As forAverroes,the correctinterpretation the Commentator'smindfora long time.We can appreciatethisfromthe dedicatedto thetopic.Averroes numberand rangeoftextstheCommentator also tellsus as much himselfin the Paraphrase , which dates of thePhysics fromthe middleperiod of his philosophicalcareer.Averroesconfessesto havingbeen puzzled at firstabout how Aristotle's proofshouldbe tackled. Since then,he has come upon Alexander'scommentson the passage,and he is now pleased to reportthatAlexanderagreeswithwhatAverroeshimself had earlier writtenon the subject.68If we accept the conventional chronologyof Averroes'writings,the allusion to confusionwould refer Since Averroes'understanding of thestrucmainlyto the earlyCompendium. 7.1 has been analysedby Helen Tunik Goldstein tureand aims of Physics in a separatestudy,I will not go into the detailsof that questionhere.69 I willonlypointout a fewdetailspertainingto the subjectofperimpossibile , Averroestookover from arguments.It seemsthatin the earlyCompendium as well as the Avempace the rudimentsof the genus-speciesdistinction, of the mover that is the decisive notion that it is the power (Neoplatonic) textand withAlexander's factor.BecomingbetteracquaintedwithAristotle's commentsled Averroesto reconsiderand revise,but not rejectthisbasic explanatorymodel. In Averroes'laterworks,the "abstraction"solutionis emphasisedand thelate ancientidea of ontologicalreliancecorrespondingly de-emphasised.There are some originalfeaturesto Averroes'approach Averroes claimsto thecontrary, as well.Unphasedby Alexander'srhetorical 7.1 is directedagainst is well aware of the factthatthe argumentof Physics of absoluteselfAverroesconsidersthe impossibility Plato's self-movers.70 bimotionto be an establishedfact,somethingalmostself-evident (macrüf - and here the Commentator takes sides Most again ).71 nafsi-hi importandy againstAlexander Averroesin his later worksis adamant on the point Let us examine 7.1 does indeed argueperimpossibile. thatAristodein Physics Averroes'consideredview of proofsfromimpossiblepremisesand how theyare employedin Aristotle'snaturalphilosophy. 68The passageis onlyextant translation offered in Hebrew: see theEnglish byH.T. ' Dordrecht inPhysics inAverroes Goldstein 1991,48. , ed. andtr.H.T. Goldstein, Questions offered totheQuestions thecopious annotation benefited from hasgready Thepresent study Goldstein. by69 Volume VII, 1, in:Harry andFunction SeeAverroes ontheStructure Austryn Jubilee ofPhysics 1, 7 & 8). 1965,335-55(seealsothenotesto Questions One, Jerusalem 70See Questions ad loc. comments inPhysics , q. 1,§6,andGoldstein's 71See thelongCommentary ontheMetaphysics , bk.9, comm.2; fortheviewthatthedisis something evident forchange activeandpassive tinction between (ma'rüf), esp. potency 4 vols., al-tabïcah mãbacd theArabictextin Tafsír , ed. M. Bouyges, S.J.,Beirut1938-52, 2:1110.3-7.

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6. Averroes onAristotle's indirect arguments In an earlywork on logic Averroesoutlinesthe correctprocedurein an We firstassumethecontraargument"throughtheimpossible"as follows.72 a want to prove. From thisstateof statement whose we validity dictory mentand fromotherpremisesknownto be truewe thenderive,through a valid syllogistic figure,an impossibleconclusion.Since the impossibility cannot resultfromthe valid premise(s)or fromthe logical form,it is thereby must originatein the originalstatement,whose contradictory shown to be true. Averroesuses this explanationconsistendyin dealing structurein Phys. with Physics7.1, and he findsthe same argumentative 8.5, 256b3-12,whereAristotleaims to prove thatthe primemotioncanAverroesis additionallyof the opinion that Aristotle not be accidental.73 uses proofsof thiskind in his physicalworks.This makes the repeatedly perimpossibile argumentan importanttool fornaturalphilosophy,even if methodof sciencepropter it does not followthe demonstrative quid™ in naturalphilosophyis treated The questionof indirectargumentation in the eighthof the physicalQuestions editedby Goldstein. mostextensively Here, Averroespicks forinspectionyet anothercontroversialpassage in the Physics , namely,the infinitepower argumentof Physics8.10. Physics 7.1 is explicitlycited as a parallel (§12), but Averroesalso detectsa sim(§10) as well as ilaritywiththe questionof increasingvolume indefinitely with the problem found in Physics6.2, ostensiblybecause talk is once more of dividingbodies and therebymotions.How can such a division be carriedon to infinity, as Aristotlesuggestswe imagine happening? BeforeconsideringAverroes'answer,it is usefulto make note of his moregeneralconcern.Accordingto Averroes, certainmaterialist Avicennians had argued that since the infinitepower argumentis invalid,the most we can reach by the aid of Aristotle'sprooffrommotionis a corporeal FirstMover- i.e., the outermostheaven. Confusionabout Aristotle'sargumentationwould thereforehave led to serious consequences. (§§6-7.) If thisclaim has any historicalmerit,thenwe willhave reacheda paradoxical conclusion.Galen's aim in arguingagainst Aristotle'sway of reasoning 72Cf.theLatinEpitome inLibros Aris totelis,in:AOACC, 1.2b&3:fol.50F-G;an Logicae ' Three translation oftheArabicoriginal is offered inAverroes Short Commentaries on English Aristotle's and"Poetics", ed. andtr.C. Butterworth, "Rhetoric," 1977,106-7. "Topics," Albany SincetheArabictitleoftheworktranslates as What is necessary inlogic theLatindesignationoftheworkas a commentary is slightly Butterworth ispreparing a critical misleading. Arabicedition andEnglish translation oftheentire textforpublication. 73See Averroes, In Phys., 4: fol.375K-M. 8, comm.36,in:AOACC, 74Cf. Questions, comesclosest to describing, and endorsing, this q. 8, §§5-6.Aristotle method ofinquiry in De cáelo1.12,281b3-15.

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was to make room for the existenceof (separate and immaterial)selfmovingsouls. Yet his objectionshad given rise to a seriesof discussions that would finallylead some (Muslim)thinkersto materialismand atheism. The resultcan be consideredironic.75 Averroes'own understanding of the infinitepower argumentwas subNevertheless,a uniformpictureof the proof's ject to several revisions.76 variedaccounts. structure underlies all of the Commentator's argumentative as our guide. In the firstplace, to the We shall use the eighthQuestion Commentatorit is evidentthat the thoughtthat the forceof the heavfalse. But is this enly motionbe doubled, quadrupled,etc., is manifestly a "possible" or an "impossible"falsehood?(§8.) Since Averroesroutinely and since talk is here gave the modal termsa temporalinterpretation,77 of eternalentities,one would assume that it is an impossibleone. In the Compendium , where Averroesdiscussesyet another oftheDe cáelo - thefamous indirectargumentofAristotle's argumentfortheworld'sincor- Averroes the distinction as follows.An impossiblefalseexplains ruptibility hood positsthatsomethingwhichcannotat all existexists,whilea possible falsehoodpositsthat somethingwhich does not exist,exists.An example of a possiblefalsehoodis when we say that Zayd is in the market,when in facthe is not.78This suggeststhatthe possiblefalsehoodis to be inter, the same example is pretedin temporalterms.In the Tahãfiital-tahãfiit When we an say that something temporal interpretation. given explicidy untrue is nonethelesspossible, we mean that it is true at some other thesubstance time.79Finally,in the sixthof Averroes'treatisesConcerning of Aristotle'sDe cáeloargumentis tied in with the infinite thecelestial sphere power argumentof Physics8.10 and both are subjected to a temporal 3LostTreatise 75ForAverroes' Mover onthe Prime Averroes concerns seeH.A.Wolfson, , repr. inWolfson 1973(op.cit., i,in:C. Steel above,n. 31),402-29andDe separatione primi prìncipi Cause. Edition and the Avwennians onthe First Anunknown treatise & G. Guldentops, against ofAverroes et Philosophie translation de Théologie médiévales, 64, 1 (1997),86-135. , in:Recherches 76See thecomments Existence inH.A.Davidson, , andthe , Creation ofGod Proofs forEternity andIslamic inMedieval 1987,311-35. , Oxford Philosophy Jewish 77I havediscussed Averroes Tahãfut al-tahãfut. Worlds inthe ofthisinPossible someaspects ofPhilosophy, oftheHistory onPlenitude andPossibility 38, 3 (2000),329-47. , in:Journal London & NewYork1991, inherIbnRushd remarks Cf.alsoDominique (Averroes), Urvoy's 95-98. 78Kiíãbal-samã3 Beirut1994,6 vols.,2in: Rasã3il IbnRushd wa-'l-cãlam, al-falsqfyyah, in theParaphrase Likewise 3:51.19-52.1. , bk.1,ch. 10,hd.2, pt.3: Arabic oftheDe Cáelo Fez 1984,157.14-158.13 ed.J. al-Dïnal-cAlawî, al-samã3 textin Talkhïs wa-'l-cãlam, (Latin Aristotelis libros De Caelo inquattuor inAverrois Cordubensis translation , in:AOACC, paraphrasis 5:fol.289B-C). 79Tahafut cf.Aristotle, , 93.8-95.3; §1 above. al-tahafat

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treatment.The heavens must be eternallyactual and all theirpotencies forotherwisean impossibleconclusionwould follow:for infinite, ofthose ifthereexisted in thecelestial bodiesa potentiality, thentheassumption have thattheheavens whosubscribe to thisview,thatis,theproposition affirming foritis thenature is a proposition thatis falsebutpossible, beendestroyed, already at sometime.Andifthispropoofpotentiality andpossibility tobecomeactualised thatis absurd and thenthere wouldfollow from ita conclusion sition werecorrect, Butit has already thatsomething eternal hasbeendestroyed. namely, impossible, no inthePrior a proposition thatis falsebutpossible thatfrom beenshown Analytics canfollow.80 absurd conclusion Both the De cáeloproof and the argumentof Phys.8.10 thereforeprove The whole point of these argutheirpoint by reasoningper impossibile. mentsis to posit a syllogismwith an impossibleconclusion,so the false premisewe are tryingto locate must be impossibleas well (q. 8, §8). time So, is the assumptionof motionaccelerated(and correspondingly, an assumptionwhich by any argumenton the lines divided)ad infinitum - also the of De cáelo1.12 can be shownto be impossible premiseat fault it is not. This in Physics8.10? Accordingto the eighthphysicalQuestion perhaps surprisingconclusionis due to a furtherdistinction.The Commentatorclaims that in addition to possible and impossiblefalsehoods, betweenaccidentaland absoluteimpossibilities. one mustalso distinguish From an accidentalimpossibility follows, only an accidentalimpossibility and likewisefroman absoluteimpossibility onlyan absoluteimpossibility. - thatmotion Now the conclusionof the argumentin questionin Aristotle mighttake place in an instant is absolutelyimpossible.It cannot thereforehave come about fromthe merelyaccidentalimpossibility of motion being acceleratedindefinitely: in thissyllogism It is obvious thatthepremise thatproduced theself-contradiction, withtheproposition whosenegation is intended, is essentially but together possible becauseno motion thanthediurnal faster motion accidentally impossible, [actually] exists. Butinasmuch as theconclusion inferred from thissyllogism isabsolutely imposcannotbe inferred from theproposition thatis sible,we knowthatthisconclusion butaccidentally Theimpossible conclusion, therefore, essentially possible impossible. canbe inferred the[other] theassumption onlyfrom posited, assumption namely, ofan indivisible time.81 80Averroes' De Substantia orbis. Critical Edition Text with Translation and oftheHebrew English andCambridge, Mass.1986,English text , ed. andtr.A. Hyman, Commentary Jerusalem text11.19-22). 125-26(Hebrew pp. 81Questions withminor In whatis probably alterations. a later , q. 8, §11;tr.Goldstein, addendum totheearlyCompendium is usedto explain the , thesamestructure ofthePhysics thatan infinite cannot ina finite reside inphysicorum libros , proof potency body:seeEpitome 148.1 withMSS m&q. Off., reading

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Averroes'conceptionthusemergesas a fairlysophisticated systemof counterfactual In the Commentator's mind,we can mostfullyutilise reasoning. the valid syllogistic tables when we carefullyrecord the modal statusof every constituentof the syllogismwe are handling.This way, we can determinethe statusof a premisewhose modalityis unknownto us, even when arguingperimpossibile. Information about the real world,meanwhile, can and should be used to deriveinformation about the knownpremises, as happens here in the case of consideringimaginaryacceleratedmotion. The fact that the daily motion is the most rapid one makes a faster motiona defactoimpossibility It not, however,an absoluteimpossibility. is, to recall a passage cited earlier,one of the thingsthat are "impossible only accidentally,as happens when motion takes place in natural is due to materialconditionswe have things,in matter."Its impossibility alreadyposited as obtainingin our world. We may wrap up our assessmentof Averroesby consideringtwo tighdy argued passages in the Paraphrase of theDe cáelo.In explainingAristotle's in De cáelo where it is per impossibile 2.14, argument supposed that the earth is generated"in the manner some naturalphilosophersascribe to it" (297a 12-13), Averroesremarksthat in this argumentthe premiseis not supposed "insofaras it is impossible,but only insofaras it is possible", even thoughwe know it is both false and impossible.In such a case, Averroes assures us, no absurditywill befall us.82A litde later, Aristodesets out to refutethe way the Tvmaeus produces physicalelementsout of geometricalshapes (ultimately, pointsand lines). But when Aristodesays that "a heavy thingmay alwaysbe heavierthan something and a lightthinglighterthansomething"(3.1, 299a30-31),Averroesdetects yet anotherimpossiblepremise:forthe physicalelementsdo have minimal extension(cf. §4 above), and therefore, minimalweight. Butifthisis so,thenthepossible inthissyllogism is posited as itis posonlyinsofar as itis impossible. WhatI meanis thathereitis assumed thatthe sible,notinsofar canbe divided as itis heavy, notinsofar as itisfireorearth. And heavy onlyinsofar noimpossibility results from theassumption ofa possibility insofar as itisa possibility.83 Averroesagain stressesthat similardemonstrations are oftenutilisedby Aristodein the natural sciences.84These two examples reiteratefor us 3 wa-'l-'alam 82Talkhis al-samã 5:fol. , bk.2, pt.4, ch.7, Ar.text274.4-12 (Lat.AOACC, cf. In De bk.2, comm.104,LatintextinAOACC, 5:fol.167AÍT. Cáelo, 312H-I); 83Talkhis al-sama3 wa-'l-calam ,5:fol. , bk.3,pt.3,ch.1,Ar.textp. 289.14-17 (Lat.AOACC 315F). 3 wa-'l-'älam 84Talkhis 5:fol. al-sama , bk.3, pt.3, ch. 1,Arabictext290.3(Lat.AOACC, 315G).

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to Avicenna, thefactthatAverroesconsidersit possible,in contradistinction to consider conceptual implicationson the generic as well as on the specificlevel. Evidendy this is done prior to assigningcertainmaterial conditions(e.g., the notionthatthereare exactlytwo heavy elements).It is all relativeto the context:for "like illnessmay be preferableto death, and yet illnessis not preferableabsolutely",as Averroes'example goes, so "certainthingswhich are small withoutqualificationare at the same time largerthan otherthings".85 7. Aquinas,AlbertofSaxony,and Buridan between"sepWe have foundthatAverroesutilisesa kind of distinction in in in and order to explicate arability thought" "separability actuality" Aristode'sreasoningperimpossibile. ChristopherMartinhas in anothercontextsuggestedthat thiskind of distinctioncould have rootsin Aristotle's Martindiscussesa curiouslyparallel developmentin the Latin De anima.m traditionat about the same time(the 12thcentury).In the earliestknown treatiseson obligationslogic- the Emmeranian treatises and the Parisianoblig- Aristotleis ations as the of quoted endorsing positing the impossible"in order that one may see what followsfromit." There is nothingin the preservedAristotleto exacdy reflectthis citation;but a somewhatsimilar principleis givenin Eudemus' name in Boethius'treatiseOn hypothetical syllogisms. There, the concessionof a hypothesiswhich is a condition in a sound consequence is contrastedwith a situationwhere a hypothesis "whichby no means can come to pass is yet conceded, in order that reason may be chased to its limits."87 It appearslikelythatBoethius'expositionand endorsement of Eudemian acted as main the Aristotelian for principles authority "positingthe imposfora certainkind of dissible",which again was used as a starting-point putationin 12th and especially 13th centuryteachingof logic. In the , the respondenthad the task of maintaininglogical conpositioimpossibilis even while sistency defendingan indefensibleproposition;the aim of the was to break thatconsistency. There came to be an understanding opponent thatsuch disputationscould be envisionedas a kindof logical laboratory, 3 85Averroes, Talkhis al-sama bk.3, pt.3, ch. 1,Arabictext288.23-24 wa-'l-calam, (Lat. AOACC 5:fol. De cáelo3.1,299b4-5. , Aristotle, 315C); 86C.J.Martin, andLiars inMedieval andGrammar , in:S. Read(ed.),Sophisms Obligations , Logic at 359(Martin alsorecalls and7.10-11). 1029a7-19 Dordrecht, 1993,357-78, Met., 7.3, 87Boethius, De Hypotheticis Brescia1969,5; cf.Martin 1993 , ed.L. Obertello, Syllogismis (op.cit.,above,n. 86),358-61.

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whereconceptualrelationscould be testedin unconventionalconditions.88 A distinction was also drawnin the earlyLatin traditionbetweenposforthe species or, to put the problem sibilityforthe genus and possibility between universalpossibilityand singularpossibility.But it differently, was used in a way directlyoppositeto Averroes'.For the Latins,something possible in a singularcase mightnot be possible universally.The lesson in this case is moralistic:thoughman may repressany particularsinful impulse,he cannot resistthem all. It is a remarkablecoincidencethat, e.g., someone like Simon of Tournai (in the 1160s) uses terminology of Averroes,even thoughboth the contextand Simon's closelyreminiscent intentare quite different.89 In lightof all this,it would hardlybe surprising to findconfusionwhen the twowaysof arguingperimpossibile and/or "in the abstract"converge,in of the mid to late 13thcentury.That such confusiondoes the scholasticism commonmay be creditedto the factthatin natural not seem particularly the Alexandrian-Arabic was clearlyprevalent exegeticaltradition philosophy, at first. We have alreadyseen that,e.g.,Thomas Aquinaswas wellinformed of the debate in the Arabic tradition.When explicatingAristotle'snatural philosophy,Aquinas, on the whole,seems to have been contentwith Averroes' "abstraction"solution,as a comparisonof theirPhysicscommentariesshows.90Aquinas' explanationof Physics7.1 is an exceptionto thisrule,althougheven here,his digressionappears to be mainlydue to the objectionsposited by Avicenna (cf. §5 above). But thereis a curious disputationsas well, as we findAquinas vestigeof the positioimpossibilis of Physics 7.1 in the followingmanner: Averroes' interpretation explaining and consequent are can be truewhoseantecedent He claimsthatan implication It is thereheis an irrational animal". likethisone:"Ifmanis a donkey, impossible, thatispresumed forsomething thatitis impossible foreconceded [inthisargument] as a wholeor in part, to cometo rest,either to moveitself justas itis impossible is valid: forfirenotto be hot,sinceitis thecauseofitsheat.Still,thiscondition comesto rest,thewholecomesto rest." "Ifa partofa mobile itself thing moving usestherestofa part nowhere ifhiswordsareconsidered ForAristotle, diligently, 88In addition in Read 1993[op.cit to thepaperscollected ., above,n. 86) see,e.g., andmedieval Positio M. Yijönsuuri, 1994,andS. Knuuttila, , Helsinki impossibilis Obligationes inMedieval Semiotics andLogic in:C. Marmo discussions , verba. imagines (ed.),Vestigia, ofthe trinity, Texts 1997,277-88. , Turnhout Theological 89SeeSimon's Louvain 1932,44,2 and60,1 (pp.128.28, ed.J.Warichez, Disputationes O. Lottin, cf.further ofthisnotion, Forthehistory 129.4and 170.26-171.3). Psychologie forthese I thank SimoKnuuttila etmorale auxXIIeetXIIIesueles , Louvain1948,2:508ff. references. 90See,e.g.,In Phys ., bk.4, cap.8, lect.12,n. 12;bk.6, cap. 2, lect.3, n. 9; bk.8, In Phys , 4:fol.359Iff.). ., bk.8, comm.23,AOACC cap.3, lect.5, n. 6 (cf.hereAverroes, theme. motions slower on thefaster/ arevariations Allthree passages

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theforce ofa conditional forthepurposes ofa statement proposition. having except thatBC comesto rest, but"oncondition Forhe doesnotsay"BC comesto rest", thatthepartcomes andagain:"oncondition itis necessary forAB tocometorest", Aristotle thisvalidimplication to rest,thewholecomesto rest".Andfrom proves [hisintended] proposition.91 case of as the hypothetical Aquinas' choice of exampledrawsour attention, therebeing a creaturewhichis a man as well as a donkeywas a favourite disputations.It was used to highlightcertain example in positioimpossibili and to question whetherone particular facetsof substance-metaphysics The covertinterestin these matterswas could have two essences. being But because Aristotle'sproofsdeal with and Trinitarian.92 Christological and naturaland not supernatural entities, because any talkof twosubstances is patentlyabsurd in the formercase, the analogy in the final analysis breaks down. One thereforehas to wonder what Aquinas is gettingat. What is crucial here is how Aquinas draws attentionto the fact that form(condition)is valid, even if its startingpoint is the bare syllogistic rules of conunsound. This in itselfis in line with the positioimpossibilis think that the statement talks be to we duct; mightaccordingly tempted constructed about some kind of conceptually(even if counter-intuitively) universe.But because Averroes' (in truth,Aquinas') response is placed afterthe objectionraisedby Avicenna,such a temptationis to be resisted. When viewed in context,Aquinas' intentbecomes clear. The point is preciselyto reiteratethat when arguingfromimpossiblepremises,one does not need to talk about any conceivableuniverseat all: one simply takesthe conditionas it is. Because it is positedas a condition,one need not care ifit is possible,accidentallyimpossible,or even essentiallyimpossible: one can simplystickto the realm of syntacticrelationsbetween propositionsand "see what follows".This readingerases the whole problem of actuallysupposingthatthe part restswhile the whole moves. The move representsa distortionof Aristotle,and it goes beyond even what Averroeshad posited;but it makes it possibleforAquinas to re-evaluate 91 . . . dicitquodaliquaconditionalis essevera,cuiusantecedens estimpossibile potest etconsequens sicutista:sihomo estasinus, estanimal irrationale. Concedendum est impossibile, estquod,si aliquodmobile movere ergoquodimpossibile ponitur seipsum, quodveltotum velparseiusquiescat; sicutimpossibile estignem nonessecalidum, hocquodest propter sibiipsicausacaloris. Undehaecconditionalis estvera:si mobilis moventis seipsum parsquitotum Aristoteles si verbaeiusdiligenter utiescit, autem, considerentur, quiescit. nunquam turquietepartis, nisiperlocutionem habentem vimconditionalis Nonenim propositionis. dicitquiescat BC, sednecesse AB, et iterum, est,BC quiescente, quiescere quiescente parte, quiescit totum : et ex hac conditionali demonstrai." In Phys vera,Aristoteles ., propositum Aquinas, inAverroes seeInPhys. 7,cap. 1,lect.1,n. 6. Fora parallel 7, comm.2, fol.307I-308C. 92See Knuuttila 1997(op.cit.,above,n. 88).

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the statusofAristotle's argument.Although"Averroessaysthatthisdemonstrationis not of the typeof simpliciter demonstrations but instead of the called demonstrations typeof demonstrations fromsignsor demonstrations in which certain conditions are , quia used",93Aquinas can revertto the view that Aristotle'sdemonstration may be propter quidafterall. Let us in closing brieflyexamine some other Latin views regarding Aristotle's indirectarguments.BenoîtPatar has recentlyeditedan Exposition and Questions onthePhysics whichhas traditionally been attributedto Albert of Saxony. In the expositionpart of thiswork,the distinctions made by Averroeswithregardto Physics 6.2, 232b21 are reproducedwithoutcomment. Motion, insofaras it is motion, does not exclude any velocity. When asked what mightwarrantsuch an exclusion,the author takes a liberal attitude:the motion of a specificbody, e.g., the celestialbody, may cause a specificvelocityto be impossible,but so may its mover.The writerdoes not differentiate betweenthe two alternatives.94 In the Questions the problemis not touchedupon anymore.The authordoes pick up one aspectofwhathad been Avempace'ssolution.Velocityincreasedad infinitum does not equal an infinitevelocity,since the term"infinite"should here be used categorematically, instead of syncategorematically.95 As for Physics7.1, the author of the Exposition and Questions evidently workswith the foregonetradition.He does not seem overlyconcerned with the attendantproblematisations. The expositionpart simplyreproduces Aristotle'sproofin the formof a syllogism,much like Alexander had done.96In the Questions , the problematicnature of the syllogismis not addressedat all. Instead, one question focuseson the broader issue of whethersome thing'sbeing moved of itself(a se) is possible.All of the traditional candidatesforself-motion are produced(soul,elementalmotion, 93"SeddicitAverroes istademonstratio nonestde genere demonstrationum simquod demonstrationum demonstrationes , sedde genere pliciter, , veldemonstraquaedicitur signi tionesquia conditionalium." In Phys , in quibusestusustalium ., 7, cap. 1, lect. Aquinas, of/from mina'l-dalã3il 1, n. 6. The term"demonstration signs"(Arabic: ) is usedin this intheCommentary connection onDe Cáelo 95:". . . demonstrationes autem ducentes , 1,comm. ad impossibile suntgeneris 5:fol.64D).(Unfortunately, thisfolioleaf (AOACC, signorům" is missing from Gerhard Endress' facsimile edition oftheArabicCommentary onDe Cáelo) 94"DicitCommentator debet nonrépugnât motus quod intelligi quodmotui inquantum hocbenesibirepugnet estmotus talismobilis veliciori, quantumlibet quamvis inquantum et proveniens a talimotore: et explicat de motucaeli."Expositio etquaestiones inAristotelis adAlbertům deSaxonia lib.6, tr.1, cap. 3, ed. B. Patar,3 vols.,Paris attributae, Physicam account is evident 1999,vol.1,283,74-7(fol.42ra).The samekindofcombinatorial in, see hisIn Physicam Aristotelis etQuaestiones, ed. Venice1501, e.g.,Walter Burley: Expositio Hildesheim & NewYork1972,fol.179va-180rb. repr. 95Expositio etquaestiones , lib.6, q. 7, 2:910-16 (fol.146rbff.). 96Op.cit. , lib.7, tr.1,cap. 1, 2:318-19 (fol.47rb).

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intellection,and will); against this, the authoritativestatementsof the Philosopherand the Commentatorare recalled.97The conclusionis that in self-movers one mustdistinguish betweenpassive and activepotentialitiesand that only in the case of the FirstCause is thereno passivityat all. The Questions thus seek a harmonisingsolutionheavilydependenton the Islamic philosophersAverroesand Avicenna.98 Patar contendsthatthe Exposition are actuallyattributable and Questions to Jean Buridan. In lightof our presentinvestigation this seems doubtin for another set of on Aristotle's thatunquesful,however, Questions Physics of Aristotleis tionablybelongs to Buridan a verydifferent interpretation advanced. Accordingto Buridan, somethingodd seems to be going on in Physics 7.1, forAristotlethereappears to posit in two successivearguan indiments,no less somethingsimplyimpossiblewhen constructing rectargument.We know as a matterof principle,however,thatanything followsfrom a contradiction,so there seems to be little sense in the philosopher'sprocedure.Now this principle(that froma contradiction, or "the simplyimpossible,anythingfollows"),99 commonlyknownas the firstparadox of implication,had not been introducedin this context before.(The principlethat the impossibleonly followsfromthe impossiand the notionthatfroman impossiblepremise ble is altogetherdifferent, followis also not the same.) It was in factfirst further only impossibilities in 12th centurydiscussionsquite independently formulated of naturalphiBuridan's use of the here is therefore losophy.100 principle noteworthy. Buridan summariseswhat he takes to be the solutionpropoundedby Averroes,as well as "many others".(Presumablywe may count Aquinas among these people.) The Commentator'sresponseto the problem had been to say that the auxiliaryhypothesespostulatedin the argumentsof Physics7.1 (partial rest and an infinitemotion)are only impossiblewith regardto "special" (i.e., specific)bodies; as regardsthe common nature of bodies in motion,however,theyare not impossible.On [ratiocommunis) 97Op.cit The authorhas sufficient ofAverroes' ., lib. 7, q. 1, 3:936-38. knowledge to citetheCommentator's claimtherethattheimpossibility of Metaphysics commentary absolute self-motion is self-evident. 3 al-tabïcï 98Cf.Avicenna, Al-samã The sameharmonising is also , 87.12-20. tendency seenin thefactthatin a variant arealsobrought in thisall-embracMS, thePlatonists Cf.op.cit.,3:941,n. to 1.28. ing99 synthesis. . . ex eo quodestsimpliciter omniasequuntur": Buridan, Quaestiones impossibile octo libros Paris1509,repr.Frankfurt a.M. 1964,bk.7, q. 3, fol. Aristotelis, super Physicorum 105rb(thepagecountreads"xcv"). 100See K.Jacobi, , in:P. Dronke (ii):thelater Logic twelfth centuiy ofTwelfth(ed.),A History Western at 232;C.J.Martin, William's , Cambridge 1988,227-251, Machine, Century Philosophy in:Journal ofPhilosophy, 83 (1986),564-72.

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Buridan's analysis,this interpretation does not work,because the things are it posited simplyimpossible: simplygoes againstthe common nature of somethingin motionthat it could (have a part which is at the same timeat) rest,and consequentlythe same holds trueforeverysingleactual body.Buridan'sobjection,then,takesroughlythe same formas Avicenna's: if thereis no imaginableworld in which the hypothesisis true,then it is absolutelyimpossible.One cannot talk "in the abstract",as it were; one mustalwaystalkabout some (possible)world.(See Quoestiones , fol.105rb.) Buridan's own solutionto the problem purportsto move along just mentionedin Physics7.1 such lines. Because the apparentimpossibilities is must referto some kind of possibility,the only viable interpretation that Aristotleis in fact operatingwith a distinctionbetween divine and Aristotleassumes things naturalpossibilities.As a matterof fact,whenever which are impossiblewithinthe contextof this world, what he has in mind is this distinction.Aristotleis, or he must be, talkingabout other worldsGod could have created.101 This readingof Aristotleis certainlynovel; it is also blatantlyanachronistic.Even Buridan has to admit that some people are likelyto retort that Aristotlewould not recognise"supernatural"as distinctfrom"natural" possibilities.They would say that forAristotle,thereis only a sin(fol. 105rb). For Buridan,the oppositeis proven gle kind of potentiality by the fact that Aristotlesays of many thingsimpossiblenaturally( per that theyare nevertheless naturales) possible absolutely(simpliciter). potentias Buridan conjures up a long list of apparent impossibilities accepted by Aristotlefor the purposesof argument:the heavens come to a halt; the spheresare alternatelydivided and continuous;the heavens move faster and slower;a corruptiblethingis presumedto be subtlerthan fire;corthereis somethingoutsidethe world. Most poreal bodies interpenetrate; of the itemson the listcan be tracedto the foregonediscussion;the ones that are new in Buridan can be understoodon the basis of the former. in fact"to a largedegree All of thisforBuridangoes to showhow Aristotle The discoveryhas took part withus in the true faith",i.e., Christianity. Buridan tells us.102 or so he Buridan prideshimselfon greatjoy, brought this clues towards to notice the the first (cf.fol. 105vainterpretation being 101Fol. 105rb;cf.also fol.104ra-va. inBuridan's S. Knuuttila, See further Necessities andNatural & J. Zupko(eds),TheMetaphysics Natural , in:J.M.M.H.Thijssen Philosophy Buridan , Leiden2001,65-76. Philosophy ofJohn 102"Respondeo in vera nobiscum Aristoteles participans magnam partem quodforte fide. . . gaudeogavisus": Quoestiones , fol.105rb.

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b). Why Buridan shouldwish to presentAristotlein such favourablelight in his Questions on thePhysicsis uncertain.103 His comments regarding Aristotle'smodal reasoningin otherworksare less than complimentary.104 For all that Buridan in an effortto save the Philosopherheaps scorn upon his Commentator,he stillcontinuesto make use of Averroes'analysis regardingthe way Aristotleproceeds with his indirectarguments. Buridan makes note of the fact that an absolutelyimpossibleconclusion onlyfollowsfroman absolutelyimpossiblepremise.And he reiteratesthe factthatotherkindsof impossibilities can accordinglybe introducedinto an argumentwith an absolutelyimpossibleconclusionwithoutthereby form(fol. 105rb).It would thereforeappear compromisingthe syllogistic thatAverroes'analysisof the syllogisms employedin Aristotle'sarguments in naturalphilosophyoutlivedthe modal model on which it was based. This is all the more remarkable,since it is unlikelythat such syllogisms lay under Aristotle'sargumentsin the firstplace.105 Helsinki ofFinland Academy 103Conceivably haveplayedsomepart.Consider thatBuridan university politics might wasoneofthefewmajorthinkers tovoluntarily a Master remain oftheArts;andrecall thatthenewmodaltheory in the14thcentury advanced Ockhamand by,e.g.,Scotus, Buridan himself wassometimes calledthe"theological" ofmodalities. theory (ForthedevelseeKnuuttila 1993{op.cit., TheclaimthatAristotle himabove,n. 27),138-75.) opments, selfrecognised theneedfora distinction between natural and divinepossibilities could thenbe takenas a declaration ofindependence ofsorts: it wouldobviate theneedfor to comein andcorrect Aristotle on thematter. Cf.thenextnote,however. theologians 104Forinstance, in hiscommentary on De cáeloBuridan criticises Aristotle's argument fortheworld's See Ioannis Buridani (inDe cáelo1.12)on formal incorruptibility grounds. etquaestiones inAristotelis De cáelo , ed. B. Patar,Paris& Leuven1996,Quaestiones expositio , bk.1, qq. 24-26,and,e.g.,thescathing review of givenat theveryendoftheExpositio thefirst book:"... istetractatus nonhaberet multam efficaciam nequenaturaliter loquendo " Cf.further (bk.1,tr.4, cap.3; Patared.,p. 88; addedemphases). nequesupernaturaliter Aristotle andCorruptibility. A Discussion De Cáelo I.xii , in:Religious C.J.F.Williams, ofAristotle, 1 (1965), 95-107and203-15, andJ.VanRijen, Losic Studies, Aspects ofAristotle's ofModalities. Dordrecht 1989,73-102. 105 Thanks areduetotheUniversity ofToronto Institute Philosophy Dept.,thePontifical ofMedieval theAcademy ofFinland and theBasilian Fathers ofSt. Michael's Studies, thisresearch I thanktheanonymous reviewers at Vivarium Collegeformaking possible. andAlfred thismanuscript. PartsofthispaperwerepreIvryfortheir helpinpreparing sented at theMedieval Seminar at Trinity in Marchand Philosophy College, Cambridge ' in at a symposium on 'Averroes' Commentaries on Aristotle's and Metaphysics Physics inJune2001. I wishto thank andSteven forinviting Jerusalem JohnMarenbon Harvey metospeakandChristopher Charles Manekin andRuthGlasner fortheir searchMartin, ingquestions.

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L'extension de la listedes modalités dans les commentaires du Perihermeneias et des Sophistici Elenchi de Guillaumed'Ockham} ERNESTO PERINI-SANTOS

Il y a une differenceimportanteentre les théoriesmodales des comet sur le mentairesde Guillaume d'Ockham sur les Réfutations Sophistiques Perihermeneias. La listedes modalitésn'est pas la même dans les deux cas. distinctesde 'proposiCette difference est la conséquence de définitions tion modale' et, plus largement,de deux développementsdistinctsde la présenteune théorie logique modale. UExpositioin LibrumPerihermeneias modale à la foisplus cohérenteet plus prochede celle de la SummaLogicae. Nous présentonsd'abord les deux versionsde la théoriemodale, ensuite nous proposons une brève comparaison avec d'autres extensionsde la listedes modalitésau Moyen Age, notammentcelle de Jean Buridan.Cet articlepoursuitun double objectif: la comparaisonentreces deux textes et l'indicationde la spécificitéde l'approche ockhamiennedes modalités, qui ne semble pas avoir été perçue par les commentateurs. 1. L'extension de la listedes modalités chezOckham L'extensionde la liste des modalitésn'est pas la même dans ces deux textes.Dans le chapitreconsacré au paralogismede la compositionet de Elenchi la divisiondans le premierlivre du commentairedes Sophistici , Ockham propose une liste de six modes, le vrai, le faux, le nécessaire, - nous et le possible le contingent appelleronsles termesde cette l'impossible, dans listeles modalitésaléthiques.Après avoir dit que touteproposition2 doit être un dictum un mode avec est distinguée propositionis posé laquelle 1 Nousremercions pourlescomJoëlBiard,ClaudePanaccioet IrèneRosier-Catach aussiHubert Nousremercions de cetarticle. dansla composition mentaires utiles Hubien, Priora inAnalitica des Quaestiones de sonédition , ClaudePanacciopour pourl'utilisation à de ce textedanssonséminaire antérieure de présenter uneversion nousavoirpermis etJulieBrumberg-Chaumont, de Québecà Trois-Rivières, l'Université pourla correction du français. 2 Le terme à desentités à desphrases, c'est-à-dire renvoie danscetarticle 'proposition' de 'propositi. suivant êtrevraiesou fausses, l'usagemédiéval linguistiques pouvant Vivarium 40,2

BrillNV,Leiden, 2002 © Koninklijke - www.brill.nl online Alsoavailable

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selon la compositionet la division,le Venerabilis Inceptor présentela liste des modes : Modiautemvocantur : verum, continsex,scilicet falsum, necessarium, impossibile, gensetpossibile.3 D'autres termes,ajoute le philosophe anglais, peuvent avoir un comportementsemblable: Et sicutdictum estde propositionibus in quibusponuntur telles modi'necessarium', dicendum est etc.,vel'necessario', etc.,eodemmodouniformiter 'impossibile' 'potest' de talibus in quibusponuntur istimodi'perse','peraccidens', etsi propositionibus totispropositionibus sicutaliimodi.Namsicut qui sintconsimiles, qui competunt dicitur dealiquapropositione totaquodestvera,velfalsa, velnecessaria, velpossibilis, velimpossibilis, itadicitur de totapropositione quodestperse velperaccidens.4 Les expressionsťperse' et ťperaccidens'parce qu'elles peuventêtreattribuées à des propositionsentières,peuventêtre considéréescomme des modes, et les propositions se comportent commeles propositions qui les contiennent avec les sixpremières modalités,du moinsen ce qui concernele paralogisme de la divisionet de la composition.Il n'est pas tout à fait clair si les ' doiventêtre modes 'perse' et 'peraccidens ajoutés à la premièreliste ou non,mais ce n'estpeut-êtrepas essentieldans ce contexte,une foisque l'on a comprisque la distinction faitedans le passage les concerneégalement. Cette même caractéristiquegouvernel'associationplus restreinte entre les modalitésaléthiqueset les termesépistémiquesdans l'examen du paralogismede l'accident: autem concluditur conclusio cumaliquacondicione totam Aliquando respiciente propositionem essefallacia accidentis sinefallacia ; et tuncpotest consequentis quantumsintverae.Et istomodoesthicfallacia accidentis : scioquod cumquepraemissae omnistriangulus habettres; istetriangulus esttriangulus ; ergoscioquodistetrianhicestfallacia accidentis 'scioquodCoriscus esthomo; gulushabettres.Similiter Coriscus estveniens esthomo'; similiter hic'omnem hominem ; ergoscioquodveniens esseanimaiestnecessarium esseanimaiestneces; Sortesesthomo; ergoSortem et hocaccipiendo illasde necessario in sensucompositionis.5 sarium', propositiones Si les termesépistémiquesn'y sont pas dits être des modes, le traitqui les unitaux modalitésaléthiquesest le faitd'êtreprédicablede touteune proposition.Il ne semble pas que l'on puisse étendrela liste des modalitésà partirde ce passage, les termesépistémiquessont en effetassociés au seul cas des propositionsmodales au sens composé, on ne sait pas si 3 Cf.Guillaume Libros Elenchorum d'Ockham, , I, 3, 6, 60-61,éd. F. Del Expositio super A. Gambatese et S. Brown, 36. Punta, (OPh III), 4 Exp.Elenchi éd. Del Punta,Gambatese et Brown, I, 3, 6, 106-113, (OPhIII), 37. 5 Exp.Elench et Brown, ., I, 6, 3, 30-39,éd. Del Punta,Gambatese (OPhIII), 51.

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les propositionsqu'ils affectent peuventrecevoiraussi une interprétation au sens divisé. Si tel ne devait pas être le cas, les termesépistémiques semblablesaux modalités; en fait,les propone seraientque partiellement sitionsavec des termesépistémiquespeuventrecevoiraussi une interpréentreces termeset des expressions .6 La différence tationin sensudivisionis ť comme 'pers¿ et peraccidentsemble s'estomper. Dans l'examen du paralogismede l'accident,7Ockham traiteles termes épistémiquescomme des modes, encore une fois,parce qu'ils peuvent affectertoute une proposition, sans que prédicats modaux et épistémiquesne soientjamais explicitementassociés. Si la proximitédu comportementlogique des termesmodaux et des prédicatsépistémiques est reconnue,la possibilitéde les regrouperdans une catégorieunique n'est pas considérée. étendsans ambiguïtéla listedes modaPerihermenias Or YExpositio in librum litésà tous les termespouvant être attribuésà une propositionentière,y comprisles termesépistémiques: Et estdicendum magisestmodalis quam quodalia causaquarealiquapropositio nisiquiain aliquapropositione alianonpotest ponitur aliquismodusseu assignari terminus velponitur verificabilis terminus de totapropositione idem, significans aliquis de totapropositione.8 diverso modo,cumtalitermino praedicabili quamvis in libros Ce critèreétaitprésentde manièretimidedans YExpositio Elmchorum, ' ' comme des modes, où il permettaitde considérer'perse et 'peraccidens quoi que d'une façon peu explicite,et d'envisagerl'adjonctiondes termes épistémiquesaux modalitésaléthiques.Il est ici clairementannoncé et sert à construirela liste des termesmodaux. Si le degré de modalité ne semble correspondreà rien dans la théorie ockhamienne,les conde 'propositionmodale' pour la constitution séquences de cettedéfinition de la liste des termesmodaux sont pleinementassumées. Cette définitionconvientaux modalitéstraitéespar Alistóte,le nécessaire, l'impossible,le possible et le contingent,mais elle s'applique aussi à bien d'autrestermes: in quibusnonponitur modales suntpropositiones Ex istopatetquodmultae aliquis 'verum' vel'falsum' in omnis nam modorum, qua ponitur propositio praedictorum 6 Cf.Exp.Eiench etBrown, Gambatese éd.Del Punta, (OPhIII),236. ., II, 9, 3, 19-27, 7 Cf.,parexemple, éd. Del Punta, ., II, 9, 4, 56-61et II, 9, 4, 144-159, Exp.Eiench etBrown, Gambatese (OPhIII), 239; 241-2. 8 Guillaume Aristotelis Perìhermeneias inLibrum d'Ockham. , II, 5, 4, 34-38,éd. Expositio et S. Brown, A. Gambatese (OPhII), 460.

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vel'demonstratum' vel'scitum' vel'creditum' et huiusmodi, estpropositio modalis. Undeomnestalessuntmodales 'omnem hominem esseanimalestscitum', 'omnem habere tresestdemonstratum', ethuiusmodi, ethocquiaintalibus triangulum propositionibus ita ponitur de totapropositione sicutin aliquisterminus qui verificatur aliis; igitur itaeritpropositio modalis.9 Il n'y a aucun doute quant aux modalitésacceptées,ni sur le critèrequi permetde les considérercomme telles. La liste de modes ainsi engendrée resteouverte: tout ce qui satisfaità ce critèreest appelé mode. La théoriedes propositionsmodales développée à la suite prend en examinela concomptecetteextension.Ainsi,lorsquele Venerabilis Inceptor versionentre les propositionsau sens divisé et au sens composé ayant ou un nom propre et pour prédicat pour sujet un pronom démonstratif un termecommun,il prend soin de préciserque cela ne s'applique pas aux modalitésconcernantnotre connaissance.10Cette remarque indique qu'une thèse générale sur une propositionmodale concerne en principe tous les prédicatsmodaux de la liste étendue des modalitéset non pas les seules modalitésaléthiques. La définitionde 'propositio modalis'l'extensionde la listedes modalités, et la portéedes thèsesde la logique modale sont identiquesdans le commentairedu Perìhermendas et dans la SummaLogicae.Le mode est défini dans ce derniertextecomme ce qui est prédicablede toute une proposition.11Les modes ne sauraient se limiteraux modalités traitéespar : Aristote,tout comme dans le commentairedu Perìhermendas Sed talesmodisuntpluresquamquatuor : namsicutpropositio alia est praedicti aliaimpossibilis, aliapossibilis, aliacontingens, itaaliapropositio estvera, necessaria, aliafalsa,aliascita,aliaignota, aliaprolata, aliascripta, aliaconcepta, aliacredita, aliaopinata, aliadubitata, et sicde aliis.12 Les modalitésnon aristotéliciennes sont objet d'un traitementspécifique, qui vientsystématiquement après l'examen du nécessaire,du possible,de l'impossibleet du contingent.13 9 Exp.Per.,II, 5, 4, 53-60,éd. Gambatese et Brown, (OPhII), 461. 10Exp. éd. Gambatese et Brown, Per.,II, 5, 4, 220-31, (OPhII), 467. 11Guillaume Summa G. Gài et S. d'Ockham, , II, 1, 44-48,éd. Ph. Boehner, Logicae dicitur modalis Brown, (OPhI), 242-3: "Circaquodestsciendum quodpropositio propter modum additum inpropositione. Sednonquicumque modussufficit ad faciendum propositionem sedoportet de totapropositione, etideo modalem, quodsitmoduspraedicabilis dicitur 'moduspropositionis' verificabilis de ipsamet proprie tamquam propositione.". 12Summa Gài et Brown, 243. , II, 1,50-54,éd. Boehner, Logicae (ÒPh I), 13Cf.Summa , II, 29,les 30,41 à 43 et 64,de III-1, ou encoreIII-3, Logicae chapitres Gài et Brown, 11,39-55,éd. Boehner, (OPhI), 638-9.

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2. Les différentes extensions de la listedesmodalités La natureet la raison de cette extensionde la liste des modalitésn'ont d'Ockhamsurle Perikermerwas. pas été saisiespar les éditeursdu commentaire Le renvoi,en note en bas de page, à Siger de Courtraiet à Ammonius nous semble en effettrompeur.14 Il est vrai que ces auteurs ont considéré que le nombre des modes n'était point limité à ceux traitéspar Aristote,mais la liste étendue des modalitésne correspondpas du tout à celle proposée par le Venerabilis Inceptor. L'extensiondes modalitésconsidéréepar Ammoniuset Sigerde Courtrai se retrouvechez Boèce. Pour le romain,le nombrede propositions modales est beaucoup plus importantque les quatre modalitésaristotéliciennes, puisque les adverbesy sont inclus: Omnispropositio autsineullomodosimpliciter ut Socrates ambulat pronuntiatur, veldiesestvelquicquid etsineullaqualitate suntautem aliae simpliciter praedicatur. dicuntur velociter ambulat. ambulationi modis,ut estSocrates quae cumpropriis enimSocratis modusestadditus, cumdicimus eumvelociter ambulare, quomodo enimambulet, id quodde ambulatione eiusvelociter significai praedicamus.15 Il n'y a pas de critèrequi sépare les modes aristotéliciens des adverbes, si ce n'est le faitqu'Aristotene traiteque des premiers.Cette approche des modalités,que nous appelonsadverbiale,se retrouveà plusieursreprises au long du Moyen Age. Ainsi plusieursauteursdistinguent deux sens de ou exclure les adverbes du sens 'mode', davantage,pour propre.16 L'héritage textuelmontreune tension entre les quatre modalitésaristotéliciennes, d'un côté, et les adverbesboéciens,de l'autre. Ammoniuset Siger de Courtrai se situentdans cette tradition,l'extension de la liste des modalités aux adverbes se fait à partir d'une définitionde 'mode' comme modificateurdu verbe. Ainsi peut-on lire dans la traductionlatine d'Ammonius: 14Exp.Per.,II, 5, 4, éd. Gambatese etBrown, (OPhII), 461«. 15Boèce,InLibrum Aristotelů DeInterpretationen editio secunda , éd.Meiser, Leipzig1880,377, 4-11. 16Guillaume - 'Introductions de Sherwood. William inlogicami, 1.7.1,21-27, ofSherwood éd.Ch.H.Lohr,P. KunzeetB. Mussler, in: Traditio, 39 (1983),219-99. Voirainsi,entre Guillaume de Sherwood, autres, Introdução, 1, 7, 1,éd. Lohre.a.,232,21-7: "Modusigiturdicitur communiter etproprie. Communiter sic: Modusestdeterminado alicuius actus. Et secundum hocconvenit omniadverbio. sic: Modusestdeterminado Proprie praedicati in subiecto uthicpatet: 'Homonecessario estanimal.' Determinatur enimhic,quomodo inhereat subiecto. Si autemdiceretur : 'Homocurrit solumdetervelociter', predicatum minatur actusverbisecundum se etnoninherentia eiuscumsubiecto. Undea talibus non dicitur modalis." propositio

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Modusquidemigitur estvoxsignificativa inestpraedicatum subiecto, puta qualiter cumdicimus 'lunavelociter restituitur'.17 velociter, Le nombrede modes est évidemmenténorme,ce sonten faitles adverbes, dont personnene songeraità dresserune liste: nontamen estcompreautem natura nonestinfinitus, [. . .] numerus ipsorum quidem hensibilis sicutnequenumerus universalium subiectorum velpraedicatorum.18 nobis, En renvoyantà Ammonius,Siger de Courtraia dans l'espritl'extension des modalitésaux adverbes. Aristote,selon lui, ne compte que quatre modes parce que ad istosquosexprimit modispereduci [. . .] omnes possunt Philosophus, tamquam cialesad generales.19 à moins Si les modes sont les adverbes,cette réductionsemble difficile, qu'il n'ait en vue, plus modestement,une parenté de comportementde Il reste que l'augmentationdu ceux-ci et des modalitésaristotéliciennes. nombredes modalitésest bien acceptée,au pointd'êtreincommensurable par notreesprit,mais il s'agit d'une liste d'adverbes. Or cetteextensiondes modalitésn'est pas du toutcelle d'Ockham. Le résultatobtenu n'est pas le même, parce que les principesde la constructiondes deux listessont différents. Sur ce point,le seul antécédent d'Ockham que nous ayons trouvé est un autre franciscainoxonien du début du XIVe siècle, Martin d'Alnwick. Son activité est légèrement antérieureà celle du Venerabilis . Il faut prendrecette hypothèse Inceptor avec la prudencede mise pour ce typed'affirmation touchantle Moyen Age. Martin était dans le couventfranciscaind'Oxford en 1300, et y a été lecteuren 1311.20Sa définitiondes modalitésest trèsproche de celle d'Ockham, même si elle est moins développée: Terminus modalis estomnis talisterminus velpredicatur, velsaltem suquisubicitur bicivelpredicali alicuius sicut totalis, potest, respectu complexi respectu propositionis.21 17Ammonius, Commentaire surlePeňHermeneias ďAristote. Traduction deGuillaume deMoerbeke , éd. G. Verbeke, Louvain1961,388. 18Ammonius, Commentaire 1961{op.cit.,supra,note17),388. , éd. Verbeke 19Sigerde Courtrai, vanKortrijk, Commentator vanPerihermeneias , éd. G. Verhaak, £eger Bruxelles 1964,148. 20Cf.A.B.Emden, A Biographical toA.D. 1500, vol.I, oftheUniversity Register ofOxford Oxford 1957,26-7. Martin De Veritate etFalsitate 14th d'Alnwick, , 13,dans: L.M.de Rijk,Some Propositionis Tracts ontheProbationes Terminorum , Nijmegen 1982,10. Century

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Il en tire la conséquence pour l'extensionde la liste des modes. Outre les modalitésaristotéliciennes, sontmodaux les verbesconcernantles actes de l'espritet le terme ťper se'22 D'autres caractéristiquesde la théorie modale ockhamiennese trouventchez lui, comme le faitque toutesles modales, propositionsqui ont un termemodal ne sontpas nécessairement le termedoit être pris modaliter ; il doit être attribué , et non pas indefinite à toute la proposition,et non pas être une partie du sujet et du prédicat.23Sans développerdavantage ce parallèle,il nous suffitde marquer la spécificitéde l'extension des modalités de Martin d'Alnwick et de de celle qui faitdes adverbesdes modes, Guillaumed'Ockham, differente dans la traditionboécienne. de la théorieockhamienneavec Siger de Courtrai Si le rapprochement et Ammoniusn'est évidemmentpas correct,il y a encore une autrevoie. Il s'agit des textesqui explorentla proximitédes comportements logiques des modalitésaléthiqueset des termesépistémiques,assez nombreuxau secondaire,notamMoyen Age et maintesfoisétudiésdans la littérature ment par Weidemann,24Knuuttila25et Boh.26 Cette parenté de comportementapparaît surtoutdans l'applicationde la distinctionentresens diviséet sens composé et dans l'examen de la validitédes inférencesavec Le raples propositionsaffectéesdes termesmodaux et épistémiques.27 prochemententreces deux typesde termesremonte,d'une certainefaçon, au XIIe siècle, qui concerne aux discussionssur le statutde Yenuntiabile des phrasesenchâsséesdans des contextescréésaussi bien par les modalités 22Alnwick, etFabitate, De Veritate 13,éd. De Rijk1982{op.cit.,supra,note22), 10: actumanime,ut 'scire', concernentes "Sic autemdico: talestermini , ínescire' 'ymaginarf ' ' ' ' cum dicipotest modalis, ', dubitare [...]; et istadictioperse' que satisproprie intellegere ut'homo estanimai de aliquocomplexo totali, perse'" ipsapotest predicali 23Cf.Alnwick, note22),10; etFalsitate De Veritate , 13,éd.De Rijk1982(op.cit., supra, et Brown, (OPhII), 461; id.,Summa Ockham, Exp.Per.,II, 5, 4, 44-45,éd. Gambatese III-1, 121-122, éd. Boehner, Gài,et Brown, (OPhI), 467. Logicae, 24Cf.H. Weidemann, dans: Archiv beiWalter desWissens Ansätze zu einer Burleigh, Logik derPhilosophie, fìirGeschichte 62 (1980),32-45. 25Cf.S. Knuuttila, inmedieval Modalities , London1993,176-96. Philosophy 26Cf.I. Boh,Epistemic Middle intheLater , London1993. Ages Logic 27Cf.Weidemann Sensuscompositus, 1980[op.cit.,supra,note24); N. Kretzmann, 7 (1981),195-229 dans:Medioevo, andpropositional Sensusdivisus, ; J. Biard,Les Attitudes, dans: Vivarium, etGuillaume deSaxeentre : Albert dusavoir Heytesbury, JeanBuridan Sophismes imMittelalter, undLogik desWollens Über 27 (1989),36-50; S. Knuuttila, Argumentation praktische - Scholastische undsemandans: K. Jacobi(éd.),Argumentationstheorie zu denlogischen Forschungen de korrekten tische , Leiden1993,612-3.Une importante partiede l'histoire Folgerns Regeln etRichard de Guillaume autour se développe cetteassociation ; cf. Billingham Heytesbury Roma1972,540-600. dellatarda A. Maierù,Terminologia Scolastica, logica

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aléthiques que par les expressionsépistémiques.28S'il est clair que la définitionockhamiennede la modalités'inscritdans cette lignée,encore faut-ildistinguerl'admission d'un comportementlogique commun aux termesépistémiqueset aléthiquesde leur réunionsous un conceptunique. Il ne s'agitpas seulementd'une affairede définitionstipulative, bien que ce soit aussi cela, mais de l'ensembledes outilsthéoriquesmis en œuvre. Ainsi Gauthier Burleigh,qui reconnaîtla parenté de comportement des termesépistémiqueset des modalitésaléthiques,ne les réunitpas sous un concept unique. Seules les dernièressont pour lui des modalités: Ad formam dubitationis dicendum quodnonomnisdictiodenotans propositionem facitpropositionem sed solumdictiones modalem, significantes qualitatem propositionis denominatis ed.Venetiis addentes , denominantis (sicBoh 1497)radone compositions faciunt modalem. Et propter aliquidsupracompositionem hoc,"scipropositionem ethuiusmodi nonfaciunt tum", "dubitatum", modalem, propositionem quiasignificant animeet nonqualitatem Sed "contingens", et qualitatem "necesse", propositionis. huiusmodi et ideocumaccipiuntur ut determisignificant qualitatem propositionis, nantverbum ratione faciunt modalem.29 compositions propositionem Ce texteest représentatif d'une traditionqui semble dominanteau XIVe siècle. Elle associe le comportement logique de ces deux typesde termes sans les réunirdans la même catégorie. Jean Buridan propose une versionintéressanted'une théorieassociant termesépistémiques et modalitésaléthiques,en quelque sorteentreBurleigh et Ockham. Les questionssur le Perihermeneias et le Tractatus de consequentiis traitent seulementdes modes "principaux", les modesaléthiques, c'est-à-dire, tout en admettantun nombrebien plus importantde modalités.30 28Cf.entre autres C.H. Kneepkens, Please don't callmePeter : I amanenuntiabile, nota A rwte onthe enuntiabile andthe Noun Verba thing. , dans: C. Marmo proper (éd.),Vestigia, Imagines, Semiotics andLominmedieval Texts fTurnhoutl 83-98. theological (XHth-XIVth century j, 1997, 29Burleigh, artem veterem . . ., citédansBoh 1993(op.cit.,supra,note26),144.II Super estsurprenant de voircomment Bohcitece textepourillustrer l'inclusion habituelle de ' danslesdiscussions 'sàturiet 'dubitatum de logiquemodale, sansremarquer que Burleigh lesexclut desmodalités; cf.Boh1993(op.cit.,supra, note26),43-4.Ce textetardif peut êtreunecritique à la thèseockhamienne. Voiraussila critique de l'assoparBurleigh ciation destermes modaux à desprédicats danslesdeuxversions du (aussiockhamienne) De Puntate Artis De Puntate Artis éd. Ph. Boehner, St. Logicae (Gauthier Burleigh, Logicae, Bonaventure 1955: Tractatus brevior , 56, 16- 57, 16,et Tractus Longior , 235,14- 237,12). Weidemann 1980(op.cit.,supra,note24) traitedu comportement logiquedes termes la distinction de leurportée dansuneproposition, sanslesinclure épistémiques, explorant H. Weidemann, Wörterbuch ; cf.toutefois parmilesmodalités , dans: Historisches Modallogik derPhilosophie, Bd.6, Basel-Stuttgart 1984,36,quiattribue l'extension de la logique modale auxtermes aussibienà Ockham épistémiques qu'à Burleigh. 30JeanBuridan, Tractatus deconsequentiis Louvain-Paris 56. , II, 1,8-12,éd.H. Hubien, 1976,

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Dans une questionsur le Perihermeneias , le maîtrepicard est trèsproche d'Ockham : viderequidvocamus Quia de modalibus loquiincepimus, oportet propositionem in modalem. Etde hoccommuniter etbene,quodmodalis dicitur dicitur, propositio determinatio innatadeterminare et kathegorice qua ponitur copulam propositionis etiampredicali Et huiusmodi sunt'nede hoctermino determinationes 'propositio'. cessarium', 'verum', 'falsum', 'scitum', 'creditum', 'possibile', 'contingens', 'inpossibile', et huiusmodi.31 'opinatum', 'apparens' Buridan définitles modalitéspar une conjonction,dont seule la deuxième clause équivaut à l'approche ockhamienne. Par cette définition, doiventpouvoirexercerces deux fonctionstous les termesmodaux, dont le cas le plus particulier, la copule devant les épistémiques; ils représentent ' ' scitwř .32Ces deux aussi des termes comme ou êtremodifiée opinatum' par fonctionnements séparentles propositionsmodales composées et divisées, si bien que leur premièredifférence est que velpredicatur etin divisis modussubicitur non,sedestdetermi[. . .] in compositis natiocopule.33 S'il arriveau maîtrepicard de dire que les propositionsinsensucompositionis il semblesurne sontpas des propositionsmodales à proprementparler,34 toutavoirune logique modale à double clé. On sera d'autantplus sensible modal à cettedifférence si l'on a à l'espritles différents degrésd'engagement de foncde Quine et son refusdes modalitésdere, et donc le double registre tionnement possiblede la logique modale.35L'extensionde cetteremarque à Ockham doit prendreen compte les deux contextesconceptuelsdans malgrésa théoriede lesquelsles modalitésaléthiquessonttraitées.En effet, est le Venerabilis la propositionmodale résolumentmétalinguistique, Inceptor modal à un sans doute plus disposé accepter engagementontologique pour des possibiliaque Quine, ce qui apparaît dans sa théoriede la variation de la suppositiondu sujet des propositionspossiblesin sensudivisionis. 31JeanBuridan, Perihermeneias Librum , II, 7, éd. R. vanderLecq, Questiones Longe super 1983,77, 12-23. Nijmegen 32Nousdevons dansla compréhension l'attention à ce typede cas et unecorrection à ClaudePanaccio. de ce passagede Buridan 33Buridan, , II, 7, éd. Van derLecq 1983[op.cit.,supra,note31),77, Questiones Longe 25-6. 34Buridan, II, 7, et II, 10,26,éd. Van derLecq 1983(op.cit.,note, Questiones Longe, onmodal , dans: Propositions 31),78,6-7,96,31-4.Cf.aussiR. vanderLecq,Buridan supra, andSemantics L.M.deRijk(éds), C.H. Kneepkens, H.A.G.Braakhuis, , Nijmegen English Logic 1981,428. 35W.V.Quine,Three andother Grades , dans: id.,TheWays ofParadox ofModalIrwohment Mass.1976,158-76. Revised andenlarged Edition, Cambridge, Essays.

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Ce double registreapparaît clairementdans le Tractatus de consequentiis de Jean Buridan, qui réservedes traitementsdistinctsaux propositions modales au sens composé et au sens divisé.Les livresII et IV, qui examinentles conséquencesentreles propositionsmodales,traitentséparément de deux types de propositions: les chapitres3 à 6 du livre II et les chapitres2 et 3 du livre IV s'occupent des propositionsau sens divisé, alors que les propositionsau sens composé sont l'objet du chapitre7 du livreII et du chapitre1 du livreIV. Seul le chapitre1 du livreII traite des deux typesde propositionmodale,justementpour les distinguer.Les propositionsmodales au sens divisé sont proches des propositionsau 4 ' et ' présentet au futuret de certainsprédicatscomme mortuus intelligi bilis' par l'ampliationde la suppositiondes termes.Dans ces cas, l'ex' pression quod est permet de résoudrel'ambiguïtéde la supposition,et donc de déterminerquelles inférencessont valides.36Malgré cette distinctionde domaines,les termesépistémiquesne sont pas inclus parmi les modalités,mais sont traitésdans la partie consacrée aux propositions 37Les contextes de inesse. propositionnels qui causentl'ampliationde la supet ceux Y n'ont pas le même effet position qui provoquent appellatorationis sémantiqueet n'incluentpas les mêmes cas.38 36Cf.Buridan, Tractatus deconsequentiis , I, 8, 439-520; II, 6, 3-17; III, 4, 299-321 ; IV, I, 10-16,éd. Hubien1976(op.cit.,supra,note30),46-8; 6; 93-4; 111.La supposition étendue danslespropositions à modalités aristotéliciennes etdanslespropositions au passé etau futur estaussiacceptée ce quine change de 'propoparOckham, passa définition sition ni la théorie construite à partir de cettedéfinition, maismontre le double modale', danslequelsonttraités lesmodalités réelles ; cf.Summa registre , I, 72 et théorique Logicae entrela logiquetemporelle et II, 7, éd. Boehner, Gài,et Brown, (OPhI). La continuité celledesmodalités chezOckham estbienmiseen évidence, entre dans autres, aléthiques C. Normore, TheLogic andModality inthe Later Middle : TheContribution ofTime Ages ofWilliam ofToronto, 1975; C. Normore, Divine , Thèsede Doctorat, ofOckham Omniscience, University andFuture : AnOverview, dans: T. Rudavsky Omniscience Omnipotence Contingence (éd.),Divine andOmnipotence inMedieval A Study , Dordrecht 1985,3-22; E. Karger, Philosophy ofWilliam ModalLogic ofCalifornia-Berkeley, 1976.La , Thèsede Doctorat, ofOckham's University thèsede Lagerlund se limiteaussiaux modalités Modal ; cf.H. Lagerlund, aléthiques intheMiddle Leiden2000. Syllogistics Ages, 37Cf.Buridan, deconsequentiis, Tractatus III, 3, 19-98,éd. Hubien1976(op.cit.,supra, note30),101-3. 38Surla différence entre lesdeuxcas,cf.A. Maierù, etConnotatio chez Buridan, Significatio dans: J. Pinborg Buridan , Copenhage (éd.),TheLogic 1976,112-3.Surla notion ofJohn rationis etle traitement des"verbes mentaux" chezBuridan, cf.aussiE. P. Bos, ďappellatio Mental Verbs in Terministic Buridan Marsilius dans: , Albert Logic(John ofSaxony, ofInghen), 16(1978),56-69; R. vanderLecq,John Buridan onIntentionality Vivarium, , dans: E.P.Bos, Semantics andMetaphysics, LeCheval deBuridan. (éd.),Medieval 1985,281-90 ;J.Biard, Nijmegen etphilosophie dulangage dansl'analyse d'unverbe dans: O. Pluta(éd.),Die Logique intentionnel, im14.und15.Jahrhundert, Amsterdam Philosophie 1988,119-37 ; Biard1989(op.cit.,supra, note27); L.M.deRijk, Buridan onUniversals etde morale, , in: Revuede métaphysique John 97 (1992),35-59.

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Il est toutefoisremarquable que cette différenced'effetsémantique n'empêchenullementla considérationdes sens diviséet composé des propositionsayantun prédicatépistémique,qui pourrontêtreconsidérées,de Cette distincmodalescommeles autres.39 ce pointde vue, des propositions terme tiongénérale,qui dépendde différentes peut avoirdans portéesqu'un une proposition,permetnotammentla descriptiondes inférencesqui "exportent"ou "importent"le sujetdans ou horsde la portéede la modalité. On peut estimerqu' Ockham lui-mêmeoffredes exemplesde propositionsdans lesquellesla copule est modifiéepar un termeépistémique, et ainsi voir 'scituÝdans ' SortesscituresseanimaVcomme un modificateur de la copule.40La modificationde la copule semble toutefoiss'approcher plus des théoriesadverbiales,comme celle de Boèce, que des théories liant les termesmodaux aux propositions,comme l'ockhamienne.Il n'est surtoutpas aisé d'imaginerle rôle des termesépistémiquescomme des de copule, du moins dans un cadre ockhamien; celle-ciest modificateurs alors que ceux-là sont des préun typede syncatégorème, Ockham pour dicats catégorématiques.On peut se demander commentles modalités de copule (ou aristotéliciennes peuvent être à la fois des modificateurs simplementdes copules) et des prédicats.Nous nous limiteronsici à indiquer une pistepour la solutionde ce problèmedans ce qu'on peut appeler à la fois en conla double appartenancedes modalitésaristotéliciennes, et définiscomme des prédicats tinuitéavec les copules passées et futures41 d'un certaintype. Il nous semble que la théorieockmétalinguistiques hamienne de la propositionmodale offreun cadre métathéoriquedans lequel se développe la théoriedes modalitésdites réelles,les modalités mais aussi, entreautres,des modalitésépistémiques.On aristotéliciennes, peut ainsi estimerque la théorieockhamiennede la propositionmodale est incomplète,elle ne traitepas de la sémantiquedes modalitésarismême s'il y a une théorieockhamiennepour de tellessituatotéliciennes, tions.Il n'en va pas de même dans la logique de Buridan,dans laquelle toutefoisil n'est pas clair commentun termeépistémiquepeut modifier la copule. On remarqueraaussi que Burleigh,qui accepte ces deux clauses de 'mode', ne garde que les modalitésaristotéliciennes.42 pour la définition Aussi bien chez Ockham que chez Buridan, on note l'existencede logiques communsaux propositionsmodales aléthiqueset comportements 39Voir,parexemple, Priora inAnalytica , II, Quaestio18a,éd.H. Hubien(non Quaestiones publiée). 40Summa Gài et Brown, (OPhI), 273. II, 9, 23-25,éd. Boehner, Logicae, 41Summa Logicae Gài,et Brown, (OPhI), 214. , I, 72,3-6,éd. Boehner, 42Burleigh, note 1955(op.cit.,supra, éd. Boehner Artis De Puntate Brevior, , Tract. Logicae 29),234.

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à celles qui possèdentdes verbes concernantles actes de l'esprit,selon l'expressionmédiévale.Ils ne traitentpas les deux cas de la même façon; alors que l'anglais déploie une logique modale homogène mais incomplète, qui n'explique tous les aspects sémantiquesdes prédicatsmodaux, le françaisa un critèreet une logique modale à double entrée,qui rend des modalitésaristotéliciennes, compte du fonctionnement quitteà avoir une théoriemoinsclairedes modalitésépistémiques. Le maîtrepicardchoisit la voie qui semble prédominanteau Moyen Age tardif.On indique des comportements logiques communs à ces deux typesde termes,notamment à propos des sens divisé et composé des propositions,sans les réunir sous un même concept,comme le faitGuillaumeHeystesbury.43 Il est intéressantde noterque Richard Billingham,dans son Speculum Puerorum , réunitles termesprédicablesde propositionsentièrestantôtsous le conmodalis , cept de terminus officialis (ou officiabilis ), tantôtsous celui terminus solutionqui est à peu près équivalenteau concept ockhamiende modalité.44En ce qui concerneBuridan,il est clair que sa démarchethéorique 43Voirainsilesdéfinitions dupremier, dudeuxième etduseptième modes selonlesquels uneproposition De ; Guillaume peutêtreau sensdiviséet au senscomposé Heytesbury, sensu diviso etcomposito et4rb,Venise, 1500: "Unde7 vel8 modisaccidit diversitas , 3vb-4ra veldividendi. Etprimus modus sicutinprincipio fuit estmedicomponendi exemplificatum antehocverbo velquocumque consimili sicut convenit. verum, ampliativo possum ampliativo : etsicde aliisquibuscumque similibus accidit possibile, impossibile, contingens compositio etdivisio. Secundus modus estmediante termino habente vimconfundendi : sicut sunt huiusmodiverba: requiro : indigeo : incipio : desidero : cupio: volo: teneo: debeo: presuppono necessarium : semper : in eternum : eternaliter : immediate : et sic de aliis."; "Septimus modusmediantibus terminis verbalibus actumvoluntatis siveintellectus : significantibus sicutmediante hocverboscio,hesito, credo,volo,desidero, et sicde aliis." appeto. ' chezRichard 44Le de 'terminus couvre aussibienlestermes concept ojjìcialis Billingham concernant lesactesde l'esprit maisne le faitpas dansle cadred'une que lesmodalités, théorie modale ; Richard , 1, IV, 1-11,éd. Maierù,345-6: Billingham, Speculum puerorum "Terminus officialis diciquilibet terminus potest qui in se importât aliquodofficium positivům velprivativum, velministerium. Suntautemhuiusmodi termini concernentes actum ut 'scire','intelligere', et mentis, 'dubitare', 'credere', 'percipere', 'imaginari', 'apparere' et universaliter suntrespectu et universaliter similia, quaecumque complexi quaepossunt esserespectu universalis ut 'possum tibipomum', licetnechoc nec hoc,et promittere similiter de aliis; similiter haecquattuor 'contin'necessarium', 'possibile', 'impossibile', 'est'quandosumitur ut 'estte esse',et haecdictio gens',et hocverbum impersonaliter, 'non'etquodlibet universale li 'non'cumquo convertitur." ratione signum negativum (cf. A. Maierù, Lo "Speculum siveTerminus estin quem"di Ricardo puerorum Billingham, ' dans: Studi Medievali Uneautreversion du textea ''officiabilis au lieu , 3 (1970),297-397). de 'officialis' estin Quem siveSpeculum ; cf. Terminus , recensio altera,1, 20, éd. puerorum L.-M.deRijk,dans: id.,Some 14th Tracts onthe Probationes Terminorum Century , Nijmegen 1982, 86. Il estplusintéressant de noterqu'uneautreversion de ce texte, ou un autretexte intitulé Puerorum aussià Billingham et trèsprochede celuiéditépar , attribué Speculum 'terminus ' cf.Richard au lieude 'terminus utilise modalis Maierù, ; oßcialis' Billingham, Speculum « dans : L.M. de » attributed Another Puerorum toRichard , 8-11,p. 215-7, puerorum Rijk, Speculum Introduction andText 1 (1975),203-35. , dans: Medioevo, Billingham.

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cas de figure,tantôt double, qui tantôttraiteséparémentles différents applique à tous les termesmodaux la distinctionentresens composé et sens divisé, est plus importanteque sa définitionétendue de 'mode'. Guillaume d'Ockham et, avant lui, Martin d'Alnwick,définissant £mode' de façon assez large pour inclure les deux groupes, en tirentles conséquences pour le développementhomogènede la théoriedes modalités. Ils montrentla diversitéd'approchespossiblespour rendrecompte d'un même type de phénomène. Une brève remarque métathéoriquepeut rendreplus claire l'importance de cette diversitéd'approche. Il nous semble que parler de reconnaissance des modalitésnon aléthiques,comme le fait Boh,45peut être trompeur,si l'on veut suggérerpar là l'existenced'un domaine indépendant des théoriesqu'il s'agiraitsimplementde décrire.Les modalitéssont La reconnaisdes outilsconceptuelsdéfinissurtoutde façon stipulative.46 modaux termes des sance de la proximitédes comportements logiques nullement à les rassembler sous ne contraint et aléthiques épistémiques un conceptunique. Même si on le fait,ce conceptpeut ne pas êtrecelui de modalité. La diversitéde constructions théoriquesn'est aucunement en oppositionavec la reconnaissanced'un ensemblecommunde données de l'examen dont il fautrendrecompte; tel est le cas, nous semble-t-il, des termesépistémiqueset modaux par ces auteursmédiévaux. 3. Conclusion La différence entreles deux textesockhamiensest évidente,par la définition et par le nombrede modalités,mais aussi par la théoriemodale esquisest plus proche de la SummaLogicae sée. Le commentairedu Perihermeneias Si les des Réfoitations commentaire et plus développé que le Sophistiques. 45Cf.Boh 1993{op.cit.,supra, surce point; estplusprudent note26),46. Knuuttila note25),176. 1993{op.cit.,supra, voirKnuuttila 46La précaution desthéories le doublestandard icide ce qu'onpourrait découle appeler et ou linguistiques à la foisdesdonnées rendre médiévales, logiques compte qui veulent ellesontrecours de l'usagedesconcepts ; si le premier aspect parla tradition auxquels à desconsidérations contraint le deuxième desdéfinitions offre le terrain prostipulatives, à Ockham, attribué UElementarium , faussement Logicae explicatives. presà desdéfinitions assez dansuneréfutation desdéfinitions, de ce doublefonctionnement donneunexemple modalités les de concernant des thèses ; ockhamienne, maladroite, Burleigh d'inspiration G. GaietJ.Giermek, Elementarium cf.Guillaume IV, 18,éd.E.M.Buytaert, d'Ockham, Logicae, des le témoignage de voirdanscetapocryphe (OPhVII), 141-2.Il n'estpas sansintérêt dontcellessurlesmodalités autourdesthèses discussions ; sur ockhamiennes, premières 17 à 20 du livreIV. lessujets ici,voirleschapitres qui nousintéressent

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deux textesvont dans le même sens, il semble surtoutque l'intégration de la réflexionsur ces termesest plus importantedans le commentaire du Perihermeneias , notammentpar la mise en place d'une stratégiedestinée à rendrecompte de ce type de phénomène. Cette conclusionpourraitinviterà inverserl'ordre de compositionde deux commentairespar rapportà celui présentépar les éditeursde deux Il est bien sûrpossibled'expliquerla différence textes.47 d'étatde la théorie sembleun locustextuelplus appromodale par le faitque le Perihermeneias Même si l'on Sophistiques. prié à un tel développementque les Réfutations il resteà expliquerpourquoi les résultatsdu accepte un tel raisonnement, n'ont été dans le deuxième. pas intégrés premier L'ordre établi par les éditeursest étayépar les renvoiscroisésdans les textesockhamiens.Le premierse trouvedans le commentairein librum Elenchorum : , au Perihermeneias Prototoistocapitulo estnotandum hictradita quoddoctrina Philosophi specialiter valetad impediendum a divisis ad coniuncta, consequentiam quandoarguitur quando in divisis, de quo dictum estin II Perihermeneias .48 aliquidbisaccipitur Le deuxièmeest dans le commentaire du Perihermeneias Elenchi , aux Sophistici , par un verbe au futur: Et estin omnibus talibus fallacia sicutin II Elenchorum ostendetur.49 accidentis, Dans les deux cas, Ockham semble renvoyerà son commentaire,plutôt qu'à Aristotelui-même,et le futurdu deuxième texte cité doit correspondreà l'ordrede lecturedes textesdu Stagirite.Indépendammentdes renvoisà l'intérieurdes textesockhamiens,cet ordre de lecture est la motivationla plus fortepour placer la compositionde YExpositio sur le Perihermeneias en premier. En effet,l'argumentle plus importantse trouvesimplementdans l'ordrehabitueldes commentaires des œuvreslogiquesd'Aristote, le Perihermeneias , comme partie de la Logica Vêtus venant avant les , , Réfutations Sophistiques Yordonaturalis , selon les éditeursd'Ockham,50et dans le faitqu'il ne semble pas que le Venerabilis ait eu le temps de les commenterplus Inceptor d'une fois. Si cette considérationest un argumentfortpour garder la chronologieadoptée par les éditeurs,les différences conceptuellesentre 47Exp.Per., éd.Gambatese etBrown, Introductio, Introductio, (OPhII), 13*; Exp.Elenchi éd. Del Punta,Gambatese et Brown, 13*. (OPh III), 48Exp.Elench., et Brown, II, 16,4, 40-43,éd. Del Punta,Gambatese (OPhIII), 305. 49Exp.Per et Brown, 451. ., II, 4, 6, 22-23,éd. Gambatese (OPh II), 50Exp.Per.,Introductio, éd. Gambatese et Brown, (OPhII), 13*.

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les textesdoiventêtre prises en compte aussi, ce qui suggèreun cadre plus complexe de la productiondes œuvresd'Ockham.51 Quoi qu'il en soit de leur ordre de composition,il nous semble clair que les théoriesmodales de ces deux textesne sontpas les mêmes et que celle du commentairedu Perihermeneias est à la foisplus développéeet plus superLibrosElenchorum. proche de la SummaLogicaeque celle de YExpositio La reconnaissancede ce point doit s'accompagnerde la reconnaissance de la spécificitéde l'extensionde la liste des modalitéset, d'une façon La théoriedu Inceptor. plus générale,de la théoriemodale du Venerabilis maître nominalistereprésenteen effetune rupturepar rapport à une importantetradition,qui remonteau moins à Ammonius et à Boèce, associant les modalitésà des adverbes. Le cœur de cette tradition,qui claire chez GauthierBurleigh,est trouveune expressionparticulièrement la compréhensiondes modalitéscomme des modificateurs de la copule. voit les modalités à la fois comme des Buridan Jean prédicablesde propositionset comme des modificateurs de la copule. Cette duplicitéapparaît dans le fait que les termesépistémiques,tout en étant comprisdans la liste de modalités,ne figurentpas dans les textesque le maîtrepicard des modalités.Guillaumed'Ockham, à l'instarde consacre au traitement a une théorie modale Burleigh, simpleet sans ambiguïté,mais sa définition de modalitécomme des prédicablesde propositionsentières,et seulement comme des prédicablesde propositionsentières,aussi bien dans le commentairesur le Perihermeneias que dans la SummaLogicae,lui donne une l'histoiredes théoriesmodales. tout à fait dans originale place Belo Horizonte,Brésil de Filosofia Departamento Universidade Federalde Minas Gerais

51On remarquera desmodaen un certain sensmoinsdéveloppé aussile traitement Dwina dePraedestinatione etdePraescientia litésdansle Tractatus , aussibiendansla classification dePraedestinatione comme deinesse affectées destermes despropositions (cf.Tractatus épistémiques éd. Ph.Boehner Deirespectu Futurorum etdePraescientia II, 45-51; III, 329-38, Contingentium, despropositions du sensdivisé etS. Brown, (OPhII), 521-2; 532),quedansl'explication surle Perihermeneias différente de celleadoptéedansYExpositio modales paruneapproche et Brown, éd. Boehner et dansla Summa , I, 309-12, (OPhII), 519). Logicae (cf.Tractatus du croisement traite Cetteremarque estd'autant précisément quele texte plusimportante et desmodalités destermes aléthiques. épistémiques

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The Liar ParadoxfromJohnBuridanbackto ThomasBradwardine STEPHEN READ

1. Introduction Thomas Bradwardinewas born shortlybeforethe startof the fourteenth century.While at Merton College in Oxfordin the 1320s, he made two seminal contributions to our understandingof the world. One is generand well known: his reinterpretation of Aristotleon the ally recognised ratio of velocityto force and resistance,that the second two vary with the square of the first.The other insightis much less well known and usuallycreditedelsewhere.Ralph Strode,friendand neighbourin London of GeoffreyChaucer later in the centurywrote: "Then appeared that prince of modern naturalphilosophers,Thomas Bradwardine,who first came upon somethingof value concerningthe insolubles."1The insolubles are paradoxes or antinomiesof language, perhaps most famously expressedin the Liar Paradox: 'What I am sayingis false'.Bradwardine's solutionwas later taken up by Albert of Saxony and John Buridan at the Universityof Paris, and is mostwell knownin Buridan'sversion,following discussionsby Ernest Moody and ArthurPrior2and translations by Scottand Hughes.3Bradwardine'streatisehas not been translatedinto English,and appeared in printfor the firsttime in 1970, edited from two of the twelvemanuscriptsknown to have survived.4 1 RalphStrode, tract. 6 De insolubilibus, citedfrom P.V.Spade,TheMedieval Liar: " Logica -Literature ' andBradA Catalogue , Toronto 1975,p. 88;cf.Spade,'Insolubilia oftheInsolubilia" wardine's in:Medioevo 7 (1981),115-34, ofsignification, p. 116. 2 E.A.theory andConsequence inMedieval Some , Amsterdam 1953;A. Prior, Moody,Truth Logic inJohn Buridan oftheBritish 48 (1962), , in: Proceedings problems ofself-reference Academy, 281-96. 3J. Buridan, onMeaning andTruth T.K. Scott,NewYork1966;G.E. , trans. Sophisms Buridan onSelfwith a Translation, Hughes, John Reference: Chapter Eight ofBuridan's "Sophismata", anIntroduction 1984. , anda philosophical Commentary, Cambridge 4 T. Bradwardine, Insolubilia despropositions insolubles au , in M.-L.Roure,La problématique XIIesiècle etau début duXIVe,suivie del'édition destraités deW Shyreswood, W.Burleigh etTh. Bradwardine d'Histoire Doctrinale etLittéraire duMoyen , in:Archives Age,37 (1970),205Mertonense 31 (1969),174-224, 326;J.A. Weisheipl, , in:Medieval Studies, Repertorium p. 178. © Koninklijke BrillNV,Leiden,2002 - www.brill.nl Alsoavailable online

Vivarium 40,2

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Even a quartercenturyafteritspublication,however,Edith Sylla could writein her essayon Bradwardinein the Routledge : Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy "Bradwardine'sothermathematicaland logicalworks[besidesDe continuo] do not seem to have been particularlynotable."5I wish to challengethis evaluationof the treatiseon the insolubles.There was more excuse for thisjudgmentwhenJohn Murdoch wrote: "Neither [De insolubilibus nor De incipitet desinit] has been edited or studied,yet the likelihoodis not that will great they eventuallyreveal themselvesto be much more than of the expositions opiniocommunis concerningtheir subjects."6Not so. Buridan's adaptationof Bradwardine'ssolutionlays it open to insuperable objections;even Albertof Saxony's alterationof it makes it unworkable. But Bradwardine'soriginalidea is not so open to challenge.It is arguablya genuine and originalsolution. The problem with a propositionlike 'What I am sayingis false', is that we appear to be able to show not only that it is false,but that,in consequence,it is true as well. Briefly,if it were true that what I was sayingwas false,it would be false and so not true, hence (assumingit mustbe eithertrueor false)it is false.But ifwhat I was sayingwas false, thenwhat I said was true,as well as false.If we thinkto avoid thiscontradictionby suggestingthat what I said was neithertrue nor false,the revengeproblemhitsback throughthe alternativeparadox: 'What I am sayingis not true'.7The same reductio proofshowsthatit is not true.The problemfor truth-valuegap theoristsis to explain why I did not speak trulywhen I anticipatedthem and said: 'What I am sayingis not true'. Bradwardinelays down fromthe startthat everypropositionis true or false. But he faces a similarproblem. He can show that the paradoxical proposition,'What I am sayingis false',is false,by the standard reductio proof.How can he avoid what seems an inevitableconsequence, that I must then have spoken trulywhen I said that it was false?Too often,purportedsolutionsto the Liar (as we will see below) concentrate on proofsthat it is true,or that it is false. But that is to avoid the real problem.We have a surfeitof proofs,both that it is true and that it is

5 E. Sylla,'Bradwardine, Thomas(c. 1300-49)', in: Routledge , ofPhilosophy Encyclopedia London1998,vol.1, 863-6,p. 865. 6J.E.Murdoch, in:Dictionary Thomas', , vol.II, New 'Bradwardine, ofScientific Biography York1970,390-7,p. 391. 7 Theterm'revenge in his'Introduction' to wasintroduced problem' byR.M.Martin R.M.Martin onTruth andtheLiarParadox 1984,4. , Oxford (ed.),Recent Essays

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false.What is needed is some analysiswhich blocks at least one of these proofs. areFalse 2. TheInsolubles Bradwardine'sproposal is that the Liar paradox, and indeed all such insolubles,are simplyfalse,and not true. At the heart of his diagnosis lies his Thesis 2, that "If a propositionsignifiesitselfnot to be true or itselfto be trueand is false."8His proofdependson to be false,it signifies and postulates,whichhe setsout explicitly: certainbackgrounddefinitions are. is an utterance Definition 1 A trueproposition signifying onlyas things are. is an utterance other than Definition 2 A falseproposition signifying things is trueorfalse. Postulate 1 (Bivalence) Everyproposition or meanscontingently or necessarily Postulate 2 Everyproposition signifies everyor necessarily. which follows fromit contingently thing or meaningis closed under This closureprinciple,statingthatsignification implicationand entailment,will play a crucial role in his diagnosis.His and thirdpostulatestateshis oppositionto his predecessors,the restringentes the cassantes :9 andforwhat Postulate 3 Thepartcansupposit foritswholeandforitsopposite is equivalent to them. Suppositionwas the medieval equivalentof reference.Postulate3 rejects the popular suggestionthat self-reference is impossible. and disjunctions Postulate 4 (De Morgan)Conjunctions withcontradictory parts contradict eachother. 8 See Roure'sedition ofthesec(citedabovein n. 4), §6.05,p. 298.Roure'sreading ondthesis is: "si aliquapropositio se nonesseveramvelse essefalsam significai ipsam, se nonesseveramet estfalsa."The proof whichfollows, theBodleian manusignificai Oxford Can.lat.219whichI haveconsulted, PaulSpade'scitation oftheBruges script ms.in Spade1975(seeabove,n. 1), 109andin Spade1981[op.cit ., above,n. 1), 118 andRoure'sowntranslation ofthethesis [op.cit.above,n. 4: p. 238)showthatthesecond'non'hereis an incorrect interpolation. 9 See,e.g.,P.V. Spade,Insolubilia, in: N. Kretzmann et al.,ed.,TheCambridge History Medieval andBradwardine, Insolubilia , Cambridge 1982/88, , ofLater Philosophy §IV.12,246-53; chs.3-5,in Roure'sedition [op.cit.,above,n. 4), 287-93.

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withtheopposite Froma disjunction Postulate 5 (Disjunctive together Syllogism) ofoneofitspartstheother partmaybe inferred. Thesis 1 • Everyproposition or meansaffirmation whoseterms havemanysupposita signifies or denialfor anyof them;and • if it has onlyonesuppositum, for thisorfor that. We come finallyto Thesis 2 If a proposition itselfnotto be trueor to befalse, it signifies signifies to be true and is false. itself The crucial passage is the following,where this thesisis proved: it signifies elseas A signifies itself notto be true.Theneither something Suppose A is nottrue, ifwe suppose itfollows that not.Consequently, well,ornot.Suppose thatitis notthecasethat as A signifies itis notwholly 1)andhence, (byDefinition all thatA signifies, andso A is nottrue(sincethatA is nottrueis,byhypothesis, A signifies itfor"asA signifies" we cansubstitute byThesis1 part2).10Therefore, from whatA signifies, itself to be true(byPostulate 2),sinceitsbeingtruefollows it is not true. that namely, to signifying itself not elseadditional On theother hand,ifA signifies something thatitis not thatA is nottrue, itfollows tobe true, e.g.,thatP, thenifwesuppose 1 andThesis thecaseboththatA is nottrueandP (asbefore, byDefinition wholly A is trueor not-P(bypostulate 1,part1 thistime)andhence,either 4).11Hence, A is trueornot-P. that Butwesupposed thateither 2,A signifies againbyPostulate thatP. Hence,it foloftheseconddisjunct A signifies theopposite here,namely, itself as well,A signifies lowsthatA is true(byPostulate 5). So on thisalternative to be true(byPostulate 2 oncemore). itself tobe nottobe true,thenitalsosignifies thatifA signifies itself Thisshows true.Thisis thefirst partofThesis2. itfollows that itself tobe false.Fromitsbeingfalse, thatA signifies next, Suppose, itself notto be true,andso bythe itis nottrue.Hence,byPostulate 2,A signifies A signifies itself to be true.Thus,ifA signifies first partofThesis2,justproven, tobe true.Thisis thesecond 2. itself italsosignifies itself tobe false, partofThesis itself notto be true, either thatanyproposition We havenowshown signifying nottrue bothbe either itself tobe true.Sinceitcannot alsosignifies ortobe false, other thanitis,andso itis false itmustsignify orfalse, andat thesametimetrue, is whatwewanttoshow) false(which itmustbe either 2). Moreover, (byDefinition itwouldbe true(byPostulate ornot.Butifitwasnotfalse, l)12andso wouldsig10Contrary towhatSpadewrites 21), (Spade1981(op.cit.,above,n. 1),121,footnote of"Ais thesubstitution in usingthefirst thesis Bradwardine is correct here,to authorise nottrue"for"asA signifies". 11Spadesaysthatthisstepis idle(Spade1981(op.cit.,above,n. 1),122,footnote 29). as itwillbe. be applied, 5 cannot Butwithout it,Postulate 12Rourehas'secundam': ms.can.lat. in Oxford thismustbe a scribal error, repeated 219,f.55va.

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2). Henceany niíyotherthanit is, and thusbe false(onceagain,byDefinition is false.13 either itself notto be true,or to be false, signifying proposition Bradwardinehas shownthatthe Liar paradox,and related Unsurprisingly, propositions,are false. As noted above, that is not the problem. How does Bradwardineblock the subsequentinferencethatit is also true?For a propositionto be true, says Definition1, thingsmust only be as the itselfto be falseBut the Liar does not only signify propositionsignifies. one mightsay. It also signifiesitselfto be true, its primarysignification, as Bradwardineshowsin the firstpart of Thesis 2. So to be true,it would have to be both false and true. But no propositionis both. So it is not true,but false. its Own Truth 3. Signifying This solutionto the Liar paradox would seem to be familiarfromitspreand the extensivemodern sentationby John Buridan in his Sophismata discussionof his treatment.But by the time the doctrine appears in Buridan it has undergonetwo crucial, and as I intend to show, fatal changes.Buridan,in fact,discussesthe insolublesin at least fivepassages in his survivingworks.14In the Sophismata , in its revisedformthe latest he of these passages, probablydatingfrom 1356 or shordyafterwards,15 writes:"some people have advanced the followingview (and it was my or assertsitself opiniontoo at one time):. . . everyproposition. . . signifies to be true,and as a resultany propositionthat eitherdirecdyor indirectlyassertsitselfto be false, is false."16Where Bradwardinerestricted the claim that a propositionsignifiesits own truthto propositionsthat Buridangeneralizesthe claim to all propositions. theirown falsity, signify Elencorum : "Let the We findBuridan endorsingthe view in his Questiones firstassumption be that every proposition on account of its formal

13Thisis a fairly in §§6.054freetranslation oftheLatintextgivenin Roure'sedition 6, 299-300. 14See,e.g.,F. Pironet, andchronology Buridan ontheLiarparadox: ofanopinion John study andJ. Buridan, , Leiden1993,293-300; , in:K. Jacobi(ed.),Argumentationstheorie ofthetexts Elencorum , ed.R. vanderLecqandH.A.G.Braakhuis, 1994,IntroducQuestiones Nijmegen tion§3. 15See,e.g.,B. Michael, Buridan : Studien seinen Werken undzur zu seinem Leben, Johannes Theorien imEuropa desspäten Berlin1985, seiner Mittelalters , Diss.FreieUniversität Rezeption 528. 16Trans.Hughes(seeabove,n. 3),§7.7.1.

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itselfto be true."17His reasoningdepends on appresignification signifies betweentwo distinctaccounts,by Buridanand othciatingthe distinction ers, of what is requiredfor the truthof a proposition. These two accountsappear explicitlyat the startof Albertof Saxony's He treatiseon Insolubles , incorporatedas treatise6 of his Perutilis Logica.18 startswith a definition: A trueproposition is onesuchthatthings arehowever it signifies theyare.19 But withina few lines he writes: to be trueis foritssubject Foranyaffirmative The secondassumption: proposition andconversely; andforit to be false to supposit forthesamething andpredicate to supposit forwhatis notthesameandconversely. is foritssubject andpredicate and tobe trueis foritssubject Thethird Foranynegative proposition assumption: andforittobe false tosupposit forwhatis notthesameandconversely; predicate to supposit forthesamething, andconversely.20 is foritssubject andpredicate Albertproceeds immediately,by way of a fourthassumption: for thatwhatitssubject andpredicate affirmative supposit signifies Every proposition is thesame, and a fifth: for andpredicate thatwhatitssubject supposit signifies Everynegative proposition is notthesame, togetherwith the first: or negative, is affirmative Every proposition to show his first,second and thirdtheses: thatitis true. affirmative Thefirst: signifies Every proposition thatitis true. The second: signifies negative proposition Every in the world thatitis true. The third: signifies Every proposition

17Ed. vanderLecqandBraakhuis 14),92. (seefootnote 18It is alsoincluded ofhisSophismata. in theParis1502edition 19Trans.N. Kretzmann Translations TheCambridge andE. Stump, ofMedieval Philosophical Texts 1988,338. , Cambridge 20Kretzmann I haveadapted andStump1988{op.cit.,above,n. 19),339;however, Venice1522,repr.Olms1974, Perutilis Albert ofSaxony, translation their Logica, following 3. Someofthemss.(e.g.,Leipzig1387andPragueIV. G4) omitassumption f.43rb.

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The proofis straightforward, given his assumptions.If everyaffirmative thatwhat its subjectand predicatesuppositforis the propositionsignifies same (assumption4), and for an affirmative propositionto be true it sufficethatits subjectand predicatesuppositforthe same (assumption2), theneveryaffirmative thatit is true.The same direct propositionsignifies proofshows that everynegativepropositionalso signifiesthat it is true, so everypropositiondoes (by assumption1). Straightforward, certainly. However, thereis a suppressedpremise,which in fullgeneralitywould be Bradwardine'scrucial Postulate 2, that a propositionsignifieswhatever is entailed by what it signifies.Some such principleis needed to connect the entailmentexpressedin the second premise (assumption2) withthe firstpremise(assumption4) to replace 'whatits subjectand predicate suppositforis the same' by 'it is true'. Buridan offeredthe same proof as Albert'sfor his thirdthesisin his Elencorum Questiones , probablywrittensome fifteenor more years earlier:21 Forevery is affirmative or negative. Buteachofthemsignifies itself to proposition be trueor at leastfrom eachitfollows thatitis true.Thisis clearfirst concerning forevery affirmative thatitssubject andpredicate affirmatives, proposition signifies forthesame,andthisis foritto be true. . . Secondly, itis clearconcernsupposit fora negative doesnotsignify thatthesubject andpredicate ingnegatives, supposit forthesame,andthisis forthenegative to be true.(ed.vanderLecq proposition andBraakhuis, p. 92.) He concludesthateverypropositionsignifies itselfto be true,and so every propositionwhich signifiesitselfto be false,is false,since it signifiesitself to be true and false at the same time,which is impossible. 4. Signification and Supposition But what is the relationbetween these two criteriaof truth,first,that "thingsare howeverit signifies", secondly,that,forexample,foraffirmatives, and subject predicatesuppositfor the same? Do the two criteriaalways give the same answer?Is it possibleto prove thattheydo? Buridan tackles the issue directlyin ch. 2 of his Sophismata. His conclusionis that the criterionin termsof signification is inadequate, and does indeed depart fromthe second. However, the reason depends on a somewhatidiosyncraticaspect of Buridan'stheoryof signification. The medievaisinherited 21Albert waswriting Elencorum 1350s;Buridan's (inParis)in themidQuestiones proba- see vanderLecq andBraakhuis' thelate 1330s blydatefrom 'Introduction', [op.cit., above,n. 14),xxx.

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via Boethius, theirconceptof signification fromtwo sources:fromAristotle and fromAugustine.22 They read Aristotleas sayingthatspokenand written languagesignified conceptsin the mindwhichwere likenessesof things in the world.In contrast,Augustineclaimed thatspokenand writtenlanguage signifiedthingsin the worldvia the mediumof concepts.Boethius added to the Aristotelianviewpointthe suggestionthat spoken and writcenten language signifiedboth concepts and things.In the thirteenth The the novel that also came things. way concepts signify tury suggestion was open for two prevailingconceptionsin the fourteenth century:with Ockham,Albertof Saxony and others,that,contraryto Aristotle,spoken, writtenand conceptuallanguage signifiesthings(whatwe mightcall the cen"Augustinián"conception,thoughit adds to Augustinethe thirteenth turyinnovation);contrastedwiththe view of Buridanand othersthatspoken and writtenlanguage signifiesconcepts,which in turnare likenesses of things,and so the formermediatelyor secondarilysignifythe latter conception). (what we mightdub the "Boethian55 So far,so good, if confusing.But thisis to concentrateon terms,the extremesof a proposition.What of propositionsthemselves?The thirteenthcenturyinnovationwould lead to an impossiblepuzzle in the succeedingcentury.If the conceptof man signifiesmen, and the conceptof animal signifies animals,and Augustinewas rightto suggestthatthe mind containsa conceptuallanguage, with conceptual or mentalpropositions as well as terms,what does the conceptualproposition,'A man is an aniA fundamental dividearose in thefourteenth mal5,signify? centurybetween those,like Adam Wodeham and Gregoryof Rimini followinghim, who claimed there must be suitablepropositionalobjects in the world, com, things(unlikemen and animals)whichwere capable only plexesignificabilia of being complexlysignified;and others,such as Ockham and Buridan ways)who denied therewere any such things.Buridan (in theirdifferent claimed that although the spoken proposition,'A man is an animal', signifiedthe conceptualproposition,'A man is an animal5,it signifiesin the worldonlymen and animals.That is all thereis. There is, he averred, or suchlike. no furtherman-being-an-animal that the "thingsare It followsfromBuridan5stheoryof signification fortruthmustbe rejected.For it is neither howeverit signifies55-criterion

22Thehistory inE.P.BosandS. Read,Concepts: detail outinsomewhat isspelled greater andPaulofGelria theTreatises , Leuven2001,Introduction §2. ofCleves ofThomas

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That it is not necessaryis shown,Buridansays,23 necessarynor sufficient. the of the by example proposition,'The Antichristwill walk', which is what it and true,though signifies(among otherthings)is the Antichrist, he is (as yet)nothing.Thus a propositioncan be trueeven thoughthings are not (now) as it signifies. Nor is the criterionsufficient, since 'A man is an ass' is false,but what it signifies are men and asses, and thesecertainlyexist.'A man is an ass' can signifyno more than what are signifiedby its terms,namely,men and asses. But its truthdoes not followfromthe mere existenceof men and asses. Indeed, 'A man is an ass' and 'No man is an ass' signifythe same (forBuridan),namely,men and asses,but theycannotboth be true. Hence the "thingsare howeverit signifies"-criterion is neithernecessary nor sufficient. Truth,saysBuridan,is not a matter(simply)of signification, but of supposition.It is the criterionin termsof supposition(that subject and predicate suppositfor the same, or not, as the case may be) which counts. 5. Buridan' s Account of Truth However,even thatcondition,in termsof supposition,needs to be applied with care in the case of the insolubles,Buridan notes. Take the Liar paradox, 'What I am sayingis false'. We have seen that we can show, , thatit is false.However,proceedingcautiously,let us take the by reductio argumentstep by step. Suppose it is true.Then, takingthe suppositional criterionas necessary,it followsthat subject and predicate suppositfor the same (since it is affirmative), and so it is false- i.e., 'false' supposits forthe same as 'what I am saying'.Thus, assumingit is true,it follows thatit is false,and so not true. Hence, by reductio , it is not true- and so it is false,by the principleof bivalence.But if it is false,then its subject and predicate do indeed suppositfor the same, and so if the suppositional criterionwere sufficient as well as necessary,it would followthat the Liar paradox was true,as well as false,and the antinomywould have returned. Buridan's solutionis not to question the principleof bivalence used here. Althoughit seems never to be explicidystatedin the Sophismata , it is implicitin everything he writes.In fact,he argues for it explicidyin

23J. Buridan, Cannstatt , ed. T.K. Scott,Stuttgart-Bad Sophismata 1977,87.

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his Questiones Ekncorum : truthis the highestgoal, and if that highestgoal fails to be achieved in the smallestregard,falsehoodresults.So every propositionis eithertrue,or if not true,false.24 To returnto ch. 2 of the Sophismata : Buridan'sstrategyis to challenge the sufficiency of the suppositionalcriterion.Suppositingforthe same is not sufficient for truth(in the case of affirmatives such as 'What I am sayingis false',or forfalsityin the case of negativessuch as 'What I am as his ninthand sayingis not true5) it is necessarybut not sufficient, tenthconclusionsof ch. 2 establish: The ninth conclusion thatiftheterms ofan affirmative [is]thatitdoesnotfollow forthesame,thentheproposition is true. . . Thetenth concluproposition supposit sionis thatforthetruth ofan affirmative itis required that categorical proposition theterms, thesubject andpredicate, forthesamething orthings." namely, supposit The suppositionalcriterionis sufficient onlyif the case is not one of selfthatis, where a propositionassertsits own falsityor something reflection, which entails that it is false. In the lattercase, a strongercriterionof truthis needed, namely,thatwhateverit entailsbe true,thatis, thatany propositionit entailsalso satisfythe suppositionalcriterion: Hence... it shouldbe saidthatwherea proposition hasor canhavereflection on it doesnotsuffice forthetruth ofan affirmative thattheterms for itself, supposit thesame,as I havesaidelsewhere, in suchan butit is required thattheterms conclusion forthesame.Thengiventhese[twoconditions] the implied supposit willbe true.26 proposition For example, 'What I am sayingis false' entailsthat it is true,so to be true,we need both that 'What I am sayingis false' satisfythe suppositional criterion,and that 'What I said is true' do so too. But that is

24Buridan, Elencorum Questiones {ed.cit.,above,n. 14,90-1:"In istaquestione primo videndum estqualiter deveritate ... estde(qualitate) estymaginandum propositionis propositionis sicutde qualitate summa ... Ita in proposito estquod,si essetaliymaginandum ita essetet nullomodosignificarei aliter significant qua propositio que qualitercumque istaessetvera.Etquamcitosignificarei aliter desineret aliqualiter quamesset, quamesset, itaquodsicutad hocquodaliquid dicatur summe esseveraetinciperet essefalsa, calidum, itaad quodaliquapropogradum frigiditatis, requiritur quodnonhabeataliquem aliter sitiositvera,requiritur quamest."See also,e.g.,Albert, quodnullomodosignificet veraestiliaque Perutilis tractIII ch. 3, f. 18ra:"premitto Logica primoquodpropositio itaest;propositio autemfalsaestiliaque nonqualitercumque significai qualitercumque itaest." significai 25Buridan, , ed. Scott(op.cit.,above,n. 23),42. Sophismata 26Buridan, , ed. Scott,136. Sophismata

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impossible,for it would require that 'true' and 'false' suppositfor the same, namely,what I said. Buridan rejectsthat possibilityexplicitly.27 This move of Buridan'sis clearlyad hocin the worstpossibleway. We noted in §1 that to deal with the paradox, we need to block some step in the reasoning.Buridan'ssolutiondoes so, but it providesno real explanation. He refusesto inferthat the Liar paradox is true fromthe fact that it is false,even thoughthat is what it says. Why does he do so? It appears to be for the best of reasons,for if a propositionentailssomethingfalse,it clearlycannot be true.So Buridaninfersthatforinsolubles to be true,we need not only that they themselvessatisfythe suppositional criterion,but so too must any propositionthey entail. One such propositionis the propositionthat they are true. Hence, to show they are true,we must firstshow theyare true. That is, for the Liar propositionto be true,it is requiredthat it already be true. It is a medieval Catch-22. In order to be true,it would have to be true already. So it cannot be true. It is simplyfalse,and the paradox is blocked. about this is to restrictit to the What is ad hocand non-explanatory insolublesalone. If insolublesmust not entail anythingfalse if they are to be true,thatshould apply equally to otherpropositions."Everypropositionis falsefromwhich,togetherwithsome trueproposition,therefolSo the suppositionalcriterionshould not lows a false one," he writes.28 for the truthof any proposition.If it is insufficient be in itselfsufficient for all. The requirementfor truth for insolubles,it must be insufficient if its is true a should be: proposition subject and predicatesuppositfor and so too forany propositionit entails,the subthe same (ifaffirmative) and for should and suppositfor the same (if affirmative, predicate ject 27See Buridan, in the1330sin his ed. Scott,198.He hadarguedsimilarly Sophismata in preparation), Posteriorum librum inprimum q. 10: (ed. F. Pironet, Questiones Analyticorum affirmativae ad veritatem nonsufficit estquodin multis conclusio "Secunda quodtermini istampropositionem proeodem.Quia ego ponocasumquodego propono supponant aliam nullam et est falsa', proponam quamistam. quod ponamus quampropono 'propositio nonvera. eratfalsa,et perconsequens Verumessetdicerequodilla mea propositio dicendo sedfalsum, dixissem si fuisset vera,egononverum quodipsaestfalsa. Quoniam 'falsum' Tamentermini supponit proeodem,quia illudpraedicatum ejussupponebant . . . Tamen etsicsupponit indifferenter falsa, proilla,cumsitfalsa. proomnipropositione aliudad quodsequeretur necassereret se essefalsam nonassereret ubipropositio ipsam velinfinitae, saltem ad veritatem credoquodsufficeret essefalsam, affirmativae, singularis proeodem." supponerent quodtermini fromherforthcoming me to citepassages forallowing to Dr Pironet I am grateful edition. 28Buridan, , ed. Scott,138. Sophismata

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different things,if negative).But Buridan has claimed that everypropo- so sition (togetherwith the claim that it exists everypropositionthat exists)entailsits own truth(ed. Scott,p. 136). Let us write'Trpv for"jfr1 satisfiesthe suppositional criterion'.Then is true' and 6Srpv for cr/?n Buridan's truth-condition generalizesto all propositionsas:29 (B) ry - (Sy a Vq((p - q) - S^)). That thisstrongercondition,(B), sufficesfortruthemergesfromsuppos1 that is, that Srp1 ing on the contrarythat,for some p, Svp but iTr/?n, Since TvfPis affirmative, does not sufficefor Tr/?n. SrTrprimeans that CT' it for the so entails and same, Tr/?n. Contraposing,it rp1 supposit followsfrom- «TTp*that -iSrTvpv. Thus, given that Tp*exists,if STp^a -i Tvp^then (p - ry) a -sr7Y' forBuridan has claimed that for adip (giventhat rp1exists) p -+ ry Generalizing,we obtain 3q ((p - q) a which is equivalentto -Xq((p - q) - SV) -►q) -> 5r^) then Ty, as Buridan says. Contraposing,if S T(pa V
(,S)

For suppose (5) holds forall />,and supposep ^ q. Then if T^p1,it follows that Tvq*(by Modus Ponens) and so Svq~*(by S). So ry

- Vq((p - q)

SY)

- notethatpropositions 29Foreachproposition for p, is a nameofthatproposition vocalorinthemind.(B)has aretoken andother medievais Buridan written, inscriptions, initshould be takenas subbutthis, andthequantification thegenerality interpretation, suboftheproposition of(B) givesthetruth-conditions thatis,eachinstance stitutional, stituted for*p'

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withp yields(p -►/>) Conversely,suppose V^((p -> q) -►Srq1). Instantiating -► whence and so Tvp^ (by S ). Thus (5) entails <-►V?((/>->?)->- -S'Y), T1/)"1 and (5) is immediate. The problem is that (.S ) is too strong,and (£) on its own too weak. conditionfor (.B) is in factdisastrous,forit robs Buridan of any sufficient truthat all. For to show T7/?1, it is, by (B), necessaryfirstto show Vq({p -►q) T[pn, this requirementincludes Srq1)). But since for all p, p T that that To is, vp^. do that,we have to show that showingSvTvp^, T' and rp1suppositforthe same, thatis, thatrp^is true.In otherwords, is true. (B) says that to show that rp1is T we need firstto show that r/?n That's impossible,and ridiculous.30 This givesthe lie to Hughes' defenceof Buridan againstthe charge of adhoccery.31 Hughes claims that Buridan could generalizehis truth-condition for insolublesto all propositionswithoutloss, since only insolubles are (as Hughes describesit) "contextually inconsistent". We now see, howthat which are consistent can no more ever, propositions contextually meet Buridan'struth-condition than can insolubles. For (B) (B) is designed to preventpropositionsfrombeing true. Propositionswhose truth-conditions are given by (B) are true only if theyare true. So (.B) specifiesno truth-condition forthem. (B) is useless as a criterionof truthin general. Yablo's versionof the paradox bringsout the ad hocnatureof Buridan's solutionin an effective way.32Yablo considersa sequence of propositions: arefalse. (1)Allsubsequent propositions arefalse. (2) Allsubsequent propositions (3) . . . At firstsight,it appears we can reason as follows.Suppose proposition (1) is true. Then all subsequent propositionsare false, including,e.g., its falpropositions(3) onwards. So proposition(2) is true,contradicting So must in be which case some false, sity. proposition(1) proposition,(«),

30Cf.Plato,Theaetetus "Atthatrate,thewaya roller 209E(tr.M.J.Levett): goesround or a pestleor anything elseproverbial wouldbe nothing withsuchdirections; compared be morejustly calleda matter of'theblindleading theblind'.To tellus to theymight addwhatwe already have,in orderto cometo knowwhatwe aretalking about,bears a generous resemblance to thebehaviour ofa manbenighted." 31Huerhes 1984(seeabove,n. 3),20. 32S. Yablo,Paradox without 53 (1993),251-2. , Analysis, self-reference

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say, is true.By the same reasoning,proposition(n + 1) is both true and false- paradox. Unless he is to admitparadox, Buridan'sline of solutionhas to be to block the move wherebypropositions(2) and (n + 1) are inferredto be truefromthe factthatall theirsuccessorsare false,thatis, fromthe fact that theysatisfythe suppositionalcriterion.That is not enough,Buridan must say- each of them entailssomethingfalse,namely,that some successor is true. The simple suppositionalcriterionmust be extended,or the paradox will ensue. Thus wheneverparadox threatens,Buridan must invoke his special truth-condition, (B). That is clearlyad hoc, unless the truth-condition is special generalized to all propositions.But then no to be true. propositiongets - he makes it In a minimalsense, Buridan's solutionworks impossible to show thatthe insolublesare true.Our investigations have impaled him on the horns of a dilemma,however. Either (B) applies only to insolubles, in which case it is an ad hocdevice designed solely,and without any real diagnosis,to block the paradoxes; or (B) generalizesto all propositions,in which case it becomes impossibleto show that any propositions are true. Buridan ends up with no theoryof truthat all. 6. Albert'sTheory The relationshipbetweenBuridan and Albertof Saxony and theirtheories of, interalia, signification, one suppositionand truth,is a difficult which needs closer examination.Moody, Boehner and othersportrayed Albert as a loyal pupil of Buridan's.33Recent researchnot only shows Buridan respondingto Albert,e.g., in the finalversionof his Summulae , but pointsup substantialdisagreementsbetweenthem on all threematters. Indeed, one begins to suspect that Albert only became aware of Buridan's doctrinesslowlyand relativelylate in the compositionof his nationsat theUniversity logicalworks.They belonged,afterall, to different of Paris, and on many issues theyare diametricallyopposed.34 Buridan's account in his Sophismata differsfromAlbertof Saxony's in two regards.First,Albertis happy to say that everypropositionsignifies 33Moody1953{op.cit.,above,n. 2), 7; P. Boehner, Medieval Manchester 1952, Logic, 70:Kretzmann et al., TheCambridge History (seefootnote 9),865. 34See,e.g.,Fitzgerald's 'Introduction' to hisedition ofAlbert's circa Quaestiones logicam in:Michael Albert onLogic: A Critical Questions J. Fitzgerald, ofSaxony's Twenty-Five Disputed Edition ofhisQuaestiones circa Leiden2002. logicam,

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itselfto be true, as in Buridan's earlier account; but secondly,Albert's account of truthapplies equally to insolublesand to non-insolubles.The resultis, however,that Albertblocks the insolublesonly at the cost of undermininghis whole account of truth. Albertpresentsas his sixththesisa resultverysimilarto Bradwardine's thesis2: "Every propositionsignifying that it is true and that it is false, is false."35His proof is straightforward. Every propositionis affirmative or negative.If affirmative, it signifiesthat its subject and predicatesupposit for the same, for,as we saw in §3, Albert'ssecond assumptionis thatforan affirmative propositionto be true is forits subjectand predicate to co-supposit.36 But by the same assumption,it also signifies its suband not to for that is what 2 ject predicate co-supposit, assumption says it is foran affirmative to be false. Clearly,subject and predicatecannot both co-suppositand not. So thingsare not howeverit signifies they are as it signifies, forit signifiessubjectand predicatenot to co-supposit, and they do not, but thingsare also not as it signifies,for it signifies - so it them to co-supposit,so thingsare not altogetherhow it signifies is false,by the definition thatfortruth,thingsmustbe howeverit signifies. A similarproof shows the same for negativepropositions,yieldingthe sixththesis. However, recall from§3 Albert'sthirdthesis,that "everyproposition in the world signifiesthat it is true." It enables Albertto show in the familiarway thatthe insolublesare false.What he does not realise,however, is that his account will be inadequate as an account of truth,just as we have seen Buridan's is, if Buridan chooses to avoid the charge of Let us representtrpn : č Then Albert's adhoccery. signifiesthat č by definitionof truthis:37 {A)

Tvp" <-> V^O1 : e -> e)

thatis, rp]is trueif and onlyif howeverrp]signifiesthingsto be, so they are. By thesis3, vp]: Tvp*(everypropositionsignifiesthatit is true).But the right-handside includesthe condition: 35Albert ofSaxony, Perutilis andStump Logica (seefootnote 20),f.43va;tr.Kretzmann 1988(op. cit.,above,n. 19),341. 36The secondassumption in fact,fromconsiderations in thePerutilis earlier follows, 'est'ponitur tertio adiacens[i.e.,addi, tract1 ch. 6, f.4r:"quandohocverbum Logica to subject andpredicate] ad subiectionally significai quamdam compositionem predicati id est,subiectum etpredicatum tum, supponere proeodem... Ex hissequitur quodomnis affirmativa subiectum etpredicatum propositio significat supponere proeodem." 37Albert ofSaxony, Perutilis cf.Kretzmann andStump, 338. , f.43rb; Logica

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y : jy and so, since ^ (4-)

-> ry

: T^1, (4) is equivalentto: ry

Aryj

where the right-handside conjoins all the thingswhich rjtPsignifies. Just as in the case of (B), [A') reveals that Alberthas no sufficient condition fortruth,forp ++ (q a p) is equivalentto p q, so (A') reduces to T'p1 -►

: e ^ e)

If rf?is true,it followsthat thingsare howeverit signifies.But the converse fails.That thingsare howeverrp1signifiesis not enough to show thatrp1is true.For rp1signifiesthatr/?n itselfis true. In order to be true, must be Each true if rp1 (first) true. propositionbecomes a Truth-teller, it is true,falseif it is false.But therenow appears no way of determining which it is. That is just as inadequate as a theoryof truthas was Buridan's.The insolublesare blocked,but at too high a price. It is usefulhere to consideranotherdiscussionby Albertof the notion of truth,in Question 11 of his Questions onthePosterior .38This quesAnalytics tionexpoundsthe same doctrines,by the same arguments, usingthe same in and same as does Buridan the 10th of his the language, examples on thePosterior Questions (see footnote27). Here both Buridan and Analytics Albertfirmlyrejectthe suppositionalcriterionwhich Albertproposed in tractof his Perutilis Logica,citedin §3 above. assumption2 of the Insolubilia In theirQuestions both Albert and Buridan argue on thePosterior , Analytics thatthe suppositionalcriterionprovidesonly a necessary,not a sufficient but not necessaryconditionforfalseconditionfortruth,and a sufficient, hood for affirmative Albert writes: propositions. forwhosetruth it is thatthere aremanyaffirmative The secondthesis propositions foris thesameas thatforwhich the doesnotsuffice thatwhatthesubject supposits arefalsein which, Forsomeaffirmative however, propositions predicate supposits. I say,'Thepropoforthesame.Forexample, andpredicate subject suppose supposit be A. Then sition whichI utter is false'andnothing else,andletthisproposition 38Albert Aristotelů Librum Posteriorum subtilissime of Saxony, Quaestiones Analyticorum super 34 above). in theAppendix to Fitzgerald 2002(seefootnote Primům , Venice1497,edited as Fitzgerald intwosimilar butdistinct Albert's arepreserved versions, Quaestiones explains in twenty-two in his'Introduction'. Version mss.,wascomposed, I, preserved Fitzgerald II preserved in twomss.andthe1497 no laterthan1355,witha laterVersion argues, earlier 11 ofVersion I citearefrom The passages edition. II, expanding pasQuestion I. 13 ofVersion Question sagesfrom

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A is falseanditspredicate is 'false'.So itspredicate wecanargue:proposition supitssubject forthe A ofwhichit is part.Similarly, supposits positsforproposition andpredicate whichI utter is false'.So thesubject 'Theproposition same,namely, A is falseis clear,because A supposit forthesame.Thatproposition ofproposition itself to be trueandto be false, it signifies sinceit is an affirmative bya corollary affirmative thesis thatevery inferred from thepreceding signifies [namely, proposition - thesamethesis injustthe as thesis1 oftheInsolubilia itsowntruth tract, proved itself to be false.Butbecauseit cannotbe sameway seebelow],sinceit signifies are is simultaneously trueandfalse,things bothtrueandfalse,forno proposition arenotas itsignifies, itfollows A signifies. Fromthis,thatthings notas proposition thatitis false.39 Albert'sargumentin this question is that the suppositionalcriterionis for truth.But whereas Buridan in his only necessaryand not sufficient , in responseto the same difficulty, proposed the strongersupSophismata B the earlier reaction both of Buridan's and of condition ), (. positional what is both Albert'sis different. Rather,theysay, necessaryand sufficient is the criterionin termsof signification: forthetruth ofanyproposition itis necessary andsufficient thatso Thefifth thesis: itbe as is signified byit.40 Insteadof proposingan additionalclause in the truth-condition specifically criterion forthe insolubles,Buridan and Albertrevertto the signification in order to block the inferenceto their truth.The counterexampleis exactlythe same in all threecases. 39Albert, subtilissime Posteriorum , ed. M. Fitzgerald, Quaestiones super (Version Analyticorum 11 (ed.Venicef. 10rb), ed. Fitzgerald 2002(op.cit.,above,n. 38),359,11. II), Question conclusio: multae suntpropositiones affirmativae ad quarum "Secunda veritatem 848-862: nonsufficit illudproquo supponit subiectum esseilludproquo supponit praedicatum. enimpropositiones affirmativae suntfalsae, ubitarnen hocproquosupponit subiecAliquae Verbigratia, tumesthocproquo supponit praedicatum. positoquodegodicam'propositi quamegoprofero estfalsa'etnullaalia,etsitistapropositio a. Tuncarguitur estly'falsa'.Ergo,eiuspraedicatum sic:A propositio estfalsa,et eiuspraedicatum supcuiusestpars.Et similiter eiussubiectum ponitproa propositione supponit proeodem, scilicet estfalsa'.Ergo,a propositionis subiectum etpraedicatum 'propositio quamprofero sitfalsapatet, se esseveramet supponunt proeodem.Quoda propositio quiasignificat se essefalsam, cumsitaffirmativa illatum ex praecedenti. Et cum perunumcorollarium hocsignificat se essefalsam. Sedquianonestsicquodsitveraetfalsa, cumnullapropositiositveraet falsasimul, Et ex ergononestitasicutpera propositionem significatur. earnessefalsam." quo nonestitasicutperearnsignificatur, sequitur Notethestrong to Buridan's discussion ofthesameissuein hisQuaestiones , similarity citedin footnote 27 above. 40Albert conclusio: ad veritatem cuiusabove,n. 38),359,11.876-877: (ed.cit., "Quinta libetpropositionis sufficit et requiritur Buridan, quodsicsitsicutperearnsignificatur." inprimům librum Posteriorum Questiones Analyticorum (seefootnote 27),q. 10:"Quintaconclusioestquodad veritatem de inesseetde praesenti etsufficit propositionis requiritur quod esseitaestin resignificata velin rebussignificatisi' qualitercumque ipsasignificat

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What, however,of the proof(set out in §3 above) in the Perutilis Logica, that everypropositionsignifiesits own truth?For that proof depended heavilyon assumption2. Albertbelievesit survivesthe revision.He writes: Fromthisconclusion thatsuppositing forthesameis required conclusion, [thefirst forthetruth ofaffirmatives] itfollows thatevery affirmative itself proposition signifies tobe true.Proof: foran affirmative tosupproposition's beingtrueis foritssubject Buteveryaffirmative positforthesameas itspredicate. proposition byreasonof theaffirmative verbalcopulasignifies thatitssubject forthesameas its supposits So every affirmative itself to be true.41 predicate. proposition signifies The affirmative copula, 'is', signifiesthat subject and predicate co-supand so an affirmative posit, propositionsignifiesthat it meets the necesin the first conclusion,fortruth.Does thatwarrant sarycondition,given Albert's corollary?To my mind, it does not. In assumption2 of the Perutilis Logica,where co-suppositingwas said to be both necessaryand the proofwent through.Here it does not. sufficient, Marilyn Adams makes a similarpoint in her discussionof Paul of Venice.42Paul presentsas his First Way (on the Truth and Falsityof and threecorolPropositions)a theorymarkedby fourtheses{conclusiones) laries. In the ms., Thesis 1 offersthe suppositionalcriterionas a necesand Thesis 2 makes it a sary condition for the truthof affirmatives sufficient conditionforthetruthof negatives.Adams observesthatCorollary 2, thatnegativepropositionsare trueif and onlyif subjectand predicate do not co-supposit,will followonly if Thesis 2 is strengthened to give thatconditionas necessaryas well as sufficient, and notesthattheincunabulum does give the thesisin that form.She attributesthe FirstWay to 41Albert, Posteriorum Quaestiones , (ed.cit.,above,n. 38),358,11.816super Analytkorum 821:"Ex istaconclusione omnem affirmativam se esse sequitur propositionem significare veram. nampropositionem affirmativam esseveramesthocproquo supponit Probatur, subiectum esseidemproquosupponit Sedmodoomnis affirmativa praedicatum. propositio ratione affirmativae hocproquo supponit subiectum esseidem copulaeverbalis significat affirmativa se esseveram." proquosupponit praedicatum. Ergoomnis propositio significat Cf.footnote 36 above.Essentially thesameproofis alsofound in Albert's Quaestiones circa , ed.Fitzgerald above,n. 34),q. 9,p. 168§170.1:"Existoinfero Logicam (op.cit., quod omnis seesseveram. Faciliter namomnis velestcompropositio significat patet, propositio veldivisio, id estvelaffirmativa velnegativa. Si affirmativa, tuncsignificat idem positio esseproquosupponit velpraedicatum, sedhocestpropositionem affirmativam esseveram. Dicitur autemsi estnegativa, tuncsignificat nonesseidemproquo supponit subiectum etpraedicatum, et hocestpropositionem esseveram." negativam Theproof doesnotappearinquestion 10ofBuridan's inAnalytkorum Posteriorum Questiones , buthe does.riveit,we saw,in hisQuestiones Elencorum: seeabove,6 3. 42PaulofVenice, II 10-11,ed. andtr.F. delPuntaandM.M.Adams, Logica Magna Oxford U.P. fortheBritish 1978,252. Academy

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Albert,citingthe Perutilis Logica.As we have seen, in that work Albert gives the suppositionalcriteriain assumptions2 and 3 as both necessary in the case both of affirmatives and sufficient, and of negatives.But he in denies this theses and 3 of 2 explicitly question 11 of the Posterior 1 Thesis of the First is endorsed Analytics. Way by Buridan and Albert in the firstconclusionof theirrespectiveQuestions on thePosterior , Analytics and Thesis 2 in Buridan'sthirdand Albert'sfourthconclusion.Theses 3 and 4 combine to reject the simple formula,"thingsare as it signifies", in favourof the stronger,"thingsare howeverit signifies",which both Buridan and Albertaccept in theirfifthconclusions,cited in footnote40 above. Van der Lecq and BraakhuissuggestthatBuridan rejectsthe formula in this work (Buridan, Questiones Elencorum , p. xviii). But Buridan in clearlyendorsesit, as shown the quotationearlier. Adams' anxietyabout Corollary 2 of the First Way is that co-suppositingsubjectand predicatewill not rendera negativepropositionfalse unless theirnot co-suppositingis necessaryas well as sufficient for the negativeproposition'struth.She correctlytracesthisback to whethercoforthe truthof the corresponding affirmative. But suppositingis sufficient in neitherms. nor incunabulumdoes the FirstWay accept thiscriterion as sufficient. Consequently,thoughAdams does not remarkon thisconsequence, the proofof Corollary 1 fails.Paul writes: 1: every affirmative thatititself is true.Proof: (Corollary) signifies proposition Every affirmative becauseofitscopulative thatwhatthesubject verb,signifies proposition, foris whatthepredicate for.43 supposits supposits But unless co-suppositingis sufficient for truth,the corollary,that the affirmative that it is does not follow.The premiseis rp1: true, signifies S[p1, that any (affirmative) propositionsignifiesthat it satisfiesthe supthe desired conclusionis vp^: Trp1, that it signifies condition; positional itselfto be true. How can one bridge the gap? One way would be to claimSvp1-> Tvp^and appeal to Bradwardine's Postulate2, thatsignification is closed under consequence. But the FirstWay has denied Srp1-► Tvp~^, in Thesis 1, just as Albertdoes explicidyin Thesis 2 of quesimplicitly tion 11 of the Posterior (cited above) and Buridan does also in Analytics Thesis 2 of question 10 his Posterior (see footnote27). Given this Analytics rejection,vp^: T^p1 does not followfromrp1: Srp1.

43Logica , ed. andtr.delPuntaandAdams, Magna (op.cit.,above,n. 42),7.

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Albert,however,is persuaded. What he fails to foresee,however,is criterionfor truth,coupled with the that revertingto the signification claim that ¿illpropositionssignifytheirown truth,places an insuperable obstaclein the way of any proposition'sachievingtruth.In fact,we can to all presentAlbert(and Buridan, if he generalizeshis truth-condition witha dilemma:iftheyare rightthatthe insolublesare simpropositions) false and not true in virtueof being unable to meet the sufficiency ply or that everyproposidemand (thatthingsbe altogetheras theysignify, tion theyentail satisfythe suppositionalcriteriontoo), then no proposition is clearlytrue in theirtheory,since Albertand Buridan both claim or at leastimplies,itsown truth.In Albert's thateverypropositionsignifies, is this: the dilemma first,suppose we accept that everyproposition case, Then no propositioncan satisfythe significational its own truth. signifies conditionfor truthset out in (A), that howeverit signifies,so it is. On the otherhand, suppose we rejectthe argumentforassumption2, on the ground that the suppositionalconditionis only necessary,not sufficient for truth.Then each insoluble is not only false, but true too, by (A). Albert'spositionis as unstableas Buridan's.44 7. Bradwardine's ofSignification Theory Bradwardine'stheorydoes not collapse into the absurdityof Fortunately, Albert'sor Buridan's.Bradwardinedoes not claim thateveryproposition to the insolor impliesits own truth.His claim is restricted eithersignifies insoluble that not claim he does ubles. Even here, every signifies simply its own truth,as the later Buridan simplyassertsthat everyproposition impliesits own truth.Bradwardineestablisheshis claim, by what we saw The was a carefuland intricateargument,frommore basic assumptions.45 that claim his Albert's of than corresponding proof proofis much deeper all propositionssignifytheirown truth,which followedin Perutilis Logica the crucial In Bradwardine's his from case, assumptions. immediately

44Thesameproblem basedontheclaimthat willaffect proposal, EugeneMills'recent solution totheLiar see E. Mills,A simple to itself": truth attributes , in: "Every proposition 89 (1998),197-212, 205. Studies, Philosophical 45As F. Récanati, etsonintérêt duMenteur médiévale duparadoxe Unesolution pourla sémanToronto du and C. Vance Amour L. Brinď in: 1983, , Archéologie Signe (ed.), , contemporaine tique as an axiomthatevery tosolvetheparadox asserting 251-64, bysimply says(264),looking is an adhocmanoeuvre itsowntruth orimplies (cf.261,n. 23).What signifies proposition it (p. 254). notjusta wayofavoiding whichsolvestheproblem, wewantis an analysis

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assumptionis Postulate2, that everypropositionsignifiesor means conor necessarilyeverything which followsfromit contingently or tingently is closed under implicationand entailment. necessarily that signification What I have renderedhere by 'contingently or necessarily'corresponds to the Latin 'ut nunc vel simpliciter',literally,'as of now or simply(or absolutely)'.These are technicaltermsfromthe theoryof consequence. fromvq^if Vp1is truewheneverrq1is. The Propositionrp']followssimpliciter inferencefromrq1to rp1may be enthymematic, in requiringan additional that in this case be necessaradditional will premise.However, premise ily true.In contrast,rp1followsutnuncfromrq1onlyif the inferencefrom true premise.For example, rq1to rjt)1requiresan additionalcontingently WalterBurley'streatiseon consequences(partof his De Puntate ArtisLogicae Tractatus written at the same time beforeBradwardine's Brevior, as, or shortly Insolubilia ) starts: a preliminary Firstof all,then,I present distinction: one sortof consequence is another sortis as-of-now. Anabsolute is onethatholdsgood absolute, consequence - e.g.'A manis running, forevery time an animalis running'. Anas-oftherefore, nowconsequence holdsgoodfora determinate timeandnotalways, man e.g.'Every is running, Socrates is running', sincethisconsequence doesnotholdgood therefore, butonlywhileSocrates is a man.46 always, Both inferences are enthymematic: the firstrequiresthe additionalpremise, man is an the 'Socrates is a man'. But the first animal', second, 'Every of these is necessarilytrue,while the second is only contingendyso. One mightworry,however,that Postulate2 is too strong,in closing under ut nuncconsequence. Recall Burley'sfamouscriticism signification of Ockham over the signification of 'finger'.We notedin §4 thatOckham reintroducedthe Augustiniánidea that spoken words signifythings,not concepts. So by moving my finger,joked Burley,I could change the meaningof 'move', sincewhen myfingerwas moving,it signified according to Ockham the finger,but when I kept my fingerstill,it didn't.47 But it is absurd, Burley declared, to suppose that I can change the of a word just by movingmy finger.Rather- accordingto signification Burleyand the orthodoxybeforeOckham the meaningof 'move' is constantthroughsuch changes,forit signifiesthe concept 'move'.

46W.Burleigh, DePuntate Artis St.Bonaventure , ed.P. Boehner, 1955,199;trans. Logicae Kretzmann andStump1988[op.cit.,above,n. 19),284-5. 47Burley, Tractatus Artis , in:De Puntate , ed.Boehner, 9; cf.G. de Occam, Longior Logicae Summa ed. P. Boehner et al.,St.Bonaventure, N.Y. 1974,ch.33. Logicae,

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A similarodditylooks to threatenBradwardine'stheoryas a resultof adopting Postulate 2, and includingut nuncconsequences in its scope. Consider the proposition,'Everything movingwas caused to move' call it A. Suppose now that I move my finger.Then A implies ut nuncthe proposition,ťMyfingeris caused to move' propositionB. So I can make A signifyB ut nunc , or not, at will,on Bradwardine'stheory.This seems as good- or bad- an objectionto Postulate2 as Burley'sobjectionwas to Ockham's account of signification. But Bradwardinewould seem contentto accept it as a reasonableconsequence, given what he writesearlier in his treatise.For example, in , he considersa situationfamildevelopinghis objectionsto the restringentes : iar in medieval discussionof insolubilia is uttered whenSocrates Platoonlyhearsthesubject-term says,'A falsehood Suppose andso inparThenPlatounderstands falsehood, bythissubject-term bySocrates'. in thisway So thesubject-term ticular thefalsehood uttered signifies bySocrates. to therestringentist thesis].48 [i.e.,thewholeofwhichitis part,contrary Bradwardineseems thento believe that 'falsum'signifiesSocrates'propo, in virtueof the contingent sition,but it clearlysignifiesit only ut nunc fact that Socrates utteredthe propositionhe did. In defenceof Bradwardine'sconceptionof ut nunc , and more generas given by Postulate2, one mightpoint to ally, secondarysignification naturaluses of 'mean' whichfunctionin the same way. Suppose one says, 'All philosophersare naturalsceptics'.One would be challenged:'Do you mean that Plato, and Descartes, were sceptics?' 'Yes,' must come the reply.The universalclaim entailsthe particularclaims,'Plato was a sceptic' and 'Descartes was a sceptic',and so one musthave meant them,in particular,by what one said. One meant whateverone's remarkentails, and if any of themis false,what one said was false.What one meant by thatfollowsfromit. But what one said embracesand includeseverything it is clearlycontingentthat Plato and Descartes were philosophers.So these consequencesare ut nunc.

48Bradwardine, Roure's textherebycomI haveemended ed.Roure, §3.05.However, a falsum dicitur ms.Can.lat.291.Hertextreads:"Sortedicente: withOxford parison in uniomnefalsum tantum. TuncPlatoperilludintelligit audiatPlatosubjectum Sorte, The illiusPlatosic significai." a Sorte.Ergosubjectum dictum versali, ergoet falsum in placeof'Plato' and'Platonis' in placeof'omnefalsum', ms.has'essefalsum' Oxford ofBradwardine's edition needfora critical an urgent Thereis clearly inthatlastsentence. all twelve mss. text, comparing

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8. Truth Bradwardinemustmeet a crucialobjectionto his theory,however.Recall from§5 Buridan's claim that everypropositionimpliesits own truth.It does so ut nunc , for it needs the extra premise,Buridan notes, that the exists. Nonetheless,this ut nuncimplicationwould mean that, proposition to Postulate 2, everypropositionwould signify{utnunc)its own according truth.If Bradwardinewere forcedto concede that conclusion,his theory would collapsejust as we have seen Buridan's and Albert'sto do. For it would provideno sufficient criterionforbeing true. It is clear that Bradwardinedid not accept Buridan'sthesisthat every propositionimpliesits own truth.If he had, he would not have given a long and complex proofof the much weaker claim that everyinsoluble signifiesits own truth,or at least, he would have followedit by that strongerclaim. Take, for example, Albert'sproof that everyaffirmative propositionsignifiesthat it is true. We should not inferthat he believes thatnegativepropositionsdo not; he immediatelyproceeds to show they do and so concludes that everypropositionin the world signifiesthat it is true.49Bradwardinedoes not accept Albert'sor Buridan's claims. For him, it is only insolublesthat signifytheirown truth,and it takes a subde argumentto show it fromclearlyarticulatedpremises. Spade claims that Bradwardineis in factcommittedto the claim that notjust insolublesbut everypropositionsignifies its own truth.50 His argumentdepends on attributing to Bradwardinenot only the closurecondition statedin Postulate2 (whichSpade dubs 'BP') but its converse,CBP, the Converse BradwardinePrinciple:"whatevera [proposition]signifies followsfromit" [op.cit.,p. 120). For if whenevervp]: e, it followsthatp e, we can show (by permutation)that ifp then V^(rp1: e -►e) and so Ty, whencep T*^1,and so by BP (Postulate2), rp1: Tvp*forany p. We have seen thatifthiswere so, it would be disastrousforBradwardine's solution. CBP to Bradwardineis that "it is preSpade's reason for attributing in some of his supposed reasoning",in particular,in the second leg of Bradwardine'sproofthat if A signifiesthatA is not true and P, then A signifiesitselfto be true. But Spade's analysisof the proof(pp. 122-3) is incorrect(cf.footnote11 above). Bradwardineargues as follows:suppose

49See above,§3. 50Spade1981 cit.,above,n. 124. (op. 1),

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A : (- 'TA a P). Since - 'TA -> - «(- 17^4a P) by Definition1 and Thesis 1, -i TA -► (7^4 v - iP) by Postulate 4, and so (- 'TA a P) -► TA by Postulate5. Hence by Postulate2, ^4 : TA. Bradwardinedoes not, and need not use CBP in thisproof. Anyone familiarwith Tarski's analysisof the concept of truth,however,will be puzzled.51How can Bradwardinedoubt that everyproposition impliesits own truth?Surely,Tarski's materialadequacy condition, that (T)

S is true iffp

be derivablein any adequate theoryof truth,where what replaces 'S' is a name of the object-languageproposition(or sentence)whose translahas the immediateconsequence tion into the metalanguagereplaces - the that everypropositionentailsits own truth propositionis thereon the right-handside, and the statementof its truthis on the left. Bradwardinewould not accept,however,that(T) is correct.52 (T) does not spell out fullythe requirementsfor a propositionto be true. They were spelled out above in considerationof Albert'saccount of truth: : e ^ e) T'p1 ++ (A) As Bradwardinesays in Definition1, "a truepropositionis an utterance only as thingsare" and the insertionof 'only' here is crucial. signifying So when Truthis an ideal, we saw any hintof failureresultsin falsity.53 other is an utterance "a false that Bradwardinesays signifying proposition than thingsare" (ed. Roure, §6.03), he means that if any part of what it signifiesfails,the propositionis false. Take Socrates' utteranceof 'What Socratessays is false'.To show that Socrates' utteranceis true,it is not enough to show thatit is false.That is only part of what it signifies.This is Bradwardine'sresponseto the revengeproblem(see above, §1). The problemis this:Bradwardine'ssolution entailsthat Socrates' utteranceis false,and Bradwardinearguesthat

51See,e.g.,A. Tarski, andPhenomenological Thesemantic , in:Philosophy conception oftruth 4 (1944),341-75. Research, 52Thisis contrary to Spade'sclaimin Spade 1981{op.cit.,above,n. 1), 131,and Bradwardine n.45),261.Consequently, 1983[op.cit., inRécanati Recanati's above, implication reductio as Spadeinfers is notcommitted, proofs. (132),to rejecting 53See above,§5;andAlbert, 1988(op.cit., andStump, Insolubilia above, , tr.Kretzmann n. 19),344.

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he has presentedthe true and correctsolutionto the insolubles.Yet did Socratesnot say thatwhathe said was false?If it is truewhenBradwardine says it, why is it not truewhen Socrates says it? Does it not followfrom Socrates'utterance'sbeingfalse(Bradwardine'sverdict)thatwhat Socrates said was true? RepresentingSocrates' utteranceby s, the schema (T) yields: Ts ++ Fs (**) Bradwardinetells us Fs, and so we conclude Ts, and the paradox has taken its revenge. George Hughes puts this objection to Buridan (JohnBuridanon Self, p. 25). He writes:"My enthusiasmfor [Buridan] dates largely Reference fromthe momentwhen it struckme that he could replyto it along the lines suggestedhere." He continues:"Buridan does not tackle such an argumentdirectly,but he comes so close to doing so that I thinkone can workout withreasonableconfidencewhat his replyto it would be." In Bradwardine'scase, we do not need to conjecture.He deals withthe objectionexplicidy.We have representedSocrates' utteranceas V; Bradwardinealso utters,'What Socratessaysis false',whichwe represent,say, ¿ and t are equiformtokensof the same type-proposition. as They have (Bradwardineexplicitlynotes,at §7.023) the same subject,predicate and copula. But theyare not equivalent.In general,equiformtokensof are equivalentand have the same truth-value. the same type-proposition is not this Nonetheless, always so. If Socrates and his wifeboth utter,'I utteranceis true and Xanthippe's is false. a Socrates' am philosopher', and so the two tokenshave The propositioncontainsa token-reflexive, different truth-conditions. accordThe propositions¿ and t also have different truth-conditions, s ¿ both that is false ing to Bradwardine'stheory.Proposition signifies and that i is true,and since it cannot be both, it is false. Propositiont signifiessimplythat ¿ is false,and so, since s is false, t is true. It does not followfromthe factthats is falsethats is true.For it is not sufficient so fors to be true that¿ be false.It is requiredthathoweverit signifies, thingsare, that it signifyonly as thingsare, and it does not signifyonly that¿ is both false as thingsare. It cannot,forit signifiesa contradiction, and true. It signifiespartlyas thingsare- ¿ is false. But it does not signifywhollyas theyare. So it is false. It followsthat (T) mustbe mistaken,forit leaves out thatvital 'only'. for the truthof (T) It makes only part of what j signifiessufficient

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is not sufficient of s, whichs signifies, has (**)as an instance.But the falsity of s (and indeed, of any proposition) for its truth.The truth-conditions are given by (Ä): Ts ++ '/e(s : e -►e) that is, Ts

(Fs a Ts a . . .)

Since no propositionis both true and false,and everypropositionis one or the other,s is false. There is a moral here for a much discussedrecentaccount of truth, Horwich claims that the conjuncnamely,Horwich's minimaltheory.54 tion of all non-paradoxicalinstancesof (T) provides"the entireconceptual and theoreticalrole of truth"(Truth, p. 5). The factthathe excludes the paradoxical cases of (T) fromthe account of truthshows,first,the nature of his account of the paradoxes- after ad hocand unsatisfactory account of truthto whichhe can appeal to explain all, he has no further the exclusion.In this regard,he is with Buridan entirely,in excluding the paradoxes simplybecause they are paradoxical. But secondly,their exclusionmeans that the minimaltheorygives no account at all of their truthor falsity.Thus, the minimal theorydoes not give an adequate account of truth,which can only come from rejecting( T ). More is requiredforthe truthof a propositionthan (T), read fromrightto left, but howexhibits.It is necessarythat thingsbe, not just as it signifies, as shown in (A). ever it signifies, Paradox 9. Curry's Bradwardine'sThesis 2 exhibitstwo exceptionsto (T), namely,propositions which signifythemselvesnot to be true and those which signify themselvesto be false. Bradwardineis able to show that these apparent insolublesare not true,but false. One mightwonder,however,whether thereare not furtherexamples of antinomieswhich are not covered by Thesis 2 and whichwill allow antinomyto return.Indeed, Haskell Curry proposed what threatensto be such a proposition,in seekingto formu-

54P. Horwich, Oxford 1998. Truth , secondedition,

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late Russell'sparadox in a language withoutnegation.55 Curryparadoxes have the form If this conditionalis true thenp. Call this conditional,c. Then if c is true, it is a true conditionalwith true antecedent,so its consequent is true, that is, Tc -►jfr,which is c itself.Inferringthat c is true, we have a true conditional with true antecedent,so its consequentis true. That proves rjö1,whateverp is. If rp1is false,we have a contradiction;if rp1is true,we have a surprising, and unconvincing, proofof rp1.(Suppose vp^is 'God exists',or Goldbach's Conjecture.) The crucial step, as far as our earlierdiagnosisis concerned,is that where we inferfromTc -> p (thatis, c) that c is true. Clearly c : (Tc p), but is that all that it signifies? Things are "as c signifies"(namely,Tc but are "however it p' they signifies"or "only as it signifies"?If vp* - 'Tc, so c : - iTc, and c fallsunder Thesis 2. is false,then (Tc -►p) But if Vp1 is true then c does not (obviously)signifythat it itselfis false, thusis not coveredby Thesis 2, and it seems thatBradwardine'saccount may not have the resourcesto deal with all insolubles. In fact,Curryparadoxes were not unknownto the medievais.Albert of Saxony presentsthisversion:56 If God exists,some conditionalpropositionis false, all other conditionalshaving been destroyed,and where the antecedent is a standardmedievalexampleof a necessaryand indubitablytrueproposition.Albertinfersthat the conditionalis false,for if it were true, its consequentwould needs be true since its antecedentis, and so if true it would be false.To block the subsequentargumentthatit cannotbe false, Albertnotes that its consequentis not true even thoughthingsare as it signifies, applyingthe truth-condition (A). For ifits consequentwere true, the conditionalwould be true,and we would have a contradiction. This reasoningdepends on takingtruthof consequentto be sufficient forthe truthof the conditional.Thus the conditionalis treatedby Albert as a materialconditional,equivalentto the disjunction 55See H.B. Theinconsistency ofSymbolic , in: TheJournal Curry, ofcertain formal logics form oftheparadox, andP.T. Logic,7 (1942),115-7,in whichhe givesa set-theoretic in:Analysis 15 (1954-5), 71-2forthenatural version. Geach,On(Insolubilia' language 56Albert, Insolubilia andStump, 1988[op.cit.,above,n. 19),359-60. , tr.Kretzmann

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EitherGod does not existor some conditionalpropositionis false. AlthoughBradwardinedoes not deal explicitlywiththe conditionalform of Curry'sparadox, he does discussthe disjunctiveform(as does Albert).57 Bradwardinewrites: 'A manis an ass or a falsedisjunction is thisdisjunction: utters SupposeSocrates A anditsseconddisjunct B. ThenA is false callthedisjunction uttered bySocrates', thatsomedisjunction uttered B itfollows as areeachofitsparts, forfrom bySocrates forA, so theconcluofthisconclusion is false, andthesubject uniquely supposits thateachpartof thatA is false.Fromthis,byPostulate sionsignifies 6, it follows thatB is false.So oneshouldtreatthiscase A, including so B signifies B, is false, ones.58 justliketheprevious thatthe disof Bradwardine'sargumentis clear: B signifies The structure If A both its disjuncts false. is is false, junction utteredby Socrates,A, are false,and so in particular,B is false. So by Postulate2, B signifies that it itselfis false,whence by Thesis 2, it signifiesthat it is true and so is false.But Ä s otherdisjunct('A man is an ass') is also false,and so A is false. So far, so good. A and B are false. Can we be sure, however,that theyare not also true?Yes, fornot only does B signifyitselfto be false, and so fallsunder Thesis 2, but so too does A. For A signifiesthat B is false(by Postulates2 and 5, since 'A man is an ass' is false)and so that A is false(by Postulate2 again, forE s being falseimpliesthatA is false, since no man is an ass). : (- iT^p1 More generally,and closeryetto Curry'sparadox: supposer/?n v q). FollowingBradwardine,suppose firstthatthisis all thatrp]signifies. Then by Definition1, -nTy -* - 1(-iTTp v q), so - iTvp^-►( T Vp1a -i^), v by Postulate4 (De Morgan), whence -'Tvp* -► Tvp^.Thus rp1: (T1//1 call it then else as on the other r, well, hand, Tp*signifies something q). If, 1 -'Tvp^ -► {{Tvp^a ~^q) v -ir). But rp^: r, so again rp1: Trp v q. The truth-condition (A) accordinglyyields: ry

-+ hry

v q) A (ry

v q)

57Bradwardine, and tr.Kretzmann ed.Roure,1970[ed.ät.,aboven. 4) §8.05;Albert, 1988(op.cit.,aboven. 19),358-9. Stump 58In Roure'stext, Postulate 2 is certainly is toPostulate 2. Butalthough thereference it is notusedat thispoint.WhereRoure,andtheOxford usedin theargument, ms., reads'sextam ms.Q 276,f. 164ra, theErfurt have'secundam supposisuppositionem', is false alia, thata disjunction 6 says,inter forPostulate which is logically correct, tionem', is false(Roure1970(ed.ät., aboven. 4),§6.04,297). ifeachdisjunct

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i.e., 7-y - g is false (as in the case, 'A man is an ass'), so is rp].Conversely, So, if r<7n suppose rq1is true and univocal, in particular,not an insoluble.Then, whateverelse - iTvp*implies,(A) will give rp1 ++ (-.ry

v q) A çrp1 v q) A (. . . v q) A . . .

where each conjuncton the right-handside containsq as a disjunct.So the truthof rq1 sufficesfor that of rp1.Hence T'p1 ^

q

and Curry'spropositionTvp1 -►q (or - iTvp^v q) is truejust when rq1is, otherwisefalse. 10. Conclusion My purpose was to counterrecentinfatuationwithBuridan's analysisof the Liar paradox and otherinsolubles,and show not onlyhow he derived his solution from Bradwardine,but how he altered it for the worse. Buridan was a great logician and philosopher.He was careful,methodical and had a greatinfluenceon succeedinggenerations.But his analysis of the Liar paradox was flawed.It introducedan ad hocsupplement to the truth-conditions of just those propositionswhich induce paradox to preventthe contradictionfromarising.What was reallyclever in his analysis,and attractedthe attentionof, among others,Moody, Priorand Hughes, was in fact derived fromBradwardine,in whose hands it was dealtwithboth consistently and successfully. Bradwardinedoes not require different truth-conditions for insolublesand others:in order to be true, all must they signifyonly as thingsare. He does not assertsimplyas a basic postulatethat insolublessignifytheirown truth:he proves it from more basic postulates.One of those postulates,Postulate2, is admittedly be closed under implication,even as-ofverypowerful:that signification now (utnunc)implication.Yet certainly,any propositionis falsifiedby the falsityof whateverit implies,even if thatimplicationholds onlyin virtue of a contingently true enthymematic premise.So that consequence is at least implicitly in contained the originalproposition.That is whythe Liar and so it canpropositionis false. It implicitlycontainsa contradiction, not be true.

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By all the historicalevidence,Bradwardine'sproposal was an original insight.On analysis,it is seen to be a great and instructiveone, too. it has become best knownin a corruptedand flawedform. Unfortunately, It is time to returnour attention,and our recognition,to a great logician's master,the doctor , Thomas Bradwardine. profiindus St. Andrews ofLogicand Metaphysics Department

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Two PossibleSources for Pico's Oratio1 M. V. DOUGHERTY

When the 15th centuryItalian thinkerGiovanni Pico della Mirandola wrotehis Oratio , he had intendedit to prefacethe public disputationof his 900 Theses , a compilationof wide-rangingstatementsboth historical and original,which he had publishedin December I486.2 The disputation was to take place in Rome in the next year, and the youthfulPico envisioneda forumheld beforethe College of Cardinals with the Pope himselfservingas the judge of the proceedings.Distinguishedscholars were expectedat the eventas well,forPico had offeredto pay the travel expenses of "any philosopheror theologian" who wished to travel to Rome to join the proceedings.3At the time,Pico was 23 years old and was well-versedin Greek, Hebrew, and Arabic texts,and his theseshad been drawn fromvaried sourcesincludingscholastic,Islamic,Peripatetic, 1 The Oratio is bestknown on theDignity ofMan"though this bythetitle"Oration titleappears to havebeentheinvention oflatereditors rather thana designation establishedbyPicohimself. include thetideOratio dehominis andDe Earlyprintings dignitate hominis No original titleis extant. On thehistory ofthetitleofthiswork, seethe dignitate. recent workofS. A. Farmer, intheWest: Pico's900 Theses Syncretism (1486):TheEvolution andPhilosophical , Tempe,Arizona1998,18-19. ofTraditional Religious Systems 2 LatintextsofPico'sworkare takenfrom De Hominis De Enteet Dignitate, Heptaplus, Uno Firenze adHermolao Barbaro , ed.Eugenio Garin, 1942;Epistola , in:Corpus , Reformátorům Vol. 9. ed. CarolusGottlieb HalisSaxonum1842,678-87;and Farmer Bretschneider, 1998[op.cit.,above,n. 1).Translations ofPico'sworks aretakenfromOntheDignity of Charles GlennWallis, PaulJ.W.Miller, Man,OnBangandtheOne, , trans. Heptaplus Douglas Mirandola andErmolao Barbaro Carmichael, 1998;TheCorrespondence Indianapolis ofG.Picodella the Relation andRhetoric oftheHistory ofIdeas,13(1952), , in:Journal Concerning ofPhilosophy andFarmer1998{op.cit.,above,n. 1). References in thenotesarealways to 392-402; theLatintext.Historical documents tothePapalinvestigation ofthe900Theses pertaining can be foundin Picdela Mirandole enFrance ed. LéonDorezand Louis (1485-1488), Paris1897. Thuasne, 3 Pico'sinvitation andpromise ofpayment cameas a codicilat theendofthepublicationofthe900 Theses whichread:"Andifanyphilosopher or theologian, evenfrom theendsofItaly,wishes to cometo Romeforthesakeofdebating, thedisputing lord himself to paythetravel from hisownfunds aut promises expenses (Etsiquis Philosophus etiam ab extrema Italiaarguendi Romam venire disTheologus voluerit, gratia pollicetur ipseDominus seviatici Ulisoluturum desuo inFarmer 1998(op.cit., putaturus expensas )." Thetextis preserved above,n. 1),552. © Koninklijke BrillNV,Leiden,2002 - www.brill.nl Alsoavailable online

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Hermetic,and Caballic works.Yet the elaborate disputationnever took place. A papal commissionof theologiansand juristswas convened by Innocent VIII in 1487 to examine the veracityof the theses,and, no doubt to the displeasureof Pico, the membersof the commissionfound Pico's work to "deviate fromthe straightpath of orthodoxfaith[a recto ortodoxe Pico's planned disputationin Rome was sustramite fideideviare)"* 900 Theses were burned afterbecomingthe firstprinted and his pended book to be prohibiteduniversally by the Church.5Afterwritinga spirited defenseof his banned work,Pico was excommunicatedby Pope Innocent VIII.6 For these historicalreasons,the Oratiowas never presentedpubYet this work has licly and was never publishedduringPico's lifetime.7 the distinctionof being one of the best-knownand most anthologized expressionsof Italian Renaissance humanism.Pico's legendaryerudition and deep acquaintance with nearly all the academic schools known at the timehave long made him an interesting subjectof studyforstudents of the Renaissance. His panoptic view of diverse intellectualtraditions was bolsteredby the beliefthat these major traditions,which are commonly held to be opposed, are in truthharmonious,and his syncretic 900 orientationseems to have been the impulse behind his far-ranging Plato and Aristotle .8 Thesesas well as otherworks,includingOn theConcord of 4 Thetextofthefindings inDorez1897{op.cit., arecontained ofthePapalcommission above,n. 2), 114ff. 5 The novelty Pico'sbookhasbeenrecognized ofthePapalactiontoward byseveral in 1487the900 "Innocent VIII prohibited Hirsch Of theeventRudolf scholars. writes, broadinquisitoin hisbullEtsiexinjuncto. Thisis thefirst theses ofPicodellaMirandola oftheindices librorum thepromulgations inthehistory ofprinting, rialaction proheralding andReading: 1450-1550 hibitorum." See R. Hirsch, 1967,89. , Wiesbaden Selling Printing, 6 Thebullofexcommunication VI in 1493. waslaterlifted byPopeAlexander 7 Forthedetails Portraits events ofPico'slife,seeEugenio ofthehistorical Garin, fiom and A. VelenandElizabeth Victor theQuattrocento Velen,NewYork1963,190-221; , trans. 1998(op.cit.,above,n. 1),1-179. Farmer 8 Forvarying Introduction seePaulOskarKristeller, accounts ofPico's"syncretism," , in: Giovanni Picodella G. Graven, TheRenaissance Philosophy ofMan,Chicago1948,220;William Geneva1981,91-107; Modem : Symbol Mirandola, Thinker, Interpretations ofa Renaissance ofhisAge: Ideas.Parts A Study intheHistory Giovanni PicodellaMirandola: ErnstCassirer, ofRenaissance 345. ofIdeas,3 (1942),123-44, in:Journal oftheHistory 319-46, /-//, esp.pp. 128-31, ofFarmer 1998{op.cit., work is therecent ofPico'ssyncretism account Themostextensive ofthe900 to thetextandtranslation introduction above,n. 1).In a generous 179-page Pico'stext"as an ideallabas onethatapproaches hismethod Farmer identifies Theses, ofcorrelative andthegrowth textual between theconnections to study exegesis oratory with in conjunction hasbeen"developed thestudy (xiv).Astheauthor explains, systems" andphilosophical ofpremodern modeloftheevolution a cross-cultural systems" religious theat a latertime(ix).Readers topublish intends which theauthor mayfindFarmer's Farmer's to be somewhat andapproach methods oretical untraditional, yetnevertheless

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The purpose of thispaper is to inquireinto the theoreticalroots that undergirdthe main principleof the Oratioand to argue that important parallelsexistbetweenthisprincipleand severalclaimsfoundin the writings of Boethius and Aristotle.The influenceof Boethius and Aristotle on Pico's doctrinein the Oratiohas been much neglectedby commentators.In the shortworkPico defendsthe unusual thesisthathuman beings have no nature {imago, , natura)proper to themselves;rather,moral facies decisionsthat human beings make cause them to become such thingsas beasts or divinities.This account of human self-determination, which is central to the Oratio , has been interpretedin manifoldways by commentators,and there does not appear to be consensusamong scholars or purpose of such a claim. The interpretive regardingthe intelligibility is magnifiedwhen attempting to findpossibleinfluences on Pico's difficulty thought,for a brieftour throughthe headings of the 900 Thesesshows that Pico was familiarwith many traditions,which he categorizesunder such headingsas magical,mathematical,Hebrew Cabalisi, Greek,Latin, Chaldean, Arabic and manyothers.Still,the importanceof such an investigationinto Pico's sources has long been recognized,and Pico remains a puzzling figurein the historyof thought.Controversyover the thesis of the Oratiothat human beings are devoid of a propernatureand must choose a naturethroughmoral activitieshas led interpreters to label Pico in ways which, althoughperhaps all interesting, cannot all possiblybe true. Pico's thesisin the Oratiohas been understoodin various ways to make Pico a proto-reformer, a late medieval,a defenderof voluntarism, a buddingSartreanexistentialist, a neo-Pelagianist,and an earlyphilosoof will.9 Pico cannot bear each of thesedesignationsequally pher Clearly workis an important contribution to thestudy ofPico'slifeandthought. Farmer credits to Picoat least10 "syncretic thatserveas thecoreofthesyncretic strategies" project, whichtheauthor identifies as "deductive reconciliations," "eliminating arbitrary equivo"letter andanagrammatic "temcation," method," symbolism, gematria, "allegorization," seeFarmer edition ofthe900Theses others; 1998,59-73.Farmer's poralstrategies," among doesnotcontain an edition of theOratio an important , buttheintroduction provides account ofthehistorical events theproposed to havebeenhad surrounding disputation in Romein 1487. 9 Fora of Picoas "reformer," see PhilipEdgcumbe Picodella presentation Hughes, Mirandola 1463-1494: A Study Part/,in:Philosophia ofanIntellectual Reformata, Pilgrimage, ForPicoas a latemedieval, 23 (1958),168-71. seeAvery Concordiae: Pico Dulles,Princeps dellaMirandola andtheScholastic Tradition Mass.1941,xi,whosummarizes his , Cambridge, thesis as theattempt to "demonstrate that[Pico's]philosophy wasprimarily a scholastic Fora comparison between Picoand theexistentialism ofSartre, see Hiram synthesis." NewYork1950,349.Fora criticism ofthosewhofindin Renaissance, Haydn,TheCounterPicoan existentialist, see PaulOskarKristeller, Renaissance , Eight Philosophers oftheItalian

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well, if at all, and it is hoped that by re-examiningthe sourcesof Pico's doctrineof human beingssome lightwill be shed on Pico's trueplace in the historyof Renaissance humanism. The presentpaper is divided into fourparts. First,I will address the importthat most scholarshave placed on the role of theologicaltextsin the formationof Pico's thesisof the Oratio.I will address the relevance of such a claim and suggestthatthereis evidencethat could modifythis commonlyaccepted view (Part I). Second, I will turnto Pico's Oratioand examine the textualevidence for the thesisthat human beings have no natures proper to themselves(Part II). Third, I will suggesttwo new sourcesforthe doctrinethat hithertohave been unrecognizedwithinthe literature(Part III). A summaryof the thesiswill complete the present paper (Part IV). Orientation I. TheAllegedTheological ofPico As has been mentionedabove, in his OratioPico setsforththe claim that human beings have no nature {imago, facies,natura ) proper to themselves, and, throughmoral decisions,human beingsbecome such thingsas beasts or gods. It has been seen that the receptionof this positionby readers of the Oratiohas been rathervaried, and many inconsistentlabels have been applied to Pico. Yet in one respectthereis unanimityamong many prominentscholars,for many agree that Pico's theoryof human beings in the Oratiois essentiallytheologicalin origin.Perhapsthe mostsustained presentationof thispositionhas been accomplishedby Charles Trinkaus, who in a large studycontendsthat "Pico's image of man is basically a religiousone" and statesthat "Pico restshis claim on apologeticand theologicalgrounds more than on philosophicalones."10Similarlyone seeErnst Cassirer Picoas a neo-Pelagianist, Stanford 1942 1964,67.Forviews presenting of ., above,n. 8), 329andPhilipEdgcumbe Hughes, op.cit.,133.Fora rejection {op.cit ofa the"voluntarist" Pico,see Farmer1998{op.cit.,above,n. 1), 108.Forcriticisms Picodella Mirandola ofPico,seeKristeller, 1964,op.cit., 66-7;id.,Giovanni "Pelagian" reading dell'umanedi Giovanni PicodellaMirandola nellastoria e ilpensiero andHisSources , in:L'Opera New anditsSources, ed. MichaelMooney, Firenze1965,53; id.,Renaissance simo, Thought Renaissance York1979,175;Craven1981{op.cit.,above,n. 8), 33; Stephano Dominioni, 18(1986),50; and andHuman Pico's''Dignity Nature: ofMan',in:Contemporary Philosophy, Eckhard in:Charles B. Schmitt, Charles H. Lohr,Metaphysics, Skinner, Kessler, Quentin 1988,581. Fora ofRenaissance Philosophy, Cambridge JillKraye(eds),TheCambridge History in: On Introduction ofwill,seePaulJ. W. Miller, ofPicoas an earlyphilosopher rejection GlennWallis, PaulJ. W. trans. Charles andtheOne theDignity , Heptaplus, ofMan,OnBeing 1998,xiv. Miller, Indianapolis DouglasCarmichael, 10Charles inItalian Humanist andDivinity In OurImage andLikeness: Trinkaus, Humanity Vol.2, Chicago1970,521,512. Uought,

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findsEdward Mahoney contendingthatthe Oratio"is not purelya philosophical treatise"and that "it seems out of the question to see Pico's views. . . removedfromtheologicalinterests."11 Althoughin itselfthe claim that Pico's orientationis primarilytheoit is importantto see that thisposilogical does not seem controversial, tion is most oftenpremisedon claims about the antecedentsto Pico's doctrine.Those who argue fora theologicalbasis to Pico's view of human beings have tended to identifythe sources for Pico's doctrinein theoin Patristicwritings.Yet when logical documents,and more specifically, it comes to identifying Church Fathers whose writings particularearly are said to give rise to Pico's theory,therehas been some room fordispute. Some scholarssuch as AveryDulles have suggestedthat Patristic sourcesare lurkingbehind Pico's doctrine,yet no effort is made to identhem.12 Wind and Edward on the other hand, have tify Edgar Mahoney, arguedat lengththatthe fundamentalsourceof Pico's doctrineon human beingsin the Oratiois the third-century theologianand apologistOrigen.13 The most exhaustivetreatmentof the issue of PatristicsourcesforPico's Oratiois foundin a studyby Henri de Lubac, who claims that "La 'metacélébrée , elle aussi,d'unetrèslonguetradition , et la morphose' par Jean Pic hérite de cettetradition connaissance est indispensible" and then goes on to cite no fewerthan fourteenpossiblePatristicantecedentsto Pico's theoryincluding such figuresas Clement of Alexandria,Origen, Gregoryof Nyssa, Macarius the Egyptian,and others.14 That Pico was familiarwith many Patristicsourceshas never been a point in dispute,forhis acquaintance withsuch traditionscan be establishedby both internaland externalevidence. As for the former,Pico does referexplicitlyto theologianslike Origen in the Oratioand in his 900 Theses}0As forthe latter,published listsof the contentsof Pico's libraryshow that it was repletewith both Latin and Greek Patristicdocuments.16 In preparingfora new argumentregardingthe sourcesof Pico's Oratio , we are calling into question the prevalentbeliefthat Pico's doctrineon 11EdwardP. Mahoney, Giovanni PicodellaMirandola andOrigen onHumans, Choice , and 5 (1994),376. , in:VivensHomo:Rivista Florentina, Hierarchy Teologia 12Dulles1941(op.cit.,above,n. 9), 16. 13EdgarWind,TheRevival Miner(ed.),Studies inArtandLiterature , in:Dorothy ofOrigin da Costa Green 1994{op.cit., , Princeton 1954,413-6;Mahoney above,n. 11),359ff. forBelle in thewritings alsosuggests thattextsfound ofGregory on Nyssamayhave Mahoney beeninfluential forPico;cf.360ff. 14Henride Lubac,Picdela Mirandole: Etudes etdiscussions , Paris1974,184. 15See,forinstance, Oratio 4>29. , 154,156;and Theses 16On thepresence of GreekPatristic in Pico'slibrary, sources see PearlKibre,The see62-4. , NewYork1936,35-6.ForLatinPatristic sources, ofPicodellaMirandola Library

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the mutabilityof human beings is fundamentally theologicalor religious in orientation.17 The approach of the presentpaper will be to disputethe assume betweenPico's docsingulardependencethatsome commentators trineof the mutability of human beingsand the religiousor Patristicallygroundedtheologicalsources.The procedureto be followedwill be the identification of hithertounrecognizednon-Patristic sourcesforPico's doctrine.More specifically, it will be argued thatcommentators have tended to neglectphilosophicaltextsas sourcesforPico's doctrine.The need for the presentinquiryhas been hinted,albeit indirectly, by some scholars. Paul Oskar Kristellerhas remarked"I do not thinkthat we should go so faras to treatPico exclusivelyas a theologian,or to considerhis doctrine as merelytheological."18It will be necessaryto establishlines of influencebetweenearlierphilosophicalthinkersand Pico. Commentators have noted,however,thatthe taskof establishingsourcesforPico's views is not a particularly easy one. As one of themhas put it, "We oftencannot tell to what extentPico was influenceddirectlyby the writingsof ancientor medievalauthors. . . thedoctrinalsourcesof Pico's thought . . . are stillpartlyunexploredor subjectto debate."19The historicaltaskof identifyingthe sources for Pico's thoughtis furtherimpeded by a difficulty that pertains particularlyto the study of Pico, namely, his syncretic approach to seeminglyopposed intellectualtraditions.20 One mightobject thatPico's syncreticapproach to textsand traditions mightmake a distinctionbetweenphilosophicaland theologicalsources Yet thereappears to be evidence that Pico did not consider superfluous. his syncreticapproach to be incompatiblewith a beliefin a distinction 17It should in be mentioned thatthenotable Picoscholar Garinjoinsothers Eugenio fora theological orientation to theviewofhumanbeingsin theOratio, forhe arguing in a moment in Italian contends thattheOratio was"composed ofreligious enthusiasm" Humanism: andCivic PeterMunz,Oxford , trans. 1965,105. LifeintheRenaissance Philosophy Yetas forthefundamental or theological sources Pico'sview,Garin religious animating doesnotprivilege Patristic sources butrather identifies "Gnostic andHebrew texts and. . . cabbalistic to notethatin arguing for mysticism," op.cit.,105.Aswell,itmaybe important a theological Trinkaus identifies as themotivating source viewin PicoCharles scripture notethat forPico'sdoctrines. See Trinkhaus 1970(op.cit., above,n. 10),519.Oneshould is corroborated thathistheory ofthemutability ofhumanbeings Picohimself contends 110. withPsalm 49,20 and82,6. See Oratio, 18Kristeller 1965(op.cit.,above,n. 9), 78. 19Kristeller 1965(op.cit.,above,n. 9),40. 20Onemight "a traditional remarks ofS. A. Farmer, whowarns, consider thesobering interms andRenaissance todiscuss Pico'sthought ofeachoftheancient, medieval, attempt in anyevent, on points of . . . would, soonbe superceded sources drawn on in hiswork. covered overmorethana smallpartofthetraditions detail:No onecanclaimmastery in Pico'stext"(Farmer 1998(op.cit.,above,n. 1),xiv).

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betweentheformalities ofphilosophicaland theologicaldisciplines. Evidence can be found in the very orderingof the 900 Theses.It is true that in the first402 of his 900 theses,where Pico reportsof positionsheld by previousthinkersand schools of thought,he does not divide the philosophical premisesfromtheologicalones. The absence of any divisionis indicated furtherin an early section of the work, where the "Theses Accordingto the Teaching of Latin Philosophersand Theologians(Conclusionessecundum doctrinam latinorum et theologorum philosophorum )" are grouped togetherunder one heading.21But if we examine the latter498 theses, where Pico turnsaway fromhistoricalreportsand instead reveals "theses .. . accordingto his own opinion (conclusiones . . . secundum opinionem prowe find that Pico has thoseopinionsthatare )," priam neady distinguished conclusiones fromthose which are conclusiones in theologia.22 Yet philosophice the neat divisionsof the textsalone is not sufficient to establishthat Pico to obtain between the formalities of theologyand recognizesdifferences for one could that Pico is established conphilosophy, argue following ventionsof the day. Rather,one must turnto the textof the 900 Theses itself.In a discussionfromthe second half of the 900 Theses , where Pico discussesthe temporalstatesof incorporealcreatures,he admits a division betweendisciplines.We find: T1 Theologically I saythatin aeviternity there is a non-continuous sucspeaking, cession thatis formally buta limited one.Following thephilosophers, intrinsic, I statethecontrary dicoquodinaevononestsuccessio however, (Theologice loquendo intrìnseca sedbene secundum tarnen aliter continuativa, terminativa; formaliter philosophos dicerem ) (Thesis4>28).23 That Pico is willingto distinguishdiscoursethat proceeds theologically fromdiscoursein the mode of a philosopher(secundum (theologice) philosophos) is evidence that the formalitiesof the philosophicaland theologicaldisof Pico's ciplinesare not called into questionby the syncreticframework writing.A syncreticprincipleand a divisionof disciplinesexist together withinPico's universeof discourse.24 21Thisdesignation isgiven tothesection 115theses, thefirst from 1.1through covering 6.11. 22The first thesis ofthose"according to hisownopinion" is thesis 403,or 1>1. The citedheading occursabove1.1.The respective ofthephilosophical andtheologigroups cal theses are2>1 through 2>80 and4>1 through 4>29. 23Somecommentators havefoundThesis4>28 to be emblematic of "double-truth" in Pico'swork.See Farmer 1998{op.cit.,above,n. 1),61-3;435. theory present 24Mostcommentators do acknowledge someparallels between oftheMarcilio writings theFlorentine translator ofGreekworks andPico'sfriend, andPico'sdescriptions Ficino, ofhuman nature. PaulOskarKristeller, ThePhilosophy Ficino See,forinstance, , ofMarsilio

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Indeed, even scholarswho contendthatPico's projectis generallytheological do acknowledgethat to Pico the formalitiesof philosophyand theologyare conceptuallydistinct.In the actual courseof presentingarguments,however,the disciplinesmay appear to overlap. Charles Trinkaus explains: "Pico . . . stressedthe importanceof a distinctionbetween theology and philosophy. . . yet there is in Pico ... as he actuallypresents his arguments,a far greaterblurringof the differences . . ."25Indeed, in actual practice one may findit difficult to identifystrictly philosophical autonomousargumentsin the corpus of Pico's works.Contextsand the The issue can varietyof sourcesforpremisescontributeto the difficulties. be exhibitedwhen one reflectsthatPico even uses the contextof a commentaryon scriptureto exhibita numberof philosophicaland scientific views,as is the case with his commentaryon the earlyparts of Genesis titledHeptaplus.The variegateduse of sources,however,does not preclude the identification of strictly philosophicalsourcesto Pico's doctrines. In the presentpaper, I seek to highlightsome philosophicalsources to Pico's account of human beings. II. TheHumanBang of theOratio Having identifiedthe tendencyof most scholarsto assign a theological orientationto Pico's view of human beings and having found evidence that he endorsesa formaldistinctionbetweenphilosophicaland theological orientations, we now turn to the textualevidence of Oratiofor the theorythathuman beingshave no propernature.Yet it should be noted that some scholars call into question the very project of searchingfor theoreticalargumentation withinthe Oratio.In his monographarguingfor a scholasticbasis to Pico's writings, AveryDulles downplaysthe Oratioas "least importantin content"due to its "oratoricalcharacter."26 Dulles is not alone in minimizingthe Oratioin lightof thisobjection,forin more recenttimesWilliam G. Craven has offereda similaraccount by contending:"The idea of man literallychoosinghis own nature,in a metaphysicalsense,would have been nonsensicalto Pico."27Elsewherehe contrans. NewYork1943,407-10;Lohr1988(op.cit.,above,n. 9), 579. Conant, Virginia Whilemostcommentators fasten Platonic , XIV.3, onewoulddo uponsuchtexts Theology wellto include I. 55,III. 44,I. 57,III. 60. Epistola, 25Trinkaus 1970(op.cit.,above,n. 10),520.Foran extended see505-29. discussion, 26Dulles1941[op.cit.,above,n. 9), 15. Forcriticisms of Dulleson thispoint,see 1965(ob.ät., above,n. 9),53: Kristeller 1979(oto. Kristeller, cit.,above,n. 9), 176. 27Craven1981(op.cit.,above,n. 8), 32.

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His elaborationof the tinues:"Pico precludedphilosophicalinvestigation. The styleof the Oratiois markedindeed idea of mutability is rhetorical."28 givenits purby oratoricalflare,yet thisfactshould not be too surprising of the 900 Theses. as the to the preface planned public disputation pose Pico did meditateon the relationshipbetween philosophyand oratory. In a letterto Hermolao Barbaro, Pico (perhaps ironically)writes: ... to conjointhemis wicked withwisdom is notto be conjoined T2 Eloquence nonconiunxisse . . . coniunxisse sitnefas) adHermolao . . . cum [Epistola (eloquentia sapientia Barbaro , 680). How one should take such remarksis open to debate, yet many scholars have noted thatPico's rigorousargumentcallingforthe separationofeloenough,in a veryeloquent quence fromphilosophyis done, interestingly the argumentthatthe Oratiois a unique workthat manner.29 Nevertheless, is not properlyto be approached for theoreticalinsightsis a position needingto be addressed.If one is to use the Oratiotext as a source for the theoreticaldoctrinesof Pico's thought,at least one mustestablishthat the workis not anomalous in the corpus of Pico's writings. Several scholarshave takenup thisissue in detail.Paul Oskar Kristeller and Charles H. Lohr have arguedthata unityof thoughtobtainsbetween the views of human beingsset forthin the Oratioand a subsequenttreatment of the issue a few years later in a piece called the Heptaplus .30 in the modes of the two works are Although expression quite different, a unityof doctrineis held to existbetweenthem.As well,Kristelleroften notes that portionsof the Oratioare incorporatedalmost verbatiminto Pico's Apologia , whichwas the ill-fatedworkmeant to defendPico against the charges of heresythat had met the publicationof the 900 Theses .31 Yet anotherpair of scholarshave takenup a quite different approach in defendingthe theoreticalsignificanceof Pico's Oratioby arguing for a unityof thoughtbetweenthe veryearly Oratioand the last of Pico's work, adver sus astro his Disputationes ErnstCassirerand Antonino logiamdivinatricem. Poppi have contendedthatPico's projectof assertingthe freedomof selfdetermination of human beingswhichis spelledout in the Oratiorequires 28Ibid 35. 29See Eugenio andtheMagus Garin(ed.),Renaissance Garin,ThePhilosopher , in:Eugenio Characters , trans. above,n. 17), LydiaG. Cochrane, Chicago1991),141;Garin1965[op.cit., BreenGiovanni PicodellaMirandola ontheConflict andRhetoric 103;Quirinus , in: ofPhilosophy oftheHistory ofIdeas,13 (1952),384-5. Journal 30See Kristeller 1964{op.cit 1979[op.cit ., above,n. 9), 67; Kristeller ., above,n. 9), 176-7;Lohr1988(op.cit.,above,n. 9), 579. 31SeeKristeller 1965(op.cit., 1979(op.cit., above,n. 9),53;Kristeller above,n. 9),177.

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as a complementthe destructionof the notion of astrologicaldetermin- one The two works early, ism, a projectcarriedout in the Disputationes. one late- are held to complementeach other in this intimateway and in theworld.32 humanpre-eminence servethe singlepurposeof establishing Having seen that there are reasons set forthby commentatorsfor regardingthe Oratioas a legitimatesource forextractingtheoreticalpositionson the part of Pico, we are now in a positionto examine the evidence for Pico's doctrineof human mutability.It has been noted above that Pico maintainsearly on in the work that human beings have no nature (iimago , facies , natura)proper to themselvesand that it is through moral decisionsthathuman beingsbecome such thingsas beasts or gods. We mustexamine thisclaim and see how Pico defendssuch a doctrine. Pico begins his Oratiowith a discussionof human nature,and contends that the traditionalnotionsfor proclaimingthe pre-eminenceof human His earlyuse of the term natura nature{humana ) have been unsatisfactory.33 for it is prehumananaturaat the beginningof the work is noteworthy, ciselythe standardmeaning of this expressionthat will subsequentlybe called into dispute.Pico proceeds by givinga creationnarrativewhere God produces human beings not accordingto a singlemodel (archetypus) but accordingto all models. We find: ofitsveryowncould thatthattowhich decided artisan T3 The supreme nothing to each hadbelonged whatsoever be in common, be givenshould individually comutcuidarenihil tandem andevery poterai proprium opifex, optimus (Statuii thing esset mune , 104). ) (Oratio filerai singulis privatum quicquid In thistextPico firstsuggeststhat human beings have no traitsthat are Human beingsare thelast creaturesto be produced peculiarto themselves. and no unique archetypesremainafterwhich they divine the artisan, by could be patterned.Rather,human beingsare composedfromqualitiesor featuresalreadynaturallypossessedby othercreatures.Human beingsdo thatwould be unique to themnot have anythinglike a specificdifference selves. Even traitssuch as rationalityand intellectionalready have been 32See ErnstCassirer, Mario inRenaissance andtheCosmos TheIndividual , trans. Philosophy ideaofPico'soration "Thedominant writes: NewYork1963,115.Cassirer Domandi, inthistreatise itsfullandpureexpression ofMan'finds 'On theDignity ]." [theDisputationes Freedom andHuman Providence Antonino , in The Poppi,in hispieceFate,Fortune, Similarly, 1988(op.cit.,above,n. 9),651-2,concurs, stating: Philosophy ofRenaissance History Cambridge ... IntheDisputationes, freedom ofhuman celebration a splendid . . . contains Oratio "thefamous astralanddemonic from thisindependence stresses Picofurther influences, hislastwork, man'sself-fashioning soas tohighlight andinstinctual from capacities." determinism, physical 33Oratio , 102.

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allocated to heavenlyanimals and angels in the orderof creationpriorto the subsequentassignationto humanbeings.34 Humans are thusaggregates composed of featuresfound already existingin otherparts of creation. It is importantto note preciselywhatkindsof featuresthe divineartisan is said to depositinto human beings.We will see thatPico's account privilegespsychicqualitiesover bodily ones. We can begin by examininga textdescribinghuman capacitiesas seeds implantedat birth.Pico writes: T4 Atman'sbirth theFather sortofseedandsprouts ofevery placedinhimevery kindoflife.The seedsthateachmancultivates willgrowandbeartheir fruit in him(Nascenti homini semina etomnigenae vitae indidit Pater ; quae omnifaria germina excoluerit illaadolescent suos inilio , etjructus , 106). quisque ferent ) (Oratio We findPico hearkeningback to an ancientnotionof spiritualseeds {semina) that are latentin human beings and require actualization.Pico will use thisimage of seeds quite frequently in the Oratio , and here he writes of the need to cultivate(excolere) these seeds in the process of self-determination.Later in the Oratiohe will speak of the cultivationof soul [cultusanimi)?0There is strongevidenceto view thesefeatureslatentin human beings to be psychic states that are actualized by moral decisions. By emphasizingthat a human being can choose which life to bring about, Pico emphasizesthe moral dimensionof his theory.A human being has thecapabilityof livingthepsychiclifeof othercreatures.We findelsewhere: T5 It is nottherindwhichmakestheplant,buta dullandnon-sentient nature; notthehidewhichmakesa beastofburden, buta brutal andsensual soul; nota spherical butright reason;and nota bodywhichmakestheheavens, from thebodybuta spiritual whichmakesan angel separateness intelligence enim sedstupida etnihil sentiens natura iumenta sed cortex, ; ñeque corium, (Meque plantam bruta anima etsensualis; neccaelum orbiculatum sedrecta necsequestratio corratio, corpus, sedspiritalis , 108). poris, intellegentia angelům facit) (Oratio Here Pico offersa psychiccriterionforanalyzingindividuals.On the one hand he seems to inheritthe traditionaldivisionof souls into vegetative, sentient,and rational,yet on the other hand he is willingto foregoan in the humanindividualifthatindianalysisof the potentialforrationality vidual seems to servethe vegetativeor sentientsoul only. In givingsuch an accountPico makeshumanidentity a fundamentally moralissue.Moral choicesplay a fundamentalrole in self-constitution. Materialor bodilyfeaturesare consideredas irrelevantin the investigation of the identityof a for such characteristics are creature, presentedas no more thanaccidental. 34See Oratio , 106. 35Oratio , 132.

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Humans as such do not existjointlyas a species withinthe hierarchyof being,but ratherindividualhumansare located in the universeaccording to what livestheyare livingand what kindof soul accountsforhow they spend theirtime.The mere existenceof potenciesforhigherpsychicdispositionsis not the criterionforlocatingan individualhuman being ontologicallyin the hierarchy,but ratherPico rates individualsaccordingto the psychiclives that are actuallybeing lived. In such a taxonomyof beings,individualsexist at a level that is determinedby moral choices. Pico underscoresthe point elsewherethatthe identityof a thingis not to be identifiedwithits body, but with the kindof soul. Pico contends: T6 Ifyouseea mangivenoverto hisbellyandcrawling it is upontheground, . . . delivered a bushnota manthatyousee.If yousee anyone overto the itis a brutenota manthatyousee.Ifyoucomeupona philosopher senses, himyoushallhonor; not allthings heis a heavenly reason, discerning byright an earthly Ifyoucomeupona purecontemplator, ofthebody, animal. ignorant nota heavbanished totheinnermost heis notan earthly, placesofthemind, he is moresuperbly a divinity clothed withhuman flesh {Siquern enlyanimal; si enim videris deditum ventri , humi vides; hominem, est,nonhomo, fiutex serpentem quern . . . sensibus brutum vides. Si recta est,nonhomo, quem mancipatum, philosophum quern nonterrenum. Sipurum conratione omnia hunc venerem estanimal, ; caeleste discernentem, mentis hicnonterrenum, noncaeleste inpenetralia nescium, relegatum, templatorem corporis 36 hieaugustius estnumen humana carne animal; , 108). circumvestitum) (Oratio It is importantto note forour presentpurposesthatin thiscatalogue of possible vitaeopen to human beings rangingfrombeastlyto divine thereis no naturalplace fora humanbeingsto livesimplyqua humanbeing. Again Pico emphasizeshis claim thathuman beingsdo not have a nature AlthoughPico does contendthatGod places human properto themselves. center of the universe{medium at the mundi)at theircreation,such beings a placementis only temporary.37 Human beings do not lie in equipoise at the centerof the world, or at the center of the hierarchyof being, but ratherfromthe beginninga movementin some directionwill occur. in turn The numerouspossibilities open forhuman beingsare highlighted 36Asa parallel consider Oratio onemight seeds, , 106:"Ifhecultivates vegetable passage, Ifrational, he he willgrowintobrute. he willbecomea plant.Iftheseedsofsensation, Ifintellectual, he willbe an angel,anda sonofGod. animal. willcomeouta heavenly buttakeshimself Andifheis notcontented withthelotofanycreature up intothecenin thesolitary darkness withGodandsetded madeonespirit terofhisownunity, then, Whodoesnot he willstandaheadofall things. whois aboveall things, oftheFather, Si ratioSi sensualia, obrutescet. thatweare?(Sivegetalia, wonder at thischameleon fiet. planta concreaturarum sorte etsi nulla erit etDeifilius, animal. Si intellectualia, caeleste evadet nalia, angelus insolitaria Patris unus cum Deospvdtus suaesereceperit, tentus inunitatis centrum caligine qui factus, chamaeleonta nonadmiretur?)." nostrum antestabit. omnia constitutus omnibus estsuper Quishunc 37Oratio , 106.

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by Pico witha continuationof spatial imagery.In the creationnarrative Pico has God tell human beings: T7 Thoucanstgrowdownward intothelowernatures whichare brutes. Thou from natures whichare canstgrowupward thysoul'sreasonintothehigher divine(Poteris ininferiora bruta insuperiora div; poteris quaesunt degenerare quaesunt inaextuianimi sententia , 106). regeneran ) {Oratio The polaritiesof divinityand bestialityofferthe two possible directions forhuman self-constitution. The spatial imageryis continuedthroughout the Oratio for we find Pico , repeatingagain: in oursouls;bytheonenature T8 Twonatures areplanted wearelifted upward totheheavens, andbytheother, shoved downward tothelower world (duplicem naturam innostris animis altera sursum tollimur adcaeiestia, altera deorsum sitam, quorum ad inferna trudimur , 116). ) (Oratio Such a descriptionof human beings as centeredbetween two opposing possibilitiessuggeststhat a taxonomyof human beings firstrequires a knowledgeof the moral state of the individual. We have seen Pico presentan account of human beings where each individual'sstatusin the world is contingentupon what kind of life(vita) is beingled, and livesare determinedaccordingto whichsoul- vegetative, or rational sentient, primarily guidestheindividual'sactions.Pico presents a moral ontology,forhe considersthe choice of lifeto be metaphysically of a human being. Human beings are ratherunique in the constitutive order of creation,forwhile all creaturesotherthan human beings have a vitaproper to theirspecies, human beings are bereftof a proper vita of theirown. We are leftto question how it is one acquires a vita , and Pico does not foregoan account of this process. The example to which he gives the mostattentionis the acquisitionof the angeliclifeby a human being. To acquire a vitaPico cautions individualsfirstto observe the actions that are characteristic of that sort of life.We find: T9 Letusseewhatthey aredoing, whatlifethey areliving. Ifwetoolivethatlife forwe can- we shallequaltheir lot(Videamus vivant vitam. quidUliagant, quam Earnsi etnosvixerimus illorum sortem iamaequaverimus) enim, , 110). possimus (Oratio As well, we findin a subsequentpassage: T10 Ifourlifeis to be shapedafter themodelofa cherub's life,itis wellworthwhiletohaveinreadiness andbefore oureyeswhatthatlifeis andwhatsort itis,whatactions andwhatworks aretheirs si adexem(Atvero operae precium, cherubicae vitanostra est,quaeiliaetqualis sit,quaeactiones, plarvitae formanda quae illorum etinnumerato , 112). opera, praeoculis habere) (Oratio

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With theseT9 and T10 passages it becomes apparentthatPico identifies to acquire a vitawitha more traditionalnotionof a habit. By attempting an becomes and somehow vita the lives habits one angel.38 angelic angelic By acting like an angel, one becomes an angel; by acting like a plant one becomes a plant,etc. With such a doctrinePico takes up the traditional notion of habituationand gives it metaphysicalsignificance.Pico provideshis listenersor readerswitha moradontologythat takesits center in the notionthathuman beingshave no habit properto themselves. AlthoughPico presentsthe vitaof a beast and the vitaof a god as equal possibilitiesfor any individuadhuman being, he clearlyposits the latter as more desirablethan the first.Pico seems to contendthat the factthat human beings have seeds or potenciesfor higherlives makes it incumbent upon individualsto spurnthe lower kindsof lives.39 Antecedents III. Two Philosophical of human Having set forthan accountof Pico's doctrineof the mutability antecedents some to in a are now we philosophical position explore beings, to the views set forthin the Oratio.Pico's paternityover a novel view of human beings should not suggestthat the view lacks a notable philosophical ancestry.It will be shown that this ancestryincludesthe works Roman philosopherBoethiusand as well as the fromthe sixth-century Greek philosopherAristode. as far as I have seen, have attemptedto identify No commentators, of Boethiusas a source forPico's doctrineof the the Consolatio Philosophise withsuch human of beings.That Pico was somehowunfamiliar mutability a popular work seems to be unlikely.Althoughthe Consolatio only first Pico that show came into printin its entiretyin 1491, records possessed 38Picoseemstoadmit nature intoan angelic be formed thatonecannot byone'sown "We maynot He writes, is in somewayrequired. assistance and thatoutside powers, nonliceat) nobis cum . . . (Quod ourselves tothisthrough , 112)." attain (Oratio pernos. . . consegui traChristian the both himself with reconcile to Pico in admission this attempts Perhaps the considers which tradition ofgraceanda Platonic thenecessity which dition postulates one'sownpowers. ortoKa^óvto be in somewaybeyond totoevortoàyafàòv ascent 39Therewouldseemto be additional theOratio outside evidence , whichwouldsubofhuman themutability thatwehaveseenregarding someofthedoctrines stantiate beings theHeptaplus from ofpassages In a number vitae. loweror higher , a commentary toward ina humanbeing thatbeastsarepresent ofGenesis on thecreation , Picocontends story the with beast internal the to seems he times At body,as when identify (268,280,284). fartopass so thatwedo nothavetotravel ourentrails, arewithin "Thebrutes hestates: situt utnon bruta adeovisceribus innostris enim intothem" sunt, peregrinandum procul atque (Intus is givenbyPlatoas wellas by thatsucha doctrine ad ilia)(280).Picocontends migremus state. to fallintosucha beastly there is always Moses,andthatthedanger

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at least fourversionsof the workin his library.40 Scholars have long recthe of the in work ognized widespreadavailability manuscriptand printed form.41 As well, there is internalevidence fromPico's writingsthat he was familiarwiththe Consolatio , forsome scholarshave argued that Pico in his treatmentof such subjectsas divineknowlalludes to the Consolatio edge and eternity.42 The treatmentof the Consolatio here will be to indicate some themes thatseem parallel to the doctrinesof Pico's Oratio.In short,the Consolatio presentsa dramaticsettingwhere the lady Philosophiaargues not infrequentlyfor the thesisthat human beings can lose theirnatures.43One finds,forinstance: Til

Foryoulearned a little timeagothateverything thatis,isone,andthatoneness itself is good;andfrom thisitfollows thateverything, sinceitis,is seenalsoto begood.In thisway,then, whatever falls from ceasestobe;wherefore goodness, - butthattheywerementillnowtheir evilmenceaseto be whattheywere - andtherefore stillsurviving form ofthehumanbodyshows to byturning wickedness human nature. Butsinceonly theyhavebythesameactlosttheir canraiseanyone abovemankind, itfollows thatwickedness goodness necessarily thrusts downbeneath thenameofmenthose whom ithascastdown deserving from thehuman condition. So itfollows thatyoucannot hima man adjudge whomyouseetransformed leftgoodness aside byvices... So hewhohaving hasceasedtobe a man,sincehecannot turns state, passoverintothedivine intoa beast(Omne esseipsumque unum bonum essepauloante namque quodsitunum cuiconsequens estutomne sitidetiam bonum essevideatur. Hocigitur modo didicisti, quod a bono essedesistit essequod sedfuisse ; quofitutmalidesinant quidquid deficit fiierant, homines adhuc ostentat. versi inmalitiam humanam ipsahumani Quare corporis reliqua species amisere náturám. Sedcumultra homines solaprobitas quoque quemque provehere possit, necesse estutquosab humana condicione hominis meritum detrudat deiecit, infra improbitas. Evenit vitiis videos hominem aestimare non ... Ita , utquem igitur transformatum possis deserta homo essedesierit, cum indivinam condicionem transiré non fitutquiprobitate posinbeluarrì) sit,vertatur , IV. p. 3, 44-56,67-9). (Consolatio Philosophiae

Withsuch an argumentPhilosophiais presentedas endorsinga somewhat Plotinianpositionwhere being depends upon unityand a convertibility 40Forthe in Pico'slibrary ofworks theConsolatio , see presence containing Philosophiae Kibre1936(op.cit.,above,n. 16),§180,§1092,§1211,§1450. 41Fora brief account oftheaccessibility oftheConsolatio intheRenaissance, Philosophiae seeAnthony TheAvailability Works Grafton, , in:TheCambridge ofAncient History ofRenaissance 1988(op.cit.,above,n. 9), 778-9.See alsoRobert BlackandGabriella Philosophy Pomaro, La consolazione della nelMedioevo e nelRinascimento italiano. Libri discuola eglosse neimanofilosofia scritti Boethius's Consolation ofPhilosophy inItalian Medieval andRenaissance Education. fiorentini. Schoolbooks andtheir Glosses inFlorentine 2000. Manuscripts , Firenze 42See Olivier Boulnois andGuiseppe in:JeanPicDe La Mirandole, Oeuvres Tognon, , Paris1993,101. Philosophiques 43See,forinstance, Consolatio , I. p. 6, 50-1;II. p. 5, 85-8;IV. p. 2,110-2; Philosophiae IV. p. 3, 50-69;IV. p. 4, 1-3.Latintexts andEnglish translations forBoethius aretaken fromTheTheological Tractates andTheConsolation H. F. Stewart, E. K. , trans. ofPhilosophy Mass.1973(= LoebClassical Rand,S.J. Tester, , Vol. 74). Cambridge, Library

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is held to obtain among being, unity,and goodness.44With the acquisition of vice an individualfallsfromgoodness,and such a fall is paralleled with a fall frombeing. In a parallel fashion,those who possess virtuesratherthan vices are held to have some kindof increasein being. Philosophiacharacterizesthe movementinto vice as a de-evolutionof an individualinto somethingwhich falls shortof humanity,and she characterizesthis movementas the loss or sendingaway {amisere) of humana natura.We also see here that BoethiusanticipatesPico in identifying the lifeof a beast as one pole in the spectrumof human actions.It is interestingto see that like Pico, Boethius argues that moral actions play a constitutiverole in self-determination. What one is is contingentupon moral acts. With immoralacts, a body may remain,but human nature, whichlater comes to be identifiedwiththe mind or soul {mens, anima),is no longerpresent.This Til passage also suggeststhe counterpartto the doctrinethathuman beingscan become beasts,namely,thatmoral goodness can "raise" one above human nature to the point of becoming divine.45It is importantto see that the loss of humananaturaforBoethius admitsof two possibilities:one can become eithera beast or a divinity. Boethiusand Pico appear to agree thatthebody is accidentalto an individual's identityin the hierarchyof being. In anotherpassage we finda doctrinewhich seems to expressdetailsquite similarto Pico, forwe find: andI seethatitisnotwrongly saidthatthewicked, T12 I admit, although they preservetheform ofa humanbody,yetin thequality oftheirminds theyare intobeasts neciniuria dicivideo tametsi humani vitiosos, (Fateor corporis speciem changed servent tarnen animorum , inbeluas , IV. p.4, 1-3.). mutari) (Consolatio qualitate Philosophiae In this text Boethius provides some furtherprecisionsconcerninghow one should understandthe claim that moral reprobatesare turnedinto beasts.By usingthe expressionqualitasanimihe seemsto amplifyhis claim that humans turn into beasts, insofaras he applies his analysisto the level of psychicstatesor habits. In this respectwe see a move that is analogous to Pico's line of argument,for we saw above that Pico was concernedwithevaluatinghuman beingsaccordingto the kind of soulsensitive,vegetative,or rational which takesprecedencein the daily life of the individual.Pico suggestedthatif a human individual'sfundamental 44See Plotinus, ofthedependency ofbeing Enneade VI, 9, 1,3. ThePlotinian principle at Consolatio is alsousedbyPhilosophia , III. p. 11,27-30andIII. Philosophiae uponunity p. 11,104-7. 45Thisposition III. p. 10,84-9; in othertexts. See Consolatio is reaffirmed Philosophiae, seealsoI. p. 4, 145;II. p. 5, 76; IV. p. 3, 28-9;III. p. 12,90-1.

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vitawas one found to be widespreadin beasts, therewas sufficient evidence to considerthat person to be a beast in the hierarchyof being. For both Pico and Boethiuspsychicqualities are set forthas the criterion by which to rate beings in the hierarchyof being.46 For our presentpurposes it is importantto note that Boethius spells out a theoryin the Consolatio in which he claims that human Philosophiae natureis somethingthatcan be lost,retained,preserved,dispossessed,or servare Such , amittere , mutare) retiñere, changed (destituerez by an individual.47 occurrencesare contingentupon moral choices made by the individual, and in this respectwe find congruencebetween the moral anthropologies of Pico and Boethius.Both thinkersexplicitlyset forthdivinityand bestialityas two poles in the range of possibilitiesopen to human beings. However,further precisionsneed to be made in lightof the comparison. One shouldnote thatBoethiusneverappears to claim thathuman beings have no natureproperto themselves.Rather,we have seen Boethiuscontendthatit is preciselythe human naturethatnaturallybelongsto human or entirely beingsthatis eitherlostby meansof immoralactivity superceded by virtuousactivity.Pico, one will recall,contendsin T3 and T4 thatall naturesare presentto human beings, and that no particularnature is properto human beings. The presence of all naturesin human beings along Pico's account suggeststhat human beings are in fact devoid of a proper nature. For this reason, the Boethian human nature cannot be identifiedwith the aggregatenature that Pico ascribesto human strictly beings. The Boethian theoryconcerninga loss of nature is thus transformedby Pico's contentionthat human beings possess all natures.Pico comes to appropriatethe Boethian contentionthat divinityand bestiality are the possibilitiesfor human beings,but does so means of an absorption of all naturesin his anthropology. Having set forthsome textualparallelsthatexistin the writingsof Pico and Boethius,we now turnto some neglectedpassages fromthe Aristotle. Althoughthe propinquityof Pico's thoughtto that of Aristotleis in a numberof ways difficult to ascertain,his acquaintance with Aristotelian doctrinesis not. As to the formerissue, Paul Oskar Kristellerhas been able to speak of "Pico's generalAristotelian orientation"whileat the same timemaintaining thathe sees "no dangerin applyingthelabel of Platonism 46One might notethatThomasAquinas readsthetexts oftheConsolatio as Philosophiae forthelossofhuman nature as meaning thelossofhabits; cf.II Sent arguing ., d. 35,q. 1, a. 5 corp. 47Consolatio , I. p. 6, 51; IV. p. 2, 111;IV. p. 2, 111/IV.p. 4, 3; IV. p. 3, Philosophiae 51; IV. p. 4, 4.

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to Pico's work."48The difficulty of tryingto establishPico as eitherfunPlatonic or in natureis a ratherproblematicissue, Aristotelian damentally especiallygivenPico's contention,as noted above, thatin core issuesany betweenthe two ancientsare only verbal at philosophicaldisagreements best.49One may take as emblematicof the difficulty of thisissue the fact that Pico's contemporary, Hermolao Barbaro, feltfreeto addresshim in the course of singleletteras both an Aristotelianand a Platonist.50 Yet to the side a moment this issue for the Greek leaving concerning philosophical allegiancesof Pico, thereis littledisputeas to Pico's knowledge of Aristotelian doctrines.In his responseto theletterof Hermolao Barbaro, Pico concedes thathe has spentnot less than six yearsstudyingscholastic thinkersand reportsof many scholasticinterpretations of Aristotlein the 51Pico's no historicalportionof the 900 Theses. extant On theConcord longer Plato and Aristotle a must have demonstrated with of greataffinity the teachings of the Stagirite.As well, in the firstof the thesesgiven "according to his own opinion" Pico was willingto defendthe followingclaim: in whichAristotle T13 Thereis no natural or divinequestion and Platodo not in theirwordstheyseemto disandsubstance, although agreein meaning estquaesitum naturale autdivinum inquoAristoteles etPlatosensu etre agree(.Nullum nonconveniant, verbis dissentire videantur) (Thesis 1>1). quarrwis Pico explicitlysaw himselfas continuingthe Boethian unfinishedproject of settingforththe harmonybetween Plato and Aristotle.52 Furtherevidence of Pico's knowledgeof Aristodeis suggestedby the surviving records of Pico's library.Accountsshow thatit was well stockedwithAristotelian textsin the originalGreek as well as in Latin translation, includingeight , and numerouslogical, , seven copies of the Politics copies of the Ethics For our presentpurposesit will be metaphysical,and biologicalworks.53 notable thatboth the Ethicsand Politics were presentin the libraryin the Greek original language.54 48Kristeller 1965(op.cit..above,n. 9),63,69. 49Lohrsuggests Picois said ofPico'sphilosophical a developmental account allegiances. withChristian to endlatter to Pico'sPlatonism to beginwithallegiance Aristotelianism; seeLohr1988{op.cit.,above,9),578-82. 50A translation from Hermolao Barbaro toPicois contained oftheApril5, 1485letter in Breen1952(op.cit.,above,n. 29),392-5. 51 adHermolao Barbaro , 679. 52Epistola hisproetuno.Boethius states 144;cf.162,as wellas theProemto De ente Oratio, Boehi Commentarvi Manlii Severini onDe Interpretation II, ch.3; seeAnicii jectintheCommentary ree.C. Meiser, editiosecunda, inlibrum Aristotelis PeriHermeneias, Leipzig1880,79-80. 53See Kibre1936(op.cit.,above,n. 16),28-30,304,Paul OskarKristeller 1965 dt.,above,n. 9),54-5. (op. 54See Kibre1936(op.cit.,above,n. 16),28; §497;§703.

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My presentinterestin approachingPico's intellectualrelationshipto Aristotleis to set fortha parallel between Pico's doctrineof the mutabilityof human beings and some rather challengingpassages in the Aristoteliancorpus that seem to bear some affinities to the claims of the Oratio.If a parallel between the teachingsof Pico and Aristotleon this point can be established,we will have succeeded in openingup the possibilityof establishingto a greaterdegree some philosophicalsourcesfor Pico's doctrine. As an ingressto thisissuewe may beginwitha textfromtheNicomachean Ethicsin whichthe Stagiritebeginshis account of ethicaldispositions.We find: T14 As theopposite ofbestiality itwillbe mostsuitable to speakofsuperhuman orgoodness on a heroicordivine scale. . . Henceif,as mensay,survirtue, virtue menintogods,thedisposition tobestiality will passing changes opposed be clearly somequality morethanhuman; forthere is nosuchthing as virtue in thecaseofa god,anymorethanthereis viceor virtue in thecaseofa beast. . . Andinasmuch as it is rarefora manto be divine ... so a bestial character israreamong human Ôèxrçv aváp|ióxxoi 0r|pióxr|xa |KxX,iax' beings (rcpòç vxivami0eíav,. . . coox' xf]v Aiyeiv f|pcovicri úrcèp Tijiaç àpexf|v, ei,KaÔárcep cpaaív, 0eoiôi' àpexfjç oxii' yívovxai éÇávGpcoTccov xoiaúxri i)7iepßoÄ.f|v, xiçav eirjÔfjXov Kaiyapcoarcep o')8è9r)pío') éaxiKaicía oúô'àpexri, xr'0T|piá)ôei àvxixi0ep.évr| eÇiçov)6è 0eot> . . . otixa) Kaió 0r|picôÔT|ç évxoîçÒcv0pco7toiç ouxcoç amvioç){Nicomachean 55 Ethics , VII, ch. 1, 1145a18-30). A ratherstrikingfeatureof this passage for our presentpurposeslies in the contentionthat the spectrumof moral dispositionsavailable to a human being terminatesin the extremesof divinityand bestiality.The acquisitionof virtuesor vices moves one towardbeing a god (0eóç) or a beast (Grjpiov). Yet it is not insignificant thatin thisT14 passage Aristotle does appear to be reportingterminological distinctions thathave currency in establishedparlance. In the course of subsequentdiscussionshe will reportfurtherthat Spartans use the appellationsof "divine" and "bestial," and he will contend that the latterterm is reservedas a special expressionof opprobriumfor individualswho have acquired a surpassing (')7cepßcxMx)VTa<;) degree of vice.56This textdoes seem to serve as an 55TextsforAristode aretakenfrom: Ethica ed. I. Bywater, Oxford1894; Mcomachea, Politica Books ed. D. M. Balme , ed. W. D. Ross,Oxford1957;History VII-X, ofAnimals: andAllanGotthelf, Mass.1991(= LoebClassical , Vol. 439).English Cambridge, Library translations aretaken from Ethics Nicomachean H. Rackham, Mass.1968 , trans. Cambridge, Mass. 1990 , Vol. 73); Politics (= LoebClassical , trans.H. Rackham, Library Cambridge, oftheHistory textis that , Vol.264);andthetranslation (= LoebClassical Library ofAnimals ofW. D. RossfromTheComplete Works TheRevised Translation ofAristotle: , Vol. 1, Oxford ed.Jonathan Princeton 1995. Barnes, 56Nicomachean Ethics , VII, ch. 1 1145a30-34.

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importantparallel to Pico's text identifiedabove as T7, at least to the extentthat there is a congruencein the respectiveassertionsthat the poles of god and beast definethe range of possible ethical dispositions. Yet at thispoint we are in need of more evidenceto establisha genuine Aristoteliandoctrine,for along a conservativereading Aristotleappears to be reportingthe use of certaintermsand one mustbe on guard not to mistakethispracticewith the actual endorsementof any metaphysics that is impliedby such nomenclature.57 Yet there are other textsin which Aristotleat least suggeststhat the notionsof god and beast are helpfulin approachingthe range of possible human dispositions.In the Politics , forexample,Aristotlewill appeal to the termsafterhavingjust previouslycontendedthat "a human being is by One finds: naturea politicalanimal (ó âvGpamoç (púaeitco^itikòv Çcpov)."58 orwhoisself-sufficing intopartnership, T 15 ... a manwhoisincapable ofentering be so thathe musteither thathe hasno needtodo so,is nopartofa state, Ôi'aúxápKEiav koivcoveîv a beastora god(óôè Svvánevoç ^ir|ôèv ôeó|ievoç ©axer'0T|píov o')0èvjiépoç r'0eóç)(Politics, I, ch. 1 1253a27-29). rcótacoç, With such a text we find furtherevidence that Aristodepreservesthe conceptualpolaritiesof god and beast in his analysisof the humanpolis, yet any metaphysicalground to such termsremainsto be established.59 in this regard. Other discussions,though,will prove to be more fruitful Ethics , we begin to findthe tracTurningback now to the Nicomachean Aristotleprovidesthe rather individual. for a bestial of an ontology ings briefaccount: is not Forthebestthing morefrightening. is lessthanvice,though T16 Bestiality it [thebest as inhe caseofman,butrather [inthebestial person] corrupted, 5é-oúyap ôè 0r|píoxTiç micíaç,(poßepcoxepov (eXaxxov thing]is notpresent Ethics àÀÀ'oí>k évxcp xòßeA/uiaxov, , coarcep Ôiék ãXTC lieintranslating difficulties n. 55),411.Theinterpretive e'xei, "inthe or rather reasonis notpresent" thesenseof"inthebestial person opento either I haveoptedfortheformer. beast reasonis notpresent." Rackham, Following

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In thispassage we would seem to finda contrastbetweentwo individuals, wherethefirstis someonegivenoverto vice,and the otheris an individual who has become bestial.The text,accordingto one reading,would suggest that in the bestialindividualthe best thing,i.e., intellect,is not present. At a minimum,this T16 passage would suggestthat a bestial person is in a worse conditionthan being merelyin the possessionof vice. We turn now to a final text for more insightinto the metaphysical thatmay undergird Aristotle's scattereddiscussionsof human underpinnings in of In terms beasts and the Historia Animalium we finda text beings gods. whichcomparesthepsychicdispositions foundin humansto thosefoundin animals,and Aristodedefendssome unusual claims. Aristotlemaintains: T17 In thegreatmajority ofanimals there ofpsychical aretraces orattiqualities which aremoremarkedly in thecaseofhuman differentiated tudes, qualities Forjustas wepointed outresemblances in thephysical so in beings. organs, a number ofanimals we observe or fierceness, mildness or cross gentleness or timidity, fearor confidence, or lowcunning, temper, courage, highspirit to intelligence, to sagacity. Someof and,withregard something equivalent thesequalities in man,as compared withthecorresponding in aniqualities thatis to say,a manhasmoreorlessofthis mals,differ onlyquantitatively: andan animalhasmoreorlessofsomeother ... in children quality, maybe observed thetracesand seedsofwhatwillone daybe settled psychological a childhardly differs forthetimebeingfrom habits, though psychologically an beast(0r|piov); so thatoneis quitejustified in saying man that,as regards andanimals, certain areidentical withoneanother psychical qualities (eveoxi Kaitcûv ccAàcdv icòvrcepì yàpèvtoîçjctaíaxoiç rr|v fyvri Çwcov yuxfiv xpórccov, oatep érci tcûv Kaiyàpfmepóiriç Kaiàypiórriç àvGpcímcov £%ei xccç cpavepcoTEpaç Ôiacpopcxç. KaiTtpaóiiç KaixaÀ£7rórr|ç KaiàvôpíaKaiôeiAiaKaicpoßoi Kai0áppr| Kai0u|ioi Kaimvoupyíai Kairrjçrcepì ëveiaivévrcoAÀoîç aÙTœv irjçôiávoiavoDvéaecoç £71 i TCÛV Ta |1£V Kaif|TTOV Ó|10lÓTTÍieÇ, K(X0a7C8p |l£pCÛV ¿AÍyO|l£V. yàpTCp |J.CxAÀOV tòvavGpomov, Kaiò av0pomoç noXkň tcov . . . cpavepcoraTov ôiacpépei rcpòç rcpòç Çcpcov • évTOÚTOIÇ Ô'egtítotoioíjtov £7ci T©v7caíÔcúv TT^v fi^iKÍav ßXe'|faoiv yàptôv¿lèv ëaTiv iSeîvolovï^vri KaiaicépinaTa, ô' ovÒkv ')GT£pov éaop-évcov ë^ecûv ôiacpépei coç eijceîv tcûv Animalium fj Trjç 0r|p(cûv KaTatòvxpóvov , tovtov) [Historia VIII, ch. 1 588al6-bl). The unusualpositiondefendedin thistexthas been notedby some scholars.61From this passage we may be able to gather some interpretative insightswithrespectto any metaphysicalfoundationswhich may ground Aristotle'ssustainedreferencesto the polaritiesof god and beast. Here Aristotlebegins his treatmentby assertingthat thereare some psychical qualitieswhich are presentin both animals and humans. These qualities of soul (ipÓTCoi are presentboth to animals and humans rcepittìv'|A)XT|v) 61In referencing thistext, W. D. Rosscomments: "In theHistoria Animalium [Aristotle] takesfrequent noticeofpoints ofaffinity between menandanimals." See hisDe Anima: with Introduction andCommentary Edited, , Oxford 1961,9.

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yet differonly in a quantitativesense. These psychic qualities, which and not qualitaand fear,differquantitatively include courage, timidity, tivelybetweenhumans and animals.62The suggestionthat psychicqualities may differonly in quantitycould be taken to implythat univocal predicationof psychicqualitiescould be attemptedwithrespectto humans and animals. Aristotleseems to develop this possibilityfurtherby suggestingtoward the end of T20 that the soul of a child does not differ This latterclaim much in comparisonwith the soul of a beast (Gripiov). does surfaceelsewherein the Aristoteliancorpus.63In short,in the suggestionthatcertainpsychicqualitiespresentin both animalsand humans differonly in degree,we finda beginningof a metaphysicalfoundation, albeit in the formof a psychology,thatwould allow us to interpretsome of the claims we have seen surfacein otherpassages fromAristotle.One could perhaps call a human being a "beast" if one were to discernthat that individualpossessed a particularpsychicquality in such a degree that normallyis found only in a beast in that degree. In all, we have foundthe hintsof a philosophicalgroundin Aristotleforusingthe nomenclatureof "beast" in referenceto human beings,and to this extentwe may have discovereda philosophicalsource forthe unusual doctrinesset .64 forthin Pico's Oratio

62One maywishto notethatàvôpeíaandotherpsychic of arepredicated qualities Animalium at Historia animals , IX, ch.3 610b22. again 63See,forinstance, Kai0r|pioiç "raiyaprcaiai Ethics Mcomachean , VI, ch.13 1144b9-10: ai guaimi')7iápxouaiv ëÇeiç." 64Outsidethescopeofthispaperliestheissueoftheextent docto whichancient ofPico'sviewofthe to theformulation oftransmigration trines mayhavecontributed forin a suchan influence, Thereis goodreasontoconsider ofhuman beings. mutability toidentify Picohimself andEmpedocles ofPythagoras discussion transmigration attempts See Oratio ofhuman withhisviewson themutabliliy as consonant doctrines , 108. beings. fr.112,117, seeEmpedocles, inthephilosophical oftransmigration Fordefenses tradition, 620a(cf.alsoTimaeus fr.7; Plato,Phaedo , 81e,82a,Republic 115,9, 127,136;Xenophanes of ofthedoctrine Ennead , III, 4, 2; VI, 7, 6. On theorigins 42c,9Id, 92c);andPlotinus, ofthispaperdisHistoria see Herodotus, , II, ch. 123.Forthepurposes transmigration, forthereasonthatit hasbeenavoided, oftheissueoftransmigration cussion primarily a religious ora philosophical is primarily whether to determine is difficult transmigration ofProteus seetheaccounts to Pico'sdoctrine, antecedents Forpossible doctrine. literary ofthe a For discussion 730-8. and in Homer, , VIII, Ovid, 454, , IV, Metamorphoses Odyssey ExileandChange seeA. Bartlett inRenaissance Giamatti, literature, literary imageofProteus Literature inRenaissance , NewHaven1984,115-50.

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V. In Sum In the course of the presentpaper I have broughttwo hithertounrecognized sources into the discussionof Pico's account of human beings cited by much of the currentrelevantliterabeyond those consistently ture.The recognitionof strongtextualparallelsbetweenpassages of the Oratioand the Boethian and Aristotelianworks have established new sourcesforPico's avenues of inquiryin the ongoingprojectof identifying a novel view of human should not Pico's over beings thought. paternity view lacks a notable and the inclusion of posithat the ancestry, suggest tionsof Boethiusand Aristotleprovidefor a new approach in interpreting the Oratio.It has been shown that in spite of his syncreticorientaof philosophyand tion Pico defendsa distinctionbetweenthe formalities rather than and theologicalsources theology, by identifying philosophical forhis thoughtI have providedfora new contextforthe interpretation thisimportantdocumentof Italian Renaissance humanism.65 Milwaukee,Wisconsin Marquette University

65I am grateful toJamesB. South,Lawrence and Michelle Masek, JohnSimmons, fortheir comments on an earlier draft ofthispaper. Ruggaber

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Juan Ginêsde Sepúlvedaund diepolitische im Zeitalter der Conquista} Aristotelesrezeption CHRISTIANSCHÄFER

I. Die Ausgangslage ChristophKolumbushattewährendeinerseinererstenEntdeckungsfahrten auf der von ihm „Hispaniola" benanntenInsel- dem heutigenHaitieine kleine Garnison unter den Eingeborenenhinterlassen.Als er 1495 dorthinzurückkehrte, um die Garnison zu entsetzen,fand er nur noch erbärmlicheÜberreste der spanischen Mannschaftam Leben und die gesamtefürdie kastilischeKrone beanspruchteInsel in hellemAufruhr. Auf seinemerbostenVergeltungsfeldzug gegen die dafürverantwortlichen karibischen Indiosnahmer eine Anzahlvon Gefangenenunterden benachbarten Stämmen. Einige dieser Gefangenenließ er nach Spanien brinals Sklavender Krone deklarierte und zum finanziellen gen,wo er sie offiziell Gewinn des Königshauseszum Verkaufanbot.2Kolumbus hatte damit eine de-factoSituationgeschaffen, die in den folgendenJahrzehnteneine schierendlosejuristische,theologischeund philosophischeDiskussionüber die Rechtmäßigkeiteiner Versklavungvon neuentdecktenVölkern auslöste, eine Diskussion,die von den Universitätenteilweisehitzigauf die Politikund breiteGesellschaftsschichten Spaniens übergriff.3

1 DieserAufsatz isteineüberarbeitete undin mehreren Punkten verängravierenden derteFassung einesVortrags, denzu halten ichwährend einesKongresses zurAntikenimFebruar hatte.Eineinsgesamt, v.a.aberim Rezeption (Heidelberg 1999)Gelegenheit Teil starkgekürzte, im historischen ausphilosophisch-argumentativen jedochteilweise fuhrlichere Version desVortrags istmittlerweile indenKongreßakten: erschienen DieThese vondernatürlichen Sklaverei inantiker undspanischer , in:ManuelBaumbach Philosophie Conquista Tradita etInventa. derAntike, zurRezeption 2000,S. 111-30. (Hg.), Beiträge Heidelberg 2 Vgl.zu diesem historischen z.B. LesleyByrdSimpson, Losconquistadores Hintergrund indio americano , Barcelona 1970,S. 16f. y el 3 Umso mehr, alssichSklaventransporte vondenWestindischen InselnaufBetreiben desKolumbus undanderer in denfolgenden königlicher Kolonialbevollmächtigter Jahren undzwaroffenbar sehrzumÄrger undgegendenWiderstand derkastiliwiederholten, schenKönigin Isabel:vgl.dazuetwau.a. Simpson 1970(s.o.,Anm.2), S. 17ff. sowie PérezLuño,La polémica delNuevo Mundo , Madrid21995,S. 191f. Antonio-Enrique BrillNV,Leiden,2002 © Koninklijke - www.brill.nl Alsoavailable online

Vivarium 40,2

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SEPÚLVEDA UNDDIE POLITISCHE ARISTOTELESREZEPTION 243 die Sklavereieine Dabei war im Spanien des 15. und 16.Jahrhunderts zwar weitgehendmarginale,aber dennochwohlbekanntesoziale Erscheiwaren es insbesondereschwarzeSklaven,die nung.4Im 16. Jahrhundert man durchausauch im christlichen Spanien nach dem Fall von Granada im Jahr 1492 von muslimischenoder portugiesischen Anbieternerwerben konnte.5Die Entdeckungder Neuen Welt und die dadurch eröffnete VersklavungganzerVölkeraber machtedie Möglichkeitflächendeckender Sklavereierst zum wirklichenjuristischenund politischenProblem: Es muslimische Erzfeinde gingnichtmehrnurum einigewenigeunterworfene oder erkaufteoder sonstwieerworbeneIndividuen,die aufgesaugtvom Leben als Einzelschicksaleuntergingen, sonderndarum, gesellschaftlichen - zumindestteilweise Völker ob das riesigeMenschenreservoir ganzer könnte. der systematischen Versklavungdurch die Spanier offenstehen die diametralenExtrempositionen Ich willkurzund starkvereinfachend in der damaligenDebatte um die Rechtmäßigkeit der VersklavungneuentFestes Fundamentbeider Standpunkteist deckterVölker nachskizzieren.6 der spanidabei die Einsichtin die Tatsache, daß das Aufeinanderprallen als irreversibles schenKulturmitden amerikanischen Faktum geschichtliches angesehenund pragmatischals Aufgabe,so wie sich die Situationnuneinmal bot,angenommenwerdenmußte;nurder dieserAufgabeentsprechende Lösungswegblieb kontrovers: • Gegen die Versklavungder Indios sprach allgemeingesagtdas (vor- Der christlich Menschlichkeitsideal. motivierte) dringlich Dominikanerpater 4 ZurSklaverei im SpanienderReconquista-Zeit undzurTradition derVersklavung muslimischer siehekonzis básico de Kamen,Vocabulario Kriegsgefangener Henry dargestellt la Historia Moderna Barcelona 1986,S. 85-9.Kamenistauch 1450-1750), (España y América in derEinschätzung zu folgen, daß die ehersporadischen des 14. Versklavungsaktionen und15.Jahrhunderts werden Spanienniezu einerregelrechten Sklavenhaltergesellschaft ließen(a.a.O.S. 85f.:Die Sklaverei undhattekeinerlei rassi„warnichtsehrverbreitet stische Dominanzstrukturen zurGrundlage"; Über.C.S.). 5 So weckt imDonQuijote schwarzer (I,Kapitel 29)dieinAussicht gestellte Beherrschung inSanchoPanzaunmittelbar Untertanen anihreDeportation denGedanken (äthiopischer) als Sklaven in Spanien, undihrenVerkauf wasalsooffenbar keinauffallig außergewöhnliches oderVorgehen indenAugeneineseinfachen des16.Jahrhunderts Ereignis Spaniers seinkonnte. 6 Überflüssig zu sagen,daß einesolchekrudeNachzeichnung den angesprochenen Theorien nichtin denDetailsgerecht werden undnützlich dieseauch kann,so wertvoll zurgerechten In Nuancen seinmögen. undTeilzustimmungen lassensich Interpretation selbstverständlich vonAutorzu Autorzwischen diesenExtrempositionen (undwohlauch in ihnenDifferenzierungen) undMischformen derArgumentation und Schattierungen aufdie hieraberzu meinem Leidwesen nichteingegangen wererkennen, Standpunkte denkann.Ichverweise dazuweiter aufdiehervorragende vonMauricio 21997.Veröffentlichung La querella dela Conquista Beuchot, , Mexiko/Madrid

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und spätere Bischofvon Chiapas in Mexiko, Bartolomé de Las Casas, kannhierals wohl berühmtester Vertreter genanntwerden.Gestütztwurde diese Sicht der Dinge durch die scholastischeNaturrechtstradition, aber auch durch autoritativekirchlicheStellungnahmenin dieser Frage, die sich schon erstaunlichbald einstellten.Sie legtenlehramüichfest,daß es sich bei den Bewohnernder Neuen Welt um Menschen im vollen Sinne handeltemitallen Rechtenund Pflichten, die aus diesemStatuserwuchsen, insbesondereaber mitdem Recht,ihrerFreiheitals Personennichtberaubt werdenzu dürfen.7 Diese Positionder naturrechtlich rationalen begründetenvollkommenen und menschlichen sowie der daraus ableitbaren Fähigkeiten Wertigkeit allgemeinenGrundrechteder Indios und die Aufgabe der andauernden moralischenEntrüstunggegenüberden Greultatender Spanier an der im spanischenDominikanerwurdeinsbesondere eingeborenen Bevölkerung orden, und zwar gegen massive Opposition der kolonialpolitischen 7 Zu erwähnen isthierzunächst z.B. die BullePapstAlexanders VI. Inter cetera vom Mai 1493,inder(nurwenige MonatenachKolumbus' erster zwarvom Entdeckungsreise) RechtderSpanischen KroneaufInbesitznahme undKolonisierung derneuenLänderdie Redeist,beides aberstrikt undallein unter dieZielvorstellung derVerbreitung desGlaubens während undmaterielle Vorteile desKulturkontakts wird, gestellt politische ausgeklammert werden einewichtige furdieBeurteilung derIndiosvorausgenom(wobei Vorentscheidung menwurde: siesindin demMaßevernunftbegabt, daß sieoffenbar ohneweiteres christianisiert werden underfüllen somit dieallgemeine desaniMenschseinsdefinition können, malrationale abervorallemdieBullePapstPaulsIII. Sublimis DeusvomJuni1536, ); sodann inderexplizit undunmißverständlich aufdasmittlerweile virulent Problem der gewordene deramerikanischen Indianer alsWerkdesTeufels undmit Versklavung bezuggenommen demchristlichen Missionsbemühen kontrastiert wird:So „[.. .] entscheiden underklären Wirkraft Unserer Vollmacht durchdiesesSendschreiben, daß die vorgeapostolischen nannten Indiosundalleweiteren dienochdurchChristen entdeckt werVölkerschaften, an Christus densollten, wennsiedemGlauben auchnochso weitentfernt weder stehen, Güter beraubt sondern nochkünftig ihrer Freiheit nochihrer werden dürfen, gegenwärtig übersieund überbeidesfreiverfugen können müssen. Sie habenfreie Verfügungsgewalt Niemand hathingegen das Recht,sie dürfen sieungehindert undrechtmäßig genießen: sollals nullundnichtig zu versklaven. JedeZuwiderhandlung gegendieseAnordnung Text nochVerbindlichkeit siehatwederGültigkeit werden, [. . .]" (Lateinischer angesehen XVIparala historia deMéxico ediert in:M. Cuevas(Hg.),Documentos inéditos delSiglo , México 21975,S. 499f.; Metzler Primi Saeculi auchin:Josef Porrúa Pontificia neuerdings (Hg.),America ihre 1493-1592 , Vatikan1991,Bd. 1, Nr.84). Die Bulle,odervielmehr Evangelizationis in Spanien vonderKronerelativ schnell unddenKolonien, wurde untersagt Verbreitung inbegrenzten Umlauf undnureineabgemilderte Textversion gebracht: vgl.dazuz.B.H. der Gütersloh undChristentum. EinHandbuch zurGeschichte 1992, Neuzeit, Gründer, Welteroberung Rolle daßSepúlveda mitseiner einflußreichen S. 122f. MandarfmitVorsicht mutmaßen, Rolle in kolonialpolitischen dabeieinegewisse beiHofunddezidierten Fragen Meinung an einigen Stellen nimmt seinDemócrates Alter habenmag.Jedenfalls exponierten gespielt ohnesiejedochalsArgumentgegner undmotivisch BezugaufdieBulle, eindeutigen sprachlich zu nennen.

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UNDDIE POLITISCHE ARISTOTELESREZEPTION 245 SEPÚLVEDA Interessengruppenübernommen.Die Dominikanerübtendabei von ihrer nicht zu unterschätzendenPosition des Bildungs- und gesellschaftlich von überhaupt(den „Leyes Predigerordens der erstenKolonialgesetzgebung de Burgos" von 1512)8 bis weit ins 17. Jahrhundert politischund administrativnachhaltigenEinflußin der Indiofrageaus.9 - zumin• Die Gegentheseeinerdenkbarenund äußerstzweckdienlichen der Bewohnerder Neuen Welt dest teilweisen Versklavungsmöglichkeit ökonomischen war einerseitsnatürlichvor allem von rein pragmatischen, und Interessen und machtpolitischen getragen;sie schien Überlegungen Blickauf das kolonialeAlltagsgeschäft aber auch durchden vergleichenden Staaten gerechtfertigt. Andererseitskonntesich diese andererchristlicher Positionauch auf ein altestheoretisches stützen, Rechtfertigungsfundament und dort unter anderem bei das sich explizit im antiken Schrifttum, - im antiken Aristotelesfindenließ, und dessen Umsetzung Kriegsbrauch - offenbar auch das Christentum nie ganz aufgegeben ein Allerweltsverfahren hatte:10 es handeltsich um den Grundsatz,daß der im gerechten KriegunterworfeneFeind rechtmäßigmit Leib und Leben in den Besitz des Siegers übergeht.Das Argumentfindetsich genauso bei Cicero wieder,von wo aus es ins Renaissancedenken seinenwiedererstarkenden Einflußgenommen haben dürfte,war aber auch in der scholastischenDiskussionder servitusUnd es war im übrigengenau diesesArguFrage nie ganz untergegangen.11 8 Verl. dazuz.B.U. Horst u.a.(Hg.),Francisco deVitoria : Vorlesungen S. 85. /,Stuttgart 1995, 9 Repräsentativ istindiesem anFrancisco zu erinnern deVitoria, seinZusammenhang erzeit derführende Gelehrte derSalmantinischen dessen berühmte undauchbei Schule, Hofekommentierten Relectiones überdieKolonialfrage unddasKriegsrecht alleausdentraditionellen aufdie Eroberung und Argumenten abgeleiteten spanischen Rechtsansprüche derNeuenWeltfurunhaltbar unddaherfurnichtig erklärten. SolcheArgumente Aneignung ihrHeidentum unter anderem: diekulturelle derIndiovölker, und waren, Unterlegenheit ihrebarbarische sichpolitisch selbst zuverwalten, aberauchetwaderuniversale, Unfähigkeit, unddashieß:weltweite desrömischen dasmitKarlV. Kaisertums, Herrschaftsanspruch aufdieSpanier zu seinschien. Relectio deIndisrecenter übergegangen Vgl.v.a.de Vitorias deutsche vonU. Horst(Hg.),Francisco de Vitoria: inventisi //,Stuttgart Ausgabe Vorlesungen 1997,S. 370-541. 10Vgl.dazu u.a. die Ausführungen undbibliographischen Weiterverweise überdie vonlat.sclavus beiCh. Flüeler, undInterpretation derAristotelischen Politica Etymologie Rezeption imspäten Mittelalter , Bd. 1,Amsterdam 1992,Anm.286zu S. 85. 11Vgl.De ojjkiis außerdem: and I, 34-40.ZurRezeption JeanDubabin,TheReception Politics A. Kenny, , in:N. Kretzmann, Interpretation ofAristotle's J.Pinborg (Hg.),TheCambridge Medieval sowie: The , Cambridge 1982,723-37, Barnes, History ofLater Philosophy Jonathan In derEinführung kommentierten , in:ibid.,S. 771-784. JustWar (S. CLXVII)zu seiner derPolitik nicht , Paris21968)listet zweisprachigen (Aristote, Ausgabe Politique JeanAubonnet als 21 Neueditionen undÜbersetzungen derPolitik zwischen 1498und1608auf weniger auchdie Sepúlvedas von 1548).Von Interesse darinisthierinsbesondere die (darunter vonErasmus dermitihmin regem (Basel1531),die auchaufSepúlveda, mitbesorgte Austausch vonBedeutung ist. stand, gewesen

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von 1495 ins Feld ment, das Kolumbus für seine Versklavungsaktion führte:die (in seinen Augen) Vertragsbrüchigen Indios seien von ihm in einem gerechtenKriegszug- als solchergalt ihm seine karibischeStrafexpedition besiegtund somitrechtmäßigins EigentumseinesKriegsherrn, der SpanischenKrone, überführt worden.12Man vergleichezum ganzen Problemkreisals AusgangspunktAristoteles,Politik1055a5ff.,der diese These als eine communis seiner Zeit opinioder Versklavungsrechtfertigung zitiert.Aristotelesselbstist allerdingsder Auffassung, wirklichgerechtfer; eine Versklavungvon Unterworfenen tigtsei nur die Sklavereia natura habe also nur dann unumstößlichesRecht, wenn der gerechteKriegund darin bestehtja zum großen Teil seine Berechtigung gegen solche Menschen geführtwird,die ihrerniederenNatur nach schon nichtfrei sind und defacto schwachenKonstitution , v.a. ihrergeistig-seelisch wegen, - Was das Weiterleben ihrLeben nichtfreianlegenund bestimmen können.13 der Aristotelischen Politikim (akademischen)Gedankengutseit 1260, dem ihrer ins LateinischedurchWilhelmvon Moerbeke, Jahr (ersten) Übersetzung im so ist daß die servitus hierwesentlichchrisdich betrifft, übrigenauffallig, vor allem als Folge der Sünde, also nichtals ein natürlicher interpretiert Urzustand des Menschen oder von Menschengruppen,angesehenwird, sondernim Gegenteilals bittereKonsequenz des Sündenfalls(vgl. z.B. Thomas von Aquin, Sentenzenkommentar Was ander, II Sent. 44.1.3.C.O.).14 erseitsim 16. Jahrhundert unterNichtbeachtungdes Unterschiedsvon „Sklaven"(in der antikenund besondersin der Aristotelischen Vorstellung von 8oûÀ,oç) und „Unfreien"(wie sie etwa Thomas5Zeitgenossenals servi - aber auch als christlichverbrämtes im Auge gehabt haben dürften) 12Ähnliches vonMexiko: Von Versklavungen derIndiobei derEroberung passiert hörtmanindenQuellen erstnachdersog.„Noche durch dieSpanier Triste", bevölkerung in denAugenderSpanier verräterischen es zumeindeutig alsonachdem kriegerischen, danach(offenbar erstmals aufseinem war:Cortés Aufstand derMexicas gekommen beginnt zu versklaven undsiemiteinem„G" (fur„guerra", Eroberungszug) Besiegte Eingeborene zu machen: zu brandmarken, umdenGrund fürihreVersklavung offenkundig Vgl. Krieg) Hernán Mexico21990,S. 276(mitdenentsprechenden Cortés, QuellenJoséLuisMartínez, angaben). 13Die ZitateausderAristotelischen entnommen derdeutschen Politik sindimfolgenden Werke Bd.9, hg.vonHellmut in:Aristoteles, vonEckart Flashar, Schütrumpf, Übersetzung Darmstadt 1991. 14ZurInterpretation zum Ihema scholastischer dieserundanderer ¡Stellungnahmen istFlüelers zumscholastischen sowiegenerell (1992,s.o.,Anm. Einführung servitus-Rtgàïï Diskussion derSklaverei zuThomas undseiner aufschlußreich; 10),S. 35-85äußerst speziell S. 27)von istdieEinleitung in Aufnahme vonAristoteles undAbgrenzung (insbesondere Politik derAristotelischen FranzSchwarz zu seiner 1989)intere(Stuttgart Übersetzung in derScholastik undihrer AbrißzurPo/zM-Kommentierung sant;fureinenkurzen „genuineoriginality" vgl.z.B.JeanDubabin1982(s.o.,Anm.11).

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ARISTOTELESREZEPTION 247 UNDDIE POLITISCHE SEPÚLVEDA fiirdie Versklavungder Indios nach antikemMusterumgedeutet Argument werdenkonnte,wo sie als gerechteKonsequenz fürder Sünden der Versder Sklavennehmer nichtals Konsequenzder sündhaften klavten, Korruption Lebenswandelverausgelegtwurde: Ihr Heidentumund ihr schuldhafter langten geradezu nach Versklavung,die dann sozusagen nur noch als ein rechtlicherVollzug sichtbaresRealsymbol für ihre Schuldhaftigkeit auf diesen Gedanken ihres moralischenZustands sein würde. Man trifft der Verbindungvon Sklavereiund bellum justumbei Sepúlveda: „Aufgrund [des Rechts, C.S.], das auf der Hand liegt und auf dem Völkerrecht genausowie aufdem der Naturberuht,und dessensichauch die trefflichsten Menschenim allgemeinenbedienen,daß diejenigen,die in einemgerechten worden sind, ebenso wie ihre Habe, den Siegernund Krieg unterworfen Erobererngehören;so entstandnämlichursprünglich die Sklaverei";15 und zur Frage der Gerechtigkeitdieses Krieges: „Wollen wir also wirklich daß diese so unzivilisierten, so barbarischen, so schändlichen daran zweifeln, und von allen möglichenSchurkereienund sündhaftenReligionsübungen durchsetztenVölker mit vollem Recht von einem trefflichen, frommen und so äußerst gerechtenKönig, wie es Ferdinand war und jetzt der Kaiser Karl ist, und von einer zivilisierten und an allen nur denkbaren wurTugenden hervorragendenNation zur Beherrschungunterworfen den?" (S. 112);16oder: „Was also konntediesenWilden besseresund heilsamerespassieren,als daß sie der Herrschaft würden, jener unterworfen durch deren Klugheit,Tüchtigkeitund Frömmigkeit sie von wilden und kaummenschlichen Wesen zu humanenund- soweites ihreVerstandeskraft zuläßt zivilisierten, und von Freveltäternzu sittsamenMenschen, von Dämonendienern zu Christenund zu Verehrerndes wahren gottlosen Gottesund der wahren Religion umgewandeltwerden?"(S. 132, lateinischer Text ausführlichin Anm. 49), u.ö. Währendder akademischeStreitum die angedeutetenPro- und ContraPositionenin der Schwebe war, mußte natürlichpolitischund jurisdiktionellmöglichstschnell und pragmatischgehandeltwerden. Man fand viafactieine (wie man dachte)vorläufigeLösung, die im wesentlichenaus 15Demócrates Alter Menendez , hg.vonMarcelino y PelayoundManuelGarcía-Pelayo, México1987[2. Nachdruck derEinzelerstauflage 1941],S. 158:„Ea [seil, lege]scilicet, etiambonicommuniter et est,qua homines utuntur, quaein promptu quaejuregentium naturae utquijustobellovietifuerint, ii etipsietipsorum bonavictorum fiant continetur, etcapientium; hincenimservitus civilis nataest." 16„Hasigitur tamincultas, tambarbaras, tamflagitiosas, etcunctis sceleribus et gentes dubitabimus ab optimo, contaminatas, impiis religionibus pio,justissimoque Rege,qualis etFerdinandus fuit etnuncestCarolus etab humanissima etomnivirtutum Caesar, genere natione in ditionem fuisse redactas?" praestante jureoptimo

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der spanischen„Leibeigenengesetzgebung" entwickelt wurde,und die als in die Kolonialgeschichteeinging:17 sogenanntesencomiendaSystemauch die Krone übertrug „encomendar",(einen Landstrichoder Sprengel)in - hierbei mittelbaroder unmittelbarden Kolonialherren commendavi dare verschiedenerGröße, die sie nahezu wie Vizekönige Verwaltungsgebiete und Auflagen)verwaltendurften. Voraussetzungen (jedochunterbestimmten Mit dieser Beauftragunggingen die Bewohner der verliehenenGebiete zwar nicht als Personen,wohl aber insofernes ihre Arbeitskraft betraf, über.18Diese Maßnahme, weitgehendin das Eigentumdes Administrators welche die (übrigensmeistensnicht an die Scholle gebundenen)Indios rechtlichnichtihrerpersönlichenFreiheit,sondernihrerArbeitsautonomie beraubte,war zunächstoffenbarnur als eine ArtZwischenlösunggedacht; doch bewahrheitetesich auch an ihr beeindruckendeine ernüchternde Einsichtaus dem täglichenLeben: Nichtshält so lange wie ein Proviso- Das rium. der (im Laufe der Zeit freilich ständigmodifizierten Fronsystem und neu durchdachten)19 encomienda überdauertefaktischdie spanische Kolonialzeitin Lateinamerika. In den Intellektuellenstreit um die Behandlungder neuentdeckten Völker eine Amerikasmischtesich in den vierzigerJahrendes 16. Jahrhunderts Stimme von einigem wissenschaftlichenRenommee und politischem 17Das encomiendainseinen stammt ausdemspanischen 12.Jahrhundert: Anfangen System wurden kürzlich den Muslimen entrissene Grenzgebiete kriegserprobten Ursprünglich derReconquista zurVerwaltung umdieVerteidigungslinie christlichen Adligen übertragen, Landstriche voranzutreiben. Zu Geschichte und unddieRekatholisierung dieser zu festigen derencomienda Grundgedanken vgl.auchH. Kamen1986(s.o.,Anm.4),S. 79ff. 18EineHandhabe, aberkonvenienterweise aufVorläufer auchin die sichgroßenteils und derInkasundAzteken stützen undberufen denindianischen Großreichen konnte, hatte erschien: Auchindenpräkolumbinischen wohlauchdeswegen alsgeeignet Imperien - meist - mutatis zur seiner Arbeitskraft derLandarbeiter mutandis etwaeinDrittel jährlichen erdenRestderZeitzurstaatlichen zurVerfugung, während Abgabe eigenen Nutznießung aufmerksam: macht aufdiesen Brauch beidenAzteken mußte. aufwenden „Agri Sepúlveda muneutunaparsessetattributa enimetprae dia,sicerantdistributa, Regi,altera publicis etpúblicos tertia ad singulorum ususseditautiidemregios ribusac sacrificiis, agroscol- Einkurzes, derÜberabervielsagendes Textdokument Alter erent" , S. 110). {Demócrates imübrigen 1970 von1544reproduziert encomienda einermexikanischen Simpson tragung (s.o.,Anm.2),S. 191. 19Zeitweilig des 16.Jahrhunderts wurdedie encomienda schonwährend sogarganz derspanischen Protests dejuré),mußteaberwegendeswütenden (zumindest abgeschafft - Kamen1986(s.o.,Anm.4), S. 85 istwahrscheinlich werden Siedler wieder zugelassen in nachseinerEinführung unmittelbar rechtdarinzu geben,daß das encomiendaSystem zu faktisch kaumvonSklavenhaltung 1503aufHispaniola) wohlzunächst Amerika (zuerst derDominikaner dieÖffentlichkeitsarbeit seit1510steuerte unterscheiden war;spätestens Krone(etwa1512die„Leyes derSpanischen Orden)sowiedieGesetzgebung (undanderer undMißbräuchen 1542die„Leyes de Burgos", Übergriffen Nuevas") jedochdenbrutalen verstärkt derKolonialherrn entgegen.

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SEPÚLVEDA UNDDIE POLITISCHE ARISTOTELESREZEPTION 249 Gewicht:die des HumanistenJuan Ginés de Sepúlveda (1490-1573).20Er selbstschreibt: Dahermeinte ichüberdieseDingemitnachdachte, in ich,alsmir,während einiges denSinnkam,wodurch die Debatte, wiees schien, daß werden könnte, beigelegt undernsthaftester ich,bei derart großen Meinungsverschiedenheiten hochgelehrter Männer übersolchbedeutende in Dinge,nichtin eineröffentlichen Angelegenheit, dersichso vieleumtun, seindürfe, oderschweigen, wo sichschonso viele untätig zu Wortgemeldet haben.ZumalichvonSeiten Männer vongroßem hochrangiger Einfluß ichsollemeineAnsichten schriftlich ummein wurde, aufgefordert darlegen, Urteilkundzutun, demsie,als iches in wenigen Worten früher einmalmündlich offenbar hatten.21 aussprach, zugestimmt Nach wissenschaftlicher seinenvielgelobten AristotelesTätigkeit(insbesondere an der Mediceischen von „Akademie" übersetzungen)22 Careggiund unter dem Medici-PapstClemensVII. war Sepúlveda nach dem Sacco di Roma offizieller Hofchronistder SpanischenKrone und zum „Praeceptor"des Erbprinzen,des nachmaligenKönigs PhilippII., geworden. In diese Zeit seineshöchstengeistigenwie politischenEinflussesfalltSepúlvedasWortmeldungzur Indiofrage. Diese Wortmeldung nahm Gestaltin Formeinesphilosophischen Dialogs den etwa um das Jahr 1543 verfaßthaben dürfte,und an,23 Sepúlveda 20Das Geburtsjahr hatAngelLosadawohleinigermaßen sicher errechnet de (JuanGinés dasTodesdatum hältderGrabstein fest(a.a.O.,TafelII). , Madrid1973,S. 14f.), Sepúlveda GeburtsundSterbeort istPozoblanco inAndalusien. ZurBiographie istzusamSepúlvedas menfassend außerdem nochinteressant: VenancioCarro,La teología y losteólogos-juristas antela conquista deAmérica , Bd. II, Madrid1944,S. 324ff. españoles 21PrologzumDemócrates Alter eruditissimorum et gravissimo, S. 43f.:„In tantaigitur rumvirorum de rebusmaximis cumquaedam mihihisde rebuscommentanti dissensione, in mentem dirimi nonexistimavi in publico venisset, quibuscontroversia possevideretur, tammultis mihiessecessandum, autloquentibus negotio tacendum; occupatis praesertim cumessema magnis auctoritate virisadmonitus, ut scripto magnaque quidmihijudicii essetexponerem, ut meamsententiam, antedicta quama mepaucisverbis (sic)probare declararem". Von denjenigen, die Sepúlveda zurschriftlichen videbantur, Niederlegung seiner Thesenbewogen istzumindest daßderErzbischof vonSevilladazu haben, bekannt, Venancio Garro1944(s.o.,Anm.20),S. 326. gehörte: Vgl. 22ImVorwort zurersten seiner Druckauflage (1548)weist P<Ä'Ä;-Übersetzung Sepúlveda selbst darauf nochnichtangemessen insLateinische übertrahin,daß dieSchrift bislang sei.Seinelateinischen imübrigen nachwie genworden Aristoteles-Übersetzungen gelten vorals diemitunter besten: 1995(s.o.,Anm.3), S. 190;ähnlich Vgl.A.-E.Pérez-Luño Introducción a la Política deAristóteles derPolitik , in seiner J.Marías, , zweisprachigen Ausgabe Madrid1951,S. LXV; vgl.auchdieTextbelege überdieRezensionen des 17.und18. dieLosada1973(s.o.,Anm.20),S. 282f.reproduziert. Jahrhunderts, 23Vgl.denProlog zumDemócrates Alter , S. 46: „Itaquelibenter feci,utmoreSocratico, et Augustinus multis in locistenuerunt, in dialogo quemnoster Hieronymus quaestionem etjustassuscipiendi causasin universum, belligerendi rationem persequerer, rectamque et aliasquaestiunculas necproposito et ad cognoscendum alienas, complecterer, perutiles obiter explicarem."

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sivede corwenientiae Alterbetitelte.24 Einen Demócrates den er Demócrates {Primus) über cum Christiana militaris Religione Dialogus allgemeine Fragen disciplina# des gerechtenKrieges hatte er bereitsvorher geschriebenund herausalterSive dejustis bellicausisapud indios gegeben gehabt. Der Demócrates nimmtdas Thema des erstenDemócrates auf, wendet es jedoch spezifisch in der Neuen Welt an. Die Schrift auf die spanischeEroberungspolitik zwischenzwei fiktivenCharakteren,einem entwickeltein Streitgespräch DeutschennamensLeopold, der durchseine skeptischen Anfragenan die spanischeConquista-Politikdas Gespräch in Gang bringtund stetsneu Geist getraanfacht,und einem gebildetenund ganz von Aristotelischem in dessen und Lehren namens Gelehrten Demokrates, Argumenten genen zum Thema man wohl uneingeschränkt SepúlvedaseigeneMeinungerkenvon Valladolidverteidigt nen darf(auch im GroßenStreitgespräch Sepúlveda die Thesen des Demokratesals seine eigenen). im Dialog weist auf drei autoriDer Hauptstrangder Argumentation tativeQuellen hin, auf die sich Sepúlvedas Gesamtthesestützt:25 des AltenTestaments, (1) Die Bibel, insbesonderedie Geschichtsbücher derenErzählungvon der Landnahmeund ExpansionIsraelsdeutlichmacht, den Krieg,unterUmständenauch den Versklavungsdaß die HeiligeSchrift Gottes des Volkes gegen andere Völker gutheißenkann.26 krieg, und unterihneninsbesondereAugustinus,dessen (2) Die Kirchenväter, Schriftenbeweisen, daß militärischeUnternehmenwie die Bestrafung Ungläubigerdurch Christen,oder unterUmständensogar ein religiöser des chrisdich-römischen Imperiumsgegen Heidenvölker, Expansionskrieg Lehre nichtwidersprechenmüssen.27 der christlichen 24Die eigentümliche im derDemocrates-Alter-Manuskripte undschwierige Textgeschichte vorEndedes19.Jahrhunderts daßderDialognicht istdafür 16.Jahrhundert verantwortlich, de la Real Menéndez wurde imDruckediert erstmals y Pelayoim:Boletín (vonMarcelino mit dieseErstausgabe 1941wurde BandXXI [1892],S. 260ff). de la Historia, Academia Alter desDemócrates inMexiko alsersteEinzelveröffentlichung pubÜbersetzung spanischer Seitenverweisen liziert (aufdenlateini(vgl.oben,Anm.15);sieliegtdenTextauszügen, wie Arbeit dervorliegenden schenText)unddeutschen genauso zugrunde, Übersetzungen lateinidemziterten undAusarbeitung) Lesarten Bedenken teilweisen gegenüber (beietilen hataußerdem insSpanische schenTextselbst.EineneuereEditionundÜbersetzung Nahean LosadasVorgaben A. Losada,Madrid1951(Nachdruck bewegt 1984)vorgelegt. Coroleu durchAlejandro derSchrift sichauchdie neueste AusgabeundÜbersetzung III, Pozoblanco 1997. Obras Completas Liegetin:JuanGinésde Sepúlveda, 25EinerechtguteZusammenfassung läßtsichu.a. bei V. Carro dieserGesamtthese nachlesen. 1944(s.o.,Anm.20),S. 344ff., 26Vgl.z.B.Demócrates u.ö. S. 166ff. S. 114-20, Alter, 27So z.B.imDemócrates Alter , S. 52,S. 94 u.ö.

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ARISTOTELESREZEPTION 251 UNDDIE POLITISCHE SEPÚLVEDA dessenpolitischeSchriften lehren,daß die Unterwerfung, (3) Aristoteles, Beherrschungund Versklavungvon Barbaren durch höherentwickelte Menschen ein Gebot der Natur ist und sogar als einzig natürlicherWeg der Koexistenzvon Besserenund Schlechterenein ethischesErfordernis darstellt.28 Von diesen drei Säulen, auf denen Sepúlvedas These von der einund Dienstbarmachungder wandfreienBerechtigungauf Unterwerfung VölkerAmerikasruht,möchteich im folgendenallein die dritteund funin der Hoffnung, damentalstebehandeln,die mitAristoteles argumentiert, daß sie sich isoliertvon den anderen beiden einigermaßeneinleuchtend darstellenläßt. Denn auch darin folgtSepúlveda Aristotelesaufs Wort, daß er zwar den gerechtenKrieg als Argumentfür die Unterwerfung und VersklavungfremderVölker (worum es ja in den Argumenten(1) und (2) geht)kenntund gutheißt,dessenBerechtigung allerdingsnochmals sehen will,und diese durcheine naturrechtliche Absicherunggrundgelegt bildet erst die Tatsache der natürlichenUnterlegenheiteinigerVölker gegenüberanderen,die von der Natur zum Führen bestelltsind. Sklaverei II. Die Thesevondernatürlichen Sepúlveda hat sicherlichrecht damit, daß die traditionelledominikanivordie im Spanien des 16. Jahrhunderts sche Aristotelesinterpretation, herrschendwar, den antikenPhilosophenscholastischverbog und (teils Er selbstdagegenwollte,wie er es ausumdeutete.29 gewaltsam)christlich 28Wasinderpolitischen Vorläufer zu habenscheint: sokeine derScholastik Philosophie indiesem ZusamdortTheorien desbellum Zwarwurden und,wiegesehen, justum gewälzt diskutiert. Daß aber vonKriegsgefangenen derservitus auchdieRechtfertigung menhang voneinem ernstzunehmenden vonbestimmten dienatürliche Menschengruppen Unterlegenheit istbisdahineigentlich zurBerechtigung desbellum christlichen Autor wird, justum herangezogen bis dergerechten die Einzelfragen Die scholastischen unerhört. Theorien, Kriegsführung verob einKriegdannseineBerechtigung inVerästelungen wiedemProblem verfolgten, habendasAristotelische zu Kampfhandlungen wennes auchan Feiertagen kommt, liert, inihren Diskussionen nieernstlich dernatürlichen servitus (soverherangezogen Argument von TheJustWar(1982;s.o.,Anm.11),in seiner liert Barnes'Beitrag Analyse Jonathan eines Parameter meritum undcausaals derscholastischen conditio, intentio, auctoritas, affectus, indiesem keinWortüberirgendeine Sinne). signifikante Stellungnahme Krieges gerechten - unddarüber imklaren Anm.37)- mit ister sichoffenbar (vgl.unten, bringt Sepúlveda desAristotelischen vondernatürlichen Direktübernahme seiner Arguments ungeschönten im wesentlichen neuen des christlichen bellum Sklaverei einenfürdie Tradition justum insSpiel. Deutungsversuch 29Zweiderbedeutendsten im 16. dominikanischen GegnerderIndianerversklavung derbereits erwähnte Francisco de VitoriaundDomingode Soto,interJahrhundert,

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Brüche dem Aristotelesfolgen,um drückte,ganz und ohne interpretative anhand der reinen Aristotelischen Lehre zu zeigen, dann erstanschließend daß diese überkulturelleGültigkeit auch für Christen beanspruchen könne.30Also anhand der Lehre desjenigenPhilosophen,„den die hervorragendstenPhilosophen und Theologen als Meister in Fragen der und überhauptauch aller anderensittlichen Tugendensowie Gerechtigkeit als scharfsinnigsten Ausleger der Natur und der natürlichenGesetze Alter anführen"{Demócrates , S. 152) eine allgemeingültige Beantwortung der virulentenFragen seinerZeit zu entwickeln: nicht Ich willdamitzu verstehen geben,daß maneinUrteilüberdas Naturrecht auchbei undEvangelientexten suchen sondern alleinin christlichen Denkern darf, dieinbester undscharfsinnigster WeiseüberdieNatur denheidnischen Philosophen, sowieüberdieSitten undallemöglichen staatsderDingeÜberlegungen angestellt VorallemaberbeiAristoteles, dessen haben. theoretischen gehandelt Angelegenheiten vonseiner undungeteilter Zustimmung Einhelligkeit Vorgaben [. . .] mitsolcher alsWorte dieseseinzeldaßsiejetztschonweniger Nachwelt wurden, aufgenommen anGrundalsGemeingut undLehrsätzen alsvielmehr allenGelehrten nenPhilosophen, Alter schlechthin , S. 66f.).31 (Demócrates gelten

vorbeiundwollan derantiken Aristoteles etwastracks Sklavenhaltungspraxis pretierten undnicht einereinfachen nichtmehrals nurdie natürliche tenoffenbar Grundlegung imersten BuchderPolitik ausdemArgumentationsgang Dienstschaft eindeutig spezifizierten zudeSotosAristoteleserkennen sowie, speziell (vgl.PérezLuño1995(s.o.,Anm.3),S. 192f., 1997(s.o.,Anm.6),S. 44). Beuchot Interpretation, 30So in derEinfuhrung an sichselbst etregis alsAnspruch zu De regno formuliert; officio Rückkehr zum beiPérezLuño1995(s.o.,Anm.3),S. 195.Zu Sepúlvedas zitiert strategischer Indians 1959 Aristotle andthe American LewisHanke, Aristoteles" , London „wahren vgl.zudem - , S. 3Iff. zurFragederspanischen nachwievoreinStandardwerk Eroberungsphilosophie außerdem nochdas (wohlauchals Spitzegegendie ImDemócrates machtSepúlveda Alter Arisalstreuer vonAquinmüsse auchThomas Zugeständnis, Dominikanerpartei gedachte) S. 152: was die Sklavenfrage aufseinerSeitestehen, betrifft, notwendig totelesausleger moranonsolum citasti auctorem Aristotelem, quoutaliarum cujussententiae „[Leopold:] naturalium etnaturae sicjustitiae liumvirtutum, interprete sagacissimo legumque magistro Thomam scholasticorum sedetiam Divum etTheologi utuntur etPhilosophi [e]stantissimi; prae naturae inexplicandis ete[/ae]mulum facile legiejusenarratorem Theologorum principem, - WiesehrSepúlveda declaraveras." etab aeterna essedivinas bus,quasomnes legemanare haben ThesenmitdenendesAristoteles seiner an dieDeckungsgleichheit geglaubt eigenen de Aristóteles wie„aquellasententia mía",die er muß,zeigenWendungen y declaración verwendet Notiz,dieLosada1973(s.o.,Anm.20),S. 286 (hierin einerhandschriftlichen reoroduzierť). 31„Nempe solumetscriptis nona christianis utintelligatur judicium legumnaturalium etsagacissime esse,sedetiamab iisphilosophis putantur quioptime Evangelicis petendum abArisratione rerum ac demoribus denatura dissentisse, praesertim dequeomnireipublicae utjam sunta posteritate etapprobatione consensu recepta totele, [. . .] tanto cujuspraecepta videantur." esse ac decreta sententiae communes sed nonunius voces, sapientium philosophi

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SEPÚLVEDA UNDDIE POLITISCHE ARISTOTELESREZEPTION 253 - auch im Urteilder modernen Das gelangihm tatsächlich Forschung32 gemessenan seinem Vorhaben und im Vergleichmit dem zeitgenössischen Aristotelismus erstaunlichakkurat,und zwar unteranderem seiner Arbeitstechnik Aristoteles nicht;zwischen wegen: Sepúlveda kommentierte der und stehen Passagen Bibelexegese Kirchenväter-Interpretation vielmehr im Demócrates Alterals Versatzstückeimmerwiederoftwörtlichübersetzte und durchnur wenigeErläuterungsbeispiele unterbrochene Textpassagen aus der Aristotelischen Politikund Nikomachischen Ethik.Diese Einschübe dienen Sepúlveda als philosophischeGrundlegungfürseine theologische und rechtstheoretische Diskussion.Inhaltlichunverdrehtund weitgehend wirdalso die antikeThese von der natürlichen Dominanz interpretationslos höherer Menschen und der ôo')taíoc oder servitus a naturader (púaei einiger Barbarenim Aristotelischen Wortlaut33 auf die politischeEinzelkonstellation der Unterwerfung der EingeborenenAmerikasdurch die Spanier Wortlautund als übertragenund mit Hinweis auf diesen Aristotelischen vetusopinioder klassischenPhilosophieals naturrechtlich sanktioniert angeführt. ZwischenNaturrecht und GottesRechtbestehtdabei keininhaltlicher was auch die inhaltliche der Aristotelischen Unterschied, Deckungsgleichheit 32Sh. u.a. beiPérezLuño1995(s.o.,Anm.3). Tatsächlich befindet sichja Sepúlveda als Humanist in einemzeittypischen dasVenancio Carro1944 Dilemma, gewissermaßen etwasbieder, aberinvielerlei Hinsicht durchaus nicht (s.o.,Anm.20),S. 329f., unrichtig zu charakterisieren hat:„Thomas versucht vonAquinundseineAnhänger folgendermaßen warenAristoteliker, unddergriechische verdiente solcheEhrbekundung auch Philosoph DochderAristotelismus derHumanisten hateinanderes Um es in gänzlich. Gepräge. zweiWorten zu sagen:Mankönnte wohlbehaupten, daß dieTheologen des 13.Jhdts., mitAlbertus Thomasan derSpitze, ihnchristianisiert haben, Magnusunddemheiligen während sichdieHumanisten mitihmzu Heidenmachten, wennauchnichtunbedingt alleimselben Maße.Die Renaissance warinderMehrheit derFälleundindenmeisten Nationen keineSchuleguterSittenoderchristlichen Im Gefolge der Gedankenguts. fürdiegriechischen undlateinischen Klassiker deraltenHeidenvölker verBegeisterung breitete sichmitdenPhilosophen eineüberdieStränge schlagende paganeGeisteshaltung, die überall etc.[Übers.C.S.] Vielleicht wardas auchdie Sichtweise der Einzughielt", Dominikaner hinsichtlich einer„aristotelischen" derethischen spanischen Konzeption in derConquista-Politik. Sh. dazuauchweiter untendie Bemerkungen zum Aufgaben letzten Abschnitt Scheitern". „Sepúlvedas 33Aristoteles' in derPolitik TheoriederSklaverei istunteranderem eineimplizite mitrivalisierenden antiken diejede ArtvonSklaverei als Theorien, Auseinandersetzung ansahen TheGreeks. A Portrait vómico lediglich begründet (vgl.z.B.PaulCartledge, ofSelfand Others AusdenScholien zurAristotelischen Rhetorik wissen , Oxford 1993,S. 12Iff.). wir, daß einerderKöpfedieservonAristoteles derGorgiasschüler und ungenannten Gegner berühmte Alkidamas war Scholien 1273b zurRhetorik „Stegreifredner" 18).Sepúlveda mag " des(. sichauchhierals getreuer Aristoteles derversucht, dienatürliche „aemulator sehen, derVersklavung demVorwurf anderer zu verteidigen, dieSklaverei Grundlage gegenüber seiausWillkür undnurvonwillkürlicher ohnenaturrechdiches geboren positiver Satzung, Fundament, getragen.

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Lehrenmitden biblischenausmacht:„Als Naturrecht definieren (ethischen) die Philosophenjenes, das überall die gleiche Bewegkraft hat, ob es uns so gefalltoder nicht.Die Theologen definierenmit anderenWortendasselbeso: Das Naturrechtist die Mitteilungdes ewigen Gesetzes an die Kreatur" [Demócrates Alter , S. 66; meine Kursiva).34Denn vernunftbegabte das fundamentalste Naturrecht,nach dem sich alle anderen iusnaturalistischenund positivenBestimmungenals dessen Ableitungenzu richten haben, sei, so sieht es Sepúlveda im Anschluß an Aristoteles,daß das Bessere über das Minderwertige herrsche.35 Insbesonderedie Argumenteaus dem fünften Kapitel des erstenBuchs der Potiti#6 sindes, die sichSepúlvedahierbeifürseineneigenenBeweisgang zu eigen macht. Sepúlveda betontin diesem Zusammenhangausdrücklich, daß es genau diese Argumenteseien, die bislang in der Diskussion um die Rechtmäßigkeit der Versklavungneuentdeckter Völkerunbeachtet eine bedauerliche geblieben waren, philosophische Lücke, die seine in dieser schließen wolle und damitrechtfertige:37 Wortmeldung Streitfrage 34„Legemnaturalem earnessedefiniunt, vim, philosophi quaeubiquehabeteamdem in hunc nonquia sic placuitaut secus.Theologialiisverbissed eodempertinentibus modum: Lexnaturalis estparticipado in creatura rationis legisaeternae compote." 35Vgl.Politik es deranderen fehlt nämlich daß 1255a19:„Demgegenüber Auffassung, dasan hohermenschlicher nicht oderdespotisch herrschen Qualität Überlegene gebieten anjeglicher In 1254a31f. warbereits Stütze wieÜberzeugungskraft". wordürfe, festgestellt den:„Inallen[natürlichen undeinbeherrschter C.S.]wirdeinherrschender Ordnungen, Teilsichtbar, undes istdieuniversalie vonderherdieses(Ordnungsprinzip) den Natur, Lebewesen innewohnt sowiein bl4ff.: áTcaafjç (pÚGecoç èvumpxei toîçé|x'|/t>xoiç)"; (èiexfjç istimVerhältnis derGeschlechter dasMännliche vonNaturausdasBessere, das „Ferner - Vgl. dasandere wirdbeherrscht". Weibliche dasGeringerwertige, unddaseineherrscht, bei Sepúlveda, Demócrates Alter enimalioquejurepaterimperat aliter , S. 82: „aliter filiis, viruxori, aliterdominus alitercivibus aliterrexpopulis servis, magistratus, atquemortalibusqui suntipsiusimperio cumsintdiversa, cumrecta tarnen subjecti, quaeimperia ratione omnianituntur varioquidem, sedprofecto, utdocent viri constant, jurenaturae; virab unoprincipio etinstituto utperfecta fortia debilibus, naturali, sapientes imperfectis, ac dominentur. utin tutepraestantia dissimilibus imperent Quodestusqueadeonaturale, alterum cunctis sivecontinuis, sivedivisis consistant, rebus, quodpotius quaeex pluribus utphilosophi um scilicet alterum essevideamus declarant", est,tenere subjectum impérium, nureinBeispiel anzuführen. 36Nurdiesewerden Demócrates nochzahlreiche hiererläutert; daneben hatSepúlvedas unddemfünund-zitate vorallemausdemzweiten weitere Aristotelesthesen aufzuweisen, soll. weiter werden ftenBuchderMkomachischen Ethik , washierabernicht verfolgt 37Sepúlveda des Dialogsäußern,diese läßtden Stichwortgeber Leopoldwährend under findesie merkwürdig. Thesenhabeer bishernochnie gehört philosophischen müßten sie antwortet seiensie wohl,abereigentlich Demokrates souverän, denkwürdig Alter einem Gebildeten bekannt sein,Demócrates , S. 80: jedenphilosophisch etpraeter hominum L.- Miranda narras, Demócrates, receptam opinionem. a liminesalutarunt: D.- Mirandafortasse, sed iis qui Philosophiam itaquete magis

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SEPÚLVEDA UNDDIE POLITISCHE ARISTOTELESREZEPTION 255 Als Beispielkann hier der Katalog vergleichbarer naturgemäßerDominanzen herangezogenwerden,den Sepúlvedavon Aristoteles zur Festigung seinerLehre von der natürlichenSklavereiübernimmt(im Demócrates Alter insbesondereS. 80ff.).Diese nämlichsei gleichsamein politischesAbbild und eine gesellschaftliche Konsequenz des natürlichenBeherrschtwerdens und der natürlichenInbesitznahmeder Körpers durch die Seele, [Politik 1254a34-b9),der Tiere durch den Menschen (b10-20),etc. Ein wichtiges linkder Argumentationskette, insofernsie die Versklavungsfrage missing der Barbarenvölkerbetrifft, stelltdabei die PolitikStelle 1253a29 dar: Außerhalb des Poliswesens (also vornehmlichbei den Barbaren), so Aristoteleshier, sei man entwederein Gott (das heißt wohl: ein unumschränkter, ungebundenerTyrann) oder ein Tier. - Es handelt sich also um die von Aristotelesals Herrschaftsformen, die durch solchegekennzeichnet Inbesitznahme des Beherrschten werden, durch das HerrschendeZustandekommen, und die auf das ontologische Grundprinzipder Unterordnungdes Geringerenunterdas Höherwertige sind (a.a.O.).38Die Artder so begründetenHerrschaftsausübung rückläufig in der Aristotelischen ist, Definition,die despotische(SearcoTiiai ap%r|1254b in sie hat ihren klassischen Ausdruck der des 5); Unterordnung Sklaven unterseinen Herrn. So 1255b18: „Denn politischeHerrschaftwird über von Natur Freie ausgeübt, despotischeaber über diejenigen,die (von Natur) Sklaven sind". Auffälligist bei Sepúlveda aber die Erweiterungder Beispielliste,die man bei Aristoteles findet:Währenddiese in 1254a34 mitder Leib-SeeleDichotomiebeginnt,setztbei Sepúlveda diese anthropologische Differeneinleitend mit der von Form und ein Materie zierung Unterscheidung die Form das die Materie das „Beherrschte"), „Beherrschende"ist, (wobei miror doctum hominem vetus etmaxime naturale decretum, philosophorum dogmanovum esseputare. - ZumGanzenvgl.auchdieeinschlägigen beiPérezLuño1995(s.o., Bemerkungen Anm.3). S.196. 38Vgl.dazuSchütrumpfs Kommentar 1991,s.o.,Anm.13),S. 249:„Die (Schütrumpf fürdespotische Herrschaft deruniversalen ein Natur, Rahmenbedingung [. . .] entstammt Aufschlußreich istfürdiesen dieParallelisierung ontologisches Argument". Zusammenhang in 1254b13f:,,xòappevrcpòç xò0fjÀ,u xònèvKpeíxxov xòÔexeípov, mi xò(lèvapxovxò (púaei - wennmandavonausgeht, Worausim Groben daß das rcpóç 0'àpxónevov". grammaoderdochzumindest dengesamten nurdasunmittelbar nächtisch, Satz,nicht sinngemäß, ststehende bestimmt Dominanzenstruktur Begriffspaar folgende spricht: Ebene: naturrechtl. Grundmuster: Bereich : Ökonom . Ebene: Beispielpolitischer Mann Besseres Herrscher Herr -►(b15-26) Frau Beherrschter Sklave Geringeres

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also mit einer Unterscheidung, die sich an diesersystematischen Stelle in der Politikdes Aristotelesnicht findet.Das mag zunächst verwundern, auch wenn es wohl nicht falschgedacht ist: Sepúlveda bringtmit der wohl tatsächlichdie unausgesprochene Aristotelische Hylemorphismuslehre I des aus Politik 5 auf einen Nenner: Grundlage Dominanzenapparats ex materia etformacompositis, Quoniamex rebusetiaminanimatis formaquiaperestpmestetquasidominatur, materia etquasiparetimperio' um dann subest, fectior erstfortzufahren: esse in animalibus multo etiam manifestius, quod , ajunt, quippe animamimpérium tenere et tamquam dominam esse et quasiservum , corpus subjectum Alter , S. 82). Doch warum begnügter sich nicht damit, die {Demócrates Aristotelischen Beispieleeinfachzu zitieren? Ich denke,daß die Antwort in einer Vorwegnahmeeines stillschweigenden Deutungspostulatsliegt, das SepúlvedasThese von der richtigen Zu- und Unterordnung von Neuer Der neu gefundeneKontinentist und AlterWelt allenthalbenbeherrscht: eine tabularasa, ein weißer Fleck und eine terraincognita nichtnur auf der - kulturelle sondern auch was seine zumindest Landkarte, Formungbetrifft. Er ist eine Art ungeformter Materie, die des Formprinzipsharrt,auf es verwiesenist und es nachgeradenötighat, um wirklichaus seinerbloßen zu werden. Eines Möglichkeit,in der er bislang schläft,herausgeführt in diesen wie es für Formprinzips, Sepúlvedas Augen weitgehendnoch terminus ad quemder Neuen Welt in ganz ausgezeichneter strukturlosen Weise die Spanierdarstellen.AufdieserBetrachtungsweise der Dinge baut Theorie des spanischenKulturauftrags Sepúlvedas gesamtenachfolgende und der Notwendigkeitseiner unbedingtenDurchsetzungauf.39Diese 39Es scheint, denfragwürdigen alswürde hierinseiner Schritt Sepúlveda Interpretation InWirklichkeit von„theoretischer" zu „praktischer" Philosophie unabgestützt gehen. jedoch verbindet er lediglich die Aussageaus der Form-Materie-Diskussion der ergänzend ausDe anima Aristotelischen 412ab,dieSeeleseidie Metaphysik (etwa1037a)undnatürlich Kadenzdernatürlichen und FormdesKörpers, mitderin Politik 1254abvorgefundenen derSeeleüberdas auszuübenden wovoneinediejenige Herrschaftsformen, naturgemäß als Perversion wird(.Politik derInverszustand dezidiert ist,während geächtet Körperliche desscholastischeint sichdabeidengängigen Materia-hehre 1254b Iff.). Vorgaben Sepúlvedas zu wollen. DiesemgiltdieMaterie nahtlos anschließen schenAristotelismus (insbesondere darauf als reinepassive diewesentlich die „materia ist,von angelegt Möglichkeit, prima") zu werden. Daß dieMaterie inWirklichkeit überfuhrt einem unddamit Agenten geformt invielen derFormist,läßtsichals Gedanke derVerwirklichungsoderBetätigungsraum finden. Solchermaßen Traditionen etwaauchimNeuplatonismus) (besonders philosophischen Materie Raumundinforme als tabula rasabegriffen {materia (v.a.„leerer") konvergieren auchbei einigen selbst derenIdentifikation Aristoteles hatte, eigentlich abgelehnt prima), vomWeltenraum v.a.auchin derAuffassung Aristoteleskommentatoren wieder. Übrigens imKommentar De caelo zu Aristoteles' , BuchI Kommentar 92-95) (wieetwabeiAverroes Erdeoder Urzustand. Geradedieseinforme undseinem formlosen terrarum undvomorbis

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SEPÚLVEDA UNDDIE POLITISCHE ARISTOTELESREZEPTION 257 auch, daß Sepúlvedakeineswegs Betrachtungsweise zeigtaber kurioserweise nur zum Nutzen der Spanier in der Amerikafrageargumentierenwill: Seinersolchermaßen„Aristotelischen" Konzeptionnach gewinntdie amorNeue Welt durch die erstein eigenes phe spanischeFormungsmaßnahme Sein im und Verein mit einer sie Form selbständiges durchdringenden erstmalseine eigene Dignität,wie es eben auch in der hylemorphistischen Sichtweiseder (bloßen) Materie geschieht. Starkherausgestellt istbei Sepúlveda außerdemdie teleologischeStütze, die Aristotelesseiner Lehre von der cpúaeiScxutaíagibt (1254b14-26): In Anbetrachtder Tatsache, daß einige Menschen von anderen so weit unterschiedensind (8i£OT&aiv: bl6) wie Seele und Körper, Mensch und etc. und ihrer Roheit sozusagen ganz als vernunftloser Tier, aufgrund und somit als ihrer natürlichen Beschaffenheit Körper wegen durch die Vernunft erscheinen,istes fürdiese Menschenvon unbeleitungsbedürftig streitbarem Vorteil,daß sie als Sklavendienen(eígicpúoei SovÀxn, oîç ßeXxiov ècmvapx£G0oci:1254bl9f.), ähnlich, wie es für den Körper vorteilhaft Seele in despotischenBeschlag genommenund ist,von der vernünftigen gegen seine eigenen Triebe und Inklinationengeführtzu werden.40Die Versklavung etwa im gerechtenKrieg istfürsolcheMenscheneigentlich nichtsweiterals der neue de-jure-Ausáruck einer seit von Geburt bestehenden úfe^/aťfo-Situation,41 denn Sklave wird man nicht,Sklave ist man eigentlichschon immer seiner rationalen oder seelischen Defizienzen wegen.42 Sepúlvedamachtim selbenSinneaufeine ähnlicheDifferenzierung Weltsteht somitals räumliche Extension fürdie formlose Materie. Das missing link , das informe Materie undformlose hierverbindet, unddaswohlauchSepúlveda Raumgröße undseineZeitgenossen inderfürsienochunstrukturierten geographischen Erstreckungsgröße der„Neuen Welt"unddemMateriebegriff dereigenen istdabeineben sahen, Philosophie derinformitas wohlv.a. in dergrundlegenden derExtension zu sehen,die Bestimmung kennzeichnet. beide,RaumwieMaterie, 40Daß diese in dieAristotelische werden Deutung vorwiegend Teleologie eingeordnet Erachtens So auchSchütrumpfs Kommentar muß,istmeines offenkundig. (s.o.,Anm.13), S. 249,zu Politik neben'vorteilhaft' dannwird I, Kapitel5: „Wenn'naturgemäß' steht, zumAusdruck daß die naturgemäße Herrschaft derErhaltung derBeteiligten gebracht, diesenthält einen dient, Aspekt". 41Vgl.nochmals teleologischen a.a.O.: „'VonNatur'Sklaveistauchderjenige, dernoch Schütrumpf in Freiheit werden lebt,'vonNatur'heißt:'derBestimmung nach',die nochaktualisiert muß[. . .1undmeint dieEinordnung in eineHierarchie". 42Miteinigen Vorbehalten demWerkundseiner Grundtendenz (diegenerell gegenüber möchte ichmichdarinimgroßen undganzenPaulCartlegdes bestehen) Interpretation außerdem a.a.O. S. 193-5 (1993,s.o. Anm.33),S. 125f.anschließen. Cartledge bringt eineausführliche neuere zurFragederSklaverei beiAristoteles, inderauch Bibliographie Stimmen ihrenPlatzfinden undinsbesondere auchdas Sklavenbild der „apologetische" Ethik Nikomachischen dasvondemderPolitik wird, berücksichtigt Abweichungen zeigensoll

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Währenddie Philosophendie Sklavereials einenangeborenen aufmerksam: Zustand erkennen,ist sie in juristischerHinsichtdas Resultateiner powie bei so wirdsowohlbei Aristoteles sitivenRechtssatzung;diese freilich, allein in der ontoschnellklar,hat ihre Rechtfertigung seinem aemulator logischen Grundlegungdes Sklaveseins,also in der „philosophischen" Definitiondes Sklaven: in ganzanderem Sinne vondenRechtsexperten [. . .] nurwirddasWortSklaverei einendem bezeichnen alsSklaverei alsvondenPhilosophen. Jenenämlich gebraucht oderVölkerdurch menschliche äußerlichen unddurch Menschen Gewalt, bürgerliches eineangeborene diePhilosophen recht Zustand, geistige hingegen zuwegegekommenen Alter Lebensweise undbarbarische undeineunmenschliche , {Demócrates Rückständigkeit S. 80f.).43 die Argumentation In mindestens einerHinsichtscheintSepúlvedaschließlich und empirischsichererdurchführen fürdie natürlicheSklavereistringenter zu könnenals der Stagiriteselbst:Gegen Ende des 5. Kapitels von Politik I (1254b27-39)fühltsichAristoteles gemüßigteinzuräumen,daß die natürliche Überlegenheiteiniger sowie das naturgemäßeSklavesein anderer nicht durchwegsan äußeren Merkmalen, auch nicht an körperlicher Höherentwicklungablesbar ist. Es gibt offenbarAusnahmen, und ein Thrakerkann in dieserHinsichteinem Griechendurchausüberlegensein: Aristotelesgibt zu, er könne bei diesem Argumentnur ut in pluribus Hier gilt sprechen.44Nicht so in Sepúlvedas Indio-Spanier-Dichotomie: als daß die und ohne GattungsEingeborenen Einschränkung, generell den höherentwickelten wie als Individualmerkmal europäischenEroberern auch in der physischenKonstitutionunterlegensind: sie sind durchwegs kleiner,kriegsuntauglicher, wenigerrobustund männlich,etc.45 zwischen Herr Freundschaft dermöglichen BuchzumProblem imsechsten (insbesondere in derantiken desSklaveseins Konstitution Zurnatürlichen undSklave). philosophischen undwehrhafte Thrakerìnnen Diskussion , Skythen vgl.danebenu.a. BalbinaBäbler,Fleissige interessanten 1998,v.a. S. 17-20mitzahlreichen bibliographischen Stuttgart/Leipzig des Aristoteles derTheorien Zu Piatons Weiterverweisen. (wohlauchzumVerständnis undontoSklaverei undihrekosmologische überdienaturgemäße Lehren bedeutsamen) vonGregory nochklassischen denimmer Beitrag vgl.insbesondere Fundamentierung logische 21981,S. 147-63. Studies inPlato's , Princeton , in:ders.,Platonic Vlastos, Thought 43„[..Slavery a diversa res tarnen servitutis quama philosophis jureperitis apellatione longe .] ac interet ab hominum illienimadventitiam vi,jurequegentium, declaratur; quamdam inhumanos ac insitam etmores tarditatem duma civili conditionem, Philosophi profectam servitutis barbaros nomine appellant." 44Vgl.zumProblem z.B. mitderAristotelischen Physiognomielehre) (inVerbindung Abrißderantiken 1993(s.o.,Anm.33),S. 125.Einenm.E.recht griechiguten Cardedge bietetBäbler1998(s.o., vonSklaven Konstitution derphysischen schenDarstellungen Befunds. desliterarischen ihreUntersuchung dabeiv.a.S. 20ff. Anm.42),interessant 45So imDemócrates hocestetiaminipsismagis Alter portento , S. 104f.: „quaeimmanitas

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SEPÚLVEDA UNDDIE POLITISCHE ARISTOTELESREZEPTION 259 Daß im übrigen die überlegenenMenschen gerade ihrer höherentwickeltenphysischenKonstitutionwegen nichtfür harte Arbeitgeeignet den Aristotelesund Sepúlveda dabei teilen. sind, ist ein Gesichtspunkt, Er geht,was SepúlvedasÄußerungenund Interessenlagebetrifft, offenbar einhermitdem Selbstverständnis der Conquistadoren,unterdenen augenscheinlichTendenzen bestanden,die Neue Welt zu erobern,nichtetwa um eigenesLand zur Bearbeitungzu bekommen,sonderngerade um keine körperlicheArbeitverrichtenzu müssen(es ist in diesem Zusammenhang auch vermutetworden,daß die jahrhundertelange Reconquistain Spanien das Bewußtseineiner Art Kriegerkasteherausgebildethaben könnte,die sich zum Erobern und Beherrschenvon neugewonnenemLand berufen und tauglichverstand,nichtaber zur Bearbeitungdes Landes).46 Das Fazit Sepúlvedas aus all dem ist schließlichdasselbe des Aristoteles: „Für einige gilt,daß sie von Natur [. . .] Sklaven sind, und fürdiese ist es vorteilhaft und gerecht(Síkocióv (cruiicpepei) èaxiv),als Sklavenzu dienen" [Politik1255a 1-3).47Für Sepúlveda bestehtdiese beiderseitsvorteilhafte der Versklavungvon Indios durch die Spanier darin, daß Gerechtigkeit durch diese wie der vernunftlose Seele jene Körper durchdie vernünftige zu einem Menschwerdungsprozeßgeführtwerden, der sie von bloßen homunculi zu vollgültigen Menschenund schließlichsogarzu gutenChristen absunt ab invicta humanis vescesimilis, quo longius Scytharum, qui et ipsiscorporibus cumsintadeoignaviet timidi utvixnostrorum hostilem ferre bantur, feritate, aspectum et saepeipsorum multamilliaperpaucis ne centum possint, Hispanis quidemnumerum cesserint muliebri undS. 106:„Cortesius autem ad hunemodům explentibus fugadissipati"; urbepotitus, hominum inertiam et ruditatem, utterrore tantopere contempsit ignaviam, nonsolum ei príncipes injecto coegerit Regemetsubjectos jugumetimpérium Hispanorum sedRegemipsum conscientiae inquadamejus Regisaeeipere, propter suspicionem patratae invincula etignavia necis, provincia quorumdam Hispanorum conjecerit, oppidanis stupore et nihilminus armisad Regemliberandum quiescentibus, quam sumptis conspirantibus", u.ö.- Sepúlveda bricht damitaucheineLanzegegeneineGrundthese seinesverhaßten LasCasas,derbehauptete, daßdieIndios, weilsiedurchschnittlich schwächGegners gerade licherseienals die Europäer, an derSklavenarbeit undalleinschon zugrunde gingen nicht zu solchharter Arbeit werden dürften. deswegen gezwungen 46Wasja auchdas äußereGrundthema desDonQuijote verist,einesim Landleben armten undzurArbeit offenbar , dersichaberzumKriegerleben psychisch untauglichen hidalgo seiner Vorfahren berufen fühlt undmiteinereigentümlichen ausRomantik und - FürMischung Frustration aufAbenteuersuche indieWelthinauszieht. (zeitweise geradezu groteske) zursozialen Situation undSelbsteinschätzung derspanischen Kolonisten zeitgenössische Belege in derNeuenWeltvgl.u.a. LewisHanke1959(s.o.,Anm.30),S. 13ff. 47Ohneweitere ohneweitere in derPolitik) korreBegründung (jedenfalls Begründung hierbeiAristoteles dieBegriffe und„gerecht", und spondieren „vorteilhaft", „naturgemäß" werden wiesalvaventate austauschbar verwendet: gewissermaßen vgl.dazudieBemerkungen beiE. Schütrumpf 1991(s.o.,Anm.13),S. 248f.

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war ja am Anfang,seitder päpstlichen macht.Der Missionierungsauftrag Bulle Interceteravon 1493, die Grundlage der kirchlichenZustimmung zur spanischenInbesitznahmeder Neuen Welt. Sepúlveda,dessenThesen sich trotzeinigerZugeständnisseund einigemBemühennichtgenerellmit Stuhlshinsichtlich und Forderungendes Apostolischen den Entscheidungen der Indiofragedecken(vgl.oben Anm. 7), siehtin der Christianisierung neben der religiösenVerpflichtungder Glaubenspredigt insbesondere auch die letzte Konsequenz und gewissermaßendas Endziel eines Kulder den Spaniern als (wie er sagt) zu seiner Zeit kulturell turauftrags, führendemVolk der alten Welt mit der Entdeckungder Neuen zugefallenist, und den sie nun annehmenmüssen. Für die Spanier dagegen Vorteilder Indioversliegtder (in SepúlvedasAugen übrigensgeringere!)48 leichter,vielverklavung darin, ihrer natürlichenFührungsdisposition in als zu können nachkommen sicherer und jeder anderen sprechender denkbarenForm von Herrschaftsausübung.49 - Es mag angesichtssolcherAussagen seltsamerscheinen,aber es ist in der Forschungteilweise(unterUmständen mit- allerdingsvielleicht doch delatorischer worden,daß Sepúlveda an eine Vehemenz)bestritten Indios der gedachthabe; vielmehrhabe er zwar regelrechteVersklavung Humanisten christlichen aber eines dezidierte, keineswegsunwürdigepragmatische Thesen zur Grundlegungeines Dienstverhältnisseszwischen Die servitus und Eingeborenengeäußert.50 Kolonialherrn , von der er spreche, 48Demócrates devictorum sedmulto Alter , S. 98: „[.. .] cumaliquavictricis majore gentis comhocestprofecto sowieS. 134:„quodipsis, barbarorum commoditate"; quamHispanis habetur". omniauroetargento ethumanitas, modius, virtus, pretiosior veraque religio quo 49NureinBelegbeispiel barbans S. 132f.:„quidpotuit vonvielenimDemócrates Alter, velmagissalutare istisvelcommodius, subjicerentur, imperio contingere, quamuteorum etproipsohumani etvixhominibus ex barbaris et religione virtute, quorum prudentia, ac veri servis Christiani et daemoniorum et flagitiosis rumcaptuciviles, probi,ex impiis cultores Dei veraeque efficerentur; ergo,et gravissimis [. . .] Agevero,et multis religionis ex causisistibarbari quodipsis, legenaturae; jubentur accipere impérium Hispanorum omni ethumanitas, hocestprofecto commodius, religio veraque quovirtus, quamHispanis armis habetur. auroetargento recusent, eritque cogipossunt, Itaquesiimpérium pretiosior auctoribus et Theologis et Philosophis ut supramaximis id bellum, declaravimus, lege naturae [. . .]". justum. 50Einigesolcher z.B. PérezLuño1995(s.o,Anm.3), S. 185f. zitiert Wortmeldungen des zurmexikanischen inseiner verweist AuchManuelGarciaPelayo Ausgabe Einfuhrung Stimmen Hinsicht in dieser auf Anm. Alter Demócrates s.o., apologetische 15) einige (1987, derAnsätze isthieraberv.a.ÁngelLosadasVerteidigung Sepúlvedas (S. 2f.).Zu nennen Alter desDemócrates zu seiner Vorwort etwaimumfänglichen undihrer , Ausgabe Wirkung, bei sindauchvorgeschlagen am negativen Madrid21984.Berichtigungen Sepúlvedabild de La utopía Mauricio Beuchot1997(s.o.,Anm.6), S. 55, BeatrizFernández Herrero, Humanismus Aristotelischer sowiebeiHorstPietschmann, America 1992,S. 224-35, , Barcelona Reinhard Ureinwohner unddieamerikanischen undInhumanität? , in: Wolfgang (Hg.), Sepúlveda undNeueWelt Humanismus 1987,S. 143-66. , Weinheim

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SEPÚLVEDA UNDDIE POLITISCHE ARISTOTELESREZEPTION 261 sei nichtmit der SklavereiantikenStils und ihrerRechtsauffassung vom servusals reinem Werkzeug,persönlichemBesitz und als res deckungsgleich noch eigentlichvergleichbar.51 solcherapologetischer Versuche Dagegen,das heißtgegendie Haltbarkeit in der Sepúlvedadeutung, scheintmirunteranderemfolgendeszu sprechen: Zwar schlägt Sepúlveda keine flächendeckendePauschalversklavung aller Völker der Neuen Welt vor, denn viele dieser Völker ließen sich auch ohne Zwangsmaßnahmenvon den Spaniernführenund zivilisieren, wären ihnen also ohnehin,auch ohne Sklaven zu sein, botmäßig.52 Auf die sich dem und diejenigenEingeborenenallerdings, Führungsanspruch der der Humanisierungsarbeit Spaniernichtöffnenoder sichihrgar entziehen zu vollständigenMenschen werden und wollen, die also nicht freiwillig somit ihr natürlichesléXoq nicht anstreben wollen, auf diese wendet die Aristotelische aus dem fünften Sepúlveda wortwörtlich Argumentation I deren Vordersatzdie Kapitel von Politik an, eine Argumentationskette, Definition bildet:„Wer von Naturaus nichtsichselbst,sondernals Mensch einem anderen gehört,der ist von Natur aus Sklave" (1254al4f.), und deren Conclusio die ebenzitiertePassage darstellt,daß es füreinige von Natur aus zuträglichsei, als Sklavenzu dienen (1255alff.).Auch die enge und mitunterpeinlich wortwörtliche Anlehnungan Aristotelesund der den antiken Wortlaut so wenigwie möglichdurch AnspruchSepúlvedas, 51Eine aus dervermeintlichen von Argumentation Doppeldeutigkeit " diesbezügliche imengeren servus Sinneodereinfach wertfrei ableiten zu wollen, „ („Sklave" „Diener") scheint mirhingegen undbei eingehender problematisch Betrachtung sogareherein vomservus alsSklaven stark imantiken Sinnzu sein: Argument ßirSepúlvedas Auffassung Zwarkannte dasMittellateinische dasWortsclavus sensu stricto zu bezeich, umdenSklaven nenundeinigeunsbekannte Autoren undAristoteleskommentatoren verwenden es auch so (vgl.Flüeler 1992(s.o.,Anm.10),S. 85);daßSepúlveda aufdieseeindeutige allerdings nichteingeht undservus sichaus seinenliterarischen schreibt, Begriffsverwendung ergibt Vorbildern undseinen humanistischen Ambitionen: Mittellatein kommt hiergarnicht erst in FrageundzurVerwendung, unddergesamte istbetont derklassischen Begriffsapparat antiken Literatur undangeglichen; heißtservus imDemócrates nachgebildet geradedeswegen Alter ähnlich wiebei denantiken Schriftstellern „Sklave", ganzbestimmt (voralleman Vorbild Ciceroistzu denken) im verwendet: Sepúlvedas großes sprachliches hauptanalog Sinneeiner res einem denpersönlichen Besitz eines , diegleich menschengestaltigen Werkzeug Herrndarstellt. In derGranDisputade Valladolid in derSepúlveda seine schließlich, DemócratesThesen istunmißverständlich von„esclavos" dieRede,nicht von„sierverteidigt, vos"o.ä.;vgl.zumganzenProblemfeld schließlich Hanke1959(s.o.,Anm.30),S. 58ff. 52Demócrates Alter , S. 166:„Itaquein hisbarbaris longealiacausaesteorum, qui Conductise Christianis in potestatem Namutde silio,auttimore atquefidem permiserunt. illorum liberiate etfortunis victor suojureac volúntate fuerit princeps potest quodvisum sichosin servitutem et bonisspoliare statuere, est,ne dicamimpium redigere injustum et nefarium. et vectigales haberelicetproipsorum videlicet Quos tamenstipendiaries natura etconditione".

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scholastische Traditionenoder Begriffsumbildungen verfälscht wiederzugeben, lassen daran zweifeln,daß Sepúlveda ausgerechnetfürden Zentralbegriff der servitus von der fürdie gesamteArgumentation Aristogrundlegenden telischenDefinitionder 8oDÄ,eiaabgewichensein sollte;um so mehr,als sie doch das prominenteste von Sepúlveda zitierteBeispiel einer Argumentationfürdie servitus a naturain der antikenGeschichtewar. Von besonderemInteressefürdie Frage dürfteaber auch Sepúlvedas Aufnahmeeines Argumentssein, das sich weiterführend im 7. Kapitel von PolitikBuch I (1255bIff.)findet,wo Aristotelesden Unterschiedvon politischerHerrschaft gegenüberdespotischerfestsetzt: jene sei von Freien über freieGleiche, diese von Herren über unfreieSklaven.Diese Unterscheidungwird anschließendmit der zwischen Staatslenkung(tcoàitucti Kal ïccûváp%r|)und Haushaltsverwaltung é^£D0épG)v (oÍkovo|xikt| |iovccp%ía) parallelisiert:Auch hier wird nur auf politischerEbene ein Verhältnis unterGleichen und Freien definiert, auf „ökonomischer"hingegenauch die despotischeHerrschaftverschiedenenGrades eines einzelnen(durch natürlicheGegebenheitendafürbestellten) über Sklaven,Tiere und anderes Hab und Gut. Verblüffend ist die zeitweisegeradezu naive Paraphrase, in der Sepúlveda dieses Aristotelische Schulstückin seine eigene Argumentationaufnimmt.53 Zwar differenziert er Aristoteles' Herrschaftsschema und argumentiert stärkerzugunstender Monarchieals der Stagirite,doch denktSepúlveda offenbargar nichtdaran, einen Unterschiedzu machen zwischenden antikensozialen Grundmustern, die Aristotelesvor Augen 53Demócrates S. 17Off. : „Naminhomines humanos etintelligentes Alter, probos, impérium civileconvenit, hominibus accomodatum imiest,velregium quodliberis quodpaternum in barbaros et parumhabentes et humanitatis, herile[„herilis" ist tantur, sol[l]ertiae desAristotelischen Sepúlvedas Übersetzung „despotisch"; C.S.].ItaquenonmodoPhilosophi sedetiamprestantissimi nondubitant essenationes in quas affirmare Theologi quasdam herileimpérium autcivileconveniat ratione accidere magisquamregium quodduplici velquiasuntnatura aut docent, servi, [...], velquiamorům qualesprovenire pravitate, aliacausanonaliter in officio in his nunccongruit contineri; possunt quorum utrumque nondum benepacatis barbaris. interest inter natura liberos etnatura serQuantum igitur interesse debetinter radones etbarbaris istisimperandi vos,tantum Hispanis legenaturae, inalteros herile. Estautem convenit, quippeinalteros regium impérium regium impérium, namdomesticam utPhilosophi simillimum administratìoni administradocent, domestiche, domus essetradunt; administrationem domestionem, regnum vicissimque regnum quoddam in magnadomofiliisintet servi ticamcivitatis, etgentis autplurium. Cumigitur unius, seu manicipia, et utrisque ministri conditiones et omnibus liberae, interjectis justuset nontarnen unomodo,sed cujuscumque ordinis condihumanus paterfamilias imperet, etjustorege,quivelit, utdebet, talempatremfamilias imitione:Hispanos egoab optimo istostamquam essedico;barbaros sed tari,paterno ministros, propeimperio gubernandos exherili etproipsorum ettemporis etpaterno liberos, regendos, quodam temperato imperio conditione tractandos."

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SEPÚLVEDA UNDDIE POLITISCHE ARISTOTELESREZEPTION 263 des 16. hatte,und den sozialen Gegebenheitenoder familiärenStrukturen Hier sindpaterfamilias, , minister , etc. generellwie Jahrhunderts. filius,servus bei Aristoteles,bestenfallswie in der antiken römischenHausordnung In dieserBeschreibungder Haushaltsstruktur und gebraucht.54 vorgestellt findetsich dann auch der Unterschiedvon serviund Bedienstetenfreien 55 Standes {ministri conditionis liber ae), wobei erstereeindeutigals manicipia bezeichnetwerden.Es dürftehierkeinWeg an der Annahmevorbeiführen, daß Sepúlveda an die antike oder an eine der antiken vergleichbare des Sklaven,zumindestdes Haussklaven,aber eben des Sklaven Bestimmung als einesMenschenim persönlichen BesitzeinesanderenMenschengedacht und sie auf die Indiofrageübertragenhat. Herausgearbeitet hatteer diesen der Sklaverei aber anhand der Aristotelischen von der qyuaei These Begriff SoaAeía, und so scheintes auf der Hand zu liegen,daß Sepúlveda tatsächlichdie Lehrevon der natürlichen Sklaverei(im antikenSinne)vertreten - ihre und- mutatis mutandis Anwendungauf die der despotischenFührung von Natur aus bedürftigen homunculi der Neuen Welt empfohlenhat. Eine an der trotzeiniger(im Textganzenwie nachgeschobenwirkFeststellung, ender) versöhnlicherer ÄußerungenSepúlvedas am Ende, sozusagen im der Werks (S. 174f.)wohl kaum zu rüttelnsein dürfte. „Anhang" III. Erklärungsversuche Die Frage muß gestelltwerden,wie es zu solch einer unmittelbaren und mitunter fastwortwördichen, teilweisegeradezunaivenAristotelesrezeption 54EsistdieseeinederSchlüsselstellen, umzuverstehen, anwelche ArtvonDienstverhältnis derunterworfenen Völker Demócrates denkt: servi , waszunächst Sepúlvedas ja auchnureinfach„Diener" oder„Knechte" bedeuten wirdals seumanicipia also könnte, konkretisiert, imSinnevon„dasheißt:Sklaven". tatsächlich Im folgenden dannSepúlveda empfiehlt immer innerhalb seiner der die der (und Aristotelischen) „Haushaltsanalogie"Behandlung Indiosalsfreie Bedienstete sedliberos) undschränkt ihreVersklavung im ministros, (tamquam Sinnedesmanicipium aufdenFallschlimmer etperfidia etinbello Vergehen (quiscelere gerendo crudelitate als Strafe diese etc.)ein,die in seinenAugendas Sklavendasein rechtfertigen; Strafe wirdallerdings auchschondurchdieandauernde Verweigerungshaltung gegenüber demspanischen undKulturführungsanspruch Humanisierungsgerechtfertigt. Manicipium heißtim (alten)römischen Rechteigentlich derförmliche KaufeinerSache(res), im Sinndannaber„Kaufsklave", einMensch also,der,ohneüberindividumetonymischen elleFreiheit zu verfügen, zumEigentumsbestand seines Herrn undrechtlich zurres gehört wird.Daß derHaushalt, denderHumanist hierundimfolgenden beschreibt, Sepúlveda natürlich derdesSpaniens seiner dochvieleherjenerderaltrömiZeit,sondern garnicht schenFamilienstruktur an welchedermöglichen Formen ist,läßtperanalogiam ersehen, vonUnterordnung unter denHerren habenmag. Sepúlveda gedacht 55Demócrates S. 172:„servi seumanicipia, et utrisque ministri conditioAlter, inteijectis nislibera".

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kommenkonnte.Die Antwortdaraufwird,wie ich denke, auch gleichzeitigzur Beantwortungder Frage beitragenkönnen,warum Sepúlvedas Thesen sich nicht durchsetzenkonnten,politischscheitertenund keine akademischeAnerkennungfanden. Neben Sepúlvedasenthusiastischer und geradezupersönlich anhänglicher56 in mit er Renaissancemanier ohne histofür dem Aristoteles, Begeisterung ristischeBrüche oder Bedenken wie mit einem Zeitgenossenumging, von Bedeutung: scheinenmir folgendeGesichtspunkte Die erstePhase der Conquista gleichzeitigdie Phase der abenteuerlichen und ritterromantischen Eroberungszüge zeichnetsich durch eine AufnahmealterSchematazur Beschreibungdes unerhörten eigentümliche Neuen aus, das da entdeckt,erschlossenund erobertwird. Offenbarwar das Ausdrucksmedium, das die klassischeBildung und der Umgang mit dem europäischenMenschendes 15. und 16.JahrhunantikemSchrifttum und Interpretationsso dominant,daß es die Perspektive dertsvermittelte, in grundlagefür alles Neue normativ Beschlag nehmen und eindeutig formenkonnte: Ein Beispielistdie „Naturgeschichte Westindiens" des Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo57von 1535,eine Darstellungder Neuen Welt,die in Motivwahl, Komposition,Methode und Stil ganz und gar am Vorbild der „NaturgeOviedos schichte"Plinius' d.Ä. ausgerichtetist.58Das Bildungsrepertoire ließ diese Art der Beschreibungder Neuen Welt anhand des Maßstabs offenbar¿ilsgeeigneteDarstellungsweise einer antikenWeltbeschreibung erscheinen. So greiftetwa auch Ähnlichespassiertin der Zeitgeschichtsschreibung: Hernán Cortés,der ErobererMexikos,bei der Beschreibungseinerersten 56Diesetreue seinen Dankbarkeit undausgesprochene gegenüber großen Anhänglichkeit einerderherundFörderern scheint Lehrern wiezeitgenössischen antiken Vorbildern, aus vielenseiner zu sein.Sie spricht gewesen Charakterzüge Sepúlvedas ausragendsten undfindet ihrennachgerade undbrieflichen rührseligen Äußerungen Handlungsweisen Lebenimmer undvomhöfischen Reisedesalternden in derbeschwerlichen Höhepunkt insKloster Privatiers vonAndalusien stärker Yuste,wo er dengichtzurückgezogenen KarlV., besucht, umihnin diesem denabgedankten Brotherrn, ehemaligen brüchigen krank und Lebennocheinmalzu sehen(imFebruar1557;1560mußsichSepúlveda Lebenzurückziehen): fastganzvomgesellschaftlichen zunehmend erblindet Vgl.Losada 1973(s.o.,Anm.20),S. 11Of. 57GonzaloFernández natural delasíndias Historia de Oviedoy Valdes, , hg.Juan generály Pérezde TudelaBueso,Madrid1959. 58Vgl.Antony Amerika , München1996,S. 85f.Der Leibarzt Pagden,Das erfundene der z.B. bei seinerÜbersetzung versuchte außerdem Hernández, II., Francisco Philipps in Pflanzenarten amerikanische insSpanische, Plinius desälteren gewisse Naturgeschichte die durch Plinius alte die als ob die denTextunterzubringen, beschreibt, Welt, so, ganz erklärt werde. Neuebesser

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SEPÚLVEDA UNDDIE POLITISCHE ARISTOTELESREZEPTION 265 Kontaktaufnahme, Unterhandlungenund anschließendenUnterwerfung der Aztekenauf Motive,Sprache,Charakterzeichnungen und Darstellungsformenaus CaesarsBellumGallicum und das dortüberdie gallischen Stämme und ihre BesiegungGesagte zurück.Cortés' fürseinen Stil bestimmende die ähnlicheAbsichtshaltung seinerSchrift mitderCaesars Lateinschullektüre, sind,wie Caesars BellumGallicum , im wesendichen (Cortés'CartasdeRelación eine Mischungaus historischem Berichtund Rechtfertigungsschreiben für seine Landsleute),das Bewußtsein,wie die alten Römer die Zivilisation durch Eroberungzu den Barbaren zu tragen,und vieles mehr- all das ließ den Conquistadorin seinerliterarischen zum Feldherrn Selbstdarstellung des (neuen)RömischenReiches Karls V. werden,59 und als solchermußte er den daheimgebliebenenLesern seines Tatenberichtsauch erscheinen. Alter , wohl unter dem Eindruck Sepúlveda selbstzieht ja im Demócrates dieserund ähnlicherTatenberichte, vergleichbareParallelenzwischenden zivilisationsbringenden Expansionskriegender alten Römer gegen die Barbaren und denen der Spanier gegen die Indios: sein,wiewirbereits [. . .] dieserKriegwürdedannvonNaturrechts wegengerecht derAussagen namhaftester undTheologen haben, aufgrund Philosophen festgestellt undnochsehrvieleheralsder,dendieRömergegendieübrigen Völker begonnen undzwarin demselben haben,um sie zu unterwerfen, Maße,wiedie christliche besser unduntrüglicher istalsdieantike undwiedieSpanier an römische, Religion undVerstandeskräften Menschlichkeit, größeren geistigen Fähigkeiten, Klugheit, KörperundAusgezeichnetheit inallenTugenden überjenenarmseligen Menschengeschöpfen Völkern Alter , S. 134).60 legensind,als diealtenRömerdenübrigen (.Demócrates Oviedo und Cortés sind in diesem Zusammenhangkeineswegszufallig waren eine Hauptquellefürdie zeitgeschichtlichen genannt.Ihre Schriften des spanischen Hofhistoriographen Veröffentlichungen Juan Ginés de und für seine Sepúlveda Informationshintergund Einschätzungder Sachlage in der Neuen Welt, die er selbstja nie gesehen hat (zudem war Cortés wahrscheinlich Und auch das ist persönlichmit Sepúlveda befreundet).61 59Vgl.dazuu.a.Eduardo El continente vacío Subirais, , Madrid1994,S. 63f.Aufschlußreich ebenfalls Eberhard DasBellum Iustum desHernán Cortés inMexico Wien1976, Straub, , Köln/ sowieManuelAlcalá,CésaryCortés , Mexico1950,undnichtzuletzt JoséLuisMartínez 1990(s.o.,Anm.12),S. 112ff. undS. 147ff. (mitweiterführenden Literaturangaben). 60„[.. .] eritque id bellum, ut supramaximis et Philosophis et Theologis auctoribus multoetiammagis,quamquodRomaniad caeteras declaravimus, legenaturae justum, nationes suosubjiciendas melior ac certior estChristiana inferebant, imperio quo scilicet et majoriingenii, et animi Religio, quamolimromana, humanitatis, prudentiae, corporis ac omnis virtutis excessu istishomunculis roboris, Hispani praestant quamcaeteris gentibus veteres Romani." 61WennauchSepúlvedas Demokrates nieseineQuellennamendich so istdoch angibt, wohlv.a.an diesebeidenhierzitierten zu denken, wennersagt:„ [. . .] dieErzählungen

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nichtzufälligso: Die klassisch-antike und Ausrichtung, Darstellungsweise dieser Schriften mußten den von der italienischen Bildungsgrundlage RenaissancederJahrhundertwende enthusiastischen Humanisten geprägten, Sepúlveda in ganz besondererWeise ansprechen,fürsich einnehmenund vielleichtsogar als einzigangemesseneund würdigeArtder Beschreibung der Neuen Welt und ihrerEroberungerscheinenlassen. So ist Sepúlvedas Stellungnahmein der Indiofragetatsächlichinnerhalb einer zu seinerZeit bereitstraditionellen und erfolgreich erprobten der zu Die sehen: Einordnung Conquista Eroberung der Neuen Welt wirdin literarischer und Aufnahmezur Paralleleder bewunAusgestaltung dertenresgestaeder antikenKulturvölker und ihrerHelden wie Alexander und Caesar, ihreskulturbringenden Eroberungskampfes gegendie Barbaren am Rand der bekanntenWelt. Vielleichtist es auch nicht zuviel psychologisiert,wenn man vermutet,daß sich Sepúlveda als Erzieher des Erzieherdes ErbprinzenPhilippals eine Artneuer,spanischerAristoteles, makedonischenErbprinzenAlexander,empfundenhaben mag.62Wenn in der Durchsetzungseinerpolier freilichauch, genauso wie Aristoteles, tischenIdeen bei seinem Zögling scheiterte. In einem wichtigenPunktergänzen sich zudem Aristoteles'politische das auch SepúlTheorien und ein Grunddatumdes Renaissancedenkens, vedas Menschenbildbestimmt:Es handeltsich um das Prinzip,daß vollständiges,zu seinemxekoqgelangtesMenschseinkeindurchZeugungoder Geburt schon immervon selbstmitgegebenesFaktum ist. Vielmehrsei habe" überdieTatenbeiderEroberung [...], dieichvorkurzem Neu-Spaniens gelesen S. 96f.). 1990(s.o.,Anm.12),S. 74Iff., Alter, [Demócrates Vgl.auchdazuJoséLuisMartínez in Betracht in Valladolid einGespräch mitCortés derdieMöglichkeit zieht, Sepúlvedas desDemócrates Alter seiderZündfunke fürdieAbfassung (S. 742),an demCortés gewesen habenkönnte u.U.sogaraufdieeineoderandereWeisemitgearbeitet (S. 764). 62Sepúlveda Wohlaberscheint erseine sichnicht zu einemneuenAristoteles. erklärt als ErbeneinesGroßreiches und demInfanten Rolleals Philosoph Philipp gegenüber demKronprinzen Alexander mehrfach mitderdesAristoteles Barbarenbeherrscher gegenüber dafür: SeinStatusbeiHofunddie Verschiedene Indizien andeuten zu wollen. sprechen imDemócrates dieErwähnung demErbprinzen; (S. Philipps gegenüber Praeceptor-Stellung derBarbaren und mitderFragenachmilitärischer Unterwerfung 56)imZusammenhang amRandederWelt(nicht zuvergessen Gebiete derunterworfenen Neuordnung politischer unddie Rolle Länderals „westindisch" derneuentdeckten istdabeidie Identifizierung als Indieneroberer); schließlich Alexanders kolonialpolitischer korrespondiert Sepúlvedas Herrschaft Barbaren einedespotische denamerikanischen gegenüber Richtlinienvorschlag, fastwörtlich abereinekönigliche, auszuüben , S. 170),überseineLandsleute (.Demócrates an Alexander vonAristoteles genaumitdem,was manvonderverlorengegangenen, vonO. Gigonzu seiner weiß:vgl.dieEinleitung Schrift „ÜberdieKolonien" gerichteten 61997,S. 23. ZurSelbsteinschätzung in vonSepúlveda derPolitik, München Übersetzung auchobenAnm.30 undAnm.33. schließlich auf Aristoteles vgl. bezug

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SEPÚLVEDA UNDDIE POLITISCHE ARISTOTELESREZEPTION 267 Menschsein,der EndpunkteinesZivilisaMenschsein,zumindestvollgültiges in dem man sichzum Menschenbildet:factushomo , nonnatus , tionsprozesses, heißtdie Devise,63die bei Sepúlveda ihrenNiederschlagdarinfindet,daß - das heißt:zivilisiertes - Menschsein fürvollgültiges und kulturellgereiftes auch humanitas ,64eine humane Lebensweise,eine gewisse Herzens- und die wilden Geistesbildung Voraussetzungist.Dieser humanitas widersprechen ihr ihreMenschenopfer, inhumanenBräucheder Indios:ihrKannibalismus, Götzendienstsowie das Fehlenvon Technik,von geschriebenenGesetzen, Alter , ja von Schriftüberhaupt,in den meistenIndianerkulturen {Demócrates S. 104). Die Indios sindihrerdefizienten humanitas ,65gerinwegen eher homunculi Vorstufen des die eher noch Affen Menschen, gere gleichen[simiaprope dixerim , entfahrtes Demokrateseinmal) und die Bildungzum Menschen nötighaben, bevor sie wirklichals verständigeMenschen geltendürfen. Hier war die Einstiegstelle fürdie Übernahme der Aristotelischen Lehre von der natürlichenSklaverei.Diese amerikanischen homunculi waren den zivilisierten in einem Sinne unterund gebildeteneuropäischenhomines Theorie der naturgemäßenUnterordnung legen,wie es die Aristotelische des Geringerwertigen unterdas Höhere zur Begründungder natürlichen 63Vgl.dazuu.a. A. ab Schöpfer seiner selbst des , imArt.„Mensch" Hügli,DerMensch Historischen Wörterbuchs derPhilosophie zu vergleichen , Bd.5 (hierSp. 1074- 81).Interessant istauchdieEntwicklung diesesGedankens beiHannah-Barbara Diezweite Gerl-Falkovitz, derWelt: inderRenaissance Erkenntnis, , Mainz1994,insbesonSchöpfung Sprache, Anthropologie dereimKapitelXII: Wiewird derMensch Das Menschsein des zumMenschen ?, S. 161-73: Menschen istgemäßderAntikeninterpretation des 16.Jahrhunderts demfacere zu vernichtdemnasci. Menschwirdmanalsonichtdurchnatürliches Wachsen wie danken, Pflanzen oderTieredaswerden, sondern durch zumMenschen, insbesondere aber Bildung durch an denkulturellen antiker dieHöhe Geister; Orientierung Leistungsvorgaben großer desMenschseins wirddieserTheorienachsomitdurchImitation, nichtdurchselbsturerreicht. spründich-freie Entfaltung 64Vgl.Demócrates S. 100:„quodcumitasint, si modo Alter, intelligis profecto, Leopolde, nostigentis moreset naturam, istisnoviorbiset insuutriusque jureHispanos optimo larumadjacentium barbaris virtute omniac humaniimperitare, qui prudentia, ingenio, tatetamlongesuperantur ab Hispanis, mulieres a viris: saevi aetate, quampueria perfecta et immanes a mitissimis, et intemperantes a continentibus et temperatis, prodigi denique simiae ab hominibus", u.ö. quam propedixerim 65So öfter imDemócrates ac moribus homúncuAlter, etwa,S. 104:„talesigitur ingenio losutesse,ac certeanteHispanorum adventům fuisse tambarbaros, taminculscimus, armiscogipossunt, tos,taminhumanos", oder,S. 134:„itaquesi impérium recusent, id bellum, utsupramaximis et Philosophis et Theologis auctoribus eritque declaravimus, multo etiammagis, nationes legenaturae justum, quamquodRomaniad caeteras imperio suosubjiciendas melior ac certior estChristiana inferebant, quoscilicet Religio, quamolim etmajori etanimiroboris, ac omnis virromana, humanitatis, ingenii, prudentiae, corporis tutis excessu istishomunculis veteres etc. Romani", Hispani praestant quamcaeteris gentibus

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Sklavereierforderte. und seine zivilSepúlvedas Renaissancehumanismus isatorischund kulturphilosophisch definierte hatte Menschseinsbestimmung somiteinen Platz in Aristoteles'sklavereirechtfertigender Wertigkeitsskala gefunden.66 IV. Sepúlvedas Scheitern Die eingangs skizzierteDiskussion über die politischeBehandlung der Ureinwohner der Neuen Welterreichte ihrenHöhepunktimJahre 1550/51 von Valladolid".Dieses offizielle beim sogenannten„GroßenStreitgespräch sich eine Reihe von Sitzungenund sogar über (das Streitgespräch ganze war unter anderem Sitzungsperiodenhinzog) nötig geworden,weil die GesetzConquistadorenund spanischenSiedlermitder indiofreundlichen gebung von 1542 (die als „Leyes Nuevas" in die Geschichte einging) unzufriedenwaren und sie teilweiseschlichtignorierten oder offengegen - sie schränkteihre sie opponierten ein, indem sie Ausbeutungsstrategien In diesem etwa Zwangs- und Akkordarbeitfür die Indios untersagte.67 Vertreter akademischenDisput bekam nun Sepúlveda als prominentester - die also der kolonialen Interessengruppe andere, sozusagen die der

66Einenicht sichan dieseFeststellung an:Dachte leichthin entscheidbare Frageschließt es konnte, diealshomunculi anders alswohlAristoteles daran,daß Menschen, Sepúlveda, aus dem einfach Sklavensind,am Endedes Kultivierungsprozesses natürlicherweise müssen? unddannebensonatürlich als Freiegelten Sklavenstatus heraustreten können imchristlichen zujenerZeiteheralstemdaß Sklaverei Dafürwürdesprechen, Spanien z.B.diese Kamen1986(s.o.,Anm.4),S. 86f.vertritt Phänomen betrachtet wurde: poräres erseischoneineinGaleerensklave, AuchimDonQuijote (I, Kapitel22)äußert Meinung. Es steht zu undseiesjetztebenwieder. malfureinige allerdings JahreSklavegewesen, undKulturbildungstheorie ausPolitik Gemeinschaftsvermuten I, (wennmanAristoteles' daßSepúlveda undSepúlvedas dazunimmt), Humanismuspostulat Kapitel1-3zugrundelegt Zustand derSklaverei ausdemnatürlichen Prozeß zurHerausfuhrung wohlehereinlängerer einerpolitisch undmoralisch habenmuß:Erstdieallmähliche Heranbildung vorgeschwebt mit Gesamtkultur würde förderlichen und-entfaltung dermenschlichen Selbstbestimmung - Bei inderNeuenWeltfuhren. vonnatürlicherweise derZeitzurExistenz Freigeborenen derSklaverei Aristoteles selbst eindeutiger „jedermenschdagegen gehtdasNaturgemäße 1991(s.o.,Anm.13),S. 249).Allerdings voraus" lichen (Schütrumpf Entwicklungsmöglichkeit umstritten Stellen dieser Aristotelischen istauchdieInterpretation 1254a23) (v.a.etwaPolitik nochmals (veri, Schütrumpf a.a.O.). 67Die wichtigsten ingedrängter Zusamzitiert Nuevas" Artikel der„Leyes einschlägigen in voller 1970(s.o.,Anm.2),S. 147-50; LängeistderGesetzestext menstellung Simpson Sources and Civilisation. American bei LewisHanke,History am leichtesten ofLatin greifbar derOpposition , London1969,Bd. 1,S. 144-9.ZumProblem gegendieneue Interpretations darauf Indienrates desKöniglichen drastischen Reaktion undderteilweise Gesetzgebung Widerruf nachderNeuenWeltbisaufköniglichen etwaalleExpeditionen (1549wurden sh.u.a. Hanke,a.a.O.,S. 36f. verboten)

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UNDDIE POLITISCHE ARISTOTELESREZEPTION 269 SEPÚLVEDA unterLas Casas vertreten wurdevon der Dominikanerfraktion Indiorechte, der Indios seineThese von der natürlichen die Gelegenheit, Unterlegenheit höchsten kolonialen dem Indienrat Verwaltungsgremium) (dem gegenüber vor einemhochrangigen Expertenkollegium juristischenund theologischen welcheder beiden Parteien Es ist bis heute heftigumstritten, darzulegen.68 im Großen Disput von Valladolid wirklichsiegreichhervorging;restlos siegreichwohl keine:69der Konfliktin Politikund Philosophieschwelte weiter.Auch nochjahrzehntelang(und im großenund ganzen ergebnislos) ist unsere Kenntnisdessen, was während des Disputs wirklichpassierte, Nur sovielistklar:In seinemGrundanliegen immernoch äußerstlückenhaft. konntesich Sepúlveda nichtdurchsetzen;die „Leyes Nuevas" von 1542 mit ihrerindioschützendenGrundtendenzwurden durch seine offizielle noch grundlegendmodifiziert, Stellungnahmeweder zurückgenommen geschweigedenn eine Entwicklunghin zu einerArtVersklavungsstrategie im Sinne von Sepúlvedas Vorschlageingeleitet.70 Lehre und kolonialpolitischen WarumSepúlvedasphilosophische Vorschläge sich in der „Gran Disputa" nicht durchsetzenkonnten,ist wohl nicht mehrganz schlüssigzu rekonstruieren. Mag sein, daß es weder mehrdie Aristotelesaufnahme Zeit noch der rechte Ort einer naiv-unmittelbaren im war: Was etwa antikisch-humanistisch durchtränkten Ambiente des Mediceischen Hofs der Jahrhundertwende als überzeugende und zeitund gemäße politischeMeinung Argumentationsstrategie gegoltenhaben konnte durchaus am Hof des barocken dürfte, Siglo de Oro Spanischen scheitern,und mußte es vielleichtsogar. „Antike"Denkungsart,Bildung 68DerKaiserselbst hattediese,Junta" an seinen einberufen, spanischen Regierungssitz vonKolonialpolitik weilesinderRegierung undamHofüberderFragederRechtmäßigkeit undEingeborenenlegislative Zuständen war(vgl. „zu bürgerkriegsähnlichen gekommen" 21965,S. 117.Generell L. Hanke, TheSpanish intheConquest Boston for Struggle Justice ofAmerica, zurGranDisputade Valladolid sh.dortS. 111-32). 69EinenVersuch oderRekonstruktion, (wohlkaummehrals das)derInterpretation welche RolleAristoteles' Theorien aufdemGroßen habenmögen, politische Disput gespielt hatLewisHankein Aristotle andtheAmerican Indians , S. 44-61(s.o.,Anm.30) vorgelegt. Generell zur„GranDisputa" Werk AllMankind is One. A Study ofthe vgl.Hankes Disputation Between Bartolomé deLasCasasandJuanGinés deSepúlveda in1550onthe Intellectual andReligious theAmerican Indians /Illinois 1974. , Dekalb Capacity 70Dieof undforschungsgeschichtlichen derGran „Nachwehen" juristischen, philosophischen habenebenfalls beiHanke1959(s.o.,Anm.30),S. 74-98undHanke1974(s.o., Disputa Anm.69)ihreweitreichende undWürdigung NeuereStudien zur Interpretation gefunden. DebattevonValladolid sind:EduardoAndujar, Bartolomé delas CasasandJuanGinés de MoralTheology versus Political undAlfredo , sowieRafaelAlvira Cruz,The Sepúlveda: Philosophy between Las CasasandSepúlveda at Valladolid in: KevinWhite , beideerschienen Controversy intheAgeofDiscovery D.C. 1997,Seiten69-87und , Washington, (Hg.),Hispanic Philosophy 88-111, respektive.

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und Philosophiewaren hier nicht mehr Maßstab aller Dinge; vielleicht den Sepúlveda aufgeandersals im italienischen Renaissancehumanismus, man in Linie war hier erster katholisch,und erstin zweiter sogen hatte, Kann auch sein, daß Linie an antikenkulturellen Vorbilderninteressiert. man hier an einem dieser- freilichtrotz allem normativen Vorbilder, in offenbar christlicher nämlichan Aristoteles, vordringlich Brechunginteroder „thomanischen essiertwar,sozusagenam „scholastischen" Aristoteles", denn worin überall wollte man einem antikenDenker trauen,der, wie Las Casas vor Kaiser Karl V. schon zu früherer Gelegenheitim Rahmen der Sklavenfragegeäußerthatte,„ein Heide war und jetzt in der Hölle brenne,und von dessen Lehren man nur soviel Gebrauch machen sollte als in Übereinstimmungmit unserem heiligen Glauben und mit der christlichen Lebenspraxisstehe".71 Vielleichtwar Sepúlveda aber auch in einer anderen Beziehung mit seinerSicht der Dinge und ihrerDarlegung unzeitgemäßgeworden:Die bildet- und die Leyes Nuevas sind ein sichtMitte des 16. Jahrhunderts - den Abschluß der ersten,heroischen bares Zeichen untervielen dafür aber auch der romantischenund großartigen, und draufgängerischen, und in vielen bunten Ausschmückungen ungeheuervielversprechenden erzähltenPhase der Conquista, die Phase der blutigenLandnahme, der nie geahntenkriegerischen Eroberungen,des persönlichenEinsatzesund Phase wurdezu jener Zeit abgelöstdurch diese todbringenden Wagemuts; ein zweite,in der man den Sinn nunmehrauf Befriedung,Neuordnung und Versöhnung,kurz auf die Suche eines praktikablenund christlich Koexistenz Modus' einer zunehmendressentimentlosen verantwortbaren Gewissen in den Kolonienrichtenmußte,und das durchausmitschlechtem und im Bewußtsein der eigenen begangenen Fehler72 eine mitunter 71Zitiert a.a.O. nachLewisHanke1965(s.o.,Anm.68),S. 124.Hankemacht allerdings als unddarinistihmrechtzu geben,daß Aristoteles darauf aufmerksam, richtigerweise einebestimmende des16.Jahrhunderts natürlich auchimSpanien Macht, „derPhilosoph" an derauchdie in Naturrechtsfragen, insbesondere blieb,einegeistige Machtstellung, unddes derAristotelesdeutung IhreandereStrategie nichtvorbeikamen. Dominikaner wares aber Gedankenumfeld christlichen Textineinem mitdemAristotelischen Umgangs machte. letztendlich zumstärkeren wohl,dieihrenStandpunkt 72Vgl.dazu Subirats die 1994(s.o.,Anm.59), S. 60, u.ö. Tatsächlich untersagte Gebrauch des Terminus' denoffiziellen Krone1573schließlich „Conquista" Spanische ihrer zurBezeichnung denBegriff statt undversuchte dessen, „Befriedung" („pacificación) Endes Zeichen desfaktischen durchzusetzen (vgl.a.a.O.,S.58).Einäußeres Kolonialpolitik waru.a.auchdiepolizurZeitderGranDisputa derConquista derheroischen Erstphase - undwohlauchpervon der Tod und tische Sepúlvedas politischem Entmachtung (Teil-) für Zeit der zu seiner Hernán Freund sönlichem Cortés, (undspeziell großen allgemein in Helddes spanischen vorbildliche als derbewunderte, Eroberungskampfes Sepúlveda) derNeuenWeltgalt.

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SEPÚLVEDA UNDDIE POLITISCHE ARISTOTELESREZEPTION 271 beschämteArt der eigenen Geschichtsbetrachtung, der Sepúlveda verständnislosfernstand.Sepúlveda als der Bewunderer und begeisterte Historiographder angesprochenenerstenPhase der Conquista bekannte, diskutierte und propagiertein seinen SchriftenmithinkolonialeIdealvorund die eigentlichbereitsüberholtund stellungen Entwicklungszustände, ihr an inneres(und auch bald äußeres)Ende gekommenwaren.Las Casas und seine Dominikaner dagegen konntenmit ihrer Gegenpositionals als Initiatoreneiner Neubesinnungin der Vorreiter, ja sogar größtenteils Sie hatten die Zeichen und Notwendigkeiten der Kolonialpolitikgelten. Zeit und der fortschreitend veränderten Situationeher erkanntund voraus- Auch denkendmitbestimmt. historischen angesichtsder veränderten Lage und ihrerEinschätzungalso konntesich SepúlvedasAristotelische Theorie der natürlichenSklaverei weder auf akademischer noch auf offiziellpolitischerEbene jemals wirklichdurchsetzen. Im Gegenteil:Sepúlvedas bis dahin veröffendichte Wortmeldungenin der verhandeltenFrage wurden im Gefolge der Gran Disputa noch während der fünfziger Jahre auf Betreibenvon Krone, Inquisitionund Universitätskreisen kassiert,um die Verbreitungseiner einschlägigen Gedanken (insbesonderein den Kolonien) zu verhindern.In den langen Nachwehender Disputa mitihrenzahlreichenGutachten,Gegengutachten und prominentenWortmeldungenund Einflußnahmenpro und contra , die Sepúlveda, verfaßtedieser seine Apologia pro librodejustis bellicausis dem Verbot des Demócrates ohne es aber letzdich sollte, entgegenarbeiten verhindernoder aufhebenzu können:Zu schwerwogen die abschlägigen Gutachteninsbesondereder UniversitätenSalamanca und Alcalá.73Der Demócrates Alterschließlichdurfteaufgrunddes gleichenVerbots nie von blieb aufJahrhunderte hinSepúlveda publiziertwerden,und die Apologia aus neben einigenSummarienseinerGegnerdie einzigegedruckteQuelle fürseine kolonialpolitischen Gedanken.Denn erstknapp 350 Jahrespäter erschieneine erste kritischedierte Druckfassungdes einzigen (damals) noch bekanntenManuskriptsdes ^weitenDemócrates im Mitteilungsblatt der Geschichtsakademie als verscholKöniglich Spanischen sozusagen lange lenes historisches Kuriosum. UniversitätRegensburg Institut fiirPhilosophie

73Zurwechselvollen Geschichte umdasImprimatur fiir denDemócrates Alter vgl.nochmals V. Carroa.a.O.,S. 326ff.

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ReviewArticle : context and its earlydevelopment The originsof humanism , its educational a reviewarticleof Ronald Witťs 'In the Footsteps of the Ancients5 ROBERT BLACK

' The Origins Ronald G. Witt's cIntheFootsteps of Humanism of theAncients fromLovatotoBruni(Brill,Leiden BostonCologne 2000, Studiesin Medieval and ReformationThought, LXXIV) traces the historyof Renaissance humanismfromits birthin the later thirteenth centuryto the beginning it Bruni and his contemporaries, with Leonardo of the fifteenth when, emerged as a fullymature learned movement.For Witt the essence of the phenomenonis style:genuinehumanismcame into being in the second half of the thirteenth centurywhen Lovato Lovati began to imitate classicalLatin verse.At firsthumanistendeavourswere limitedto poetry, The domprose remainingin the domain of the medieval ars dictaminis. inance of poetry began to wane in the mid-fourteenth centurywith imitation to classical but his eclectic Petrarch, preventeda fullapproach for scale revivalof antique prose style.The turningpoint prose compositionwas the teachingof Giovanni Malpaghini da Ravenna in Florence at the veryend of the fourteenth century:he put forwardCicero as the and Latin prose,and his pupilswere finally rhetoric model for preeminent able to achieve a genuinelyclassicalprose stylebased on CiceronianimiCiceronian prose writerto emergefromthis tation.The firstsignificant stablewas PierpaoloVergerio,but it was Malpaghini'sotherpupil,Leonardo Bruni, who for Witt representedthe firstsuccessfulattemptto imitate Cicero.Wittconcludeshis accountwiththespreadof Bruni'sCiceronianism to Venice and Milan, under the auspices of such figuresas Gasparino Barzizza, Uberto and Pier Candido Decembrio and Andrea Biglia. Witt'sown descriptionof his book as a 'monograph'in no way does justice to its wide scope. Some idea of the breadth of Witt's treatment will be apparentin the fiveaspects of thisbook which I propose to discuss in this reviewarticle:(1) Witt'sdefinitionof humanism;(2) his discussion of the originsof humanism;(3) his treatmentof the educational Vivarium 40,2

BrillNV,Leiden,2002 © Koninklijke - www.brill.nl online Alsoavailable

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contextof humanism'searly history;(4) his discussionof early humanism's affiliations with Christianity; and (5) his emphasis on humanism's as to dimensions. literary, opposed political, * * * Witt'spreoccupationwith stylestemsfromhis definitionof humanism: tocenter ofhumanism onstylistic derives . . . from Mydecision mydiscussion change a humanist thata litmus foridentifying washisintention to imitate myconviction ancient Latinstyle. Attheleast,a dedication tostylistic imitation initiated thedestabilization ofan author's ownlinguistic universe hiscontact withthatofantithrough Asa consequence, I donotregard as humanists those whowere quity. contemporaries inhistorical andphilological research onancient culture butwhoshowed no engaged toemulate I consider ancient butrather themantiquarians. signofseeking style, (22) This definition focuseson the implicit,ratherthan the explicit,meaning of humanism.The nature of everyhistoricalphenomenonis not clearly ifonlybecause forthemitsessentialfeatures articulated by contemporaries, were so obvious as to requireno explanation.In the case of humanism, any moderatelyinformedresearchercan detectthe presenceof a humanist textsimplythroughits Latin: by attempting to show his readersthathe is however with the Latin styleof the ancients himself, affiliating imperfectly, as opposed to the moderns(or medievaisin modernparlance),a writeris withthe humanistmovement. makingan implicitdeclarationof his affinity For the explicitmeaning of humanist,one has to turn to the classic definitionof humanism as a discipline, as developed by Paul Oskar Kristeller(to whose memory,in fact,the book is dedicated).In his seminal article 'Humanism and scholasticismin the Italian Renaissance',1 Kristellerreturnedto contemporaryusage of the later fifteenth century, when the word humanista was invented to designate a teacher of the humanitieson the analogy of such medieval universitylabels as legista, or artista. , canonista jurista Althoughthe termhumanismwas a nineteenthKristeller connectedhumanista with a definedgroup of centurycoinage, the studia humanitatis , normallyconsistingof grammar,rhetoric, subjects, a recognizedacapoetry,historyand moral philosophyand constituting demic disciplinedistinctfromthe philosophical,medical and theological studies now known as scholasticism.It has subsequentlybeen demonstratedthat Coluccio Salutati was the firstto revive the phrase studia 1 First in:Byzantion, 17(1944-45), andrepublished sub346-74, published manytimes sequently.

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humanitatis (in 1369) on the basis of Cicero's usage in the oration Pro is but Arckia,2 the core of fivesubjectsembodied in the studiahumanitatis alreadyevidentin Petrarch'slist of favouritebooks, datingfromthe first halfof the fourteenth Moreover,althoughPetrarchneverseems century.3 to have used thephrasestudiahumanitatis , he did make mentionof 'humanorum studiorum'.4 have theiradvantagesand disadvantages.Witt's Both these definitions aims of the humanistmovementand to disto the novel helps identify from their medievalforeruners, whileKristeller'stends humanists tinguish from whichit emerged. the medieval to assimilatehumanismwith disciplines Kristellerwas aware thathis emphasison humanismas a disciplinetended to blurtheboundariesbetweenmedievaland Renaissancelearning.On the one hand, he attemptedto overcomethisdifficulty dialectically.Excluding such as ultramontane of theItalianhumanists, fromhis definition precursors classical scholars and writersof the twelfthcentury,as well as Italian fromthe twelfthand earlierthirteenth practitionersof the ars dictaminis thesis that humanismwas fullyborn only he forward the centuries, put when ultramontaneclassicismwas mergedwithItalian rhetoricalactivities On the otherhand, Kristeller'sdefiat the end of the thirteenth century.5 nition has the advantage not only of contemporaryusage, but also of embracing a wide range of activities,writersand scholars under the umbrellaof a broad discipline.By applyingKristeller'sdefinition, signs of early humanismcould be detectednot only in the areas highlighted by Witt,such as Lovato Lovati's attemptsto imitateclassicalverseforms or in AlbertinoMussato's revivalof Senecan tragedy,but also in Brunetto Latini's study and use of Ciceronian orations and rhetoricaltexts,in BartolomeoBenincasa'sand GiovanniBuonandrea'slectureson Ciceronian rhetoricalhandbooks,in Giovanni del Virgilio'steachingof the classical Latin poets, in Gerì d'Arezzo's and Giovanni de Matociis's early efforts at criticalliteraryhistoryor in Geremia da Montagnone'sand Benvenuto Campesani's readingof rare Latin authorssuch as Catullus and Martial. Witt'snarrowerfocus on Latin styleas the 'litmus'of humanismcan tend to exclude ratherthan include. While scholars such as Kristeller, 2 B. Kohl,Thechanging Renaissance humanitatis inthe studia , in:Renaissance early ofthe concept 6 (1992),187-8. Studies, 3 R. Black,Humanism Medieval 1998,248-9. , Cambridge , in: TheNewCambridge History 4 Lefamiliari 1933,vol.1,47. , 1.9,ed.V. Rossi,Florence 5 P. O. Kristeller, Humanism Antecedents TheMedieval , inhisEight Philosophers ofRenaissance California Renaissance 1964,160-2. , Stanford, oftheItalian

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RobertoWeiss6or BertholdLouis Ullman7have recountedthe earlyhistoryof humanism,Witt's definitionleads him to a preoccupationwith who and who were not in fact the firsthumanists:his distinguishing accountcan become less a historyof humanismthan of thosefigureswho meet his criteriaas humanists.Thus Witt rejectsthe humanistcredentialsof Geremia da Montagnone,despitehis 'knowledgeof a wide range of ancient authors' (113), as well as of Riccobaldo of Ferrara, 'whose fidelityto a medieval genre of historicalwritingand apparent lack of interestin expressinghimselfin classicizingstylemake him more like Geremia da Montagnonethan like Lovato' (114). Similarly,despitetheir achievementsas criticalscholars,the humanistcredentialsof Giovannide Matociis and Benzo d'Alessandriaare rejected: LikeGeremia da Montagnone in Padua,de Matociis andBenzoshould notbe considered humanists. Allthreemen,andespecially thelatter ofhavtwo,gaveproof towards their sources andanincipient senseofanachronism. inga newcritical mentality Butwhereas Lovato'sstudyof Seneca'smeters thewayforMussato's prepared inVerona thephilological ofscholars remained Senecan-style patriotic tragedy, progress inertuntiltheycouldbe translated intothenewclassicizing medium. culturally theidentification oftexts andauthors, andthereconstruction research, Philological ofsegments ofancient werevitaltothedevelopment ofhumanism, butthey history couldonlybecomehumanistic whencontributing to thereconstruction ofa society ofhuman andtheir distinctive ofthought andfeeling. The revivifybeings patterns stemmed from thehumanists' effort to recreate thestylethatencoded ingprocess theemotions andthoughts ofancient (168) society. One has to wonder if the unexplained absence fromthis book of an extendedtreatmentof Boccaccio is due to his failureto meet the stylistic criteriarequiredby Witt'sdefinitionof humanism. * * * Particularlyprovocativeis Witt's treatmentof the originsof humanism. For Witt,Latin literacythrivedin northand centralItaly for 'the first fivecenturiesfollowingthe fall of Rome . . . Broad strataof the general populationhad frequentcontactwith documents,and elementaryLatin literacyseems to have been relativelywidespread'.(14) This Italian Latin literaryculturereached its peak in the eleventhcentury: 6 II primo secolo dell'umanesimo: studi e testi inItaly , Rome1949;TheDawnofHumanism , London1947. 7 Some TheSorbonne andtheItalian Renaissance humanism, oftheorigin aspects ofItalian , library in hisStudies intheItalian Renaissance , Rome1955,27-54.

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ROBERTBLACK north of As in their French Italiancathedral schools eleventh-century counterparts, in theancient instruction writRomepreserved bookculture, Carolingian stressing before thegreat ofLatinletthepoets.Norinthiscentury ers,especially flourishing in theirownpoetic tersin Francedid theItaliansappearin anywayinferior to theFrench. (15) compositions

However,thisthrivingliteraryand classical culturewas shatteredby the InvestitureContestat the end of the eleventhcentury: A majorcasualty inGregory ofecclesiastical reforms wasthecathedral VII'sprogram inwhich ofnorthern andcentral thatinstitution thegrammatical curriculum school, Italian Within thelasttwenty-five yearsoftheeleventh century, Italyhadthrived. overaspects ofreform such cathedral bydisputes chapters appeartohavebeenriven Shattered schools as clerical andlayinvestiture. strife, byfactional disapmarriage insomecasesformany decades. ofchapter thedocumentation life, Although pearfrom in thetwelfth as cena fewcathedral likethatat Lucca,survived schools, century to themodmostothers seemto havebeencommitted tersofliberal-arts training, fortheperformance oftheir functions. esttaskofpreparing thediocesan religious clergy ofthetradieducation entailed thedeterioration The withering ofcathedral-school education tional ofgrammatical (16) goingbacktotheCarolingian period. program For Witt,traditionalliteraryculturewas replacedby a new practicaland professionaleducationalmovement: waslargely andcentral The intellectual lifeofnorthern Italyin thetwelfth century andRomanandcanon concerns anddirected driven bydictatores bylegal-rhetorical wasgenerally determined ofgrammar . . . The extent bythehumtraining lawyers dictamen to In thecaseoftheelitewhowentbeyond ofarsdictaminis. ble demands in reading andwriting years' legalLatinformed partofmany legalstudies, training direction. instruction undera lawyer's (16-7) Accordingto Witt,classical studiesin Italy lay dormantuntilthe end of the twelfthcentury:the scholinvasion ofFrench after1180,whena massive ofgrammar revived fortunes ofRome. lifeofItalynorth influences transformed theintellectual arlyandliterary andpoetsmadetheir . . . French Attheheight oftheir majorcongrammarians glory almost a ceninItaly. After ofletters andscholarship future tribution tothebrilliant decades to studies an auxiliary roletorhetoric, ofplaying grammatical required tury of in northern ofLatinpoeticcomposition buttheburst revive; Italybythemiddle showstheir thethirteenth bythattime.(17) development century vigorous Witt does not give furtherdetails in this book, but refersto his earlier article'Medieval Italian cultureand the originsof humanismas a stylistic ideal', where he cites Geoffreyof Vinsauf as an agent of French influencein Italy,Henry of Settimello'sElegyof 1193 as an example of classicizingpoetryin the Gallic manner and Boncompagno of Signa as a contemporaryItalian who reacted against the school of Orléans and

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itspreference forrhetoricbased on the traditional studyof ancientauthors.8 Witt's thesisregardingthe originsof Italian humanismis that its seeds were sown at the end of the twelfthcenturybut that they took over nearlya hundredyears (1180 to 1267-68) to germinatein the person of Lovato Lovati and his fellowLatin classicizingpoets in the second half of the thirteenth century. Witthas persuasivelyidentifiedthe key elementsin the backgroundto Italian humanism,especiallythe decline of medievalItalian classicaleducation and the rise of the professionaland legal studies.But his account of the way and particularlythe chronologicalorder in which these elementscombinedto give birthto humanism,in my view, needs revision, and I thinkthathe places too much emphasison the role of Frenchclassicismin the dawn of Italian humanism. In the firstplace, it is unclear that traditionalItalian clericalgrammar educationunder the auspices of ecclesiasticalschoolswas in decline during the twelfthcentury.It may be true that the InvestitureContesttemthe functioning of churchschools:here,to the listof porarilyinterrupted citiesaffectedby the crisiscould be added Arezzo, where no mastersare mentionedin the documentsbetween 1088 and 1138 and where one pupil is known to have returnedto Arezzo froma school elsewherein 1082.9This kind of evidence,togetherwith the examples cited by Witt, amountsto argumentexsikntio and musttherefore be inconclusive.Indeed, in the case ofArezzo,it is knownthatby 1138 the churchgrammarschool of S. Maria della Pieve was again in operation,10 and that the cathedral 11 school was functioning in 1178; thereis also a long seriesof canon magistřiin the Aretinechurchfrom 1158 to 1240.12 More suggestive,I think,is the evidenceof actual Italian school books datingfromthe twelfthcentury.In my recentbook on the Latin school curriculumin Italy,I have been able, withthe help of the palaeographer Gabriella Pomaro, to identify41 Italian textsof classical authorsused as 8 In:A. Rabil(ed.),Renaissance Humanism: andLegacy, 1988, Foundations, Forms, Philadelphia I, 44-50. 9 H. Wieruszowki, Politics andCulture inMedieval andItaly , Rome1971,423;R.Black, Spain Studio e scuola inArezzo durante il medioevo e il Rinascimento. I documenti d'archivio finoal 1530, Arezzo1996,100-1. 10Black1996 above,n. 9), 101,n. 8. (op.cit., 11Ibid.,107,n. 29. 12Ibid.

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schoolbooksand produced during the twelfthcentury.13 Most of these textbookswould have been used at Italian ecclesiasticalsecondaryschools duringthe twelfth century,and indeed two of them (textsof Cicero's De amicitiaand of Sallust's BellumIugurthinum ) actuallycontain referencesto and ecclesiastical life.14It is no accident that contemporaryepiscopal Roffredoda Beneventoreferredto the flourishing state of Latin literary studyin Arezzo at the turnof the thirteenth century(Trater,cum venisti ab Aretio ubi hodie vigetstudiumlitterarum').15 A more persuasivepictureof Italian educationaldevelopmentsin the twelfth centurymay be thattherewere in facttwo competingtendencies in education:one emanatingfromtraditionalgrammarschools based on the classical authorsand stilllinkedto ecclesiasticalinstitutions, and the other stemmingfromnascent lay highereducation,focusedon notarial in Bologna and legal studies,which led to the emergenceof universities in the twelfthcenturyand then in Arezzo and Padua in the early thirteenth.As Wittpointsout, these two approaches to educationwere diametrically opposed: the formerprivilegedclassicalauthors,whilethe latter emphasizedpracticaland rapid Latinityaimed at entryinto the professions. The first,more classical and grammaticalapproach,is represented Italian schoolbooksidentifiedin my survey,and is by the twelfth-century reflectedin the neo-classicalpoetryof a clergymansuch as Henry of Settimello,who studiedin Bologna probablyin the thirdquarterof the twelfth The second,more practicaland less classicalapproach, century.16 of Albericof Montecassino(ca. 1075); is firstnoticeablein the arsdictaminis it had spread to Bologna by the middle of the twelfthcenturyand is associated with a manuals by Adalberto da San Marino, Bernardo da Bologna and anotheranonymousBolognese dictator}1 As Wittand manyothersbeforehim have shown,thisconflictis vividly portrayedin the writingsof the eminentBologneseprofessorof rhetoric, Boncompagno da Signa (c. 1165-c. 1240). First,Boncompagno declares thathe had neverimitatedCicero nor indeed everlecturedon him. Then 13R. Black, Tradition andInnovation inMedieval andRenaissance Humanism andEducation Italy. theTwelfih totheFifteenth inLatin Schools 2001,186-92. , Cambridge Century from 14Black2001(< MediceaLaurenziana Biblioteca ., above,n. 13),190-1(Florence op.cit Pluteo64.18and76.23). 15Wieruszowski 1971(op.cit ., above,n. 9), 390. 16A. Montiverdi, italiani in: Dizionario s.v.Arrigo da Settimello, , Rome biografico degli vol.4, 315. 1960-, 17Witt1988{op.cit., andthedefense above,n. 8),43 and65,nn.64-6;id.,Boncompagno of 16 (1986),4-5. andRenaissance ofMedieval rhetoric Studies, , in:TheJournal

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he goes on to reject his predecessors'methodsof teachingthe ars dictaminis , accusing them of too much reliance on the ancients:of the traditional five parts of the letter,only three were actuallyessential;if this was against the doctrineof the ancients,then theirteachingshad been useless and damaging. He derides the methodsof writinglettersbefore his day: mastershad spenthuge amountsof time adorningtheirepistles withvivid displaysof verbiageand learned quotationsfromthe authors, who were believed to providethe seal of approval fortheirliteraryproductions.He even criticizesCicero's theoryas inept and self-contradictory.He saysthathe was reprimandedforrejectingthe traditional practice of padding his prose with classical quotations(proverbia ) and ratifiedterminology,complainingthat he was derided for lackinga knowledgeof Latin literature{litter atur a), and for drawingexamples fromthe present At the turn of the thirteenth day. century,the school of Orléans was particularlyassociatedwiththe traditionalstudyof the classicalauthors,and Boncompagno accuses his academic opponentsof too much indulgence in Aurelianism.18 What is crucial here is the geographicalcontextof thisbattleforand againstthe ancientauthors.Wittseems to assume thatthe source of classicismwas France,whichhe sees as now challengingtime-honoured Italian rhetorical But this constitutes a non-classicizing practices.19 only partial too is thefactthatBoncompagno readingof Boncompagno'stexts.Important presentshimselfas an innovator,revisingthe methodsof his predecessors, to whom he constantlyrefers.The pictureof rhetoricalhistoryas presentedby Boncompagno is that he was attemptingto replace traditionalclassicalteachingas hithertopractisedin Italy;thesetime-honoured methodshad been sanctionedand reinforcedby the authorityand presas an tige of the school of Orléans. Boncompagno's self-advertisement innovatorand a radical would be difficult to understandif Witt's view of Italian educationas dominatedby the ars dictaminis in the twelfth cenin turywere the whole picture.In fact,as a resultof the rise of dictamen the twelfthcentury,culminatingwith Boncompagno in the early thirteenth,traditionalItalian educators,whose approach may have been reinforcedby Orléanistdictatores now feltthreatened workingin thepapal curia,20 and so attackedBoncompagno as the leading representative of the non18Fortextual seeBlack2001(< references, ., above,n. 13),192-3;seealsoWitt1986 op.cit ., above,n. 17),passim. (iop.cit 19Witt1988((op.cit ., above,n. 8),45. 20Witt1986(op.cit., above,n. 17),7-8,n. 16.

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in response,he presentedhimselfas the leader classicaltypeof rhetoric;21 of the educational innovatorsand radicals, singlingout the school of Orléans as the bastion of traditionalclassicism.Boncompagnoin fact is the traditionalauthor-basedapproach to grammarand rhetoric criticizing which had long been practisedin Italian ecclesiasticalschools and which he now wanted to displace with a more rigidlypracticaltraining.The factthatBoncompagnostrodeforthas a modernizeronto the Italian educational scene must mean that therehad been a traditionaleducational in establishment long in existencewhen he was writing.The reformers Italian educationat the turnof the thirteenth centurywere not the advocates of Orléanismso much as Boncompagno,Bene da Firenzeor Guido Fava, who were displacingthe traditionalclassicallybased educational approach of medieval Italy (and France). Boncompagno'spolemics show that classicismexistedin Italian education at the end of the twelfthcentury,but one has to wonderwhether thistendencywas whollyor even mainlyimportedfromFrance. Geoffrey of Vinsauf'sverse textbookon rhetoric,datable between 1208 and 1213, may reflectpossible teachingactivityin Italy; moreover,it was the most influentialtreatiseon rhetoricalstylein Italian schools fromthe time of its publicationto the end of the fifteenth century.But the kind of style he taughthad nothingto do with classicalprose, but ratherrepresented associatedwiththe practiceof the arsdican abstractelegance,intimately indeed,Geoffrey taminis;22 quoted no classicalexamplesin his work.Henry of Settimello'sfamouselegyis the mostsignificant piece of neo-classicizing Latin poetrywrittenin ItalybeforeLovati and the emergenceof Paduan humanism.It shows the directinfluenceof both Ovid's poetryof exile Echoes of Vergil and Horace are also as well as of Boethius'sConsolation. to the classicalworld,whilebiblical references are countless there evident; allusionsare rare. Henry'sstoicphilosophyis possiblyinspiredby Seneca. relevantis thatHenrywas dráwnto the FrenchLatin What is particularly of the twelfth century,such as Walter of Châtillon,Alain of Lille poets eccentricites and MatthewofVendôme,whosepoetictechniquesand stylistic thisFrench was drawn to is how The he appropriated.23 question Henry material.Witt supposes that the 'communicationbetween France and intensein theseyears,because Walter's Bologna musthave been relatively borrowed which from Alexandras purpose, , generouslyfor stylistic Henry 21ForBoncompagno's seeWitt1986(op.cit traditionalist ., above,n. 17),1,n. 1. critics, 22Black2001{op.cit., above,n. 13),342-9. 23Montiverdi above,n. 16),315-6. (op.cit.,

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had been composedonlyabout a decade beforetheElegiaitself'.24 However, it seems unlikelythat Henry came into contactwiththistextat Bologna, where he had been a student:afterhis studentdays Henry rose up the ecclesiasticalhierarchy,onlyto be deprivedof an importantpost,possibly by the Bishop of Florence a loss which provided the stimulusfor his poem.25If the date of the Elegy(1 193), writtenin the wake of his displacementfromhighecclesiasticaloffice,is takenintoaccount,Henryhad probablyleftBologna to workin the diocese of Florencebeforethe composition ofAlexandras (1 182). Moreover,Henry'sknowledgeof Frenchpoetryseems to have been unique in Italy during the twelfthand earlier thirteenth century:as Witt declares,'Henryjoined the Frenchpoets in influencing a second Italian writer,Stefanardodi Vimercate,whose De controversia hominis etfortunae [ca. 1265] reflectsboth the manneriststyleand French With only Henry and Stefanardo(d. 1297), one concerns. philosophical Instead of evidence for the can hardlyspeak of a literarymovement'.26 1180, Henryof Settimello influx of French classicism on after major Italy is the proverbialexceptionto the rule. CommuncationbetweenBologna and France cannot have been intensein thisperiod,if Henryis the only example of Gallic neo-classicismbeforeStefanardo. Witt is rightto identifythe presence of French classicismin Italy in the secondhalfof the twelfth of Orléanism century:thereis thepenetration into the papal chancery,the evidence of Henry'sElegyand, most important,the testimonyof Boncompagno. But it seems unconvincingto me that thistendencycould have been transplantedonto barrenItalian soil; indeed Witthimselfgivesevidenceforcontinuedclassicalstudyin twelfthcenturyItaly: in thetwelfth of course, one encounters instances of some Occasionally century, oftheancient in northern writers andcentral knowledge Italy.PaulofCamaldoli's in thelasthalfofthecentury27 Introductiones written . . . indicates Paul'sacquaintance withthestandard Latinpoets.[Thereis also]a twelfth-century Italiancommentary on theDe inventione . . .28 24Witt1988(op.cit ., above,n. 8),49. 25Montiverdi above,n. 16),315. (op.cit., 26Witt1988(iop.cit ., above,n. 8),49. 27Le«Introductiones diPaoloCamaldolese dictandi» inedito delsec.XIIex.),ed.V. Sivo, (testo in: Studie ricerche dell'Istituto di Latino,3 (1980),69-100.See alsoLe «Introductiones de notitia versificando diPaoloCamaldolese inedito delxec.XII ex.),ed.V. Sivo,in:Studi (testo e ricerche dell'Istituto di civiltà classica cristiana 5 (1982),119-49. medievale, 28G. C. Alessio, Brunetto Latini e Cicerone in:Italiamedievale e umanistica, (e i dettatori), 22 (1979),125-6,citedbyWitt1988(op.cit., are above,n. 8), 66, n. 71. The following somefurther Italiancommented ofCiceronian rhetorical texts twelfth-century manuscripts

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Indeed, accordingto Otto of Freisingthe Lombards in the firsthalf of the twelfth century'retainthe elegance of the Latin language.'29A more is thatindigenousItalian classicalgrammaticalstudies, crediblehypothesis French in ecclesiastical concentrated schools,werestimulated by thisimported classicism,producinga work such as Henry's Elegyand Boncompagno's Italian schoolbooksof radicallynegativereaction.The 41 twelfth-century classical Latin authors that I have been able to identifyin Florentine these are explicittesFrenchinfluence;30 librariesshow no contemporary traditionin the and Italian an to grammatical indigenous thriving timony twelfthcentury. Wittis correctto highlightFrenchinfluenceon Italy fromthe end of the twelfth century,but the principalimportwas not classicism.The burItalian clerical,notarial,legal and academic classes administrative, geoning methodsof artificial slowtraditional withthepainfully could not be satisfied immersionin the authors;these were aspiringprofessionalswith careers and rising to pursue and quickerprogresswas needed. The ars dictaminis a twelfth the studies of centuryrepresented practical Italy during legal and professionalacademic direction,requiringa correspondingly pragmatic and simplifiedunderpinningin Latin at the secondarylevel. This was providedby the new Parisianlogical school of grammar,developed by teacherssuch as William of Conches and particularlyPetrusHelias. This systematicand logical approach to language, as created by the Parisiangrammarians,did not remainan esotericbranch twelfth-century of higherlearningin the middle ages; on the contrary,it was brought down to the humblerlevelsof the educationalhierarchyin the mostdeciPluteo50.7 Biblioteca MediceaLaurenziana, libraries: in Florentine thatI haveidentified Medicea ad Herennium Rhetorica ), glossed bya later12thc. hand;Biblioteca (Deinventione, in a written adHerennium Pluteo50.10(Deinventione , Topica , Rhetorica Laurenziana, ), partly in Caroline minuscule hand(11/12th Beneventan (12thc.),with12thc. glosses c.),partly MediceaLaurenziana, ofDe inventione to thebeginning in Caroline minuscule ; Biblioteca first ad Herennium Rhetorica Pluteo50.43(Deinventione, half,central Italy, ), 12thc. possibly unidentified a hitherto toDe inventione with12thc. glosses (thisms.contains bythescribe visible ofPoggio, exlibris light:[fol.86r]LiberPoggii onlyunderultraviolet autograph sec.'ap. Fl. 1 Ir.L. 2. S. 16 [thecostofthebookis addedbya latercursive hand]); ad Rhetorica VI.175(Deinventione, Nazionale Biblioteca Centrale, Florence, Magliabechiano 12thc. glosses. Herennium ), withsomepossible 29Tr. from inJ. B. Chroniclers Fideriä Gesta , andreprinted ofItaly Early byU. Balzani, Reader Medieval RossandM. McLaughlin , NewYork1949,281. (eds),ThePortable 30TheonlyFrench ofgramI havebeenabletoseeinthesebooksis a series influence ofplace,usingFrench casesofnounsandadverbs on changing matical exercises place on Horace,butthesedatefrom verseglosses to someFrench namesandcorresponding seeBlack2001(op.cit thesecondhalfofthethirteenth ., above,n. 13),189,n. 91. century:

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sive imaginable manner at the very turn of the thirteenthcentury.In ' 11 99, Alexander of Villedieu composed what must be one of the most influentialand innovatoryworks in the historyof education: Doctrinale. One aim of thistextbookwas to providea practicalsubstitute forPriscian's had a further in a numberof Institutiones. Doctrinale common with purpose otherworkscomposedat theturnof thethirteenth thedisplacement century: of the Roman classicsfromthe school curriculum.This was not only an but also of Alexander'sEcclesiale , where he explicitobjectiveof Doctrinale a as declared of the school of famous forits Orléans, emerged opponent classicism.Alexander'santi-classicism not only indicateda new direction for the literaryside of the curriculumbut also a new approach to the teachingof syntaxin the classroom:the traditionalmethodof immersion in the authorswas to be put to one side, and replacedby grammarbased on logic and philosophy.Alexanderemergesnot only as the arch-enemy of Orléans but also as the championof the new philosophy'shome, Paris, where he had himselfstudied.31 and the othergreatFrenchverse grammar,Evrard AlthoughDoctrinale of Béthune's Graecismus (1216), were both northernFrench works,they reached Italian schools rapidlyin the thirteenth century.Conclusiveevidence here comes fromItalian grammarswrittenin the thirteenth cenPietroda Isolella'sSumma contains , datableto the thirteenth tury.32 century, materialtakenfromDoctrinale and Graecismus , as does Giovannida Genoa's 33 Catholicon , completedin 1286. Most important, however,is the testimony of the PiedmontesegrammarianMayfredodi Belmonte,who in 1225 , in imicomposed a grammarin Vercelli,givingit the tide of Doctrinale tationof and homage to Alexanderof Villedieu.34This new styleParisian to the congrammarimportedto Italy correspondsin its anti-classicism anti-classical Italian ars dictaminis of temporary Boncompagno,Bene da Firenze and Guido Fava of the earlierthirteenth century. The earlythirteenth not a centuryrepresented period of slowlyrising classicismin Italy,but the collapse of traditionalItalian classicallybased secondaryeducation. An indicationof the spin-offon the school curriculumfromthe professionaldirectionof Italian highereducationcomes in a renownedFrenchtextof the earlythirteenth Henri d'Andeli's century, La batailledes.VII. ars: among the forcesranged againstgrammarand the 31Fortextual seeBlack2001(< references, ., above,n. 13),74-5. op.cit 32Black2001(op.cit., above,n. 13),82-3. 33Black2001(op.cit., above,n. 13),83-4. 34Black2001(op.cit., above,n. 13),55,n. 131.

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The Lombards authorsis rhetoric,marshallingmany Lombard knights.35 rhetoric rode with dialectic, following together wounding many honest enemiesfromthe authorialcamp.36The authorsare now abandoned in are removed from grammar'sjurisdiction. France; artistiand canonisti Bretonsand Germansstillare undergrammar'ssway,but grammarwould be throttledby the Lombards,given the chance.37 This collapseof classicaleducationin thirteenth-century Italyis confirmed by my recentlypublishedsurveyof schoolbooksnow housed in Florentine libraries.In comparisonwiththe 41 manuscriptsof classicalLatin authors Italy,the figurefor the next produced as schoolbooksin twelfth-century to a total of 10.38 This only pattern,to some extent,mircenturydrops rorsthe drop in overallnumbersof classicalmanuscriptsbeing produced in Europe as a whole in the thirteenth but the extremityof century,39 catthe fallsuggeststhatthe shiftaway fromthe classicswas particularly in Italian schools of the Duecento. aclysmic While emphasizingthe impactof Frenchclassicismon Italyafter1180, Witthimselfprovidesevidenceat the same timethatclassicalstudieswere in decline in Italy duringthe firsthalf of the thirteenth century: on an ancient thesurest Thatno Italiancommentary author, signthattheancient to theperiod1190to students, candefinitely be assigned author wasbeingtaught weretaught theancient works ofhowextensively 1250,raisesthequestion literary evenafter1190,andevenin Bologna. (35) Indeed, in place of the authorstherenow burgeonedpracticalmanuals forthe studyof secondaryLatin in thirteenth-century Italy,a genrewhich had hardlybeforeexistedsouth of the Alps. The thirteenth centurysaw the firstgreat floweringof Italian grammaticalstudies;this was also a period in whichmany copies were made in Italy of Alexander'sDoctrinale In some sense,the lattertwo workscame to serve and Evrard'sGraecismns. a dual purpose in thirteenth-century Italy: on the one hand, theyreinforcedpreviousgrammaticali knowledge,providingrules and listsin an memorized verse format;on the other,theyprovideda typeof subeasily stitutefor the study of the authors themselves,and were accordingly 35TheBattle ďAndeli A French Arts. , ed. L. Paetow, Berkeley byHenry poem oftheSeven 1914,43,w. 68-9. 36Ed. Paetow, 51,w. 224-5,228-9. 37Ed. Paetow, 60,w. 444-9. 38Black2001(op.cit., above,n. 13),192. 39See L. Reynolds a dropof andTransmission 1983,XXVII,giving , Oxford (ed.),Texts citedin thebook(from 280to 140)between ofmanuscripts number 50% in theoverall XIIc. andXIIIc.

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glossedrepeatedlyin the traditionalschool manner,as soon as theymade theirappearance in Italy. If collapsing,not rising,classicismwas the prevailingcultureof Italian education in the early thirteenth century,how then can the emergence ofhumanismbeginning withLovatolaterin thatsame century be explained? Here Witt'sfocuson the rise of Provençaland vernacularpoetryin early thirteenth-century Italy is crucial. This period is famous for the rise of the Italianvernacular,and thismovementcorrespondsexactlyto the anticlassicismcharacteristic of Italiangrammarand rhetoricteachingin schools and universities at the same time.What Lovato's humanismrepresented was a reactionagainst the overwhelminganti-classicism of the preceedas vernacular and Provençalpoetry: ing generations, typifiedby LovatodeiLovati . . . implied thatthepopularity ofvernacular him poetry spurred towrite Latinpoetry outofa spirit ofcompetition. in a letter So he suggested that he wrote about1290to hisfriend, Bellino a Latinpoetwho,perhaps Bissolo, only forthepurpose of argument, was apparently to champion thevernacular willing Lovato's criticisms. LovatotoldBellino ... hehadcomeacross a singer . . . 'belagainst thebattles ofCharlemagne andFrench in French, in barlowing exploits' 'gaping barous them outas hepleased, intheir nopartofthem fashion, order, rolling proper on no effort'. thelisteners hadhungon every word. Nevertheless, songsrelying Whilerecognizing thewisdom ofmaintaining themiddle coursebetween writing verses forthefewandforthemany, Lovatodeclared that'ifyoumusterron one . . . The obvious reference herewasto his side,it shouldbe on thesideofdaring' intention to write in Latinas opposed hispoetry to thevernacular: Do youdespise him[thecourageous thatonemustfolpoet]becausehe believes lowinthefootsteps oftheancient vatum poets(veterum vestigia ) ... I won'tchange my mind.I standfast, as is myhabit, andI won'tcorrect theviceofmylongdisease. Thisletter ofca. 1290conveys theelitism ofLovato, wholookeddownon vernacularliterature as inferior to Latin. . . Although theimmediate was antagonist - Provençal - givenLovato's French status poetry poetry commonly enjoyed higher totheveterum vatum canbe nodoubtthatheconsidered , there loyalty vestigia Provençal alsoinferior to Latinverse.Moregenerally, theletter indicates thecreative poetry tension between vernacular andLatinpoetry at thedawnofhumanism andinjects an element ofcompetition intothemixture ofcausesleading to theriseofa new Latinpoetry around1250.(53-4) In short,I agree withWittthattherewas a thrivingclassicalgrammatical cultureprevalentin Italian ecclesiasticalschools untilthe twelfth century. However, fromthat point I believe the evidence does not substantiate Witt'spictureof a rapid decline in classical education in Italy nor of a collapseof ecclesiasticalgrammarschoolsthereduringthe twelfth century. On the contrary,the evidence suggeststo me a coexistenceduringthe twelfth centuryof a classicallybased grammareducationin ecclesiastical schools togetherwith a risingnon-classicaleducation focusedon the ars dictaminis and professionalstudy.At the turn of the thirteenth century,

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these two conflictingapproaches openly clashed, as is clear from the polemicsof Boncompagno.The practical,non-classicalemphasisquickly prevailed,bolsteredas it was by the nascentuniversities, by the influxof new streamlinedFrench-style methods and by the rise grammarteaching of the vernacular.I do agree with Witt that Lovato's humanismwas a reaction,one, however,which was not just against the vernacularbut also opposed to the anti-classicism of the entire'secolo senza Roma', to or 'l'exil des belles lettres',in the words of Gilson.41 quote Toffanin,40 * * * Just as Witt'spictureof the culturalambience in which humanismwas born seems to require revision,so too does his view of the educational contextin which early humanismgrew.Accordingto Witt itseems thatbythemiddle decades ofthethirteenth courses likely century, university in ancient literature werebeingoffered at bothPaduaandBologna, andperhaps alsoat Arezzo.(89) It is correctto suggestthattherewas a minimalamountof classicsteaching subsistingin thirteenth-century Italy. This is confirmedby Witt'sreference to a commentaryon Persius made at Bergamo in 1253 and a copy of Horace, used as a Schoolbookin Treviso duringthe second half of the thirteenth century.(89-90) Moreover,it has been knownformore than fiftyyears that Geri d'Arezzo read Terence at school in Arezzo probablyduringthe 1280s.42None of thesescatteredpieces evidencecontradictsthe view that the studyof the classicshad drasticallydeclinedin Italy since the thirteenthcentury,substantiatedas it is by direct conand by myrecentsurveyof schoolbooksin Florentine temporary testimony libraries.Indeed, Wittseems at timesto supportthisview, declaringthat 'most of the earliestItalian humanistswere autodidactsas far as classical literaturewas concerned' (133), although he does not seem to be entirelysure about this point, statingas well that 'the young Lovato profitedin the 1250s and 1260s fromthe revivalof formalstudyof the ancienttextsin the studioof Padua' (95). In fact,Witt'spersuasiveand perceptivediscussionof Dante's earlyeduin favourof the view that therewas mincation offersfurthertestimony imal teachingof the classicsin thirteenth-century Italiangrammarschools: 40II secolo dalXIIIalXVIsecolo 1933. Roma dell'umanesimo senza , CittàdiCastello , inhisStoria 41E. Gilson, Paris1962,400-12. auMoyen Âge, Philosophie 42R. Weiss, e testi Il primo secolo dell'Umanesimo: Studi , Rome1949,128.

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We knownothing aboutDante'searlyeducation otherthanthatLatinicouldhave beenhisgrammar-school master. Whether or notthiswasthecase,Latini'sown on intermediary sources forhisfrequent references to ancient dependence poetsin theTresor underlines thegeneral ofthosepoetsin Florentine lifeand neglect literary ifDantewasLatini's makes itprobable ancient that, pupil,thenDantedidnotstudy in grammar school ... poetry in developing absorbed hiscreative talents in composing vernacular Passionately Dantehimself laterimplied inJune1290, that,untilthedeathofBeatrice poetry, whenhe hadbeenin hismidtwenties, he hadhadlittle needforotherintellectual stimulation. Overwhelmed itwasthen, he tellsus in Convivio thathe 11.12, bygrief, turned toBoethius's De consoìatione andCicero's De amicitia. Butheencounphilsophiae in reading tereddifficulty theLatin: "andit happened thatfirst it wasdifficult forme to understand theirmeaning, I entered butfinally intoitas faras I couldwiththegrammar [i.e.Latin]I had anda little ofmynative (214-5). insight" Witt's picture of Dante's weak Latin education in thirteenth-century Florenceis echoed by PatrickBoyde, who, as paraphrasedby Witt, divides Dante'seducation into'twoages,'in thefirst ofwhichhe waspassionately devoted tovernacular In thefiveyearsafter thedeathofBeatrice, heentered poetry. intothe'second andcontemplation . . . was age,'whenhecametoseethat'speculation man'shighest . . .' Boydeidentifies histurning forconsolation to Cicero's De activity amicitia andBoethius's De consoìatione as thefirst philosophiae phaseofthe'second age'. (216,n. 124) In my view, Witt,moreover,has successfully cleared up the interpretativeproblemsinvolvedin Dante's referenceto his 'lungo studio'of Vergil in Inferno I, 82-83, by referenceto FrancescoBarberino'sview,articulated in 1313-15,thatthis'lungo studio'may have meantthathe 'made notable progressin his studyin a shorttime' (220). What is unclearis whetherthisminimalteachingof the classicsoccurred at the level of higheror post-secondary education.In townssuch Arezzo, and Padua, secondarygrammarteachingwas supervisedby the Bologna universityauthorities;this practice goes back to the thirteenth century, and is evident,for example, in the famousAretineuniversity statutesof 1255.43But this university umbrelladoes not mean that the teachingof classical authorswas not at the secondarylevel, intendedprimarilyto completethe educationof grammarschool boys. The firstdocumentsof a university to read classicalauthorsis Giovannidel Virgilio's appointment at Bologna in 1321 to teach Vergil, Statius,Lucan and Ovid; the election was made by the commune of Bologna and thereis no mentionof the Studiumor university.Giovanni was simply appointed along with BertolinoBenincasa, the latterto teach rhetoric.It would be misleading 43See most Black1996(op.cit ., above,n. 9), 184-5. recently,

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to argue thatthisappointment was therefore independentof the university, as Bologna was of course the seat of one of Europe's greateststudiageneratici. On the otherhand, the authorswere not normallyincludedin the universitycurriculumin Italy until the fifteenth century;Giovanni del here would constitute an uncharacteristic Virgilio'sactivity example in the Trecento,especiallygiventhathis teachingdutiesin Bologna weresaid to include rhetoricin a subsequentdocument.It could be argued that, ratherthan a university-level appointment,his post at Bologna resembled the workof a communalgrammarteacherand auctorista , who also taught the authorsand rhetoricto more advanced pupils,like,forexample,Nofri di Giovannida Poggitazziat Colle Valdelsa in 1382, who 'leggieVergilio, Lucano et tuctialtori,rector[ic]a et anche lo Dante, a chi volesseudirlo'.44 Wittgoes on to suggestthat therewas littleteachingof the classicsat the grammarschool level in centraland northernItalybeforethe end of the fourteenth century(195-7). I have no doubt that this view is incoras there is substantialevidence showingthat the revivalof the clasrect, sics in Italian grammarschoolsgoes back to the earlyfourteenth century. In a late twelfth-century manuscript of Lucan (Biblioteca Medicea hand (not very late) Laurenziana, Pluteo 35.15), a fourteenth-century rewrotethe originaltext and cleaned all the parchment,includingthe numerousnotes of possessionat the end of the manuscript:one of these erased ownershipnotes was 'Iste Lucanus est <. . . e>lis <. . .> Magistři Andree', suggestingthe usual formula'morantisin scholismagistři';previouslythe book seems to have belonged to Maestro Andrea himself, judging fromanothernote on lr: 'Lucanus MagistřiAndree'. In another Lucan, this time copied in the thirteenthcentury(Florence,Biblioteca Riccardiana,546), thereare a numberof erased notes of possession,one of whichspeaksof 'morantisin sc<. . .>' (1 13v); thesenotesmustgo back to the fairlyearly Trecento,because theywere covered by seven verses writtenin cancelleresca script,datable no later than the thirdquarter of the fourteenth century.In a manuscriptof Ovid, copied at the end of the twelfth century(BibliotecaMedicea Laurenziana,Pluteo 36.14), a note of possessionon the finalfolio referring to MaestroJacopo da Vigevano century.A Sallustcopied may even go back to the end of the thirteenth in the twelfthcentury(Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Pluteo 89 inf. ,45who left 20.2) was later owned by a lawyercalled Ognibene de Vedrotis 44Black2001(op.cit., above,n. 13),201-2. 45Fol.64v:Explicit iudicis. D. Ugnibeni de Vedrotis liberSalustii

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not only ricordi of his various professionalactivitiesin 1349, 1351 and 1352 (2v, 9v), includinga period as a judicial rectorin Pescia but also this possible indicationof his own schooldays:'Require illud modicum istiusprimilibriin librotuo Apostilorum dominidey,et principiumsecundi libriin DonatoMagistřiGuiçardi optimiprofessoris.'(32v)46This annotationrefersto theteachingof earlyhumanist, MaestroGuizardoda Bologna, who taughtin his native cityfrom 1289 to 1319 as well as in Florence from 1321 to 1322; it is possible that this Sallust came to Ognibene in the contextof Guizardo's teaching.There is also a clear North Italian, Lombard school Sallust in Florence (Biblioteca Medicea Laurenziana, Ashburnham900), datingfromthe earlyfourteenth centuryand bearing the followinglate-Trecentonote of possession:'Est Marcholi de Pergamo qui legit in iscola Magistřitolomei de Magna' (13v),47as well as BibliotecaMedicea Laurenziana, Pluteo 36.5, a compositeMetamorphoses and at the turnof the fourteenth copied in the thirteenth century(212r: Liber MagistřiPeregrinide Pisis). Other earlyfourteenth-century schoolbooks include a Horace (BibliotecaMedicea Laurenziana, Pluteo 34.22) and a ValeriusMaximus (BibliotecaMedicea Laurenziana,Pluteo 63.28). Particularlyproblematicis Witt'sview that in Florence the 'firstlevel of education was designed to provide studentswith trainingin reading and writingtheirown language' (194), arguing'for the formalteaching of the vernacularin Florentineschools' (193, n. 74). I am certainthat the vernacularwas not used at what mustseem to us as the most obvious point in the curriculum:the elementarystages of learningto read. All survivingelementaryreading texts from Italy before 1500 are in Latin.48It may have been educationallyproblematic,if not impossible,to teach basic readingtechniquein a language withoutany fixedorthograbeforethe sixteenthcentury.Indeed, in phy, such as the Italian volgare the middleages and earlyRenaissance,Latin was regardedas an artificial, created,unchanginglanguage, an ars suitablefor teaching,whereas the vulgarlanguageswere regardedas changeable,unstable,and literallyas formsof babble,49learnt naturallybut formallyunteachable; only with triumphof the humanistview of Latin as itselfa natural, historically 46Thisannotation, at endoftheincomplete BC andacephalous coming BJ, indicates where tofindthemissing passages. 47Fol. 12v:Marcoloidentifies himself as sonof'DominiMichaelis de Pergamo'. 48See Black2001 above,n. 13),41-2. (op.cit., 49On changing ofLatinandvernacular inthemiddle conceptions agesandRenaissance, seetheimportant il latino e il volgare study byS. Rizzo,Petrarca, , in: Studipetrarcheschi, andbibliography. (1990),8-40,whocitesa widerangeoftexts

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changinglanguage in the sixteenthcenturycould it become conceivable to teach fundamentallanguage skillsin the vernacular medium. It is of ars importantto rememberthe close association,even identification, and teachingin the middle ages; Latin was teachable preciselybecause it was consideredan artificiallanguage,whereas teachingthe vernacular not an ars.A parwas inconceivablebecause it was natural,not artificial, indicationof exclusivelyLatinate elementaryeducaticularlysignificant tion,moreover,is the progressivestructureof the elementarycurriculum. CurriculumoutlinesthroughoutItaly specifya similarsyllabusprogressing fromtable to psalterto Donatus. The elementarycurriculumwould make littlesense if vernaculardevotionaltexts,for example, the seven penitentialpsalms,had been insertedas a preparationto read a demanding elementaryLatin worksuch as Ianua. The factthatvernacularprayers thatthesewere texts and psalmsexistin manuscriptin no way indicates50 used to learn reading:an accuratereadingof the MargheritaDatini's letter to her husband Francesco about the early readingof theirdaughter Tina at the turnof the fifteenth century,suggestingthatthe sevenpsalms were no longersynonymouswiththe psalterby the turnof the fifteenth century,is concreteevidencethatcollectionsof the sevenpsalms,whether in the vernacularor in Latin, were not used as psaltersto teach reading.51The evidenceforan entirelylatinatereadingsyllabusin fourteenth seems conclusive.52 and fifteenth-century Italy,therefore, 50As suggested Florence Art.Grammar, andculture inTrecento , society, byP. Gehl,A Moral in areknown IthacaN.Y. 1993,36: 'penetential , forexample, psalmsin Tuscanvolgare ofItalian thefirst andwouldbe among presses printing popular products many manuscripts forbeginhavethought ituseful masters wouldsurely andwriting in the1470s.Reading in thevernacular'. nersto learnto readsuchtexts 51See Black2001(< ., above,n. 13),38-9. op.ät 52Nevertheless, cenGehl1993(< ., above,n. 50),32,saysthat,forthefourteenth op.cit inthevernacular butinconis sketchy wasentirely thatsomeschooling the'evidence tury, attheCrossroads: Hercules a document as evidence Witt, trovertible', byRonald published citing the N.C. 1983,31,n. 13regarding Salutati TheLife, andThought , Durham Works, ofColuccio in 1372:'[thecommune] in Buggiano communal schoolmaster possit proeiussalariosibi libros libros si docebit et,si nondoceret stantiare, gramaticam, quinquaginta gramaticam, , 31, takesthispassageto meanthat'localschoolmasters Witt,Hercules vigintiquinque.' often didnotknowLatin'.Gehl'sinterpretation, 32-3, bytheseruralcommunes employed fora stipend statutes is: '[...] in thecaseoftheBuggiano provided [. . .] thecityfathers and25 lireiftheonlyoneavailwhocouldteachgrammatica of50 lirefora schoolmaster but whocouldnotteachgrammatica suchinstruction ablecouldnotoffer [. . .] Themaster in Latin.'A moreaccurate notteaching weissurely andwriting whocouldteachreading to him[namely, can authorize oftheLatintextis: [thecommune] translation payment of50 lire,andifhe werenotteaching ifhe willteachgrammar, theteacher], grammar, wouldbe paidaccordlire.Gehltakesthepassageto meanthata teacher oftwenty-five moreifhe knewLatin,lessifnot.Butsincethetextis notabout ingto hisabilities:

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Witthas continuedto argue in favourof the vernacular Nevertheless, as a mediumforteachingreadingin earlyRenaissanceFlorence,53 putting forwardthreepossiblepieces of concreteevidence. Firstly,he notes that some vernacularversionsof the Latin classics 'appear in manuscriptsas if theywere used forteachingpurposes,withthe textin the middle and commentariesand notes in the wide marginsor between the lines'.54 Secondly,he saysthat'Florentinevernacularverseson the ABCs ascribed to a certainGuidottoexistforthe fourteenth century,suggestinga direct in the tavola :'.55Thirdly,he pointsto a collectionof linkwithinstruction vernaculartexts(BibliotecaMedicea Laurenziana,Gaddi 193) which'served as a vernacularparallel to shortLatin textssuch as the Disticha[Catonis] 56used at the and Dittochaeon grammarschoollevel' (103).57I remainunconvinced. Firstly,translatedcommentariessometimesaccompanied Latin texts(e.g. excerptsfromWilliam of Conches's commentaryon Boethius were translated and copied into the margins of Biblioteca Medicea do not seem to have Laurenziana,Pluteo 23 dxt. 11)58but the translations been used for teaching.59Commentarieswere mechanicallytranslated along with textsfrom commentatedLatin versions(see e.g. Biblioteca Riccardiana, 1338 (translationof Henry of Settimello,Elegia)84v ff.)but thiskind of vernacularmechanicaltranslationof textsdoes not indicate teachingor a school context,any more than the mechanicalcopyingof Latin commentaries.Secondly, Maestro Guidotto's alphabetic rhyming couplets(foranotherms. not mentionedby Witt,see Florence,Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale,II. 11.68, 239r-v)call to mind the opposite of reading in the vernacular:oral, not written,teachingof the alphabet (a type of alphabeticnurseryrhyming).Thirdly,as Witt acknowledges,the text of BibliotecaMedicea Laurenziana, Gaddi 193 cannot itselfbe a schoolbook, giventhatit is writtenin mercantesca script(hardlyfoundin schoolbooks) and is an unused copy; he goes on to speculate that thereis 'a collectionswhich strongprobabilitythat the Gadd. 193 representsvolgare ofthe thesubject he does,teachgrammatica whether theteacher can,butwhether (Latin), nothislinguistic is thelevelat whichhe willbe teaching, capacities. passage 53What Florence read andunite? inearly Renaissance didGiovannino , in:I TattiStudies, Literacy 6 (1995),83-114. 54Ibid,83-4. 55Ibid, 102. 56On thesetexts, seeBlack2001(iop.cit , above,n. 13),173ff. 57Witt1995(iop.cit , above,n. 53),103. 58SeeR. BlackandG. Pomaro, and Boethius' s Consolation ofPhilosophy inItalian Medieval andtheir inFlorentine libraries Renaissance Education: schoolbooks , Florence 2000,86,239ff. glosses 59Ibid,310,n. 522.

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wereso used and subsequently However, disappearedfromwear and tear'.60 the assumptionthat this book was the work of schoolboysis uncertain: the ownersare not identifiedas attendingschools,and the hand of the copyistrecallsnot a school contextbut the vernacularambience of devotional codices fromthe mid-fourteenth century. * * * Wittconsidershumanismas in essence a secular movement,involvedin literaryand philologicalactivitiesdistinctfromthe Christiantradition.For to antique him,humanismwas born when Lovato succeededin returning verse style as practised by the great Roman pagan poets; he himself showed no particularreligiousinclinations,nor did AlbertinoMussato, his successoras the leader of the movement,untilthe end of his life.In Witt'sview, Petrarchwas an aberration,as was Salutati: theirattempts to integratehumanismand Christianity were not entirelysuccessful,and with the rise of early Ciceroniansmunder the leadershipof Leonardo Christianinclinationsand returned Bruni,humanismshed its artificially to a less volatileand internally secularmovement.Wittsugcontradictory that Christian humanism made a genuine returnonly with Valla gests and his generationin the mid-fifteenth century. There is much to recommendthisapproach: it would be hard to find a group of writersand intellectualsless outspokenabout theirChristian affiliations than the practitioners of the ars dictaminis and so it is convincing to findthat theirimmediateprofessionalsuccessors,the firsthumanIn fact,it was not ists,were also lackingin deeper Christiansentiments. the dictatores as forerunners of the who, humanists,showed little only explicitinterestin the Christiantradition.The grammaticaltradition,as embodied in the studiesof grammarteachersin medievalItaly,was also to Christiansources.In my recentbook on the gramnotablyindifferent in medievaland RenaissanceItaly,I foundthatthe explicmar curriculum in manuscriptglosseswere 'overwhelmingly itlynamed authorities literary/ in character.'The entirelistincludesonlythree grammatical/philological' authoritiesin theology:Boethius,Augustineand Jerome. Old and New Testamentsare both near the bottom.'61Similarly,in my recentstudyof in medievaliand Renaissance manuscriptglossesto Boethius'sConsolation grammarschools,I found that the only theologicalauthorityto emerge 60Witt1995(op.cit., above,n. 53),104. 61Black2001{op.cit., above,n. 13),303.

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was Augustine,and that he lagged behind Seneca, Ovid, Cicero and Horace.62In Boethiusglosses,the Bible made a bettershowingthan in glossesto literarytexts,but it seems clear that the overall characterof Boethiusglosseswas literary/philological, not philosophical/theological. The evidence emergingfromWitt's studyof the early humanists,as well as frommy work on grammarschool glossing,confirmsKristeller's pictureof the Renaissance and humanismas showing thesteady andirresistible ofnonreligious intellectual interests which werenot growth so muchopposedto thecontent ofreligious as rather withit doctrine, competing forindividual andpublicattention. Thiswasnothing new,butrather fundamentally a matter ofdegree andofemphasis. TheMiddle a religious Ageswascertainly epoch, butitwouldbe wrong to assumethatmen'sentire attention wasoccupied byreliletalonebytheological, ... I amconvinced thathumanism was gious, preoccupations initscoreneither norantireligious, buta literary andscholarly orientation religious thatcouldbe and,inmany without discourse onrelicases,waspursued anyexplicit whootherwise be fervent or nominal members of gioustopics byindividuals might oneoftheChristian churches . . .63 Wittdistinguishes betweengenuineChristianhumanists,such as Petrarch and Salutati,and thosewhose adherenceto Christianity hardlypenetrated theirhumanismto any significant degree,such as Lovato and Bruni.Again, thisis furtherdemonstration of the soundnessof Kristeller'sapproach: thetermhumanism, to theRenaissance ofthewords Confining according meaning humanist and humanities, to therhetorical, and moralconcerns of the classical, Renaissance oftheparticular ortheological humanists, regardless philosophical opinionsheldbyindividual andofthetheological, or humanists, scientific, philosophical, whichindividual scholars withtheirhumanist juristic training mayhavecombined wemight choose tocallChristian humanists allthose scholars whoaccepted education, theteachings ofChristianity andweremembers ofoneofthechurches, without necortheological intheir orscholarly essarily discussing religious topics literary writings. allRenaissance before andafter theReformation, Bythisstandard, humanists, practically wereChristian sincetheallegedcasesofopenly conhumanists, paganor atheistic victions arerareanddubious. Butitisprobably tousetheterm Christian preferable humanism in a morespecific itto thosescholars witha humansense,andtolimit istclassical and rhetorical whoexplicitly discussed or theological training religious in all or someoftheir problems writings.64 Where I should to some extentpart fromKristellerand Wittis in their insistencethatthe rootsof the Renaissancewere essentially non-Christian. For Witt,Renaissance humanismwas born, as has been already seen, 62BlackandPomaro2000 cit (op. , above,n. 58),6-8. 63Kristeller, andChristianity in hisRenaissance TheClassic, and Paganism Scholastic, Thought. Humanist Strains , NewYork1961,72,74-5. 64Ibid,86.

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when Lovato attemptedto recapturethe poetic style of the ancients. Similarly,Kristellerwrotethat the oreven a religious humanism wasinitsorigin view. . . thatRenaissance movement, intheMiddleAges,seems tendencies a religious certain reaction antireligious against or exaggerated.65 to meequally wrong In a paper which I publishedin 1995, I believe I demonstratedthat the idea of the Renaissance as a rebirthof a time of lightas opposed to a precedingdarkerperiod was relatedto discussionsof ecclesiologyin the middle ages.66In particular,Petrarch'sideas of ancientand modernhistorywere developed explicitlyfromhistoricalschemes about the primitive and modern periods of church historyin which the Donation of Constantineprovidedthe crucial turningpoint.67Moreover,I showed,I think,that Petrarch'slinkingof religiousand culturalhistorywas carried on by many later humanistsand persistedthroughoutthe sixteenthcenIn view of this new evidence,it seems to me that Kristellerand tury.68 the religiousimplicationsof the Renaissance's Wittgo too farin dismissing early development.Althougha key early humanistsuch as Bruni may not have writtenexplicitlyreligiousor Christiantexts,it is hard to believe that when he talked about the revivalof the arts69he could have been unaware of the powerfuland inherentlinkbetweenthe declineof antique classicismand the decay of the early churchwhich had been developed so powerfully by Florentine by Petrarchand thenechoed soon afterwards writerssuch as Boccaccio and Filippo Villani.70What I am sayingis that the ideology of the Renaissance, as created by Petrarch,was potently linkedto the ideal of the revivalof the primitiveand apostolic church; it is hard to agree that humanismwas an in this basic sense, therefore, 65Kristeller 1961(op.cit ., above,n. 63),74. 66R. Black,TheDonation a newsource ?, in: oftheRenaissance fortheconcept ofConstantine: 51-85. Oxford Renaissance and AlisonBrown 1995, , Italy of (ed.),Language Images 67Ibid.,64-9. 68Ibid.,69-77. 69E.g.in hisLifeofPetrarch in RossandMcLaughlin intoEnglish (eds),The , translated Reader Portable Renaissance , NewYork1978,128. 70Black1995{op.cit., di Bandino, Domenico fellow Aretine, above,n. 66),78. Bruni's fellow thatoneofBruni's link:seeibid.,78,n. 98. It is alsointeresting madea similar humanist a secular as in book Witt's who Giceronians, appears Vergerio, Pierpaolo early a panwrote ofdeepreligious evidence actually commitment'), givelittle (383:'hiswritings and fortheendoftheGreatSchism inan oration church oftheprimitive pleading egyric oratio cardinales ad Romanos ecclesia in 1406:see Proredintegranda delivered tempore uniendaque storico habita inconsistorio schismatis , ed. C. A. Combi,in:Archivio per , a. 1406,novembri, 1 360-74. il e l'Istria Trentino, Trieste, (1881-2),

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secular movement.Humanism may have begun along a 'noninherently Christiandirectionunder the religious'path, but it took an irreversibly reins of Petrarch,when he created the ideology of the Renaissance in termsof a contrastbetweenantiquityand moderntimeswith the dividing line providedby the Donation of Constantine. * * * For Witt,humanismwas in essence a literaryphenomenon;the social and particularly the politicalideas of the humanistswere secondaryconcerns. This is a refreshing approach, especiallyin the wake some twenwhich tended to place the politicalimplications tieth-century scholarship, of humanismin the historicallimelight.Most influential here was the theof 'civic a label invented Hans in 1925 to Baron humanism', ory by describewhat he believed to have been a decisivemomentof change in Westernthought:fromthe contemplative,monarchicalemphasis of the middleages to the active,republicanideals of the Renaissanceand beyond. However,it is now commonlyaccepted that Bruni,like Salutati71before after him,was an apologistforthe oligarchicregimein Florenceinstituted Bruni and 1382; many of his compatriotswere not the idealisticand patrioticrepublicansportrayedby Baron.72EliminatingBaron's claim to have foundthe momentof transitionfrommedieval to modernthought reduces 'civic humanism'to a more or less fleetingideology,fashioned frompre-existing traditionsof politicalideas. It is misleadingto call these apologetics'civic humanism':it is well knownfromKristeller'sworkthat humanismdid not constitutea philosophy,73 and so any civic varietyof humanismcould not involvea new directionforhumanistthought.It is a misunderstanding of the nature of humanismto see it as an evolving seriesof philosophicaloutlooks:humanismwas not a developingphilosophy but rather a rhetorical /philologicalapproach and method. The of works quantity pro-monarchical (forexample,'mirrorof princes'tracts) faroutweighsgenuinelypro-republican productionsduringtheRenaissance, a facthardlysurprisingin a period which saw the witheringand virtual demise of the Italian communal tradition.Medieval scholasticthought, 71See R. Black,The chancellors political , in:TheHistorical thought oftheFlorentine Journal, 29 (1986),991-1003. 72SeeJ. Hankins Renaissance Civic Humanism , Cambridge (ed.), 2000,esp.thearticles by andM. Hörnqvist; A. Field,Leonardo Florentine traitor? theMedici and J.Najemy Bruni, Bruni, anAretine 51 (1998),1109-50. of1437,in:Renaissance conspiracy Quarterly, 73Kristeller 1944-45 ., above,n. 1). (< op.cit

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on both sides of the Alps, could be richlyrepublican,anti-monarchical and favourableto activepoliticalparticipation.Notable here are not only familiarfiguressuch as Marsilius,Ptolemyof Lucca and Aquinas, but also othersrarelyencounteredin this context,such as Nicole Oresme, John of Paris, Engelbertof Admont and William of Ockham.74'Civic humanism'is a misnomer:most Renaissance political thoughtwas not civic,and muchmedievaland Renaissancecivicthoughtwas not humanist. For Witt,on the otherhand,theheartof humanism'searlydevelopment is theemergenceof a classicalprosestyleand particularly of Ciceronianism. There can be no doubt that Witt'semphasishere is historically correct. Despite the early poetic predelictionsof Lovato, Mussato and even the youngerPetrarch,prose soon became the overridingpreoccupationof humanists;almostall humanistswroteLatin prose,whereasonlya minority attemptedLatin verse. What united the vast majorityof humanistswas not a particularpoliticalphilosophyor even any special interestin politics or politicalthought,but ratheran attemptto reviveclassicalprose style. Baron's concentrationon humanistpoliticalideas is an anachronisticdistortionof the humanists'actual interestsand activities.Politicsand political thoughtloomed largerin the twentiethcenturythan latinity,but in theRenaissanceit was just the opposite.It is perhapsWitt'smostsignificant achievementto have at last restoredthe properbalance betweenthe literaryand politicalsides of Renaissance humanism. * * * is a wide-rangingsynthesisof Ronald Witt's (In theFootsteps oftheAncients' his own copious earlier researchand writings,as well as of a massive amount of otherscholarlyliterature.He adds to this existingmateriala detailed stylisticanalysis of key examples of medieval and particularly earlyhumanistpoetryand prose. Out of thismaterialhe fashionsa stimof the originsof humanismand its ulatingand provocativeinterpretation of from the interpretative It detracts originality subsequentdevelopment. Witt'sachievementforhim to suggestthathe is the firstscholarseriously to considerthe generationsbeforePetrarchas genuinehumanistsrather than pre-humanists(18-21). In fact, Roberto Weiss entitledhis classic whileKristellerwrote book,publishedin 1949, Il primosecolodell'umanesimo, that 'Petrarchwas not the fatherof humanism,nor the firsthumanist, " andmedieval 74J.Blythe, humanism 2000(op.cit., "Civic above, , in:Hankins thought political n. 72),30-74.

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of a movementthat had begun but merelythe firstgreat representative at least one generationbeforehis time'.75AlthoughI do not agree with neverthelessit is undeniable that this several of Witt's interpretations, to the fieldof humaniststudies,and thatit book is a major contribution discussionand research. will stimulatefurtherfruitful Universityof Leeds SchoolofHistory

75Kristeller 1964(op.citabove,n. 5), 162.

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Reviews Walter undEpochenstil imlateinischen Mittelalter. IV. Ottonische Berschin, Biographie Biographie. Das hohe 920-1220n. Chr.ErsterHalbband, 920-1070n. Chr.Anton Mittelalter, Hiersemann 1999XIV & 272S. ISBN3 71729102(Quellen und Verlag, Stuttgart desMittelalters, zurlateinischen Band12,2) Untersuchungen Philologie Ebensowiein denvorhergehenden Bändenfallt beiderLektüre desneuesten Teils(IV, erster vonBerschins fesselnd undEpochenstil imlateiniHalbband) geschriebener Biographie schen Mittelalter auf,dasses kaumeineliterarische Gattung gibt,in derdie traditionsgebundenen Elemente Aufbau undinzahlreichen einegrössere Einzelheiten) (imallgemeinen alsin derspätantiken undmittelalterlichen Treffsicher weissder Rollespielen Biographie. ininhaltlicher Autor wiesichdenvetera allmählich auchnova sowohl zugesellen, darzulegen, daraufhin Hinsicht alsinderliterarischen Form.Erweist (S. 128),dassdie beispielsweise im allemannischen vonAugsburg erstmals Raumeine Vita(I) S. Uodalrici vonGerhard nichtklösterlicher Kultur die das Ergebnis städtischer, ist,und Biographie repräsentiert, imMittelalter indieser Literaturform erbetont erstmals (S. 212),dassAdamvonBremen mit dieVorzüge undSchwächen einerPerson(Bischof Adalbert vonHamburg-Bremen) hat. Aufmerksamkeit bedacht gleicher Im vierten zuerst die beklagenswerte Bandbeschreibt Berschin Lage,in dersichdie imAbendlande zwischen einerZeit,in lateinische Literatur 920und960n. Chr.befand, schwere NotüberEuropagebracht derdieAngriffe derWikinger, Sarazenen undUngarn zu stellter fest,wusste sichauchdamalsnocheinigermassen hatten. Die Biographie, siesicheinJahrhundert Darauf entwickelte Literaturgattung, langalsdieführende behaupten. in war.Der Schwerpunkt wiesiedas auchin derMerowingerzeit lagzunächst gewesen aus dem undEngland im zwölften traten Jahrhundert jedochFrankreich Mitteleuropa, Schatten hervor. Berschin sichvorzüglich Imspezifischen desMittelalters kennt Vokabular aus,wasseinen überpräziseWorthatin mancher beachtenswerter Bemerkung Niederschlag gefunden ornamenta sindzumBeispiel Kunsthistorisch Bemerkungen; folgende wichtig bedeutungen. die 'Inneneinrichtung'; ecclesiae bezeichnet den'Kirchenschatz' (S. 146),nichtallgemein wieHychni findet manfìirlucida während dependentes (S. 145)in denLexikaÜbersetzungen Versuche: exlaquearibus' 'lustre', 'Fenster'), (andere 'Glasgemälde', 'lampe','candélabre' aufIsidorus, bietetBerschin die richtige Etymologiae Ubersetzung 'Apsis',unterHinweis Berschin unsauftischt. lanx welche Es isteinefachmännisch bereitete satura, 15,8,7. Feinsinnige derLatinität derverschiedenen Perioden, Beschreibungen eingehende Charakterisierungen Hinweise aufTopoiundtraditionelle Autoren undvielesachkundige derwichtigsten ist Zu korrigieren in reichem Masszu finden. Bandwieder sindauchindiesem Elemente von anlässlich einerStellein der Vita(I) S. Uodalrici eineStelle(S. 144),wo Berschin das Nomen istam Anfang 'In griechischen bemerkt: vonAugsburg Gerhard Majuskeln XPYI0Yhypergräzisierend sacrum I, 0 statt T) wiedergegeben (prol.2).'Ermöchte (Y statt Es handelt sichhierjedoch Buchstaben also'Christi' lesen,in griechischen geschrieben. ist: dreierNominasacra,wobeieineÄnderung um einegeläufige überflüssig Kürzung zumBeispiel Manvergleiche SohnGottes'). (MP0Y, Y(iò)I0(eo)Y('Christus, XP(iaiòç) findet. als auchaufMosaiken in Handschriften dassichsowohl 'Mutter Gottes'), Vita S. Odilonis alsQuellefìirIotsald, weist Berschin 1,13(S. 246)aufSuetonius, Richtig Vwarium 40,2

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latericium etreliquisse marmoreum. WasKaiserAugustus vonRom Vita 28,3hin:invenisse Augusti latericium ist zu korrigieren: hat,sagtOdilovonCluny.Hieristdie Übersetzung gesagt traditionelle sondern 'aus Ziegeln'. Um nocheinigebewusst verwendete nicht'hölzern', hervorzuheben: wieAbraham sumetpereElemente (Gen. 23,4)vonsichselbst sagt:Advena inWidmungsbrief derGesta vos sichAdamvonBremen , bezeichnet Hammaburgensis grinus apud eeclesiae ebenfalls als einenFremden (S. 212).EineStelleaus der Wiboradavita pontificum an das Gleichnis vombarmherzigen Samariter zu erinnern (S. 123semi(c. 33) scheint semivivo auchplagis hat necem discesserunt nebenLuk.10,30abierunt relicto; impositis relinquentes hiereineParallele). DerTextin derWiboradavita istjedochbewusst mitanderen Worten worden. stilisiert inseiner AlsJohannes desBischofs Adalbert vonPrag(c. 8) die Canaparius Biographie melior bono verwendet erseinModellinderklas(S. 163),findet Formulierung augustus patre EinEchoklingt Carm. nach sischen Horatius, 1,16,1o matre pulchra filiapulchrior. Dichtung: inderAdalbertpassion maior exparentibus (II) c. 1 vonBrunvonQuerfurt: filius magnis (S. 169) undweiter nochzweimal am Schluss derselben Stelle:Bonus sedmelior mater, pater, Optimus exipsis sedpukrior ; und:pulcra quinascitur facie, spiritu. istauch,dassdasvonPetrus DamianiamAnfang Zu bemerken derVorrede zurVita S. Romualdi verwendete mundus immundus Schriften (S. 264)sichindenchristlichen Wortspiel seitAugustinus findet. Die lateinische des Klinck, Vgl.zumBeispielRoswitha Etymologie Mittelalters Studien Aevum, 1970,S. 117f.; (Medium Philologische 17),München J.Werner, Lateinische undSinnsprüche desMittelalters , Darmstadt 1966,S. 72 (M 82)Mundus Sprichwörter caret necmundo nomine laude Venantius Carmina claret, Fortunatus, 3, 23a, 11 (Ausg.Leo,S. mundi mundus necsinttibicrimina mundi. ; ibid.4,6,3(S. 84):Sedquiatumundus 74):inlecebris In Abbo,Passio S. Eadmundi c. 12(S. 229)antwortet dasabgeschlagene HauptdesKönigs aufdieFragedersuchenden Leute'Wobistdu':Her,her, Latinus sermo her, quod interpretatum Kontext könnte einEchosein Hic,hic,hic.Das hic,hic,hicin einemwunderbaren exprimit: vonderWeise,in derPaulinus vonMailand(VitaAmbrosii Hist. 51; vgl.auchOrosius, dieErscheinung desverstorbenen Bischofs Ambrosius derMascezel deutbeschreibt, 7,36,7) lichmacht, dassdieserebenan derStelle,wo er dreimal mitseinem StabdenBoden überseinenBruder Gildosiegenwird(Hinweis (ait:'Hic,hic,hic',signans schlägt locum) A. Bastiaensen). AmEndedeszweiten Halbbandes wirddieAuswahl literarisch undhistorisch bedeutender lateinischer in Gruppen, die Zeittafel, das Verzeichnis derzitierten Biographien Handschriften unddasNamenregister zu finden sein.Das monumentale Werkistmitdem Halbband wieder seiner nähergekommen. jetzterschienenen Vollendung Nijmegen

G.J.M.Bartelink

"Historia - Übersetzung - literaturwisHasse(ed.),Abaelards calamitatum". Text Dag Nikolaus Walter de Berlin-New York ISBN 2002. senschaftliche Modellanalysen. Gruyter, 3-11-017012-4.

Abelard's Historia calamitatum hasneverceasedto provoke theinterest ofreaders from a widerangeofdisciplinary andnational Forcenturies, thistexthasbeenseen backgrounds. - a rebelagainst as presenting Abelard as thearchetypal 'modern' theauthority of figure whoanticipates theindividualism ofmodernity. is theexchange tradition, Justas famous ofletters between HeloiseandAbelard, attached tothisautobiographical narrative always in themanuscript tradition. The longhistory ofscholarly these controversy surrounding texts itself testifies to their oftwelfth-century keyrolein anydebateaboutthecharacter © Koninklijke BrillNV,Leiden,2002 - www.brill.nl Alsoavailable online

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editedbyDag Hasse,proThisnewvolume, to modernity. anditsrelationship culture to a newstagein thisdebate.It brings videsa welcome contribution essays by together ofliterary in applying a variety interested ofyounger German a newgeneration scholars, inbotha Latinedition toa familiar text, (basedonthatofMonfrin, presented perspectives translation anda German ofthecritical elements withonlyessential retained) apparatus The volume oftheotherletters). oftheHistoria calamitatimi not,unfortunately, (although Latintext, buta range notonlyAbelard's toolthatpresents an excellent teaching provides thathasneverlostitstopicality. on a narrative ofcontemporary perspectives moveawayfromthehotly Hassenotesthatall thecontributors In hisintroduction, scholars so muchinthe1970sandearly1980s. thatagitated ofauthenticity, debated issues ofa traces thatthebodyofletters thattheyreston a 'newconsensus' He argues betrays thatcomesfromthetimeofAbelardand Heloise,in whichthe 'Gesamtkomposition' as an independent conceived calamitatimi wasoriginally Historia composition, byAbelard tradition of themonastic within to a corpusofletters, butwasthenattached preserved inhisintrotheseperspectives theParaclete (Hasse,p. viii).Hassedoesnotclaimtounify theAbelard-Heloise thattheyall consider otherthanto suggest duction, correspondence in thisvolume is a desireto move to all theessays models. in terms ofliterary Implicit intention or ofauthorial to readthesetextsin terms conventional attempts awayfrom of the concerns into a The collection insight fascinating provides individuality. subjective ofoneofthemostcelin theirreading theorists ofGerman a newer literary generation of all shapedin onewayoranother texts ofthetwelfth ebrated bytheconcerns century, rather thanindividuality, formodels they hopetomakeeviBylooking post-structuralism. clichés. to stereotyped reduced texttoooften ofa medieval dentthecomplexity a number concerned is explicitly Whilethevolume calamitatimi, onlywiththeHistoria This Abelard withtherestoftheHeloisecannot avoiddealing ofessays correspondence. on ofMarkus thecasewiththechapter is particularly Asper 'Rezeptionsästhetik'. Asper book'forthesisa 'Foundation to provide wasintended thatthecorrespondence argues has intimate intowhichinauthentic oftheParaclete, ters(andperhaps dialogue monks) ofHeloiseservaboutthemonastic an exemplum topresent beenincluded life,theletters toestabwithanyattempt The difficulty conversion. a modelofmonastic ingtoprovide reader ofthis is thattheonlyknown calamitatum oftheHistoria function lishthe'original' manis thattheearliest wasHeloise.Evenmoreproblematic textin thetwelfth century outside inthelatethirteenth tocirculate ofthecorrespondence century onlystart uscripts as as a wholefunctioned thatthecorrespondence milieu. Whiletheargument a monastic Luscombe like scholars raised book'attheParaclete, a 'Foundation Waddell, previously by as a wholewere theletters as towhether remains one,thequestion etc.,is a reasonable To left unresolved. are so issues when a as written many composition, single originally liferisks modelofthereligious a monastic impospresents arguethatthecorrespondence different between withtension thatbrims ona dialogue uniform subtly category inga single andHeloiserespectively. ofreligious models life,ofAbelard ofMichel in drawing on thethought ofFrankBezneris moresatisfying The chapter calamiofselfin theHistoria oftheconstruction context thepolemical toexplain Foucault of theascetic is thatit situates ofBezner's Partofthestrength tatum. argument analysis aboutthe in thesermons ofhiswiderargument thecontext within narrative Abelard's claims without oftheworld, andtherejection ofChrist imitation anyproblematic making of Abelard's is thewayBenzertraces interest aboutHeloise.Ofparticular understanding thatChrist hisdoctrine a basisforhiscontroversial as providing proChristology, exemplum Foucault totheloveofGod.While wearedrawn which videsthesupreme through example andmodtotheMiddleAges,as totheancient as muchattention never devoted himself thatcanbe madebyapplythecontribution shows article Benzer's ernperiods, brilliantly texts. oftheselfto medieval abouttheconstruction inghisinsights Breith is a paperbyAstrid Studies' of'Gender as an example included The chapter revealItisperhaps letters. andassociated calamitatum intheHistoria construction ongender

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should be preserved torefer toa modeofanalying,thatan English phrase bytheeditor sisthatseemsto havea farmoreslender holdin theGerman thanit hasin academy North wherefeminist discourse hashada greater on medieval America, studies, impact andon study ofAbelard andHeloisein particular. Breith's treats 'Heloise'as a chapter fiction within thecorrespondence. Herargument is at itsmostconvincing when literary to Abelard, forwhomthereis a verycleargendered in which natural order, referring malerulesoverfemale, as spirit rulesoverflesh. Whether theletters ofHeloisesimply collaborate in thisconstruction, or question thisconstruction (as muchNorthAmerican hasdone)is another notdiscussed matter. scholarship, byBreith, LucDeitzoffers as an example ofrhetorical a detailed examination ofAbelard's analysis in theHistoria account calamitatum 11.280-424) ofhisaffair withHeloise, culmi(Monfrin, inhiscastration. He convincingly demonstrates thatalthough a logician rather than nating rhetorician Abelard tothefulla gamut ofrhetorical devices tocrebytraining, employed atea powerfully dramatic account. Rather is the'literary different psychology' approach ofHannesFrick, whoexplores theroleofAbelard's needtoovercome thetrauma ofcasor at leastto display howhe hasdoneso in theHistoria calamitatum. Frickdoes tration, notdenythedifficulty ofapplying in dealing withthetherapy oflivconcepts developed toa literary text.Hisreading makes a goodcasefortaking Abelard's ingsubjects seriously allusions to thestigma ofcastration as symptomatic ofprofound trauma. Thechapter ofDag Hassepresents itself as 'Kulturwissenschaft He (NewHistoricism)'. relates Heloise's aboutrejecting bothas reported andin argument marriage, byAbelard, Heloise 's first to contemporary ecclesiastical to outlaw in the reply, attempts concubinage Eversince outthispassage in TheRomance Rose clergy. JeandeMeunsingled , Heloise's ofthe hasbeenoneofthemostdebated in theentire corargument against marriage passages Abelard's ofherargument theidealofphilosophic respondence. report certainly privileges therebuke fromHeloisein herfirst letter thathe hadpassedoverhis purity, earning aboutpreferring lovetomarriage. Hasse'sargument, thatwhenHeloise however, arguments saidshepreferred tobe Abelard's shewasreferring toa wayoflifeshared concubine, by other concubines oftheclergy, seemnaively inthatitfailstodiscuss the historicist, might ethical dimension ofherargument thattrueloveis notconcerned withexternal appearances.Thesameprinciples underlie whatshehastosayinherthird aboutthedanletter, inreligious life.Abelard forward an ideal gersofexternal appearance maywellbe putting ofmoralpurity, in linewiththatofotherreformed monks andclerics ofhisgeneration, buthismodelofupright behaviour is notnecessarily thesameas thatpresented in the letters ofHeloise. The finalessayin thecollection, is farlesscertain thanthatof byNicolaKaminski HasseandAsperthatthere is unified theme tothecollection ofletters. that Emphasizing arepurely artificial as in rhetorical aboutmoderconstructions, binary opposites phrases shearguesthatAbelard usespolluisse in a waythatdeliberately alludesto poliere. nity, on Derrida's ownloveofwordplayin French to evokedeferred that Drawing meanings areneverfully in thepresent, Kaminski thatbehind Abelard's talk encapsulated suggests ofpollution liesa wholeraftofunexamined here.Her ideas,toofullto be documented is thatshedoesnotreally ideastogether intoa unified readdifficulty pullthesesuggestive calamitatum. ingoftheHistoria Thereis muchofinterest in thisanthology, whichdeserves to be studied byall those in oneoftheclassictexts interested ofthetwelfth notjustbyGerman century, speaking scholars. Thereis stillmuchtobe doneinapplying theinsights ofliterary notjust theory tothefamous ofAbelard andHeloise, buttotheir other as well. correspondence writings Thevolume editedbyHassemakesan important stepin thisdirection. Australia Victoria,

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Diskurses imdreizehnten desphilosophisch-anthropologischen Theodor Köhler, Jahrhundert: Grundlagen Verständnis. Leiden2000 imzeitgenössischen umdenMenschen DieErkenntnis-Bemühung Brill, Bd.71)x & 745pp.ISBN desMittelalters, undTextezurGeistesgeschichte (Studien 90 04 116230 ofphilosophical anthroa massive bookon "thefoundations Köhlerhaswritten Theodor butowesitsgreat in thethirteenth The bookhasa simple organization, century. pology andsummaries. Köhler texts withtranslations a richsupply ofprimary to having length andwithsources. Thebookhas workwithmanuscripts hasclearly donea lotoforiginal sources. and secondary ofbothprimary an excellent However, it,likethe bibliography thanKöhlersuggests. hasa morelimited ofthebookin general, domain compass scholthestateofcurrent In thefirst he discusses as follows: Köhlerproceeds chapter, lackin and finds it the thirteenth about century, gravely anthropology arship philosophical In the whenI applyittohisownwork.) hiscritique todiscuss below, ing.(I shallreturn about sources andthequestions oftheprimary hegivesa preliminary nextchapter, survey ofmanwas howthescience In thethird Köhlerdiscusses manthattheyraised. chapter, of thefields sciences ofmedieval tofitintotheordering , including (Wissenschaften thought ofthehuman howthescience he discusses andtheology). beingcame Finally, philosophy while sciences within itself alltheother ofas theultimate tobe thought science, including culmination. as their at thesametimeserving someofwhichare thebooktendsto haverepetitions, Becauseofthisorganization, do serve cross-listed [e.g.,79 & 239;472n. 1039;52-5& 488-97& 558].Therepetitions source as a reference ofthereader's thefunction beingableto usethebookpiecemeal in themainbodyofhisworklongdisAs Köhleralsohasincluded forvarious topics. I canseeusing ofvarious workst andsources ofthedating, cussions contents, authenticity, On theotherhand,thebookcouldbe conthebookin thisway[e.g.,97-103;168-75]. andsources andwithout ofpoints without so muchrepetition shortened having siderably inthemaintext.Becauseofthisapproach, andauthenticity aboutdating longdiscussions thatitstitleis somewhat ofthebook,I shallsuggest as wellas thecontent misleading: abouthuman oftheories somuchas 'a preliminary notthe"foundations" survey [Grundlagen) in thethirteenth andtheir century'. significance beings well.He showshowtherewasa shift historical Köhlermakessomesignificant points tomanas a being "inbutopposed tonature" manas a transcendent from being, studying a spiritualistic from in nature[58].Thatis,therewasa shift per[72]to a naturalistic and viewto a moreAristotelian andAugustinián a morePlatonist [147],from spective ofBathtookup andlater,thoselikeAdelard one.So, in thetwelfth Averroistic century reflects thata human seeninPlato'sRepublic anewtheviewalready beingas a microcosm olderviewwasthat"manis in ofthecosmos[52-5;488].The prevailing, thestructure statethatit sincethegoalofa soul,at leastnowin thefallen butopposedto nature", The without as possible, hasnow,is togetoutofthisworldas quickly mortally. sinning Arabicsources, thanPlatothough: viewsofthisnewgroupwentfurther they following in canbe found ofthecosmos andall thestructures thatevenall theelements asserted on thehumanbeingsoftheir humanbody.Theyhad a newemphasis theindividual ofman ofthenature tothemoreBiblical as opposed actualacquaintance, preoccupation eveninvestigated ofConches before theFall[60;72].William development embryological a bit[62]. Platonist Aristotle thoselikeNeckham, sources, Plato,orrather, Later, replaced through hasa spiritual itself ofanimals thattheknowledge It wasclaimed as themaininfluence. overthesexlifeoffrogs William ofConches dimension. [122],butthose mayhaveglossed ofbeavers in theself-castration couldfindmoredidactic likeNeckham [141;cf. meaning ofhowthespotted themeaning itseems, thattheydidnotdiscuss, 529].- I amgrateful - Certainly ofbiolofthespiritual someofthediscussion significance hyenareproduces! Vivarium 40,2

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ofjustifying theutility ofsuchresearch totheChurch, which distrusted ogyhadthepurpose suchworkandcontinued to do so, as therebukes to theMertonian in the calculators fourteenth attest. or Aristotle, forthatmatter, Still,we,likemodern century zoologists wellwonder whether thismaterial is"scientific". Theuseofanetymological might approach, donebadly,reinforces theseworries. thoselikeNeckham understood Isidore, Following ' ' as 'arbor ' withthehairbeingtheroots ofthetree, andthelimbs thelimbs anthropos inversa - I won'tevenaskaboutthefruits! - Wealsomight wonder whether Köhler isstray[150]. hisstated thesocialconditions forthestudy of ingfrom subject bydiscussing necessary anthropology. Laterwriters inthethirteenth continued towrite onthese butnowmostly issues, century in Summae, andcommentaries on Aristotle compendia, [167].One majorissueconcerned where manshould be studied WasAristotle's De anima a treatise on thesoul scientifically. orontheensouled Howdoesmoralscience fitintothescheme ofthescibody?[336-42] ences?[385]Therewasin general no explicit science ofmanstudied in a separate sciit seems, to Aristotle's nothaving hadone [449;381;296].Stillthe ence,duemostly, Summae treatises likeAquinas' De homine etc.,andalsoa fewshort , diddealwiththeissues insucha science. Theknowledge ofman,ifnota special butunderstood as philoscience, cametobe considered thehighest sophical self-knowledge, goal[442].Thereweredifferent either onphilosophy as theconsummation ofself-knowledge, oronself-knowledge emphases: as theconsummation ofphilosophy [458]. The microcosm viewreemerged in thedoctrine thatmanis a universal of principle as he unites thecorporeal andthespiritual Manbecomes "theworknowledge, [487-97]. thiest ofcreatures", notforhisnatural butforhismoralvirtues. Hence properties (Wesen), natural science therecameto be morefocuseither on gota lowerstatus [486].Instead, human in general, on "manquaman",as Albert rationality putit,oron onlyintellectual ofFreiburg to speakofa transempirical self-knowledge [584-5].Thisfocusled Dietrich suchan intellect are intellect, sc.,self-consciousness [575-9].Thosewhoseekto develop Hencethephilosopher becametheculmination ofman;otherwise manis philosophers. another animal[611-3].Concentrating on developing thistransempirical merely intellect, thephilosopher shouldbe monastic andvirginal shift" [620].Köhlerseesno "paradigm tohomo solus intellectus from animal FortheAristotelian sci(Leitkonzepi) perfectissimum [622-3]. enceof thewholemanprevailed. manwas no longerseenin an Yet,Köhlerinsists, Aristotelian butin a moreHeideggerian existence, wayas a thing way,in hisconcrete withan intellect thatis notthing-like [640]. "Foundations It is besttounderstand whatthisbookis andwhatitis not.I found thetitle, Discourse ..." rather (Grundlagen) ofthePhilosophical-Anthropological First, misleading. thebook doesnotanalyze ofthesources thatitcitesandsummarizes. It verymuchthereasoning doespresent whattheauthors themselves ofman.Yet,evenhere, sayaboutthenature Köhlerhimself hasreserved theanalysis oftheirtheory to a laterwork[34-7;204].So he mostly often thetablesofcontents or headings discussions, givessummary byparsing inthebooksthathecites[e.g.,206-13]. As he alsothensummarizes their contents in his owntables, itseemsthatsometimes he couldhaveomitted thoselongsummaries. Whatanalysis Köhlerdoesgiveseemsoften andbrief. Forinstance, Köhlerdiscryptic cussesLull'sinsistence on theimportance ofthequestion: 'Whatis a human and being?', " hisanswer toit,"enshomoficans thisvery Lullis asserting the [80;88].He finds significant: ofreflexive self-consciousness theimportance ofnottreating man centrality (andperhaps ' ' looks as a merething) andthata meredefinition doesn't suffice [86-8].Yet enshomoficans evenmoretrivial than'homo rationalis' wouldbe nice. So, at theleast,moreexplanation I found theuseof'anthropological' Köhlerhimself, incriticizing the Again, misleading. earlier remarks thattherewasno "anthropology" nor"psychology" literature, secondary so calledin thethirteenth thathe meansby"philoproperly century [27-8].He explains

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reflections on thenature ofman[34].Thecentral sophical-anthropological" philosophical becomes: whatmanis,whata humanbeingis in herlifeas a wholeandin question whatthatwholelifeconsists [73]. In practice, Köhlerlimits hisdiscussions to whatthe"philosophers" saidaboutthe humanbeing.Thesewouldinclude thosein natural bothphysical andmedphilosophy, thosein thefaculties ofartsandoftheology, or those ical,andin theology, sc.,mostly an equivalent likeAverroes, Köhlerdoes status, Lull,or IsaacJudaeus. However, having notdiscuss all thephilosophical works thatbearon thetheory ofwhatthosetextssay. Forexample, as we haveseen,therecameto be a newemphasis on thestudy ofthe human thestudy of"manquaman".Köhler devotes beingas thefocalpointofphilosophy: muchattention to considering whatAlbert theGreatsaysaboutthelogicalstructure of 'manquaman'[585-94]. Yethe considers andhiscommentaries on the onlyhisSentences Ethics andon De anima discussions ofreduplication in thelogi, andnothismoreformal cal works, northesecondary literature on them(A.Bäck'sOnReduplication , Leiden1996, bychancecomesto mind.) Nowwe might wellask,too,whatdoesall thishaveto do with"anthropology", sc., themodern scientific MuchofwhatKöhlerdiscusses doesnotappearin moddiscipline? ernanthropology: intotheanatomy of a womanbefore theFall e.g.,an investigation overthetitleofa book:whether thesubject ofAristotle's [204],or a consuming worry De anima is theanimate in natural discussed ortheimmortal rational science, soul, being, as "anima" wasoften takento suggest ofstudy [353;381].Dividing up fields justaccordandsubject matter ofthe[extant!!] booksofAristotle seemshardly to ingtothenumber - Indeed, savethephenomena. criticized Albert forhaving a treatise on rational Aquinas - Thatis,on bothempirical didn'thaveone [381]. andon activity justbecauseAristotle muchofwhatKöhlerreports wouldbe dismissed as notbeing methodological grounds, inspeculating After isnotmuch overa prototypical woman all,there "anthropology". point basedsolelyon an interpretative of Scripture, norin basing"anthropological" reading research onthehermeneutical ofcertain texts ofAristotle taken tobe canoninvestigation icalifnotquasi-sacred. Science thephenomena, andnotpasttexts todaystudies primarily offers theories ofmechanisms thatcanbe corroboaboutthephenomena. Anthropology ifnotrefuted, andexperiment as Köhler observation rated, Moreover, [K. Popper]. through usedin thethirteenth therewasno unified remarks, century terminology "anthropologiis a criterion ofhaving cal" discussions [307].Yet,as Kuhnholds,standard vocabulary in We canseeglimmers ofa modem scientific normal science undera paradigm. theory in theempirical, medical as wellas in thesyssomeofthismedieval material: research, oftheory onAristotelian wouldnot tematization Still, or,ifyoulike,Hempelian, grounds. historians ofscience whofollow Kuhn? thismaterial be considered bycurrent 'protoscience' - even,it Aristotle himself dida greatdealofempirical workin developing histheories The magistři seemrather tohavedissected thehearts ofpigsandturtles. seems, dissecting wouldthePhilosopher havehadforthem? ofAristotle. Howmuchapproval thetexts ofthe with"philosophical thathe is concerned Köhlermaywellreply anthropology", in at Catholic universities ofMan"courses, sortstilltaught generally todayas "Philosophy . Thus,hedefines "thephilosophical-anthroandphilosophy [cf.32-3] departments theology ofphilosophical efforts toknowaboutman"[34]. But, discourse" as "thetotality pological andreflection to all thetheory in thatcase,whynotbroaden thescopeoftheinquiry on in thethirteenth ofhumanbeingscarried and condition aboutthenature century? Köhlerdoesnotdiscuss muchwhatcan be themin passing, For,although mentioning thematerials ontheInvestiture abouthuman from attitudes aboutmedieval beings gleaned - notto speakofwhatcan be gleaned commentaries Biblical Conflict, theory, political too scholars forconcentrating hisfellow Köhlercriticizes artandliterature. from Indeed, and totheexclusion andethical muchon themetaphysical of,say,themedical literature, himhereon similar we notcriticize literature thetheological grounds? [30].Yet,might Köhler's tothe"philosophical"? the"anthropological" And,evenifweshould, Whylimit

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waswidely read[410,n.795]. himself notesthatthePolitics hasitsgaps.ForKöhler survey discussed itsuse. Yethe barely a "modofmedieval In sum,Köhlerdoesshowus newaspects Yet,from philosophy. muchofthematerial thathe notfroma postmodern, ern",albeitperhaps perspective, A lotofthesedoctrines haveonly thesilliness ofsomemedieval confirms thought. presents ofthismaterial, we interest. Asforthetransempirical historical orantiquarian significance itto us later. shallhavetowaitforKöhlerto explain Allan Bäck

Kutztown

Cannstadt Thomas lesen. Albert 2000(Serie Zimmermann, Stuttgart-Bad Fromman-Holzboog, 2) 296 S. ISBN 3 772820050 Legenda, Arbeiten überdiemittelalterliche Nebenseinen vielen strikt wissenschaftlichen Philosophie Prof.Dr. Albert hatderbekannte Emeritus desKölnerThomasInstituts, Zimmermann, in das DenkenThomasvonAquinspubliziert unterdemTitelThomas eineEinführung indiezentralen an Handeiniger lesen. Es isteineEinführung, Textbeispiele, Fragestellungen derLehredesAquinaten. In diesem sehrwichtige, vielleicht diewichtigsten Buchbehandelt Zimmermann Aspekte zwischen Glauben undWissen, dieWissenschaftslehre, derLehredesThomas: dasVerhältnis Er lässteinekurze dieAnthropologie unddieEthik. dieSeinslehre, dieErkenntnislehre, undschließt des LebensundWerks das Buchab miteinem Beschreibung vorausgehen KapitelüberdieWirkungsgeschichte. SeineAbsicht zu bringen' ist,wieersagt,'ThomaszurSprache (S. 9). Er willdeutlich wieThomas auchfürdiemodernen Menschen. Es sind machen, wichtige Fragen aufgreift, dieThomasbehandelt. ja ewigeFragen, betont Zimmermann dieRationalität desDenkens vonThomas, pacedesThomismus, derThomasmanchmal unkritisch verehrte Thomasistfürunsauchhierdurch (S. 13-14). undverständlich, daßaucherineinerunsicheren Zeitlebte(S. 14). wichtig sagtderAutor, willThomasdarstellen in Diskussion Zimmermann mitanderen, undnichtals einen Es handelt, fürdenallesfesteht. sichin diesemBuch Systemdenker, sagtZimmermann, überThomaswieeinemPartner imGespräch (S. 9). Vorallemkannmansagen,daßZimmermann in gutverständlicher sehrklarschreibt, Er hat,wiebekannt, einegroßeKenntnis derLehrevonThomas.Es istklar, Sprache. daßThomasdemAutor sehrsympathisch erdieGedanken desThomas ist,undso macht auchbesser verständlich. Dannundwannkannmannichtgutsagen,wo genauZimmermann, undwo genau in demKapitelüberdieNotwendigkeit Thomasspricht. So zumBeispiel desGlaubens. In seinerallgemeinen daß manThomasgut (S. 54/55)sagtZimmermann, Darstellung Er sagt:'Überall verstehen durchdenkt. kann,wennmandieErfahrung gründlich gibtes undzwaraus einemZustandgeringerer in einenZustand Dinge,die sichentwickeln Vollkommenheit'. oderspricht der größerer SagtThomasdiesin diesem Zusammenhang, Autor? UndistdieseAuffassung selbstverständlich? AufS. 66:'Stellung undBestimmung desMenschen zu ergründen, istbleibendes Anliegen derPhilosophie bisinunsere Das giltja dochnicht fürallePhilosophen, zum Gegenwart'. nicht fürdieanalytischen? Beispiel Mankönnte hierdieEinführung etwamitAnthony vergleichen Kenny's Aquinas (Oxford welche Arbeit aucheineEinführung zu Thomas alsPhilosoph ist.Mankönnte 1980), sagen, daßKenny einegrößere Distanzzu Thomaseinnimmt, sichsogar, dannundwanngegen Thomas Ermacht stellt. zumBeispiel inArten desDenkens about und Unterschiede, (thinking © Koninklijke BrillNV,Leiden,2002 Alsoavailable online- www.brill.nl

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dieThomasnichtmacht. In seinem daß es nichtnötig thinking that), Preface sagtKenny, denkt mitThomasmit. sei,daß derLeserThomas'Lehreteile.Zimmermann dagegen Dannundwannverweist derAutor aufmoderne undTheorien. Dasgeschieht Standpunkte selten. Erverweist zumBeispiel, undnicht sehrexplizit, aufFrege(S. 126),auch allerdings aufHobbes(S. 149).Ichhatteerwartet, daßhier,weilZimmermann ThomaszurSprache inHauptpunkten, würde. will,eineausfuhrlichere Diskussion, bringen wenigstens präsentiert AufS. 62 (vergi. S. 66)spricht Zimmermann übereinige dienicht, großePhilosophen, wieThomas, dasGlückdesMenschen in derErkenntnis dertheoretische Wissenschaften sehen. Leider nennt derAutor hierkeine Namen undpräzisiert nicht alternative Möglichkeiten. Zimmermann nenntin einerFußnote Ansichten des HansJonas.Er isteinbekannter Forscher derGnostik desAltertums, aberdochnichtsehrbekannt als Philosoph. IndemKapitel überdieWirkungsgeschichte verweist Zimmermann u.a.aufdenThomisten Maréchal undsagt(S. 278),daß dieseArbeit auchvielKritik herJoseph (1878-1944), habe.WennderAutor würde diessehrinforhätte, vorgerufen einige Kritikpunkte genannt mativ sein,glaubeich. gewesen Das BuchZimmermanns sehrklarundhinreißend, ichdann ist,wieichsagte, obgleich undwannBeispiele vermißte S. 160ff.,das KapitelüberdieErkenntnis). (zumBeispiel Die Bibliographie am EndedesBuchesistwertvoll, namentlich wegenderÜbersicht deutscher derWerke desThomas. Übersetzungen Leiden

E.P. Bos

dermittelalterlichen inderTheologie desThomas Park,DieRezeption Seung-Chan Sprachphilosophie vonAquin. Mitbesonderer derAnalogie. YorkKöln Brill,Leiden-New Berücksichtigung 1999(Studien undTextezurGeistesgeschichte desMittelalters, Bd.65)ISBN90 04 112723 in theMiddleAgeswerewelltrained students in grammar, University logicandrhetoric, before oneofthehigher Alsotheologians faculties. tookwiththem thetechniques, entering distinctions andarguments in thetrivium , andputthemto usein distheyhadlearned Butwhatdidthisbasicknowledge consist in,and cussing specifically theological problems. howdiditfunction in scholastic Overthelastforty underthe theology? years, especially influence ofthepioneering work ofLambertus de Rijkinthe1960s, research intomedieval oflanguage hasincreased thenewknowlHowever, logicandphilosophy considerably. thatresulted from theseefforts havehadonlya rather limited effect so edgeandinsights faron thestudy ofscholastic Different reasons forthis.Themidtheology. mayaccount around thetimetheSecondVatican Council alsomarked therapiddecline 1960s, ended, ofinterest in medieval theproponents of Moreover, thought amongCatholic theologians. a morehistorical, medievalist to medieval logicfelta certain approach urgeto emancithedominance oftheearlier neo-scholastic andneo-Thomist and patefrom metaphysics barriers andongoing within thefieldofmedieval studtheology. Language specialization iesaddedto thedifficulties therediscovery ofscholastic its logichad(andhas)infinding medieval is at oddswiththepractice This,ofcourse, wayto thosewhostudy theology. ofthemedieval scholastics whothought oflogicandtheology as distinct, but themselves, notseparate, academic disciplines. ofstudy. Morerecently, seemstobe a tendency tointerrelate there againthetwofields in medieval between The tentative, butgrowing, mutual logic understanding specialists in thisstudy ofa young Koreanscholar. It is the andinscholastic is epitomized theology I knowofthatexamines theroleofmedieval first systematically philosophy monograph ofde Rijk,Pinborg, in scholastic on thebasisofthefindings oflanguage Jacobi theology BrillNV,Leiden, © Koninklijke 2002 - www.brill.nl Alsoavailable online

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to focuson theonemedieval thinker who (tonamejusta few).Parkdoesnothesitate had beenthecentral of neo-scholasticism, ThomasAquinas, to and,moreover, figure address oneofthemostdiscussed viz.analogy. The author, topicsofThomas'thought, a student ofCharles LohrandKlausJacobi, hisstudy as a dissertation to the presented ofTheology at theUniversity ofFreiburg i. Br.in 1998. Faculty After an introductory theauthor first information. He chapter, givessomebackground sketches thehistorical ofmedieval summarizes thechardevelopments logicandgrammar, acterization Thomasgivesofthescientiae sermonicales he might have , andliststhesources used.Withregard tothelatter, Parkpaysspecialattention tothemorespecialized extant texts ofThomas'contemporaries, viz.thelogical ofPeterofSpain,William of compendia andLambert ofAuxerre, andthetreatises onthemodi He acknowlShyreswood, significandi. evidence forThomas'direct ofthesesources is not edgesthatthehistorical knowledge conclusive. Notmuchis known aboutThomas'owntraining. thelogical Furthermore, textbooks from different anditis notclearat whattime originated geographical regions, in Paris(andto Thomas).And,finally, thetreatises on themodi theybecameknown thathavebeeneditedso far,onlygo backto around1270.Parkjustifies the significandi useofthesetexts forexamining whatinfluence thecontemporary oflogicandgramstudy marhadonThomas, towhatde Rijkhascalled"a universe ofcommon docbyreferring thatistosay,thetexts a largely transmitted trine", represent (intheir general outlines) orally anddoctrines, shared all overtheLatinWest. masters bodyofknowledge bytheArtes In chapter Parkexplains thebasictechnical terms Thomasuses.He interprets three, thembycarefully thecontexts in whichtheyappearin Thomas'texts, andby analysing howtheyarediscussed in thethirteenth-century textbooks. The mostimporexamining tantonesaresignificato ratio nominis andressignificata (including impositio, ), modus significandi, andanalogy andequivocity). Theseexplanations areresumed suppositio, (including univocity in thenextchapter, in whichParkinterprets sixlonger keytextsofThomasthatillustratethefunctions oflogicaland grammatical in theological distinctions discourse. The selected textsdealwithcentral in theology: thedoctrine ofdivinenamesand problems theproblem ofreference inchristological andtrinitarian fiveoffers a syssayings. Chapter tematic account ofThomas'viewon naming from thepreviGod,basedon theresults ousdiscussions. Thisstudy setsa shining oftextual andinterpretation ofThomas' theoexample analysis Themeticulous ofthetexts alsoserves Park's crux: logical writings. reading methodological theimportance oftaking intoaccount theactualcontext within whichThomasdiscusses a problem. Whomis headdressing? Whataretheobjections heis dealing with? Andwhat doeshe wanttoprevent? Thesequestions direct Thomas'choicefora misunderstandings certain andtheydetermine howhe (re-)formulates certain rulesin a particular strategy whatdistinctions or subdivisions he thinks areuseful to make,andwhatexamples text, hechooses. toPark,oneshould notgather statements from different take According texts, themoutofthespecific whichbothsupports andlimits their andthen context, cogency, a general, Thomist on a subject. Thisgoesafortiori for trytoreconstruct systematic theory Thomas' scattered remarks onissues Thomas explored bycontemporary logicandgrammar. draws onthebroadbackground ofhisaudience, without toomuchabout knowledge caring technical andterminological details. heis notinterested inthesetopics fortheir Moreover, ownsake.He addresses themonlyinsofar theotheycanplaya rolewithin specifically andhe adaptsthelogicalor grammatical distinctions anddivisions to logicaldiscussions, meetthetheological under discussion. Thomas' remarks from their theoproblems Isolating thevalidity andapplicability oftheirargumentative logicalcontext, universalizing force, andthenestablishing theThomist doctrine leadstoa of,forexample, supposition, usually distortion ofThomas'thought ortotheunwarranted conclusion thathechanged hismind - andteaching - Thomas orcontradicts himself. Parkshowsagainthedanger ofstudying statements from thecorpora ofarticles in theSumma or the bywayofcollecting Theologiae outtheobjections andtheanswers to them. , whileleaving Questions Disputed

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Park'smethod of reading Thomasalso accounts fortheorganization and presentationofhismaterial in thewayI indicated earlier. The advantage ofthestructure ofhis bookis thatitshows thefluidity withwhich Thomasdrawson hissources, clearly adapts andshifts on thecontext ofthetheological he arguments priorities, depending questions is discussing. On theother textual intheform hand,italsoleadstoa certain redundancy ofrepetitions andinternal references. togive This,andthefactthatParkhasa tendency detailed information thatis notquiterelevant forunderstanding Thomas'texts (forexamsubdivisions oftheModistae) burden on thereader. ple,theintricate placea certain The mostnotorious ofover-systematizing Thomas'thought is theattempt of example - and manyafterhim - to piecetogether 'thedoctrine of analogy of Thomas Cajetan Parkshowsthatin thevarious in which texts Thomasusesthenotion ofanalAquinas'. aredifferent andtheological andconsiderations ogy,there logical, metaphysical, objections inviewofwhich chooses anddivisions. involved, Furthermore, Aquinas particular emphases Parkargues thatanalogy is notthekeyinstrument ofThomas'theology, butonlyoneof themanymeansbywhichThomasexplores andindicates thepossibilities andlimits of in naming humanlanguage God.Othersuchmeansare,forexample, thedistinctions between a quoandad quod modus I agree andressignificata. , orbetween impositio significandi thatmostThomists haveoverstated theroleofanalogy. The mainmotive behind this,I wouldliketo add in support ofPark'sthesis, is notjusttheirwishto givea moresystematic account ofThomas' butrather thereluctance totakeseriously theapophatic thought, character ofhisdoctrine ofGod.ParknotesthatCajetanandotherThomists usedthe so-called as an epistemological method to gainknowledge ofGod analogia proportionalitatis ofGodis notthegoalofhiscom(pp.391,450).ButforThomashimself, knowledge ments on analogy, buttheir offaith, nourished andexpressed knowledge presupposition: andprayer thesecond-order, reflection on the byScripture, liturgy, precedes theological divine names.Analogy serves whatthefaithful know:we speak onlyto explicate already abouttheGodwe believe thanwe canthink or say. in,butGodis always truly greater Becausetheyseta different ofanalogy, Thomists hadto seeit as a goalforthenotion meansofcircumventing or neutralizing Thomas'strong statements abouttheineffability andincomprehensibility ofGod'sbeing.Park,on theotherhand,rightly seeksexplicitly toembedThomas'texts onthedivine namesinthegeneral framework ofhistheoiogia negativa. itis alsoat thispointthatI wantto takeissuewithPark,becausesomeof Hower, hisarguments of andphrases areambiguous, whenit comesto thesemantics especially God-talk. Thomasexplicates theapophatic character ofdivinenameson twolevels.First, synnamesfallshortbecauseoftheirmodus whichhas to do withthe significando tactically, different wordclasses(nouns, concrete andabstract tenses verbs, terms, etc.) adjectives, in human this has not to be understood a sense. although exclusively grammatical Next, innaming words arealsoimperfect Godsemantically, thatis,onthelevelofsignification. ofGod Thisdoesnotonlygoformetaphors, butalsoforthosenamesthatarepredicated in their one literal sense.'Goodness', 'life',andthelike,signify onlya limited perfection, instatParkfollows Ashworth thatis different forexample, or 'knowledge'. from, 'justice' in terms thissemantic ofmodus significandi deficiency ingthatThomasdoesnotexplicate butitdoes Thisseemsto be correct, e.a.; cf.pp. 428,461-68). (paceMclnerny, Pinborg of is givenwiththeverystructure notaltertheclaimthatalsothesemantic imperfection intellect canconsider and Parkstates a coupleoftimes thatthehuman human language. ofitsmodeofbeing, intentional or a perfection thatis,irrespectively 'absolutely', signify or thedivine whether itexists to thecreaturely extramental, and,ifthelatter, according hisclaimwithreference tothenatura absolute modeofbeing(cf.pp.300,365).He supports intwoofhisearlyworks, Thomasmentions considerata 8, 1 andDe Ente Quodlibetale , which andpropthatitis thebasisforpredicating etEssentia 3, andParkseemstosuggest truly - misleading. the is- at least ofGod.In myview,thissuggestion First, erlyperfections works. occurs consideration notion ofanabsolute Next, early onlyinThomas' (Avicennian)

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Thomas from thepeculiar a nature onlysaysthatsucha consideration prescinds properties hasin either intentional or in extramental buthe doesnotspecify thelatter existence, intocreaturely anddivineexistence. it givestheimpression thatthereis a kind Finally, inwords ofunivocity ofGodandofcreatures. Thisimpression is strengthened predicated thatThomasadoptsa (moderated) between themodi by Park'sassumption isomorphy in thesamewayas theModistae do (pp. 162,284,323). , andessendi significant, intelligent I think, thatThomasdisagrees withthe(later) Modistae on thispoint. however, explicidy His frequent reference to theso-called of reception' is received 'principle ('everything tothemodeofthereceiver'), withitsepistemological concentration according ('everything is known to themodeoftheknower, notofthething is meantto according known'), stress thediscontinuity between themodeofunderstanding and precisely (andsignifying) thewaythings are. Park'sanalysis andinterpretation do notmakeit quiteclearthat,in discussing analthatthenegativity cutsalsoright intotheheartofthe ogy,Thomaswantsto emphasize semantics ofkataphatic God-talk. The meaning ratio nominis, of, (ressignificata, significatimi) forexample, includes thatit is a specific andlimited kindofperfection, dis'goodness' tinct from etc.:itincludes a modeofbeingthatbefits creatures. justice, knowledge Precisely thismode,which is calledin De Pot.7, 5, ad 2 themodus is,hasto be deniedof significati itis inextricably boundup withtheverystructure ofhuman God,although language. Parkhas extensive of themajordoctrines of thirteenth-century knowledge logicand he is sensitive to thedeeptheological motivations ofThomas'thought, andhe grammar, hasthepatience toanalyse ingreatdetail. Thomas'texts Thesethree factors haveresulted ina study thatreintegrates scholastic oflanguage andtheology, andshedsnew philosophy on oneofthemostdebated thenotion ofanalogy. light topicsofThomist theology, Utrecht

HarmGoris

Dietrich vonFreiberg, seiner Neue und Perspektive Philosophie, Theologie Naturwissenschaft. Freiburger 10-13März1997.Herausgegeben vonKarl-Hermann Burkhard Kandier, Symposion: Franz-Bernhard Stammkötter. 1999(Bochumer Mojsisch, Amsterdam/Philadelphia Studien zurPhilosophie, 28)viii+ 287 S. ISBN90 60323556 Im März1997wurdein Freiburg imBreisgau einSymposion, anläßlich desAbschlusses derkritischen Edition derWerkeDietrichs vonFreiburg veranstaltet. DieseWerkesind imRahmen desCorpus Teutonicorum Medii Aevi worden. Dietrich von Philosophorum publiziert isteinsehrwichtiger undTheologe, dessen Werke (ca. 1250-1318/20) Freiburg Philosoph dieletzten mitgutem Rechtvielbeleuchtet werden. erDominikaner Jahrzehnte Obgleich seinen berühmten ThomasvonAquinscharf war,hatDietrich kritisiert, Ordensgenossen besonders derInterpretation des aktiven Intellekts den bezüglich (Dietrich interpretiert Intellekt alseinenProduzenten derKennobjekte, mandiesnicht fassen darfwie obgleich Immanuel KantesJahrhunderte tunwürde. Dietrich hatsichbesonders vonProklos später undDionysius beeinflussen lassen). Die Intellektslehre Dietrichs istnichtdas Einzige, das das Interesse derHistoriker der undTheologie Diesisimvorliegenden Banddeutlich: Dietrich von Philosophie erregt. Freiberg. seiner Neue undNaturwissenschaft. Die Herausgeber habenzwölf Perspektive Philosophie, Theologie ZehnderBeiträge sindin deutscher eineristin französiBeiträge gesammelt. Sprache; einerin englischer. scher, Aufsehroriginelle Weisefangt derBandmitzweiBeiträgen überdieGeographie des heimatlichen Umfelds Dietrichs an. DieseBeiträge überSachsenals (vonK. Blaschke undvonO. Wagenbreth überFreiburg undseinen in derZeit Kulturlandschaft, Bergbau © Koninklijke BrillNV,Leiden,2002 Alsoavailable online- www.brill.nl

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die stellen dengeographischen Dietrichs da, u.a. die Silberminen Dietrichs) Hintergrund hat.Die beidenArtikel enthalten Dietrich wahrscheinlich selbstgesehen auffalligerweise wohlaberweiterführende Literaturhinweise. keineFussnoten, Dererste istvonJanAertsen. Wiebekannt istAertsen Beitrag philosophisch-historische Erkonzentriert aufden dermittelalterlichen Transzendentalienlehre. sichbesonders Spezialist tranzendentalen Terminus kritisiert dassdieser ,Eines'.Aertsen (S. 24) KurtFlaschdafür, imkantischen Dietrich als einenTranszendentalphilosoph Sinnecharakterisiert hat,und eineNeufassung derTranszendentalientheorie Burkhart (S. 43,n.41),dassDietrich Mojsisch sollen. hätteentwerfen zu leicht voneinerdeutschen Interessanterweise weist Aertsen darauf hin,dassmannicht weilBerthold vonMoosburg eineganzandere Dominikaner-Schule kann, Auffassung sprechen LehredesEinenderaristotelischen derTranszendentalien hat.Berthold ziehtdiePlatonische Einheit Dietrich. Derletztere sieht wieeine,reelle Intention', vor,underkritisiert Philosophie der,Sein'demNichts Manwundert DunsScotus, demNichts. sich,inwieweit gegenüber S. 43,N.43). verhält sichhierzu Dietrich stellt, (überDunsScotusbeiAertsen gegenüber vonTizianaSuarez-Nani werIn dem(infranzösischer Beitrag geschriebenen) Sprache undEngeldiskutiert. SiesindTeildermitdendiegeschiedenen Substanzen, Intelligenzen Im Mittelalter man,apprivoisier desJensits'. versuchte telalterlichen ,Metaphysik l'espace de l'au-delà', undSuarex-Nani weistdaraufhin,dasses sichhierum einengrossen Die Schriften desProklus sindhierwiederum zurmodernen Kultur handelt. Unterschied des,ordo konkludiert fürDietrich. DerVerfasser (S. 66-67)dassderZwischenraum wichtig ist.AufdieseWeise aufdieMetaphysik undauchaufdieTheologie rerum' eineAntwort Dietrich unterlässtsichverstehen. unddiegöttliche istdasUniversum Leitung intelligibel, denmittelalterDer Autorunterstricht zweiOrdenen derVorsehung. scheidet zwischen isthierdasBeispiel dafür. undDietrich lichenoptimistischen Rationalismus, macht Markus L. Führer es deutIn einem inenglischer Beitrag geschriebenen Sprache in denGrossen, undnicht in derTradition desAlbertus vonFreiburg lichdassDietrich Intellekts WasdieTheoriedesaktiven derdesThomasvonAquinsteht. anbelangt, gilt mitseinem nichtidentisch istderIntellekt desMenschen Einfluss. BeiAlbertus Proklus' Der Intellekt is alsosuperior. desWesens. beiDietrich istderIntellekt Wesen, aufGrunde vonMoosburg isteinerder am Anfang einerSchule(S. 88);Berthold So steht Dietrich Schüler. wichtigsten kosLinieneineGeschichte Im sechsten Jeckin grossen Beitrag gibtUdo Reinhold Mansoll, können. Sachensichändern diegöttlichen d.h.inwieweit Paradoxe, mologischer derHimmelkörper lassen,dassdie Anomalien erklärungsgelten sagtJeck,das Faktum derHimmelkörper wardieStillederBeweging sind.BeiAristoteles unmöglich. bedürftig derZeit, Es istda keinProblem wirdenParadoxien. Testament AuchimAlten begegnen Gottes. aberdesEingriffes auchBriefe kleinen Schriften hatnebenseinesehrbekannte Ps. Dionysius ,mystische' den ,Spruchdes deman Polycletos) hier(imsiebten Wirfinden Briefe, geschrieben. behandelt vonFrieberg dergöttlichen überdieÄnderung Dinge.Dietrich Apollophanes' des isthier,was,derSpruch Zentral De origine entium in seinem diesenBrief separatorum. zumBeispiel überdieSonnenfinsternis wird.Hierspricht Dionysius genannt Apollophanes' Dietrich sindnurbei Christus SolcheWunder beimTod Christi. argumentiert möglich. dasBewegliche, Willen nachseinem zuweilen dassderersteBeweger (S. 116),wieAlbert Er als Albert. Er gehtaberweiter zu manipulieren d.h.die Himmelkörper, vermag. Sachen. derkosmischen Hierarchie mitderneuplatonischen Alberts dieTheorie verknüpft überJohannes miteinerDiskussion Weiseschliesst Aufinteressante Jeckseinen Beitrag ab. KeplerhatauchdenBrief demberühmten (S. 116-119). Astronomen, gelesen Kepler, nova klar.1604wardie Super derHimmelsphären AuchfürKeplerwardie Konstanz damitund sichintensiv Helle.Keplerbeschäftigte einSternmitübergrosser erschienen, über sichKeplermitTheorien befasste nachdemSinndesPhänomens. suchte Zugleich

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Er fanddenSpruch Christi. desApollophanes dasGeburtsdatum Jeckschliesst vernünftig. dassderBrief desDionysius nochnicht unterseinen ab mitderBemerkung genug Beitrag suchtwurde. Er untersucht imBandistvonKarl-Hermann Kandier. die Der theologischte Beitrag istauchTheologe, undin dieser Dietrichs. Dietrich theologischen FolgenderPhilosophie Hinsicht istesbedauernswert dasssseinePredigte nicht aufbewahrt sind.Die Intellektslehre an Dietrich, stehtim Mittelpunt des Interesses derHistoriker aberes gehtihmnach in seinem Kandier umeineEinung mitGotthin.BeiderAbendmahlslehre willDietrich mandasHeilmysterium Deaccidentibus welche esgibtfalls zeigen, Schwierigkeiten philosophisch will.In seiner Christus ascendent omnes cáelos erklären dieKandier zusamsuper QuestioUtrum menfassend Dietrich nicht sondern er übersetzt, argumentiert philosophisch, sagtKandier, überdenAusdruck an handvonSchriftstellen. reflektiert Franz-Bernhard Stammkötter legtdardassaufdemFeldederpraktischen Philosophie Dietrich nicht sehrwichtig ist.In seinem Tractatus dehabitibus ister,wennerüberdenWillen Problemen interessiert. ZumBeispiel umnaturphilosophische und spricht, gegenEckhart Ulrich vonStrassburg interessiert ersichmehrfürmetaphysische Probleme derGotteserkenntnis alsfurdiepraktische SeitederReligion. Vielleicht istderGrund, sagtStammkötter, dassDietrich zuvielmitderOrganisation desDominikanerordens war. beschäftigt Sehrfundamentale in Dietrich werden vonNikiausLargier Begriffe metaphysische Es handelt sichüberNegativitat, undFreiheit im bei Dietrich dargestellt. Möglichkeit, mitMeister Eckhart. Die Diskussion überdenIntellekt handelt letztendlich über Vergleich dasIch,dasdenGrundin sichselbst hat.Ausser demIntellekt istMöglichkeit. Das Ich istnachLargier ein Theorieteil. Dietrich lehrteineTheoriederlauteren Möglichkeit. Dietrich undEckhart stehen damitausserdemHorizont einerOnto-Theologie. Wouter GorisgibtunseineschöneDarstellung mitdemTitelDietrich vonFreiburg und Meister Eckhart über dasGute. NebstdemBeitrag vonAertsen handelt diesersichauchum dieTranszendentalien. Bei Dietrich, einrelationeller sagtGoris,ist,guťprimär Begriff, derdas Seiendekonstituiert. DerBeitrag Norbert istdergrösste Winklers desBandes(78 Seiten) undenthält neben einerEinführung eineÜbersetzung desaltdeutschen Traktats VonderWirkenden unddervervonderSeligkeit an Eckhart vonGründig ), zugeschrieben (DieLehre mögenden Vernunft (Anfang des14.Jahrhunderts, dieser Eckhart istnicht identisch mitMeister vonHochheim). Eckhart DieserTraktathandeltüberdie Naturdes Intellekts und der Gnade.Nach dem Aristotelismusstreit konkludieren DieterundEckhart, dassnebendemVerstand Gnade ist(S. 223).Bemerkenswert Textdarüber wiedieTrennung ist,dassdieser nötig schweigt, vonGottüberwunden Er gibtdemGlauben werden könnte. hierkeineRolle. Ein Beitrag vonBurkhart schliesst denBandab undstellt da wieBerthold Mojsisch vonMoosburg dieKritik desAristoteles umdieIdeePiatons Dietrich berückinterpretiert. dieseKritik. Berthold dieUniversalientheorien Albertus und Avicennas, sichtigt verknüpft umdieEinwände Aristoteles anPlatozu entkräften. NachBerthold hatAristoteles Dietrichs, Platozu Unrecht kritisiert alswärendieIdeensinguläre Formen. Die platonischen Ideen sindaufgrund derUniversalität ihresAbgetrennt-sein (d.h.nichtnurlogisch) allgemein. Dervorliegende Bandenthält wertvolle zumStudium eineswichtigen Beiträge Philosophen undTheologen. Es gibtzwareinenNamenregister, aberichvermisste eineTotalbibliographie undeinIndexderBegriffe. Das BuchistvonGrüner worden. Verlagschönundsorgfaltig herausgegeben Leiden

E.P. Bos

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andPaulofGelria. TheTreatises BosandStephen Read,Concepts. ofThomas ofCleves Egbert de Introduction. Editions de l'Institut AnEdition with a Systematic Supérieur oftheTexts + xii 147. Louvain-Paris Editions 2001, Peeters, Louvain-la-Neuve; pp. Philosophie, t. XLII) ISBN90 429 09013 (Philosophes médiévaux, 18and30 pageslongrespecan edition oftwobrief contains Thisslimvolume treatises, or itscareful foritsoriginality treatise is particularly Neither developnoteworthy tively. ofmedieval to thehistorian buttheyareinvaluable mentofphilosophical logic. points, andthey illusthoseofBuridan, ofnominalist doctrines, especially Theyshowthediffusion ofthelatefourteenth tratethelogicalcommonplaces Moreover, theyareexpliccentury. andof discussions ofsignsandsignification Sincethisheading covers itlyaboutconcepts. andsyncategorematic first andsecondintentions, ofterm, categorematic including types distinctions came howlogical wecanseeclearly andunivocal andequivocal terms, terms, in terms ofmental to be discussed byPeterof language. Onlyone othersuchtreatise, tookup the authors at leastsevenknown from is available thesameperiod, though Ailly, andearlysixteenth centuries. topicin thelatefifteenth tohavedetermined He is known ThomasofClevesis theearliest. Ofthetwoauthors, at thecatheBuserin 1364,andhe latertaught William ofParisunder at theUniversity at therefounded He waslisted morethanonceamongthemasters dralschoolinVienna. of at theUniversity ofVienna,and in 1391waslistedamongthemasters University at Parisintheearly which He diedin 1412.Histreatise, mayhavebeenwritten Cologne. Paulof ofthreecommentaries. andwasthesubject in twomanuscripts, 1370s,survives underhimat Parisin 1375.He taught determined GelriawasThomas's student, having inPrague forlessthana yearbefore in 1382.He stayed forPrague atParisbefore leaving ofColognefrom1397 at theUniversity ofVienna.He taught to theUniversity moving in onlyone manuscript, is heavily whichsurvives untilhisdeathin 1404.His treatise, withthehuman itaddstwoextrasections on thatofThomas, dealing though dependent works mention no other The editors ofcognition. andwiththeobjects cognitive powers Thomasor Paul. byeither onp. 91 line14itwouldbe preferseemsimpeccable, ofthetexts Theedition though velvisuicolsolumauditui, ableto read'sonum'for'solum'in thephrase"applicans theindexcouldhave is generally materiell The editorial oratum." though veryhelpful, Therearegooddisofparallel thefinding to facilitate beenlonger, passages. especially The mainpart edendi. andtheratio livesandofthemanuscripts cussions oftheauthors' in found ofthedoctrines is devoted toa clearanduseful oftheintroduction presentation mention. On p. 10 Lambert thatdeserve Therearejusta fewsmallinfelicities thetexts. than is datedat c. 1240rather ofLagny) ofAuxerre's (moreprobably byLambert Logica thatthe fallintotheerrorofsuggesting c. 1250(orevenlater).On p. 29, theeditors In fact, senseperceives. sensibles arewhatthecommon common theyarethosesensibles Paul'stextis reatheproper sensibles. unlike thatareperceived bymorethanonesense, andthecomcolouradequately thatvisioncognizes clearon thispoint,saying sonably monsensibles acceptwithout non-adequately (p. 116).On p. 39 andp. 41 theeditors 'substance' isa substance term Paul'soddclaimthatthewritten comment (p. 123),although Thereis a tableon p. 43 as an example. text(p. 94) gave'quality' Thomas's parallel shadesofgreyandblack different which is rendered bytheuseofinsufficiently mysterious theinformation. to convey an overview offourteenth ingiving is successful Theeditors' introduction century logic ofall the a detailed itdoesnotattempt in relation to thetwotexts. However, exposition and withthedefinitions which wouldbe illuminated comparison bymoreextensive points ofthelate nominalists discussed JohnDorp,andtheParisian byPeterofAilly, problems didnothave thattheeditors One canunderstand andearlysixteenth fifteenth century. to ThomasandPaulmorefully orto relate theseissuesthrough, timeorspacetofollow Vivarium 40,2

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theircontemporaries and successors, butit is worth at justone case,thedisglancing tinction between andsignifying Thomas(p. 91) is like signifying instrumentally formally. PeterofAillyin regarding words insofar as instrumentally as theyare spoken significative instruments fortheproduction ofconcepts and,whilehe doesnotdirectiy speakofconhe does(despite theeditors' denialon p. 36) do so indiceptsas formally significative, whenhe remarks thatsignsotherthanconcepts arenotformally rectly significative (p. on theother hand, 92),thatis,significative justbecauseofwhattheyare.PaulofGelria, is muchclosertoJohnDorpwhenhe speaksofa signas an instrumentally effective or formal ofthething ofinstrumentality cognition signified (p. 121).Dorpusedthenotion to distinguish humanconcepts from theintellect as suchandfrom God,bothofwhich canbe thought ofas representative insomesense.Allthesesenses ofinstrumentality were in laterParisian tofigure discussions. Sometimes a fullexposition ofthetexts wouldhaveinvolved a lookbackwards intime. Thomas's brief ofmetaphorical andironic usesofterms case handling (p. 92) is a useful in point.The general division between thetwouseswas discussed in his byBuridan Summulae desuppositionibus butwhereBuridan 4.3.1,withsomeof thesameexamples, themoreusualword'transsumptio as ifit applied ', Thomasdoesuse'metaphor' employs to anyfigure of speech.In hisbrieflistof typesof figure, he listsseveralmodesof modesofclassification in forinstance, found, metonymy, alongwiththemoregeneral Gervasius ofMelkley, ofidentity for similitude, namely identity, (a subdivision equality andcontrariety. Thismishmash ofrhetorical lorepresumably meant Gervasius) something tothemedieval student whohadbeeninstructed inthese butisa lotmoredifficult matters, forthemodern reader to sortout. The treatises areoften becausetheyareso succinct, butthisuseful edition frustrating willundoubtedly further research intohowthedoctrines touched on byThomas inspire andPaulwereactually usedanddeveloped. Ont. Waterloo,

E.J.Ashworth

Lamentìi Vallensis De linguae latinae Ad IoannemTortellium Aretinum elegantia. perme M. Nicolaum Ienson Venetiis est.M.CCCC.LXXI.Introducopusfeliciter impressum traducción ción,edicióncrítica, y notasporSantiago LópezMoreda,TomosI-II. Universidad deExtremadura, Cáceres1999(Grammatica Humanística. SerieTextos. 3) 833pp.ISBN84 77233578 / 84 77233586 Das Werk De linguae Latinae desitalienischen Humanisten Valla(Laurentius Lorenzo Elegantia zu denwichtigen Schriften aus demHumanismus, vondenenes noch Vallensis) gehört keinetextkritische Edition sichausdenUmständen, unter denen gibt.DieseLückeerklärt das Werknochzu VallasLebzeiten das Lichtsah.Die Elegantiae wurden nämlich ohne VallasZustimmung in einernochsehrvorläufigen FormvonAurispa veröffendicht. Zu einer istesbeiVallasLebzeiten nicht mehr Schon endgültigen Veröffendichung gekommen. vorseinem Todewarenzahlreiche, an vielenStellen erheblich voneinander abweichende Versionen derElegantiae in Umlauf. Die erstegedruckte Edition erschien imJahre1471, dasheißtvierzehn JahrenachVallasTod. derElegantiae 1441 LópezMoredamacht glaubhaft (S. 24-5),daß dieersteRedaktion undeinezweiteRedaktion, fürdie VallaeineAnzahlneuentdeckter Werkevonu.a. Plautus ist.Die endgültige Version datiert hatte,1443erschienen durchgesehen López MoredaaufdasJahr1448(S.25). NacheinerEinführung, in derLópezMoredakurzVallasLeben(S. 13-6),seine Polemiken mitPoggioBracciolini, Antonio del Rho,Sanchezde las Brozas,Panormita, © Koninklijke BrillNV,Leiden,2002 Alsoavailable online- www.brill.nl

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Bruni(S. 16-22)erörtert, selbst und FaciusundLeonardo gehternäheraufdieEkgantiae aufdieBedeutung desBegriffes beidenHumanisten ein(S. 23-41).1 elegantia inseinem einerspaniBucheineTextausgabe derElegantiae nebst LópezMoredabietet habenJ. IJsewijn undG. Tournoy zum schenÜbersetzung. Vorungefähr Jahren dreißig undgedruckten Editionen derElegantiae MaleineKatalogisierung derHandschriften ersten Edition zu ermöglichen.2 Dieses mitdemlangfristigen Ziel,einetextkritische vorgenommen, inSicht.López derobenerwähnten nochlangenicht Zielistaber,wegen Schwierigkeiten, vonIenson Textesaufdie Textausgabe Moredahatsichbei derWahldeslateinischen In seinem wurde. textkritischen dieimJahre1471inVenedig beschränkt, gedruckt Apparat beschränkt die Abweichungen den gedruckten gegenüber LópezMoredasichdarauf, vonGryphius Aldus(Venedig Editionen 1557) 1536)undSteelsius (Paris1532), (Antwerpen wiederTitelseinesBuchessuggeriert, alsonicht, zu verzeichnen. LópezMoredabietet derEdition vonIenson. vielmehr handelt es sichumeineNeuauflage eineedición crítica' Editionen In denwenigen Fällenin denenLópezMoredadenTexteinerderanderen es sichaußerdem umeineeindeutige demdesIensonvorzieht, handelt Fehlentscheidung. oleiinventrix DiesistdieLesart So gibtLópezMoredaS. 56,Z. 28-29:Minerva putatur. quod in derklassischen aber Literatur erweisen Die Belegstellen vonSteelsius; Iensonhatoleae. des als die Erfinderin Lesartseinmuß,weilMinerva daß oleaedie korrekte deutlich, wird.3 Warum desOlivenöls Ölbaums undnicht (oleum) LópezMoredain dargestellt (olea) wirdnicht klar. diesem Einzelfall dieLesartdesSteelsius vorzieht, entfernt textkritischen Edition nochvoneinerrichtigen WieweitdieWissenschaft ist, in demsieeine BuchvonMariangela manausdem1993erschienenen ersieht Regoliosi, Zur zumerstenBuchderElegantiae textkritische Editiondes Vorworts präsentiert.4 Edition basierenden textkritischen Handschriften deraufdenvorhandenen Rechtfertigung mehralshunbraucht dieVerfasserin Seitenzählenden, dieseseinen, nurfiinf Vorwortes, Werkabernicht vertraut.5 dertSeiten. LópezMoredaistmitdiesem So Fehler. Textfinden sichleiderzahlreiche In demvonLópezMoredagebotenen so S. 58,Z. 3: Worten einf wo eins zu lesenistundumgekehrt; gibterin bestimmten statt secundus.6 deskorrekten sitanstatt abhominibus fit,S. 404,Z. 21fecundus quemadmodum So gibter,wo Vallaim Fehler. unterlaufen Auchinhaltlich LópezMoredadesöfteren zu vonHieronymus zumvierten Buch(S. 406,Z. 34)übereinenBrief Vorwort spricht, es mit„la cartadelgranorador". orátorem : epistola illaadmagnum Unrecht ,7undübersetzt weistValla sondern es sichabernichtumeinen„großen handelt Tatsächlich Redner", LXX desHieronymus hin.8 Brief aufdenan denRedner Magnusgerichteten dem imTextvonIensongegenüber indenendieAbweichungen NebendenFußnoten, bietetLópezMoredaweiverzeichnet AldusundSteelsius TextvonGryphius, werden, klassischer Autoren ZitateausWerken in denendievonVallagegebenen tereFußnoten, undwimmeln sindaberallesanderealsvollständig werden. DieseFußnoten identifiziert BuchderElegantiae zumersten vonFehlern. Wennwirunsaufdas Vorwort geradezu daß LópezMoredahiernurS. 62 Z. 21 sichheraus, dannstellt beschränken (S. 56-64), Zitateund erkennbare identifiziert. einZitatvonVergilius Sogarwennes sichumleicht deutet . . . handelt, tandem wieS. 62,Z. 11: Quousque , Quintes LópezMoreda Anspielungen wirdas BuchvonRegoliosi nichtan,daß es sichumeinZitathandelt.9 auf,10 Schlagen ausklassischen schon siebzehn indiesem Vorwort daßsieallein sichheraus, sostellt (!)Zitate fìirdas ganzeWerk istleiderbeispielhaft hat.DieseNachlässigkeit identifiziert Autoren unterlaufen odereineUngenauigkeit WennVallaeinFehler vonLópezMoreda.11 ist,fehlt Ferner schreibt eineErläuterung.12 fastimmer LópezMoredadie Zitateaus klassischen so daß derLeserzu Unrecht nurteilweise Autoren sehroftnichtganzsondern kursiv, dasWorthat.13 istundVallawieder daßdasZitatabgeschlossen denEindruck bekommt, Autoren es auchvor,daß LópezMoredaeinZitatausklassischen Wiederholt kommt zum aus demVorwort vondenschongenannten nichterkennt. Beispielen Abgesehen identifizierten undunrichtig ersten BuchkannmaneinelangeListevonnichterkannten Zitaten aufstellen.14

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Das BuchvonLópezMoredaistnochin einemanderen Bereich sehrunbefriedigend. Es handelt sichumdieZitatewelche Valladenrömischen insbesondere ausden Juristen, entnommen hat.Vallaselbst hebtimVorwort zumdritten Buchnachdrücklich Digesten, daß er die fünfzig BücherderDigesten vonAnfang bis Endedurchgenommen hervor, undstudiert diesesjuristischen Werkes füreingutes hat,wobeier die großeBedeutung Verständnis lateinischer betont. Es istdahererstaunlich, daß López unzähliger Begriffe Moredasichgeradebei VallasZitatenrömischer als überfordert Juristen systematisch erweist. ZitateausJustinians Institutiones vertraut;13 LópezMoredaistnurmitdenDigesten identifiziert erdaherzu Unrecht alsFragmente ausdenDigesten, selbst wennVallainaller Deutlichkeit aufJustinian hinweist.16 Ferner derNameTribonian nichts.17 sagtihmselbst Die Hinweise aufDigestenstellen sindaußerordentlich undoftschlechthin falsch.18 ungenau Überdie ofterheblichen Unterschiede zwischen demWortlaut dervonVallazitierten unddemTextdermodernen Standardedition vonMommsen verliert Digestenstellen López MoredakeinWort.19 Auchin derÜbersetzung finden sichmanchmal seltsame Sachen.20 AnallenEckenundKanten sichnicht dieMühegegeben man,daßLópezMoreda spürt Hinweisen Vallassorgfaltig So erklärt VallainElegantiae hat,nicht-spezifischen nachzugehen. III 7 (S. 312),das Wortliberi im allgemeinen nurim Plural, aber: ("Kinder") begegne Liberum tarnen etapudPaulum In denFußnoten profilioetapudQuintilianum Caiumque reperio. fehlt einHinweis aufQuintilian, wohlaberweist eraufzweiDigestenstellen LópezMoredas undDig.50,16,148pr. Erstere Stellebeinhaltet denfolgenhin,undzwarDig.26,2,22pr denText:Si quistutorem dederit suosenium, liberum cum esset isñeque esse, servus, filio quem putabat liber tutor eût.Es bedarf wohlkeiner daßdasWortliber hiernicht ñeque "Kind, Erläuterung, Sohn"sondern "frei" außerdem stammt dasZitatnicht vonPaulussondern von bedeutet; Die zweiteTextstelle stammt vonGaius:Nonestsine Ulpian.Das Zitatistalso falsch. "habet "nonhabet cuivelunus unave enuntiatio liberos" liberos" semliberis, filius filiaest:haecenim numero sicut et et codicilli. Dieses Zitat ist also korrekt.21 perplurativo profertur, pugillares Derartige Fehlzitate sindgangundgäbe;LeserdesBuchesvonLópezMoredawerden daheralle ZitateundHinweise müssen. genauüberprüfen Einzweites inElegantiae IV 1 (S. 412-416) ValladenBedeutungsunterBeispiel: bespricht schied zwischen libertinus undlibertus. In diesem weist Kapitel LópezMoredaaufnureinen hätten sichzahlreiche hin,undzwarDig.1,5,2lpr.Geradeindiesem Digestentext Kapitel Hinweise aufdieDigesten finden sollen. Vallasagt(S. 412,Z. 1-2):Libertinus etlibertus sola habent necgrammatici, neciurisperiti maxime elegantiae gratia differentiam, quam (quod pudendum est) sciunt. DieseAussage Vallaskanmanwiderlegen durcheinenHinweis aufDig.40,15,6 tiens seconfitetur, libertům autem GaiiSeiisenegat . . . In Z. 18 (Ulpian): quo quislibertinům quidem conditionem sicut einHinweis hominis, sagtValla:Perlibertinům ; hierfehlt significarne peringenuum aufDig.1,1,4(Ulpian): liberi ethiscontrarium servi ettertium idesthiquidesierunt liberti, genus esseservi. In Z. 22 erklärt Valla:utiniure civili: sunt Servitute manumissi sunt". „libertini quiiusta Deutlicher kanneinHinweis aufdie Digesten nichtsein;es handelt sichumDig.1,5,6: Libertini manumissi sunt. Ebensogehörte zu Z. 23: Quemadmodum e sunt, quiexiustaServitute " contrario: matre servi aufDig. sunt, nati,necpostea „Ingenui quilibera factisuntein Hinweis libera natisunt aufJust., Inst.l,4pr:Ingenuus 1,5,5,2: sunt, Ingenui , undeventuell quiexmatre utnatus estliber est.LópezMoredabietet keinerlei somit est,quistatim Hinweise; geschieht VallaUnrecht, weilderLesernicht in derLageist,VallasWerkvollzu würdigen.22 Der daßdemVerfasser diejuristische nicht sichauch Umstand, ist,rächt Terminologie geläufig in Elegantiae IV 48:Aliud essealiudiura(S. 474-476). Vallapolemisiert leges gegendiemittelalterlichen wieAccursius, underörtert Rechtsgelehrten dann,daßdiesemodernen Juristen einZitatvonPaulus,Ulpianodereinemanderen römischen einelexnennen; Juristen diesenWortgebrauch hältVallafürinkorrekt, da sichdasWortlexbeidenRömern auf wiedie lexAquilia kannmannurverstehen, wenn , bezog.DiesePolemik ganzeGesetze, mandiejuristische derGlossatoren kennt: dieseunterteilen einTextfragment Terminologie ausdenDigesten in tituli undleges P LópezMoredaistdieseTerminologie nicht geläufig, unddaherbleibt in seiner derKernderPolemik unklar. Übersetzung

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mittels einesZitates In Elegantiae ValladenBegriff VI 46 (S. 770-2)erörtert instratum, Instratum aus Dig.50,16,45(nicht, wieLópezMoredazu Unrecht gibt,Dig.34,2,25,3): lautetder omne Labeoait.In Wirklichkeit vestimentum continere, quoamkimur Ulpianus inquit mitDig. omne vestimentum Zusammen Text:In stratu continere, quodiniciatur. Ulpianus inquit non . . . fuhrt dieszu derSchlußfolgerung, sivictum velstratum 42,1,34: inferri quisiudicato patiatur oder hatund,unddaß es stratum daß es keinWortinstratum gibt,daß Vallasichgeirrt hierüber aberkeinWort. stratus heißt.LópezMoredaverliert (der4. Deklination) undUnrichtigkeiten.24 Auch vonUngenauigkeiten Das BuchvonLópezMoredastrotzt nichteinwandfrei. So verfahrt in methodologischer Hinsicht LópezMoredamanchmal esse VI 59 (S. 796,Z. 8-9)dieLesart: bietet erimTextvonElegantiae Necobidveteratorem debeconsidestudiis eruditus sit diesabermit„Y porestomismo , übersetzt quodliberalibus wobeierbemerkt enlostrabajos rarse veterator elqueseaexperto liberales", (S. 797,Fußnote nam de la variante , quedanlasediciones, y nopor 86):„Hemosoptadoporla traducción conla diferenciación entreel de Valla.La congruencia nec,comoapareceen la edición NunhatdiebesteHandschrift derDigesten, asílo requiere." veterano esclavo y el novicio nam.Die codices deteriores unterstützen AuchdieBasilica derFlorentinus (F),dieLesartnam. dahersoll aberhaben¿dienec.Es istalsoklar,daßVallaausletztgenannter Quellezitiert: Buchkeineswegs Hierwirderneut werden. auchnecübersetzt klar,daß LópezMoredas Arbeit daß mitLópezMoredas Edition darstellt. Es istzwarerfreulich, einetextkritische Werk vonVallaswichtigem undÜbersetzung handliche eineschöngestaltete, Textausgabe dieman WeisedenAnforderungen wirdaberinkeinster vorhanden ist,dieArbeit gerecht, stellen darf. an einesolcheVeröffentlichung Leonter Beek Nijmegen 1 Aufschlußreicher «Elegantiae inLorenzo Valla's Grammar istD. Marsh, », , andpolemic , method 19 (1979),S. 91-116. in:Rinascimento, 2 Cf.J. Lfsewijn - G. Tournoy, a stampa e delle censimento deimanoscritti Unprimo edizioni » di Lorenzo 18 «Elegantiarum Valla sex latinae libri Lovaniensia, , in: Humanística linguae degli delle e delle deimanoscritti contributi edizioni ., Nuovi Elegantiae perl'elenco (1969),S. 25-41;idd diLorenzo Valla 20 (1971),S. 1-3. Lovaniensia, , in:Humanística 3 Cf.Verg.,Georg. Minerva ' inventrix; 1,18-19: priquod Hyg.,Fab.164,1:Minerva oleaeque Minerva suas esoleas Resrust. ineaterra oleam mům ; Ov.,Mix12:mirata 1,2,19; sevit, Varro, saepe oleaMinerva. AufdieseZitateverweist Deci.13,19:inventrix LópezMoredaaber Ps.-Quint., nicht. 4 Cf.M. Regoliosi, «Elegantie delle e montaggio delValla. Nelcantiere Elaborazione »,Roma1993. 5 Er erwähnt S. 43-7. in derBibliographie undes fehlt es nirgendwo 6 Auchsonst S. 60,Z. 24:everta alsfehlerfrei. istderTextallesandere EinigeBeispiele: S. statt S. 280,Z. 22:pothac stattcomposuerit; S. 62,Z. 25: composuerint statt posthac', eversa; stattmalehabeat S. 454,Z. 12:malahabeat stattceperunt, ; S. 474,Z. 292,Z. 10:coeperunt S. 798, S. 792,Z. 8: eastatt statt S. 750,Z. 30: ewitais statt 22: civilium earn; civitatis', civile', istdurchweg Wörter Die Akzentuation statt Iavolenus. Z. 6: Iabolenus unrichtig, griechischer so S. 60,Z. 13;S. 314,Z. 17-18;S. 450,Z. 13;S. 600,Z. 22; S. 762,Z. 4. 7 Derselbe delquattrocento, E. Garin,Prosatori sichin demStandardwerk Fehlerfindet TextohneweihatLópezMoredadiesen [1952],S. 618-9;wahrscheinlich Milano-Napoli teresübernommen. 8 Cf.I. Hillberg, ParsI: Epistulae Sancii Eusebii I-LXX,VindobonaeEpistula, Hieronymi 1890(CSEL 54),S. 700-8. Lipsiae 9 Cf.Cic.,Cat.1,1;Liv.6,18,5;Sali.,Cat.20,9;Quint.4,1,68und9,2,7. 10Cf.Regoliosi 1993(s.o.,Anm.4), S. 120-5. 11Bei Zitaten deutet aus denPsalmen an,daß es sichum LópezMoredamanchmal dieseAndeutung iuxta Hebraicum LXX(G)oderumdiePsalmen iuxta diePsalmen (H)handelt;

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aberS. 158,Z.4: Psalm.141,4G; S. 484,Z. 5: Psalm. fehlt 104,23,2G; S. 554,Z. 4: Psalm. 31,8 G. 12So S. 112,Z. 26,woVallaausdemXXVILBuchederDigesten inWirklichkeit zitiert; VallaausPsalmo handelt es sichumBuchXXIX.AufS. 146,Z. 6 zitiert undécimo; López Moredaübersetzt mit"en el salmoXXI". Tatsächlich hatVallasichgeirrt, abereine wäreamPlatzgewesen. AufS. 198,Z. 30 spricht VallaüberPsalmXL,was Erläuterung In Wirklichkeit ohneweiteres übernimmt. handelt LópezMoredain seinerÜbersetzung es sichaberumPsalmCXL. 13Beispiele: S. 452,Z. 17-18:hocestenim auctoritatem fienistnochZitatvonPaulus(in S. 584,Z. 2-3:Et. . . licitatio derÜbersetzung istnochZitatvon unrichtig angedeutet); S. 750,Z. 23-27istvollständig Zitat unrichtig Ulpian(inderÜbersetzung angedeutet); wohlin derÜbersetzung S. 752,Z. 6-8:nochZitatvon (imTextnicht, angedeutet); Marcian(LópezMoreda,Z. 2, nenntihnzu Unrecht Marcus);S. 752,Z. 35: appellantes . . . reponeretur nochZitatvonCelsus; S. 756,Z. 10-11: ZitatvonModestinus; vollständig S. 756,Z. 12-15:dasZitatvonFlorentinus Z. 15 dicuntur, S. 762, gehtbiseinschließlich Z. 6: Contra . . . ager nochZitatvonVarro;S. 796,Z. 1-9:vollständig ZitatvonVenuleius nichtangedeutet); S. 796,Z. 10-18:vollständig ZitatvonUlpian(in (inderÜbersetzung derÜbersetzung nichtangedeutet); S. 798,Z. 15-16:Namque . . . duorum nochZitatvon . . . exauctoravisse istvollständig ZitatvonUlpian(nicht Ulpian;S. 800,Z. 13-16:Ignominiosa vonJulian, wieVallaZ. 13 sagt,übrigens ohnedaß LópezMoredadieseVerwechslung S. 800,Z. 32:Depectus . . .pactus inderÜbersetzung); istZitatvonUlpian(richtig bemerkt); S. 802,Z. 24-31:vollständig ZitatvonUlpian(inderÜbersetzung nichtangedeutet). 14Beispiele: S. 64,Z. 4: cf.Liv.5,49,7;S. 124,Z. 3: Priscianum bezieht sichaufPrise., Inst.3,2(GLKIII, S. 93);S. 178,Z. 5 zitiert VallaausCic.,Brut. e Cilicia dece1,1:Quum In seiner dens Rhodům venissem. e Sicilia decedens Rhodům gibtLópezMoreda:Quum Übersetzung " wozuer in einerFußnote bemerkt: venissem, „Cic.,Brut.1,1:Sicilia proCilicia(sic!)In Wirklichkeit habendieManuskripte Cicerosnurdas korrekte Cilicia. AufS. 204,Z. 24, wo Vallaaus Ov.,Her.19,76:Copia sitmodo identifiziert placandae parvatuizitiert, López MoredadiesalsOv.,Her.19,74,undfügt hinzu:„Esincorrecto porquesolohay15cartas."WasLópezMoredasichhiergedacht hatisträtselhaft. AufS. 212,Z. 14-15, zitiert VallaausCassiusHemina, abernicht ausdem2. sondern ausdem4. Buch(cf.H. Peter, Historicorum Romanorum Iteratis curisdisposuit recensuit est.Volumen reliquiae. praefatus prius, Lipsiae1914,S. 109-10).AufS. 292,Z. 4-5 fehltein HinweisaufCic.,Mur.28: si mihi. . . stomachum moveritis. AufS. 308,Z. 5, istderHinweis Reg.7,17in Reg.3,7,17zu ändern. AufS. 324,Z. 28-29,spricht Vallavonseinenlibri dialectici. LópezMoredasagt in einerFußnote, VallanehmehieraufEleg.II 25 Bezug.In Wirklichkeit bezieht Valla sichnatürlich aufseinWerk Dialecticae an demVallainderselben Zeitarbeitete disputationes, unddas 1439veröffendicht wurde. AufS. 330,Z. 25 zitiert Vallaaus„dem5. Buchder OdendesHoraz";einHinweis daß es sichumeineUmschreibung desBuches darauf, derEpodenhandelt, wärehieram Platz.AufS. 334,Z. 14,istderHinweis Psal.8,2,10 in Psalm. AufS. 392,Z. 9 istin derFußnote 8,2.10zu ändern. „Cic.,Sal.5,5"in „Ps.zu ändern. AufS. 396,Z. 21,zitiert Valla Cic.,Inv.inSali.2,5(keinbuchstäbliches Zitat)" Cicero:Equités nonoptimos misisse credo Caesar ad tuum , nihil equitatum. LópezMoredasagt in einerFußnote: hierzu . Es istkeinWunder, daß diesesZitatsich „Caes.,noninvenituríí beiCaesarnicht weiles,wieVallaimTextdeutlich findet, sagt,demCiceroentnommen übersetzt ist,undzwarCic.,Deiot. 8,24.Übrigens LópezMoredahierad tuum equitatum mit„parala preparación de tucaballería" zu deiner „imVergleich unrichtig (sollheißen: AufS. 410-1identifiziert als Kavallerie"). LópezMoredaeinZitatvonEuripides lediglich aus derHecuba es handelt sichumdieVerse814-9dieserTragödie. AufS. stammend; vondemdurchVallamit 442,Z. 20 undZ. 21 verdeutlicht LópezMoredazweiZitaten Namengenannten Boethius nurdurch„Boeth .". AufS. 490,Z. 9-10,zitiert VallaCicero: vela seorsum vel(utCiceroni a seorsum eundo dicta. Seditio, sedendo, placet) LópezMoredagibt

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Zitataus überliefertes es handelt sichaberumeinbeiNoniusMarcellus keinen Hinweis, omnia. Fase.39: dem6. BuchedesDe republica ; cf.M. TulliCkeronis scripta quaemanserunt K. Ziegler. Accedit tasextum De re publicalibrorum sexquae manserunt recognovit a M. Tullio estinlib. bula,Lipsiae1964,S. 122:Non.,p. 25,3: seditionis manifestata proprietas seditio diciture. Mansehe eunt aliiad alios, VI:,eaque dissensio derepublica civium, quodseorsum skutCicero aitinderepublica. AufS. 494, est, undzwar:o mieinZitatvonCiceronichterkannt, Z. 11 hatLópezMoredawiederum InWirklichkeit invenitur". administrandi consulatus. seram conditionem sagtnur:„non LópezMoreda administrandae sed o condicionem miseram nonmodo istdasZitatausCic.,Cat.2,14entnommen: iuventa ein reipublicae. AufS. 530,Z. 26-27,istpetulansque etiam conservandae möglicherweise = Carm. mai.9,84:quosinter Honorio dictum ZitatausClaud.,Epithal. petulans Aug.etMariae aufdasbekannte Vincere Iuventas. AufS. 558,Z. 3-4isteinHinweis altacervice seis, Hannibal; AufS. 604,Z. 21,istdasZitatin Hor.,Serm. utinescis zu ergänzen. victoria (Liv.22,51,4) mortis einHinweis beidemZitatPropositis AufS. 646,Z. 15,fehlt zu ändern. 1,1,16-17 auf Clodicontentionesque etexilii manseheCic.,Att.2,19,1:minae minis; proponuntur, es is huicurbi beidemZitatMagnum einHinweis derselben Seitefehlt ostenditur, periculum ostenditur. AufS. 786,Z. 27,gibtLópez einZitataus Cic.,Div.2,47:urbiigitur periculum sich aufeinenDigestentext; es handelt einenHinweis MoredabeieinemZitatausFestus = S. 22 Müller. AufS. 776,Z. 21,wo Vallasagt:quod S. 20 Lindsay aberumFestus, " si convictus esset XII tabularum : „Calumniator idem illam declaratur quo(sic)reus, patiatur, perlegem Vallaaus Ps.zitiert weistLópezMoredanurauf„Dig.,o Gell."hin;in Wirklichkeit etcalumniator idem utproditor morte .è.erant enim Deel.19 arg pateretur quod leges, puniretur, Quint., esset. si convictus reus, 15Auffallig aus wieLópezMoredaFragmente wirkt dieArtundWeise, undverwirrend z.B.Dig.20,1,5,1,1. Er gibtkonsequent einenfünfstelligen zitiert. denDigesten Hinweis, Hinweis: Üblichisteinvierstelliger Buch,Titel,lexundParagraph. LópezMoredaweist desParagraphen nochaufdieZeileinnerhalb darüberhinaus Ziffer dieletzte durch (offenbar) nichtdie hat.Jedenfalls benutzt er hierfür abernichtwelcheTextausgabe hin,erwähnt in operis Iustiniani Th. Mommsen, Standardedition recognovit adsumpto Augusti Digesta Berolini 1962-1963. Vol.I-II.Editioalteralucisopeexpressa, PauloKruegero. societatem TürundTor. Fehlern öffnet Zitierweise Moredas unübliche López 16AufS. 492,Z. 34,weist Inst. Inst. 4,6,15 4,6,15statt Just., LópezMoredaaufGramm. Iustiniani S. 746,Z. 2-6:„Noxaededere, bietet hin.Eingutes pace,siveTreboniani Beispiel estpersonae Latinas litteras neciura,necforsitan namIustinianus etsociorum, dare, novit, Ille autemait:,Noxa,estcorpusquod ob noxam,qua significatur sivetradere culpa. " aber daßillesichhieraufIustinianus noeuit.'Es istdeuüich, bezieht, LópezMoredaweist Inst.4,8,1.AufS. 747, handelt es sichumJust., hin.In Wirklichkeit aufDig.9,1,1,11 AufS. 748, verfehlt. undDig.50,16,238 aufDig.35,2,63 Fußnote 55,sinddieHinweise exeoappellatur idem in bezugaufdasZitatTestamentům, einHinweis Z. 1,fehlt quod inquit, Inst.2,1Opr. istJust., aufJustinian; sichidem mentis est.Auchhierbezieht testatio gemeint VallagegendenGlossator AufS. 784,Z. 17-22polemisiert der,nachAussage Accursius, in Institutionibus, verkennt: desWortes Vallas,dieBedeutung „qui(jc.Accursius) lignum fiunťsicinterex qua aedificia ubidicitur significatur, ligniomnismateria ,appellatione materiam immemor a iurisconsultis etlapides, utcaementa, prolignoad exponi pretatur, et Plinius et Cato et Varroet Columella aedificia qui de agricultura utili;quamquam etbreviter illiusmateriam etiamarborem appellant, particulamque scripsere, aliiquevivam sonvonlignum woabernicht Inst.2,1,29, aufJust., einHinweis Hierfehlt omnelignum." = Dig.41,1,7,10 statt dieRedeist(demGaius,Dig.50,16,62 dernvontignum [mitquibus utili beziehen adaedificia materiam a iurisconsultis Die Worte proligno exponi qua]entnommen). ut nomen sichaufDig.32,55pr est,sedsicseparatur, generale „Ligniappellatio (Ulpian): necesfulciendum Materia sitaliquidmateria, est,quaead aedificandum aliquidlignum. est."FürCatoläßtsichu.a. auf causaparatům comburendi sariaest,lignum, quidquid fiirColumella furVarrou.a.aufResrust. 1,22,1und1,41,1, 6,3und21,2verweisen, Agr.

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aufResrust. si necessitas 1,2:materiam lapidemque, aedificandi coegerit (undpassim ), fürPlinius, hättedie Erwähnung Nat.hist, passim (BTL 164Mal).AufS. 792,Z. 6-10,wo genügt Vallaspricht vonIustinianus cumUlpiano vero inInstitutionibus dicens , weistLópezMoredaauf Inst.4,6,7hin;außerdem Dig.20,1,5,1,1 (sic)stattdeskorrekten Just, gibter Z. 8 nicht earn sondern dasungrammatikalische ea. 17In Elegantiae VI 35,aufS. 747,Fußnote sei 54,behauptet LópezMoreda,Trebonianus derlatinisierte NamedesJuristen In Wirklichkeit warTribonian derwichtigTryphoninus. - E. Seckel, stederjustinianischen cf.H. Heumann Handlexikon zudenQuellen Kompilatoren; = desrömischen Rechts der , 10.Auflage, Jena1907 Graz1958,S. 593:„528-529 Mitglied Kommission fürdie Ausarbeitung des KodexersterLesung,530-533Präsident der 533 mitdenProfessoren undDorotheus in demmit Digestenkommission, Theophilus derInstitutionen betrauten Urheber derL decisiones Ausschusse, Abfassung geistiger (cf. lust.Inst.I 5, 3),534erstes derKommission fürdieHerstellung descodexrepetiMitglied taepraelectionis; inhohen Aemtern: 535ff wieder officiorum, magister quaestor, gest.546". ManseheauchCod.Iust.l,17,2pr.9.1 law 1.17;A. Berger, , Encyclopedic dictionary ofRoman 1953= 1968,S. 742;T. Honoré,Tribonian, London1978. Philadelphia 18Folgende Hinweise sindzu korrigieren: S. 584,Z. 3 lesemanDig.39,4,9,1-2; S. 584, Z. 9 Dig.18,2,14pr-2;S. 776,Z. 32 Dig.48,16,lpr-l; S. 778,Z. 4 Dig.48,16,1,6; S. 782, Z. 22 Dig.47,10,15,11-12; S. 790,Z. 26-29Dig.50,16,43-44 (Ulpianbeziehungsweise Z. 10Dig.21,l,37pr. AufS. 800,Z. 13 istein ibid., Gaius);S. 796,Z. 3 Dig.21,1,65,2; Hinweis aufDig.3,2,2,2zu ergänzen; in derselben Zeilezitiert Vallairrtümlicherweise statt Julian Ulpian. 19Als dieneein TextvonGaiusaus Dig.39,4,9,1-2 Beispiel (nicht1-3,wieLópez MoredaaufS. 584,Z. 3-9zitiert), wobeiichin eckigen Klammern denWortlaut der Mommsenschen Edition „Licitatio hinzufüge: [locatio] vectigalium, quaecalore[calor]licitantium ultramodumsolitaeconditionis ita demumadmittenda inflatur, [conductionis] et cautionem offerre est,si fideiussores idoneos, is,qui licitatione vicerit, sit;ad paratus conducendum invitus nemocompellitur. Et ideocompleto convectigal [impleto] tempore ditionis sunt.Licitatores ad [conductionis] alloquendi [elocanda] [reliquatores] vectigalium iterandam conductionem conductioni satisfaciant, admittendi non ante,quamsuperiori sunt". Auchin anderen vonVallazitierten TextensinddieUnterschiede zumderzeitigen Standardedition ohnedaßLópezMoredasieerwähnt. Einkrasser Fallistauch erheblich, wo es bei LópezMoredavonovesundovem die Rede Dig.47,14,1,1 (S. 710,Z. 19-24), Mommsen boves undbovem hat.Übrigens istabigens in Z. 23 (inderÜberist,während aufS. 711 beibehalten) ohneweiteres essollabigeus heißen. EineAusnahme setzung unrichtig: findet sichaufS. 750,Z. 10,wo dasdurchVallageschriebene nonimDigestentext fehlt undLópezMoredadiesineinerFußnote erwähnt. Dennoch mutet dieseeinsame Fußnote komisch an,wennmaneinigeZeilenspäter (S. 750,Z. 31 - S. 752,Z. 8) imTextvon zahlreiche durch nicht Dig.50,16,239,3 LópezMoreda signalisierte Abweichungen gegenüber demDigestentext vonMommsen feststellt undaußerdem denNamendesJuristen Marcian zu Marcusverstümmelt sieht.EinezweiteStellewo LópezMoredaselbst Textvarianten erwähnt findet sichS. 771,Fußnote aufdenTextselbst(Dig. 76,wo abereinHinweis fehlt. Unerwähnte erhebliche finden sichferner S. 756,Z. 3-11 48,5,35) Abweichungen S. 762,Z. 4 (griechisch); S. 762,Z. 27-31(= Dig.32,52,1, nicht (= Dig.50,16,60pr), Dig, S. 768,Z. 11-16(einTextvonMarcian, nichtvonMarcus), undzwarDig. 32,52,2,1); Ferner aufS. 770,Z. 6-10(= Dig.48,5,6,1) 35,2,91(nicht Dig.35,2,1,2). Abweichungen imGriechischen. Einmerkwürdiger Fallfindet sichweiter S. 770-771, wo sichZ. 10das Wortôiaicópevaiv inderÜbersetzung dasfehlerhafte und findet, griechische ôiaKÓjrpcuaiv indenDigesten AufS. 776,Z. 3,zitiert Valla cp0opáv (vonLópezMoredanicht erwähnt). ausDig.50,17,65 undDig.50,17,177 Hinweise sind (dievonLópezMoredagebotenen Natura . . .; in denDigesten findet cavillationis, unrichtig): aKœ(i|iaappellaverunt quamGraeci sichabernichtaxxowia sondern AuchhierkeineErläuterung. Im ZitataufS. acopixr|v. wimmelt es ebenfalls nurso vonAbweichungen 782,Z. 11-18(= Dig.47,10,15,3-5)

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demDigestentext. AufS. 788,inElegantiae VI 55,erörtert ValladieBedeutung gegenüber derWörter liberi undposteriores. Vallafangt miteinem ZitatausDig.38.10,10,7 , maiores, patres wieLópezMoredazu Unrecht an (Z. 12):„Patres," (nicht, gibt,Dig.38,10,10,8,1) inquit ad tritavos vocábulo Paulus, „usque proprio nuncupantur apudRomanos LópezMoredaerwähnt daß Paulusin denDigesten nichtvonpatres sondern vonparentes wasim nicht, spricht, Falleinengroßen Unterschied macht. AufS. 802,Z. 24-31istimTextvon gegebenen nur§ 17)obsidiani veientani zumrätselhaften absciani neuentani verDig.34,2,19-17-19 (nicht ballhornt. 20So übersetzt mit„M. Manilio", waser,ibid., LópezMoredaaufS. 293M. Manlius Fußnote Es handelt sichabernichtumeinenManilius, sondern umden 8, wiederholt. bekannten Retter Roms(cf.Liv.5,47,1-8). AufS. 782,Z. 15,übersetzt LópezMoreda adversus bonos mores mit"enrelación a lasbuenascostumbres"; istnatürlich "congemeint trario a las buenascostumbres". 21HätteLópezMoredasichetwasmehrMühe so hätte erfolgende Parallelen gegeben, finden können: Cod.Iust.3,28,33pr: Si quissuotestamento maximam libero derequidem portionem Illiusetiam talem linquet (ausdemJahre529)undCod.Iust.5,9,8,4(5): patris, quiinsuapotestate liberum velliberos habens . . . (ausdemselben Jahr). 22Aufähnliche Weisefehlt aufS. 454,Z. 10 (pupillus) einHinweis aufDig.50,16,239 inpatris esseautmorte autemanciest,qui,cumimpubes est,desiit Pupillus (Pomponius): potestate AufS. 474,Z. 25 (iuscivile) fehlt einHinweis aufDig.1,1, lusautem patone. 7pr(Papinian): civile senatus decretis auctoritate venit est,quodexlegibus, sciüs, consultis, plebis principům, prudentium undeventuell aufJust., Inst.1,2,3:Scriptum iusestlex,plebiscita, senatus consulta, principům S. 484,Z. 26: Silvaetlucus sicdifferunt, edicta, placita, magistratuum responsa prudentium. saltusque silva nomen est solet esse caed.ua istzweifelsohne teilweise einem ; praeterea quod generalius Digestentext vonGaius,Dig.50,16,30pr, entnommen: Silvacaedua est,utquidam putant, quaeinhochabetur, utcaederetur. FürS. 486,Z. 23 (vectigal) cf.Dig.50,16,17,1 Publica intelvectigalia (Ulpian): exquibus . . . FürS. 500,Z. 6 (monumentum) cf.Dig.11,7,2,6 debemus, legere vectigal fiscus capit servandae Monumentum memoriae fürS. 500,Z. 19cf.Dig.38,1; est,quod existât, (Ulpian): gratia furS. 500,Z. 22 cf.Dig.38,1,1.FürS. 626,Z. 30 {occupare) cf.Just., Inst.2,1,12:quod enim ante raùone conceditur. FürS. 752,Z. 24 cf.Dig.15,1,5,4. nullius est,idnaturali occupanti AufS. 752,Z. 21 istderHinweis aufDig.15,1,5,4,2 durch zu ersetzen. Auf Dig.15,l,4pr S. 758,Z. 11 ersetze manDig.50,16,60,1,1 durchDig.50,16,198. AufS. 762,Z. 7-8 = S. 175Müller, VallasichaufFestus, aufDig.50,16,30,2. bezieht S. 181Lindsay nicht AufS. 768,Z. 19 ersetze manDig.27,3,1,9,1 durchDig.27,3,1,8-9. AufS. 768,Z. 29 fehlt einHinweis aufDig.48,5,35pr stattcupidinis). Zu S. 770,Z. 2-3: (mitconsuetudinis innupta, invirgine, velvidua, velpuero committitur mandenHinweis Adulterium stuprum ergänze innupta invidua velvirane velpuero committiaufDig.48,5,35,1: Adulterium admittitur, stuprum aufdenlocus aufDig.3,2,4,4einHinweis tur.AufS. 776,Z. 26,fehlt bei denHinweis statt adversa). geminus Dig.47,15,lpr (mitaltera 23Mansehe 15. auchFußnote 24So spricht VI 48 (S. 774,Z. 12)vonC. Flaccus VallabeiLópezMoredainElegantiae lautet: Fiaccoen el inlibro deiure „Granio , wasaufS. 775in derÜbersetzung Papiniano nicht korHierhatLópezMoredawieder einenFehler librodelderecho de Papiniano". sondern umeinevon es handelt sichnichtumdenbekannten Juristen Papinian, rigiert: dassogenvonleges Sextus rund500v.G.angelegte regiae, (oderPublius) Sammlung Papirius curinanteiusPapirianum; cf.Dig.1,2,2,2 „Etitalegeset ipse(sc.Romulus) (Pomponius): inlibro exstant etsequentes atasad populum tulit: tulerunt reges. Quaeomnes conscriptae Corinthii exprinDemarathi SextiPapirii, illistemporibus, filius, quibusSuperbus quifuit de nonquiaPapirius iuscivilePapirianum, viris. Is liber, utdiximus, appellatur cipalibus latasinunumcontulit; undibid.36: sedquodlegessineordine suoquicquam ibiadiecit, Mansehe in unumcontulit". Publius Fuitautemin primis (sic)Papirius, quilegesregias desrömischen Die Quellen 1907(s.o.,Anm.17),S. 403;L. Wenger, auchHeumann-Seckel 1953(s.o.,Anm.17),S. 617 (ungenau). Rechts , Wien1953,S. 356-7;Berger

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' nelMedioevo e nelRinascimento della 'Laconsolazione Robert Black& Gabriella Pomaro, filosofia ' / Boethius' s 'Consolation Libri discuola e glosse neimanoscritti italiano. ofPhilosophy fiorentini Schoolbooks andtheir Glosses in Florentine Medieval andRenaissance Education. inItalian e archivi, SISMEL:Edizioni delGaluzzo,Florence 2000(Biblioteche 7) Manuscripts. xxii& 362pp.with50 plates.ISBN88-87027-92-7 ofBoethius' Consolatio is the bookonthetradition Thismagnificently Philosophiae published in Florentine libraries. The ina projected series ofstudies ofmanuscript schoolbooks first willeventually coverallthemajorschool series Horace, authors, Cicero, Claudian, including Valerius SenecatheTragedian, Sallust, Statius, Terence, Lucan,Ovid,Persius, Juvenal, whowerereadin thegrammar schoolof as wellas minor Maximus andVergil, authors, in Florentine Florence. Out ofover1,300manuscripts extant medieval andrenaissance as schoolbooks for theauthors haveidentified about325which canbe regarded libraries, contain thesignatures ofpupils at school, oranother. onereason Theymay,forexample, thatclearly suchas elementary or showotherfeatures marginal pointto theclassroom, in anthologies oftexts andinterlinear , andthepresence probationes pennae glosses, grouped auctorum which reflect curricula andsyllabus outlines. It is theauthors' intencontemporary a fullpalaeographical, andhistorical ofeachmanutionto publish philological analysis to itseducational context. Judged script, giving particular emphasis bythehighscholarly in thestudy ofthefirst thisseries willbecomea landmark ofmedieval volume, qualities in Italy. andrenaissance schooling Boethius' Consolatio wasa logicalchoicewithwhich to opentheseries. The Philosophiae andwasreadbypeoplefrom different in society. In bookwasimmensely ranks popular, schools it waswidely witness theage-oldtradition ofglosses and thegrammar studied, A suresignofitspopularity is thefactthatthe37 MSS oftheConsolatio commentaries. inFlorentine libraries andidentified as schoolbooks, found constitute thelargest number of MSS foranyschool textinthesurvey BlackandGabriella Pomaro. this byRobert Among - again,thelargest aretwelve as schoolbooks number ofsigned groupthere copiessigned MSS foranyauthor inthesurvey. In theintroduction, school written anexplanabyBlack, tionis givenforitspreeminent He showsthattheConsolatio amongschoolbooks. position inthecurriculum wasa staple oflayandcommunal a transitional schools, holding position between theminor authors Prudentius' and , Aesop's fables, Dittochaeon, (suchas Cato'sDistichs classics suchas Horace, Ovid,Cicero Epigrammata ) andmajorauthors (Latin Prosper's Vergil, and Sallust). The Consolatio circulated almost whichsetsit codices, alwaysin single-text theminor texts which werenormally included inanthologies. Blackalsosuggests apartfrom thatallusions toother texts arefrequent in majorbutrarein minor texts. In thisrespect seemsto belongto themajortexts, it is unclear howmany too,theConsolatio although allusions arein factmeresententiae takenfrom thesummary ofthe anthologies (compare authors citedonpp.6-7withthelistofsententiae onp. 14).On theother hand,thepresenceofextensive vernacular thatithadmoreincommon withtheminor glosses suggests - which - thanwiththemajortexts. texts werefrequently in thevulgar glossed tongue Thistransitional status oftheConsolatio as a schooltexthasbeenhinted at byearlier scholars buttheevidence herepresented is thefirst clear (e.g.thelateMargaret Gibson), Blackconvincingly relates thispointto curricular andinstitutional in proof. specialisation latermedieval catered forthehigher theteaching of Italy.Universities disciplines, leaving inthegrammar toteachers andcommunal schools. The Consolatio becamea stagrammar oftheseschools, which areoften pleinthecurriculum explains whytheglosses verysimandphilological focus.It is therefore not ple andhavean overwhelmingly grammatical thatbefore thethirteenth theConsolatio washardly usedas a schooltext, surprising century themajority ofMSS dating from thefourteenth andearly fifteenth centuries. ref(Dante's madein thefirst decadeofthefourteenth to theConsolatio as 'thatbook erence, century, known to onlya few'seemsto confirm thispoint;Convivio thatthe Il.xii.)Blacksuggests © Koninklijke BrillNV,Leiden,2002 - www.brill.nl Alsoavailable online

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in themonastic Consolatio didnotfindmuchfavour andecclesiastical schools morecharacteristic oftwelfth andearlythirteenth-century thethirteenth Italy,for'before century, thetextwouldhaveentered intoa comprehensive andunspecialised curriculum extendtherudiments ofreading andwriting all thewayto metaphysics andtheology. ingfrom In thiscontext, itwasinconceivable thatthephilosophical, scientific andtheological dimensionsoftheConsolation couldhavebeenignored' (pp.28-29).WhentheItaliansituation is compared to thatin northern seemscertainly Europe,Black'ssuggestion plausible. ofAuxerre andWilliam ofConches(ca. 1125) certainly (ca. 900),hisrevisers Remigius didnotignore thesedimensions. Thisdoesnot,however, ruleoutthepossibility thata evenwithin sucha broadanduniversal chosetoignore the teacher, curriculum, working andto treattheConsolatio as a grammar andtheological text.After philosophical aspects a merely northern all,thereareMSS from twelfth-century Europewhichreflect gramsimilar totheoneinlatermedieval matical Italy.Whythiscouldnothavehapapproach penedin twelfth-century Italyis stillan openquestion. observations. He hasfound usein the Blackmakesseveral further extensive important MSS oftheBoethius ofAuxerre Florentine commentaries andespecially by byRemigius which I havesomeWilliam ofConches andNicholas Trevet. theview, (Thisshould qualify thathumanists fromthe'pretimescomeacross, consciously onlyglosses appropriated Aninteresting is thetranslation twelfth intothevernacular of century.) discovery gothic' as wellas extensive extracts from thehitherto unfrom William's commentary excerpts di Carmignano identified vernacular translation BML,Pl. 23 dxt. (Florence, byGiandino has oftheuseofthevernacular toteachLatinlanguage andliterature 11).Thequestion R. Witt, 'Inthe scholars beensubject tosomecontroversy (seemostrecently Footsteps among thisMS,which seemstobe excepLeiden2000,194-5, n. 74).Apartfrom Ancients', ofthe - Blackis sceptical - indeedatpresent translations abouttheuseofvernacular tional unique in Latineducation noteon p. 319n. 522),buthe notesthatvernacu(seehisimportant in theMSS (33 outofthe37 Boethius schoolbooks larglosses arefrequently encountered inthesame inFlorence often different commentators vernacular contain byseveral glosses, in thecategory oftheminor whichwere texts, MS). Thisseemsto placetheConsolatio notable in thevernacular farmorefrequently thanthemajortexts(with excepglossed I think, thesharpedgesofthe shouldsoften tions,see p. 37 n. 59). His conclusions, debate. nature ofthe theoverwhelmingly observation concerns Another philological important thatthe It is commonly assumed (e.g.byE. Garin,P. Gehland P. Grendler) glosses. MSS showan almost total buttheFlorentine Consolatio served toteachmoralphilosophy, In general, leveloftheglossing theintellectual andmoralinterest. lackofphilosophical to butit forms a welcome antidote is low.Thisconclusion maynotsoundspectacular, with in itstrainan enhanced viewthathumanism thecommon preoccupation brought Was education. withreference to Italianhumanist in particular in theclassroom, morals in dailyclassroom withmoralphilosophy there activities, apart anyserious preoccupation or defended theircurmadewhentheyadvertised fromtheelevated claimshumanists Previous letters andotherappropriate in prefaces, riculum orations, genliterary genres? facevalue,claims claimsat their elevated ofscholars often tookthehumanists' erations andwiseperintovirtuous wasessential forturning thattheir totheeffect pupils training ofhumanist Theimpact éliteofstateandchurch. sons,fittobe employed bytheruling Thisviewhasrecently classeswastakenforgranted. on society anditsruling education that'itis clearat leastthat Black'sconclusion butit is stillwidespread. beencriticised, formoralinspiralookto Boethius teachers andpupilsdidnotsignificantly Renaissance sucha view.In addievidence tionandguidance' against important (p. 23) is therefore Italian onthecommentaries valuable sections contains hisintroduction bytwofamous tion, in Italian on theConsolatio da MuglioandGiovanni Pietro Travesio, teachers, grammar humanists. ofitspopularity andon thedecline incunables amongthefifteenth-century be areequally ofthisvolume sections Theother valuable, theywillprobably although

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studied Pomaro's erudite oftheMSS is onlybya smallgroupofspecialists. description a modelofitskind.(A smalladdition: a fragment ofa Florence, BML,Pl. 77.3contains aboutitsauthenticity, not Pomaro, Vergil commentary byTrevet; p. 108,is stilldoubtful oftheimportant article Studies knowing , 54 (1992),in which byM. L. Lordin Mediaeval Trevet's is proved Thethird section contains authorship beyond anydoubt.) transcriptions ofsubstantial extracts ofinterlinear and marginal otherthings) glosses, showing (among theimpact ofthecommentaries ofConches andNicholas Trevet ontheItalian byWilliam schooltexts. thisimpressive volume. Fifty platesconclude The question is ofcourseto whatextent thesefindings, basedon an important but localgroupofMSS, arerepresentative forotherregions thanTuscany. A fewtentative arein order.Grammar schoolauthors wereusedas schoolbooks suggestions throughout andgreat inthewaythey differences wereread,orinthegrammatical andphiloEurope, taken tothem, areprobably nottobe expected. Thetransitional status logical approaches oftheConsolado isalsoapparent from Thereisevidence thattheConsolatio transalpine Europe. waslectured onintheGerman inthelatermedieval universities sinceitismentioned period, inrecords from andVienna.It alsoappears ina number of'Introductions Erfurt, Prague toPhilosophy' ina thirteenth-century Artscourses), but (forexample guidetotheParisian itisunlikely, intheabsence ofanyclearevidence, thatitbelonged tomainstream university In thetransalpine curriculum teaching. too,Boethius' proper placewasinthepre-university thatis,in thegrammar schools andin thereligious housesbefore students were years, senttotheuniversity. ThusTrevet's waswritten attherequest ofhisconfrères commentary intheDominican andquickly attained a widedissemination theinternational order, through network ofhisOrder.Thecommentary wastoolongandtoocomplicated fortheaverage so ithadtobe extracted andcutdowntomanageable size- a process teacher, grammar which ofcourse tookplacebothnorth andsouthoftheAlps,andwhich resulted notonly in countless butalsoin entire but marginal glosses commentaries, inspired byTrevet's, ofa lessdemanding nature. ofthecommentaries intellectually (One thinks byWilliam Tholomaeus de Asinariis, da Cortemilia, andArnoul Wheteley, Guglielmo Greban.) in Italianeducation seemsto haveresulted in a greater on Specialisation emphasis issues.Certainly thisis moreapparent in Italianschoolclassesthan merely grammatical in thoseofnorthern in northern schools Europe.Andwhenthemasters too, European suchas BadiusAscensius andJohannes restrict themselves to gramMurmellius, mainly commentaries arestillmoreadvanced thantheglossing wefind intheFlorentine mar,their MSS. In transalpine hadalways beenmorethanjusta schooltext. EuropetheConsolatio It waswidely readat thecourts, anditbecameverypopular ofthe amongtheBrethren Common Lifein thelateMiddleAges.Thus,eventhough somehumanists didtheir best todiscredit 'whoseagewasbarbarous andhencehisprosewasflawed' Boethius, (asJ. C. theexistence ofa variedreadership a market for(cheap)ediScaliger wrote), guaranteed tionsduring theearlyprinting ofthetext.Ifit is truethatBoethius wasreadin history as a schoolauthor, tobe replaced maiores Italyalmost exclusively , this bythetrueauctores thegreatdifference between thenumber ofincunabular editions ofthetext: might explain editions eightItalianversus fifty-six transalpine (ata conservative estimate). couldonlybe madethanks tothisexcellent book.Itis thefirst detailed Myobservations ofBoethian muchmorethana complement totheCodices Boethiani survey manuscripts, being which hasserious technical as itdoesmanuscripts which conproject, limitations, omitting tainonlycommentaries without thetextoftheConsolatio to reconstruct the , andfailing behind individual It is a significant contribution notonlyto thestudy story manuscripts. oftherichBoethian tradition butalsoto thedebateon thecontinuity anddiscontinuity ofschooling andeducation in theMiddleAgesandRenaissance in general. LodiNauta

Groningen

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BooksReceived Petri Abaelardi IV: ScitoTe Ipsum ediditR.M. ligner. Turnhout Opera Theologica. Brepols, Continuatici 2001(CorpusChristianorum. Mediaevalis, 190)lxix& 109pp. ISBN 2 503 049028 "Historia - Ubersetzung - literaturwissenschaftliche Abaelards calamitatimi". Text Modelanalysen. vonD.N. Hasse.Walterde Gruyter, Berlin/New York2002(de Herausgegeben Texte)xiv& 322pp. ISBN 3 11 0170124 Gruyter Albert s Twenty-Five onLogic. A critical edition ofhisQuaestiones Questions ofSaxony3 Disputed circa Leiden /Boston /Köln2002(Studien undTexte Brill, logicam byM.J.Fitzgerald. zurGeistesgeschichte Bd. 79)ix & 433pp.ISBN90 04 125132 desMittelalters, inquinqué Ammonius Hermeae: Commentarla voces Übersetzt vonPomponius Gauricus. Porphyrii. = CAGXIII/I). InAristoteli 'scategorias Nachschrift desJohannes (erweiterte Philoponus Übersetzt vonIoannes Rasarius. Neudruck derAusgaben 1539und Baptista Venedig vonRainerThielundCharles Lohr.Frommann1562miteinerEinleitung Venedig in Aristotelem Graeca.Ver2002(Commentaria Holzboog, Stuttgart-Bad-Cannstatt sioneslatinaetemporis resuscitarum litterarum (CAGL),Bd. 9) XXII & fol.20 & coll.69-204ISBN 3 772812295 miteinerEinAnselm vonCanterbury, Über dieWahrheit. Lateinisch-deutsch. Übersetzt, vonM. Enders. undAnmerkungen Meiner leitung herausgegeben Verlag, Hamburg Bd. 535)cxv& 126pp.ISBN 3 787315799 2001(Philosophische Bibliothek, andRenaissance Tradition andInnovation Robert Humanism andEducation inMedieval Black, Italy. inLatin Schools theTwelfth totheFifteenth Press2001 from Century. University Cambridge XV& 489pp.ISBN0 521401925 (HB) Tractatus Petri EditéparJoëlBiardet BlaisedeParme, Questiones magistři Hispani. super logice duMoyen Graziella Federici Vescovini. Vrin,Paris2001(Textes philosophiques Age, 20)434pp.ISBN 2 711614999 II: Austria A Conspectus Codices Boethiani. , Belgium, Denmark, ofBoethius, ofManuscripts oftheWorks The Warburg TheMetherlands, Editedby L. Smith. Switzerland. Sweden, Luxembourg, and London-Turin Institute Institute-Nino 2001(Warburg Editore, Surveys Aragno Texts,XXVII)xvi& 259pp.ISBN0 854811214 A Conspectus Codices Boethiani. , III: ItalyandtheVatican ofBoethius ofManuscripts oftheWorks andL. Smith. The Warburg Institute-Nino EditedbyM. Passalacqua Aragno City. Institute andTexts,XXVIII)xxi& London-Turin 2001(Warburg Editore, Surveys 619pp. ISBN0 854811230 oftheTexts TheTreatises ofThomasofClevesandPaulofGelria.AnEdition Concepts. Read.Éditions de l'Institut Edition Bos and Stephen witha Systematic byEgbert Louvain-la-neuve/ Editions Louvain-Paris de philosophie, 2001 Peeters, supérieur médiévaux, XLII) xii& 147pp.ISBN90 429 09013 (Philosophes A. Marmodoro, medievale Documenti e studi sullatradizione , XII (2001)586pp.contents: fibsofica Alessandro diAfrodisia a confronto Delta7:diversi soluzioni ; M. Bonelli, esegetiche Metaphysica, nel astronomiche intermedie e ledimostrazioni e la metafìsica ; A. Longo,Le sostanze scientifica diAristotele: M etN dellaMetafisica diSiriano suilibri delcommento ; Th.-A.Druart, prologo dans Legenre dessubstances inAvicenna ; L. Bauloye, of'Being' Shay'orResas Concomitant arabialla di alcuni commenti ebraica M. Zonta,Sullatradizione la métaphysique d'Averroès; testuLe citazioni A. Bertolacci, Ibnal-Tayyib e Averroè)' Metafisica implicite (Abül-Farag di Alberto nel Commento alla Metafisica di Avicenna ali dellaPhilosophia Magno: prima andCelestial Double Albert theGreat, analisi ; G. Truth, ; D.B. Twetten, Causality tipologica 3 a nelcommento di Tommaso delladefinizione dell Galluzzo,Il problema dAquino oggetto Thomas andRobert Faith andtheWilltoBelieve. Metafisica ; R. Työrinoja, Aquinas £ 10-11 über das Heinrich vonGent M. Pickavé, ontheVoluntary Holkot Nature Belief ofReligious Bate's inHenry Averroes derMetaphysik alsErsterkanntes ; ; G. Guldentops, Metaphysics Subjekt Vivarium 40,2

BrillNV,Leiden, © Koninklijke 2002 - www.brill.nl online Alsoavailable

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325

indicedei ontheSentences', inPeter Aureol's W. Duba,Aristotle's Commentary Metaphysics INDICE DEINOMI MANOSCRITTI, Librum Sententiarum. inTertium etQuartum Guillelmus de la Mare,Quaestiones Herausgegeben C.H. Beck), Akademie derWissenschaften vonH. Krami.Bayerische (Kommission: München 200119*& 243 S. ISBN 3 769690222 Oxford andrecovery Thetransmission Sextus LucianoRoridi, ofPyrrhonism. University Empiricus. Classical vol.46) American Association: Press2002(American Studies, Philological xvi& 150pp.ISBN0 19 5146719 mitAusblick beiDunsScotus DieIdeen undPossibilien Creatura intellecta. TobiasHoffmann, auf Münster undMastrius. Aschendorff 2002(Beiträge vonMayronis Franz , Poncius Verlag, desMittelalters, undTheologie derPhilosophie zurGeschichte NF,Bd.60) 356pp. ISBN 3 402 040115 critical edition andindexes Summulae: De demonstrationibus , introduction, Buridanus, Johannes 2001(Artistarium, Publishers, 10-8)lx Groningen-Haren byL.M.de Rijk.Ingenium & 265pp.ISBN90 7041941 6 Rekonstruktion einer De Obligationibus. Brill, Disputationstheorie. spätmittelalterlichen Hajo Keffer, Leiden/Boston/Köln 2001ix & 290pp. ISBN90 04 122486 Matter Theories. Edited andEarly Modern LateMedieval J.E.Murdoch, byC. Lüthy, Corpuscular andEarly Modern /Boston /Köln2001(Medieval W.R.Newman. Leiden Science, Brill, W.R. C. Lüthy, vol.1)viii& 611pp.ISBN90 04 115161 contents: J.E.Murdoch, in Minima Particles andMinima Introduction: Atoms, ; D. Jacquart, Newman, Corpuscles, Tendencies Salerno Bacon's Medical Texts ; G. Molland, Corpuscular from Roger Twelfth-Centuiy andDiscrete Lull'sTheoiy ossetes te* s too ; ); C. Lohr,Ramon oftheContinuous (andsome ofGr TheMedieval andRenaissance Tradition ofMinimaNaturalia; J. Henry, J.E.Murdoch, andFrancesco da Cher so's UseofAtomistic Mathematical Realism Void Patrìzi Arguments', Space, From Ancient Sources towards Modern Science Giordano Bruno's Soul-Powered Atoms: H. Gatti, ; in theNorthumberland Circle S. Clucas,Corpuscular Matter ; S.A. Manzo,Francis Theoiy A Reappraisal DavidGorlaeus' or:TheMarriage Bacon andAtomism: Atomism, ; C. Lüthy, of Italian W.R.Newman, Protestant with Natural Experimental Corpuscular Metaphysics Philosophy', inAristotelian : From Geber toSennert, E. Michael, Sennerts SeaChange: Atoms Alchemy Theoiy onMixtures', andCauses', D. Des Chene,Wine andWater: Honoré Fabri C.R. Palmerino, A Bridge totheRotaAristo telisParadox: between Matter and Galileo's andGassendi' s Solutions Motion Wasthe Mechanical Theories', Non-Epicurean M.J.Osier,HowMechanical Philosophy? andtheir ; A. Gabbey,Mechanical ofNature Aspects ofGassendi's Philosophy Philosophy A. Clericuzio, Charleton andBoyle onmatter andMotion', P. Anstey, Gassendi, Explanations', L. Downing, TheUseofMechanism: in Matter, against Thinking Corpuscularianism Boyle A andB ofLocke's L.M.Principe, Wilhelm Drafts Homberg: Chymical Corpuscularianism Essay; intheEarly indexof names, list of andChiysopoeia ; bibliography, Eighteenth Century CONTRIBUTORS GordonLeff, andReligion intheMedieval West. Aldershot 2002 Heresy, Philosophy Ashgate, x & 322pp. ISBN0 86078888 1 (Variorum) Mediaeval Commentaries ontheSentences Lombard. VolumeI: Current Research. Edited ofPeter Leiden-Boston-Köln 2002xiv& 548pp.ISBN90 04 119817 byG.R.Evans.Brill, contents: A Biographical Lombardus electronicus: Database S.J.Livesey, ofMedieval Commentators onPeter theLombard's L. Hödl,DieSentenzen desPetrus Lombardus Sentences; inderDiskussion seiner Schule TheSentences 1250-1320. ; R.L. Friedman, Commentary, General TheImpact andtheTestCaseofPredestination', paris: Trends, Orders, oftheReligious TheCommentary ontheSentences; L.O. Nielsen, J. Dunbabin, ofJohn ofParis(Quidort) Peter Auriol's Words. TheGenesis Auriol's Commentaries onPeter Lombard's Waywith ofPeter First andFourth Books ontheSentences; Chr.Schabel, Parisian Commentaries Peter from Auriol toGregory andtheProblem P. Bermon, La Lectura sur ofRimini, ofPredestination', lesdeux livres desSentences deGrégoire deRimini O.E.SA.(1300-1358); oxford: premiers R. Wood,EarlyOxford thesentences Theology; R.J.Long,TheBeginning ofa Tradition:

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Fishacre Franciscans Ockham: Walter Chatton and O.P.;Chr.Schabel, ofRichard Oxford after AdamWodeham; R. Edwards, Themes andPersonalities inSentence Commentaries at Oxford inthe1330s;J.-F.Genest, Lespremiers écrits deBradwardine: textes inédits et théologiques découvertes récentes Bakker & Chr.Schabel, Sentence Commentaries ; othercentres: PJ.J.M. Fourteenth ontheSentences ; M.J.F.M. Hoenen,TheCommentary oftheLater Century of Marsilius R.L. Friedman, Conclusion ; index ofInghen; La musica nelpensiero medievale Ravenna 2001274pp. , a curadi L. Mauro.LongoEditore, ISBN 88 8063291 4 contents: G. Fioravanti, Presentazione ; F.A.Gallo,Introduzione ; G. Stabile, Musica e cosmologia: l'armonia delle neicommenti ai ; L. Mauro,La musica sfere «Problemi»: Pietro d'Abano e Evrart deConty; P. Proietti, e musica nelMedioevo: Numero da allacomplessità delQuattrocento Suono e musica inunenciclopedista del ; A. Morelli, Agostino XIIIsecolo: » diBéarnais; M. Bettetini, Musica tracielo e terra: lettura del«Demusica Vincenzo diAgostino L'orecchio come risonatore neitrattati «Deanima» ; G. Mambella, d'Ippona organo e inmedicina concionatore. Unpassodi Tommaso e l'eloquenza ; E. Artifoni, Orfeo d'Aquino nelle città italiane nelsecolo L'udito inSanBonaventura; XIII;F.M.Tedoldi, politica spirituale » diAgostino; L. Folli,«Canticum »: la musica cordis e l'interiorità nell«Enarrationes inpsalmos C. Crisciani, dimusica medicinale. A. Fiori, La voce Note tramusica e mediAppunti rapsodici; cina.Tematiche e suggestioni A. Puca,Astronomia e «musica munda» lessicali; interdisciplinari nella «Commedia» diDante; O. Weijers, La placedela musique à la Faculté desarts deParis. ; indicedegliautori,delle opereanonime e deglistudiosi Nicolasd'Autrécourt, condamnés. TextelatinétabliparL.M. de Rijk. , articles Correspondance traduction et notespar Ch. Grellard. Introduction, Vrin,Paris2001(Sic et Non) 190pp.ISBN 2 711614883 Stefano Aristotle's andItsRenaissance Commentators Leuven Perfetti, Zoology (1521-1601). University and Medieval De Wulf-Mansion Press,Leuven2000(Ancient Centre, Philosophy. SeriesI, XXVII)x & 258pp. ISBN90 5867050 3 Dominik Theorien derIntentionalität imMittelalter. Frankfurt am Main Perler, Klostermann, Bd. 82) xiii& 435pp.ISBN 3 465 031784 2002(Philosophische Abhandlungen, andLogic inDunsScotus. AnInterpretation inthe Pini,Categories Giorgio ofAristotle's Categories LateThirteenth 2002 (StudienundTextezur Brill,Leiden-Boston-Köln Century. desMittelalters, Bd. 77)viii& 225pp.ISBN90 04 123296 Geistesgeschichte L.M. de Rijk,Aristotle. Semantics andOntology. VolumeI: General Introduction on , TheWorks 2002(Philosophia Brill,Leiden/Boston/Köln CI/I)xviii& 749pp. Logic. Antiqua, ISBN90 04 123245 L.M. de Rijk,Aristotle. Semantics andOntology. VolumeII: TheMetaphysics. Semantics in Aristotle's /Boston /Köln2002(Philosophia Brill,Leiden ofArgument. Strategy Antiqua, CI/II)xi & 498pp. ISBN90 04 124675 EricL. Saak,HighWaytoHeaven. TheAugustinián Between andReformation, Piaform Reform in Medieval 1292-1524. andReformation 2002(Studies Brill,Leiden/Boston/Köln vol.89)XVI & 880pp.ISBN90 04 110992 Thought, Thomas von «Summa contra Wissenschaftliche RolfSchönberger, Aquins gentiles». Buchgesellschaft, Darmstadt 2001236pp.ISBN 3 534 142667 et traduits sousla direction deJ.-C.Bardout et O. Surla science divine. Textesprésentés Presses universitaires de France, Paris2002469pp.ISBN2 130511058 Boulnois. - Pierre - Huguesde Saint-Victor - PierreAbélard - Robertde Melun Avicenne deJeanOlivi Henride LombardAlexandre de Halès Thomasd'AquinPierre - Thomas - Grégoire - JeanDunsScot - Guillaume de d'Ockham Bradwardine Gand - Gabriel - Luisde Molina Descartes Sebastián René Rimini Izquierdo Vázquez undzurWirkungsgeschichte desNikolaus Ludus Studien HansGerhard zumWerk sapientiae. Senger, undTextezurGeistesgeschichte Leiden /Köln2002(Studien vonKues. /Boston Brill, Bd. 78)x & 411pp.ISBN90 04 120815 desMittelalters, auMoyen études danssesrapports avecla théologie etla consolatrice. La philosophie La servante Age, réunies 3) xv parJ.-L.Soléreet Z. Kaluza.Vrin,Paris2002(Texteset traditions,

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La & 258pp.ISBN2 711615634 contents: J.-L.Solére, Avant-propos; J.-L.Solére, etstructure des Le besoin demétaphysique. desthéologiens ; O. Boulnois, Théologie philosophie à la théologie etretour, médiévales Bacon delaphilosophie ; C. Trottmann, Roger métaphysiques etthéologie danslesPrologues dela Lectura etde/'Ordinario G. Sondag, (lm Métaphysique duConvivio deDante deJeanDunsScot, T. Ricklin, etphilosophie ; Théologie Alighieri partie) etTrinité duXIIeau XIVesiècle A. Maierù,Universaux ; M.J.F.M. Hoenen, JeanWyclif etlesuniversalia realia:ledébat surla notion devirtus sermonis auMoyen etlesrapAgetardif univocità etseparabilité des entre la théologie etla philosophie Bakker, Inhérence, ; P.J.J.M. ports accidents : observations surlesrapports entre etthéologie auXIVesiècle, eucharistiques métaphysique : JeanBuridan, inMetaphysicam Quaestiones (s. ult.Lect .), L. IV, q. 6, Marsile appendice inMetaphysicam , L. IV, q. 5 Quaestiones d'Inghen, Studien II. Herausgegeben vonP. Ochsenbein undK. Schmuki. zumSt.Galler Klosterplan Historischer Verein desKantons St.Gallen, St.Gallen2002(Mitteilungen zurvaterländischen Bd.52)368pp.ISBN3 906395316 contents: P. Ochsenbein, Geschichte, W.Jacobsen, DerSt.Galler 300Jahre Die %ur Einführung, KlosterplanForschung, J.Duft, umdenSt.Galler in denJahren W. Vogler, oder 1948-1962; Sorge Klosterplan Realplan St.Galler über denSt.Galler zurbarocken Idealplan? Überlegungen Klostergeschichtsschreibung Die Reform in derersten des9. Klosterplan; J. Semmler, geistlicher Gemeinschaften Hälfte underKlosterplan vonSt.Gallen; W. Berschin, DerSt.Galler als Jahrhunderts Klosterplan A.A.Häussling, inderKarolingerzeit undinderSt.Galler Literaturdenkmal; Liturgie Klosterplan; B. Brenk, derVierflügelanlage infrühchristlich-frühmittelalterlichen ^umProblem (Claustrum) C. Eggenberger, DerSt.Galler imReichen dervera F. Huber, Der Klöstern; crux; Klosterplan St. Galler imKontext derantiken undmittelalterlichen Architektur und Klosterplan Zeichnung H. Gelbhaar, Ein neues unddieMassangaben ModellzumKlosterplan im Messtechnik; V. Hoffmann, DerSt.Galler einmal anders R. Fuchs Kirchengrundriss; Klosterplangesehen; & D. Oltrogge, einer desSt. Galler Ergebnisse technologischen Untersuchung Klosterplanes; F. Huber, vonSt.Gallen; personenundortszumkarolingischen Bibliographie Klosterplan VERZEICHNIS DERZITIERTEN HANDSCHRIFTEN REGISTER, 8-9(1997-1998). Université deCaen/ Universidad deSalamanca, Ediciones Universidad Voces, de Salamanca, contents: ActasdelEncuentro inter2000 337 pp. ISSN 1130-3336 nacional sobre léxico latino 18-19noviembre Léxico ((Salamanca 1999)i.a. C. Codoñer, y enla EdadMedia. El Catholicon; V. deAngelis, Z/elementarium diPaia:método gramática eprassi diunlessicografo; C. Jacquemard, Avant la Practica attribuée à Hugues geometriae deSaintVictor: le lexique dela géométrie au XIesiècle; E. Montero El Cartelle, pratique léxico médico latino entre la Antigüedad la asimilación delosmodelos médicos y elRenacimiento: y léxico " zum„médico AnneWigger, Vom BilddesArztes imSpanien „matasanos perfecto Zjimliterarischen des16.Jahrhunderts. Berlin 2001412pp.ISBN 3 92586756 2 VerlagWalter Frey,

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be accompanied induplicate andpreferably should be submitted Contributions bya disk. an ASCIIandMicrosoft Wordareaccepted BothWordPerfect wordprocessing programs; formatted diskis alsoacceptable. andthetextmust in either French or German shouldbe written English, Manuscripts mustbe numbered The manuscripts andin goodliterary be grammatically correct style. biblioall notes(ina separate andcomplete, file), including consecutively, double-spaced, etc. references, tables, graphical within to theeditor whichshould be returned forreading, Authors receive galley proofs arereadbytheeditor. oneweekofreceipt. Pageproofs than madetoproofs other authors forchanges theright tocharge Thepublisher reserves orconversion errors. correction ofcompositor's Citation abstracted in:ArtsandHumanities Vivarium isindexed/ Index;ATLARDB;Current FRANCISdatabase; Internationale IndexPhilosophicus; Dietrich's Contents; Bibliographie of ofBookReviews Wissenschaftlicher Literatur/International derRezensionen Bibliography ausAllenGebieten derZeitschriftenliteratur Internationale Literature; Bibliographie Scholarly Iter from all FieldsofKnowledge; ofPeriodicals desWissens /International Bibliography the Middle and to LinguisBibliography/ Bibliographie Linguistic Gateway Ages Renaissance; on theModern ofBooksandArticles Languages Bibliography tique;M L A International Periodicals and Index;Old Testament and Literatures; MiddleEast:Abstracts Abstracts; IndexOne:Periodicals Contents Index;Religion Index;The Philosopher's (RIO);Religion Author Works. IndexTwo:Multi-

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