Vivarium - Vol Xlvii, No. 1, 2009

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VIVARIUM An International and Intellectual Journal forthePhilosophy LifeoftheMiddle and Renaissance Ages Aims& Scope Vivarium is an international ofphilosophy and journaldedicatedto thehistory thehistory of ideasfromtheearlyMiddleAgesto theearly-modern period.It takesa particular intheprofane interest sideofphilosohy with anditsrelationship otherareasof thought and learning fromtheseperiods.It is widelyrecognized as an unrivalled forthehistory oflogic,semantics resource and metaphysics. It as well as historical studiesof ideas,textsand analyses publishesphilosophical theinstitutional context ofmedievaland early-modern and learning. It thought also welcomeseditionsof texts.It publishesannuallya specialissuedevotedto a particular themeor philosopher. Editor L.W. Nauta(Groningen) EditorialBoard L.M. deRijk(Leiden), HAG. Braakhuis C.H. Kneepkens (Nijmegen), (Groningen), (Madison),E.P. Bos (Leiden)and D. Perler(Berlin). W.J.Courtenay AdvisoryCommittee T. Gregory (Rome),A. Zimmermann MA). J.E.Murdoch(Cambridge, (Cologne), Instructions forAuthors Contributions to thejournalshouldbe sentas an e-mailattachment and paper versionto Lodi Nauta,Facultyof Philosophy, of Groningen, Oude University Hie Netherlands A 52, 9712 GL Groningen, Boteringestraat ([email protected]). sheet is available at www.brill.nl/viv or can be from the obtained editor. style inEnglish(UK orUS), French Contributions mustbewritten orGerman;they mustbe grammatically andstylistically correct. mustbe clearly Manuscripts typewritten withnumbered Use pages,doublespacingandwidemargins throughout. notendnotes. Titleandnameoftheauthorshouldappearon a separate footnotes, titlepage in orderto facilitate Each articleshouldbe anonymous peer-review. whichshouldstatetheprincipal conclusions bya 10-lineabstract, accompanied ofthepaperand2-6keywords, forindexing bothabstract andkeywords purposes; shouldbe in English. Authorsof acceptedcontributions receiveone setof proofsforproofreading. The publisher reserves therightto chargeauthorsforcorrections madeto the oferrors in thetypesetting thatoccurred orconverproofsotherthancorrections sionprocess. Authors receive1 complimentary copyoftheissueinwhichtheirarticle appears contributions, (in thecaseof multi-authored copiesaresentto thefirst-named forprivate circulation. author)as wellas a PDF fileoftheircontribution Vivarium ISSN 0042-7543, onlineISSN 1568-5349) ispublished a year 3 times (print TheNetherlands, tel+31 (0)71 5353500, 2, 2321JCLeiden, byBrill,Plantijnstraat fax+31 (0)71 5317532.

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VIVARIUM

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VIVARIUM An International and Intellectual Journal forthePhilosophy LifeoftheMiddle Agesand Renaissance Aims& Scope Vivarium is an international ofphilosophy and journaldedicatedto thehistory thehistory of ideasfromtheearlyMiddleAgesto theearly-modern period.It takesa particular interest intheprofane with sideofphilosohy anditsrelationship otherareasof thought and learning fromtheseperiods.It is widelyrecognized as an unrivalled resource forthehistory oflogic,semantics and metaphysics. It studiesof ideas,textsand publishesphilosophical analysesas wellas historical theinstitutional contextofmedievaland early-modern and learning. It thought also welcomeseditionsof texts.It publishes a to issue devoted annually special a particular themeorphilosopher. Editor L.W.Nauta(Groningen) EditorialBoard L.M.deRijk(Leiden), H A.G. Braakhuis C.H. Kneepkens (Nijmegen), (Groningen), (Madison),E.P.Bos (Leiden)andD. Perler (Berlin). W.J.Courtenay Committee Advisory T. Gregory (Rome),A. Zimmermann MA). (Cologne),J.E.Murdoch(Cambridge, Instructions forAuthors Contributions to thejournalshouldbe sentas an e-mailattachment and paper versionto Lodi Nauta,Facultyof Philosophy, of Groningen, Oude University TheNetherlands A 52, 9712 GL Groningen, Boteringestraat ([email protected]). orcanbe obtainedfromtheeditor. stylesheetis availableatwww.brill.nl/viv Contributions mustbewritten inEnglish(UK orUS), French orGerman;they mustbe grammatically andstylistically correct. mustbe clearly Manuscripts typewritten withnumbered Use pages,doublespacingandwidemargins throughout. notendnotes. Titleandnameoftheauthorshouldappearon a separate footnotes, titlepage in orderto facilitate Each articleshouldbe anonymous peer-review. whichshouldstatetheprincipal conclusions bya 10-lineabstract, accompanied ofthepaperand2-6keywords, forindexing bothabstract andkeywords purposes; shouldbe in English. Authors of acceptedcontributions receiveone setof proofsforproofreading. The publisher reserves therightto chargeauthorsforcorrections madeto the otherthancorrections oferrors thatoccurred in thetypesetting orconverproofs sionprocess/ Authors receive1 complimentary copyoftheissueinwhichtheirarticle appears contributions, (in thecaseof multi-authored copiesaresentto thefirst-named forprivate circulation. author)as wellas a PDF fileoftheircontribution Vivarium ISSN 0042-7543, onlineISSN 1568-5349) ispublished a year 3 times (print The tel 2321 +31 Brill, 2, Leiden, Netherlands, 5353500, (0)71 JC by Plantijnstraat fax+31 (0)71 5317532.

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Vivarium 47 (2009)1-23

Robert Grosseteste's Commentary

Conclusiones

and the

on the Posterior Analytics1

David Bloch University ofCopenhagen Abstract Thisarticleexamines thenatureof RobertGrosseteste s commentary on Aristotle s Posterior with reference to his "conclusions" conclusiones It is ). ( Analytics particular as a casestudy)thatthesimple 2, ofthecommentary argued(usingbook1,chapter demonstrative of the which is muchtheresult ofthe64 appearance commentary, very isinpartanillusion. inthecommentary isnotsimconclusions, Thus,theexposition ofthePosterior andontheproof-procedures plybasedonthestrict principles Analytics ofEuclidean rather the is a mixture ofdifferent commentary complicated geometry; oftwelfth-century elements texts andthescholarship ofGrosseteste s day. Keywords Robert Posterior medieval science Grosseteste, Aristode, Analytics, logic,demonstrative I. Introduction RobertGrosseteste s commentary on thePosterior is a somewhatidioAnalytics but thereis a syncratic pieceofwork.2It is, of course,a literalcommentary, to the more of the In thirteenth longway regulartype century. a relatively recentarticle,Sten Ebbesen even used the heading"LiteralCommentary withoutPrinciples"to describethis particularcommentary, meaningthat Grosseteste doesnothavea standardprocedure in theindividualchapters, but 1}Texts arecitedfrom bothprinted editions inthepresent andmedieval article. manuscripts I havesometimes inorthography madechanges and/or Alltranslations However, punctuation. aremyown.I owethanks toStenEbbesen andtheeditorial ofVivarium board forcomments andcriticism. 2)Robertus Commentarius inPosteriorum Libros Rossi Grosseteste, , ed. Pietro Analyticorum (Firenze 1981). ©Koninklijke Brill DOI:10.1 2009 NV, Leiden, 163/156853408X383015

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D. Bloch /Vivarium 47 (2009)1-23

ratherallowshimselfto comment,explain,define,concludeetc.in theorder he seesfit.3In thisarticleI shallexaminethecommentary and tryto establish itsnaturemoreprecisely. In particular, I shallfocusattention on theconclusionesas relevant to thispurpose. At first seemsto be composedon strictand sound readingthecommentary - although Grosseteste methodological principles. proceedschapterbychapter hisdivisionsintochapters do notalwayscorrespond withtheonesusednowaIn each he Aristotle's of course,but it is done text, days. chapter interprets withtheuseofhisownconceptualtools:"definitions" (
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s commentary is notonlyan interpretation ofa textthat Thus,Grosseteste setsfortha demonstrative it is also itself based on demonstrative method; science (axiomatic-deductive) principles.But the traditionof demonstrative was not completelyuniformin Grosseteste's In the twelfth days. century demonstrative theoriesdevelopedin different and thusthesciendirections, tificfoundationof Grossetestes workon demonstration and demonstrative methodsin theearlythirteenth centurywas potentially verycomplex.One whichis partlymedieval,thattherearethree mightsay,usinga terminology kindsofprocedure withinthedemonstrative textsofthetwelfth century: 1. Textsthatboth(a) demonstrate, while(b) upholdinga cleardistinction betweenpremisses and (c) teach (axioms)and conclusions(theorems), how to demonstrate. Aristotle's Posterior is, of course,by far Analytics themostprominent example,but especiallyBoethius'De Hebdomadi suchas GilbertofPoitiersand Thibus,lecturedon bynotablethinkers of Chartres as well as the latter s pupil Clarembaldof Arras,6 and erry scatteredremarksin his otherwritings(in particulara description of in Boethius'secondcommentary demonstration on Porphyry's ), Isagoge werealso usedas aids.7 2. Textsthat (a) demonstrate, while (b) upholdinga clear distinction betweenpremisses but (c) do not (axioms)and conclusions(theorems), teachhow to demonstrate. Euclid'sElements is theleadingworkin this , Archimedes' group,buttherewereothersin use,suchas Euclid'sOptics On theQuadrature .8 oftheCircleand Ptolemy's Almagest 3. Textsthat(a) demonstrate, but (b) do not upholda cleardistinction betweenthe premisses(axioms) and conclusions(theorems);instead 6) TheCommentaries onBoethius edited (Toronto, byGilbert 1966); ofPoitiers, byN.M.Häring Commentaries onBoethius andhisSchool ,edited byThierry (Toronto, ofChartres byN.M.Häring andWorks A Twelfth-Century Master 1971);Life , ofClarembald ofArras. oftheSchool ofChartres edited (Toronto, 1965). byN.M. Häring 7)G. Schrimpf, DieAxiomenschrift desBoethius alsphilosophisches Lehrbuch (DeHebdomadibus) desMittelalters 'Scientific 'mAHistory (Leiden, 1966);C. Burnett, Speculations', ofTwelfth-CenWestern ed.P.Dronke tury 1988),151-76. Philosophy, (Cambridge, OnEuclid inthetwelfth seee.g.M. Clagett, 'TheMedieval Latin Translations from century, theArabic oftheElements ofEuclid, with ontheVersions ofAdelard ofBath', Special Emphasis Isis44 (1953),16-42; 'TheMedieval Euclid: Salient oftheTranslations J.E. Murdoch, Aspects oftheElements Adelard ofBathandCampanus ofNovara deSynthèse 89 (1968), , Revue by 'Euclid: Transmission oftheElements' 67-94; 4 J.E. Murdoch, ,Dictionary ofScientific Biography Onother mathematical works demonstrative (1971),437-59. seeBurnett, 'Scimethods, using entific 161-62. Speculations',

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D. Bloch /Vivarium 47 (2009)1-23 (at leastideally)froma singlefirst proposition, theydeduceeverything The Liberde Causisis not teach how to demonstrate. texts do These (c) themodelofthiskindofprocedure.

whereasthe The first twokindsareexplicitly bythemedievais,9 acknowledged Lohr has shown.10 as Charles thirdkindis implicitly Therefore, acknowledged, with is likelyto have operated(consciouslyor unconsciously) Grosseteste thesethreekinds sciences.Apparently, thiskindofdivisionof demonstrative as it was knownand used in the of demonstration, exhaustthepossibilities centuries.11 and earlythirteenth twelfth a demonis undeniably on thePosterior Grossetestes commentary Analytics we oughtto be able to place it in one of thesethree text.Therefore, strative dependson theprecisenatureofhis groups,but themoreexactclassification on theconclusiones. method,and in particular in this In theonlystudyknownto me devotedsolelyto theconclusiones not was that Grosseteste to show Evans tried Gillian justbeing commentary, as tradition a twelfth-century selfbutwas actuallyfollowing hisidiosyncratic Works original.12 althoughthefinalresultwas certainly methodology, regards andNicholasofAmiensArsFidei Iuris10 suchasAllanofLiliesRegulaeCaelestis 9)Seethepreface andthe inClagett, Elements III ofEuclid's toVersion , printed 'KingAlfred in illorum veris et ex demonstratio "Est autem 275: Elements', arguens primis argumentatio, expremaccidunt necessario estquodsequentia contexta arsproposita Sicenim conclusionibus. etdemondemonstrare demonstrativa scientia Estenim autprincipiis issis quaedocet deinceps. A utgeometria". etnondocet etquaedemonstrat Anale utPosteriores demonstrare, stran ti(ci), is attribdocuit demonstrando viewofAristotle's similar demonstrare") ("Aristoteles procedure Bibl.del inMs.Cordoba setofquaestiones inananonymous andaccepted utedto"Alexander" inC. Marmo, therelevant edition Cabildo Excellentissimo 52:82ra.Seepartial part) (including ProEdition: A Partial Posteriorum. librum Cordubensis, Questiones super primům 'Anonymus 1 (1991),. 107-39. andqq. 1-5',CIMAGL6 logue 10)C. H. Lohr, inthe ofScience Theories andLatin Liber deCausis Aristotelian "ThePseudoW.F.Ryan ed.J.Kraye, Middle inthe inPseudo-Aristotle Twelfth andThirteenth Centuries', Ages, Seealso 'Scientific 165-66. andC. B. Schmitt 1986),53-62;Burnett, (London, Speculations', derartesimHorizont Methodik Wissenschaftliche undAxiomatik M.Dreyer, 'Regularmethode ed.I. CraemerundSpätmittelalter, undArsimHochinScientia des12.Jahrhunderts', Tradition = 1 22/ 145-57. Mediaevalia Miscellanea and A. York, 1994), (Berlin-New Ruegenberg Speer 1u Ofcourse, different theories onthebasisoftheir demonstrative onecouldalsodistinguish 'Boethian Onthis, seeEvans, andsuppositions definitions usesofaxioms, (hypotheses/postulates). Method'. Axiomatic andEuclidean 12)G.R.Evans, AnaonthePosterior Grosseteste's ofRobert 'The"Conclusiones" Commentary 24(1983),729-34. serie terza, medievali, , Studi lytics 13)Edition Iuris Caelestis Alanus de Insulis. in N. M. Häring, , AHDLMA(1982), Regulae

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in deducingconclusionson thebasis CatholicaeH exhibitverysimilarfeatures or rather:the and Euclid was the ofundisputedaxioms, foundation, primary In thisway,Grossetestes of all suchattempts.15 commenmajorinspiration, in an which conclusions are deduced becomes axiomatic-deductive tary system fromfundamental a few scholars have without quite premisses.Therefore, reflection translated conclusiones withtheword"theorems".16 However,in relationto Grosseteste, Evansand othersdo not seemto takeintoaccountthat thinkers ofthetwelfth did actuallydistinguish betweendifferent sorts century a ofdemonstrative theories. more of Grossetestes Thus, precisecategorisation workcan be made,thereby moreaboutitsnatureand Grosseteste s revealing = I 2 shall use book of his 1, (hereafter 1.2), chapter generalmethodology. as a casestudyin whichI willfocuson theuse ofthestructuralcommentary conclusions.1.2 suppositionsand, in particular, isingconcepts:definitions, with some be called the most may justification important chapterofthework, sinceitlaysthefoundation foreverything to come.17 II. Analysis:In AnalyticaPosteriora1.2 Grosseteste's 1.2 also corresponds to Aristotle's Posterior 1.2.18His Analytics 1.1 is introductory and containsno definitions, or conclusions suppositions thatformpartof thesciencein question;thechapteris simplyused to posit SeealsoDreyer, undAxiomatik', and147n. 7 forfurther 97-226. 147-50 'Regularmethode bibliography. 14)Foranedition andinterpretation seeM. Dreyer, Nikolaus von Amiens: ArsFideiCatholicae EinBeispielwerk axiomatischer Methode See also und (Münster, 1993). Dreyer, 'Regularmethode 146-50. Axiomatik', 15)ButseealsoLohr, 'ThePseudo-Aristotelian Liberde Causis(foruseof,andinspiration theLiber deCausis) andJ.Marenbon, 'TheTwelfth inMedieval ed. from, Century", Philosophy, at177-78 influence ofGilYork, (London-New 1998),150-87, (forthepossible J.Marenbon bert ofPoitiers ontheaxiomatic-deductive theories ofthetwelfth century). I6)Seee.g.Ebbesen, 'Medieval LatinGlosses', P.Rossi, 'Robert Grosseteste andthe 143-44; ofScientific inRobert Grosseteste: NewPerspectives onhisThought andScholObject Knowledge', at72-73.Inaccordance with earlier , ed.J.McEvoy (Turnhout, 1995),57-75, arship, practice, Grosseteste usestheorema when aboutdeductions ingeometry: Robertus Grosseteste, speaking InAPo.1.1.52(ed.Rossi, Firenze that Nicholas ofAmiens iswillhowever, 1981),p.95.Note, inhistheological work. ingtousetheterm 17)Foranalyses ofthischapter, seealsoDod,'TheStudy ofAristotle's Posterior 115Analytics", 'The"Conclusiones" ofRobert Grosseteste's 732-33. 18;Evans, Commentary', 18)Robertus InAPo.1.2(ed.Rossi, Firenze APo.1.2, Grosseteste, Arist., 1981),pp.99-104; 71b9-72b4.

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the existenceof demonstration and knowledge,sincethesefactscannotbe withinthescienceofdemonstration In 1.2,on theotherhand, treated itself.19 he beginsthe interpretation and analysisof demonstrative scienceas such. Almostimmediately thestructuralizing concepts(definition, suppositionand s work. conclusion)playthedominantrolein Grosseteste Aristotle and one putsforwardtwo definitions Accordingto Grosseteste, on thebasisofwhichhe presents thefirstconclusionof thescisupposition, enceofdemonstration: We haveknowledge 1. Definition1 (Dl): Of knowledge. whenwe know thecause{causa)ofsomephenomenonsimpliciterà that is known is known through 2. Supposition1 (SI): "Everything demonstration."21 "Demonstration is a deduction 3. Definition2 (D2): Of demonstration. thatproducesknowledge."22 4. Conclusion 1 (Cl): "Demonstrative scienceis based on principles/ thatare true,primary, immediate,as well as priorto, better premisses knownthanand causesoftheconclusion."23 ofthePosterior clarifies whathe believesto be thestructure Thus,Grosseteste and withtheuse ofhis conceptualtools:"definition", "supposition" Analytics and he further believesthatthestructuralising methodthathe "conclusion"; itself. Thatis,he believesthat usesis actuallyusedalsoin thePosterior Analytics his himselfhas structured workusingdefinitions, and Aristotle suppositions used theterms.Grosconclusions,althoughhe has not,of course,explicitly a suppositionis added to the setestedefinesknowledgeand demonstration, he apparently ofknowledge, and fromtheseprinciples deducesthe definition ofdemonstrative science.This,to first thefoundation conclusionconcerning and the result of 1.2. On the it is the surface,thisis, briefly, procedure put and to the then,a veryclearand fairkindof (demonstrative) interpretation, 19)InAPo.1.1.12-13 artifìcis eststabilire suum Firenze 1981),p. 93:"quianullius (ed.Rossi, . . .". velquodestantesuum neartem subiectum subiectum, transgrederetur 20)InAPo.1.2.5-8, ed.Rossi, .,APo.1.2,71b9-12. p.99.Cf.Arist 21)InAPo.1.2.29-30, see ed.Rossi, scitur"; quodscitur, perdemonstrationem p. 100:"[0]mne APo.1.2,71bl2-l3. alsoidem, InAPo.2.6.76-79, ed.Rossi, p.406,andArist., 22)InAPo.1.2.36-40, estsyllogismus faciens scire". See ed.Rossi, p. 100:"[DJemonstratio APo.1.2,71bl7-18. Arist., 23)InAPo.1.2.41-42, scientia estexveris etprimis etimmeed.Rossi, p.100:"[Dļemonstrativa APo.1.2,71b19-22. etcausis conci usionis". Cf.Arist., diatis etprioribus etnotioribus

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ithasbeengenerally bestofmyknowledge acceptedas suchbymodernscholarsworkingon thecommentary.24 However,whenone examinesGrosseteste's morecarefully, and comparesit withAristotle's commentary originaltext, Theseproblemsareoftwokinds:(1) Problems someproblemsseemto arise.25 of Aristotle, and (2) problemsconinterpretation concerningGrossetestes of Grosseteste s Bothtypes the demonstrative commentary. procedures cerning mostof themareof type1, butthe ofproblemsaretreatedin thefollowing; mostimportant are,in myopinion,thetype2 problems. D 1 (thatis,theneedto knowthecauseofsomephenomenon , if simpliciter text we areto haverealknowledge)is basedon a passagein theAristotelian clear.26 on wherethePhilosopheris actuallyuncharacteristically Grosseteste, theotherhand,presents a moreelaboratedescription whichis designedto pull the readerin a ratherdifferent directionfromthat intendedby Aristotle In fact,D1 is neverpresented in accordingto mostmoderninterpretations. theformofa singleclearproposition; insteadGrosseteste that simplyexplains thepurposeof D1 is to statewhatknowledgeis. Thus,he beginswitha brief statement: Thefirst definition determines what itis"toknow", because toknow ispersethepurpose ofthis science.27 Thisis in completeaccordwiththeAristotelian text.Butthenhe immediately ofdifferent The different kinds proceedsto a description typesofknowledge.28 24)Seee.g.Dod,"The ofAristotle's Posterior 'The"Conclusiones" of 102;Evans, Study Analytics, Robert Grosseteste's Commentary'. 25)Contra ofAristotle's Posterior issound. Dod,'TheStudy , 118:"G.s general analysis Analytics Hisgrasp oftheoverall structure ofthetext isimpressive, andhisbasicthesis ofa series ofconclusiones' from a fundamental ofdefinitions a most effective anaspringing complex provides inthechapter ofwhich theimportant elements arebrought into tool,bymeans lytical clearly focus." 26)Arist., APo.1.2,71b9-12 iscited innote50below). (thepassage 27)InAPo.1.2.5-6, ed.Rossi, autem esteiusquodestscire, definido est p.99:"Prima quiascire huius scientiae". persefinis 28)InAPo.1.2.9-22, ed.Rossi, nosquodscire dicitur communiter et p. 99:"Sednonlateat etmagis etmaxime Estenimscientia communiter veritatis et proprie proprie. comprehensio, sicsciuntur etdicitur scientia veritatis eorum erratica; contingentia proprie comprehensio quae velfrequentius unomodosehabent, etsicsciuntur scilicet naturalia, nata, semper contingentia est demonstratio communiter Dicitur edam dieta. scientia quorum proprie comprehensio magis veritatis eorum unomodosehabent, inmathematicis etsicsciuntur tamprincipia quaesemper Cumautem Veritas sitilludquodestetcomprehensio sitcompreveritatis quamconclusiones. hensio eiusquodest,esseautem eiusquoddependet abaliononcognoscitur nisiperesseeiusa

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kindsofcertainty, Grosseteste of knowledge, says,has different rangingfrom to thecommonusageofknowingtheever-changing particulars themostcerThiskindofknowledge, the whichis demonstrative. tainformofknowledge, aboutwhichthetermis used in theoriginaland primary sense,is "through in its causaleffect".29 its and that is immutable of a cause being understanding and refers to God, as is clearfromthephrasing, Withthesewords,Grosseteste as he has alreadymade clearin 1.1; forthereGod has beenmadeultimately forourknowledgeoftrueprinciples.30 Thus,eventhoughAristoresponsible tle is actuallyquiteclearin thisparticular passage(APo. 71b9-12),and does to referto anygod, Grosseteste the need not,of course,mentionor imply ofAristotle's changesthefocusofthepassagebygivingonlya briefdescription alsoseems aboutthemoreprecisecontent.Grosseteste viewwithoutbothering viewby claimingthatall otherkindsof knowledgeare to distortAristotle's In thepassagein quesin comparisonwiththedemonstrative.31 "sophistical" seandsecunbetweensecundum on thedistinction was focusing tion,Aristotle between trueand the distinction same as is not the which dumaccidens , quite In the as Grosseteste implies. particular, knowledgeproducedby sophistical, s sciencesis no lesscertainthanthefinalformin Grosseteste themathematical And furthermore, as sophistical.32 division,and thusit cannotbe categorised Grosseteste focusesnot so muchon the causeas the important partof the cause (God) whichis but ratheron thefactthatthereis a greatest definition to whichall other and in comparison theoriginalcauseofall trueknowledge, causesand kindsof knowledgeare sophistical.This,as so muchelse in the and it or at leastinspiredbyAugustine, is Augustinián theory,33 commentary, eiusquod scirecomprehensio dicitur manifestum estquodmaxime proprie quodependet, ethocestper esseimmutabile, eiusa quoilludhabet immutabiliter estpercomprehensionem inessendo etincausando". immutabilis causae comprehensionem 29)InAPo.1.2.21-22, inessendo et immutabilis causae ed.Rossi, p.99: percomprehensionem incausando". 30)InAPo.1.1.26-36, illudvocodoctrilines ed.Rossi, 32-36:Necsolum p.94,inparticular etiam locodoctoris sedscripturam namquodab oredoctoris et,siverius audimus, accipio; movent sedsolum exterius visadočet, neclittera sonat docet necquiexterius dicamus, scripturae ostendit". etveritatem mentem illuminât estquiinterius doctor sedverus haecduoetexcitant; ed. ed.Rossi, Withthispassage, p. 139;InAPo.1.17.38-48, compare e.g.InAPo.1.7.96-103, Rossi, pp.240-41. 31)InAPo.1.2.21-2, scire huius scire ed.Rossi, dictum] [seil, propriissime p. 100:"etrespectu accidens". secundum et sciendi aliosmodos Aristoteles vocat sophisticos 32)Elsewhere, ed.Rossi, ofthis, seeInAPo.1.11.141-42, tobewellaware seems Grosseteste dicta". maxime etprincipaliter etdemonstratio estscientia mathematicis p. 179:"Insolisenim 33)SeeE. Serene, Medieval PhilosoinTheCambridge 'Demonstrative Science', History ofLater

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ofit.On an Augustextorin an interpretation hasno roleto playinAristotles tiniánview,theprinciplesof knowledgeare recognisedthroughthelightof is God, who is, then,thefirstand originalcause of knowledge.Grosseteste in levels of causes between different similar lines distinguishing along thinking in itsbeingand itscausal in thehighestone whichis "immutable culminating is echoedthroughdivinelight,as is well-known, and theAugustinián effect"; on the otherhand,does not in thisplace out the commentary.34 Aristotle, elaborateon his conceptionof "cause",and his discussionselsewhereshow to him.35 One attributes thatit is verydifferent fromtheone thatGrosseteste thatAugustine's conceptionofknowledge glancethinkitstrange mightat first s text,butevenapartfrom and divinelighthas anypartto playin Grosseteste ofAugustinethereareat leasttwoobviousreasonsand a third theauthority reason.First,thePosterior Anamoreinteresting, possible,butphilosophically in this work was not of that is forward and the demonstration theory put lytics assimilated intomedievalthoughtuntilwellintothethirteenth century(not and priorto thisassimilation leastas a resultof Grossetestes efforts), Augustinewasan important sourceand inspiration. Thus,itwasonlynaturalthathe Westerninterpretations ofthePosterior shouldplaya partin thefirst thorough also that who was an one Second, Grosseteste, speculate might Analytics. to followone of extremely religiousmanevenforhistime,founditsatisfying in authorities even matters of science. themostrespected Third,and religious an of solves one of the finally, Augustinián theory light majorproblemsin Aristotle's theoryofdemonstrative knowledge:thatourcognitionoftheultimate principlesmustbe morecertainthan any knowledgededuced from to intuitive them.Aristotle couldonlyrefer cognition(voûç)andstrongbelieve of can arguethatGod as the foundation but (7cí
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D. Bloch í Vivarium 47 (2009)1-23

of Grossetestes theresult,i.e. feature is, of course,an un-Aristotelian theory, the of is one that Aristotle would certainty concerning principles knowledge, in if he been a to the reasons for haveliked had position accept presumably it. This thirdexplanation, then,is thephilosophicalreasonforadoptingan on issue.38 stance this particular Augustinián of different The ratherlong description typesof knowledgewas probably of thePosterior of Themistius' paraphrase adoptedfromtheLatintranslation extensive use.39 The divisions of knowlof which Grosseteste made Analytics for reasons irrelevant to Themisfor Grosseteste are, however, important edge for Grosseteste since make Dia more substantial foundation tius'purpose, they theconceptof "cause",the more to build on; forthe betterwe understand willD 1 appear.Thus,he hasgood reasonsto discussand solidand convincing inAristotle s suchdivisionsofcauses,buttheyarenotfoundexplicitly present text.40 also is a deductionthatproducesknowledge", D2, thatis, "demonstration suffers fromsome problemsof clarityas well as some additionalones conthe As regards cernedwiththedemonstrative appearanceofthecommentary. 38)As regards in general, seeSerene, 'Demonstrative on Grosseteste influence Augustinián andRobert Grosseteste. Since William 501-504 and,inparticular, Marrone, Science', ofAuvergne ofthe examined is probably themostcarefully thesubject commentary partofGrossetestes intothematter. Posterior , I shallnot,however, godeeper Analytics 39)J.R.O'Donnell, inGerard ofCremona's of 'Themistius' the Paraphrasis Posterior Analytics at247-48. SeealsoHackett, 'Robert Gros20(1958),239-315, Mediaeval Studies Translation', seteste andRoger 165-66. Bacon', 40)Dod,'TheStudy asa evenregard thissection ofAristotle's Posterior , 118,would Analytics W. 'Aristotle's of On the other anAristotelian "blemish hand, Detel, view)". (from Logic point inA Companion toAncient ofScience', andTheory , ed.M. L. GillandP.Pellegrin Philosophy a inthePosterior whofinds isa modern MA.,2006),245-69, (Maiden, Analytics interpreter information about Grossescience. Forgeneral science andpossible between distinction perfect of ofknowledge, seeR.J.Palma, 'Grossetestes ofdifferent kinds teste's classifications Ordering in P.Rossi, 'Laclassificazione dellescienze TheNewScholasticism 50(1976),447-63; Scientia' = Philosophes aumoyen inL'homme etsonunivers Roberto Grossatesta', âge,vol.II,ed.C. Wenin 1; J-Longeway, 'Medieval Theories ofDemonMédiévaux 27(Louvain-La-Neuve, 1986),646-5 ed. E. N. URL= inTheStanford 2005 Zalta, , stration', (Fall Edition) ofPhilosophy Encyclopedia A.C. Crombie, entries/ demonstration-medieval/>. archives/ fall2005/
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Grosseteste problemsof clarity, begins1.2 byexplicitly statingthatAristotle setsforthtwo definitions and one suppositionas thefoundationof thefirst conclusion.41 But Grosseteste does not at thispointpresentall of themto thereaderin theformofpropositions; onlyD 1 is mentioned(and,as I have this definition is notevenprovidedexplicitly in the alreadyargued, particular formof a singleand clearproposition), and it is obviousfromthefollowing textwhereD2 is presented. In fact,Grosseteste doesnotuseD2 untilwellinto thechapter,42 and noteventhendoes he identify itexplicitly as thedefinition referred. It is simplystatedthata newdefinition (D2) to whichhe previously is neededat thispointin thetextto supportS 1 and thefollowing partofthe he does notsaythattheone providedis thefundamental D2.43 commentary; Thatis,one mighteasilymistakeD2 fora simplesupporting definition instead of recognising itsfundamental rolein theentireargumentthatGrosseteste s at thebeginningof 1.2 implied.In particular, thislackof originalstatement becauseD1 is neverevenexplicitly statedin proposiclarityis bothersome, tionalform.That is, we have two definitions: of the firstone (a) we are informed aboutthegeneral,butnotabouttheparticular and precise,content, and (b) it is mentionedthatthisis thedefinition in question;whileforthe second(a) we have theprecisecontentsin propositional form,(b) but it is neverexplicitly referred to as theseconddefinition mentionedat thebeginthatthereaderwillhaveto figureout ningof thechapter.Thisis something forhimself. structure is difficult to follow, orat leastnot Thus,thehierarchical as clearas itcouldbe,evenin thiscrucialpartofthecommentary inwhichthe foundation oftheentireworkis laid. Evenmoreimportantly, Grosseteste statesthatthisdefinition is explicitly forward because of the and its function is to put previousarguments, partly thesupposition, as he also statesin thetext.44 Thisproducesproblems clarify as regards thedemonstrative for,assuminga bottom-up procedure; hierarchy45 41)InAPo.1.2.1-5, ed.Rossi, modoquocontingit scire etsolvere p.99:"Explanato oppositiones destruentium inchoat Aristoteles scientiam in hoclibrodocere scire, quamintendit primo duasdefinitiones etunamsuppositionem, exquibus concludit ponens consequenter primam conci usionem huius scientiae". 42)InAPo.1.2.38-39, ed.Rossi, p. 100. 43)InAPo.1.2.36-39, ed.Rossi, p.100:"Ergo propter explanationem praecedentis suppositionis etpropter Aristoteles hancdefinitionem: demonstratio estsyllogismus faciens sequentia subiungit scire". 44)InAPo.1.2.36-38, ed.Rossi, note. p. 100.Seetheprevious 45)Notethatthebottom-up isusedonlyasanillustration. Onemight well hierarchy equally haveuseda top-down toillustrate thepoint. hierarchy

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elementsat thebottomand thederivedand withthebasicand fundamental he must as a resultplaceD2 aboveDl, sincethe the above former, secondary thecontentofD2, a ofunderstanding is ofknowledge precondition definition of sincethecorrectunderstanding belowS 1 in thehierarchy, butpresumably D2. Buthismethodin 1.2, then,producestheresultthatDl SI presupposes to whichSI is added,46and onlythenis D2 definition is the fundamental theoriginalappearanceat and futureuse. Therefore, added forclarification incorrect. Furtherofthechapteroftheseas equalsis apparently thebeginning more,D2 was alreadyusedin thediscussionsin 1.1- which,bytheway,are - without thatdo notusethesciencein question47 supposedto be discussions forthewholework.48 importance anyhintthatitwas offundamental The majorproblemof the foundationpresentedin 1.2 is, however,SI, to Aristotle:thatall knowledge(scientia) also attributes whichGrosseteste science.First,thissimplycannotbe supportedby comesfromdemonstrative WhattheLatinsactuallyhad fromAristotle's text.49 theAristotelian hand,in madebyJamesofVenice,is thefollowing: thetranslation - andnotinthesophistical and ofsomeobject Wethink wehaveknowledge simpliciter theobject which we the cause wethink cognise accidental is,[that is, through way when cannot beotherthis andthat that itisthecauseoftheobject, wecognise] when wethink issucha thing.50 that tohaveknowledge itisclear wise. Thus, thecauseof a Aristotle claimsthatwe possessknowledgewhenwe recognise causeof that this is the sufficient aware and are (1) phenomenon, particular thephenomenonin question,and (2) thatthephenomenonmustnecessarily existand be exactlyas itis whenthecauseis present.Buthe doesnotsayanyor,in fact,thatdemthingto indicatethatthisis theonlykindofknowledge, is theonlywayto reachsuchknowledge.In thefollowing onstration partof this it is clear that in next the and Aristotle's Posterior 1.2, chapters, Analytics he actuin the and is a questionon whichhe hasnotyettakena position; end, 46)InAPo.1.2.29-30, ed.Rossi, p. 100. 47)InAPo.1.1.9-17, ed.Rossi, p.93. 48)SeeInAPo.1.1.6-9, ed.Rossi, p.93. 49)Eventhough of inseveral other thePosterior hedidnotunderstand John respects, Analytics seeMetalogicon 4.8.3-14 (ed.J.B. HallandK. S. B. point right, Salisbury gotthisparticular Turnhout Keats-Rohan, 1991),146. 50)Arist., autem "Scire APo.1.2,71b9-l3 (transi. Iacobi): simpliciter, unumquodque opinamur arbitramur cumcausamque modoquiestsecundum sednonsophistico accidens, cognoscere Manisehabere. hocaliter illius causaest,etnonestcontingere quamresest,quoniam propter scire sit". huiusmodi est festum aliquid igitur quod

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In thepassagequoted allybelievesthatthereareotherkindsof knowledge.51 we arein whenwe is that at least the state that above,all Aristotle reallysays must be called but theremay the cause of "knowledge"; something cognise levelGrosseteste has made stillbe otherkinds.That is, at the fundamental muchmorespecific demandsfroma theoryconcernedwithobtainingknowledge,and in factthewholediscussionof knowledgeat thebeginningof 1.2 s S 1 is a verystrongviewignoring the (see above)also showsthatGrosseteste a littlelaterin the detailsoftheverydifficult Furthermore, conceptofscientia. he is seento be awareofthe"theambiguity oftheword'knowlcommentary huius nominis and thus to 'scire), recognisethatnot all edge'" {ambiguitas mustmeanthat Thus,Grosseteste knowledgederivesfromdemonstration.52 stricto sensuall knowledgeis a resultofthedemonstrative buteven syllogism, I as have is doubtful as an of Aristotle. this, indicated, very interpretation textthathe did not intendtheproposiSecond,it is clearfromAristotle's tionin questionas a basic suppositionof the Grossetestean kindby means of whichtheremaining of the science of could be deduced.On theory part thecontrary, in Aristotle used thephraseto sum up his precedingargument a sentencethatreadsmorelike a summaryconclusionthansomethingto be used as one of thefundamental axiomsof theentiresciencein question. on the other states thatthesupposition mustbe adoptedon Grosseteste, hand, two grounds:53 (1) the discussionof the deduction(syllogism)in thePrior 51)SeeAPo. 1.2,71b16-17 (transi. and,in particular, 1.3,72bl8-20:"Nosautem Iacobi), dicimus omnem scientiam demonstrativam esse.. .".Grosseteste ñeque bystrengthening argues theAristotelian distinction between intellectus andscientiandthus claims that there canbeno true intuitive ) offundamental (scientia (intellectus ): In only knowledge principles, understanding For a more cautious APo.1.2.91-102, ed.Rossi, see Robert com103. p. Kilwardby's approach, inD. Cannone, 'LeNotule Libri Posteriorum diRobert nella tradizione mentary Kilwardby esegeticalatina medievale vol.II (unpublished PhDThesis, delXIIIsecolo', Rome2003-2004), benedicit 'doctrina etdisciplina' etnon'cognitio', [seil. Aristoteles] p.13:"Item, quianonomnis intellectiva fit ex sed humana solum. melius dicit 'doctItem, cognitio praeexistente cognitione, rina etdisciplina' 'scientia scientia conclusionum est sed intellectiva , tantum, quam quia proprie humana esttamprineipiorum cognitio quamconclusionum". 52)InAPo.1.3.3-38, ed.Rossi, InAPo.1.3.24-38 terms, p. 105;and,inevenstronger (p.106). Inthelatter he states that italldepends kind ofscire wearetalking passage explicitly uponwhat ofcourse, tothedistinctions madeatthebeginning of1.2(seethediscussion about, referring, above). 53)InAPo.1.2.29-39, ed.Rossi, Aristoteles hanc p.100:"Consequenter subiungit suppositionem: omne scitur'. Haecautem sumitur a libro quodscitur, perdemonstrationem suppositio partim Priorům etpartim in est dicitur hune terminům 'demcognoscitur quid quod cognoscendo per onstratio'. Demonstratur enim inAnaleticis Prioribus fuit quodomne quodcognoscitur postquam dubium velopinionis contrariae persyllogismum cognoscitur; ergo, quoddemonstratio cognito

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, and (2) somesortofcognitionthatariseswhenone comesto recogAnalytics nise the meaningof "demonstration" (
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viz. deductionsfromwell-structured premissesto a conclusion (D2).57 idenof the result as of an (d) Knowledge knowingitscauseis therefore object this conof the ticalwithknowinga conclusionthroughknowing principles derived clusion(CI). Thatis,theconclusionis,in Grossetestes view,directly withthisanalhas certainly fromD 1-2and SI. Still,eventhoughGrosseteste own text,he hasdone ofCI beyondAristotle's ysiselaboratedthefoundation describedabove,and not leastthe so in an Aristotelian spirit.The features ownelaboroadwhichleadsto CI, areto a largeextentGrossetestes clear-cut In one Aristotelian. se unare not but ration, they particular, maynotice per of theentirecomconclusion and mostimportant thatCI, thefundamental own text(see above). whichis foundin Aristotle's is a statement mentary, The unclearin important CI is,however, Aristotelian Eventhistruly respects. both of Grosseteste's and ofthePosterior theories commentary belong Analytics mustnot to material logic,notto purelyformallogic,and thusthepremisses to other demands live also be true and must be well-formed; up they only feels the Aristotelian Grosseteste Therefore, text) (following imposedbyreality. if the must forcedto add a numberofconditionsthat premisses fulfil, theyare But thewhole to honourthedemandsof D 1-2 and SI (see the following). follownatuthe conclusions this kind is that of in a deductive intention system D 1-2 and theneedfor in case and this from the and SI, premisses, rally clearly 1.2. clarification further provesthatthishas nothappenedin Grosseteste's CI containsa numberof undefined In fact,and mostimportantly, predicatesofdemonstrative "immediate", "true","primary", "priorto", knowledge: "betterknownthan"and "causes",and moreare added as Grosseteste proetc.58Theseare "eternal", "universal", ceeds,e.g. "necessary", "incorruptible" in untilthefollowing and substantiated notclarified partofthecommentary; 1 on book of the a substantial (1.1-1.11) commentary part quite particular, thatis, a sectionof almost90 pagesis used is used to treatthesepredicates; knows of CI.59 Grosseteste thefoundation to clarify, discussand substantiate that the defend the even tries to and fact, well, followingpartof the very 57)InAPo.1.2.36-40, ed.Rossi, p. 100. 58)Seethetext inthenext note. 59)InAPo.1.2.61-1.11.296, SeeInAPo.1.12.1-8 ed.Rossi, (p.188):"Aprincipio pp.101-87. Aristoteles demonstravit istum libri adlocum 71al-77a35] [=APo.1.1-11, quoddemonusque etper etnotioribus etcausis etnecessariis etprioribus etveris etimmediatis stratio estexprimis tamprincipiis etexpropriis etincorruptibilibus etuniversalibus etperpetuis seinhaerentibus nisi nonaggregantur simul conditiones etconclusionibus; ethaeomnes quaminterrogationibus scientiam indemonstratione maxime etpropriissime dietam, dicta, propriissime quaeacquirit inprincipio". estscire secundum quoddiffinitum

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constitutes a clarification and an analysisofCl,60butthisbrings commentary himdangerously closeto a circularargument of thekindthatan Aristotelian must If conclusiones areto be directly philosopher deduced, reject: thefollowing or at leastderived,fromCl, thentheycannotthemselves on Aristotelian and Euclideanprinciples be usedto clarify thefirst would have conclusion;61 they to be definitions or suppositionsinsteadof conclusions.But iftheyare not deduced/derived fromCl, theaxiomatichierarchy ofconclusiones wouldseem to be an illusion,and Grosseteste willhaveinsteada numberofequallyfundamentalprinciples ofscienceand scientific theory. In fact,it shouldbe noticedthatGrosseteste himselfmayhavebeenaware thatthedeductionof Cl fromD 1-2 and SI is not as clear-cutas he would havelikedit to be. Forin theintroduction to thechapter, beforetheanalyses he states that the conclusion is established "fromthese" proper, unhesitatingly (exquibus), thatis,fromD 1-2 and SI.62Butafterhavingstatedand analysed D 1-2 and SI he no longersays"fromthese",but insteadhe informs us that Cl "isadded"(subnectitur) as theresultoftheformer This principles. seemsto be a muchweakerdescription on Grosseteste s part. At first s commentary sight,then,Book 1, chapter2, ofGrosseteste appears to be thesolidfoundation ofa demonstrative of Butwhen theory knowledge. theparticulars areexamineda littlemoreclosely, therewouldseemto be substantialproblems.First,one mightdisputesomeessential s partsofGrosseteste of Aristotle's text.Second,and much moreimportantly, the interpretation demonstrative sometimes,and in crucial proceduresof the commentary seem in theconclusions. respects, questionable, particular concerning III. Aristotle's Intentionand DemonstrativeSciences Grosseteste wasno fool.On thecontrary, he wasa singularly and independent clear-headed thinker.63 the Therefore, problemsconnectedwithD 1-2,SI and 60)SeeInAPo.1.2.51-64, ed.Rossi, autem huiusprimae conclusionis, p. 101:"Praedicatum estexmultis, dividitur utparticulatim facilius sicutpluries fitin quiaconiunctum probetur, scientiis etpostquam considerata fuerint demonstrativis; manifesta erit singula particulatim, haecpropositio: omne faciens scire estexveris etprimis etimmediatis etprioribus etnotioribus etcausis conclusionis . . .". 61)SeeEvans, 'The"Conclusiones" ofRobert Grossetestes 732:"Theessence of Commentary', Euclid's method isthedemonstrable ofallmore advanced earlier dependence principles uponthose shown tobeeither self-evident ortobethemselves first dependent uponself-evident principles." 62)Seethetext innote41above. 63)On themore ofGrosseteste s thought, seee.g.J.McEvoy, ThePhilosophy general aspects of

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Cl arenotsimplymistakesor carelessworkon hispart.I suggestthatGros1.2 (and thecomreasonsforstructuring setestehas two,partlyinterrelated in general)thewayhe does. mentary andwhatGrosFirst,one mustconsiderthenatureofthePosterior Analytics is one setestewantsto accomplishwithhisexposition.The Posterior Analytics and coherence ofthe and the structure Aristotelian ofthemostdifficult works, textare not easilyestablished. Nowadaysmostscholarswould argue,I supis at least becausethe treatiseis not a finishedwork, that this partly pose, severaltreatises a work but rather not even by broughttogether perhaps single ofRhodesor someothereditor.64 Andronicus But,Aristotle beingtheauthor of thetext,Grosseteste reasonably expectedcoherencein thework,and ifit the was not easilyfound,it was mostlikelybecausewe did not understand this commentator to out coherIt is the of the bring Philosopher job rightly. and a demonstrative enceoftheworkclearlyto thereader, expositionis byfar of so. for Grosseteste themostcompelling But, way doing (althoughperhaps thisproduceda clashbetweena literal he did notconsciously seeitthatway65), incoherent textand difficult and (seemingly) oftheoftenrather interpretation ofa demonstratheclearintentions of thePhilosopher, viz. theconstruction I thinkit is certivetheoryofscienceand a theoryofhowone demonstrates. Aristotles and they believedthathe perceived tainthatGrosseteste intentions, Thatis, Grosseteste commentson what werewhathe primarily expounded.66 on the text itself.But,even to be Aristotle's not so much heperceives theory, at it sometimes makesthecomGrosseteste is this, exceptionally though good or at leastnoteasilycompatible, withtheAristotelian mentary incompatible, workson thebasisofhisown viz.thatGrosseteste original.Thisexplanation, intentionratherthanon thebasisof thetextitself, perceptionofAristotle's also accountsforsome of the most strikingfeaturesof the commentary: s methodofcommenting is unusuallypersonal,and he himself (a) Grosseteste

andScholarRobert Grosseteste Grosseteste: NewPerspectives onhisThought (Oxford, 1982);Robert ,ed.J.McEvoy 1995). (Turnhout ship 64)Aristotle's Prior D. Ross(Oxford, andPosterior ed.with introd. andcomm. 1949), Analytics, Posterior transi, with comm. Barnes 19932[19751]) 6-23,75;Aristotle: (Oxford, J. Analytics, xi-xxii. 65)ButseeInAPo.1.9.1-177, ed.Rossi, fora chapter which indicates that Grossepp.162-69, embrace thisprocedure. teste didperhaps sometimes consciously 66)Seethevery ofthecommentary, first words InAPo.1.1.1-2, ed.Rossi, Arisp.93:"Intendo totelis inhoclibro estinvestigare essentialia etmanifestare demonstrationis". Generally, phrases inthecommentary. suchas"intendo Aristotelis" or"intendit Aristoteles" arefrequently found

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takesresponsibility formanyof thearguments;67 is very (b) thecommentary and close attention to individualpassagesand phrasesin rarelypays general ifone comparesGrossetestes Aristotle's text.68 Thesefeatures arestriking comwith those of later thinkers such as Robert mentary thirteenth-century Kilwardby orThomasAquinas.One mightsaythatGrosseteste is makingtheAristotelian meansand by theoryappearmorecoherentthanit actuallyis by rhetorical literal comments. this close But would not be Grossetestes certainly avoiding own viewof thesituation, and it would not be completely faireither.For in he mayverywellbe rightabouttheAristotelian intention. manyinstances demonstrative methods Second,and relatedto theformer point,different and thirwere,as statedin the"Introduction" above,availablein thetwelfth teenthcenturies. treatises Of thethreekindsofdemonstrative menpreviously itselfbelongsto type1, namelytextsthatboth tioned,thePosterior Analytics and teachhow to demonstrate, and Grossetestes demonstrate commentary to to the same But ought belong category.69 the analysisof Grossetestes 1.2 aboverevealeda numberofdifficulties thehierarchy ofdefiniconcerning conclusions.CI is supposedto be the tions,suppositions and, in particular, basisoflaterconclusiones andexpandon CI , , buttheseareoftenusedto clarify whichshouldnot be possibleon a traditional axiomatic-deductive theoryof sciencesin thetwelfth type1. Thus,type1 in theabovelistofdemonstrative which is must be 3, by type actuallymoresuitedto century70 supplemented It is constructed as a deductive describeGrossetestes commentary. certainly that each a first it would conclusion is derived and on system, appear reading fromtheprecedingone(s). But on further analysis,theconclusionsareactu67)Seee.g.InAPo.1.1.26-36; In ed.Rossi, 117-20. 1.2.77-102; 1.5.1-82, pp.94,102-103, in in the sections with an these and others Grosseteste settles problems beginning passages many view". andthen a ¿//co-section, thatis,"Hereismy(authoritative) oftheproblem explanation totheargument, seealsoR.W.Southern, Robert Groshisownauthority OnGrosseteste lending MindinMedieval TheGrowth seteste. 19922 37-38, [19861]), (Oxford, citing Europe ofanEnglish Franciscan William ofAlnwick. thethirteenth-century Oxford 68)On thispoint, ofRobert Grosseteste s Commentary', "The"Conclusiones" seealsoEvans, ofAristotle's PosteContra 'Medieval Latin 143-44. Glosses', Dod,"lheStudy 730-31; Ebbesen, anadlitteram ofAristotle's rior 98("primarily text"). exposition Analytics", 69)Dod,"lheStudy andSerene, 'Robert Grosseteste ofAristotle's Posterior 102-103 Analytics', seem tothink that forthesame onInduction', 104and115n.35(citing view), John Longeway ofthePosterior andinteresting move tousethetheory itisa particularly clever byGrosseteste inthe"Introduction" this kind of toexpound thevery sametext. above, But,asI stated Analytics was welland how to demonstrative is, demonstrate) (that procedure demonstrating teaching known alsointhetwelfth century. 70)Seethe"Introduction" above.

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in waysthatdo not alwaysmakeit clearwhichareprimary allyinterrelated and whichare derivedfromthe others,or rather:whichmake it clearthat thereis notalwayssucha hierarchy. However,it seemsthatD1 aloneis never or to need additional disputed thought support,and in thisrespecttoo Grossetestescommentary resembles 3 type (thatis, in usinga singlefundamental for the entire like principle theory, theLiberde Causis, whiletherelationships betweenthededucedconclusionsaremoreuncertain).71 Thecommentary is a combination ofnos. 1 and 3, then,butevenmorecan be saidaboutitsspecific in and aboutthenatureoftheconnature, particular clusiones. EuclidsElements withthemostimporprovidedthetwelfth century tantexampleof applied demonstrative science,thatis, type2 in the list. The first However,Euclid was not simplyEuclid in the twelfth century.72 knownversionwas Boethius'translation, but it was onlypartial,and imporalmostall theproofsweremissing, thatis,thereaderscouldnotseehow tantly theindividualtheorems werederivedfromprevioustheorems. In thecourseof thetwelfth the Elements was translated several times,and thetradicentury, tion was ratherunstablewith frequentcontaminationfromthe different sourcesforthetext.As regardsthemostwidelyusedversionof theElements remark: (VersionII), CharlesBurnettmakesthefollowing important Themost version oftheElements omits Euclid's altowidely twelfth-century copied proofs andreplaces them thereader which earlier theorems touse gether byinstructions showing inorder toobtain theproof. Theframework oftheargument isgiven, butthereader isleft tofillinthedetails himself.73 71)SeealsoInAPo.1.2.5-8, ed.Rossi, autem definido esteiusquodestscire, p.99:"Prima quia scire estpersefinis huius finem autem inintentione esseprimům etcognitiscientiae; oportet finis convenit omnia cetera InAPo.1.12.1-8, ed. one,quiasecundum moderari"; exigentiam libri adlocum istum demonstravit Aristoteles Rossi, p.188:"Aprincipio usque quoddemonstratioestexprimis etveris etimmediatis etprioribus etnotioribus etcausis etnecessariis etperse inhaerentibus etuniversalibus etperpetuis etincorruptibilibus etexpropriis tamprincipiis quam etconclusionibus; ethaeomnes conditiones nonaggregantur simul nisiin interrogationibus demonstratione maxime etpropriissime scientiam dicat,quaeacquirit dietam, propriissime secundum estscire inprincipio". quoddefinitum 72)Onthereception intheMiddle ofEuclid seenote8 with references. Ages, 73)Burnett, 'Scientific 161. See also S. 'Remarks abouttheProof Speculations', e.g. Brentjes, Sketches inEuclid's Elements B.N.,fonds latin10257', in , BookI asTransmitted byMs.Paris, Mathematische Probleme imMittelalter. Derlateinische undarabische , ed.M. FolkSprachbereich erts C. Burnett, 'TheLatin andArabic Influences ontheVocabulary (Wiesbaden 1996)115-37; Demonstrative in the Versions of Euclid's Elements associated with AdeConcerning Argument lardofBath', inAuxorigines dulexique dela latinitas , ed. philosophique européen. L'influence (Louvain-La-Neuve, 1997),117-35. J.Hamesse

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Grossetestes is verymuchindebtedto Euclid'sElements. Evans commentary hasevensuggested thatGrosseteste triedto "superimpose EucliduponAristotleas a meansof tidying and ordering whatAristotle is saying"by"following the sequenceof Aristotle's his own progression argumentbut maintaining fromconclusio to conclusiď J4 I thinkthisis exactlyright, butonlyin thesense of theEuclidwho,in thewordsof Burnett, "omitsEuclid'sproofs",perhaps not "altogether", sinceGrosseteste oftenpositsarguments and explanations, butto a certainextent, thelackofproofis a veryconspicuous and in particular oftheveryfirst feature and mostimportant conclusionofthecommentary in 1.2ŠWe cannotat presentsayprecisely whichversionsofEuclidwereknown to Grosseteste,75 buthe clearlyhad verygood sourceswhenitcameto obtainwiththiskindof ingevenrareworks.Thus,he cannothavebeen unfamiliar Euclideantradition. Euclid'sElements seems,then,to have methodologically inspiredGrossefortype2 elementsin the teste,butthistextmaynotbe theonlyinspiration In theDe Hebdomadibus textson , one of themostimportant commentary. demonstrative scienceusedbyscholarsofthetwelfth Boethiusexpliccentury, deductivemethod.76 Thus,he statesnine itlyclaimsto use a mathematical regulaefromwhichhe claimsto be able to deduce the conclusionsthathe needs.Butit is notablethatBoethiusneveractuallyexplainswhichregulae to use and how to use themin the individualpassages.Insteadhe wantsthe readerto perform thistaskhimself;77 thatis, Boethiushas givenhimthefundamentalaxiomsand theconclusionsthatshouldbe reached,buthe has not toldhimwhenand wheretheindividualregulaeareto be used.Thiswas left to thetwelfth-century commentators on thetext,and theyall did so; Claremwithmuchzeal,but neitherThierry bald ofArras,in particular, of Chartres 74)Evans, influ'The"Conclusiones" ofRobert Grossetestes 731.ForEuclidian Commentary', allastoria enceonGrossetestes seealsoP.Rossi, 'Uncontributo dellascienza nel commentary, Rivista difibsofia neo-scolastica 67(1975),103-10. Medioevo', 75)ButseeW.R.Knorr, Robert ofTynemouth, vs.adversarius: Grosseteste, John 'Falsigraphus inthirteenth-century inMathematische imMittelalter. Probleme Der andGeometry Oxford', lateinische undarabische ed.M. Folkerts 1996),333-59. (Wiesbaden, Sprachbereich, 76)Boethius, De Consolatone , ed.C. Moreschini (MunichPhilosophiae, Opuscula Theologica at For a see The Tractates andthe 187. 186-94, translation, Boethius, 2000), Theological Leipzig, E. K. RandandS. J.Tester ed.H. F.Stewart, Consolation Mass., (Cambridge, ofPhilosophy, at38-41. 19732 38-51, [19181]), 77)Boethius, De Consolatone , 188:"Sufficiunt quae Philosophiae, Opuscula Theologica igitur a prudente verorationis suisunumquodque See interprete aptabitur argumentis". praemisimus; whois,however, mistaken Axiomatic alsoEvans, 'Boethian andEuclidean Method', 37,43-44, intheEuclidean insaying that a similar isnotfound tradition. procedure

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norGilbertofPoitiersignoresthetask.78 The Boethianmethod,then,is nota clear-cut of 1 the demonstrative sciencedescribedin the"Introexample type duction"above;foritalsocontainsfeatures thatareverysimilarto theEuclid- Boethius'and Euclids- were ean ones describedas type2, and thesetexts well-known in thetwelfth Therecan be no doubtthatGrosseteste was century. with both of them. acquainted of Grosseteste's Thus, the conclusiones commentary may be conceivedas theorems their but the demonstrative to provethemare author, by arguments oftenlacking.Eventhoughhe is sometimescarefulto pointout theconnectionsbetweentheindividualdefinitions, and conclusionsthereis suppositions oftenno realargument involved;itis donesimplybyusingwordsand phrases such as consequenter or subnectitur haecconclusionTo repeat,theseare not demonstrative but rather "instructions arguments showingthereaderwhich earliertheorems s case,definitions, [thatis,in Grosseteste suppositions, explanationsand conclusions]to use in orderto obtaintheproof"(Burnettcited feature ofthecommentary alsoexplainsat above).I believethatthisparticular leastmostof thedifficulties thattheanalysisof book 1, chapter2, revealed. Foriftherelationships betweenthedefinitions, and conclusions, suppositions wereclearto Grosseteste, as indeedhe felttheywere(seealsothe"Conclusion" haveescapedhimthatnoteverysingleone of below),thenit maysometimes his conclusionscould be demonstratively deduced,the reasonforthe overthat he followed the sightbeing procedureof some versionsof Euclid's Elements , and was mostlikelyalso inspiredby Boethius'De Hebdomadibus , and thismaybe thereasonwhyhe did notexplicitly statetheproofs.Butstill, he knewthattheconclusionswereright;thatis,notonlyweretheyAristotelian,theyweresimplytrue. It seems,then,thatGrosseteste's is theresultof severalinflucommentary ences,and theseare, or so I have triedto argue,much more intricately connectedand combinedthanhas so farbeensuspected.Whenone adds the factthatGrosseteste was one of themostremarkable individuals of medieval it is no wonder that thecommentary is trulysuigeneris .80 thought, 78)Forthetexts, seetheeditions mentioned innote6. On thecommentaries, seealsoEvans, 'Boethian andEuclidean Axiomatic 43-44.Forearlier commentaries on Boethius' Method', Sacra Scottus , seeE. K.Rand, (Munich, Johannes Opuscula 1906). 79)Evans, "The "Conclusiones" ofRobert Grosseteste's 733. Commentary', 80)Interestingly, Grosseteste's onthePhysics seems toconsist ofnotes fora similar commentary itistransmitted ina much structure, lessfinished but,asiswell-known, state than thecommenonthePosterior . SeeRoberti Grosseteste Lincolniensis Commentarius in tary Analytics Episcopi VIIILibros ed.R.C. Dales(Boulder, Aristotelis, Colorado, Physicorum 1963).

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IV. Conclusion All thisadds up to a ratherpeculiarmixtureof praiseand blameof Grossetestes commentary on thePosterior His commentary is not always Analytics. to use as an to aid the Aristotelian text,but it is easy understanding original thefirstextantLatincommentary on thistreatise,81 it is a remarkable intellectualeffort, in thelaterscholastic and thecommentary was veryinfluenciai treatment ofthetext.Priorto Grosseteste s work,we knowofno Latinscholar to have masteredthisAristotelian thereis much treatise;on the contrary, evidencethatscholarsusuallyavoidedit throughout thetwelfth and century, whentheydid not,theyoftenmadebad mistakes ofinterpretation.82 Grossetestes interpretation and itmaynotgenerally maybe somewhatidiosyncratic, themodernreaderas an interpretation ofAristotle. satisfy Perhapsthemedievaiswerenotthemselves because the and satisfied, completely methodology of Grossetestes is in structure not found comcommentary apparently any in thiscontextit is perhapsalso signifimentaries of thefollowing century;83 cantthatthemethodsofAlainofLiliesRegulaeCaelestis Iurisand ofNicholas ofAmiensArsFidei Catholicaewereapparently not reproduced eitherin the literature.84 theological Butcertainly Grosseteste in hisown did in factmasterthePosterior Analytics him and to the text as Evans clear. Thatis, was, out,85 way, points luminously Grosseteste Aristotelian and he intentions, trulygraspedmany although somein particularas the resultof his timeswenttoo farin his interpretations, 81)On a possible ofVenice, seeS. Ebbesen, Veneticus onthe 'Jacobus commentary byJames thirteenth Posterior andSomeEarly Oxford Masters ontheElenchi , CIMAGL Century Analytics 21 (1977),1-9fortheargument infavour. I havepresented anargument sucha comagainst inD. Bloch, ofVenice andthePosterior CIMAGL 78 37-50. (2008) 'James mentary Analytics', Atleast ofPhiloponus' onthePosterior hadbeentranslated byJames, commentary parts Analytics arenowextant. SeeS. Ebbesen, andGrosseteste usedthem, butonlyfragments 'Anonymus and Boethius. Ancient Scholasticism andtwelfth Aurelianensis II,Aristotle, Alexander, Porphyry at89-107; P.Rossi, 'Tracce versione Western CIMAGL 16(1976),1-128, della Century Europe', inPosteriorum latino aiSecondi analitici nelCommentarius diuncommento Analyticorum greco Rivista difilosofia neo-scolastica S. Ebbesen, Libros diRoberto 70 (1978),433-39; Grossatesta, of"Alexander s"Commentaries onAnalytica Posteriora andSophistici Elenchi 'NewFragments , CIMAGL 60(1990),113-20. 82)I plantotreat ina future theearly ofthePosterior article. reception Analytics 83)SeeEbbesen, whoalsopoints inter'Medieval Latin outsomeofthemost Glosses', 143-44, in the of later Walter s on Grossetestean features commentary periods;particular, Burley esting with onthePosterior Politics hassomeinteresting affinities Grossetestes commentary Analytics. 84)SeeEvans, 'Boethian andEuclidean Axiomatic 36. Method', 85)Evans, "The ofRobert Grossetestes "Conclusiones" 734. Commentary',

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he oftenproduced and hisdivinelightmetaphysics, inclinations Augustinián was everfoundin the than of demonstration a morevividand coherent theory on thetext.Aristottreatise or in anyothercommentary originalAristotelian the most as "one of hailed has been le'sPosterior brilliant, original, Analytics is one of Grossetestes worksin thehistoryof philosophy";86 and influential is on thistextwhichactuallyshowswhythisstatement thefewcommentaries to thetheoryofdemoncontribution true,whilealso makingan independent of thePosterior Latin tradition the stration.His commentary Analytics gave one. also a challenging but notonlya verycapableand inspiring beginning

861 Barnes inAristotle: Posterior transi, with comm. 19932 (Oxford, J.Barnes Jonathan Analytics-, xiv. [19751])

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KtC/0 £#) '•»v BRILL

Simplicius

VIVA RIUM www.bnll.nl/viv

Vivarium 47 (2009)24-53

and James of Viterbo

on Propensities*

AntoineCôté Université d'Ottawa

Abstract s doctrine ofpropensities Thepaperexamines ) inhiscommen(epitedeioteis Simplicius the late thirteenth Aristotles and follows its on century by application tary Categories to thecausesof ofViterboto problems andphilosopher James relating theologian he usesAristotelian intellection andnatural volition, terminology Although change. s doctrine with ofAristode, those toconflict andmeanshisdoctrine James minimally an to a constitutes ofpropensities dressing really attempt providetechnically rigorous ishisrejecCentral toJamess convictions. tohisAugustinián andBoethian procedure thatis movedis that"everything tion,following HenryofGhent,oftheprinciple of as a meansof doctrine movedbyanother". uses James Simplicius' propensities to the caseofthe which had limited the of that Henry principle, extending rejection of and The result is a and natural will,tocognitive theory cognition change. operations own and a of natural causeofits thatseesthesoulastheprincipal volition acts, theory ofexternal thecausalimpact thatminimizes agents. change Keywords innatism seminal reasons, intellection, volition, propensities, aptitudes, Introduction In a seriesof quodlibetsdisputedbetween1293 and 1296, Jamesof Viterbo who succeededGiles of Rome as regentmasterof theologyforthe of Paris,defended orderof theHermitsof SaintAugustineat theUniversity the view thatthe intellect,the will and matterare endowedwithnatural, that is, innate,potencieshe called propensities(idoneitates ) or aptitudes of Marenbons ata session ofJohn waspresented ofthispaper Anearlier version History of the I wish to thank members at seminar 2007). (May Trinity Cambridge College, Philosophy onthat occasion. fortheir audience questions DOI:10.1 Brill ©Koninklijke 163/156853408X345909 2009 Leiden, NV,

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} Althoughthe thesisthatthe intellectpossessesinnateknowl(aptitudines) to scholastics,and indeed of its objectswas not unfamiliar of some edge seemedto enjoysomedegreeoffavorin theArtsFacultyfromthe1230sto the were of Aristotle who acceptedthe authority mid-60s,2majorphilosophers was in rejecting it.One ofthemanyreasonsforthisrejection near-unanimous of Aristotle's be inconsistent with was to thattheview deemed conception the to forty somethirty as a tabularasa.Writing intellect yearsaftertheseauthors, a and of Viterbo James provided systematic unapologeticdefenseof a very similarview.One authorwho playeda keyrolein theshapingofJamess theon AristoNeoplatonist Simpliciuswhosecommentary oryis the6thcentury in the last William of Moerbeke wastranslated tle'sCategories by quarterofthe considerable influof would exercise thirteenth course, century.3 Simplicius, in thirteenth and fourteenth ence variouswayson many authors,not century juston JamesofViterbo.His doctrineofqualities,forinstance,is discussedat lengthbyThomasAquinasin ST I-IIae qq 49-50, who seemsto be thefirst Scholasticto discusshisviewsat anylength.4 Simpliciusis also an important and remission offorms.5 Late on theintension sourceformedievaldiscussions his authors also make use of thirteenth and fourteenth heavy century century vitalroleforJamesof ButSimpliciusplaysa particularly doctrineofrelations.6 !) Theonly isstill P.FidelCasados overview ofJames's andnoetics complete metaphysics single 'Elpensamiento La Ciudad deDios163(1951), filosófico delBeato deViterbo', 437-54; Santiago 164(1952),310-331;165(1953),103-144; 163(1951), 489-500. 282-302; Metaphysics: realdistinction: seminal reasons: 164(1952),301-14; 165(1953), 314-331; 437-54; analogy I willbeusing almost thewill:283-293; beatitude: 293-302. 117-144; 103-117; psychology asalmost allofJames ofViterbo s hitherto s four edited, James exclusively quodlibetal questions dequolibet Unless edited works, ,4 vols.(Würzburg, 1968-1975). byEelcko Ypma: Disputationes will the number first which otherwise references toJames's noted, quodlibets provide quodlibet - ,followed tothevolume number ofthequestion, thepagenumber bythenumber corresponds intheYpma andlineation edition. 2)See,Anonymi, Artium Lectura inlibrum deanima a quodam discí(c. 1245-1250), Magistři Roma. Naz. V. E. ed. R. A. Gauthier 1985), (Ms. 828), (Grottaferrata [Romae], puloreportata 21*.SeealsoR.A.Gauthier, 'Lecours surXethica nova èsarts editor's d'unmaître introduction, duMoyen deParis Archives d'histoire doctrinale etlittéraire (1235-1240)', Age42 (1975),83-92. 3)Thelistofworks ofMoerbeke isgiven inGuillaume deMoerbeke. Recueil translated byWilliam d'études à l'occasion du700eanniversaire desamort andW.Vanhamel (Leu(1286),ed.J.Brams 403-404. ven,1989), 4)SeeVivian - A Question onDispositions inFundamental andSimplicius Boland, 'Aquinas Moral New 82 467-478. (2001), Theory', Blackfriars 5)SeeJames's inQuod.II,3,p.33-50.SeeRichard discussion On Sorabji, preface, Simplicius, Aristotle 7-8,xiv. Categories 6)Foran overview oftheinfluence ofSimplicius's onAristotle's on commentary Categories

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A. CôtéI Vivarium 47 (2009)24-53

notionofidoneitas Viterbo,as it is he who provides Jameswiththeimportant thatis at thecenterofJames'snoetics,his theoryof volitionand his natural philosophy. In thispaperI examinethewayin whichJamespicksup and expandsupon in orderto developan original, ideas culledfromSimpliciusscommentary doctrine of ) that propensities(idoneitates thoughultimatelyproblematic, strives to avoidwhatareinJamessviewthepitfalls ofbothPlatonismwithits of actualizedideas,and Aristotelianism beliefin the pre-existence withits insistence on thepassivity ofthehumansoul. The outcomeshouldbe a better of Jamesof Viterbos unique formof innatism,and a better understanding of thesometimesunexpected docwaysin whichphilosophical appreciation trinesinfluence eachother. I startout by presenting s discussionof Aristotle's doctrineof Simplicius of Categories , chapter8. I thenexamineJames's qualityin his commentary in what are probably of of doctrine applications Simpliciuss propensities of Viterbo's most James important philosophicalquodlibetalquestions,viz., with ofthewill'smotion,quodlibetI, 12, which deals the cause quodlibetI, 7, whichdeals with the distinctionbetweenactiveand passiveintellectand quodlibetII, 5, devotedto thediscussionofseminalreasons. Simpliciuson Powersand Propensities In chapter8 of the Categories Aristotledefinesquality,ratherunhelpfully, as "thatby whichmen are qualified,"notingthatit is "one of the things whichare spokenof in severalways."7Thereare in factfourmainkindsor The firstspeciescomprisesstates "species"of qualityaccordingto Aristotle. "noteasily Hexeisarestablecharacteristics, {hexeis)and conditions{diatheseis). are and the moral diatheseis such as virtues; knowledge passing dislodged" to somesuchas healthand illness.Thesecondsortofqualityrefers conditions thing"in virtueof whichwe say thatsomeonehas the makingsof a good tohisedition ofWilliam ofMoerbekes translation: seeA.Pattin s introduction theScholastics deMoerbeke d'Aristote. Traduction deGuillaume Commentaire surlesCatégories , ed. Simplicius, ofThemistius s (andPhiloponos's) examination A.Pattin Paris, 1971).Fora detailed (Louvain, inJames Intellect ofViterbo onJames, seeE. P.Mahoney, 'Themistius andtheAgent influence of Brabant and andOther Thirteenth Thomas, (Saint Bate)', Henry Century Philosophers Siger ofMoerbekes translafortheimportance ofWilliam 23(1973),422-467. Finally, Augustiniana deMoerbeke. inthedevelopment oflater medieval seeGuillaume tions thought 7) Categories , 8b25-26.

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boxerora goodrunner." Aristotle callsthisa naturalpower(dunamin phusikēn) as opposedto a poweror capacitythatresultsfromconditioning or training. The thirdsortof qualityare "affective thatis, qualqualitiesand affections," in our senses."Examplesare tastesand colors, itiesthat"cause affections heat and coldness.Finally,the fourthspeciesare the figuresand shapesof objects. Aristotelian Commentators werepuzzledbythislist.8If thefourclassesof are must not quality species, they fallundera commongenusor sharea commonfeature? such a commonfeature, is difficult fora reason however, Finding statedby IamblichuswhomSimpliciusquotesapprovingly, namelythatwe "areseekinga commonfeaturein somethingthatis "enmattered and has another we are "drawn to the in determinate characteristics parts;"or,put way, which the common featureinheres"(and drawnaway fromthe forms).9 Becausequalitiesarequalities-of-particulars somephilosophers wentso faras to denythatqualitiesexistoutsideofparticulars.10 Butfora Neoplatonist such - and Iamblichus - forwhomtheexistence as Simplicius ofcommonfeatures at one levelof realitymustbe explainedin termsof priorentitiesfoundat a thesuggestion thatqualitiesshouldbe reducibleto mathigherlevelofreality, teris senseless.11 cannot exist and compounds," Qualities onlyas "particulars also "havepriorexistence as an effective Thisis in fact theymust priorcause."12 is entitled"Concernwhy,accordingto Simplicius, chapter8 oftheCategories to the"incomposite ingthequalifiedand quality:"The term"quality"refers form"or characteristic, whereas"thequalified"is a reference to what"partakes"oftheform.13 to distinguish twolevelsin orderto providean Yet,althoughit is necessary account of adequatemetaphysical quality,qualityproperly speaking,thatis, thatto whichwe referwhenwe say,e.g., thatSocratesis wiseor thatPeter

8)OnNeoplatonic commentaries ontheCategories andthe ,seeS. Strange, 'Plotinus, Porphyry ofthe'Categories',' inAufitieg undNiedergang derrömischen Welt , Neoplatonic interpretation ed.W.HaaseandH.Temporini, II. 36.2 (1987),955-974. 9)Simplicius, ed.Pattin I shall besupplying (seen.6),221,24.Inthefollowing Commentary, inparentheses theGreek to Kalbfleisch's edition inAristotelis [=K]{Simplicii original according commentarium ofMoer, ed.C. Kalbfleish, [Berolini, 1907]),followed categorias byWilliam inPattin's beke's Latin edition [=P]. 10)Antisthenes, K 208,28-31/ P 286,00-02;216,12-14/ P 296,91-3. n) SeeK 218,11-13; P 298,64-299, 1. 12)K 216,28;P 297,7. ,3)K 207,29;P 285,64-5.

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Anditis to qualwouldmakea good boxer,is thecharacter qua enmattered.14 thatSimpliciusturnsmostofhisattention. itythusunderstood To discussqualitiesin thissecondsenseSimpliciususes theNeoplatonic of Simpliconceptof logoswhichBarrieFleet,in thenotesto his translation their forms receive which as "theprinciple hasdescribed ciuss commentary, by in matteras qualities."15 Qualitiesare definedas "logoithatgive expression withthematterofeachqualifiedthing co-exist formto thequalified."16 They existence. theirsubstantial butwithoutforsaking Theyare, perse, immaterial distinctfromtheincompositeform.Thus,to use Simpliciussown however, example,the logosof whitenessis not the PlatonicForm(of whiteness)but This leads to the following somethingexistingwithinthe qualifiedthing.17 definition: and after theform second asthat which isnamed a quality supervenes Properly speaking incomposite and assomething substance inthepre-existing natures, co-exists implanted oneandthe assomething ofsuchanaccount hasthepresence that participates everything sameinherent.18 of thereception ofqualityas involving Thisgeneralmetaphysical explanation the Formin the matterappliesto all speciesof quality,includingnatural thesecondspeciesofquality,as we shallnowsee. capacity, to a naturalcapacityas a pros lead,Simpliciusrefers FollowingPorphyry as idoneitasPHe translates of Moerbeke William which ), pensity(iepitedeiotēs ,4)K218,29-31;P 299,85-7. 15)B. Fleet, OnAristotle 7-8(London, inSimplicius, 2002),171,n. 234.On the Categories IambliontheSoulinLater AStudy TheChanging seeC. Steel, notion oflogos Neoplatonism: Self. in connection the 126. Steel discusses Priscianus and Damascius 1978), chus, (Brussels, concept to Simplicius beenascribed on theDe animathathastraditionally withthecommentary setoutina 1972article for reasons toPriscianus attribute andF.Bossier Steel butwhich ('Prisciavoor 34(1972), vanpseudo ende"indeAnima" nusLydus (?)- Simplicius, Fibsofie Tijdschrifi of(?) "lhePsychology seeH.J.Blumenthal, ofthearguments, Fora short 761-822. presentation Late in the Stucture in Soul and anima the De on , NeoplaofBeing Commentary Simplicius' andA.C. Lloyd ed.H.J.Blumenthal Proclus andSimplicius, 1982), tonism. (Liverpool, Syrianus, ona coninformation itprovides because here tothecommentary 73-5.I refer helpful simply roleinNeoplatonism. animportant that oflogos , that plays cept, ,6)K 218,9; P 298,62-3. 17)K 218,29;P 299,84-5. 18)K 222,11-14; P 303,14-17. 19)SeePorphyry, etresponsionem ,ed.Abusse InAristotelis perinterrogationem Categorias expositio Howis for translation Another 19-23. 129, "suitability". 1887), (Berolini, epitedeiotēs possible more arerather forSimpliciuss istobepreferred, choice of"propensity" Fleets ever, epitedeioteis

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considers twosuchpropensities: ingeneral(haplõs)orpropensities propensities "in termsof a certainprogress tina; secundum exordium (kataprokopën quodwhichthepropensity is alreadyevidentand at hand(forexamdarn)through It is this ple, in the personwho is said to have an aptitudeforboxing)."20 secondsortofpropensity Aristotle has in mindwhenhe refers to "thatin virtueofwhichwe saysomeonehasthemakingsofa boxeror a runner." Accordsuchpropensities to something thatis "less,"so ingto Simplicius, correspond to speak,thanthefullyacquiredskillwhenitexistsin its"fullrealization" (i.e. in theformof a habitor an act), but "more"thanthepurepotency"thatis forit is already, as it were,on theway. presentin moreor lesseverything,"21 Thus Hippolytus,Simpliciustellsus, was naturallytemperateby virtueof his having"manyadvantages" and "naturalpredisposi( pollapleonektēmata) - as opposedto having tions"(aphormas tēs apo phuseõs)towardtemperance somegeneralcapacitytowardtemperance thatis presumably sharedbymost humans. Simpliciusrecountsthat therewas some debate amongstthe Ancients the numberof cases in whichone mustposit propensities kata regarding tina. The for admitted such in Stoics, instance, prokopēn propensities only the case of thevirtues, whileallowingonlythemoregeneralkind(haplös)in the case of thearts.Accordingto Simplicius,it is necessary to positthemin "all thingsthatreachcompletionin anywayat all,"thatis, in all thingsthatgo froma stateof imperfection to relativeperfection.22 His reasonforholding thisbeliefseemsto be theassumption thatthepassagefromone extremity or stateto anotheris impossible withoutsomething to connectbothextremities or states.Propensities aretakento constitute such a connection.Theyare just described as "bridging thegap"betweenthetwoextremities,23 they something are takento do by producingin thequalifiedthinga "predisposition and a on thewayto fulfillment." starting-point This starting-point is describedby Simpliciusin a varietyof ways,as "an advancepaymentfromthe actualization," a "previouswarmingof thewick 24 beforetheheatoftheflame," butmostimportantly of perhapsas "a foretaste active thantheword Forthesakeofclarity andunity ofexposition wewill suitability suggests. alsouse"propensity" totranslate theterm idoneitas asusedbyJames ofViterbo. 20)K 242,8-10;P 332,22-24;K 244,25-27;P 335,12-15. 21)Quoting from Fleets OnAristotle, 7-8, 104. translation, Categories 22)K 248,25-26;P 340,71-73.SeealsoK 249,13-16; P 341,95-8. 23)K 248,29;P 341,75-6."Bridging thegap"isB. Fleets clever translation forsunagõgos oun esti tõnakrõn. 24)K 248,33;P 341,79.

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theform"(proemphasis eidous s conception ; praeimpressio ).25Simplicius speciei ofpropensities is thusanchoredin hismetaphysics ofparticipation. Propensitiesrepresent "a partialparticipation ; mediocris ( metriametousia ) participatio in theformdividedoffproportionately, notpresentin itsentirety."26 Giventhatpropensities areto be positedin thingsthatmovefromincomto it is thattheymustbe found, pletion completion, in thelowerhypostases thatis,at thelevelofSoul and Nature,butmostobviouslyso in Nature.Thus, ofintellection as a turning ofthe appealingto theNeoplatonicunderstanding soul towardthe Forms,Simpliciusexplainsthatthe intellect(in the soul) ) in orderto be broughtto comrequiresa naturalcapacity(
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idoneitates/ , then,are capacitieswhichwe must Epitedeioteis/ propensities in to exist all that move fromimperfection to perfection. They suppose beings are a half-way statebetweenthe generalpropensity and the corresponding habitor actand,and aredescribedbySimpliciusas a sortofpre-possession of theformofwhichtheyarean imperfect participation. ForJamesof Viterbosuch a doctrinewas to offertwo important advanwithan Augustinián undertages.Firstof all, it had moreobviousaffinities in of the sense that it a more active role on the standing cognition, implied in soul'spartthandidAristotle's as the De anima. Secpsychology expounded the doctrine was an Aristotelian commentator and could ondly, developedby to a certainextentat least,be passedoffas Aristotelian in inspiratherefore, tion.Thisis an important of Viterbo makes no James mystery point:Although ofhispreference fortheviewsofAugustine,30 Boethiusand Anselm,thefact is thatAristotelian and conceptsstillheldswayin philosophical terminology in theUniversity discussions ofParisin the 1290s; itwas therefore important formasters, and indeedexpectedofthem,to showthattheirdoctrines, whatevertheymightbe, did not conflictwithfundamental Aristotelian axioms afterall.31

Jamesof Viterboon Propensitiesand Aptitudes 32 a) TheWilland itsAptitudes Jamesdevotesone of hislongestand mostoriginaldisputedquestionsto the problemofthewilland thecauseofitsmotion,one ofthemostcontroversial 33As is wellknown,the of the 1277 condemnation. topicsin theaftermath 30)Ontheimportance ofAugustine intheworks ofJames, seeE.Ypma, "introduction", Disputano de . xxii. ., prima quolibet. 31)SeeM.Phelps, 'TheTheory ofSeminal inJames Reasons ofViterbo', 30(1980), Augustiniana andtheAgent 271andMahoney Intellect', ('Themistius 451)onthis point. 32)James ofViterbo s doctrine ofthewillhasbeenstudied ingreat detail (see'La byF.Ruello liberté humaine selon de 24[1974], whoalsoexamines 283-347), JacquesViterbe', Augustiniana doctrine ofpropensity. henotes onAnselm, Ruello does James's James's Although dependence notexplore thedoctrinal relations between andSimplicius. James 33)SeeR.Macken, 'Heinrich vonGentimGespräch mitseinen über diemenschZeitgenossen liche Franziskanische Studien onthesubject isvast. Dom 59(1977),154.Theliterature Freiheit', OdónLottin's et morale aux XIIe XIIIe et 1 t. 225siècles, (Louvain-Gembloux, 1942), Psychologie {The 389,isstillinvaluable. Wippel Metaphysical Thought ofGodfrey ofFontaines, [Washington, offers a brief overview ofthedoctrinal context inthelatethirteenth 1981],184-202) century

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whobelievedthewillwastheprincipalcausal controversy pitted"voluntarists" in the of volitions factor who assigned production against"intellectualists" thatroleto theintellect.It is customary to citeHenryofGhentas an example ofthefirst ofthesecond. groupand ThomasAquinasas a chiefrepresentative in Thedifferences betweenbothschoolstendto becomemoremarkedstarting thelate 1280s.ThusGodfrey of Fontainesespousesa formofintellectualism that thatis morerigidthanthatofAquinasand Jamesa formofvoluntarism is arguablymoreextremethanHenrys.In quodlibetI, 7, Jamesarguesthat thewill itselfis theprincipalnaturalcause of itsown volitions,whereasthe onlyin objectof volitionas apprehendedthroughthe intellectis necessary thewillto act. orderto stimulate Jamesis, of course,wellawareof themanyobjectionsthatcan be leveled The mostobviousobjectionis that againstthethesisthatthewillmovesitself. axiomsof Aristotle's it runscounterto one of thefundamental physicsand is that that is moved moved by the metaphysics, proposition "everything both of such as heavy thisaxiomappearsto be true another";34 simplebeings, and lightbodies whichare moved by another,and of animals,including humans,who are moversfromone pointof viewand movedfromanother 35 pointofview. entailsthatitis inpotency is movedbyitself tosaythatsomething Similarly, the and in actualityat the same time,whichis impossible.More generally, shows that some active and s between distinction passivepotency Philosopher one thingcannotmoveand be movedat thesametime.Activepotencyis the

with tothisdebate andhisdisagreement ofGodfreys contribution examination anda detailed inchapter Bonnie ofViterbo 3 ofVirtues Kent, (197andpassim). James Finally, oftheWill inthethirteenth withofvoluntarism aninteresting account 1995)offers century (Washington, ofViterbo. outhowever James discussing 34)Aristote, ,VII,1,24lb24. Physics 35)SeeJames can ofthethesis that discussion ofViterbo, Quod.IV,4,fora detailed something inthecase that theprinciple wastrue wanted toargue Whereas somephilosophers move itself. doesnoteven believes theprinciple notinthecaseofhuman ofnatural actions, motion, James one Fora fall of bodies the free of natural to certain motion, heavy being example. types apply seeR.Teske, oftheprinciple, on therejection, recent discussion 'Henry by "Augustinians", "Omne movetur inProceedings abaliomovetur' ofthePrinciple: ofGhent's from quod Rejection on the Occasion theInternational Anniversary ofhisDeath(1293),ed. ofthe700th Colloquium ofthisposition, ofFontaines' forGodfrey W.Vanhamel 1996),279-308; (Leuven, upholding andtheAct-Potency ofFontaines seeJ.F.Wippel's Axiom', Journal oftheHistory 'Godfrey 11(1973),299-317, aswellas TheMetaphysical ofFontaines, Thought ofGodfrey ofPhilosophy 184-202.

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powerto moveranotherqua other;passivepotencyis thepowerto be moved byanotherqua other. Jamesanswersthesetworelatedobjectionsbycleverly placinghissolution in the assertion theDe anima that ofAristotle, undertheauthority quoting claimsis equiva"thesoul is in a certainwayeverything" whichhe promptly that"everything is in a certainwayin thesoul." The lentto theproposition is "in"thesoul?After questionis: whatdoes it meansto saythatsomething in which can be said to be "in another", four different ways things discussing in that are the soul is in virtue comes to the conclusion the James waythings of a certainconformity : everything is containedin thesoul byvirtueof some ofall thingsin thesoul (withthingsoutsidethesoul). conformity thislaststatement thesoul Now, accordingto one wayof understanding wouldbe a purelypassivepower;itsconformity wouldliein itsindeterminacy, - and thisis arguablywhatAristotle its abilityto receiveall and any forms meantby theexpression "intellectthatis everything." ButJamesthinksthis willnot do. Althoughhe grantsthatthesoul is partlypassive,he disagrees withtheviewhe attributes to theStoics,thatthesoul could be characterized exclusively byitscapacityto be actedupon byexternalagents.He liststhree reasonsforthis.The first reasontakesas itsmajorpremisetheproposition that all vitaloperationsproceedfrominternalactiveprinciples, forwhichJames arguesas follows:whereasinanimatebeingshaveonlya passiveprincipleof motion,animateoneshavebothpassiveand activeprinciples. Now,thereare certainmotionsthatarecommonto bothanimateand inanimatebeingsbut such which,in thecaseofanimatebeings,proceedfroman internal principle; aregeneration, alteration and locomotion;a fortiori , motionsthatareproper to livingbeingsmustalsoproceedfroman internal, A second activeprinciple. reasonis thatactionsmustbe proportioned to theactivepowersfromwhich theyderive,"sothattheydo notexceedtheactivepower."A vitalaction- such as are intellective and volitionalacts- musttherefore proceedfroma vital activeprinciplethatis proportionate to theactionsthatstemfromit,in other or volitionalprinciple:"It followsthatthe soul words,froman intellective mustbe relatedto suchactionsin a waythatis notpurelypassive,but in an activeway;indeed,theyproceedfromthesoul morethantheydo fromthe objects."36 Accordingto thethirdreason,therearetwokindsofactions,transientand immanent actions.37 Transient actionsresultfromtheactionofone 36)Quod.I, 12,p. 166:308-9. 37)Or between absolute actions andactiohabens sibioppositam Thedistinction is passionem. attributed toSimplicius 407,35-408, (Pattin 38).SeeQuod.Ill,4,p. 56:23-p.57:27);also Quod.111,4, p.63:197-201.

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actionsremainin thesubjectwhichtheyperfect; beingon another;immanent - thesoul- morethantheydo on it followsthattheydependon thesubject to showthatthesoulcannotbe theobjects.Jamestakesthesethreearguments it must be so. whollypassive,though partially The souls "potentialconfortherefore somehow be construedas a partiallyactive to must mity" things He describes activestatean incomplete state.Jamescallsthispartially actuality. it thus: anda tothings] is an inchoation (inchoatio ), a beginning {exordium) [Thisconformity For this reason we can call itan with to the act. ) ( preparation praeparatio respect ensuing act.Sucha tothecompleted ora propensity (idoneitas ) withrespect aptitude (aptitudo), andtherefore tothesoulandnaturally inserted isconnatural {naturaliter indita), propensity init;(butitremains) sometimes sometimes alsoalways remains by imperfectly, perfected ofquality, forasSimplicius tobelong tothesecond theact.Thispower seems says species thepower which tothis hasmany intheCategories ,astheword pertains potency meanings, interms sense butconsidered isa natural notintheabsolute ofquality propensity, species ina thiskindofpower toallthatisperfected Ashesays, ofa certain belongs progress. to the from what is For does not certain absolutely imperfect perway. something proceed thatislacking to thataddssomething thepresence ofsomemiddle without fect, power ashesays, a from whatismost reach (.. .) Thus, perfect. completion perfection, deriving ofthiskind(potentia (idoneitas ) anda begin) isanaptitude (aptitudo ), a propensity power withrespect tothesciences andthevirtues. ofmansfuture (exordium) completion ning which aresaidtobeinus,that andvirtues aretheseeds ofthesciences These is,those prothe virtues.38 have with to the sciences and which we and respect aptitudes pensities is thusconstituted The souls conformity James by Simplicianpropensities. from cannot move the fact that to them his by something appeal justifies as we of a "middle the to act without However, power".39 presence potency willnowsee,he developstheconcept. Thus,in thenextsectionofhisdiscussionin quodlibetI, 7, he tellsus that followsthatof the theaptitudesarenumerousand diverse,and thisdiversity eorumquibus materiam et diversitatem the soul conforms to which (iuxta things .40Aptitudesfallintotwoclasses:general(generales animanataestconformavi) ) and special {speciales)ones.41The most generalones are the sense faculty, 38)Quod.I,7,p.92:418-438; seeQuod.II,5,p.71:414-425; 525-531. p.74:521-524; 39)Thisissimilar nisipermedium" nonpervenitur adextremum "deextremo totheprinciple inAquinas that wefind , I,q. 55,a. 2,ad2. in,e.g.,Summa theologiae 40)Quod.I,7,p.93:442-4. 41 } Albert ofan unidentified theposition to characterize theGreat usessimilar vocabulary ofall innate intellect theviewthattheagent whodefended Arts Master possesses knowledge

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theintellect and thewill.But each generalaptitudeis thendividedintofurtherspecialpropensities. The specialpropensities of thesensefaculty arethe different external and internalsenses.And in turn,each (external sense)containsfurther thatcorrespond to thedifferentiae ofsensible specialpropensities A similar breakdown in the case of the intellect and the objects.42 applies will:The intellective is a with power generalpropensity respectto all intelligiblesupon whichare foundedfurther specialpropensities corresponding to thediversity ofall {omnia)intelligibles.43 {secundum) Likewise,thewillcan be considered as a generalpropensity on whichspecialidoneitates arefounded that"are as numerousand diverseas are diversethe notionsof desirable things."44 As theaboveshows,Jamesclearlyholdsthatthereis a verystrictcorrespondence betweenpropensities and theirobjects;indeed,in quodlibetI, 13, he explainsthatthelogicalorderwhichobtainsbetweenthedifferent propensitiescorrespondsto the orderthatobtainsbetweenobjectivefeaturesof theworld.For instance,the intellectmovesitselfto the knowledgeof substancebefore thatof accident.45 This priority of substanceoveraccidentin the intellectcorresponds to the actualorderthatobtainsin the "entitative order"betweensubstanceand accident.46 However,Jamesstopsshortof tellus how close the between and extra-mental ing correspondence propensities realityis; the answerto thatquestion,he tellsus, cannotbe knownin the presentlife: Howfarthedivision ofspecial ineachpower; what sort of,andhow propensities proceeds a in the a (corresponding) division ofaptitudes inthepower, greatdiversity object requires that isknown with thesoulwith itspropensities. Butwecancertainty byHewhocreates notknow these andperfectly inthepresent life.47 things naturally

universais sespecialitātes etgeneralitates omnium rerum. . ("habebit Thispassage is penes anddiscussed R. A. 'Le cours sur Xethica nova Gauthier, 90. , quoted by 42)Quod.I,7,p.93:450-2.Itisunclear here what means OnepossibilJames by"differentiae." thateachsensecontains ofallthedifferentiae ofitsproper ityis thathethinks propensities thesense ofsight would contain Thus, ofallthepossible thesense of object. colors, propensities smell allpossible etc. smells, 43)Quod.I, 7,p. 93:455-6.SeeP.FidelCasados'El 165(1953),137fora pensamiento...', onthispassage. commentary 44)Quod.I,7,p.94:501-2. 45)Quod.I, 13,p. 189:212-215. 46)Quod.I, 13,p. 189:218-20. 47)Quod.I,7,p.93:458-63.

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Whatemergesclearlyfromtheforegoing is thefactthatforJamesofViterbo, are not and propensities merely verygeneral indeterminate capacitiesor abilities:specialpropensities correspondto individualdesirablesand individual and specialsensepropensities intelligibles, correspondto individualsenseThis sets them from the"naturalinclinations" or objects. quitedistinctly apart of the virtues" that were scholas"inchoations commonlyacceptedbymany tics.48 , assertsthattheintellectconAquinas,forinstance,in theDe ventate - suchas thefact tainsseedsofthesciencesin theformofaxioms(dignitates) - suchas the thatthewholeis greater thanthepart- or incomplexconcepts he holds thatthereexistsin thewill a conceptof beingor one;49similarly, naturalactiveprinciplewherebythewill is inclinedto its ultimateend and whichcan be consideredas an inchoationof thevirtues.AlthoughThomas doessaythatsuchprinciples in us,and thatallsubsequent "preexist" principles are"included"in them,he clearlydoes notthinkofthemas "forms", sayspein thesoul. Indeed,in his cificor genericforms,present, albeitinchoatively, on theDe animaand in othertextshe explicitly commentary rejectstheview thattheagentintellectcould be a "habitusprincipiorum".50 The reasonfor thisofcourseis thatThomasthinksthatthisinformation neednotbe present in thesoul becauseit is suppliedbyexperience. inchoatively a lot Yet,althoughit is clearthatJamessidoneitates represent something morespecificthanthesortsof thingsAquinashas in mindwhenhe talksof are not naturalinclinations, Jamesalso makesit veryclearthatpropensities " or are actualities:" volitions, fiill-fledged intelligibles sensibles;they incomplete withrespectto thereceptive theyareactualities capacityofthesoul,butthey areincomplete insofar as theyrequiresomething additionalto turntheminto or actualvolitions, as the case sensations, maybe. ThisiswhyJames cognitions assertsthattheaptitudeand thevolitionalor cognitiveoperationintowhich it unfoldsbelongto twodifferent We willsee further on speciesof quality.51 48)SeeB.Nardi, 'Ladottrina inStudi difilosofia medidiAlberto suli'inchoatio formae', Magno - Aptitudonaturalis', Bulevale aswellasH. Merle, natum esse , Rome, 1979),69-101, 'Aptum Medii Aivi53(1981-1 letin duCange: Archivům Latinitatis 982), 122-139. 49)De ver itate, omnia 45,1(Rome, 1972), q. 11,a. 1,co.,inSanciiThomae Opera Aquinatis inDe virtutibus, texts a. 8. co. Fora discussion see 1, 350b,258- 351a,279.Seesimilar q. in nachThomas vonAquin', H. Seidel, 'ÜberdieErkenntnis erster, Prinzipien allgemeiner NewYork, Thomas von Werk undWirkung, ed.A.Zimmermann (Berlin, 1988),103-16. Aquin. 50)Thomas Thomae Sentencia libri deanima, liber III,cap.IV,inSancii Aquinas, Opera Aquinatis fordiscussion omnia 45,1(Rome, Paris, 1984),219,24-42.Seetheeditors fontium apparatus andparallel texts. 51)Quod.I,7,p.94:483-92. for doctrine of GilesofRomecouldbea possible source Jamess

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thatthesepropensities mightin factbe more"complete"thanJamesis willing to recognize, but forthetimebeingit is important to stressthatJamesis at leastverysystematic aboutstatingthatpropensities arenotactualizedvolitions or cognitions.52 This suffices to distinguish brandof innaJamess particular tismfromthemoreextreme formespousedby,say,theAnonymous Masterof Artseditedby Gauthier,who wrotethat"theagentintellecthas intelligible speciespresentto itand actuallyjoinedto it."53 in thecaseofthewill, HavingexaminedwhatJamesmeansbypropensities it remainsto be seenwhythefactthatthesoul has thesepropensities entails thatit shouldbe able to moveitself.One ofJames'sstrategies in arguingfor thisconclusionis to tie in his doctrineof propensities withsaintAnselms of the will as in the De concordia .54 The will,Anselm theory expounded can be in considered three It can first be consideredas an explained, ways. instrument , thatis, as a faculty {instrumentum) capableof beingdeployedin certainways;it can also be considered fromthepointofviewofitsparticular whichAnselmcallsitsaffec), thatis,itsactualabilities, aptitudes(,aptitudines - ; of which there are two the commodi and theaffectio tions, affectio justitiae we can thinkof the will insofaras it is actuallybeingused. James finally, actualities". SeeFriedemans in'Het'intellectus discussion noster estpotentia "incomplete pura ingenere vanAverroës ende'ratio indezelfkennis intelligibilium' intelligendi' volgens Aegidius 8 (1958),85-86. Romanus', Augustiniana 52)Another clear indication ofthisisoffered discussion ofthenotion ofintelligible byJames's between twostages ofthespecies: theaptitude oridoneity thatis James species. distinguishes innate andtheoperation which itwhich the"excitation" ofthesenses. SeeQuod.I, perfects require 187:148. 13,p. 186:120-p. 53)SeeLectura inLibrum Deanima , 473,395-6. 54)SeeDe concordia etpraedestinationis etgratiae deicumlibero III [11], arbitrio praescientiae inS.Anselmi ed.F.S. Schmitt, Cantuariensis Omnia 2 (Edinburgh, 1946), archiepiscopi Opera isbynomeans theonly 278-84. toenlist thehelpoftheDeconcordia insupJames Augustinián ofthesoul's self-motion. Hehadbeenpreceded ofGhent. SeeQuod.XII,q. 26, port byHenry ed.J.Decorte, inHenrici deGandavo Omnia 16 1 44: use 94-95.Henrys (Leuven, 1987), Opera ofAnselms Deconcordia ofMurro inhisDisputed iscritized utrum byJohn question "quaeritur obiectum voluntatis moveat adactum volendi ed.E. Longpré, inMélanges finem", ipsam Auguste Pelzer SeeMacken, 'Heinrich vonGentimGespräch', 488-492. 171-2. (Louvain, 1947), James alsoreads hisdoctrine ofidoneitates intoBoethius. SeeQuod.I, 12,p. 173:540-1. use James's ofBoethius asa source ofphilosophical isreminiscent ofthat oftheEnglish Domininspiration icanNicholas Trevet whowillwrite a commentary onBoethius s Consolation circa1300,though Nicholas israther lesssympathetic than istoBoethius s radical Platonism. SeeL.Nauta, James's "TheScholastic Context oftheBoethius Nicholas in Boethius inthe Trevet', Commentary by Middle Latin andVernacular Tradition ed.M.F.M.Hoenen Ages. ofthe'Consolatio Philosophiae' andL.Nauta(Leiden/New York/Cologne, Brill, 1997),41-67, esp.49-58.

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is reallythesamethingas announcesthatwhathe callsa generalpropensity towhatAnselm thespecialpropensities Anselmssoul-instrument; correspond callsthewills aptitudes,and whatAnselmcallsthewills use is simplywhat becomeclearer Jamescalls the act of willing. The benefitsof thisstrategy thatit is thewill whenwe readlaterin thesamechapterof theDe concordia which is just that moves {movei)all otherinstruments;55 qua instrument movesitself. anotherwayofsayingthatthewillqua instrument in of the self-motion is basedon a favor souls s substantive James argument betweentwo sortsof motion.One sortof motionis thatwhich distinction cause- heating, ofthecompleteformin theefficient followsfromthepresence causedbythepresenceoftheformofheatin the forinstance,is a movement sort ofmotionis thatwhichfollowsfroma causethat the other heatingbody;56 in an the form only incompleteway,such as downwardmotion, possesses in an incomplete whichfollowsfromthepresence, way,oftheformofgravity thissecondkindofmotionis the in theheavybody.Now,whatcharacterizes inclinatur ad suicompie tendstoitsfulfillment factthatitnaturally (naturaliter with the first This contrasts if it. attain it and would , meritum) nothingimpedes to guartypeofmotionwherethepresenceofthecompleteformis sufficient which of motion is the one The first ofitsfulfillment. anteetheattainment type on another one substance it involves is involvedin transitive actions; acting The second in rebetweenmoverand thingmoved.57 a distinction and requires orabsolute;itis ab eodemin idem. Jamescallsthe typeofmotionis immanent, efficient motion first of motion;thesecondtypehe callsformalmotion. type Now bothtypesof motionplaya rolein theexplanationofhumanvolition: cause ofvolitionsin thesensethatit is He who endows God is theefficient but thesoul faculties and propensities;58 humanbeingswiththeappropriate In otherwords,the to actuality. itselfis theformalcauseofitsownmovement willis to itsownvolitionsas theheavybodyis to downwardmotion: itsaffectowilling itself howthewillmoves seefrom theforegoing Onecaneasily through butformally. notefficiently moves itself downward Theheavy tions. body through gravity, 53)Thisisa popular de See.A.Pattin, medieval L'anthropologie Augustinians. passage amongst Gérard d'Abbeville 1993),xix. (Leuven, 56)Quod.I,7,p.95:518-519. 57)SeeQuod.IV,4,p. 19:158-60. 58)Godistheefficient infuses thepropensities inthesense that heefficiently causeofvolitions is tovolition. Thepoint thesoulinitsself-motion thatheassists inthesoul,notinthesense andQuod.I,7, SeeQuod.I, 12,p. 176:649-50 totheintellect. with mademost clearly regard 23:260. aswellasQuod.I, 14,p. 195,92-94andQuod.IV,4,p.22:244-p. p.98:641-46,

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asgravity issomething with tobeing below orbeing moved downJust incomplete respect sothat, there is no the follows atoncefrom thegravity; ward, obstacle, provided perfection sotoothewillmoves itself towillsomething itsownaffections which areincomthrough with totheactofwilling, sothat theact(ofwilling) follows atoncefrom those plete respect unless it.59 affections, prevents something and Jamesappearsto taketheanalogybetweentheheavybody'sself-motion thesouls self-motion quiteliterally despitewhatwouldappearto be an importantdifference betweenthetwocases,namelythatwhatprevents a heavybody fromfallingis thepresenceofan obstacle,whereaswhatprevents thewillfrom into an actual volition is the absence of an of developing object willing.The twocasesaresimilaronlyinsofaras therelationoftheremovalofan impedimentto downwardmotionas thepresenceof an objectto thewillis one of "extrinsic thatis,theremovaloftheobstacledoesnotcontribdenomination," ute anything formalto the natureof the motion(i.e. its direction, velocity and necessarily fromthebody'sheaviness;in like etc.)whichfollowsnaturally fashion,itwouldseemthattheobjectwhosepresenceis requiredin orderfor an actualvolitionto ensuedoes notcontribute to thecontentofthe anything volitionalact,butrather theunfolding ofthesoul'spreexistmerelyfacilitates ingpropensity. That thisis indeedwhatJameshas in mind can be seen by readinghis detailedaccountof thecausalroleof theobjectand theintellectin theproductionof volitions.Jamesuses the distinction, familiarsince the timeof between the exercise and the oftheactofwillto answer Aquinas, specification 59)Quod.I,7,p.96:572-79. theterminology discussion here isindebted differs, James's Though toHenry ofGhent's inQuod.X,q. 9 (ed.R.Macken, isthere 230,62-77).Henry responding totheobjection that canbethecauseofitsownbeing if true (entitas ). Thisistrivially nothing onemeans that that innowayexists cannot causeitself tobe.Buta thing that exists something tosubstantial form canina certain according waybesaidtobethecauseofitsownentity means thatitcanmoveitself from to act. Thus its substantial form Henry potency through which itgets from Goda heavy hasthecapacity tomove andwillexercise that downward, body intheabsence ofanyobstacle orupontheremoval ofone:"Sicenimgenerans capacity grave movet admovendum ingravi, etgrave seipsum movet grave, quiaabilioestvirtus quiacontinet virtutem seaccepit" causethat 230,69-71).Itisthisgenerating {Ibid., quamad movendum ofViterbo callstheefficient cause ofmotion, andtheself-motion ofthething toits James owing theappropriate itsformal motion. Thesame ofgravity asanillustrapossessing capacity, analogy tionofthesoul's self-motion isusedbyHenry ofGhent in,e.g.,Quod.IX,q, 5 andQuod.X, ofBruges, ad inR.Macken, 'Heinrich , 4, 5m,quoted Quaestiones q. 9 asbyWalter disputatae q. vonGentimGespräch', fora commentary 153.SeeTeske onthephilosophical of significance this ofGhent's 291andpassim. 'Henry analogy, rejection',

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thisquestion.60 As regardstheexerciseof theact,he considersthatthewill movesitselfformally and is movedefficiently thespecificabyGod. As regards tionoftheact,thewillis movedbothbytheexternal objectand bythatsame in theintellect, but in bothcasesit is movedonlyin a objectas represented or a targetis a cause metaphorical way,thatis,in thewayin whicha terminus ofmotion.61 the will is also movedefficiently Finally, bytheobjectas grasped Thismightsoundsurprising in viewofJames s assertion that bytheintellect. it is God who movesefficiently but suppliescreatures withthe appropriate faculties orpowersto act,butthesortofefficient motionhe hasin mindwhen he saysthatthewillis movedefficiently different bytheobjectis an altogether sortofcausalityfromGod s efficient For to be in moved causality. something thissecondwayis forit to be movedin virtueof a "certainconnectionand excess."WhatJameshasin mindis thefollowing: Becausetheintellect and the willareseatedin thesamepowerand areconnectedwitheachother,whenthe intellectin the soul is actualizedan inclinationoccursin the soul which Thiskindof motionJamescallsmotion promptsthewillto actualizeitself.62 . The will is not necessitated {excitatione) by stimulation by thisstimulation; becauseoftheorderinstituted and thewill, rather, byGod betweentheintellect thewillcannotsetitself in motionwithout a priorexcitation fromtheintellect. It is important to be clearabout the implications ofJamessanswer.One reasonforresorting to thedistinction betweenthespecification and theexerciseoftheactofwillis to providea clearerpictureoftheinterplay ofwilland in theproduction intellect ofvolitions. The ideais thatthewilldependson the intellect forthespecification or determination oftheobjectbutis itselfsolely fortheexerciseof theact.The intellect responsible suppliestheinformation; thewill decidesor not to act on it. Unlikeotherauthorswho rejectedthe distinction on his use of thedisJameselectsto keepit; however, altogether, it is no longerclearin whatsenseone can saythattheintellect tinction, specifiesthewill,thatis,suppliesitwithanyinformation. Indeed,thewillis taken 60)Thomas usesitforthefirst timeinST Ia-IIae.SeeO. Lottin, etmorale..., I, Psychologie aswellasMacken, 'Heinrich vonGentimGespräch', 132. 254-256, 61)Quod.I,7,p. 103:816.Ontheobject asmoving seeGérard ofAbbeville, "metaphorically" et morale aux XIIe et XIIIe siècles Gem(Louvain, Quod.XIV,q. 4, ed.O. Lottin, Psychologie theobject ofknowledge moves was bloux, 1942),t.1,250,1.52.Theideathat "terminatively" ofcourse inthethirteenth notuncommon those who century, especially philosophers amongst favored a more active roleonthepartoftheintellect. itsbestknown was Arguably proponent Peter Olivi.SeeQuaestiones insecundum librum Sententiarum , ed.B.Jansen John (Quaracchi, vol.2,q. 72. 1926), 62)Quod.I,7,p. 104:849-54.

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. God causesthe withthehelpof itsown idoneitates as movingitselfformally the desired the volitionsefficiently objectand its by supplying idoneitates' oftheactof moveonlyinsofaras theyaretheterminus mentalrepresentative volition;the"fit"betweenthevolitionalact and theobjectis guaranteed by alone. divineinstitution Such, then,in a nutshellis James'ssolutionto the problemof thewill's It is similarin manywaysto whatone findsin otherauthors self-motion. For instance, schoolin thethirteenth to century. belonging the"voluntarist" in of the is to the soul formal James following footsteps causality bygranting is central Henryof Ghent.ButwhatsetshissolutionapartfromHenrys the The soul can onlymoveitselfbecauseit conplacehe assignsto propensities. ofitsvolitionaloperations.James tainstheseeds,in theshapeofpropensities, that as we haveseenis carefulto add thatthesoul cannotgo it aloneentirely, theobjectmustplaysomerolein thegenesisofthevolitionalact,butthefact remainsthatthesoul is stilla causein a verystrongsenseoftheword.Thatis issueintocompletedacts. whichnaturally becauseit containspropensities 63 and itsPropensities b) TheIntellect is notwhethertheintellect s mainquestionon theintellect The titleofJames dealsat lengthwiththatissueas well, can moveitself,thoughhe eventually but ratherwhetherthe agentintellectis partof the soul, in otherwords, betweenan agentintellect and a possible itis necessary to distinguish whether is of intellect withinthesoul.64One reasonforpositingsucha realdistinction to accountof intellection. courseThomas influential Thomas, According outsideofthesoul,the unlikethesenseswhoseproperobjectsexistin actuality intellectsobjects the intelligiblesexistonlyin potencyoutsidethesoul; to raisethemto thelevelofactuallyinteltheytherefore requiresomefaculty whose businessitis to makepotentialintelintroit the ligibles: Agentintellect, to followthe ButJames, who,as he putsit,prefers ligiblesactuallyintelligible. not believe thatinteland Boethius65 does of the Blessed opinions Augustine in at not the in outside the soul rate exist any objectsofthe potency ligibles in the intellect construed he sees no need for an senses.66 Consequently, agent 63)Fora general s theory ofcognition, seeL.Spruit, overview ofJames Species from intelligibilis: toknowledge 1994),238-240. (Leiden, perception 64)Thequestion ofViterbo wasa popular oneinthelastthird ofthethirteenth James century. the follows Gonzalvus ofSpaininarguing distinction. against 65)Quod.I, 12,p. 165:267-268. ^ Theintelligibles are areofcourse outside ofthesoulinGod,andalthough they present

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A. CôtéI Vivarium, 47 (2009)24-53

wayThomasdoes, thoughhe does not wantto dispensewithit altogether, once againbecausethedistinction is presentin Aristotle and his commentaIfJamescan make tors,and becauseJamesthinksit is at leastin partjustified. a plausiblecase fortheviewthatbothintellects arenotreallydistinct, whilst that that view does not conflict with the raison d'être Aristotles, showing very ofa realdistinction betweentheagentintellect and thepossibleintellect will collapse.Let us see howhe proceeds. Jamesis cleverly goingto presenthispositionas a sensible,moderatesolutionthateschewsthesymmetric and equallyuntenablepositionsofthosewho hold thatthesoul is exclusively activewithrespectto intellection and those who hold thatit is purelypassive.As we haveseenpreviously, Jamesbelieves thatwhilethesoul maybe partlypassive,it is also partlyactive.He is now withinthesoulthatis bothactive goingto showthatitis theverysamefaculty and passive.Now,althoughthissoundsas ifJamesis onceagaingoingtovoice hisdisagreement withAristotles axiom,he in factcontendsthat act-potency his thesisis notcontrary to Aristotles forthesoul is notactiveand passiveat thesame time.Now it is important to note,in orderto understand Jamess position,thatwhenhe saysthatthesoul is passive,he does notmeanto suggestthatit undergoesany changeas a resultof some externalactionbeing exercised on it;passive,forJames,refers to thesoul'scapacityto be actualized. Likewise,in talkingaboutan "agent"intellect, Jamesdoes notmeanthatthe intellect actson anything outsideofitself;whathe is referring to ratheris the soul'sabilityto setitselfin motion.His contention, is that it is thevery then, sameintellectthatis bothin potencyand in act,thoughdiversimode , which times."67 The questionis,whatkindofa power turnsout to mean"atdifferent mustthesoul be in orderforit to be in potencyand in actat different times? answers: James Foritisa sort ofincomplete tothesecond ofquality, that is,a actuality species belonging interms andpreparation toward the natural considered ofa beginning {exordium) power, anaptitude future act.Thusitcanbetermed anda natural (idoneitas ) {aptitude) propensity isinpotency toanincomplete act toward thecomplete act.Nowthatwhich according Thus moves itself exse)tothecomplete butformally. act,notefficiently (movetur perhaps, with tothesamething notinthe itispassive andactive {secundum idem), regard though a transient action nora transient same andisneither modo) passion.68 way{eodem arenecessary inorder totrigger theprocess contained evenpotentially bysensibles, phantasms willultimately intheintellects actualization. SeeQuod.I, 12,p. 177:680-685. that result 67)Quod.I, 12,p. 167:355-357. 68)Quod.I, 12,p. 167:330-338.

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of But it is a property The powerthatfitsthebill is an incompleteactuality. once to actuality. suchan incompleteactualitythatit can moveitself James thatwe sawabove us to thesamepassageofAnselms De concordia againrefers to justify thisstepin his argument, claimingthatAnselmsassertionthatthe As in thecase willmovesitselfappliesto theintellect and thesensesas well.69 And as in of thewill,thesortof causationthattheintellectusesis formal.70 to theeffithecaseofthewill,theformalcausalityofthewillis subordinated cientcausationof God, in thesensethatit is God who putsthepropensities in thesoul. is nota purelyinternalaffair, i.e., internalto thesoul. however, Thinking, Jamesdeniesthatknowledgecan occurwithoutexternalthings(res)playing anycausalrole.Thingscan be consideredto movetheintellectin twoways: first theintellect thesensitive byexciting powers,and second,insofar through Letus briefly as theyaretheterminus ofknowledge. discussthesetwopoints. the intellect moves "nevertheless it is also moved itself, formally Although an the means of a stimulation or inclination."71 Now for by phantasmsby to movebystimulation or inclination twoconditionsarerequired: something must a) it mustbe conjoinedto thatwhichit movesand b) itsactualization havea relationofconformity, thatis,a relationofresemblance, withtheactuis naturally But theimagination unitedwithand alityof themovedthing.72 relatedto the intellect.Moreover,when the imaginationis in act, in other - say the image'dog'- thereis a wordswhensomethingis beingimagined relationof conformity betweenthatimage and the concept'dog towards whichtheintellect is naturally suitedto moveitself.73 Thatis howone can say thattheintellect is stimulated and inclinedto moveitselfto theactualcognithattheoperation tionof 'dog'.Jamescautionsus,however, againstthinking ofstimulation to the involvestheintellect a phantasmthat conferringpower wouldmakeit receivable bytheintellect.74 69)Quod.I, 12,p. 167:344-6.Forthereference toAnselm, seen.54above. 70)James that thesoulcanbethought ofasanefficient doesconcede causelarge (see accipiendo What hehasinmind ina istheintellects itself from Quod.I, 12,p. 176:652-7). moving being state ofactuality with toprinciples toa state ofactuality with respect (perhaps dignitates) respect toconclusions. Theintellect isanefficient asitisabletodraw causeinsofar inferences. 71)Quod.I, 12,p. 172:502-504. 72)I briefly inmy'L'objet examine this etlacause selon delaconnaissance Godefroid deFontaines.Étude, texte ettraduction duquodlibet 1,question 12',Freiburger Zeitschrift furPhilosophie undTheologie 54(2007),407-429. 73)SeeQuod.I, 12,p. 172:504-14. 74)Quod.I, 12,p. 174:575-82. SeeQuod.II, 16,p. 173:170-175. otherwise would Believing

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The secondwayin whichtheobjectmovestheintellect is bybeingtheterminusofknowledge. involves the soul itselfto things, Knowledge conforming not thingsconforming themselves to the soul. Thingstherefore move the in thewayin whicha finalcausemoves,thatis,metaphorically; intellect they movetheintellectby beingobjectsfortheintellect.75 Jamesquotesapprovto theeffectthatan objectof inglya passagefromAugustinesDe trinitate a likenessofitselfin us,so thatactualknowledge is both knowledge generates caused by the object and the knower.This is perfectly true,he avers,but one needsto add thatalthoughtheactualknowledgeis causedbytheobject it is onlycausedby it in one way,i.e., by thefactthatit is a likenessof the object,whereastheactualknowledgeis causedby theintellectin twoways: - i.e., insofar as theintellect also containsa likenessoftheactualisnotitia first, - , and secondbecauseit movesitselfto theactual the requisitepropensity knowledge.76 as an incomplete Jamesbelievesthatconceivingtheintellect actuality providesa plausibleaccountofintellection linesthatdoes not alongAugustinián conflict withanyimportant Aristotelian principle.Therearefivesuchprinciples he realizeshis theoryof cognitionmightseem to conflictwith.I shall mentionthreethathavea directbearingon theissueofidoneitates. briefly One propositionis Aristotle's claimthatthesoul is likea tableton which This is clearlya propositionthatis centralto Aristotle's nothingis written.77 noeticsand Jamesis keento showthathisviewsdo not conflict withit. He startsout byagreeingthatthesoul is not in potencywithrespectto itsaptiwithrespectto the completeact of which tudes;it is in potency,however, thesepropensities aremere"préimpressions," thatis,withrespectto an actual act of cognizing. is that it suffices to maintainthatthesoul James suggesting is in potencyin thissecondwayin orderto bringhispositionin harmony with Aristotle.78 He is adamant,at anyrate,thathispositiondoesnotcommithim to Platonism.79 Accordingto James'saccount,Platonismis theviewthatthe soul possessesactualcognitionpriorto itsbeingunitedwiththebody;after thattransitive action involves material orformal presuppose (Jamess something "migrating" from theagent tothepatient, which thinks isa mistaken viewofwhat is. word) James change Fora discussion ofthis see which asks: "Utrum naturale Ill, 24, 188-194, point, Quod. p. agens idinquoagitperaliquid immissum abeoinpassum?". agattransmutando 75)Quod.I, 12,p. 177:665-70. 76)Quod.I, 12,p. 177:674-80. 77)Aristotle, Deanima, III,4,430al-2. 78)Quod.I,q. 12,170,459-69. 79)Quod.I, 12,p. 170:470-p.171:500.

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whatitpreviously unionwiththebody,thesoulforgets knew;all thatremains whichis thenactivated(excitatur is a sortof "habitualknowledge" ) byteachingor thesenses.Jamesrespondsthataccordingto hispositionthesoul does thatlearning innatam nothave"innateknowledge" ), and therefore {scientiam of fullyconstituted thatis, a reactivation is not remembering, forms;it does howeverhaveinnatehabitualknowledge , whichis "incomplete knowledge."80 be contends,becauseit To positthatkindof knowledgeis "notunfitting," does notentailthatthesoulprecontains completecognitions.81 triesto harmodoctrinewithwhichJameslengthily AnotherAristotelian as thesensithattheimagesareto theintellect nizehistheoryis theassertion for bles are to thesenses.82 Now, thisviewcould be potentially problematic from the sensible if sensation to result he understood James objectsdirectly sensation. But thisis nothowJamesunderstands actingon thesense-organs. ofmotionto sensationas he "stimulation He applieshisnowfamiliar theory" andvolition:Theobjectsacton (immutant haddoneto intellection ) thesensein with the firstof the with the accordance which is power, conjoined organ else by two conditionsthatmustbe metforsomethingto movesomething has been set in motion Once thesense-organ inclinationand stimulation.83 withthe aptitude it bearsa resemblance or a similarity (quibusimmutatiš) foundin thesense accordingto thesecondcondition and this,somehow, forthesenseto moveitselfto actualcognition.So Jamescan hapis sufficient what thattheimagesareto theintellect that he agreeswithAristotle pilysay thesensiblesareto thesenses,becausein facthe does believethatintellection thathe howeverit is thisverystructure and sensationarestructurally similar, s. in a waythatis clearlyat oddswithAristotle understands The thirddoctrine Jamestriesto tiein withhisownpositionis thedoctrine absolute. to abstraction ofabstraction. assuresus thathe subscribes Jamesfirst involvestheintellect What he rejects,he tellsus, is theidea thatabstracting them.84 the imagesor purifying Indeed,as we saw previously, illuminating in that the intellect the notion Jamesrejects anywayactson theimages.To 80)Quod.I, 12,p. 171:494. 81)James's inthis issimilar tothat oftheanonymous commentator ontheethica position regard nova(seen.2 above). 82)Quod.I, 12,p. 171:501-p.177:690. 83)Seeabove inn.62. thepassage referenced 84)Thisseems tohavebeenthebelief ofGodfrey ofFontaines. SeeQuod.V,q. 10,inLes six et de de Fontaines ed. M. De Wulf & J.Hoffmans , , (Louvain, sept Godefroid quodlibets cinq 1914),37.

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abstract hasbeenprompted simplymeansthatoncetheintellect bytheimages it cognizesin a purerfashionthantheimagination.85 To sumup,itis notnecessary intelaccordingtoJamesto posittwodistinct lectswithinthesoul. The intellective soul can be thoughtof as one faculty endowedwithpropensities or aptitudesthatrepresent realnaturally partially izedcognitive items.Thissamefaculty can be regarded as "possible"insofar as an aptitudein itsnaturalstateis incomplete, or itcan be regarded as an agent insofaras theaptitudemovesitselfformally intellect to itsown act,in a way similarto thatin whicha heavybodyformally movesitselfthroughitsgravin his quodlibetalquestionon ity.86 AlthoughJamess appeal to propensities the intellectis aimed at achievinga somewhatdifferent goal fromthatof a distinction between twointellects and I, 7, namelyrejecting rigid quodlibet with abstraction it at the same doctrine is that theory, is, bottom, doingaway in bothcases:idoneitates. It now remainsto be seenhow he proceeds offered in thecaseofseminalreasons. 7 c) Matterand SeminalReasonř One reasonforwhichthescholastics saw a needto positseminalreasonswas in matterthatmeanttheyeither thebeliefthatifformsdid notexistvirtually cameout ofnothingorwereinfusedbyan external agent,an operationwhich considered to be violentaction.One groupofauthorsJamesmenscholastics ofquodlibetII, question5, whichis entirely tionsat thebeginning devotedto seminalreasons,respondedto thischallengeby positingan internalformal frommatteritselfand cooperattheinchoativum , stemming principle, formae in with an order to externalagent producethe form.Accordingto one ing of thisview,theinchoativum formaewas identicalwith groupof proponents thecompletedformand merelyrequiredto be uncovered, muchas silveris ofthe revealedwhentheruston itis scrapedoff.Thisis ofcoursereminiscent of innateintelligiPlatonicunderstanding ofknowledgeas theremembering He therefore from.88 blesthatJamesis so keento distancehimself predictably that it fails to account for the fact thatforms this view on the rejects grounds the of a of from aregenerated, are result they process change non-beingto 85)Quod.I, 12,p. 178:696.James abstraction exprofesso inQuod.I, 13. dealswith 86)SeeQuod.IV,4,p. 17:73-76. 87)Fora general 'TheTheory ofJames's views onseminal reasons seeM. Phelps, presentation inJames ofViterbo', as well as ofSeminal Reasons 30 271-83, (1980), J.Wippel, Augustiniana La ciudad deDios164 andCasado, The 294-314, ofFontaines, Metaphysical Thought ofGodfrey (1952),301-14. 88)Quod.I, 12,p. 168:395-7.

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being:iftheform,or a partoftheformor a commonform,is alreadypresent beforethegeneration proper,thenno changehas takenplace. who dismisstheviewthat Jamesthenmentionsanothergroupof thinkers a seminalreasonis an inchoativum Some ofthisviewclaim formae. proponents thatit is an "activeprinciple"inherent in matterthatis conducive(activaut inducatur formain materia)to theproductionoftheform;othersthatit is an externalagentproductiveof the formsand a potentialprinciplecapableof undergoing change.The firstview is rejectedbecauseit makesthe seminal reasonboth a passiveand an activeprinciple;the secondview is rejected becauseJamesthinksthatit belongsto theconceptofa seminalreasonthatit be something inherentin matter. Analysisof the conceptof seminalreason leadsJamesto theviewthatforsomethingto be calleda seminalreasonit musta) embodysomeprogress ) and inchoation(inchoatio (exordium ) ofwhateverit is theseminalreasonof and b) be an activeprinciple.Once againwe convictionthatthesubject see,appliedto thefieldofnaturalchange,James's ofchangeis theprinciplecauseofchange. To establishthatseminalreasonsare "inchoations" or exordia , he turnsto Aristotles discussionofthepotentialexistence offormsin matterinMetaphysicsVII andAverroes thereto. Forms,accordingtoJamessreading commentary ofAristotle, in matter, not in actuality, but in potency.89 pre-exist Following Averroes's of this takes this as doctrine, James interpretation implyingthat thereis a distinction betweenthepotencyofmatterand matteras such.What characterizes thepotencyof matter( potentiamateriae)is thefactthatit is a relation of matterto form;90 and thischaracteristic of matteris itselfa conseof its form.91 lack is of two sorts: can lacka Now, quence lacking something or which it is in not its nature to particular power quality possess(e.g.,a stone lackssight);or a thingcan lacksomepowerorqualitywhichitis naturally apt to possess.Forthisto be thecasethelackmustbe accompaniedbyan aptitude The concept (iaptitude ) and propensity (idoneitas ) forthatpoweror quality.92 ofpotency(ofmatter)thuscomprisesfourthings:1) matter, 2) lackofform, itis aptitude 3) aptitudeand 4) relationto form.Of thesefourcharacteristics, thatwillreceivethelion'sshareofJames's attentionin therestof question5. The reasonis thefollowing: it is notsufficient in orderto understand whatit 89)Quod.II 5,p.66:224.TheScholastics, atleastthose whowere infavor ofseminal reasons, usedAristotle's doctrine ofpotency with Averroes's insupport commonly together commentary ofthedoctrine. SeeNardi, 'Ladottrina, 79. 90)Quod.II,5,p.68:304. 90Quod.II,5,p.68:318. 92)Quod.II,5,p.69:330.

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meansto saythatmatteris capableoftakingon a particular formto simplysay thatit is so disposedin virtueof itshavingtherightaccidents:one needsto posit somethingelse {aliud) in matter;thissomethingelse is the progress and inchoation0inchoatio {exordium) ).93 Greateffort is devotedto provingthislastpointin thenextpagesofquestion5. Justwhatis exactlythisprogress and inchoationoftheform? To understandthis,Jamesassuresus, it suffices to keepin mindthata formhas two modesofbeing:potentialand actual.It is thesameformthatis in potencyand thenin actuality, butjustas matterand theactualformaretwodistinct things {duae res)thatmake up one actualcomposite,so too matterand potential formaretwodistinctthings{duaeres)thatmakeup one potentialcomposite. Jameswrites: Thispotential form iscalled anaptitude fortheactual ora preparation, ora capacity form, ora way{via)-, itcanalsobecalled material Now (habilitas), materiae). appetite (appetitus because isa principle ofactuality andrelates toactuality, itiscorrectly a termed potency anditisa natural tothesecond ofquality.94 potency, potency pertaining species The positionJameshasjustsketchedbearsa resemblance to theconceptionof seminalreasonshe had initially that to the view thattheformto is, rejected, be producedis alreadypresentin matter, in theshapeofa seminalreason.But fromthatone on a centralpoint:The propoJamesthinkshispositiondiffers nentsof the inchoativum formaemake the formin matteran actualform, whereasJamesis veryclearthatit is theformqua potential, or imperfect.95 andAverroes Realizingperhapsthatin spiteofhismanyappealstoAristotle he is reallyproviding an accountofnaturalchangethatis verydifferent from the Stagirites, offers five additional of the of underJames proofs necessity as "naturalpotencies," Aristotle s termistandingforms-in-potency following Many of thesesimplyrehearseargumentsfrom nologyin the Categories. Aristotle and Averroes to theeffect thatthepassagefrompotencyto act does notresultin theproduction ofa different inwhatwasimperbeingbutresults In one ifhis proofs,however, fectbeingperfected. to Jamesturnsexplicitly Simplicius. when hetalks aboutthiskindofpotency that tothesecond of Simplicius pertains species whenever itisproduced innoother occurs, saysthatinallofNature, quality generation 93)Quod.II,5,p.70:380. 94)Quod.II, 5,p. 71:408-413. Later refers tothepotential form asa resmateriae on,James 88: 985). superaddita (p. 95)Quod.II,5,p.72:426-433.

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itisthrough that matter forthesubstance; a potency moreover, potency waythan through thiskindofaptitude orpotency receives Now,because ) issaid {aptitude) {potentia species. andlack, itfollows that this andbecause connotes tobeimperfect, imperfection privation lackandprivation.96 ofaptitude orpotency includes kind to a numberof objections Jamesappealsto Simpliciusagain in responding of themostinteresting of as inchoation. One his against conception potency thatifthepotency forourpurposesis hisresponseto an objectionto theeffect ofmatteris theformitselfin potentialbeing,thenmatteris in potencyowing In answerto thisargument, thatis extrinsic to itsnature.97 to something James ofmatteris thatitis a lack(
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A. CôtéI Vivarium, 47 (2009)24-53 Thisiswhat Boethius "Itisfrom those forms that are matter, saysinthebookonTrinity: matter that these forms cametobethat areinmatter andconstitute bodies."99 beyond

As we sawabove,100 to be a seminalreasonit Jamesbelievesthatforsomething musthavetwofeatures: it mustbe an inchoativum formaeand it mustbe an activeprinciple ofchange.The inchoation, we nowknow,is conceptualized in termsofAristotle and Simplicius s discussionof thesecondspeciesofquality. Butinwhatwayis theseminalreasonan activeprinciple ofchange?As we have alsoseen,Jamesis critical ofthewayinwhichotherauthorsaccountforchange becausetheyeithermaketheseminalreasonitself sucha principle, thusmaking it bothan activeand passiveprincipleor makeit an entirely passiveprinciple theactualcauseofmovement beingan external agent.Jamestakessomething ofbothofthesesolutions.On theone hand,he considers thattheinchoativum is an active insofar as it inclines matter to itsact;101 this principle formae already is whathe callstheactiveprinciple sicutinclinans. this inclination is However, insufficient to bringabouttheactualization oftheformon itsown,an external is therefore that agent required effectively bringsaboutthechange;thisis the activeprinciple sicuttransmutam™2 Jamesexplainsthattheactiveprincipleis able to do thisowingto thepowersgrantedto it byGod. God s causalrolein theproduction ofnaturalchangeis thesameas hiscausalroleintheproduction of volition,thatis to say,God causeschangein theveryloose sensethathe bestowsadequatepowersto creatures so thattheymightdirectly causechange, notin thesensethathe actively as an efficient causein theproducparticipates tionofa particular volitionor thegeneration ofa particular form.103 As in thecaseofvolitionand cognition, admits that theremustbe an James externalagentin orderto bringtheinchoationto itscompletion.And as in thoseothercases the causal contribution of the extrinsic agentseemsto be We know that it does not act manifest whatis verymeager. by rendering in a latent for that there would be to that of form, deny already reality change. It nowturnsoutthatitdoesnotproduceitseffect orintroducbytransferring in theseminalreasoneither. The extrinsic inganything agentcausesbychangform,by makingthe ing the mode or the dispositionof the preexisting form an actual form.104 potential 99)Quod.II,5,p.82:776-85. 1001 Seeabove, thesection oftext tofootnote 89. leading I01)Quod.II,5,p.89:103-105. 1021 Quod.II,5,p.90:1042-1067. 1031 Quod.II,5,p.89:1015-1019. 1041 SeealsoQuod.II,5,p.72:459.James doesnotwant tosaythat Quod.II,5,p.78:633-37. theactual form in matter because this would mean that no has (albeit latently) preexists change

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Giventhatthisis takento occurin all casesof naturalchangethatmeans But if thatforJamesofViterbotheformsof all thingspreexistin matter.105 or spethisis so, whyis it thenexternalagentsbringaboutonlydetermined His answeris thatalthoughall formscoexistin matter, cificeffects?106 theyare in orderedin twoways.Firstof all, theyareorderedaccordingto perfection, thesensethattheformof a compositeis noblerand moreperfectthanthe formof an element.Second,theyare orderedaccordingto thesequencein whichtheyadvancefrompotencyto act. Thus, in orderformatterto be forma , mattermustfirstbe actualizedbya certain changedintoa particular relation(ordinem form¿'thathasan immediate ) witha (i.e. mattercannotbe whichtheformof thesubthat with actualizedimmediately bya).m Now, stancethatis to resultfromchangehas an "immediaterelation"is theform - for thatis foundin whatJamescallsthatsubstances"proximate agent"108 instancethesemenofan adulthorse,as opposedto thathorseitselfor a celestialbody.The formofhorseness agentbearsa resempresentin theproximate withtheformthatwillemergein therecipient relation" blanceor "immediate thatis, in themares womb.But of coursethefactthathorsesemen matter, notbyanycausalfitis determined, shouldresultin a horsebeinggenerated butbytheparticular nessbetweenthecauseand theeffect, placehorsesemen to and thisordering of of in advancement the act, potency sequence occupies God.109 as indeedthefirst one,is instituted by A veryclearpatternthusemergesfromthewayin whichJamesofViterbo the movefrompotencyto actualityin volition,cognitionand understands he attributes fromtheproperties Thispattern naturalgeneration. clearlyresults In eachcasethreetypesofcausesareinvolved:a formalcause,an to idoneitates. causedbythe cause.An act ofwillis formally efficient causeand an external motionof the idoneitates under of its store of means metaphorical faculty by motionofGod.110 theobject,i.e.,theexternal Likewise, cause,and theefficient once it has of to a act moves itself theintellectformally knowledge specific causationofGod. Finally, beenstimulated bythephantasmundertheefficient theseminalreasonsor inchoationsstoredin matteryieldbiologicalcreatures inmatter, is inpotency, which hesays theform tohisposition occurred. Butaccording preexists of which seems a more from the actualized distinct form, way satisfactory hardly onlymodally forchange. accounting ,05)Quod.II,5,p.86:905-6. ,06)Quod.II,5,p.87:935-6. 107) with Quod.I, 12,p. 172:504-14. Quod.II,5,p.88:955-66. Compare 108) Quod.II,5,p.91:1057-67. 109) Quod.II,5,p.87:951-54. 110) SeeRuello, 340.

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of a certainsortwhentheyareactedupon bytherequisiteproximate (extertherelation, in each nal) agent.Although Jamesdoesnotusethisterminology, cause- object,phantasm, orproximate case,betweentheexternal agent- and thepropensity is one ofextrinsic denomination causecontributing , theexternal to the content or formal nature of the act.111 Thus,theobjectknown nothing the intellect is said to move the will because whentheobjectis knownan by inclinationrelatingto thatobjectoccursin thesoul,not becausetheobject in howeverindirecta way,theintellect;thattheinclination should specifies, be of the"right" is due to the "connection" of intellect and will in the object soul. Similarly, phantasmsmovetheintellectbecausetherehappensto be "a relationofconformity"112 betweenthephantasmand thecorresponding conthe not because of some formal causal interaction intellect, ceptproducedby betweentheobjectand theintellect, is ruled for,as we saw,suchinteraction out explicitlyby James.Finally,generationoccursbecause thereexistsan "immediate relation" betweentheappropriate cause(theproximate cause)and thebeinggenerated, whichimmediaterelationresultsnot fromdirectcausal interaction betweentheputativecauseand theeffect butis instituted byGod. In all threecases,theexternal has a mode of causation which agent appearsto be littlemorethana causasinequa non}10Thatexternal should be so agency conceivedis ofcoursethenecessary of consequence thefactthatJamesconsiderstheintellect, thewilland matterto be endowedwiththerequisite informationqua incomplete whicharenotyettheactualperfection butare actualities, exordia on the to already way perfection. Conclusion As I statedat theoutset,Jameswas one of a numberof authorsin thelate middleageswho usednotjustSimpliciusbuttheworksofotherNeoplatonic authorsnewlymade availableby the translations of Williamof Moerbeke. notonlyfortheextensive use he makesof the However,Jamesis exceptional translated those of Themistius and works, recently particularly Philoponos,114 m)SeeQuod.I, 14,p. 194,49-50. 1,2)Quod.I, 12,p. 172:504-14. 11 3)Thisisa point forwhich would beseverely criticized andsucJames byhiscontemporaries cessors. ofAuvergne, contra deViterbio See,e.g.,Bernard .,ms.Vat.lat. Jacobum Impugnationes 298,f.177va. Borghesianus 114) L.J.Bataillon, utilisateurs destextes rares deMoerbeke triaopuscula ) 'Quelques (Philopon, etparticulièrement deViterbe, inGuillaume deMoerbeke , 112. Jacques

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hasbroughtto light,butalso forhis recentscholarship Simplicius, something in theseauthorsand to put fruitful doctrines abilityto discernphilosophically to originaluse. thesedoctrines isundoubtofpropensities s doctrine is a Simplicius caseinpoint.Simplicius notion of Aristotle's fruitful an and development edly original philosophically in the mentionsonlybriefly of thesecondspeciesof qualitywhichAristotle of a more to detailed understanding Simpliciusattempts provide Categories. themwithinthecontextof whatpropensities are,and howbestto characterize a Neoplatonicmetaphysics. an originaldevelopment doctrineof idoneitates , in turn,represents James's of Simplicius'sposition.Jamessays littleabout the complexNeoplatonic when he thatundergirds Simplicius'sdoctrineof propensities; metaphysics does considerparticularNeoplatonictheses,he tendsto considerthemas - explanation. or Boethian ofthetrue- Augustinián Instead, approximations the "half-way" he focuseson thosepassageswhereSimpliciuscharacterizes - half-way, thatis,betweenthepowerand itsoperation natureofpropensities a muchmoredetailed orhabit.ButJamesgoesbeyondSimpliciusbyproviding viewofwhatidoneitates are,and howtheyareto accountforthesoul'soperahe explainsthatthe thesoul operations, tionsand naturalchange.Regarding soul is dividedinto threemain powers,namely,intellect,the will and the senses,eachofwhichbranchesout in ever-more Jamesis propensities. specific thenable to tiein his doctrinewithAnselmsnotionof aptitudesand Henry - whichhe extendsto intellect of Ghent'sanalysesof thewill'sself-motion viewat least,successfully and sense.The resultis a psychology that,inJames's and cognitiveoperationswithoutraisingmanyof the accountsforappetitive associatedwithrivaltheories,especiallythosethatpostulatethe difficulties existenceof an agentintellectdistinctfromthepossibleintellect.Moreover, withAristotle. But or so Jamesbelieves, thetheory is byand largecompatible, basic device to the of natural also the same James applies explanation change. : theyareactive fromidoneitates Seminalreasonsturnout to be littledifferent principlesthatinclinenaturalbeingsto theiract but whichrequiresome external althoughJames's agencyin orderto unfoldintoactualforms.Finally, from thirteenth and fourteenth will elicit reactions mainlynegative attempt of names of of Bernard authors the Godfrey Fontaines, Auvergneand AlphonsusVargasofToledospringto mind thiscouldbe due as muchto the in hisdoctrines inherent as to thefactthatthetimeswerejustnot difficulties innatismespousedbyJames. for the kind of yetripe thorough-going

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«.Klc/«y {*}'»«i BRILL


Vivarium 47 (2009)54-73

Time as a Part of Physical Objects: lhe Modern 'Descartes-Minus Argument' and an Analogous Logic Argument from Fourteenth-Century (William

Heytesbury

and Albert of Saxony)

MichaelJ.Fitzgerald Abstract and WilliamHeytesbury I arguein theessaythatthefourteenth-century logicians Their I call the Socrates-Minus an Albert ofSaxonydeveloped argument Argument. resolution tothe a direction towards a pragmatic ofitindicates andrejection analysis is similar to the view Theirresolution Descartes-Minus Argument. contemporary ofphysthat"arbitrary undetached vanInwagen, namely, parts todaybyPeter adopted the hisfinger do notexist.I conclude like'allofSocrates icalobjects," simply except s lawoftheIndiscernibility doesnotrunafoulofLeibniz fourteenth-century approach of Indiscernibles a formof LeibnizsIdentity of Identicals, bututilizes that,when resolution to the combined witha weak"anthropic yielda pragmatic principle," Descartes-Minus Argument. Keywords relations Albert ofSaxony, time,Descartes-Minus, part-whole 1. Some ModernMetaphysicalPositions ofphysicsand biologyconA current debatein thephilosophy metaphysical is a physicalpartofphyss temporalhistory timeor something cernswhether is a as a ical objectsor organisms, physicalpartofa tableor theheart just leg is a physicalpartof a humanbeing.Those who claimthatthe ontological is basicallyfour-dimensional ofmaterial structure argue objectsand organisms as are thattimeisjustas mucha physicalpartofphysicalobjectsororganisms ofphysical thosewhoclaimthestructure theirspatialparts.Bycontrast, objects is basicallythree-dimensional or organisms arguethattimeis not a physical partof physicalobjects,onlyspatialpartsare.Each of thesepositionshas its DOI:10.1 Brill 163/156853408X383024 ©Koninklijke 2009 NV, Leiden,

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own attendant viewof thenatureof time:presentism and eternalism. Presentistsmaintainthatphysicalobjectsthatoccupyspaceat presentarethosethat havetheontological eternalists statusof"realexistent".1 denythat Bycontrast, in orderto be considered a "real physicalobjectsmustoccupyspaceat present, existent."2 in twovery Thesetwopositionsregarding theroleoftimearealso reflected different accountsofthepersistence ofphysicalobjects:endurantism andperdurantism . Forendurantists, theproblemofthepersistence ofa physical object one whole and completephysicalobject presupposesthatit is numerically is understood throughanychangein itspartsovertime.Becausepersistence in termsofnumericidentity, an objectsbeingnumerically one and wholeand If a numerically one completeis a necessaryconditionforits persistence. wholeand completephysicalobjectundergoesa changein itsphysicalparts thechange,itmusthaveendured and survives as a numerically one and whole and completeobjectthroughout thechangeeventhoughitsspatialextentmay on theotherhand,maintaintimeitselfis a physical getaltered.Perdurantists, a of "worm-like four-dimensional part physical object,"i.e. a physicalobject fromits temporalinceptionto its temporalcessationthatfillsa givensubof a regionof the entirespatio-temporal spreadthereis.3Here persistence in is not understood terms of the numeric a of physicalobject identity particularspatialobjectfromone timeto another,becausepersistence is understood to be a partwhole relationof a physicalobjects temporalpartsto itswhole"temporal worm."Such "worms"mightalso be "scattered physical objects,"i.e. objectswhosepartsmaycome fromdifferent spatial-temporal intoone "temporal worm." locations,and areintegrated together All fourof thesemetaphysical enduraneternalism, positions,presentism, and become in intertwined a tism, perdurantism, veryinteresting argument 4 tobyMichaelJ.Louxas the Descartes-Minus referred .4Thisargument Argument' 0 "Typical endurantists arewhat wemight callpresentists. believe that theuseofthetenses They isontologically Asthey seeit,onlywhat inthepresent exists exists andonly significant. really what isgoing oninthepresent isreally on."Michael a contemporary J.Loux, going Metaphysics: introduction (London, 2002),220. 2)"Perdurantists, is anything distinctive aboutthe bycontrast, denythatthere ontologically I happen time tocallnow'or'thepresent', andthey that there isanything deny metaphysically abouttheuseofthepresent tense. andtheir contents tohave privileged Theytakealltimes thesameontological status. account oftime." [T]hissortofviewcanbecalledaneternalist 221. Ibid., 3)Ibid., 216-220. 4)ItwasPeter vanInwagen whooriginally invented the"Descartes-Minus SeePeter Argument."

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has been utilizedmostrecently of a by Mark Hellerto arguethedefenders three-dimensional viewof physicalobjectsmustadoptthefour-dimensional withrejecting one of Leibniz'slogicallaws,theIndisview,or be confronted i.e. '□ (x) (y) (F) {(x = y) - » (Fxs cernibility ofIdenticals, Fy)}'.5Louxs formulationoftheDescartes-Minus is as Argument verybriefly follows:Assumethat Descartesbefore a giventime,ř,is wholeand completewithbothhis hands. Call thisDescartes:'Descartesbefore t' Furthermore, considerall ofDescartes his left and call that Descartes: 'Descartes-Minus'. At time,t, hand, except Descartes'handis cutoff,and callDescarteswiththemissinghand:'Descartes fortheendurantist is "cashedin" in termsof the aftert' Now,ifpersistence numerical ofa physicalobjectthatiswholeandcompleteacrosstimes, identity thenconsiderthefollowing statements: identity t = Descartesaftert. (1) Descartesbefore t. (2) Descartes-Minus aftert = Descartes-Minus before = Descartes t Descartes-Minus t. (3) after after Therefore, t = Descartes-Minus t* (4) Descartesbefore t,and (5) Descartesbefore before Descartes-Minus t. before Loux maintainsthisargument is usedbyHellerto showthattheendurantist is logically to thetruthof(1), (2), and (3); and giventhelawofthe committed of identity, the endurantist mustalso acceptthe obviouslyfalse transitivity is false because thenumerically one wholeand (4). (4) proposition obviously Descartes t had a but the Descartes-Minus t did hand, complete before before not.So, theperdurantist ofthelogicallawofthe reasons,sincetheantecedent ofIdenticalsis truebutitsconsequentis false,theendurantist Indiscernibility is committed to thedenialoftheIndiscernibility ofIdenticals.Moreover, the endurantist mustalso acceptthetruthof (4) s contradictory at thesametime, i.e. (5), forprecisely thesamereasonhe acceptsthetruthof (4); namelyDescartesbefore thad a hand,butDescartes-Minus did not.Endurantists arenow vanInwagen, 'TheDoctrine ofArbitrary Undetached 62 Parts', Pacific Philosophical Quarterly (1981),127. 5)Mark Parts ofFour-Dimensional inMetaphysics: AnAnthology, ed. Heller, 'Temporal Objects', Kim and Ernest Sosa Heller uses the notion of 312-326. (Oxford, 2000), Jaegwon actually inhisversion oftheargument rather than'Descartes-Minus', butI willutilize 'Body-minus' Loux's version inthis forthesakeofsimplicity. paper

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forcedto acceptlogicallycontradictory (4) and (5) as identity propositions true unless are to concede that time is a jointly they willing really physicalpart ofDescartes.Iftheyaccepttimeas a physicalpartofDescartes,thenDescartes t and Descartesaftert arejustphysicalparts("slices")ofthewholeDesbefore cartes'physicaltemporal"worm."The problemofthepersistence ofa physical is from shifted a its to object away probleminvolving identity a problem itspart-whole relations.6 involving 2. The Fourteenth-Century 'Socrates-MinusArgument' A strikingly similarargument was developedin themid-fourteenth century. The logiciansWilliamHeytesbury and Albertof Saxonydiscussedan argumentthatI willrefer to as the'Socrates-Minus Argument". First,I willgivean accountofWilliamand AlbertsSocrates-Minus Argument.ThenI willarguethattheirrejectionof theSocrates-Minus Argument is not onlyhistorically but also philosophically It is interesting interesting. it because is a to Peter van historically interesting precursor Inwagensrejection of theexistenceDescartes-Minus as a numerically one wholeand complete "doctrine of physical object,and hence,doesnotsuccumbto themetaphysical undetached because arbitrary parts(DAUP)."7 It is philosophically interesting theirrejectionavoidsan epistemological createdbytheperdurantist difficulty claimthattimeis a physicalpartof a physicalobject.Finally,I concludeby resolutiongivenbyAlbertand WilgivingwhatI taketo be the pragmatic liamsresponses to the"Socrates-Minus and applyit to themodArgument," ern"Descartes-Minus Argument." Formulation (2a) WilliamandAlbert's ofthe'Socrates-Minus Argument' Around1340, in the secondproofof WilliamHeytesbury s 27th sophism: 'The whole Socratesis less thanSocrates'( TotusSortesestminorSorte)?he introduces an argumentverysimilarto the contemporary Descartes-Minus I which callthe'Socrates-Minus Williamsays: Argument, Argument'. 6)Loux, , 238-240. Metaphysics 7)Seenote4 above. 8)Professor Norman Kretzmann discusses bothHeytesbury andAlberts contributions tothe ofthisparticular in his fourteenth-century analysis sophism, 'Syncategoremata, sophismata, in TheCambridge Medieval , ed.Norman Kretzmann, exponibilia', History ofLater Philosophy andJanPinborg 1982),234-240. Anthony Kenny, (Cambridge,

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MJ.Fitzgerald /Vivarium 47 (2009)54-73 forthesamereason, thewhole Socrates canbelessthanSocrates; therefore, Similarly, a partofSocrates can because Theassumption is argued Socrates is lessthanSocrates. the whole isproved the common etc.Theantecedent beSocrates; therefore, by indicating tobea doesnotbegin hisfinger, andletitbethecasethatthat ofSocrates, finger except with allhisother LetAbethat Socrates sothat theremaining ofSocrates, parts. persists part ofSocrates; andA isa part 'Abegins tobeSocrates, ThenI argue thus: Socrates. persisting and the The inference is evident Socrates'. to be a part ofSocrates therefore, assumpbegins andhehimself thiswillbesomething, after Socrates because tionisargued, immediately a finger andhisintellective material other thanhispersisting willbenothing partexcept A ismadeupofprecisely the A isalready for andpropounded. that, But, soul,asisnoted ThereA is so made. after asSocrates. andform samematter this, Therefore, immediately A immediately this willbeSocrates. after which A nowisthat Therefore, fore, immediately And A begins tobeSocrates. willbeSocrates andisnotnowSocrates. after Therefore, this, which wastobeproven.9 tobeSocrates, ifso,then ofSocrates a part begins

Sometimelaterin the1350sAlbertofSaxony,in hisworkSophismata , invites 'The whole Socrates xlvi: of his the truth us to considera defenseof sophism is a partofSocrates'( TotusSortesestparsSortis ).10Albertsays: becalled andletthat hisfinger; ofSocrates Fortakealloftheintegral A,and except parts A andByletitbecalled from whole hisfinger Ç. Thenitisargued B,andtheaggregated 'A isSocrates with B make A together andA ispartofÇ, because andC isSocrates; thus: 9)"Similiter, Sorte. estminor ratione totus Sortes esseminor Sortes Sorte, ergoeadem potest in casu etc. Antecedens esse Sortis Sortes; probatur ergo potest quiapars Assumptum arguitur, illius. Etponatur Sortis residuum totum communi quodilledigitus praeter digitum signando sui secundum continue maneat residuum itaquodtotum nonessepars Sortis, quamlibet incipiat A et est A esse sic: Tunc A illud residuum. sit Sortes, pars Quoposito arguitur incipit partem. etassumptum esseSortes. Sortis; quia arguitur, apparet Consequentia incipit ergoparsSortis exillaparte etipsenoneritaliudquamcompositum immediate Sortes posthoceritaliquid, EtiamestA estetpositum. sicutnotum etillaanima a digito, materiae residua intellectiva, forma. eteadem exeadem materia A compositum estenim huiusmodi praecise compositum, hoc immediate illud A nunc est hoc immediate post erit quod Ergo, post componitur. Ergo, A esseSortes. non est Sortes. et nunc hoc erit Sortes A immediate Sortes. incipit Ergo, post Ergo, William esseSortes, Etsisic,ergo Heytesbury, Sophquoderatprobandum." incipit parsSortis in islessthan Socrates Sorte estMinor Sortes xxvii: Totus Socrates'), ('Thewhole ismatay sophisma Ven. . cum eiusdem et diviso desensu etc., Hentisberi Gulielmi , Sophismatibus. composito Regulae aremyown, citedLatintexts from ice:Bonetus 1494,f.I47vb.(Alltranslations Locatellus, otherwise unless noted.) 10)Forconvenience oftheSocratesversion onAlbert's discussion thesubsequent sakeI willfocus in off' Socrates' mention not does William because Minus , finger "cutting explicitly Argument totheDescartes-Minus seems closer Albert's version hisversion. given Argument Consequently, ofthe ownevaluations William andAlbert's I shallnotewhere byLouxthandoesWilliams. arise. astheoccasions differ Socrates-Minus Argument

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Socrates isa part ofSocrates'. Theinference holds andthesecond of upÇ. Therefore, part theantecedent isself-evident. Thefirst A isa manandisnot because partisproclaimed, another manthan Socrates. Theassumption isproved, because A ismadeupofbody and intellectual sort ofcomposition heisa man.Thisisconfirmed, soul,andbythat A because isananimal, since itisanensouled sensitive substance andnotanother animal than a man. ifa finger were tobecutoff, A would beSocrates. A But,thereason Secondly, bywhich then wasSocrates, isthesamereason A isnowSocrates. A isalready Therefore, bywhich Socrates.11 I thinkone can renderbothWilliamand Albertsversionsof the SocratesMinus Argument, into threedistinctparts[a], [ß], and [y],all of which are together supposedto yield the conclusion:Socrates-Minusbeforet is t. Lets first considerpart[a] . alreadySocratesbefore [a]

t is all of Socratesbefore t, excepthis finger, i.e. Socrates(I') A before Minus. B , is a partofSocratesbefore t. (2') Socrates'finger, t, i.e. C (3 ) A conjoinedwithB makesup Socratesbefore

Premise(3') is takento be self-evident. But Premise(1') is provedto be true thetwofurther byconsidering sub-parts[ß] and [y].12 t, i.e. Socrates-Minus, is madeup ofa bodyand an intellec[ß] (4') A before tivesoul,and a manis thatsortofthing. t thanÇ, i.e. the (5') Thereis no otherman underconsideration before wholeand completeSocrateswithall hisfingers.

n) "Namcapiatur totalis Sortis suum etvocetur^4, etsuusdigitus pars integrālis praeter digitum, B,etaggregatum exA etB, vocetur A estSortes, etC estSortes, etA est Ç. Tunesicarguitur: Sortes estparsSortis. Ç,quiaunacumB constituit Ç. Ergo, parsipsius tenet, Consequentia et secunda notaestdese.Sedprima etnonestalius declaratur, parsantecedentis quiaA esthomo exanima intellectiva etcorpore. Et quamSortes. Assumptum probatur, quiaA estcompositum talecompositum esthomo. A est cum sit substantia Confirmatur, animata animal, sensitiva, quia etnonaliudanimal Secundo esset A esset Sortes. sic,quiasidigitus Sed abscissus, quamhomo. eadem ratione esset eadem ratione nuncipseestSortes. iamA estSortes." Sortes, quatunc Ergo, Albertus deSaxonia, , Paris1502(reprinted, 1975)ParsI, sophisma Sophismata Olms-Verlag, f.25va-vb. Thisinteresting is xlvi, mentioned and treated Paul buthedoes sophism by ofVenice, notmention itssource. 12)Heytesbury, , ff.I47va-vb. Sophismata

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Furthermore, cutoffat t, [y] (6') IfÇ has a finger then, (7') A aftert is Socrates. And: t is SocratesforthesamereasonthatA before twasSocrates. (8f) A after Therefore, t is already{iam) Socratesbefore t. (9') A before Finallythen,thetruthofWilliams(10'), "ThewholeSocratescan be lessthan Socrates,"and Alberts(II1), "The wholeSocratesis a partof Socrates,"are supposedto followfrom(l')-(9'). ' (2b) WilliamsRejection ofthe'Socrates-Minus Argument Williamsrejection of(9') turnson hisrejection oftheinference from:"Socrates can be less thanSocrates,therefore, thewholeSocratesis less thanSocrates {Sortes )." He arguesthat potestesseminorSorte,ergototusSortesestminorSorte theantecedent"Socratescan be less thanSocrates"clearlyassumes(I') and His underlying seemsto be something likethefol(3') to be true.13 reasoning Part A establishes t i.e. is a , [a] Socrates-Minus, lowing: before partofÇ, i.e. thecompleteSocratesbefore t. However,Ç is a man,and beinga manentails soul/mind/life as itspart. havingan intellective principle{animaintellectiva) C is thecompositeofa bodyand an intellective soul/mind/life principlebefore t.XA So, we needPart[ß] as wellto showthetruthofthesophism.But,A cannotbeginto be C before t becausebefore tA is onlya partofÇ. A itselfbefore t onlycould be Ç, ifwe weretalkingabout Socratesbefore t beingjust his withhis completefinal "body".But C is Socrates"completemattertogether hisbodyand intellectual soul/mind/life Socrateswill form," namely, principle. 13)Ibid.f.147rb. 14)Ibid.

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or whenhe is a cadaver,and he is notthateitherbefore onlybe justhismatter in ř.15 we Part as well to need order Therefore, [y] justimmediately prove afier thesophism.But, Heytesbury reasons,if all the antecedentof the sophism 'Socratescan be lessthanSocrates'meansis "Socrates'bodycan be lessthanit t," he concedestheinference and deniestheantecedent is in actuallyis before facttrue,i.e. he deniesthatA before t, i.e. Socrates-Minus, is Socrates.ForifA wereSocratesbefore t and about to becomea man,thentherewould be an infinite numberofotherSocrateses, justlikeA, thatarealso aboutto become thatmanat ř,whichWilliamthinksis absurd. ForifA isabouttobemadeupinthisway, itfollows that A isabouttobecome a man, because of matter and a final form that is an intellectual soul/'life every composite principle' isa man.Andsoitwould follow that onemanisabouttobeaninfinite ofmen, number isimpossible.16 which Williamsdiscussion notesthattheSocrates-Minus turnson theidea Argument thatthewholeand completeSocratesis identicalwithanyofhisparts(
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characterizes relationsin termsof the logicalinferences integralpart-whole betweenpropositions the concontaining namesofwholes',to propositions the Albertcharacterizes "a quantitative whole" taining namesoftheirparts'.18 as: "a commontermdetermined like man'. A bya universal sign, every proper wholeis a singulartermcontainedunderit,likethe partofsucha quantitative term'Socrates'or 'Plato',or a commontermwitha demonstrative pronoun, like'thisman'or 'thatman'."19 "thisman,and thatman, Here,theexpression and thatmantakencollectively" makesup thequantitative whole"every man." In PartI of hisSophismata elaboratesupon integral , sophismaxlv,he further partsand wholes. Third itisobserved that anintegral iscalleda quantitative that a quanis,'having part part', which with another make whole. tity', together quantitative part upsome quantitative Neither isoneofthem inpotency totheother, norcanbemadecomplete theother. through From thisitisclear that themind/soul/life ofSocrates orthebody ofSocrates is principle notcalled 'anintegral Foralthough mind/soul/life ofSocrates part'ofSocrates. principle would make soquantified, andalsothebody ofSocrates issohaving upSocrates quantity; nevertheless mind/soul/life ofSocrates isnota quantitative The principle partofSocrates. matter ofSocrates is madewhole andcomplete thesoul/mind/life of through principle Socrates. thematter ofa horse isa horse soquantified, andtogether Similarly, although with a soul/ mind/life ofa horse make soquantified, nevertheless neiprinciple upa horse ther ofthese soquantified orsoul/mind/life of a are called 'an [i.e.a horse horse] principle ofa horse. Thereason forthisisthat onepartismadewhole andcomplete part' integral theother, andisinpotency toit.Suchparts where oneismadewhole andcomthrough the other are not called but'essential' or'qualitative plete through parts', 'integral parts'.20 cannotbe justa numerically one and wholeand complete Socrates,therefore, whole made from his integral up integralparts,becausehe has qualitative l8)Alberto deSajonia, Perutilis oLogica ed.Ángel Muñoz García, Logica MuyÚtil(o Útilísima), Universidad Nacional Autónoma De México, México D. F.,1988(hereafter 4,ch.19, PL),Tract no.1263,375,andch.21,no.1307,385. 19)PL,Tract IV,ch.21,no.1291,382. 20)"Tertio notandum estquodparsintegrālis dicitur idest,habens parsquantitativa, quantitatemquaecumaliaparte constituit totum necunaillarum est quantitativa aliquid quantum, adaliam, necperfectibilis Exhocpatet Sortis velcorpus Sortis potentia perearn. quodanima nondicuntur anima Sortis constituât Sortem etetiam Sortis, parsintegrālis quialicet quantum, Sortis sichabens tamen anima Sortis nonestparsquantitativa. Etetiam corpus quantitatem, materia Sortis estperfectibilis Sortis. materia sitquanta etcum Similiter, peranimam equilicet anima constituât tamen neutrum eorum dicitur equiquanta equum quantum, parsintegrālis hocquodunaillarum estperfectibilis etestinpotentia adeam. equipropter partium peraliam Ettalespartes unaestsicperfectibilis sed quarum peraliamnondicuntur partes integrales, essentiales velqualitativae." f.25rb. Albertus, , ParsI,sophisma xlv, Sophismata

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and qualitative whole."Aqualitative partsas well.He is in facta quantitative than itspartsbecauseits whole,"Albertsays,is one "thatis entitatively greater in contain that whole and as is clear the case of a man,who others, parts is entitatively becausein additionto his matter, the greaterthanhis matter, mancontainshisform,and themanis also entitatively than his form, greater becausein additionto hisformthemancontainshismatter."21 even Moreover, thanhisparts,theman is notquantitathoughtheman is entitatively greater in the proposition"The whole is than them. This is because tivelygreater than its "the parts," expressionparts'does not disgreater syncategorematic tributeanycomparative termfollowingit, and cannotdistribute anyof the In addition,in thecaseofpropositions, termspreceding it."22 like"Thewhole Socratesis a partof Socrates(TotusSortesestpars Sortis)?wherethesubject termis a propername ratherthan a commonnoun, whatwe reallyhave .23Whenwe considera accordingtoAlbert,is an improper exceptive proposition of his is white( Quaelibet like, head, Socrates, "Anypart proposition except Sortis suum est alba Albert )," says: pars praeter caput ... inthesaidproposition, theterm 'Socrates' isnotthesubject, butthecomposite expresisa common sion:a part ofSocrates', andthis term ofmany. theprecedHence, predicable isparsed as:Any hishead iswhite isunderstood: ,andthis ingproposition part ofSocrates except anintegral part.2A The termexcept'in thatpropositionis beingemployedsubtractively of the term'Socrates',and is notbeingused in itsproperexceptive sense.25A proper exceptivepropositionmustcontaina commonnoun as itssubjecttermand nota propername.26 Ifa propernameoccursas thesubjecttermin a propositionlike,"ThewholeSocratesexcepthis finger . . . ( TotusSortes praetersuum . which is similar to then one can be above, (lf) digitum. only talkingsubabout the of the whole and parts tractively completeSocrates,notexceptively of them.LikeWilliam,Albertpointsout thatthetermwhole'(totus)can be 21)Sophismata f.26rb. , ParsI,sophisma xlix, 22)Ibid., f.27ra. 23)PL,Tract no.859,270. III,Cap.7 ("Depropositionibus exceptivis"), 24)"...indicta Sortes non est subiectum hocaggregatum: sed ethoc propositione ly parsSortis, estquoddam commune depluribus. Undepraedicta predicabile propositio exponitur peristam: suum estalba,etintelligatur hocdeparte Quaelibet parsSortis praeter caput integrali." Sophismata thediscussion lixandsophisma between lx. , ParsII,f.54va, sophisma 25)PL,Tract III , Cap.7,no.858,270. 26)"Terminus a quofitexceptio sitterminus communis habens from (Aterm plura supposita." which onemakes isa common term , Ibid. referents.) exception many having Sophismata

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takeneithercategorematically orsyncategorematically. Whenthetermwhole'is takensyncategorematically it is a determinate of the , subjecttermin theproposition,and equivalentto theexpressionanyintegral part'(«quaelibet parsintenot When the ), (< merelyany parť quaelibetpars). grālis expressionwhole' is takencategorematically it is the in term the and is equiv, subject proposition alent to the expression:"A thingmade up and whole and completefrom itsparts"{Enscompositum et comp letůmexpartibus ).27However,Albertdoes that William does not do with to something respect theterm'totus(whole'). 4 Albertnotonlytellsus whatthetermtotusdistributes (namelythetermfolus an explanation lowingit),but,as NormanKretzmann pointsout,he offers ' ofhowthetermtotusdoes itsdistributing, theterm namely,bydistributing thatfollowsit forpartswithinitself, and notthoseoutsideitself, ?8 ... itisobserved that there aresome terms that donotdistribute theterm syncategorematic towhich areaddedoutside themselves which isnota part oftheexpres, that is,a term they siontowhich that term isequivalent insignifying; butthey distribonly syncategorematic utea term within that which isa partoftheexpression towhich the themselves, is,a term term is in and this is if that term is of dissyncategorematicequivalentsignifying, capable tribution. Forexample, thesyncategorematic term whole' doesnotdistribute a term outsideitself towhich itisadded, liketheterm butrather within like 'Socrates'; [aterm] itself theterm issemantically to anyintegral Thesameis part'[e.g.whole' equivalent part']. clearwiththesyncategorematic term issemantically 'at 'always' [e.g.'always' equivalent andothers insignifying tocomplete time'] every equivalent expressions.29 (Myitalics.) In theparticular caseofthesophism"ThewholeSocratesis partofSocrates," thetermwhole'is notdistributing outsidethewholedesignated bythename withinthewhole 'Socrates',i.e. overotherSocrateses,but onlydistributing designatedby thatpropername.The termwhole' in thissophismis really 27)"Aliquando tenetur Etquando lytotum sincategorematice, aliquando capicathegorematice. tursincategorematice huicorationi: Quandoverotenetur aequivalet quaelibit parsintegrālis. tunc huicorationi: enscompositum etcompletum expartibus." aequivalet categorematice, Soph ismata f.25rb. , ParsI,sophisma xlv, 28)Kretzmann, 233. exponibilia', 'Syncategoremata, sophismata, 29)"...notandum estquodaliquasunt terminům extra se syncategoremata quaenondistribuunt non est orationis cui illa in cuiadduntur; idestterminům qui pars syncategoremata aequivalent terminům intra se, hocestterminům sedtantum distribuunt quiestparsorationis significando, cuiaequivalent insignificando. Ethocsiilleterminus sitdistribuibilis, verbi hocsyncatgratia extra secuiaddatur, sicutisteterminus 'totus' nondistribuit terminům sed 'Sortes', egorema estisteterminus Idem de hoc et beneintra se,sicut 'pars'. patet 'semper'de syncathegoremate insignificando." aliisaequivalentibus orationibus Albert, , ParsI, sophisma integris Sophismata xlvf.25ra-rb.

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tothecomposite 'anyintegral partofSocrates'. expression semantically equivalent that sort ofwholeis not which' without is "a for An integral part, Albert, part AlberttakesSocrates'heartto be an integral ableto be."30 partofSocrates,but is not,sinceSocratesis able tobewithouthishandor Socrates'handor finger whole Albertclaimsthatforanyintegralpartbut not his heart.31 his finger, sort of some mustsignify relationto obtain,the integralpartsthemselves in orderto comprisean integral i.e. somemagnitudeor multitude, quantity, he whole.In hisAn Extremely Useful Logic says: are whole from isa certain Anintegral whole ,anditsparts parts having quantity aggregated arecalled whole isanintegral called , thewallandtheroof ; justasa house integral integral P parts to integral Albertdoes nothererefer parts"withoutwhichthatsortofwhole He only whole.33 is notableto be"as beingthe"essential parts"oftheintegral wholewith"havingessentialand incidental a qualitative identifies parts,"not whole.Forexample,in Part1, sophismaxlix,"Every or integral a quantitative thanitspart( Omnetotumestmaiorsuaparte)," he saysthata wholeis greater wholeis one madeup frompartswhereone is notoutsidetheother, qualitative and is madewholeand completethroughtheother.Thisis in twoways:inciIf it is made completein thefirst or essentially. way,it is an essential dentally 30)PL,Tract 4,ch.21,1308,385. 31)"What tocease a thing clear. Butifyoucancause aremaynotbealtogether 'material objects' but wasnotoneofitsparts that from it(oreven toexist bydestroying) something bydetaching ofallitsparts thearrangement ofitsenvironment , while wholly unchanged, leaving part simply a matebecalled that canproperly I maintain, ifyoucandothat ,then youhavenotgotanything 126.BothVanInwaUndetached ofArbitrary "The Doctrine rialobject." VanInwagen, Parts', material arenotpurely think human objects. beings genandAlbert 32)"Totum habentibus expartibus autem dicitur quantitatem; compositum quoddam integrale dicuntur autem ettectum totum sicut domus eiusdicitur etpars [est] paries integrale, integrālis, no. a concomitantibus PL ch. "De locis 382. Tract 1290, substantiam", 4, , partes integrales." 33)Thischaracterization Albert seems tobe and to shows that with wholes, respectintegral " parts , essentialism Loux's calls"mereobgical a defender ofwhat (Metaphysics 241):"...theviewthat butAlbert doesnotseemtobea ornecessarily," a thing whatever has,ithasessentially parts ".. .ifa part that near-essentialism calls'mereological ofwhat vanInwagens defender ,i.e.theview must then that isremoved from anobject, andnonewpartisaddedtothe'remainder' object Undetached ofArbitrary 'TheDoctrine ceasetoexist." therewith Parts', 124). (VanInwagen, that are'principal' between a distinction Buridan introduces Unlike Albert, John parts integral this seems to Albert thatare'non-principal', andthose implicitlyaccept distinction. although transi. Summulae deDialéctica, SeeJohn 6, Klima, Buridan, 2001),Treatise (NewHaven, Gyula ch.4,6.4.4,431.

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whole.If in thesecondway,it is an incidental whole.òA Here,it is clearthat essentialand incidental are the same as a parts thingsqualitative parts.Nevertheless,everyfinitequantitative physicalwholehas qualitativepartsthatare whole,and yetthosequalitative spatiallycongruentwiththatquantitative are not themselves Still, parts quantitative.35 thisdoesnotimplythatan essentialqualitative of the one wholeand completeSocrates,like part numerically hissoul/mind/life-principle, mustbe an "immaterial" partofhim.Itonlyimplies thatan essentialqualitative like a mustbe indipart, soul/mind/life-principle, therelationship visible,whichAlbertconcedesis indeedthecase.36Moreover, betweenan integral wholeand a quantitative wholeis asymmetric forAlbert. wholeis a quantitative whole,butnotviceversa. Everyintegral ' 4 (2d) Albert's Rejection ofthe Socrates-Minus Argument notionsin hisaccount,AlbertdeniestheconcluUtilizingtheaboveauxiliary sionoftheSocrates-Minus tisalready Socrates (9') A before namely, Argument, t. before Tothatdoubt, somerespond theinference "Socrates isa partofSocrates." And denying when itissaid;'Takealltheetc.',thecaseisgranted. Andwhen itissaid:'AisSocrates', that isdenied.37 Thereseemto be tworeasonsforAlberts denialoftheargument s conclusion. in hisresponse The first reasonemerges to theOpponentsclaim(4f):A before t, i.e. Socrates-Minus, is called a man becausehe is made up of a bodyand an intellective soul,whichoccursin sub-part[ß]. Albertsreasoning here,like soul/ Williams,is thatmerelybeingmadeup froma bodyand an intellective mind/life is not a condition for to be called a man: principle sufficient something 34)"Totum dicitur expartibus unanonestextra etcum aliam, qualitativum componi quarum Et hoc hocunaestperfectibilis aliam. vel una aliam essentialiter vel per dupliciter: perficitur per accidentaliter. Siprimum, sicesttotum essentiale. Sisecundum, sicesttotum accidentale. Exemetforma sicut estcompositum exmateria substantial^ sicut est secundi, plum primi, Exemplum ex et ParsI,sophisma f.28vb. albedine." Albert's Albert, xlix, compositum corpore Sophismata^ discussion ofquantitative andqualitative here beinspired butisclearly may parts byHeytesbury, s. notthesameasHeytesbury 35)Ibid.if.26va-b and27ra. 36)Sophismata , ParsII,f.48ra. 37)"Adilluddubium, dicunt istam Sortes estparsSortis. quidam consequentiam: negando Etquando dicitur: totalis casus. Etquando dicitur: A [NB]estSortes, etc.,admittitur Capitur f.25vb. Albertus, , ParsI,sophisma xlvi, negatur." Sophismata

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isdenied.38 A isa man;theinference When itissaid:'Aismadeupof,etc.,therefore, ' numeriTo be called a man, a manmustbe also be "perse unum (in himself " sé" one man who is unum per (numerically callyone),and notpartofanother one is a precondition fora man to persistas a in himself).Beingnumerically in his Furthermore: manthroughout parts.39 changes When it A isSocrates"; itisconceded. When itissaid"With a finger cutoff, TotheThird: hethen wasSocrates, heis now thereason issaid:"But,forthesamereason bywhich isinitself one that isdenied, because with a finger cutoffv4 , butwith Socrates"; numerically A would initself one.Forsomeone tobe a finger notcutoff notbesomething numerically for someone one itisrequired that hebeinhimself ,justasitisrequired Socrates, numerically tobeananimal.40 tobea manorsomething t, i.e. Socrates-Minus, is not Albertsreasoningseemsto be: SinceA before ' t when Socrates' until la man one in called really after, numerically himself is actuallycutoff,A does notreallyexistas a wholeand completeman finger is actuallycut offfromÇ, onlythenA t. Only C does.When a finger before onein himself Therecan be saidto be a wholeand completemannumerically A t only t cannotreallybe thesameas Ç before t,because before fore,A before A must can be called"a partofÇ", not"a wholeand completeÇ." Therefore, t* havebeen numerically distinct fromÇ before ř,i.e. Socrates-Minus before Socratesbefore ř.41On thebasisofParts[a], [ß],and [y],and hisdenialof (9') A before t is already(iam) Socratesbefore ř,Albertfinallyconcludesthatthe

38)"Etquando A esthomo; A estcompositum exanima dicitur: etc.,ergo consequennegatur f.25vb. tialAlbertus, , sophisma xlv, Sophismata 39)Theinterrelationship between natural substances andtheir hasbeenthorcomposite unity andEssence inAristotle discussed Substance ,AnInterpretation Witt, byCharlotte ofMetaoughly and 126-142. VII-IX 102-3 (Ithaca, 1989), physics 40)"Adtertiam, A esset Etquando dicitur: adhuc conceditur. Sortes; quando Digitoabscisso dicitur: Sedeademratione eademratione nuncest:negatur hoc,quia quatuncessetSortes, A esset A nonesset abscisso seddigito nonabscisso, perseunum, aliquod perseunum. digito sitSortes, Sedadhocquodaliquid sicut ad requiritur quodsitaliquid perseunum, requiritur hocquodaliquid sithomo, velaliquid sitanimal." Ibid. 41)Itshould beobvious thelarge roleAlberts commitment toa presentisi viewoftime strong inhisanalysis oftheSocrates-Minus Fora discussion of , aswellasWilliams. plays Argument inrejecting Albert s commitment topresentism andtheroleitplays eternalist viewof Buridans thecopula 'Problems with andScientific 'is',seeMichael J.Fitzgerald, Temporality Propositions inJohn 44 (2006),305-337. Buridan andAlbert ofSaxony, Vivarium

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)" sophism"ThewholeSocratesis a partofSocrates( TotusSortesestparsSortis is simplyfalse. 3. William,Albert,and Petervan Inwagen Williamand AlbertsrejectionoftheSocrates-Minus is historically Argument instructive becauseit appearsto be a forerunner of theviewarticulated and defendedbyPetervan Inwagen.Van Inwagenarguesthattheredoes notexist one wholeand completephysicalobjectthatcan be anysortof numerically called'Descartes-Minus i at all. Aftert bothDescartesand Descartesbefore Minussurvivethelossof thesamephysicalpartand occupythesameregion ofspace.Therefore, theymustbe identicalwholesaftert, and yettherewas a timewhentheyweredistinct, i.e. before t.A1 But Descartes-Minus t and before t occupieddifferent Descartesbefore of t. We theremust, regions space,before one whole and completeobjectearlierhad fore,concludethatnumerically twowholeand completeobjects,whichis a clearviolation been numerically ofthetransitivity ofidentity. He maintains premise(2) oftheDescartes-Minus = t i.e. Descartes-Minus Descartes-Minus t>therefore after before Argument, The undesirable mustbe false.43 (4) simplycannotbe inferred. Williamand Albertscommentson the Socrates-Minus Argumentshow thattheycameto thesameconclusionas van Inwagendoes in theDescartesMinus Argument,but by a different route.They reason:A and C must havebeendifferent one and whole ř,sinceA is the numerically objectsbefore A before t, i.e. Socratesand completeSocrates'onlyaftert. On theiranalysis, one,wholeand complete Minus,could not reallybe anysortof numerically t, becauseit is onlyafiert thatA in factbecomesa physicalobjectat all before one(perse unum).AA wholeand completephysicalobject,in itself numerically This is clear fromtheirrejectionsof Parts[a], [ß], and [y],whichimply one wholeand completeÇ before t. thatA mustbe somesortof numerically Hence, like van Inwagen,theywould also claim thatpremise(2) of the of the undesirable Descartes-Minus Argumentis false,and the entailment from and (1), (2), (3) cannottake (4) of the Descartes-Minus Argument, are historical forerunners of their and conclusions place. Hence, arguments Petervan Inwagens.

42)VanInwagen, ofArbitrary Undetached 'TheDoctrine 125-126. Parts', 43)Ibid.,126. 44)Cf.alsoHeytesbury, , f.I47va-vb. Sophismata

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4. A "pragmaticresolution"to theModem Descartes-MinusArgument: and a Weak 'Antrhopic Principle' EmbracingtheIdentityofIndiscernibles, AlbertandWilliamsanalysisoftheirSocrates-Minus is philosophiargument it because us with "a callyinteresting today provides pragmaticresolution" to the modernDescartes-Minus Argument.It is Albertsinsistencein the Socrates-Minus thatSocratesmustbe a man"wholeand complete Argument in particular, one in himself," and numerically thatsuggests a pragmatic resolutionto theDescartes-Minus The pragmatic resolution he has in Argument. mindis thatwe mustbe able to discernSocratesto be "wholeand complete and numerically one in himself," whetherbefore , during,or after , t. Indeed, "Leibniz'slaws"is reallya compoundof an epistemological a and metaphysical claimwithrespectto physicalobjects.As I see it,theIndiscernibility ofIdenticalsis themetaphysical claim.It maintains: if two "Necessarily, physicalobjects are numerically identical,then theyhave all the same propertiesand are indiscernible fromone other,i.e. we cannotdiscernthemto be different from one another." TheIdentity Indis cer n ib ile on the other is the s, hand, of epistemoiftwoobjectsareindiscernible from logicalclaim.It maintains:"Necessarily, one otherand have all the same properties, thentheyare numerically one fromone physicalobject becausewe cannotdiscernthemto be different another."The metaphysical claim is logicallynecessary, but the necessity involvedin theepistemological claimis at bestonlynaturally necessary, given thewaywe perceivephysicalobjects.Indeed,Hans Reichenbach, thetwentihaspointedout thereis a crucialepistemoeth-century physicist-philosopher, in inherent the four-dimensionalist accountofphysical logicaldifficulty objects. Insucha space[i.e.four-dimensional one]eventhehuman bodywouldbefour-dimenanditsperceptual would bevery different. ofthetwo-dimensional Instead sional, apparatus retina oftheeye, there bea three-dimensional would retina. Whereas thevisual experience ofthethird the"depth," is nowachieved effect dimension, primarily bythecombined ofthetwoeyesandis therefore different from theexperience oftheother qualitatively twodimensions, thethree-dimensional ina four-dimensional would beas experience space immediate astwo-dimensional inourthree-dimensional Thecombined experiences space. effect ofthetwothree-dimensional ontheretina would uswith thevisual pictures supply ofthefour-dimensional Ifwetry toimagine interms suchexperience of experience space. ourpresent weshallfind that there arecertain limitations. Thenewperceptual sensations, wewishtodescribe would havenewsense that donotexist under the experience qualities conditions with which wearefamiliar. Wecantherefore indicate mathematical what [i.e.viaabstract models] onlyindirectly kind ofperceptual insucha world.45 would result experiences 45)HansReichenbach, ThePhilosophy andTime MariaReichenbach andJohn , transi. ofSpace

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Hence, even if a givenfour-dimensional temporalwhole is made up of its withourpresis no naturalpossibility, there four-dimensional temporalparts, either the four-dimensional or discern can see that we entperceptual apparatus, wholeto be "initselfa wholeand completeand parts,orthefour-dimensional We simplydo not discernone temporal worm." one numerically space-time sliceof it fromanotheror thewholeand completetemporal"worm."To be forus simplymeansthatifourperceptual "discernible" apparatusis functionand a physicalobjectis directly presentto us,thenwe perceiveit ingnormally one and Fora thingto be numerically structured. to be as itis so geometrically coora set of it to be for us is for wholeand completephysicalobject spatially dinatedphysicalelementsand nothingmore.This meansphysicalobjects becausetheyarein factso three-dimensionally arediscernable byus precisely one three dimensional i.e. structured, numerically objectsare "in themselves here to I am . and wholeand complete"{perse unumetperfectibilis) appealing 4 theweakformofwhatRogerPenrosecallsthe anthropic ' i.e. "... the principle universewe perceiveabout us mustbe of sucha natureas willproduceand accommodatebeingswho can perceiveit."46 AlthoughI realizetheanthropic based valuemaybe oflimiteduse,nevertheless, overallargumentative principles K at from the 2.7 radiation on thecosmicmicrowave Bang Big background three-dimensional our absolute C above 2.7 zero), perceptual (i.e. degrees of structure reliableindicatorof thethree-dimensional abilityseemsa pretty Kenneth remarks withIntroductory 1958),291.Prof. (NewYork, Freund, Carnap byRudolf takes issuewithReichenbachs ofSouthern at theUniversity a biologist Mississippi, Curry, out(ifI haveaccurately haspointed with conversation Inprivate here. account me,Prof. Curry is leveloforganization at the tissue structure our retinal that his understoodview), although a three-dimensional have cellular level at the the nerve two-dimensional, endings primarily evenifwehadonly three-dimensional andwillgiveuslimited ability perceptual arrangement twoeyes, enhanced is further visual oneeye.Whilethisthree-dimensional byhaving ability from different" is enhancement the three-dimensional that claim Reichenbachs "qualitatively it could be For is tissue on the retinal thetwo-dimensional biologically suspect. example, image the andaltering farther theeyes vision three-dimensional toenhance apart, byspacing possible but three-dimensional Thismight vision, structure. retinal giveusenhanced eyesunderlying andtheprevithisnewvisualization between difference" toany"qualitative notamount would suchanenhancevisualization. bethree-dimensional would Moreover, ousone.Bothessentially asisthe belostfornearby andwould distant would ment objects, objects, helpusinseeing only main withReichenbachs doesagree Prof. smallobjects. however, casenowwithvery Curry, four-dimensional and three-dimensional between difference" that any"qualitative namely, point, cannowbiologically beunlike would visualization imagine. anyone anything 46)Roger Guide totheLawsoftheUniverse A Complete , (NewYork, RoadtoReality: The Penrose, 2005),28.6,757-8.

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physicalobjectsin theuniverseat large,". . .at leastout to thelimitsof the observableuniversewhichextendsto a distancethatincludesaround 1011 We simplydo notdirectly some 1080baryons."47 perceive galaxies,containing and and as "whole four-dimensional numerically complete physicalobjects tistaccountof physicalobjectsis thatthree-dimensional one." The perduran physical four-dimensional physicalobjects,like Socrates,are reallyincomplete one and These latter are whole and . numerically when only complete objects i.e. "death"in thecase theirmaterialtemporal"worms"taperout ofexistence, are accessibleto us, of organisms.Epistemologically, they only indirectly three-dimensional via mathematical models.But,discerning physical namely, seems whole and over different one and as times, complete objects numerically naturalcapacityofhumanbeingsthathassurvival to be an evolvedpragmatic valueforthem.Human beingsseemto haveevolvedvia naturalselectionto wholeand completeand numerically be able to discerna three-dimensional buthavenotevolvedso as one enduringlion,say,as a threatto theirsurvival, lion "a four-dimensional to discern perduring space-timeworm"to be such on us as surviving a threat.No greatsurvivaladvantagehas been conferred theredoes seem a but to discern four-dimensional lion, perduring organisms a three-dimensional one. conferred on us to discern to be a survival advantage "survival value"wouldhaveto be "cashedin"bytheperduFour-dimensional rantistas our abilityto "conjoinall thetemporalslicesof thelion,"perceive whichisno improvethatconjunction, andthentakeflight atthatconjunction, "in lion as himself one menton perceiving thethree-dimensional numerically naturalperceptualcapaciand wholeand complete."Our three-dimensional seem to functionas the epistemicand pragmaticgroundto ties,therefore, resolvetheDescartes-Minus Thissortof epistemicand pragmatic Argument. whatis lackingin theperdurantist evaluations seemsto be precisely grounding in of the Descartes-Minus is not the evaluation of but lacking Argument, our theSocrates-Minus Socrates is fourteenth-century by logicians. Argument "wholeand completeand numerically one 'in himself'," on theiranalysis. While it is truethatwe can conceiveof some abstractfour-dimensional Socratesor Descartes,"our discerning of anyspatiallycoordinated "temporal betweenthe threeand four-dimensional Socratesor elementaldifferences Descartescanonlyaccomplished two different and abstract bycomparing very with one another.A four-dimensional "space-time geometricalstructures Socratesor Descartes"is conceived and locatedonlyindirectly, via an abstract 47)Ibid,718.

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of a certaintypeof geometricstructure. Neitherare directly representation because are not and numerically perceivable by us, precisely they temporally completein thepresent. maintainsthatSocrateshas Althoughneithermedievallogicianexplicitly a claim thattheiracceptanceof physical"temporal parts," perdurantist might Socrateshavingphysical"qualitative thanclaimparts"is no morecomplicated ingthathe has temporalparts.Yet,forWilliamandAlbert,thephysicalqualitative different fromthecontemporary partsofa physical objectaresignificandy tists For both William andAlbert,qualitaperduran physical"temporal parts." tivepartsof a physicalobjectaretemporally boundto thepresenttime,and bounded the kind of spatially by physical objectitis.lhe "temporal parts"ofa four-dimensional for the are not so or object perdurantist temporally spatially bounded,unlesstheobjectwas suddenlyto ceaseto existin thepresent. we are merelymetaphysically Accordingto perdurantists "prejudiced"in the three-dimensional when we carve the way up spatialspreadof physical A claim that Socrates-Minus and Socratesare objects.48 perdurantist might distinct and discerned to be so,eventhoughtheyoccupythesame numerically is all of Socratesexcepthis finger and is mappedonto space.Socrates-Minus Socrateswithall hisfingers. We directly see bothofthemoccupying thesame fillsup the same space as space at the same time,becauseSocrates-Minus - exceptfora finger. Socrates Hence,we can see themas numerically distinct, in both the same yet space. Williamwouldprobablyreplyto sucha perdurantist byarguingthatgiven accountwe should also see an infinitenumberof Socratesperdurantist Minusesfillingup thesame space as Socratesat thesame time- exceptfor somepart.This,he wouldthink,wouldbe too absurdfortheperdurantist to defend.Albert,on theotherhand,wouldprobablyarguethatSocrates-Minus doesnotexistatthesametimeandinthesameproperspacewithSocrates simply and tenfingers. is simplynot"in himself, Socrates-Minus wholeand complete and numerically in theirrepliesto theperdurantist, one."49Nevertheless, both Albertand Williammakean implicitepistemological appealto ourimmediate awareness ofSocratesto avoidtheperdurantist s conclusion. perceptual In conclusion,theprimary of the shortcoming contemporary perdurantist Descartes-Minus is thatin emphasizing themetaphysical claimin Argument LeibnizsLaws,theyblatandy itsepistemological claim.Perdurantism, disregard 48)Loux, , 228-229. Metaphysics 49)"Impossible estquodduocorpora sintsimul locoproprio." PL, tract 3, perse ineodem no.759,251.

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if embraced,would constantly four-dimensional requireus to reformulate into more familiar three-dimensional to ones, generateany sortof objects The rejectionofSocrates-Minus as a really plausiblenaturalized epistemology. both Albert and the and that William, object,by existing requirement whateverobjectis beingconsideredmustbe "in itselfnumerically one wholeand complete,"remindsus todaythatthe medievalpragmaticresolutionto the Socrates-Minus alsocan be appliedto thecontemporary DescartesArgument Minus Argument.Hence, the contemporary Descartes-Minus Argumentis farmoremedieval,or perhapsthemedievalSocrates-Minus is far Argument moremodern,thanhas beenpreviously thought.

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Vivarium 47 (2009)74-96

John Wyclif and the Theory of Complexly

Signifiables

RichardGaskin University ofLiverpool Abstract ofessential claimsthatthere arerelations andformal distinctness John Wyclif identity In and individuals. some universais, complexly Wycconnecting signifiables, respects lifs position on complexly withwhatI calltheadvancedres coincides signifiables theviewthatcomplexly arereally identical withbutformally distheory, signifiables Butthereis no questionin Wyclif s treatment ofa tinctfromworldly individuals. I arguethatWyclif reduction ofcomplexly to individuals. his signifiables populates mostfundamental level with structured entities both indipropositionally ontological issuperior tothatofitsnominalist vidualanduniversal, andthatthisapproach rivals. withother versions oftheadvanced restheory animplausible ButWyclif shares theory thecoherence oftheclaimedrealidentity between ofidentity, andthisaffects individuals andcomplexly signifiables. Keywords formal universais distinction, realism, essence, identity, complexly signifiables, 1 Introduction signifiables {complexe sigAccordingto thelatemedievaltheoryof complexly ofRimini,theulti), championedbyAdamWodehamand Gregory nificabilid ofa spokenor written declarative and theobjectof matesignificate sentence, and is an scientific and theological assent,dissent, knowledge, extra-categorial thesentencein quescanonically bynominalizing worldlystructure specified tion.Thus thesignificate of thesentence"God is threeand one" ("Deus est and one(.Deumesse trinuset unus")is takento be theobjectthatGodis three was developedin oppositionbothto Williamof trinum etunum)}The theory 0 A. Wodeham, Sententiarum. etDistinctio eds. Lectura Secunda inPrimům Prima, Prologus Lectura ofRimini, R.WoodandG.Gal,(St.Bonaventura, 1990),esp.180-208; Super Gregory Brill ©Koninklijke 2009 NV, Leiden,

DOI:10.1 163/156853408X345927

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attitudes and bearerofpropositional Ockham,whoheldtherelevant significate mentalis to be a propositio , and to WalterChatton,who heldthattherelevant ofthesentencessubject, itemwas (in thesimplest kindofcase) thesignificate extra-mental individual God, in thecaseofoursama non-complex typically In contrast with the sentence.2 simplerestheoryof Chatton,some later ple as de Neufchâteau and Hieronymus such André Pardo,adopted philosophers, whichagreedwithGregorys whatwe mightcallan advancedrestheory, theory, Aristotein thefirst theresulting with butaimedto reconcile instance, ontology and usuallyalso withnominalism, lian category byarguingthatcomtheory, The took be reduced to individuals.3 doctrine could typically plexlysignifiables and thearticulated formof claimingthatappropriate complexlysignifiables arereally identical butformally distinct. individuals So, forexample,God would be reallyidenticalwith,butformally distinct from,theentitythatGodis three in someofitsnomI havediscussedtheadvancedrestheory andone. Elsewhere inalistmanifestations.4 But thetheoryalso lentitselfto a realistconstruction, thatI wishto focushere. and itis on a prominent suchversionofthetheory treatise on withtheprincipalaim wrote his famous universais JohnWyclif ofdefending realism.Butin thecourseofpursuingthisobjective metaphysical thatis of conhe developeda versionof thetheoryof complexly signifiables to siderablehistorical and systematic interest. Corresponding thesetwo featuresof its interest,the discussionwhich followshas two main aims, a one and a polemicalone. AlessandroConti notedin 1997 that descriptive criticaleditionofWyclifs treatise on untilthepublicationin 1985 ofthefirst in s favour of universais scholarshad generally neglectedWyclif philosophy has his theologyand politics.5 Contis own work,alongwiththatof others,6 etDist.1-6,eds.A.Trapp Primum etSecundum Sententiarum andV.Marcolino , t./,Prologus LateScholastic and seeG. Nuchelmans, (Berlin, 1981),esp.1-40.On thetheory generally, and Humanist Theories (Amsterdam, 1980),3-140;E. J.Ashworth, Language oftheProposition in the Post-Medieval Period Studies in Post-Medieval Semantics 37-76; (Dordrecht, 1974), Logic (London, 1985),ch.IV. 2)Forreferences totherelevant seemy' Complexe andAristotle's texts, ', Significabilia Categories andI. Rosier-Catach Latradition médiévale descatégories (eds.), (Louvain, 2003),187inj.Biard 205,nn.3 and5. 3)Seemy'Complexe inA. Maierù andtheFormal andL. Valente Distinction', Significabilia Medieval Theories andNon-Assertive (eds.), (Rome, 2004),495-516. ofAssertive Language 4)Seeart.cit.,previous note. 5)A. Conti, andFormal Distinction: On theLogical BasisofWyclif s Metaphysics', 'Analogy Medieval and at 134. 6, 1997, 133-65, PhilosophyTheology p. 6)HereI shallbeespecially with concerned 'Introduction' toJohn OnUniversais Spade's Wyclif: deUniversalibus A Kenny ), trans. (Tractatus 1985). (Oxford,

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thatimbalance,butofcoursethereis muchstill gonesomewayto rectifying to be done, and one aspectof Wyclifs philosophythathas suffered undue oflogicand languageis hisrealistic treatment of neglectevenfromhistorians thetheory ofcomplexly That is the signifiables. largely descriptive programme topicof§§2-4 ofthispaper.As formypolemicalagenda,itwillbe arguedthat Wyclifs versionof thetheoryof complexlysignifiables, thoughnotwithout is philosophically to its main nominalist rivals(§§4-5). The difficulty, superior in which it is is one that it shares withitsrivals, principalrespect problematic and stemsfromthe veryidea of attempting to combinereal identity with formaldistinctness; forthe advancedrestheoryhas difficulty makinggood senseoftherelationofrealidentity (§6). 2

Complexesignificabiliain the Tractatusde Universalibus

In his Tractatus de Universalibus, whichformsthesixthtractofthefirst book oftheso-calledSummadeEnte7andwasprobablycomposedin 1373-4,8Wycrealismabout universais,9 identifies lif,in thecourseof defending universais withtruths on theone hand,10 and withcomplexly on theother.11 signifiables Forexample,theuniversal is identified bothwiththetruth"thereis humanity a man"{homoest),conceivedas a worldlyentity, and withthecomplexly signifiablethatthereis a man(hominem In the De Logicatheproposition esse).12 is definedas an "ens complexesignificans", or moreaccurately as a "racio sicut est vel sicut non indicativa, and the est", congrua,significans complexe 7)On thiswork ingeneral, seeJ.Robson, andtheOxford Schoob 1961), Wyclif (Cambridge, Part II. 8)SeeI. Muellers introduction tohisedition oftheTractatus deUniversalibus (TdU),(Oxford, xix-xxx. Allreferences totheTdUwillbetothis edition. 1985), 9)Foruseful oftheessential ofWyclif s metaphysics andtheology, seeA.Kenny, surveys points "The PlaceofMetaphysics {Oxford, inWyclif s Theology', inA.Hudson 1985);G.Leff, Wyclif andM. Wilks Ockham toWyclif OnWyclif s treatment (eds.),From (Oxford, 1987),217-32. ofuniversais, seeConti, 'Studio inJohannes storico-critico' Universalia Quaestio Sharpe: super andAnalogy', 150-8. (Florence, 1990),esp.298-309, 10)TdU,55,93-56,104; follow the 79,184-84,315; 167,429-172,539; 373,490-6. (Allcitations format: linenumbers.) Cf.Johannis Tractatus deLogica ,vol.2 (Logica (2)), pagenumbers, Wyclif ed.M.Dziewicki Summa deEnte, Libri Primi Trac(London, 1896),33,12-30; Johannis Wyclif tatus Primus etSecundus (SdE),ed.S. H. Thomson 44,22-45,28. (Oxford, 1930), n) TdU,22,109-11; Cf. 74,88-99; 77,161-78,168; 79,184-84,315; 111,17; 167,429-172,539. De EnteLibrorum Duorum 39,21-41,35; (2),33,12-30; (ELD),ed.M. DzieLogica Excerpta wicki (London, 42,31-9; 1909),30,10-11; SdE,27,16-29,16; 44,22-45,28. ,2)TdU; 70,13-16. Cf.169,457-172,539; 181,754-5.

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of the propositions "Deus est" and "homo est" are specifiedas significates Deumesseand hominem esserespectively.13 Wyclif agreeswithAdamWodeham and Gregory ofRiminithattheseentitiesaretheultimateobjectsofscientific and thereasonshe givesarereminiscent ofGregorys in particular: knowledge, one can havethatknowledge withoutbeingacquaintedwiththerelevant spokenor written termsor mentalconcepts,and thatknowledge can survivethe demiseofspokenorwritten claims,against signsandmentalconcepts.14 Wyclif theOckhamisttradition, thatno spokenor written sentencecouldbe trueor ofa truthor necessity a parterei, necessary excepton thebasisoftheexistence and thatsuchrealexistenceis independent of theexistenceof signs:it is the universal of generalterms,not thosetermsthemselves or worldlysignificates theircorresponding mentalconcepts,thatgivesscienceitsgenerality.15 As faras worldlytruthsareconcerned, WyclifagreeswithWalterBurleigh thatthereis sucha thingas a propositio in re>or realpredication, as he callsit.16 In hisDe Logica, Wyclifin factdistinguishes twokindsof realproposition.17 (i) First,thereis whathe callsthe"propositio realis",examplesofwhichareiste homoand istelapls.Wyclifclassifies theseas propositions becausetheyhave in the case of istehomo , for implicit(and real) subject-predicatestructure: of the in man instance,humanityis implicitly reallypredicated question. thereis the"truth on thesideofthething,likethetruth (ii) Secondly, signified thatmanis"(Veritas a partereiy sicutistaVeritas: hominem Like esse).18 significata realpredication to truths,19 and indeedat one point Wyclifrestricts Burleigh, he evenrefuses thetitle"predication" to falsepredications.20 ButWyclifgoes further thanBurleighin one important respect:whereasBurleighallowedthe sentenceto havea realcorrelate, copulaofa truenegative namelythediversity of thethingsforwhichtheextremes denies realexistenceto supposit,Wyclif 13)Johannis Tractatus deLogica , vol.1 (.Logica (1)),ed.M. Dziewicki (London, 1893), Wyclif cf.Logica doesnotdistinguish between 14,1-24; thesignificates ofprop(2),203,24-31. Wyclif ositions andoftheir nominalizations SdE,27,16-28,4; (dicta): 29,17-30,20. ,4)TdU,144,444-149,564. Cf.SdE, S. H. Thomson, £A "Lost" , 35,11-13; Chapter ofWyclif's Summa deEnte atpp.342-3. , Speculum 4, 1929,339-46, 15)TdU, 140,356-65; 144,444-61. 16)TdU16,24-28,170. OnBurleigh, seeJ.Pinborg, 'Walter ontheMeaning ofPropBurleigh Classica etMediaevalia ositions', 28,1967,394-404. ,7)Logica Cf.thedefinition ofpersepredication atTdU, 18,41-4. (1),14,25-15,25. 18)Cf.Kenny, 'TheRealism oftheDe Universalibus' inA. Kenny inhisTimes ed.,Wyclif atpp.18-19; (Oxford, 138-42. 1986),17-29, Conti, 'Analogy', ,9)TdU,27,160-28,169; cf.ELD, 13,20-3. 140,356-65; 20)TdU,33,231. SeeSpade, xl-xli. 'Introduction,

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toutcourt}1So forWyclif negative propositions onlypositivetruepredications can be real.Indeedhe introduces further restrictions on thescopeofrealpredication:truthsaboutthepastand future, likenegativetruthsand logicalpossibilitiesare,forWyclif, mereentiarationis whoserealcorrelate is God.22In real existence to s denying negativepropositions Wyclif positionis morecircumscribed thanBurleigh's; butin anotherrespectitis muchmoreradical.We can see thisifwe notethatBurleigh's doctrineofthepropositio in reis wrongly so called.For,giventhathe locatesthecopulain themind,and giventhat,on hisview,thecorrelates oftruepositiveand negativesentences in theworldare theidentity ordiversity ofthethingsforwhichtheextremes ofthosesentences supposit,respectively, Burleighin factendsup witha positionon thepropositionnotsubstantially different fromthatofhisnominalist opponents:thereis for structured that is in theworld. not, Burleigh, anything propositionally wholly ButforWyclif whathe callsrealpredication areindeed propositions involving in the world: so for him the world does contain wholly really propositionally structured entities.23 Thesepropositionally structured entities,whichare in effectthe same as whatGregory callscomplexly arefurther identified with signifiables, byWyclif individuals drawn from the ten calls the idenappropriate Wyclif categories.24 butbythishe meanswhatis usuallycalled tityin question"essential" identity, "real"identity: he usestheword"essence"to denotethings, whether ofgeneric, or numerical the term for in the essences specific, unity,25 reserving "quiddity" usualsense,thatis, for(collectionsof) constitutive and properties, reserving thenotion"realidentity" fora sub-classofessentialidentities whichneednot concernus here.26 Like otherproponents ofwhatI havecalledtheadvancedrestheory(§1), who held thatcomplexlysignifiables are reallyidenticalwith,but formally distinctfrom,worldlyindividualthings, Wyclifcombinesa claimofessential betweenindividualsand appropriate withthe identity complexly signifiables thesisthatindividualsare formally distinctfromthe complexlysignifiables 2,)TdU,27,157-28,169. 22)TdU,27,157-28,169; Cf.'LostChapter', deEnte 128,77-9; 138,312-18. 342;Johannis Wyclif Predicamentali {EP),ed.R.Beer(London, 1891),ch.1. 23)Seehere (1),14,1-15,25. again Logica 24)TdU,72,48-73,67. Seefurther TdU,74,88-99; 124,322; 90,112-20;114,79276,83-277,84. Cf.Logica ELD, 37,6-38,19; SdE, 19,4-5; 22,1-13; (2),203,24-31; 25,18-27,15; 36,11-26; 44,22-45,28. 25)TdU,90,126-91,130; Cf.Kenny, 21-2. 129,110-130,119. Wyclif 26)TdU, p.91,131-7. Cf.Spade, xxi. 'Introduction,

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of identical.27 withwhichtheyare essentially And, givenhis identification that univerthat has the withcomplexly universais consequence signifiables, distinctfrom,individuals: identicalwith,thoughformally saisareessentially disthetwoareformally andviceversa, universal isindividual, I agree . . . that though every thespecies of . . . How,I askyou,would from eachother. universally knowing tinguished that this manisisthat a species? this manwere this unless manhelptoknow man, Similarly toitsinferior.28 issomething common thesuperior manis,andinthis realpredication inasmuchas ittellsus thatthereis in facta complete Thispassageis interesting and individucoincidence between universais, complexly signifiables, worldly with areto be identified universais als.We havealreadyseenthat,forWyclif, with are to be identified and complexlysignifiables complexlysignifiables The abovepassageconareindividuals. it followsthatuniversais individuals: theconverseimplication thisimplication,29 butitalso affirms firms ("andvice It followsthatthe versa"),indicatingthateveryindividualis a universal.30 and threeexpressions "universais", pick "complexly signifiables", "individuals" thateveryentityis out exactlythe same worldlythings.(It followsfurther such identicalwithat leastone individual.Second-order universais, essentially as beingpredicable Anygivenentitypickedout ofmany,are no exception.)31 underone of thesecharacterizations is, in Wyclifs terminology, essentially distinct identical from,an entitypickedout undereach with,thoughformally ofrelevant As faras thesupposition oftheothertwocharacterizations. expressionsgoes,thismeansthata nounphrasesuchas "beingblind"(caecumesse) can have eitherpersonalsupposition,in whichcase it suppositseitherfor or or foranyoftheiraccidents,32 themselves blindindividuals (thesubstances) 27)TdU,178,695-9; cf.ELD, 37,6-38,19. 28)TdU, 87,57-69 "concedo... translation): (I haveadapted Kenny's quodomneuniversale foret formaliter abinvicem Quomodo, estsingulare etecontra, licetdistinguantur quaeso, nisi ille universaliter ilium hominis, hominem, speciem pertinens cognoscendo cognoscere reali homoforet sicutiliumhominem esseesthominem esse,inquapraedicatione species, SeealsoTdU,102,100-4; communicatur suoinferiori?". 139,346-140,351; 284,262superius ELD, 37,5-39,26; Cf.Logica 308,176-97; 338,193-212. 285,278; 289,380-91; (2),37,3-18; SdE, 61,8-12. 29)Cf.TdU,150,8-16; xxiv-v. Cf.Spade, 'Introduction, SdE,65,16-27. 30)Cf.TdU,137,281-4. 31)Cf.Spade, xxv. 'Introduction, 32)Notjusttheaccident asweshallseeshortly, accidental are(at ofbeing blind, for, properties asweshall least onWyclif s official with their andthough, alsosee,the view)identical subjects, sview tobethat universais relation ofessential isnotingeneral transitive, identity Wyclif appears

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of simplesupposition,in whichcase it suppositsforthe formor property noun"blindness" blindness.The abstract (caecitas ), on theotherhand,always thougha partereithereis no distinction suppositsfora formor property, identicalwith betweenblindnessand beingblind (theyare both essentially in questioncan be conveyedboth The essentialidentities blindindividuals).33 and bywhathe calls"essential predpredication" bywhatWyclifcalls"formal ication":letus examinethesenotions.

3 Wyclifon Predication of theprediwe are told,involvestheformalinherence Formalpredication, as a real in taken the cate,takenas a real (thatis, worldly)entity, subject, is said to involveone and thesameessentia whileessentialpredication entity, as and as both predicate(again,takingsubjectand predicate subject featuring of predication of thesevarieties Now Wyclifs treatment realentities).34 gives of essential riseto some exegeticaldifficulties.35 First,the officialdefinition conditionof and nota sufficient plainlysuppliesonlya necessary predication essentia are the same and where are cases for there it,36 (real)subject predicate in the structure to "essential but whereWyclifrefusesthe title predication" de Universalibus Secondly, althoughWyclifclaimsin the Tractatus question.37 in thefourthtreatise includesformalpredication,38 thatessentialpredication in comerrores circauniversalia bookoftheSummade ente(.Purgans ofthefirst 39 exclusive. aremutually muni) he statesthatessentialand formalpredication commonto twofeatures to notethefollowing Butforourpurposesitsuffices de in the Tractatus as theyarepresented bothformaland essentialpredication well as as accidental Both include Universalibus. predication,40 quidditative with eachother: identical areessentially inanindividual 271,800TdU,91,138-47; that converge Cf. in text 1-19. the 24,1 SdE, below). 272,806 (quoted 33)TdU,132,171-133,194. Cf.Logica SdE,23,21-27,15. 42,38-43,27; (2),40,39-41,35; 34)TdU' 28,171-33,234. Cf.'LostChapter', 342-4. 35)Cf.Spade, ofpredicaa third wecanignore xxxv-xli. Forourpurposes 'Introduction, variety habitudinem. secundum identifies: tionthat Wyclif praedicatio 36)PaceConti, 156. 'Analogy', 37)TdU,32,219-33,233; 259,514-22. 38)TdU,35,258-36,267. 39)'LostChapter', 342. 40)Inthecaseofquidditative essential andquidditative formal andaccidental predpredication, essential foraccidental atTdU, 28,170-35,249; definitions theofficial from thisisclear ication, 'LostChapter', 342-3. cf.ELD,35,26-32; see,e.g.,TdU,240,49-59; predication,

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and bothinvolvetheessentialidentity of subjectand predicate, takenas real entities. of Wyclifthusfollowsa standardmedievaltheoryof thetruth-conditions non-modaldeclarative theso-called sentences, simplesingularpresent-tensed "identity theory", accordingto whichthetruthofsuchsentences requiresthat and taken as entities, subject predicate, linguistic suppositforthesamething; in Wyclifs case,giventhathe is construing subjectand predicateas realentiis expressed as a requirement thatsubjectand predicate ties,therequirement be the same.41 To forestall itwould confusion, actually possibleterminological be wellto stateclearlyhowtheidentity differs fromthe theoryofpredication simpleand advancedrestheoriesof sentencemeaningwe havealreadymentioned.The identity ofa declarative sentheoryaimsto tellus whatthetruth tenceconsistsin- namelythe identity of subjectand predicate,in Wyclifs oftheirsignificates, in theusualversions.The restheversion,or theidentity aims to tell us what the sentence contrast, ory,by meaningof a declarative consistsin- namelytheindividualsignified its term. That is the by subject to whichtheadvancedversionadds thatthe simpleversionof therestheory, relevant individualis reallyidenticalwith,butformally distinctfrom,therelevantcomplexly signifiable. It is noteworthy thatwhilein Ockhamsmorefamiliar versionof theidenof subjectand predicateis notonlynecessary but titytheory, co-supposition alsosufficient forthetruthofthecorresponding insists that sentence,42 Wyclif of subjectand predicateis onlya (castingthe theoryin his terms)identity and not also a sufficient For thereare sencondition,of truth.43 necessary, tences,suchas "TheFatheris theSon","Man is an ass","The Deityis begottherequirement ten,diesetc.",and "Thequiddityofa maniswhite",satisfying thatsubjectand predicate be identicalin re, butthatarenevertheless nottrue. Thesesentences needto be subjectedto exportation (to borrowQuines term) of criticalexpressions in orderto renderthemtrue:44 forexample,the first needs to be converted to "The Father is that proposition thingwhichis {illud the the secondto "Man is whatan ass is",etc.45We arriveat quod est) Son", thatare presumably "essen(to put it in Wyclifs terminology) predications In sayingthatsuch tial",and true;butwe do nothavea commonsuppositum. 41)Ontheidentity further references torelevant seemy'Überlegungen zur (with texts), theory Identitätstheorie derPrädikation', undWeisheit 60, 1997,87-103. Wissenschaft 42)Summa Loeicae etal.(St.Bonaventura, , ed.P.Boehner 1974),II,2,249,8-250,16. 43)TdU,32,219-33,233; 259,514-22. 44)Cf.my'Complexe andtheFormal Distinction', §4. Significabilia 45)Cf.TdU,99,34-102,104;240,59-67;264,622-267, 706.

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arepresumably I takeissuewithP.V. Spade,whoargues essential, predications thatin orderto captureWyclifs realintentions we shouldadd therequirementof a commonsuppositum to thedefinition of essentialpredication.46 If thatis correct,therelevantexported'predications ("Man is whatan ass is", afterall,and so notrealpredication etc.)willnotinvolveessentialpredication either(sincetheyarecertainly not casesof formalpredication). But it is one - itis after thingto holdthat"Man is an ass"doesnotinvolverealpredication all falseand,whatever we thinkofthepoint,Wyclif as we have seen(§2), does, restrict realpredications to truths; itwouldbe quiteanotherthingto holdthat "Man is whatan ass is",whichis true,does notinvolverealpredication, and I thinkwe shouldtryto avoidimputingsucha strongdoctrineto Wyclif. Whetheror not I am rightabout this,it is clearthataddingto Wyclifs definition of truth,which,as we haveseen,yieldsmerelynecessary and not alsosufficient therequirement ofa commonsuppositum conditions, (or,to put it in Spades terms,addingtherequirement thattherelevantpredication be will not that definition. Instead we will real) patchup flipfroma specification ofnecessary butnotsufficient conditionsfortruthto one ofsufficient butnot conditions: real on its own was not for necessary identity sufficient truth, becausetherearecasesoffalsehoods such ("Man is an ass"); involving identity realidentitytogether witha commonsuppositum is not necessary fortruth, becausetherearecasesoftruths notinvolving a commonsuppositum ("Man is whatan ass is"). definition of truthintoa specificaRather,in orderto converttheofficial tionof bothnecessary and sufficient conditionswe haveto alludeexplicitly to suppositiontheory. Now in thetreatise on universais to Wyclifis unwilling do this,becausehis realistapproachto predicationis precisely designedto obviatetheneedto talkaboutrelations betweenlanguageand theworld.But how otherwise arewe to accountforthedatumthat"Man is an ass"failsto be true,and failsevento involvean essentialpredicationin spiteof thefact thatman and ass have the same essentia(the genus animality),47whereas "Man is thatthingwhichis an ass"succeedsin beingbothtrueand (presumTherecan onlybe one explanationof this ably) an essentialpredication?48 the variation between thesetwosentencesin thesupposidifference, namely tionof therelevantlinguistictermsoccurring therein:thereis a shifteither frompersonalsupposition in thefirst caseto simplesupposition in thesecond, 461 xxxvii-xxxviii. 'Introduction, 47)TdU,33,227-32. 48)TdU,99,34-43.

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or fromsimplesuppositionof thespeciesin thefirstcase to simplesuppositionof thegenusin thesecond.49By contrast,as long as we remainat the levelof ontologywe do not have the resourcesto distinguish betweenthe that man is an ass and that man is that complexly signifiables thingwhichisan ass.(In thisconnectionitis interesting to notethatin theLogiceContinuado , whichis exclusively concernedwiththerelationbetweenspokenand written - presuming termsand theirsignificates,50 thatthe TracWyclifhad followed - a moretraditional tatusde Universalibus was writtenlater51 wayof dealing withtheseand similarproblems,in termsof standardsuppositiontheory, accordingto whichsophismsarisefromillicitshiftsin thesuppositionofkey terms.)52 linguistic Hence, whileI findattractive Spades exegeticalsuggestionthatWyclifs "doctrineof formaland essentialpredicationplaysforreal predicationthe samerolethatthetheoryofpersonaland simplesuppositionplaysat thelevel oflinguistic itseemsto me that,ifthedoctrinereallyis meant predication",53 to rendersuppositiontheoryredundant in respectof realpredication, it fails. On thispoint,at least,if not on others,thegrandprojectwhich,as Conti oflogiplausiblysuggests,54 Wyclifis engagedin, namelythehypostasization - theattemptto replicatethesedistinctions cal and linguistic distinctions in - breaksdown. detailat thelevelofontology It is an importantfeatureof Wyclifs versionof the identitytheory(as, mutatis mutandis of subjectand , of otherversions)thattheessentialidentity taken as real in hand hand with a in the distinction entities, predicate, goes As Wyclifnotesconcerning essentialpredication waytheyarepresented. (and he impliesa similarpointin thecase of formalpredication), whilethesame essenceis (real)subjectand predicate, theratiopraedicati differs fromtheratio subiecti .55Wyclifs position,as so farcharacterized, is clearlya versionof the advancedrestheory; butthereareseveralimportant inwhichhisposirespects tiondivergesfromthetypical(nominalist)versionsof thattheory.I turnto thesein thenextsection. 49)Forthedetails ofWyclifs ofsupposition, seeLogica (1),39-42. theory 50)Logica (2),55,16-18. 51)SeeMueller's introduction toTdUatpp.xxxvii-xxxviii; cf.N. Kretzmann, Indi'Continua, andChange inWyclifs inA. Kenny visibles, inhisTimes (ed.),Wyclif LogicofScripture', atpp.40-1. (Oxford, 1986),31-65, 32)SeeLogica (2),34,30-47,2. 53)'Introduction', xliii. 54)'Analogy', 164. 55)TdU,28,173-4; 30,194-7.

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4 Wyclif'sVersionof theAdvancedRes Theory as wellas quidditaFirst,althoughWyclifs official positionis thataccidental tivepredications, whether oftheformalor essentialsort,involvetheessential of(real)subjectand predicate, withtheirformaldistinctness, identity together we findthatin practiceWyclifoftenrestricts hisattention, whenconsidering combinationsof essentialidentityand formaldistinctness, to identities betweenindividuals and theirquidditative that to those univeruniversais, is, saisthatattachto individualsas a conditionof theirexistence, and so to the in and differentiae the of substance genera,species, category applyingto the individualin question.56 at one or twopointsin theTractatus Wyclifevensuccumbsto a temptation - thoughthisis certainly de Universalibus nothisconsidered viewandis amply - to denythataccidentscan be resuniin thetreatise contradicted elsewhere versales .57He also noteswithapprovaltheAristotelian view(as he construes it) thatwhileinperse (thatis, quidditative) thesubjectis identical predications withthatthingsbeing{idemestsubiectum etipsumesse),in thecaseofaccidental predications thisis notso: so a whitething{album)and (its)beingwhite - thislatterbeingidenticalwiththeuniversal - arediswhiteness {albumesse) tinctnatures.58 Aristotle's inconsistent (He interprets apparently pronouncementson therelationbetweenspeciesand generain thecategory ofsubstance, on theone hand,and primary on the other,as anticipating his substances, own view:formally such speciesand generaare distinctfromprimary subare Elsewhere adds that the accistances;essentially identical.)59 they Wyclif dental propertiesof a substanceare consequentialupon that substances essentialbeing,and arenot (identicalwith)thatsubstance, butareaccidental modesofsubstance;and in an argument fortheidentity ofman {homo)with thecomplexly that a man is the factthatneitheris {hominem esse), signifiable role.60 an accidentoftheotherplaysan important 56)TdU, 88,78-89,98; 105,182-90; 119,207-10; 92,163-94,195; 128,70-131,156 (onthis pas196,327-36; 201,440-57; 204,527-37; 198,390-199,401; 148-50); 'Analogy', sageseeConti, 276,79-277,86. 206,585-207,589; 57)SeeTdU,57,140-58,143; isunequivElsewhere 68,355; 91,138-92,170; 218,230-5. Wyclif aswellassecondary ocalthat there arecommon oruniversal accidents substances: TdU,244,158cf.'LostChapter', 271,800-272,806; 65;255,428-32; 259,524-260,552; 343;SdE,54,27-59,23. ofthequiddities ofgenera other than that ofsubstance, ina context AtTdU,270,755 hespeaks where itisclear that a quiddity isa universal. 58)TdU,72,48-55. Cf.72,59-73,67; 121,257-61. 59)TdU,94,196-96,236. 60>TdU, 127,65-128,69; 120,221-121,261.

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in the Tractatus de Universalibus to However,despitethismarkedtendency the of in the case of accidental downplay identity theory predication predicaof formaland essentialpredication, characterization accordtion,theofficial to which not but also accidental such only quidditative ing predications involvetheessentialidentity(but formaldistinctness) of subjectand predinotan oversight on Wyclifs part:fortheclaimthataccidental cate,is certainly involvean essentialidentity ofsubjectand predicateis repeated, predications orpresupposed, at a numberofpointselsewhere in histreatise.61 Butitwould that s view the one that he most appear Wyclif preferred consistently applies - is thatonlyquidditative in practice suchpredications involvethatidentity. The secondrespectin whichWyclifs positiondivergesfromthestandard versionsof theadvancedrestheoryis thatWyclifmaintainsa self-predication thesisin respectof thespeciesand generathatare essentially identicalwith, but formally distinctfrom,theindividualsfallingunderthem:62 thespecies man.63In man,whichcollectsindividualmen,is itselfsaid to be an aggregate theninthchapterofthe Tractatus de Universalibus tackles the Wyclif problem raisedbythe"ThirdMan" objectionto self-predication, and claimsthatselfof speciesand generadoes not precipitate an infinity of distinct predication individuals: he arguesthatall aggregates of individualsin thesamespeciesor individualsin therelevantspeciesor genus,but claims genusare themselves thatit is unnecessary to positdistinctaggregates of aggregates, foranysuch to first-level Hence two higher-level collapse aggregates aggregates. "original" in a species(twomen,say)generatethreeresultant individuals individualsin thatspecies(theoriginaltwoplustheaggregate), threeoriginals seven generate and so on, accordingto theprinciplethatn individualsgenerate resultants, 2n - 1 resultants Giventhattherewill be (therebeingno emptyresultant). as well as a number of originalindividuals generic specificindividuals, large willobviouslygenerate a verylargenumberofresultant individuals: buthoweverlargethenumberoforiginalindividuals, as longas thatnumberis finite thenumberofresultant individuals willalso be finite.(In thecaseoftheTrinsincehe distinentities, ity,Wyclifarguesthattherearein facteightresultant takenas an aggregate fromthedivineessence,and bothof guishestheTrinity thesefromthethreepersonstakenseverally and fromtheaggregate pairs.)64 ButalthoughWyclifdoes notconcedethatconsiderations ofself-predication 61)TdU,91,138-47; 97,262-72; 132,171-9. 62)TdUy 191,211-193,266; 194,289-195,296; 225,403-19. 63)See,e.g.,7^,74,88-99;140,351-5; 153,90-154,94; 157,174-82; 191,200-193,254. 641TdU, 187,107-188,136.

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he nevertheless does of originaland resultant individuals, generateinfinities of such individuals,sincehe claimsthatany thinkthatthereare infinities ofspecies,so thatevenone original, specifically genuswillcontainan infinity unique individual(Wyclifalludesto the phoenix,a standardexample)will ofotherindividuals.65 involvean infinity fromtheadvancedres The thirdrespectin whichWyclifs positiondiverges is this:giventhe essentialidentityof theoryin its standardmanifestations individualsand suitableuniversais, Wyclifis preparedto saythatindividuals are and thatuniversais are predicableof many,thoughnot qua individuals, a not universais.66 universal ofmany,thoughagain Further, impredicable qua thesameas an individuala fallingunderit and essentially is bothessentially thatdiffer thesameas otherindividuals froma , sinceit is essentially different in this no other. There need be contradiction from a and from each essentially different fromb, itdoesnot position,providedwe insistthat,ifa is essentially the same as b' universais followthata is not essentially providea counterthe same as and since theyare both essentially instanceto the entailment, but we from their different individuals, maynotinfer instantiating essentially thesame thesameand notessentially bothessentially thattheyare,absurdly, on theotherhand,arenotonlyessentially as thoseindividuals.67 Individuals, Hencetherelathesameas,eachother.68 butalsonotessentially different from, is not transitive. and symmetrical, tionof essentialidentity, thoughreflexive connectsupposita relations , the (Butnotethatin thespecialcasewhereidentity 1 return to thispointbelow. is transitive.)69 relation ofessentialidentity inWyclifs treatise on universais thereis no suggestion and finally, Fourthly servethepurposeofreducing essentialidentities thatrelevant complexly signientities,to non-proposifiables,whichwould otherwisebe extra-categorial This is themostimportant individuals.70 tionallystructured intra-categorial fromstandiffers to signifiables pointon whichWyclifs approach complexly As a staunchrealistabout versionsoftheadvancedrestheory. dardnominalist with and givenhis policyof identifying universais, complexlysignifiables of the real existence maintains universais, complexly signiWyclif appropriate Ifanyreduction structured fiablesas genuinepropositionally worldlyentities. 65)TdU, 190,188-191,198. which denies Man"problem, tothe"Third Fora different approach seeELD, 43,1-45,3. from their aredistinct that individuals, component aggregates 66)TdU,93,174-94,195. Cf.156,142-9. 67)TdU,96,243-9. 68)Cf.TdU153,90-154,94. 69)Spade, xxxviii. 'Introduction, 70)Cf.Conti, 139-40. 'Analogy',

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direction. And werein theoffing, it would ratherhaveto runin thereverse de Universalibus indeedwe findthatin somepassagesin the Tractatus Wyclif of identifying individualsuband Boethiantradition followsthePorphyrian On stanceswithuniquebundlesofaccidentaland non-accidental properties.71 willbe unientitiesin each of thecategories thatapproach,thefundamental willbe derivedentities.But then,givenhis identification versais;individuals ontoof universais withcomplexlysignifiables, Wyclifs mostfundamental entities. level will consist of structured propositionally logical thesepassagesas representing Now we shouldno doubtbe waryoftreating on Wyclifs part.For elsewherein the a consideredtheoryof individuation Tractatus de Universalibus and in his otherwritings othercandidatesforthe role of ultimateindividuato rs of individualpropertiesand/orsubstances arecanvassed:matter, place,God, a things perse cause,and motionor time in combination.72 areallvariously accordedthisrole,sometimes And thereare textswhereindividualsubstances areheldto be theindividuators ofindividual It is thushard to extracta clearand consistent accidents,not vice versa.73 ofindividuation fromWyclifs writings. Buttheconclusionofthepretheory - thatat itsmostfundamental levelWyclifs worldis propocedingparagraph structured remains whether or not Wyclifs considered secure, sitionally viewwouldbe thatindividuals can be reducedto universais or not.Foreven ifwe shouldsaythathisconsidered viewis thatindividualsubstances cannot be reducedto thebundlesofuniversais a instantiate to subset ofthat (or they in either are an but individual non-derivative or ultimate, manner, bundle), aresubjectto a remotenon-universal individuator likeGod, stillWyclifconmaintainsin passageafterpassagethatan individualsubstance, a , is sistently with certain identical And essentially complexlysignifiables. althoughthe of these as we haveseen, awaits, completespecification complexly signifiables a definitive and consistent accountfromWyclif ofthemetaphysics ofaccidentalpredication, includeat leastthata is and thata is F for theyundoubtedly F. It followsthatpropositionally structured entities anyquidditative property obtainat as deep a levelof Wyclifs ontologyas do individualsubstances, whatever levelthatis.74And if,in respectof ordinaryindividualsubstances 70 TdU, 89,105-7; Cf.Porphyry, InPorphy106,195-206. AL,13,25-14,2; Boethius, Isagoge, rium Commentaria , III,PL64,114. 72)Matter: TdU, 261,557-61; Tractatus de Logica , vol.3 (.Logica (3)), ed. Johannis Wyclif M. Dziewicki Place:ELD, 36,3-6. God:Logica Perse (London, 1899),5,5-10. (2),190,33-5. cause: Motion ortime: TdU, 316,385-6. (2),190,30-3. (2),189,16-192,9; Logica Logica 73)Logica (2),191,19-20; (3),5,5-7. Logica 74)Seehere 140-2. Conti, again 'Analogy',

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likeSocrates,thereis a morefundamental levelhousingone or moreultimate such individuators will in turn be essentially identicalwithrelindividuators, evantcomplexly and nature. (at least)theirexistence signifiables specifying So whether or univerWyclifs deepestontologicallevelhousesindividuals sais (or both), propositionally structured entitieswill obtainat thatlevel. Hence theroutethatis surelytheonlycoherentwayforward forthosewho wishto maintaintherealidentity, butformaldistinctness, ofcomplexly signifiableswithappropriate thatindividuindividuals, namelyone ofmaintaining als are ultimately does indeedappearto have structured,75 propositionally beenembraced(witha shiftof terminology from"realidentity" to "essential forthetypicalnominalist of identity") byJohnWyclif. Bycontrast, proponent the advancedrestheory, the identification of certaincomplexlysignifiables withindividualsubstances was adducedin orderto essaya reduction of those to relevant whichareconceivedto be adeindividuals, complexly signifiables in a non-complex (thatis, quatelysignifiable way,and so to be notessentially as a matteroftheirnature)propositionally structured. It followsthat,forsuch a nominalist, whilecomplexly (orsomeofthem)existin theworld, signifiables we cannotregard"theworld"as pickingout a singleontologicallevel:thereis, in theworld,a deeperontologicallevelthantheone thathousescomplexly and it is at thisdeeperlevelthatnon-propositionally structured signifiables, individuals areaccommodated. ForWyclif, and waivingtheissue bycontrast, whether hisdeepestontologicallevelhousesindividuals or universais, orboth, theentitiesinhabiting thatdeepestlevelare,as a matteroftheirnature,propstructured. ositionally The reasonwhyWyclifs is theonlycoherentwayforward forthosewho wishto maintaintherealidentity, butformaldistinctness, ofcomplexly signifiableswithappropriate and whyhisversionof theadvancedres individuals, theoryis accordingly superiorto itsnominalistrivals,is this.Individuals(or bundlesof universais, if thatis whatindividualsfundamentally appropriate mostbasicleveltheyarealready are)do notcomeneat:at themetaphysically sortedand structured. So foranyindividuala , at anylevelat whichthatindividualcomesintoview,metaphysically speaking,we mustalreadybe able to discernitsbeingstructured F thatsortsit by by somequidditative property and So the that a F is must genus species. complexly signifiable alreadybe in the as soon as the individual a in luminis oras. Otherwise wewould picture, emerges be committed to an unacceptable Kantiantranscendental idealism,in which themanifest worldcontaining of certain sorts was not objects metaphysically ' 75)Seehere andtheFormal Distinction', §8. myComplexe Significabilia

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on or in somewayaroseout of something morerudibasic,butsupervened the and conceivable in a mentary opaque hardly goings-on murkyunderworldof Dingean sich.Ifwe are to avoid theincoherent attemptto tracein thisKantianwaya philosophical for of certain sorts,we must aetiology things mostbasic levelobjectsand insist,withWyclif,thatat the metaphysically cometogether as an ontologicalpackage. complexly signifiables 5 Wyclifand theFormalDistinction forproponentsof the Wycliffollowswhat I take to be the best strategy advancedrestheoryin anotherrespect, too. He makesit clearin the Tractatus de Universalibus thattheformaldistinction, in hisapplicationofit,functions as a distinction of reason of reasonis nota meredis, butthatthisdistinction tinction ofreason,foritis ontologically grounded.Thispolicyagreeswithone ofScotus'applications ofthephrase"differentia rationis". Scotusdistinguishes betweentwo sensesof thisphrase:accordingto one, the ratioin question standsfora merecreature oftheintellect; accordingto theother,itstandsfor a realquiddityinsofar as it is graspedbytheintellect.76 It is in thelattersense thatScotusacceptsan equivalencebetweenthedistinctio and a distinc formalis tiorationis. oftheformaldistinction formspartofhisclasWyclifs definition in the fourthchapterof the treatiseon universais,77 of the three sification, - (i) real-and-essential basic kinds of distinction (this distinctioncovers in all ordinary cases:it is justcalled numerical, specificand genericdifference "essential" in but,as Spaderightly notes,thereis a clearimplication byWyclif, thetextthatan essentialdistinction is a kindof realdistinction);78 real(ii) but-not-essential coversthedistinction ofpersonswithinthe (thisdistinction and thedistinction of memory, reasonand will in thehumansoul); Trinity and (iii) formal.The formaldistinction is introduced as follows: Thethird istheformal difference ordifference ofreason, differ [difference] bywhich things eachother] even inthesame [sc.from essence orsupposit.79 they though converge singular

76)Ordination Omnia I,d.2,p.2,qq. 1-4,nn.388-410, ,vol.II,ed.C Balieetal.(Vatican Opera 1950),349-61. City, 77)TdU,90,121-92,170. Seehere 158-63. Conti, 'Analogy', 78)Spade, xxin.35. 'Introduction, 79)TdU, 91,138-40: "Tertia estdifferentia formalis velsecundum rationem, quaresdifferunt, licet ineadem conveniant essentia velsupposito". singulari

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in manyotherpassagesin thetreatise, Herewe haveboththepoint,confirmed of reasonare,forWyclif, one and thedistinction thattheformaldistinction in contrast this does not stand distinction and thesame,80 and thepointthat betweenthingsat thelevelof to, but goes hand in handwith,a distinction betweenthe case of the Note the Trinity:the distinction special ontology. but as a real-but-not-essential the is classified of distinction,81 Trinity persons thedistinction betweenthedivineessenceand each of thedivinepersonsis is classiThe factthatthelatterdistinction as a formaldistinction.82 classified does not distinction fiedas a formalratherthanas a real-but-not-essential thatit is notgroundedin re'it clearlyis so grounded,given mean,however, thedefinition oftheformaldistinction.83 include:thedistinctness ofa formaldistinction manifestations Further (but in the the same ofaccidentalproperties essentialidentity) substance, inhering ofa superioruniversal and its ofmatterand form,thedistinctness distinctness and concavIn theLogiceContinuado inferiors. surface, , thequantity, figure, ofeach to reason,sincetheessentia "according ityofa subjectareheldto differ 84 the aredifferent": is thesame,buttheformalrationes again,though essentia etc.areclearlynot ofquantity, formalrationes is thesame,thedifferent figure, in the same in Later are but notional, merely grounded ontologicalreality. from its differs treatise we aretoldthattheuniversal phoenix singularinstance same but the rationem secundum , whilebeing(sc. essentially) thingas that;85 heldto be compatiblewiththeclaimthata substanceunithisis nevertheless realiter versaland one ofitssingularinstancesareduodistincta , giventhatthe of its instances.86 each is causeof,and naturally universal priorto, or salibus,theformaldistinction de Univer The pointthat,in the Tractatus butgroundedin ontologicalrealofreasonis notepiphenomenal, distinction and accidental ity,is worthdwellingon a little.Firstrecallthatquidditative with that areessentially identical ofindividuals individual, though properties 80)Cf.Spade, xxiin.37. 'Introduction, 81)TdU,91,131-7. Theoloeica Summa Cf.Aquinas, 1894),I,q. 30,a. 2. (ST),vol.1 (Rome, 82)Wyclif without thisviewat TdU, 92,154-8, mentions it;buthedoes expressly endorsing EP And cf. his TdU, 264,638-266,664, itelsewhere: endorse , 70,29-75,26; 266,661-2. esp. deTrinitate Tractatus ST,I,q. 28,a. 3. , ed.A.Breck 1972),143;Aquinas, (Colorado, 83)Seehere Cf.Aquinas, ST,I,q. 28,a. 3. 77,30-78,1. 75,24-26; EP,70,29-78,20; again 84)Lorica (2),36,9-13. 85)Logica (2),53,13-29. 86)Logica inthefourth anddistinction ofkinds ofidentity Theclassification (2),54,9-17. given raises incommuni, circa universalia errores thePurgans bookoftheSumma, ofthefirst treatise ofthese toanappendix. I relegate discussion inthisregard: difficulties

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distinctfromit (and fromeach other),a point thatis confirmed formally in the again following passage: nature doesnot[sc.as such]beget, is not[sc.as such] [T]hedivine justas humanity - notunless white itiswhiteness, oritsperseinferiors are[sc.andneither ofthese isthe isthewayinwhich theninecategories ofaccidents, with their case].Forthis along species, aredistinguished oneanother] : thus isnotquality, because noquantified [sc.from quantity isqualified orcontrariwise. Andsowith substance, theother For quaquantified, categories. allthecategories areidentical inthesubject, butnecessarily ... I do distinguished formally. notseehowotherwise wecouldmaintain thedistinction oftheninekinds ofaccidents from eachother andfrom substance.87 Thattheformaldistinction, as so appliedbyWyclif, amountsto a distinction ofreasonemergesfromthefollowing for passage, example: Itisnoobjection that onecanhavedifferent ofthesamething under different thoughts Forinstance when I conceive that Peter isananimal, sobig,white, a father, aspects. begetinbed,rich, I amthinking ofthetencategories tired, butina complex ting, today lying manner asbeing inmythought. truths Atother times I think ofthesametencategories in a non-complex manner. Butthese arenotaltered because ofthechange inmy things arethecontext ofthose which thechanges between (rationes ) from they thought; aspects andnon-complex taketheir rise.88 complex thought - as HereWyclifnotes,in effect, thatone can thinkofa complexly signifiable it mightbe, thatPeteris an animal(Petrumesseanimal),or,as Wycliftellsus thebarebeingan animal(esseanimal)- in eithera complexor a elsewhere, lhe complexway involvesthinkingof it as such; one non-complexway.89 thinksof it in a non-complexway when one thinksof one of the simple 87)TdU',271,798-272,818, trans. divina nongenerat, uthumanitas "[N]atura Kenny, adapted: nonestalba,nisiipsaveleaperseinferius sitalbedo. Haecenimestratio novem distinguendi accidentium cumsuisspeciebus, utquantitas nonestqualitas eoquodnullasubstantia genera Etsicdeceteris est,estqualisvelecontra. Omnia quanta, inquantum quanta praedicamentis. enim suntidemsubiecto, sednecessario formaliter. . . . Necvideo praedicamenta distinguuntur aliter distinctio novem accidentium a seinvicem eta substantia." quomodo poneretur generum Cf.TdU,367,348-368,363. 88)TdU,139,333-42, trans. "Necobest deeadem resecundum rationem disKenny, adapted: habere varium utconcipiendo Petrum esseanimai, intellectum, parem album, quantum, patrem, inlectohodieiacentem, decern sedcomplexe divitem, generantem, fatigatum, intelligo genera utsuntveritates considerationem meam. Eteadem decern aliasintelligo apud praedicamenta Necvariantur resillaepropter variationem intellectus illas mei,sedcircumstant incomplexe. rationes exquibus variatio intellectus etincomplexi." capitur complexi 89)Cf.TdU,55,93-56,104; 57,137-40; 70,1-74,99; 84,300-12; 118,183-8; SdE,27,16-30,20.

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entities withwhichit is essentially identical:in thecaseofthatPeterisan animaltheentitiesin questionaretheindividualPeterand theuniversal animalPeter and animality arebothformally distinct fromthatPeterisan animak ity. and herewe are told thatthisformaldistinction is constituted by different of and about thesame ways thinking non-complex complexrespectively But there is no in the that these different worldlything. suggestion passage waysof thinkingabout one individualare not ontologically grounded.Of are: the man Peter exists in butso do the course,forWyclif, re; they obviously universal and the that Peter is an animal.It is animality complexly signifiable s claim thatthesethreethingsall existin the world,and Wyclif precisely indeedareessentially distinct.The different comidentical,thoughformally and of about a are plex ways thinking non-complex singleentity groundedin different and real of complex non-complex aspects thethingin question. 6

lhe CoherenceofWyclifs Doctrineof EssentialIdentity

But ifWyclifs versionof thethesisthatworldlyindividuals and appropriate are identical but distinct worldlycomplexlysignifiables essentially formally conforms to whatI have identified as the mostpromisingrouteforproponentsof thisthesisto follow,one mightstillquestionthecoherenceof the claimedessential(or,in theusualterminology, Forwe havehere real)identity. to do witha relationthat,as we haveseen,does notobeytransitivity. In view ofthat,it maybe questionedwhether therelationin questionmeritsthelabel In fact the is situation even worse.The standardcriterion forreal "identity". in medieval is one that we call assured creidentity thought might "mutually ationand destruction": a and b arereallyidenticaljustifGod cannotcreateor a withoutcreatingor destroying b, and viceversa,thatis,justifit is destroy for a to b exist unless exists,and viceversa.(Correlatively, logicallyimpossible fortherealdiversity ofa and b it is requiredeitherthata can existwithoutb, or thatb can existwithouta.)90But now therealidentities envisagedbythe formaldistinction, notonlyin its(i) originalScotistmanifestation, butalsoin itsapplication(ii) by theadvancedrestheory, that undertheory's assuming of what it is for a to and (iii) byWyclif, complexly standing signifiable exist, do notmeetthiscriterion. For(i) theScotistcommonnaturescan survivethe destruction ofindividuals can survive sharingin thosenatures;(ii) individuals 90)See,e.g.,Gregory, Primum etSecundum Lectura t.Ill, dd.19-48 Sententiarum, , ed. Super A.Trapp andV.Marcolino (Berlin, 1984),dd.28-32, q. 1,atpp.79-115.

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theloss of accidentalproperties, so that,forexample,theman Socratescan survivethedestruction (which,accordingto typicalversionsof theadvanced restheory, of complexly goeshandin handwiththefalsification) signifiables 91and suchas thatSocrates iseating, and (iii) forWyclifuniversal genera species arenaturally priorto theindividuals fallingunderthem,in the(Aristotelian) sensethattheexistenceof theseuniversais does not dependon theexistence on anyoftheirinstantiating individuals and can survivethedemiseofanyof thoseindividuals.92 thatthe advancedres Wyclifmightindeedappearto avoid one difficulty - a restricmakes for itself in this connection theory bydintofhisrestricting tion that,as we have noted,he usuallyappliesin practiceeven thoughhis official definition of formalpredication thatenjoy ignoresit- theuniversais essentialidentities withindividualsto quidditativeuniversais. And in some contexts wherehe arguesfortheidentity ofa thing(an essentia ) withitsbeing {ipsamesse)he does so on thebasisthatitsbeingpasses- and byimplication its accidentalproperties fail- the standardtestforessentialidentity.93 But, sincehe refusesin generalto individualizethe quidditative with properties whichindividuals aresaid to be essentially identical,94 Wycliffailsto produce essential(thatis, in theusualterminology, to the real)identities conforming standardcriterion forrealidentity, that of namely mutuallyassuredcreation and destruction. In view of thisfurther deficit,it is beginningto look as lacksanyinteresting content. thoughtheclaimofrealidentity Of course,thatthereis somerelationbetweentherelataoftheclaimedreal identities to calla relagoeswithoutsaying,butitis surelymerely obfuscatory tionthat,in Wyclifs treatment, conformsneitherto transitivity nor to the criterion ofmutually assuredcreationand destruction a relationofidentity. At the thesis seems to be rate, no any doing significant philosophicalworkfor 91 > André deNeufchâteau, forexample, thatonlytrue declarative sentences the argues signify that identical with(butformally distinct complexly signifiablesarereally indifrom) worldly viduals: seeInPrimum Librum Sententiarum (Paris, 1514),fol.Ilvb;cf.fols. Vllira;IXra-vb; CXXXVIva. Theabsence ofa corresponding Xva-XIrb; isevena criterion complexly signifiable forthefalsity ofa declarative sentence: "ideodicitur oratio insefalsa [= quianullum intelligibile eicorresponderé" Itfollows ifSocrates complexe significabile] isnoteat(fol.IXvb). potest that, that Socrates iseating doesnotexist. ing,thecomplexly signifiable 92)TdU, 144,443-7; 189,155-190,183; 208,1-229,505; 278,120-8; 284,250-1; 337,184-338, 192;cf.Logica (2),33,23-30; 51,7-17; ELD,30,42-31,3; SdE,89,9-15. 93)See,e.g.,TdU, 122,281-123,304, where thatGodcannot create a thing Wyclif argues (an without itsbeing essentia) andviceversa, anargument that canbeextended esse), creating {ipsam toallquidditative, butnottoanyaccidental, ofa thine. Cf.127,54-6. properties 94)See,e.g.,TdU,74,88-99; andthepassages 87,65-9; inn.56above. cited 308,176-97;

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it maybring:in eachcaseit is theclaimof him,whatever theologicalbenefits distinctness thatbearsthephilosophical load, and thisis obviouslynot formal unconnected withthefactthattherelationofformalidentity doesconform to well as to and of and to the (as critetransitivity reflexivity symmetry,course), rionofmutually assuredcreationand destruction. The abovemaynotconstitutea knock-down argument againstthecoherenceofWyclifs claimingthe relationin questionto be an identity relation:but it does createa sufficient that claim to throw theonusontohimto producea conpresumption against reason one of which("formal vincing whywe shouldregardtwo relations, and thecriterion ofmutually assuredcreationand identity") obeystransitivity and theotherofwhich("essential[= real]identity") destruction, obeysneither ofthese,as belongingin anyinteresting senseto thesamelogicalkind.So far as I knowthisis nota challengethatWyclifmeets.

Appendix The classification ofkindsofidentity and distinction treagivenin thefourth tiseof thefirst book of theSummade Ente, theso-calledPurganserrores circa universalia in communi in , cutsacrosstheclassification the Tractatus de given Universalibus'P forexample,thedistinction betweenmatterand substantial formis classified in theformer treatise as a distinction secundum rem , in the latteras a distinction secundum rationem. In thePurganstherearefivevarieties ofthedistinction secundum rem arecontrasted , and these,takentogether, with thedistinction secundum rationem the two overarching kindsof distinction ; areregarded as exhaustive and exclusive. Afterlistingthefivevarieties of real concludes: distinction, Wyclif Setpostremo secundum suntidemessenracionem, distinguuntur aliquasolum quando cialiter sinedistinccione unum tarnen nonestformaliter reali, utcommunius et reliqum, suumperseinferius. Possunt autem omnes istedifférencie reduci addifferenciam secundumremetdifferenciam secundum racionem.96 Now in the Tractatus de Universalibus thedistinction betweenwhatis more commonand itsperseinferiors is likewiseclassified as a kindofformaldistincbut theretheformaldistinction tion,97 underwhichit is rangedis,in effect, ,5>Cf.Spade, 'Introduction ,xx-xxi. *» ELD, 38,37-40. 97)TdU,92,154-5, 163-70.

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said to involvea corresponding realdistinction.98 Therethusappearsto be an inconcinni between the two texts. I Hence must ty disagreewithSpades sugthat "the contrast betweentheformaldistinction and thevarious gestion sharp kindsof realdistinction [madein thePurgans'is intendedin theDe univ.as well".99 Thisremark seemsto me mistaken on twocounts.First,forthereason what Wyclifsaysin thepassagefromthePurjustgiven,namelythat,despite viewin the Tractatus de Universalibus is that gansquotedabove,his effective theformaldistinction This is,or at anyrateentails,a kindofrealdistinction. realdistinction often and in hand hand with an essential will, may, go identity, forexamplebetweena speciesand a participating individual:nevertheless, at leastin the Tractatus de Universalibus , as we haveseen,Wyclifmaintainsthe doctrinethatthe species(and a fortiori the genus) is naturally priorto its and so can survive the in destruction the individuals, instantiating ordinary senseofthoseindividuals. So thedistinction betweenthemcannotbe merely notional.Secondly, thePurgansdoes notin factapplyitsofficially sharpdivisionbetweenthedistinction secundum remand thedistinction secundum ratio nementirely I As haveremarked, thedistinction betweenmatter consistently. and substantial de Universalibus is classified as a form,whichin the Tractatus vel secundum rationem is in classified the differentia formalis officially Purgans as a distinction secundum rem matterand formare , butlateron in thattreatise "cumtalibusque formaliter suntresdistincte".100 groupedtogether But ifI am rightthatWyclifs formaldistinction entailsa realdistinction, does in the Tractatus de Universalibus betweenthesecwhy Wyclifdistinguish - the real-but-not-essential ond and thirdvarietiesof distinction distinction and theformaldistinction?101 becauseof Perhapshe was led to do so precisely his assimilationof the formaldistinctionand the distinctionsecundum rationem : he mayhavefeltthat,in orderto makeabsolutelyclearto hostile criticsthatthedistinction, in particular, betweenthepersonsoftheTrinity is a realdistinction, and notin anysenseepiphenomenal or a construct ofmere rationes forit,appropriately labelled. , he had to devisea separateclassification Froma purelyphilosophical pointofview,it is hardto see whatis gainedby theseparationof the real-but-not-essential distinction fromthe formaldistinction.But theologically it is possibleto motivateit,at leastforthecase of

98)TdU,91,138-40. 99)'Introduction, xxxn.49. ,00)ELD, 44,23-7: onthetext atthis seeS. H. Thomsons noteat'LostChapter, 346. point 10,)Cf.Conti, 162-3. 'Analogy',

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theTrinity:102 forthedivinepersonsarenotonlyessentially identicalwithbut distinct from the divine essence;theyare also distinctsupposita formally , somethingthat does not apply to othercases of essential-identity-withsuchas Peters essentialidentity withbutformaldistinctformal-distinctness, nessfromthespeciesMan (Peteris a suppositum butthespeciesMan is not). Thesamestrategy willnot,however, workforthecaseofmemory, reason,and will:hereit is revealing that,in a passagealludedto abovefromthePurgans , and reason like matter and are, "cum talibus form, memory groupedtogether suntresdistincte",103 and in theLogiceContinuadotheyare que formaliter held to differ "secundumracionem,dum suntidem singulare".104 explicitly One is temptedbythehypothesis thatWyclifdevisedthereal-but-not-essentialdistinction in orderto accommodatetheTrinity, but includedin it the distinction betweenmemory, reasonand willas an afterthought, lestthedivisionappearmerelyad hoc.

I02)Spade, xxviii-xxxi. 'Introduction', 1031 ELD,44,23-7. 1041 (2),36,25-8. Logica

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iÊ}'ti* BRILL


Vivarium 47 (2009)97-127

The Early Arabic Liar: The Liar Paradox in the Islamic World from the Mid-Ninth

to the Mid-Thirteenth

Centuries

CE*

AhmedAlwishah Stanford University David Sanson OhioStateUniversity Abstract Wedescribe theearliest oftheLiarParadox occurrences in theArabictradition. The claim Mutakallimùn the Liar Sentence is both true and also associate false; early they theLiarwithproblems whichis somewhat pluralsubjects, concerning puzzling. - as Abhari anunsatisfiable truth totheLiarSentence condition (1200-1265)ascribes - andso conhe putsit,itsbeingtrueis theconjunction ofitsbeingtrueandfalse cludesthatthesentence is nottrue.TiisI(1201-1274)argues thatself-referential senliketheLiar,arenottruth-apt, and defends thisclaimbyappealing to a tences, oftruth. Translations ofthetexts areprovided as anappendix. correspondence theory Keywords Liarparadox, Arabiclogic,Tusī,Abhari truth, self-reference, Introduction The LiarParadoxis easyto statebutdifficult to solve:startwithyourfavorite - "I am lying", LiarSentence "Thissentence is false","WhatI sayis false","All thatI sayis false";add,ifnecessary, a fewcontingent it background assumptions; Thispapergrew outofa presentation, totheMoodyConference in author, bythefirst Medieval 2004. We would like to thank the in that UCLA, Philosophy, February participants conference fortheir valuable Calvin Christofeedback, Normore, Mendell, especially Henry Martin andRegaWood. Wewould alsoliketothank Michael Martin, Tweedale, pher CooperandStewart forfeedback ondrafts, andNickJones son,BenCaplan, forhelplooking Shapiro fortheLiarinEastern traditions. philosophical ©Koninklijke Brill 2009 DOI:10.1 NV, Leiden, 163/156853408X345909

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follows(dependingon exactlyhow you runtheargument)thatthesentence is bothtrueand false,or thatit is neithertruenorfalse.1 The Liarappearsin theAncientGreek,theMedievalLatin,and theMedievalArabictraditions.2 We knowof no clearand unambiguousinstanceof theLiarfromanyEasterntradition.3 The Greekand LatinLiarsarewell-known. TheArabicLiaris not,presumablybecauseit has gone unnoticed:we havenot founda singleworkbyany Westernscholarthatmentionsit.4 Paul Spade arguesthatthe Latin Liar does not derivedirectly fromany knownGreeksources.5LaterLatin authorsattributethe Liar to Aristotle's thepassage,he 25. Spade claimsthisis a redherring: Sophistical Refutations is not about the and Latin authors who discuss thepassage Liar, argues, early and sayLiar-likethingsarenotactuallydiscussing theLiar.6Spadespeculates thatthedevelopment oftheLatinLiarwas influenced nowby"otherforces":

!) Weuse'TheLiarheretorefer toa bundle ofclosely related boththe paradoxes, including Liar('Thissentence isfalse') andvarious Liars(e.g.,'AllthatI sayisfalse', Simple Contingent when that sentence isallthat I say). 2)By'theMedieval Arabic tradition werefer totheintellectual tradition within themedieval Islamic inthistradition world. Work wascarried outprimarily, butnotexclusively intheArabiclanguage. 3)Foranambiguous seeJ.E. M.Houben, 'Bhartrhari s Solution totheLiarandSome instance, Other Indian a seventh 23 392. Paradoxes', Bhartrhari, (1995), Journal of Philosophy century Sanskrit discusses thesentence I amsaying isfalse'. Given grammarian, 'Everything appropriate itis possible togenerate a Contingent Liarfrom thissentence, butBhartrhari assumptions, doesnotdoso.Instead, hepoints outthatthesentence isself-refuting. Forsimilar see cases, Sextus the II and Abù Nasr Kitãb al-tahlīl ed. 55 , al-Fārābī, , Empircus, Against Logicians Raflq s discussion is notable forhisfocus onthewaysin (Beirut, 1986),108.Bhartrhari al-cAjam which semantic self-reference theproblem. Formore, seeTerence 'Bhartrhari Parsons, generates onwhat cannot besaid', EastandWest 51(2001),525-534. Philosophy: 4)ButseeAhadQaramaleki, asamm nazd-e Motakallemān' ['TheParadox 'Mummã-ye jezr-e oftheSpeechless RootintheOpinion oftheMutakallimùn'] Sadra5,6(1997), , Kheradnameh 67-73. 5)SeePaulVincent oftheMediaeval Franciscan Insolubilia-Literature', Spade,'TheOrigins Studies in his and in 33 (1973),292-309, the Later Middle Lies, reprinted Language Logic Ages in TheStanford ed.Edward N. Zalta (London, 1988);'Insolubles', Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy, (Stanford, 2005),URL= http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall2005/entries/insolubles 6)PaulVincent inTheCambridge Medieval eds. 'Insolubilia, Spade, History ofLater Philosophy, Norman and Paolo Crivelli 247. Kretzmann, 1982), Anthony Kenny, JanPinborg (Cambridge, hasrecently thatSophistical onthe 25 is abouttheLiar.Seehis'Aristotle argued Refutations andhisAristotle onTruth weremain 23(2004),61-70, Liar',Topoi 2004).Though (Cambridge, wesayhere onhowthis isresolved. skeptical, nothing depends question

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obscureStoicsources,perhaps;or somenow-lostcommentary on theSophisticalRefutations 7 Arabicthoughtwas,of course,influenced by Greek,and LatinbyArabic. So it would be no surpriseifthehistoryof theLiar fitthispatternof influence.It is somewhatsurprising thatSpade does notdiscussthispossibility. Our presentjudgment,however,vindicatesSpade on thispoint.Arabic on Sophistical commentaries 25 do notsuggesttheLiar.Aristotle's Refutations a man who "at the sametimesayswhatis bothfalseand example suggestive true" is omittedfromall buttheearliesttranslations.8 NeitherAvicennanor Averroes mentionit in theircommentaries.9 Bothinterpret theexamplethey - a manwho takesan oathto breakan oath- in a veryun-Liardo mention likeway:forthem,it has to do withwhethertheman is good or bad, rather thanwithwhether he is or is notan oath-breaker. In fact,althoughtheGreek,Arabicand Latintraditions arehistorically connectedin coundessways,we havefoundno hardevidenceand litdecircumstantialevidencethatsuggests connections betweentheGreek,Arabic, anyhistorical and LatinLiars.Each tradition readsas thoughitinvented theparadoxanew.10 historians will at the absence of well-bound chainsofhisSystematic despair toricalinfluence. Thosewho turnto history fornew perspectives on familiar havereasonto rejoice.The history oftheLiarpresents not however, problems, one butthreeextendedindependent eachwithitsown perspective on stories, theproblem. Twoofthosestories havebeentold.We herebeginto tellthethird. Thispaperhas threeparts.In thefirst, we analyzetheLiaras it appearsin In thesecond,we analyzeAbharls attemptto solve theearlyMutakallimùn. - its theLiarbyasserting thattheLiarSentencehas a specialtruthcondition in he consists its both In true and false. the third,we beingtrue, says, being analyzeTus!s solutionto the Liar:Tīisīargues,on thebasisof a correspondence theoryof truth,thatthe predicates'true and 'false'do not applyto selfreferential sentences. Tïisîs solutionis ofspecialinterest: we knowof no earliertexton theLiar, in anytradition, ofcomparablesophistication; and we knowofno earliertext on theLiarthatsuggeststhat,at root,theparadoxis a paradoxof self-reference. (Thisobservation mustbe temperedbytheobservation thattheGreek 7)Spade, 308-309. 'Origins', 8)Mantiq ed.'Abdal-Rahmān Badawl Ibn'Adi(893-974) 968.Yahya Aristütälis, (Beirut, 1980), andIbnZurah(942-1008) bothomit theexample. 9) Avicenna, , inal-Shifa, , ed.F.al-Ahwānī (Cairo,1958), al-Safiatah al-Mantiq, al-Safiatah Talkhīs ed. Šālim Muhammad Salīm 98;Averroes, (Cairo, 1972),157. al-Safiatah, 10)SeeChris inSophisms andLiars', inMedieval andGrammar, ed. Martin, 'Obligations Logic Read(Dordrecht, forsucha reading oftheLatin tradition. 1993),357-81, Stephen

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tradition survives Butwe havefoundno Greekfragments onlyin fragments.11 that the Liar is a of suggesting paradox self-reference.) The workoftheearlyMutakallimùn also bearsstudy.It is theearliest work on the Liar in theArabictradition, and is therefore of significant historical interest bothforour understanding of theinternalhistory oftheArabicLiar, and because,iftherewasGreekinfluence, thisiswhereitwasmostlikelyto be. AbharlandTusItogether thefirst substantive workon theLiarin represent theArabictradition. Theyoccurearlyenoughthattheycould havehad an impacton theLatintraditioniftheirworkmade it West.Abharissolution, in particular, bearssome striking to thewell-known resemblances solutions advocatedbyBradwardine and Buridan. Thereare,then,good reasonsto beginthestudyof theArabicLiarwitha studyof thesethreeparts.But we mustemphasizethatthisis onlya small partofthefullstory. 1. The Liar in theKalām Tradition12 lhe earliestsurviving textin thetradition comesfromthe Usülal-dīn( PrinbycAbdal-Qāhiral-Baghdādī(c.96l-l 037/8),a mathematiciplesofReligion) cianandAsh'arītheologian who livedand workedin Nisapurand Baghdad.13 But Sayfal-Dīn al-Āmidī(1156/7-1233)reportsthattheLiarwas discussed by Mutazilah theologiansa generationpriorto al-Baghdādī.14 Relyingon of theArabicLiarto thelateninth al-Âmidï s report, we datetheemergence or earlytenthcentury CE. It aroseas partofa debate,withintheMutazilahschoolofkalãmy overthe sentence(
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laterdiscussedwithinthecompetingAshari schoolof kalām. However,we havefoundno evidenceoftheLiaroutsidekalāmfromthisperiod. oftheLiaris as follows:15 Baghdad!s statement "Declarative intheoriginal sentence" sense isdivided intothetrue andthefalse. (khabar) The truedepends on agreement withthesubject(that-about-which-something-isandthefalse istheopposite ofthat. There isnodeclarative sentence that isboth declared), true andfalse one:namely, thedeclaration together, except byhewhohasnotliedatall, about that heisa liar, andthisdeclarative from isfalse. Anda liar himself, sentence, him, whodeclares that heisa liarsaysthetruth. Andtherefore thisonedeclarative sentence is true andfalse, andithasonesubject. ofa declarative senBaghdad!treatstheLiaras an exceptionto thedefinition tence(ikhabar As Baghdad!putsit,declara) in termsofexclusivebivalence.16 tivesentences are"dividedintothetrueand thefalse",in thesensethat"there is no declarative sentencethatis bothtrueand falsetogether, exceptone",the sentencethatis bothtrueand false. Liar,a declarative - at leastin this So Baghdādīssolutionis to giveup exclusivebivalence bivalenceis the specialcase.17He couldhavecontinuedto hold thatinclusive mark of a declarative since and sentence, distinguishing prayers commands areneithertruenorfalse.However,thereis no indicationthathe generalized in thisway;he seemsinsteadto taketheLiarto be an exceptionto thedefinithedefinition.18 tion,ratherthangroundsforrevising Writinga bit morethana centurylater,Āmidī,our secondsource,was a who taughtin Baghdad,Cairo, and Damascus. theologianand philosopher His mostimportant work,Abkãral-Afkãr(theBeginning ofIdeas),is botha refutation of philosophy{falsafah a and refutation of the ) teachingsof the Mutazilah. In his al-Ihkãm fi usülal-ahkãm( TheMasteryofthePrinciples of[Islamic] Law), Āmidīreportson a debatewithinthe Mu tazilahschool,concerning thedefinition ofa declarative sentence.In thecontextofthisdebate,theLiar occursas a threatto thedefinition:19 15)Usül al-dīn identical occurs atUsül al-dīn , 13.Analmost , 217. passage 16)Thisdefinition echoes De Interpretatione Aristotle, 4, 17al-6,aswellastheStoicdefinition ofanaxiómata theLogicians , II 73). (e.g.,Sextus Empiricus, Against 17)Graham Priest should behappy tofind hisfavored solution here. Seehis"The represented ofParadox, 8 (1979),219-241. wrote a treatise Journal Logic ofPhilosophical Logic Chrysippus this sort of solution. See Lives Eminent 197. Laertius, VII, against Diogenes of Philosophers, 18)Thanks toStewart forforcing ustoclarify this Shapiro point. 19)al-Lhkãm v2,250-252. fiusülal-ahkãm,

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A.Alwishah, D. Sanson /Vivarium 47 (2009)97-127 TheMutazilah, Abu'Allal-Jubba Abi'Abel Allāh andothI,hissonAbūHāshim, al-Basrī, erssaidthata declarative sentence isa speech thatispervaded {khabar) {kalām) bytruth andfalsehood. There arefour this definition. problems brought against

Thefourproblems thatĀmidīreports thattherearecounterexamples are,first, declarative sentencesthatare neithertruenor false;second,thatthedefinitionis circular;third,thatthedefinition entailsthatall declarative sentences arebothtrueand false;fourth, thatthedefinition entailsthatGods declarativesentencescan be false.The Liar appearsas one of two counterexamples thatmakeup thefirst ofthesefourproblems.20 The definition Āmidī mentionsis obscure.What thing,exactly,is "pervaded by truthand falsehood",and what does thatmean?The thirdand fourthproblemshe discussesput pressureon theseissues.What we learn fromĀmidīs discussionof thoseproblemsis this:21Contraryto the third does not say thateach declarative sentenceis perproblem,the definition vadedby truthand falsehood.Instead,it saysof thespecies,declarative sentence {khabar),consideredas a whole, that it is pervadedby truthand falsehood:itsmembersare all eithertrueor false.(Similarremarks applyto s definition: it is the khabar that is "divided" into true and species Baghdādl false.) So thedefinition is once againin termsof bivalence:declarative sentences aresentencesthataretrueor false.Our primary interest liesin thefirst problem Āmidīdescribes,thatthereare counterexamples to the definition. The firstcounterexample Āmidīdescribesinvolvesa distributive with predication a pluralsubject:22 canbeundermined 'Muhammad andMusaylimah are [Thisdefinition] bythesentence in proclaiming Thissentence truthful theprophecy'. cannot be true,because [then] claimwouldbe true, andthissentence cannot be false, because [then] Musaylimah's Muhammad's claim would befalse. To see theforceofthiscounterexample, returnto thedefinitions oftruthand falsehoodgivenby Baghdādī:"truthis an agreement withthe subject,and sentencehas two subjects, is theoppositeof that".23 The problematic falsity and it "agrees"withone of thosesubjectsbut not the other.The sentence, 20)ibid., 250-1. 21)ibid., 252. 22)ibid., 250. 23)Usūlal-dīn, 217.

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one of truth.To relievethepressure, on thisdefinition therefore, putspressure or sentence.24 ones of declarative needsto modify definition truth, subject, is theLiar:25 The secondcounterexample allofhisdeclarative definition canalsobeundermined] [This byhewhosaidtobefalse can"All sentences are false." This declarative sentence sentences declarative bysaying, my sentences befalse, notbetrue, forifitwere then allofhisdeclarative would andthis true, sentence. Anditcannot befalse, forifitwere, declarative sentence ishisonlydeclarative - would - thisbeing sentences hisonlydeclarative sentence be then allofhisdeclarative "All senhewouldhavespoken when he declarative andtherefore said, false, truly my tences arefalse." fromBaghdad!s in threeways:he Āmidīspresentation of theparadoxdiffers rather thanparticular the from a universal generalization; generates paradox to bothexclusiveand inclusive he presentstheparadoxas a counterexample to exclusivebivalencealone; he bivalenceratherthanas a counterexample tweaksthe backgroundassumptions used to ensurea genuineparadox.We describe these three differences and theirsignificance. briefly s Liar Sentence is, Baghdad! Lß

I am a liar

whichhe treatsas equivalentto theparticular proposition, Lp

Some ofmydeclarative sentences arefalse.

Âmidïs LiarSentenceis a universal Bycontrast, proposition, Ly

All ofmydeclarative sentencesarefalse.

In thisrespect,Âmidïmatcheshis contemporary, Abharī.PerhapsĀmidīis thanthoseof the early the conventions of his own rather period following Mutakallimùn. Neithersentenceis, by itself, paradoxical.Lp can be truewithoutparadox if the speakersayssomethingfalseotherthanLp. can be falsewithout 24)NoteBaghdad! s cryptic attheendofthepassage wequoted "this above: onedeclarremark, " ative sentence istrueandfalse, andithasonesubject. isemphasizing evenif that, Baghdādī sentences with canbedealtwithinsomeother theLiar, a sentence way, plural subjects being with onesubject, cannot. only 25)al-Ihkãm usui al-ahkãm , 250. fi

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trueotherthan1^. To generate a genuparadoxifthespeakersayssomething ineparadox,one mustmakesomefurther assumptions. has us assume that the "has notlied at all" priorto sayspeaker Baghdādī "I In am not a liar." this he blocks thepossibility thatthespeaker way, ing said something falseotherthanLp.Āmidīhas us assumethatL^ is thespeak- that is the only thinghe has said. This ers onlydeclarativesentence 1^ blocksthepossibility thatthespeakersaid something trueotherthanL^. (It is not clearfromwhatĀmidīsayswhetherthespeakerneveruttersanother declarative to whatthe sentence,or whetherthereis an implicitrestriction Abharimakesexplicit.) speakernowutters.Thisis something theLiaras a counterexample to exclusivebivalenceand Baghdādīpresents "solves"theparadoxby allowingan exceptionto exclusivity. Āmidīpresents theLiar as a counterexample to bothinclusiveand exclusivebivalence.Perhe intends to haps preemptBaghdādīs wayout. For thefirstcounterexample, Āmidīprovidesa detailedcriticalaccountof the different solutionsproposedby different Mutazilah: accordingto Abū cAlīal-Jubbaī(d. 915), a sentencewithtwosubjectsis truejustin case both subjectsagreewiththepredicate;forAbū Hāshim (d. 933), a sentencewith two subjectsis reallytwo separatesentences,each separately évaluablefor truthor falsehood;forAl-Qādī 'Abd al-Jabbār (d. 1025), "true"and "false" evaluatethe speaker,not whatshe says.But he does not describea single Mutazilahresponseto theLiar.His entirediscussionoftheLiaris contained in thefollowing remarks:26 cryptic Withrespect tothesecond thedeclarative sentence either corpartofthefirst objection, if tothat about which isdeclared ornot.Iftheformer, then itistrue; responds something foritisimpossible tohavetogether thetwocontradictories in thelatter, thenitisfalse, thecaseofaffirmation orinthecaseofnegation. Āmidīheremakesno attemptto solvethe Liar.But he pointedlydismisses Baghdādīssolution:a singlesentence,he says,cannotbe bothtrueand false, and it is impossibleto have becausetruthand falsehoodare contradictories, two contradictories PerhapsBaghdādīs solutionwas thedominant together. solutionandwidelyknown,and thisexplainsĀmidīs uncharacteristic brevity. in the thetwocontradictories Āmidīsays"itis impossibleto havetogether or in the case of negation".This is ambiguous.It may case of affirmation sentencecan be bothtrueand false,whetherit is mean thatno declarative or negative(thecase of negation).Or it affirmative (thecase of affirmation) 26)ibid., 251.

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sentencecan be bothtrueand false(the maymeanthat,justas no declarative caseoftwocontradictories in together an affirmative way),so too no declarativesentencecan be neithertruenor false(the two contradictories together in a negativeway). If thesecondreadingis correct,thenĀmidīwas casting a wider net: perhapssomeone among the earlyMutakallimündefended theviewthattheLiar Sentenceis neither truenorfalse.One suspects,howof this ever,thatĀmidīwould havereportedon an important disagreement he reported suchdisagreements in theothercaseshe sort,givenhowcarefully discusses. SeveralscholarshavearguedthattheearlyMutakallimün wereinfluenced to between theirprinciples by Stoic logic and grammar, pointing parallels and definitions and thoseof theStoics.27 But thereare fewstriking parallels betweenwhattheMutakallimün StoicfragsayabouttheLiarand surviving mentson theLiar.We knowthattheStoicshad a sophisticated takeon the Liar:Chrysippus wroteseveralbooksarguingagainstvariousproposedsolutionsto theLiar,and proposeda solutionofhisown.28Measuredagainstthat the workof the earlyMutakallimünis naïve and apparentsophistication, undeveloped.Hence it seems unlikelythattheywereworkingwith Stoic sources. Thereis one tenuousparallelworthnoting.Diogenesliststogether three worksbyChrysippus:29 tothose whosolve theLiarParadox Reply bydivision; Proofs that indefinite notbesolved showing arguments bydivision; ought toobjections those whocondemn thedivision ofindefinite Reply urged against arguments. Whatdoes itmeanto solvetheLiar"bydivision"? Whatdoes thathaveto do with"indefinite arguments"? SupposethatourLiarSentenceis "WhatI sayis false".The subject,"What I say",is, in Stoicterminology, an indefinite term.30 As an indefinite term,it mayreferto anyone of severalthingsI say.Hence thefollowing"solution" 27)Forthedetails, seeS. Horowitz, 'ÜberdenEinfluss desStoicismus aufdieEntwicklung der beidenAraben, derDeutschen 57 (1903), Philosophie Zeitschrift Morgenländischen Gesellschaft VanEss,"The Structure ofIslamic inLogic inClassical Islamic 177-196; Josef Logical Theology', Culture Greek Elements In , ed.G.E. vonGrunebaum (Malibu, 1970),32;C. H. M.Versteegh, Arabic (Leiden, 1977). Linguistic Thinking 28)Diogenes, Lives ,VII 196-198. 29)ibid.,196-97. 30)Roughly, definite terms aresingular; indefinite terms aregeneral. SeeA.A.LongandD. N. The Hellenistic 1987),207-8. Sedley, Philosophers (Cambridge,

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- trueofone ofwhatI itself:theLiarsentenceis bothtrueand false suggests say,falseof anotherof whatI say.The Liar,then,is solvedbydivision,and, term. divisionofan indefinite in particular, is plausiblefortheproblemof division" "solution like this by Something theprophecy'is true in 'is truthful the proclaiming pluralsubjects: predicate Hāshim Abū not but of Muhammad, appearsto advocatea Musaylamah. solutionto theproblemofpluralsubjectson theselines. So, if we are rightabout Chrysippus,the Stoicsand the Mutakallimūn or pluralterms.But indefinite bothassociatedtheLiarwithpuzzlesinvolving this tenuous it is hardat thispointto putmuchweighton parallel. 2. Abharîon theLiar theLiarwas divorcedfromtheproblemof giving In thethirteenth century, ofa declarative thedefinition sentence,and treatedas a logicalfallacyor partheroleoftheLiarin this adox (mughãlatah ) in itsown right.In thisrespect, Severalprominent tradition. in Latin the role its resembles sophismata period to had time things sayabouttheLiar:31 relatively sophisticated logiciansofthe Athlral-Dīn al-Abhari(1200-1265), Nasīr al-Dln al-ļusī (120 1-1274),32 Kātībīal-Quzwinī(d.1276),33Saad Ibn MansùrIbn Kammùnah(d.1284),34 and Shamsal-Dīn Muhammadal-Samarqandï(1240-1304)35all takea stab at solvingtheparadox.In thissection,we focuson Abharīssolution.In the next,we turntoTusī. 4 Our sourceforbothAbhariand Tusl is the chapteral-mughãlatãí('On the logicalfallacies')of Tusls Tadīl al-míyãrfi naqd Tanzīlal-afkãr( The of Criteria:A Critiqueof InspiredThoughts).Respondingto Refinement Abharis textverbatim. Abhari,Tusīreproduces thirteenth mathematician, Abhariwas an important logician,phicentury al-hikmah His ), a ( Guide to Philosophy losopher,and astronomer. Hidyãt was widelyread and commented workon logic,physics,and metaphysics, - arediscussed 31)Someofthese - though in Nicolas workon theLiar nottheir logicians 196-210. Arabic The 1964), Rescher, of (Pittsburgh, Development Logic 32)Tusī,Tadīlal-miyãr mabãhes-e inManteghe 1974), alfãz(Tehran, al-afkãr fi naqdtanzīl 235-237. 33)SeeDashtakī, Kheradal-asamm Risãlah , ed.AhadFaramarz Qaramaleki, al-jadhr fishubhat Sadra5,6(1997),77. nameh 34)IbnKammūnah, 1982),205-206. al-Jadīd (Baghdad, fial-hikmah 35)SeeDashtakī, Risãlah , 78.

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on Porphyry's His commentary upon withinIslamicphilosophy. Isagogewas withinthetradition; we possessa printedbilingualedialso quiteinfluential tionofthetext,in Arabicand Latin,from1625.36 Abharishowsan increased Judgedagainstearlierworkin the tradition, awarenessof the problemthe Liar poses, and an increasedambitionto theLiaras a "difficult addressthatproblem.He describes (mughãlatah fallacy" to pinpointthefallaciousinference thatgenerates sa bah),and thenattempts theparadox. oftheparadox:37 Hereis hispresentation One of thedifficult fallacies is theconjunction of thetwocontradictories (Jam "AllthatI sayatthismoment isfalse". Thissentence whensomeone says, al-naqidyan) Ifitistrue, thenitmust betrueandfalse. trueorfalse. Andifitisnot («qawl ) iseither thenitisnecessary thatoneofhissentences atthismoment istrue, aslongashe true, he at this other than this sentence. this utters moment But, Thus, nothing something. says isnecessarily true sentence andfalse. Abharis presentation of theparadoxcombineselementsfoundin Baghdādī - All likeĀmidī's,is a universal and Āmidī.His Liarsentence, generalization thatI sayat thismomentis false'.He securestheparadoxby assumingthat thespeakersaysonlythisat thismoment,improving on Āmidī'sloosercharacterization ofthecase.ButlikeBaghdādī,he drawstheconsequencethatthe sentenceis bothtrueand false,nottheconsequencethatit is neithertruenor false. His solutionis shortand puzzling:38 wesay:weshould then Tosolvetheparadox notconcede thatifitisfalse oneofhissentences istrue. Foritsbeing trueistaken tobetheconjunction ofitsbeing true {kalām) andbeing false. Therefore itsbeing false necessitates thenon-conjunction ofitsbeing true andbeing false. Andthenon-conjunction ofitsbeing true andbeing false doesnotnecessitate itsbeing true. He generates theparadoxbya separationofcases.The Liarsentenceis either trueor false,and, 36)Isagoge breue introductorium Arabicum cumversione Lat.:ac theses idest, , inscientiam logices sancta Nouariensis edita.Quapublice Roma , 1625. fideiy fr Thomœ opera studioq. disputabuntur intheBodleian Available BOD Bookstack MM (Bodleian 32(4)Jur). Library 37)Ta'dilal-mtyãr , 235. finaqdtanzil al-afkãr 38)ibid., 236.

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(1) IftheLiarSentenceis true,thenit is bothtrueand false, while (2) IftheLiarSentenceis false,thenit is bothtrueand false. So eitherway,it is bothtrueand false. He locatesthefallacyin thereasoningin supportof (2). Whatis thatreatheparadox,he defends(2) bysaying:39 presents soning?Whenhe initially Ifitisnottrue, thatoneofhissentences atthismoment istrue, as thenitisnecessary something. longasheutters Ifthereis a fallacy, then,itliesin (3): (3) If theLiarSentenceis not true,thenone of thespeakerssentencesis trueor thespeakersaysnothingat all. forhe says,"weshouldnotconcedethat It is clearthat(3) is Abharîs target, ifit is falsethenone ofhissentencesis true". and (3) followsfroma genThe Liar Sentenceis a universalproposition, eralprinciplegoverning universal propositions: is false,theneitherit has a counter-instance (4) If a universal proposition or itssubjecttermis empty.40 For example,"Alldogs havefourlegs"is falsebecausetherearethree-legged dogs; "Allunicornshave horns"is falsebecausethereare no unicorns.The is to showthattheLiarSentenceis a special burdenfacingAbhari,therefore, nor case: contrary to (4), it can be falsebut have neithercounter-instance emptysubject. 39)ibid. 40)Thesecond universal inArabic asinAristotelian because isnecessary logic, logic, disjunct inAristoissues ofthisandrelated haveexistential (Fora nicediscussion import. propositions The ofOpposition, 'TheTraditional telian seeTerry Parsons, Encyclopedia Square Stanford logic, = N. URL ed. Edward Zalta, 2006), (Stanford, .) onExistence', SeeAllan Avicenna intoArabic. theGreek rendered Bäck, Journal of they copula 25(1987),353. Philosophy

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Hereis whatAbharlactuallysays:41 istrue. Foritsbeing ifitisfalse then oneofhissentences that . . .Weshould notconcede .. . true andbeing false ofitsbeing true istaken tobetheconjunction So theLiaris specialbecauseithas a specialtruthcondition: (5) The LiarSentencesbeingtrueis theconjunctionof itsbeingtrueand beingfalse. does (5) mean?And is Abharlentitledto assertit? What,exactly, As a first stab,we mightinterpret (5) as simplematerialbiconditional: (5*) The LiarSentenceis trueifand onlyifit is trueand false. of (5) is thatit is easyto reconOne reason(5*) is a plausibleinterpretation Abhari structan argumentfor (5*) fromAbhari'sstatedcommitments. if a sentrivial observation that from and the (1) accepts(1), and (5*) follows tenceis bothtrueand false,thenit is true. From(5), Abhariinfers,42 thenon-conjunction ofitsbeing trueandbeing itsbeing false necessitates ...Therefore false ... In otherwords, (6) IftheLiarSentenceis false,thenit is notbothtrueand false. (6) followsfrom(5*). Assumingthattruthand falsehoodarecontradictories, It is thenextmovethatis problematic:43 itsbeing true andbeing false doesnotnecessitate . . .Andthenon-conjunction ofitsbeing true. In otherwords, 41)Tadilal-miyãr 236. finaqdtanzīl al-afkãr, 42)ibid. 43)ibid.

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(7) It is not thecase that,iftheLiar Sentenceis not bothtrueand false, thenit is true. The generalprinciplebehind(7) is clearenough:thenegationof a conjunctiondoes notentailthenegationofa conjunct;so fromnotbothtrueandfalse you cannotinfernotfalseand so true.Abhariappearsto be sayingthatthe Liarrestson an elementary scopefallacy! But,ofcourse,Abhariis notentitledto (7). In somecases,thenegationof a conjunctiondoesentailthenegationof a conjunct:"notbothP and P" for example,entails"not P". As a generalrule,the negationof a conjunction entailsthe negationof each conjunctwheneverthe conjunctsare logically equivalent,i.e., whenevertheone followsfromtheotherand viceversa.So Abhariis entitledto (7) onlyifhe is entitledto assumethat'The Liar Sentenceis true'and 'The LiarSentenceis false'arenotlogicallyequivalent.But thatassumption wouldbegthequestion. for Worse,Abharihas said nothingto undercuttheargument (2) IftheLiarSentenceis false,thenit is bothtrueand false, thathe originally The LiarSentenceis a universal so, presented. proposition, if it is (non-vacuously) false,it musthave a counter-instance (by (4)); but, itsonlypossiblecounter-instance assumingthatitis theonlysentenceI utter, is itself;so ifit is false,it mustbe true.Thereis no stepin thislineofreasonto thescope fallacyAbharidescribes.If thisreasoning ing thatcorresponds succeeds,then,given(1), thetwoconjuncts,"TheLiarSentenceis false"and "TheLiarSentenceis true"arelogically Iftheyarelogically equivalent. equivato the of the lent,then,contrary (7), negation conjunctiondoes entailthe negationofeachconjunct. Abharis "solution"therefore fails. We suspectthat,ifpressed,he wouldrefocusourattention on (5). (5) tells us thatthe Liar Sentencehas a specialtruthcondition:its beingtrueis its beingtrueand false.How mightthisspecialtruthconditioncause trouble for(2)? Consideran argumentfor(2) thatis a bit different fromtheone Abhari provides: (8) (9) (10) (11)

The LiarSentencedeclaresitselfto be false. Assumeit is false So, thingsareas itdeclaresthemto be. So, theLiarSentenceis true.

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like: The inference from(10) to (11) requiressomething (PI) A sentenceis trueifthingsareas itdeclaresthemto be.44 a denialof (P1)? Can (5) be usedto motivate Recallthat(1) supports(5): (1) IftheLiarSentenceis true,thenit is bothtrueand false, (1) restson a line of reasoningthatgoes somethinglike this:the sentence declaresitselfto be false;assumeit is true;thenthingsare as the sentence declaresthemto be, so it is false.So (1) dependson theconverseof (PI): (P2) Ifa sentenceis true,thenthingsareas it declaresthemto be. If (5) is to undercut(PI), it had betternotalso undercut(P2), lestit thereby undercut(1), and so undercut(5), and so undercutthe basis of Abharis solution. A theoryoftruththataccepts(P2) butrejects(PI) is a theorythatembodmorethanthingsbeingas thesenies theidea thattruthrequiressomething Latin tencesaystheyare.A viewof thissortis defendedbythe 14thcentury Thomas Bradwardine.45 philosopher Bradwardine heldthat or necessarily (BSP) Everypropositionsignifiesor means contingently which follows from it or contingently necessarily.46 everything So a proposition like"Zaydis sitting", that given(BSP), does notjustsignify is but also that is and this is the Zayd sitting, signifies something sitting, kicker signifies that"Zaydis sitting" is true. Bradwardine also heldthat

44)Theprecise of(PI) and(P2)arebothinspired canberead byTusï.Together, wording they asglosses onAristotle's dictum: "Tosayofwhatisthatitisnot,orofwhat isnotthatitis,is while tosayofwhatisthatitis,andofwhatisnotthatitisnot,istrue" false, , (.Metaphysics 1011 b25). 45)Stephen from Buridan backtoThomas VivarRead,'TheLiarParadox Bradwardine', John ium40(2002),189-218. 46)Read, LiarParadox', "The 191.

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is an utterance (BTP) A trueproposition onlyas thingsare.47 signifying So the truthof "Zayd is sitting"requiresnot just thatZayd be sitting,but - that"Zaydis sitalso thatsomething be sitting, and also- again,thekicker is true. ting" thatit is false.But,justas EveryoneagreesthattheLiarSentencesignifies "Zayd is sitting"entails"'Zayd is sittingis true",and so, by (BSP), signifies itsown truth,so too theLiarSentence,by (BSP), signifies itsown truth.So theLiarSentencesignifies a contradiction: it signifies boththatit is falseand thatit is true.Likeall contradictions, it is false. Thatis Bradwardines solutionto theLiar.Returning toAbharl,and to (PI): (PI) A sentenceis trueifthingsareas itdeclaresthemto be. like(BSP). Distinguish a broadand a narrow SupposeAbhariheldsomething senseof thingsbeingas thesentencedeclaresthemto be- thenarrowsense to whatwe ordinarily takea sentenceto declare;the broad corresponding sensecorresponding to thatalongwitheverything it entails.Given(BTP), in thenarrowsenseof "declares", is in the broad sense,it is true. (PI) false; Returnto theargument for(2) thatrelieson (PI): (8) (9) (10) (11)

The LiarSentencedeclaresitselfto be false. Assumeit is false. So, thingsareas thesentencedeclaresthemto be. So, theLiarSentenceis true.

The argument no longergoesthrough: theuseof"declares" in (10) is equivocal: from(8) and (9) onlyif"declares" is usedin thenarrow sense;(10) (10) follows if in "declares" is used the broad sense. So the fails. (11) supports only argument Bradwardinian would also Abharl for the principles give grounds rejecting falseuniversal musthavea counprinciplethata non-vacuously proposition if it has a counter-instance, ter-instance: thenthingsare not as it narrowly declaresthemto be,so thatis one wayforthesentenceto be false;butalso,if it is not true,thenthingsarenotas it broadlydeclaresthemto be, so thatis anotherwayforit to be false,evenifit has no counter-instance. Consider(5) in lightof a Bradwardinian analysis.(5) can be readas the claimthatforthingsto be as theLiarSentencebroadlydeclaresthemto be is 47)ibid.

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forthesentenceto be bothtrueand false.Hence thereis a sensein whichthe sentenceitselfis causingtheproblem,by(broadly)declaringa contradiction. Sucha thoughtseemsverymuchin thespiritofAbhari. It is therefore to readAbharias a proto-Bradwardinian. Such a tempting is not without it makes sense of Abhari s reading entirely support:primarily, use of (5). But thereadingstretches what Abhariactuallysaysis that charity: one cannotinferthenegationof a conjunctfromthenegationof a conjunction,which,as we haveseen,is a mistake. Proto-Bradwardinian or not,Abharis workon theLiaroccursearlyenough thatit couldhaveinfluenced Bradwardine ifit madeitswayWest.Sinceit is withBradwardine thattheLatintradition picksup steam,one mightwonder whetherthatsteamwas theresultofArabicforces.48 theearliUnfortunately, estknownLatintranslation ofanyworkbyAbhariis thebilingualeditionof his commentary on theIsagoge , from1625, whichis too late,and has nothingto do withtheLiar.49 It is possiblethatAbharis workwas knownto theWestindirectly. Tusť if it was available,mayhave quotesAbhari,and TusI's workin astronomy, attracted Bradwardine s attention.

3. Tùsl on theLiar TusIwas a thirteenth who wroteimportant worksin astroncentury polymath and theology, other omy,mathematics, philosophy, among subjects.His most fame stems from his work in As founder and director of enduring astronomy. thefamousobservatory at Marāgha,hisworkwas centralto thereformation of Ptolemaicastronomy. The techniqueshe and his followers most developed - werelater theso-called"TusIcouple" famously, appropriated byCopernicus. JusthowCopernicuscameto knowTusIs workremainsa puzzle.Thereare no survivingLatin translations of any of TusIs work.Henri HugonnardRochesuggestsa routethroughByzantinesources,reachingItalyin thefifteenthcentury.50 ClaudiaKrenhasspeculatedthat"somepossiblyfragmentary and evengarbledversionoftheal-TusI device"liesbehinda puzzlingpassage 48)Inthewords ofRalph Bradwardine wastheone"whofirst Strode, cameuponsomething of valueconcerning insolubles." Strode andconcurs: , 249)quotes "with Spade('Insolubilia him, theinsolubilia-iitersLture entered itssecond andmost productive phase." 9)Seenote36above. 50)"The Influence ofArabic IntheMedieval inEncyclopedia West', Astronomy oftheHistory of Arabic Science, VI,ed.Roshdi Rashed, (NewYork, 1996),303.

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Y. Tzvi Langermannhas suggestedthatthe missing fromNicole Oresme.51 knownto a fiflinkmaybe a fourteenth centuryHebrewtexton geometry, teenthcenturyJewishsavant,who in turnwas in contactwith Christian savantsin Northern Italy.52 In sum,we haveno clearidea howanyofTïisïs workcameto be knownin no reasonto supposethathisworkon theLiar theWest,and, in particular, was everknownin theWest. TusI frameshis discussionof theLiar as a responseto Abharl.He quotes mentionsthatit is a paradox of theparadoxverbatim, Abharîs presentation - a tantalizthathas been"broughtforthbya numberofpreviousthinkers"53 ingbut obscurereferenceand proceedsto explainhow he thinksthepara- that is to say, how the paradox should be dox "should be arranged" s solutionto theparadoxverbatim, Abharl He then briefly quotes generated. thatsolution,and beginsto describeand develophisown solution, criticizes betweenthe negation(nafi) of and the whichdependsupon a distinction oftheappliand and upon a restriction of truth nonexistence padaní) falsity, 'true'and 'false'. cationofthepredicates TusI focuseson (5): whenAbharls saysthat"itsbeingtrueis takento be theconjunctionof its beingtrueand false",TusI says,ifhe meantthat"its "which thenthatis something beingtrueis theobtainingoftheconjunction" an alternative Tïisïventures we shouldnotconcede."54 perhaps interpretation: of its beingtrueas a Abharlmeansthat"itsbeingtrueis the necessitating truth Abharls conjunctive resultof itsbeingfalse".TusIseemsto be replacing truthcondicondition("itsbeingtrueand itsbeingfalse")witha conditional to clarify tion("itsbeingtrueifit is false").He does not sayanything what, mean. this exactly, might But his criticalpointdoes not dependon this.Tïisïarguesthatwhatever as thetruth conditional)Abharlwantsto identify fancything(conjunction, conditionforthe Liar Sentence,it will not matter,becausepace Abharl, fromthenegationof a comwe can generatetheparadoxwithoutinferring, its of one of parts.We can arguedirectly plextruthcondition,thenegation ofitsbeingfalse,and so entailsitsbeing thatitsbeingfalseentailsthenegation true. 50'TheRolling Isis62 ofNicoleOresme?', in theDe spera DeviceofNasïral-Dïnal-Tusï (1971),497. 52)'Medieval Mathematica Historia 23 (1996), oftheLune', ontheQuadrature Hebrew Texts 34-35. 53)Tadīlal-miyãr , 235. al-afkãr finaqdtanzīl 54)ibid., 236.

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Tutsiis makinga pointwe made above:Abharlfailsto undercutseveral obviousand apparently validlinesof argument fromfalseto true , and thereforefailsto showthattheparadoxrestson thefallacyhe describes. Tus!s preferred solutionrequiressetup.He beginsbytellingus,55 Ifa declarative candeclare-something-about thenitis sentence, byitsnature, anything, that ititself candeclare-something-about another declarative sentence. possible In otherwords,ifthereareno constraints on thepossiblesubjectmatterofa declarative then it is to declarative sentence, possible have a meta-linguistic sentence:a sentencethathas as itssubjectanotherdeclarative sentence. He proceedsto describea case in whichone declarative sentence,(D^, declaresanotherdeclarative sentence,(D2), to be false,as in (D^ (D2)

(D2) is false. Zayd is sitting.

Of sucha case,he makestwopoints: Thesecond declarative sentence would become in that-about-which-something-is-declared onerespect, anda declarative inanother. sentence Ifthefirst declarative sentence declares thesecond declarative sentence tobefalse, thenthefirst declarative sentences true being andthesecond declarative sentence s being false areconcomitant. Tïisîis herebelaboringtwo points.First,once we havea sentencedeclaring abouta sentence,we havea singlesentencethatplaystwogramsomething maticalor logicalroles:(D2) is thegrammatical subjectof (Dļ), and it is also a declarative sentencein itsown right.The secondpointconcernsthelogical relationsbetweensentenceslike (Dx) and (D2): if (D^ is true,then(D2) is false(and,presumably, viceversa). Armedwiththesedistinctions, we can considerthe case thatmatters:a - thatis, a sentencethathas sentencethatdeclaressomethingabout itself itselfas subject.As Tusī sets it up, we are asked to imaginethatour first declarative sentence,(Dj), declaresitselfto be false,ratherthan(D2): (Dj)

(D,) is false.

55)ibid., 235.

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Of sucha case,TusItellsus:56 itsbeing then[both] itself tobefalse, declares ifthefirst sentence declarative Moreover, as it is that-aboutinsofar and its as it is a declarative insofar false, sentence, being true, areconcomitant. which-something-is-declared, Thisis justan applicationof thetwopointsmade above.The sentenceplays - and corresponding to each roles- subjectand sentence two grammatical between the relations and or its truth we can consider falsehood, role, logical them. Now we arereadyto considertheparadox:57 isa which declarative Thefirst canbegenerated: thefollowing sentence, Thus, paradox If it is either false or true. it is is that about true, declaration false, itself, {khabar) namely itmust betrue, Ifitisfalse, then tobefalse. itdeclares itself because then itmust befalse, isabsurd. which itwillbecome then ifitissaidfalsely, because true, thispassageis. The contemporary howremarkable It is hardto overemphasize withtheidea thattheLiarParadoxis a paradoxofselfreaderwillbe familiar ButTusī is, as faras we know,thefirstpersonto expressthisidea. reference. in anytradition. Thispassagehas no precedent featsin shortorder.First,his Liar threeremarkable Tusī has performed and itdeclaresitselfto be false.Gone, Sentenceis singular:itssubjectis itself, then,is the choice betweenuniversalor particularLiar Sentence,and the a genuineparato generate associatedproblemofaddingfurther assumptions the paradoxas one of self-reference. dox.58Second, he has characterized forgena keyassumptionthatmightbe responsible Third,he has identified a declarative that the the entire sentence, byits problem: assumption erating nature,can declare-something-about anything. ļusī beginsto develophisown responsein theguiseofa recommendation to Abharî:59 then ifitisfalse, itfollows tohavesaidthat fortheauthor havebeenbetter Itwould that, time. at the same is true that it is itdeclares about what false, itself, namely

56)ibid., 236. 57)ibid. 58)Itispuzzling noattempt thishimselr, that Tusïdoesnotmention and,aswewillsee,makes LiarSentences. tonon-singular hissolution toapply 59)Tadtl 236. al-afeãr, al-miyãr finaqdtanzïl

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TusIimmediately retracts thisadvice,in thefollowing difficult passage:60 thedenial ofitsbeing Asfortheclaim that itsbeing true isnecessitated false, byitsbeing ofitsbeing Forthedenial ofthelatter false doesnotnecessitate theaffirmation true. [its is willnotnecessitate theformer Rather what isnecessitated [itsbeing true].61 false] being thedenial ofitsbeing true. itisimpossible forsucha sentence tobetrue, because Thus, because itsbeing itsbeing true necessitates itsfalsity; anditsbeing false isnotimpossible, false necessitates thenonexistence true. Çadam)ofitsbeing How can he, in the same breath,both acceptthe validityof the inference from , and thenpresentan argument againstit? falseto true in responseto theargument Tusīseemsto recognizethis.He suggests, just that one once the basic quoted, mightrespondby argument againrepeating fromfalseto true: Ifitisfalse, itdeclares thatitisfalse, istrue, andthusthe then what aboutitself, namely isregained. paradox This is, in essence,the same argumentthatAbharlput forthwhenhe presentedthe paradox;it is, in essence,the same argumentTusī held up in responseto Abharīssolution.And nowTūsīseemsto havebothacceptedand rejectedit in shortorder.Whatis goingon? Tusī knowsthat the ultimatesolution,if it is going to succeed,must He appearsto be callingourattenexplainwhatis wrongwiththisargument. tion to the factthatAbharīssolutionfailsto providesuch an explanation, - evenifit is movingin theright and thattheconfusing justvetted argument direction has notdoneso either. Tusī respondsto thischallengeby makinga distinction betweentwo different from to true:G1 arguments false Theresponse tothis isthat itsbeing insofar asitisa declarative anditsbeing true, sentence, insofar asitisthat-about-which-something-is-declared, areconcomitant. false, However, thisisnottheissuehere. itisthatitsbeing insofar asitisa declarative senRather, false, doesnotnecessitate itsbeing true. tence, ^ ibid. 61)Thebrackets ourjudgment astotheproper of'former and'latter. represent interpretation Notethat cannot intheprevious refer backtothemainclause sentence ofits ('thedenial they false does not the necessitate affirmation of its Hence we them true'). being being interpret as backtotheformer andthelatter ofthefirst clauseoftheprevious sentence referring parts true isnecessitated false ('.. .itsbeing byitsbeing 62)Tadīlal-miyãr , 237. finaqdtanzīl al-afkãr

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TusI wantsus to distinguish an argumentthattradeson theroleof theLiar Sentenceas subject(as that-about-which-something-is-declared) and an argumentthattradeson itsroleas declarative sentence.The former he argument, seemsto wantto say,succeeds;thelatterdoes not. The argument thatTusIhas nowrepeatedseveraltimes, Ifitisfalse, then what itdeclares about itisfalse, istrue, that itself, namely is theargument thatTusIaccepts,and so mustbe theargument thathe takes to tradeon the role of the Liar Sentenceas subject.To bringthisout, we abstract theformoftheargument: IfS isP,then that itisP,istrue. what 'S isP' declares about S,namely, ifa subjectis as a senThe generalprinciple we arerelying on hereis familiar: tencedeclaresit to be, thenthatsentenceis true: (PI) A sentenceis trueifthingsareas it declaresthemto be. TusIs idea is that,when(PI) is broughtto bearin theargument fromfalseto true,the argumentbeginsby focusingon the role of the Liar Sentenceas - the 'S' role- ratherthanits roleas declarative - the 'S is sentence subject P' role. What is theothersortof argumentthatTusI has in mind,theargument thatbeginsby focusingon the roleof the Liar Sentenceas declarative sentence?Pickingup wherewe leftoff,he says:63 ... itsbeing insofar asitisa declarative doesnotnecessitate itsbeing true. false, sentence, thedenial itsbeing necessitates asitisthat-about-whichInstead, false ofitsbeing false, insofar insofar and[necessitates] itsbeing asitisa declarative sentence. false, something-is-declared, inthis the of its weshould notconcede denial false necessitates its that, Hence, way, being true. being The keymoveis in italics.Again,we abstracttheformoftheargument: thedenial ofSs P-ing, insofar asS isthat-about-which'S isPs being false necessitates something-is-declared. 63)Ibid., ouremphasis.

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The underlying principleis: (P3) If a sentenceis false,thenthe subjectof the sentenceis not as the sentencedeclaresit to be. How does (P3) getus an argument fromfalseto true?Forsimplicity, letour LiarSentencebe: (L)

L is false.

Assumethat 'L is falseis false. By (P3), we can inferthat L is notfalse. to bearsomething like(PI) - withBut,ļusī wantsto say,withoutbringing Tusī'srubric,returning to considertheLiarSentenceinsofaras out,following - we cannotgetanyfurther; it is that-about-which-something-is-declared in we cannot from infer, particular, L is notfalse to L is true. So Tusī needsto showthatthereis a waythatL can failto be falsewithout beingtrue.In hiswords, . . .Weshould notconcede thatinthiswaythedenial ofitsbeing false necessitates its true. being To establish this,he appealsto thefactthattheLiarSentenceis self-referential:64 M)ibid.

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A.Alwishah, D. Sanson /Vivarium 47 (2009)97-127 Ifthedeclarative sentence isthesameas that-about-which-it-declares, thenitcannot be conceived tobetrue andfalse. Foragreement cannot beconceived asbetween two except andwecannot conceive them asopposed. Forifonething isaffirmed, then noththings, andifonething is denied, thennothing canbe conceived to be ingwillbe denied, affirmed.

Tiāsīis arguingthata declarative sentencethat"is the same as that-about- thatis, a sentencethathas itselfas subject - can be neiwhich-it-declares" thertruenorfalse.The argument restson twoprinciples truthand governing falsehood: betweensubjectand declarative sentence. (T) Truthis an agreement betweensubjectand declarative sentence. (F) Falsehoodis a disagreement These principlesare not new to Tusī. We have alreadyseen themat work withintheArabictradition withBaghdad!:65 Truth is an agreement withthat-about-which-something-is-declared, andfalsity is the of that. opposite However,(T) and (F) areopen to interpretation. On one interpretation, (T) is simplytheconjunctionof (PI) and (P2), (P1&2) A sentenceis truejustin case thingsareas it declaresthemto be. witha minimalist (P1&2) is consistent theoryof truth:it does not impose accountofthemetaphysics oftruth. upon us anyparticular But theargumentmakesit clearthatļusī thinksthattheagreement and and this. His central claim is (F) go beyond requiredby (T) disagreement thatagreement and disagreement bothrequiredistinctness:66 cannot beconceived as between twothings, conceive andwecannot except Agreement them asbeing opposed. he says,require"two[distinct] Bothagreement and disagreement, parts".In the case of a sentencethat is its own subject,thereare not two distinct 65)Usül 217. al-dïn, 66>ibid.

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- just the same thingplayingtwo different roles- so therecannotbe parts so therecannotbe truth.Likewise,therecannotbe disagreement, agreement, areneithertruenor sentences cannot be falsehood.So self-referential so there false. it appearsthatTusīhas somesortofcorrespondence In verybroadstrokes, of truth (and falsehood)in mind.Truthrequiressomesortofrealrelatheory betweensubjectand sentence,and real relationsrequire tionof agreement distinctrelata. betweentwowaysin Ifwe grantTusī this,thenhe can makea distinction a sentence can fail to be true to be true. a sentence can fail which First, thereis no becauseit is false:it is not truebecausethereis no agreement; a sentence can failto there is because But, second, disagreement. agreement it is not truebecausethereis no agreebe truebecauseit is self-referential: becausetherearenottwodisment;thereis no agreement (or disagreement) tinct parts.Tusī expressesthis by sayingthat we can conceive of the nonexistencepadaní) of agreementand truthin two ways: the way that and falsity), and "opposesthenaturaldisposition"(thewayof disagreement and truth(thewayof thewaythatinvolvesthenegation(naß) of agreement neither nor agreement disagreement):67 notinthesense ofanagreement, inthatcasethenonexistence Wecanconceive i^adam) - butrather - i.e.,falsity inthe nonexistence that thenatural padaní) disposition opposes - i.e.,thenonexistence oftruth. sense ofthenegation padaní) ) ofanagreement (nafi TusīsaysthattheLiaris68 Where,then,does thisleavematters? inno towhich truth andfalsity tosomething theresult ofa judgment thatapplies they in the misuse of a them is and to anyway predicate. wayapply, apply In otherwords,thefallacyis to supposethatthepredicates'true'and 'false' sentenceliketheLiar. applyto a self-referential and obviof the Many problemsforthissortof solutionarewell-known that seem so we here focus on ous, especiallypressinggivenTusīs problems concerns. trueor false,e.g., referential sentencesare non-paradoxically Many self"Thissentenceis sixwordslong"and "Thissentenceis a sausage".Moreover, it seemsrightto saythat"Thissentenceis sixwordslong"is truebecausethe 67)ibid. 68)ibid.

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subjectagreeswiththesentence,and that"Thissentenceis a sausage"is false becausethesubjectdisagrees withthesentence.So whatever sensesof agreementand disagreement areherein play,it does notseemthattheidentity or distinctness ofsubjectand sentencematters. It is puzzlingthatTusīs solutiondoes not directly addressthe Liar Sentencesprovidedby his immediatepredecessors, includingAbhari.Does the sentence'AllthatI sayat thismomentis false'declaresomething aboutitself? Thereis a clearsensein whichit does: thesentenceitselfis amongthethings I sayat thismoment,so it is amongthethingsthesentencedeclaressomethingabout. But ifwe extendTusīs solutionto coverthissentencein this of the previousparagraphbecome more proway, the embarrassments nounced:thesentence,"Alldeclarative sentencesaresentences", forexample, aboutitself, declaressomething and so is neithertruenorfalse.69 'AllthatI say at thismomentis false'generates a paradoxonlywhenwe assumethatit is theonlythingI sayat thismoment.So perhapsTusī could distinguishsentencesthat declaresomethingabout themselvesalone and sentencesthatdeclaresomething about themselves and otherthingsas well. Such a distinctionwould allow his solutionto coverthe Liar Sentences foundin Abhariand Amidiwithoutforcinghim to denythetruthof every universalproposition.Perhapssome similarmovecould be meta-linguistic made to handleBaghdādī'sversionof the paradox,based upon a particular proposition. we returnto thebeginning.RecallthatTiisībeganwiththeclaim Finally, that, then .. . Ifa declarative sentence can,byitsnature, declare-something-about anything, ofthisconditional? Arethere, Does he,or does he not,accepttheantecedent sentences forTusī,self-referential declarative or not? to thedefiniNeitherTusī norAbhariframetheLiaras a counterexample sentence".But it is clearthat,forTusī,no self-referential tionof "declarative sentenceis truth-apt: theyare not thesortsof sentencesthatare capableof thata false. If he acceptsthedefinition of theMutakallimùn, true or being sentenceis one thatobeysbivalence,thenhe shouldconcludethat declarative sentenceis not a declarative a self-referential sentence,and so concludethat 69)A consequence butTusIdoesn't seemto notice. SeeRussell, Bertrand Russell endorses, ofTypes', American 'Mathematical Journal ofMathematics, Logicas Basedon TheTheory inhisLogic andKnowledge 30(1908),224;reprinted 1956),63. (London,

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it does not declaresomethingabout itself,but insteadfailsto declareanyat all. thingaboutanything in In theArabictradition, thatviewdoes not appearforanothercentury, theworkofSad al-DīnTaftazānī(d.1390) butthatis foranotherpaper.70 4. Conclusion We haveattemptedto describeand analyzethreeimportant chaptersin the historyof theArabicLiar: its earliestappearancein the workof the early Abharlsattemptto solvetheparadoxby appeal to a special Mutakallimūn; if inadequate, truthconditionforthe Liar Sentence;and Tusís remarkable, theoryoftruthin supportoftheclaim attemptto appealto a correspondence thatself-referential liketheLiarSentence, areneither truenorfalse. sentences, Much remainsto be done. The ArabicLiar continuesforat leastanother fourcenturiesafterTusl. Broaderhistoricalquestionsof inter-traditional influence remainunanswered; theonlyanswerwe can giveat the or,rather, momentis a negativeepistemic:no inter-traditional linesof historical influencehavecometo light.

Appendix ' 71 Translation fromAl Āmidī,On theTruthoftheKhabarand itsDivisions' The Mutazilah,such as Abu 'All al-Jubba I, his son Abū Hāshim,Abī cAbd Allahal-Basrland al-Qādī 'Abdal-Jabbār and otherssaid thatthedeclarative sentence{khabar)is a speech(kalām)thatis pervadedbytruthand falsehood. Therearefourproblemsbroughtagainstthisdefinition. can be underminedby the sentence"Muhammad First,[thisdefinition] in proclaimingthe prophecy".This sentence and Musaylimahare truthful cannotbe true,because[then]Musaylimahsclaimwould be true,and this sentencecannotbe false,because[then]Muhammad'sclaimwould be false. And furthermore, sentences byhe who saidto be falseall ofhisdeclarative by "All declarative sentences are false". This declarative sentence cansaying, my notbe true,forifit weretrue,thenall of his declarative sentenceswould be false,and thisdeclarativesentenceis his only declarativesentence.And it 70)Taftazānī, Sharh ,ed.Abdal-Rahmān (Beirut, 1989),286-287. Umayrah al-Maqãsid 71)al-Ihkãm al-ahkãm, v2,250-252. fiusül

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- thisbeing cannotbe false,forifitwere,thenall ofhisdeclarative sentences - would be false.And therefore his onlydeclarative sentence he would have "All when he sentences arefalse". said, spokentruly mydeclarative - thatwhichis either of the declarativesentence Second,the definition - is a circulardefinition. trueor false For thedetermination of thetrueand the falsedependson knowingthe declarativesentence,since somethingis trueifit agreeswiththat-about-which-something-is-declared, and it is falseif itdoes not,and thatis impossible. Third,truthand falsehoodareoppositeto each other,and it is inconceivable thattheybe together in one declarative sentence.And thatnecessitates thateitherit is impossibleforthedeclarative sentenceto existin an absolute sentenceexiststogether withthe sense,whichis absurd,or the declarative of the of truth and falsehood impossibility possibility pervadingthroughit, and thusthedefinedthingwould be understood withoutit sayinganything aboutthethingwhichis definedbyit,and thattoo is absurd. Fourth,God s [word]mustbe a declarative sentence,butGod'swordcannotbe false. With respectto the firstobjection,Abu All al-Jubbaīrepliesto theone who utters'Muhammadand Musaylimahare truthful', thatthissentence the truth of one of them the of the other, truth {kalām)signifies provided thatis,one ofthemsaysthetruthprovidedthattheothersaysthetruth[. . .] Abù Hāshim repliesthatthisdeclarative sentenceacts as two declarative one declares the truth of the sentences, prophetand the otherdeclaresthe truthofMusaylimah[. . .] senAl-Qādī cAbdal-Jabbār repliesthatwhatwe mean by "A declarative tenceis eithertrueor false"is thatlanguagedoes notprevent us fromjudging a speakerbysaying,"whatyousaid is trueor false"[. . .] Abù cAbdAllahal-Basrlrepliesthatit is falsebecausein such a sentence truthis appliedto both[. . .] Withrespectto thesecondpartof thefirstobjection,thedeclarative sento that-about-which-something-is-declared or not. tenceeithercorresponds Iftheformer thenit is true;ifthelatter, thenit is false,forit is impossibleto in thecase ofaffirmation thetwocontradictories or in thecase havetogether ofnegation. Withrespectto thesecondobjection,al-Qādī 'Abdal-Jabbār replies[. . .] With respectto the thirdobjection,it has been said in replythatthe definedthingis thespeciesofthedeclarative sentence,and it admitstheperit in samewaythatblackand white of truth and falsehood vading through are conjoinedin thespeciesof color.This is not correctbecauseevenifthe

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must definition is of the speciesof the declarativesentence,the definition existin everyindividualdeclarative sentence,sinceotherwisean individual and thatis impossible. declarative sentencewouldexistwithoutitsdefinition, sentencethereis no conAnd it is clearthatin each individualdeclarative even and because of truth falsehood, thoughit appearsto be an junction absoluteconjunction, whatis intendedby theconjunctionand' is therepesense. titionofthetwopartsin a figurative Withrespectto thefourthobjection,it has beensaid thatthereplyto it is whichwe havealready thesameas thereplytotheprevious explained. objection, ' ofCriteTranslation ' fromhisThe Refinement fallacies ofTūsīyOn thelogical ria:A Critiqueof'InspiredThoughts72 fallaciesis theconjunctionof thetwo He [Abharl]says:One of thedifficult when someonesays,"AllthatI sayat this contradictories (jam al-naqīdyan) is momentis false".Thissentence(qawl) eithertrueor false.Ifit is true,then thatone of it mustbe trueand false.And ifit is nottrue,thenit is necessary his sentencesat thismomentis true,as longas he utterssomething. But,he sentence. this sentence is at this moment other than this Thus, saysnothing trueand false. necessarily I say:Thisfallacyis broughtforthbya numberofpreviousthinkers. Let us it be state how should [first] arranged: If a declarative sentence,by its nature,can declare-something-about anyanother thing,thenit is possiblethatit itselfcan declare-something-about declarativesentence.Thus, the second declarativesentencewould become in one respect, senand a declarative that-about-which-something-is-declared sentencedeclarestheseconddeclaratencein another.If thefirstdeclarative sentencesbeingtrueand tivesentenceto be false,thenthe firstdeclarative ifthe theseconddeclarative sentence s beingfalseareconcomitant. Moreover, first declarative sentencedeclaresitselfto be false,then[both]itsbeingtrue, insofaras it is a declarative sentence,and itsbeingfalse,insofaras it is thatareconcomitant. about-which-something-is-declared, the can be generated:The firstdeclarative senThus, followingparadox tence,whichis a declaration(khabar)about itself,namelythatit is false,is eitherfalseor true.If it is true,thenit mustbe false,becauseit declaresitself to be false.If it is false,thenit mustbe true,becauseifit is said falsely, then itwillbecometrue,whichis absurd. 72)Tadîlal-mîyâr , 235-237. finaqdtanzil al-afkãr

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He says:To solvetheparadoxwe say:we shouldnot concedethatifit is falsethenone ofhissentences{kalām)is true.Foritsbeingtrueis takento be its beingfalse the conjunctionof its beingtrueand beingfalse.Therefore of its beingtrueand beingfalse.And the necessitates the non-conjunction its of its being trueand being falsedoes not necessitate non-conjunction beingtrue. I say:When he said, "itsbeingtrueis takento be theconjunctionof its beingtrueand beingfalse",he eithermeantthatitsbeingtrueis theobtainwhichwe shouldnot concede,or thatitsbeingtrue ingof theconjunction, ofitsbeingtrueas a resultofitsbeingfalse.[Butifthatis is thenecessitating thenonthecase]thenwe shouldnotconcedethatitsbeingfalsenecessitates the it necessitates existencei^adarn)of thatnecessitating. Rather, negation of thesentence{kalām).Hence, thesentence{kalām)is (nafi)of thefalsity notfalse,and whatwe meanby'beingtrue'is exactlythat.Hence,it appears its being true.Thus, the paradoxcan be that its being falsenecessitates regained. It wouldhavebeenbetterfortheauthorto havesaid thatit followsthat,if it is false,thenwhatit declaresabout itself,namelythatit is false,is trueat the same time.What I mean by thisis thatbeingtrueand beingfalseare theother.As fortheclaimthat so thatto denyone is to affirm contradictory, the denialof its beingfalse its its beingtrueis necessitated false, by being ofitsbeingtrue.Forthedenialofthelattheaffirmation does notnecessitate Rather the former[itsbeingtrue].73 ter[itsbeingfalse]will not necessitate is thedenialof itsbeingtrue.Thus,it is impossiblefor whatis necessitated itsfalsity; and sucha sentenceto be true,becauseitsbeingtruenecessitates thenonexbecauseitsbeingfalsenecessitates itsbeingfalseis notimpossible, istence{'adam) ofitsbeingtrue. its being One may respondby saying:Justas its beingtruenecessitates is beingtrue.Because,ifit is itsbeingfalsenecessitates false,concomitantly, false,thenwhatit declaresabout itself,namelythatit is false,is true,and thustheparadoxis regained. senThe responseto thisis thatitsbeingtrue,insofaras it is a declarative tence,and its being false,insofaras it is that-about-which-something-isdeclared,are concomitant.However,thisis not the issuehere.Rather,it is thatitsbeingfalse,insofaras it is a declarative sentence,does notnecessitate thedenialof itsbeingfalse, itsbeingtrue.Instead,itsbeingfalsenecessitates its and [necessitates] insofaras it is that-about-which-something-is-declared, 73)Seenote61above.

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sentence.Hence,we shouldnotconbeingfalse,insofaras it is a declarative cedethat,in thisway,thedenialofitsbeingfalsenecessitates itsbeingtrue. truthand falsityapplyto everydeclarative sentence Upon investigation, thatis distinctfromthat-about-which-it-declares,74 so thatone can conceive a declarative sentenceand a declarative sentenceoppositeto it standingon if so one of truth or sides, that, contrary falsityis assignedto that-abouttheothershouldnotbe assignedto it,so thatone of them which-it-declares, willbe trueand theotherof themwill be false.Furthermore, thedenialof one ofthemwillresultin theaffirmation of theother,and theaffirmation of one ofthemwillresultin thedenialoftheother. sentenceis the same as that-about-which-itHowever,if the declarative candeclares,thenit cannotbe conceivedto be trueand false.Foragreement notbe conceivedexceptas betweentwothings,and we cannotconceivethem as opposed.For ifone thingis affirmed, thennothingwillbe denied,and if one thingis denied,thennothingcan be conceivedto be affirmed. sentencedeclaresitselfto be false,thenwe Moreover,if thisdeclarative cannotconceivein thatcase an agreement betweenitstwopartssuchthatit is true.Butwe can conceivein thatcasethenonexistence padaní)ofan agree- i.e.,falsity - but ment,notin thesensethatopposesthenaturaldisposition rather nonexistence in the sense of the of an padani) negation agreement i.e., thenonexistence (ťadam) oftruth. it is nottruethatthisdeclarative sentenceis eithertrueor false, Therefore, and judgingit to be eitherresultsin an impossibility. Rather,it is truethat thissentenceis neithertruenor false.And the affirmation of the one does notresultfromthenegationoftheother,and so no impossibility follows. Now,fromwhatwe havediscussed,it is clearthatthisfallacyarisesas the resultofa judgmentthatappliestruthand falsity to something to whichthey in no wayapply,and to applythemin anywayis themisuseofa predicate.

74)Literally, "itsthat-about-which-something-is-declared."

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intheMiddle Leiden andBoston: Schabel (ed.),TheTheological Quodlibeta Ages, Christopher xiii + Vol. 1: The Thirteenth vol. 2: The Fourteenth 2006-2007. 563 , , Brill, pp.; Century Century vols.1 and7.) Price €125each. xiv+ 791pp.(Brills totheChristian Tradition, Companions ISBN:9789004 123335 (vol.1)and9789004 162884 (vol.2). Ina survey intheLexikon onphilosophical article desMittelalters andtheological disputations, ofthedisputation that "the and textual dequoliHödl remarks academic development Ludwig . . isnotyetfidly elucidated" betinthe13thand14thcentury. (vol.3: 1117).Onemaydoubt Schabel constitute a colossal contributhat itever willbe,butthetwovolumes edited byChris aredestined anindispensable theattainment ofthisgoal,andthey tobecome tool tiontowards - anyone inthe nature ofquodlibetal forfuture research. Duetotheparticular disputations toraisequestions aboutanyimaginable anddequoliaudience wasallowed topic{a quolibet - they ofcurrent interest thecentury between intotheissues bet) unique during provide insight that their andtheendofwritten 1230-1330. records, is,roughly appearance work ontheological twovolumes arethemostextensive since Schabels quodlibets single his two volumes on this hitherto Palémon Glorieux research with literary pioneered neglected ofhisvolumes "toprovide describes theobjective asthreefold: (1925and1935).Schabel genre ina format oftheologians differa convenient andstimulating tothequodlibetal writings guide toencourage research toupdate andcorrect further that chosen entfrom Glorieux; byGlorieux; scholars ofmedieval texts" onandpublications ofthese (vol.2: 13).Twenty-five phitheology, the of the editors economics contribute to success and history, goal.Intwenty-eight losophy, butthey alsopress ontonewterritory notonly review thestate oftheresearch, by they chapters ofprinted thetextual andunprinted ofdoctrine, history quodlisurveys byclarifying offering critical editions ofsomequodlibetal andbycomposing bets, questions. tothem tides areabbreviated): listofthechapters willfacilitate reference A numbered (some Kevin Volume 1: (1)Jacqueline White, Hamesse, (2) Quaestiones Quodlibetales"; "Theological "Franciscan "Thomas 1270-1285"; Etzkorn, (4) HansKraml, (3) Girard Quodlibeta Aquinas"; "Giles ofRome"; ofGhent"; "William delaMare"; Pini, Porro, (6)Giorgio (5)Pasquale "Henry "A inthe Normative Power Elsa of Fontaines"; (8) (7)John Marmursztejn, "Godfrey Wippel, Roberto "Franciscan Lambertini, 1280-1300"; Pirón, (10) (9) Quodlibeta Sylvain Making"; inQuodlibeta"; "Economic "Political Ceccarelli, (12)Jean(11)Giovanni Quodlibeta"; Thought "ThePrinciple ofIndiVolume 2' (13)Martin LucSolére, "WastheEyeintheTomb?" Pickavé, of Noone Chris "Peter inQuodlibeta"; viduation Schabel, (15)Timothy and (14) Auvergne"; ofPouilly" DunsScotus"; Francie ; (17)Cecilia Hödl,"John Roberts, (16)Ludwig "John Trifogli, "Nicholas ofBars "Peter "Thomas Pirón, Auriol"; (19)Sylvain (18)LaugeNielsen, Wylton"; ofReggio "Reflections onVat.lat.1086andProsper Collection"; (20)William Courtenay, "Canons andtheMonks"; Friedman, Sullivan, Emilia"; (22) Russell (21) Thomas Regular "Carmelite ca.1260-1330"; "Dominican Schabel, ; Literature, (23)Chris Quodlibeta" Quodlibetal Brill ©Koninklijke 2009 Leiden, NV,

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GilesofRome"; after andWilliam Schabel (25) Quodlibeta (24)Chris Courtenay, "Augustinián "Oxford Rondo after Franciscan "Continental William Keele, Scotus"; (26) Duba, Quodlibeta ofQuodlibetal "TheDemise toHolcot"; from Ockham (27)William Courtenay, Quodlibeta AnAnalytic Index." "Natural Cross, Literature"; (28)Richard Philosophy: sixheadings: under ofthechapters theachievements I willoutline Inwhatfollows, (1) the ofquodlibetal self-awareness; characteristics (4)sur(3) themasters' (2)doctrine; disputations; lists and(future) ofreligious; ongroups editions; (6) question (5) textual history veychapters and in the section on doctrine into account will be taken on authors andindices. Chapterssingle inother sections. tosomedegree ofQuodlibetal TheCharacteristics Disputations oftheological intotheliterary offers an introduction Hamesse quodlibets genre Jacqueline atfirst inthe1230s, aroseoutofthequaestio 1).Quodlibetal disputata disputations (chapter intheUniversity of andsoonafterwards orders ofthemendicant inthestudy houses apparently to make room and Advent a Lent twice courses would Paris. TheUniversity year during suspend todosoactively whodesired forthesolemn parOnlymasters disputations. quodlibetal public ofthe tothearguments whowouldgivetheinitial assisted response bya bachelor ticipated, were thefirst tookplaceintwostages: Theoraldisputation session, questions during opponent. A few contra were advanced. and for each inrandom and asked order, pro question, arguments to the master the oral a second session, later, accordinga reorganizedquestions days during themonths In . each answered scheme and cases, (determinatio) many during question logical Thewritfor would revise hisnotes themaster thedisputation, (ordinario). publication following from ornotes either betheordinatio inthemanuscripts tenrecords may (reportationes) preserved from the Paris the session. thefirst orsecond Faculty spread disputations quodlibetal By 1270s, ofArts. aswellastotheParis andtothePapalCuria ofTheology toOxford Faculty features oftheoralandwritten more about welearn thebook, quodlibets. general Throughout thathebeasked beforehand instances themaster Inseveral quesspecific mayhavesuggested theUniveroutside determinations There arealsosomecasesofquodlibetal tions. bybachelors ofGilesofRomeandtheQuodlibets arethefirst ofParis Quodlibet examples sity (prominent themaster a more allow that Porro ofPeter Olivi). personal John quodlibets Pasquale emphasizes of ofHenry ofGhent theexample andgives other than publicly witnessing literary genres style andtheuniversity thebishop, hisdestined beenpressured successor, bythePapallegate, having forms theunicity ofsubstantial totakea position chancellor (vol.1: 199-200). Quodliagainst bethey hisfor about most suited theliterary betsareingeneral issues, questions current genre such ornewforms ofeconomic intheHolyLand, suchasthefallofAcre torical events practice oftheBeguines. annuities asperpetual Pace ofGlorieux. somegeneral inthisbookdisprove Thestudies contained suppositions Paris of the Universities that were held outside of wearegiven Glorieux, examplesquodlibets who andevenbythose whowerenotactually determined andOxford, regent, bymasters ofa religious order. suchasminister tomajor administrative hadadvanced general positions isaddressed isa puzzle that records ofquodlibets cessation ofwritten Thesudden repeatedly, 1 Hamesse tothe and Hamesse and mostsystematically 28). points Courtenay (chapters by onthepart XXIIaswellasdisenchantment ofquodlibetal byPopeJohn disputations disapproval that asked. underscores ofsome duetothenature ofthemasters themselves Courtenay questions

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while written records diminish inthe1330s, theoralsessions continue tobepracticed. abruptly Somemasters elaborated their intoseparate treatises or included quodlibetal disputations suchmaterial in their Sentences commentaries. Keelepoints outthatsomequodlibets were solinked tothelocaldebates that were difficult tounderstand inisolation from this context they (vol.2: 692). Doctrine Intheir offered theoccasion forstudents toasktheir master to heyday, quodlibetal disputations ortoclarify material from theclasses for topress their adversarattended, deepen they colleagues iesonhotly debated andforthebroader audience toraisequestions aboutpractical issues, matters orethical dilemmas ofanysort. From thevastrange oftopics intheological contained - reaching - numerous farbeyond theboundaries oftheology arediscussed quodlibets topics atsomepoint oranother inSchabel's volumes. Inwhatfollows I willprovide from examples different fields ofinquiry. /philosophical s position ontheidentity ofChrist's durTheology Aquinas anthropology. body the triduum that the time after his death and before his is the , is, main of resurrection, ing object 12byJean-Luc Solére. wasasked inthree chapter Aquinas subsequent quodlibetal disputations toclarify howhecanaccount forthegenerally ideathatthehypostatic union(the accepted union between thehumanity inthesingle anddivinity ofChrist) continued the person during triduum with Christ's soulandbody infact inhisview thedeadbody isnolonger substan,when andnumerically thesameastheliving Theproponents ofa plurality offorms ina tially body. human individual that Christ's continued tobeunited totheform ofcorporeity argued divinity which remained intact after Inthequodlibetal death. adversaries tried to disputations, Aquinas's himtoadmit force thathisdenial ofanyadditional substantial ina human forms apart being from thesoulimplies absurdities. answered thatinthecaseofChrist, unacceptable Aquinas hasa different basisthan inother human Thedeadbody ofChrist hasthesame identity beings. astheliving itsidentity isrooted intheunion with thesecond one,because (esse) being person oftheTrinity, rather thanintheunion withthesoul.Yetthedeadbodyis"body" onlyinan when totheliving sense, equivocal compared body. /metaphysics-. Atopic inthevolume discussed istheeternity of Theology ofcreation frequently theworld William delaMareisasked whether God 3,4,15,and16).Forexample, (seechapters knows thefirst inwhich moment hecouldhavecreated theuniverse. William denies thatan infinite time is nevertheless there isnofirst moment before which theworld actually possible; couldnothavebeencreated, forGodcouldhavechosen before theoneheactually anymoment chose. Sincenosuchfirst moment Goddoesnotknow it(chapter exists, 4). Martin Pickavé examines discussions oftheprinciple ofindividuation inprinted Metaphysics-. from to about1320(chapter 1277 tothedoctrinal interest ofsucha 13).Inaddition quodlibets diachronic this constitutes alsoa casestudy ofhowfruitful a methodical study, chapter explorationofquodlibets toa larger canbe.Recurring issues aretheprinciple of belonging spanoftime individuation forimmaterial theroleofaccidents inindividuation, andthedistincsubstances, tionbetween anexternal andaninternal ofindividuation. Thealmost seamless principle study ofquodlibetal onindividuation to that the ofScotus s questions bringslight despite originality hiscritique ofprevious accounts washighly indebted toearlier authors. AlsoOckham solution, isnotasinnovative asonemaythink: hisviewthat areindividuated rather beings bythemselves

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than isfound before inRoger Marston andJohn ofNaples. Pickavé shows byanaddedentity that there were twomain of individuation current themedieval in thinkers: conceptions among thestrict sense inthebroad aslimitation andcontraction ofcommon forms oressences; sense as what fortheindividuality accounts ofindividuals. /metaphysics : Lessfamous than isChatton's Ockham's razor orthe"Chat"anti-razor," Logic tonPrinciple," discussed onemust 26).ForChatton, byRondoKeele(chapter positasmany entities asarerequired tomake a proposition true. Thisimplies that thetransition a given from state tothecontradictory state involves thegeneration orcorruption ofsome Accord(res). thing Chatton suchasproduction, andsuccessive suchas accidents, accidents, posited respective ingly, motion. ForOckham, motion issimply a connotative a term, conversely, primarily signifying andsecondarily that itsuccessively indifferent exists Torefute object moving signifying places. Ockham anexample inwhich there isa realdifference a change inentiwithout Chatton, gives tiesinvolved: a moment anangel iscreated, theproposition "anangel isbeing after created" is thesameentities areinvolved Godandtheangel). false, although (namely, Moral Oneofthemost inthequodlibets debated isfreedom andits hotly psychology: topics inintellect foundation andwill.A diachronic on freedom like Pickavés on individuation study wouldbefascinating, suited fora booklikeSchabel s because itcouldeasily hardly although intoa sizable onitsown.Yetsomeaccounts offreedom inthe arediscussed grow monograph evenifbriefly, suchasGilesofRome's Piniinchapter ofPouillys volume, 6) andJohn (Giorgio Hödlinchapter issueinthese discussions isthequestion ofwhether 16).A central (Ludwig volitional defects aretraceable A keytext tocognitive defects. onfreedom Duns Scotus is by inchapter 15 byTimothy edited NooneandFrancie Roberts. Ethics-. ofFontaines' XIVcontains ofthevirtue a lengthy discussion of Quodlibet Godfrey theobject ofchapter that isa general virtue 7 byJohn justice, Wippel. Godfrey argues justice distinct from from theother moral andthatapart and virtues, (a supernatural virtue) charity is the intellectual indeed the natuvirtue, (an virtue), prudence justice only only general general ralmoral virtue. ofViterbo, forwhom isa general moral Godvirtue, James Against friendship onAristotelian that isa particular moral virtue. Asa moral virtue, frey argues grounds friendship inthesense resides andasa general hasthecommon virtue, justice appetite, justice goodasits and end. principal object - especially : Throughout thebookthere arediscussions Politics ofpolitical Church thought - andinaddition, anentire isdedicated tothistopic(chapter 10byRoberto politics chapter AnissueofChurch recurrent inthebookisthedebate aboutmendicant Lambertini). politics in and What started out as a debate about the 8, 10, (discussed 16). privileges especiallychapters of mendicants to hear confessions the soon into evolved a (a right by Pope) privilege granted overthenature intheChurch, andlimits ofpapalpower andmore about controversy deeply - thepopealone, rival Whoreceives from Christ oralsothebishecclesiologies: power directly and Medieval masters also discussed secular forms ofgovernment, suchas the ops prelates? of elective over 10). advantages hereditary monarchy (chapter 11byGiovanni : Chapter Ceccarelli isoneconomic rent fair contracts, Economy topics: usury, trade andfair lifeannuities, etc.Questions abouteconomic issues were freprice, particularly inthose thatwereheldintheeconomically cities of quent quodlibetal disputations dynamic southern France andofItaly(seealsochapter inthedebates a trend in 9). Onecanobserve economic that modern financial While themasters numerprepared thought systems. provided ousaccounts oftheimmorality ofusury, alsodiscussed casesinwhich they monetary taking

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of andsome theAristotelian fora loandoesnotfallunder theory usury, critiqued compensation wasbased. ofmoney, onwhich animportant thesterility usury against argument whose diedandcomes arerather "Doesa wife husband Somequodlibetal questions strange: "Howshould a marital tothismanthantoanother?"; backtolifehavea greater obligation likethese are with twoheads?" etc.AsSolére that isborn monster bebaptized shows, questions of butrather bearonthephilosophical notaboutcasuistry orsacramental problem practice, identity. personal TheSelf-Awareness oftheMasters inthatthey self-awareness as areself-referential reveal themasters' Somequodlibetal questions himself isasked whether someone whocandevote to oftheology. Forexample, teachers Aquinas ofa oftheology arebuilders histime tostudy. ForAquinas, teachers sinsifhegives careofsouls who how to care for salvation of souls and teach are architects edifice; investigate spiritual they teachers rather teach situations ofimminent should from others todoso.Thus, necessity, apart sdeterminacaretothesalvation ofsouls. than individual sacred doctrine Likewise, Aquinas give from inform versus tions about theuseofrational authority incidentally arguments arguments hisownmethod ofinquiry usabout White, 2). (Kevin chapter thequodlibetal that reflect themasters' ElsaMarmursztejn systematically questions investigates inanalogy to a sort of"mirror ofthedoctors" that thequodlibets were self-consciousness, arguing to notonly considered themselves suited thespecula 8).Themasters exclusively (chapter principům claim to the to evaluate the doctrinal but also laid train thehigher competence power clergy, they that itis ofGhent, for unconditional oftheclergy. instance, obedience, Henry argued denouncing Inparticular inthe todispute thepower ofprelates. licit andextremely "absolutely advantageous" became of1277bybishop Etienne academic freedom aftermath oftheCondemnations Tempier, after thattheintellectual climate a burning issue. ofFontaines 1277nolonger Godfrey argued andfear ofexcomfor butrather fostered anatmosphere ofsuspicion thesearch truth, encouraged torevoke theCondemnations. Hecalled for onthebishop munication. pressure inthefirst twoUniversity Anexample ofthecautionary attitude after 1277isfound Quodliarticles Inhissecond Gilesaddresses a number ofcondemned betsofGilesofRome. Quodlibet, to articles are also made Numerous references condemned 6). byHenry explicit directly (chapter stillprovide thebacka listonp.207).The1277Condemnations ofGhent 5,with (chapter ofhuman witnesses tothefact ofPouilly s discussions toJohn freedom, John although ground from therestrictions were themselves thatthetheologians bythe imposed increasingly freeing Condemnations 16). (chapter ofReligious Groups issues ourknowledge ofhistorical andtextual Thisbookscollective effort toadvance concerning involume ispresented ofthiskindofscholarship isgigantic. most 2, the quodlibets Although ofgreat andcareful examination. volume arelikewise thefruit ofthefirst contributions learning ona comprehensive authors tobebased Thechapters onsingle (oralmost comprehensive) appear when which isquiteimpressive ofthequodlibets, prolific quodlibet treating something reading ofGhent. soHenry GilesofRomeandevenmore likeThomas authors John Wippel Aquinas, infavor oforagainst inorder toponder evidence ona single focuses mainly quodlibetal disputation

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ofthesecintheendinitsfavor asa quodlibet, itscharacterization 7).Thechapters (chapter settling work ofhighest rank. onunpublished arelargely based ondvolume material, pioneer constituting I This inthese can some From therichmaterial contained chapters onlyprovide highlights. ofthevarious ofreliwillbriefly thesurveys ofthequodlibetal literature section discuss groups material with aneyeto willreview thechapters that Thenext section explore unpublished gious. willhavetoremain suchasefforts critical details future editions. unmentioned, Many complete ofdating. toclarify matters inchapters Franciscans arediscussed of 25byWilliam 3,9,and25.Inparticular, chapter Groups authors ofquodlibets after isa tremendous fount allknown Franciscan Scotus, Duba,covering a treatment Foreachofthese Dubagives ofinformation. information, authors, biographical ofthree Franciscans anda question list.Thequodlibets ofthequodlibets andtextual problems, ofMeyronnes, andofGerard inextenso : those ofFrancis ofMarchia, ofFrancis arediscussed ofFranciscan held whose isthelastwritten record Odonis, Quodlibet quodlibetal disputations fordefending a position on Gerard's controversial ontheContinent thatisextant. Quodlibet, and ina single with theviewofPopeJohn thebeatific vision associated XXII,survives question ina single Theappendix tothechapter discusses animportant codex forthestudy manuscript. ofmedieval Scotism. ananalogous service forDominican andimpugnationes Russell Friedman quodlibets performs ofDominican theentire ofquodlibets period quodlibetal writings ("anti-quodlibets"), covering thestatus ontheDominican after 22).Friedman (chapter provides quodliAquinas quaestionis shedonquodlibetal more betal literature anddiscusses what they disputations generally. light Hervaeus Natalis's collection ofquodlibets Numerous authors arediscussed; getsthemost ofitssizeanditswidedistribution. Friedman concludes that "Domindetailed attention because infullthedynamic, ofearly andcreative nature icanquodlibetal literature reflects evolving, transcribes ofAuvergnes Thomism" Friedman Bernard (vol.2:475).Intheappendix, impugnaofOrfords ofGhent's tiones ofHenry 5.9and6.1,aswellasRobert Quodlibet anti-quodlibet 5.9. Quodlibet Henry's against inParis their started TheCarmelites werea very order, activity prolific religious although in 1295.Building as their first master oftheology rather ofBologna late,withGerard upon ChrisSchabel notonlymakes Xiberta's writer Bartomeu Xiberta, scholarship bytheCatalan hisdisbutalsocorrects andsupplements research known totheEnglish-speaking community, nature ofCarmelite coveries andreception attribution, quodlimanuscripts, concerning dating, writers arediscussed, with onGerard ofBologna, bets(chapter 23).Numerous special emphasis Theinterest ofstudying CarmelandJohn early fourteenth-century GuyTerrena, Baconthorpe. itesliesinthefact that to neither Scotus nor are and "loyal Aquinas, they 'impartial' independent indiscussions with thelines oftopics onwhich, notable exceptions, contemporary participants hadalready beendrawn between Franciscans andDominicans" (vol.2: 539).Intheappendix, theearly show Schabel reconstructs where modern editions 1.10-12, Quodlibet Baconthorpe's 1 He alsotranscribes of Peter "An someirregularities. 5 Quodlibet q. Swanington:angelus cognoscat certitudinaliter futura contingentia?" Similar instructure is thesubsequent butmuchshorter andWilliam bySchabel chapter onAugustinians after GilesofRome. Itishere that four ofViterbo's James Courtenay popular are discussed. quodlibets Another tremendous work ofscholarship isThomas Sullivan's onCanonRegulars contribution inlexicographic andMonks arediscussed buttheCanonReg21).Mostauthors (chapter style, ularServais ofGuezorServais deMont-Saint-Eloi alsoprominently inchapters 8, (whofigures

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11and19),theBenedictine Pierre (thefuture VI),andtheCistercian Roger PopeClement James ofThérines aretreated insomedetail, a précis ofsomeofthethemes discussed. providing they Textual and(Future) Editions History Schabel's twovolumes willbea mandatory handbook for future editors ofquodlibets. Itcontains thecurrent state ofresearch onmanuscript evidence anddating, anditgoesbeyond a mere ofexisting survey scholarship. Chris Schabel's 14onPeter ofAuvernes sixQuodlibets isbased ona complete chapter reading ofall108questions andaninspection ofitsnineteen known medieval Thechapter manuscripts. contains a listofallexplicit citations a listofallmedieval ananalysis of byPeter, manuscripts, theapparatus criticus ofeachoftheexisting editions a brief employing multiple manuscripts, assessment ofeachmanuscript, a question andanedition ofQuodlibet Deussit list, 1.1,"Utrum infinitae virtutis invigore." In preparation ofa complete edition ofDunsScotus's Nooneand Quodlibet, Timothy Francie Roberts examined 42ofthe63known that contain thework. Inchapter 15 manuscripts discuss itscomplex tradition andedititsquestion 16(onthecompatibility of they manuscript freedom ofwillandnatural tenmanuscripts intheir also necessity) bycollating entirety. They andqualitative foreachofthetenmanuscripts aswell provide quantitative patterns employed, asa tentative stemma. consists ofa systematic 17byCecilia collection oftheresults ofprevious Chapter Trifogli studies onThomas arecontained inthesingle Wylton's Quodlibet. single Eighteen questions butfive more were discovered Dumont. manuscript plusfragments, questions recently byStephen Foreachoftheeighteen liststhemanuscripts thatcontain mentions them, questions, Trifogli editions whenever a bibliography, andrefers torelated inother exist, they provides questions works. Shealsosummarizes eachquestion. Sheaddsanedition ofquestion 11 (ontheactofthe beatific andquestion 12(onthemultiplicity ofreally distinct inGod). vision) perfections Several andanearly modern edition contain Peter Auriols or manuscripts printed Quodlibet Inchapter thereof. listsitsprologue andsixteen 18,LaugeNielsen parts questions, providing references tothemanuscripts that contain them. Heedits 7 (onthesoulasform ofthe question which theearly modern edition didnotprint initsentirety, aswellas GuyTerrenas body), Auriols isattacked. 5.14,inwhich Quodlibet philosophical anthropology Thenext twochapters areeachdedicated toa single Thetopic ofChapter 19 by manuscript. Pirón isa manuscript that toNicholas ofBar-le-Duc, a collection Sylvain belonged containing of170quodlibetal almost concerned with authors, questions byeighteen exclusively practical moral cases. OneofPirons contributions inthechapter ishisattempt toidentify theauthors' names notgiven infull 20byWilliam discusses a manubythemanuscript. Chapter Courtenay material andinformation from active inParisinthe1310s.It script containing theologians includes ofReggio Emilias Sentences aswellashis"notebook" that contains Prosper commentary of in considers some detail the many personal reportationes quodlibetal questions. Courtenay andcontext oftheSentences inpreparation for which seems tohave dating commentary, Prosper assembled the"notebook." includes a table ofauthors intheSentences cited commenCourtenay andinthe"notebook" andattempts toidentify someabbreviated names. tary

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ListsandIndices Question Numerous contain lists that arecorrections ofGlorieux's lists orthat Glorieux chapters question didnotinclude inhisvolumes. Inaddition, thebookcontains four indices: anindex ofancient andmedieval names ofmaintreatments ofquodlibetal a longindex (vol.1),anindex authors, ofmanuscripts, andanindex ofnames andcontemporary) andlocations medieval, (ancient, decided nottoinclude a bibliography ofprimary sources andrefers toa instead (vol.2).Schabel useful website Pirón etal.,www.quodlibase.org. tremendously bySylvain Oneindex deserves attention. Richard Cross a lengthy index tothe special provides analytical abundant onnatural in natural 28).Since quodlibetal questions philosophy (chapter philosophy theMiddle is from issues such as the location transubstantiation, Ages inseparable theological ofangels, theImmaculate andsoon,Crossincludes notonlyquestions thatask Conception about matters ofnatural butalsotheological that involve issues explicitly philosophy, questions innatural lheindex isorganized andsubheadings. Forinstance, philosophy, bymajor headings under thegeneral "Self-motion" onefinds four more "Will heading specific headings, including asself-mover," seven a Besides useful research the index instrument, containing questions. being isitself a witness tothebreadth anddepth ofmedieval quodlibets. Appraisal Thetwocopious volumes ontheological aretheoutstanding ofteamwork result and quodlibets ofcareful work AsSchabel remarks inthepreface, "some an bytheeditor. chapters required amount ofwork andcouldeasily havebeendeveloped intosmall books" (vol.1: extraordinary a great ofapproaches thebookhasanoverall Thetopvii).Despite variety bytheauthors, unity. icsarethoughtfully chosen andattuned tooneanother; there arenumerous cross-references thechapters. Thebooknotonly thestate ofthequestion onquodlibetal literaamong surveys butitgreatly advances research andlaysthebasisforfuture studies andeditions, attimes ture, even concrete forfuture research giving suggestions possibilities. LikeGlorieux, Schabel didnotseekpure for otherwise a work ofthese dimensions perfection, would havenever seenthelight ofday.Forexample, he a on though initially envisaged chapter ofAbbeville, Gerard a contemporary andadversary ofThomas andtheauthor oftwenty Aquinas rather short hewasunable togetanoriginal onGerard, Adriaan quodlibets, piecebytheexpert Pattin. Thislacuna ispartly that Gerard isrepeatedly inother discussed compensated bythefact chapters. Weareingreat debttoChris Schabel andhiscontributors for assembled sucha highly having informative anduseful work. Thebooksetsthestandard for works ondifferent analogous literary that arestill desiderata. genres major TheCatholic , D.C. University ofAmerica, Washington

Tobias Hoffmann

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í1' l,Ê} '48* BRILL


Vivarium 47 (2009)136-144

Reviews

del'enseignement deThomas Adriano etsaconception dela 'Sacra Oliva, O.P.,Lesdébuts d'Aquin l'édition duprologue desonCommentaire des'Sentences'), 2006(Bibdoctrina' Paris, (avec J.Vrin, 1618279. thomiste, 58);416pp.ISBN978271 liothèque ofgreat andlearning, written without which isdestined tobecome Thisisa work haste, diligence ontheSentences forallconcerned with anditstradition. required Aquinas' Commentary reading first Thebookrepresents anengaging instalment ofthe'Leonine* critical edition ofAquinas' vol. of the omnia. in Sententias: the of the Commission President 17 Scriptum long-awaited Opera in ofthewritings ofThomas Commission for thecritical edition ,so-called (the'Leonine Aquinas ofPopeLeoXlllth, whofirst established oftheFrench honour CNRS,Olivahere it)andmember in2002under intheology, thedirection ofJeanthecoreofhisPh.D.thesis completed publishes Pierre attheSwiss of the book is Torrell, O.P., University bya short Structurally, opened Fribourg. inseven followed Présentation conclusion chapters, bya concise (pp.341(pp.7-9),andunfolds indices: a table aresupplemented andtwoaccurate 346).These bya bibliography (pp.347-386) intheapparatus ofPrologues edition ofwritings, both andprinted, (pp.387manuscript quoted ofcontents follows ofproper names 1).A table 404),andtable (pp.413-416). (pp.405-41 1 touches on the 'Leonine' tradition oftextual which is Thefirst criticism, 5-24) chapter (pp. 1 inchapter of seven indetail thereader totheschool described (pp.289-300).Olivaintroduces editors from theendofthe19th andhistorical criticism byAquinas century developed philology ofthismethod, which onefinds scattered the onwards. Olivasums uptheelements throughout the of works. Oliva to the volumes masterful (who enjoyed privilege Aquinas' Through prefaces thevoice ofa long ofbeing a longtime associate ofthelateRené-Antoine Gauthier, O.P.), speaks Inparticular, several that the ofdistinguished built tradition scholars, upover generations. given asa university text InI Sententiarum wastransmitted , Olivafocuses transmission) (i.e. ofpeciae . Each"piece" "the basictextual cell"ofanorganic here onthesystem whole, represents criticism sothat eachmerits and distinct 20). (p. singular l) Concerning "larestitution dela graphie theLeonine Commission champions orthography, falls the the of médiévale" edition, 290-295). emphasis rightly (pp. Concerning'criticityany itself. Theproblem ofsources, is rather thanuponthetext introduction then, upontheeditor's c'est-à-dire les ofa twofold solved dites, ("lessources quotations proprement bymeans apparatus: à l'auteur ou à l'oeuvre, soitparun soiparle renvoi citations dansle texte meme, indiquées references textes ex. le and renvoi comme ("les alii") quipourimplicit simple anonyme, par allbiblical delarédaction"). ouinspiré l'auteur aumoment raient avoir influencé Furthermore, Orditheeditio oftheLatin BiblecumGlossa notonly arechecked princeps quotations against Bibl.Nat., theso-called Biblia butalsoagainst naria 1481), parisiensis (e.g.Ms:Paris, (Strasbourg Ottob. Lat.293). la.15467)andtheCorrectorium byHughofSt.Cher(e.g.Ms:Vatican City, DOI:10.1 Brill ©Koninklijke 2009 163/156853408X345936 Leiden, NV,

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Thesecond ofextant andoldprinted chapter (pp.25-66)contains descriptions manuscripts editions ofInI Sent.. Olivabuilds research V.Shooner, useful uponprevious byHugues adding details: abouttheMs.Vat.Borgh hadpreviously to and been annotated 362,which belonged andtheMs.Vat.Rossinianus 160(VIII.99)which wasrichly byPierre Roger, byatleast glossed three "hands" isalsofound inother ofthetext(e.g. (pp.51-58).Codicological analysis parts Ch.5,pp.214-220, theMs.Naples, Bibl.Naz.I. B. 54),ofwhich I willhere concerning a "Trois différents de sontfacilement dansce present only sample: types parchemin repérables ms.(.. .) TypeB:lemême de mais un moins le folio est aussi moins fin; genre parchemin, peu il faitunsoncomparable au douxcrépitement d'unfeuouà la souple, quandonle tourne, fraction d'unehostie unelégère différence dansla ; le faitqu'ilaitétémoins lissé,produit couleur. . ."(p.215). three initsgenre. identified distinct families Chapter (pp.67-101)isa masterpiece Having ofcodices a genealogical tree. Hisstemma consists (a, ß ande),Olivaisabletoestablish 101) (p. ofa single a result of"university transmission". Thefamily a presents a twofold characbranch, both"primitive andrevised" ofa (which Olivacallsa*) ter, being (p.82);a first sub-portion which deteriorated andwasthusreplaced depends upona single exemplar rapidly bya second, corrected andnewly text. The second ß,"evidently" interpolated family depends uponthefirst itrepresents a newversion further , a*),eventhough (a and,a priori (substantial) revealing withreference toa passage ontheology assubalternated science (InI Sent., notably changes: a. 3).Thethird e doesnotderive from eventhough itstext Prol., model, family anyuniversity on the tradition with contaminations from and does not (a, depends university again ß) representany"parallel textual transmission". alsoconsidered theprinted editions Having (pp.95theVivèsedition 100),Olivais abletojudgetheir (Paris1873)and respective reliability: Mandonnet's toa (a text aswehaveseen,had (Paris1929)more which, closely correspond beenoncerevised). already Thefollowing shows thevariants distinct versions ofInI Sent., chapter (pp.103-185) among with thesuccessive revisions introduced onbyAquinas himself. modidealing early Significant fications concern thenotion ofverbum and123-130), thedivine I,d.27,a.2;pp.108-109 {Sent. attributes andboththeconcept 17and130-139) ofscholastic I,d.2,a. 2 resp.' {Sent. pp.109-1 and the of subalternation a. and139117-123 I, Prol., 3; 104-107, (Sent. theology theory pp. extant bearwitness to"when" and"how" suchrevisions were 144).Atleastfive manuscripts inserted intotheexemplar which wasalready incirculation itself, (p.116).Thelastmodification toAquinas' andiselegantly edited attheend (called D") belongs byOliva"rectification Prologue ofOlivasbook.Thirty-one have handtext(allthose tothe manuscripts itasa first belonging sucha characteristic); other include it as a addiß share family eight manuscripts only marginal while havenotraces ofit.Avery ancient to tion, (N3)attests thirty-seven manuscripts testimony a reader's : "àlamarge duf.2r[.. .] lamainU2écrit larectification D" (p.119; gloss supérieure Olivaconsiders U2as"lepremier utilisateur" ofN3).Thisrectification D isadded bywayofa vel asanalternative, answer. Such an character dicendum, though optional, optional distinguishes thelastmodification from theothers andexplains, atleast toOliva, fewer manuaccording why take itintoaccount. Somefine remarks onthe"opening formulas" scripts employed byAquinas thereader withuseful information onAquinas' aswellas its (cf.pp.136-139) provide style evolution. Arich studies the D of modification concern166-185) (the appendix (pp. reception asscience") de'Annibaldi andtwoofAquinas' other first ing"theology byAnnibaldo "disciples": theDominicans ofBologna andRomānus Orsini ofRome. Thisispreceded Bambolognus byan oftheparallel texts ontheologia utscientia auteurs unpeuantérieurs ou analysis by"certains

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deThomas": OdoRigaldi, William deMelitona, ofHales(or, Alexander presque contemporains more theeponymous andBonaventure Atthecloseof Albert, Summa), precisely, (pp.144-152). hiscodicological andtextual Olivaalsoconfirms P.M. Gils'remark onAquinas' attianalysis, tudetowards hisownwritings: "Thomas s'endésintéressait unefois lui étaient sorties des qu'elles mains" atp. 165). (quoted takes a biographical five turn. Olivareconsiders thebiographical docChapter (pp.187-253) inorder uments toestablish thetime, anddivision ofAquinas' oftheSenduration, teaching tences atParis. He doesthisandclarifies much doubt onthefactthat more, casting Aquinas a papallicense duetohisexcessively Lecrequired age(pp.198-202), young Aquinas' analyzing turasuper Isaiam hadbeenreadalready atParis(p.223),andincidentally an , which adding footnote utscriptum. Healsothoroughly Thomas' studies autointeresting concerning theologia inorder todetermine theevolution ofhishandwriting, andthen calculates "combien de graphs vers1252età l'Université deParis, en classe des 'Sentences' durait, temps l'enseignement que donnait lebachelier" a consistent relation between the is,asOlivamakes clear, (p.225).There contents ofhislectures andthedivisio textus oftheSentences 237).Anauxiliary (p. investigation clectio intothemeaning oftheexpression a study ofinternal cross-refer(pp.226-238), precedes ences madebyAquinas, wherein Olivaintroduces a subtle distinction between cross-references from theedition oftheScritpum andthose backtotheactual classes themselves dating going noteverything canbeestablished with thesame (pp.238-253, esp.p.243n.147).Eventhough ofcertainty, Olivaisabletocreate a picture ofthehistorical context ofThomas' degree early Onp.253,theauthor summarizes theresults ofhisinvestigation asfollows: "Passant teaching. duStudium à l'université deCologne deParis, en1251,ouen1252auplustard, Thomas commence dela Bible(d'Isaïe etJérémie), cequil'occupa une parl'enseignement cursif pendant Il seconsacra année environ. deuxans,à lalecture desSentences ensuite, , commentant pendant l'unaprès l'autre lesquatre livres duLombard. unoudeuxans,iltravailla à la Ensuite, pendant révision desonScriptum etauxtâches lui incombaient comme bachelier les lu Sentenqui ayant le3 mars ces(.. .),attendant l'admission à lalicence, avant 1256". quiadvint Thesixth theelegant edition ofAquinas' tohisScripchapter (pp.255-287), precedes Prologus tum librum Sententiarum Petri Lombardi atpp.302-340). Olivacompares (text super primum Thomas' tothose ofhispredecessors whocommented ontheSentences ofPeter LomPrologue bardbefore focuses onformal in as found the of Alexander 1255.Theauthor aspects, Prologues ofHales,HughofSt.Cher, Roland ofCremona, OdoRigaldi, Richard Albert the Fishacre, A sober Richard Bonaventure andRichard ofAquinas' own Great, Rufus, Kilwardby. analysis alsofrom thepoint ofview ofcontent, concludes thechapter andshows the text, (pp.269-287) manifold of the Thomistic notion of sacra not doctrina, acceptance perhaps sufficiently although welltojustify inthetitle itsinclusion ofthevolume. Olivadoeshowever further this develop inhisarticle '"Doctrina" et"sacra ofhisresearch doctrina" chezThomas et aspect d'Aquin in:Ph.Büttgen desescontemporains', etal.(eds.),'Vera doctrina'. ZurBegriffigequelques-uns L'idéededoctrine desaint à Descartes vonAugustinus bisDescartes. schichte derLehre , Augustin Wiesbaden, Harrassowitz, (Wolfenbütteler Forschungen). forthcoming Twofinal asa substantial toChapters arealso First, II,IVandV,readers points. complement A.Oliva, 'Laquestione Aproposito advised toconsult dell'"alialectura" diTommaso d'Aquino. Lincoln Lat.95',in Quaestio dell'edizione dellenotemarginali delms.Oxford, ,6 College Olivahimself infootnote 14onp.36;butseealsop. 143 refers (towhich (2006),pp.516-521 inwhich ofThomas Lectura romana n.70),anarticle Olivapresents hiscritical review Aquinas, inprimum Petri Lombardi Pontifical Sententiarum , ed.L.E. BoyleandJ.F.Boyle, Toronto,

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Institute ofMediaeval 2006.2 itisnotable thattheauthor thesignifiStudies, Second, neglects canceofAristotle's forAquinas' oftheological science. thedomiTopics conception Although nance ofthePosterior in this is Olivas exclusive stress onthis Analytics regardunquestionable, text risks one-sided, lhevery ideaof'Scripture asdoctrine', oftheunity oftheCanon', as being wellastheproblem oftheological itseems tome,already entail a more certitude', comprehensivetheological hermeneutics thanthatwhich from thenotion of'deductive maybederived in the TheAnalytics wasnotusedbyAquinas tothe , inother words, necessity' present Analytics. exclusion oftheTopics butwasmore as a , asa newandalternative model, likely regarded parmore ofthe'traditional' hermeneutics. The ticular, development though rigorous, theological same onemight inthecaseJohn alsobetrue DunsScotus, recent scholfact, add,may although hastended intheopposite direction. Anintegrated reads the is,onewhich (that arship approach in the shadow of the could allow for a more of view thirteenth ) Analytics Topics comprehensive andfourteenth from theabove, there areonlya fewvery minor century Apart theology. points ofcriticism, which donotmerit discussion.3 Thelastword, must beoneofgrateful however, forOlivaandhiswork: a bookwhich, onemaysafely shall thenext decpraise wager, passover adeswithout diminution. vonHumboldt (Alexander Stiflung, Seminar Philosophisches AlbertimBr.) Universität, LudwigsFreiburg

Andrea A.Robiglio

2)Asa useful thereader couldfurthermore looktotheunpublished dissertation complement, by K.Spatz, AStudy andEdition delivered theFaculty Nancy Principia: ofInception Speeches before of attheUniversity ca.1180-1286 (Ph.D.Cornell 1992). Theology ofParis, University 3)Disregarding andinconsequential I limitmyself hereto thefollowing sparse misprints, remarks. Atp. 16,n.4: sincetheChronicon for its the Lanercost, of testimony concerning Summa ofAlexander ofHales, notdepend oneshould notwrite: Bacon, "(.. .) may uponRoger fondée surleseultémoignage deRoger Bacon". Onp. 191,nn.13-14, thecircumstantial information chronicorum trusted provided byGuis Flores mayhavebeentooeasily byOlivaand toBartholomew ofCapua's. Onpp.192-193 havebeen unfairly preferred (esp.n.20):itwould advisable totakemedieval intoconsideration DieZahlenallegorese (cf.H. Meyer, numerology imMittelalter Mrs.leBrun-Gouanvic iscredited with ,München 1975).Onp. 188,that having alone"soigneusement reconstitute latradition manuscrite delabiographie écrite parGuillaume deTocco" seems notentirely as H. V.Shooner hadthesubstantial merit ofit(leBrunfair, hadfully herdebt). Onp.317,commentary tolines Gouanvic, 47bytheway, acknowledged ofB.Geiger 49: thefindings hadbeenanticipated (1941)on "participation" byC. Fabro in1939. already

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TheCambridge toRenaissance NewYork: , ed.James Hankins, Companion Philosophy Cambridge 2007.ISBN978-0-521-84648-6 Press, (hb),978-0-521-60893-0 University (pb). Renaissance hasattimes beencompared toa barren bordered philosophy valley bytwolofty onesummit scholastic the mountains, other occupied bythegreat philosophers, bythegrand builders oftheseventeenth Thisimage reflects theopinion thatRenaissance system century. asJames Hankins describes itinhisintroduction to TheCambridge to philosophy, Companion Renaissance a "swampland inhabited seemmere ofthe , resembles Philosophy bywhat epigones moralizers andlittérateurs andcompilers, scholastics, , byphilologists great bysententious by andNaturphilosophen, as fertile inpropagating newideasas they were wiled-eyed magicians indefending them" ofthis that theRenais(339).Theimplication is,ofcourse, incapable image sance isa period over which students ofphilosophy should forfear that losetheir skipover, they thelesser thinkers ofthis wayamong shadowy period. scholars havediligently labored toerode this viewoftheRenaissance, Hankins still Although faces enormous inediting a collection ofessays that aimstopresent Renaissance challenges phitoboth intellectual andnon-specialist ofwhom belargely historians, readers, losophy many may unfamiliar with inthefifteenth andsixteenth andwhomaybelieve that centuries, philosophy theRenaissance isinfact barren and has little or to contribute to philosophically nothing phiHankins alsofaces difficulties that concern thevery nature ofphilosophy as itself, today. losophy wellasthose that stem from thecultural that affected Renaissance detailing developments phiandthewayitwaswritten. Theeditor andthecontributors themselves losophy certainly prove to the and the result is that haveprovided a richresource onRenaissance up challenge, they philosophy. Thevolume isdivided intotwoparts that reflect a Janus-like structure. Thefirst which part, consists ofeight focus ontherevival ofancient traditions intheRenaisessays, philosophical aswellasitsphilosophical inheritance from Medieval scholasticism. sance, While thefirst part looks thetenessays that constitute thesecond look forward to while backward, part modernity, atthesametime onsomeoftheoriginal contributions that Renaissance dwelling philosophers madetometaphysics, thephilosophy oflanguage, andethics. cosmology, psychology, InPartI Hankins examines theculture ofHumanism, itsrelationship toscholasticism, and themovement soverall of onPetrarch's ofschoconception philosophy. mainly Focusing critique lastic Hankins alsodiscusses thefailure ofHumanist toproduce philosophy, philosophers great andheexplains thatHumanism "bracketed thedeepest philosophy, whyitiscomprehensible aboutnature andhuman in thedesire existence tomakeitspeacewithreligious questions ontherevival ofPlatonic Celenza (46).Inanessay authority" philosophy, Christopher surveys thehistory ofPlato's from Petrarch to but saves the bulk of hisdiscussion Leibniz, dialogues forMarsilio Insodoing Ficino. Celenza situates Ficino atthecenter ofthenarrative of history thedialogues intheRenaissance, while atthesametime thecentral features of nicely revealing Ficino's owninterpretation ofPlato's WhileCelenzas discussion ofFicino iscrystal dialogues. histreatment ofthehistory ofPlatonism and difficult to follow. clear, is,attimes, Jill opaque addsanexcellent ontherevival ofHellenistic intheRenaissance. Kraye essay philosophies Kraye thatalthough thethree schools ofHellenistic eachwent a compliargues philosophy through inthefifteenth cated revival andsixteenth nonetheless remained onthe"margins centuries, they ofRenaissance culture" wasdominated With clar(97),which philosophical byAristotelianism. outlines thedifficulties ofincorporating Hellenistic Stoicism ityKraye philosophies, especially andEpicureanism, intoa Christian sheconcludes herinteresting framework; philosophical ©Koninklijke Brill DOI:10.1163/ 2009 156853408X383042 NV, Leiden,

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thesevenintheRenaissance thatitwasnotuntil ofEpicureanism discussion byrecognizing closes BrianP.Copenhaver thatthe"abhorrent doctrines" wereneutralized. teenth century ofthephilosophical nature andaimsofRenaissance Part I with a provocative discussion magic. De vitaIII, onFicino's focuses most ofhisattention practices, especially Copenhaver magical with thetheological risks that were associated Ficino with andfinally reveals Aquinas, compares of intheRenaissance. that Ficino's ofmagic isa "tour deforce claims theory Copenhaver magic sideto andCopenhaver illustrate thepractical caution andevasion" (164).Theessays byCelenza thestehimthereputation andbothchapters lessen Ficino that earned asa medicus animarum, its a divorced from the and concerns. of the Florentine Platonist as body philosopher reotype from the ofPlatonism wasnot"mentalistic, divorced Celenza brand saysthatFicino's unique insecond ofeveryday life with ethics andtherealities (84); decidedly placetometaphysics" body, ofPersia De vitausesthe"primordial andEgypt howFicino's Copenhaver explains knowledge" inmagical natural to better themselves toshow "hiscontemporaries howtouseordinary objects and that thecreative, reflect theopinion, dominant (137).Bothessays today, ways" imaginative, rather thanthemore more elements ofFicino's accurately systematic aspects, magical thought, character ofhisthought. thepeculiar capture Moran onthephilosoII looks tomodernity. Itopens with anessay Part forward byDermot its influence on modern Moran thatCusais of Nicholas of and Cusa, phy philosophy. argues insome a "lonefigure with norealsuccessor" (173),evenifsomeofhisideaswouldresonate howCusaisboth"profoundly tradiMoran toshow modern attempts philosophers. Although itself. inhisepistemology, hefails tomake tomodernity tional" andmodern anyrealconnection that a lucidessay onLorenzo Vallaandtheriseofhumanist dialectic LodiNautacontributes each ofVallaandAgricola because are"largely focuses onthetheories mainly they responsible, inhisownway, thetransformation ofAristotelian-Scholastic intoa forhaving logic inaugurated thecommon oflanguage, humanist dialectic" howthestudy (193).Nautadescribes especially wasfor Vallaa "sharp-edged toolfor allkinds Latin based onclassical authorities, exposing usage intherealms ofmetaphysics andontology. oferrors andmisunderstandings" (195),especially ofthis intohisrich discusNauta weaves what heunderstands tobetheshortcomings approach II alsoincludes P.Doyle, ofHispanic scholassionofValla. Part anexcellent discussion, byJohn from the ticjuridical, andtheoretical that takes thereader toregions far afield moral, philosophy ona strong notewith ofhumanIberian Peninsula itself. Thebookconcludes luciddiscussions istic andscholastic ethics andtheproblem oftheprince byDavidA.Lines, byEricNelson. asa whole illuminates the Thecontributions arelargely andthevolume excellent, skillfully itinthehistorical rich anddistinctive texture ofRenaissance bycarefully philosophy situating context ofbothMedieval Oneproblem isthatthisapproach causes andmodern philosophy. a chronology of someamount ofrepetition which cannot beavoided. Thevolume alsoincludes willbehelpful andbrief ofRenaissance that tothe events, important philosophers biographies onemaygetthefeeling that theconnection between Renaisreader. Attimes, however, general sance is thin and and that some threads are as andmodern unsubstantiated, philosophy dropped inMoran's soonasthey arepicked isespecially onCusa,where there isonly evident up;this essay casual evidence forCusas"subterranean influence" onSpinoza TheconnecandLeibniz. given tionbetween theRenaissance issuggested onthelevel ofinnuandmodernity, therefore, mostly endo.Anessay that inpart, thattheRenaissance of thelegacy Hellenistic considered, recovery hadonthedevelopment ofmodern this wouldhaveperhaps solved philosophies philosophy ifanything, andcomplemented Thisshortcoming, isexcusable, problem, Kraye's essay nicely. since there arecertain understandable limitations that beplaced ona bookwith must this scope

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andnature. Hankins alsoprovides a polemical tonetotheintroduction andconclusion, which isinprinciple notoutofplaceina bookthat considers theHumanist ofschoseriously critique lastic Hankins discusses thedifferent andnegative, that intellectual values, philosophy. positive historians andphilosophers andsermonizes onthestate of placeonRenaissance philosophy, Hankins tries toconvince that would contemporary philosophy. contemporary philosophers they benefit from asidetheir familiar conversational from andopena diaputting partners history, with Renaissance While it is uncontroversial that intellectual historians writlogue philosophers. "cannot failtogive Renaissance a central ingonmodern today (3), philosophy philosophy place" Hankins hasunfortunately failed toprovide reasons even for those who anysatisfactory (perhaps aresympathetic tohisview)forshowing that should converse with contemporary philosophers Renaissance In of Hankins s bestefforts toshow that thehistorical situation philosophers. spite oftheRenaissance isa mirror tophilosophy andculture theeighteen that constitute today, essays thebody ofthis insharp volume stand andpaint a portrait ofRenaissance contrast, philosophy that ofitsnature andaims, from is,interms mostly foreign contemporary philosophy. Marist College

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ed.Angelo Mazzocco E.J.Brill, Humanism, (Leiden: 2006).ISBN Interpretations ofRenaissance inIntellectual Studies 9789004152441. (Brill's 143) History, A tribute tothememory ofHansBaron, PaulOskar andEugenio Kristeller, Garin, Interpretations Humanism isa tour deforce scholars oftheday. Their ofRenaissance bysomeoftheleading tovarying with thetheories ofthese andtogether essays engage degrees twentieth-century giants, a survey ofthestate ofscholarship attheoutset ofthetwenty-first present century. Thebookbegins with a sketch ofthegeneral trends andquestions inthehistoriography of Renaissance humanism from thelate19th the the of the 1950s, century through lay establishing landfor theauthors ofthis volume. Theessays ofPart I treat thedevelopment ofhumanism from itsinception intheDuecento toitsestablishment as a movement bythemid-Quattrocento. Those ofPart II treat some ofthemovement itself. IIIconsiders Part some ofits principle aspects and intellectual landmarks. Each of the the Mazeditor, major agents essays, according Angelo ismeant to'stand onitsown'(p.17n.64).However, asthese from series zocco, of essays began attheRSAannual in2003and2004,itmight notbesurprising that papers presented meetings thedialogue between them constitutes oneofthemore ofthebook. stimulating aspects InPart between thecontributions Ronald Robert I,thedialogue of,respectively, Witt, Black, PaulE Grendler, Massimo and Mazzotta is forunderMiglio, Giuseppe particularly important theideological andsocial factors which thehumanist movement. Both standing initially shaped WittandBlackplacetheorigins ofthemovement in themid-Duecento. Theyalsofollow inemphasizing Kristeller theinfluence ofprofessional andpolitical considerations ontheearly humanists. Witt for too much on the criterion ofliterary Black, however, critiques focusing emulation. Heclaims, that ineducation andclassstruggle were thesignificant rather, changes causal mechanisms. Mazzotta offers a valuable ofboth Hedemonstrates qualification arguments. that theintellectual foundations ofhumanism were connected toDuecento debates theological - namely between theFranciscan andDominican orders onthehierarchy ofknowledge andon thequestion ofpoetasvates. Mazzottas thus that the of humanism were essay suggests origins - oratleast - secular less lessdirectly andpolitical than isperhaps potentially appreciated. Grendler andMiglio focus ontheinstitutionalization ofthehumanist movement, beginning inthemid-Quattrocento. Their ofwhat ismeant differ, interpretations by'institutionalization' butarenotuncomplimentary. Grendler seeshumanism asa force ofcultural innovation operatcriticism. Heposits, that humanisms ona given however, ingthrough impact depended region on theextent towhich itwasincorporated schools anduniversities. largely bytheregions Grendler thatthemovements institutionalization inthetheology goesontocontend departments ofGermany ledtothebirth oftheReformation andtotheReformation's inthat strength area.Hismeasuring-stick for'impact' isdisciplinary This (usedina positivist sense) change. couldbeusefully withfurther evidence from non-academic institutional augmented appoint- with ments andfrom thebooktrade tothecirculation ofboth classical andhumanistic respect works. s for considers theprivileged circulation ofbulls, and documents, Miglioessay, example, humanists. Heargues that their as distribution, epistolary correspondence penned bythecurial wellasthepapallibrary wasinstrumental intransmitting itscanon, itself, humanism, scholarly andmodes ofthought. Acurial notonly haveenabled thecirculation ofa practices, postwould humanist s ideasandworks, itwould alsohavelentthem a certain status. Thuscurial exemplary - providing humanism anditsworks cametodominate theculture ofEurope newmodels forstandardization, asMiglio aswellasstarting forinnovation. Onemight notes, thus points ©Koninldijke Brill 2009 NV, Leiden,

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that academic' institutionalization insomecases, bemore ofa symcould, suggest specifically bolicaffirmation orrecognition ofanalready extant cultural andintellectual impact. Thesecond andthird ofInterpretations treat andagents ofthatimpact. These parts aspects Riccardo Charles feature, G.Nauert, Eckhard Fubini, Hankins, parts James Kessler, respectively, Arthur F.Kinney, andAlison Brown. Theessays Mazzocco, Monfasani, John Angelo byKessler andKinney willbeofparticular interest tothose thetheoretical andpractical of studying aspects humanisms ofclassical rhetoric anditsinfluence onRenaissance culture. Monappropriation fasani contributes a skillful andsuccinct ofRenaissance cultural atwork, example politics namely in'Chapter 'sMiscellaneorum 90'ofPoliziano centuria This illustrates theextent prima. analysis andnature ofthecultural which couldpotentially beattached toa single politics philological emendation. asstriking, asMonfasani notes istheeasewith which circumstances well, Perhaps couldpermit tooverlook andevenforget suchthings. Hisestablishment ofa reliable posterity text andtranslation of'Chapter willfurther 90' (pp.253-65) benefit students ofPoliziano, the tradition ofAristotle, andthehistory ofmelancholy. Hankins' contribution onthemodernity ofthehumanist movement andAlison Brown's essay onreinterpreting notcoincidentally, basetheir onusesofLucretius. it,perhaps arguments They alsoconcur that Lucretius wasoneoftheRenaissance's most controversial ancient authors. Parina volume offourteen the this that the full ticularly introduction), essays (including suggests ofLucretius forourunderstanding ofRenaissance humanism isonlybeginning to significance beappreciated. therelatively recent ofinterest inthetopic Indeed, resurgence bysucheminent scholars asHankins andBrown, aswellasamong therising would indicate generation, justthat. Totheir I should like to add that own corroborates Hankins of insights my research suggestion Ficino s primacy. Theattack, which Ficino mounts inhisTheologia Platonica , bookXIVchapter seemto be thefirst attested 'thematerialistic 10,doesactually ofreligion against etiology inLucretius' De rerum natura itdoesnotsystematically address Lucre, though (p.150)found tius'account introduced inI. 62-148). TheTheobgia Platonica itself also {DRNV.1161-1240, seems torepresent thefirst time that wefind a Renaissance text between 'Lucredistinguishing tians' and'Epicureans'; theformer constitute Ficino's inthethree-pronged attack explicitly target ofXIV.10. scholars inthehistoriography interested ofRenaissance humanism willfind useful the Finally, 'Introduction' as well as his on Petrarch's role in the renovatio Romae. Mazzocco, byAngelo essay Thelatter WarII interpretations tothose oftheQuattrocento humanists. juxtaposes post-World Thebibliography ofthevolume alsoprovides a guide ofthesecondary literature essential tothe debates incontemporary scholarship. Taken asa whole this collection ofessays isaninvaluable resource for in interested anyscholar thehumanist movement anditsorigins, with to its Italian as well as context, particularly respect forthose inthecontemporary interested ofhistoriography. history Arts & Rutgers Camden University ofthe University,

Zinn Pamela

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textuelles et lestraditions surlesmanuscrits Nouvelles Bestiaires Médiévaux. , ed. perspectives deLouvain, Publications Univ. Louvain-la-Neuve: Baudouin VandenAbeele, Catholique del'Institut d'Études 2005. Médiévales, LouvainetStéphane Counet dune Nicolas deCues. LesMéthodes Mercier, ,eds.Jean-Michel pensée del'Institut d'Études Publications Univ. deLouvain, 2005. la-Neuve: Médiévales, Catholique Brill 2006. alsAktbeiThomas , Leiden: vonAquin Nissing, Sprache Hanns-Gregor à Colette médiévaux. Volume ¿iestextes Écriture etRéécriture Sirat, d'hommage offert philosophiques 2006. Turnhout: Brepols etJosé médiévale etImagination dansla philosophie Intellect , eds.MariaCândidaPacheco 2006. Turnhout: Francisco 3 vols., Meirinhos, Brepols, LuisSuárez, Obras Pedro deValencia, ed., III,Académica , estudio Juan preliminar Completas la de MaríaNieto con colab. Francisco notas trad., Jesús Juan Domínguez, Domínguez Léon:Universidad deLéon2006. Ibáñez, Caroti etal.,LouvainMaierii Studies inHonour 'AdIngenti Acuitionem. , eds.Stefano ofAlfonso 2006. Internationale desInstituts d'Études Fédération la-Neuve: Médiévales, onAristotle's De anima, eds. TheTradition andRepresentation. Mind, ofCommentaries Cognition M.M.H. Thijssen, Aldershot: andJohannes PaulJ.J.M.Bakker 2007. Ashgate, Brill andOntology intheSyllogistic 2007. PaulThom, , Leiden: Kilwardby ofRobert Logic alserste Studien zu einem Heinrich vonGentüberMetaphysik Martin Pickavé, Wissenschaft. Vierteides Leiden: ausdemletzten 2007. 13.Jahrhunderts, Brill, Metaphysikentwurf Helsinki: intheMedieval West Trinitarian Kärkkäinen, , ed.Pekka Luther-AgricolaTheology 2007. Society, Tradition. theAreopagite andtheNeoplatonist Klitenic WearandJohn Sarah Dillon, Dionysius theHellenes 2007. ,Aldershot: Ashgate Despoiling à travers le littéraires etdigressions 'Tendenda Vela'. Excursions Édouard Jeauneau, philosophiques Turnhout: 2007. , Brepols Moyen Âge Gene:Droz andnotes Letters andLetter dePins, , ed.,comm. JanPendergrass, Jean Fragments 2007. Guide ArtandLogic Hull.A User's The 2007. , Leiden: Brill, Bonner, Anthony ofRamon Hofmeister as 'Scientia ed.Roberto NewEssays onMetaphysics Pich,LouvainTranscendem, Internationale desInstituts d'Études la-Neuve: Fédération 2007. Médiévales, auMoyen Ve-XVIe siècle del'image. Unearchéologie duvisuel Olivier Au-delà , Paris: Boulnois, Age, 2008. Seuil, Eckhart. Lessources arabes dela "mystique allemande suivide D'Averroès à Maître Kurt Flasch, 2008. laphilosophie Paris: étudions-nous médiévale?', Vrin, 'Pourquoi XIVe -XVIe siècles Biard & Sabine etthéorie dumouvement, ,eds.Joël Rommevaux, Mathématiques Univ. duSeptentrion, 2008. Villeneuve Presses de'Ascq: ©Koninklijke Brill 2009 NV, Leiden,

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TheSentences. Book 2: OnCreation GiulioSilano, Toronto: Pontificial Peter Lombard, , transi. 2008. Institute ofMediaeval Studies, Peter TheSentences. Book3: OntheIncarnation GiulioSilano, , transi. Lombard, oftheWord ofMediaeval 2008. Toronto: Pontificial Institute Studies, Enlasenda delFlorilegium Gallicum. Edición Beatriz Fernández delaCuesta González, yestudio Archivo delflorilegio delmanuscrito Fédération 150, Louvain-la-Neuve: Córdoba, Capitular d'Etudes 2008. Internationale desInstituts Médiévales, Latin andVernacular Translations Treatises inMedieval Science Translated. ,eds. ofScientific Europe Michèle Pieter De Leemans andAnSmets, Leuven: Leuven Univ. 2008. Press, Goyens, Their Function andSignificance Iribarren inMedieval and ,eds.Isabel Angels Philosophical Inquiry. Martin Aldershot: 2008. Lenz, Ashgate, deloscorrelativos. Liber correlativorum innato introd. de Ramon Libro rum, trad., Llull, ynotas 2008. G. Higuera Madrid: Editorial Trotta, Rubio, José 2008. Pauliina Remes, , Stocksfield: Acumen, Neoplatonism Iconee simboli traPlatone e il neoplatonismo Pàtron Stefania , Bologna: Bonfiglioli, Agalma. 2008. Editore, Turnhout: , ed.Niels Buridanus, Green-Pedersen, Quaestiones Johannes Jorgen Brepols, Topicorum 2008. Aristotle's On Animals, transi. Irven M. Resnick and Albert theGreat, Questions concerning D.C.:TheCatholic Univ. ofAmerica 2008. Kenneth F.Kitchell Press, Jr., Washington, Studies intheDissemination andImpact William Ockham andOckhamism. J.Courtenay, ofhis 2008. Leiden: , Brill, Thought P.Reilly, Toronto: Pontificial Institute of TheGilson Lectures onThomas , introd. James Aquinas 2008. Mediaeval Studies, andtheWorld Middle inHonour Frankland. TheFranks oftheEarly Ages. Essays ofDameJinty andDavidGanz, Manchester: Manchester Univ. 2008. Nelson Press, , eds.PaulFouracre ed.MarkG. ofHarclay, andOrdinary XV-XXIX, I-XTV, Questions Questions Henry Ordinary transi. andMarkG. Henninger, Edwards SJ, SJ,withEnglish Raymond Henninger, 2 vols., 2008. Oxford: Oxford Press, University A.Newton, Leiden: 2008. Medieval Commentaries onAristotle's ed.Lloyd Brill, Categories, undhistorische Die Syncategoremata' desWilhelm vonSherwood , Kommentierung Einordnung Leiden: 2008. vonRainaKirchhoff, Brill, derEngelsprache alsAntizipation einer Locutio DieDiskussion Bernd SprechaktRoling, angelica. 2008. inMittelalter undFrüher Neuzeit theorie , Leiden: Brill, Leuven: Leuven Univ. deGandavo variae Henrico , ed.Girard J.Etzkorn, Quaestiones adscriptae 2008. Press, Remedies between Three Faiths inTwelfth-Century Ibnaklarish's Book Medical ,ed. Spain ofSimples. in with TheArcadian assoc. Oxford Charles Oxford: Press, Burnett, Library University 2008. Harald Ancient 2009. Acumen, , Stocksfield: Thorsrud, Scepticism

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