Vivarium - Vol Xliv, Nos. 2-3, 2006

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VIVARIUM An International and Intellectual Journalfor thePhilosophy Life of theMiddle Agesand Renaissance Aims & Scope Vivarium includes extensive examinations offundamental and philosophical problems thehistory ofideas.Specialattention is givento theprofane sideofphilosophy and to itsrelationship withotherareasofthought and learning fromthisperiod. Sinceas farbackas 1963,Vivarium has beenestablishing itself as an unrivalled resource forthesubject bothin themajorresearch libraries oftheworldandon the bookshelvesof professors and scholars.Vivarium offers private youan easywayto stayon topofyourdiscipline. Vivarium articles withintroductions and notes.Specialconsideration is comprises on manuscript tradition and thehistory oftexts. Reviewarticles and givento studies in combination bookreviews are published withan annualappearance of regularly thematic issues. Editors L.M. de Rijk(Leiden),H.A.G.Braakhuis C.H. Kneepkens (Nijmegen), (Groningen), (Madison),E.P. Bos (Leiden),D. Perler(Basel)and L.W. Nauta W.J.Courtenay (Groningen). AdvisoryCommittee TullioGregory (Rome),AlbertZimmermann J.E. Murdoch(Cambridge, (Cologne), MA). ISSN 0042-7543, Vivarium onlineISSN 1568-5349) is published 3 timesa year (print tel+31 (0)715353500, 2, 2321JC Leiden,The Netherlands, byBrill,Plantijnstraat fax+31 (0)715317532. Allcommunications, shouldbe addressed to C.H. nature, exceptthoseofa business derLetteren, Faculteit Mediaevistiek, Kneepkens, Rijksuniversiteit Groningen, Vakgroep P.O. Box 716,9700AS Groningen, The Netherlands. Noticeto Contributors Contributions in duplicate shouldbe submitted andbe accompanied byan electronic text(Microsoft Word)eitheron diskor as an emailattachment (c.h.j.m.kneepkens @rug.nl). shouldbe written in eitherEnglish, Frenchor Germanand thetext Manuscripts mustbe grammatically correct and in goodliterary mustbe style.The manuscripts numbered and complete, all notes,biblioconsecutively, double-spaced, including references, tables,etc. graphical An English abstract ofno morethan300 wordsshouldaccompany yoursubmission.Authors receivegalleyproofs forreading, whichshouldbe returned to theeditorwithin one weekofreceipt. are readbytheeditor. Pageproofs The publisher reserves therightto chargeauthorsforchangesmadeto proofs otherthancorrection ofcompositor's or conversion errors. Visit our web site at www.brill.nl

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VIVARIUM

AN INTERNATIONALJOURNAL FOR THE PHILOSOPHY AND INTELLECTUAL LIFE OF THE MIDDLE AGES AND RENAISSANCE

VOLUME XLIV (2006)

BRILL LEIDEN • BOSTON

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VIVARIUM An International andIntellectual Journal forthePhilosophy LifeoftheMiddleAgesand Renaissance Aims& Scope Vivarium extensive examinations includes offundamental andthehistory philosophical problems ofideas.Special attention isgiven totheprofane sideofphilosophy andtoitsrelationship with other areasofthought andlearning from thisperiod. Vivarium articles withintroductions andnotes. consideration is givento comprises Speciali studies onmanuscript tradition andthehistory oftexts. Review articles andbookreviews are incombination with an annual ofthematic issues. published regularly appearance Editors L.M.deRijk(Leiden), H.A.G.Braakhuis C.H.Kneepkens (Nijmegen), (Groningen), W.J. Courtenay E.P.Bos(Leiden), D. Perler andL.W.Nauta(Groningen). (Madison), (Basel) Committee Advisory TullioGregory Albert Zimmermann (Rome), J.E.Murdoch MA). (Cologne), (Cambridge, Vivarium ISSN0042-7543, online ISSN 1568-5349) is published 3 times a yearbyBrill, (print TheNetherlands, tel+31(0)715353500, fax+31(0)715317532. 2,2321JCLeiden, Plantijnstraat

BrillNV,Leiden, TheNetherlands © Copyright 2006byKoninklijke theimprints Brill Brill NVincorporates , Hotei Koninklijke Publishing, IDC Publishers, Martinus Publishers andVSP. Nijhoff stored in Allrights reserved. Nopartofthis translated, publication maybereproduced, a retrieval ortransmitted inany orbyanymeans, electronic, form system, orotherwise, written without mechanical, prior photocopying, recording ofthe publisher. permission orpersonal tophotocopy items Authorization forinternal that useisgranted provided byBrill toCopyright theappropriate feesarepaiddirectly Suite 910 Clearance 222Rosewood Drive, Center, MA01923,USA.Feesaresubject tochange. Danvers, PRINTED INTHENETHERLANDS

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CONTENTS

OF VOLUME

XLIV (2006)

Russell L. Friedman Introduction and Chris Schabel Mark Thakkar Francis of Marchia on the Heavens Chris Schabel Francis of Marchia's Virtusderelida and the Context of Its Development Fabio Zanin Francis of Marchia, Virtusderelicta , and Modificationsof the Basic Principlesof AristotelianPhysics Francis accidentis. Fabrizio Amerini sitdeessentia Utrum inhaerentia the Nature Debate on of Marchia and the of Accidents Andrea A. Robiglio How Is Strengthof the Will Possible? Francis of Marchia and the Act of the Will Roberto Lambertini Francis of Marchia and William of Ockham: Fragmentsfroma Dialogue .... Andrea A. Robiglio The Thinkeras a Noble Man (benenatus) Remarkson the Medieval and Preliminary Concepts of Nobility Brooke Heidenreigh Does the Habit Make the Nun? A Case Findley Study of Heloise's Influenceon Abelard's Ethical Philosophy P.S. Eardley Conceptionsof Happiness and Human Destinyin the Late Thirteenth Michael J. Fitzgerald Catarina Dutilh Novaes Lodi Nauta Lorenzo Casini

1 21 41

81

96

151 184

205

248

276 Century ProblemswithTemporalityand Scientific Propositionsin John Buridan and Albert 305 of Saxony of : The Return Strode 's obligationes Ralph 338 Consistencyand the EpistemicTurn Lorenzo Valla and Quattrocento 375 Scepticism of Freedom Luis Vives' Juan Conception of the Will and Its Scholastic 396 Background

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iv Reviews

CONTENTS Isabel Iribarren,Durandus of St Pourçain. A DominicanTheologianin the Shadow of Aquinas 418 {rev.by William J. Courtenay ) Medieval New AnthonyKenny, Philosophy(A Historyof WesternPhilosophy,vol. 2) (Rev. by DominikPerler) 420

Books Received

424

Corrigenda to Vivarium , XLIV/1

427

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The Thinkeras a NobleMan (bene natus) and Remarkson theMedievalConcepts ofNobility* Preliminary ANDREAA. ROBIGLIO

Ce beaumot,bientrivial maisbien cGaudent benenati' énergique: [CharlesLe Maitrede Claville1] Abstract The late medievaldiscussionof 'nobility'(= nobilitas,dignitas)definedin terms(as opposedto othersocialnotionslike'aristocracy') , prophilosophical duceda largenumberofwritings, Nevertheless, manyofwhichare stillunedited. modernphilosophicalhistoriography the seventeenth (developedthroughout has and its first with century reaching apogee Hegel) neglectedthe concepassumed it to be a dead relicof the tual debateson nobility. Perhapshaving and historians understood 'pre-illuminist' past, philosophers 'nobility'as a in issue and so it still non-philosophical appears contemporary scholarship. The firstaim of thisessayis to draw attentionto thisissue by presenting a sortof preliminary of the different of of catalogue types conceptualizations of the 'mobility'.By exploringthe meaningsand philosophicalemployment 'benenasci' and ' bene this article also reveals a new natus' aspect expressions of the Aristotelian notionof magnanimity. * Thisresearch n° 360-20is a partofa project funded bytheDutchNWO (Grant drewmyattention to thequestionable translation of"virbene 093).ZénonKaluzafirst ofAutrecourt's natus" as noble-man, andtoNicolas usageofthisexpression. PepijnRutten in theInternational me to present thesereflections invited 'Tradition, Truth, Workshop ofNijmegen March4-6,2004),whereMaarten Transition' at theUniversity (Nijmegen: HoenenandCharles offered thesimilarCaspers helpful suggestions, especially regarding andennobling ofthemedieval medieval rituals Theanonyitiesbetween Liturgy university. ofthisJournal mousreader(s) drewmyattention to someweakpoints ofmyfirst draft In addition, and madeinsightful remarks. OlivierBoulnois, Charlesde Miramon and Grellard havehelpedmein various to all Christophe ways.I express mydeepgratitude oftheabove. 1 C. F. N. Le Maitrede Claville, Traité duvraimérite del'homme danstousles , considéré lesconditions: avecdesprincipes à former lesjeunes à la vertu, d'éducation, âgesetdanstoutes propres de (3rded.) 1737,83: "Unephysionomie Paris-Lyon qui plaît,desyeuxqui annoncent d'heureuses de la bonté, de la docilité, & le désird'apprendre, voilà dispositions, l'esprit, le mérite naturel. De-làvientce beaumot,bientrivial, maisbienénergique, bene gaudent nati".Cf.n. 69 below. BrillNV,Leiden,2006 © Koninklijke Alsoavailable online- www.brill.nl/viv

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' and withJuridical as a Philosophical Problem 1. Nobility Religious Edges Nobilityis a fundamentalconcept which shapes the contoursof philosophical discourse,yetone not oftenexaminedon itsown termsby historians of philosophy.2In Book Three of De consolatione (P. 6, § 7), philosophie Boethiusclaims that 'nobility'does not deservethe attentionof philosoboth of the concept of phers: it is plain for everyoneto see the futility it more to and of precisely[iamveroquam nobility any attempt explicate non 's nobilitati sit inane nomen, , quamfittile videat?).However, the very quis fact that he makes this polemical claim implies that there were others who held a different point of view.3 This essay shall presentseveral medieval conceptionsof 'good birth', their essentialconsistencyand clarifying with two aims: demonstrating 2 No majorencyclopaedia an entry hasyetincluded ofphilosophy, to myknowledge, Wörterbuch derPhilosophie cf.inter alia: J. Ritter on thetopicof'nobility', , (ed.),Historisches - Stuttgart 1971 Basel -ff.;TheStanford (onlineat: http://plato. ofPhilosophy Encyclopaedia as a is treated theconcept Andwhere itdoesreceive consideration, merely stanford.edu). A. De Liberaand in:C. Gauvard, or socialissue;cf.Ph.Contamine, 'Noblesse', political W. Conze,Adel, duMoyen-Âge M. Zink(eds),Dictionnaire Aristokratie, , Paris2004,990a-992a; Historisches W. Conzeand R. Koselleck in: O. Brunner, Grundbegriffe. (eds.),Geschichtliche vol. 1 (A-D),Stuttgart inDeutschland, Lexikon 1972,1-48.Two zurpolitisch-sozialen Sprache therule:cf.A. Kolnai, thatproves remarkable articles byAurelKolnaiaretheexception in: andId.,Dignity, 46 (1971),203-21,esp.219ff., Theconcept , in:Philosophy, ofhierarchy 51 (1976),251-71. Philosophy, 3 Thequestion thewritings issues ofnobility isoneofthemostrecurring in,forexample, - in connection studia litterarum". cultivation ofthe"sancta withthenecessary ofEnnodius Ennodius usestheideain a sense forhisnephew In theDictio VIII, written Lupicinus, Rome.He employs andcloseto thatofancient Christian' which is both'moderate vegis theapproundera goodSchoolmaster howthetraining to explain etablemetaphors dicta treebearnoblefruit. Ennodius, quando Praefatio Lupicino waytomakea well-born priate ed.W.Härtel, Vienna1882(CSEL,6), estDeuterio V S.,in:Id.,Opera inauditorio traditus omnia, testatur et naturae odoresignificai 446-50:"Meritum (. . .) primavisione geniům cespitis feritatis maculam auditur licetinrecessibus, voxmundae (. . .) [nevertheless] semper originis, novitesseplaciturum. adserere nonévitâtqui nonfestinat (. . .) Nascitur quodmeritis est".Andlatertheauthor telluris: vomeribus de fertilitate exercitii desiderium agendum oftheartes liberales : "Spemsolidam arenotbutthestudy thatsuch'ploughshares' explains doctori bonumingenium de tuaperfectione (. . .) genus optimo mancipamus concipimus: eruditio laudisindoctoribus estsingulare (. . .) caelum magistři opinioperpuisât discipuli at least useoftheideathatbeing'well-born' Foranother fectione interesting discipuli". ' 'bene natus oftheexpression of'nobility', seetheoccurrence tothedevelopment contributes Teodorico F. Delle Cf. ed. Härtel liber 221. in Id.,Epistularum Donne, 1882, VIII,cap.33, in: Invigilata di Ennodio, di stirpe nelpanegirico di nobiltà ' II concetto 'rexgenitus lucernis, strand to theanti-aristocratic on thetopic,withrespect 20 (1998),73-84.Fineresearch Oxford andSociety intheMiddle Reason is in A. Murray, in laterScholastic Ages, thought, 1978,esp.partiv: 317-404.

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theirrespectivepositions(§§ 12-13 below). By analyzingthe work of a successionof medieval thinkersup to Nicholas of Autrecourt,thispaper ' as it was will outlinethe generaland agreed sense of the term' benenatus understoodwithinmedieval scholasticdiscourse,as well as explore the term'suse in connectionwithconceptsof intellectualperfection, the pursuit of happiness,and spiritual(namely,Christian)perfection. To this end, some preliminarysteps are required.Firstthe topic will be delimitedand the scope of the presentwork definedin relationto otherratherisolated scholarlytreatments(§ 2).4 The medievalperiod had a distinctive concept of nobility,particularly in termsof its legal and religiousimplications(§§ 3-5). As thisis different fromthe one generallyarticulatedby ancient thinkers,the understandof ing of the ancientlegacy of this notionwill enrichour understanding itsmedievalconception(§ 6-7). To thatend thevarioususes of the expression benenatuswill be analyzed (§ 8) before turningto some canonical whoseself-conscious use of theconceptof nobility withina theoretical figures in illuminates its the medieval context setting significance (§§9-10). The of Nicholas of Autrecourt of conception representssomething a departure of good birththat thisinvestiga(§ 11); thusit is withhis representation tion will conclude. The prominentlegal and religioususes of the idea contradictone another.As a legal notion,nobilityis most closely bound up with the maintenanceof highsocial rankin an establishedorderby virtueof bloodline- nobilitas nonestvirtus , the juristssay (cf. § 4 below). The Christian of on the otherhand, in some ways bears the seeds of concept nobility, a transvaluation (cf.§ 5 below). That is to say, thisChristianelementhas the sense that nobilityis not the embodimentof intellectualgenius or but is instead derivedfromboth divine grace and the cultisuperiority, vation of moral virtue.In principle,therefore, the potentialto acquire it is universal.The impetusforthistransvaluation is the catholicdimension of Christianity; forin Christthereis neitherJew nor Greek,neitherslave nor master.This was difficult formedievalphilosophyand learnedtheology 4 Alexander andAlainDe Liberaareamongtherarescholars tohavetreated Murray thetopicalsoin philosophical terms. See A. De Libera,Penser auMoyen , Paris1991, Âge to RuediImbach(374,n. 13) and Luca Bianchi 246-98,as wellas his references see also (383 n. 20). Murray1978(n. 3), 261-63,270-81.For further development, A. A. Robiglio, Dante(bene nato'Guido Cavalcanti e Margherita Porete in Par.V,115' in: 26 (2005),45-62. L'Alighieri,

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to assimilate,as it seemed, at least on the surface,to underminetheir dignityas disciplines. Anotherelementinforming the medievalphilosophicaltheoriesof nobilitywas a traditionof 'knightly'and courtlynobility.This was indirectly - in the formof discourses connectedto the environment of the university about clerksand masters,as well as about the social rank of scholars accordingto theirintellectualdignity. These interpretations of the nature of nobilityspeak to the question of whetherthereexistsa structuralconnectionbetweenthe exerciseand teachingof speculativethought,on the one hand, and the nobilityof the thinkeron the other.The convictionthatit does existdates back at least to the time of Pythagoras.Though it must be said that relativelyfew authorsthroughoutthe centurieshave writtenexplicitlyabout such connections,thisdoes not implythat theybelieved such connectionsdid not exist.The issue functionedon different levels. On the one hand, a man's good birthcould be seen as merelyone of a numberof social and physical 'conditions'whichfixedhis characterand influencedhis educationand thushis inclination to studyphilosophy.This case shouldbe considered an elementof human education and is not philosophicallyproblematic. However, at another level, the trainingin and developmentof higher philosophicalskillscould be viewed as a conditionforthe attainmentof human excellenceand 'nobility'.In thiscase, a natural-bornphilosopher, would, ipsofacto , be a member of a chosen elite and thus trulynoble.5 From thisperspective,the conceptuallink betweennobilityand philosophy could not be regardedas accidental.6The problem of this concep5 Theissueis thusnotmerely socialquatale a barely received notion of"noble , though birth" as "socialprestige" circulated theMiddleAges,informing and interthroughout oftheconcept ofnobility. The socialissueis theonewe find withotheraspects acting in University whereit often means"beingbornofnobleparents"; some documentation, scholars usedthis"factoflife"to theiradvantage, forinstance, theirnoble mentioning in their orviaanother to thePope- either birth direcdy Examples supplications patron. inW.Courtenay andE. D. Goddard Rotuli Parisienses: ofthistendency aredocumented (eds), tothePope , vol.II: 1352-1378, , vol.I: 1316-1349 ofParis Supplications fiomtheUniversity of"dign.": Leiden-Boston-Köln 2002-2004 (seetheoccurrences e.g.I, 261and265). 6 Anexplicit linkbetween andsystematic hadbeenpreingenuitas professionis philosophy De mundo sentinLateAntiquity. Cf.Apuleius, , prol.,ed. C. Moreschini, Leipzig-Stuttgart cui suumnondespexit necindignam se existimavit 1989,146:"Solaphilosophia ingenium ac dicere tambonas rerum sedconducere divinarum ethumanarum deferatur, disceptatio istiusmodi suaecredidit et congruere arteset eiusmodi professionis operamcumingenuitate aremine). Tencenturies theItaliandoctor curamtalibus studiis etmoribus" after, (italics - calledII Galateo - (1448-1517), with dealtextensively andhumanist, Antonio De Ferraris

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tuallinkand thevariouswaysin whichcertainmedievalthinkers attempted to elucidateit constitutesthe heart of this examination. 2. A Definition ofNobility of theConcept The concept of nobilitywhich concernsthis investigationapproximates an expressionof it used in recentliteratureby Claudio Donati, withsome Donati's paradigmof nobilityhas threeelements:(a) a privileged alterations. "social" statusthatbears (b) certification by explicitpublic laws or statutes and/or historical a scientific Followingthisdelinjustification.7 having(c) eation, Donati tends to deny that therewas a clear concept of nobility beforethe Middle Ages. For instance,he holds thatancientRoman patricians, althoughtheycomprisedthe politicalelite, did not have juridical recognition.8

Christian ofnobility withrationality theissue.Hisequation conception gavean essentially denobilitate A. De Ferrariis, flavours. bothStoicandAristotelian (1495),ed. in: Epistola differentia "Verarerum detto il Galateo Antonio De Ferraris D. Colucci, , Lecce1939,140-41: ratio differentia a forma, ea est,quaesumitur quae datesserei;iliaenimin hominibus a quibusmenteet ratione differentiae, est;in brutis, ignoramus; quae sintsingulorum recteappellabimus Nobiles valent, qui ignobiles, plusratione quicumque igitur separamur. autPriamo etiamsi sintCraesolocupletiores minus, obtemperat, antiquiores; qui rationi is nechominis immohicverehomoest;qui minus hicverenobilis, dignus; appellationi sunt vitavivere. maximam brutali hominum Nobiles ideodicunt, quivere philosoigitur partem to De Ferraris, aremine).Philosophical etiamsi training, according (italics inopes" phantur ' ' from1496,in E. Garin(ed.),Prosatori via (seealsohisEremita is butthe heroica , dating sources werenot De Ferraris's delQuattrocento latini 1952,at 1070).Among , Milan-Naples Renaissance of the humanistic and Aristotelian Juande {e.g. dialogues philosophy only the CanonLaw.The Glossa De vita butalsomedieval Lucena's (Divitias' byquoting felici) and(atleastvirtually) wasequatedwithbothvirtue stressed thatnobility 50.5.8.4, Digest Cf.B. Croce,Poeti contemnunt "Verephilosophantes economic pecuniam". independence: Rinascimento delpieno e tardo e scrittori , vol.I, Bari1945,17-35, Knights esp.21;A. Scaglione, Italian Renaissance Ottoman tothe & Courtesy atCourt: , BerkeleyCourtliness, from Germany Chivalry LosAngeles-Oxford 1991,224. 7 Oneshould evenconof'historical notethatthenotion different, justification' presents fields. Forjuridical to itsuse in distinct connotations disciplinary according tradictory, need a practical whichanswered a sortofparadigmatic it constituted argument thought iniure. On theother intempore, oneofRomanlaw's'first andapplied prius potior principles': sameclaimwasinterpreted thevery hand,inanAristotelian differendy: setting philosophical itself to whatis 'necesreveals itself 'to be' as longas it assimilates whatalways persists as it was couldhavebeenvalidinsofar thehistorical argument sary'.On thesegrounds On theconcealment ornatural tothe'unhistorical', abletoconform argument. biological hasmadeinteresting Pierre Bourdieu ofone'struehistorical sugges/family background, Paris1979,78ff. sociale dujugement, La Distinction: tion;cf.P. Bourdieu, critique 8 C. Donati,Nobiltà Rome sociali delle scienze , vol.VI [Moneta-rrezziJ, , in: Enciclopedia

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During the late medieval period, however,a more loose relationship betweenstatuteand rule prevailedin a numberof formsof intellectual organization,especiallyin the case of the humanistscholars.Therefore it is more appropriateto considera paradigmrequiringconditionsa and c, but conditionb only in a general sense (thatis, I considerthe scholarly setting,as such, as a juridical frame).Moreover,the notionof 'privilege' is used primarilywithoutexclusivereferenceto personsor, when it does have such reference,it is both in terms of his (1) access to the best scientific and educationalresourcesavailable and in termsof his (2) participationin settingthe socio-politicalagenda by way of being wellpositionedto establishthe hierarchyof learningpriorities.9 3 in Medieval 3. 'Nobility A FirstGlanceat Different Traditions Thought: The question de veranobilitate , that is to say its nature and thus how it mightbe achieved,characterisedvarious traditionsin medieval thought, particularlyfromthe thirteenthcenturyonward. Andreas Cappellanus' De amore(ca. 1180) dealt withit extensively; thistreatisewas the onlywork and Cappellanus the sole author to be explicitlyand distinctly cited in Tempier's 1277 condemnations, perhapsindicatingitssubstantialinfluence by attemptingto stem its tide. The writing'On true nobility'by the Dominican William Peyraut,though less developed, also had a wide influence.10 The epistlesof the jurist-statesman Pier delle Vigne likewise contain points that implicitlyrecall the keen courtlycontentionabout whethernobilitywas determinedby one's lineage or by virtueof one's - in otherwords: animiprobitas by good birthor by personalworth.Also addressed in Aristotle'swritings,this issue provided an ongoing source for disputesabout similartopics.11

a selected theclassic works 1996,235a-246a (with bibliography ennumerating byN. Elias, G. Tabacco,M. L. Bush,andbyDonatihimself): at 235a. 9 I consider c to be thecorephilosophical condition andintend to develop it aspect, in a further on Scholastic study Ingenuity. 10Guillelmus Deeruditone omnia Peraldus, , (ca. 1265),in:Thomas principům Aquinas, Opera t. 16,Parma1865,395a-396b; cf.Id.,Summa devitiis tract. VI 'de superbia', (1250?), esp. - consultation: on-line at:www.unc.edu/~swenzel/superbit.html cap.28 (available February ' e la teoria 3nelDuecento Lefonti del*Fiore divirtù della*nobiltà , in:Giornale 2004).Cf.M. Corti, storico dellaletteratura 136(1959),1-82;Murray 1978(n. 3),274-75and471. italiana, 11Petrus de Vinea,Friderici II. Imperatori Basel1740, , III, 27,ed.J. R. Iselius, epistulae inquosvires "Vosigitur virifortes etnobiles, & ánimos 432-33: grata proavorum generositas

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The late medieval receptionof the Liberde causisfromJohn of Wales to HeymericusofCampo, forexample,saw some unique developmentsin the concept of the 'noble soul' {animanobilis). Accordingto Heymericus's syntheticapproach, Neoplatonic philosophical concepts correspond to accordTrinitariantheologyand assume different shades of interpretation to the different 'schools' or traditions of thought.12 ing Disputeson the dignityof variouslanguagesand stylesoccurredunder the auspices of the Trivium,especiallygrammarand rhetoric.13

& honorem nostrum de potentiae vestrae felicitate est, confidite, qui vester propagavit, De nobilSee alsotheinteresting claro rumoperum affectibus courtiy dispute promovete". Petrode Vineaet Taddeode etprobitate animi to both"magistris itate , dedicated generis II allacorte diFederico sullanobiltà editedbyF. DelleDonne,Unadisputa Suessa", recently ofthisdispute in:Medioevo diSvevia, 23 (1999),3-20.Another Romanzo, pointevocative II Frederick ofDante'sBanquet toemperor be theAristotelian , attributed quotation might , IV, hi,6). (Dante,TheBanquet 12In hisDisputatio andPeripatetici describes howPlatonici ecclesiastica depotestate , Heymericus "Deus per suum of theUniverse theTrinitarian understand differently: production etPerypatetici ad modum, verbum, ponunt quoPlatoponitmentem quodestextraipsum secundum Platonem 16v/et cumeiusspiritu, quise habetutanimamundi intelligencias/1 universa" aremine).On thistextby fecit velanima nobilis secundum (italics Perypateticos, fromtheMs. Trier,CodexCusanus106,f. 116,see now transcribed Heymericus, und vonHeymericus deCampo F. Hamann, Koran undKonziliarismus. zumVerhältnis Anmerkungen 43 (2005),275-91, at 278n. 3 and284n. 36.Heymericus vonKues, in:Vivarium, Nikolaus divinoofthenotion of'thenoblesoul'in hisCompendium a parallel development presents 8 (1967),56-75and 9 (1968),3-90. ed.J. K. Korolec, in: StudiaMediewistyczne, rum, ofintellecconnects thethemeofthenoblesoulwiththeAlbertist The author concept in thehighest form of nobilis allowsparticipation theanima tualdivinisation ("deificado"): strahabensesseintellectuale, life,sinceitis the"imagointelligentis quo efficitur agentis, suaeintellectualitatis mentum (2ndpart,75);so that"propter perfectionem intelligentiae" level("caeloautemstellato nobilis" activae (2ndpart,76).Ata cosmic dignatur appellari thenoblesoulis he whorefuses to degealiaforma nondebetur quamanimanobilis"), life(thatis to say"vitasimaffairs andattains thetrueintellectual nerate intomaterial in comparationem ad animasignobiles, earumin "Dicitur nobilis quaepropter pliciter"): immersionem nonexserentes vitamsimpliciter materiam supermateriam dégénérant, ofthought ofa viarum concordia distinct traditions elevatam". (ib.).Thissynthesis amongst ofCusa'scultural a 'Neoplatonic frame' alsocomestobe a focalpointofNicholas within ofthe'noblesoul',seealsotheworkofDe Libera, esp.De Libera agenda.On thetheme 1991(n.4), 277-78. 13See forinstance, De vulgari DanteAlighieri, II, n, 2-3,ed. P. V. Mengaldo, eloquentia, danin:Id., Opere minori, , in:Enciclopedia 1979,148.Cf.F. Salsano, Dignità Milan-Naples of Seville's t. 2 (Cim-Fo), Rome19963,443b.On medieval cf.Isidorus tesca, stylistics, De musica, , I, 39, 9; readalsoAugustinus's V, 8, ed. Migne,PL 32, 1155: Etymologiae duoillinobilissimi: heroicus et quemiambicum etiam "Qualessuntversus vulgovocant, ipsesenarius".

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In the school, 'nobility'itselfalso became a crucial tool for disputation.Indeed, in the structureof scholasticargumentation, the role played the criteria of excellenceis omnipresent, as is evidentby the common by In logic,morenobilitatisi usage of the vocabularyof nobility:hocestratione withnobility,firstprincipleswere also over,since dignitywas synonymous called dignitates , because theyare the principalcause of knowledge.15 The question'on nobility',in fact,became part of a strategyto establish a new hierarchyof knowledge,and also, by way of this strategy,to endorsea new social order.16 Scholarshave pointedout thatthis'explosion' 14Petrus inII librum Sententiarum Olivi,Quaesüones , q. 21,ed.Jansen, Johannis Quararcchi all scholastic authors usethevocabulary of'nobility' to present their 1922,386.Almost from GilesofRome,Duns excellence'; 'arguments amongthesewereHenryofGhent, Scotus(oneofwhoseprinciples is "quodmelius ponitur, ponendum est"),HenryBate, evenPeterofJohnOliviandWilliam ofOckham. Lullus, Raymond Theymadeparticuandstriking useofthiskindofargumentation, anditsstrong seems larly frequent presence to go handin handwitha neoplatonic Authors whooften de mentality. quotetheLiber causis tomyreading, tendtobe extremely sensitive tothe'meta-nobility , according argutheDominican fourteenth constitutes a parment'; JohnReginaofNaples(early century) toJohn, since"numerus binarius estprincipium adigmatic example. divisionis", According thatis to saybad anddiabolic, all alternatives or divisions shouldbe reduced to a hierso thatoneofthetwois nobler; seeF.Johannes de Neapoli, variae Parisiis archy Quaestiones ed.D. Gravina, ofthehuman disputatae, soul,forinstance, Naples1618,377a.Thesimplicity is demonstrated on thebasisofa lackofdifference ordivision amongitsparts(a sortof oftheindiscernibles antelitteram): "In eodemetiamlibroDe causis identity dicitur, quod estsimplex, & nondividitur, & quia unaparseiusnonestcilianobilior et intelligentia melior" sucha typeofargument hasrelevant (ib.,214b).Moreover, metaphysical applications. Olivi(quotedabove)arguesthat:"Quia formae substantificare magiscompetit cumsubstantificare etperse essesitnobilissimus actussubstantiae" quammateriae, [InII he says:"Quodin nobispossemoveri ad Sent., q. 16,ed.Jansen1922,299);similarly, et idemestin omnibus habentibus pluralocavelin eodemlocoestnobilitatis partialem situm et locum, in Deo hocessetvaldeignobile quamvis (. . .)" (ib.,313);"Quodforma sicabsoluta habetactualitatem modoettotalis" longenobiliorem" (ib.,320);"Nobilissimo cf.Averroes, libri Aristoteli^ De memoria etreminiscentia (ib.,334).Additionally, , 196 Compendium ra 63-64,ed. E. L. Shields, etvigilia , 201 ra (Mass.)1949,65; Id.,De sompno Cambridge 18-24,202 ra 50 and202vb 22,ed. Shields1949,77, 102and 116;Id., Commentaňum medium inAristoteli 's De generatone etcorruptione libros , I, 21 (158vb 52) andII, 41 (172ra Die 14),ed. F. H. Fobes,Cambridge (Mass.)1956,33-34and 129-30.Cf.N. Wicki, desKanzlers material forfurther research , Freiburg Philosophie Philipps (CH) 2005,109.Useful canbe found in:E. P. Mahoney, II concetto digerarchia nellatradizione e nelpensiero padovana moderno veneto e scienza moderna. Atti deXXVanno accademico , in:L. Olivieri (ed.),Aristotelismo delCentro dellatradizione aristotelica nelVeneto , Padua1983,vol.2, 729-41. perlostudio 15Cf.Les 'Auctoritates ed.J. Hamesse, Louvain-Paris Aristotelis' 1974,123(op. 1, 97). Butseealsoother occurrences ofthesamevocabulary: estnobile.g.117: "Nullascientia ioret melior 118(op. 1,43); 128(op. 1, 157);174(op.6, 2); 176(op.6, metaphysica"; 24-25);187(op.6, 150);231(op. 11,2); etc. 16Duringthesecondhalfof thethirteenth thereception and studyof the century, in theFaculty Aristotelian of theArtsprovided newmaterial forjustifying the corpus

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of theproblemof nobilitydatesfromthe middleof the thirteenth century.17 This is supportedby the markedincrease in the numberof philosophical textsdealing with the issue duringthe late Middle Ages, reflecting and humanist the growingweightplaced upon it in both the university traditions. The mastersof Civil law increasinglydiscussedthe 'concept' of nobilcentury,while comity,as Bartolo of Sassoferratodid in the fourteenth 18Their of the Roman CodexJuris. mentingon the sectionDe dignitatibus referencesreveal that there was an 'open library'in which Aristotle's Ethics , Aquinas's Summa , the Decretalsof Pope InnocentiusIII (whomthey call doctorsubtilis)belonged to the juridical canon, along with Sacred , particularly Scripture.They also referto Dante Alighieri'sThe Banquet to the fourthand final book which, in addition to being the longest - in thesenseofhisbeinga follower ofAristotle, as "Periexcellence ofthe'philosopher' in De principiti forexample, sectator". toJeande Sécheville, veritatis According patetice ofnature Montréal-Paris naturae 1956,35-57,thestudy , prol.,ed.R.-M.Giguère, permits thusmerely artium meditationibus a 'newbirth' consolari, quasimodogeniti"), ("Liberalium "Otium ofSeneca'smotto: cum vita Consider there-reading from itsneglect. 'death'results areinterpreted as knowlvivisepultura", where'theLetters' sinelitteris mors est , hominis to"ea quaeantiqui tradidere". Sciences peripathetici according edgeofLogicandNatural whichis formtheverysamebackground andAristotle's Averroes's Categories Commentary inBoccaccio's novelonGuidoCavalcanti recalled , VI,9: "Adimostrarci (.Decameron implicitly di luie deglialtri idiotie nonletterati chenoie glialtriuomini siamo,a comparazione ofSécheville's short See alsoPseudo-John uomini scienziati, morti"). peggiocheuomini ofDe principiis naturae we findit in thesamemanuscript De excellentia treatise philosophiae' account ofthesedebates, cf.De Fora first Merton (Oxford, College,292,if.85r-87v). status hominis ' Von den'beatiores Libera1991 (n.4),ch.vu;Th.Ricklin, zum(optimus philosophy im derradikalen in:J. A. Aertsen-A. Aristoteliker, Speer(eds),Geistesleben ZurEntradikalisierung Berlin-New York2000(Miscellanea 13.Jahrhundert, Mediaevalia, 27),217-30;S. Ebbesen, Arts Masters Or: Philosophy andFreedom Brito: TheLastofGreat , ib.,230-51;andthe Radulphus TheRoleofthePhilosopher inthePolitical ofM. Toste,'Nobiles, solidstudy viň, optimi philosophť. attheFaculty inParisintheLateThirteenth , in:J. F. Meirinhos (ed.), Century ofArts Community à MariaCândida Pacheco dephilosophie médiévale Itinéraires dela raison. Études , Louvain-laofferts Neuve2005,269-308. 17Cf.M. Ascheri, medievale: nellaGlossa e inBartolo diSassoferrato La nobiltà , in:Id.,Diritto e delle Problemi delprocesso, dellacultura medievale e moderno. , Rimini1991,72. fonti giuridiche evidence. PaulOskarKristeller, themostoftdiscussed Thereisalsocodicological presenting outtheimportance ofnobiissuesin earlyRenaissance (1300-1600), manuscripts pointed di L. Lehnus e G. Velli), difilologia lezioni Quattro (conduescritti lity.Cf.P. O. Kristeller, differences ed.byL. C. Rossi,Venice2003(Medioevo 1),18;withslight europeo-Ritratti, of as TheLachmann Method: Merits andLimitations , in:Text.Transactions already published 1 (1981),11-20. forTextualScholarship, theSociety 18Cf.Ascheri Intorno 1991(n. 17),55-80.See alsotheexcellent study byE. Cortese, toscani e ai caratterì diunceto medievale in:Id.,Scritti , ed.byI. Biracchi (1981), agliantichi 'judices' andU. Petronio, vol.I, Spoleto1999,747-82.

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section of the work,is exclusivelyconcerned with the issue of nobility and its nature. The vocabularyof the university or studiaoffersfurther evidenceof the connectionbetweenthesediscusionson intellectualnobilityand the institutionalsettingof philosophicalteaching.The word 'bachelor' (baccalar ins),for instance,derivesfromthe glossaryof feudal chivalry,where it meant'a youngnoble' or 'youngster', a propercandidatefordefinitive ennoFrom the fourteenth blement.19 centuryonward,moreover,a new means of social mobilitywas instituted.By means of a twentyyear-longperiod of university teachingone could potentiallyattain noble statusfor oneselfand one's descendents.Especiallyin the Facultyof Law, thisbecame a normal and accepted method of social ennoblement.20 Outside of the University,humanistsalso contributednotablyto the debate about the natureof nobilityand the means by which true ennoblementcould be achieved.Coluccio Salutati,forinstance,wrotea treatise De nobilitate at the end of the fourteenth legumet medicine century.Before in favour of the social and of arguing politicalprominence Law (in chapterI) Coluccio dealt philosophicallywith the 'essence' and definitionof

19See Du Cange'sGlossarium mediae etinßmae Latinitatis , ad vocem'Bacchalari'. Apart from the'bachelor' musthaveall themoralandphysical oftheknight. money, requisites See alsoM. Teeuwen, TheVocabulary Turnhout 2003 ofIntellectual LifeintheMiddle Ages, surle vocabulaire intellectuel du Moyen-Âge, (Etudes 10),33-35. 20Cortese1991(n. 18),780,n. 91. See,forinstance, theEpistola o siaRagionamento by theElder(d. 1381),a summary ofjuridical doctrine written for Lapoda Casteglionchio hissonBernardo. di Dottore, , ed. L. Mehus, Lapo,Epistola Bologne1753,29: "Di stirpe e specialmente se lettoavesseil Dottore di cui si cercasse, o di coluiche fossedi lui XXanni,perciocché allorasarebbe di Conte".The singular Liber disceso, Conte,o disceso da Prato(1270-ca 1338), madeincollaboration with theBolognese figuraram byConvenevole and dedicated inluminator Bartolomeo de' Bartoli to KingRobertofNaples,depicts a a portrait ofConvenevole whorepresents thepersonification of himself) knight (probably thetownofPrato(nearFlorence). Thesignsofnobility tothemanofLetters and belong ofHumanities fora longperiod.So, theverbaldidasmatchhishaving beena teacher mili caliatells:"Causajubetquiasicin equostem, tisarmati sum rex,modosessor/ signi, aremine). suamsicstando Cf.A. Frugoni, (italics namque professor/ pratensis figuram" referoque I. Convenevole inonore delPetrarca. daPrato e unlibro Studi suConvenevole daPrato , maestro figurato dell'Istituto Storico Italiano diRoberto , in:Bullettino peril MedioEvo e Archivio d'Angiò careerseemsto havecon81 (1969),1-32,at 27. Suchan accomplished Muratoriano, in this anduniversity cerned butalso'schools' notonlyindividual masters, départements; di stemma e di lignaggio couldwrite that:"La nobiltà senseCarloDionisotti (. . .) erano halfofthe15thCentury] dellaormaivecchia scuola a quellastessadata[second propri e lafortuna diSuiseth e Ermolao Barbaro 'moderna' di Pavia";cf.C. Dionisotti, , in:Medioevo Studi inonore diBruno Rinascimento. Nardi , Florence 1955,vol.I, 232n. 11.

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In such cases a connectionclearlyemergesbetweenthe theme nobility.21 of philosophicalnobilitywiththe idea of a corporativeidentityof a group of learned men (eitherLegisteor Artiste). These debates about nobilityin and outside of the Universityduring the late Middle Ages were enmeshedin broader traditionsof philosophical discussions,two of which can enhance our perspectiveon the question. The firstbringsus to Roman Law throughthe Latin language and the historicalusage of the term 'nobilitas '. 4. TheJuridicalConcept ofNobility

The Latin term 'nobilis V appeared in the fourthcenturyB.C., and derived fromthe verb 'cognosco , cognitum, , -is, cognõvi -cre' which means 'to know' or 'to attest',but also 'to express a judgement' or 'to judge someone'.22The meaningof nobiliswas essential'dignity'and renownor reputation,not far from the definitionof Aristotle'sPolitics(1294a2 1): "Nobilitymeans ancientwealthand virtue".This conceptionwas retained in Marius Victorinus'sDe definitionibus (known in the Middle Ages as Pseudo-Boethius):"Nobilityis the virtue of ancestors,and the accoutrementsof successors".23

- De verecundia 21C. Salutati, De nobilitate etmedicine , ed. E. Garin,Florence 1947, legum 8-10.Forthebackground ofthisdispute, thefundamental articles apartfrom byEugenio GarinandCarloDionisotti see nowP. Gilli,La noblesse dudroit. Débats etcontro(below), verses surla culture etle rôledesjuristes dansl'Italie médiévale ), Paris juridique (XIIe-XVesiècles TheItalian Noblemen: Humanists onHappiness 2003;cf.alsoCh.E. Trinkhaus, , New Adversity's York1940,80-120;F. Tateo,La disputa sullanobiltà e realtà dell'Umanesimo , in:Id.,Tradizione italiano del sapiente nellasocietàperfetta', , Bari1967,355-421(esp.'L'ufficio 390-421). Thework ofDionisotti remains C. Dionisotti, umanistica e testi irreplaceable; Filologia giurìdici e Cinquecento deltesto. AttidelII Congresso dellaSocietà internazionale , in:La Crìtica fia Quattro italiana distoria deldiritto , t. I, Florence 1971,189-204. 22Cf.Donati1996(n.8), 235. 23MariusVictorinus, De definitionibus in:Th. Stangl, Tulliana etMarìo, ed. Th. Stangl, München nobilitas estvirtus Victoriniana, 1888,22: "Utmoneat maiorum, apudposteros sarcina". We findtheverysamedefinition in Isidorus ofSeville's , II, 29,8. In Etymologiae thelatemedieval Latintexts, nobilitas anddignitas aresynonyms. On generally speaking, thesocialconnotations ofnobility in theancient Romanworld, cf.H. Oppermann (ed.), Römische cOrdo senatorius undnobilitas'. Die , Darmstadt 1967,446-67;D. Schlinkert, Wertbegriffe Konstitution desSenatsadels inderSpätantike 1996.Everyone remembers thewell^ Stuttgart known as recorded Claudius, speechoftheEmperor , advocating byTacitusin hisAnnals admission ofGallicnobility intotheRomanSenate(48A.D.);sinceexcellence wasbased

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line of enquirywhen, in one of his Cicero gives us a more intriguing sacerdotium .24At least Summa nobilitas est . . . amplissimum he wrote: , Philippus was connectedto 'nobility'. one of the connotationsof the termsacerdotium The sacerdotal elite was a fractionof ancient Roman intellectualarisinstitutedthe 'rules of the tocracy,but the fractionwhich,nevertheless, - that is to of the the foundations originalRoman Law.25 say, game5 Roman Law affectedmedievalthoughtdeeply.Apartfromitsinfluence on technicalaspects and proceduresof both medieval Civil and Canon Law, the Roman juridical traditionintroducedinto medieval thought some of its implicittheoreticalassumptions.In particular,it introduced rei a tensionbetweentwo competingmodels of 'truth':truthas adaequatio etintelkctusin otherwords,a model but also as adaequatio etintellectus operis on the one hand (also shared by philosophers)and one of representation of procedureon the other.26 Accordingto Roman Law, as it was understoodduringthe thirteenth century,nobilityis treatedas a juridical conceptin commentarieson the

wouldhavebeenintrinsically andthetradition ofthegentes on seniority , nobility expanan interesting is alsothatofCh. Badel, andpeoples; sivethroughout survey generations ofTacitus, Theinfluence La noblesse del'Empire romain 2005,esp.106-90. , Seyssel (France) cf.M. Ferrari, Il rilancio deiclasindirect: theMiddleAgeshadbeennevertheless during delMedioevo, letterario Menestò sicie deiPadri , in:G. Cavallo-C.Leonardi-E. (eds),LoSpazio 1978(n.3),271-72. Latino deltesto 1. Il Medioevo , Rome1995,441.Murray , voi.3,La ricezione 24M. TulliusCicero,In M. Antoniům orationes , 13,4, ed. P. Fedeli,Leipzig Philippicae 1982,158,12. 25Cf.A. Schiavone, dellarivoluzione Roma Il secolo Giuristi e nobili nella scientifica repubblicana. antico 1992(2nded.),vii: a selected nelpensiero , Rome-Bari groupof persons giuridico wisdom , hadbuilta social-casuistic unparalleled ), bymeansoftheir responsa (thesacerdotes Mucius Scevola Cf.alsoG. Lepointe, civilizations. , t. I. Sa vieetson Quintus amongancient La Religion romaine surledroit oeuvre Sesdoctrines , Paris1926;G. Dumézil, pontifical juridique. La desÉtrusques surla religion avecuneappendice , Paris1974(2nded.);P. Veyne, archaïque: oftheLatin Paris2001,v-vi,247-280(onthejuridical société romaine meaning (3rd ed.), 'liber alis , V). adjective 26I cannot WhenI say"modelofrepresentation" whatI havehereassumed. develop hasrecendy as JanAertsen I do notrefer to modern recalled, notions; representational as a represenas muchan ontological reietintellectus"-formula the"adequatio expresses TheCity seeAugustine's Fora better oftruth. tionalconcept , IV, ofGod understanding, 1992(n. 25),73-108(fortheideaof'doubletruth', ch. 27. See alsoSchiavone justified at 105);Dumézil1974(n.22), andcommon noblemen between people, bythedistinction ordealmayalsohaverepresented medieval In this'juridical' 111-15. sense,thebarbaric Studio distoria deldiritto Leordalie. See thesolidworkofF. Patetta, a sortoftestofnobility. delDiritto e scienza , Turin1890,333-99. comparato

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sectionof theJustinianCode: 'On dignities'.27 Firstof all, dignitas makes a man free,since it rescues him fromparental power and tutelage (the In earlyRoman law onlysacerdotaldignitycould do that;28 patriapotestas). theemperorextendedthispowerto otherdignities:the Patrice,the Consul, etc. The ancientjuridical notionof nobilitywas coupled withthe notions of freedom,independenceand governance.Withoutenteringinto detailed analysis,let me note some aspects of thisjuridical meaning of nobility: to be freeof bondage or tutelage,to be able to choose foroneself,to be allowedto inherit,and to have the skilland authority to commandothers.29

27See Codex andpassim. Cf. Corpus , BookXII, Tit.i butalso Tit.in ('de consulibus') IurisCivilis, Codex Iustinianus Berlin1877,454aff.See G. Barni, ,' 12,3, ed. P. Krüger, suiconcetti di'dignitas', nobilitas inBartolo daSasso/errato ' 'officium' Appunti , in:Archivio giuridico Serafini', 1958,130-44, 'Filippo esp.132-36. 28SeeDigesta Iusüniani ed.Th.Mommsen, 14,6 ('desenatusconsulto Augusti, macedoniano'), vol.I, Berlin1870,43Iff.Cf.alsoInstitutiones ed. P. Krüger, Berlin , 1, 4 ('de ingenuis'), 1886,2. 29Fora detailed ofthosedifferent seethebibliography above.One commentary aspects, couldnotea linguistic connection between the(predisposition andtheideaof to) nobility - ÉmileBenveniste - l'homme thefreeman: "En latinet en grec teaches libre,(e)leutheros, se définit à une'croissance', à une'souche'; positivement parsonappartenance (. . .) en des'enfants' : naître de bonsoucheet êtrelibre latin,la désignation (biennés)parliberi c'esttoutun".According toBenveniste, intheGreek-Latin ofbirth, freeworld, legitimacy andstock allconjoin. "EnGermanie, selonTacite,la société comdom,(virtual) nobility, desnobiles, desingenui Il estclairque nobiles et ingenui , desliberti prenait , desservi. , avec la distinction de la noblesse etde la naissance, à liberi; d'autre font équivalent partlesservi aveclesliberti servi. ainsiquela notion de 'liberté' se con, anciens groupe (. . .) Il apparaît stitue à partir de la notion socialisée de 'croissance', croissance d'unecatégorie sociale, d'unecommunauté. Tousceuxquisontissusde cette'souche', de ce 'stock1, développement sontpourvus de la qualitéde (e)-leutheros. (. . .) Le senspremier (. . .) estceluide l'appartenance à unesoucheethnique de croissance Cette désignée parunemétaphore végétale. confère un privilège et l'esclave ne connaissent appartenance que l'étranger jamais(. . .). Ainsiliber . . . 'denaissance aboutit à former unterme celuide liberi légitime', indépendant, 'enfants'" Le vocabulaire desinstitutions 1. Economie, (E. Benveniste, indo-européennes. parenté, société/ 2. Pouvoir, droit, , Paris1969,vol. 1, ch. 3 'L'homme religion libre',321-33;butsee alsovol.2, ch.8 'Royauté et noblesse', denoted 85-88).Notethattheideaofa stock by meansofa "métaphore de croissance is exemplified végétale" bythetreesofgenerations, from ofFloreto modern thearbora iuris ofmedieval law. Joachim genealogists, through alia,Johannes de Legnano's Dearbore See,inter , inthems.Paris, consanguinátatis Bibliothèque Mazarine, 1434,ff.109r-115ra oneis (I couldonlyreadthisms.,whiletheauthoritative Vat.Lat.2639,ff.215-226v). to whomalsoa treatise De virtute JohnofLegnano, heroyca isascribed, became nobleforhaving beenteaching overtwenty-years longattheUniversity; seeJ. P. McCall,TheWritings with a ListofManuscripts 23 ofJohn ofLegnano , in: ' Traditio, Thegenealogy trees deo(1967),415-37;cf.E. H. Wilkins, ofthegenealogical oftheGenealogia 23 (1925),61-65. rum'in:Modern Philology,

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How to Be Nobleafter Adam'sSin 5. Aspects of theReligions Conception: At least at firstglance, nobilityseems to be condemned by Christians: engage'aristocracy'is a sin,even ifa venial one. Rejectingactivepoliticeli mentin favourof 'equality'among peoples,the Christianmessagestressed the relevanceof the equalityclaim. Firstof all, Adam's sin cancelled any eitherinnateor originalhuman excellence;secondly,Jesus Christ'sIncarnationopened again to all people the possibilityof being electedby God. de dominico die octavarum sanctaePaschae , says as Augustine,in his Tractatns follows: in Alloquoritaque vos, unus dies,infantesmalenatiex Adam, benerenati Christo(. . .) Simulredemptisumus,unumpretiumomneshabemus:frumentumnostrumest sanctumevangelium.Fratresnos facitde servis, qui redimii:coheredesnos unicumfecit.Unus erat, et fratreshabere carissimi(. . .). Videte dignatusest: nolite oblivisciistam dignationem, in sed venturaest ventite. Palea abundat dico: esto area, quod grana lado, separabitur palea".30 Accordingto Saint Paul, there should be neitherJew nor Greek, freeman nor slave. Christiandoctrineseems indeed to rejectpreviousrepresentationsof human excellence,but not to renounce the conceptionof 'excellence' or nobilityas such. The new Christianconcept of nobility becomes ratherits only acceptable,or exclusiveform,which is indepen30EditedbyG. Morin, Sermones in:Miscellanea , I, Sancii Augustini postMaurinos Agostiniana are mine).See alsoAugustinus, Sermo 182, at 500 (italics , Rome1930,499-501, reperti Si benenatisumus, c. 3, ed. Migne,PL 38, 986: "Fratres, quidestquodrenascimus? naturaquae lapsa Naturaquae corrupta fuerat, reparatur; quidestquodrenascimus? Eusebius naturaquae deformis 'Gallicanus', fuerat, jacebat,gratiareformatur". erigitur; Turnhout 1970(GC SL, ed.Fr.Glorie, XIV'DePascha Homilia homiliarumi iii' in : Collectio dicereaudeat,quemtotdomini se interhaecingenuum "Nescioquomodo 101),167-68: in partes suasdistrahunt. quod quodaliquisbenenatusest?Quidprodest Quidprodest nosextrinsecus claritate Videmus estinconscientia? liberestin natura, generis quiservus etcriminum serinnocentum infirmitate intrinsecus mentis dominos, sublimes, degeneres; " velhonore velgenere vos.(. . .) Sinecausaesta foris ingenuus conspicuus, quinonestintus divine Incarnation cf.also of'nobility' aremine). Aboutthetransvaluation through (italics at Rome1968,b 65b-68a, De rationibus Thomasde Aquino, , 7, ed. H.-F.Dondaine, fidei - pauperes - evenif he was "homoinfinitae 66a:"UndeChristus parentes dignitatis" et parentum divitiis ne quisde sola carnisnobilitate virtute perfectos, elegitet tarnen honorum revout homines ab inordinato vixit, appetitu (. . .) absquedignitate glorietur of alsoin terms thePelagian has recently studied Salamito caret". struggle Jean-Marie one:cf. andthe'new'Christian ideaofnobility theRoman-juridical between thetension etles enteAugustin sociaux dela controverse Lesvirtuoses etla multitude. Aspects J.-M.Salamito, Grenoble 2005. pélagiens,

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dent of earthlypower and position.In this Christianconception,'nobility' depends instead upon election (eitherof a nation or of a man) by God: it is a question of divine grace. God's choice, accordingto the Old Testament,is the reason forone's excellenceof lineage. The Christianreading of the ancient pagan writings,at least fromthe thirdcenturyA.D., proceededwithcaution,assimuniversalisticaspect of late Hellenistic ilatinga yet to be fully-realised culture.Thus the true nobleman is the holy man, the saint who follows a patternof conductset forthin the Gospels,as interpreted by the Church. In this sense onlyJesus Christis the principleof nobility,because he is the veresanctus , the verymodel and source of human holiness.Ambrose of Milan, forinstance,repeatedin his De paradiso(c. 4, 24) that:Non loci, nongeneris sed virtute nobilitate, unusquisque gratiamsibi comparaiThe claim an established was directedalso against against people's specificdignitas to be the nation. Christianauthors,from Jewishpretensions unique holy Gregorythe Great, went over the subject repeatedly.Their authority was integratedinto Canon Law. In the Decretum Gratiani magistři (pars Ia, D. 40, c. 3) we read: Nos, qui presumus,non ex locorumvel generisdignitate,sed morum nobilitateinnotescere debemus,nec urbiumclaritate,sed fideipuritate.31 Only God has the rightto make distinctions among men; so thatif there in dignitytheyare merelya consequenceof divinedecree.32 are differences The two sides of this statement,even if theyare completelydifferent in mirror in one another In other neither social nor words, practice, theory. intellectualaristocracyis an institution peculiar to Christendom.But the Christiancontextualisation became possible by means of an alternative of distinction.33 (theological)conception 31Decretum Gratiani , I, d. 40, 3, ed. E. L. Richter, Leipzig1839,126.Cf.ib.,9, ed. nonlocussalvatanimam. 128: "Gratia, ItemAmbrosius, lib.De paradiso". The Richter, authoritative workbyHenry ofSuse'Hostiensis' suchopinion. Cf. (d. 1271)strengthened alsoBadel2005(n.23),190-99. 32On thisaspect, seetheiudicious ofSalamito analysis (n. 30),ch.2. 33TheideaofChristian wasuseful, whenlatemedieval authors wished tocritnobility icizetheapproach ofthephilosophical schools. Francis forinstance, offer us a Petrarch, clearexample ofambiguity: on theonehandhe stresses theennobling powerofknowlautaulicisartibus, edge("Nonmeritis (. . .) meorum, nequemilitaribus (. . .) sedingenio ac litteris"), whileon theother handdismissing the'pagan'valueofbothknowledge and culture in contrast withthesimplicity ofChristian life:"Titulorusticiore ac (. . .) meliore contentus sum".Cf.F. Petrarca, Desuisipsius sanctiore, atqueob earnremetiamnobiliore,

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Additionally,the developmentof medieval liturgyshows a continuous It should be noted interplaywiththe vocabularyand ritualsof chivalry.34 that at the end of the feudal age we finda newlyarticulatedconception of nobility,which stillconstitutesthe semanticreferentof our common Because of this,the medievalinstitution of chivalry, politicalexpression.35 its development,and relation to Christian doctrine deserve particular attentionwhich I cannot give here.36I will limitmyselfin the following one elementwhichtypifies the 'noble paragraphs(cf.§§ 7-13) to suggesting thinker'in a university milieu. etmultorum, III, 37 and42 (cf.IV,49),in:Id.,Invectives , ed. D. Marsh, ignorantia, Cambridge 2003,254and258.See alsothebrilliant (Mass.)-London essaybyO. Boulnois, Scolastique ethumanisme. etla croisée designorances Monignorance etcelledetant , in: Pétrarque, Pétrarque d'autres 2000,5-43. (1367-1368 % Grenoble 34The sacrament ofconfirmation in theMiddleAgesmeantalso'giving so courage': theconfirmed Christian becomes a valiant Cf.A. Adam,Das Sakrament derFirmung knight. nachThomas vonAquin, 1958(Freiburger Studien, Freiburg 73),68-84;at 84 theologische theopposition between 'Ehre'and'Schande': wiedasmilitärische Zeichen "(.. .) ähnlich nachderSchlacht denSiegern zumRuhm". The German Dominican of Hugo Ripelinus ' whenhe tothe'militia andthe'clipeus crucis (d. ca. 1268)alsorefers Strasbourg spiritualit dealswithconfirmation in his Compendium totius veritatis theologiae (lib.VI, c.. 10/11,ed. from the13th J.Prüss, Strassbourg 1489).See alsotheritual gesture "peralapam", dating cf.Guillelmus Rationale divinorum Duranti, V-VI,ed. A. Davril- T.M. century; oßciorum, Turnhout 1998(CC CM, 140A),433. Thibodeau, 35MarcBloch,inhisLa Société thata proper fiodale,Paris1940,maintained conception of'nobility' connected withdefinite did (sinceit hadbeenintrinsically rituals) ennobling notappearbefore In recent theXII century. decadesBloch'saccount hasbeendeeply discussed and revised. dansla France Cf.G. Duby,La noblesse médiévale , in: Id.,La société etstructures Hommes auMoyen chevaleresque. Âge(I), Paris1988(2nded.),9-33;Ph.Contamine, La noblesse auroyaume deFrance. DePhilippe leBelà Louis XII, Paris1998(2nded.);M. Aureli, TheWestern intheLateMiddle : A Survey andSome Ages oftheHistoriography Nobility Prospects for andNobility inMedieval : Concepts, NewResearch , in:A J. Duggan(ed.),Nobles , Europe Origins Tabaccois still , Woodbridge 2002,263-73.The survey Transformations by Giovanni cf.G. Tabacco,Su nobiltà e cavalleria nelmedioevo. Unritorno a MarcBloch? fundamental; ', in:Rivista storica 91 (1979),5-25. italiana, 36SeeScaglione ofScaglione's 1991(n.6),chs.1-8.Somedetails learned research should be revised, thanks tolight shedonthesubject deAdam's (onSalimbene byCinzioViolante ofcourtesy), Girolamo Arnaldi ofDante),Ernst Benzandoth(onthenobility conception ers(onthe'truenoblemen' offourteenth-century Nevertheless mystics). survey Scaglione's a sufficient Cf.C. Violante, La 'Cortesia' clericale e stillprovides basisformyreflections. nelDuecento 1994(Saggidi 'Lettere La nobilità Italiane', , Florence 49);G. Arnaldi, borghese diDante laprovvidenzialità dellamobilità sociale 41 (2003), e Cacciaguida, ovvero , in:La Cultura, Raison etfoi: archeologie d'une crise d'Albert leGrand à JeanPaulII, Paris 203-15; A. De Libera, C. S. Jaeger, Love: In search one-sided, 2003,334-43and490-93.Although ofa Ennobling a stimulating from thetwelve cenLostSensibility , Philadelphia 1999,presents perspective ofU. Carpi,La nobiltà diDante theimportant research , vol.I, Florence 2004, tury. Lastly, esp.20-84.

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During the Late Middle Ages the concept of nobilitycarriedvarious connotations,dependingupon the context[e.g.juridical or theological)in which it occurred.This both enrichesand complicatesour picture.The distinction betweenclerksand laymenwas a freshdevelopmentin medieval one which made the statusof those who shared characteristics society,37 of both sides difficult to evaluate a couple of centurieslater. This was the case withthe receptionof the ideal of 'chivalry'in the late thirteenth stacentury.On the one hand, the twelfth-century knighthad a different tus than the cleric:he undertookmilitaryserviceand was dependentupon the grace of the king(the anoblissement ), in a way analogous to the dependence of a virtuousChristianupon the grace of God. On the otherhand, the Latin termmilesbelongedalso to the clericalvocabularyand referred to the noblemaninsofaras he became a milesChristi and integratedhimselfinto the (lower) aristocracyas a servantof the Ecclesiain hoc mundo .38Those knightsand the social groupstheyrepresentedhad an ideposita alised code of conduct,expressedin a collectionof textswrittenforthem by clerks(AndreasCappellanus' De amoreis one importantexample)39and in eponymousliterature.The importanceplaced upon 'nobility'in such a 'canon' cannot be overemphasized. In the contextof the urban and higher-education developmentsof the thirteenth as has been these documents were read in a noted, century, 37See myreview ofDante, lafilosofia e i laici 44 (2003),140-45, withref, in:L'Alighieri, erenceto bothDomenico and CarloDionisotti, to whoseworks shouldbe Comparetti addedCh. T. Davis,Dante's andother 1984.Among recent contri, Philadelphia Italy essays cf.G. Guldentops-C. 'Liarsd'amour, de butions, Steel,Vernacular fortheNobility: Philosophy vertu etdeboneuté', anOldFrench s Ethics ca.1300, in:Bulletin Adaptation ofThomas Aquinas' from de philosophie de médiévale, 45 (2003),67-85. 38In thissense,according to thewellknown ofmedieval the orders, example military nobleknight ina form shares ofclerical status. WhentheFrench kingPhilipIV ofValois hislong-term battle theTemplars, heperhaps calculated interms ofmateengaged against rialandpolitical we cannotavoidseeingit alsoas an opposition However, advantage. between twoconflicting models ofnobility: thealready obsolete twelve-century conception andthenewlayconception, sharedbyPhilipIV's advisors; cf.A. Murray 1978(n. 3), Idealietici e pensiero nel'Derecuperatane Terrae sanctae' 253-55;A. Ghisalberti, politico (1306) diPierre Dubois da Pucrs, PortoAlegre], 159(1995),643-58.See also, , in:Veritas [Revista on thenotion ofmilitia Christi La langue desaint Benoît , Chr.Mohrmann, , in : Ead.,Études surlelatin desChrétiens chrétien etmédiéval at 337;andj. Flori, , t.II: Latin ,'Rome1961,325-42, De la chevalerie à la chevalerie chrétienne? Christi' e Crociata neisecoli XI-XIII. fiodale , in: Militia AttidellaXI Settimana internazionale di studio, Mendola, 1989,Milan1992,67-101. 39Cf.thefinearticle La struttura del'DeAmore' diAndrea byF. Colombo, , in: Cappellano Rivista di filosofia 89 (1997),553-624. Subdeis d'A.S. Avalle, Ai luoghi di neo-scolastica, sullalineaitaliana delXIIIsecolo, Delizia pieni. Saggio 1977,25-29,34,andesp. Milan-Naples cf.Murray 1978(n. 3),275-77, onJeande Meung. 38ff.;

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new light,togetherwith new books, verse poetry,and treatiseswritten forlaymen.40 And when an Italian layman,Dante Alighieri,wrotea sort of philosophicalhandbookforfreebornmen, The Banquet , a striking portion of it (the entirefourthbook) concernedthe debate on the nobility of man. This long treatiseon nobilityshould not be considereda digression on a social issue, as Etienne Gilson did41and scholarstend stillto do. Dante's Banquetinsistsupon a very specificphilosophicalinterpretation of nobility,and was understoodas such by later commentators: both and masters of the Arts This let us turn jurists faculty.42 rapidlysketched, back to the Ancientconceptionof nobility. 6. Nobility as a 'Network witha HistoryitsPhilosophical and the Background ' birthof theAncientSchoolsof Thought ' The notionof nobilityemerged,thoughimplicitly, at the verybeginning of the Western Philosophy,since the rise of an autonomous space of researchentailed the conscience of a specificphilosophicalßiog, a 'way of Life', defined(and justified)against the others.43 A rigorousinterpretationof nobilitywas employedby Plato in his sternattackon the Sophists. He integrated criticisms of absolutesocial aristocracy, such as thosedepicted like in and order to offera renewed by poets Lycophron Euripides, 40See thepioneering overview ofK. Vossler, Diephilosophischen neuen zursüßen Grundlagen StildesGuido Guinicelli Cavalcanti undDante , Guido , Heidelberg 1904,24-41("die Alighieri Adelsfrage"). 41Cf.É. Gilson's ReviewofNardi'sDal 'Convivio' alla 'Commedia storico ' in: Giornale dellaletteratura 138 at 568. italiana, (1961),562-73 42Basicbibliographical references arein:F. Cancelli, Bartolo daSasso/errato , in:Enciclopedia dantesca D. Consoli, e nobile Nobiltà , t. 1 (A-Cil),524b-526b; , in:ib.,t. 4 (N-Sam),58a-62a; theseminal sullanobiltà storica 101 , in: Rivista italiana, study by C. Dionisotti, Appunti La noblesse danslessermons desDominicains deNaples (1989),295-316; J.-P.Boyer, (première moitié duXIVsiècle), in:N. Couplet andJ.-M.Matz(eds),La noblesse dansleterritoires angevins à lafinduMoyen Actes ducolloque international Saumur , Age. organisé parl'Université d'Angers (Angers3-6Juin1998),Rome2000,567-80.Olivi'sshort treatise Milesarmatus as Lo (alsoknown cavalier deserves seeCarpi2004(n.36),34.Fora rich, well-reasoned 'catmention; armat) ofnobility, seeJeanGerson's De nobilitate alogue'ofthemedieval (1423). interpretations muchelusive, R. HowardBloch,Etymologies andGenealogies. A Literary Suggestive, though Middle oftheFrench Ages, Anthropology Chicago1983,83-87. 43PierreHadothasrepeatedly dreawn theattention to thisaspect.Cf.alsoB. Snell, DieEntdeckung desGeistes. Studien deseuropäischen Denkens beidenGriechen, zurEntstehung Göttingen Le thème desgen219-30and314-17(ontheideaofLebensweg 19937, ); R.Joly, philosophique resdeviedansl'antiquité S. Gastaldi, }. Generi Bruxelles 'Bioshairetotatos di 1956,12if.; classique, vitaefelicità inAristotele, Naples2003.

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thatDiogenes Laertius not surprising conceptionof nobility.It is therefore included a long treatmentof Plato's own nobilityin his Vita Platonis (III, 88-89).44 Plato understoodthe expression'nobility'to mean human excellence in a social,physical,and moral dimension.Such a conceptionof 'nobility' is less a social or politicalrole than a calling or vocation (close to Max Weber's idea of Beruf ).45Moreover,it is less a matterof parentalqualinoble stock.Plato thought virtutis of the originating tiesthanof theprimordio, of noblemenas rulersand governorsof the State; those men who have rightto rule must be philosophers,because the love of wisdom comes fromafar,fromthe relationto Solon: Verymuch so, said Critias;for,I may say, he is in facta philosopher [...]. That, my dear Critias I said is a giftwhichyour familyhas withSolon.*6 had a long whileback, through yourkinship The founderof a house or a lineage is thus introducedas an essential characterin 'nobility',which is a sort of networkoriginatingfromand back to him. referring Thus, Solon is presentedas the founderof the familyof 'philosophers'. Since Solon is also the well-knownprince of Greek rulers,accordingto Plato,thissame nobilitymakespossiblethe fusionof philosophyand political leadership.So, when Plato foundeda school of philosophy,the famous research forscientific AthenianAcademy,he promotednot onlyan institute and highereducationbut also a way of life,a communityof fellowssharing the same kind of social and political outlook and practices.Among manyof thesephilosophersand men of science existedboth strongfamilial associationsand bonds of friendship.Hence, even if theirrespective 44Forthebackground of'nobility', cf.A. Capizzi(ed.),I sofisti ofPlato'sre-construction , nellasocietà La concezione dellanobiltà Florence 1976,v-xxv;R. Laurenti, greca: filoaristotelici I Frammenti deidialoghi e antiaristotelici Antichi, , II, Naples1987(Filosofi , in:Aristotele, 8), N. su Platone lezioni Einaudi, , Turin2003(PiccolaBiblioteca 767-81;M.Vegetti, Quindici Idealidivitanella is A. Momigliano, , in: S., 238),201-14.Stilluseful sofistica: Ippiae Crizia estoriografia antica in:Id.,Stona La Cultura, 9 (1930),321-30, , Bologne1987,63-72 reprinted 45Notsurprisingly, inbothDonati's andSalamito's thereference toMaxWeberappears works. Cf.Salamito 2005(n. 30),18-25, , and340-44. passim " 46 Plato, Charmides , 155 a, ed. J. Burnet,Oxford1903: ànò zrjçlóÀcovoç his 'divina withthe of Solon . Forthemedieval (jvyyeveíaç" sapienza' reputation (coupling G. Boccaccio, Trattatello inlaude diDante ofgrace)see,forinstance, Christian , ed. concept Boccaccio Balduino-P. G. Ricci(eds),Tutte leopere diGiovanni P. G. Ricci,in:V. Branca-A. , Milan1974,437.

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theoriesdiffered, Plato and Aristotlenonethelessshared a common set of and questions philosophicalproblems,not least of which was nobilitasa problemwhichwas discussedin the ancientschools and destinedto have a long life.47 The word 'school', as everyoneknows,derivesfromthe Greek oxoXfj , which originallydenoted leisure or otium.Later it came to referto the kind of occupation peculiar to men who have leisure at theirdisposal. It then came to signifythe group of such freebornmen, as well as their associationforliberalpurposes.As it is well known,both Latin and Greek derive the meanings of 'trade' or 'business' by means of a negation Yet to have leisurewithoutbeing compelledto work (à-GxoXía,neg-otiurrì). in the mechanicalarts or commercewas not a universalcondition.This was a 'distinction'connectedto the practiceof philosophyfromits very beginning. In his Dialogues , Plato equated having 'leisure' with one of the conditionsforphilosophicalconversation:"You shall hear- Phaedrus said- if you have leisureto walk along and listen".48In The Laws (VII, 820 c), on the otherhand, he suggestedthatdealingwithphilosophicalproblems The would be "a more refinedpastime for old men than draughts".49 Platonic academy offeredto its membersthis 'nobler' formof leisure. Moreover,theirmembers'love forwisdom((piXoaoçíá)seems also to have beta a dynasticpursuit,thatis, the businessor specialityof a clan (yévoç ). Each noble family,includingthe higherlevels of its clientèle , shared a sort fromthatof otherfamilies.Philosophy of characteristic hobby,distinctive

47Cf.C. Natali, e l'organizzazione della srnscuola La vita diAristotele BiosTheoretikos. , Bologne with'themost Laurenti 1987(n. 44),II, 770-81.Aristotle, 1991,28 and45ff.; dealing whichhad ofthephilosopher, commitment thepolitical noblekindofLife',relativized in Plato'sRepublic. Cf.Gastaldi element 2003(n.43),19-65. beenan essential 48Plato,Phaedrus Oxford1901"[levarieï croio^oArç npoïôvxi , 227 b, ed.J. Burnet, between Politics áKoveiv".In Aristotle's opposition (VII, 14) we findan interesting xàxpil^i^áontheother ontheonehand,andáaxoXía/ / xàkccÀxx, Jtóke^ioç/ eipr¡vr¡ axoXrf/ intobusi"Alsolifeas a wholeis divided Politica one:e.g.Aristoteles, , VII, 14,1333a31-33: are aimedsomeofthemat things andouractions nessand leisure , andwarandpeace, On the nobles at things anduseful, others (ta KaÀá)" (transi, byH. Rackham). necessary of'leisure', cf.F. Solmsen, Plato'sandAristotle's difference between conceptions respective IdealState Leisure andPlayinAristotle's 1968,1-28,esp. , II, Hildesheim , in:Id.,Kleine Schriften book(n.43). to Gastaldi's 15.See alsothebibliography appended 49Plato,Leges ikeïv¿v raïçrovrcov Oxford 1907:"(piXov áÇíaioi , 820 c, ed.J. Burnet, herebyPlatowasthatoftherelarecalled Theparticular axokái<¿' philosophical problem withincommensurable. tionofcommensurable

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could be the hobby of a yévoç , as for other clans it was horse riding. Carlo Natali, in his fineaccount of Aristotle'slife,drew attentionto this point.50 One of Aristotle'slost dialogues dealt with the conceptionof nobility. Diogenes Laertiusrecordsa one-booktreatiseOn nobility ( Uepi evyeveíaç ), threefragmentsof which are extant,as number 15 in his catalogue of Aristotle'sworks.51Nobility,according to Aristotle,connotes a network and refersto a firstparadigmaticfounder.On one level, this definition is clearlythe verysame as that of the 'philosophicalschool'. Aristotle'sconceptionof nobilityis a ratherdynamicone, and seems to accord with what we read in his other academic works.In Book II of Rhetoric (c. 15, 1390b24-27),forinstance,dealingwithcharacters'turns and qualities,Aristotleteaches that: For the generations of men thereis a kindof crop as in the fruitsof if the race is good, fora certainperiodmen out of the field;sometime, the commonare born in it, and thenit deteriorates.52 For men as well as crops, thereare varyingyieldsacross the years and generations;now and then,where the stockis good, exceptionalmen are produced for a time, and then decadence sets in. The prerequisiteof 'nobility',in this case, primarilyrefersto heredity.Nevertheless,in the verysame passage, Aristotleemploysanothermeaningand introducesa tensioninto the traditionalidea of nobility.The 'deterioration'of the race, in fact,is not only that of a set of materialconditions{e.g.the loss of goods and privileges), but is foremosta 'degeneration',thatis, the deteriorationof the ipsageneris virtus. And, at the same time,Aristotleshows how power and goods can be noxious to the virtueof a freebornman. Worst of all, the rich man cannot have either 'measure' or 'common sense' (ib., c. 16, 139 1al 7-19). Since the lattertwo comprisethe ethical 50Natali1991(n.47),71-72:"Questaparticolare sceltadi dedicare la propria vitaalla filosofia a volteci appareanchecomeunaquestione di yévoç, unaffare di famiglia e sembrarientrare nell'ambito di quellecaratteristiche checostituiscono tratti differenziali tipici di unafamiglia o di un gruppo di famiglie aristocratiche". Natalibelieves, forinstance, thatAristotle entered intothePlatonic between (also)becauseofthefriendship Academy hisfellow Prossenus andthemaster Plato. 51Stobeaus recorded themin hisAnthologii libri duoposteriores cf. , c. 29 (On Nobility); selecta Aristoteles, , ed. W. D. Ross,Oxford 1955,57-60:'On GoodBirth'. Fragmenta 52Aristoteles, Arsrethorica trans, ed. W. D. Ross,Oxford 1959,105(I usetheEnglish lationbyJ. H. Freese).

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and intellectualcharacteristics of Aristotle'swise man, we see how, when materialconditionsconflictswithvirtue,'nobility'becomes but a hollow shell that cannot endure. 7. A Particular Distinction: Aristotle and thePhilosopher as a Man ofNatural Ability Withoutdiscrediting completelythe relevanceof social conditions,Aristode reformulates a conceptof nobilitythatintegrates otherelements.A certain social comfortpermittedby fortunatebirthdefines'nobility'only if an additionalelementis present.For thepreservation of nobility, one requires also the capacityto imitatethe liberal inclinationsof the one's founding fathersand to repeat the deeds of the yevoq.'Common sense', a keen intelligence,and a sense of 'measure' are also needed. Such qualitiesare those of the men of good nature (' ayadòç ávr¡p),53the one called to be a thinker.Consequently,the good thinkerbecomes a bettercandidatefor authenticnobility.Let us see how. In the TopicsAristotleexplicitlyrefersto the man of natural ability (eîxpvijç).There, the contextis stricdyphilosophical,withoutany reference to societyor formsof government. Aristotleassertsthatthe rulesof syllogismcan be taught.Nevertheless, theirproperuse in philosophicaldiscussioninvolvesa certainnaturalskill which cannot be learned at school. He writes: - one should,in the For trainingand practicein thiskindof argument firstplace, accustomoneselfto converting arguments(...). Also to take and to have takenin at a glancethe resultsof each of two hypotheses forthe cultof knowledgeand philosophical is no mean instrument wis53Aristoteles, W. D. Ross,Oxford1958.Cf.alsoib., , VIII, 14, 163a30,ed. Topica ' 163b13-14.Forcognate ofthe'bonus vir connotations opento usein theMiddleAges, De vocabulis see Isidorus ofSeville's ed. W. M. Linsday, Oxford 1911: , b, , X, Etymologiae "Beatus dicitquasibeneauctus, scilicet ab habendo etnihilpariendo quodvellet quodnollet.Illeautemverebeatusestqui et habetomniaquaevultbona,et nihilvultmale.Ex Bonus a venustate creditur dictus: hisenimduobusbeatushomoefficitur. postea corporis nomen. Eumautemdicimus bonumcuinonpřeválet malum: et ad animum translatum estvirsponte ad benefaciendum Benignus paratus eumqueoptimum quipeccatminimum. distat a bono,quia et ipsead benefaet dulcisadloquio. Nonautemmultum benignus bonusesseettristior, etbenequiciendum videtur Sedineo diifert expositus. quiapotest nontarnen suavisessenovitconsortio; demfacere et praestare benignus quodposcitur, autemsuacunctos novit invitare dulcedine. , quasiobrutus, (...)Brutus quiasensucaret.Est sineprudentia". enimsineratione,

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choice of one of them. dorn;forthenit only remainsto make a correct For such a process one must possess a certainnatural ability,and realnatural consistsin beingable correctly to choose the trueand ability avoid the false.Men ofnatural cando this ; fortheyjudge correctly ability whatis bestby a correctfeelingof love or hatredforwhatis set before them.54 Boethiustranslatedthe Topicsinto Latin in the sixthcentury.The Latin virbenenatusrenderedthe Aristotelianexpression'man of naturalability' It has also been recordedin one of themostwidespreadAristotelian (evcpvrig). 05 Qui benenatisuntbenefacere florilegia: possunt. Settingaside the otheraspects of thisstatement,I wish now to examine this particularnotion of 'well-born'.It seems a worthyinvestigation as, to my knowledge,the medievalusage of it has not yet been analysed. 8. A Condition To Be Well-born ofPhilosophical ((benenatus') Nobility: 56with the Latin When Boethiusdecided to translatethe Greek evcpvrig benenatus , he used an establishedexpression,more or less equivalentto the Latin bonaeindolis,boniingenii or even ingenuus. 34Ib., 163a30-164bl5 translation (I usetheEnglish byE. S. Forster). 55Hamesse 1974(n.15),331(op.37,126).Notethat, tosomemedieval traditions, according theStagirite himself hadbeendescribed as a 'virbene fortunatus' (andibenefaciens> ) because ofbothhislogicalability and moralcontinence. Cf.De vitaAristotelů , ed. V. Rose,in: V. Rose(ed.),Aristotelů librorum quiferebantur fragmenta, Leipzig1886,442-50:at 447.This short is recorded alsoinJohnofWales'sCompendiloquium, III, 5. Cf.I. Düring, biography Aristotle inthe Ancient Tradition 1957(ActaUniversitatis , Göteborg Biographical Gotheburgensis, '71 e' (taken from 63/2),142-63and(onJohnofWales)164-65.See alsotheFragment Policraticus Incubidaemonis , VII, 6): "Fuerunt JohnofSalisbury's qui eum filium crederent et gloriaeappetitum" propter agilitatem corporis, perspicaciam ingenii of "deûmfiliidegeneres" fromthatof 'heroes'); cf. (ib.,408).On thetheory (distinct M. vanderLugt,Lever, ledemon etla vierge. Lesthéories médiévales delagénération extraordinaire , Paris2004,349-50. 56A further on themeaning in bothancient and and usesofsuchexpression study medieval is inpreparation. In thecontext ofthisessay, thefollowing texts are philosophy Departibus animalPlato,Respublica , III, 12,401 c, and 17,409e; Aristoteles, noteworthy: ium via means"being born , IV, 11,69lb15;Id.,Ethica JVicom., Ill, 5, 1114b8-12 (hereevq> withmoralvision") andVI, 13, 1144b34; Cf.Eustratius, Id.,Rhetorica , II, 14, 1390b28. Ethica See alsoAlexander ofAphrodisias, Ethical , VI, 13,ad 1144b34. Super , Probi. problems Ithaca1989(Ancient Commentators on Aristode), 29,trans, byR. W. Sharpies, 76-82; Alexander In VIIIlibros Aristotelis ed. Venice1541, commentatio, Aphrodisiensis, Topicorum f. 102va.Important remarks in M. Vegetti La 1Repubblica ' voi.2 (BooksII(ed.),Platone, III),Naples1998(Elenchos, 28/2),116-17, esp.n. 93,andthecommentary byF. de Luise andG. Farinetti, ib.,200-02, esp.n. 13.

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11 ('Canace to her brotherMacareus'), Ovid, in the EpistulaeHeroidum refersto the virbenenatusas a man of good birthwho has (and respects) his familytradition.57 In his Res rusticae , TerentiusVarro describesa mixture of naturalgiftand agriculturaltalent: De solo fundividendumhaec quattuor,quae sit forma,quo in genere terrae, quantus,quam perse tutus.Formaeveroduo generasint,una quam naturadat, alteraquam sationesimponunt;prior,quod alius ager bene natus , aliusmale;posterior, est,aliusmale.58 quod aliusfundusbeneconsitus In late antiquity,the expressionis equivalentto the Italian "nato con la camicia" (also to the French"né avec une cuillèreen or dans la bouche", and the German "ein Glückskindsein"). We find clear examples of this in textsdating fromthe fourthcentury.In the interesting Altercatio Heraclianilaici cumEpiscopoSirrniensi at the , Bishop Germinus, beginning, triesto turnHeraclian towardArianism:59 57P. Ovidius ed. H. Bornecque, Paris19912, 69: "Nubite Naso,Heroides , XI, 107-12, felices Parcameliore /amissae memores sedtarnen estemei!/Quidpueradmisit sorores, tampauciseditus horis facto vixbenenatus avum?/Sipotuit meruisse necem, ?/Quolaesit meruisse miser admisso illemeo(. . Cf.alsoQ. Horatius putetur:/a! Flaccus, plectitur ed.D. R. Shackleton ref, II, 1,232-34, Epistulae 1985,300(with Bailey, Leipzig-Stuttgart erenceto 'Beotian taste'ofsomearistocrats): "Gratus fuitille/ Alexandro, regimagno, incultis et malenatis/rettulit Choerilus, qui' versibus acceptos, regalenomisma, Philippos natus heremeans"poorly orunseemly). Sucha classic mean[i.e.coins]"iemale composed" onelateremployed forinstance, ingseemsto mecloseto theRenaissance byErasmus, in hisInstitutio Christiani et educatione 6. , I ('De nativitate Principis Christiani'), Principis 58T. Varro,Rerum rusticarum libritres, are I, 6, 1, ed. G. Götz,Leipzig1929(italics we findin theCorpus to the mine).Someoccurrences 42, 1) refer priapeorum ('Carmen' sameagricultural context. 59Theedition is stillthatmadeavailable C. P. Caspari, KirchenbyCarlPaulCaspari: historische Anecdota nebst neuen undkirchlich-mittelalterlicher , I. Lateinische Ausgaben patristischer Schriften had , Oslo 1883,131-47;as Caspariacknowledges Schuften (atvii),HenryFynesClinton first drawntheattention of thescholars to theAltercatio. The topicof 'bonanativitas' Veteris etNoviTestamenti CXXVI Quaestiones I, ed. A. Souter, appearsin Ambrosiaster's 1908(CSEL,50),q. 13 (On God'selection andrejection) andq. 127(On Wien-Leipzig Adam'ssin);at 408 [10-25]we read: "A fidelibus enimet beneagentibus melioratur ab infidelibus autemetmaleagentibus deterioratur. Sic enimestnativitas nativitas, quasi arborquaeinseritur, melior fietet bonadicetur, sinvero inseritur, quia,si bonosurculo malosurculo et deterior eritet nonbona,sedmalavocabitur. Ita et nativitati inseratur, sibonaaccedat bonosfaciet si autem malosfaciei fructus. Itasicut doctrina, fructus; mzda, necessaria estarbor, utsit'ubi'inseratur, itaetnecessaria estnativitas, utsitubiproficiatur. Sedrespondetur e contra: 'Si utilis estnativitas, currenascitur?' Nonrenascemur, nisiutilis essetnativitas. Renascienimrenovari estet qui renovatur instauratur. Nonergoaccusai renascibilitas sedreformat, etquodreformatur beneab initio institutum nativitatem, probatur.Igitur ... utreddamur ad statum Adae".Thereareoccurrences quodrenascimur of'benenati'alsoin Ennodius Sermones the , andJerome. (n.3),Augustine's Commenting

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Germinuscoepiteum collaudare,dicens:'Bonumcor habes,et benenatus es, et ab infantiatua novimuste; converteread ecclesiam nostrani [i.e. 'Arii'].60 Heraclianrejectsthisofferand (drawingheavilyon Tertullian'sApologeticum) professeshis faithaccordingthe Nicean credo. Germinus'swords should be understoodas a preliminarycaptatio benevolentiae , in rhetoricalterms.61 That said, in Boethius'swords,the Aristoteliantextread above ( Topica VIII, 14, 163b9-16) is translatedas follows: Et ad cognitionemet secundumphilosophiamprudentiamposse conspicereet conspexissequae utrimqueacciditdicere ex hypothesinon nam reliquumhorumrecteeligerealterum. parvuminstrumentum; Oportet autemad huiusmodiinesseboni ingenii;et hoc est secundumveritatem bonumingenium,posse bene eligereverumet fugerefalsum;quod qui natisunt benepossuntfacerebene; nam qui amant et qui odiunthoc facilediscernunt quod profertur optimum.62 In the thirdtreatiseof his commentaryon Topics , Book VIII, Albertthe Great observes:63 Psalm105,Jerome refers tothe'noble' venumdatus est",andwrites: Joseph "quiinservum "Benenatuset sanctus virvendi tur".See Hieronymus XL inPsalmis Tractatus , Presbyter, Ps. 104,17,ed. G. Morin, Turnhout 1958(CG/SL,78),191.PeterofRavenna already stressed the'ingenuity' ofthebiblical whiletheRomanLaw,approximately inthe Joseph, sameperiod, recalled thesamecaseinpointandtried tolimit itsconsequences; cf.Novellae Constitutiones Valentiniani III, tit.32,ed. G. Hänel,Bonn1844,237-40:"De parentibus, qui filiossuospernecessitatem distraxerunt et ne ingenui barbaris venumdentur ñequead transmarine ducantur". Morethantwocenturies Eusebius 'Gallicanus' describes the later, ' with servi oftheslavery ofvices,andequates'bene natus tus",symbol "Aegypti tyrannical (cf.n. 30 above). beingfree-born 60Caspari1883(n.59),135-136 italics). '(my 61Cf.M. Simonetti, suli 'Altercato Heracliani cum in:Vigiliae Osservazioni Germinio', Christianae, ' at 21 (1967),39-58:on 'bene natus 42,n. 12 62Aristoteles Latinus Bruxelles-Paris , V 1-3,Topica , ed.L. Minio-Paluello, 1969,177,18-25. Boethius's translation oftheTopics datesfrom thebeginning ofthesixth andabout century areextant. Cf.B. G. Dod,Aristoteles 270manuscripts latinus , inN. Kretzmann-A. KennyMediaeval From J.Pinborg (eds),TheCambridge ofLater History Philosophy: ofAristotle Rediscovery tothedisintegration 1100-1600, 1982,45-79:at 75. See alsoN.J. ofScholasticism Cambridge TheTradition intheMiddle München Vienna1984;and Green-Pedersen, oftheTopics Ages, T. Hunt,Aristotle, andCourtly in:Viator,10 (1979), at97-98. Dialectic, Literature, 95-129, 63NotethatAlbert theGreatwillbe one of themainsources forfifteenth-century scholastic authors isa paradigmatic dealwiththepast'schools (Heymericus case)whenthey ofthought'. On thispoint, from theclassicworks andKaluza,see apart byMesserman ' nowP. Rutten, Secundum etmentem Versori s':John sorandHisRelation Ver totheSchools processum in:Vivarium, 43 (2005),292-336, Reconsidered, ofThought esp.294n. 6. A textbook printed in Colognein 1494,namely theReparationes librorum totius naturalis couldbe philosophiae,

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ANDREA A. ROBIGLIO bene Quiaqui natisuntbene , hoc est,quibusbene innatumest,hoc possunt : quia ingeniumdiciturintusgenitus,et hic est qui subtileshabet facere et expeditasanimalesoperationes, et bonámradonemcollativam.64 spiritus

The point is mainlybiological:intellectualactivityand learningis facilitated by a good physicaldispositionand well balanced mind-bodyrelation(notethe referenceto the ratiocoIlativa). an innatequality Additionally, claim is consonantwiththe originaldistinction and slaveamong free-born born men (accordingto the readingof Aristotle'sPolitics). ' in his influential Albertalso dealt withthe conceptof 6benenatus comon the Ethics Nicomachean it in , discussing implicitly connection mentary withthe notionof 'heroic virtue'.65 This commentary, in additionto the Aristotelian Liberde bonafortuna , is one of the sourcesforThomas Aquinas, mentioned ofthenobler andsanior schoolofthought, thePeripatetic here;thedefinition one (ofwhichAlbert wouldhavebeenthenoblerfollower anda sortofre-founder) is madebyreference to theancient former founder: vero,quorum "Peripatetici archipater Aristoteles" theideaof'degeneration', in similar contexts (f.103r).Moreover, employed showssomeconnection withthetheme ofnobility, i.e.thedegeneration from byAlbert, to Epicurean theGreat, Liber denatura etorigine animae Peripatetic (cf.Albert philosophy , tr.2, c. 5) wouldnotbe possible ifthefirst schoolhadnotbeennobler thanthesecond. On Heymericus, seealsoGreen-Pedersen 1984(n.62),404 (A.42). 64Albertus omnia, vol.II, Paris1890,520-24:at 521a , ed. A. Borgnet, Magnus, Opera (myitalics). 65Cf.Albertus Ethica commentum etquestiones Magnus, , III, 7, andVII, 1, ed. W. Super vol.1, 173-78, andvol.2, 514-20. Theconnection ofthe'heroic Kübel,Münster 1968-87, virtue' withthetheme of(divine) wasalready stressed nobility Grosseteste; cf., byRobert forinstance, Robertus Grosseteste, , 124,ed.H. R. Luard,London1861,350.Cf. Epistolae DoesTheolog)): andthe'Pearl'-Poet, Notre-Dame J. Rhodes, Chaucer, Grosseteste, Poetry 2001, offourteenth the 43-71,260-65.It is extremely that,in themiddle noteworthy century, 'heroic virtue' becamea necessary in theChurch's evidence cf.A. canonising processes; La sainteté enoccident auxderniers siècles duMoyen lesprocès decanonisation Vauchez, Âged'après etlesdocuments insufficient crit, Rome1988,607.See thestimulating hagiographiques though icismofP. L. Giovannucci, Genesi e significato diunconcetto la virtù eroica nell'età modagiologico: erna di storiadellaChiesain Italia,58 (2004),433-78,esp.459-66.Cf.also , in: Rivista R. Saarinen, 'Virtus heroica '. 'Held'und'Genie' alsBegriffe deschristlichen Aristotelismus , in:Archiv fürBegriffsgeschichte, 33 (1990),96-114;on Luther: 101-03(esp.n. 26) and 114n. 96. At 101: "Luther willeineArtvonFürstenspiegel indemerunter den'Göttern' schreiben, desersten Psalmenverses die Fürsten zu denen versteht, [A. 82: 'Der höchste Richter'] Gottspricht". IndeedtheVulgate s words(= Ps. 81, 1: "Deusstetit in synagoga deorum in medioautemDeusdeiudicat") weretranslated as follows: "Gottstehet byLuther ynn desgemaine Gotes/und istRichter interdenGöttern". On thepost-Renaissance notion of'genius', cf.at 113:"Interessant istauch,daß baldnachderReformationszeit neben denmonarchischen Fürsten auchderintellektuelle dasGenie,alsBeispiel Heros,nämlich dermenschlichen Vollkommenheit tritt" Bruno, ib.,113n. 91).AndJ.M. (onGiordano Heroic Virtue andtheDivine in 'Paradise Lost oftheWarburg Steadman, ' in:Journal Image andCourtauld 22 (1959),88-105. Institutes,

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who touched on the topic in his Tractatus de ventate fidei(the so-called ContraGentiles 92.66 ): III, The formula,in any case, gained a specific'Aristotelian'sense and was used especiallyby the Masters of Arts.Well known,for instance,is the dedicationof Jacobus de Pistoia's Questiodefelicitate to his friendGuido "one of the world's best Cavalcanti, logicians":67 Viro benenatoet a naturadilectoet prae aliis amico carissimoGuidoni dominiCavalcantisde Cavalcantibusde Florentiamagister Jacobusde Pistorioille quem respicitEuripussalutemet agere sicutdebes.68 To this,otherexamples taken fromuniversity textscould be added.69 66Thomas deAquino, t. 14/3,Rome1926,279-82. usestheexpresomnia, Opera Aquinas ' as sion'bene natus to 'bene to 'fortune' rather thanto ingefortunatus' equivalent referring ' In thesamecontext he speaksofthe'bene naturatus whohasa finebodily man, nuity. ' cf.alsoPetrus On the'virtus heroica de Alvernia's continuation ofAquinas's complexion. to Aristode's Politics (III, 12,4). Commentary 67"Unde' migliori loicicheavesseil mondoe ottimo filosofo naturale" (G. Boccaccio, Decameron Milan1976,563;cf.ib.,at 1342,n. 5). , VI, 9, ed. V. Branca, 68ThisQuestio in 1931,wasfirst Grabmann edited , discovered byMartin byPaulOskar in 1955.I use themostrecent Kristeller edition IreneZavattero, whosefinecomby deserves mention. See I. Zavattero, La 'Quaestio defelicitate' di Giacomo da Pistoia: mentary untentativo diinterpretazione allalucedi unanuova critica deltesto and edizione , in:M. Bettetini F. D. Paparella nelMedioevo 2005(Texteset étudesdu , Louvain-la-Neuve (eds),Lefelicità at 395.On thesuicide ofAristotle, evoked to 31),355-409: Moyen-Âge, bythereference overlooked Suicide intheMiddle 2 voll.,Oxford 'Euripus', (curiously byA. Murray, Ages, 1999-2000), seeM. de PanizzaLorch, Il suicidio diAristotele o la demistificazione umanistica delin:Lettere 43 (1991),391-405; andRobiglio 2005(n.4),47-50. l'intellettuale, Italiane, 69See,forinstance, thefourteenth-century Quadrivium's Rome,Biblioteca manuscript: Pal.Lat. 1380,f. lOOr(transcribed alsoon-line Vaticana, Apostolica byChristian Meyer, at:www.lml.badw.de, lastconsulted onJune2004):"Etestmultiplex musica velmultiplex scilicet musica velproporcio tocius mundi universalis secundum suaspartes uniproporcio, et estetiammusicavel proporcio humanain qua proporcione elementorum versales, hominis consistit habetbonosmores etsic vita,etquihabetbonamproporcionem etiam, inbonaproporcione bene nati musice" aremine); cf.L. Schuba, DieQuadriviumsgaudent (italics der'Codices Palatini Latini' inderVatikanischen Bibliothek Handschriften , Wiesbaden 1992,111. Consider also theinteresting collection of miscellaneous the texts, university including Secretum intheMs.Paris,BnF,lat.16089,which offers us an eloquent secretorum, preserved One ofthequestions discussed example. bytheMaster JohnVate(endofthethirteenth is "Utrum naturaliter scabiosi sintnaturaliter latrones". Letus readtheanswer: century) "Dicendum ex húmido se evaporante quodscabiesquedamcausatur superfluo putrefacto ad partes exteriores etmaxime ad capud,utpueri;etde istisnonquerit Aliaest questio. scabiescausatamagisex malanaturali estex malo hominis, complexione quiageneratus menstruoso etcorrupto; etistascabies durâtpertotam vitam etmale sanguine putrefacto et maxime sidetin capite,quia capudestquasicaminus curari, potest [caminum cod.] totius etideoomnes exhalationes interius ad ipsum ettalessuntlibencorporis ascendunt; terlatrones et ideohabilessuntad malumet inclinativi quia suntmalenati, naturaliter;

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in a polemFurthermore, MargueritePoretereferred thoughadmittedly ical context to being well-bornas a conditionforbecomingcompletely âmes(at the beginningof the fournoble.70WritingLe Mirouerdessimples teenthcentury),she developedan originalconceptionof Christiannobility At the verybeginin orderto presenta paradigmof human excellence.71 the Great,the to Alexander this makes reference of text,Marguerite ning She uses the petrine trulynoble king and disciple of the Philosopher. equation of the sacerdotaland the regal, and definestrue nobilityin a way similarto the conceptionof PeterOlivi, accordingto whichthe highest human perfectionis merelythe abilityto offerno resistanceto Divine action.72Describingthe perfectionof a soul inhabitedby the Holy Spirit, in chapter 100, Margueritemakes 'Amor' speak: ideopropter conversari inter nonestnecessarium. tamen homines, Quiaveromalepossunt one thequestions thatfollow, italics aremine).Among suntlatrones" defectum (f.74V15; tothesensible bonum" is about"Utrum bonusgenerat 'complexion (f.75ra:and,according in civitate". debeatesseprinceps about:"Utrum is 'yes'),another theanswer philosophus Medii Commentariorum seeW. Senko, ofthemanuscript, Fora detailed Repertorium description Parisiis assewantur Latinorum AeviinAristotelem Nationale, (Bibliothèque publicis quaeinbibliothecis MediiAevi/ SteGeneviève Mazarine, Sorbonne, ), Warsaw1982(OperaPhilosophorum Arsenal, Lenuméro 16089desmanucf.B. Hauréau, Textusetstudia, 5/1),I, 208-23.Furthermore, etextraits desManuscrits dela Bibliothèque in:Notices latins dela Bibliothèque Nationale, scripts Die etautres Nationale , t. 35, 1stpart,Paris1896,209-39;M. Grabmann, bibliothèques Alberts desGroßen undderEinfluß vonBrüssel desHeinrich Aristoteleskommentare aufdiemittelalterin:Mediaeval 'Denobilitate M. L. Colker, München liche animi' 1944,17-28; Aristoteleserklärung, 3e re depourceaux Notasu and50; E. Randi,*Philosophie 23 (1961),17ff. taumaturghi. Studies, in: Quadernimedievali, 22 (1986),129-35,esp. 133;J. Agrimi, unmanoscritto parigino, ' The P. Biller, medievale Studi sulla scientia nature 2002,124-25; , Florence fisiognomica Ingeniosa inMedieval Measure , Oxford2000,271; Id., TheBlackin Thought Population ofMultitude: Lehrman Center Gilder ofthe5thAnnual Science: What Medieval ?,in:Proceedings Significance atYaleUniversity Conference International 7-8,2003):'Collective Degradation: (November at:www.yale.edu/glc/ on-line ofRace',1-16:at 7; available andtheConstruction Slavery onJanuary 2005). (consulted events/race/Biller.pdf 70On theconnection Mirouer on theoneside,andPorete's between , texts, University seeRobiglio on theother, 2005(n.4), 55-59. 71I use theLatinversion Commission whichthecensorial of Porete's (and Speculum edited under their had as of Fontaines by P. Verdeyen, well) eyes, Godefroy maybe nowin: is thatbyRomanaGuarnieri, Turnhout 1986(CC CM, 69).A fineintroduction Rome2004(Storiae e istituzioni tramistica Donne e Chiesa, R. Guarnieri, XIII-XV), (secoli andanniSee alsotheremarks Nobility Letteratura, byJ. M. Robinson, 218),eh.3, 239ff. NY2001,1-25and111-24,esp.13 souls Porete's Mirror hilation inMarguerite ' Albany, ofsimple and 111,n. 2. ofBingen) (onHildegard 72See,amongothers, textbyOlivi,In II Sent. thefollowing q. 16,ed.Jansen1922 intellectualis: naturae quodestDei singulaperfectio (n. 14),311-12:"Haecestsumma esteiussingularis riter imago(...)".The whole Augustinum, capaxet in hoc,secundum remarked. hadfirst as Guarnieri of'nobility', ontheconcept a polyphony Speculum develops lateritis refers to 'nobility', whoexplicitly halfoftheworkitis Amor Whilein thefirst

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natus.Isti enimsuntgentesregales.Ipsi Qui est de tali genere,est optime habentcorda excellenter Ipsi enim generosaet magnae attemptationis. non possentfacerealiquod opus parvivaloris,nec inciperealiquidcuius non attingerent.73 terminům et complementum in the place The polemical use of the expressionand the use of 'optime' and the of the reference both to the of 'bene'' transfiguration familiarity testify of this interpretation. The innate abilityto understandand to use the tools of logic seems no longer to be the necessaryconditionof nobility.Marguerite'santiand polemical use of the expressionis neverthelessa sign intellectualistic of how establishedits meaning had become. The followingthreecases will illustratethis. 9. Boethius ) century ofDacia (secondhalfof thethirteenth on theTopics In his Commentary , , Boethiusdoes not referto the virbenenatus even if many signsof it are evidentin his approach. The firstwords of are forhonourablemen, thatis to say,the firstphilosophers: the Proemium of whospeaksaboutanddefines the'Soul'{Anima) it;see thefollowing passages mainly : I, 17; XIII, 72; XIX, 28; XXII, 12; XXXVI, 1-20;LXXXVI,30ff.; theSpeculum CXVIII, 19ff., 80; CXX, 1; CXXI, 16. Cf. G. Cary, XCI, 1; XCIX, 1; GUI, 24ff.; oftheWarburg andCourtauld inMedieval Alexander TheGreat Institutes, , 'in:Journal Theology ' etles Uneapproche socioLe Roman d'Alexandre 17 (1954),98-114;M. Gosman, 'juvenes'. notdeveloped, 66 (1982),328-39;also,though Id.,Alexandre , in:Neophilologus, historique à l'histoire d'une ouleplaidoyer le Grand etlestatut dela noblesse Prolégomènes pourla permanence. decivilisation médiéandJ. vanOs (eds),'Nonnova sednove'. , in:M. Gosman Mélanges légende cf.C. Gaullier-Bougassas, Alexandre valeofferts à W.Noomen , Groningen 1984,81-93.Lastly Maddoz(eds),The intheFrench Alexander Romances andAristotle , in D. Maddox-S.Sturm Medieval French Alexander , NewYork2002,57-73. ' ' seeM. Tullius 73C, 7-12,ed.Verdeyen natus De 1986(n. 71),275.On optime Cicero, ed. L. D. Oxford bonorum et malorum , V, 56-57, 1998,201-02:"Cumque finibus Reynolds, circuios nonhabeantingenuas exdoctrina oblectationes, natus consectari est,esse (...).Itaqueutquisqueoptime institutusque aliquoset sessiunculas Nam orbatus vescivoluptatibus. omnino nolitinvitasi gerendis negotiis possit paratissimis autqui altiore animosunt,capessunt rempublicam autprivajtim malunt, aliquidgerere honoribus auttotosse ad studia doctrinae conferunt. Qua invita imperiisque adipiscendis, abestutvoluptates etiamcurassollicitudines tantum consectentur, vigilias perferunt optiaciefruuntur quae in nobisdivinaducendaest,ingeniet mentis maquepartehominis, necvoluptatem necfugientes laborem" aremine). dealswith (italics Marguerite requirentes the'optime natasoul'alsoat chapters LH, 1,andLXX,48; at LII, 1-3,9-10,ed.Verdeyen benesitisin solo 1986(n. 71):"O optime nata,dicitAmor,huicpretiosae margaritae, inquodnullus intrat libero nisisitde genere vestro manerio, (...)Nontarnen legitimus. per sedperattingentiam suiultraamoris". intellectus amoris, attingentiam

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Cum honorandi viňvidelicetpatresnostrireverendiprimiphilosophantes res temporales contemnenteset vitam suam in studio sapientiae ponentes...74 is significant The expression'honorandi forus. It evokes here the idea of a 'professional'philosopher,as Boethiuslater explainsthat the honorabiks scientiae are Ethics, Physicsand Mathematics,75 which allow the thinker to attainthe 'divinescience' quaeperaltíssimas rerum causasprocedit etde substantiisseparatis Even if the Topicspresents a less rigorous perscrutatur. approach (the topicescireis distinctfromand weaker than demonstrare ), it stillrequiresingenuityand the full use of human reason, since rarissimi enimsunt discretio .76 , quorum passionenonimpeditur Furthermore,in Book III, at question 20, Boethius asks whetheror not the thinkerwould seek glory(iutrum which,forhim, gloriasitappetendo), - Boethius is the equivalent of honour.11 The opportunityto seek glory - is argues justifiedfor two reasons: first,due to a Peripateticprinciple, accordingto which everylearned man ought to look for noble things, and secondly,out of a socio-politicalcommitment,according to which the philosopheras a superiorand noble man shouldbe a model forcommon people who stimulatesthemtowardachievementof theirduties,i.e. theirvirtuouslife: Gloriaestprincipium actuumnobiliumet studiosorum. Qui ergoappétit actusnobiles,appétitgloriam.Sed quilibetstudiosusdebetappetereactus nobiles.(...) Inferiores enim in humanissuperioribus tenenturhonorem et gloriamimpendere, et cum solvunt, quod tenentur, complentopussuae virtu tis.78 74Boethius librum ed. N. J. Green-Pedersen Dacus,Quaestiones , proem., super Topicorum andJ. Pinborg, in:Id.¡Opera, VI/1,Kopenhagen 1976,3. Thetoneofthispassageevokes theGlose'Divitias' as "virhonorandus", see Ricklin 2000 (n. 6). On thePhilosopher (n. 16),228. 75Ib.,3 [5-7,12]. 76Ib., 10 [179-1801. 77CarloDionisotti hasrightly recalled thehugeroleplayedlater,during thesixteenth remarks of'honour'; cf.Dionisotti 1989(n.42),296.Fundamental century, bythenotion alsoinCortese 1999(n.18),776.Evenremaining limited tothecommentaries onAristotle's a seaofexamples forsucha phenomenon. forinstance, Ethics Nicomachean , wefind Consider, andwhether theJesuit on moralphilosophy : "Thediscussion ofhonor teaching happiness 3 'Ethics init"occupied a position ofnewrelevance. Cf.D.A.Lines, Aristotle's is tobe found and the Moral Education intheItalian Renaissance The Universities , (ca.1300-1650). problem of Leiden-Boston-Köln 2002,325-83, esp.370-73. 78Green-Pedersen andPinborg 1976(n. 74),195[16-18,29-31].

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Here Boethiusdraws a pictureof the thinkeras a man fromthe upper classes,committed(thoughpassively)to his community, masteringhis pasis never overriddenby passions),who seeks gloryby sions (his discretio seekingphilosophicaltruthin the naturalsciences,ethicsand astrology. Those elementsare not deniedwhen Boethiustreatsthe 'man of natural Let ability'.The passage standsat the beginningof the treatiseOn dreams. a moment. us glance at this for There are threegoods available to man: natural,moral, and intellectual. The supremenaturalgood is the preservationof the individualand continuationof the species. Powers of nutritionand growthare ordered to achieve these goods. Man also pursues 'politicalhappiness'by means of moral action. This achieved,the ultimateintellectualgood possiblefor man is then perfectknowledgeand contemplationof truth.The intellectual delightwhich accompaniescontemplationis a part of thismostperfectgood, since it servesto sustaincontemplation(thispoint recalls the in librum divisionof goods , VI, q. 25). This tripartite Quaestiones Topicorum and human facultiesexplicates(some of) the different approaches to life found among men. Some are mainly concerned with carnal pleasure, otherswith political activity,and a chosen few with the pure contemplation of truth;that is to say, with the dispassionatestudyof nature: Et quia virtusnaturaliter in suumbonumet suumdelectabile, inclinatur ex hoc contingit, homines benenatiad scientias ex contemplativi quod quidam sui et animae nec ab eis curas exteriores incipartecorporis impediti propter de eo quod cogitantadmirantes ob defectum piuntprofundeperscrutari sicut vehementer causae, admirantes,quomodo homini quidam nuper somnium fieri eventuum de quibus futurorum, per potest praecognitio ut eis scriberem, numquamcogitavit, rogabantinstanter, quid per somniumsciripossitet quomodo.79 Being benenatusseems to be a necessaryconditionfor the achievement of higherphilosophicalcontemplation, even ifit is not identicalwithbeing a contemplativus. The explicitreferenceto the body is a sign of the middle 79Boethius ed.N.J.Green-Pedersen, in:Id.,Opera Dacus,Desompniis, , VI/2,Kopenhagen at 382[30-37](italics aremine). hastranslated "virbenenatus 1976,381-91, JohnWippel ad scientias" as follows: "manwellfitted forthesciences"; cf.Boethius ofDacia,Onthe - Ondreams. Ontheeternity Translation and Introduction goodsupreme oftheworld byJ. F. ' di Boezio Toronto 68-69. See also G. Fioravanti, La 'scientia di 1987, Wippel, sompnialis Dacia delleScienzedi Torino,II. Classedi ScienzeMorali, , in: AttidellaAccademia Storiche e Filologiche, 101(1966-67), at 335. 329-69,

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stateof benenasci , as a naturalbodilygiftwhich can dispose men to further intellectualachievements.The higher states,however,involve the previousdegrees;because thinkerswho reach the higherdegreesof consui et animae . The ex partecorporis templationmust be benenatiad scientias 'sciences' referredto here are the 'honourable' ones: ethicsand natural the skilfulscholarin thesefieldsmustalso science above all. Nevertheless, masterthe basic disciplines,includinggrammarand logic. If myinterpretation is correct,we could say thatthe virbenenatusstands et bonusvir as the bachelor to the master,as the honestus to contemplations to the tided nobleman. In otherwords,accordingto Boethiusof Dacia, the expressionbenenatusindicatesthe good rational and emotionaldispositionof a man, but at the same time presentshim as a (necessary) linkin a chain of human philosophicalperfection.Being benenatusis the firstrung on the ladder leading to nobilityof the mind. 10. JohnBuridan(ca. 1300-ca. 1360) Aristotle's Ethics to benenatuswhilecommenting , Book 7.80 JohnBuridanrefers In the second questionhe asks whetherheroicvirtuebelongsto the 'sensensitivo . virtus heroica sit in appetitu sibility':utrum At firstsight,it seems so. Indeed, accordingto Aristotleand his commentators(Eustratiusis quoted) thereare threehierarchicallevels of the same masteryof the body: continenceand both human and heroicvirtue. of To reach human perfection,that is to say felicitas , the mortification lower passions is required.But such controlof the emotions,to be natural, cannot be exertedfromthe outside.The virtuerequiredto mortify (inordinate)passions,namely,heroicvirtue,mustbe in the same 'subject' as that to which the passions belong:

80I useQuaestiones adMcomachum libros Ethicorum Aristotelis Buridani decern , Paris super Joannis ThepartofthetextI dealwithis alsoavailFrankfurt 1513[repr. 1968],if.cxLva-cxLir' able online, digitally transcribed by Fabienne Pironet, at onFebruary 2004).In thesecondary (lastconsulted http://mapageweb.umontreal.ca/pironetf on thisparticular I havefoundnothing literature by topicapartfroma finefootnote duprochain. desoi,amour Amour Cf.C. Grellard, atn.90 below). Grellard (quoted Christophe n°66), condamné del'article morale etl'idée d'une Nicolas d'Autrécourt, (autour laïque JeanBuridan Études à ^m°nKaluza médiévale. delapensée in:P.J.J.M. Bakker , Turnhout offertes (ed.),Chemins 2002,215-51, esp.240.

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Virtusmortificans passionesdebetponi in subiectoilio in quo passiones innataesuntfieri;sed ipsae innataesuntfieriin appetitusensitivo;ideo etc.81 The argumentagainst this opinion is taken fromthe very meaning of heroic virtue,which is identifiedas 'divine' and ought to belong to the superiorpart of the soul: not to the appetitebut the intellect: Oppositumarguitur: quia virtusheroicavocaturdivinaeo quod per earn homo maximeassimilatur diis; ergo heroicaponendaest in partesuperiori. [. . .] Etiam videturquod heroica sit ilia virtusin cuius opere consistithumana felicitas, sed secundumillam virtutem meliorest vita secundum hominem. Habens enim non secundum earn, quam quod homo est,sic vivitsecundumquod in eo divinumaliquidexistit, ut dicit in decimo 'Ethicorurri'. Aristoteles Then Buridansums up the different before conceptionsof heroicvirtue,82 his own of view. Here he introduces the notion of bene natus : presenting point Ego autemputo,secundumea quae dixiin ultimaquaestioneprimilibri, si per virtutem heroicamdebeamusintelligere virtutem ad cuiusperfectionemnon possuntnaturaliter , proutdiximusin attingerenisi benenati alia quaestione,quod virtusheroicaponendasitet in appetitusensitivo, et in tam/b/concupiscibili quam irascibili,et in appetituintellectivo, intellectupracticoet in intellectuspeculativo.In omni enim appetitu nostrovirtusmoralisponenda est,in omniparteintellectus virtusintellectualis,ut apparuitin primolibroet in sexto.

81lb, f.CXLV. 82"Multiponunt in appetitu istamvirtutem heroicam sensitivo rationes factas, propter sednonin appetitu sedinirascibili eiusarduitatem. concupiscibili propter [2] Aliiautem, rationes ad oppositum earninvolúntate". Thethird caseBuridan adductas, propter ponunt records is interesting: "Etaliidicunt earnessesapientiam incuiusoperedicunt humanam felicitatem consistere" ofOckham seemed to hold (ib.,f.cxlv).Cf.belown. 98. William theopposite tohim,theconcept ofheroic virtue determines itself pointofview.According theactofwill),forthesakeofGod'shonour, all natural (viz.through formally against inclination. See Guillelmus de Ockham, Bibliae sivequaestio deconnexione virtutum , Principium ed.J. C. Wey,in:Id, Quaestiones variae NY 1984(Operatheologica, , St.Bonaventure, 8), 336-37and354-55.At 336 [163-64] we readthat"Actus formaliter imperativus (...)est virtutis andat 354 [323-29]: inquinto "Iustitia estvirheroicae", generativus gradu, prout tusheroica in unochristiano, honorem Dei, perfecta qui talemactumimperarei propter noncompati tursecumaliquodvitium necdefectum eandemcausam. culpabilem propter Tarnen virtus heroica alicuius benecompatitur aliquodvitium, philosophi quia illaesuntalterius alianon". speciei, quiaunahabetDeumproobiecto,

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This said, Buridan then triesto reconcilethe excellenceof heroic virtue with the fact of its belongingto the 'lower' appetites.For, accordingto him it does not belong to a higherpart of the soul, but does belong to a 'nobler subject',a more excellentman (Carlylewould say 'the Hero'), whose soul must be open to higherachievements: Quo concesso,rationabileest dicerequod virbenenatusad talemgradům in appetitusensitivo virtutis pervenire potestad quem alii non pervenirent etiam in intellectu et volúntate,propterin ipso et, per consequens, sensumet appetitumsensitivům esse subiectosnaturaliter intelmagis lectuiet voluntatiet in eis meliusministrare. The well-bornman shouldnaturallybe self-controlled. This said, Buridan continuesand refersto Aristotle'streatmentof Hector,the Homeric hero who possessedsuch heroic virtue. heroica So, as far as I see, the virtus , accordingto Buridan,is the common virtueof the noblestman, ratherthan the most noble virtueof the common man. As such it belongs to him as a whole, even if it refers mainlyto the part due to which a man is the most noble: the intellect in fullpossessionof itself: In vita autem contemplativa virtusheroica dicta principaliter est ipsa sapientiavel illa virtusin cuius opere consistitfelicitascontemplativa, in prologosuo quo praemissit libroPhysicorum propterquam Commentator dixitde Aristotele talem virtutem esse in individuouno miraculoquod sum et extraneumexistitet quod si haec dispositioin hominereperitur, digniusforetesse divinusquam humanus.83 In the same way, the indignityof man affectsall partsof his being: both his body and the parts of his soul. This is what characterizesthe bestialita^ ř,which is the final topic of the question. From the remarksin this sectionsome elementsmay be gatheredtogetherwhich will help us to understandwhat is requisiteto being benenatus . First of all, a good bodily complexion;meaning the absence of any disease of the bodily humours.84In this sense the benenatusmust be a 83Ib. Cf. Averroes, In Physicam , ed. Venice1562,vol. 4, f. 5r. Somestimulating in A. De Libera,Métaphysique are nowgathered etnoêtique. Albert le Grand , suggestions Paris2005(Problèmes et controverses). 84Buridan, usumrationis inEthicam, ed.Paris1513,cxlv:"Aliiamittunt Questiones propter efficiuntur velmente alienati tasesthabiutquimaniaci (...)nectalisbestiali aegritudinem, inorgano sensus vel tusmoralis, sedestdispositio naturalis velcausalis existens subiective sensitivi". appetitus

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man (vir),rather than a woman (;mulier ).85 Secondly, he must possess an innate,well-formed the of faculty imagination,whichis to say a wellbalanced sensibility,with the rightconnection between body and the sensitiveoperationsof the soul.86Finally,he musthave rightmoral conduct, accordingto reason which rejectsvices and produces good habits. This thirdconditionof rightconduct,even if it does not oppose the others,representsan importantaddition (not always admittedby other Mastersof Arts)whichrelativizesthe biologicalconditions.The rightconin any case, indicatesa strongintellectualistic duct requirement, approach means of which the contraposition betweensapiensand vulgus excludes by solution(as we read, forinstance,in Marguerite any anti-intellectualistic Porete or, later and differently, Petrarchand Gerson). 11. NicholasofAutrecourt (ca. 1295-1369) In the prologue to his main philosophicalwork,the so-called Exigitordo executionis ,87Nicholas speaks of the well-bornman. Arguingfor a sort of scepticismabout sensible knowledge,against the useless studyof traditional logic, and in favourof a philosophicalknowledgeapt to support ethicalcommitment, Nicholas writes: Cum etiamapparuitquod hominesmodicumdebentadhaerereapparentibusnaturalibus, apud me hoc venitjudiciumquod, si hoc cognoscerentbenenaticommunitatis se ad res moríset politicae,converterent adhaererent firmiter sacrae.88 legi

85Women often havediseases, whentheyaregravid, infectum esse especially "propter a fumis ex retentis menstruis ascendentibus". Theconnection between thedisappetitum cussion on female on theone side,andthecourdy "Anmulier sit complexion, dispute nobilis" to themostgeneral one:"Quidestmulier?"), on theotherside,is (belonging in thesameperiod;cf.Giovanni Boccaccio, Boccaccio, largely developed by Giovanni or'TheLabyrinth Corbaccio N.Y. 19932. See also ofLove'ed. A. K. Cassell,Binghamton, thebrilliant notebyA. K. Cassell,7/Corbaccio' andtheSecundus Tradition , in:Comparative 25 (1974),352-60. Literature, 86Ib.: "Quidamenima nativitate carent usurationis orbitatem seudefectum propter tisymaginativae virtu velcogitativae". 87I usetheedition ofthetextestablished Nicholas , in: byJ. R. O'Donnell, ofAutrecourt Mediaeval 1 (1939),179-280. On Nicholas, seeZ. Kaluza,Nicolas d'Autrécourt. Ami Studies, dela vérité littéraire dela France , in:Histoire , t. 42/1,Paris1995,22-43. 88Nicolausde Utricuria, ordo ed. O'Donnell1939 , PrimaParsPrimiPrologi, Exigit stresses thelogicalcompetence ofthenatural (n. 87), 181 [36-41].A secondoccurence bornphilosopher, at 184[7-11]:"remanens insuperficie, sedquasipenetrans ipsas

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the civilelite,ratherthanphilosophers, Here, the 'well-born'men represent even if theyare public pupils for instruction in philosophy.The restriction of meaning (the specificationcommunitatis ) probablyexplains politicai thisreferenceto politicalicontext.The well-bornmen of the community are those who learn philosophyin order to become governorsand ministersof the Res publica.The fact that they also have to studylogic is noteworthy. In theArticuli condemnati (firsthalfof 1346), we findan even more inter6 estingoccurrenceof the expressionbenenatus'At n. 55 the censorsrecall thatMasterNicholas sponsoreda courseon Aristotle'sPolitics dealingwith the subject of justice.89In one of the questions,he had said that there were cases in which robberywould be permitted.The example Nicholas gave is the following:Imaginea youngstudent,well fittedforthe sciences, meetinga masterofferingto teach him all the principlesof knowledge and askinghim forpaymentof fees in a shorttime. If the studentcannot obtain thatmoneyexceptby theftor deception,thenhe may morally steal or defraudthe money.The studentis justifiedby the philosophical principlethat one must do what is honest to the presentmoment.To learn about the structureof createdbeing is definitively good in the eyes of God; ergo etc.: , Ponaturquod sit aliquis iuvenis benenatus , qui inveniataliquem,qui in brevivelitipsuminstruere in omniscientiaspeculativa, que potesthaberi de rebuscreatis,et non velitfacerenisiille iuvenisdet sibicentumlibras, quas ille iuvenishabere non potestnisi per furtum.Dixit [Nicholas], eratlicitumilli iuveni,quod probatsic: Quod est quod ilio casu furtum amabile Deo, est faciendum.Sed quod iste iuvenisacquiratsuam perfectionem in predictis, estamabileDeo. Et non potestper aliummodum [fieri],ut dictumest,quam per furtum, ergo furtumest faciendum.90 resperceptivus illeestrecti namapparet causarum, judicii; quodtalispotest pervenire usque inquibuscontinetur In hocconsidèrent ad conceptos Veritas bene natiad proprios quaesiti. a qualibus intellectibus doctrine hominum" aremine). The (italics judicandum processerunt bene natirepresent theheroes ofhuman knowledge. 89"Quicunque unacumquibusdam voluerit audire librum Politicorum Aristotelis questionibus, inquibusdisceptatur de iustoetiniusto, novaslegescondere, conditas, perquas... poterat ofAutrecourt, Proclamatio si que sintcorrigenda, (...)".Cf.Nicholas presumptuosa, corrigere art.56, ed. byL. M. de Rijk,in: Ch. Grellard d'Autrécourt, (ed.),Nicolas Correspondance condamnés Paris et 150. Articles 2001 , (Sic Non), 90Art.56, in: Grellard bene 2001(n. 89), 150;cf.ib., 181-82n. 140:"(...)L'homme etla prudence natus l'habilité estdoncceluiquipossède ), ainsique les (deinotica) (phronesis bonnes moeurs".

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Such teachingwas condemnedas heretical{hereticum quoaddeterminationerri). The positionheld by Nicholas seems quite radical in its consequences. In any case, for his argumentto work, the young freebornand skilful studentmust be in a necessaryrelationwith his own perfection,that is to say, to arriveat 'speculative'competenceabout createdbeing through philosophicalstudies.Such connectionpresupposesthat the young man has all the predispositions needed to achieve the task;theseare the same dispositionsrequiredby heroic virtueaccordingto John Buridan, apart fromethical commitment. That said, Nicholas's account of intellectualnobilitydoes not match otheraspectsof the notionwe have seen in others,forinstance,in Boethius of Dacia. The nature of the textwe have at our disposal (the Articuli is a listcompiledby ecclesiasticalcensors,not a systematic workby Nicholas) leave us withouta conclusiveanswer.However,let us note some particulars. First,thereis an explicitreferenceto both lack of money and the need forit; thisreferencesounds bizarre,since accordingto the common medievalidea of nobility(in this respecta clericalidea, but nevertheless also accepted by laymen):verephilosophantes contemnunt pecuniam. Secondly, thiscommondoctrinetendedto punishnoblesand freemenmore severely, sincegreatdignitymeansgreatresponsibility and, as Bartoloof Sassoferrato nobiles .91 says, magispuniuntur quamignobiles Thirdly,consideringthat such a young man 'of natural ability'seems to be isolated fromthe context of social hierarchy;this promisingiuvenis , indeed, is hardlya link in an intellectualchain of wise men; he pays his masterand in brevilearns all thetheoretical forinstance, knowledgehe wishes;he showsno commitment, to the teachingof otheryoung freebornmen. Perhaps thislast reflection seems hasty;howeveranotherarticlecould confirmmy reading. In articlen. 23 Nicholasbreakswiththe fundamental logic of the notion of nobility,in denyingthe possibilityof maintainingthe superiorityor excellenceof one being to another:Nonpotestevidenter ostendi nobilitas unius reisuperaliam?2No one, havinggrownup in the chools, had ever dared 91Evenif,ontheother cannot bepunished likecommon hand,noblemen people"eisdem cf.Ascheri 1991(n. 17),79. poenis"; 92Grellard 2001(n.89),138.The art.24 recalls a cognate idea:"(.. .) Quacunque re demonstrata nullusseitevidenter, omnesalias-Revoco quinipsaexcedatin nobilitate hereticum et blasfemum". Atn. 25 Nicholas deniestheequivalence of falsum, tamquam Godwiththeensnobilissimum. One couldnote,however, thatthepointofviewaccording towhich all entities arealikeshould be seenin thecontext ofNicholas's atomism: thisis an ontological to do withthedebates aboutbothintellectual pointandhaslittle nobility

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to say that.Once again,Nicholasrevealshimselfas a nonconformist thinker, rejectingthe scholasticidea of nobility(evenifkeepingone of itssignificant key expressionsin use), but he does not substitutefor it any 'mystical' alternativenotion.In his time,he set himselfoutsidethe neo-peripatetic as well as the ecclesiasticnetworks;and he probablypaid for this with his rupturewith the schools. Account 12. Nobilities of theMedievalMind: a Provisional At the close of this firstengagementwith a heterogeneousset of theoand fourteenth centuries, logical and philosophicaltextsof the thirteenth we can summarizesome different of conceptualisations 'nobility': a. The political concept: It was developed primarilyby jurists and probablyhas itsmostinfluential championin Bartoloof Sassoferrato. In thissense, the notionof nobilitymustbe connectedto that of a (particular)communityand cannot existwithoutbeing certifiedby Any 'ontological'nobilityof sinexplicitpublic laws or statutes.93 is as individuals94 unacceptable withina Christian gular rejected so that the notion framework, only functionsin a politicalcontext. as does not requirevirtue,but onlyprincely Moreover,nobility, such, recognition.It representsthe medievalequivalentof a legal-positivist concept of nobility,according to which there is no privilegedor 'natural'statuspriorto, or independentof a definedjuridical status. b. The philosophical'peripatetic'concept:Dante setsforthin Book IV such of The Banquet , and even if it permitsvarious interpretations, a notion admits,to some degree, an ontologicalhierarchyof the human being grounded in the use of 'philosophical'reason, connectingnobilitywith intellectualvirtue.Moreover,the conceptualisation of emotionsand human sensualitas plays a vital role: one of a possible analHereI limit tostress ofphilosophical andtheexcellence myself profession. I amaware, inother of'nobility'. ofapplication ofthenotion different fields ogybetween underthelightshedbyJ. R. Weinberg, ofmyreading, ofa possible one-sideness words, A Study in14thCentury Nicolaus , NewYork19692,149-62and237-38; Thought ofAutrecourt. selon d'Autrécourt dela connaissance Croire etsavoir. Lesprincipes Nicolas andbyCh. Grellard, , de la spéculation"), Paris2005,29-38("Le statut esp.33,n. 1. 93Cf. G. Salvemini, di Firenze e altriscritti cavalleresca nelComune La dignità , ed. byE. andCarpi2004(n. 36),258-59. Milan(2nded.) 1972,99ff. Sestan, 94The ontological is ofcourse i.e.thescaleofdifferent ofbeings, species, hierarchy maintained.

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the conditionsforbecominga noble thinker,in fact,is to be wellwhich born; thatis to say, to have a bettermind-bodyconfiguration facilitatesthe controlof passions.95This articleexplored aspects of the philosophicalnotion,albeitfroma narrowperspective,following some interpretations of the peripateticformula'virbenenatus' c. The radical Christianconceptof nobility,accordingto whicha man is a true noble-mansola gratia : It refersto ancientsources (such as the Stoic tripartite divisionof beatitudeand the Gnostictaxonomy of pneumatic,psychicand materialmen),but is engaged forpolemical purposeswith the other competingnotions(
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ANDREA A. ROBIGLIO the nobler conclusion.Examples of such argumentationfollowthe principlethat,giventwo elements,eitherone is less noble and dependent upon the other(nobler)element,or both are dependentupon a thirdelementthatis noblerthan both {ubiduo,unusab altero , etc.).

Apart frompoint d (whichdeservesa separateand detailedtreatmenton both logical and metaphysicalniveau ), we can easily see that each conof a entails toward the dialecticalrejectionof the cept nobility tendency others. Two of those a and c notions, , could co-existunder certain (two) conditions.But the relationbetweenthem and b must be exclusive. which tend to blend the firstthreeconIndeed, we assistthose efforts b and into different idea of excelcepts (a, c) stepsof a unique 'historical5 lence. The value of havinga good educationaltrainingand belongingto a 'good' communitycould temperthe radicalismof c. Accordingto such a conception,which I call the moderate Christianconcept of nobility, divinegrace ordinarie acts throughhistoryand by mean of historicalmediation (for instance,throughthe teaching of noble theologicalschools). Nevertheless,the irenic reading was a practical tendencyin philosophy ratherthan an actual conception. Moreover,each idea (again, apart fromd) becomes an expressionofa characteristic social and institutional network,the membersof which are recruitedor undergo formationin part because they share a particular and exclusiveideal of human excellence.In a more specificsense, each 'School of thought'tended to represent,more or less implicitly,a particularkind of nobility;each had a shared commonlanguage,a common set of referencesand a privileged ' bibliothèque imaginaire'The expression 'virbenenatus' as we have seen, also became a sortof shibbolethof a philosophicalneo-Aristotelian networkthat,in recentyears,has beenwellSuch a shibboleth, reveals researchedfromotherperspectives.98 incidentally, as well some elementsof the paradigm of the 'PhilosopherGentleman', one which was to have a long lifein modernEurope's courtlysociety." 98Luca Bianchiand Gianfranco Fioravanti haveillustrated thisaspectwell.See,for ' 'ascetismo L. Bianchi, Felicità botha perspective and a selected intellettuale, bibliography, 3diBoezio andPaparella e 'arabismo': nota sul'Desummo bono diDacia 2005(n.68), , in:Bettetini 13-34. 99Forbackground, references Eliasarestilltherequired works theclassical byNorbert Cf. also theemotions'). hisstudyof thehistorical (inparticular processof 'educating : Some Between andLikemindedness A.A.Robiglio, of'conversatio Aspects oftheConcept Language andCultural toGuazzo civilis3 , in:L. Nauta(ed.),Language ofthe Change: Aspects from Aquinas

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bornMany(vir bene natus) and theImportance 13. The Meaningof cWellof ' School Been Studied in One ! Noble Having Summingup: the man benenatuswill be of good birth,from'honest'100 (if not rich) parents;he will be physicallyfit,withoutany major bodily defects;he will be good-natured,will possess naturalintelligence,ability, and talentswhich may be developed duringhis earlyeducation 'under a he good master'.Thanks to his having studiedin a prestigiousschool,101 Middle andUseofLanguage intheLater , Leuven2006,113-32. AgesandtheRenaissance Study A stimulating is still Geschonden Wereld. Eenbeschouwing over de/cansen J. Huizinga, reading in: Id., Verzamelde Werken vanonzebeschaving , VII, Haarlem1950, (1943-1945), opherstel from Charles Le Maitre thequotation taken 477-606, Additionally, esp.483-84and575-78. ' thatwas to a meaning of 'bene natus use;in thesame (n. 1) is related opento stillricher andFrench seventeenthandeighteenth-century authors. senseI couldquoteother English there In theBritish ancient traditions as wellas oftheir universities, jargon, proudoftheir ' 'bene or'borntogladness'), natus areinteresting usesoftheexpression ('well-born' employed achievements andfora brilto signify theyoungundergraduate student aptforfurther Anexample liantcareer. be theOxford to whichmatricmight commonplace, according inhiswitty ulaemustbe welldressed, bene natietmódíce dočti. DuffTraill, Henry biography ofLawrence stillemployed late-medieval scholastic distinctions: on theonehand, Sterne, which included a certain and whendealing withthegoodbodily disposition light-heartness Traillusedtheexpression on theother ofcharacter, hand,he 'good-naturated'; generosity bene natus whenreferring totheSchool's under'an able usedtheLatinexpression training to a cultural established elite.Describing Sterne's ownentry master' andtheappartenance ofJesusCollegewasa natural intotheUniversity, Traillcomments: "Theselection one: hadbeenitsMaster, andhadfounded scholSterne's laterArchbishop, great-grandfather, to oneofwhichtheyoungsizarwas,a yearafter hisadmission, elected. there, arships from orevenindusNo inference be drawn thisas toSterne's can,ofcourse, proficiency, inhisacademic studies: itis scarcely morethana testimony tothefactofdecent and try, in thesenseofbeingrelated He wasbene behaviour. to theright natus, man,the regular founder" London1882,14). (H. D. Traill,Sterne, 100 I cannot The senseoftheLatinword"honestum" hada widewebofconnotations here.FortheRenaissance debateconcerning theuseof'honestum' intheLatintransstudy cf.A. Birkenmajer, DerStreit vonCartagena lations ofAristotle's desAlfonso mit Leonardo Ethics, in Id., Etudes etdela philosophie Bruni d'histoire dessciences duMoyen Aretino, Age,WroclawWarswa-Kraków 1970(StudiaCopernicana, 1) 405-86,esp.452-54.See alsothebibliogto P. Cherchi, L'onestade e l'onesto raccontare del'Decameron', Fiesole2004.A raphy appended further hintforclarifying therelation between "nasci"and"benenasci"couldbe found 3d'Evrard in an analogy takenfrom Le 'Grecismus deBéthune à travers logic:cf.A. Grondeux, XIIIe sesgloses entre et du et XIVesiècle, Turhout 2000, grammaire positivegrammaire spéculative 176-78 "esse'V'bene 497-51 1;lookat499: (onthedistinction esse")andthesecond Prologue, "de essephilosophie naturalis" [76-77]vs."de beneessenaturalis [78-80]; philosophie" andagainat 507 [285-91]. 101 A prestigious musthavea prestigious founder or,laterin Academy (likeAristode thefifteenth ofteaching tohim:these Plato)as wellas a longtradition century, referring aretwoprerequisites forthenobility ofa school.An explicit reflection isolated) (though on thenobility ofa schoolofthought in Dionisotti canbe found 1955(n. 20).

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will have gained competencein logic, a sound knowledgeof Aristotle's works,and will have learned the naturalsciencesin order to be able to This having explain natural phenomena,both per causasand per effectus. been done, he will become ipsofactoa member of the intellectualelite and, as such, his behaviourwill always be 'measured by Reason' (even if interpretationsof the meaning of 'reason' and 'measure' may be disputed). Moreover, attendinga school in which higher 'scientific'trainingis offeredand illustriousmastersteach, becomes a conditionof the Bildung the nobilityof the school of a man 'born to gladness'; correspondingly, is also establishedby its having benenatistudents. In the course of the fifteenth gradcentury,nonetheless,the University a 'school idea of education. The on such its lost higher ually monopoly of thought' as independent from political authorityand nevertheless the mostnoble knowledge, deservingthe academic reputationforoffering The true'nobilloses itsappeal and (to some extent)itshistoricalreality.102 Aristotle resituated when scholars left the of wisdom' Peripateticschool, ity in now also him in a more varied landscape by presenting complete(and originalGreek) editions,instead of the anonymouscompanyof barbaric gothicflorilegia. While Dante boasted the authorityof having attended'the schools of the philosophers'(and, accordingto an ancientbiographicaltradition,he had travelledto Paris, because it was the motherof scholasticwisdom), Petrarch(thoughhe firstthoughtof being a 'laureate' in Paris) preferred umbra to go to Rome, beneathits laurelssubImperatoris , farfromany acain some of Carlo Dionisotti's This evolutionhas been illustrated demicmilieu. studies:in courtlysociety(and an eminentcentreof this world was the Roman Curia) the theme of the nobilityof the thinkerdid not lose its importance,but it did change its nature and references.'Honour' and 102 to is indebted idea of 'schoolofthought', The non-scholastic speaking, generally to reference of with narrow I a Humanist this, case-study thought.presented pedagogical deV in mypaperPourla lecture themid-fifteenth ofPaviaduring theUniversity century, ' deLorenzo 4Encomium at the le 7 mars Valla(Rome: Thome sancti 1457),presented Aquinatis 1370to 1500'(Leuven, ofIntellectual Tarameters International Conference Changefrom de philosophie médiévale, jr.,in:Bulletin byK. Emery June17-20,2003);cf.thereview to datesandcolourations haddifferent ofcourse, 45 (2003),246-47.Thisshift, according ofthe foundation forinstance, theimperial andpeople.In Germany, countries different as a of something to theframing also withreference mustbe considered universities 'national' elite.

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'glory' became its prominentaspects, and the main ennoblingpowers Princeand Pope- powers againstwhom the two Renaissance paradigms of nobilitywere formed,in the figuresof the Courtierand the Cardinal. So John of Lucena, in the fifteenth century,could write:luegolos cardenales son los beatos. Freiburgim Breisgau Seminar Philosophisches Universität Albert-Ludwigs-

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Does theHabit Make theNun? A Case Studyof Heloise'sInfluence s EthicalPhilosophy on Abelard' BROOKE HEIDENREICH FINDLEY

Abstract to Abelarďs A carefulreadingofHeloise'sletters revealsbothhercontribution betweenher ethicalconcernsand his. In ethicalthoughtand the differences her letters, Heloise focuseson the innatemoralqualitiesof the innerperson oftheinnerpersonthroughfalse or animus. Hypocrisy themisrepresentation deceitfulreligioushabitor outerappearance,exemplified by the potentially - is a matterof habitus greatmoralconcernto her. When Abelardresponds and to Heloise's ideas, firstin his lettersto her and later in his Collationes He Scitote ipsum , he turnsthe discussionaway fromher originalinterests. as falseappearanceinto a discussion her metaphorof the habitus transforms of anothertypeof habitus , the habitualprocessof acquiringvirtue,and inteinto his developingideas about sin as intengratesher focuson the animus and Abelard's betweenHeloise'sethicalthought thedifferences tion.Examining of both. allowsus to appreciatethe distinctcontributions Recent scholarshiphas begun to recognize Heloise, not only for her particuimpressiveliterarytalent,but forher philosophicalcontribution, that the scholars are in the area of ethics. realizing Increasingly, larly famouslettersaddressed by Heloise to Abelard can also be read as an ethical treatise.Andrea Nye has shown how "[Heloise's] views on love, religiousdevotion,and language [present]an alternativeto philosophic method as it is conceived by Abelard."1Constant Mews has examined and Heloise's ethicalthoughton love, innerdispositionand intentionality different is concluded,not onlythatHeloise'sethicalphilosophy significantly fromAbelard's,but thather influenceon him in thisarea was "decisive."2 1 Andrea andHeloise TheLetters ora Man'sDiscipline? , ofAbelard Thought Nye,A Woman's 7.3 (1992),1-22,esp.1. in:Hypatia, 2 Constant andAbelard , NewYork1999,135.For Mews,TheLostLoveLetters ofHeloise See alsoMews,Philosophical 131-35and 138-39. see 116-17, ofHeloise's overviews ethics, theVoice toHeloise: Wheeler Amantium inthe Duorum Themes , in:Bonnie (ed.),Listening Epistolae York 35-52. Woman New a 2000, , of Twelfth-Century Vivarium 44,2-3

BrillNV,Leiden,2006 © Koninklijke - www.brill.nl/viv online Alsoavailable

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When he turnedto writingethicalworkslate in life,Mews argues:"Abelard came closer to acknowledging[Heloise's] concerns,withoutever explicitlyacknowledgingher contribution."3 This article takes as its subject one specificcase in which Heloise's influenceon Abelard's ethicalthoughtis apparent:a debate betweenthe famous couple over the nature and ethical implicationsof hypocrisy, , or nun's habit. This loosely organized around the image of the habitus debate beginsin the couple's well-knownexchange of letters,but it does not end there. Abelard continuesto reflecton it in two ethical works that were most likelywrittenafterthe letterexchange: his Collationes (or a with a and a Christian and Scito te ), Dialogueof Philosopher Jew ipsum(or 4 Yet the in as Abelard treats it these works moves Ethics). away question fromHeloise's originalconcerns.What begins as Heloise's discussionof of innerselfand outercovering,ultimately becomes and hypocrisy, sincerity Abelard's examinationof intention,consentand the struggleforvirtue. The habitus debate providesa strikingexample of the phenomenonfor whichMews has argued: Heloise did indeed have a profound,frequently unacknowledgedinfluenceon Abelard's ethicalthought.As the following discussionwill show, passages of his ethical philosophycan be traced debate also directlyto concernsraised in her letters.However,the habitus some significant differences betweenHeloise's ethicalpreoccuhighlights pationsand Abelard's.While the ethicalproblemsthatAbelard takes up of themremainsuniquely are manifestly inspiredby Heloise, his treatment his own. Examiningsuch pointsof disjunctionpermitsus to continuethe processthatscholarslikeMews and Nye have begun: to separateHeloise's philosophyfromAbelard's in order to appreciate,not only her influence on her famoushusband,but the value of her thoughtin its own right.

3 Mews1999,172. 4 DatingAbelard's works is a difficult issuethatwillbe treated in moredetailbelow, note46. The letters are typically datedaround1133,soonafter theHistoria calamitatimi arecontroversial in date,butI acceptAllen's thatthey (1132).The Collationes arguments datefrom after theletter withHeloise. SeeJulieA. Allen,Onthe probably exchange Dating A Reply toMews 36 (1998),135-51.Payeralsodates , in:Vivarium, ofAbailard's Dialogus: theCollationes from 1136-39. sometime between SeePierre A Dialogue J.Payer, ofa Philosopher a Jewanda Christian with teipsum seemstohavebeenincircu, Toronto 1979,6-8.TheScito lation Abelard's Peter Abelard's Ethics , Oxford among by1139.See D.E. Luscombe, disciples 1971,XXX.

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I. HeloiseRaisestheQuestion Heloise devotesher firsttwo lettersto Abelard- her so-called "personal - to an examinationof her own letters" guiltand innocence,both in her formerstate as Abelard's lover and in her presentstate as an outwardly of successfulabbess. Her concern is, continually,with the interrogation What provesthather love forAbelard was selflessand her own sincerity. purelymotivated?What, on the otherhand, were the motivationsforher religiousconversion,and what are the ethicalimplicationsof her apparent success in the religiouslife?Heloise emergesfromthese lettersas a self-identified "sincerehypocrite":the sincerityof her love forAbelard is tied inextricably up with her religioushypocrisy,and her apparentconversionis false preciselybecause her love for Abelard is true. That she has taken the veil out of love forAbelard and followinghis commandof her love forhim and the mentstandsas proofboth of the selflessness to God.5 of her outward commitment hypocrisy and hypocrisy, Heloise insists of sincerity Throughouther interrogation on the primacyof the innerself,or animus(mind,soul).6For Heloise, the inner selfrepresentsthe core essence of the person, and hypocrisyconsists in seekingto conceal that inner self. Hence, she interrogatesthe in tesemper habuerim"1 natureof her love forAbelardby asking"quemanimum what soul I always I alwayshad towardsyou; or, literally, (whataffections had in you); and demonstratesher continueddesire for him by describ" "8 infixasuntanimo (are fixed in my ing the erotic memoriesthat nostro soul). The primacyof the inner selffor Heloise formspart of a larger systemof contraststhatshe sets up betweeninside and outside,the inner person and externalappearance, the spiritualand the corporeal. These

5 Heloise, sa Fame Pierres Abaelart etHeloys La VieetlesEpistres 1, ed. EricHicks, , Epistola ofHeloiseand to theLatintextoftheEpistolae Paris-Genève 1991,52,67.Allreferences willbe myown. translations oftheletters willbe from theHicksedition; Abelard English 6 Latindistinguishes alsoused theanimus between soul,mindorconscience; (therational thebreath). orlife,literally andtheanima ortheheart) torefer tothepassions (thespirit Latin See Oxford , ed. P.G.W.Glare,Oxford1982,132,134-35.HeloiseconsisDictionary theinnerself;shespecifically animus to refer towhatI havetermed the term uses tently to be thatsheconsiders in opposition to thosepartsoftheindividual placestheanimus I havetranslated animus as soulor mind. exterior. 7 Heloise, Eto.1,51. 8 Heloise, Ep. 2, 66.

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opposingconceptsare apparentin the followingpassage,in whichHeloise dramaticallyaccuses herselfof hypocrisy: Castamme predicant, munditiam carqui non deprehendunt ypocritam; nis conferunt in virtu tem: cum non sit corporissed animivirtus,aliquid laudis apud homineshabens,nichilapud Deum mereor,qui cordis et renumprobatorest et in absconditovidet.9 People declareme to be chaste,who do notperceive[thatI am] a hypocrite.They ascribepurityof the fleshto virtue,but sincevirtueis not of the body but of the soul [animus ], I have some praisefrommen but do not deserveany fromGod, who is thejudge of heartand entrails and sees whatis hidden. In proclaimingthat "virtueis not of the body but of the soul," Heloise opposes the physicalto the spiritual,and what is manifestto "what is hidden"- specifically, what is inside the body (the "heart and entrails"). Heloise employsthe image thatwill particularlysparkAbelard's interest,thatof the habit,as just one componentof thissystemof oppositions. In herfirstletter,she uses the habitas a metonymy of externalappearance, in placing it parallel with the body and opposingit to the inner self: Ad tuamstatim jussionemtamhabitůmipsa quam animumimmutarem, ut te tam corporismei quam animiunicumpossessoremostenderem.10 at yourcommandI myself Immediately changedmyhabitand mymind [animus ] alike,that I mightshow you to be the sole possessorof my body and mindalike. AlthoughHeloise here suggestsa harmoniouscorrespondencebetween her externaland internalaspects,in her second lettershe insteademploys the religioushabit as a metaphorof her own hypocrisy, using it to refer to the purelyoutwardaspects of her conversion: Tua me ad religionis habitůmjussio, non divinatraxitdilectio.. . . Diu simuladomea fefellit, ut religioni te,sicutet muitos, deputares ypochrisim.11 Your commandbroughtme to the religioushabit,not divinelove.. . . For a long time,my feigningdeceivedyou as it did many others,so thatyou tookhypocrisy forreligion. 9 Heloise, Ep.2, 67. 10Heloise, Et).1,49. 11Heloise, Ep.2, 67.

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Heloise's referenceto her nun's habit is closelyfollowedby a reference to hypocrisyas a formof simulating(simulatio). Her choice of word suglink a between the habit and the gests religious adoption of a deceitful has a visual connotation.12 In the lines that appearance, since simulatio follow,she developstheseconnectionsfurther, challengingAbelardto recher her habitus ognize hypocrisyby lookingbeyond (whichmightbe read here not onlyas "clothing,"but as "appearance")to her "internaldisease": Nemo medicinaperitusinteriorem morbumex exterioris habitusinspectionedijudicat.Nulla quicquidmeritiapud Deum optinent,que reprobis eque ut electiscommuniasunt. Hec autem ea sunt que exterius tamstudioseperaguntquantumypochrite.13 aguntur, que nullisanctorum No one experiencedin medicinejudges an internaldiseaseby an inspectionofexternalhabit[clothing/ . Those thingsthatthereproappearance] bates and the elect have in commondo not gain any meritin God's thethingsthatare done outwardly, whichnone eyes.Those are certainly of the saintsperformas fervently as the hypocrites. Here, Heloise links the externalappearance or habit with the outward worksthathave gained her the praiseof many,includingAbelard.Neither her actions nor her dress,she argues,should be taken as representative of her internalstate. Heloise's imageryof hypocrisyas a contrastbetweeninternalselfand externalappearance or actionsis familiarto us today,and it also speaks In particular, to a richmedievaltradition. the associationbetweenhypocrisy and clothingas concealingcoveringgoes back long beforeHeloise. In his "wolves homilyon the Sermonon theMount,Augustinetermedhypocrites in sheep's clothing,"and the associationbetweenthisbiblical image and the figureof the hypocritequicklyattainedproverbialstatus.14 Already, 12Heloise's discussion ofthe useofthetermsimulatio mayalsobe a nodto Gregory's inhisMoralia inlob.According toGregory, simulator ofthehypocrite , as hecallsthefigure Heloiserecognizes andobsessive loveofpraise"; thesimulator hasan "inordinate similarly, forAbelard's thatherownthirst religious praisehas led herto perform hypocritically totheHigh TheSemantic actions. See Frederic Whited ofHypocrisy Sepulchres: History Amory, 53(1986), in:Recherches de Théologie ancienne etmédiévale, Middle 5-39,esp.25-30. Ages, withclothing: thehypocrite's likeHeloise, alsoassociates thehypocrite clothing Gregory, in Deuteronomy, is double, likethemixedwoolandlinenforbidden 1986,26. Amory 13Heloise, Ep. 2, 68. 14Augustine, Turnholt 1967(Corpus inmonte Desermone Domini Mutzenbecher, , ed.Almut contains theimageofthe SeriesLatina,35),132.Matthew 7:15already Christianorum, buttomyknowledge "false wolfinsheep's usedtodescribe Augustine prophets," clothing,

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in the CarolingiansatireDe Hypocritis , Theodulfususes the phrase to refer to the monks who are the butt of his criticism: specifically hypocritical "A loose hood coversthe head, an ulteriormotivethe mind,/Uncarded wool the limbs,sheep's clothingthe wolf. / The cloak outsideis double Sartorialhypocrisyamong monks [lined], the heart withintwo-faced."15 and nuns was also a favoritetopic of many of Heloise's contemporaries: PeterDamian, St. Bernard,John of Salisbury,and Guibertof Nogent all spilled ink on the subject.16And, well afterHeloise, such 13th century writersas Jean de Meun and Rutebeufwould re-useAugustine'simage as theyelaboratedon the tradition,again and again employingthe religious habit as a metaphorfor religioushypocrisy.17 For Heloise in these two letters,the metaphorof the habit functions primarilyas a rhetoricaltool: it allows her to locate the selfin an interior The importancethatHeloise space, independentof its exteriorcovering.18 thatshe asso, and the recurringimagesof interiority assignsto the animus ciateswithit,place her squarelywithinthetraditionsof Roman Stoicism19 is thefirst to associate themetaphor withhypocrites, thusvalidating a direct specifically linkbetween andhypocrisy. clothing 15Quotedin Amory 1986(n. 12),31. 16Amory 1986,31-33. 17The hypocritical monkFauxSemblant, whoexploits hisreligious habitas a deceitfuldisguise, all thewhileinsisting that"thehabitdoesnotmakethemonk," playsan dela Rose.FauxSemblant's discussion ofsartoimportant partinJeande Meun'sRoman rialhypocrisy contains a specific reference to the"wolf in sheep'sclothing." SeeJeande dela Rose ed.Armand Paris1992,594.Jean's Meun,LeRoman , 11.11127-11139, Strubel, concern withhypocrisy owesa debtto thepoemsofRutebeuf. to the Jean'sreference wolfinsheep's echoesRutebeuf's discussion ofhypocritical inhisDiscorde clothing clothing del'Université etdesJacobins. See Rutebeuf, Discorde del'Université etdesJacobins , 11.41-56, Oeuvres FaraiandJuliaBastin, Paris1959,t. 1, 240-41.See also , eds.Edmond complètes Strubel from Rutebeuf's 1992,595 n. 1.JeantakesthenameFauxSemblant Complainte deGuillaume deSaint Amour , 11.78-86,BastinandFaraieds. 1959,t. 1, 261-62.See also Strubel 1992,585 n. 2. 18Heloise's in theinnerselfmayextend interest to herother, lessexamined writings. Mews1999,131-34, hasshown thata rhetoric ofinteriority or "inner disposition" plays a keypart,notonlyin Heloise's better-known letters butin an earlier, letter anonymous collection thatMewsbelieves shouldbe attributed toAbelard andHeloise. 19AsGretchen eventhough theStoictradition ingeneral views Reydam-Schils explains, "intheRomanStoicstheemphasis on interiority interwoven," bodyandsoulas "closely is striking." TheRoman Stoics: andAffection Reydam-Schils, , Chicago2005, Self, Responsibility, 35.Scholars havenotedAbelard's affinities withtheStoics, mostimportantly inhisdevelofan ethics basedonconsent andintention. See CalvinNormore, Abelard's Stoicism opment anditsConsequences andJackZupko(eds),Stoicism: Traditions and , in: StevenK. Strange Intentionalist Ethics , Cambridge 2004,132-47;PeterKing,Abelard's Transformations , in:The Modern 72 (1995),228-31;Gerard ThePresence inMedieval Schoolman, Verbeke, ofStoicism

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and Augustiniándualism.20By contrast,Abelard's replyto Heloise will be informedby an Aristotelian universe,in whichthe term"habit" stands at the centerof a rich array of associationsthat go far beyond its link to deceitfulappearance. The Aristotelianimportanceof the term may and hypocrisy explainwhy,whenAbelardtakeson thequestionsof sincerity that Heloise has posed, he does so almost exclusivelythrougha discussion of the habit,makingwhat was forher one metaphoramong many into the primaryfocus of his argument.21 II. AbelarďsReply:Two BlackBrides In his replyto Heloise's second letter,Abelard returnstwiceto the image of the religioushabit that she has invoked:first,in his discussionof the "black bride" of the Song of Songs as a figureof the nun; second,in his retellingof an anecdote fromhis and Heloise's past concerningHeloise's own habitus . The "black bride," or Ethiopian beloved of the Song of Songs, had Abelard since Origen been taken to be a figureof the bride of Christ.22 as a figureof the nun, notingin particularthather reads her specifically andGiovanni Orlandi D.G. 1983,51-53;andJohnMarenbon , Washington, (ed. Thought forHeloise theprimacy oftheanimus andtrans.), Collationes 2001,Iii.However, , Oxford in Abelard, hasno exactparallel as I willshowin moredetailbelow. 20On Augustine's and oftheduality between ofinteriority bodyand understanding - seeCharles - sometimes The dualism" Sources soul termed oftheSelf: Taylor, "Augustinián Abelard's ethical is mani, Cambridge 1989,127-42. thought Making oftheModern Identity intheinner thatsinoriginates influenced doctrine person, specifically byAugustine's fesdy Abälard: Meister undOpfer desScharfsinns in thewill.See L.M. de Rijk,Peter , in: Rudolf undWirkung. Abaelardus: Person Thomas(ed.),Petrus , Werk , Trier1980,125-38, esp.137. 21In Abelard's wealsoseewhat context intothedebate, introduction ofanAristotelian andStoic fusion between theAristotelian ofanAbelardian be termed thebeginnings might whatMatthias todevelop hereisprecisely Theethical thatAbelard traditions. system begins - modified, ofa modified Stoicism" Abelard's "ethics Lutz-Bachmann hastermed significantly, ofhuman ofhabitas an acquired of"theAristotelian disposition concept bytheaddition Ethics Abelard's Modem mind." , in:TheModern Lutz-Bachmann, Philosophical ofPeter Aspects 72 (1995),201-11, Schoolman, esp.207. 22The locus on theSongofSongs,citedby classicus forthisis Origen's commentary ofHeloiseandAbelard totheLatintextoftheEpistolae Abelard, Ep.2, 71.Allreferences sa Fame Pierres Abaelart etHeloys La VieetlesEpistres EricHicks, willbe from , Paris-Genève ofthe"blackbride" willbe myown.Fora different translations 1991.English analysis Desire Fictions seePeggy , Lincoln1982,27-32.WhileKamuf's Kamuf, ofFeminine passage, theletters because shedoesnottreat thanmine, hasa different specifically purpose analysis Heloise themes. "Theanalogy similar sheidentifies as a philosophical debate, [between becauseit appearsto Heloise's to displace andtheblackbride]can function hypocrisy

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blacknessis similarto the blacknessof the nun's "exterior habitus ."23Abelard takesthisanalogybetweenthe habit and the bride'sblack fleshas a point of departurefor an extendedredirectingof the interior/exterior images that for Heloise functionas metaphorsof hypocrisy: Habet autem Ethyopissaexteriorem in carne nigredinem, et quantum ad exteriorapertinet,ceterisapparet feminisdeformior;cum non sit tamenin interioribus dispar,sed in plerisqueetiamformosior atque canin sicut ossibus seu dentibus. videlicet dentium candor didior, Quorum in ipso etiam commendatur cum dicitur: "et dentes eius lacte sponso, candidiores."Nigra itaque in exterioribus, sed formosain interioribus tribulationibus est, quia in hac vita crebrisadversitatum corporaliter in carne exterius.24 afflicta, quasi nigrescit The Ethiopianwomanhas a blackexterioron her flesh,and in all that concernsher exteriorshe appearsuglierthanotherwomen.Still,she is not different fromthemin interiorthings,but in many thingsshe is even morebeautifuland whiter,as in her bones or her teeth.Whiteness of teethis commendedin the bridegroom whenit is said "and himself, his teethare whiterthan milk."Thus, she is black in exteriorthings, but beautifulin interiorthings.Because in thislifeshe is afflicted corof adversities, it is as if the exterior poreallywithfrequenttribulations of her fleshdarkens. The analogythatAbelarddrawsbetweenthe nun'shabitand the Ethiopian woman's fleshhas the immediateeffectof elidingclothingwith flesh,a covering that can easily be removed with the exteriorsurface of the body itself.This is indicativeof an importantdifferencebetween what exteriorappearance signifies forHeloise and what it signifies forAbelard. While Heloise considersexteriorsto be superficialand potentiallydeceitful,forAbelardthe bride'sexterioris an aspect of her identityas a whole. Her externalblacknessdoes not conceal or contradicther internalwhiteness; rather,each complementsthe otherand togethertheyforma complete entity. Abelard'sdiscussionof the bride'sanima illustrates the , or spirit,further between her interior and exterior. Not is the bride's anima harmony only - evensanctify - thecontradiction sanction ofappearances. thissanction is tied Moreover, notonlyto thereduction oftheinteriority ofherdesirebutalsoto itsreappropriation within a noncontradictory masculine space,"Kamuf1982,30. 23Abelard, Ep. 2, 71. 24Abelard, Ep. 2, 72.

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inseparablefromher flesh,but her fleshis the outward expressionof : her anima Ossa quippe,que interiora suntexteriori carnecircumdata, et ipsiuscarnis quam geruntvel sustentant, roburac fortitudo sunt,bene animam movetatque sustentât, exprimunt, que carnemipsamcui inestvivificat, ministrat.25 regit,atque ei omnemvalitudinem The bones, that are withinand surroundedby exteriorflesh'exteriori of thatveryfleshthattheybear carné],and are the core and strength whichbringsto life,sustains,moves or sustain,expressthespirit[anima], all its and rulesthe fleshitselfin whichit is contained,and furnishes to it. vigor For Abelard, animaand fleshforma unified,workingsystem:the anima has the power to influenceand governthe flesh,while the fleshin turn expressesthe "vigor"of the anima.This passage may be read as a direct and animus.In responseto responseto Heloise's polarizationof her corpus Heloise's discussionof the animus(mind or inner self),Abelard invokes the anima(the life forceanimatingthe flesh),suggestingby his veryterminologythe degree to which body and soul are inseparable. Thus, Abelard revisitsHeloise's metaphorsof interiorand exterior, black and white,soul and body, but he does so in order to forma new system,one emphasizingharmonyand unityover polarization.In this nor the system,the interioris not necessarilyequated with truthfulness, exteriorwith hypocrisy.In fact,the black bride's exteriorqualities are the ones that Abelard linksto truthwhen he says: amorsponsiearnsichumiliât.26 Sic veroearnsolverusdécolorât, quia celestis Thus surelythe truesun discolorsher,because thusthe celestiallove of makesher humble. her bridegroom The bride's black fleshowes its color to the "true sun" (sol verus). In otherwords,God (frequendyreferredto by both Abelard and Heloise as Veritas ) is responsibleforher appearance, and leaves a markon her body thatexpressesthe humilitythatis in her soul. In the same way, the nuns' habit is revelatoryof theirtrue nature,as the word "vere"(truly)in the followingpassage indicates: 25Abelard, Ep.2, 72. 26Abelard, Ep.2, 72.

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instar Ipse quippe cultusexteriornigrorumaut viliumindumentorum, virosplanlugubrishabitusbonarumviduarummortuosquos dilexerant gentium,vos in hoc mundo. . . vereviduaset desolatasostendit.27 Indeed thisexteriorattireof black or vile clothing,a semblanceof the mourninghabitof good widowslamentingtheirdead husbandswhom widowedand forsakenin thisworld theyloved, showsyou to be truly (emphasismine). Markingthe importanceof clothingin this passage, Abelard uses three " and "habitus differentwords to designate it: "cultus" " indumentum ." " " Significantly,cultus can mean not only an outfitor toilette(specifically, any aspect of the appearance that is cultivated)but a cult, religionor way of life.28Through his choice of words, Abelard emphasizes the factthat the nuns' holy way of life {cultus) is summedup by theirclothing [cultus). In the above passages, Abelard respondsto Heloise's use of the habitusmetaphorby emphasizingthat the clothing(or flesh)of the nun (or black bride) need not be symbolicof hypocrisy.However,when Abelard discussesthe nun's habit again later in the same letter,he does use it to explorethe implicationsof a deceitfulexterior.It is at thispoint that he tellsan anecdote,takenfromhis and Heloise's own past,in whichanother "black bride" figures:Heloise herself: Nosti etiam,quando te gravidamin meam transmisi patriam,sacro te habituindutam monialemte finxisse, et tali simulatione tue quam nunc habes religioniirreverenter illusisse.Unde etiam pensa quam conve- immo nienterad hanc te religionemdivinajustifia gratia traxerit nolentem,cui veritànon es illudere,volensut in ipso luas habituquod in ipsumdeliquisti,et simulationis mendacioipsa rei Veritasremedium emendet.29 prestet,et falsitatem You knowthatwhenI sentyou to myhomelandpregnantyou disguised mocked yourselfas a nun dressedin a sacred habit,and irreverently withsuch a simulationthe religionthatyou now have. Now thinkhow to suitablydivinejustice,or rathergrace,has draggedyou all unwilling this religiouslife,whichyou did not fear to mock,wishingthat you shineforthin thatsame habitagainstwhichyou transgressed, and that 27Abelard, Ep.2, 71. 28See Glare1982(n.6), 467. 29Abelard, Ep. 2, 79.

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FINDLEY BROOKEHEIDENREICH a remedyforthe lie of the pretense, the truthitselfof the thingfurnish and emendthe falsehood.

Although,at the beginningof thispassage, Heloise's habit is a deceitful coveringservingto conceal truth,it turnsout in the end that the habit has actuallyreshapedtruth.God suppliesa remedyforfalse representaso thatit will reflectrealitymore tion,not by changingthe representation willbecome, accurately,but by changingrealityso thatthe representation use Heloise's at least in retrospect, true.The "pretense"(simulation echoing becomes "the truthitselfof the thing" of the word in a similarcontext)30 (;ipsareiventas).While Heloise believesthat appearance oughtto conform to an inner reality,Abelard sets out to show her how realitycan and does conformto appearance. In hindsight,Heloise's disguisefunctions, not as a lyingsign, but as a propheticact- the sartorialequivalentof a performative statement,perhaps. The habit has, quite literally,made the nun. The implicationsof Abelard's anecdote are especiallyrich because the evokesso manylayersof meaningwithintheAristotelian Latinwordhabitus traditionas Abelard knew it. As Abelard himselfputs it in his Dialéctica: "habitusautemvocabulum habuiť (the apudphilosophos significationem multiplicem Habitusis one word habitushas had many meaningsfor philosophers).31 : it describes of the termsused in the Latin versionof Aristode'sCategories a settledstate,less easily altered than a "disposition"(
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thisdefinitionin his Sic etNon, and will later discussit in more detail in his ethicalworks.34If virtueis a habit acquired throughthe practice of virtuousactions,it is all the more symbolicallyapt thatbecominga nun for Heloise should have resultedfromthe practiceof wearingthe nun's In this anecdote turnedphilosophicalparahabit,even if disrespectfully. in the process of acquiringthe "habit of the habit," ble, we see Heloise so to speak. In thisway, Abelard's explorationof the symbolicpossibilities of the habitusalso servesas a directresponseto Heloise's contention that "virtueis not of the body but of the soul," insofaras it refocuses the discussionon Aristotelianideas about the habitualprocess of acquiring virtue. In a sense,Abelard'sanecdote sidestepsthe issue of Heloise's hypocrisy altogether,portrayingher instead as caught up in a granderscheme in whichGod's designtakesprecedenceoverherown motivations. Nevertheless, Abelard does not entirelyignorethe questionof hypocrisy:he also refers to and condemnshypocritesin his letter.Significantly, however,he bases his condemnationon a different of one centered understanding hypocrisy, not around falsehoodbut around "disrespect."Abelard does not referto hypocritesas hidingtheirtruenatureunder a deceitfulhabit,but as "disrespecting"that habit. Condemningthose who, "sicutypocrite" (behaving likehypocrites), disregardthe commandmentto prayin privateand instead make a public spectacle of theirprayers,Abelard says: - immo Cuius quidemconsilii preceptidivini muitoshuiushabitusnostricontemptores adhuc gravitersustinemus.35 We stillendurewithdifficulty themanywho holdin contempt thiscoun- and thishabitof ours. sel- or ratherdivineprecept Abelard refersto hypocritesas disregarders, or holders-in-contempt [conof the habit. Instead of being a concealingcoveringover their temptores) instead usesa termthatmight be translated as "settled state"[Greek he opposed hexis]; thistoa temporary condition diathesis See Marenbon andOrlandi , Latindispositif. [Greek 2001(n. 19),128,n. 98.TheLatintradition renders bothethos andhexis as habitus. Habitus is further related to habere another termofimportance in theCategories, (having), making thewordintoa particularly richsiteofdisparate Aristotelian associations thatarespecific to theLatintradition. 34PeterAbelard, SicetNon , 144,ed. BlancheBoyerand Richard McKeon,Chicago 497-98.On virtue as a habitin Abelard's laterethical seebelow. 1976-77, works, 35Abelard, Ep. 2, 74.

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truenature,the habit is a sign thattheyhave not yet learned to respect. to any wrongdoingof Heloise's in this AlthoughAbelard is not referring passage, there is still an analogy to be drawn here. In recountingthe storyof Heloise's disguisein a nun's habit,Abelard seems less concerned with the false externalappearance that she cultivatesthan with the disthather choice of costumeimplies.He does not mentionthe exterrespect nal/internaldichotomyat all, but he referstwiceto the factthatHeloise "mocked" {illudere) the habit throughher misuseof it. Like the individuals to whom Abelard refersin the above passage, Heloise was a hypocrite because she "held the habit in contempt,"not because she used it as a coveringto conceal her true nature.36 Kamuf has claimed of thisletter:"[Abelard's] counter-portrait [of the black bride] [. . .] eradicatesthe charge of hypocrisyeven as it preserves its formalstructure.[. . .] It is not the structureof hypocrisywhich is convertedbut thevalue placed on it."37I agree thatAbelardhas effectively emptiedHeloise's originalinside/outsidecontrastsof theirnegativevalue, preservingthe structureof her metaphorswhile imaginingnew meanings forthem. However,I would take issue withKamuf by emphasizingthat - he has Abelard has notceased to condemn hypocrites only moved the label "hypocrisy"aside, away fromwhat has become an essentiallyunrelated discussionof clothingand the habitual process of acquiringvirtue. not to any contrastbetween Hypocrisynow refersto disrespector mockery, exteriorselfand interiorappearance. Indeed, hypocrisyas Heloise conceives of it, the coveringover of the innerselfwitha falseexterior,cannot exist accordingto Abelard. Instead, he considersthe exterior,even to be an aspect of the self if it is initiallyincompatiblewithtruthfulness, ratherthan a disguisingcoveringover the self (fleshratherthan clothing, as it were). In this way, he rejectsHeloise's idea of the self as an interioressence thatremainsuntouchedby the mere "externals"of body, clothingand insincereactions.

36JohnMarenbon all sinas, at base, defines teipsum Abelard arguesthatin theScito Abelard ThePhilosophy ofGod."Marenbon, 1997,265-66. , Cambridge ofPeter "contempt to hypocrisy, hereis notspecific ofcontempt thathiscondemnation Thiswouldimply at all. in hypocrisy interested thathe is notparticularly substantiating mybelief 37Kamuf1982(n. 22),29.

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III. HeloiseEmptiesherMetaphors In her thirdletter,ratherthan continuingto engage Abelard on a personal level by writingto him about her love, past and present,Heloise begins to engage him on a professionallevel by askinghim to establish a rule forher and her nuns. Yet even as she makes thisprofoundchange in subjectmattershe continuesto referto the habitusthat has become a bone of contentionbetweenherselfand Abelard. In so doing, she establishes a philosophicaland ethical continuitybetweenher "personal" lettersand this,the firstof the so-called "lettersof direction." Early in her letter,Heloise says that she would like a rule "[qui] ex nostre conversionis statum describa ť (that describesthe state integro habitumque and habit of our conversionin its entirety).38 "The habit of our conversion" is an enigmaticphrase. Habituscan also mean "nature,"and, for the purposesof a literalreading,that seems the best way to understand it here. Nevertheless, given Heloise's earlieruse of the habit as a symbol ofthepurelyoutwardaspectsof conversion, her demandsoundscontentious. In the lines that follow,Heloise makes it clear that she uses the word habitus in its most here,withwhat seems to be an ironicdisingenuousness, literalsense. She justifiesher requestfor a rule by pointingout that the Benedictinerule is not well suited for women. In order to prove her point, she begins with the example of clothing.Followingare the very firstquestionsthat she asks Abelard about the Benedictinerule,just a fewlines afterher requestthathe writethema rule describingthe "habit of theirconversion": et scapularibusibi scripQuid ad feminasquod de cucullis,femoralibus tumest?Quid deniquead ipsasde tunicisaut de laneisad carnemindumenstrue hec omnino mentis,cum earumhumorissuperflui purgationes réfugiant?39 How does what is writtenthereabout cowls,breechesand scapulars abouttunicsor woolensworn applyto women?And how whatis written nextto the flesh,since theirmonthlypurgationsof superfluous humor are entirely averseto thesethings? Once again, Heloise takes up the issue of the habitus , but this time her discussionremainson a literallevel. Instead of tacklingthe philosophical 38Heloise, Ep. 3, 89. 39Heloise, Ep. 3, 89.

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questionsthatboth she and Abelard raised earlier,she descendsinto the and even biological,questionsthat arise when the word habinitty-gritty, tus is understoodas simplyreferringto prescribedreligiousclothing more particularly, religiousclothingin its relationshipto the femalebody. While tantalizing,her referencecomes as a non sequiturin the philosophical debate that she originallysparkedwithAbelard. The way in which Heloise is at once redirectingand continuingthe debate,just as she redirectsand continuesthe correspondence,does not become clear untillater in her letter,when yet another allusion to the habitus arises. Once again, the referenceis a seeminglydisingenuousone: this time, because the discussionof the habitusis not in Heloise's own words, but contained within an extended quote from Augustine.Yet Augustine'smessage turnsout to be Heloise's own. In this passage, as Heloise tellsus, Augustinedistinguishes "intervirtutem etvirtutis exhibitionem" (betweenvirtueand the exhibitionof virtue),saying: Continentia non corporis,sed animevirtusest.Virtutesautemanimialiin quando corporemanifestantur, aliquandoin habitulatent.40 Continenceis a virtue,not of the body but of the soul. Now virtuesof in the body,and sometimeshide in the soul are sometimesmanifested the habit. It is surelyno coincidence that the passage of Augustinethat Heloise citeshere is also the source of her self-accusation of hypocrisyin her second letter.Heloise now calls her reader's attentionto the fact that she was echoing Augustine("continentia noncorporis , sed animevirtus esť) when she insisted,in her second letter,"non [est]corporis sed animivirtus ," with Merely by inserting specificreferenceto her own lack of continence.41 this citationinto her thirdletter,Heloise uses Augustine'sauthorityto back up her originalpoint, implicitlyreclaimingher status as "sincere of understanding hypocrite"and throwingdoubt on Abelard's conflicting the habitusas a sartorialact. As Heloise's quotation of Augustinecontinues,however,it becomes is quite different fromeither clear thatAugustine'suse of the termhabitus Abelard's or Heloise's. While Heloise used the termto referto outward and potentiallydeceitfulappearance, Augustineuses it here in one of its 40Heloise, Ep. 3, 101. 41Heloise, Ep.2, 67.

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alternatemeanings:"nature" or "mode of existence."Thus, he explains sit "how virtuemay existin habit even if it does not in works"("quomodo 2 abstithe nonsit in opere") virtus in habitu , etiamsi ,4 by usingJohn Baptist's nence fromfood and drink as an example of "virtuein works," and Christ'slack of abstinencefromfood and drinkas an example of "virtue in habit." Similarly,he says: in Johannequi nullasexpertusest Non est imparmeritumcontinentie . . . Sed continentiam Johannes nuptias,et in Abrahamqui filiosgeneravit. et in opere,Abrahamvero in solo habituhabebat.43 The meritof continenceis not unequal inJohn,who knewno wedlock, and in Abraham,who begatsons.. . . ButJohn'scontinenceis in works, and Abraham'sonlyin habit. What Augustinemeans by "habit" in these passages, then,is effectively the opposite of what Heloise meant by "habit" in her firsttwo letters. There, Heloise used the metaphorof habit as disguisingcoveringto refer to the hypocriticalappearance of virtue;here, Augustineuses the same word, under an alternatemeaning,to referto the essentialnature from which virtuousdeeds spring.By includingthis quote fromAugustinein source of her her letter,then,Heloise not only reveals the authoritative virtue's not to the statement about belonging body but to the original which functions the extent to this statement she also soul; displays as that of the habit. Her earlier insisof such independently metaphors tence on the split between appearance and realityparallels Augustine's divisionbetween "works" and "habit" (nature),yet her usage of terminologyis opposite to Augustine's.Kamuf has noted Heloise's penchant forbreakingdown oppositions,and here,in her skilledhands,we see the into its termat the heart of her debate withAbelard being transformed own antonym.44 Through her two seeminglydisingenuousreferencesto habit, Heloise in factmakes a particularlyastuterhetoricalmove. Earlier,Abelard preservedthe superficialstructures of her metaphorsof clothingas covering 42Heloise, Ep. 3, 101. 43Heloise, Et. 3, 102. 44Kamuf1982(n.22),44,argues thatHeloise's letters ofthestrucstagea "breakdown As shedemonstrates, tureofopposition." Heloisefrequently buildsarguments or creates aroundopposing or destroy theputative metaphors onlyto destabilize pairsofconcepts, differences on whichtheseoppositions arebased.

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and insideversusoutside,even as he changed theirmeaningsto the detrimentof Heloise's originalpoint.Here, Heloise does the opposite:she dismantlesher originalhabitus repeatingthe metaphor,while simultaneously substanceof the argumentin which she exploitedit. Not acts, but the nature of the person, are what determinesvirtue,she (and, as it turns out, Augustine)insist.This is truewhetheror not the image of the habitusis employedto elucidate the problem: in this letter,Heloise repeatbut pointedlydoes notemployit as a metaphor edly mentionsthe habitus in her argument.In thisway, she pulls the rug out fromunderAbelard's and philosophicallysubtle manipulationof the word"habitus" artistically of her metaphors.The real effectively puttinga stop to his refiguring question here, Heloise seems to say, is an ethical one: its substanceis what is important,not the images withwhich she has illustratedit, and which she can deconstruct just as easily as she has constructedthem. In drawingan implicitdistinctionbetween the substanceof an argumentand the metaphorsthatfacilitateits expression,Heloise is of course metaphor.Subtly,she seemsto imply creatinganothereven more effective thatby pursuingimages ratherthan substance,the letterratherthan the spirit,Abelard has in a sense been guiltyof his own brand of rhetorical on her origBy contrast,Heloise continuesto focusrelentlessly hypocrisy. inal question.It is possible to read this entireletteras a furtherinquiry betweenvirtueand the appearanceof virtue,"between into "the difference the essence of a person and her acts. That this inquiryhas been transplanted fromthe personal realm of Heloise's own experienceinto the theologicalrealm of what constitutesan appropriaterule for nuns does not make it any the less piercing. Heloise acknowledgesher strong By invokingAugustineas an authority, with Augustiniándualism: she, like Augustine,insistson drawaffinities between a "virtueof mind" and a "virtueof works." a distinction ing Her ethical focus,as we have seen, is on the inner essence of the person, not on thatperson'soutwardsacts. Such views mightseem to recall an ethicsof intention,or what we have now come to call "Abelardian differences ethics."45 However,as I willarguebelow,thereremainsignificant 45Indeed,de RijkhasshownthatAbelard's as a ethical maybe understood thought of ofsinwiththemoment identification Abelard's doctrine: oftheAugustinián reworking locationof sinin thewill.De Rijk 1980(n. 20), 137. consent Augustine's parallels focus Heloise's between to distinguish itis important as I willarguebelow, Nevertheless, andAbelard's closer toAugustine's selforessence ontheinner pinpointing "will") (perhaps as sin. thatcanbe identified ofinneraction("consent") ofa moment

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between Heloise's ideas here and the ideas that Abelard will eventually put forwardin his worksof ethicalphilosophy. IV. Continuations and theScitote ipsum of theDebate:The Collationes At this point, Heloise's voice falls silent on the subject of habit and hypocrisy.However,in Abelard's two major ethicalworks,the Collationes and the Scitote ipsum , we can see him continuingto work throughthe ideas thatHeloise has raised in her letters as it seems,seekpersistently, out answers with which to to ing satisfactory respond her challenges.46 The followingpassage of the Collationes acquires a new depth when it is read as a continuationof the habitus debate, and a replyto Heloise's selfaccusationsof concupiscenceand hypocrisy. Virtus,inquiunt,est habitusanimioptimus.. . . Est igiturhabitusqualitas rei non naturaliter insita,sed studioac deliberationeconquistaet difficile mobilis.Unde hanc quam naturalemin quibusdamcastitatem nominantex corporisvidelicetfrigiditate vel aliqua complexionenature, nullam que umquamconcupiscentie pugnamsustinetde qua triumphet, nec meritumobtinet,nequaquam virtutibusconnumeramus. . . . Ubi non est non est quippe aliqua repugnantiepugna, superantisvirtutis iuxta illud etiam vestii 'Non coronabitur corona, magni philosophi: quis nisilegittime certaverit.'47 "Virtue,"theysay, "is an excellenthabitof the mind.". . . For habitis a qualityof a thingnot presentin it by nature,but acquiredby strivand whichis difficult to alter.So thechastity which ingand deliberation, fromfrigidity of the body or theycall naturalin some people,resulting 46It willbe clearthatmydiscussion hereandin section V is basedon mybelief that theCollationes werecomposed Abelard's ofletters withHeloise. Scholars have after exchange haddifficulty on a datefortheCollationes a , withMewsin particular agreeing proposing dateas earlyas themid1120s.See Constant theWorks Abelard Mews,OnDating , ofPeter in:Archives d'histoire doctrinale etlittéraire duMoyen However, Age,52 (1985),104-126. inhismorerecent workMewsleanstowards a dateintheearly1130s.See Mews, Abelard andHeloise Mews'1985article, Allenhasargued fora later , Oxford 2005,176.Countering date.In particular, shemakesthecasethatthedefinition ofsinin theCollationes represents a progression inthinking from theCommentaria inRomanos must , so thattheCollationes havebeenwritten after theCommentaria. See Allen1998(n.4), 148.The Commentaria has inturn beenshown todatefrom after Abelard's VII toHeloise. See E.M.Buytaert, Epistle Petri Abaelardi continuado medievalis I, CorpusChristianorum Opera Theologica 11,Turnholt thisparticular oftheCollationes makes senseas a response 1969,36.AsI arguehere, passage to issuesraisedin Heloise's letters. 47PeterAbelard, Collationes andOrlandi, Oxford 2001(n.19),128-30. , ed. Marenbon

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FINDLEY BROOKEHEIDENREICH ofnature,whichdoes nothave to struggle fromsomeconstitution against concupiscenceover whichit mighttriumphand whichdoes not obtain . . . Indeed,wherethere merit,we in no wise reckonamongthevirtues. is no fightagainstoppositionthereis no crownfora conqueringvirtue, of yourgreatphilosopher:"He is not even accordingto the statement crownedunlesshe has competedaccordingto the rules."48

Abelard begins his discussionof virtueby citingBoethius' definitionof virtueas a habit,and explainingthathabitsare acquired qualitiesdifficult to alter.These are ideas, ultimatelyderivingfromBoethius'commentary on Aristotle,that Abelard has already discussedin his Sic etNon*9New and striking here,however,are both Abelard's emphasison "strivingand deliberation"as a means to acquiringvirtue,and his choice of the example of chastityand concupiscence.Accordingto Marenbon and Orlandi, the idea that the habit of virtuemust be acquired throughapplication and hard work does not appear in Aristotleor Boethius,but is original with Abelard.50Yet this is an idea that never appears in Abelard's discussionof virtueas a habit in the Sic etMn , suggestingthatit may have been conceived later,perhaps as a way of replyingto Heloise. Indeed, and to "thefightforthecrown"specifically to "striving" Abelard'sreferences recall his injunctionsto Heloise in his second letter,where he encourages her to win virtueby strivingagainsther own desires: nisi cui enimsuperestpugna,superestet corona,quia 'non coronabitur qui legitimecertaverit.'51 For whomthefightremains,thecrownalso remains,because "he is not crownedwho has not competedaccordingto the rules." Abelard's choice of concupiscenceas an example also seems tailoredto Heloise's complaintsabout her inabilityto be "displeased"by eroticmemories of herselfand Abelard.52Indeed, in this passage of the Collationes , Abelard almostseems to be backhandedlypraisingHeloise, implyingthat she has proved she is not "frigid."Finally,a slightchange that Abelard

48Trans.Payer1979(n.4), 109. 49See alsoMarenbon of combination ofAbelard's 1997(n. 36),284,fora discussion here. andAristotle Boethius 50Marenbon 1997(n. 36),285. andOrlandi2001(n. 19),129n. 98; Marenbon 51Abelard, Ep. 2, 86. 52Heloise, Ep. 2, 66.

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makes to Boethius' wordingmay perhaps be a nod to Heloise. While Boethius' commentaryas quoted in the Sic et nonreferredto virtueas "mentis animi Optimus ."53 habitus here Abelard calls virtuea "habitus optimus" Heloise's passionateinsistencethat virtueproceeds fromthe animusmay be in his thoughtshere. It would seem that,as he writesthe Collationes , Abelard has not ceased to reflecton the ethical questionsthat Heloise has posed, nor has he ceased to defendher cause and praise her as virtuous,even as she herselfclaims to be sinful.However, despitehis sympatheticattentionto some of Heloise's concerns,Abelard continuesto directthe conversationaway fromher originalfocuson hypocrisyas coninto cealmentof the self.Heloise's concealinghabit is here transformed the "habit of virtue";the possibilityof falsehoodand deceit never enters into a discussionthat instead focuseson the struggleto conquer inborn inclinationsthroughgood actions. In the Scitote ipsum , Abelard continuesto develop the issues that he . He devotes severalpages to outlinesin this paragraph of the Collationes in and of itself does not constitutea sin,54 that concupiscence proving once again quotingthe Biblicalpassage about the struggleand the crown to demonstratethat strivingagainst a bad inclinationleads to virtue.55 answerto the problemof Heloise's claim However,his most satisfactory comes when he introducesthe idea of consent. of persistent concupiscence mulierem sed concupiscentiae consentire Non itaqueconcupiscere peccatum consensus concubitus sed voluntatis nec voluntas est, dampnabilisest.56 Sin is not lustingfora woman but consentingto lust; the consentof the will is damnablebut not the will forintercourse.57 The "consentof the will" is perhaps the crucial componentof Abelard's eventualsolutionto the problemthat Heloise has posed him: lust in and of itselfis not a sin,as long as our willdoes not consentto it but continues to struggleagainstit. Alongside"intention,""consent"comes to forma 53Abelard, SicetNon144,p. 498. 54Abelard, Scito teipsum Oxford 41-45. , ed. D.E. Luscombe, 1971,11-15, 55Abelard, Scito teipsum, 13. 56Abelard, Scito teipsum , 14. 57Trans.Luscombe 1971(n. 4), 15.Interestingly, Luscombe outthatthisis a points from theEpistola ofAbelard's , 15,n. 2. On theprogression changein thinking thinking - a termthatdoesnotappearbefore towards thenotion of"consent" teipsum theScito seeMarenbon 1997(n. 36),259-60.

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De Rijk has demonstratedthat lynchpinof Abelarďs ethical system.58 Abelarďsidentification of sin as consentis in parta reworking ofAugustine's doctrinethat sin originatesin the will. Accordingto de Rijk, Abelarďs originalitywith respectto Augustineis to distinguishcarefullybetween desire and consent,thus clarifyingAugustine'sconcept of the "will."59 withhis own Indeed, here we see Abelard combiningAugustiniánvoluntas In revisitingAugustine,Abelard is also to some extentrevisitconsensus. ing Heloise: we have alreadyseen how Heloise inscribesher ethicswithin the Augustiniántradition. WhileI concurwithde Rijk'sobservations, I believethatwhereAbelarďs ethicsdiffercruciallyfromboth Augustine'sand Heloise's is in Abelarďs focuson sin as a momentof action , albeit mental action,ratherthan on the innate good or bad qualities of the animus(Heloise) or the voluntas (Augustine).Like Heloise, Abelard believes that outwardactions in and of themselves are indifferent. However,unlikeHeloise,he does not attempt to measurethe moral qualitiesof the innerpersonas a whole,but rather to pinpointa momentof mental action that can be identifiedas a sin. As Marenbon has shown,"intention"forAbelard bears a directrelation to action: "intentions[. . .] are sinfulonly in relation to a definitely intended(althoughperhapsprevented)action."60Furthermore, as Abelard himselfspecifies,"consent" is a moment of mental action that can be pinpointed: Tunc vero consentimus ei quod non licet,cum nos ab eius perpetratione nequaquam retrahimus parati penitus,si dareturfacultas,illud perficere.61 The timewhen we consentto what is unlawfulis in factwhen we in no way draw back fromits accomplishment and are inwardlyready,if the to do it.62 chance, given

58See Lutz-Bachmann 1995(n.21),208-09. 59De Rijk1980(n.20),137:„Abälards dieSündeseiderKonsens, istim Grundthese, Grunde eineweitere, desaugustinischen genommen scharfsinnige Ausarbeitung Standpunktes desHandelns; dieSündebestehe alsoimWillen"), denu. a. („derWilleseidas Prinzip dieSchuleAnselms vonLâonschonvertreten hatte. Abälards zurursprünglichen Beitrag Lehrewares, des weiteren zwischen undZustimmung zu unterVerlangen (Begierde) scheiden". 60Marenbon 1997(n. 36),256. 61Abelard, Scito teipsum, 14. 62Trans.Luscombe 1971(n.4), 15.Similarly, Marenbon 1997(n. 36),262 describes

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AlthoughAbelard internalizesthe momentof sin, he is still concerned it as a moment,an act ratherthan an essence as it were. withidentifying Perhapsthisis whyHeloise's concernwiththe natureof the innerselfand the possibilityof hypocrisyseems to hold only a limitedinterestforhim. Andrea Nye sums up this differencesuccinctlywhen she explains that virtue for Heloise depends on who an individual really is; for Abelard,on how an individualacts by forceof will on who he is. As she puts it: Heloise'svirtuedoes not requiretheheroicact of willofAbelard'sdualIn Abelard'sethics,the innerevil of appetiteis eradiist metaphysics. desirable even,so thatthe rationalmasteryof the soul overvice cable, can be exercised.Virtuecan neverbe a "naturalhabit" because such buta change Heloise'svirtuerequiresnotwillpower a thingis impossible. of heart.63 Nye's insight,thoughbased on her readingof the lettercollectionalone, is fullyapplicable to the largercorpus of Abelard's ethicalwritings.The betweenthe termanimusas Heloise uses it, and termssuch keydifference as Abelard uses them,has all too oftenbeen overand consensus as intentio looked. The concludingsectionof this essay will take a closer look at a particulartextualmomentin Heloise's letters:one that servesto demonstrateboth the importancethat she places on the animus , and the extent to which criticalreceptionof her thoughtmay have tended either to effacethat focus,or to mistakenlyattributeit to Abelard. This textual momentalso indicatesjust how far we may need to reassess Heloise's influential to, the philothoughtas separatefrom,althoughunquestionably sophical systemknown as "Abelardianethics." or "Heloisian"Ethics? V. "Abelardian" In one of the more famouspassages of her firstletter,Heloise draws a betweenactionsand the spiritin whichtheyare accomplished, distinction in order to weigh her own guilt and innocence in the outcome of the disastrouslove affair: of theoutward theperformance and prompting as "a mentalact preceding consent act". sinful 63Nye1992(n. 1),11.

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BROOKEHEIDENREICH FINDLEY Que plurimumnocens,plurimum ut nosti sum innocens:non enim rei effectus, in crimineest,nec que fiunt,sed quo sed efficientis affectus animo fiunt,equitaspensât.64 I who was harmfulin manythingswas also, as you know,innocentin manythings.Crime is not in the doing of the thing,but the stateof mind [affectus] of the doing,and justicethinksnot of whatis done, but in what spirit'quo animo]it is done.

Heloise reiteratesthis idea using similarwordingin her thirdletter: Non itaque magnopereque fiunt,sed quo animo fiantpensandumest, si illipiacerestudemus, qui 'cordiset renumprobatorest' et 'in abscondito videt.'65 Thus,we shouldnot thinkof whatis done,but in whatspiritit is done, if we striveto please him who 'is the inspectorof heartand entrails' and 'sees whatis concealed.' This second passage repeats a pair of Biblical quotationsthat Heloise used earlier in her self-accusationof hypocrisy.66 At all three of these , points,Heloise's focusis on the innerperson,representedby the animus whom God is able to judge throughhis investigationof the "heart," "entrails"and "whatis concealed." It is the stateof the animusthatallows us to assignguiltor innocence.Heloise's words are strikingand succinct in theirexpressionof a fundamentalaspect of her ethical thought,but theyalso contain an echo of one of her favoriteauthors.She draws her turnof phrase fromAugustine'sDe sermone Dominiin monte , a textthat is also veryconcernedwith the problemof hypocrisy: Non ergoquid quisquefaciat,sed quo animofaciat,considerandum est.67 Thereforenot whatsomeonedoes, but in whatspirithe does it, should be considered. The parallel betweenHeloise's words and Augustine'sdoes not mitigate her originality, but insteadmarksthe philosophicaltraditionwithinwhich

64Heloise, Ep. 1,51. 65Heloise, Ep. 3, 103. 66Heloise, Ep. 2, 67; quotedabovep. 252. 67Augustine, mine. Desermone Domini inmonte , ed.Mutzenbecher (n. 14),137;translation

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she places herself.As we have already seen, it is typicalof Heloise to reformulate statementsfromauthoritiesand incorporatethem seamlessly into her text. This is one of the more frequently quoted passages of Heloise's letters. Yet, ironically,commentatorson her words have tended to term them an expressionof Abelarďs"ethics of intention,"and even to implythat Heloise is borrowingan idea of Abelard'sin orderto apply it to her own case.68However,beforewe assume that Heloise's thoughtis derivativeof Abelard'shere,we shouldstop to considertwo things.First,Heloise never uses the word "intention"(;intentio ), a term typicalof Abelardian ethics; she about the soul or innerselfand the emotionsor state instead, speaks of mind (animus, Her focusis not on the intentionthatleads one affectus). to performa specificdeed, but on a certain state of being: a crucial as I have argued. Second, althoughAbelard was alreadycondifference, the sidering problemof intentionbeforethisletterwas written,onlythose worksdemonstrably writtenafter thislettershow the influenceof thispassage, with its focus on the animus. Already,in works dating fromthe mid-1120s, before his correspondence withHeloise, Abelard is in the processof thinkingthroughan ethical distinctionbetween works (opera)and their source in the thought " or intention(iintentio (cogitatio) ).69In the Sic et Non, he states: omniaopera velbonavelmalaa cogitatone ."70And, in the TheologiaChristiana , he procedunt " tota secundum intentionis radičem sit"71 While says: qualitasoperum accipienda these statementsclearlylay the framework forsome of the ideas that he will develop more fullyin the Scitote ipsum , theyare not directlyrelated to Heloise's statementabout the primacyof the animus.However, four different worksby Abelard, all of which probablypostdateHeloise's letter, do contain echoes of her words. In the course of these passages, 68See Etienne Héloïse etAbélard, Paris1938,105-07; ThePersonal Gilson, J.T.Mückle, Letters Between Abelard andHeloise 15 (1953),47-94,esp.55-56;and , in:Mediaeval Studies, andHeloise Radice,TheLetters , NewYork1974,18, 115n. 2. However, Betty ofAbelard thatthisis an entirely unfounded Nye1992(n. 1),9 and 19 n. 15,recognizes assumption. 69Indeed, Marenbon hasshown thatthefocuson "intentional ethics" wasnotin fact withAbelard, hisdevelopment ofitwasmorecomplete thanthatofhis original although "Abelard's views . . . arethecontinuation anddevelopment ofa instead, contemporaries: Marenbon 1997(n. 36),252. longtradition," 70Abelard, SicetNon142,p. 492. 71PeterAbelard, Christiana Abaelardi , V, 49,Petri II, ed. E.M. Theologia Opera Theologica Turnholt 1969(Corpus Continuatio Christianorum, Mediaevalis, Buytaert, 12),369.

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Abelard develops Heloise's thought,and cruciallyfusesit with his own thus changingthe focus of her by adding the term"intention"[intentio], are the relevant passages, given (to the originalidea slightly.Following best of scholarlydatingability)in chronologicalorder.72 Nec tam quod fiat,quam quod quomodo vel quo animo fiat,pensandum est.73 We shouldthinknot so much of what is done as of the way or spirit in whichit is done. [animus] ubi cunctaquae fiuntsecundum Hoc quidemest examenveraeiustitiae, secundum intentionem operumqualitatem.Quae pensanturmagisquam cum nunc intentionem attendebant, quidem operaJudaei magisquam Christianinaturalisuscitatajustifianon tam attendantquae fiuntquam quo animo fiant.74 of truejustice,in which all that is done is This is the consideration ratherthanaccordingto thequalthe intention of to according thought ityof the deed. Indeed, theJews are more attentiveto deeds than to whilejusticeinventedby Christiannatureattendsless to the intention, in whichit is done. whatis done thanto the spirit[animus] vel quecumque usibus nostrissunt Et nulla, credo, sunt instrumenta, intentionum commodata,quibus pro qualitatetam male uti non possimusquam bene; ad quod scilicetnichilrefert quid fiatsed quo animo fiat.75 or anythingsuitableforour And, I believe,thereare no instruments use whichwe are not able to use bothevillyand well throughthequalityof our intention.In this,what is done is not what matters,but in it is done.76 whatmind [animus] Non enim quae fiunt,sed quo animo fiantpensâtDeus, nec in opere . . . Quis etiam sed in intentionemeritumoperantisvel laus consistit. electorumin his quae ad opera pertinent ypocritis potestadequali?77 72On thedating seenote46 above. oftheCollationes, 73PeterAbelard, in:Mediaeval ed. T.P. McLaughlin, Rule Studies, Women, forReligious mine. 18 (1956),241-92, esp.265.Translation 74PeterAbelard, Abaelardi PauliadRomanos inepistolam Commentarla , Petri Theofogica Opera Mediaevalis Continuatio 1969(Corpus Turnholt ed. Christianorum, 12), I, E.M.Buytaert, mine. 65. Translation 75Abelard, Collationes , 210. 76Trans.Payer1979(n.4), 161. 77Abelard, teipsum Scito , 28.

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For God thinksnot of whatis done but in whatmindit may be done, and themeritor gloryof thedoer lies in theintention, notthedeed. . . . Moreover,in respectof works,who among the elect can be compared withhypocrites?78 Deus vero solus qui non tam quae fiunt,quam quo animo fiantadtennostrareatumpensâtet vero iudicioculpam dit,veraciterin intentione examinat.Unde et probatorcordiset renumdicitur et in abscondito videre.79 Indeed God alone,who considersnot so muchwhatis done as in what mind it may be done, trulyconsidersthe guiltin our intentionand examinesthe faultin a true trial.Whence he is said to be both the proverof the heartand the reinsand to see in the dark.80 Abelard's earliestreiterationof Heloise's words occurs in his "Rule for nuns,"a textthatstandsas a directreplyto her letters.There, his words are essentiallya quotation of hers.81In later works,however,he echoes her wordsin conjunctionwithhis own thinking on intention,making"the spiritin which somethingis done" appear to be anotherway of expressing "intention."The last two passages cited here, both fromthe Scitote , seem to acknowledgeHeloise's contributionmore directly,since ipsum echoes of her letters.In the first theycombineher statementwithfurther of these passages, Abelard draws a connectionbetween Heloise's statementand her condemnationof hypocriteswho, as she describesthemin her second letter,energetically pursuegood deeds withoutpossessinginner In the second,Abelard cites Heloise's statementalongsidea pair virtue.82 of Biblical quotationsthat she uses twice in a similarcontext,83 creating an especiallystrikingecho. At both of these points,Abelard also moves his discussioncloser to Heloise's concerns: hypocrisy,concealmentand the hidden selfrevealed to God. In sum, here we see Abelard taking an arrestingphrase coined by Heloise via Augustine,and reusingit as a way of both clarifying his own 78Trans.Luscombe 1971(n.4), 29. 79Abelard, Scito teipsum , 40. 80Trans.Luscombe 1971(n.4),41. 81A closelookat bothAugustine's andHeloise's showsthatAbelard wording clearly is notmerely theAugustine ofHeloise, butis specifically echoing passageindependently herwording: forexample, Abelard Heloise's est"rather than reusing repeats "pensandum "considerandum est." Augustine's 82Heloise, Ep.2, 68. 83Heloise, Ep.2, 67,andEp. 3, 103.

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and buildingproductivelinksbetweenhis ideas and hers.However, thinking Abelard's withoutbeing aware of the originalcontext reading reworkings of Heloise's statementmay tend to obscure the key difference between Abelard's pinpointingof momentsof mental action, and Heloise's striving to uncovera particularstate of mind betweenthe momentof consensusto a crime and the qffectus accompanyingthe doing of that crime, as it were. Yet this distinctionis crucial to understandingthe difference betweenAbelardianand Heloisian ethics. Previousscholarshiphas not onlyfailedto acknowledgethisdifference, it has even failedto recognizeHeloise's famousstatementas her own. It is especiallypainfulto see Mückle,facedwiththisverycollectionof related passages, attemptingto attributethe originalthoughtin Heloise's letters to Abelard, speculatingthat "Heloise had likelyheard Abelard speak of this doctrinemore than once" and that "we cannot rule out the possibilitythatthe commonsource [ofthisidea] is Abelard'smind."84Instead, the sequence of passages and the progressionof thoughtthat they disstatement, play clearlypointsto Heloise's originalauthorshipof a striking and Abelard's reworkingof it over the course of the last decade of his lifeto fitwith ethicalideas that he was already developing. We may seem to have come a long way fromthe debate over habit with which we started.However, the common thread lies in Heloise's beliefthatany ethicaldiscussionmustbeginby uncoveringthe truenature - one of the inner self.Virtue forher proceeds froman interioridentity over which an individualmay not have completecontrol,for she seems to believe her own animus , at least, to be unchangeableby any amount sin as she understandsit has its root in falseof struggle.Concomitantly, taken as a lack of correspondencebetweenthe inner hood or hypocrisy, selfand an individual'souter appearance or actions. In his multiplereuses of Heloise's statementabout the animus , as in himself Abelard shows his transformation of her metaphorof the habitus , to be more interestedin her imageryand turnsof phrase than in her underlyingideas about the inner self. While this demonstrateshis creativityin effectingintelligentand artfulreworkingsof his source, it of Heloise's thought.Abelard's has also tended to obscure the specificity of a comprehensivesystemof intentionalethics,based in development systems,remainsuniquely part on a fusionbetweenStoic and Aristotelian 84Mückle1953(n.68),55,56.

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his. However,Heloise deservesrecognitionin her own rightforher explorationof the ethicalimplicationsof interiorsubjectivity.85 , TN Memphis Rhodes College

85Theinteriority - and,I believe, - taken oftheselfis frequently as a charmistakenly modern notion. whoframes hisstudy ofinterior See,forexample, acteristically Taylor, inWestern as a history ofthedevelopment of"modern 1989 subjectivity thought identity," theStoicandAugustinián traditions evidence (n. 20),3. However, that, provide strong evenin Antiquity, somethinkers didlocatetheselfin an interior space.Heloiseis thus notoriginal forherideasofinteriority ofthose perse,butforherparticular development ideasin an ethical context.

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of Happinessand HumanDestiny Conceptions in theLate Thirteenth Century P.S. EARDLEY

Abstract as Medievaltheoriesof ethicstendedon the whole to regardself-perfection thegoal ofhumanlife.Howevertherewas profound disagreement, particularly in the late thirteenth century,over how exactlythiswas to be understood. Intellectualists such as Aquinas famouslyarguedthathumanperfection lay in primarily comingto knowtheessenceof God in thenextlife.Voluntarists such as the Franciscan arguedthatultimateperJohnPeckham,by contrast, fectionwas to be achievedinpatriathroughthe act of lovingGod. The present articleargues that Giles of Rome and Henry of Ghent defendeda withrespectto thefinaldestinyofhumanbeings. different sortofvoluntarism of the Ratherthanclaimingthatthegoal of humanlifelay in theperfection achieved with God was to be that ultimate union instead self,theyargued whichoccurredthrough an act ofself-transcendence, ecstasy through mystically or quasi-deification. It is commonplaceto associatemedievalconceptionsof ethicswithancient conceptionsas being broadly eudaimonisticin nature.1This association is justifiedto the extent that the majorityof Christian thinkersfrom Augustineto Aquinas tended to agree with such predecessorsas Plato and Aristotlethatthe goal of human lifewas happinessor self-perfection. They also shared with the ancientsthe notion that happiness,insofaras it was an activity,had to involvethe perfectionor actualizationof what was best in human nature.Accordingly,theyvery oftenconcluded that it mustlie in the operationof reason. Of course,Christianthinkersoften disagreedwith theirpagan predecessorsas to the appropriateobject of 1 Cf.V. Bourke, , 2 vols.,NewYork1970,I, 10-11;B. Kent,TheMoral ofEthics History toMedieval in:A.S.McGrade 2003, Philosophy, Cambridge Companion (ed.),TheCambridge Lifei toMaclntyre From Bonaventure Virtues. Conscience andOther Park, , University 232;D. Langston, andC. Becker Ethics LateMedieval PA. 2001,2; andS. MacDonald, , in:L. Becker (eds), NewYork2003,54-56. Ethics A History , 2ndedition. ofWestern Vivarium 44,2-3

BrillNV,Leiden, © Koninklijke 2006 - www.brill.nl/viv online Alsoavailable

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happiness,along with the question of whetherit could be achieved in the presentlife. Still,in theircommon beliefthat the purpose of ethics themselvesfrom lay in discoveringwhat it is goodto be, theydistinguished modern ethical theoriessuch as Kantianism and Utilitarianism, which as the of ethics the of what it is to do.2 Hence regard goal discovery right the common label of eudaimonisticas attachedto ancientand medieval moral philosophy,in contrastto theirmore modern successors. A particularlyprominentexample of this accepted picture is Georg Wieland's chapter on medieval theoriesof happiness in The Cambridge ofLaterMedievalPhilosophy. History Accordingto Wieland,Christianthinkers both agreed with Aristotleand disagreedwith him over how to understand the goal of human life. They shared with Aristotlethe view that happinesshad to consistin "the perfectionof human nature, the actualisationof possibilitiesinherentin man."3 They disagreed with him, however,over the question of whetherhappiness could be achieved in via. Aristotleclearlythoughtthatit could by means of moral and intellectualexcellence,while for the Christianthinkersof the middle ages the presentlifewas too filledwithvicissitudes,its goods simply too open to fortuneand abuse. True happiness,in the Christiantradition,was thereforenecessarilyreservedfor the life to come.4 Wieland's characterizationis accurate to a degree,but it failsfullyto capture the richness,complexityand diversityof later-thirteenth century views on the finaldestinyof human beings. In this paper, then,I want to challengeWieland's blanketassertionthatforthe Christiantheologians of the medievalperiod human happinesslay in the fullactualizationor perfectionof the self.On Wieland's account, medieval thinkersbelieved thatthe goal of human lifewas self-perfection, whichwould be achieved in the next life in union with God, either throughcontemplatingthe divine essence in the beatific vision, or through loving God.5 And while the textual evidence supportsthis interpretation for perhaps the majorityof medieval thinkers,two of the most prominenttheologiansof the late-thirteenth century,Henry of Ghent (d. 1293) and Giles of Rome 2 Bourke, , I: 10. ofEthics History 3 G. Wieland, ThePerfection A. Kenny, Happiness: ofMan, in:N. Kretzmann, J. Pinborg Medieval , Cambridge (eds),TheCambridge 1982,673. See also ofLater History Philosophy Wieland's moreextensive Ethicascientia DieAnfange der studyon thesubject, practica. Ethik im13.Jahrhundert Westfalen 1981. , Münster philosophischen 4 Ibid. 5 Ibid.,673-83.

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(1243/7-1316), departed fromthis conceptionby defendinga radically unorthodoxaccount of human destiny.Rather than understandingthe finalend of human beings to lie in self-perfection, theyargued that the true destinyof human beings lay in a certaintranscendence of the selfto be achievedthrougha typeof deificationor excstasy.In this,theydirectly challengedthe teachingsof Thomas Aquinas and otherson the question of happiness and the final goal of human beings. In establishingthis claim, it will also become apparent that Giles of Rome, at least in his mature works,was more closely allied to the voluntarismof Henry of of Thomas Aquinas than has previously Ghent than to the intellectualism been supposed.6 The Will vs. The Intellect The majorityof medieval thinkersagreed with Aristodethat happiness, insofaras it was an activity,could only be achieved by the highestor suchas JohnPeckham bestof humanpowers{EN 1098a29-31).7Voluntarists Franciscan (ca. 1225-1292),Aquinas's contemporary, argued thatthe will in the was the highest(altissima soul; accordingly,on Peckham's ) power account,beatitudeconsistsprimarilyin an act of love.8Intellectualists, by 6 Thetraditionell inthethomistic ofGileswasthathewasanintellectualist interpretation morale aristotéliciens seeJ. de Blic,Uintellectmlism tradition. Forthisinterpretation, chezdeux moralia inhonorem eximii Domini Arthur delafinduXIIIesiècle , 2 vols., , in:Miscellanea Janssen 7Ime,Contradiction andFreedom Louvain1948,I: 45-76;S.D. Dumont, oftheWillin the 3 (1992), filosofica LateThirteenth in:Documeni e studisullatradizione medievale, Century, Medieval FreeWillandFreeChoice , in: TheCambridge 578-79; ofLater History J.B.Korolec, etmorale auxXIIeetXIIIesiècles andO. Lottin, , 6 vols.,Louvain, 629-41; Psychologie Philosophy evidence to support theview there is textual Gembloux I, 315-18.However, 1942-1960, ofhumanaction, at leastin hismature a morevoluntaristic thatGilesdefended picture andGiles ontheWill Thomas works. See P.S. Eardley, , in:The Reviewof ofRome Aquinas inLater Medieval 56 (2003),835-62and TheFoundations ofFreedom Philosophy. Metaphysics, oftheHistory ofPhilosophy Giles andhisContemporaries , in:Journal (forthcoming). ofRome 7 See,forexample, Summa theologiae (= ST) I-II,q. 3, a. 5, corp.:". . . si beatAquinas's autemoperhominis. itudohominis estoperario, Optima operatio oportet quodsitoptima obiecti. autem estquaeestoptimae ariohominis Optima potentia respectu optimi potentiae nonestobiecestbonumdivinum, cuiusobiectum estintellectus, quodquidem optimum sedspeculativi." tumpractici intellectus, 8JohnPeckham, Pecham , ed. Quodlibeta Quodlibet quatuor (= Quod),I, q. 5, in: Ioannis consistit Grottaferrata F. Delorme andG. Etzkorn, 1989,16:"Dicoquodbeatitudo prinmeriti et praemii. in actuvoluntatis . . . Primodicoconsiderando proportionem cipalius - nisi et etiampraemium meritum Certum estenimquodpraecipue prosuiperfectione, est XII Super Genesim : 'Unaibiettotavirtus UndeAugustinus, caritas cadita perfectione. totavirtus estibi felicitas esthaberequodamas.'Si igitur amarequodvideas, et summa

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contrast,claimed thatthe intellectwas the highestpower in the soul and thattruehappinesshad thereforeto consistin the beatificvision.Related to the questionof human happiness,then,is the questionof whetherthe will or the intellectis the higherpower of the soul. Aquinas is probably the best-knownrepresentative of the intellectualist position.He was also the focal point of later voluntaristicreactions such as that of Henry and Giles.9 In the Summatheologiae Thomas famouslyaddresses the question of whetherthe will is a "higher" (altior Later ) power than the intellect.10 willask whetherit is "greater"(superior thinkers "nobler" nobilior or "more ), ), (; Whatever the terminology,at issue was whether perfect"(perfectior).u the intellectis dependenton, and thereforesubordinateto the will, or vice versa. In addressingthis question Aquinas draws a distinctionbetween that whichis absolutelyhigher{simpliciter) and thatwhichis higherin a qualified sense (.secundum quid).He definesthe formeras takenin itself,and the latter in relationto somethingelse.12This distinctionpermitshim to show that,althoughthe intellectmust be considered,in the final analysis,as the intrinsically higherpower, the will also has nobility. According to Aquinas the intellect is the higher potency without qualificationbecause its object is simplerand more abstractthan that of the will. That is, since the object of the will is the desirablethingitself, etfelicitas estibiamarequiafelicitas estvirtus consummata." amare, ergototabeatitudo dicendum Ibid.,q. 6 (ed.Etzkorn, XXV),19:"Adsextum perinteremptionem, quiavoluntasestaltissima etfinis animaeabsentis a sensuusquead summum animae." 9 On Henry's voluntarism andgeneral theories ofthewill,seeR. Macken, Heinrich von Gent imGespräch mitsdnen über diemenschliche Freiheit Studien Zeitgenossen , in:Franziskanische 59 (1977),125-82andLa doctrine deS. Thomas concernant la volonté etlescritiques d'Henri de Gand nellastoria delpensiero studies , in: Tommaso , Naples1976,84-91.Forgeneral d'Aquino on thedebates between voluntarists andintellectualists in thelate-thirteenth see century, B. Kent,Virtues inthe LateThirteenth oftheWill.TheTransformation ofEthics , Washington, Century D.C. 1995;Lottin, etmorale Insolente liberté. Controverses , vol.I andF.-X.Putallaz, Psychologie etcondamnations au XIIIesiècle, Friboure 1995. 10Aquinas, ST I, q. 82,a. 3: "Utrum voluntas sitaltior potentia quamintellectus." 11Cf. Henryof Ghent, de Gandavo Quod.I, q. 14,in: Henrici , Leuven OperaOmnia vol.V, ed.R. Macken, ofFontaines, 1979-, 83; Godfrey Quod. VI, q. 10,in:,LesQuodlibets deFontaines Louvain1914, , sixetseptdeGodefioid cinq , ed. M. de WulfandJ. Hofïmans, vol.III, 182. 12Aquinas, ST I, q. 82,a. 3, corp.:"Respondeo dicendum alicuius ad quodeminentia alterum uno modo,simpliciter; alio modo,secundum potestattendi dupliciter: quid. Consideratur autemaliquidtalesimpliciter, tale;secundum proutestsecundum seipsum talesecundum ad alterum." quidautem, proutdicitur respectum

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which is a compositeof matterand form,while that of the intellectis only the formor ratioof the desirablething,it followsthat the latteris more simple and abstractthan the former.Since the more abstractor detached frommattera thingis, the higherit is, it standsto reason that the object of the intellectis higherwithoutqualificationthan that of the will. Now accordingto Aquinas, the nature of a potencyis determined by the mannerin which it is relatedto its object. Thus, if the object of the intellectis higherthan that of the will, it followsthat the intellect itselfwill possess a nobler naturethan that of the will.13 position on this AlthoughAquinas clearly endorses an intellectualist in the will is some instances that to concede question,he is prepared higherthan the intellect.Advertingto Aristode,he admitsthatthe objects of the will, good and bad, are in things,while the objects of the intellect, truthand error,are in the mind. From thisit followsthatwhen an object is higherthan the soul and thereforeincapable of being understood as fullyas it is capable of being loved, it is betterto love such an object than to know it. Material objects,on the other hand, are lower thanthe immaterialsoul. It is therefore better,so Thomas thinks,to know them. such objectsthan to love Althoughthe will may be noblerin relation to certainobjects such as God, Aquinas nonethelessinsiststhat the intellectis unqualifiedlythe nobler of the two potencies.14 13Ibid.:"Si ergointellectus emisecundum considerentur etvoluntas se,sicintellectus enim Obiectum obiectorum ad invicem. excomparatione invenitur. Ethocapparet nentior intelnamobiectum absolutum etmagis estsimplicius intellectus voluntatis; quamobiectum cuiusratioestin intellectu, autemappetibile, bonům estipsaratioboniappetibilis; lectus tantosecunet abstractius, voluntatis. estobiectum Quantoautemaliquidestsimplicius volestaltiusquamobiectum intellectus et altius.Et ideoobiectum dumse estnobilius ad obiectum, ordinem sitsecundum ratiopotentiae Cumergopropria untatis. sequitur volúntate." sitaltior et nobilior intellectus se et simpliciter quodsecundum 14Ibid.:"Secundum invenitur voluntas ad alterum, etpercomparationem quidautem, re invenitur in altiori voluntatis ex eo scilicet altiorintellectu; interdum quodobiectum essesecundum auditum Sicutsi dicerem intellectus. visu, quidnobiliorem quamobiectum color estaliquarecuiusestcolor,quamvis nobilior resaliquacuiusestsonus, inquantum in hoc consistit sono.Ut enimsupradictum etsimplicior sitnobilior est,actiointellectus exeo quodvolactusverovoluntatis estinintelligente; perficitur quodratioreiintellectae ad ipsamremproutin se est.Et ideoPhilosophus untasinclinatur dicit,in VI Metaph., etfalsum, verum suntinrebus; etmalum, voluntatis, quae quaesuntobiecta quodbonum estnobilior resin qua estbonum, suntin mente. suntobiecta intellectus, Quandoigitur estaltior ad talemrem,voluntas inqua estratiointellecta; percomparationem ipsaanima, tuncetiamin compaestinfra intellectu. animam; Quandoveroresin qua estbonum, estamorDei quam Undemelior estaltiorvolúntate. ad talemrem,intellectus ratione rerum estcognitio autemmelior e contrario quamamor.Simpliciter corporalium cognitio; estnobilior intellectus tarnen quamvoluntas."

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of the intellectare conNotice thatAquinas's claimsforthe superiority sistentwith the notion that the will is inferiorbecause it relies on the as Aquinas assigns intellectforitsdetermination.15 Indeed, such superiority to the intellectwill in turnprovide the foundation,as we shall see, for his claim that true happinessconsistsprincipallyin an act of the rational potency.16 As withseveralof his othertheories,Thomas's view of the primacyof the intellectwas firstchallengedby Henry of Ghent. Disputed in 1276, twoyearsafterAquinas'sdeath,Henry'sfirstQuodlibetcontainsa sustained defenseof the claim that the will is a superiorpotencyto the intellect.17 Given thatpriorto Aquinas thereis no evidenceof such a questionbeing discussed,it is reasonableto suppose that Henry's disputationis a direct However,whereasAquinas based responseto his Dominicanpredecessor.18 his claim that the intellectis nobler than the will on the superiority of an its object alone, Henry bases his conclusionnot only on investigation of theirrespectiveobjects,but also of theiracts and habitsas well. This is because, so Henry thinks,"the power whose habit,act and object are superiorto the habit act and object of anotheris withoutqualification superiorto that otherpower."19 is supeFirst,accordingto Henry,the habit of the will,charity(caritas), riorto the habit of the intellect,wisdom(.sapientia because ), throughcharwe at a arrive love of God and does not explain, ity neighbour.Henry on philosophicalgrounds,whylove of God shouldbe superiorto the wisdom throughwhichwe contemplateGod and "thingseternal."20 Because 15Ibid.,ad 2: "Dicendum ettempore, estimperquodilludquodestpriusgeneratione et imperfectio fectius; actum, quiain unoeodemque potentia tempore praecedit perfectionem. Sed illudquodestpriussimpliciter et secundum naturae estperfectius; ordinem, sicenimactusestprior Ethocmodointellectus estprior sicutmotivům volúntate, potentia. et activum bonůmenimintellectum movet voluntatem." mobili, passivo; 16Aquinas, ST I-II,q. 3, a. 6, corp. 17Fordiscussions ofthisQuodlibet n.9),84-91;andR. Macken, , cf.Macken1976(above, La volonté selon Henri deGand de humaine, , in: Recherches faculté plusélevée quel'intelligence ancienne et médiévale, 42 (1975),5-51. Théologie 18Kent1995(n.9), 102. 19Henry ofGhent, 86: "Etdicendum estsimQuod. I, q. 14,in:vol.V, ed. Macken, cuiushabitus, actuset obiectum alteri, pliciter quodillapotentia praeminet praeminet actuiet obiecto alterius." habitui, 20Ibid.,84-85:"Etpatetassumptum habitus voluntatis in quoniam proprius quo fertur bonum actuveriamoris, esthabitus caritatis, quo secundum Augustinum perse diligimus inDeo etpropter Deumetproximum Deum.Habitus autem intellectus estsapisupremus secundum XIVoDe Trinitate. entia, quaDeumetaeterna speculamur Augustinum Quantum autempraeminet habitus caritatis omnihabitusapientiali et cognitivo, beneexprimit

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thiswas a standardclaim, Henry simplyassertsit, citingas his evidence the authorityof Augustineand St. Paul. Having comparedintellectand will withrespectto theirhabits,Henry proceeds to explain how it is that the act of the will, which is to love, is superiorto thatof the intellect,which is to know. He argues thatwilling is superiorto knowingboth in comparisonto theirrespectiveacts Central to his view that the and insofaras theyperfecttheirsubjects.21 act of the will is superiorto thatof the intellectis the claim thatthe will is the commandingpower,or motiveforcewithinthe soul. From Walter of Bruges (fl. 1267-1269) he inheritsthe notionthat the will is the "universaland firstmoverin the whole kingdomof the soul."22FromAristode, he derivesthe view thatwhatevermovesis noblerthan thatwhichundergoes motion.23It is worthpointingout that Aquinas had employedthe .24 of the intellect same textfromtheDe animaas evidenceforthe superiority in defense of the voluntarist identical text Given Henry'suse of this posito avoid the conclusionthatHenryis takingdirectaim tion,it is difficult at Thomas here. In comparingthe act of the will with that of the intellectinsofaras theyperfectthe subjectsin which theyinhere,Henry employsan argument which he derivesfromDionysiusAreopagite,and which Giles of Rome will subsequentlymake a focal point of his own theory.Because the will is inclinedtowardthe object as it existsin reality,it transforms itselfinto the object willed. The intellect,on the otherhand, {transformat) merelyapprehendsa likenessof the realitythatis known.That is, by the whereas act of lovingthewillis perfected by becominglikethe objectitself, of the thing. in knowingthe intellectis perfectedby a mere representation As regardsobjects such as God, it is clearlybetter,accordingto Henry, etangelorum, hominum XIIIo:Si Unguis cumcumdicitla Corinthios, loquar Apostolus nonhabeam caritatem autem , etc." 21Ibid.,, 85: "Quantum actusvoluntatis autemsupereminet qui estveliesivediligere, excomactuiintellectus primo comparatione: patetexduplici quiestsciresivecognoscere, ad suumsubiectum ex comparatione secundo uniusactusad alterum, utriusque paratione perobiectum." perficiendum 22Ibid.,85: "Voluntas in totoregnoanimae, motor et primus autemestuniversalis Themetaphor videbitur." utinfra omniaaliaad finem movens etprimus etsuperior, suum, voluntarist ofthesoulwasa common overthe"kingdom" forthewillas a ruler metaphor ofthesoul.Cf.R. Teske, theother tocommand thewill'sability usedtoillustrate powers intheThirteenth over the Powers TheWillasRuler , Century ofanImage oftheSoul.UsesandSources in:Vivarium, 32 (1994),62-71. 23Ibid.ForAristode's seeDe anima III, 5, 430a18-19. text, 24Aquinas, ST I, q. 82,a. 3, ad. 2.

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to become like God as He is in Himselfthan merelyto possess a likeness of Him in accordance withour mode of knowing.25 Aquinas, recall, had argued similarly.Where an object is higherthan the soul, it is better to love such an object; where it is lower, it is betterto know it. However accordingto Aquinas this relationentailsthat the will is only higherin a certainrespect(.secundum quid).Henry turnsthe tables against Aquinas. He impliesthaton Aquinas's ownreasoning,if the will is higher with respectto its act of loving God, this entailsthat it mustbe higher, not secundum This is because the nobiltyof a quid, but rathersimpliciter. is to power judged absolutelyaccording the absolutelyhighestobject.26 When God is the object, then,the act of lovingsuch an object mustbe consideredhigherthan the act of knowingit.27 of theirobjects,Henry maintains Finally,as to the relativesuperiority that the good in generalis superiorto the true. He bases this argument on the notionthat the object of the will, the good withoutqualification, encompassesand includesthe object of the intellect.On thisaccount,the true is reducibleto a relativesort of goodness,the good of the intellect. the true is merelya particulargood that serveshappiness, Furthermore, which is the object of the will. The object of the intellect,on Henry's account,is thereforesubordinateto that of the will.28 25Henry ofGhent, 86-87:"Ex secunda I, 14,in:vol.V, ed. Macken, Quod. comparatonesimiliter actione voluntatis voluntas patetintentum, quoniam perficitur ipsaredilecta utinse habetesse,quiavoluntas inipsamrem,actione actione suainclinatur autemintellects perficitur uthabetessein intellectu, ipseintellectus ipsare intellecta quiaintellects actione suatrahit inse ipsamremintellectam, voluntas autemactione suatransfert se in ipsumvolitum se uteo fruatur, et perhoc,utdicitDionysius 4o capitulo De propter divinis actione intellectus sua assimilai se reiintellectae, voluntas verotransnominibus, format se inipsum volitum. Cumergomulto etaltiusesttransforman inipsum perfectius bonumutin se estsecundum suamnaturam, quamassimilali ipsiveroutestin intelli. . . multoperfectior voluntatis gentepermodum intelligentis, ergoet altiorestoperario estamoretdilectio Dei quamcognitio eius." quamintellectus, quantomelior 26Ibid.,87: "Etsienimrespectu eorumquae suntinfra animam e converso contingit actiositaltior etnobilior estinanimacognitio rerum volúntate, quodintellectus quiaaltior essenobiliorem volcorporalium quamearumamor,hocfacitsecundum quidintellectum autemrespectus etcomparatio facit voluntatem essesuperiorem úntate, primus simpliciter bonumet primum verum suntperse et primaobiectavoluntatis et intelquiaprimum et aliarespectu illorum secundario et secundum lectus, quid. . 27Ibid.,88: . . simpliciter etabsolute melior iudicandus estactusvoluntatis quamintelcumrespectu suiprimi obiecti melior estilio." lectus, simpliciter 28Ibid.:"Quodautemobiectum voluntatis obiecto intellectus, supereminet patet,quia obiectum voluntatis habetrationem finis etultimi quodestbonumsimpliciter, simpliciter obiectum autemintellectus habetrationem bonialicuius ut intelfinis, quodestverum, et itautfinis subfineet ordinatum ad aliudutad ultimum finem." lectus,

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AlthoughGiles of Rome, unlike Aquinas and Henry, supplies no ex treatmentof whetherthe will as such is higherthan the intellect, professo of the formeris assertedin his Quodlibet the superiority III, question 18. in an act of the consists In the course of discussingwhetherbeatitude will or the intellectGiles claims that the will is nobler than the intellect it. The intelsince the will moves the intellectby commanding{imperando) will the moves on the other hand, merely[solum) lect, by "showing"(
29Gilesof Rome,Quod.Ill, q. 18,in:Aegidii Romani Columnae , ed. P. de Quodlibets am Main1966,193: . . dicendum Louvain1646;repr.Frankfurt quodintelConinck, Sed ostendendo. sedsolumei finem voluntatem necmoveat lects necdirigat imperando, et voluntad subiecta sunt nostra et omnia intellectum movet voluntas opera imperando, sitaltior Ideoex hocnonhabetur eiusimperio. quamvoluntas, potentia quodintellectus onthe andGiles Thomas See also,P.S. Eardley, imomagiseste contrario." ofRome Aquinas in 56 (2003),835-62and TheFoundations Will ofFreedom , in:The ReviewofMetaphysics of oftheHistory andHis Contemporaries Giles Medieval Later , in:Journal ofRome Philosophy: Philosophy (forthcoming). 30GilesofRome,Quod. rationalis creatura 276:"Utrum V, q. 5, in:ed. De Coninck, Deo uniatur amare, quamintelligere." per magis

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Intellectionis inferiorto lovingbecause it merelyperfectsthe intellect. Love, by contrast,perfectsthe entireagent, or "lover" (amans),since it him into the beloved object itself. transforms When the intellect"desires" (imit)the presenceof the intelligibleobject thisis forthe sake of its own This is not true of love, for "the lover,such as he is, does perfection.31 not will the presence of the beloved only on account of love itself,but indeed for the sake of the beloved thingitself,to which,as far as he is Giles goes so far as to add approvingly able, he wills to join himself."32 that love, when it has God as its object, permitsa sort of self-transcendence to occur, for "divine love, which is to say the love by which we love God, causes extasy(extasim), thatis, places loversbeyondthemselves."33 Giles marshals two furtherargumentsto support the position that union throughloving is betterthan union throughknowing.First,if it is true that even in heaven we will know God as he is in us, but will love him as he is in himself,it followsthat union to God throughintellection will occur in a merelyhuman manner. Union throughloving, however,will occur in a divine one. Because it is betterto be unitedto God as he is in himselfratherthan as he is in us, i.e., as a mere likeness, it is necessaryto conclude that union throughlove is betterthan union throughknowing.34 Giles's second argumentrelieson the standarddistinction betweenpriin in versus It asserts that while the informority origin priority perfection. ing principlemay be temporallyprior to the formedobject, it is often 31Ibid.,277:"Si ergointellectus, secundum vultpraesentiam intelliquodhuiusmodi, hocestpropter utquiaforte nonpotest id intelligere gibilis, ipsamintellectionem, plene nisiperpraesentiam eius." 32Ibid.:". . . sedamans, secundum nonvultpraesentiam amatisolum quodhuiusmodi, enimveropropter vult cui,quantum propter ipsumamorem, ipsamremamatam potest, se coniungere; velletseipsam in ipsam imo,secundum quodhuiusmodi quantum posset, transformare. amoriapproprientur, utpatetper Ideoqueestquodunireet transformare 4. cap.De divinis recitante verbaHierochea, nominibus, Dionysium, 'quodomnisamor estquaedam virtus unitiva' ..." 33Ibid.:"Divinus id Deum,estfaciens extasim, ergoamor,id estamorquo diligimus estponensamantes extraseipsos, nonpermittens eos amaresiveipsosamantes essesui sedfaciteosesseamantes id est,rerum amatarum." amatorum, ipsorum, 34Ibid.,278:"Namsi Deusetiamin patriaintelligetur secundum quoderitin nobis, et diligetur a nobisut estin seipso,consequens estquodperintelligere uniemur Deo secundum modum sedperdiligere uniemur ei nostrum, quoderitin nobis,et secundum utestin seipso, etsecundum modum divinum. Et quiaunioad Deumsecundum modum divinum estmulto etmaiorquamunioad ipsum secundum modum connostrum, potior estquodunioperamorem eritpotior et maiorquamunioperintelligere." sequens

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the case that the latteris priorin perfection.For instance,althoughthe seed is priorto the flowerin origin,the floweritselfhas priorityin perfection.This principleapplies equally to the relationbetween knowing and loving.Giles, like all thinkersof the period,voluntaristand intellectualistalike, concedes that we must know an object beforewe can love the act of the intellectmustbe consideredpriorin origin. it. Accordingly, union However, throughknowingis merelyinchoate;it achieves perfection,accordingto Giles, only once the knownobject is loved. On Giles's account, then, union throughlove is more perfect,since it has priority in perfection.35 Giles of Rome's solutionto whetherrationalagentsare unitedto God morethroughthe act of lovingthanthroughknowingexhibitsunmistakable with,and possiblyeven relianceon Henry of Ghent,particularly affinity his conclusionthat lovingis betterthan knowingsince it unitesus more V, question 5, also shows closelyto God. On the other hand, Quodlibet For one thing,in this Quodlibet Giles focusesexcluseveraldifferences. the acts of the will and the intellect;for another,his concern on sively withthe relationof these acts to God. Henry,by contrast,had is strictly compared the will and the intellectin termsnot only of theiracts, but of theirhabits and objects as well. Moreover,Henry did not restricthis to the relationof the respectiveacts to God, but also cominvestigation in relationto one another. them pared The crucial The foregoing,of course,are relativelyminordifferences. point is Giles's defenseof the idea that love, which is an act of the will, unitesthe rationalcreatureto God more closelythan knowledge,which is an act of the intellect.Implied in this argumentis the notionthat the will is superiorto the intellect,a claim that Giles had made explicidy,as we saw, in Quodlibet III, question 18. 35Ibid.:"Namea quae suntprioraorigine Undeet Aug. suntposteriora perfectione. flos et tempore Namorigine et priuselectione. interpriusorigine 12. Conf.Distinguit et ibidem eumdem florem. Sic etiamsecundum verofructus electione fructum, praecedit formáinforme saltem in pluribus aliislocis,etsinontempore, praecedit semper origine, informe. Eo formátům et perfectione praecedit tům;nullitamendubium quodelectione aliud unumpraecedat et amandinostrum, modum intelligendi ergoipsoquodsecundum estobiectum hocest,quodintelligere amare, quiabonumapprehensum praecedit origine et sitpotior estquodunioperamorem in 3. De anima.Consequens utdicitur voluntatis, unio et amare,sedhuiusmodi reiperintelligere ergomodouniemur Utroque perfection unioperintelsed in amoreconsummatur; in intelligendo inchoatur, praecedit origine estergounioperamorem, unioperamare.Potior sedperfectione quam praecedit ligere, estpotius sicutconsummatum quaminchoatum." perintelligere,

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The ScopeandNatureofHappiness Does happinessconsist,then,in an act of the intellector an act of the will? Does it consist chieflyor essentiallyin the contemplationof the such as Aquinas divine essence, or in the love of God? Intellectualists claimed thatthe finalend forhumans consistedessentiallyin the beatific vision,althoughtheyacknowledgedGod's role as the object of beatitude. Voluntariststypicallyargued, as we've indicated,that love of God was the finalend of rationalagents.John Peckham,forexample,argued this, as we saw above.36Richard of Middleton(ca. 1249-1300),anotherpromiof the period,took a more measuredapproach. Although nentvoluntarist Richard stressesthe priorityof the will in human action, happinessfor him nonethelessconsistsin a certaincooperationbetween the will and Whateverone's emphasis,most theologiansof the period, the intellect.37 in stressing as Wielandhas correctly noted,followedAristotle self-perfection as the final destinyof human beings.38That is, they located happiness primarilyin human activity,whetherof the intellect,the will,or a combinationof the two. Henry of Ghent and Giles of Rome, at least in the latter'smature works,stand out by theirlack of willingnessto "baptize" Aristotleon the questionof the finaldestinyof human beings.Instead,theylooked to the older, mysticaltraditionof Dionysius Areopagite as a primarysource. as the final end of human That is, ratherthan stressingself-perfection or exstacy.Accordingly, theylocated beings,theystressedself-transcendence in will and the intelwho is the of the God, object happinessprimarily Giles endorses lect. As we shall see presently, Henry's although ultimately view of thefinaldestinyof humanbeingsin the matureQuodlibetal , Questions the influenceof Aquinas is undeniable. To appreciate the reasons for which Giles incorporatesthe thomisticview into his own formof voluntarism,it is necessaryto turnto Thomas's and Henry's theoriesfirst.

36See note8 above. 37Richard ofMiddleton, Sent. libros Sententiarum, IV, d. 49, a. 1, q. 6, in:Super quatuor 4 vols.,Brescia1591[repr. Frankfurt amMain1963],vol.IV, 652:"Videtur mihidicenin actuintellectus dumquodbeatitudo consistit et voluntatis cuiusratioestquia simul, in perfecta essebeatitudinis vitaehumanae consistit unioneanimaerationalis cumDeo. Haecautemunioincludit animaeunionem cumDeo secundum omnem suipotentiam ... On Richard's estintellectus etvoluntas." seeKent1995(n.9), 138-40. voluntarism, 38See note3 above.

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On Aquinas's account, beatitudo is the universalend or "perfectgood It is also the object of the will.Because thatwhollybringsdesireto rest."39 the object of the will is universal,it cannot be completelysatisfiedwith any created good since such objects are by definitionlimited.Such an account, of course, necessarilyexcludes goods such as pleasure,wealth, power and honors frombeing identifiedwith the finedend, for if some good is reallyto bringdesireto rest,it mustbe infinite. Aquinas identifies such an object with God.40 Having associated the source of human happinesswith God, who is obviouslyoutside of the created soul, what then does Thomas make of is an activity of the soul? For Aristotle'sclaim that happiness(eúôaijiovíoc) Aristode,the sourceof humanhappinessis not some externalgood; rather, it is associated with an internaloperationof the soul {EN 1098a16-18). Indeed, Aristodeexplicitlydismissedthe notion that happiness can be of happiness externalto the soul in rejectingthe Platonic identification withthe subsistentForm of the Good {EN 1096b31-34).Aquinas is aware of the discrepancybetweenhis account of happinessand Aristotle's,and takes pains to ensure that he does not entirelydeviate fromthe latter. he distinguishes betweenhappinessas "created" and happiAccordingly, ness as "uncreated,"a distinctionhe inheritedfromWilliam of Auxerre {ca. 1140/50-123 1).41 39Aquinas, ofbeatitude, ST I-II,q. 2, a. 8, corp.ForAquinas's see, understanding Reason andHuman ontheTwofold Human Good. D. Bradley, treatment's Aquinas amongother A. Celano,TheConcept D.C. 1997,369-423; inAquinas's Moral Science , Washington, Happiness oftheHistory ofPhilosophy, Beatitude intheWritings , in:Journal ofThomas Aquinas ofWorldly and onAristotelian in:S. MacDonald 25 (1987),215-26;andA. Kenny, Happinessi Aquinas MoralTheory. inHonour E. Stump Kretzmann , Cornell 1998, ofNorman (eds),Aquinas's Essay's 15-27. 40Ibid.:"Respondeo hominis esseinaliquo estbeatitudinem dicendum quodimpossibile alioBeatitudo enimestbonum bonocreato. quietat appetitum; quodtotaliter perfectum, Obiectum autemvolsi adhucrestaret finis, aliquidappetendum. quinnonessetultimus intellectus est sicutobiectum estuniversale bonum; humanus, untatis, quaeestappetitus nisibonum voluntatem Ex quopatetquodnihilpotest universale verum. hominis, quietare in aliquocreato, sedsolumin Deo, quiaomniscreatura universale. Quodnoninvenitur secunhominis UndesolusDeusvoluntatem habetbonitatem implere potest; participatam. Deo etc.In soloigitur inbonisdesiderium' in PsalmoCil: 'Qui replet dumquoddicitur hominis consistit." beatitudo 41William Summa Altissiodorensis Guillelmi Summa aurea ofAuxerre, , III, tr.20,in:Magistři 'Deusdilig663:"Tamendicimus Rome1980-87, aurea , ed.J.Ribailler, quodcumdicitur connotat divinam iturquia bonus,'haecdictio'bonus'praeter essentiam, quamsignât, vel beatitudinem vel dilectionem suavitatem scilicet creatam, quae est aliquidcreatum, 1981 Cf.alsoWieland inquoquiescitur." estfinis inDeo; Deusautem finis quoquiescitur (n. 3),675.

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Now according to Aquinas, the term "end" {finis)has a twofold It can representeitherthe externalobject towardwhich the signification. rationalagent is striving, or it can signifythe possessionof the appetible object. In the firstsense, the finalend refersto God, the infiniteobject thatfulfills all human aspirations.In the second sense,it signifies an activof the human soul. Insofar as the final end God as the ity represents source of happiness,it is uncreated.Insofaras it signifiesthe subjective attainmentof God, however,it refersto human, and thereforecreated In identifying the source of happinesswith God as an uncreactivity.42 ated object, Aquinas remainstrue to the Christiantheologicaltradition; in associatingcreatedhappinesswithan activityof the soul, on the other hand, Aquinas is faithfulto Aristotle. Having seen thatuncreatedhappinessconsistsin God who is the objectiveend of rationalbeings,and havingestablishedthatcreatedhappiness is an activityof the soul, Aquinas proceeds to address the question of whetherthe latterconsistsessentially(essentialiter) in an act of the will or the intellect.He concludes that uncreatedhappiness consistsessentially in an act of the intellect.43 Now it is impossible,on Thomas's account, that beatitudeconsistin an act of the will. Happiness is definedas the attainmentof the ultimate end. Will, however,is merelyan inclinationtowards the ultimateend when it is absent,and an enjoymentof it when present.That is, in relation to the finalend the will acts in one of two ways: it is eithermerely an inclinationtoward or a delightin perfectiononce achieved. perfection, In neithercase does it compriseperfectionitself,and thereforecannot constitutehappiness.44 42Aquinas, ST I-II,q. 3, a. 1, corp.:". . .finisdicitur Unomodo,ipsares dupliciter. sicutavaroestfinis Aliomodo,ipsaadeptio velpossesquamcupimus adipisci, pecunia. eiusreiquaedesideratur; sicutsi dicatur sio,seuususautfruitio quodpossessio pecuniae estfinis etfrui revoluptuosa estfinis Primo hominis avari, intemperati. ergomodo,ultimus finis estbonumincreatum, scilicet bonitate voluntatem Deus,qui solussuainfinita potest hominis Secundo autemmodo,ultimus finis hominis estcreatum perfecte implere. aliquid in ipsoexistens, velfruitio finis ultimi. Ultimus autem quodnihilestaliudquamadeptio finis vocatur beatitudo. Si ergobeatitudo hominis consideretur ad causamvel quantum sicestaliquidincreatum; si autemconsideretur ad ipsamessentiam obiectum, quantum sicestaliquidcreatum." beatitudinis, 43Ibid.,q. 3, a. 4, corp. 44Ibid.,:"Dicoergoquodquantum ad id quodestessentialiter ipsabeatitudo, impossibileestquodconsistât in actuvoluntatis. Manifestum estenimex praemissis quodbeatitudoestconsecutio finis ultimi. Consecutio autem nonconsistit inipsoactuvoluntatis. finis Voluntas autemfertur infinem etabsentem, cumipsum etpraesentem, cumin desiderat;

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It would be inaccurate to conclude fromthis that Aquinas entirely excludesthe will fromthe activityof createdhappiness.He acknowledges that once the intellectattainsthe essence of God in the beatificvision, the glorifiedsoul will experiencewhat he calls delight(
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human activity,and (2) for excludingthe will fromthe attainmentof beatitudeby assigningit a merelyaccidentalrole.49 Henry of Ghent is firstand foremostopposed to the thomisticimplication that man can contributeto his own salvation.50He accordingly rejectsthe claim that happinessconsistsessentiallyin an activityof the soul, intellectualor otherwise.He suggeststhatwhile it is understandable that happiness should be denominatedas an activityby some, this is nonethelessinaccurate.On Henry'sview, it is not the act of the intellect or even that of the will that constitutesthe happiness of the blessed; rather,it is God, who is the ultimateend. The source of beatitudethereforeconsistsprincipally( pňncipaliter ), so Henrythinks,in the object of the will and the intellectratherthan in any of theiracts.51 Recall that Thomas, like Henry, had associated the source of beatitude with God. However, Aquinas also attemptedto remain true to ofthesoul,specifically Aristotle's claimthathappinessconsistedin an activity in the perfectionof the intellect.Thomas thereforeposited a twofold aspectto the finalend: God, who is the object of the will,and the human subjectiveresponseto thisobject, or the beatificvision.He termedthese two aspects created and uncreatedhappiness,respectively. Henryof Ghentresistssuch an incorporationof Aristotleinto Christian conceptionsof beatitude.To claim that happinessconsistsin an activity of the soul, for Henry,is to argue that acts can be equivalentto ends. Henry here adopts the argumentthat Aquinas had used to exclude the beatitudeand, as it were,turnsit against act of the will fromconstituting him.That is,whileThomas had exludedtheact of thewillfromcomprising happiness on the grounds that it is merelya means toward the end, 49Fordiscussions orAct ActoftheIntellect ofbeatitude, seeA. Celano, ofHenry's theory in the13thandEarly IdeaofHuman Perfection ofAristotle's Reception oftheWill.TheCritical et Littéraire du MoyenAge,57 (1990), d'Histoire Doctrinale 14thCenturies , in:Archives deGante La vision deDiossegún andJ.RoviraBelloso, 1960,113-53. , Barcelona 103-09; Enrique 50Celano1990,108. 51HenryofGhent, a ordinarium Summa (= SQO),a. 49, q. 5, in: Henricus quaestionum Ordinariarum Summa , ed. Badius,Paris1520[repr.St.Bonaventure, Gandavo, Quaestionum denominali beatus in proposito N.Y.,1953],fol.37rO-P:"Quarequamvis aliquidpotest illaoperatione, infinem etab ipsofinequemadipiscitur etab operatione quia qua tendit ab ilioquodprincipaliter intendenominatur beatustamquam tarnen a fineprincipaliter finem et ita secundario, ab ilioquodintendit dit,et ab operatione tamquam propter - quia si praescribatur finisa substantia scilicet actionis, ipsofinisadipiscitur inquantum - cumquaeritur illamposset dicibeatus absolute nonpropter quidsitilluda quo istedicin finem, eiusquodtendit iturbeatus, etsiquoquemodobenedicitur quodsitoperario obiectum." melius tarnen dicitur siveoperationis quodsitipsefinis

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Henry argues that by thisreasoningthe act of the intellectmustalso be excluded fromcomprisingbeatitude.52 Both the act of love and the act of knowingare interiorends toward the exteriorend that is God. For Henry,theyare "ends under an end," {finessubfine)or means towardthe ultimateend of being unitedwithGod.53The questionnow becomes,for Put otherwise, Henry,whichact accomplishessucha goal mostefficaciously. is that our end which instrumental God, activitywill get us assuming closestto union withthe divine:the act of loving,or the act of knowing? Unsurprisingly Henry concludesthatit is an act of the will thatunites the rational soul more closelyto God than an act of the intellect.He offersthreereasonsforthis.First,the will is the more activepotency,for while it transfers itselfto the object "by means of its own action" {sua actione sdpsamtransfer eî)^ the intellectcan only elicitan act of understandonce it has ing passivelyreceivedthe formof the object.54Second, the intellectmerelyunites itselfto God as if to an assimilatingform.The will,by contrast,unitesitselfto God as to an "end" {finis)and a "good" {bonum) throughan act of love. Because love has the power to transform 52Ibid.,fol.37rP:"Sic ergooperatio siveintellectus sivevoluntatis nonpotestesse ultimus finis eiussecundum utideonullomodopotest inipsaprinsumitur, quodpraecise consistere utaperte iampatebit." fol.40vG:"Eo beatitudo, Ibid.,in:ed. Badius, cipaliter estfinis ultimus et primum obiectum voluntatis et intellectus et per ipsoquodbeatitudo hoc principium omnium actionum et operationum sunttamquam quae in beatitudine in finem, quaedamordinata igitur nequeactusintellectus nequeactusvoluntatis possunt esseessentialis beatitudo beatusnecpertinet ad ipsamut quae debetessefinisultimus obiectum in quo consistit. intellectum autvolitum Nectamensequitur ex hocquodnon ad ipsamut actuseius,perquemattingit finem iliumut obiectum beatificans. pertinet Vanumestergoquodaliquinituntur excludere actumvoluntatis a beatitudine, quianon volitum. Eademenimratione excluditur actusintellectus, potestesseprimum quia nec esseprimum intellectum autvolitum." potest 53Ibid.,a. 49, q. 6, in: ed. Badius,fol.40vH:"Nonpossunt essefinesultimi ... Si utiliasittamquam finis subfine. ergoin ipsisconsistât aliquaratiobeatitudinis oportet Actioautemveloperatio, nonestsicutfinis subfinenisiquiaestsicutfinis interior conexteriori velsecundum beatitudinem rem,velsecundum rationem, tingens primum propter secundum beatitudinem Dei." creaturarum, propter 54Ibid.,fol.42rO-P:"Finisilleseipsum inintellectum facit creatum ... etperhocquod inintellectu, veriexistit ex intellectu finis subratione ipseintellectus, quasiunumexistens in intelligibili, ex intellectu elicitactumintelligendi perintelligibile tamquam performale ineo,utordine existit illudinintellectu existens principium quodamrationis quasiprimo . . . Econverso sicutforma et quasisecundo elicitur ex intellectu actusintelligendi autem in actione voluntatis. Voluntas enimprimoallectasuaactione transfert contingit seipsam in ipsumobiectum in intellectu, et peractumsuumfacitquodillud sibipraesens, primo in intellectu, idemsitsibipraesens verius secundo, quamsitsibiautintellectui praesens finis in ipsavolúntate maximesub ratione et veriusexistens quamin ipsointellectu beatifican tis,utiampatebit."

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and convertthe loverinto the beloved,such an act unitesus more closely to God, who is our end, than that of the intellect.55 Finally,a thingis to it when its perfectedmore,according Henry, possesses object underthe aspect of the good than when it does so it under the aspect of the true.56 Centralto Henry'sinsistencethatthe willunitesus to God more nearly thanthe intellectis DionysiusAreopagite'sidea that"love, whetherdivine or angelic, intellectual,animal or natural,is a certainunitiveand continuativepower."57Perfectbeatitude,in a subjectivesense,consistsin the will, by its own act of love, convertingitselfto the known good. After thisinitialact of desire,a "nobler" and "more perfect"act of the will is ) itselfon the end, engendered by which the will impresses (imprimit "immersesitselfin it, adheresto it, and enjoysit."58For Henryof Ghent, what he calls "divineexstaticlove" (
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The carefulreader will notice that at root there is a very different of human destinyforHenrythanforThomas. For Thomas understanding the goal of human lifeis the perfectionof the selfby means of the intellect. For Henry,by contrast,the goal is not the perfectionof the selfbut a sortof (
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Sentences , for instance,he maintainsthat beatitudeconsistsin an act of the will, thus evidentlysiding with voluntaristssuch as John Peckham Questions , on the otherhand, he againstAquinas. In the later Quodlibetal resemblesHenryof Ghent's, presentsa theorythat,althoughit ultimately nonethelesstakes certainprinciplesfromAquinas. The firstof Giles's discussionson the will's contributionto beatitude can be foundin his commentaryon book IV of the Sentences , the reportatio ofwhichhas been dated by ConcettaLuna to 1269.63Here Giles rehearses what he takes to be the intellectualist position,or the position of the in oppositionto it. and defines himself ), "philosophers"(philosophi He explains that beatitudehas a double component:one that is outside of the self,and one that is within.The firstis identifiedwith God, and the second with an act of the blessed by which we are united to God. The troublewiththe "philosophers"(philosophi ) is thattheylimited theirinvestigations about the final end for man to naturalphenomena. him as They excluded God fromtheirtheoriesand so could not identify the object of beatitude.Accordingly,theymistakenlybelieved that beatitude had to consistin the perfectionof somethingnatural,concluding thatthishad to be an act of the intellect.In contrastto the philosophers, however,the blessed are joined (coniunguntur ) to the essence of God and as such know that beatitudeconsistsin Him.64 Giles argues that if beatitudeis identified Againstthe intellectualists, withthe operationby whichwe are most nearlyjoined to God, thenwe mustconclude that thisis achieved in an act of the will ratherthan the intellect.His conclusionis groundedin the standardvoluntarist argument thatwas inspiredby DionysiusAreopagiteand lateremployedextensively 63C. Luna,La lecture deGilles deRome surlequatrième livre dessentences. Lesextraits duCLM. 8005, in:Recherches de Théologie ancienne et médiévale, 57 (1990),183-255, esp.203. 64GilesofRome,Sent. IV, d. 49,q. 24,in:Luna1990(n.63),250:"Duplexestbeatitudo:quaedamestextra, et hocestfinale scilicet obiectum, bonum, quodestsummum in actubeati,quo unitur illisummo deus.Aliaestbeatitudo bono.Et quia que consistit nonviderunt illudsummum bonumperessentiam, ideononposuerunt beatiphilosophi ineo,sedsoluminaliquoactuintelligendi, naturale hominis non tudinem quiaintelligere se extendit ad essentiam sedad effectus divinos. Et quianullum natdivinanti, intelligibile a nobisestitaperfectum sicutactusintelligendi hocnonposuerunt uraliter illius, propter in aliquare extra, in eo qod beatitudinem sedsolumin intelligere intellectus, tamquam et in velieintelligere, in illudquodconiungit nosin actum perse desideratur, tamquam Sedbeati,quicertisuntde aliquameliori divina cuiconire,scilicet essentia, intelligendi. habereomnem modum beatitudinis et cuipossibile esthominem unguntur, quamsciunt beatitudinem suampercomparationem ad divinam uniri, essentiam, ponunt principaliter itaquoddeusestbeatitudo hominis."

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by Henry of Ghent. The argumentassertsthatwhereasthe act of knowing merelyreceivesthe intelligiblespecies of the object accordingto the limitedmode of a rationalagent, an active motion of the soul towards That is, while intellectionis the object characterizesthe act of willing.65 characterizedby the passive receptionof a representation of the object, the act of love activelyextends toward the object itself.But the chief point to bear in the mind is that,throughlove, the agent is transformed into the beloved object for,as Giles puts it, "in knowing,God is in the blessed soul, in willing,the blessed soul is in God."66According to Giles, then,the mode of union that occurs throughlove is more perfectthan that which occurs throughintellection. Finally,Giles advances an argumentthatwe have alreadyencountered in Henryof Ghent.It is groundedin the identification of beatitudedefined as the "end" or the "good" ratherthan as, for example, the "true." It assertsthat since the highestgood is the end of all things,the act that unitesus to such an object under the aspect of an "end" is thatin which beatitudeconsists.Like Henry,Giles argues that such an act accrues to the will. The intellect,by contrast,apprehendsobjects, God included, underthe aspect of the true.Beatitudemusttherefore consist,subjectively in an act of the will rather than the intellect.67 speaking, The foregoingdiscussionservesto underscoreGiles's firmcommitment to the primacyof the will and its principalrole in beatitude.That it in certaincrucial respectsfromHenry'sdiscussionshould come as differs no surprisegiventhatthe reportado of Book IV of Giles's commentaryon the Sentences Summa ordinariarum predatesHenry's quaestionum by well over 65Ibid.:". . . intelligere estmotusreiad animam, ita quodintelligere estperreceptionem in anima.Et quiaomnequodrecipitur, intelligibilis recipitur permodum recipiideointelligere divinam essentiam secundum modum anime.Sed entis, recipientis velieestmotus animead rem,quitransformat in amatum in amantem etponitamantem amato." 66Ibid.:"Etsicpatetquodconiungit animam beatam deosecundum modum divinum, nonsecundum animebeate,ita quod intelligendo deusestin anima animabeataestin deo.Et hocestmagisbonumet maiorperfectio beata,in volendo in actuvoluntatis." hocdicendum quamprimům. Propter quodconsistit 67Ibid.,250-51: estpercomparationem ad beatitudinem ". . . beatitudo nostra attendenda nonsicbeatitudo scilicet ad summum extra, bonum, omnium, philosophoquodestfinis inilioactuqui debetconsistere rum,sedsolumactuanime.Ex hiispatetquodbeatitudo Hoc autemestactusvoluntatis, quiaintelmagisnosunitillifinisubratione qua finis. ad deumutbonumet in deumin eo quodverum, sedvoluntas inclinatur lectusrespicit hocbeatitudo conobiectum estratiobonisivefinis. utfinis, magis Propter quiaproprium in actuvoluntatis." sistit

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ten years.68But perhaps the most strikingdifferencebetween the two worksis Giles's conclusionthatbeatitudeconsists,at least partially,in an act of the will. Henry,recall, claims that beatitudeconsistsprimarilyin God, and that the acts of the will and the intellectare merelymeans to beatitudeor to union with God. He accordinglyargues for a hierarchy involvingthe uncreatedobject of the will,i.e. God, and the created acts of the soul, of which the will is higherthan the intellectsince it unitesus morecloselyto our end. No such hierarchyof means and ends is endorsed In that work Giles merely by Giles in the commentaryon the Sentences. will's love forGod as the as of and the God the object beatitude, posits subjectiveresponse to this object, both of which are equal partnersin the achievementof beatitude. In this respect Giles resemblesThomas Aquinas, although,in line with the voluntaristsof the period, he subsitutesthe act of love for the act of intellection. is not entirelyat odds with Still, Giles's commentaryon the Sentences Henryof Ghent'sdiscussionof beatitudein article49 of the latter'sSumma. The most obvious similarityis the vital role played by the Dionysian of love as a transformative power. It is perhapsthisaspect understanding more than any otherthat representsthe most significant departurefrom the final end forratiothat associates from or indeed theory any Aquinas, of the self ratherthan with a transference nal agentswithself-perfection into God. closer to Henry of Giles draws substantially In the Quodlibetal Questions of beatitude,athoughelementsof his account are Ghent'sunderstanding featureof Quodlibet drawnfromAquinas. The moststriking almostcertainly conclusion that beatiof his earlier 18 is Giles's III, question rejection tude consistsin an act of the will. Beatitudeis now "nothingotherthan On this that towardswhich the will tends as its finalcause (finaliter)."69 it must tend toward its own the will cannot incline act; rather, account, an beatitude of "end." towardthatwhich has the character Accordingly, mustprincipallyconsistin the object of the will ratherthan its act.70

68Henry's toGomezCaffarena, wascomposed between Summa 1277and1293.According Serparticipado article 49 canbe datedto Christmas 1282.Cf.J. GómezCaffarena, y der enla metafisica deEnrique deGante subsistente , Rome1958,270. 69GilesofRome,Quod. 187:"... sciendum III, q. 18,in:ed. De Coninck, quodnihil voluntas tendit ..." aliudsitbeatitudo quamilludin quodfinaliter 70Ibid.:". . . beatitudo voluntatis sitmagisinipsoobiecto quaminactuquiaratiofinis voluntatis quodomnino princimagisestin obiecto quamin actu.Ex hocetiamapparet

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AlthoughGiles locates beatitudeprincipallyin the object of the will, this does not preventhim fromrecognizingthat thereis also a subjective elementto happiness.For thisreason he distinguishes betweenbeatitude as a finalcause and beatitudeas a formalcause.71As a finalcause, beatitudecan be consideredeitherwithoutqualification{finaliter ), simpliciter or in a certaingenus [finaliter in aliquocerto As a finalcause withgeneri). out qualificationbeatitudeconsists,as we have seen, in God who is our "repose" (
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withan act of the will that tends,not to God Himself,but to the vision of God.74 Despite Giles's claim thatbeatitudeconsistsin some way in the vision of God, it is worthbearingin mindthathe places a ratherstrictqualification on this claim. Specifically,he maintainsthat happinessis only found in the vision of God to the extentthat such an act of the intellectis associated withthe will. The explanationforthisis that felicityis the object of the will ratherthan the intellectand thereforemustbe identifiedwith the formerfacultyifit is to countas as a formof beatitude.75 Accordingly, he precludesthe intellectfromhavingan intrinsicrole to play in happiis nothingother to it a merelyancilliaryone, for"felicity ness,attributing than the object of the will or an act of the will."76 Giles, then,recognizesfourtypesof beatitude:(1) God, (2) an act of the will tendingto God, (3) the vision of God, and (4) an act of the will tendingtoward the vision of God.77 How preciselyare we to interpret this taxonomy?In positingfour typesof beatitude,does Giles mean to ends? In point of fact,Giles say that rationalagents have fourdifferent thinksthat rational agents have only one principaland final end, and that is God himself.The vision of God, thougha finalcause, is merely the object of the will in the created order; it is an "end under the end" [finissubfine ).78Indeed, even the acts of the will are merelymeans toward the goal of being unitedwith God.79 74Ibid.:"Sicoportet dareduoin quibussitbeati tudoformaliter: unumin quo beatiincertogenere. tudositformaliter etaliudquodsitformaliter beatitudo Damus simpliciter in Deumtamquam autemduplicem actumvoluntatis: unumperquemformaliter tendit in obiectum finale in visionem voluntatis et aliumperquemtendit formaliter simpliciter, in obiectum finale sedin certogenere. Actusergo Dei, tamquam eius,nonsimpliciter, voluntatis formaliter nosDeo,quiestnoster finis eritbeatitudo forconiungens simpliciter, Sed actusvoluntatis in visionem maliter tendit Dei, non simpliciter. perquemvoluntas infinem incertogenere, sedtamquam finem estbeatitudo formaliter tamquam simpliciter nonsimpliciter, sedin certogenere." 75Ibid.:"Visioergopotest essebeatitudo modoquo dictum est,nonquiaestaliquid intellectus necquiaestad intellectum sedquiaestobiectum voluntatis. ... Si pertinens, in bonumtenhabetrationem finis et finis rationem boni,et sitvoluntatis ergofelicitas ad voluntatem, nulloautemmodopercomparationem ad dere,solum percomparationem intellectum secundum se estaccipienda felicitas." 76Ibid.:"Nihilaliudestergofelicitas, nisivoluntatis velvoluntatis actus..." obiectum, 77Ibid.,190:"Possumus si velimus, felicitates se habentes autem, assignare quatuor per ordinem: videlicet in Deum;visionem ipsumDeum;actumvoluntatis perquemtendimus in huiusmodi visionem." Dei; et actumvoluntatis perquemtendimus 78Ibid.,189. 79Ibid.:"Hocetiamidempatet:namsi visioestbeatitudo, hocestproutestobiectum

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Althoughthe will and the intellect,then, are merelymeans toward union with God, it may stillbe asked whetherone act unitesus to God more closely than the other. Given the voluntaristframeworkof this , it is not surprisingto findGiles endorsingthe claim that it is Quodlibet the will's act thatjoins us to God more closelythan the intellect's.The The explanavision of God merelyjoins us to God mediately{mediate). tion for this is that any act of the intellect,no matterhow exalted, is good. The will's act, however, merelythe object of the will as a created is able to surpass any created good- the vision of God included- and who is, of course, uncreated.80 tend immediatelytoward God himself, Moreoverit is Giles's view,as we establishedin the previoussection,that the will is a nobler power than the intellect.It is united to God as he is in himself,while the intellectis united to God merelyas he existsin the intellect.81 Based on the foregoingdiscussion,it is safe to conclude that Giles's representsa species to volunpresentationof beatitudein the Quodlibets tarism.The discussionacquires additionalsignificancehowever,once it is recognizedthatthe particularformof voluntarism beingadvanced bears a strikingresembanceto that of Henry of Ghent. For one thing,Giles establishes,as we have seen, a hierarchyof "created beatitudes"(
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act of the will tendingto God, because throughsuch an act the will is more immediatelyunited to God. Afterwardthere will be beatitudein the visionof God itself,and finallytherewill be felicityin an act of the will to the extentthat it tends to the vision of God."82But perhaps the most obvious and significant similarityto Henry of Ghent is the claim is beatitude achieved that, although by means of the intellectand the in the act of either.Rather,beatitudeconsistsprinwill,it does not consist cipallyin the object of the will: God himself. What does Giles's theoryowe, if anything,to Aquinas? Recall that Thomas, in orderto reconcileAristotlewiththe Christiantheologicaltrabetweenhappinessas a createdgood and dition,had drawn a distinction as an uncreated one. The formerhe identifiedwiththe attainhappiness mentor visionof God, and the latterwithGod himself.Giles adopts this distinctionas his startingpoint. The created good or the vision of God Giles designatesas the finalcause of the will in a certaingenus (finaliter in certo ). Happiness as an uncreatedgood, or God himself,on the genere other hand, is termed the final cause of the will withoutqualification (finaliter simpliciter). Now althoughAquinas maintainsthat happinessconsistsessentiallyin the beatificvision,which is an act of the intellect,he rejectsthe notion thathappinessis the object of the intellect.83 Rather,it is the object of the will.84To Giles's mind, such a claim demonstratesthat happinessmust always be understoodin referenceto the will.85He accordinglydevelops Aquinas's distinctionbetweenGod and the visioDei as the finalcauses of the will by introducingthe furtherdistinctionbetweenthe will's act as it tends to God himselfand its act as it tends to the vision of God. Both acts are formalcauses of the will: the firstis the formalcause of the will withoutqualification(formaliter and the second its formalcause simpliciter) in a certaingenus (formaliter in certo Giles ranksthesecreatedbeatgenere). 82Ibid.,191:"Ergointer beatitudines creatas eritbeatitudo actusvoluntatis principalior inDeumquiaperhuiusmodi tendens actum immediatius voluntas Deo. Postea coniungitur in ipsavisione eritbeatitudo autemeritfelicitas in actuvoluntatis Dei,ultimo prouttenditin visionem Dei." 83Aquinas, ST I-II,q. 3, a. 4, corp. 84Ibid.,ad 2. 85GilesofRome,Quod. 188:"Si ergofelicitas habet Ill, q. 18,in: ed. De Coninck, rationem finis et finis rationem boniet sitvoluntatis in bonumtendere, solumpercomad voluntatem, nulloautemmodopercomparationem ad intellectum secunparatonem dumse estaccipienda felicitas."

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itudes- i.e. the will's act of tending to God, the vision of God, and the will's act of tendingto the vision of God- accordingto the degree to which they are capable of unitingthe rationalcreatureto God. He concludes,recall,thatwill's act of tendingto God himselfis nobler than the intellect'sact of the visioDei in the achievementof beatitudebecause it joins us to God as he is in himselfratherthan merelyas he is in us, whichis all thatthe visioDei achieves.86Giles therefore developsAquinas's positionin the directionof Henry of Ghent. In the finalanalysis,Giles of Rome departsfromAquinas because he thinks,as Henry does, that Thomas's intellectualist argumentdoes not ultimatelyachieve what it sets out to. Aquinas's position,as Giles reports it in his replyto an objection,purportsto show thatthe intellectis higher than the will because its nobilityis intrinsicto it, that is, "because in knowingthere is a motion of thingsto the soul."87The will's nobility, by contrast,is relativeto its object. Now althoughAquinas regardsthe intellect as the nobler power simpliciter , he thinks that in regard to divinethingsthe will is highersince it is betterto love God than to know him. Relative to thingsthat are beneath the soul, however,it is better to know than to love since "the cognitionof naturalthingsis more noble than the thingsthemselves."88 Accordingto Giles, Thomas positiondoes not demonstratethatthe intellectis higher;rather,it showsthe opposite. That is, if the will is higherwith respectto God as its object, then as faras beatitudeis concerned,willingmustbe consideredmore noble than 86See note81 above. 87GilesofRome,Quod. 193:"Datotarnen Ill, q. 18,in:ed. De Coninck, quodintellects essetaltior adhucnonhaberetur namponentes intentum, potentia quamvoluntas, intellectum essealtiorem dicunt sitalitor si considerepotentiam quodintellectus potentia turin se et nobilior namnobilitas intellectus estex hocquodhabeatin se quiaintelliad animam. Nobilitas verovoluntatis estex eo quodtendat in gendoestmotusrerum aliudquiainvolendo estmotus animaead res.Simpliciter autemet absolute estnobilius ad aliudetideosimpliciter et absolute, quodesttalein se quamquodesttalein ordine utdicunt, intellectus estnobilior volúntate et intelligere nobilius quamvelie." 88Ibid.:"Sedsiintellectus etvoluntas etactuseorum, utaiunt, nonconsiderentur secundumse sedin ordine ad obiectum, velhoceritad resnaturales velad resdivinas, si ad resnaturelles sicadhuc,ut aiunt,nobilius estintelligere quamvelie,quia ressuntintellectaeutsuntin anima,suntvolitae utsuntseipsis. Nobilius autemhaberit essein anima nobilior estenimcognitio naturalium Sed quamin seipsis, quamipsaesintresnaturales. si intelligere et veliecomparentur ad resdivinas sicdicunt quodveliesitnobilius quam bonitas habetesseutestinseipsaetuta volúntate desiderintelligere quiadivina perfectius ata quamproutab intellectu et nobilior resestipseDeusin se quamcogniconcipitur tioquamhabetcreatura de Deo."

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knowing.Our beatitude principallymust consist in loving God rather than in knowinghim, then,chieflybecause, as was indicatedabove, the act of lovingconjoins the rationalsoul more closelyto God than knowing does.89 The theorythat Giles advanced in the Quodlibets , then,is significantly more redolentof Henry of Ghent than thatwhich Giles advanced in the Perhaps the chiefpoint to bear in mind, commentaryon the Sentences. however,is that both works differin the final analysisfromAquinas's view. First,on Thomas's account, created and uncreatedbeatitude are essentiallyequal partnersin the final end for rational agents. Second, Aquinas thinksthatthe will's act, delight,is merelyan accidentalfeature, a by-productof human beatitude,which consistsessentiallyin the perin fectionof the intellect.For Giles, althoughthe finalend cannot consist an act of the will,the will nonethelesshas an essential,ratherthan merely accidental,role to play in its achievement. featureof Giles's theoryof the primacy Perhaps the most significant of the will is the strongemphasison love as a transformative power. In the finalanalysis,this representsa rathersignificant departurefromthe standardAristotelianaccount of the final end, which is associated with of the self.On Giles's view,the finalend forrationalagents the perfection is not actuallythe perfectionof the selfor any of its powers,which are bonum forrationalagents just means to the finalend; rather,the summum of the soul into God. Such a theory, consitsin a type of transference in certain indebted to respects,is far more redolentof although Aquinas than of Ghent of Thomas. Henry Conclusion In stressing objectivebeatitudeover subjectivebeatitude,thatis, in stressas God our final destinyratherthan the vision or love of God as ing theircontemporarieswere doing, Henry and Giles departed quite radically fromthe mainstreamtheologicaltradition.Specifically,theydevel89Ibid.:"Ponentes sitaltiorpotentia igitur quodintellectus simpliciter quamvoluntas rerum divinarum veliesitnobilius etaltiusquamintelligere etquia ponunt quodrespectu inanima, rerum divinarum beatitudinem diceredebemus respectu ponimus quodrespectu felicitatis et beati tudinis veliesitnobilius Beati tudoergonostra quamintelligere. princietinactuvoluntatis paliusestinamarevelinveliequamintelligere quamintellectus quia actummagisconiungimur perhuiusmodi ipsiDeo ..."

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of happinessthatdoes not repose in oped a quasi-mystical understanding the perfectionof the selfand its human capacities,but in a sort of selftranscendencethroughlove. It is truethatin the EthicsAristotleintimated that theremightbe a divine aspect to happinessinsofaras it mightbe a giftfromthe gods (EN 1099b11-14). He never consideredthe possibility,however,that it mightconsistin an exstaticimmersionof the self in the divine being. Guelph, Ontario of Guelph University

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Problems withTemporality and Scientific Propositions in JohnBurìdanand Albertof Saxony MICHAELJ. FITZGERALD

Abstract The essaydevelopstwo majorarguments. First,ifJohnBuridan's'firstargument' for the reintroduction of naturalsupposition is only that the "eternal truth"ofa scientific is preserved becausesubjecttermsin scientific proposition propositions suppositforall the term'spast, present,and futuresignificata thenAlbertof Saxony thinksit is simplyineffective. indifferently; Only the 'secondargument', i.e. the argumentforthe existenceof an 'atemporal copula' thistask;but is rejectedby Albert.Second, laterfouradequatelyperforms criticisms ofBuridan'snatural , givenin certainNotabilia supposition teenth-century fromthe anonymousauthorin, Paris, BnF, lat. 14.716, ff.40va-41rb,are nothingbut an interpolated hodge-podgeof criticisms givenearlierin the various views of Buridan'sby Albertof Saxony.It is thisfact centuryagainst that makes Albertthe real source of late fourteenth-century criticismsof Buridan'sview of natural supposition. The traditionalview of the role of natural in fourteenth-century supposition nominalistsuppositiontheory,as articulatedby L.M. de Rijk, is thatJohn Buridanimportedthe notionfromthirteenth-century "realist"supposition " " and "eternaltruth " of to account for the theory,specifically necessity scientificpropositionswhich involve only referenceto particularspatiotemporalobjects.1More recently,however,H.A.G. Braakhuishas argued that there are actuallytwo argumentsemployedby Buridan to defend the reintroduction of naturalsupposition into fourteenth-century nominalist logical theory.First,"... the acceptabilityof naturalsuppositionis argued forby stressingthat nouns which signifythingswithoutco-signifying any determinatetime, signifypresent,past, and futurethingsindifferently."2

1 L.M.de Rijk,TheDevelopment naturalis inMediaeval II: Fourteenth ofSuppositio Logic. Century as Atemporal Natural 11 (1973),43-79. , in:Vivarium, Supposition (Omnitemporal) Supposition © Koninklijke BrillNV,Leiden,2006 Alsoavailable online- www.brill.nl/viv

Vivarium 44,2-3

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Second, "... by contrast,'thatsupposition'is presentedas the one according to whichthe verb 'is' may be takenforeverytime,present,past, and The firstsortof argumentBraakhuisclaimsis develfuture,indifferently."3 but the second sortof argumentis oped in Buridan's£fc.y-commentary, more fullydeveloped in his Questions on De generatione et corruptione and Summulae .4 In this essay, I will compare Buridan's view of naturalsupposition with Albertof Saxony's,and show thatAlbert'saccount sheds some new light in the fourteenthcentury.My on the debate over naturalsupposition will of these two thinkers proceedby developingtwo arguments. comparison I if First, will argue that John Buridan's firstargumentfor the reintrois only that naturalsupposition duction of naturalsupposition requires the in a all term scientific to for the term'spast, subject proposition supposit and future to the eternal truth of scientific significata preserve present, as an propositions;then Albertof Saxony thinksit is simplyineffective accountforthe eternaltruthof a scientific proposition.It seems it is only the second argumentmentionedby Braakhuis,Buridan's argumentfora special atemporalcopula, which actuallydoes the workof accountingfor It is Buridan's the "eternaltruth"( perpetue veritatis ) of scientific propositions. defenseof the existenceof an atemporalcopula that is the real targetof Albertof Saxony's criticismsagainst naturalsupposition , and not the fact for all theirpast, present that naturally terms suppositing subject supposit and futuresignificata.5 Second, I will argue that the later fourteenth2 H.A.G.Braakhuis, and andContingent Knowledge, Signification Scientific Knowledge Reality. inBuridan's on De Generatione etcorruptione, in:J.M.M.H. (Natural) Supposition Questions onAristotle's De Generatione et & H.A.G.Braakhuis Tradition (eds),TheCommentary Thijssen Ancient Modern 1999(Studia Artistarum , Medieval , andEarly , Turnhout 7), 139. corruptione: 3 Braakhuis 1999,139. 4 Braakhuis 1999,143. 5 A briefnoteon myterminology I use thenotions and hereis important. atemporal in a different omni-temporal omni-temporal waythandoesDe Rijk.De Rijkusestheterms andatemporal a "nominalist term to distinguish usage"ofa naturally suppositing subject a termhasor hasnot,Buridans' natural from a "realist usage."He says:"Accordingly, times ofthetenseoftheproposition, totheextent thatall(possible) supposition regardless forthatreasonit canbest areincluded; at whichparticular maybe in existence beings is oftheRealist On theotherhandFerrer's natural be termed omnitemporal supposition rather than which as a universale is time-less in thatitinvolves a metaphysical entity, type, De Rijk1973 Therefore hisnatural atemporali maybe termed supposition omnitemporal. arenaturally I seetheseterms to thenounswhich as notapplicable (n. 1),68. However, to twopossible usesof in a proposition, butas onlyapplicable terms suppositing subject tensecopula'is' is i.e. whenthepresent tensecopula'is' in a proposition, thepresent andwhenit as tense-less ortime construed ), i.e. atemporali y (intemporale) (intemporale independent

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SCIENTIFIC PROPOSITIONS IN BURIDAN & ALBERTOF SAXONY 307 centuryrejectionof Buridan'sview, in variousNotabiliamentionedby an anonymousauthor,in BnF, lat. 14716, ff.40va-41rb,is nothingbut an interpolatedhodge-podgeof Albertof Saxony's own criticismsof various views of Buridan's fromearlierin the century.It is this latterfact that makes Albertthe ultimatelate fourteenth-century source forcriticismsof Buridan'sview on naturalsupposition. I John Buridan and Albert of Saxony are typicallyclassifiedas medieval "nominalist who acceptthe ontologica!primacyofparticulars, philosophers" withuniversaishavinga lesserontologicalstatus.For example,theyboth certainlyagree that spatio-temporalparticulars". . . come into existence at a time;pass out of existenceat some later time; and theyexist at all timesin between."6Medieval ontological"realists"had arguedthat"nominalists"could not have scientific via demonstration, understanding along the lines suggestedby Aristotlein his Posterior since the , Analytics objects of such demonstrations were spatio-temporal particulars.Realistsclaimed thatpropositionsabout such objectswere at best onlycontingently truenot necessaryor eternallytrue. As De Rijk points out:

is construed as a present tensed at every/ eachgiven time itoccurs , i.e. omnitemporally (inomni Sincenounssignify all theirsignificata oftime,I do notfindthe tempore). independendy distinction withrespect to theissueof natural between helpful supposition ontological "nominalists" and "realists." As I see theissue,thereal"shooting" between Albert of andJohnBuridan aboutnatural is actually aboutwhether ornotthe Saxony supposition tensecopula:'is' canbe takenina tense-less ortime-independent eternal sense present , or only inthesensethatitis confined tothe tense at every/ eachoccurance ofitsuse.I believe present thelatter sensecorresponds to whatBraakhuis outis Buridan's secondargument points forsubject terms natural in scientific Moreover, having supposition propositions. partofmy motivation forchanging De Rijk'susageisthefourteenth-century menauthor, anonymous tioned a version oftwoofBuridan's byDe Rijk,inBnF,lat.14716,formulates arguments forthenatural ofterms, i.e. Arguments 2.5 & 2.7 below,bydistinguishing supposition between thecopula'is' takenas connoting notime atall (nullum tempus connotaret) [whatI call ' as signifying time signifying atemporali 'y'],andtaken any given (quodlibet tempus significam) [what I callsignifying 'omnibetween Hence,thedifference temporally]. myusageoftheterms andDe Rijk'sisthatDe Rijk'susageapplies thedistinction tonouns, atemporal/ omni-temporal butI applythedistinction to thedifferent tensecopula signifying usagesofthepresent 'is'.I believe thatmyusagewillhelponemoreclearly understand therealdisagreement overnatural between Albert and Buridan, andAlbert's to Buridan's supposition responses in favor ofnatural particular arguments supposition. 6 M.J.Loux,Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction , 2nded.,London2002,216.

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MICHAEL J. FITZGERALD It is self-evident thatthelogiciansof the anti-Realist tradition who were all abstractentitiesof whateversort,could eagerlyinvolvedin exorcising not help takingthe Realist explanationof demonstrative propositions were com(like Ferrer's)forsheernonsense.Since concreteparticulars theanti-Realists monlyheldto be theonlyproperclaimantsto existence, in concrete ofknowledge setthemselves thetaskto establish theobjectivity particularbeingand nowhereelse. In theirviewall universalknowledge was ultimately knowledgeof concreteparticularbeings.Of courseas a was of outstandthe doctrineof supposition generaltheoryof reference withinthe scope of the anti-Realist program. ing interest The crucialpoint lay in the propositionsof demonstrative science, whichare supposedto be necessarily true,i.e. trueat all possibletimes. of present Howevertheyjust have the formof categoricalpropositions tense,e.g. 'Omnis homo est animal', 'Tonitruusest sonus factusin tradition had to takethemfor nubibus'.For thisreason,the anti-Realist falseif no man happensto exist(c.q. if no thunderhappensto be) at the timeat whichthe propositionis writtenor uttered.Puttingit in a generalway the problemwas: how is the necessityof science to be particularbeings?7 groundedin contingent

demonstraHence, nominalistslike Buridan all hold that a scientifically ble proposition,like 'Thunder is a sound made in the clouds' is notjust about the subject term'spresentsignificata,but also about its past and futuresignificataas well. But, Buridan reasons, if the subject termsof for demonstrablepropositionsare takenas personally suppositing scientifically thisor thatparticularinstanceof thunder,when thereis no thunder,the proposition'All thunderis a sound made in the clouds' willbe falserather science.Hence, demontruepropositionof demonstrative thanan eternally for the strativesciencesrequirenaturalsupposition subjecttermsof their propositions,in order for the subject termseven to be said ofall (dicide omni)of theirsignificata. utunturhuiusmodisuppositione Deinde quartoscientiaedemonstrativae in libroMetheorum 'omnetonisi dicamus quia, [i.e. suppositionaturalis], truumest sonusfactusin nubibus'vel 'omnisirisest reflexioaut refrachoc solumdicerepro praesentibus. tio lucis',non intendimus Immo,si ... Et in praesentivel iris,tamenita diceremus nullumessettonitruum

7 De Rijk1973(n. 1),51-52.

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SCIENTIFIC IN BURIDAN PROPOSITIONS & ALBERTOF SAXONY 309 hoc manifeste dicitAristoteles sic "'de omni' quidem primoPosteriorum dico quod non est in aliquo sic et in aliquo non nec aliquando sic nec aliquando non."8 De Rijk maintainsthat Buridan believed only an atemporal view of the demonstrative "logic of names" would solve the problem of scientifically propositionsinvolvingclaims about all spatio-temporal particularobjects.9 "Thus Buridanappearsto hold thatin thecase of demonstrative propositions,thisviewof thelogicof namesmay solveour problem.They do not make an assertionabout any particulartime,but about all times. The termsof suchpropositions are regardedto standforall thingsthat i.e. can possiblydenote,regardless of theparticulartimeof theysignify, their(possible)existence.It is here that Buridanhas recourseto the older logicians.He thinksthat theyrecognizedthis in distinguishing betweenaccidentaland naturalsupposition. A termis said to have accidental suppositionif it standsfor thingsexistingat some determinate time,whereasa termhavingnaturalsuppositionstandsforall concrete thingsit signifies ), regardlessof whethertheyexistat the (all itssupposita in thepastor willexistin thefuture existed ... So Buridan presenttime, takesthe naturalsuppositionused by the older logicians{antiqui logici) as an omnitemporal whichcauses a termto standforall its supposition, whethertheyare in the present,past,or possiblesupposita indifferently, future."10 8Johannes Summutae De suppositionibus 4.3.4, ed.R. vanderLecq,Nijmegen 1998(Artistarium, De Suppositionibus). 46, 14-17& 22-24.(hereafter 10-4), Buridanus, John Summulm deDialéctica . Anannotated witha philosophical introduction Buridan, translation, andfourth, thedemonstrabyG. Klima,NewHaven-London 2001,260:"Furthermore, tivesciencealso use thissortof supposition. Forifwe sayin [connection with]the thatevery thunder is a soundmadein theclouds, or thatevery rainbow is Meteorologica a reflection or refraction oflight, thenwe do notintend to saythesethings onlyconthepresent eveniftherewereno thunder or rainbow at thepreones;indeed, cerning senttime, wewouldnevertheless . . . Aristode states thisin saythesamethings explicitly bk.1 ofthePosterior "I call'[true]forall' [deomni Analytics: ] thatwhichis notsuchthat it holdsforsomeanddoesnotholdforanother, norsuchthatsometimes it holdsand sometimes itdoesnot." 9 I am usingthenotion ofa 'proposition' herein a metaphysically neutral way,to refer towhatever is considered thebearer oflogical truth andfalsity, whether indifferently thatbearer is takentobe: 1) a sentence; or 3) a common con2) a statement; "meaning tent"acrossdifferent without a position withregard to their languages, taking ontological or howeffective eachcandidate is forfulfilling thetaskofbearing status, or logicaltruth falsity. 10De Rijk1973(n. 1),55-57.

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has naturalsupposition Hence, it is reallybecause the subject term thunder in thatproposition,ratherthanpersonal that , supposition the propositionis and we can claim thatit is necessaryand eterdemonstrable scientifically nally true. The view thatit was John Buridanwho reintroducednatural supposition for preciselythis purpose,is also confirmedin the mid-fifteenth-century discussionof naturalsupposition , c.1456, by Lawrence Sartorerof Sweden (LaurentiusSartorerisde Swendenetum).Lawrence says: naturalissuppositionis: utrumsupDubitatursecundocircadescriptionem extra conveniat terminis naturalis communibus, propoaequaliter positio Pro quo notandumquod quidam moderni sitionemet in propositione. est quando terminussupponitin naturalis opinati sunt quod suppositio Unde dixerunt ordinead copulamnonimportantem aliqwddeterminatimi tempus. Tonitruum estsonus Homo est talium subiecta animal; propositionum: quod In enim naturaliter. talibus in nubibus , propositionibus, factus supponunt ut ipsi dicunt,subiectanon capiunturin ordinead aliquod determinasuntcontingentes. tumtempus,quia si sic, talespropositiones Quod est PrimoPosteňorum. Et ergo ad salvandumillaspropocontraPhilosophum naturalem Buridanus sitionesnecessarias , dicensquod suppositionem excogitavit nonimporin ordine ad terminus habet fieri copulam supponit ipsa quando Ex a connotatone immo absolvitur determinatum tantem , temporis. tempus aliquod alia naturalis et secundum quaelibet ipsumquod suppositio quo sequitur suppositiosolum est in propositione.Alii autem dixerunt,sequentes actualis solumestin propositione. Suppositiovero antiquos,quod suppositio 11 tionem. in extra tam proposi quam propositione, ponabilis,

11Laurentius de suppositione naturali Tractatus de Swendenetum, Sartoreris , Lat. naturalis De suppositione Ms. Michaelbeuren , see 57, f. 223vb.Forhisentirediscussion ofnatural thedescription itis doubted ff.223va-226va. supposition: concerning "Secondly a proposition and terms outside whether natural appliesto common equally supposition areoftheopinion moderni thatcertain to whichit shouldbe noted, within it.According witha copulanotintroducwhena termsupposits occurs thatnatural arranged supposition as 'Man ofsuchpropositions time.Hence,they saythatthesubjects ingsomedeterminate Forinthese is a soundmadeintheclouds'arenaturally 'Thunder is an animal'; suppositing. witha copula arenotarranged ofpropositions, as theythemselves sorts say,thesubjects arecontinsomedeterminate time,becauseifso,thosesortsofpropositions introducing And I Posterior in Book of the what the That is Analytics. says Philosopher against gent. natural Buridan devised ofsuchpropositions to savethenecessity therefore, supposition, not witha copula thatit has to obtainwhena termsupposits bybeingarranged saying itis absolved determinate some , oftime time', from anyconnotation nay,on thecontrary, introducing occurs andanyothersupposition to himthatnatural sinceitfollows supposition according others theancients, supposition However, saythatonlyactual following onlyina proposition.

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SCIENTIFIC PROPOSITIONS IN BURIDAN & ALBERTOF SAXONY 3 11 In the balance of his essay,De Rijk focuseson only the 'FourthReason' Buridangivesforwhynatural mustbe reintroduced. But,Buridan supposition himselfactually gives us several more reasons for reintroducingnatural seem , in addition to the reason that scientificdemonstrations supposition to requireit. First,Buridan says, thereare certainverbs which ampliate their subject terms to supposit for all their past, present and future ' intel significatain a propositionalcontext,such verbs as: Ho understand (; ' 'to ' ' ' j, 'toknow(scire),tocognize(«cognoscere ligere) signify' (.significare ), tothink'' (opinan), and others. Buridan thinksthat the presenceof theseverbs requiresnatural fortheirsubjectterms,in orderfortheirsubjecttermsto supposit supposition forall theirpast, presentand futuresignificata.12 Second, certain other propositionalcontextsrequire naturalsupposition fortheirsubjectterms,whetherthe propositionsare trueor false,contexts like 'Everythingthat is, or was or will be, runs' (Omnequodest, velfuitvel erit , currit).13 Third, the presenceof certaintermsin a propositionaffectthe distributionof the subjecttermforall its past, present,and futuresignificata, and these other termsrequire subject termsto have naturalsupposition , ' ratherthanpersonal or material Terms such as: 'perpetually supposition. (jper' ' ' functionin thisway. For exam), eternally petue ), always(semper), (
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why we have to utilize various writtenor spoken linguisticexpressions like 'man' or 'animal' to designatethem. When our intellectscomplexly foreverytime,past,presentand future. conceive,theydo so indifferendy the have natural when they occur in mental Hence, supposition concepts claims that there are both 'material'and 'formal' Buridan propositions.15 componentsto any given proposition,written,spoken, or mental. The materialcomponentsare the subjectand predicateterms,and the formal componentis the copula.16Since Aristotlesays that the most basic elementsof a propositionare a noun and a verb; the copula: is, is reallya the syncategorematic part of the predicatetermwhichmerelyjoins together of is and This function the subject predicated conjoining copula implicitly containedin every So, in the proposition'A man runs' forexampredicate. ple, the presenttenseverb 'runs' impliesthe presenttense copula 'is', in such a way that the verbs 'runs' can be replaced in any propositionby 'is-running'withoutany loss of truth-valuein the resultingproposition. Gabriel Nuchelmans summarizesBuridan's view of mental propositions as follows: distans. A mentalproposito is a complexconceptformedby a complexio consistsof the conceptsthatare the The matterof the mentalpropositio velfuturo homo homoestanimal', sedisti'omnitempore praesenti, praeterito tempore estveleritanimal'." fuit, 15Ibid.,48, 13-49, naturali 2: "Adhuc quia,sicutposposset arguiproillasuppostone omniaammalia, asinos sumus indifferenter concipere equosetc.,unoconceptu putahomines hocnomen'animal', a quo sumitur homines, equosvelasiabsquehocquodconcipiam ita a quibussumuntur istanomina'homo''equus','asinus', nosconceptibus specialibus a quosumitur unoconceptu communi indifferenter omniatempora egopossum concipere hocnomen praesentiam, praespecialibus conceptibus 'tempus' absquehocquodconcipiam coessetinpropositione teritionem velfuturitionem. categorica Ergopositoquodnecesse eam nonoporteret cumtempore, tamencorrespondenter conceptibus pulamsignificare sedposset velfuturum, autdeterminate determinate praeteritum tempus significare praesens sinedifferentia communem expartetemporum secundum consignificare tempus conceptum velfuturi. praesentis, praeteriti 16Johannes inmateria Librum Perihermenias , q. I, 7: utrum Buridanus, Quaestiones longe super 1983(Artistarium, universali naturali , ed. R. vanderLecq,Nijmegen 4), particularis equivalei in hocloconosintelestprimo 33, 17-18:"Notandum propositionis quodpermateriam etperformam etpraedicatum subiectum copulam." propositionis ligimus 17Ibid.,I, 5: utrum adplaátum "verbum estvoxsignificativa verbi sitbonainquadidtur diffinitio dicuntur nota eorum etestsemper estseparata cuius nulla cumtempore , quedealtero parssignificativa essecopulavelimplicare ed.VanderLecq,23,20-24:"Sednecsubiectum copupotest ad partem ad duas,scilicet orationis reducuntur Ideoprincipales lamnececonverso. partes scilicet etad partem quiapotest perse essecopula perse copulativam, perse subicibilem ad subiectum." velimplicare copulam praedicati

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SCIENTIFIC IN BURIDAN PROPOSITIONS & ALBERTOF SAXONY 313 comsubjectand predicate;the formis the mentalcopula, a conceptus thatis an act of compoundingor separating.The mentalcopplexivus ula does not signify thatthe subject-thought and the predicate-thought are relatedto the same thingor are not relatedto the same thing.It or separating of compounding is, rather,theactivity itself, beinga mode of conceivingof a thingin a complexway,eitheraffirmatively or negis the significate of the vocal proposition the atively.The mentalpropositio vocal termsand conceptsof thingsbeingsignified by the categorematic the way of conceiving,the mentalcopula, being signified by the synwordsestand nonest.If we wishto speakof the significate categorematic of a propositio as such,we can mean onlythatthe mentalpropositio is the of the vocal propositio or, in a less importantway, that the significate vocal propositio is the significate of the written proposition In addition, the Buridanian "mental copula" signifies any timeyou please The mentalcopula in facthas a different onto(
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mental Withoutthisspecial atemporal , the subordinatedconventional copula writtenand spoken propositionscould not be comprehendedor ever be true ." Moreover, according to Buridan, we only need a called "eternally singlecomplex conceptionto be able to conceive past, presentor future, particularthings,such as a man or an animal, withoutany additionof mental copula special temporalconceptsat all. This is because the atemporal the that binds is the 'timelessinvisibleglue5 togetherwith subject-thought into a complexmentalthought,i.e. a mentalpropothe predicate-thought to account forthe ability sition.Buridanthinks,we need natural supposition a mental i.e. of thissingleatemporal proposition,and its complex concept, and to to any time any particularentities. abilityto apply indifferently Item,sicutintellectus potestconciperehominemet animalsine differenistitermini'homo' et tia temporisillisconceptibusa quibusimponuntur est quod potestformareconceptumcomplexivum 'animal',ita verisimile illorumsine differentia temporis.Et erittuncpropositiomentalisomni Ideo etiamtermini vel futuro,indifferens. tempore,praesentipraeterito Sed non habemus indifferenter. illis omnibus supponunt temporibus pro talem copulam mentalem. vocem proprieimpositamad significandum talem Ideo possumusad placitumhac voce 'est' uti ad significandum non quam praepraesens magis tempus significabitur quam copulamper immonullum.Ideo, sic eritsuppositionaturalistervel futurum, teritum minorum.20 mental copulathat is doing all However, it is actuallythe special atemporal the work of preservingthe necessityand "eternaltruth"of scientifically demonstrablepropositions,not the natural suppositionof their subject demonstrafor scientifically terms.Buridan's defenseof naturalsupposition ble propositionsactuallyrestsupon the "second argument"mentionedby Braakhuis,namely,Buridan's argumentfor the existenceof the atemporal mental copula. 20Buridanus, De suppositionibus , 4.3.4,ed. Van derLecq,47, 19-22;JohnBuridan, is ableto Summulae 4, 4.3.4,p. 261:"Again, Klima,Treatise justas theintellect , trans. oftimebymeansoftheconcepts ofmanandanimalwithout conceive anydistinction a thatitis abletoform so itis likely areimposed, 'man'and'animal' theterms whence Butthenthemental oftime. without [formed proposition anydistinction concept complexive to all present, withrespect willbe indifferent withthisconcept] times, past,andfuture Butwe from thosetimes foreverything willsupposit andso also[its]terms indifferently. sucha mentad to signify do nothavean utterance copula,so we can imposed properly thepresent sucha copulabywhich usetheverb'is'byconvention ] tosignify [adplacitum no thanis thepastor thefuture: timewillno morebe signified indeed, [itwillsignify] of the terms." willoccura natural timeat all,andso there supposition

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SCIENTIFIC IN BURIDAN PROPOSITIONS & ALBERTOF SAXONY 315 Buridan'sinsistenceupon the existenceof a special atemporal mental cop" of ula for mental propositions,in order to ensure the "eternaltruth demonstrablepropositions,is a forerunnerof a view of the scientifically nature of time which the contemporaryphilosopherMichael J. Loux characterizesto as "eternalisť ratherthan as atemporal : Eternalists . . . makemuchof tenselesslanguage.Indeed,eternalists have wanted to claim that we without loss traditionally everything say can, of content,be expressedin a tenselesslanguage.On thisview,even the claim thata particulartimeis presentcan be expressedin a language that exhibitsno built-inprejudicein favorof one time over another. These eternalists remindus thatexpressions like 'now' and 'the present' are indexicals.Indexicals,recall,are referring expressionswhose reference on any occasionof utteranceis determined by the contextof that utterance."'Now' is an indexicalwhich,on any occasionof utterance, have genpicksout the timeat whichthe utteranceoccurs.Eternalists taken this fact to I show that when a refer to time as 'now' or erally 'the present,'I am not identifying it as some ontologically privileged moment;I am merelypickingit out as the timeat whichmyutterance occurs.... To speak of an eventas past or futureis not to denigrate it, to deny it full-blown ontologicalstatus;it is merelyto say that it - the occurs beforeor aftera particularutterance veryutteranceby whichI date it.21 II Unlike Buridan,the presentseems to hold a special ontologicalstatusfor Albertof Saxony. He defendswhat Michael J. Loux refersto as a "pre" sentisi . . . believe positionwithrespectto the natureof time. "Presentists thatthe use of tensesis ontologicallysignificant. As theysee it, onlywhat existsin the presentreallyexistsand onlywhat is goingon in the present is reallygoing on."22AlbertclearlysatisfiesLoux's characterizationof a presentisi: In propositione de praesenti, in qua non ponituraliquisterminus ampliasive his quae sunt, tivus,nomendenotatursupponerepro praesentibus quamvisin eadem propositioneetiambene supponatpro aliis. Et ideo

21Loux2002(n.6), 221-22. 22Loux2002(n.6), 220.

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MICHAEL J. FITZGERALD in omnipropositione hoc verbum:est,sit copula explicitesive implicite. in omni terminusobtinetqui denotatursupponere Igitur, propositione, per illam propositionem pro eo quod est. Unde quamvisin ilia: Adam tarnenilla proposi tio resolvi tur , ponaturverbumde praeterito, ßiit homo in unam in qua hoc verbum praesentistemporisest copula,ut in illa:Adamestpraeteritus homo. Et ideo sicutdictum, semperterminus23 in propositione in qua poniturdenotatursupponerepro eo quod est.24

In fact,Albertmaintainsthat everypropositionis reallyonly about the arguesthatthe presenttensecopula thingsthatpresentlyexist.He further a is an of 'is', really independentpart proposition.It is not any syncategorematicelementin a propositionor a part of the predicateterm,as Buridan implies.25It is a significative term in a categoricalproposition that only signifiesthe presenttime: Probatur: Secundaconclusio:quod hoc verbumestnon estsyncategorema. alicuiusabsque hoc illudnon est syncategorema quod est significativum con, per praecedentem quod alicuiaddatur;sed sic est de hoc verboest clusionem,ergo,etc. Tertia conclusio:hoc verbumest,est significativum temporispraesentis. est Probatur,nam in communimodo loquendi,cum dicimus:Socrates modo hoc non est albus albus; , significaiquod pro praesentitempore esse nisi hoc verbumestessetconsignificativum temporispraesentis.26

23 ed. 24Albert A critical ofhisQuaestiones edition onLogic. Questions Disputed ofSaxony's Twenty-foe Leiden-Boston-Köln circalogicarci, ed.MJ.Fitzgerald, 2002,(hereafter QCL),Utrum in tenseproposition, 5: "In a present velpotest esse , 347. 1, pp. 255,13-256, ßiit,velerit, forpresent or those a nounmeansitsupposits is no ampliating which there term, things forothers. inthatproposition italsocorrectly which Therefore, are,eventhough supposits or implicitly. in every thisverb'is',is thecopula,either Therefore, explicitly proposition in thatproposition forthat which meansitsupposits in every a term prevails proposition Adamwas there is a verbofthepasttensein theproposition: which is.Hence,although tenseverb thatproposition is parsedintoonein whichthepresent a man;nevertheless as [is]said,a termis always 'is' is thecopula;as in:Adamis a pastman.Therefore, forthatwhichis." in which itoccurs, in a proposition indicated to supposit 25See notes17 and 18 above. 26Albertus ed. AngelMuñozinArtem Veter de Saxonia,Quaestiones em,edicióncritica, s De Interpretation InLibrum Aristoteli 1988:Quaestiones Maricaibo , De VerboSecunda García, cumtempore sitsignificativum omne verbum utrum , 885-86, p. 552 (hereafter Quaeritur Quaestio: Thisis expression. QAV). "TheSecondThesisis:Theverb'is' is nota syncategorematic withofsomething, is significative which Thatisnota syncategorematic expression proved. to thepreceding butso itis withthisverb'is' according outbeingaddedto something, etc. Thesis.Therefore,

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IN BURIDAN & ALBERTOF SAXONY 317 SCIENTIFIC PROPOSITIONS the same presentthingthatthe participlebeing The copula 'is' (est),signifies time . connoting signifies, althoughthe noun beingsignifiesthat thingwithout Similiterhoc verbumest, significaieandem rem quam significaihoc illamsineconnotatione ens , licetnomenenssignificai temporis.27 participium The presenttensecopula 'is' independently signifiesthatthe subjectterm for and predicatetermsof the propositionare to be takenas co-suppositing in verb the same presently Moreover,every everyproposition existing things. containsthispresenttense copula 'is'. Hence, the categorematic implicitly termsin the propositioncan only suppositfor things (ensvel entiá)which on the Albert's are ontologicallyprivileged emphasis presently (quae sunt). statusof "the presenttime" also emergesfromhis general characterization of suppositionitself: turest acceptioseu usus terminicatUnde supposi tio de qua hic intendi tione.Unde qui accipiturpro aliquo vel aliquibusin proposi egorematici dico accipi pro ilio de cuiuspronomine terminům alicuiuspropositionis denotaturverificali iliumpraedicatumin illa propositione demonstrante affirmative vel negative,verbi gratia dicendo 'homo est animai', vel 'homo' accipdicendo'homo est nomen'.In primaistarumhic terminus Sortemvel iturpro Sortevel Platone,quia de pronominedemonstrante Platonemli animal quod est praedicatumpraedictaepropositionis per denotaturverifican, ut dicendo 'hoc est anipraedictampropositionem mal' demonstrando per ly hoc Sortemvel Platonemvel aliquem alium hominem.28 for ThirdThesisis: Thisverb'is' is significative ofthepresent tense.Thisis proved, in theusualwaywe say:Socrates is white, thatat thepresent timehe is signifies speaking oftheprewhite. Nowthiswouldnotbe thecase,unlesstheverb'is' is consignificative verbum sitnota eorum senttense." Cf.also,QCL,Utrum semper quaedealtero ad subiectum dicuntur velpraedicantur , 170,pp. 167,15-16:"Et istacompositio praedicati See alsonote nonestaliudnisiidemesseproquo supponit subiectum et praedicatum." 20 above. 27QAV:Quaestiones In Librum Aristotelis De Interpretationen 884,pp. 550 & 552:"Similarly, thisverb'is' signifies thesamething as theparticiple thenoun 'being'signifies, although time" thatthing without 'being'signifies connoting ' Alberts 28Christoph derTermini: EineUntersuchung zur(Perutilis Kann,DieEigenschaften logica vonSachsen terminorum , Leiden1994,Perutilis , Tr. II, cap. I: De suppositionibus , 167,8-19. "Thesupposition which is intended hereis thetaking or useofa categorematic term, by in a proposition. whichitis takenforsomething or somethings Hence,I saya termin a proposition is taken forthat, which hasbeenpointed inthatproposiout,thepredicate ofa pronoun or negatively; tionis meantto be verified forexample affirmatively saying 'manis an animal'or saying 'manis a noun'.In thefirst ofthese,thisterm'man'is taken forSocrates orPlato,becauseofa pronoun, Socrates orPlatohaving beenpointed whichis thepredicate ofthepreceding is meantto out,theterm'animal', proposition, 'thisis an be verified; as in saying whilepointing to Socrates or Platoor some animal', other man,usingtheterm'this'."

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In order for the termhomoto have anysupposition at all, in the proposition: Homo est animal one be must to Socrates or Plato right , pointing or some man other at the the now, existing presenttime,using demonstrative pronoun 'Aoc' and saying: Hoc est animal.So, the subject term in that that it signifies, propositioncannot suppositfor everything past, present, and future,but only the presentlyexistingones. Unde non pro omni ilio quod terminussignificat potestsupponerein de omni ilio quod significat. propositione.Nec etiam est verificabilis Unde lyalbum , quamvissignificet albedinem,tamenhaec estfalsa:Albedo estalba.29 The onlyknownplace in Albertwritingswherehe explicitlydiscussesnaturalsupposition is in the nineteenthquestion of his Quaestiones circalogicam: Utrum inpropositione depraesenti subiectum ad possitampliari supponendum pro eo In vel eût vel esse. that Albert draws the distinction , potest Question , quodfait, betweenthe naturaland actualsupposition of a term. indifferenter Secundo,notandumquod suppositioqua terminus supponit omnibus suis et futuris, pro significatis praesentibus, praeteritis, potest vocari suppositio naturalis. Suppositioautem qua terminusaccipiturpro ilio quod est vel pro illisquae sunt30 actualist potestvocarisuppositio a subjectterm's The presenttensecopula 'is', in any proposition,restricts actualsupposition to its presentlyexistingsignificata.Subject termsdo not For example,in a propositionlike usuallysuppositforall theirsignificata. 'Thunder is a sound made in the clouds' the subjecttermhas natural supfor all and future instances of but the thunder, position past,present, propositionliterallymeans that the subject term has actualsupposition only for the presentinstancesof thunder.Albertsays:

29QCL: in a proposition. Neither itsignifies cannot foreverything supposit pp. 197,1-4:"A term theterm'white' ofeverything itsignifies. is itabletobe verified Hence,although signifies is false." 'Whiteness is a whitething5 nevertheless theproposition whiteness; 30velfuit, ed. 31QCL: , forall itssignificata, termindifferently thatthesupposition supposits bywhicha subject The supposition, can be called'natural however, supposition'. past,andfuture, present, a subject termis taken is,orthosethatare,canbe called'actual forthatwhich bywhich supposition'."

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IN BURIDAN SCIENTIFIC PROPOSITIONS & ALBERTOF SAXONY 319 tionemnaturalemtermini, Tertio,notandumquod quamvispono supposi non tamen propterhoc sicutplurimi32 antiquorumlogici posuerunt,33 volo concedereistas 'Tonitruumest sonusfactusin nubibus'(supposito 'Rosa estflos'(suppositoquod nullasitrosa), quod nullumsittonitruum), naturalemet consimiles; quas conceduntpropteristam suppositionem quia intendobene concederequod in ista 'Rosa est flos' (positoquod nulla rosa sit),subiectumbene supponitsuppositione naturalipro eo quod est vel fuit,vel erit,vel potestesse, sed in propositionein qua ponitur,denotatursupponeresolumpro eo quod est,ex quo est propoEt igitur, estneganda siti de praesenti sinetermino ampliativo. propositio tamquamfalsa,ex quo per eam denotaturquod rosa est quae est flos. termini Unde non secundumomnemsuppositionem propositiodebetdici vera vel falsa,sed solum secundumistam qua terminusaccipiturpro tionem. aliquo vel pro aliquibusper quem denotaturaccipi per proposi Ideo ilia estfalsa'Tonitruumestsonusfactusin nubibus'(suppositoquod nullumtonitruumsit). Similiter,in ista: Eclipsislunae etc. (supposito quod nulla sit),et sic de aliis pluribus.34 In his Perutilis , Albertsays: Et sic dico quod subiectumistiuspropositionis 'Tonitruumest sonusfactusin nubibus'supponitpersonaliter35 pro eo quod fuitvel eritvel potest 32plurimum, ed. 33possuerunt, ed. 34QCL:, I putforth thenatural ofterms, supposition Although justas didmanyoftheolderlogi'Thunder is a soundmadein the cians;I do notwantto concedethesepropositions thatno thunder nowno roseis; and clouds', is; 'A roseis a flower', assuming assuming similar I intend which olderlogicians concede becauseofnatural propositions supposition. toconcede thatin theproposition 'A roseis a flower', thatno roseis;thesubassuming forthatwhich is or was,or willbeor can jecttermcorrectly supposits bynatural supposition inwhich bea rose.But,theproposition thesubject term is placedmeans that thesubject term is in thepresent tenseand lacksan is,sincetheproposition forthatwhich supposits only term. sincetheproposition meansthata roseis whichis a flower; Therefore, ampliating theproposition is deniedas false.Hence,itis notbecauseofevery ofterms supposition thata proposition butonlyaccording to thesuppooughtto be saidto be trueor false, sition thesubject in theproposition term is takenforsomething orsomethings bywhich it is meant tobetaken. thatno thunder Therefore, is, theproposition forwhich assuming 'Thunder is a soundmadein theclouds', is false.Similarly, no eclipseofthe assuming moonis now,theproposition 'Aneclipseofthemoonetc.'is falseandso on formany others." See also,PaulaJ. Smithka, andNatural In Albert Ampliation Supposition ofSaxony's CircaLogicam, in:J.Biard(ed.),Itinéraires d'Albert deSaxeParisVienne AuXIVe Quaestiones Siècle,Paris1991,137-148. 35Kann1994(n.28),Tr.II, cap.IUI: De suppositione 177,3-5:"Suppositio personali, personalis estacceptio termini vocalis velscripti estad significandum vel proiliocuiimpositus

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MICHAEL J. FITZGERALD esse vel imaginan.Sed quia per proposi tionemdenotatursupponerepro eo quod est, cum sit de praesentisine terminoampliative,praedicta sit.Similiter dicerepropositioestfalsasuppositoquod nullumtonitruum turde ista 'Rosa estpulcherrimus florum'positoquod nulla rosa esset.36

Since at presentthereare no particularinstancesof thunder,forwhich the personally suppositing subject term can be taken in the proposition 'Thunder is a sound made in the clouds', the propositionis literally false. On Buridan'sview,by contrast,the subjecttermhas natural for supposition all its past, presentand futuresignificata.Even though this is also the case forAlbert,it is because a subjecttermcan be ampliatedto supposit for its significatawhich are beyond the tense of the principalverb in a proposition.Paying carefulattentionto verbal tense in a propositionis essentialfor determiningthe thingsfor which the subject term actually For example,when thereis an ampliatingtermin a proposition, supposits. like the term 'dead' in the proposition'The king is dead', the subject termis ampliatedbeyond the presenttense to signifyits past significata. However,the occurrenceof a past tensedcopula 'was' in the proposition 'Adam waj (fiât) a man', he says,is merelya disguisedabbreviationfor the presenttenseexpression:'is a past man'. Hence, the propositionreally means 'Adam is a past man'37 The past tense copula 'was', ampliatedthe subjectterm'Adam' to suppositbeyondthe implicitpresenttensecopula 'is' to include past men as well as presentmen in its supposita.Hence, the actualsupposition of the term'Adam' in the proposition:'Adam was a man' is for both its presentand past supposita.The situationis exactly the same forscientific propositionslike 'Thunder is a sound made in the clouds'. Hence, Albertthinksthat subject termssuppositingin propositionscan onlysuppositforpresendyexistingspatio-temporal objects,stricdy " termini mentalis ("Personal significai. supposiacceptio proilioquo naturaliter proprie or tionis thetaking ofa spoken orwritten termforthatwhich itis stipulated to signify ofa mental thetaking termforthatwhichitproperly naturally signifies.") 36Ibid.,cap.V: Depropositionibus dubitandis 2: "Andso I saythatthesub, 197,17-198, inthisproposition 'Thunder is a soundmadeintheclouds'personally supposits jectterm means forthatwhich wasorwillbe orcanbe orimagined. But,becausetheproposition an ampliatense without thatitsupposits forthatwhich is,sinceitis a present proposition It should thatthere is no thunder. tiveterm, thepreceding is false, assuming proposition 'The roseis themostbeautiful offlowers' forthisproposition be saidsimilarly assuming thatno roseis." 37QCL: ,347,pp. 255, 18-256,3: "Undequamvis in unamin illapropositio resolvitur verbum de praeterito, tarnen Adam , ponatur fidthomo homo." estpraetmtus praesentis estcopula,utin ilia:Adam temporis qua hocverbum

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SCIENTIFIC IN BURIDAN PROPOSITIONS & ALBERTOF SAXONY 321 speaking,unless there occurs some ampliatingterm which expands the range of the subject term's supposita to also include its past or future The suppositaof an actually significata. suppositing subjecttermmighteven extendto significatathat can be or can be imaginedat present: . . . terminusin propositionepotestsupponerepro aliquo quod fuitvel eritvel potestesse vel intellegivel imaginariabsque hoc quod in ilia vus.38 propositione ponaturterminusampliati without tense However,verbsnever , as Buridanclaims.39Albertadopts signify what he claims to be the real position of Aristode,in De Interpretation e: verbs mustalways signifywithtense.There cannot be atemporal verbs(verba ), whethersuch verbs are takento be written,spoken,or menintemporalia tal. He presentseight different argumentsfor this position. 1) In grammar we acknowledgeknowledgeimpersonal verbs(verbaimpersonalia :), e.g. 'It is raining(Pluit)' 'It is thundering( Tonat)' but we do not hear of "tense40 Verbs less" atemporal verbs actionsand under(verbaintemporalia). 2) signify but both of these actions, going concepts require persistentparticular at all.41 thingsundergoingthe passage of time in orderto be comprehended If therewere such atemporal verbs,therewould be no greaterreason 3) to say that that a verb was of the past, present,or futuretense, rather than any other.424) If there were such a thingas an atemporal copula, thenassumingtherewould be no animalsnow but were some in the past or will be some in the future;both partsof a disjunctiveproposition'An animalis healthyor an animal is sick'havingincompatibledisjunctswould be true;since the copula 'is' would indifferently signify past, present,and futureanimals. However, the disjunctivepropositionis obviouslyfalse, 38Kann1994(n. 28),cap.V: Depropositionibus dubitandis , 197,14-16:". . . A termin a can supposit forsomething thatwas,or willbe,or canbe,or can be comproposition orimagined, an ampliative without termbeine: prehended putin thatproposition." 39QCL:< OctavaQuaestio > Utrum verbum absolvi a tempore sicquodnonsignified cum possit breviter ad quaestionem istamconclu, 147,pp. 157,18-19:"Respondeo tempore ponendo sionem: nonpotest absolvi a tempore." quodverbum 40Ibid,148,pp. 158,7-9:"Siverbum absolvi a tempore, posset sequeretur quodhaberemusverbaintemporalia sicuthabemus verbaimpersonalia. . nonaccipimus discovered Viennamanuscript [itade talibus ed.]." 41Ibid,149,pp. 158,13-15:"Secundo, omneverbum sigificat agerevelpati.Sedagere velpatinonpossunt sinetempore." intelligi 42Ibid,150,pp. 158,15-17:"Tertio, si aliquaverbapossunt absolvia tempore et indifferenter etfuturum; tuncnonessemaior consignificare tempus praesens, praeteritum, ratiode aliquibus quamde aliis."

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verbs because nowthere are no animals.435) If we allowed for atemporal could be true verba togethere.g. ( ), contradictory propositions intemporalia 'An eclipse of the moon is a lack of lightfromthe sun', and 'No eclipse of the moon is a lack of lightfromthe sun5,if thereis no eclipse of the verbs moon now.446) & 7) If we allowed foratemporal , then even scientific for terms whose nothing,would be true at supposit subject propositions 'An ass is an animal' when no false. For rather than example, present, animal is rightnow; or 'A man is an animal', if thereis no man right verb now.458) If therewere such a thingas an atemporal , it would be pointi.e. its tenses between less to grammatically presenttense,is; distinguish frompast tense, was; or futuretense, will be.*6Given all these reasons, or eternal of the presenttensed copAlbertthinksany atemporal signifying ula 'is' is simplyillusory.Even thoughin the presenttense copula 'is' is implicitin everyverb; AlbertNEVER allows the presenttensecopula 'is5 use. It alwayssignifiesthe presenttense.In addition, to have an atemporal tense since nouns always signifyall of theirsignificatawithout , even when nouns are suppositingsubjecttermsin scientific propositions;theyalways For Alberttalkingabout and future their significata. signify past, present, in Buridan's terms of subject natural way is simplyotiose.Albert supposition seems to reason that even thoughthe subjecttermsof scientific proposithe tense that are for tionscan be said to naturally beyond supposit things of the verb in a particularpropositionalcontext,the proposition'struth or falsitydoes not depend upon thatsortof supposition.It depends upon someone at a given time takingthe subjecttermsas personallysuppositto thetenseof theverbin that ing for somethingor some things,according : proposition non supponunt Concedoquod in librisclausistermini pro aliquo, inscripti pro aliquo. Et igitursi aliquishomo alius proquia a nulloaccipiuntur 43Ibid.,151,pp. 159,8-16:"Quarto, animalesset, positoiamquodnullum sequeretur nam Sedhocestfalsum, estaegrum'. velanimal estsanum quodhaecessetvera:'Animal estincasuquod ex eo quodpositum cuiusquaelibet istaestunadisiunctiva parsestfalsa, animeil sit." nullum 44Ibid.,152,pp. 159,18-19:"Quinto, essent simul sequeretur quodduocontradictoria Ibid,154,pp. 160,18-19:"Septimo, proboquodhaecnonsit vera,sedhocestfalsum." homoesset." Homoestanimal, concedenda: positoquodnullus 45Ibid.,153,pp. 159,24-25:"Sexto, adhuc essetasinus, positoquodnullus sequeretur estanimal." haecessetvera:Asinus 46Ibid.,15,pp. 160,12-13:"Octavo,sequeretur et temporis, quodverbapraesentis ab invicem." et frustra frustrarentur etpraeteriti futuri, distinguerentur temporis,

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SCIENTIFIC PROPOSITIONS IN BURIDAN & ALBERTOF SAXONY 323 ferret'Homo est animal',et nec ipse nec alteracciperetillos términos pro aliquo, diceremquod praedictitermininon supponerent.47 Nevertheless,Albertcan say that scientificpropositionslike 'Thunder is a sound made in the clouds' are in fact "eternallytrue;" if by that one understandsthat thismeans wheneverthe propositionis actuallyformed at particulartimesand places it is true,i.e. it is trueon each occurrence of its thought,utterance,or inscriptionand not otherwise,i.e., it is true at eachof thosetimesor omni-temporally true : . . . Scientiadebet esse de his quae suntperpetuaeveritatishoc est de suntverae, et illae his propositionibus quae quandocumqueformantur Et ideo stanteimpositioneterdicunturimmutabiles et incorruptibiles. Modo logica,quamvis minorumnon mutantur de veritatein falsitatem. sit de enuntiationibus et de argumentationibus, quae suntcorruptibiles formataede his tarnenpropositiones et possuntformariet non formari, forPatetquia quotienscumque suntincorruptibiles ad iliumintellectum. Et mantursuntverae, et non suntmutabilesde veritatein falsitatem. scitaede his vocat demonstrativae ideo quia sempersuntpropositiones .48 veritatis eas Aristoteles perpetuae propositiones 47QCL,253,pp. 209,1-5:"Terms forsomething written closedbooksdo notsupposit ifa manwereto utter becausetheyarenottakenforsomething Therefore, byanyone. for he noranyothermanwereto takethoseterms 'A manis an animal', andneither I wouldsaythoseterms do notsupposit." something; 48QCL:Utrum velpractica sitscientia , 21,pp.70,11-71, speculativa logica whichare eternally true 4: "Understanding ; thatis,ofpropositions oughtto be ofthings andincorsuchthatwhenever theyaremadetheyaretrue.Theyarecalled'immutable cannot ofterms, thesepropositions and,therefore, giventhecurrent stipulation ruptible'; Nowalthough utterances andarguments from a truth to a falsehood. logictreats change to that andcapableofbeingmadeor not,nevertheless, whicharecorruptible according madefrom themareincorruptible. Thisis clear,because thepropositions comprehension, from are formed whenever thosepropositions theyare true.Theyare notchangeable thataredemonintofalsehoods. becausetherearealways truths Therefore, propositions 'eternar ". See also, understood from Aristotle callsthosetruepropositions them, stratively 0 Lògica Alberto de Sajonia, Perutilis , ed.Ángel Muñoz-García, Logica MuyUtil(O Utilísima) demonD.F. 1988,Tractatus Primus, , 98: ". . . Propositiones México, cap.8: De Praedicato veldemonstrabiles scitaevelscibiles scientia esseperpetuae dicta,debent strantes, proprie in LibroPosteriorum, secundum dicoquidam'perpetuae veritatis; quoddicitAristoteles veritatis' id est,quotiescumqe formantur velquotiescumque suntvelerunt formabuntur, velfuerunt veraemanente eademsignificatione terminorum. ..." I think thatW.V.Quine's viewof"eternal sentences" a viewverysimimaybe ofsomehelphere.Quinedefends lartoAlbert's. thenaneternal sentence isa sentence whosetokens Quinesays:"Succincdy, allhavethesametruth value. . . Whenwespeakof'2 < 5' as an eternal then, sentence, wemustunderstand thatwe areconsidering in ourlanguage, itexclusively as a sentence andclaiming thetruth ofitstokens thatareutterances orinscriptions onlyofthose produced

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with Buridan's view of scientificpropoHence, Albert'smajor difficulty sitionsis reallynot that theirsubject termshave naturalsupposition for all theirpast,present,and futuresignificata in such propositions.Alberthimself also claims that subject termsin scientificpropositionshave natural for all theirpast, present,and futuresignificata.What really supposition bothersAlbertabout Buridan'streatmentof scientific propositionsis that Buridan requiresan atemporal copulaforthem to be "eternallytrue". It is not because of the naturalsupposition of the subject termthat a scientific or other proposition, any propositionforthatmatter,is true;it is because the propositionrequiresthat the subject term be verifiedby the predicate termaccordingto the tense of the verb in thatproposition,on each occasion of the utteranceof the proposition.Albert'sgreatinsightforhis nominalistprogenywas seeingthat on thisbasis one can have "eternally trueand necessary,"universalscientific about presendyexisting propositions concreteparticulars,where the subjecttermsof such propositionssupposit . Consequently,it is not the natural of theirsubjectterms personally supposition which makes scientificpropositions"eternallytrue or and necessary"at all. One can have trueand necessaryscientific withoutrequirpropositions, of subject terms,the existenceof an "eternal or ing the naturalsupposition " ." ," or special eternally atemporal copula existing objects Ill How does understanding Albert'sview here help us in understanding the context of later discussions of natural ? De philosophic supposition Rijk's anonymousauthorgives to us some Notabiliaincludedwithhis discussion Buridan'sviews,in BnF, lat. 14.716,ff.40va-41rb.These "Notabilia" reject The variousviews John Buridan'svariousargumentsfornatural supposition. given in theseNotabiliaseem to me to be merelyan ad hochodge-podge of variousviews of Albert's,againstvarious positionsof Buridan's,given earlierin the centuryand interpolatedby the anonymousauthorforhis own purposes.Consider for example the formulations of the two major in the Buridan's view of natural The Notabilia , arguments against supposition. firstargument,1.2.1, claimsthatsinceany subjecttermas a categorematic

in ourlinguistic . . . Whenwe calla sentence we arecalleternal, therefore, community relative at a particular time."(W.V.Quine, ingit eternal onlyto a particular language , Englewood Cliffs, Philosophy ofLogic NJ1970,14).

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& ALBERTOF SAXONY 325 IN BURIDAN PROPOSITIONS SCIENTIFIC noun supposits"properlyarrangedwith the copula of the proposition" forall of its present,past, and futuresignificata;thereis reallyno need for the subject termto accomplishthis: to introducenaturalsupposition 1.2.1 Quilibetterminus supponitin ordinead copulamsue propositionis. Ergo nulla est suppositionaturalis.Consequentiaest bona. Et antecedenspatetper diffinitionem suppositionis.49 followsfromAlbert'sposition.50 As I havejust illustrated above, thisdirectly The second major argumentagainstBuridan'sview of naturalsuppoin a proposisition,1.2.2, is that if a subject termhas naturalsupposition tion the way Buridan claims; then if a subjecttermsuppositsfornothing which is, the propositionwill be false. Consider the propositionCArose is (Rosa est)'when thereis no rose. If one takesthe subjecttermas naturally forwhatis, the propositionis true. However,the propositionis suppositing it to be {nonestita sicut asserts arenotso, as theproposition falsebecause " things esse asseritur earn ):" per 1.2.2 Secundo sic. Si aliquis terminussupponeretnaturaliter, sequitur ' quod ista propositioessetvera rosaesť secundumistamsuppositionem, suppositoquod nulla rosa sit.Consequensest falsumet non est ita sicut esse. Consequentiadeclaratur.Quia rosa est vel fuit, per earn asseritur ' ' ' sequiturquod ista propositiorosa ergo si li rosa supponatnaturaliter, esť est vera, suppositoquod nulla rosa sit in temporepraesenti.51 Albertclearlymaintainswhen a subject termin an affirmative proposition suppositsfor nothingthat is, the propositionis false. The subject termin a negativeproposition,whichsuppositsfornothingthatis, is true: cuius subiectumpro Secundo,inferoquod omnispropositioaffirmativa nullo supponitest falsa.Propterhoc haec est falsa 'Chymaeraest chymaera'. Et propositionegativacuius subiectumpro nullo supponitest vera. Et propterhoc haec est vera 'Chymaeranon est chymaera'.52

49De Riik1973(n. 1),57. 50See note34 above. 51De Rijk1973(n. 1),57. 52QCL: 170.2,pp. 168,8-9: Secondly, I inter: propoKvery affirmative is a chimera' isfalse.Becauseofthat'A chimera term whose sition fornothing supposits subject Because istrue. fornothing term whosesubject anda negative isfalse; supposits proposition is true." is nota chimera' ofthat'A chimera

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sit vera Further,in his QCL, Utrumomnispropositio velfalsa, he accepts thatpropositionsare false,"whentheydo notsignify just howthings are Isto supposito,propositiovera est quae sic se habet quod est sicutper earnsignificatur. Propositioautemest falsaquae sic se habetquod aliter vel quae sic se habetquod sicutper earn quam est per earnsignificatur non taliterest. Unde ad hoc quod aliqua propositiositvera, significatur requiritur quod qualitercumque significai, quod ita sit.Unde si significant aliqualiteraliterqualiteresset,et tarnenaliter;ipsa essetfalsa.53 Hence, the two major objectionsagainst Buridan's utilizationof natural are clearlydefendedby Albertof SaxonyearlierthantheNotabilia supposition of our anonymousauthor. According to our anonymousauthor, all the Notabiliathat he gives make two verygeneralassumptions.The firstassumptionis thatif natural is construedas when the subjecttermsuppositsin a proposition supposition forall its past,presentand futuresupposita,theneveryoneaccepts natural taken in that sense, and everyoneeven grantsthat the subject supposition termscan suppositfor significatawhich can be conceived or imagined: 4.1 Primomodo quod terminusin ordinead verbumaliquod,vel ad vel predicatum, supponatpro omnibussuissignificatis que sunt,fuerunt, Et istomodoconceditur ab omnibus talis erunt,et sic supponitnaturaliter. Nam aliquandoterminus non solum pro omnibus suppositio. suis significatis vel que sunt,fuerunt, erunt,ymmoetiampro illis que licet esse, possunt numquamerunt,ymmosecundumaliquos terminus supponitaliquando pro illis que possuntymaginari,licet non possunt 4chimera esse. Ut in ista propositione: vel 'vacuum li ymagmatuf ymaginatuť ťchimera ' et li 4vacuum ' illis licet esse, supponunt pro que possuntymaginari non possintesse.54 53QCL: 364,pp.,263,22-264,1-6:"Thishaving a trueproposition is suchthatthings aresojust-as is signified a falsepropobyit.However, sition is suchthatthings areother than as signified is signified arenot byit, orjust-as byit,things insucha way.Hence,it is required fora proposition to be truethat:inwhatever wayit sothings are.Ifitsignifies in somewayotherthanhowthings are signifies, are,andthings thentheproposition is false." otherwise; 54De Rijk1973(n. 1),59: "In thefirst withtheverb way,a termproperly arranged orpredicate forallitssignificata which are,were,orwillbe,andhencesupposits supposits Taken inthisway, natural is conceded Forsometimes a term naturally. supposition byeveryone. notonlysupposits fortillitssignificata thatare,were,orwillbe; nay,on thecontrary, it alsosupposits forthosewhichcan be, although theyneverwere;nay,on thecontrary

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SCIENTIFIC IN BURIDAN PROPOSITIONS & ALBERTOF SAXONY 327 As is clear fromabove, Albertof Saxony clearlyconcedes somethingvery similarto this firstassumptionin his QCL: , Utrum inpropositione depraesenti subiectum possitamplialiad supponendum proeo , velpotestesse.55Althoughhe does not explicitlysay there quodfait,velerit naturalsupposition that "everyone ," when it is construedas the subject accepts term in a propositionsuppositingfor all its past, present,and future in he certainlyconcedes that he understandsnaturalsupposition significata, thatway.56Neitherdoes he see his own view as being a rejectionof naturalsupposition. , just as the ancient supposition Althoughhe claimshe also accepts natural is in factunnecessaryforhim, natural supposition logiciansdid, nevertheless since the subjecttermin any propositionis alwaysa categorematicnoun, it already signifiesall its present,past and futuresignificata.Hence, he also acceptsthe Second Assumptionof theJVotabilia , 4.2, namely,ifa subthen natject termis takenforall its present,past, and futuresignificata; ural suppositionis a superfluous: tio sic,videlicet 4.2 Secundomodo potestymaginarihuiusmodisupposi et naturaliter terminus pro omnibussuis quandoque supponat quod in merede presenti. vel erunt propositione que sunt,fuerunt, significatis est sonus factusin nubibus',li 'tonitruum'supUt in ista: 'tonitruum Et isto modo non oportet et futuris. preteritis, poneretpro presentibus, maxime cum ipsa non sit de virtute ponere, predictamsuppositionem sermonis.57 De Rijk also points out that the anonymousauthor assertsin this secmaintain"... thatnaturalsupond assumptionthatothercontemporaries are incompatible.. . .".58However, sermonis positionand the ideal of virtus neitherDe Rijk nor the anonymousauthor gives us an explanationwhy which areabletobe imagforsignificata to some,a termsometimes supposits according is imagined,although '[A] chimera theyarenotableto be. Hence,in theproposition vacuum forthings theterm chimera andtheterm isimagined', ined'or'[A]vacuum supposit be." thatcanbe imagined, theycannot although 55Again,seenote34 above. 56Ibid. 57De Rijk1973(n. 1),60: "In thesecondway,thissortofsupposition canbe imagwhich andforallitssignificata a termsupposits inedas: at sometimeorother, naturally of thepresent tense,as in thisproposition are,or were,or willbe, in a proposition willsupposit foritspresent, 'Thunder is a soundmadein theclouds';theterm'thunder' to putforth the Andtakenin thisway,it is notnecessary [significata]. past,andfuture sinceitis nottakenliterally." supposition, especially preceding 58Ibid.,62.

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naturalsuppositionand a propositionbeing takenliterally {devirtute sermonis) would be incompatible.Buridanhimself, does however, giveus the reason. He says: Sed tarnenconvenienter possetdici quod in hoc casu talis locutioad talemintentionem non estde proprietate sed ad breviloquium. sermonis, Cum enim demonstrative volentesloqui dicimusquod omne tonitruum estsonusfactusin nubibuset quod omniseclipsislunae estpropterinternon essentverae positionemterraeintersolem et lunam,propositiones de proprietate sermonis sermonis,cum hoc verbum'est' de proprietate non sitimpositum ad significandum nisipraesenstempus;et tarnenforte nec est tonitruum nec eclipsislunae in praesentitempore.Et ita tales ad breviusloquendumponunturloco talium'omne tonipropositiones truumquandocumquefuit,est vel erit,est,fuitvel eritsonusfactusin nubibus';et 'omniseclipsislunae quandocumqueest, fuitvel erit,est, fuitvel eritpropterinterpositionem terraeintersolem et lunam'. Nec tamen tales propositiones propterhoc sunt negandae quia verae sunt sicutpositaesunt,sed essentfalsaesi ad sensumpropriumessentpositae et receptae.Et quia sophistaenon voluntreciperepropositiones nisi secundumpropriossensus,ideo non soientuti hac suppositione in isto casu modo praedicto.59 Buridan himselfgrantsthat the naturalsupposition of the subject termsin scientific sense(devirtute sermonis propositionsis incompatiblewiththe literal deproprietate such sermonis) of propositions. 59Buridanus, De suppositionibus modisdivisionibus Summuiae, , 4.3: De communibus sup4.3.4[De divisione innaturalem communis etaccidentalem] , ed. positionum: suppositions VanderLecq,47,4-18;JohnBuridan, Summuiae , 4.3.4,trans. Klima,260-62: "Nevertheless, wecancorrectly sucha locution thunder is forth] saythatin thiscase[putting is notin accordwithitsproper , withthisintention meaning, forthesakeofbrevity. Forwhenwewantto speakdemonstratively, but[itis putforth] andwesaythatevery thunder is a soundmadein theclouds, orthatevery lunareclipse is duetotheinterposition oftheEarthbetween thesunandthemoon,thenthesepropositions wouldnotbe truebyvirtue oftheirproper sermonis [devirtute ]. Forthe meaning verb'is' byvirtue ofitsproper wasimposed to signify time, meaning onlythepresent whereas there orlunareclipse atthepresent time. Andso suchpropomaybe nothunder inplaceof'Every sitions arepropounded forthesakeofbrevity whenever itis, thunder, lunareclipse, was,orwillbe,is,was,orwillbe a soundmadein theclouds'and'Every oftheEarth whenever it is,was,or willbe,is,wasor willbe dueto theinterposition between thesunandthemoon'.Suchpropositions therefore arenottobedenied , sincethey aretruegiventhewayin whichtheyarepropounded, buttheywouldbe falseifthey wereadvanced andtakenin their sense.Andsincesophists wantto takeproposiproper inthemanner described do notusesuchsupposition tionsonlyintheir sense, they proper in thiscase."(Thewordsin [. . .] areKlima's.)

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SCIENTIFIC PROPOSITIONS IN BURIDAN & ALBERTOF SAXONY 329 Now Albertclearlyaccepts Notabiliaassumption4.1, and at least the firstpart of 4.2. Althoughhe does not explicitlyassertthe claim of incomhe certainly does say thatit is not because of the natural patibility, supposition of the subjecttermin a scientific propositionthat the propositionis said to be true,and at the same time it cannot be at variance withthe actual of the subject termin propositionin which it is placed. Since supposition the propositionis a presenttense propositionand lacks an ampliating meansthatthesubject term term,a presenttense scientific propositionliterally if that which is. the term has natural Therefore, supposits for suponly subject for all its past, present,and futuresignificata,the propositionis position denied as false.60This same positioncan be gleaned fromhis treatment of the truthof the propositions'A rose is a flower';'Thunder is a sound made in the clouds'; and 'An eclipse of the moon, etc.', when there is no roses, or thunder,or eclipses.61Moreover, in his QCL: < Vicésima omnis sitveravelfalsa, he maintainsthatin obligQuaestio>Utrum propositio ational disputes,Respondents should never have to distinguisha true from a false sense for any given propositionthat is being proposed to them, if thosewho begin the obligationreallyknew and comprehendedthe litof propositions.62 eralsense(virtutem Hence, the claim thatthe presermonis) is clearlyin conflictwith sent tense copula 'is', can be taken atemporally It is mostlikely a proposition'ssense being takenliterally [devirtute sermonis). that the anonymous author is simply interpolatingboth Albert's and Buridan'sviews in developinghis own treatmentof the issues. De Rijk's anonymous author lists seven furtherrefutationsof the are given in Notabilia particularargumentsof Buridan's. The refutations 5.1-5.7. With the exceptionof the Notabiliareplyto Buridan's argument at 2.5, analogues of the remainingcriticismscan also be foundin Albert. Consider next,Notabilia5.1-5.2: Ad primamet secundamrationes:quando sic, diciturquod respectu illarumdictionumbene supponuntpro suissignificatis que sunt,fuerunt, vel erunt.Et hoc nonestcontradicta,quia hoc estin ordinead copulam.63

60See note34 above. 61Ibid. 62QCL:367.1.2.1, pp.268,7-13:"Respondentes distinguunt sossensus unusaliquando estveruset reliquus hoc falsus, propositionis quorum quamvis etiamnonoporteret fieri si omnesassentatores scirent et intelligerent virtutem sermonis ." 63De Rijk1973(n. 1),60: "To thefirst andsecondreasons, whenitis saidthatwith

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From notes 33 and 34 above, one can see that Albertearlier also had made these assumptionsabout naturalsupposition. LikewiseconsiderNotabilia5.3: Ad tertiamquando dicitursic: "nisi aliquis terminusetc.," dico quod . . . etc.' de virtu te sermonissintfalse,suptiones:'Tonitruum isteproposi et tonitruum sit nullum quod yrisnon sit.Sed ponunturab positoquod est vel fuitvel sub hoc sensu:quando que tronitruum Aristotile in et fuit vel erit sonus factus est vel nubibus, quando erit,ipsum vel est fuit vel eritreflexio luminissolis.64 est vel fuit erit, que yris Albertgives preciselythis sort of responsein QCL, < Octava Quaestio> cumtempore. He conUtrum verbum sic quodnonsignificet possitabsolvia tempore if cedes that this is Aristotle'sview, but only the copula is construedin sense.65This Albert'somni-temporal sense, and not in Buridan's atemporal means that the propositionis true only on each presentoccasion of its utterancewhen an instanceof thunderoccurs. It is not true across all times,or trueindependentof time.Yet, as I indicatedabove, Albertthinks it is stilltrueto say "'Thunder is a sound made in the clouds' is eternally true".66 Notabilia5.4 simplyconcedes the claim made at 2.4, that if a geometricianhas knowledge[strictly ) of the proposition'Every speaking](.scientia given trianglehas three angles equal to two rightangles', [i.e. knowledge in thatproposition then the termtriangle via a deductivedemonstration]; indeed signifieseverytrianglethat is now, was and will be, and has natin that proposition.67 uralsupposition Notabilia5.41 and Notabilia5.42 are disjunctsof a disjunctivepropositionwhich make two claims about 5.4. 1) The firstclaim, 5.41, is that even thoughthe term 'triangle'in that

which fortheir tothosewords, are,were,orwill significata supposit theycorrectly respect 2.1 and2.2],because whatwassaid[i.e.Buridanian be; thisis notagainst assumptions withthecopula,[i.e.is]." itis arranged 64De Rijk1973(n. 1),60. "To thethird[reason], a term whenitis saidthus:'unless arefalse, ''Thunder . . . etc.'literally etc.,"I saythatthesepropositions: assuming speaking wouldnotbe. ButAristode andthattherainbow thattherewouldbe no thunder puts thereis or was,or will thereis,or was,or willbe thunder, forth thissense:Whenever there thereis,wasor willbe a rainbow, andwhenever be a soundmadein theclouds, from thesun." oflight is,orwas,orwillbe a reflection 65See note5 above. 66See note48 above. 67De Rijk1973(n. 1),58.

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SCIENTIFIC PROPOSITIONS IN BURIDAN & ALBERTOF SAXONY 331 geometrician'sdemonstratedpropositionsignifiesevery trianglethat is, was, or will be; that termdoes not actuallysuppositin that proposition for all of those significata.Nevertheless,if one has a true understanding of the demonstratedconclusion'A triangle [strictly speaking](i.e. scientia) has three angles equal to two rightangles', then ipsofactohe also has of thatsubjectterm.2) 5.42 knowledgethatit holds forall the significata thenclaims thatone does not need to give a new demonstration in order to have the knowledgethat the subject term triangle all signifies its past, in and future 'A the present significata, proposition trianglehas three if to two angles equal rightangles', he already acquired that knowledge fromthosepreviouspremisesand thatpreviouslydemonstrated conclusion: 5.4 Ad quartam:"si geometreetc.," concedo illud. 5.41 Sed propterhoc non sequiturquia iste terminus'triangulus'in vel erunt,licet predictapropositione supponatpro illisque sunt,fuerunt, omnes triángulossignificet. Sed si vera scientiade aliqua conclusione demonstrata, habeturscientiade omnibussignificatis per eius subiectum. 5.42 Vel potestdici quod hoc est quia per casus premissoset per quos primodemonstratur predictaconclusio,ipsa possetdemonstrari, supposito quod omnes trianguliqui sunt,fueruntvel erunt,iam de factoessent. Et ideo non oportetfierinovám demonstrationem.68 In his QCL, < Octava Quaestio> Utrumverbum sic possitabsolvia tempore non all cum addresses three of these Albert , quod significet tempore points. says: est,dico quod non habeo sciRespondeoquod quando nullustriangulus entiamde istaconclusione: Triangulushabettresángulosaequalesduobus rectis,sed in intellectumeo bene est aliquid quod fuitde illa scientia quando fuitvera, et est69scientiaadhuc illiusconclusionis< quando> illiusconclusionis vera.Et adhuc72 non estiverà,eteritscientia quandoerit71 turaliquidde novo.Et quando nuloportetquod in mentemea generare lus triangulusest, adhuc in mentemea est scientiailliusconclusionis:

68De Rijk1973(n. 1),60. 69esseted. 70esseted. 71esseted. 72ad hoced.

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MICHAEL J. FITZGERALD habettresaequales duobusrectis.Et ita conesttriangulus, Si triangulus similiterdiceretde istis:Homo est animal,posito quod nullushomo estsonusfactusin nubibus,et de consimilibus esset,et: Tonitruum propo73 sitionibus.

These commentsare logicallyequivalentto the responsesgivenin Notabilia 5.4-5.42. AlthoughI have been unable to findpreciselythisresponsein Albert's logical works,which would match the criticismof Buridan given by Notabilia5.51, it is certainlycompatiblewithAlbert'sviews.In fact,Albert sit makes preciselythissortof move in the SeptimaQuaestio:Uttum possibile libros Posteriorum subtilissime nosaliquidscireof his Quaestiones super analyticorum In that Question,he distinguishes two sortsof evidence: thebest Aristotelis. are . The examples he gives of thebestevidence and naturalevidence evidence the Principleof Non-Contradictionand evidence of his own existence. Naturalevidence ; stillcannot be turnout to be , althoughnot thebestevidence or false except by sophisticreasoning deception by some supernatural is power. Even though the latteris a distinctpossibility,naturalevidence stillgood enough for us to be said to have knowledge,especiallyfor us to have knowledgeof nature: firmiter assenSed evidentianaturalisdicitursecundumquam intellectus vero.Licet sic assentiendonon possetfalliper aliquam tii alicuifirmiter potentiamnaturalem,tarnenpossetfalliper potentiamsupernaturalem, verbigratiasicutevidentiasecundumquam assentiohuiccomplexe:Omnis ignisestcalidus.Unde in sic assentiendonon possumfalliper aliquam potentiamnaturalem,cum nulla potentianaturalispotestfacerequin ignis sit calidus. Unde in sic assentiendopossum falliper potentiam Unde potentiasupernaturalis possetfacerequod ignis supernaturalem. calidus. potestesse calidus,et tarnennon esset

73QCL: 156.2,pp. 161,5-15:"I respond is notrithatwhenthere 'A triangle hasthreeanglesequalto theconclusion angle,I sayI do notcomprehend thatwasan understanding butin mymindthereis rightly tworight something angles', ofthatconclusion whenitwastrue,andis an understanding ofthatconclusion [when] whenitwillbe true.Still,itis ofthatconclusion itis true,andwillbe an understanding in mymind.Whenthereis no triangle, newbe generated thatsomething notrequired is a triangle, in mymind:'Ifa triangle ofthisconclusion therestillis an understanding itcouldbe saidofthepropothen ithasthree Similarly, angles'. angles equaltotworight thereis no thunder thereareno men;and [assuming Manis ananimal sition: , assuming such and similar in the is sound made Thunder clouds', propositions." now],

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IN BURIDAN SCIENTIFIC & ALBERTOF SAXONY 333 PROPOSITIONS Tertio,sciendumquod non ad omnem scientiamrequiriturevidentia evidentianaturalis,sicutad scientiamnaturalem.74 summa,sed sufficit Notabilia5.52 maintainsthat even if time did not exist,the copula 'is', would connote an imaginable time. Hence, termswould still have the propertyof suppositionwhen conjoinedwiththe copula.75AlthoughAlbert does not put the matterexactlyin thisway,forhim the copula 'is', always verbcontainsthat presenttense copsignifiesthe presenttime,and every 76This is the case even when the ula implicitly or explicitly. suppositingsubterms that which are not, but terms involved would be signifythings ject which can be, or be imagined or comprehended,termslike 'chimera', or 'Adam': 'Antichrist', tionede praesentiin qua non poniQuarta conclusio:In omni proposi tur aliquis terminusampliativussubiecti,subiectumper illam propositionemdenotatursupponerepro ilio quodest , si propositiositaffermativa. denotaturquod idem sit pro quo Patet quia per illam propositionem tur per supponitsubiectumet praedicatum.Hoc autem non denotare tursubiectumsupponerepro eo quodest.11 istamnisiper eam denotare Notabilia5.6 raisesthe pointthateven thoughthe copula 'is', has a grammaticalway of signifying onlythe couplingof the predicateto the subject, 74Albertus de Saxonia,Quaestiones subtilissime libros Posteriorum Aris totelis, super analyticorum TortosaCathedral, lat.ms.108,f. 166r:"Butthatis callednatural evidence to according inso assenting which theintellect assents tosomething true.Although itcanfirmly firmly nevertheless it canbe deceived notbe deceived bysomenatural power, bysomesuperI assent natural forexample, theevidence tothis:'Allfireis hot'.Hence, bywhich power, in assenting to thisI cannot be deceived sincethereis no such bysomenatural power, I canbe deceived powerthatcanmakefirenotto be hot.Hence,in so assenting, bya supernatural power.Hence,a supernatural powercan makefireto be hot,and nevertheless it notbe hot.Third,it shouldbe known thatnotall knowledge thebest requires evidence evidence as in natural science." suffices, , butnatural 75Ed. De Rijk1973(n. 1),60: "5.52Aliter possetdiciquod,supposito quodnullum adhuccopuleconnotarent in etsictermini esset, tempus tempus ymaginabile supponerent "In another ordine ad copulam;" an wayitcanbe saidthatthecopulawillstillconnote wouldsupposit no time,andso terms imaginable coupledto thecopula,evenassuming timewouldbe." 76See note24 above. 77QCL: Utrum descriptio suppositionis quadicitur; Suppositio estacceptio seuusustermini , 250,pp. 207, categorematici quaaccipitur proaliquoinpropositione Thesisis: In every tenseproposition, inwhichan 21-25& 208,1-2."MyFourth present termdoesnotmodify thesubject, theproposition meansthatthesubject ampliative supwhich is.Thisis shown. The proposition meansthatthesubject andprediforthat posits cateterm forthesamething. Thiswouldnotbe meant unless supposit bytheproposition, itmeantthatthesubject termsupposits which ¿y." forthat

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stillit cannotsignify withouttense.78 AlthoughAlbertdoes not make these claimsspecifically or raisepreciselythoseexamples,he clearlyholds someverbum sit thingsimilarto them. In QCL: Utrum semper notaeorum dicuntur velpraedicantur , Albertsaysthatthesignification quaedealtero of the copula 'is', is nothingbut the coupling of the predicateterm to its subjecttermin a proposition: Ad secundam,dico quod quamvishoc verbum:est,habeatsignificationem distinctam tam a significatione subiectiquam a significatione praedicati; tamensua significatio non est nisiin ordinepraedicatiad subiectum, et dicitur:notapraedicati , propterdictascausas et non subiecti.Quod autem verbi non sit nisi in ordinepraedicatiad subiectum,patet significatio I Perìhermenias , quia hoc verbum:est,significai per Aristotelem quandam compositionem quam sine extremisnon est intelligere.79 It seems to me, for Albertthese claims would be ultimatelyequivalent to Notabilia5.6. At 2.7 our anonymousauthor claims Buridan concedes: 2.7 Septimosic. Licet nullumverbumpotestimponiabsolutea connotationetemporis, tamenpotestimponialiquod verbumquodlibettempus significans.80 AlthoughI have not been able to findwhere Buridan givespreciselythe above formulation, he does say:

78De Rijk1973(n. 1),60: "5.6Ad sextam diciquodcopulaverquandosic,potest solamunionem tamenipsanonpotest a absolvi balis,licetratione copulationis significet, connotatione ("To the temporis quia ipsa habeta modosignificandi gramaticali." itcanbe saidthateventhough a unionbyits theverbal sixth, copulawouldonlysignify nevertheless it cannot lacka connotation oftimebecauseit hasthisbecause copulation, ofitsgrammatical modeofsignifying.") 79QCL: Utrum verbum sitnota eorum dicuntur velpraesemper quaedealtero dicantur 6: "To theSecondReasonI say:Eventhough this , 174,pp. 163-169, 19-170, from andpredicate; itssignification verbfis'hasa distinct thatofthesubject signification ofthepredicate to thesubject. is nothing butthecoupling Hence,theverb'is' is called: 'an indicator forthesaidreason, andnotofthesubject. to ofthepredicate' According in BookI ofDe Interpretationeì oftheverb'is' is nothing other Aristotle thesignification Thisverb'is' signifies a certain comthanthecoupling ofthepredicate to thesubject. whichthesubject andpredicate cannot be comprehended." without position, 80De Rijk1973(n. 1),58: "Although no verbcanbe stipulated to signify completely a verbcanbe stipulated to signify without time,nevertheless (quodlibet anytime connoting )." tempus significans

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SCIENTIFIC PROPOSITIONS IN BURIDAN & ALBERTOF SAXONY 335 Tertio,etiam hoc apparetubi terminusconfunderetur per istas dictiones vel consimiles'perpetue',4aeternali Tales enim dictioter','semper'. nesimpositae videtur ex usu fuerunt, auctorum, prout apparere antiquorum ad distribuendum omni vel pro temporepraesenti,praeterito futuro. Unde non apparet esse usus illius dictionis'semper,' si diceremus totasolumhora,licetea semperSocratemcurrere,ex eo quod curreret sola uteremurtamquampraesente. . . Unde videturquod ista 'semper homo est animal' non aequivaletisti 'omni temporehomo est animal', sed isti'omnitemporepraesenti,praeterito vel futurohomo fuit,est vel eritanimal'."81 Notabilia5.7., given by the anonymousauthor,repliesto Buridan's view at 2.7: 5.7 Ad ultimam dicitur quod si talis terminusimponereturad omne tempus,tuncterminiin ordinead ipsumbene supsignificandum vel erunt.Et omnibus suis significatis ponerentpro que sunt,fuerunt, hoc non est contradicta,quia hoc priusfuitconcessum.82 Now Albertdoes not explicitlydiscussthe locution'any time' (quodlibet tempus ), but he certainlydoes not understandthe locution'at-every-time' to be about all temporalinstantscollectively takentogether (in omnitempore) i.e. as to 'at , being equivalent indifferently every present,past or future time'.This is quite clear fromAlbert'sanalysisof the proposition'Always a man was' (.Semperhomofuit). The term man, he says, supposits nonin the proposition'Always a man was'. It does not supposit distributively and confusedly distributive ly as Buridan claims:

81Buridanus, De Suppositionibus in natucommunis , 4.3.4., ed.VanderLecq,46, 1-8& 9-11;JohnBuridan, Summulae , trans. thesameis clearalsowhentheterm is confused Klima,260:"Third, bythewords'perandtheirlike.Forsuchwordswereimposed, as it would petually', 'eternally', 'always', theusageofauthors, to distribute forpresent, times. So it appearfrom past,andfuture wouldnotappeartobe correct ifwesaidthatSocrates usageoftheword'always' always runs, giventhathe ranonlyin thisonehour,evenifwe tookonlythathouras thepresent... So it seemsthat'Manis alwaysan animal'is notequivalent to 'Manat every timeis an animal'butto 'Atevery manis,wasorwillbe time, present, pastandfuture an animal'." 82De Rijk1973(n. 1),60. "To thelastit is saidthatifthatsortoftermwasstipulatedto signify forall there everytime,theterms coupledto a copulawouldsupposit whichwas,or willbe. Butthisis notcontrovert whatwassaid,becausethis significata wasconceded earlier."

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MICHAEL J. FITZGERALD Ex principaliregulaedam infertur quod omne syncategorema aequivalensalicuiorationicompositaeex signouniversali affirmativo et termino illumterminům communemconfusedistributive et communi,confundit terminům aliumsequentemconfusetantum.Et propterhoc in istapropositionsSemperhomofuit,ly homo tantum , supponitconfuse , nam ly semper , , compositoex signo universaliet aequivalet huic orationi:omnitempore terminocommuni.Et igiturdicitur:Semper homo fuit,valet tantum sicut:'Omni temporehomofuit'.Et hoc estverum,quia non fuitaliquod 85 tempus83 quin in isto homo fuit.84'

Albert'sreasoningis that since the termalwaysis equivalentto 'at-everytime', the term 'man' cannot be confusedlydistributed for all temporal instants distributed for time' , i.e., indifferently 'any (quodlibet tempus ). The actual propositionalcontext,he seems to think,requires that the term 'man' suppositmerely and dwidedly , foreachgivenmanat eachgiven confusedly instant. Nevertheless,preciselyas in the case of Notabilia5.7, this temporal does not make Albert'scomprehensionof the locution'at-every-time' (omni with that in terms scientific tempore) incompatible accepting subject propositionshave naturalsupposition , since Albertalso accepts a view similarto the one defendedin Notabilia4.1, as I noted above.86 On the basis of the above evidence,I conclude thatupon closerexaminationof Albert'sviews it seems that De Rijk's anonymousauthorwas viewswhichAlbert directlyor indirecdydrawingupon and interpolating himselfhad articulatedsome yearsearlier.Moreover,the criticisms Albert defendsare preciselythe criticismsthat the anonymousauthor takes to be the dominantobjectionsto Buridan's views,especiallyagainst natural Thus, Albert of Saxony seems to be the best candidate as supposition.

83temporis ed. 84semper add.ed. 85QCL: Utrum diate etterminům mediate tantum distributive, , 298.3,p. 231: confuse sequentem sequentem confuse "Froma principle Rule[ofSupposition] itis alsoinferred: Every syncategorematic expressionequivalent to a composite ofa universal affirmative expression signanda common confuses thecommon termconfusedly anddistributive term, ly,andanyothertermfollowing On account ofthisinference, theterm'man'supposits thecommon termmerely confusedly. in theproposition: a manwas',fortheterm'always' is a commerely confusedly 'Always andis equivalent to 'at-everyaffirmative anda common term, sign positeofa universal a manwas',is equivalent to 'At-every-time a manwas'. time'.Therefore, itis said'Always Thatis truebecausethere wasno time, unlessa manwasat it." 86See above,p. 329.

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SCIENTIFIC PROPOSITIONS IN BURIDAN & ALBERTOF SAXONY 337 the ultimatesource forlater fourteenth centuryobjectionsto naturalsupDe author does thinkthat Buridan can easily position. Rijk's anonymous , but unfortunately respond to all the objections given by the Notabilia does not reallyelaborate and tell us preciselyhow such responseswould take place. 1073 Lake Estates Dr. Hattiesburg,MS 39402-3603 USA

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Ralph Strödtsobligationes: The Returnof Consistency and theEpistemicTurn CATARINADUTILH NOVAES

Abstract I have used In whatfollows,I analyzeRalph Strode'streatiseon obligations. made a hithertounpublishededitionof the text(based on 14 manuscripts) I a of which first brief Strode's Prof. Ashworth. text, give description E.J. by is all the morenecessarygiventhatit is not availableto the averagereader; I also offera reconstruction of the rulesproposedby Strode,following the in rules of and of reconstruction used Swyneshed's style myanalysis Burley's - that is, elsewhere essentiallybased on the idea that obligationescan be viewedas logicalgames.In the secondpart,I addressStrode'sexplicitargumentscontraSwyneshed.In the thirdpart,I discussStrode'sepistemicand pragmaticapproachto obligationes. Introduction has been a popThe medievalgenre of disputationknownas obligationes ular object of researchamong medievalistsin the last few decades, and many studieshave greatlycontributedto create a betterunderstanding of this(at least at firstsight)ratherpuzzlingformof medievallogical literature.It is known by now, for example, that Walter Burley'streatise (writtenaround 1302) was very influentialin the decades followingits composition,and that he spelled out the standardrules of how obligawere to be conducted;1it is also well knownthataround tionaldisputations 1 The development stilla matter is however oftheobligational genrepriorto Burley attribWalter andtheObligationes ofcontroversy. Some(P.V.SpadeandE. Stump, Burley ofLogic,4 (1983),9-26)haveargued andPhilosophy uted toWilliam , in:History ofSherwood theendof the has beenwritten before on obligationes thatno fully structured treatise attributed toSherwood thatthetreatise 13thcentury, andinparticular (R. GreenThelogwith Critical Texts 9:AnIntroduction icalTreatise (DeObligationibus (?) and ofSherwood ofWilliam de Louvain, PhD dissertation, Université Walter 1963.)couldnothave Catholique Burky. inEarly inparticular Braakhuis beenwritten Obligations (H.A.G.Braakhuis, byhim.Others, Paris : theObligationes Thirteenth , BJf.lat.,11.412 ), ofParis(?) (MsParis ofNicholas Century Vwarium 44,2-3

BrillNV,Leiden,2006 © Koninklijke - www.brill.nl/viv online Alsoavailable

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1330 Roger Swyneshedwrotea treatiseon obligations,proposinga deep revisionof the rulesgoverningthisformof disputationin orderto exclude some aspects of Burley-style obligationswhich seemed awkwardto him and to some of his contemporaries.These two stylesof obligationswere and novaresponsio sometimesreferredto as antiquaresponsio , respectively.2 But Burley'sset of rules for obligationaldisputationsseems to have resistedSwyneshed'sattacksand to have remained more influential;it has been argued in the secondaryliteraturethat thiswas due, to a great for the are more efficient extent,to the fact that Burley-style obligationes of the abilities of Respondent.Moreover, putativepurpose testing logical the rulesintroducedby Swyneshedappeared to generateeven graveroddthan the alleged odditiesgeneratedby itiesin the obligationalframework after a few decades rules. So Swyneshedcomposed his treatise, Burley's were writtenwhich essentiallysuba couple of treatiseson obligationes scribed to the antiquaresponsio , and whose authors openly criticizedthe novaresponsio. However, theywere not a mere repetitionof Burley'streahad prompteda more finethe tise; challengeposed by the novaresponsio the rules structure the of underlying generallogical grainedunderstanding of obligationes. Therefore,the studyof these later textscan greatlycontributeto the as well as to the understanding of these logical structures, understanding of each of the two most influentialstylesof obligationaldisputation.In the secondaryliterature,more and more work is being done on these latertreatises,but the main focusof researchhas been so faron Burley's and Swyneshed'streatises.3 In what follows,I analyze Ralph Strode'streatiseon obligations.I have used a hithertounpublishededitionof the text(based on 14 manuscripts) evidence to theeffect that haveprovided in:.Vivarium, 36 (1998),152-233), compelling halfofthe13thcencanbe datedtoas earlyas thefirst treatises full-fledged obligational outofthescopeofthepreThehistory ofthisgenre however, falls, priortoBurley tury. sentpaper. 2 Cf.P.V. Spade,Three : Burley, andSwyneshed onCounterTheories ofObligationes Kilvington andPhilosophy ofLogic,3 (1982),1-32;C. Dutilh Novaes, , in:History Roger Reasoning factual in:Synthese, 151/1 Game a Logical Recognition?, (2006),125-53. ofInference Obligationes: Swyneshed's 3 Thisholdsofmyownprevious workon obligations as well,cf.C. DutilhNovaes, as Logical Games Maintenance Medieval 145(2005), , in: Synthese, ofConsistency Obligationes I alsodiscuss a significant 371-95;DutilhNovaes2006(n. 2). In thesetwotexts partof thesecondary literature on obligationes andforthesakeofconcision, here ; forthisreason, I shallnotrevisit eventhough crucialforthe manyofthesearticles, theyarecertainly topicin general.

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made by Prof.E.J. Ashworth;and I am verygratefulto her for having shared it with me.4 The importanceof Strode (activein the second half of the 14thcentury,in England) as a logician has been increasinglyrecognized over the last years,but the publicationof most of his writingsis stillto take place.5 The only otherstudydedicatedto Strode's treatiseis (not surprisingly) Ashworth1993; her main topic in thatstudyis the analysisof the notions of consistencyand inconsistency thatemergefromhis treatise.In the present study,I also deal extensively with these notions,as theyare indeed crucial in the treatise,but I attemptto complementher analysisby outliningsome of its otherinteresting aspects as well. In the firstpart of this paper, I give a briefdescriptionof Strode's text,which is all the more necessarygiven that it is not available to the of the rules proposed by average reader; I also offera reconstruction used in my analysisof Burley's Strode,followingthe styleof reconstruction and Swyneshed'srules6 that is, essentiallybased on the idea that obligationescan be viewed as logical games.7 In the second part, I address Strode's explicitargumentscontraSwyneshed.In the thirdpart, I discuss He participated Strode'sepistemicand pragmaticapproach to obligationes. in the general'epistemicturn'in logic thattook place in the second half of the 14th centuryin England (cf. Normore 1993, Boh 2001), and this is clearlyseen in his treatiseon obligationes , as I attemptto show. I. The Essentials ofStrode'sTreatise a. Description of thetext Strode's text presentsa very clear structure.Chapter I is the prefatio. In the introduction(chap. II), Strode puts forwardfour remarks,five suppositionsand four conclusions.Chapter III questionsthree opinions 4 It is a 43-pagetypedtext.I willrefer to the to it as 'Strode, Obi.,'andwillrefer form. unpublished pagesofthetextin itscurrent, 5 Foras faras I know, texts is nowbeingcoorforpublishing Strode's a majorproject is itscompletion ambitious with such Prof. A. as dinated but, Maierù; projects, always by ofmanyyears. a matter 6 Cf.DutilhNovaes2005(n. 3); DutilhNovaes2006(n. 2). 7 In thepresent thanin thetwo seemslesshelpful thelogicalgamemetaphor study, I willthough occaonitas muchas I havedonebefore. ones,so I willnotinsist previous fora particular ifitappears to be illuminating resort to themetaphor, point. sionally

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. ChaptersIV-VIII discussobjectionsto each of the concerningobligationes five suppositions(one suppositionper chapter);chaptersIX-XII discuss objectionsto each of the four conclusions.Finally,chaptersXIII-XVI deal with otherformsof obligationes than positio. In sum,Strode'srulesof obligationes are in factall presentedin theintrowhich is thus far the most duction, by importantchapter.ChaptersIV-XII argue forthe soundnessof the rulesproposedin the typicalmedievalway of examiningobjectionsand sophismata thatcould threatentheserules,but which are dealt with and explained away. As in the analysisof Burley's and Swyneshed'stheoriesof obligationes , I only deal withposition therefore, the fourfinalchaptersof Strode's textare not looked into in the present below only concernspositio. discussion,and the reconstruction b. Remarks and conclusions , suppositions As just said, the rules governingStrode-style are all presented obligationes in the introductionof his treatise,in the formof fourremarks,fivesuppositionsand fourconclusions.These are: Remarks: 1. Primoergo describendisuntquidam terminiad propositum. The firstremarkonlygivesa generaldescriptionof the obligationalgenre, 4 in particularof the role of the terms etc.- definingthe jbono' deponrf different formsof obligationes. Some of the proceduralrules of the game are also introducedin thispassage, and theyare identicalto Burley'sand Swyneshed'sproceduralrules. 2. Secundo notandumquod tempusobligationisdurâtab instantiquo casus admittitur donee dicat opponens:cedat tempusobligationis, uel uel se transferat ad in alia uel aliquod tale, materia, pendisputandum itusdimittatdisputare. This remarkintroducesan importantaspect of the proceduralrules of the game, namelywhen it begins and when it ends. Notice that Strode uses the term 'casus', and this deservesa commentary.In Burley'streawere distinctnotions.The casusdefinedthe hypotise,casusand positum theticalsituationthat was to be consideredas true for the sake of the disputation;often,the casusto be acceptedwas simplythingsas theyreally were ('sit rei ventas* ), but occasionallya casus divergingfromthe actual

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stateof thingswas to be accepted.8The positura , however,was not to be taken as true,and Respondentshould only be interestedin the possible inferentialrelationsbetween the positura and the subsequentlyproposed propositions. In later authors,the two notionswere ofteninterchangeably used, and the casus was often simplythe propositionpromptingthe disputation. Yijönsuuri conjecturesthat these authorsmay have followedOckham's suggestionthatfollowingthe casus(in contextsotherthan obligations,for instancewithrespectto sophismata ) amountsto the same as followingthe , methodologically positura speaking.9Indeed, in Strode's case, it seems at times that he distinguishesthe two notions,but more frequentlythey appear to be taken as equivalent,for example when he says: Sed quod remanetdepositosignopositionisdiciturcasus et positum,ut ista:'tu curris'in istapositione,scilicet:pono tibiistam:'tu curris'.(.Strode Obi, 2) In practice,Strode appears to use the term 'casus' for the verysituation as well of positingthe positura, includingthus the contentof the positum itselfdoes not have as the fact that it has been posited but the positum to be consideredas true. tio pertinensdiciturque sequituruel 3. Tertio notandumquod proposi diciturque nec sequitur concesso uel concessis. Sed impertinens répugnât nec répugnât. This remarkis crucial. As widelyacknowledgedin the secondaryliterawas his ture,10the core of Swyneshed'srevisionof the antiquaresponsio redefinition of pertinent/ impertinent propositions.In the antiquaresponsio a pertinentpropositionis one that followsfrom(.sequens ) or is repugthe and/or the followsfrom nant to (its contradictory repugnans) positum of the denied and the contradictories propositions. grantedpropositions Accordingto Swyneshed,a pertinentpropositionis one thatfollowsfrom followsfrom)the positum or is repugnantto (its contradictory only; the As a not taken into account. are subsequentlyproposed propositions 8 Cf.M. Yijönsuuri, and onSophismata Fourteenth Treatises TheRoleofCasus insome Century und Scholastische zudenlogischen , in:K. Jacobi(ed.),Argumentationstheorie. Forschungen Obligations korrekten semantischen , Leiden1993,301-22, esp.304. Folgems Regeln 9 Cf.Yriönsuuri 1993,310. 10Andas discussed in DutilhNovaes2006(n.2).

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consequence,I have argued, Swyneshedexcludes the dynamicaspect of : in the novaresponsio the antiquaresponsio , the order in which propositions are proposed does not matter,and Respondentdoes not have to take his previousmoves into account to make a good move in fact he may as well 'forget'the irrelevantpropositionsproposedas much as his responses to them.11 Strode returnsto Burley'sdefinitionof pertinent/ impertinent propositions,and thisfactalone means that the dynamiccharacteris again an obligationes. importantelementof Strode-style 4. Quarto notandumquod negandumin propositodiciturquod est dignumnegari,et concedendumquod est dignumconcedi,et dubitantio debet concedi, dum quod est dignumdubitare.Sed quando proposi et in uel dubitali ponendis. patebit suppositionibus regulisinferius negari, but it does This remarkmay seem ratherredundantand uninformative, The rules rules. of the character stressthe normative obligational properlyspeakingare presentedsubsequently. Suppositions: 1. Primo:quod omnepossibilescitumesse possibilenon repugnansalicui et solumtale cum positouel admissocum poniturest a te admittendum, ponitur.Et proptertale possibilepositumet admissumnon sit aliquod Debet enimnegaripropositio concedendum. impossibilis quanimpossibile uel ponitur. documqueproponitur is thatit be possible.Moreover, The rule forthe admittanceof a positum an impossiblepropositionshould never be accepted as the positum , and since it neverfollowsfroma possibleproposition,ifproposedas a propositum Therefore, , an impossiblepropositionis neverpertinentto thepositum. an impossiblepropositionshould always be denied. tio: quod omne scitum esse positumet bene admis2. Seconda supposi sub debitaformasua propositum, est concesum in temporepositionis, dendum,et quodlibetsequens ex ilio; et quodlibetrepugnansilli est negandum. That is, what followsfromor is repugnantto everypropositionproposed and rightly grantedduringthe disputationmustbe granted/ denied,and 11Cf.Yrjönsuuri 1993(n.8), 317.

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not only what followsfromor is repugnantto the positum .12Notice also the 'sub debita which relates a to forma!clause, propositionfirstput forward as positum : it should be grantedproand then again as propositum vided thatit is in the rightform.This clause is meant to avoid pragmatic inconsistencies of the kind that will be discussedbelow. 3. Tertia suppositioest quod ad omnempropositionem impertinentem est secundumsui qualitatem,i.13si sit scitaesse uera est respondendum concedenda,si scitasit esse falsaest neganda,si dubia dubitanda. This is the general rule forimpertinent propositions,presentin Burley's treatiseas well as in Swyneshed's.In itself,it is an incompleterule,sinceit of an impertinent dependson the properdefinition proposition(remark3). 4. Quarta suppositioest quod extratempusobligationsrei ueritasest fatenda,quia cum quis conceditfalsumuel negatuerumnon obligatus male respondet. The intentionof this remarkseems to be twofold:on the one hand, it may indicate the fact that mattersof truth,includingthe evaluationof Respondent'sperformanceduringthe disputation,were to be discussed only once the disputationwas over;14on the other hand it stressesthe factthat,duringan obligationaldisputation,it is not truththatis at stake, as in other formsof disputation,but ratherlogical notionssuch as followingfrom,being repugnantto and being consistentwith.Partisansof the novaresponsio had objected that,in the antiquaresponsio, any falsehood could be proved;here, Strode seems to be defendingthe view that,given the verynature of obligationes , this is not at all problematic. infratempusobliga5. Quinta suppositioest quod omnesresponsiones suntdande contions retorquende suntad idem instans,i. responsiones tinuepro eodem instantiquo casus est positus. 12Further ofthe form on Strodestates thisrulein a moregeneral (in hisdiscussion omnesequens talisregula: fundatur first Strode , Obi, 3: "Superquamregulam conclusion); benenegati uel uelconsessis uelopposito cumbeneconcesso ex positoet beneadmisso etsi quidtalibus cumproponitur estconcedendum, benenegatorum repugnans, oppositis illudestnegandum." 13Here(andin subsequent ofthe edition occurences of"i.") I follow E.J.Ashworth's text. 14E.J.Ashworth, inObligational onInconsistency Strode , in:K.Jacobi(ed.), Disputations Ralph korrekten undsemantischen Scholastische zu denlogischen Regeln Forschungen Argumentationstheorie. , Leiden1993,363-86, Folgems esp.366.

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- an This is a modification improvement? withrespectto Burley'soriginal theory.15 Burleydoes say that all responsesmustbe reduced to one can be true,but he does not instant,namely one in which the positura judge it is necessaryto determinewhich specificinstantthat would be.16 Perhaps this indétermination gave way to Swyneshed'sintroductionof several instantsaccording to which impertinentpropositionsshould be judged (namely,the instantsin which each is respectively proposed).But this stipulationgave rise to even more inconsistency withinSwyneshed(see Il.d below), so Strode feltcompelled to determine styleobligationes which instantwas to be taken into account forthe responseto explicitly impertinentpropositions namely the instantin which the disputation begins.

Conclusions: 1. Primaconclusio:quod non sequitur:tu concedisfalsumseitum a te essefalsum, uel negasuerumscituma te esseuerum,uel concedisdubium scituma te esse dubium,ergo male respondes. This conclusionis relatedto the fourthsupposition(the truthis not what is at stake during an obligationaldisputation),and it followsfromthe firstand second suppositions.Strode remarksthat the casus/ positura is and that the to should be to the usuallyfalse, response proposita according second supposition,and thus not according to their truth-valuein the case of pertinentpropositions. 2. Secunda conclusio:quod non est inconueniensquandoque respondentemconcederese male respondere, uel negarese bene respondere. This conclusionconcernsthe pragmaticcharacterof Strode's approach to obligationes , which is discussed in detail in part III below. What we could call 'performative contradictions' are not consideredto be real contradictionsby Strode; forhim,just as much as a contingentfalsepropositionmaybe admittedat some pointof thedisputation, 'you are responding is a thus it can be granted badly' contingent(hopefullyfalse!)proposition,

15Butnotice thatthesameclausecanbe found insome13thcentury treatises onobligforexample inthetreatise ofParis(?): "omnes ationes, byNicholas responsiones retorquende suntad ideminstans." 1998(n. 1),177,1. 15). (Braakhuis 16Cf.Yrjönsuuri 1993(n.8), 308.

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A whole different situationis when,outwithoutgeneratinginconsistency. side of the time of the disputation,one grantsthat he respondedbadly duringthe disputation,since,accordingto the fourthsupposition,outside of the time of the disputation,the truthmust prevail. debet 3. Tertiaconclusio:quod cumpositumpossibilerépugnâtpositioni, debet sed et cum admitti, negari positioproposita proponiturconcedi, [. . .]. contraThis conclusion also concernspositathat generateperformative If such a positum is put forward(forexample,'Nothingis posited dictions.17 it to you'), it should be accepted, and if it is re-proposedas a propositum should be granted(presumablyas followingfromthe positum , according to the validityof the principlethat everypropositionimpliesitself).But if the situationdescribingthe positiois put forwardas a propositum , as in ' be denied "Nothingis positedto you" is positedto you', then it should (althoughit is true),as it is repugnantto the positum. 4. Quarta conclusioet ultimaest talisquod in respondendoper obligatoriasit ordo maximeattendendus. This conclusionis a maxim to be born in mind ratherthan a rule of the disputationproperlyspeaking.By statingit explicitly,Strode simply stresseswhat I have describedas the dynamiccharacterof the obligational ; when followingits rules, disputationaccording to the antiquaresponsio his into account take should previousmoves.The very always Respondent two disputationsothertimes of at different same propositionproposed wise identicalis very likelyto receive different responses.The example man runs' and the responses mentionedby Strode is the positum 'Every to be given to 'You are running'and 'You are a man', dependingon theirrelativeorderof being proposed,whichI have discussedat length.18 Notice thoughthat,once a propositionhas been accepted or denied, no longermatters.19 its relativeorder with respectto the otherproposita

17SeeIII.cbelow, inMedieval andParadox , Inconsistency Disputations p. 365,andEJ.Ashworth, 44 (1984),129-39. in:Franciscan Studies, 18DutilhNovaes2006(n. 2). 19The orderofthepremises that ofinferential fortheexistence is irrelevant relations, is:ifA, B - C is valid,thenB, A - * C isjustas valid.

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c. Reconstruction A Strode-style obligationaldisputationis definedby the quadruple Ob = < So, S0 is the state of common knowledgeof those presentat the disputation at themoment thatthepositumis posited(supposition5). It is an incomplete value. model, in the sense that some propositionsdo not receive a truthdiffers from Strode radically Swyneshed.Swyneshedwants ConcerningS0, to be impertinent propositions judged accordingto the state of common knowledgeof the verymomentin which the propositionis proposed; so in Swyneshed'sobligationesthefirstelementof the quadrupleis an ordered set of successivestatesof common knowledge. , thenS0 should Here, ifthe casushappensto be distinctfromthepositum followthe casusand be complementedby the actual state of knowledge at the momentin which the disputationbegins. As for the other three elementsof the quadruple, they are virtually identicalto thoseof the quadrupledefiningBurley'sgame. O is an ordered set of propositions,it is the set of propositionsactuallyput forwardby Opponent duringan obligation.Each elementof O is denoted by '(pn'> where n is a naturalnumber,denotingthe place of cpnin the ordering. The order correspondsto the order in which the propositionsare put T is an ordered set forwardby Opponent, startingwith cp0(thepositum). of sets of propositions,which are formedby Respondent'sresponsesto the various cpn.How each Tn is formedwill be explained below. The orderingis such that Tn is contained in Tn+1.R(cp)is a functionfrom propositionsto the values 1, 0, and ?. This functioncorrespondsto the rules Respondentmust apply to respond to each propositioncpn.1 correspondsto his accepting(pn,0 to his denying(pnand ? to his doubting (pn.The logical rules of the game are definedby R(cp): Positum : Strode holds that any possiblepositum mustbe accepted, even ifit is pragmatically inconsistent withthe act ofpositing,admitting, or more in the The nature of this generallyparticipating obligationaldisputation. pragmaticinconsistencywill be discussed in section III below, but for now we must understandwhat it means for a positum to be possible.20 20Theissueas towhich weretobe considered inviewofpragpropositions 'possible', maticparadoxes, waswidely in several discussed treatises. Cf.Ashworth 1984 obligational (n. 17).

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21I used a In my reconstruction of Burley'sobligationes syntacticcriterion to definea possible propositionas a propositionfromwhich absurdity not cannot be derived.I have also stressedthe importanceof thepositum being an inconsistent proposition;if thiswas the case, Respondentwould and thus of winningthe game. stand no chance of keepingconsistency, The same appears to be true of Strode,but a semanticcharacterization of a possible propositionalso seems more than welcome, given the verytermsused by Strode in supposition1. A propositionNnis judged to be possible according to Sn, the state of common knowledgeat the momentit is proposed; in the case of the positum N0, this would be S0. Using the diamond '0' to representpossibilityand c||"'to representthe relationof 'being true in' between a propositionand a state of knowledge, we have: R(nand Sm '' in sible proposition the followingfamiliarway: Sn II"0 9n ^ There is some Smsuch that Sn R Smand Sm ||*(pn The definitionthus stated also takes care of positathat are only perforand which thus should be accepted accordingto mative contradictions, are Strode: 'you asleep' is not true in S0, since Respondentis participating in the disputation,but a state of knowledgein which 'you are asleep' is true is easily conceivablein S0. Similarly,propositionsthat are falsifiedby theirown existence,forexample 'No propositionis negative' also come out possible according (which were dubbed impossibly-true), 21DutilhNovaes2005(n. 3).

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- 'No to this criterion propositionis negative'describesa state of affairs conceivablein S0, namelythe stateof affairswhereonlyaffirmative propositionsare formed,and thus thisverypropositionis not formed.By contrast,a logical contradictionsuch as 'You are in Rome and you are not in Rome' is not conceivablytrue in any of the statesof knowledgeconceivable in S0. are virtuallyidenticalto Burley's The rules for respondingto proposita rules, includingthe all-importantdefinitionof pertinent/ impertinent is that S0 is referredto in the responses propositions;the only difference to impertinentpropositions,and not some undeterminedinstant,as in Burley'sobligations. R(

- rn-1 I" -'«Pn,or

R(
(■/->
- rn

'/
- rn

(■/(pn,r„ .1 '/ ->(p„,S0 II"/(p„,Soil"/"'«Pn

'(pnand So II"-'(Pn

I here presentthe rules of the game viewed as a determinedgame, i.e. where thereis only one correctmove at each stage. However,it appears that Strode's treatiseofferseven more compellingevidence than Burley's treatiseto a non-deterministic of obligationes, interpretation corresponding to some degree of freedomfor strategicplayingconcerningimpertinent propositions.22 Formation setsof propositions ofrn.The different acceptedby Respondent the to which he has in the game) are committed himself (i.e. propositions formedin the followingway: If R((pn)= 1, then Tn = rn_iU {q>n} If R(q>n)= 0, then Tn = Tn_iU {^(pn} If R((pn)= ?, then Tn = rn_i In particular,if R(cp0)= 1, then T0 = {cp0}.If R((p0)= 0, then the disputationdoes not get started. 22An account ofa non-deterministic ofthegame(interms ofa 'point interpretation canbe found in DutilhNovaes2005(n. 3). system')

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re-established maintenance II. ContraSwyneshed: consistency Throughoutthe treatise,it is clear that Strode is reactingto Swyneshed, in generaland as much as Swyneshedhad reactedto the antiquaresponsio in chapterIII, named in is even to Burley particular.Swyneshed explicitly where Strode discusses and rejects three specificopinions. Strode also that questionedthe appears to be reactingto other views of obligationes as such of the , Kilvington'sand thoseproposed antiquaresponsio principles But his main in an anonymoustreatiseknownas the 'Merton treatise'.23 enemyreallyseems to be Swyneshed,so in thissectionI discusssome of Strode's explicitobjectionsagainst Swyneshed. thewrong a. Swyneshed problems spotted The firstthingto noticeabout Ralph Strode'sreactionto the theories is thathe did not agree withtheirdiagnosisof the of his predecessors at issue.24 problems The two main problemsattributedto the antiquaresponsio by authorssuch falsehoodcould as Swyneshedwere the fact that any randomly-chosen of is a if the be proved forexample, positum disjunction two contingent is one of the disjuncts,thispropositum falsehoodsand the firstpropositum mustbe accepted shouldbe denied,and subsequentlythe otherpropositum when proposed- ; and the factthat,in two disputationshavingthe same , the same propositioncould be accepted in one and denied in the positum other.25 is not a real problem for Strode can be seen That the firstdifficulty fromhis fourthsupposition,where he stressesthat the truthof thingsis est/atenda')only outsideof the time of the to be acknowledged{'reiVeritas obligationaldisputation;therefore,grantinga falsehood,any falsehood, and the previouslygrantedpropositions, which followsfromthe positum or the contradictoriesof previouslydenied propositions,is simply a Even thoughthis consequence of the rules of this formof disputation.26 23N. Kretzmann inMerton De arteobligatoria andE. Stump1985,TheAnonymous College toL.M.de Dedicated : Studies andMetaphysics Semantics MS. 306, in: E.P. Bos (ed.),Medieval ontheOccasion attheUniversity andMediaeval ofLeiden , Ph.D.,Professor Philosophy ofAncient Ryk 375. 1993 Ashworth cf. His 60th 239-80; (n. 14), 1985, , Nijmegen of Birthday 24Ashworth 1993(n. 14),379. 25Cf.DutilhNovaes2006(n.2). 26Strode conceditur debite Obi. supposition], [second persecundam , 3: "Etcumproponitur,

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so-called randomly-chosefalsehood seems at firstirrelevant,since it is to the positum (even thoughit is one of the disjuncts,froma impertinent the individual disjunction disjunctsdo not follow),it becomes pertinent as the disputationcontinues. As forthe second difficulty, again Strodedoes not see whatthe problem is witha propositionreceivingdifferent responsesin two disputationswith The responseto a propositionis essentiallydependent the same positum. on the relativeorder withinthe disputationin which the propositionis proposed,as Strode points out several times(forexample, in the fourth - see also conclusion chapterXII, where possible objectionsto this conclusion are dealt with).We also encounterhere tracesof the 'pragmatic' approach to obligationaldisputationsproperto Strode; the responseto a givenpropositionmustdepend on the actual course of thingsin a given only. disputation,and cannot be determinedabstractlyfromthe positum b. An evenworse formof inconsistency is that the application Strode's main accusation against the novaresponsio withinthe obligational of its rulesyieldsthe worstformof inconsistency framework (farworsethan the two 'inconsistencies' just discussed),namely that in some occasions Respondent may be forcedby the rules of the novaresponsio to grant the contradictoryof the positum/ casus. Strode's are '), and are disarguments presentedin chapterIII (' Contratresopiniones cussed in.27Ashworthconcludes that Strode's argumentas she reconstructsit is not sound and that it could be blocked by Swyneshed. Strode's argumentsgoes as follows: , accepted cp0:'Every man is running' positum (pt:'You are a man' irrelevantand true,accepted
utpriusdictum est.Undepatetquodaliquando officium, que fundatur superadmissionis concedens falsum in istaartepositas, benerespondet secundum et nonmale." regulas 27Ashworth 1993(n. 14),381-3.

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- must be 4,and thereforethe contradictory of the positura must be accepted. Ashworthclaims28that the problemwith Strode's argumentis that Swyneshedwould not be obliged to grantthe conjunctionof cp,and and true(impertinent because both conjunctsare impercp3as impertinent he would be entitled to tinent);rather, deny thisconjunctionas pertinent and repugnantto the positura. As I see it, the problemwithStrode'sargumentsdoes not concernthe statusof a conjunctionformedby two irrelevant(accepted)propositions; rather,what Strode seems to be claimingis that,once one has granted q>l54,simplybecause one has granted its antecedent(by modusponens).The faultof the argumentis to assume and true that,in the aova responsio , what has been grantedas impertinent can functionas premise of an inferenceso that its conclusioncan be inferred.But as noted before,impertinent propositionsthat are granted as true are simply'forgotten'if one plays the game according to the novaresponsio , theyseem to have no 'assertiveforce'whatsoever;so they cannot be used as premises in an application of modusponens.They would of course have this'assertiveforce'in a game played accordingto the antiquaresponsio , and that is perhaps the source of Strode's miscast argument. So Strode's attributionof this formof inconsistencyto Swyneshed's a formof what theoryseems to be unfounded.He could thoughidentify is now called a co-inconsistency with respectto the positum, on the basis of the conceptof T-consistency introducedby Godei in his famousincomA theoryis co-inconsistent if both of the following pletenesstheorem.29 hold in it, for some predicate'F': There is an x such that F(*), but -> F(*0, "• F(x2),-> F(*3)etc., for all x„. 28Cf.Ashworth 1993(n. 14),383. 29Cf.K. Godei,On formally undecidable ofPrincipia mathematica and propositions related Works I, in: Collected , vol.I, Oxford 1986,145-95. systems

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In the case of Strode's example,what we have is a similarsituation,but then with a universalproposition:it is grantedthat everyman is run, but of all men who are not running,'you are a man' ning as thepositum and 'you are not running'must be accepted as true and impertinent.30 ifthepositum is an existential Similarly, propositionthatis acceptedbecause it is possible but in fact at that momentno individualsatisfiesthe predicate expressedin it (forexample, 'There is an antichrist'), then of each individual('He is the antichrist')it will be denied that (s)he satisfiesthe with respectto the positum predicate,generatingco-inconsistency properly speaking. This propertyis also related to the notoriouslyawkwardbehavior of a universalpropodisjunctionsand conjunctionswithinthe novaresponsio; sitioncan be seen as equivalentto an infiniteconjunction,whereas an existentialproposition('particularproposition',in medievalterms)can be seen as equivalentto an infinitedisjunction.31 Now, it is well knownthat while everydisfor Swynesheda disjunctioncan be accepted as positum as and but here the situationseems must be denied false irrelevant; junct is a conjunction(or, equiveven more awkward,since even if thepositum alently,a universalproposition),some of the conjunctsmust be denied as false and irrelevant. is a In the frameworkof the incompletenesstheorem,co-inconsistency so ifco-inconsistency weaker(lessdamaging)property thanplaininconsistency; with respectto the positumor somethingsimilarto it is what threatens Swyneshed'stheory,and not plain inconsistency,then Strode's attack against Swyneshedis less effectivethan he, Strode, thoughtit to be. ifSwyneshed'sobligationes withrespect Nevertheless, generateco-inconsistency to thepositum , thisseems alreadybad enough,so the gistof Strode's critique is not entirelymiscast. / impertinent a. The coreof thematter: ofpertinent definition propositions As alreadynoted,the core of Strode'sstrategy to 'correct'the novaresponsio and exclude the inconsistencies it generatedfromobligationaldisputations 30Provided thattheyarenotproposed as a conjunction, inwhich case simultaneously, thisconjunction wouldbe repugnant to thepositum and thusshouldbe denied.So the actuallogicalform ofthisargument is: V* (F(*)-*■ butforsomex„such G(*))is granted, thatF(*„)is granted, G(*„)is denied. 31Cf.E.J.Ashworth, des Obligationes 'Autour de RogerSwyneshed: la NovaResponsio LesÉtudes , 3 (1996),341-60, philosophiques esp.349.

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is to returnto Burley'sdefinition of pertinent/ impertinent propositions just as much as the core of Sywneshed'sstrategyto 'correct'the antiqua had been to reformulate this distinctionand let it depend only responsio on the positum. I have proved that,if one followsthe rules proposed by Elsewhere,32 thus Burley(and by Strode),in particularwith respectto the definition of a pertinent/ impertinentproposition,then Respondent can always maintainthe consistency of the set of propo(and even the co-consistency)33 sitionsformedduringthe disputationby the propositionshe grantsand the contradictories of the propositionshe denies. In other words, there is always a winningstrategyfor Respondent,assumingthat the goal of the game is consistencymaintenance. Hence, the same holds here; the strangefeaturesof the novaresponsio were all relatedto different formsof inconsistency being producedby the application of its rules. Since the fundamentalchange introducedby Swyneshedwas the new definitionof the notion of pertinent/ impertinentpropositions,all Strode had to do to re-establishconsistencywas to returnto the old distinction,which differentiates a pertinentfroman impertinent propositionon the basis of all previouslygranted/ denied propositionsin a given disputation(cf. his thirdremark): Strode Obi., 5: Respondetur igiturquod non solum capitur'sequens' in locis predictispro sequenteex posito,sed pro sequenteex positocum bene concessouel consessis,ut dicebaturin primaconclusione. d. Avoiding time-related inconsistency Besides introducinga new notionof pertinent/ impertinent propositions, anothercontroversial move by Swyneshedwas the stipulationthatchanges in thingsduringthe timeof the disputationshould be takeninto account in Respondent'sresponsesto impertinent propositions.The resultof this stipulationwas that the set composed of granted / denied impertinent propositionscould be inconsistentnot only on the level of molecular 32DutilhNovaes2005(n. 3). 33Presumably, in a Burley-style ifa positum is an existential, obligation, contingently falseproposition, andeachofitsindividuell instances is gradually anddeniedas proposed andfalse,thentheverylastindividuad instance wouldhaveto be impertinent proposed as sequens itis false(justas whena disjunction is thepositum : ifall , eventhough granted other havebeenproposed anddenied, thelastdisjunct must begranted as sequens). disjuncts

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but even on the atomiclevel. propositions(conjunctionsand disjunctions), If at the beginningof the disputation'you are sitting'was proposed to Respondentand he was in fact sittingat that moment,then he would have to grantthispropositionas impertinent and true. But if soon after in are not was and indeed the meantimeRespondent 'you sitting' proposed, had stood up, then he would have to grantthispropositionas irrelevant in the meantime and true,since the firstpropositionhad been 'forgotten' and had not been added to the informationalbase of the disputation and possiblyof otherpositasubsequently positum (composedonlyof the first posed).34 Strode, of course, is not willingto accept this formof inconsistency. of the notion of pertinentpropositionsis in fact The mere redefinition as logical relationsbetween sufficient to excludethisformof inconsistency, over the actual state of things.So, in the examhave priority propositions ple when 'You are not sitting'is proposed,accordingto Strode'sdefinition of a pertinentproposition,it is not impertinent (as it is for Swyneshed), - in since it contradictsa previously but ratherpertinent fact,repugnant, in This is why, Burley'stheory,no specificinstant grantedproposition. had to be referredto in the responsesto impertinent propositions;the to exclude thisform notionof pertinentpropositionsalone was sufficient of inconsistency. But Strode goes further.He is more aware of this issue than Burley , so he stipulatesthat was, having been exposed to the nova responsio one specificinstant,namely the moment when the disputationbegins, should be consideredfor the responsesto impertinent propositions(fifth supposition). One possibleobjectionto thisstipulationis discussedby Strode in the chapterdedicated to the fifthsupposition(chapterVIII). Say the positum is 'you are runningand the king is sitting'.Then 'the king is sitting'is proposed; Respondentmust doubt it, since at momentS0 when the disputationbegan, he had no idea whetherthe kingwas sittingor not. Then 'you are running'is proposed; he must deny it, since at S0 he was not running.Then 'the kingis sitting'is proposedagain, and mustbe granted. 34Swyneshed ofa secondor third thepossibility positum accepted beingposedduring thedisputation, so thatin practice theactualpositum becametheconjunction ofthetwo in theantiqua itis ; cf.DutilhNovaes2006(n. 2). Bycomparison, posita responsio accepted as though ordenied orimpertinent, orproposievery granted positum proposition (pertinent becamea newpositum. tum)

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Now, if all responsesreferto the same instant,how can Respondentfirst doubt whetherthe king is sittingand then accept it? The same objectioncould have been raised against Burley,but since Burleydoes not explicitlysay thatall responsesreferto the same specific instant,this situationappears to be less awkwardwithina Burley-style obligationaldisputation.Strode,however,mustexplain how it is possible thatat the same momentRespondentgrantsand doubts the same thing. In his discussion,he proposes many ways around this difficulty, but an accurateand straightforward would in be to reply simply say that, itsfirst 'the is was and thereforeindeed occurrence, king sitting' impertinent, judged accordingto S0, but that in its second occurrenceit had become a pertinentproposition,and therefore the responseto it simplyhad nothto do with is not S0. Thus, S0 ing therebyproved to be an inconsistent state of knowledge. e. Conjunctions and disjunctions Finally,what was consideredby many as the most embarrassingcharacteristicof the novaresponsio, namelythe behaviorof conjunctionsand diswas also discussed junctions, by Strode (in particularin his analysisof the firstof the three opinions he objects to in chapter III). Obviously, Strode is not happy with the inconsistencies relatedto conjunctionsand in that a disjunctions appear Swyneshed-style obligation,so in chapterIII he proposesways to avoid thisphenomenon. Let us recapitulate.Accordingto Swyneshed,it is entirelypossiblethat both conjunctsare grantedwhen proposedas individualpropositions, but - for that their conjunctionis denied when proposed as a conjunction example, in the case of the conjunctionof a false positumand a true impertinent propositionalready granted(the conjunctionis then a false impertinent proposition,and thereforeshould be denied). Similarly,it is possiblethata disjunctionis grantedand thatsubsequentlyboth disjuncts are denied (if theyare both false,impertinent propositions).35 How do conjunctionsand disjunctionsbehave in Burley'sobligational framework? Such inconsistencies do not occur, but it is worthexamining why it is so, which I shall do by means of some examples. 1. Suppose thatN0,a falsebut possiblepositum , is granted.Then Disputation a true it is propose Nb impertinent proposition; granted.Then propose 35Cf.DutilhNovaes2006(n. 2).

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N0 & N,; the question is then whetherN0, N, N0 & N, is a valid consequence. Obviously,it is, so N0 & Nj must be grantedas a pertinent proposition,which followsfromthe positura togetherwithwhat has been So the consistentset r2 = {N0, N1?N0 & Nj} is formed. granted.36 2. Now supposethat,in a different the same propoDisputation disputation, sitionsare proposed,but in a different order.We startwiththe falseposituraN0,and then the conjunctionN0 & Nj is proposed (N, alone has not been proposed yet).At this stage, the conjunctionis clearlyimpertinent; moreover,it is false,since one of the conjuncts(namelyN0) is false. So it is denied. Then N, is proposed, and the question is: is it a pertinent proposition?Yes it is, namelya repugnantproposition,because the consequence N0,i- (N0 & Nj) ' N, is valid. So N, mustbe denied, and the consistentset r2. = {No,1-^ & N^r-N,} is formed. As for a disjunction,the situationis even simpler. 3. If the positumis a disjunctionand one of the disjunctsis Disputation denied in the next round,then wheneverthe otherdisjunctis proposed, it must be accepted as a pertinentproposition,since N0 v Nb ""Nq |" Nl is a valid consequence. (If the disjunctfirstproposed is accepted, then the second disjunctremainsan impertinent proposition,whichthusshould be judged accordingto its own quality). So what guaranteesthatthe behaviorof conjunctionsand disjunctionsin a Burley-style obligationdoes not generateinconsistenciesis the notion of pertinent/ impertinent propositions,and the influenceof the orderin which propositionsare proposed. Strode proposesyet a different Interestingly, way of avoidingthiskind of inconsistency. One wonderswhy he does so, since the Burleyrules as to avoid the problem.Strode's proposal is essentheystand are sufficient to consider as true.37If one does so, Disputation2 above the tially positum has a different outcome,even if played accordingto the antiquaresponsio canon: if one considersthepositum N0 as true,then the conjunctionN0 & Nj, proposed just after the positum , becomes an impertinentbut true and therefore must be the same response proposition, granted.Incidentally, would be given by someone playing the game according to the nova 36Bycomparison, forSwyneshed theconjunction in thiscaseis an impertinent proposition becausetheconsequence N0-* N0& N,is notvalid. 37Strode Obi, 6; cf.Ashworth 1993(n. 14),381.

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canon (the difference between the two canons would appear in responsio the next round: accordingto the antiquaresponsio , Nt would be a pertinent proposition,while according to the novaresponsio it would be an impertinent proposition,since it does not followfromthe positum alone). Notice thoughthat stipulatingthat the positum is true does not seem to solve the inconsistency createdin Disputation3 if played accordingto the novaresponsio : if a disjunctionis taken to be true,then one of its disjunctsis takento be true,but Respondentstilldoes not disposeof enough information to determinewhich disjunctit should be, and thereforemust still deny both disjunctsif they are proposed and happen to be false propositions. be viewed as true to avoid Why does Strode propose that the positum inconsistencies relatedto conjunctions?As argued,the usual Burleyrules already guaranteethat therebe no such inconsistencies.One possibility is that Strode is proposingan amendmentto the novaresponsio , so that such inconsistencies would not occur even ifone played the game accordcanon. Strode was probably aware of the fact ing to the novaresponsio that the antiquaresponsio as it was avoided the generationof such inconsistencies,but the puzzle remainsas to whetherhe thoughtthat considas truewas a necessaryamendmentto the antiquaresponsio , eringthepositum or onlyto the novaresponsio. It is also possiblethatStrodewas not defending this positionas his own, but only proposingit as a possible way of handlingthe positum.™ III. Focuson Epistemic / Pragmatic Elements of theDisputation As already mentioned,many scholars have argued that, in the second halfof the 14thcentury,especiallyin England,an epistemicturnin logic in thetheoriesof consequences,40 tookplace.39This is to be seen in particular 38According toE.J.Ashworth, thisposition wasexplicitly heldbytheanonymous Merton cf.Ashworth 1993(n. 14),375. author, 39Butit hasalsobeenarguedthatan epistemic notion ofconsequence is alsoto be andLiars foundin Boethius andAbelard , in: M. Yijönsuuri (cf.C.J.Martin, Obligations Formal , Dordrecht 2001,63-94),andin some13thcentury (ed.),Medieval Logic logicians, Review ofM. Yijönsuuri suchas Kilwardby (ed.),Medieval formal logic: (cf.E.J.Ashworth, andPhilosophy ofLogic,23 (2002), insolubles andconsequences , in:History 296-97). obligations, ofthesecondhalfofthe14thcentury were So itwouldseemthattheEnglish logicians toan old novelwayofapproaching notintroducing an entirely logic,butrather returning theBurley-Ockham-Buridan whichhadlostitspredominance period. during approach, 40I. Boh,Four in:Theoria, 56(2000),129-44, Phases Logic, esp.129-30: ofMedieval Epistemic

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and one of its main signsis the recastdefinition of 'formalconsequence'. While in the firsthalf of the 14th centurythe notion of formalconsequence was usuallydefinedin termsof Topical, semantic,logical or substitutionalcriteria,in the decades followingthis period many authors startedto formulateit in epistemicterms:a formalconsequence is such that the consequent is understoodin the antecedent,so that whoever understandsthe antecedent(as true) will understandthe consequent (as true).In otherwords,a formalconsequence is thus definedwith respect to the knowledgeand understandingof a hypotheticalagent, and not anymorepurelyon the basis of featuresof the consequenceitself.Strode's own definition of a formalconsequence runsverymuch along theselines: A consequenceis called soundby formwhen,if the way in whichfacts are adequatelysignifiedby the antecedentis understood,the way in which theyare adequatelysignifiedby the consequentis also underthatyou are a man, he will stood;forinstance,if anyoneunderstands understandalso thatyou are an animal.41 The same focus on the knowingagent is noticeablein Strode's treatise on obligationes , as I will tryto show in this section. Simultaneously,his focuson the agent also outlineswhat we could call the pragmaticnature of obligationaldisputations(and of logic in general)as an actual activity, takingplace in space and time,and the issues that mustbe dealt withas a resultof this approach.42These include the issue of the actual logical verbalnatureof thesedisputations, knowledgeof Respondent,the essentially

andperhaps themostimportant "Thefourth logic]arose phase[inmedieval epistemic within thetheory ofconsequences; cameto seethatnotonlythemostgenPhilosophers butalsothoseinvolving eralrulesofpropositional modalities, logicandalethic epistemic, needto be recognized as themostbasicprinciples of andothermodalities obligational in 1360s,is certainly in various Strode's realms. , written Consequences reasoning probably ofthisstage." thebestrepresentative 41W. Seaton, AnEdition andTranslation deConsequentiis" Strode, ofthe"Tractatus byRalph Fourteenth andFriend Chaucer. Ph.D. Dissertation, of Logician ofGeoffrey University Century andRulesofConsequence in the 1973,quotedin I. Boh,Consequences California, Berkeley Post-Ockham Period Formal , in:M. Yrjönsuuri , Dordrecht 2001,147-81, (ed.),Medieval Logic esp.156-57. 42A similar is noticeable Buridan's staunch comin,forinstance, pragmatic approach mitment toproposition-tokens as thebearers oftruth-value, andintheamendments made to hislogicalsystem as a result ofthiscommitment. Cf.G. Klima,Consequences necessary TokenBasedSemantics: TheCaseofJohn Buridan andPhilosophy of , in: History ofa Closed, Buridan's andinference Logic,25 (2004),95-110;C. DutilhNovaes, consequence consequentia: within a token-based semantics andPhilosophy ofLogic,26 (2005),277-97 . , in:History

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and how to handle propositionsreferring to the very circumstancesof the disputationas well as to the verymoves taken withinit. a. Epistemic clauses Both in Burley'sand Swyneshed'streatises,epistemicelementswere present in the rules of how to respond to impertinent these propositions:43 propositionsshould be respondedto on the basis of Respondent'sactual knowledgeat the momentof the disputation.If he knew an impertinent propositionto be true,it should be granted;if he knew it to be false,it shouldbe denied,and if he did not knowwhetherit was trueor whether it was false,then it should be doubted. But the epistemicclause was not extendedto the evaluationof the positum , nor to the assessmentof inferential relationsbetweenthe positum and the proposita. a te esse By contrast,in Strode's treatise,phrases such as 'falsumscitum 'verum ' scitum a teesseveruni(cf.firstconclusion),possibile scitum esse falsum' ' 4 essepositum'(cf. second supposition) possibile(cf. firstsupposition),scitum 'scitumesse uerumnon 'scitumessefalsumnonsequent(cf. second repugnans' are abundant. Indeed, such epistemicclauses were characconclusion), teristicof Oxford logic.44 At firstsight,these seem harmlessand in factconceptuallyinteresting additionsto the obligationalframework, relatedto Strode's generalepistemic penchant and to the focus on Respondent as an actual, nonomniscient thisepistemicapproach agent.But,undera giveninterpretation, also be seen as a confusion betweenthe normight problematic,yielding mativeand the descriptivecharactersof the obligationalrules. It has been stressedby many scholars45 that the rules of obligationes are ; commentatorshave expressedthisnormativecharacessentiallynormative ter in different ways, such as pointingout theirconnectionwith deontic or problems,46 stressingthe importanceof the notion of 'correctness',47 as But Strode's clauses viewingobligationesrule-governed games.48 epistemic 43Burley andSwyneshed hadthesameruleonhowtorespond toimpertinent propositions, onwhich wereimpertinent. but,as I havestressed times, many they disagreed propositions 44I owethisremark Ashworth. toJennifer 45Cf.Yriönsuuri 1993(n.8), 302. 46S. Knuuttila andActions inObligational & M. Yijönsuuri, Norms , in:O. Pluta Disputations im14. und15.Jahrhundert , Amsterdam 1988,191-202. (ed.),DiePhilosophie - Rekonstruktion 47Cf.H. Keffer, De Obligationibus einer , spätmittelalterlichen Disputationstheorie Leiden2001,123-7,147-50. 48DutilhNovaes2005(n. 3).

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approach to those rules,and thiscreates appear to introducea descriptive difficulties. of some of the obligationalrules, Consider the followingformulations in the spiritof the phrases containingthe term 'sàturi quoted above: (Rl) Respondent grantsthe positumif he knows it to be a possible proposition. if he knows it to be a true,not (R2) Respondentgrantsa propositum repugnans proposition. if he knows it to be a false,not (R3) Respondentdenies a propositum sequensproposition. Accordingto this formulationof Rl, if Respondentdenies a givenpositumthat is in factpossible,but that he does not know to be possible,he Rl. Similarly,suppose that a proposiis properlyspeakingnotinfringing tumis in factrepugnant,besides being true,but that Respondentfailsto and thepositum thislogicalrelationbetweenthispropositum (together identify to withotherpreviouslygranted/ denied propositions, according the antithis proposition;again, prop), and that he thereforegrants qua responsio R2, given the failureof the epistemic erlyspeaking,he is not infringing clause. The same holds for R3. Hence, if Respondent'slogical knowledgeis deficient,given the epistemicclause, he is properlyspeakingnot respondingbadly. But the point of obligationaldisputations(or at least one of them) is preciselyto test Respondent'slogical abilitiesand knowledge;he will respondwell if he knowshis logic well. A situationin which Respondentmakes logical mistakes and can stillbe said to have respondedwell in some sense (perhaps 'to the best of his abilities')is againstthe whole spiritof the game. So the epistemicclauses, albeit realistic,jeopardize the normativecharacter of obligationes. Indeed, one way to make sense of the obligationalrules thus formulated is to view themas descriptiverules;in reality,Respondentwill only as following if he knows it to be possible, a propositum accept a positum such etc . . . if it to be he knows fromor repugnantto the positum only of that is treatises But the purposeof obligational spellingout presumably rules of how to respond correctly (how to win the game) and not that of how such of as a disputationsactuallytake place. description serving Anotherway to interpretsuch clauses is to view them as related to - as of the propositionsbeingput forward the explicitformulation opposed to their 'mental' formulation.As will be discussed below, Strode was

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againstthe view that some propositionswere implicitly grantedduringa if 'I the was to disputation;similarly, positura posit you the proposition that I am thinkingabout', Respondent could neitheraccept nor deny such a positura , since he didn'tknowthe (unuttered) propositionto be possible or impossible.But if this is so, a perhaps more intuitiveformulation of this clause would have been somethinglike ^falsum scituma te' insteadof 'falsum scitum a teessefalsum' stressingthus thatthe proposition in questionmustbe knownto Respondent,but not necessarilyknownto be such-and-such. Thus, one wondersto whichextentStrodewas only reproducingsome of the standardOxfordformulations of theserules,or whethertherereally was an epistemic-descriptive componentin his conceptionof the obligational rules. b. Onlyexplicitly base proposed propositions belongto theinformational Although Strode's main opponent in this treatise really seems to be Swyneshed,in chapter III he also criticizesa particularview on obligationesnot defended by the latter. Indeed, this view was defended,for example, by the anonymousauthor of the so-called Merton treatise.49 The specificview in questionwas that some propositions,even if not proposed, are implicitlygrantedduringan obligationaldisputation,and thereforeshould be takeninto account by Respondentwhen grantingor The typicalexample illustrating this view goes as denyingthe proposita. follows:the positum is 'Every man is running'.The firstpropositum is then 'You are running':accordingto both Burleyand Swyneshed,Respondent must deny thispropositum as impertinent and false (Respondentis in fact not runningat that moment). But according to the Merton author,50 Respondentis tacitlycommittedto the truthof the proposition'You are a man', even thoughit has not been explicitly proposedin the disputation, and therefore must 'You are Respondent grant running'as followingfrom thepositum with the together tacitlygrantedproposition'You are a man' Strode Obi , 6). (cf. 49Cf.N. Kretzmann andE. Stump, TheAnonymous De arteobligatoria inMerton College MS. 306, in: E.P. Bos (ed.),Medieval Semantics andMetaphysics : Studies Dedicated toL.M.de andMediaeval attheUniversity ontheOccasion , Ph.D.}Professor Ryk ofAncient Philosophy ofLeiden , Nijmegen 1985,239-80,andE.J.Ashworth ofHis 60thBirthday 1993,RalphStrodeon in Obligational in: K. Jacobi(ed.),Argumentationstheorie, Inconsistency Disputations, Leiden1993,363-86, esp.375-9. 50Kretzmann andStump1985,246(Latintext), 255(translation), 266/7(comments).

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Strode is radicallyopposed to this view. He startshis counter-argumentationby noticingthat 'granting'can be understoodin two ways, verballyand mentally,and that accordingto some (the Merton author, for instance),it is not more reasonable to grant a propositionthat follows fromthe positum togetherwith a verballygrantedpropositionthan it is to granta propositionthat followsfromthe positum togetherwith a Obviously,thispositionputs at riskmany mentallygrantedproposition.51 of the crucial aspects of Strode-styleobligationes , such as the importance of the order in which propositionsare proposed,and the fundamentally pragmaticcharacterof a disputation,seen as an actual deed performed by those involvedin it. One could add the objection that, since those are onlyaccessibleto Respondent,it becomes mentallygrantedpropositions to virtuallyimpossible judge objectivelywhetherhe has respondedwell or not at the end of the disputation,as the total set of denied / granted propositionsis not publiclyavailable. Strode's argumentagainst this view, if I understandit correcdy,runs is 'Everyman is running',to whichmenroughlyas follows:ifthepositum tal propositionsis Respondent actually committed?To the proposition that he is a man or to the propositionthat he is not running?They are both true propositions,but if they are both granted(mentallyor otherset of propo, then clearlyan inconsistent wise) togetherwith the positum sitionshas been granted. Thus, if mentallygrantedpropositionsare included in the informationalbase of the disputation(theset of propositionson the basis of which pertinenceis judged), then the rules of the game no longer determine the correctresponse(s)to a proposition.Given the positum 'Every man is one can eitherdeny is 'You are if the first running', propositum running', it as else or and false is an as it it, following grant proposition, impertinent and the mentallygrantedproposition'You are a man'. fromthe positum , then it can eitherbe Similarly,if 'You are a man' is the firstpropositum as and or denied as true, repugnantto the positum granted impertinent are not running'.52 'You the with mentallygrantedproposition together

51Strode, essemaiorratioquaredebetaliquaproposiObi, 6: "Nonenimeisuidetur ex positocumscitoesseuerouelbeneconcesso ti concedi vocaliter, quam que sequitur mentaliter." ex positocumscitoesseuerouelbeneconcesso quandosequitur 52I havearguedthat,withrespect seemsto to impertinent Respondent propositions, in howto respond to them.Butherewhatis at stakeis indetermihavesomefreedom or impertinent. a proposition is pertinent nancyevenofwhether

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Strodealso noticesthatgrantingmentalpropositions the fourth infringes that the order of and is conclusion,namely granting denying crucial. While verballygrantingand denyingtakes place in time, and therefore the order of responsesis well-established, mentallygrantingand denying subvertsthe order principle,since presumably¿ill mentallygranted or denied propositionsare grantedor denied at the same time.So the order principlecan no longerbe applied.53 Strode's critiqueof thispositionindicatesthat he is well aware of the essentially pragmatic(as opposed to abstract)characterof obligationaldisputations.Such disputationsare dependenton elementsof the actual situation in which they take place, such as the actual state of knowledge of thosepresent,thepropositionsthatare actuall- i.e. verbally proposed, and the order in which they are proposed. Here, the game metaphor comes in handy, as it stressesthe role of the participantsplaying the game and the specificmoves made by each of them,in a certainorder. A 'mental move' is simplynot a move in the game- intersubjectivity is a fundamentaltraitof any game. In obligationaldisputations,all moves are and must be verbal,explicitmoves. c. Self-contradictory posita to the situationof the very disputationin which Propositionsreferring are are discussedin virtuallyall obligationes treatisesof the they proposed 14th century.This fact has led to the hypothesisthat obligationes were and self-referential, Liaressentiallya frameworkto deal with sophismata like paradoxes.54Even if one does not agree with this hypothesis,55 one muststillprovidean explanationforthe abundantpresenceof sophismata in obligationaltreatises.I have argued56thattheseseem to be limitcases, which serve to test the soundnessof the obligationaltheorybeing procases withoutbecoming posed; if the theorycan deal with such difficult incoherent(forexample,withoutyieldingconflicting instructions on how should then it is a sound Respondent reply), theory. 53Strode, Obi, 6: "[.. .1videtur uerum ordinem quodistapositio transponit respondendi." 54Cf.E. Stump, A. From theBeginning totheEarly Fourteenth 1982,Obligations: , in: Century N. Kretzmann, A. Kenny, Medieval J.Pinborg (eds),TheCambridge History ofLater Philosophy, 1982,315-34. Cambridge 55Asforexample M. Yrjönsuuri, andLogical Coherence , Obligations , in:Theoria, Disputations 56 (2000).205-223. esD.216. 56Cf.DutilhNovaes2006(n.2).

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In any case, the discussionof self-referential propositionsin Strode's treatiseis not a particulartrait of this text. What is perhaps novel in Strode'streatise(withrespectto his predecessorssuch as Swyneshedand Burley)is thathe formulatesspecificrules on how to deal withthem (for instance,in the firstsuppositionand in the second and thirdconclusions), in such a way thatthesesophismata are no longerdiscussedas limitcases. of the theory. seem to be at the core Rather,they were But instead of viewingthis fact as a indicationthat obligationes in I tend to believe Strode's to meant solve that, case, , sophismata really it is a sign of the general epistemic' pragmaticfocus of his treatise. Worthconsideringis Strode'sdiscussionofpositathatlead to what can contradictions: be called performative positathat contradictthe very act of positingby Opponent,thepositio('Nothingis positedto you'), or posita that contradictthe veryact of acceptingthe positum by Respondent,the Strode's third admissio('You are sleeping now') (cf. conclusion). Even though these positaseem to create contradictions(of the performative, pragmatickind),Strode statesveryclearlythat theyshould be accepted as posita.He remarksthat denyingthese as positaon the basis of the first supposition(accordingto which impossiblepositashould not be accepted) is nothingbut an escape for the miserable,who do not know the force of this art.57 - i.e. the But if a propositiondescribingthe paradoxicalpositio veryact of positingthe givenpositum is proposed as a propositum , then it should That is, be denied, since (althoughtrue) it is repugnantto the positum. should be is is to It that the granted, positum 'Nothing posited you'. suppose as it is not impossible.Then, if '"Nothing is posited to you" is posited to you' is proposed,it should not be granted,even thoughit is true in the disputationalsituation,because it is repugnantto thepositum (it is an instantiationof 'Somethingis posited to you'). Therefore,since inferential relationstake priorityover truthin the case of pertinentpropositions, it should be denied. Also worthnotingis Strode'ssecond conclusion:Respondentcan grant thathe is respondingbadly and yet not lose the game (noticethatit follows fromthe fourthsuppositionand the firstconclusion:if denyinga truepropositiondoes not necessarilymean respondingbadly,Respondent 57Strode, Obi, 3: "Ex quibuspatetquodtalescasusnegarenonestnisifugamiseroistius artisuigorem." rum,nescientium

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can grantthathe is respondingbadly even thoughhe is in factresponding well). Consider the following(hypothetical)disputation: N0: 'Every man is respondingbadly.' Granted,possible. and true. Nj: 'You are a man.' Granted,impertinent fromN0 and N1# 'You are follows N2: respondingbadly.' Granted, What is paradoxical about this situationis that the veryact of granting 'You are respondingbadly' correspondsto Respondent'srespondingwell, whereasdenyingit would correspondto his respondingbadly.58But again Strode does not considerthese performative contradictions to be vicious to be excluded from the framework. contradictions, obligational How can we make sense of these paradoxical situations?I propose here to consider the distinctionbetween the contextof utteranceof a propositionand its contextof evaluation,familiarfromtwo-dimensional semantics.59 It is as if all grantedor denied pertinentpropositions(includcontext, ) were being evaluated with respectto a different ing the positura not that of the disputation.Impertinentpropositions,on the otherhand, are evaluated with respect to the very context of the disputation.So Respondentcan grant that nothingis posited to him, that he is dead, that he is respondingbadly etc, because it is as thoughthese referredto a different situation,not to the verydisputation. is also helpful:in the case the Here, thought-experiment hypothesis60 of pertinentpropositions,one should replyto them as if one were crein which theposisituation,a thought-experiment, atinga counterfactual turais true. These pragmatic' performative paradoxes are thus resolved with one to if, respect pertinentpropositions, supposes that Respondent - in which he is is not referring to the very situationof the disputation situation. utteringtheseperformative paradoxes but ratherto a different From this point of view, such performative contradictionsare not very falsepropositions.61 different fromplain contingent Indeed, in the example

58Something 'I am notspeaking now'. likeuttering 59Cf. D. Chalmers Semantics , availableat 2004,TheFoundations ofTwo-Dimensional http://consc.net/papers/foundations.html 60Somescholars, thatan in particular 2000(n. 55),219 havecontended Yijönsuuri framework is toviewitas a technique oftheobligational modern interpretation adequate to buildthought-experiments. 61A similar toBuridan's withtheapplication ofthisdistinction conclusion wasreached timeitis uttered, itis impossibly'No proposition is negative': true,sinceitis falseevery

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'"Nothing is positedto you" is posited to you' is falsein the situationin which that nothingis posited to you is the case.62 But it remainscrucial to identifycorrectlywhethera propositum is perifit is impertinent, tinentor impertinent; it shouldbe respondedto accordto the context of utterance ing very (and in thiscase thereis no distinction betweencontextof utteranceand contextof evaluation),but if it is pertinent,it should be responded to according to the relevantinferential relations.These responsesprogressively create a counterfactual situation that is, as it were, the contextof evaluationof pertinentpropositions.63 An issue that stillmustbe addressedis whetherStrode would be willor inconsistencies, ing to accept all kindsof pragmaticand performative only those discussedso far. E.J. Ashworthargues that he mightbe seen as rulingout positaof the kind 'You are in Rome and no conjunctionis differsso much posited to you'.64I am not sure whethersuch a positum from'Nothingis positedto you' or similarposita.On the basis of the distinction betweencontextof utteranceand contextof evaluation,Respondent could then simplyconsidera situationin which he is in Rome (participatingin a disputationor not), and eithernothingis posited to him, or a positum is posited but it is not a conjunction.But if explicitreference is made to the verydisputationtakingplace- 'You are in Rome and no conjunctionis posited to you in this very disputation' , then it seems that we would have a real paradox, similarto Liar-likeparadoxes with explicitself-reference ('This propositionis false').

- it is in facta butit is notimpossible, sincethesituation it describes is notimpossible possible proposition. 62Thegistofthisdistinction canalsobe found in thefollowing remark byAshworth: 'Ashe [Strode] toprevent theresponout,there is,after all,nothing subsequently pointed dentfrom onthelogical ofwhathehasadmitted. He has following through consequences todenythathe himself is speaking, ordebating, orgranting, ordenying orengagsimply which is incompatible withhisbeingnon-existent, ormerely inginanyaction asleep.This ona careful distinction between andmaking a statement about approach depends uttering theconditions ofutterance. It is all right fortherespondent to reply, buthe mustnever thathe is replying.' 1993(n. 14),367). grant (Ashworth 63It is worth thatRespondent doesnotstart outwitha givenmodelto noting though serveas thecontext ofevaluation forpertinent thismodelis created rather, propositions; as thedisputation Cf.DutilhNovaes2005(n.3);Yijönsuuri 2000(n.55),220 progresses. 'semantic ofobligations). (against interpretations' 64Ashworth 1993(n. 14),366.

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d. Somerulesthatdo nothold In his influential treatiseon consequences,65 Strode presentsrulesof convalid within the realm of These basically sequence specifically obligationes. to the issue of whether the pertain consequentor antecedentof a consequentiaknown to hold should be granted' denied ' doubted once the antecedentor consequenthas been granted' denied ' doubted.66 There are however a few obligational'consequences' that mightbe expected to hold, given the intuitivecharacterof theircounterpartsin contextsotherthan obligationes , but whichfailto hold withinStrode'sobligational framework.Interestingly, the counterexamplesto these invalid schemataare oftenrelatedto the self-referential phenomena and performativecontradictions just discussed. Anothersource of counterexamplesare propositionsthat referto the ť verymoves being made in the game, for example as in p ought to be granted'(wherep is any proposition);in such cases, the meta-evaluation of a given move takes place withinthe verydisputation,and can prima facie be iteratedas many timesas one wishes.It is as if therewere var- the ious layers of disputationwithinthe disputation disputationitself, talkingabout the disputation,talkingabout talkingabout the disputation etc . . . These different layers are particularlyconfusingwhen they are 'tossed' togetherin the same proposition,for example in the case of a disjunctionor conjunctionwhose membersreferto different layers '/>or to be back and forth the different p ought granted'.Going layersmay create what Ashworthhas termed'obligationalinconsistencies',67 but still several authors,includingStrode, seemed to be prepared to deny the validityof schemata that would otherwisepreventobligationalinconsistenciesfromarising. In what follows,I shall representsome of these schemataby means of basic propositionallogic and some modal-likeoperators.So 'T[/?]' correspondsto the statementthat propositionp is true; 'G [/>]'to the statement that propositionp is granted,and 4OG[/?]' to the statementthat propositionp ought to be granted(square bracketsrepresentthe nominalizationof p). Iterationof these operatorsis possible.Withinthe obligational context, G[/?] is in fact equivalent to />,insofar as statinga propositionis in this contextthe same as grantingit. 65Seaton1973(n.41). 66See Boh2001in.4lì. 162-3fora formal reconstruction. 67See below, pp. 372-73.

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The firstschema that,in otherdisputationalor argumentative contexts, is usuallyexpected to hold is that which associatesthe dutyof granting a propositionwithits truth.Indeed, as shownby Yijönsuuri,68 originally in the Aristoteliantheoryof disputationsas well as in earlier medieval treatiseson the topic- , Respondent'smain commitment is withthe truth, or at leastwithhis knowledgeof what is true(Respondentis not expected to know all truthsas true).The schema can be representedas: (Sci) OG [p] <==> T [p' In otherwords,ifp is true it ought to be granted,and if it ought to be granted,it is true. But, as argued by Yijönsuuri,69the significantturn introducedby obligationaltreatisesof the late 13th centuryis precisely that Respondent'sduty towardstruthbecomes overriddenby his commitmentto the recognitionof certain inferentialrelations.Not only is Respondentcommittedto acceptingfalsepositain the contextof obligationes , but he is also committedto grantingall propositionsthat follow fromthe positura , regardlessof theirtruth-value.Indeed, Strode is very much aware of this subversionof the originalpurposes of disputations, and states clearly in his firstconclusion that one does not necessarily respondbadly when one grantsa falsepropositionor denies a true one. Anotherschema that does not seem to hold in a Strode-style obligational disputationis the one associatingthe grantingofp withthe granting thatp is true. (Sc2) G[p] <==>

OG[T [p]]

Prima facie,thisappears to be a variationof the TarskianT-schema and, in effect,withinmost medieval logical systems,the T-schema would not hold. This is relatedto the medievalview thattokensare the truth-value bearers:"p iffT[/>]" does not hold because, fora propositionto be true, it must exist (it must be formed);so this schema holds only under the provisoof the token'sexistence.70 But here we seem to encountera different situation,insofaras the reason why (Sc2) does not hold withinStrode's (and otherauthors',such as seems to be of a different nature.Recall Burley's)obligationalframework 68Yrjönsuuri 2000(n.55),207. 69Yrjönsuuri 2000(n.55),209. 70Cf.Ashworth 1993(n. 14),368.

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the distinctionbetween contextof utteranceand contextof evaluation; or a propositum havingbeen accepted as persuppose thatp is thepositum but that tinentand followingfromthepositum , p is actuallyfalse.Because it is a pertinentproposition,its contextof evaluationis not that of the disputation,which is its contextof utterance.But T [p' is an irrelevant proposition,and thereforeshould be evaluated accordingto the context of utterance;now, in this context,p is false,thus T [p] is also false,and thereforeshould be denied.71 We obtain thus the awkwardsituationof having grantedp and having denied T 'p]. DiscussingBurley'scontentionthat (Sc2) does not hold, of obligaYijönsuuri takes this to be a sign that semanticinterpretations forthe analysisof counterfactuals, tiones(as a framework thought-experimentsor beliefrevision)are not adequate, as it seems absurd that,in the same situation,p holds and T[/?] does not hold.72But perhaps the problem is withthe view that only one situation(or one class of situations)is at stake duringan obligationaldisputation;what may be needed is the distinction betweenthe fictionalsituationprogressively being constructed, - or and the actual situationof the disputationtakingplace73 similarly, 'between utteringand any metalinguisticassessmentof the speech act involvedor of the utteranceitself'.74 to Yijönsuuri'ssuggestion This being said, I am extremelysympathetic consistentsets of senthat 'obligationaldisputationsaim at constructing tences',75takingplace thus essentiallyon a linguisticratherthan semantic level.76While it may seem absurd that in a sensibledescriptionof a possible state of affairsw, p holds and T [p] does not hold, a set containingboth p and ""Tfjb] is not necessarilyinconsistent(in particularif the T-schema does not hold). 71Admittedly, thethesis that thepositum tobedefending Strode seems atsomepoint , once in section II.e. as discussed as true(evenifactually be considered should false), accepted, in virtue ofbeingsequens, thataregranted is saidaboutfalseproposita Butnothing and, as true. thesearenotto be considered presumably, 72Yriönsuuri 2000(n.55),220. 73In DutilhNovaes2005(n. 3),I haveargued(following a suggestion byChristopher ofconstructing to theprocess an obligational thatplaying gameis equivalent J. Martin) wouldcorwhich Lindenbaüm's setofpropositions, a maximal consistent lemma, following setsof consistent as maximal worlds are defined if a to world, possible respond possible propositions. 74Ashworth 1993(n. 13),368. 75Yriönsuuri 2000(n.55),221. 76Thispointis alsorelated ofobligational verbalnature to theessentially disputations III (pp.359-60). in section discussed

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The last two schematathatI would like to discuss,whichdo not seem to hold in Strode's theoryof obligationes , have also been discussedin with to in respect sophismata proposed Burley'sand Sherwood's (?) treatises.77 They both concernthe evaluationof moves of the disputationwithinthe 4 and verydisputation,by means of normativetermssuch as concedendurrí ' in or as neganduírí occurring propositionsproposed (as posita ). proposita Properlyspeaking,such 'deontic operators'can be iteratedad infinitum, creatingthe confusingeffectof different layers of discoursewithinthe same. Consider the followingschema: (Sc3) OG [p' <==> G [p] An obligationaldisputationwhere this schema holds is clearly a fully determinedgame, in the sense that whateveris correctlygrantedought to be granted.In otherwords,in such disputationsRespondenthas no space for maneuver,and thereis at each turnonly one move that will avoid him losingthe game. As alreadymentioned,I have argued in that there are elementsin Burley'streatisesuggestingthat the deterministic is not the onlyone possible,and thatsome space formaneuinterpretation ver and strategicplaying seems to be leftwith respect to impertinent propositions(since in such cases grantingit as well as denyingit allow Respondentto keep consistency).78 In some passages, Strode seems to defend preciselythis non-deterministicview of the game: Respondentwould have the dutyto grantpertinentpropositionsthatare sequens and to denypertinentpropositionsthat are répugnons , but as for impertinentpropositionsno such duty would , a clear counapply. In chapter XI, he presentsthe followingsophisma to terexample (Sc3):79 N0: '"Nothing is posited to you" is posited to you.' Granted (as possible). and true). N,: 'Somethingis positedto you.' Accepted(as impertinent80 77Knuuttila andYrjönsuuri 1988(n.46),197-9. 78DutilhNovaes2005(n. 3). 79Strode, Obi, 27: "Respondeo admitiendo casum['nihil esttibipositum' sittibiposita eta tebeneadmissa]; etcumproponitur: etnegoquod concedo, 'aliquidesttibipositum', illasita meconcedenda, ex mihipositoetbeneadmisso." quiadicoquodnonsequitur 80Strode, Obi. ex mihiposito .. , 27: . . nonsequitur

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N2: '"Something is posited to you" ought to be granted.' Denied ('Somethingis posited to you' does not followfromN0).81 That is, the reason he gives fordenyingN2 is that 'Somethingis posited to you' is impertinent;so even though Respondenthas grantedNl5 he was under no obligationto do so. (Sc3) is also relatedto the normative' descriptivedichotomydiscussedin sectionIILa.82 If this schema is supthat posed to be descriptive,then obviouslyit fails,since not everything oughtto be grantedis in factgranted namely,when Respondentactually respondsbadly. But in Strode'stheory,(Sc3) seems not to hold even thatis grantedought undera normativereading,insofaras not everything that are granted,under to be granted(namely,impertinent propositions the non-deterministic By contrast,under the normative interpretation). left to right)of the schema obviously the other direction (from reading, holds: if Respondentdoes not grantwhat ought to be granted(a pertinent sequens proposition),then he respondsbadly. Moreover, in special cases (for example, when the positurais a disin one of the disjuncts:'/?or p junction featuringthe term concedendum a propositionp oughtbe granted that it can occur be to granted'),83 ought to be granted' must be denied as repug(as sequens ), but that '/?ought nant,even thoughit is true(it describesa truefactabout the disputation). In sum, in such cases p oughtto be granted,but '/>oughtto be granted' - in does not have to be granted fact,since Respondent'scommitment to truth,it has relations towardsinferential priorityover his commitment oughtto be denied. Thus, the schema (Sc4), where the deonticoperator 'OG' is iterated,was oftenrejected.84 (Sc4) OG[p] <==> OG[OG[/>]] In a recent and yet unpublished article,85E.J. Ashworthargues that therewere basicallytwo trendsamong the authorsof obligationaltreatises 81Strode, Obi, 27: . . negoquodiliasita meconcedenda, quiadicoquodnonsequitur ex mihipositoet beneadmisso." 82See p. 360;alsodiscussed 1988(n.46),197. andYijönsuuri in Knuuttila 83Gf.Knuuttila 1988(n.46),198. andYrjönsuuri 84'Neither "Yououghtto grantP ifandonlyifyououghtto grantT oughtto be an obligas principles nor"P ifandonlyifP is true"wereaccepted governing granted"' 1993(n. 14),368). ational (Ashworth disputation.' 85E.JAshworth, d'unsophisme l'histoire esttibipositura": estasinus3) "cTuamis'(vel'homo Conference oftheSophismata intheproceedings surlesObligationes, dans lestraités forthcoming (Geneva, June2003).

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concerning(Sc4), namelythose who rejectedit as a valid principlegoverningthe disputation,and thosewho accepted it, presumablyunder the argumentthat denyingthis principlewould generateobligationalincon- for sistencies example, if Respondentdenies p but grantsthatp ought to be granted.Possibily,according to the firstgroup of authors,such 'inconsistencies' would not be verydifferent fromotherpragmaticinconsuch as 'Nothingis positedto you5,whichmanyauthors,among sistencies, whom Strode, were glad to accept as possibleposita.So one may conjecture that Strode would tend to deny the validityof (Sc4), but in his textI have not foundconclusiveelementsas to which trendhe belonged on thisparticularissue. The questionis of course,once thesedifferent layersof discourseabout the disputationare introduced,whetherthe veryrulesof obligationforce Respondent to grant inconsistencies.I have proved in (Dutilh Novaes 2005) that,if one sticksto the object-levelof discoursewithinthe dispuBut withthe different tation,Respondentcan alwaysmaintainconsistency. in of discourse this not be layers may possible, any case if obligational If theyare viewed as 'inconsistencies' are viewed as real inconsistencies.86 then there is no real mere pragmaticand performative inconsistencies, if But are more than and inconproblem. they pragmatic performative then a dedicated which remains for sistencies, discussion, they require now a subject forfutureresearch. IV. Conclusion One of the most interesting aspects of the studyof the obligationalliteratureis the fact that the medieval authors really seemed to be conversingwithone another,yieldinga livelydebate. Indeed, an authorsuch as Swyneshedwas clearlyreactingto Burley,whereassomeonelike Strode is clearlyreactingto Swyneshed,not to mentionthe other,less known participantsof this debate. The resultwas that the discussionspresented in the obligationes treatiseswere oftenprogressively sharperand deeper. I have attemptedto show that Strode's contributionto this debate revolvesmostlyaround his criticismof the novaresponsio and his epistemic and pragmaticversionof the antiquaresponsio. The rulesof the game presentedby Strode,properlyspeaking,differverylittlefromBurley'srules, 86DutilhNovaes2005(n. 3).

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but the conceptualanalysisaccompanyingthe presentationof his theory flavor.His goal is, in any case, clearlythat seems to have a different of re-establishing consistencyas the main principleguidingobligational disputations. are disIn Strode's treatise,objections to Swyneshed'snovaresponsio cussed in a compellingway, in particularwith respectto the notion of consistency,but some of his argumentsseem to be slighdymiscast.In I have arguedthatone of Strode'sargumentsagainstSwyneshed particular, but not necshowsat best thatthe novaresponsio producesco-inconsistency, also defends a to Strode position be foundin essarilyplain inconsistency. some 13th centurytreatises,but which is not to be found in Burley, namelythat all responsesduringthe disputationbe givenwithrespectto is put forone and the same moment,i.e. the momentwhen thepositum which threatenedconsisward. An importantfeatureof the novaresponsio tency,the behaviorof conjunctionsand disjunctions,is also discussedby Strode, and, as a remedyto it, he seems to propose that the positabe viewed as true. Moreover,Strode discussesin detail some pragmaticaspects involved in obligationaldisputations.While many of these aspects were already presentin previous treatises,such as Burley's,in Stode's treatisethey occupy an eyen more prominentposition. In this paper, some of his analyses have served as inspirationfor a discussionof certain foundational issues concerningobligationes , such as its normativevs. descriptive nature (relatedto Strode's demand character,its essentiallyperformative that only explicitlyproposed propositionsbe taken into account), and contradictionsthat are or are not allowed duringa some performative disputation.Also inspiredby Strode'sremarks,I have discussedsome rules that one mightexpect to hold withinthe obligationalframework,but which do not simplyhold. In sum, my goal withthe presenttextwas to divulgea hithertorather unknownbut conceptuallyvery interesting obligationaltreatise that of Ralph Strode , and to take thistextas a startingpoint fora discussion of some foundationalissues withinthe obligationalframework. Universityof Leiden Instituut Filosofiseli

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LorenzoValla and Quattrocento Scepticism LODI NAUTA

Abstract to be a sceptic.Equipped LorenzoValla (1406-1457)has oftenbeen considered withan extremely and critical his whole oeuvreseemedto mind, polemical aim at undermining receivedphilosophicaland theologicaldogmas. More he has been associatedwiththe burgeoninginterests in ancient specifically in In the fifteenth this in article the century. scepticism arguments support will be critically of thisinterpretation examinedand evaluated.Based on a discussionof two of his major works,De verobonoand the Dialéctica , it will be shownthatValla was not a sceptic.Even thoughthe firstworkbetrays the techniquesof theAcademyas employedby Cicero,the appropriation of thesestrategies servedan agenda whichcan hardlybe called 'sceptical'.The second work containshis reformof Aristotelian dialectic,which seems to to a in interest which and testify sceptical arguments relyon verisimilitude dubiousvaliditysuch as soritesand paradox. But ratherthan reflecting an endorsement of Academic scepticism,this work,on closer reading,shows Valla to be highlycriticalon such arguments.This raisesthe questionof how scepticismis relatedto rhetoric.Their similarities and differences will be discussedin the finalsection:Valla the Christianoratorwas no proponentof doubt,uncertainty and a suspensionofjudgement,even thoughat timeshe used strategies derivedfromAcademicscepticism. Like all "-isms","scepticism"is a termwithrathervague semanticalcontours.1It means different thingsto different people, and because historians do not always make clear in which sense they are using the term, debatesabout whethera particularthinkerwas a scepticor not are bound to arise. Some scholarswould only speak of scepticismif the main tenets - the of ancient are explicidymentionedand endorsed scepticism equipollence 1 Earlier versions ofthisarticle werereadat a conference on scepticism, organized by Henrik inUppsala(May2005)andattheannualconference oftheRenaissance Lagerlund, ofAmerica in San Francisco to theaudiences Society (March2006).I am grateful presentat theseoccasions forstimulating discussions on thehistory ofscepticism, inparticularJohnMonfasani, BrianCopenhaver, DavidLinesandDominik Perler. © Koninklijke BrillNV,Leiden,2006 Alsoavailable online- www.brill.nl/viv

Vivarium 44,2-3

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of beliefs,the suspensionofjudgement,and the tranquillity of the mind. In a broader,less historically determinedsense, it can mean the conviction that the human mind is principallyincapable to grasp the truthof things.On this view, certaintyand truthare out of reach for human beings,who should thereforebe contentwith probability,verisimilitude or mere plausibility. This convictioncan easilylead to fideism,and some thinkersin the past have used scepticismas a preparationfor faithor have even regardedit as basicallycongruouswithit.2In an even broader sense it means any formof questioning,doubtingand underminingtraditionalbeliefs,arguments,opinions or conventions.Used in this sense, historiansmay caillany thinkerin the past a scepticwho problematised or criticisedestablishedopinionsand practices.And these are just some of the meaningswhich have been attachedto the term. It is clear that an historianusing the term,for instance,in the first, strictsense distinguishedhere, will come up with a different historyof scepticismthan someone who uses it in the last, much broader sense. The firsttype of historywill probablypass over the Middle Ages, since - Sextus the principal texts of ancient scepticism Empiricus5Outlinesof , DiogenesLaertius'livesofthePhilosophers , and Cicero'sAcadémica Pyrrhonism, did not, or hardly,circulatethen and were virtuallyunknown.3The latter type of historywill focus on those periods when traditionalsystems of beliefswere criticised,forexample late-medievalnominalism,humanIt is therefore ism, the Reformation,and the French Enlightenment.4 to be clear about one's and use of the term,for important understanding otherwiseone is bound to talk at cross-purposes.In this articleI shall 2 The rehearsal ofsceptical inthedefence offaith cantakedifferent forms. arguments It is one thing to use sceptical and sceptical to giveexpression to language arguments one'sreligious as Montaigne did whenhe thought thatthesceptical and the beliefs, Christian arebasically thesceptic's to comply with positions compatible, linking precept thecustoms andlawsofsociety withhisownpreservation of"theancient beliefs ofour It is an another to employ as a preparation forfaith religion". thing sceptical arguments as Gianfrancesco PicodellaMirandola didinhisExamen in 1516.See vanitatis, completed T. Penelhum, andFideism Tradition , in: TheSkeptical , ed. M. Burnyeat, Skepticism Berkeley 1983,287-318on 296-97. 3 However, thecirculation ofSextusEmpiricus wassomewhat widerthanhashitherto beensupposed; seeR. Wittwer, Sextus Latinus. Dieerste lateinische von Sextus Übersetzung Empiricus' ForCicero's Académica in theMiddleAgessee eis,Leiden(forthcoming). fyrrôneioi Hy polypös C. B. Schmitt, Cicero The Hague1972,33-42(e.g.pp.39-41onHenry ofGhent's Scepticus, useofit). 4 Seenowonmedieval forms ofscepticism Dominik undGewissheit. Perler, Zweifel Skeptische Debatten imMittelalter, amMain2006. Frankfurt

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argue thatthe debate on the so-calledscepticismof Quattrocentohumanism, in particularthe scepticismof one its most famousrepresentatives, Lorenzo Valla (1407-1457), has sufferedfromthis vaguenessor equivoItalian humancationof the term.This is not surprising. Fifteenth-century ism saw the rediscoveryand slow disseminationof ancient sources of termed"sceptical"in the more scepticism,but it has also been frequently general sense of doubting,questioningand underminingtraditionalsystems of beliefs.5Humanism defineditselfin oppositionto scholasticism, attackingscholastic modes of thinkingand writingwhereverit could. Humanistsproclaimed intellectualfreedom,rejectingwhat they saw as the ipse¿/m/attitudeof the scholastics.Their rediscoveryof ancient litrhetoric and philosophysuggestedto them that the truthof erature, Aristotlewas just one truthamong many others,and that therewas an intellectuallife beyond the confinesof what theysaw as the rigid,dogmatic and closed-offworld of the scholastics. To many historians,these tendenciesfindno betterexpressionthan in the work of Lorenzo Valla.6 Equipped with an extremelypolemical and criticalmind, his whole oeuvre seemed to aim at underminingreceived philosophicaland theologicaldogmas. He famouslyexposed as a forgery the Donation of Constantine,one of the pillars of the papal claim on worldlypower. He approached criticallythe vulgate text of the Bible, comparingit,forthe firsttime,withthe Greektextof the New Testament, and drawingsome theologicallydaring conclusionsfromit. He attacked Aristotelian-scholastic metaphysicsand dialecticsalmosttoutcourt.He was 5 The term in e.g.V. Kahn,Rhetoric, features andSkepticism inthe Prudence, prominently Renaissance andC. Schmitt, Renaissance , IthacaandLondon, 1985;B. Copenhaver , Philosophy TheConfessionalization Oxford inReformation 1992,ch.4; ErikaRummel, ofHumanism Germany. Oxford 2000,50. 6 See e.g.M. Fois,Il pensiero cristiano diLorenzo Vallanelquadro storico culturale delsuoambiente In OurImage andLikeness. andDivinity inItalian , Rome1969;C. Trinkaus, Humanity Humanist Valla. 2 vols.,1970,vol.1, 103-50;S. I. Camporeale, Lorenzo , London, Thought Umanesimo e teologia Vallatrail Concilio diBasilea e quello Lorenzo 1972;R. Fubini, , Florence diFirenze, e ilprocesso dell' in Conciliarismo, stati . Atti del inizidell'umanesimo nazionali, Inquisizione, XXVConvegno storico Todi... 1988,Spoleto1990,287-318;R. Fubini, Due internazionali, contributi suLorenzo Valla e Rinascimento, 8 (= n.s.,voi.5) (1994),101-16; , in:Medioevo B. Copenhaver and C. Schmitt, Renaissance , Oxford1992,209-27;W. Scott Philosophy Thenegative dialectic Valla:a study in thepathology Blanchard, , in: ofLorenzo ofopposition Renaissance 14 (2000),149-89; T. Izbicki, Valla:TheScholarship inEnglish Lorenzo Studies, 1992, in:Humanity andDivinity inRenaissance andReformation. inHonor Through Essays ofCharles Trinkaus See n. 11belowformorestudies , eds.J. O' Malleyetal.,Leiden1993,287-301. on Valla.

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highly"sceptical"about some religiouspractices,attackingthe validityof with vows of the clergy.Other scholarsassociateValla, more specifically, in ancientscepticism.7 Influencedby theAcademic the burgeoninginterests scepticismof Cicero, Valla was highlysceptical,accordingto thesescholof certainknowledgeand the attainmentof truth. ars, about the possibility This is ¿lisobelieved to be the reason why he pays considerableattention to formsof argumentationwhich rely solely on probabilityand - formswhich had no verisimilitude place in the "sterile"scholasticstudy of Aristoteliansyllogistics. These argumentsfor Valla's scepticismhave not gone unchallenged. It has been pointed out that thereis no reason to call Valla a sceptic.8 There is forinstancenothingscepticalin his interestin topical invention and typesof argumentswhich seem to destroycertainty.9 Indeed, Valla was highlycriticalof such captiousreasonings.Valla's appeal to freedom of inquiry,withoutadheringto one particularsect of philosophy,does not necessarilyreflecta scepticalmind either.Lastly,Valla expressedhis own opinionswitha vehemenceand self-confidence (notto say arrogance) which would have caused a scepticto blush. So, was Valla a sceptic afterall or not? In this articleI propose to examine the debate in more detail. The argumentsin themselvesare interestingenough and raise deeper questions,for instance,about the betweenfideismand scepticism, and scepticism, betweenrhetoric relationship uses of the termand how thissemanticambibut also about the different And it may lead to a betterappresuch controversies. can lead to guity - a task which seems ciation of Valla's achievementsand limitations to me long overdue in view of the almost hagiographietone of much scholarshipon Valla.10 7 See esp.L. Panizza,Lorenzo andOratorical De verofalsoque Valla's bono,Lactantius L.Jardine, 41 (1978),76-107; Institutes andCourtauld oftheWarburg , in:Journal Scepticism of oftheHistory Dialectic VallaandtheIntellectual Lorenzo , in:Journal ofHumanist Origins andtheNew Valla:Academic 15 (1977),143-64;L. Jardine, Lorenzo Scepticism Philosophy, 1983(n. 2),253-86. in:Burnyeat Humanist Dialectic, 8 See esp.J. Monfasani, of oftheHistory VallaandRudolph Lorenzo , in:Journal Agricola inRenaissance inhisLanguage andLearning 28 (1990),181-200, (repr. esp.192-200 Philosophy, VallaandAgricola 1994,no.V); P. Mack,Renaissance Argument. , Aldershot, Italy Hampshire andDialectic intheTraditions , Leiden1993,83 and 109n. 35 (onValla).They ofRhetoric Panizza's do notdiscuss though. interpretation 9 We shallcomebackto thisbelow. 10I hopetofulfil Sense. bookonValla:InDefence thattaskinmyforthcoming ofCommon andMedieval Humanist Valla's Lorenzo Philosophy. ofAncient Critique

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De verobono I shall brieflydiscuss two works which have been seen as embodying Valla's scepticalposition.The firstone is his De voluptate , a brilliantpiece of forensicoratory,which revealshis indebtednessto the scepticalworks of Cicero and Lactantius.It is a dialogue,publishedin 1431 when Valla was stillin his mid-twenties, between a "Stoic", an "Epicurean" and a "Christian"on the highestgood.11The firstversionis entitledDe voluptate ?;laterversions,whichdifferin castingand setting(thoughnot in argument),bear the titleDe verobonoand also De vero falsoquebono.The result of this confrontation between pagan and Christianmoral thoughtis a combinationof Pauline fideismand Epicurean hedonism,in which the Christianconceptsof charityand beatitudeare identifiedwith hedonist pleasure,and in whichthe philosopher'sconceptof virtueis rejected.No reader can fail to notice the highlyrhetoricalcharacterof the De vero bono cannot , and the positions,therefore,defendedby the interlocutors, be automaticallytaken at face value. Appealing to Cicero's declaration of the orator'seclecticfreedomto use argumentsfromwhateverprovenance, the interlocutorsremind each other and the reader that their speeches are developed forthe sake of debate ratherthan as defencesof accuratepositions.Fromtheway "Stoicism"and "Epicureanism" historically are used, it is clear that theyare simplylabels which have hardlyanything to do with the historicalsystemsof ancient thought."Stoicism" designatesany kind of abstractrationalism,conveyedin dialecticalargumentation,of the philosophers(includingAristotle);"Epicureanism"stands fora realisticview of human nature,based on empiricalobservationand exemplifiedby individualcases.12The oratoricalstrategiesare explicitly

11The literature on De vero bono is vast.Fordiscussions see forinstance G. Mancini, VitadiLorenzo Valla Valla.Filologia e storia nell'u, Florence 1891,ch. 2; F. Gaeta,Lorenzo manesimo italiano H.-B.Gerì,Rhetorik alsPhilosophie. Valla Lorenzo , Naples1955,15-53; , Munich Valla. e religione nell'umanesimo italiano Lorenzo 1974;G. Di Napoli, , Rome1971,137Filosofia G. Radetti, La religione diLorenzo Valla e Rinascimento. 246;Fois1969(n.7),95-167; , in:Medioevo Studi inonore diBruno Nardi Trinkaus 1970(n. 7), 103-50; , Florence 1955,voi.2, 171-83; B. Vickers, Valla's Ambivalent Praise Rhetoric intheService ofPleasure. , in:Viator ofChristianity 17(1986),271-319; M. de PanizzaLorch, A Defense Valla's Lorenzo , ofLife: Theory ofPleasure Munich1985;M. de PanizzaLorch,TheEpicurean inLorenzo Valla's On Pleasure, in:Atoms, andTranquillity. andStoicThemes inEuropean Pneuma, Epicurean , ed. M. J. Osler, Thought 1991,89-114. Cambridge 12Cf.Geri1974(n. 11),97-118andD. Marsh,Quattrocento Classical Tradition Dialogue. andHumanism Innovation Stoicabstract , Harvard 1980,esp.74:"Valla'sEpicureanism opposes

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They frequentlystate that theyact and recognisedby the interlocutors. thattheyspeak under falseprein manner oratorical {oratorio more), argue and that and use tences{simulate theyknow thatthe position irony, loqui) of the speakerdoes not reflecthis actual views.13 to disThe highlyrhetoricalnature of the work has made it difficult tractValla's own position.Today most scholars are inclined to accept Valla's own point of view,which does the Christianpositionas reflecting not mean, however,thatthe "Stoic" and "Epicurean"positionsare entirely rejected.They can be consideredas stagesof the plot or necessarysteps - ratherlike thesis in a dialecticalmovement ("Stoicism")and antithesis in of ("Epicureanism") resulting the synthesis the Christianposition.14 This Christianpositionis given an highlyoratoricalpresentationin the formof an imaginaryvoyage of the soul to heaven whereit enjoysbeatitude as ultimatepleasure.Adoptingthe Epicurean notionof pleasure as the universalmotivationof human behaviour,the Christianinterlocutor the themeof earthlypleasuresinto that of heavenlypleasure. transforms Withoutenteringinto a fulldiscussionof the contentsof Valla's diastrategiesadopted betraythe logue, it is evidentthat the argumentative techniquesof the Academy as employedby Cicero in severalof his diawhich examan inductive method anditsdialectical rationalism empiricism byproposing ofrhetoric". andflexible methods ofmenbythepractical inesthelivesandbehavior 13Valla,De vero De Bari1970,22 and107;OnPleasure/ bono , ed.M. de P. Lorch, falsoque A. KentHieattandMaristella Lorch,NewYork1977,90 and261.In , transi. Voluptate andthe1977translation, ofthe1970edition I refer to pagenumbers whatfollows sepintheintroduction musttherefore aratedbya slash,e.g.3/53,14/75.WhatVallawrites menwhoare on thesubject as interlocutors be ironical veryeloquent (3/53):"I introduce andposito hischaracter to eacha discourse alsomygoodfriends, according assigning heldamongthemselves". withtheconversations tionandconsistent theyrecently 14See L. Nauta,ThePrice Fideism Valla's Problems inLorenzo , in: Epicurean ofReduction: - Wissenschaft biszurNeuzeit vonderAntike derNormenbegründung Modelle oder Lebenskunst? Ethik , disA muchlonger Münster & E. Kessler, eds.S. Ebbersmeyer 2006/07). (forthcoming, book(n. 10). in chapter 5 ofmyforthcoming is found cussion 15Eventhough dialecac platonicus" Vallarefers to Ciceroas "academicus (Repastinatio to Cicero's ticeetphilosophie , ed. G. Zippel,Padua1982,2 vols.,362 and 3), references inthefirst veris onlyonequotation there In theRepastinatio arescarce. Académica (absent intheElegantiae onp. 311.Thereis,as faras I know, , inbookIII, justonequotation sion), Vallae Laurentii fromBookI (I checked sentence 66 whereValla quotestheopening In Hildesheim Pinilla and M. I. Garcia eds. concordantiae 1997). , J. Pareja, J. Elegantiarum Academicorum about"quatuor from1447Vallaasksforinformation to Tortelli a letter ValleEpistole foundin Siena[Laurentii to havebeenrecently Ciceronis" , eds. reported tobe a falsereport Padua1984,312);itappeared andM. Regoliosi, O. Besomi (seethe wefindfour oratoria Institutio toQuintilian's editors' 301-2).In Valla'sglosses commentary, and"inAcadémica" "Hortensius" to"Lucullus", direct references (Valla,LePostille (twice)

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are scarce,15Valla drew in logues. Though referencesto the Académica the Tusculanae De Oratore on , and the De naturadeo, Disputationes particular to Cicero's ideal of an oratorwho argues the quesrum , which all testify tion on both sides (in utramque partemdisserere),withoutdrawingdogmatic conclusionsor claimingto attaincertaintyand truth;forthe functionof , is to elicit what is probable in philosophy,Cicero writesin De Oratore everyquestion.16The presentationof opposing argumentsoftenleads to a compromise(e.g. De Finibusand De NaturaDeorum ). Before this comand often various is conflicting pointsof viewsare develpromise reached, devil's advocate. Sometimes, the freelyplay oped and the interlocutors in typicallyscepticalvein, theydeliberatelypronounceopinionswhich do not reflecttheirown actual views; Socratic ironyis used and explicitly acknowledgedas an importanttool forthe orator.Seeing the matterfrom various angles, withoutcommittingoneselfto one particularphilosophical school,is essentialto Cicero's Academic outlook:thislibertas disserend% hallthe "a true called has been mentioned him, rightly by frequently All thesefeaturesrecurin Valla's De vero markof Academic scepticism".17 bono , and in thissense of employingCiceronian strategiesValla's method may indeed be termeda brand of scepticaloratory. But does this turnValla into a sceptic?If one focusessolelyon these rhetoricaldevicesand argumentative strategiesthe answerwould perhaps be yes, but then we should call Descartes a sceptic too, since he too kind).But of employedscepticalarguments(thoughof a whollydifferent was to refutethe in his radical doubt aim Descartes' course, developing of the And absolute certainties. history philosophy sceptics by finding provides several other examples of the use of sceptical argumentsfor

andA. Perosa, Padua1996, Martinelli oratoria diQuintiliano all' Institutio , eds.L. Cesarmi doesnotappearto have withtheAcadémica 75, 104,135and243).Valla'sacquaintance of drewin hisstudies in linewiththepicture Charles Schmitt beendeep,whichis fully inModern Times See hisTheRediscovery oftheAcadémica. thereception , ofAncient Skepticism in:Burnyeat 1983(n. 2),225-51. 16Deoratore theTroublemaker: seeW.Görler, Academic 3.79.On Cicero's Silencing scepticism, VeriSimile, andJ.Glucker, 1.39andtheContinuity De Legibus Probabile, ofCicero's Scepticism Oxford the Twelve Terms andRelated 1995, , ed.J.G.F.Powell, , bothinCicero Papers Philosopher. andPhilosophy in is cited;J.E.Seigel,Rhetoric wheremoreliterature 85-113and 115-43, andWisdom to Valla TheUnion Renaissance Humanism. , Petrarch , Princeton, N.J. ofEloquence andArgument. Studies in Forrecent studies on Cicero'sAcadémica see Assent 1968,16-30. 'Academic books' Leiden1997. Cicero's , eds.B. InwoodandJ. Mansfeld, 17Görler1995(n. 16),103.

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non-scepticalpurposes; one may thinkof Kant. A similarcase can be made forValla. The argumentative strategiesclearlyservean agenda that can hardlybe called sceptical.This wider agenda can be distilledmore dialectice etphilosophie. easily fromanotherwork of Valla's, the Repastinatio In thiswork,much of the argumentationof the De verobonorecursin a Valla here speaks in his own voice, and long chapter on the virtues.18 form. the argumentationis couched in a non-dramaticand non-literary This strongly suggeststhatValla's positionof a Christianhedonismcould In otherwords,Valla also be developedwithouttheseAcademicstrategies. has a positivedoctrineto teach. dialectice etphilosophie Repastinatio Valla, however,not only put into practice the dialecticalprocedure of Academic scepticism,he is also said to have made it the heart of his reformof dialecticsin his critiqueof Aristotelian-scholastic philosophy, his Dialéctica.™ He etphilosophie dialectice the so-calledRepastinatio , or briefly, startedthisworkin Pavia in the early 1430s, and continuedto workon it throughouthis life; threeversionsare extant,the last of which Valla was stillworkingon by the time of his death. Valla envisagedit as a comprehensivework of philosophyand dialectic,correspondingroughly with the AristotelianOrganon. The firstbook of the Repastinatio , which deals withthe categoriesand transcendentais, ; correspondsto the Categories the second book, which deals withthe combinationof termsinto propothe Topicaand the sitionsand withcommonplaces,to the De Interpretationen of proposiwith the combination deals third which the book, Rhetorical Prioraand, to to the Analytica tions into various formsof argumentation, elenchis. a lesserextent,De sophisticis Indeed, his projectis only intelligible withinthe limitsof thisAristoteliancorpus of textsand Porphyry's Isagoge 18Thisis discussed in Nautaforthcoming in Nauta2006/07(n. 14)and morefully (n. 10). 19The workis extant contains edition vol.1 (pp. 1-356)ofZippePs in three versions; from the whichlistsvariant a critical Valla'sthird version, readings apparatus including ca. 1438).On this version thefirst contains Vol.2 (pp.357-598) second version. (finished Milan1968,28-77;Mack1993 e la retorica workseeC. Vasoli,La dialettica dell'Umanesimo, Valla efilosofia inLorenzo Dialettica , Milan1999;L. Nauta,William of (n.8); M. Laffranchi, Reduction andOntological Semantics andLorenzo Valla:FalseFriends. Ockham , in: Renaissance oftheentire andexegesis discussion critical A philosophically 56 (2003),613-51. Quarterly, in Nautaforthcoming workwillbe found (n. 10).

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While (all in Boethius'translations) alongsideBoethius'own commentaries. Valla utterlyrejectedscholasticmodes of thinkingand writing,his knowledge of late-medievallogic was verymeagre.20 By farthe longestbook is the firstone whereValla aims to cut at the some of its funrootsof Aristotelian-scholastic metaphysicsby criticising terms damentalnotions,such as the ten categories,the six transcendental as the such "one" and genus,species "true"), predicables (such as "good", and differentia by which we can definea thingand allot it a place in the so-calledtree of Porphyry.Further,he rejectsthe Aristotelianaccount of formand matterand act and potency.Accordingto Valla, these terms, couched in a ungrammaticalor even rébarbaconceptsand distinctions, tive Latin, complicateand confuseratherthan enlightenand clarifyour picture of the world, which should be based on common sense and expressedin good, classical Latin. The principaltask he has imposed on of techniis to cut throughthis useless superstructure himself,therefore, cal jargon and void conceptsby reducingthem to what he considersas the basic elementsof a common-senseworld view. These basic elements are thingswe perceive eitherphysicallyor mentally,and they may be describedas qualifiedsubstances,thatis substancescharacterizedby their qualities and actions. These three categories substance, quality and action are the only threefromAristotle'sten which Valla admits.The other accidental categoriescan be reduced to these three: fromValla's grammaticalpointof view thereis no reason to keep the othercategories: a thingis qualifiedby size, its relations,its place and time no less than is by its qualitiesproper. The centraltermin Valla's picture,therefore, also to and but we see to refer to the it is used feel, things "thing"(res): its elements(substance,qualityand action)out of whicha thingconsists.21 Apart from metaphysics,Valla deals with a host of other issues in the firstbook of the Repastinatio , such as the soul, the virtuesand natural philosophy.

20A. R. Perreiah, Dialectic Humanist , in:Sixteenth-Century Journal, ofScholastic Critiques 13 (1982),3-22,on 7-8;Nauta2003(n. 19),esp.617,623-25,and644-48. 21See myLorenzo to Dialectic VallaandtheRiseofHumanist , in: TheCambridge Companion Renaissance , ed.J. Hankins, 2007),andmoreextensively Cambridge (forthcoming Philosophy ofthispaperI shallrefrain from Nauta2003(n. 19),esp.625-36.Giventhepurpose in anydetailhere;itmustsuffice to givean indication ofthe Valla'sposition explaining in orderto assesstheclaimwhether Vallacan be calleda ofhisprogramme outlines or not. "sceptic"

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Book II and III containValla's reformof dialectics.The main topics here are propositionsand theirsigna(indicatorsof quality and quantity such as omnis,aliquis , and non),the square of contraries,proofand argument, and various formsof argumentation.It is especiallythese books which are believed to embody Valla's "distinctively skepticaldialectic", thatis, his "coherentantidogmatist ratiodisserendi" .22Even thoughValla's endorsementof scepticismcan onlybe inferredfrom"loaded quotation", Jardinebelievesthat thisworkis "packed with argumentsborrowedand citedfromthe keyavailable workson Academic skepticism".23 She argues thatValla's dialecticswas aimed at makingan inventoryand analysisof a much broaderrange of argumentsthan the formadsyllogismwhichwas the centralcore of the scholasticstudyof logic. Stimulatedby the rediscoveryof ancientliterature,philosophyand rhetoric,Valla and his conas a vehiclefordebate,persuasion, temporaries regardedlanguageprimarily communicationrather than as a formalisedscientifictool, studied in abstractionfromits living contextof speech and discussion.So in his analysis of formsof argumentationValla wanted to "shiftaway from syllogismand formalvalidity,and towarda surveyof the varied and varInstead iouslyreliableactivetechniquesforsettlinga matterin dispute".24 of studyingformadvalidityand rulesof inferencein abstracto , Valla wanted to studyand assess argumentsin termsof persuasionand usefulness, thus to the all kinds of which on adding syllogism arguments rely probability and even problematicvalidity.The basic source forthisreorientation of dialecticswas Academic scepticism,and this- so the argumentgoesentailedthat forValla "the pursuitof truthis an elusiveif not impossible undertaking" and that"any studyof ratiocinationwhichrestricts itself to, or even concentrateson, objectivetruthand techniquesfor arriving at it must be inadequate".25What Valla sought was "a dialectic rich enoughto allow him to explorethe relativeprobabilityof conflicting dogoverallassent".26 This is whyhe was so interested mas,whilewithholding again, still according to this interpretation in dilemmaticarguments, paradoxes,soritesand similartypesof argumentswhich undermine"the Moreover,thisthemeof doubt is possibilityof certaintyin knowledge".27 22Tardine 1983(n. 7), 265. 23Eadem. , 268. 24Eadem, 257. 25Eadem, 259. 26Eadem, 259. 27Eadem , 273.

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underscored,Jardine argues, by Valla's rehearsalof ancient philosophical schools in the prefaceto his work and his defenceof freeinquiry. is based on arguto see that thisinterpretation Now it is not difficult mentswhich to use the terminologyof our theme are doubtfuland of dubious validity.First of all, there is no textualevidence that Valla of knowlendorsedthe scepticalpositionof doubt and the impossibility of the In he atqueindubi"firma edge and certainty. fact, explicidyspeaks " tata principia which "Hippocrates, Euclides and some others" have Nor does he ever suggest,paceJardine,suspendingjudgeestablished.28 ment. Further,in the prefacewhere he praises Pythagorasand enumerates a numberof ancientsschools and philosophers,he aims at criticising of Aristoteliansby showingthat in Antiquitythere the ipse¿/mi-attitude were more positionsavailable and that Aristotlewas not consideredthe philosophicalgodhead as he is in Valla's time.29This is also the context of his referenceto Socrates' famousdictumthat the only thinghe knows - an attitudewhichis contrastedto the is thathe knowsnothing ipsedixit

28Repastinatio whoclearly onFreeWillthefictional 6. In theDialogue Lorenzo, , ed.Zippel, withtheirpointofview,who the"Academics dismisses fortheauthor, stands explicidy owndoubts; couldnotdoubtoftheir wouldputallindoubt, and, certainly although they zealforinvesnevertheless is known, theydidnotlosetheir nothing theyargued although addedmuchto whatwaspreviously we knowthatlaterthinkers Furthermore, tigation. also" otherthings andexample found out;their oughtto spurus to discovering precept P. O. Kristeller in TheRenaissance C. Trinkaus ofMan, eds.E. Cassirer, Philosophy (transi. itisasserted thattheAcademics andJ.H. Randall, Jr.,Chicago1948,159).Buteventhough endswitha strongly thetreatise deniedthatmancan attainknowledge (ibid.), wrongly noteofPaulinestamp. fideistic 29Repastinatio whowrites , ed. Zippel,2-4.Veillamayhavebeeninspired byQuintilian code"(¡varare to anyphilosophic "toswearallegiance thatthereis no needforan orator In his oratoria here(.Institutio thesceptics includes 12.2.24). explicitly ), andQuintilian leges further without VallaquoteshereAulusGelliuson thePyrrhonists to Quintilian, glosses to Aulus Martinelli andPerosa(n. 15),246,referring Le Postille comment; , eds.Cesarini Atticae Noctes , II, 5. 1-4andII, 5, 8. Gellius, 30Ed. Zippel,2.Jardine but a passagefrom Valla'spreface, 1983(n.7), 266translates in theLatintextofthesecondversion andsentences sheomitscertain (present phrases statesthathe doesnotbelongto any in whichVallaclearly whichshetranslates) from onFreeWill, from theDialogue that sect,including (Andsee thequotation oftheAcademics. citedabovein n. 28.) Thussheomitsthephrase"quantomagisiis qui nullisectese and also "qui nulliussectehominum" addixerunt" (whichis Valla'sownapproach), sherefers ed. Zippel,2). Moreover, sectehomini"; version: (inthethird "quimihinullius e teoloin hisLorenzo Valla.Umanesimo ofthefirst version to S. Camporeale's transcription aut si me stoicum passage:"Nuncigitur gia(n. 6), butshedoesnotcitetheimportant . . ." aut academicum aut,quod maiusac verumest,nulliussectedixero epicureum note. 407;ed. Zippel,362).See alsotheprevious (Camporeale,

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attitudeof the Aristotelians. He frequently claims forhimselfthe rightto and think without himselfto any school.30This speak freely, committing of proclamation philosophical libertyis certainlyinspired by Cicero's libertas disserendi but as Valla explicitlymentionsthe Academics as one school out of many,he clearlydoes not professhimselfto be an Academic sceptic.31 Apart fromthe absence of an explicitexpressionof supportfor scepticalphilosophy,thereis anotherreasonwhythisinterpretation is implausible. Valla's project in general is not only to criticisewhat he sees as perfidiousdevelopmentsin philosophyand theology,but also to repair and renew their foundations. The titles of the successive versions are significant: or retilling)dialectice etphilosoRepastinatio (the re-ploughing Reconcinnatio totius dialectice et universalis , phie (refabrication) fiindamentorum and Retractaùo or totius dialectice cum philosophie (repair restructuring) fitndamentis universe .32In otherwords,farfromadvocatingsuspenseof philosophie beliefor carefullybalancing different positionsin order to elicitwhat is most probable, Valla forciblyproclaimswhat he sees as the truthon a host of issues.33As he says at the beginningof the Repastinatio : the aim of his critiqueof Aristotleand the Aristoteliansis to recall recenttheologiansfromtheirmistakenengagementwithAristotelian philosophyand to lead themto "correcttheologising"{ad veretkeohgandum ).34And his own of dialectic and to the commonlanguage programme recalling philosophy of the greatauthors,rejectingall kindsof specializedidiom,is invariably couched in termsof the truth.35 If he were a sceptic,he disguisedthe factratherwell. - a theme It is thereforeinstructive to look at his notionof truthitself which would certainlyhave elicitedcommentsfromsomeone with scep31Cicerocriticised theipsedixit ofthePythagoreans inDe natura deorum 1.5.10, approach referred to byVallain hispreface to hisRepastinatio , ed. Zippel,360. 32See Zippel'sintroduction ot hisedition, xii-xvi. 33See myLorenzo Valla's 41 (2003),120-43. , in:Vivarium, ofAristotelian Critique Psychology On natural issuesVallaexpresses a number of"dogmatic" even philosophical opinions, at times he embraces a quasifideistic natural notto though position, urging philosophers aboutthings thatreally existbutaboutwhich itis impossible toknowanything, speculate at leastin thislife,suchas thesubstance ofthestarsandheavens (422and98ff.). 34Repastinatio , ed. Zippel,7. 35See e.g.thepreface to thethird book(ed.Zippel,277-78): nonpos"Ergovincere nisiVeritas hisenemies are"veritatis hostes". Theprefaces totheElegantiae sumus, vincat"; Latinae offer instances. linguae manyother 36See Nauta2003(n. 19),242-44andmorefully in Nautaforthcoming (n. 10).See , ed. Zippel,378-79and 19-20. Repastinatio

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tic inclinations.Without going into details, Valla's eclectic account of truthcombinesan adaequatiotheorywithan Augustiniánnotionof divine illumination.36 Truth is firstregarded as "knowledge or cognition of - a notion which whateverthing" goes back to Aristotleand was later in at Thomas Aquinas. Valla howeverdevelops it into developed length truth with"the lightof the mind extenda different direction,comparing senses".37 This of light the mind comes fromwithin,not ing itselfto the fromwithoutlike solar light,thoughthe sun in makingvisionpossibleis like God who makes intellectualvision possible: "Yet, as the sun shows and exhibitsthe colours of bodies to the eyes, so too God shows and exhibitsthe qualities of thingsto the mind. Plato proposed this theory in the Republic somewhatdifferently , when he said that diverse) (nonnihil truthis like the sun, knowledge and cognition like authentic vision .38 Having defined truthin terms of knowledge or aspectum)" (sincerum cognition,Valla goes on to apply true and falseto spokenwords.A verbal expression,he holds, is false when "someone, while his mind is not fromwhat he thinks"(falsityout of wickedness) erring,speaks differently or "when someone,while his mind is erring,misleadshimselfratherthan Whateverwe may thinkof Valla's another" (falsityout of ignorance).39 discussionof truth,it is clear that it does not show any tracesof a sceptical mind,which doubts whetherwe can arriveat the truthof things. What remainsthereforeof the claim that Valla's reformof dialectic reflectsan endorsementof Academic scepticismis his interestsin arguor even dubiouslyinferential mentswhichrelyon verisimilitude techniques and dubious validity.This claim seems to come in two parts: (1) Valla's 37Repastinatio, et orationi" and estque sensuimentis ed. Zippel,378: "qualitas inest, estproprie scientia sivenotitia 19:"verum siveVeritas' rei,etquasiluxanimi, cuiuscunque quoquese porrigit". que ad sensus 38Repastinatio It is interesting to to Republic 6.19,508C-509B. , ed. Zippel,19 referring toPlato'sRepublic notice thatValla'sreferences ("Derepublica ") occuronlyinthelaterverDecembrio had translated theworkin thelate1430s(seeJ. Hankins, sions.His friend Renaissance PlatointheItalian , 2 vols.,Leiden1990,vol.1, 126),andtherewasobviously fortranslation becauseofits muchdebateaboutPlato'stextwhichBrunideemedunfit ofPlatosee Zippel'sintroduction On Valla'sknowledge andappreciation basemorality. vol.1,xcvii, n. 1. to hisedition, 39Repastinatio version thisdistinction is expressed , ed.Zippel, 20,lines11-14.In thefirst in terms and"imprudence, thatis injustice" of"ignorance, thatis wickedness" (378,lines In thefirst adds from thelaterversions. version Vallafurther 25-7),whichareomitted after thetruth ofan issueonlywhena controversy aboutit hasarisen. thatwe inquire thecognition ofa disputed theignorance ofit (Veritas est Truthis therefore falsity thing, notitia reicontroverse, vero eiusdem inscitia, 378:16-19). /abitas

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interestsin topical invention,that is, findingplaces fromwhich one may draw argumentsconcerninga particularcase, and (2) his interestin various kindsof argumentssuch as dilemmaand sorites(the so-called"heap argument":if 100 grainsconstitutea heap, 99 certainlyalso constitutea heap. But if we go on subtractinggrains,we may arriveat the conclusion thatjust one grainconstitutes a heap. The argumentdiscreditsideas of limit).Now, it is certainlytrue- and has in fact been widely recognised- that Valla rhetoricisedthe studyof dialectics.For him dialectics, and refutation, is merelya part being definedas a speciesof confirmation of one of the five parts of rhetoric,namely invention.40 Compared to - a resbreuis dialectics is an etfacilis- since it rhetoric, easy subject prorsus considersand uses the syllogismonly in abstracto ; its aim is only to teach. The rhetorician,on the other hand, uses not only syllogisms,but also in perenthymeme,epicheireme,example, and has to clothe everything suasive argument,since his task is not only to teach but also to please and to move. As long as an argumentis persuasiveor constitutes a good move in a disputation,dialogue or debate- whetherin courtor in philosophical discussionof moral and politicalissues it should be admitted to the armouryof the debater or orator.Valla's remarkthat dialecticis an almostpuerile art is, of course,a polemical sneer at the elevatedstatus of dialectics among the scholastics,but in his actual treatmentof and otherformsof argumentsValla's tone becomes less polemsyllogisms ical, and he pays serious attentionto syllogismsin theirvarious figures and modes. In his discussionof topics he reliesheavilyon Quintilian.As he says, he himselfhas nothingnew to say on thistheme,so he is happy to quote Quintilian'sdiscussionof enthymeme, epicheireme,inductionand deduction and the topicsbased on thingsand person(resatquepersonas , 5.10.23). from the fifth book of Institutio oratoria amounts to 30 (This quotation in critical For the whole the modern edition.) Quintilian point of pages is to what is not certain means of what is argumentation prove by certain:41

40Repastinatio 1990(n.8), 183.Valla'sformulation , ed.Zippel,175.Gf.Monfasani may Institutio oratoria havebeenindebted to Quintilian's 5, prooem.2. 41Quintilian, D. A. Russell, Mass.2001, transi. Institutio oratoria 5.10.11-12; Cambridge, vol.2, 371-73.

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is proof-giving sinceArgument reasoningby whichone thingis inferred fromanother,and which confirmswhat is doubtful,there must be in the Cause whichdoes not need Proof;forunlessthereis something whicheitheris or seemsto be true,and fromwhichassurance something may be givento what is doubtful,therewill be nothingby whichwe can proveanything. As certaintiesQuintilianlistssense perceptions,"thingsabout whichcommon opinionis unanimous","provisionsof law", "whathas been accepted as moral custom","whateveris agreed betweenboth parties","whatever has been proved",and "whateveris not contradictedby our opponent".42 On the basis of these certaintieswe may renderdoubtfulthingscredible or probable. Quintilian elaborates on this notion of probabilityby disthreedegrees:(1) "the strongest"{firmissimum ), "because almost tinguishing "the ); (3) "the merelycompropensius highlylikely"(velut alwaystrue"; (2) Beforeembarkingon his own discussionof nonrepugnans). patible" (itantum for its "carefulstudyof the topics, Quintilianpraises Aristode'sRhetoric all to that thingsand persons,and what commonlyhappens everything has made friendlyor hostileto other things thingsand persons Nature or persons".43But he warns the reader not to thinkthat he has a perfectand absoluteknowledgeof the subjectifhe has learntall theserules.44 Argumentswere already used before theirkinds were being noted and collectedforpublicationby writersof rhetoric.And thisqualificationwas certainlynot lost on Valla, whose own position on the topics and the formsof argumentis much indebtedto Quintilian. The oratoricalcontextof Valla's treatmentof the topics and formsof withdifferent of arguments involvesa consideration naturally argumentation degrees of probability, just as we have seen in Quintilian.Valla distinwith certainand truepremises,leading to certainconguishessyllogisms those from clusion, syllogismswith premiseswhich are not so certain, ac semicerta that is, half true and half certain(.semivera , with a conclusion For instance:A motherloves her son; Orestes is which is seminecessaria). it is probable or credible,or at least posson. Therefore, Clytemnestra's - a that loves Orestes sible, likelythoughnot certainpropoGlytemnestra is the case that a motherloves her son. Having for it not sition, necessarily 425.10.12-14, vol.2, 373. transi. Russell, 435.10.17,transi. vol.2, 375. Russell, 445.10.119-120. 45Repastinatio from Mack1993(n.8), 82. , ed. Zippel,243;I quotethetranslation

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dividedkindsof proofinto necessaryand credibleones, Valla writesthat "all proofarisesthroughtruethingswhich are certainand throughthese thingstruthitselfmakes some otherthingwhichwas previouslyuncertain As we appear certain,and it does this eithernecessarilyor plausibly".45 have seen, thisis basicallythe same as Quintilian'sview. Unless we want to call Quintiliana sceptic (and even Aristotlewould come in for such a label in that case), there is no reason to thinkthat the distinction betweendegreesof credibility is the hall-markof Academic scepticism. The second featureof Valla's alleged scepticismis his interests in types of captiousreasoningssuch as sorites,paradoxesand dilemmas.46 In bringing about aporiaand the suspenseofjudgementtheserhetoricaltechniques are gristto the sceptic'smill,but Valla interestingly thinkstheseand similar argumentssophisticaland fallacious.Their forceis easily brokenif we examinethe case carefully, payingattentionto itswidercircumstances and its chronology,and take notice of the normal meaning of words. Such an approach will dispel theirair of insolubility. The dream parafor in which a dream tells the dreamer not to believe dox, instance, dreamsis characterisedas a dream which assertssomethingwhich defies Valla is particularly interestedin what the Greekscall properverification. and Cicero that the conversion is, manoeuvre,taughtmainlyby antistrephon a which dilemmatic rhetoricians, by argumentcan be counteredby another one. Valla extensivelydiscussesthe famous dilemma reportedby Aulus Gellius about a lawsuitbetweenProtagorasand his pupil Euathlus.47 The has to the second of instalment the fees after pupil promised pay having won his firstcase. However,he refusesto pay, and Protagorasbringshim to court. If Euathlus loses the case, he will have to pay the rest of the fee because of thejudges' verdict,if he wins,he will have to pay as well but now on account of his agreementwithProtagoras.Euathlushowever convertsthe argument:in either case he will not have to pay. Aulus

46Repastinatio Dilemmatic Towards , ed.Zippel,306-28.See esp.G. Nuchelmans, arguments. a history andrhetoric Vallaon Lorenzo , Amsterdam 1991,88-94;G. Nuchelmans, oftheir logic MediiAevi,eds.B. Mojsischand O. Pluta, theDream Paradox , in: Historia Philosophiae 1990 Amsterdam 1991,771-85;cf.Mack1993(n. 8), 90-92,98-100,105-8,Monfasani e la retorica dell'Umanesimo Vasoli,La dialettica (cit.aboven. 19),68-74.For (n.8), 194-98; an extensive discussion seechapter 8 ofNautaforthcoming (n. 10). 47Repastinatio himself an oration on Protagoras's , ed. Zippel,312-21, making imagining about be noticed thatVallais notnegative seeMack1993(n.8), 105-8.It should behalf; ofantistrephon dilemma butaboutthistechnique itself, (seeed. Zippel,312).

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Gellius thinksthat thejudges should have refrainedfrompassingjudgement because any decision would be inconsistentwith itself.But Valla rejectssuch a rebuttalof dilemmaticargumentsand thinksthatan answer may be formulatedin responseto such a dilemma. So while not denying thattheseargumentsmay deceptivelyappear to be convincingin creatingan aporeticsituation,he considersthe genusmore cunning,amusing ac lepand wittyratherthan sincereand valid (genusmagisargutum ,festivum in corroboration ac validum idumratherthan sincerum ), finding proargumento it.48 about silence Quintilian's Yet, it should not be overlookedthat Valla is one of the firstin the Latin West who dealt withtypesof dilemmaticarguments,a genrewhich had been forgottenduringthe Middle Ages. As Nuchelmanswrites:"A remarkablefeatureof medievalstandardtextson logic (. . .) is the absence of reflectionsabout dilemmaticreasonings".49Valla's discussion,then, to the slow recoveryof "forgotten testifies parts of ancient dialecticand rhetoric".Furthermore,having narratedthe law suit between Euathlus and Protagoras,just mentioned,Valla writesthat there are others{sunt qui) who thinkthiswas said by Corax and Tisias ratherthan by Euathlus and Protagorasand that thejudges drove them out of court shouting"a bad egg froma bad crow" (citedby Valla in Greek).FromthisNuchelmans whichhe musthave obtained,directlyof indiconcludes:"an information mathematicos , II, 97-9), since thatis rectly,fromSextus Empiricus{Adversus the only source reportingthat the judges drove both Corax and Tisias out of court,shoutingat them'a bad egg froma bad crow'".50It is however unlikelythat Sextus Empiricuswas Valla's source. Pace Nuchelmans Sextus gives only the name of Corax, and, more generally,there is no textualevidence at all that Valla was familiarwith Sextus. The importantquestion,however,is whetherthis enlargementof the restrictedscope which dialectics may have had in medieval times, or 48Repastinatio, about Cicerotoois negative ed.Zippel,332-34and322.In hisAcadémica Vallato citethis Antiochus forusingit.One wouldexpect histeacher sorites, criticizing placetoo,ifhe hadaccessto it.Cf.n. 15 above. 49Nuchelmans, Valla Lorenzo , 1991(n.46),79. 50Valla,Repastinatio Dilemmatic , 1991(n.46),90, , ed.Zippel,314.Nuchelmans, arguments andthesendofthesaying listsothersources butseealso68 n. 24 whereNuchelmans lexicon , ed. A. Adler, Leipzig1933,vol.3, 14, ingawayofCoraxandTisias(e.g.Suidae reference toCicerois lessrelevant. lines16-23). (ThenamesofCoraxandTisias, Zippel's oratoria Institutio thestory, alsooccure.g.inQuintilian, without 3.1.8.).I do notknowfrom thisinformation. whomVallaobtained

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ratherthis subordinationof dialecticsto rhetoric,based on the rhetorical writingsby Cicero and especiallyQuintilian,is sufficient for calling Valla an Academic sceptic.Let me therefore of conclusion address by way the more general question of the relationshipbetween scepticismand sensesof sceporatory.This will also allow me to returnto the different ticismand theirapplication. Conclusion: and Rhetoric Scepticism Historicallyspeaking,thereis much reason to associaterhetoricand scepticism.Cicero feltattractedby the argumentative strategiesof Academic scepticism.The oratoricalmethod is well suited to the explorationof philosophicalissues,since it does not expressits conclusionsin any dogmatic way but franklyacknowledgestheirprovisionalstatusas the most likelyposition.As one of the interlocutors says in De Fato: "there is a close alliance betweenthe oratorand the kind of philosophyof which I am a follower,since the orator borrowssubdy fromthe Academy and repaysthe loan by givingto it a copious and flowingstyleand rhetorical ornament".51 And the other interlocutortoo bringsthem into close harmonywhen he answers: "I am acquainted with the rhetoricaldiscoursesof yourschool (rhetorica vestra),and have oftenheard and also often shall hear you in them;moreoveryour Tusculan Disputationsshow that you have adopted thisAcademic practiceagainsta thesisadvanced".52In disserere , definingitselfas speech and counterspeech,as in utramque partem rhetoriclooks uncannilyclose to scepticism,for scepticismis, to quote Sextus' canonical description,"an abilityto set out oppositionsamong thingswhich appear and are thoughtof in any way at all", followedby sides of the matter, and ataraxia .53Moreover,in opposing different epoche both rhetoricand scepticismdo not aim at teachingany positivedoc-

51De Fato3, transi. III, De Fato Stoicorum inCicero, De oratore H. Rackham , De , Paradoxa Mass.1982,195(slightly òartitione oratoria , Harvard, adapted). 52De Fato4, transi. ofthesceptics' terminoltheborrowing 197.Ofcourse, Rackham, andprobsuchas verisimile included crucial terms the(Greek) rhetorical tradition ogyfrom abile 1995(n. 16),esp.136. ; seeGlucker 53Outlines 1.8,transi. 2000,4. Forthe Cambridge J. AnnasandJ. Barnes, ofScepticism theLanguage TheRhetoric Sextus I am indebted to I. Sluiter, ofScepticism: against following Tradition andtheSceptical 2000, , ed.J. Sihvola,Helsinki , in: Ancient Scepticism Specialists 93-123, esp.106-13.

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with the trines.As a method of discourse,rhetorichas strongaffinities close that comes it has been said works. Indeed, scepticism way scepticism to a discoursestrategy,and one may even speak of a "sceptic rhetoric as long as its statusas usefulpracticalguidelineswithoutepistemological This suggestsanother resemblancebetween claims is acknowledged".54 the two. Both concern our linguisticrepresentationof the appearances ratherthan the appearances themselves.This is evidentin the case of rhetoric,but also the sceptics"say what is apparent to themselvesand nothingabout reporttheirown feelingswithoutholdingopinions,affirming externalobjects": "When we investigate",Sextus writes,"whetherexisting thingsare such as theyappear, we grantthattheyappear, and what we investigateis not what is apparent but what is said about what from investigatingwhat is apparent is apparent- and this is different to notice that Sextus himselffoundthe proximitself".55It is interesting itybetweenrhetoricand scepticismso disturbingthathe soughtto refute it, hardlyconvincingly, by redefiningrhetoricas the productionof useless and incomprehensiblespeech.56Nonetheless, there is an obvious differencebetween the two: the orator argues one side of the case in order to win, while the sceptic only opposes the dogmatistin order to balance the case; or he may argue both sides of a particularcase himthat is, on the self.Oratorydoes not thriveon doubt but on credibility, and as to forward strongas possible in arguments persuasive ability put .57 order to renderdoubtfulthingscredible -facereadfidem By now it should be clear that Valla cannot be called a sceptic. In we do not see a balancing of opinions, an arguing in the Repastinatio

54Sluiter 2000(n. 53), 120n. 6 whoaddsthatSextushimself speaksaboutskeptikoos theMathematicians 11.19). legein (Against 55Sextus AnnasandBarnes2000 1.15and 1.19,transi. Outlines ofScepticism Empiricus, "Pistis andapistia 2000(n. 53), 107argues: , andthewhole (n. 53),7 and8. As Sluiter to boththesceptic's and ofpeithein/ is alsoonethatis in a senseessential peithô concept as an artofpersuasion It is central to rhetoric therhetorician's (...)• Forthe enterprise. is central tothetheory ofepoche theproblematization ofpeithô (...) Sincethesyssceptic, form ofpeithô will thatareequally togenerate temis toopposethings , neither peithô likely s poweris broken clinch thematter, andhencepeithô* byitsuse". 56See Sluiter 2000(n.53),110. - -which 57Within theforensic oforatory divide setting onlycasesaboutwhich opinions - areto be discussed materia andsettled; thesetdubia butit is precisely maybe termed matters doubtful credible thatis theorator's aim. byrendering things tlingofdoubtful InJardine materia should notbe confused withthedoubtofthesceptic. Hence,thedubia 1977(n. 7),thetwoseemsto be conflated (e.g.p. 262).

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What we see is a debunkingof all kindsof philosophical utramque partem. doctrinesin a highlypolemical, self-confident and frequentlyaggressive style.As such it is no less than the dialogue De verobono the work of an orator,but an orator with a message, which, in the Repastinatio , is broadcastin a styleutterlyalien to the Academic probingof diversepositions. The dominantrole allottedto rhetoricentails a wideningof the scope of formsof argumentationto be examined and employedby the rhetorician.The drive behind this developmentis to do morejustice to the multipleway in which argumentsare used in actual speakingand writingthan the formalisedstudyof the Aristoteliansyllogismcould do. And since the issues,discussedin court,in daily lifeor in the houses of men of lettersin leisuredretreat,do not usuallyfall under the category of absolute necessity,certaintyand indisputabletruth,it is only natural thatthisentailsan examinationof the less certainarguments.This however need not reflecta scepticalattitudeat all. There is a sense howeverin which the term"scepticism"may rightly be applied to the humanistsof the Quattrocentoand theirsuccessors.58 The overall effectof the study of classical antiquityin all its aspects, includingof course the studyof the classical languages,was a widening of perspectives,and this could easily lead to feelings of doubt and trauncertainty an erosionof the confidencepeople had in authorities, in It is the of the and so forth. ditions,customs, hardly Vulgate reliability - contributed to thisprocess thatanyonewho- perhapswilly-nilly surprising of dislocatingold certaintieswas branded a sceptic,or, worse, an atheist. These termsof abuse oftentellus more about the accuserthan about the accused. It is importantthereforeto distinguishbetween intention, aim, strategy,effect(intentionalor unintentional)when calling someone a scepticor somethingsceptical.The overall effectmay be the dissemination or even encouragementof a scepticaloutlook,but this does not mean that this was the originalintentionor the aim of the thinkerin significance question.In otherwords,we should not let the retrospective interfere withthe perspectiveof the historicalagent. To do so is to genof prolepsis",that erate what Quentin Skinnerhas called "the mythology 58Cf.Rummel andinformal 2000(n. 5),50 whospeaksof"crypto-skepticism expresofa preferto her,"thesetooktheform frame ofmind". sionsofa Skeptical According and rhetorical enceforcertain dialogue, paradox, literary genressuchas open-ended onbothsidesofa questopresent theauthor thatallowed forms declamation, arguments tionor toplaythedevil'sadvocate".

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an observer betweenthe significance is, "the conflationof the asymmetry in a the meanclaim to find historical and given episode mayjustifiably ing of that episode itselP.59In the case of Quattrocentohumanismwe may be especiallyprone to generate such a type of mythology,since ancientsourcesof scepticismdid slowlybecome available at thistime. It is all the more expedientthen to examine our sourcescriticallyand ask what our writerwas doingin presentinghis contribution. Well, what Valla certainlywas notdoing was to subscribeto or propagatea scepticalposition, even though as a defenderof Christianoratoryhe at times used strategiesderivedfromCicero's Academic scepticism. Universityof Groningen FacultyofPhilosophy

59Meaning andunderstanding inthehistory Vol. 1: Regarding , in hisVisions ofideas ofPolitics. Method revised version ofhisarticle thatappeared , Cambridge 2002,73. (A thoroughly underthesametitlein History andTheory, 1969.)

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9 of Freedomof the Will Juan Luis Vives Conception and Its Scholastic Background LORENZO CASINI

Abstract The aim of thepresentpaper is to approachJuan Luis Vives' conceptionof freedomof the willin lightof scholasticdiscussionson will and freechoice, similarities withtheanalysisof freechoiceconand pointto someinteresting ad librosEthkorum Aristotelů tained in Jean Buridan's Quaestiones superdecern Nicomachum. 1. Introduction The SpanishhumanistJuan Luis Vives (1493-1540)is perhapsbestknown as an educationaland social theorist,as well as forhis spiritedattackon scholasticlogic.1His contributionto philosophicalpsychology,however, is also worthyof consideration.On account of his insightsinto human natureand conduct,he has occasionallyeven been called "the fatherof on the human soul Vives5philosophicalreflections modernpsychology".2 are mainlyconcentratedin De animaet vita(1538).3 This treatise,which 1 Fora general see CarlosG. Noreña, ofVives'thought, , The JuanLuisVives study Hague1970. 2 The first Watson. to Vivesseemsto havebeenFoster one to ascribethisepithet 22 (1915), TheFather See Foster Review, , in: Psychological Watson, Psychology ofModern ofmodern, "Viveswasnotonlythefather toGregory 333-53. empirZilboorg, According cenofthetwentieth ofthedynamic butthetrueforerunner icalpsychology, psychology A History See Gregory , NewYork1941,194.Fora ofMedical Psychology Zilboorg, tury". e Ludovico Vives seeAdolfo ofVives'originality, assessment morebalanced Faggi,Giovanni e letterari la psicologia , Torino1938,210-23. , in:Adolfo Faggi,Studi filosofici 3 Thereis stillno critical used etvita.The mostcommonly ofVives'De anima edition omnia inJuanLuisVives,Opera textis theoneincluded , ed. Gregorio Mayansy Siscár, arepreceded tothisedition London1964.References 8 vols.,Valencia1782-90; reprinted in thelimited sensethatit whichcanbe calledcritical M. Foran edition bytheletter etvita De anima of1538,seeJuanLuisVives, edition textwiththefirst , Mayans' compares arepreceded to thisedition Padova1974.References ed. MarioSancipriano, bytheletOn the edition. etvitaaretakenfrom De anima from terS. Allquotations Sancipriano's derWerke Edition kritischen seeJozef ofVives'works, editions lackofcritical %ueiner IJsewijn, Vivarium 44,2-3

BrillNV,Leiden, 2006 © Koninklijke - www.brill.nl/viv online Alsoavailable

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and maturestage belongsto the late and philosophicallymore interesting of his intellectualcareer, representsa mixtureof old materialand new ideas. Vives' originalitylay above all in the importancehe attached to observationand experience.For that reason, he is sometimesregarded as initiatingthe empirical study of the mind, and contributingto the developmentof modern psychology,that is psychologybased on observation and experienceratherthan on the traditionalAristoteliancategoriesso centralto scholasticism.In the opinion of WilhelmDilthey,for example, Vives' approach marks the transitionfrom metaphysicalto descriptiveand analyticpsychology.4 In spiteof the relativeoriginality of his approach,Vives also pays considerable tributeto tradition.A briefreview of De animaet vitareveals that he was a man of encyclopaedicknowledge.His account adduces knowledgefroma varietyof sources, such as Aristotle,Cicero, Galen, Plato, Pliny, Plutarch,Quintilian and Seneca.5 Vives' indebtednessto to assess. Not the scholastictraditionis, on the otherhand, more difficult a single medieval author is mentioned or quoted in De animaet vita. This fact is perhaps not particularlysurprisinggiven Vives' ambitionto replace the scholasticcurriculumwithone more appropriateto a classical

in:August Buck(ed.), LuisVives: inderHerzog Bibliothek desJ.L. Vives, Juan Arbeitgespräch August vom6. bis8. November 1980, Hamburg 1981,23-34. Wolfenbüttel 4 Wilhelm undAnalyse desMenschen sátRenaissance undReformation Weltanschauung Dilthey, in hisGesammelte see also II, Leipzig1914,423.On Vives'descriptive Schriften approach MarioSancipriano, G.L. Vives e la descrizione delle dellaAccademia , in:Attie memorie passioni 44 (1981),131-37. di lettere, artie scienze, Petrarca 5 A systematic ofVives'sources is stilllacking. Fora discussion ofVives'attitreatment tudetowards PlatoandAristotle, seeNoreña1970(n. 1), 164-73; Vives, J. C. Margolin, lecteur etcritique dePlaton etd'Aristote onEuropean , in: R. R. Bolgar(ed.),Classical Influences Culture A.D.1500-1700 e la , Cambridge 1976,245-58;andIsabelTrujillo, JuanLuisVives aristotelica nell'umanesimo 24-25(1993),267-278.Foran tradizione , in: Schedemedievali, account ofVives'physiological which ismainly approach, inspired byGalen,seeRaymond D. Clements, inJuanLuisVives oftheHistory , in:Journal Physiological-Psychological Thought A Humanistic oftheBehavioral 3 (1967),219-35;A. A. Travili, Sciences, JuanLuisVives: ofMedicalHistory, 4 (1987),53-76;andSimone Medical Educator , in:CanadianBulletin de Angelis, inderRenaissance mitBlickaufdieAnthropologie von ZurGalenRezeption JuanLuis " " inderFrühen Vives. einer vom Menschen zuderkonfiguration Neuzeit , in: Wissenschaft Überlegungen ManuelBaumbach etInventa: derAntike zurRezeption , Heidelberg 2000, (ed.),Tradita Beiträge 91-109.ForQuintilian's influence on Vives'philosophical see LouisJ. Swift psychology, ' andStanley L. Block,Classical Rhetoric in Vives oftheHistory ofthe , in:Journal Psychology Behavioral 10 (1974),74-83;andMatilde CondeSalazar,Presencia deQuintiliano Sciences, enlas "teorias deJuanLuisVives, in:TomásAlbaladejo et al. (eds.),Quintiliano: psicológicas" Historia dela retórica, 3 vols.,Logroño 1998,III, 1209-1218. y actualidad

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education.6It is also in light of this fact that Vives' constanteffortto understandhuman naturenot as a metaphysicianbut as a moralistand a pedagogue should be understood. But thisdoes not necessarilymean thatVives was unfamiliarwiththe naturalphilosophyof the scholastics,especiallygiven that he spentsome of Paris.According yearsas a studentof thefacultyof artsat the University to the receivedview,Vives enrolledas a freshmanin 1509 and leftParis in 1512. During those threeyears he devoted himselfalmost exclusively to the study of logic withoutpublishinganything.Carlos Noreña, for example,providesthe followingassessment: Those who believein a revolutionary progressof nominalistic physicsin the fifteenth will be not to find a century certainly surprised singlereferenceto thatmovementin the books ofJuan Luis Vives,a man with in thepragmaticside ofhumanknowledge. a greatinterest The omission is especiallyintriguing because Vives [. . .] did encouragethe inductive observation of Natureas a remedyagainstthe speculative physicsof the School; and also, because one of his most respectedteachers,John on Buridanus.However,ifwe keep Dullaert,was a recognizedauthority in mind that the Parisianstudenthad only one year formetaphysics, we willnotfindit strangethathe completely ethics,and physics, ignored theveryspecializedquestionselaboratedby Albertof Saxony,Domingo de Soto, Buridan,and othernominalistic physicists.7 Enrique González y González, however,has shownthatVives spentmore time in Paris than was previouslythought.In fact, he remained there

6 Vives'reformational ofIn Pseudodialecticos withthepublication (1519) program begins work is divided inDe disciplinis andis elaborated atgreat (1531).Thisencyclopaedic length of to a thorough in three artium (sevenbooksdevoted critique corruptarum parts:De causis Vives' bookswhere De tradendis thefoundations ofcontemporary (five education), disciplinis with treatises De artibus andfiveshorter educational reform is oudined), mainly dealing De De censura De explanatione Deprima essentiae, veri, cuiusque philosophia, logicandmetaphysics: seeWilliam On Vives'reformational andDe disputatone. instrumento program, probabilitatis intheRenaissance, 10(1963), Arts Treatises onthe , in:Studies Sinz,TheElaboration ofVwes's 3nella cultura e *metodo dell'umanesimo: e la retorica 'Invenzione* 68-90;CesareVasoli,La dialettica inVives: efilosofia andValeriodelNero,Linguaggio delXVeXVIsecolo , Milano1968,214-46; 93 ofVives' delsapere nel"Dedisciplinis (1531),Bologna1991.Fora discussion L'organizzazione MuñozDelgado, see alsoVicente andscholastics, humanists rolein thedebatebetween SañudoandCiríacoMorónArroyo Nominalismo, , in: ManuelRevuelta logica y humanismo TheHumanistandErikaRummel, enEspaña 1986,109-74; , Santander (eds.),El Erasmismo Ma. 1995,153-92. andReformation Debate intheRenaissance Scholastic , Cambridge, 7 Noreña1970(n. 1),47f.

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until1514, theyear in whichhe startedhis publishingcareer.8This means thatthe questionof Vives' scholasticbackgrounddeservesmore attention than it has receivedso far. As Cesare Vasoli has pointed out: even the most obsessiveadvocatesof a returnto the pure springsof classicallearningand the studiahumanitatis could not be unawareof the textsgeneratedby Buridanand Swinesheadwhichhad spreadas faras the Italian universities. Nor were theyunawareof the disputations on under the the and influence of cakulatores or other which, physics logic teacherslike Oresme,had come to be the principalactivityin many scholasticcircles.9 In this respectit mightperhaps be sufficient to examine brieflyVives' introduction to a course on Francesco Filelfo's(1398-1481) Convivia mediolanensiathat was printedin October 1514. The last paragraph of this is an invectiveagainstscholasticphilosophers,personifiedby the praelectio name of Swineshead: Do you thinkthen,mygood man,thatnaturalphilosophy consistsmerely of Swineshead'snonsenseand thoseuselesssophisticaldiscourseson the 'intension'and 'remission'of qualities,on 'uniformmotion',on 'motion deformed'and 'deformedly whileit reallyis in fact deformed', uniformly I like do not deformed', you? denythatthislearnsomething 'deformedly but it is was transmitted ing by veryloftyminds, certainlynot worth so much time on.10 spending In thispassage, Vives mentionsthe intensionand remissionof qualities, as well as uniformmotionand uniformly deformedmotion.These terms do not belong to the subjectoflogic,but as Vives himselfpointsout- to 8 See EnriqueGonzálezy González, De la escolastica al humanismo , JoanLluísVives: ' in1512-1517: Valencia1987.ForVives'earlycareer, seealsoJozefIJsewijn, J. L. Vives A Reconsideration 26 (1977),82-100;andMarcus , in: Humanistica Lovaniensia, ofEvidence De Schepper, inParis(1514):J. L. Vives B. Guarinus, in:DirkSacréandGilbert April Editing onNeo-Latin Literature inMemory , Leuven 2000, (eds.), Tournoy Myricae: ofJozef Essays IJsewijn 195-205. 9 CesareVasoli,TheRenaissance B. Schmitt etal. (eds.), , in:Charles ofPhilosophy Concept TheCambridge , Cambridge 1988,60. ofRenaissance History Philosophy 10JuanLuisVives, Praelectio inConvivia : "Etputas, virbone,naturalem Philelphi inquam, totam in Suisethicis inperditissimis cavillationibus de philosophiam quisquiliis, quibusdam intensione ac remissione de motuuniformi, de motuuniformiter difformi et qualitatum, difformiter et beneprofecto resut tu difformiter consistere? Noneo difformi, difformi, infidas remessea summis sedindignam sanein qua plurimum temingeniis proditam, 2, ed.JozefIJsewijn porisconsumatur". Quotedfrom JuanLuisVives,EarlyWritings etal.,Leiden1991,149.

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naturalphilosophy.The intensionand remissionof qualitiesconcernthe controversyamong natural philosophersabout the motionsof increase and decrease in the intensity of a qualitativeform.Uniformmotionand deformedmotionrefer,on the otherhand, to what is known uniformly as the Merton mean-degreeor mean-speedtheorem,accordingto which difform, i.e., linearlyincreasingor decreasing,qualitiescorreuniformly to their mean spond degrees.11ApparentlyVives became (pace Noreña) fairlyfamiliarwithSwineshead's"thornyand uselessquibbles" about the of qualitiesthroughhis teacherJan Dullaert (d.1513) who quantification used to quote him frequently in his lectureson physics.12 Moreover,as Rita Guerlac has noted, "Vives demonstratedin his treatiseon metaphysicsthat he had absorbed Dullaert's teaching,and the theoriesof Albertof Saxony and Marsiliusof Inghen".13 A scholasticinfluencemightperhaps also be foundin Vives' descriptive approach to the philosophicalstudyof the soul. In one of the most , he asserts: frequently quoted passages fromDe animaet vita

11Foranoverview ofthese Medieval debates, see,e.g.,EdithSylla, ofQualities: Quantification theMerton forHistory ofExactSciences, 8 (1971),9-39;EdithSylla, School,in:Archive Medieval : theOxford Calculators d'histoire doctri, in:Archives Concepts oftheLatitude ofForms naletlittéraire du moyen andEdithSylla,TheOxford Calculators, âge,40 (1974),223-283; in:Norman Kretzmann etal.(eds),TheCambridge Medieval , Cambridge ofLater History Philosophy 1982,540-63. 12See M, VI, 201.JanDullaert wasbornin Ghentin Flanders andarrived in Paris around thebeginning ofthesixteenth wherehe studied with century JohnMajor(1469He taught a classat Collègede Montaigu between 1506 1558)at Collègede Montaigu. and 1509andthenmovedto Collègede Beauvais where Vivesattended hislectures. See HubertÉlie,Quelques maîtres del'université deParisvers Van1500, in: Archives d'Histoire Doctrinale et Littéraire du MoyenAge,18 (1951),222-224;and Gonzálezy González 1987(n.8), 148-54. Attherequest ofFrancisco a fellow student from Cristóbal, Valencia, a short Viveswrote ofhismaster whenhediedon September 10, biography JanDullaert inthesecondandposthumous 1513.Thisobituary wasprinted edition ofDullaert's comonthefirst bookofAristode's SeeJuanLuisVives,Vita Ioannis Dullardi, mentary Meteorology. in:JuanLuisVives, etal.,Leiden1991,10-15. 2,ed.Jozef Early Writings IJsewijn According to IJsewijn, thetopographical ofthecityofGhentdisplayed in thisshort bioknowledge sketch thatViveshadseenthetown.SinceDullaert returned toGhent graphical suggests in 1512itis possible thatVivesaccompanied him.SeeJozef Vives andPoetry , in: IJsewijn, Roczniki 26 (1978),24. Gilbert maintains thatVivesconsidered Tournay Humanistyczne, ithisduty tocarry onhismaster's work andbesidehaving thesecond edition ofDullaert's on thefirst bookofAristotle's he alsotookoversomeof commentary Meteorology printed, hiscourses. See Gilbert andtheWorld , in:GutenbergTournay, JuanLuisVives ofPrinting, 69 (1994),129. Jahrbuch, 13RitaGuerlac, thePseudodialecticians: A Humanist Introduction , in:JuanLuisVives, Against Attack onMedieval ed. andtrans. RitaGuerlac, Dordrecht 1979,22. Logic,

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in knowingwhatthe soul is, but ratherhow it is We are not interested and what its operationsare. Neitherdid he, who exhortedus to know ourselves,referto the essenceof the soul,but to the actionsthatmould our morals.14 tend to stressthe noveltyof Vives' In thiscontext,moderncommentators in view their by the progressiveeliminationof the approach,represented of the structureof the soul in favourof of analysis metaphysicalaspects But it mightalso be observedthat its phenomenologicalmanifestations.15 one can discern in late medieval psychologya developmentfrom the demonstrationof the real nature of the soul on the basis of its evident operationsto the simple explanationof the disparatefunctionsof those operations.In this process, the philosophicalstudyof the soul became and the questionof the real nature graduallyseparatedfrommetaphysics, of the soul, which was viewed as beyond the mandate of naturalphilosophy,was eventuallyabandoned.16 This development,whichhad its rootsin the naturalisticapproach initiatedby William of Ockham and was carriedthroughbyJean Buridan and several of his numerousfollowers,is perhaps best exemplifiedby de anima}1The organizingprinciPierre d'Ailly's(c.1350-1420) Tractatus ple of this treatiseis indebtedto the approach of facultypsychology,in which the soul is describedas being composed of a numberof different facultiesor powers,each directedtowardsa different object and responThe conceptof the soul in d'Ailly'saccount, siblefora distinctoperation.18

14S, 188;M, III, 332:"Anima nostra scire:qualisautemetquae quidsit,nihilinterest animae sed de essentia necqui iussit utipsinosnossemus, eiusopera,permultum; sensit, morům". ad compositionem de actionibus 15See,e.g.,ValerioDel Nero,Pedagogia di Vives, in:JuanLuis e psicologia nelpensiero Valencia1992,211. I: Volumen Introductorio Omnia Mestre, , ed. Antonio Vives,Opera 16See Katherine A. Weisheipl onLateMedieval Albert's , in:James Park, Psychology Influence is theScience andtheSciences 1980,510-22; , Toronto JackZupko,What (ed.),Albertus Magnus 110 A CaseStudy intheEvolution Natural , in:Synthese, ofLateMedieval Philosophy oftheSoul?: Modern Substance andSoul:TheLateMedieval andJackZupko, Origins ofEarly (1997),297-334; Medieval and : TheRelations between F. Brown , in:Stephen (ed.),Meeting oftheMinds Psychology Modern Classical European Philosophy , Turnhout 1998,121-39. 17Thistreatise, works on philosophical whichis oneofthemostimportant systematic readwellintothesixteenth cenin thefourteenth waswidely written century, psychology ofthiswork, with tentimes between 1490and 1518.Fora recent andprinted study tury EinBeitrag desPeter vonAilly: seeOlafPluta,Diephilosophische critical zur edition, Psychologie desspäten Mittelalters 1987. Geschichte derPhilosophie , Amsterdam 18See,e.g.,d'Ailly's in Pluta1987,3. offaculties scheme diagrammed

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however,is, as Jack Zupko has pointedout,merely"an emptyplaceholder, whose real natureis not even relevantto psychology".19 of scholasticpsychologywas also a consequence This transformation of the parsimoniousway of doing philosophyconnectedto the ontology endorsed by Ockham and Buridan, according to which there are only as menindividualentitiesin the worldand universaisshouldbe identified Vives shares the view tal items that representmany thingsin reality.20 that the only universalentitiesit makes sense to talk about are universal are singularentitieslike all others,when concepts,which metaphysically he writesthat "thereis no universalin imagination,nor in nature;but it is attained throughdiscursivereason as a very indistinctand thin image when the mind stripsitselfoff,as best it can, fromthe cognitions of fantasy".21 The aim of the presentpaper is to show that also Vives' account of the will,whichis containedin chapterXI of the second book of De anima et vita , is best viewed in lightof scholasticdiscussionson will and free withthe analysis similarities choice. It is argued that it shows interesting decern librosEthicorum of freechoice containedin Buridan's Quaestiones super Aristotelis ad Mcomachum. 2. JeanBuridanon FreeChoice arbitrium Scholasticdebateson freewill and freechoice (liberum ) were domstands.22The firstof inated by two traditionsthat took ratherdifferent and associatedwiththe posithemis oftenreferredto as 'intellectualism' tion of Thomas Aquinas and his followers.Accordingto thisview, "the root of all freedomis found in reason".23Human freedomcomes from 19Zupko1998(n. 16),137. 20See,e.g.,PaulVincent MainThemes Some s Nominalist , in: Metaphysics: Spade,Ockham' toOckham PaulVincent 1999,100-17; , Cambridge Companion Spade(ed.),TheCambridge totheProblem Solution andPeterKing,JeanBuridan's , in:J. M. M. H. Thijssen ofUniversais andNatural andJackZupko(eds.),TheMetaphysics , Leiden2001, ofJeanBuridan Philosophy 1-27. 21S, 222;M, III, 344: "Universale sicutinecin natura: estin imaginatione, nullum dum ac tenuissima, confusissima subimagine a ratione discurrente tantummodo attingitur, se notisexuit". efficere mens, quantum potest, phantasiae 22Foran overview FreeWilland B. Korolec, seeJerzy ofthesemedieval discussions, Medieval et al. (eds.),TheCambridge Kretzmann FreeChoice ofLater History , in: Norman 1982,629-41. , Cambridge Philosophy 23ThomasAquinas, De ventate 2. , q.24,art.

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followingthe intellect,and the will can never act directlyagainst the intellectin choosing which goods it should pursue or which evils it should avoid.24 The second traditionis usuallycalled 'voluntarism'and identifiedwith the movementthat arose withinthe Franciscanorder afterBonaventure. These thinkers, who, althoughtheyconsideredthemselves good Aristotelians were unwillwere also influencedby Augustineand Anselmof Canterbury, ing to accept the Thomisticaccount of the relationshipbetweenintellect and will,and maintainedinsteadthatthe will is an independentand selfdetermining power. Accordingto theirview,the will is freeto act against reason's dictates.The will is entirelyundeterminedone way or another untilit makesa choice, and it determinesitselfin the directionit chooses. In arguingthat the will determinesitself,voluntaristsheld that the will in need of no efficient cause otherthan itself.25 is a self-mover, In his account of the contrastbetween these two different ways of thinkingabout will and free choice Calvin Normore has pointed to a numberof key claims. He characterisesthe Aristotelianmodel, championed by Aquinas and his followers,in the followingway: a) everything whichchangesis changedby another;b) deliberationis alwayswithrespect to means ratherthan with respectto ends; and c) everything soughtis it is to because the of under perceived be) good. sought aspect (thatis, on the otherhand, came to hold a ratherdifferent Voluntarists, position, accordingto which: a) the will is a self-mover;b) there is deliberation with respectto ends as well as means; and c) the will has no necessary orientationtowardsthe good.26 Vives' account is to a large extentvoluntarist,but shows also interoppositioestingsimilaritieswith Buridan's analysisof free choice [libertas ad in decern libros Ethicorum Aristotelis his contained Quaestiones , super ns) as a media between the introduced its author and Mcomachum , opinio by 24See,e.g.,ThomasAquinas, is Summa , I-II,q.17,art.l:"Therootofliberty theologiae as itscause.Forthewillcantendfreely butitis thereason thewillas thesubject thereof; becausethereasoncan havevarious notions ofgood. towards various objects precisely define freechoiceas beinga free reason Hencephilosophers , implying judgement from arising Thomas thatreason is thecauseofliberty". BasicWritings , ed. Aquinas ofSaint Quotedfrom Anton C. Pegis,2 vols.,NewYork1945. 25Fora detailed inmedieval account ofthevoluntarist tradition discussions ofwilland freechoice,see BonnieKent,Virtues in theLate oftheWill:TheTransformation ofEthics Thirteenth D.C. 1995. , Washington, Century 26SeeCalvinG. Normore, Anselm andChoosing: andOckham onChoice , in:Vivarium, Picking 36 (1998),23-39.

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two opposed traditionsmentionedabove. Vives mighthave become familiar with this work duringhis years in Paris, where Buridan was highly renownedin the early sixteenthcenturyand many of his works were As we have alreadyseen,one ofVives5mostrespected editedand reprinted. on Buridan. teachers,the FlemingJan Dullaert,was a recognisedauthority Moreover,theworkin question whichwas, togetherwithAquinas' expomedievalcommentaryon Aristotle's Mcomachean sition,the mostinfluential - was 27But it in in Paris 15 13. also be the case that Ethics might printed Vives became acquainted with Buridan's account throughone of his numerousfollowers.28 Buridan's mediaopinioconsistsin the idea that the will, althoughit is determinedby the intellectto the extentthat it can only choose what the intellecthas judged as good, can nonethelessdeferits choice whenever the goodness of the object is in some way doubtfulor uncertain. Since the intellectcan err in its judgement,the will is not invariably moved by the greatergood perceivedby the intellect,but can- at least - deferitsact of in the absenceof evidentknowledge acceptance.According to Buridan,wheneverthe intellectpasses judgementon the goodness or badness of an object, the object appears to the will as good {subratione boni)or bad {subratione mali).This judgementgeneratesin the will a certain agreement{complacentia) or disagreement(
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Crucial to Buridan'saccount,however,is the idea that,besides acceptance and rejection,thereis deferment(
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Accordingto Fabienne Pironet,Buridan'stheoryis based on threeprinciples:a) the will cannotwill somethingbad as such,or will againstsomethinggood as such; b) the will cannot will that which the intellecthas notjudged to be good in some way or other;c) the will can neverchoose a lesser good while a greatergood is taken into consideration,because the lessergood is bad in comparisonto the greatergood.33As we shall see, Vives subscribesto all threeof these principles. 9 3. JuanLuis Vives ofFreedom oftheWill Conception Vives maintainsthat all knowledgeis givenforthe sake of the pursuitof the good, so that when the good is known it will be desired and pursued. The facultythat seeks to attainthis end in animals is the sensitive appetite;in human beings it is the will,which is definedas "the faculty or power of the soul to seek what is good and turnaway fromwhat is evil under the guidance of reason".34Accordingto Vives, thereare two and disapproval(reprobatio different acts of the will: approval (approbatio) ), fromwhich our externalactionsfollow.Approval,which pertainsto the to obtain it; and disapproval,whichpertainsto good, producesthe effort evil, produces eitherthe reactionto overcomeit or the retreatand the flightin order to avoid it.35 in: MediaevalStudies,16 (1954),72-86;Jerzy andFreeWillaccording toJeanBuridan, etleproblème dulibre arbitre à la lumière desCommentaires B. Korolec, à Nicomaque L'Éthique Zimmermann duXIIIesiècle etla philosophie dela liberté deJeanBuridan , in:Albert parisiens an derPariser Universität imXIII.Jahrhundert , Berlin1976, (ed.),Die Auseinandersetzungen Buridan andDonald Davidson onAkrasia, in:Synthese, 96 (1993), RistoSaarinen, 331-48; John A. Vos,Buridan onContingency andFreeWill,in: E. P. Bos and H. A. Krop 133-154; A Master Freedom , Nijmegen 1993,141-55; ofChoice (eds.), ofArts JackZupko, JeanBuridan: The 57 (1995),75-99;Fabienne inBuridan's Moral in:Mediaeval Studies, Pironet, Psychology, " " Ethics andJackZupko(eds.),The Notion , in:J. M. M. H. Thijssen of nonvelieinBuridan's Leiden2001,199-220; andLagerlund andNatural 2002 Buridan, ofJean Philosophy Metaphysics (n.28),173-203. 33Pironet 2001,202f. 34S, 340;M, III, 382:"Cognitio esttributa, senomnispropter bonumexpetendum utcognitum bonumexpetat, sualispropter mentalis mentale, sensuale, expetendo propter etcongruat; sicenim fieri autemsequatur doneese illiadiungat, quidem possit, quantum aversetur et defugiat, illieritbonum, malum necaliter; vero,quodbonositcontrarium, in brutis est Facultas ne se illiapplicet, appetitus quaeid exequitur, quo fiatei malum. seuvisanimi, in homine. seuvoluntas Estigitur voluntas, facultas, sensualis, qua bonum animantes ducenatura, nammutae malum duceratione: aversamur, quaesenexpetimus, susextimulat". 35S, 352;M, III, 386f.:"In volúntate ex et reprobatio, actussuntduo,approbatio

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like Buridan and most scholastics,between HerebyVives distinguishes, elicitedacts, i.e., approval and disapproval,which the will bringsabout in itself,and commandedacts, i.e., the pursuance,avoidance or reaction againstsome given object, which followupon the will's elicitedacts and are broughtabout externallyif no hindranceis present.Approval and disapprovalclearlycorrespondto what Buridan calls acceptance (accepta in difference tio)and rejection(refiitatio ). There is, however,an interesting Vives' analysis of the actions that follow upon the act of disapproval. With regardto an object that appears evil, Buridan only discussesavoidance. Vives, on the otherhand, introducesa new aspect,by distinguishkindsof commandedacts in relationto something ingbetweentwo different that appears evil: the avoidance of or flightfromthe evil, and the reaction that aims at subduingit.36 Accordingto Vives, the will is the rulerand commanderof all things, but since it has no lightof its own, it is illuminatedby the mind,which has been paired with it not in order to rule and forceit, but to advise and guide it. The will does not tryto pursue or avoid anythingthat has not been pointed out beforehandby reason. Thus, accordingto Vives, an act of will can be describedas "conceived by reason, but delivered by the will".37The human will has been declared free by God, and althoughit submitsitselfto reason, it is never bound to anythingparto will (velie)or ticular.It is freebetween activityand privation{orbatio), not will, to will against (nolle)or not will against.Vives seems herebyto with willing,and the act of disidentifythe act of approval (approbatio) with approval (reprobatio) willingagainst.Moreover,Vives also holds,with ad proficiscuntur. Approbatio, quaeestde bono,paritexecutionem quibusactusexteriores ad illudsuperanilludconsequendum; autem, reprobatio quaede malo,velinsurrectionem et fugam ad evitandum". dum,velcontractionem 36Although credited forhaving abandoned thedistinction Vivesis sometimes between andconcupiscible motions ofthesoul,thedistinction between irascible motions thathave andmotions theformal thathavetheforobject"sensible goodoreviltakenabsolutely" or arduous", malobject"sensible is nevertheless echoedin goodor eviltakenas difficult hisdistinction between motions offlight or avoidance from evil(a malo) andthosethat aimat subduing evil(inmalum). 37S, 340and342;M, III, 382:"Voluntas estomnium et imperquidem ipsadomina sedperse nihilhabetlucis;illuminatur a mente, hocesta ratione ac iudicio, atrix, quae estillivelutconsultrix nonut regatauttorqueat, sedut dirigat, et apposita ductrixque, meliorum admoneat. autdevitat, nisia ratione Itaquenihilvoluntas appétit, praemostratum.Quocirca a volúntate actusvoluntatis a ratione autemiudicatur, quidem producitur, et suadetur; a volúntate estigiatque,utsicdicam,a ratione gignitur, paritur. Magistra voluntatis nondomina". tur,etpraeceptrix ratio,

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Buridan,that the will is not freein relationto opposingacts, because it can neitherwill anythingthat does not in some way appear good, nor will against anythingthat does not somehow appear evil. If something which appears good is presentedto it, it is in the will'spower to not will it, but it is not in its power to will againstit, i.e., to reject and hate it. And, vice versa, if somethingthat appears evil is presentedto it, it is in the will's power not to will against it, but it is not in its power to will it, i.e., to embrace and love it.38Thus Vives subscribesto the firstof the principlesin Buridan'stheoryoutlinedby Pironet,i.e., that the will cannot will somethingbad as such, or will againstsomethinggood as such. When the will does not incline to eitherthe acceptance of the good or the rejectionof evil,thereis whatVives calls 'privation'(iorbatio ).39From his description, it wouldseem as ifhe had in mindsomekindofindifference, due to which the will is not inclinedone way ratherthan another.This mightcorrespondto the passive state about which Descartes writes: I feelwhen thereis no reasonpushingme in one But the indifference directionratherthan anotheris the lowestgrade of freedom;it is evibut ratherof a defectin knowlof freedom, dence not of anyperfection a kind of or negation.40 edge In the voluntaristtradition,however,there was another conceptionof to thepositivefacultyof choice betweenoppowhichreferred indifference, sites. This positive indeterminacy,which Duns Scotus describes as "a of the will, consistsin the capacity,when all superabundantsufficiency" conditionsfor acting are met, eitherto act or deliberatelyto refuseto 38S, 342;M, III, 382f.:"Voluntatem liberam iussit esseautorsuus,et enimhumanam sednulliuniestallirationi, obtemperat quidemiliasemper quasisuiiurisac mancipij; Liberam ex propositis. libuerit autem,quamcunque quidemanimointer gata:sequitur velienonvelie,nollenonnolle,noninterduosactuscontrarios; actumet orbationem, velie,nisisubaliquabonifacie:nihilnollenisisubmali: quandoenimvishaecnihilpotest nonvelie,sednonpotest nonmali:potest ostensa bonispecie, nolle,hocestaverquidem nonnolle,sednon sariet odisse;vicissim quoqueobiectamalispecie,nonboni,potest et amare". potest velie,hocestamplecti 39S, 340;M, III, 382:"Suntergoinvolúntate seuamplexus actusduo,propensio boni, inclinât". in partem estutriusque, et aversatio mali;orbatio quumillaociosaneutram 40RenéDescartes, autemilla, Meditationes deprima , AT VII, 58: "IndifFerentia philosophia est in alteram in me ratio unam nulla cùm impellit, magis quàm partem quamexperior, in cognitione sed tantummodo & nullamin eâ perfectionem, infimus graduslibertatis, ThePhilosophwal from RenéDescartes, testator". sivenegationem defectum, Quoted quandam, etal.,Cambridge 1984,40. Fora thor, vol.II, eds.JohnCottingham ofDescartes Writings seeLilli ofthewillanditsscholastic ofDescartes' background, conception oughdiscussion ch. 7. Ma. Mind Descartes' s Concept 2003, , Alanen, of Cambridge,

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act. The will,by virtueof being a rationalpower, is such that it can, at the verymomentat which it acts, act otherwise.41 Vives' remarkthatthe will is freebetweenactivityand privationseems to implythat,in his view, it is possible to refrainactivelyfromwilling what one is naturallyinclined to will, by not elicitingany act of will. This, in turn,suggeststhat it is a conceptionof the latterkind he has in mind, and that privationcould thereforebe compared to the act of defermentin Buridan's account. As the latterpoints out: the power of not acceptingan apparentgood, or of not rejectingan apparentevil,is forour ultimatebenefitnot so thatwe mightstandfirm but so that,before in this mode of non-acceptanceor non-rejection, we or an mightinquire into everygoodaccepting rejecting object, ness or evil whichfollowsupon thatobject,or is annexedto it, so that at last we would accept what is absolutelygood and reject what is absolutelybad.42 It seems thatwhat Vives is tryingto capturewiththe term'privation'is similarto what Buridan describesas the "mode of non-acceptanceor non-rejection". There are severalreferencesto thismode in Vives' account. The will, he writes,can impose a furtherdeliberationand inquire whethersomethingbetteror more favourablecan be found.43He also observesthat, in the processof deliberation,the will is freeto deferthe issue or to turn the mind's attentionto somethingelse, like a sovereigncan command thatthe decisionon some matterbe put underadvisementor postponed.44 The view that the will can always turn the intellectaway fromconsideringa givenobject,however,is also put forwardby Aquinas, who writes that "no object moves the will necessarily,forno matterwhat the object

41JohnDunsScotus,Quaestiones libros Aristotelů, IX, q.15. See also super metaphysicorum McCordAdams DunsScotus ontheWillas a Rational in:Marilyn AllanB. Wolter, Potency, DunsScotus (ed.),ThePhilosophical Theology ofJohn , Ithaca1990,163-80. 42QNE,VII, q.8, 145va.Quotedfrom Portrait JeanBuridan: ofa FourteenthJackZupko, Arts Master , NotreDame2003,256. Century 43S, 344;M,III, 383:"Potest itemvoluntas ulteriorem deliberationem etquasi indicere, ne ibisistatur, an quicquam inveniri sedinquiratur, et amplius pronunciare, queatpotius, conducibilius". 44S, 342and344;M, III, 383:"Tuminipsadeliberatione licetveliubere remdifferii, velinuniversum silentium aliorsum mentis convertere: nonaliter indicere, intentionemque taride negocio velomitti velreijci". quamprinceps, quiconsul quopiam imperat, prorsum,

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be, it is in man's power not to thinkof it".45But since Aquinas maintains that the will is to be consideredas rationalappetite,it would seem that the will is able to avertthe intellectonly if the intellectjudges that thiscourse of action is best. The issue of whetherthe will is necessitated to choose the greatergood is, as far as I can see, also one of the bones of contentionamong moderninterpreters of Buridan. Invokingthe principle that "the will cannot will thatwhich the intellecthas notjudged to be good in some way or other",Pironethas argued that defermentis possible "if and only if the intellecthas judged that not-willingis the greatergood at the moment".46Henrik Lagerlund,on the other hand, maintainsthat "we may in factchoose the lesser,since we may deferon the highergood and then accept the lessergood".47 In his characterisation of what we have called the voluntarist position, Buridan mentionsan argumentwhich maintainsthat the will can, all other thingsbeing equal, choose the lesser of two incompossiblegoods presentedto it by the intellect:"For even if the intellectjudges that one should go to church, the will can, nevertheless,while thisjudgement stands,not will to go indeed it can also will not to go therebut to the pub".48This is, however,somethinghe opposes,since "because of itsfreedom, it cannot be that the will is able to will what is less good, since the will's freedomto choose has not been given to it- whetherby God or by nature- because thisis a bad thing,but because it is a good thing, since it is a conditionpertainingto nobilityor excellence,as everyone concedes".49But thismeans onlythat"if the will shouldchoose, it chooses the greatergood by necessity",which correspondsto the thirdprinciple mentionedby Pironet,accordingto which the will can never choose a 45Thomas Summa a nulloobiecto exneces2: "voluntas , I-II,q.10,art. theologiae Aquinas, sitatemove obiectononcogitare". tur,potestenimaliquisde quocumque Quotedfrom BasicWritings G. Pegis,2 vols.,NewYork1945. , ed. Anton ofSaintThomas Aquinas 46Pironet 2001(n. 32),207. 47Lagerlund 2002(n.28),188and200,n. 51. 48QNE,X, q.l, 203r:"Namquamvis intellectus iudicaverit eundum essead ecclesiam, voluntas tamenhoc stante potestnonvelieire,immoet nolleire,sed ad tabernam.". onBook X oftheEthics McGrade Questions , in:Arthur JeanBuridan, Quotedfrom Stephen et al. (eds),TheCambridge Translations Texts. Volume Two:Ethics and ofMedieval Philosophical Political 2001,502. , Cambridge Philosophy 49QNE III, q.4, 43vb:"ex sua liberiate, nonpotest haberequodpossetvelieminus nonestsibidata,sive bonum, probatur qúiaillalibertas oppositionis quamhabetvoluntas a deosivea natura, suummalum, sedpropter suumbonum, cumiliasitcondipropter tiopertinens et excellentiam, ut omnesconcedunt". ab nobilitatem Quotedfrom Zupko 2003,397,n. 50.

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lesser good while a greatergood is taken into consideration,since the lesser good, in this case going to the pub, is bad in comparisonto the greatergood, i.e., going to church.50 Buridan also asserts,and thismightbe exactlywhat he meant by pre, that it is "in the power of the will to sentinghis view as a mediaopinio command the intellectto desistfromconsiderationsof the greatergood, and in that case, it could accept what is less good".51In other words, thewillis free(pacePironet)to avertthe intellectfromconsidering whether to go to church or to the pub, and considerinstead whetherto go to the pub or not. And since the latteris not somethingbad as such, the will can in fact choose what initiallywas the lesser good, namelyto go to the pub. Vives holds the same view and explains that,when severalthingsare presentedto us, even if reason recommendsone that is rightlythe most , to prefer worthy,the will is free,afterhavingsetthemostworthy thingaside anotherone, even if the latterappears good only in the slightestway.52 This seems to be an expressionof the thirdprinciplein Buridan's theory mentionedby Pironet. In other words, Vives agrees with Buridan that the will cannot choose a lesser good while a greatergood is taken in consideration.They both appear to think,however,that the will is freeto deferits act of volitionwheneverwe lack absolutecertaintyabout the goodnessof an object. This is somethingwhich,at least accordingto Vives maintainsthat Vives, seems always to be the case in human life.53 50QNE,III,q.4,44ra-rb: "sivoluntas debeat maius bonum". eligere, ipsanecessario eliget "ifthewillis ableto choose, readsas follow: it chooses thegreater Zupko'stranslation See Zupko2003,397,n. 50. goodbynecessity". 51QNE III, q.4,44ra:"inpotestate voluntatis intellectui utdésistât a considimperare eratione illiusbonimaioris, et tuncpoterit minus". acceptare Quotedfrom Zupko2003, 397,n. 53. 52S, 344;M, III, 383:"Multis etiamsi efficax etvalida quoquepropositis ostensisque, ratiounumaliquodprobet, ac suadeat, si quodaliudtarnen faciem bonialipraese fert tenuissima hueseseflectere, et ex solasuspiciuncula hocsumere, quam,quamvis potest in quo insitpermagna alterorepudiato, boniet species etessentia". 53S, 344;M,III, 383:"quaminremmagnam ei ansampraebet, omnes quodresnostrae mistae suntbonisac malis,tumex nobisipsis,qui ex rebusdiversissimis constamus; suntnobiscircumspicienda et respicienda in animo,in corpore, in externis". multaque Cf.alsoDescartes' inMeditations remark onFirst : "Butsincethepresconcluding Philosophy sureofthings to be donedoesnotalways allowus to stopandmakesucha meticulous itmustbe admitted thatinhuman lifeweareoften liabletomakemistakes about check, and we mustacknowledge theweakness of ournature". See René particular things, ThePhilosophical vol.II, eds.John(Nottingham etal.,Cambridge Descartes, ofDescartes, Wrìtings 1984,62.

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it is even possible to refrainfrompursuinga clearlyperceivedgood, if for no otherreason than wantingto demonstrateone's freedom: To show thatit is the ruler,the will oftenrejectsand dismisseseverything,just like a prince,who in ordernot to seem governedby someone else, excludesand rejectsall the good advices of his counsellors, and it ends up as withthe one in the satirewho says:'This I will,thus I command,let arbitrariness be the reason'.54 Vives adds, however,that not even thisis done withoutany formof the good, since the will cannot pursue or act withoutan intentionwhich some reason has consideredgood.55This last point is in agreementwith the second of the principlesin Buridan's theoryoutlined by Pironet, namely,that the will cannot will that which the intellecthas notjudged to be good in some way or other. There are also tracesof Buridan'snotionof the firstact of the will in Vives' account. These are most evidentin his discussionof the emotions siveajfectiones {affectus ), which he definesas "the acts of those facultiesthat nature gave to our souls to follow good and avoid evil, by means of which we are led to the good and move away fromor against evil".56 Accordingto Vives, the acts of the emotionalfaculty,"no matterhow 54S, 344;M, III, 384:"Saepeedam,utse ostendat voluntas essedominam, ac reijcit haudaliter a quoquam salutaria omnia omnia, spernit quamprinceps, quinevideatur regi, consiliariorum suorum mónita excludit etrespuit, Sicvolo, fitque (quoddicitillein satyra) siciubeo, sitproratione libido ". Vives'quotefromtheSatires is notcompletely accurate. textreadsas follows: "Hocvolo,siciubeo,sitproratione voluntas". SeeJuvenalis, Juvenalis' TheSatires itsactforno otherreasonthan , 6.V.223.The ideathatthewillcansuspend to experience itsfreedom is to be found alsoin Bartholomaeus Arnoldi de Usingen. See 2002(n.28),190.Cf.alsowith whoina letter toMesland Descartes, Lagerlund (9 February that"itis always a clearly known 1645)declares opento us to holdbackfrom pursuing a clearly we consider it a goodthing truth, good,or from admitting perceived provided todemonstrate thefreedom ofourwillbyso doing". See RenéDescartes, ThePhilosophical et al.,Cambridge , vol.Ill, eds.John(Nottingham 1991,245. Writings ofDescartes 55S, 346;M, III, 384:"Tametsi nihilenimpotest volunñequehocsineboniforma, tasexpetere, autagere,nisieo proposito, quodratioaliquabonumessecensuerit". 56S, 456;M, III, 422:"Ergoistarum a natura facultatum, quibusaniminostri praediti suntad sequendum velvitandum actusdicuntur affectus siveaffectiones, bonum, malum, velcontra vela malorecedimus". On Vives'analysis milium, quibusad bonumferimur, oftheemotions, seeCarlosG. Noreña, andtheEmotions Carbondale , 1989; JuanLuisVives 3De animaet vita, LorenzoCasini,Emotions inRenaissance Humanism: in: JuanLuisVives Henrik andMikko andChoice Boethius toDescartes , Lagerlund (eds),Emotions from Yijönsuuri Dordrecht andAnti-Stoicism inJuanLuis 2002,205-28;and LorenzoCasini,Aristotelianism Vives* s Conception on , in:JillKrayeandRistoSaarinen oftheEmotions (eds.),Moral Philosophy theThreshold , Dordrecht 2005,283-305. ofModernity

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quick and hastythey mightbe, always followthe conclusionsof judgeof the ment".57As he stresses,the terms'gooď and 'evil' in his definition what each rather or but what is not emotionsmean, evil, really good personjudges to be good or evil.58Vives5classificationof the emotions between and distinguishes is expoundedin accordance withhis definition, movementstowardthe good, and movementsaway fromor againstevil: All the motionsof the soul are about the good or the evil,as faras it is the oppositeof the good. These motionsare towardthe good, away fromevil or againstevil. Good and evil can be present,future, past or possible.The absence of good is evil and the absence of evil is good. The good as soon as it becomesknownto the mindpleasesus at once. This feelingis firstlike the gentlebreeze of a risingmotion,whichis The it becomeslove {amor). called liking(
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LORENZOGASINI will,and whatI rejectI willagainst,and vice versa.And upon thisact followsactual pursuit(prosecutio thereimmediately ), ) or avoidance(fuga if it [the thingaccepted or rejected]is apprehendedas pursuableor avoidable and thereis no obstacle. [. . .] And, third,fromthe act of acceptance,or, properlyspeaking,of volition,therenecessaryfollows or perhapsthe love {amor)and fromthe act of rejectionhate {odium); love and the rejectionhate.60 acceptanceis, formally,

It mightbe objected that no mentionof the will is made in the passage fromVives' accountoftheemotionsquotedabove. But as Mario Sancipriano has pointed out, Vives seems to thinkthat the emotions"act inside the to distinguish will, so that,in some passages of the treatise,it is difficult an emotionfromthe will itself".61 The tendencyto describeemotionsas motionsof the will is most evident in Vives' discussionof love. "The will",he writes,"as soon as somethingthatis judged to be good is presentedto it, is moved and attracted This motionis called to it by means of a sort of naturalconformity".62 if love it becomes confirmed, and, {amor).In his view, liking{allubescentia) love is thereforebest understoodas an inclinationor movementof the will towardsthe good.63Althoughthe will is the rulerand leader of the whole soul, it is in its turnled and draggedtowardits own good by love. This motion,accordingto Vives, is the most impetuous,since it is the 60QNE, X, q.2, 206v:"Proquantoergoibidictum actus est,ponamus quodprimus in obiecto, ex apprevoluntati sitcomplacentia veldisplicentia attributus que consurgit veldisconvenientis; de quo illiusobiecti subratione bonivelmali,convenientis hensione intertia nonse habetad istum actudeterminatum fuit tertii libri, questione quodvoluntas et libertate et hocibi requiris. actumlibere, necesteiusdominadominio oppositionis; veldisplicentie aliusactusqui solet Deindeistum actumcomplacentie sequitur aliquando dicitur volitio velnolitio, velrefutatio, etilleproprie vocari quiaquod loquendo acceptatio statim hocnoloet econtra. Et ad istum actumsequitur hocvolo,et quodrefuto accepto velfugibilis actualis velfugasi illudsitapprehensum prosequibilis permodům prosecutio estin primaquestione tertii Et de ilioactudeterminatum et si nonsitimpedimentum. se habetlibere voluntas libriet in duabussequentibus quodad eiusactusproductionem Tertio et hocetiamibi requiratur. et estdominaeiusdominio et libertate oppositionis; amornecessario, dietevolitionis, seu proprie autemex ilioactuacceptationis, sequitur amoret refutatio illa acceptatio estformaliter et ex acturefutationis odium,vel forte onBookX oftheEthics odium". , in:Arthur Questions Stephen JeanBuridan, Quotedfrom Two: Texts. Volume Translations McGradeet al. (eds),TheCambridge ofMedieval Philosophical Ethics andPolitical , Cambridge 2001,518. Philosophy 61Sancipriano 1981(n.4), 132. 62S, 472; M, III, 428: "Quodbonumesseiudicatur simulac voluntati estoblatum, as sesecongruentia earncontinuo, et allicit movet quadamnaturali". 63Ibid.:"Allubescentia siveinclivoluntatis estamor;hunclicetintelligere confirmata ad bonum". siveprogressum nationem,

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voluntatis quickestand "on the verge of the will" (in precipiti ), which, as he explains,means that it originatesand developswith its complacence, so thatit almostseems as it was fallingoffa slope. Love is thereforethe strongestand most powerfulof all the emotions.Moreover,it is also the originof all emotions,since we followand desirewhat we love, and shun and hate what is contraryto what we love.64 Traces of Buridan's notion of the firstact of the will are discernible also in Vives' chapteron the will. In connectionwithsome remarksconcerninganimal behaviour that reflectssome kind of dissimulation,such as the cautiousnessshown by the cat when it hunts the mouse, Vives points out that the firstmotion, consistingin the impulse towards the object,is keptback by a contrarymotion,comingfromthefearof suffering or of losingthe prey.In his view, however,thisis not to be regardedas some kind of deliberation,but ratheras the obstructionof the firstact.65 Vives' wordingin thispassage is verycareless,since he seems to suggest that animals also have a second act in which a higher facultycorrespondingto the human will elicitsan act of acceptance or rejection.His point,however,is thatanimals,althoughtheyact on the basis of the sensitiveappetite,can nonethelesshave contraryimpulses. 4. Conclusion As we have seen,Vives subscribesto all the threeprinciplesthatFabienne Pironetidentifiesas the basis of Buridan's theoryof free choice, maintainingthata) the will cannot will somethingbad as such, or will against somethinggood as such; b) the will cannot will that which the intellect has not judged to be good in some way or other;c) the will can never 64S, 504;M, III, 440f.:"Primum voluntas estanimiuniversi dominatrix etrectrix, voluntatis incitatisamor;rapitenimillamamorad suumbonum, qui motusestomnium simus: celerrimus nascitur enimetgliscit volente voluntatis; quoniam perse,etinprecipiti ut tanquam videatur affectionum omnium ipsaac libente, impelli perpronum; quocirca amorfortissima utmerito sitilludconsensu totseculorum est,et potentissima; approbatum:Amoricedereomniatanquam victori. Et alioquisi quissubtilius ex perscrutetur, amore anteadicebam, affectus omnes etconinveniet, quemadmodum profluere; sequimur, et odimus contraria videlicet, cupiscimus quaeamamus: fugimus ijs,quaeamamus". 65S, 348;M, III, 384f.:"Suntquaedam ammalia ad simulationem et dissimulationem a natura utvulpes, etfelisquumvenatur murem: ex metu, ne facta, quaecautionascitur autamittat; namin brutoquumad suumobiectum ruenti offertur quidpatiatur pericuab aliterò nonestea consultatio, sedimpedimenlum,retardatur contrario; priorimpetus tumprioris motus".

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choose a lesser good while a greatergood is taken into consideration, because the lessergood is bad in comparisonto the greatergood. In spiteof theseclear structural similarities withBuridan' theory,howvoluntarist. ever, the spiritof Vives' account is more straightforwardly For example,one of the analogies employedby late medievalvoluntarists is the image of the soul as a kingdomin which the will has supreme power. The will can command all the otherpowers of the soul as a sovRoland Teske has argued that the ereignwould command its subjects.66 source of the image of the will as king and ruleramong late thirteenthIn his De centuryvoluntaristsis the writingsof William of Auvergne.67 anima , forinstance,he maintainsthat thehumansoul bearsthelikenessof a well-ordered and wellestablished city,because the will is presentin it as kingand ruler{rexet imperator ), the intellectiveor reasoningpower is its counselor,while the lower powers,namely,the irascible,concupiscible,and movingpowers,that is to say, those whichcarryout movement,are like ministers, whose officeit is to carryout the ordersof the willthatreignsoverand commandsthem.68 There are severaltracesof thisimageryin Vives' account. He describes the will as ruler{domina) and commander{imperatrix). The mind,i.e., reason and judgement,is, on the other hand, characterisedas counsellor and guide {consultrix ). He also compares the role of the will in ductrixque the processof deliberationto thatof a sovereign{ princeps ) who can command thatthe matterbe put under advisementor postponed.Moreover, in order to show the supremacyof the will,Vives comparesit to a sovereignwho, in ordernot to seem governedby someoneelse,oftenexcludes and rejectsall the good advice of his counsellors.In De primaphilosophia (1531), he also mentionsthe motivepowers, sayingthat the will is the ruler,reason is the counsellorand the motivepowers are the body of servantswho carryout the commandsof the will.69 66On theanalogy between civilpolity andthesoulamongst latemedieval voluntarists, seeErnst DieSeele als "minor mundus" undab "regnum". EinBeitrag der zurPsychologie Stadter, mittleren undPartikularismus imMittelalter Franziskanerschule , in:PaulWilpert , (ed.),Uniuersalismus Berlin1968,56-72. 67Roland thePowers over J.Teske,TheWillas King oftheSoul:UsesandSources ofanImage intheThirteenth 32 (1994),62-71. , in:Vivarium, Century 68William ofAuvergne, De anima Teske1994,64f. , c. II, pt. 15.Quotedfrom 69M, III, 227:"Habetergohomo,ad Dei quandam voluntatem, consilium, imaginem, siverationem, etvires, utconsilum autdissuadeat voluntati suadeat, quaeestimperatura,

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Reaching a betterunderstandingof Vives' philosophicalstudyof the soul and providinga more accurate basis for the assessmentof its originalityand influenceon early modern conceptionsof the human mind require a carefulanalysisof extensivetextualmaterialand an examination of theoriesand conceptsthatwere influential in the formationof his account. To achieve a definitive of the intellectual picture backgroundof Vives' conceptionof freedomof the will is, of course,beyond the scope of the presentstudy.I hope, however,thatthe reader has come to share my view on the significanceof Vives' scholasticbackgroundand that what has been presentedhere will turnout to be a valuable clue to some of the importantmissingpieces.70 Uppsala University Department ofPhilosophy

voluntas viribus utse exerant ad opus,virescapessant imperet jussa;voluntas ergodominaest,ratioconsultrix, viresmancipium". 70Workon thispaperwasbegunwiththesupport ofa Frances A. YatesResearch at theWarburg in London.An earlier Institute draft waspresented at the Fellowship annualmeeting oftheRenaissance ofAmerica heldin Cambridge, in Society England DavidA. LinesandLodiNauta,whoorganized thepanelon April2005.I wishtothank Renaissance ethics as wellas theparticipants andmoralpsychology, in thediscussion for their I amparticularly andsuggestions. to LilliAlanen, Martin helpful questions grateful Henrik andRistoSaarinen fortheir valuable comments andcriticism. Gustafsson, Lagerlund

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Reviews IsabelIribarren, Durandus A Dominican in theShadow ofSt Pourçain. Theologian ofAquinas. Oxford Oxford 2005(Oxford xiv+ 311pp. Press, University Theological Monographs) ISBN0-19-928231-5 DurandofSt.Pourçain haslongbeenrecognized as oneoftheleading intellectual figures at theUniversity ofParisin theopening decadesofthefourteenth often century, placed PeterAureolas representative ofa turntoward a morecritical alongside philosophical in theyearsimmediately after Durandwasthesubject ofa approach JohnDunsScotus. Kochin 1927andwellas numerous in booksandarticles majorworkbyJosef byothers thelastcentury. Iribarren's work concerns thedocAlthough onlyoneareaofDurand's thought, namely oftheTrinity trine andthedebatewiththeThomist HervéNedelec(Hervaeus Natalis), sheplacesbothHervéandDurandin a newandmorenuanced context. The opening section examines conciliar andscholastic on theTrinity from theFourth Lateran teaching Council withparticular attention toAquinas andtheories on relation, the Scotus, through divineprocessions, and thePersons, whichform thethreeareasofTrinitarian doctrine discussed at eachpointin thebook.The secondpartexamines in thecontrothestages between ofDurandand headoftheDominican Hervé,as theleadingopponent versy commission toexamine hiswritings, andDurand. Thisdoctrinad withHervé's partbegins ontheTrinity inhisSentences Durand's comteaching (1302-03), commentary pre-Parisian on theSentences thecriticisms andresponses ofeachtheologian intheir mentary (1307-08), of Durand(1314),hisresponse thecensure in his quodlibetal disputations (1308-13), Hervé's inhisReprobationes corrective Excusationes, , thesecondcensure (1317),andthefinad redaction ofDurand's on theSentences. commentary Iribarren notessignificant differences between viewsandwhatcametobe the Aquinas' Thomistic accepted"common" opinionin theearlyfourteenth century amongHervé de la Palud, andother Dominicans. Nedelec, JohnofNaples,Pierre JamesofLausanne, Shealsobrings tolight theshaping effect Franciscan hadonthediscussion ofthe thought evenamongDominicans, in theperiodafter Scotus.The traditional Trinity, interpretationthatsawHervéas a defender ofThomasagainst a non-Thomist Durandis replaced witha picture ofconflicts within twodifferent Franciscan currents ofthought. byIribarren Sheuncovers Scotistic inHervé's elements andseesinDuranda return toelements views, intheteaching inplaceofa picture ofBonaventure on theTrinity. ofDurand Moreover, inthedirection histeaching ofThomasin response topressure from hisorder, modifying Iribarren shows thatDurandadopted ofhisopponents thetechnical without abanwording mostoftheprincipal elements ofhisposition. alsocallsattention to the Iribarren doning historical ofthedoctrinad ofDurandin 1317, significance agendaofthesecondcensure which aimedatestablishing theauthority ofThomas as thecommon oftheorder teaching andtheschools. ofhisepiscopal from thesafety to reshape throne, Durandus, preferred inkeeping thefinal redaction ofhisSentences withwhathefeltwastheteachcommentary enriched andclarified debate. ingoftheFathers byopenscholastic anditsphilosophical Iribarren theintricacies ofthedoctrinad foundations, Beyond dispute and historians intended herbookto be ofinterest bothto theologians byplacingthe BrillNV,Leiden,2006 © Koninklijke - www.brill.nl/viv Alsoavaiilable online

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The twoprotagonists, andcontext. in botha historical discussions sequence theological ofSt.Jacquesin 1303,albeit at theconvent wereresident HervéandDurand, together at on theSentences whileScotuswaslecturing in their academic at different careers, points hadcensured Dominican convent. theFranciscan him, theologians Bythetimehisfellow V andJohnXXII. Iribarren ofpopesClement withthesupport DurandwasinAvignon toassert their Parisian between as a conflict characterizes thissituation masters, attempting in such itssuperior in doctrinal andthepapacyreasserting matters, authority authority the to successive whichled to Durand'sappointment matters. bishoprics, Papalsupport, thefullreachof lastofwhichwasMeauxto theeastofParis,placedDurandbeyond shouldnotbe overstressed, contrast thisParis-Avignon Dominican Although jurisdiction. of the seconddecadeofthefourcontroversial that the other itisworth theologian noting thatledtohisappointfrom alsobenefited PeterAureol, teenth papalpatronage century, hisdeath.HervéNedelec, ofAixshortly before ment as archbishop participated bycontrast, le Bel:thecallfora initiated or condoned in manyofthejudicialactions byPhilippe in 1307,andthe oftheTemplars Boniface VIII in 1303,theconfessions council against theTemplars. in 1308to theking's ofParisian concerning questions theologians response andsubject author anda thorough withan extensive Thebookconcludes bibliography Thomisiic School thatFrederick index.It is surprising, however, (Dubuque Early J.Roensch's it in fairness to Iribarren, or notes, in thebibliography although 1964)wasnotincluded or conclusions. heranalysis wouldnothavealtered HowdidHervéat Parisin 1308cometo knowor would remain. Certain questions in 1307-08 studium at a provincial delivered witha commentary evenbother bya student hiscontemDurandinformed oftheology? evena bachelor whowasnotyettechnically butby hispermission, without wascirculated exercise thatthetextofthisfirst poraries maintains whomand amongwhom? Koch,thisfirst Moreover, if,as Iribarren against and master andattacked workwascomposed byHervéin 1308and 1309whileregent how was it Sentences at Durand read the France before of master Paris, possiprovincial to readat Parisin General bleforDurandto be appointed Chapter bytheDominican inadvance andrequired tookplacetwoyears thatnormally 1309or 1310,an appointment as ofhislectures wastheresult lectura Koch'sviewthatDurand's annualapproval? prima andthusis still oftheseevents thepolitics oftheology at Parisbetter bachelor explains worth considering. of contributions toourknowledge recent bookis oneofthemostimportant Iribarren's andto in thatperiod, ofThomism to thedevelopment thought, earlyfourteenth-century ofDurandandhis ourknowledge advances It clearly inTrinitarian thedebates theology. in much her debt. we are for which contemporaries, Wisconsin Madison,

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vol.2).Clarendon ofWestern Medieval Philosophy, (ANewHistory Philosophy Anthony Kenny, Oxford 2005,xvii+ 334pp. ISBN0 19 875275X Press, whoknowmoreandmoreaboutlessandless.The study We livein a worldofexperts ofan efforts to thesustained no to thisrule.Thanks is ofmedieval exception philosophy anddebates ofscholastic sources a largenumber ofmedievalists, international community scholars tendto havean increasin recent havebeenrediscovered years.Butindividual othoftopics: someworkontwelfth-century ofa decreasing number ethics, ingknowledge author ora andstillothers focuson a single erson earlyfourteenth-century metaphysics, in articles andbooksthat school. intellectual research, mostly presented single Specialized to recognize makesit difficult foroutsiders forotherexperts, arewritten anycoherence to geta vague in thescattered field.Non-professional readers mayevenhaveproblems inthehistorical conis aboutandhowithasdeveloped ideaofwhatmedievali philosophy anda solidintrowhoseekorientation ofnon-specialists, thisaudience text.It is precisely in thatAnthony duction to morethana thousand Kennyaddresses yearsofphilosophy, to fromAugustine book.He chartsthestoryof medieval thisambitious philosophy familiar students thechancetobecome thusgiving andfocuses onmajortexts, Pomponazzi in thesea ofscholarly literature. without withthemostimportant drowning topics overview Thefirst Thebookis divided intotwoparts. 1-2)givesa short part(chapters from thefourth to theearlysixteenth andsketches thedevelopment ofthemainauthors a "mustinclude ofWestern outthata history philosophy century. Kennyrightly points inanymodern sense"(p. xiv),andthereofphilosophers whoarenot'Western' treatment in hispanorama. Thisis a wisedeciAverroes andMaimonides foreincludes Avicenna, in theLatinWest from thestartthatmanytheories sion;becauseit makesclearright from Muslim and without theintellectual couldnothavebeendeveloped inputstemming as a Christian to seemedieval authors. It wouldbe erroneous merely philosophy Jewish forMuslim andJewish to problems philosophers posedbypaganphilosophers. response todealwiththem. anddeveloped a number ofproblems, mulated strategies sophisticated usedthese Christian thewaysinwhich Thatiswhyitis important toexplore philosophers thatthey borandcombining them withother strategies transforming strategies, eventually Whatmakesmedievali orinvented themselves. ancient authorities rowedfrom philosophy andtheinnovation thatdevelofdifferent traditions is theamalgamation so fascinating focuses Muslim andJewish cultures. between Christian, Kenny opedduetotheencounter He nicelyshowsthatthirteenthit withmanyexamples. on thisaspectand illustrates andAverroes' relied andimagination aboutintellect debates heavily uponAvicenna's century andattributes aboutGod'sexistence debates andhe explains thatmedieval psychology, to emphasize sources. It is important from IslamicandJewish borrowed manyelements nowthatit seemsto be in thismulti-cultural especially philosophy, aspectofmedieval to speakabouta "clashofcivilizations." vogue(evenamongintellectuals) to an introduction muchlonger The second, 3-9)provides partofthebook(chapters oflogicand language, crucialtopicsand sub-disciplines: knowledge, physics, questions listtakesthe ofGod.Thisbalanced andthestudy mindandsoul,ethics, metaphysics, medieval ofreducing thedanger intoaccount. Itavoids areasandproblems philosophy major committed is thecase in handbooks of religion and philosophy to metaphysics (which tobe found oflanguage ortologicandphilosophy toContinental (a tendency philosophy) showsthatmedieval in theolderschoolof analytic Kennysuccessfully philosophy). about offreewilltoquestions from theproblem hadwideinterests, ranging philosophers to highlight divineomnipotence. three-valued Anyattempt logicandpuzzlesconcerning is boundtofail.If medieval theone"essential" ortoemphasize a single interest problem anda vastnumofproblems markat all,itis thefactthata plurality is an essential there listof theMiddleAges.Kenny's werediscussed berofsolutions longanddetailed during Vivarium 44,2-3

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illustrates thisin an admirable discussion oftheseproblems, way.His diligent problems andbasedon first-hand oftherelevant enablesevery texts, knowledge alwaysaccurate - a flavour theflavour ofscholastic debates forclarity, andthe reader todiscover subtlety ofphilosophical serious ambition to getto thebottom problems. on political Dante'sMonarchia thevolumelacksa chapter Unfortunately, philosophy. andMarsilius ofPadua'sDefensor referred tobutnotdiscussed, Ockham's pacisarebriefly areleftout.A andGilesofRome'sextensive works areonlymentioned, writings political inpolitical ofjustice, ofthemajordebates philosophy (e.g.aboutthenature presentation ofmonarchy) wouldhaveshownthatthis ofjustwar,or thelegitimacy thepossibility buta crucial ofmedieval ofphilosophy is notjusta modern branch invention, ingredient "Goldenage" of Spanish theso-called Furthermore, Kennytotally ignores philosophy. ofjustice, nor whowrote an important Neither Francisco de Vitoria, scholasticism. theory northeConimbricenses, whomadesignificant aninfluential Francisco Suárez, metaphysician, Ofcourse, ofnature, arediscussed. itisimposcontributions topsychology andphilosophy in onebook,anddrawing a sharpline latemedieval author sibleto include every single No periodhas is hardly latescholastic andearlymodern between philosophers possible. is sucha thing as a definite It is evendubious thatthere clearboundaries. periodin the who as a historical ofphilosophy: eachperiodis constructed entity byauthors history earlier andschools. Yetoneshouldnot to distance themselves from intend philosophers andtheories werepromiofargumentation thefactthatscholastic methods, styles ignore Latescholastic authors didnotsimply andseventeenth centuries. nentfarintothesixteenth andtransformed Scotusor Ockham, butcriticized theories byAquinas, repeat developed bookdoesnotaddress themin significant anyof thesetransformations. ways.Kenny's in a subsequent volumethatdoesnotstart theywillbe takenintoaccount Hopefully, and earlyseventeenth-century to sixteenth butpaysparticular attention withDescartes scholastic authors. to theright who,in hisview,"retains Aquinas Kennyis at hisbestwhenhe presents ofthehighMiddleAges."(p. xvi)Thismaysound be classedas thegreatest philosopher narracredo.YetKennyis farfrom likean old-fashioned Thomistic beingan uncritical he points outboththeir Whenhe reconstructs histheories, torofAquinas'philosophy. In the to form their ownopinion. andweaknesses, thusstimulating thereaders strengths an showsthatAquinasis neither forinstance, he convincingly on knowledge, chapter forintellectual is byitself sufficient whothinks thatsensory cogniexperience empiricist ofinnate whoassumes thatthere isa stock nora rationalist Rather, tion, Aquinas concepts. needsto abstract holdstheviewthattheintellect (so-called concepts intelligible species) In lightofthiscombination of information on thebasisofsensory (so-called phantasms). toa famous Kantian dictum: andrationalism, states, alluding "Thought Kenny empiricism to themind." are empty; without without phantasms speciesare darkness phantasms ofAquinas' But clearandconcise characterization keythesis. (p. 165)Thisis a perfectly himself to reconstructing thisthesis. He critically outthat points Kennydoesnotconfine howtheacquisition ofconcepts andcognition work. enables to explain itsimply Aquinas In orderto explain it doesnothelphimto givean accountofknowledge. However, in thestrict forAquinasto Aristotelian sense,it wouldhavebeennecessary knowledge - principles totheformation offirst that yields process principles spellouthowa cognitive butnevertheless true.Kenny concludes: aresomehow basedonsensory infallibly experience is thatitleavesquiteunclear whatis therole "Theserious withAquinas' theory problem in science." for ofexperience andexperiment (p. 169)Thisis indeeda serious problem hasnoclearsolution.1 onthisweakspot,thusencourwhich Aquinas Kenny putshisfinger to lookfora satisfying solution. aginghisreaders 1 Forrecent toprovide a solution, seeS. MacDonald, ofKnowledge," attempts "Theory in:TheCambridge toAquinas & E. Stump, , ed.byN. Kretzmann 1993, Companion Cambridge

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doesnotonlyreconstruct healsoshows howitdiffers Kenny theory concisely, Aquinas' from earlier andlaterones.Thus,hepoints outthat"forAquinas wasa conthespecies in question, oftheintellect forScotusit is theimmediate cept,thatis to sayan ability thespecies intoan inner Scotuspavedthe objectofknowledge." (p. 172)Turning object, Forwhatis immediately to theintellect is not wayfora representational theory. present theexternal buttheinternal thatis onlycausally linked totheexternad thing, species thing. willseethatthisis a decisive in thehistory reader moment ofphilosophy Anyattentive ofmind:a realist thatstresses theimmediate relation between intellect theory cognitive andmaterial worldwastransformed intoa theory thatpostulates innerrepresentations. thisissueandthusenableshisreaders to becomeawareofa change Kennyemphasizes thatproved to be important notjustformedieval butformodern philosophy, epistemologyas well. forAquinas hasa drawback: itleadshimtounderUnfortunately, Kenny's highesteem estimate otherphilosophers. One ofthemis Ockhamwho,according to Kenny, holds A closer someimplausible orevenabsurd examination ofthetexts howreveals, positions. canonlybe dueto a misunderstanding. In thechapter on lanever,thatthisaccusation states thatOckham toa mental guage,forinstance, Kenny(nodoubtcorrectly) appealed ofmental wordswithgrammatical features. Buthe is notimpressed language consisting to language. In hisview,it is hardly to assume bythismentalistic approach convincing thattherearemental wordssuchas theconnective 'and'or thequantifier 'all':". . . we readiness totransfer ofmedieval idiomatic features Latin maysmileat his[sc.Ockham's] intotheuniversal iniofthemind." language (p. 145)Thisis an echooftheoldcritique, formulated thatOckham's mental is nothing buta faint tially byJ. Trentman, language andwritten Latin.Yeta closer lookat Ockham's texts reveals thatthisis copyofspoken notthecase.2First, he emphasizes thatthemental doesnotcomprise allwords language and grammatical butonlythosethatare necessary features, "propter significationem". he points outthatquantifiers like'all' arerequired becausetheyexpress crucial Second, Forinstance, we needa quantifier on themental levelbecause'All logicaldifferences. menarerunning' 'A manis running'. differs from Mentallanguage is notsimply clearly a copyofthespoken that(a) enablesus to endowspoken sounds one,buta language witha meaning andthat(b) includes thebasicelements fora logicalstructure. necessary Another concerns Ockham's ofthesoul.Unlike Ockham holds theory critique Aquinas, thattheintellectual soulis abletograspindividual underan individual But things aspect. whatthen,Kennyasks,is thedifference theintellectual and thesensory between soul? inparticular Thesensory sensation andimagination, alsograspindividuad faculties, things underan individual ofOckham's razorto aspect."Ifthatis so,thenitseemsa violation twodifferent faculties withexactly thesamefunction." postulate (p. 247)Thisconclusion ifonetakesintoaccount is notcompelling thattheintellectual soulis a linguistic faculty: mental andsentences. itforms terms The sensory takes soul,on theotherhand,merely insensory andcomesupwithsensory a tree,I simThus,whenI imagine inputs images. andgreenpatches. WhenI think abouta tree,I plyvisualize something bigwithbrown form term'tree'andI amabletomakepredications like'Thetreeis brown' thementad or'Thetreehasleaves'.It is therefore toposittwopsychological notsuperfluous faculties: in different ways. theydealwithindividual things

a foundationalist andE. Stump, whopresents , London& New solution, 160-95, Aquinas whooptsfora reliabilist one. York2003,217-43, 2 See Quodlibeta N.Y. IX, StBonaventure, V, q. 8-9,ed.byJ.C.Wey,Operatheologica Ockham onConcepts Fora detailed seeC. Panaccio, 2004. , Aldershot 1980,508-518. analysis,

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ofKenny's theoverall arenotintended to question Theseexamples exposition quality toengage thereader On thecontrary, showthatheinvites andphilosophical they analysis. andto tryoutdifferent in a critical to lookat theoriginal texts, discussion, interpretaa philosophical introduction to theMiddleAgesis notjusta from tions. Whatoneexpects evaluation ofolddebates, buta critical andtexts, nora mereparaphrase listofauthors - an evaluation and andarguments theses thattakesmedieval ofthesedebates seriously It is exactly thisphilosophical intojudging their thereader engagement validity. provokes tomedieval hiscomprehensive andlucidintroduction stimulates with thatKenny philosophy. Berlin

Perler Dominik

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BooksReceived Actesdu XIe etlittérature au XIIesiècle. universel. AlaindeHile,le docteur théologie Philosophie, de la SociétéInternationale pourl'Étudede la Philosophie Colloqueinternational A.Vasiliu etA. Galonnier. 23-25octobre 2003,édités Paris, Médiévale, parJ.-L.Solére, de Philosophie Turnhout 2005[Rencontres Médiévale, 12]XIV & 495pp. Brepols, etlenéoplatonLesécrits A. Niederberger, ISBN2 503 520154 - contents: dionysiens etla pluralité Alaindelille,la métaphysique deLille;C. Erismann, isme d'Alain érigénienne Alain deLille deChartres Alain deLilleetl'école des , Héritier ; D. Poirel, ; M. Lemoine, formes Polemic TheAnti-Jewish deSaintdel'école ; F. Hudry, Victor?-, ofLille ofAlain J.H.Pearson, nadeNatura dansleDe planetu Lafigure AlaindeLille* Maisquiétait donc J.Jolivet, éléments surlesquatre chrétienne deLille:unemythologie turaed'Alain ; I. Caiazzo,Discussions dela nature etconnaissance V. Rodrigues, Nature AlaindelilleetRaouldeLongchamp; chez M. AmrietdanslesGlosaesuperTrismegistum; dansleSermode sphaera intelligibili diconoscenza Modelli deLille Alain etrhétorique Connaissance sensitive chez ; L. Catalani, Kilani, diLille, leGlosesuperTrismegistum Alano eAlano diLille diPoitiers traGilberto ; I. Parri, e sanzalodo:Moral dell'anima e l'immortalità fiom ; M. Colish,Sanza'nfamia Neutrality di Alano diLillae Amalrico AlanofLilletoDante Dialettica, ; P. Lucentini, teologia, filosofia: Una e laprassi. Trala teoresi Alano diLillae la teologia Bène ; C. Chiurco, ; G. D'Onofrio, AlaindeLilleetPrévostin inAlano diLilla dellateologia ; L. Valente, interpretazione possibile conexio. dulangage surl'équivodté deCrémone Unitas, ; C. Trottmann, aequalitas, théobgique . . . ratiotrinitaires desanalogies AlaindeLilledansla tradition ; M. Dreyer, arithmétiques Alain in publicum deducere. infirmare et. . . rationes nabiliter quibusfides[innitur] sainte danslesSermones L'Écriture delafoi; J.Longère, avec lesadversaires deLilleetleconflit dela Bible. deLille uariid'Alain ; G. Dahan,AlaindeLilleetl'exégèse e del Tractatus dellaLoyca di Francesco da Prato La logica Fabrizio , conl'edizione Amerini, SISMEL - Edizionidel Galluzzo,Firenze2005 [UnioneAccadedevoceunivoca. MediiAevi,Testie studi,19]V & 646pp. micaNazionale. CorpusPhilosophorum ISBN88 84501377 d'ancien dePrémonté dansla France del'ordre AnneBondéelle-Souchier, , II. régime Bibliothèques étudeset répertoires, Paris2006[Documents, CNRS Éditions, desinventaires. Édition desTextes, et d'Histoire de Recherche 58] parl'Institut publiés ThomeBraduardini, circaTractatum Biaisede Parme, magistři proportionum Questiones Vescovini. de G. Federici éditéparJoëlBiardetSabineRommevaux, Vrin, préface du Moyen Paris2005[Textes Age,22] 240pp.ISBN2 711617904 philosophiques Press Tusculanum 76 (2005)282pp.Museum etlatin, duMoyen-Âge del'Institut Cahiers grec De memoonAristotle's Metochites D. Bloch,Theodoros ISBN87 63504766 - contents: IssuesV; H. andPhilosophical Trinitarian Theology ria;C. Schabel& R.L. Friedman, ' Master onBoethius AnEarly Brito, Radulphus Hansen, Topics;WJ.Courtenay, Commentary 1-3 Elenchorum libri Bur Walter M. von and Arts ley's Quaestiones Perger, Theology; of Elenchos 4-12. Gualterus & 13-18;S. Ebbesen, Burleus, superSophisticos Quaestiones A revised edition. Collected 2006 [Variorum inScholasticism. MarciaL. Colish,Studies Variorum, Ashgate Studies Series]

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Conradüs de Mure,Fabularius Turnhout 2006 , curaet studioT. vande Loo. Brepols, Continuatio Mediaeualis, 210] XCVI & 648 pp. ISBN 2 [CorpusChristianorum, 503051014 DunsScotà Paris1302-2002. Actesdu colloquede Paris,2-4septembre 2002.Editéspar O. Boulnois, Turnhout E. Karger, 2004[FIDEM, J.-L.Solére,G. Sontag. Brepols, Texteset études du MoyenÂge,26] XXIV & 683pp. ISBN 2 503 5181109 CécileFabris, Étudier etvivre à ParisauMoyen deLaon(XIVe -XVe École siècles). Âge.Le collège deschartes, Paris2005 [Mémoires et documents de l'Ecoledeschartes, 81] V & 504pp. ISBN 2 90079176 6 Florian Das Siegel derEwigkeit. undKonziliarismus beiHeymericus Hamann, Universalwissenschaft 16] Aschendorff Münster derCusanus-Gesellschaft, deCampo. 2006[Buchreihe Verlag, 369pp. ISBN 3 402 031701 Passions in William Ockham 's Philosophical KluwerAcademic Vesa Hirvonen, Psychology. in theHistory ofPhilosophy of Dordrecht-Boston-London 2004[Studies Publishers, Mind,2] beiNicolaus Cusanus. Intellectus und und sinnlicher Erkenntnis Imaginatio. Aspekte geistiger Herausgegeben vonJ.M.André, G. Krieger, H. Schwaetzer. B.R. Grüner, Amsterdam-Philadelphia G. Krieger, Studien zurPhilosophie, 2006[Bochumer 44]VIII & 157pp. contents: vonOckham Buridan und absolutus. Parallele Wilhelm zwischen ,Johannes %ueiner Conceptus inderCusanischen Formel: Cusanus Intellekt Nicolaus „Sistutuus ; J.Machetta, Kontemplativer " unddie des etegoerotuus"; DieMetapher der„Mauer desParadies J.M.André, Kartographie ' undImagination inCusanus Erkennens beiNikolaus vonKues ; D. Thiel,Intellekt Trialogus de possest; H. Schwaetzer, Die methodische derCusanischen Begründung Symbolphilosophie. von alsKreativität Verhältnis und visio;M. Thurner, Imagination Zumsystematischen imaginatio und Cusanus. WalterHaugzum75. Geburtstag; K. Yamaki,Funktion nachNicolaus - einkonkretes derimaginatio beiCusanus war „ImAnfang ; K. Reinhardt, Tragweite Beispiel vonKues derMagnetismus ". EinBeispiel imSermoCCXII desNikolaus ; M.S. fürImagination Marinho DieMetapher desSehens beiNikolaus vonKues ; F.-B.Stammkötter, Nogueira, vonKuesüber Musik Nikolaus A Dominican IsabelIribarren, Durandus in theShadow ofAquinas. ofSt Pourçain. Theologian Oxford Oxford xiv+311 pp. 2005(Oxford Press, University Theological Monographs) ISBN0 19 9282315 andCultural andUseofLanguage intheLater Middle oftheStudy Ages Language Change. Aspects MA 2006[Groningen andtheRenaissance , ed.L. Nauta.Peeters, Leuven-Paris-Dudley, in Cultural Studies 24] XV & 224pp. ISBN90 429 17571 - contents: Change, inFifteenth-Century ViaModerna; S. Müller, and C.H.Kneepkens, LariguageReality Theology, A Conflict Scholasticism versus Humanism: LateFifteenth-Century on ofInterests? Reflections Grammar inNorthwestern Nicholas ; I. Bocken,TheArtofSpeaking. Europe ofCusaas a ortheHolyTongue? Imitation andAuthenticity ; I.E. Zwiep,Hebrew Philosopher ofLanguage inMedieval Hebrew Between andLikemindedness: Some ; A.A.Robiglio, Writing. Language Civilis toGuazzo The ; J. Hankins, Aspects oftheConcept ofConversado from Aquinas intheFifteenth Bruni inLatin TheWritings Popularization ofHumanism ofLeonardo Century: andtheVernacular, E. Chayes, andImages intheRimedegliAcademici Language ofWords Occulti 1568:Reflections PreL. Nauta, andthe Humanist ofthe Conceptual?; linguistic Relativity Imitation Latin CanChange Minds ; A. Moss,Language ofClassical Charles H. Lohr,Latin Aristotle Commentaries Literature. SISMEL/ , V. Bibliography ofSecondary Edizionidel Galluzzo,Firenze2005 [UnioneAccademica Nazionale.Corpus MediiAevi.Subsidia XV] XIV & 567pp. ISBN88 8450 1458 Philosophorum Melanchthon undderCalvinismus. vonG. FrankundH.J.Selderhuis, unter Herausgegeben Mitarbeit vonS. Lalla.Frommann-Holzboog, Cannstatt 2005[MelanchthoStuttgart-Bad Schriften derStadtBretten, G. Frank 9] 375pp.ISBN3 772822363 - contents:

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P. Metzger, Geleitwort ; R. Faber,TheHumanism Vorwort, HJ.Selderhuis, ofMeianchthon andofCalvin; L.D. Bierma, TheStructure Catechism: Melanchthonian or oftheHeidelberg IllePhoenix: Meianchthon undderHeidelberger Cahinism 1583Cabinisti H.J.Selderhuis, 1622; K. Maag,Higher education andCalvinism: a comparative ; forMeianchthon approach Methodik unprotestantische VonMeianchthon zu Zabarella ; J. Röhls,Aristotelische Theologu. M. Becht,Pia Synodus. Die Lehre vomKonzil in derTheologie Melanchthons und Philipp Calvins in derEthik desfrühen Calvinismus ; C. Strohm, ; Johannes Melanchthon-Rezeption G. Frank, GottesundTrinitätslehre beiMeianchthon undCalvin; T. Mahlmann, Meianchthon %ur als Vorläufer desWittenberger M. Engammare, Thehoroscopes , Kryptocalvinismus; ofCabin Meianchthon andLuther. Anunexpected W. Janse,Die post-tridentine polemical argument; desNonkonformisten Wilhelm W.van't Spijker, Kiebitz (ca.1533-1568); Melanchthonrezeption DieDwersität derreformierten Scholastik. Dietheologische Methode Melanchthons undCabins im undbeider Scholastik; Vergleich Auswirkungen aufdiereformierte A.J.Beck,ZurRezeption Melanchthons beiGisbertus Voetius namentlich inseiner Gotteslehre (1589-1676), Moral ontheThreshold EditedbyJ.KrayeandR. Saarinen. ofModernity. Philosophy Springer, Dordrecht Historical TextsandStudies intheHistory 2005[NewSynthese Library. ofPhilosophy, and Scholastics 57] VI & 340pp.ISBN 1 402030002 contents: Neo-Scholastics: D. Lines, Sources andAuthorities inthe Italian Renaissance: forMoral Philosophy Thomas andJeanBuridan onAristotle's T. Pink,Action , WillandLawin Ethics; Aquinas LateScholasticism; Michael M.W.F.Stone, Baius(1513-89) andthe Debate onePure Nature3: andMoral Grace inSixteenth-Century R. Schlüssler, OntheAnatomy Scholasticism; Agency of S.K. Knebel,Casuistry andtheEarly Modem intheNotion Probabilism; Paradigm Shift of - Theories ofHumanRights andDominion: R. Lambertini, andPower: Charity; Poverty Franciscans inLater Medieval Political V. Mäkinen, TheFranciscan Thought, Background of Modem Discussion: andSubsistence; Rights Rights ofProperty J. Varkema, Early Justification Conrad Summenhart onNatural R. Saarinen, Ethics inLuther's : through Being: Rights; Theology - Reformers TheThree andHumanists: G. Frank, TheReason Meianchthon' s Orders', ofActing: andtheQuestion andConsistency oftheUnity Concept ofPractical ofHisPhilosophy; Philosophy D. Bellucci, andEthics inMeianchthon; C. Strohm, Ethics inEarly Natural Philosophy L. Casini, andAnti-Stoicism inJuanVwes's Aristotelianism Emotions'. ; Cabinism; ofthe Conception as MoralPhilosopher: Marc-Antoine Mureťs 1585Edition J. Kraye,TheHumanist ofSeneca alsAkt beiThomas von Leiden-Boston 2006[Studien Brill, Hanns-Gregor Sprache Aquin. Nissing, undTextezurGeistesgeschichte desMittelalters, 87] XIV & 827 pp. ISBN 90 04 146458 AJournal ofEarlyandMedieval 44 (2005), Sacris Erudiri. on theInheritance Christianity, orprotreptic? D. Rankin, Audiences 490pp.ISBN2 50351796X - contents: Apologetic andProtrepticus; M. Elsakkers, Gothic andstrategies inClement Stromateis ofAlexandria's Gothic Version Vetus Latina andVisigothic Law:Evidence Bible, fora Septuagint-based ofExodus; etrésuldesaintAthanase methodes B. Gain,L'édition (1698).Genèse, parMon faucon SecundaofAthanasius', Three Historical Problems intheApologia tats;P. Van Nuffelen, surDaniel deJérôme dansl'Occident médiéval chréR. Courtray, La réception duCommentaire Freiheit radikal Liberum securitas und tien K. Bracht, arbitrium, siècle); (Vir-Xir gedacht. attribué à P. Van Deun,Le De animaet angelis derUrsprung desBösen beiAugustin; M. De Groote, Alttestamentische Eustrate deConstantinople (CPG7523):untexte fantôme?', R. Kottje, EinFragment des"Paenitentiale" indnem Vatikaner Codex; Passionsprophezeiungen R.B.C.Huygens, der"Institutionen" vonCambrai auseinem Frühdruck Justinians; Halitgars selon C. Wollin, etsonexplication del'évangile À propos deChristian ditdeStavelot Matthieu; "Kein La deBourgueils carm. Wein zuBaudri 202;G. Partoens, Marginalien furdieNormannen". deGuillaume deSaintad Romanos dans/^Expositio d'Augustin superepistolam présence onPeter Comestor's Historia scholastica ofStephen M.J.Clark,TheCommentaries Thieny; andHughofSt.Cher, PseudoTh, Marschler, praedicare. Disputando Langton Langton,

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inderscholastischen des13.Jahrhunderts amBeispiel ZurPräsenz theologischer Systematik Predigt vonOstersermones desOdovonChâteauroux codicum (fi273);Index imUmkreis Universitäten um1400.Lateinische undvolkssprachige Texte Schriften mitteleuropäischer ausPrag,WienundHeidelberg: Unterschiede, Gemeinsamkeiten, , herausWechselbeziehungen vonF.P. Knapp,J. Miethke undM. Niesner. 2004 Brill,Leiden-Boston gegeben in theMiddleAgesandRenaissance, andSociety XXIX & 310pp. [Education 20] ISBN90 04 140530 - contents: F.P.Knapp,EinFragenkatabg derTagung, zumThema Konrad von Soltau : ,Lectura D. Walz,Konrad vonGelnhausen: Firmiter' J.Nechutová, super caput Leben undPredigt undMoral:Schuften an mitteleu; M. Nuding, ,De contractibus' Geschäft Universitäten imspäten 14.und 15.Jahrhundert, F. Šmahel, DieVerschriftlichung ropäischen frühen derQuodlibet-Disputationem anderPrager bis1420; C. Flüeler, Ethica inWien Artistenfakultät anno1438.DieKommentierung derAristotelischen anderWiener ,Ethik' ; W.E. Artistenfakultät litteratus autilliteratus? Fürsten um1400 Wagner, Princeps Sprachfertigkeiten regierender realen undpädagogischen Humanismus zwischen ; D. Schmidtke, Anforderungssituatationem Texte desMatthäus vonKrakau unddeutsche ; C. Roth,Lateinische Pastoraltheologische Predigten imUmfeld vonUniversität undHofinHeidelberg um1420;V. Boku. F. Löser, DerWiderruf desPeter vonUničov vorderPrager ,DieWyclifsche'. Universitätsgemeinde (1417);A. Thomas, Frauen inderHussitenbewegung, F.P. Knapp,Liebeslieder imUniversitätsmilieu; J. Miethke, Rückblick eines Historikers aufeineinterdisziplinäre Tagung La Sophistria deRobertus Etudeet édition etI. RosierAnglicus. critique parA. Grondeux avecla collaboration de Ch.Brousseau-Beuerman etM. Sirridge. Catach, Vrin,Paris 2006[Sicet Non]428pp. ISBN 2 71161820X KlausWriedt, Schule undUniversität. innorddeutschen Städten desSpätmittelalters. Bildungsverhältnisse Gesammelte Aufsätze. Leiden-Boston intheMiddle andSociety 2005[Education Brill, 23] IX & 267pp. ISBN90 04 146873 AgesandRenaissance, to Vivarium, XLIV / 1 (2006) Corrigenda Twoerrors inthelastissueofVivarium. On p. 1,line3 from the inadvertently appeared read"Marchia's entire oeuvre" instead of"Marchia's French oeuvre". On bottom, "1" superscript. the"a" should havea number criticus, p. 61,line46 oftheapparatus

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inderscholastischen des13.Jahrhunderts amBeispiel ZurPräsenz theologischer Systematik Predigt vonOstersermones desOdovonChâteauroux codicum (fi273);Index imUmkreis Universitäten um1400.Lateinische undvolkssprachige Texte Schriften mitteleuropäischer ausPrag,WienundHeidelberg: Unterschiede, Gemeinsamkeiten, , herausWechselbeziehungen vonF.P. Knapp,J. Miethke undM. Niesner. 2004 Brill,Leiden-Boston gegeben in theMiddleAgesandRenaissance, andSociety XXIX & 310pp. [Education 20] ISBN90 04 140530 - contents: F.P.Knapp,EinFragenkatabg derTagung, zumThema Konrad von Soltau : ,Lectura D. Walz,Konrad vonGelnhausen: Firmiter' J.Nechutová, super caput Leben undPredigt undMoral:Schuften an mitteleu; M. Nuding, ,De contractibus' Geschäft Universitäten imspäten 14.und 15.Jahrhundert, F. Šmahel, DieVerschriftlichung ropäischen frühen derQuodlibet-Disputationem anderPrager bis1420; C. Flüeler, Ethica inWien Artistenfakultät anno1438.DieKommentierung derAristotelischen anderWiener ,Ethik' ; W.E. Artistenfakultät litteratus autilliteratus? Fürsten um1400 Wagner, Princeps Sprachfertigkeiten regierender realen undpädagogischen Humanismus zwischen ; D. Schmidtke, Anforderungssituatationem Texte desMatthäus vonKrakau unddeutsche ; C. Roth,Lateinische Pastoraltheologische Predigten imUmfeld vonUniversität undHofinHeidelberg um1420;V. Boku. F. Löser, DerWiderruf desPeter vonUničov vorderPrager ,DieWyclifsche'. Universitätsgemeinde (1417);A. Thomas, Frauen inderHussitenbewegung, F.P. Knapp,Liebeslieder imUniversitätsmilieu; J. Miethke, Rückblick eines Historikers aufeineinterdisziplinäre Tagung La Sophistria deRobertus Etudeet édition etI. RosierAnglicus. critique parA. Grondeux avecla collaboration de Ch.Brousseau-Beuerman etM. Sirridge. Catach, Vrin,Paris 2006[Sicet Non]428pp. ISBN 2 71161820X KlausWriedt, Schule undUniversität. innorddeutschen Städten desSpätmittelalters. Bildungsverhältnisse Gesammelte Aufsätze. Leiden-Boston intheMiddle andSociety 2005[Education Brill, 23] IX & 267pp. ISBN90 04 146873 AgesandRenaissance, to Vivarium, XLIV / 1 (2006) Corrigenda Twoerrors inthelastissueofVivarium. On p. 1,line3 from the inadvertently appeared read"Marchia's entire oeuvre" instead of"Marchia's French oeuvre". On bottom, "1" superscript. the"a" should havea number criticus, p. 61,line46 oftheapparatus

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Abstracting& Indexing Vivarium is indexed/abstracted in: Artsand Humanities CitationIndex;BibLing; Current Dietrich's IndexPhilosophicus; Indexto BlackPeriodicals; InterContents; nationaleBibliographie der Zeitschriftenliteratur aus allenGebietendes Wissens; International of Book Reviewsof Scholarly International Literature; Bibliography andLanguage Behavior Bibi.;Linguistics Abstracts; MathSci;MiddleEast: Philosophy Abstracts & Index;MLA; M L A International ofBooks& Articles on Bibliography theModernLanguages andLiteratures; Old Testament Periodicals Contents Abstracts; Index;Philosophers Index;ReligionIndexOne: Periodicals; ReligionIndexTwo: MultiAuthor Works. Subscriptionrates The subscription pricefortheprinteditionplusonlineaccessofVolume44 (2006, 3 issues) is EUR 170/ USD 212forinstitutions andEUR 57 / USD 71 forindividuals. For institutional it is also possibleto subscribe to onlineonlyaccessat customers, EUR 153 / USD 191.All pricesare exclusive ofVAT (notapplicable outsidethe ofshipping & handling. EU) butinclusive tothisjournalareaccepted forcomplete volumes Subscriptions onlyandtakeeffect withthefirst issueoftheyear. Claims Claimsformissing issueswillbe met,freeof charge,ifmadewithin threemonths ofdispatch forEuropeancustomers and fivemonths forcustomers outsideEurope. Online access Fordetailson howto gainonlineaccess,pleasecheckwww.brill.nl/viv. Subscriptionorders,payments,claims and customerservice Stratton Business Brill,c/o TurpinDistribution, Park,PegasusDrive,Biggleswade, Bedfordshire SC 18 8TQ, UnitedKingdom, tel.+44 (0)1767604954,fax+44 (0)1767 601640,e-mail:[email protected]. Back volumes Backvolumes ofthelasttwoyearsare availablefromBrill.Pleasecontactourcustomerservice as indicated above. Forbackvolumes orissuesolderthan2 years, Periodicals Service Compleasecontact NY 12526,USA.E-mail Germantown, pany(PSC),11 MainStreet, [email protected] or visitPSC's websitewww.periodicals.com. © 2006 by KoninklijkeBrill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands BrillNV incorporates theimprints IDC Publishers, Brill,HoteiPublishing, Koninklijke Martinus Publishers and VSP. Nijhoff Allrights reserved. No partofthispublication stored translated, maybe reproduced, in a retrieval ortransmitted in anyform orbyanymeans,electronic, mechansystem, or otherwise, without of the ical,photocopying, recording priorwritten permission publishers. Authorization to photocopy itemsforinternal or personal useis granted bythepublisherprovided thattheappropriate feesare paid directly to Copyright Clearance 222 RosewoodDrive,Suite910,DanversMA 01923,USA. Feesaresubject Center, to change. Printed in The Netherlands (on acid-free paper).

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