Vivarium - Vol Xlvi, No 3, 2008

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VIVARIUM and Intellectual An International Journal forthePhilosophy LifeoftheMiddle Renaissance and Ages Aims& Scope ofphilosophy Vivarium is an international and journaldedicatedto thehistory of ideasfromtheearlyMiddleAgesto theearly-modern thehistory period.It intheprofane takesa particular interest sideofphilosohy anditsrelationship with fromtheseperiods.It is widelyrecognized otherareasof thought and learning forthehistory of logic,semantics It as an unrivalled resource and metaphysics. studiesof ideas,textsand analysesas wellas historical publishesphilosophical context ofmedievaland early-modern and learning. It theinstitutional thought a issue to also welcomeseditionsof texts.It publishes devoted annually special a particular themeor philosopher. Editor L.W. Nauta(Groningen) EditorialBoard HAG. Braakhuis C.H. Kneepkens L.M.deRijk(Leiden), (Nijmegen), (Groningen), (Madison),E.P.Bos (Leiden)and D. Perler(Berlin). W.J.Courtenay AdvisoryCommittee T. Gregory MA). (Rome),A. Zimmermann J.E.Murdoch(Cambridge, (Cologne), forAuthors Instructions to thejournalshouldbe sentas an e-mailattachment Contributions and paper of Groningen, versionto Lodi Nauta,Facultyof Philosophy, Oude University TheNetherlands A 52, 9712 GL Groningen, ([email protected]). Boteringestraat sheet is available at www.brill.nl/viv or can be obtained from the editor. style inEnglish(UK orUS), French orGerman;they Contributions mustbewritten correct. mustbe grammatically andstylistically mustbe clearly Manuscripts typewritten withnumbered Use pages,doublespacingandwidemargins throughout. notendnotes. Titleandnameoftheauthorshouldappearon a separate footnotes, Each articleshouldbe titlepage in orderto facilitate anonymous peer-review. whichshouldstatetheprincipal conclusions bya 10-lineabstract, accompanied forindexing bothabstract andkeywords ofthepaperand2-6keywords, purposes; shouldbe in English. receiveone setof proofsforproofreading. Authorsof acceptedcontributions The publisher reserves therightto chargeauthorsforcorrections madeto the in thetypesetting oferrors thatoccurred orconverotherthancorrections proofs sionprocess. receive1 complimentary Authors copyoftheissueinwhichtheirarticle appears contributions, (in thecaseof multi-authored copiesaresentto thefirst-named forprivate circulation. author)as wellas a PDF fileoftheircontribution Vivarium ISSN 0042-7543, onlineISSN 1568-5349)ispublished a year 3 times (print TheNetherlands, tel+31 (0)71 5353500, 2, 2321JCLeiden, byBrill,Plantijnstraat fax+31 (0)71 5317532.

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Vivarium 46 (2008)223-231

Introduction

DominikPerler Berlin HumboldtUniversität,

A specialissue dedicatedto Aristotelian in the periodbetween psychology extensive Aristoteand or 1250 1650 hardlyrequires explanation justification. lianismwas so dominantin thisperiod,and De anima gave riseto such a that considerable numberof commentaries, disputedquestionsand treatises, ifthefateofthistextdid notattracttheinterest ofhisitwouldbe surprising In fact,itwouldbe astonishing ifanyoneinterested not toriansofphilosophy. in in in of to look at but nature philosophy just psychology generalneglected thewayDe animashapedphilosophical debates.Afterall,thistextis a crucial on naturalphilosophy, and commentators readitas partofAristotle's writings De sensu a workbelongingto thispartofphilosophy, oftenalongwithPhysica, with natural etsensato, De generatione etcorruptione and otherwritings dealing who wants to understand how nature was conceived by Anyone philosophy. medievaland earlymodernphilosophersought to look at the way they - as something thatis notopposedto livexplainedthesoul as partofnature as "theprincipleof to but that functions bodies or added them, simply ing life"and thatmakeslivingbodiestheverythingstheyare.Thatis whya study ofthesoul is a crucialpartofthestudyofnature. the titleof thisissuemaygiveriseto some doubt,perhaps Nevertheless, I wouldliketo mentionthreequestionsone mightaskquite evento irritation. whenreadingthetitle.First,one mightwonderwhytheword spontaneously "transformations" is usedas a keyword.Shouldwe nottalkin a moremodest Afterall, itwas thecommenon Aristotelian texts? about commentaries way in ofAristotle's a role the transmission literature that crucial theory tary played one shouldexaminethe ofthesoulfromancientto moderntimes.Therefore, boththeircontentand theirspecialform,and comparethem commentaries, to theoriginaltexts. word"soul"is emphasizedin Second,one mayaskwhytheold-fashioned wroteabout the soul, the title.Of course,Aristotleand his commentators ©Koninklijke Brill 2008 NV, Leiden,

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" and anima . And Aristotle conceivedof explicitly usingthewords"psyché" thesoul as an all-embracing of the life, principle including vegetative aspects, notonlyas a principleofmentallife.Butwoulditnotbe moreappropriate to talkaboutthemindwhenlookingat theAristotelian tradition froma modern attention to those of Aristotelian pointofview,thereby parts paying psychologythatexplainthemindand its relationto thebody?And shouldwe not focuson theaccountgivenoffeatures thatarecharacteristic ofthemind,say, ofintentionality and consciousness? Third,one mayaskwhythetitleputsan emphasison theperiodbetween 1250 and 1650.Whyis thereno mentionoftheMiddleAges,theRenaissance and the EarlyModernPeriod,as it is the case in so manyhandbooksand And whyis no priority encyclopedias? givento one of thesethreeperiods?In eachofthemthereareplentyofauthorsand textsthatdeserveto be analyzed. So, whyshouldone coversucha longperiod? Letmesketchan answerto eachofthesequestions.I hopethiswillnotonly shedsome lighton mymotivation forpreparing thisissue,but also hintat somemethodological we need to take into accountwhenapproachproblems the of Aristotelian In field concernsare ing psychology. fact,methodological as important as concernswithtextualdetails,becausemethodological decisionssettheframework foran analysisofindividualtextsand havean impact notonlyon thesolutionspresented to variousproblemsbutalso on thevery problemsthatareposed. Let me startwiththefirst question.Whyshouldwe talkabouttransformations?Whena transformation a simplecontinuation of occurs,thereis neither nora sharpbreakwiththeold or a revolution thatsweeps something existing, it awayand replacesitwithsomething new.A transformation ratheris a long and steadyprocessin whichsomething newis growing out ofsomething that exists. What is so a about transformation is the fact that the already interesting even dissimilar, pointand the end pointof the processare utterly starting similarto each thoughtherearenumerousstagesin betweenthatarestrikingly other.Take the exampleof the caterpillar that,becominga butterfly, goes various of In transformation. itssecondstageitis quitesimilar through stages to how it was in itsfirststage,and in itsthirdstageit is stillquitesimilarto how it was in its secondstage.Nevertheless, thelaststageyieldssomething newthatis completely dissimilar to theanimalin thefirst stage.Thissurprisis because an internal as well as an external ingprocess possible changeis taking place. The caterpillar changesitselfinternally by creatinga cocoon and itsorganism. At thesametime,theexternal conditions(thesearestructuring

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in theair,etc.) changeas welland thelight,thehumidity sonaitemperature, of the the influence caterpillar. development heavily in theperiodbetweenthe theevolutionofAristotelian psychology Studying we can observea similarprocessof thirteenth and theseventeenth century, commenWhatwe see at thestarting transformation. point,namelythefirst tariesby RichardRufus,Albertthe Greatand otherLatin authors(not to different fromwhatwe detect is strikingly mentiontheirArabicpredecessors), or Eustachiusa whenwe examinetheend pointand readtheConimbricenses whenwe look at Descartes, SanctoPaulo.We discoverevenmoredifferences who openlycritCureaude la Chambreand otherearlymodernphilosophers oftenwithout use manyAristotelian icizeAristotle butnevertheless elements, between the starting differences In of the it. spite striking acknowledging are quite that intermediate we find and the end many stages point, point similarto each other.This givesriseto a simplebut fundamental question: to occur?How could nonhow was it possibleforsuch a transformation theoriesgrowout of a longAristotelian or evenanti-Aristotelian Aristotelian to Albert How could Descartes'theoryof thesoul be as dissimilar tradition? and nevertheto thecaterpillar is dissimilar theGreats theoryas thebutterfly answerwould be: becausea less relyon scholasticsources?The traditional whichsweptaway occurredin theseventeenth revolution scientific century, theold Aristotelian tradition, despitethepresencethistraditionstillhad in theuniversity curricula.But thisanswerwouldbe too simple.StevenShapin thesis withthe provocative revolution about the scientific his book opened never there That revolution."1 as the scientific no "there was such that is, thing in whichan entiretheoretical was a momentof radicalchangeor conversion There ratherwerevariouschanges, a new one. with was replaced program that and modifications shifts additions, graduallycreateda new theoretical framework. It seemsto me thatit is helpfulto look at thehistoryofAristotelian psynot of the in as the same way Shapinapproached history physics: in chology We need to ask what kind of but of transformation. termsof revolution, createda new theoretical framework, changes,additionsand modifications and we oughtto examinehownewelementswerecombinedwithold onesdeniedthattheyused eveniftheso-calledmodernphilosophers polemically at numerous look we should elements. old Moreover, stagesbetween any AlberttheGreatand Descartes,stagesthatwerein manyrespectssimilarto !) Steven & London, Revolution TheScientific 1996),1. (Chicago Shapin,

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each otherbut nevertheless framework. graduallychangedthe theoretical When we carefully these we can detect modifications that analyze stages, affectedcentralelementsof the originalAristotelian for instance theory, partsof the soul, of its changesconcerningan explanationof the different causalpowerand itsrelationto thebody. Like in thecase of thecaterpillar, bothinternaland externalchangestook That on the one was a reinterpretation hand there of keyconcepts is, place. insidethe Aristotelian community. Metaphorically speaking,one may say thatAristotelians werespinningsomekindofcocoonwhenengagingin scho- a cocoon thatenabledthemto testand re-examine lasticdebates keyconand assessingbasicelementsoftheold cepts.In thisprocessofreinterpreting different of Aristotelians were opposing each other.For theory, groups Scotists were Thomists when instance, attacking explainingtherelationship betweenthe variousfacultiesof the soul, and Ockhamistswere fighting againstScotistswhen givingan accountof the cognitivemechanismsthat takeplace in thesoul. On theotherhand,therewerealso externalchanges, due to influences fromothertraditions. Forexample,Neoplatonictheoriesof causationhad an impacton thewayAristotelians explainedthecausalpower of thesoul, and Arabictheoriesof visioninfluenced theway theyanalyzed actsofperception. Bothinternaland externalchangesmadea longprocessof transformation possible.We can detectthisprocessnotonlywhenlookingat commentaries in thestrictsense,butalsowhenstudying othersources(treatises, disletters, in commentaries on the Sentences some cases even , etc.), puted questions, whenreadingtextsthatmaylookanti-Aristotelian at first sightbutthatreveal Aristotelian elements when more What is so fascinatmany closely. inspected these texts is not the about only way theypresentoriginalAristotelian ing Aristotelian ideas,butalso thewaytheyadd newonesor substantially modify to be faithful to thephilosophies. theses,evenwhenaffirming Let me now turnto thesecondquestion.Why shouldwe talkabout the soul and not simplyabout themind?In contemporary philosophyit seems natural that the mind not the soul a quite poses specialproblembecause themindhas specialfeatures thatneedto be explained.Thus,we noticethat is a specialfeature and askwhythisis so. Whyarementalstates intentionality aboutsomething? Andwhycan this"aboutness" notbe reducedto properties ofbodilystates?Likewise,we noticethatconsciousness is a specialfeature and askagainwhyit is so difficult or evenimpossibleto reduceit to properties of In states. all these discussions we take it for that there are wellbodily granted bodilystateswhichprovidethebasisformentalstates. functioning

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we see thatsomeofthesequesWhenturning to theAristotelian tradition, tionsweregivenas muchattentionin theperiodbetween1250 and 1650 as waswidelydistheproblemofintentionality theyreceivetoday.In particular, " ".2Looking authorsevencreatedthetechnicalterm intentio cussed;scholastic mind or the it was not the we see that at their debates, however, simply closely intellect thatposeda problemforthem.Aquinas,Buridan,Suárezand many are intentional. othersdid not onlyask how and whyactsof thinking They wereequallyintrigued bythequestionofhowand whyactsofseeing,hearing When analyzingthesesensoryacts,all Aristoteor smellingare intentional. liansagreedthattheytakeplacein bodilyorgansand thatwe needto look at bodilychangesifwe wantto explainthem.Thatis whytheydid not drawa mentalacts. bodilyactsand intentional sharpline betweennon-intentional some of themwere of intentional rather studied different acts; They types in intellect. locatedin theexternaland internalsenses,others theimmaterial Moreover,theywerenot concernedwiththe issueof reductionbut unanihas itsown actsthatshouldcareintellect mouslyagreedthattheimmaterial senseorgans.In acts that take be from fully distinguished placein thematerial ofvarioustypesof intenlookedfora detaileddescription fact,Aristotelians levelwereconsideredto be as important tionalacts.Thoseon theimmaterial as thoseon thematerialone. I hope thisexampleshowsthatit would be misleadingto use a modern as a special, framework, explainedintentionality askinghow Aristotelians of themind.It was notjustthemindthatwas intrigunon-reducible feature in thesoul as a whole,comprising seningthem.Theyweremoreinterested actson soryand intellectual capacities,and in thewayit can haveintentional different levels.Theywantedto knowwhatkindof levelsthereareand what actsor statesarepossibleon eachofthem.Of course,theydid notneglectto as thehighestlevel.Buttheywerewellawarethat to theintellect payattention cannotbe understoodunlessone also it is justone leveland thatitsfunction we Aristotelian examinesthelowerlevels.In orderto understand psychology wasexplainedin itsrelationto otherpartsor needto analyzehowtheintellect capacitiesofthesoul.In fact,one couldspeakabouta mind-soulproblemthat washow role.The crucialquestionformanyAristotelians playeda prominent of can be explainedwithintheframework forthinking, themind,responsible formany a theorythattakesthesoul to be theprincipleof life,responsible relatedto seeingand smelling, vitalfunctions. How, forinstance,is thinking 2)SeeDominik amMain,2002), derIntentionalität imMittelalter Theorien Perler, (Frankfurt 11-23.

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How can therebe one soul thatis responand desiring? butalso to imagining functions? And how can thiscomplexsoul be in a sibleforso manydifferent a make a of matter or even body piece livingbodywitha specificsetofvital discusIn lightof thesequestionsone shouldembedAristotelian functions? ofthesoul,thusdealsionsintowiderdebatesaboutthenatureand function ing with the mind-soulproblemas much as withthe famousmind-body problem. Let me now turnto thethirdand lastquestion.Whydoes thetitlesimply to thethreeclasmentionthetimebetween1250 and 1650 withoutreferring AccordandEarlyModernPhilosophy? sicalperiodsMiddleAges,Renaissance thatcan stillbe foundin many tradition historiographie ingto an influential one shouldfavorone oftheseperiodswhenspeakingaboutAristotextbooks, telianpsychology, namelytheMiddleAges,becausethisperiodwas the"heyThe traditional storyrunsas follows:Aristotelianism day"ofAristotelianism. theMiddleAgesandwasrespondebatesthroughout dominatedphilosophical later sible forthe emergenceof so-calledscholasticphilosophy.Therefore, Renaisin relation to Aristotelianism. terms of their can be defined periods of PlatonismrejectedmanyaspectsofAristotesancephilosophyas a rebirth brokewiththistradition, lianism,and earlymodernphilosophydefinitely of mechanistic the influence new theories under instead physics. introducing of the soul, the tradiis to theories scheme applied When thisexplanatory had subscribed tionalstorycontinuesas follows:whilemedievalphilosophers reintroduced Platonicelements Renaissancephilosophers to hylomorphism, and favoreda dualisttheory. Seventeenth-century philosophers rejectedboth traditions and introducednew theories, rangingfromnew typesof dualism it hardly and idealism.On the line of this interpretation to materialism makessenseto lookat theentireperiodbetween1250 and 1650 withoutmakAnd it makeseven less senseto speak about Aristotelian ing subdivisions. as somekindofcommonground. psychology come underattack, approachhas repeatedly Althoughthishistoriographie it is stillpresentin manycurriculathatneatlyseparatecoursesin medieval, And it is equallypresenton the Renaissanceand earlymodernphilosophy. eachofthese bookmarketwithnumerousintroductions separately discussing schemerevealsthatit threeperiods.However,a closerlook at thetraditional did notsimplydie out in the Firstofall,Aristotelianism is utterly misleading. Renaissanceand in theearlymodernperiod.Thereweremorecommentaries in thefifteenth and thesixteenth on Aristotle centurythanin theentiresoa as CharlesLohrmadeclearwhenestablishing calledmedievalperiodbefore,

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listof theextantmanuscripts.3 Even in theseventeenth whenphicentury, were there was a lively still Aristotelianism, losophers increasingly opposing debateamongAristotelians.4 It would therefore be misleadingto talkabout threedistinctepochsand to definethemin termsof theirattitudetowards Aristotle. It was precisely thepresenceofAristotelianism thatcreateda contithe the from thirteenth to seventeenth Whetherone studnuity early century. iesAquinas,Buridan,Pomponazzi,Suárezor Eustachiusa SanctoPaulo,they all tookAristotle as theirstarting pointand cameup withtheirowninterpretationswithina commonframework. EvencriticslikeDescartesand Cureau iftheyarenotseenas beingrelated de la Chambrecan hardlybe understood to thisframework. itis alwaysdangerousto talkaboutperiodsorepochsas some Furthermore, kind of historicalentitiesthatfolloweach otheralmostnaturally. Theyare themselves historical and theirdefinition variesfromone generation products, tothenext,sometimes evenfromone historian to thenext.As itiswellknown, thereis no agreement about a definition of the highlycontroversial period labeled"MiddleAges."Some thinkthatit endedin theearlyfourteenth cenothersarguethatit continueduntiltheriseof turywithDante and Petrarca, modernphysicsin theearlyseventeenth and stillothersdefendthe century, viewthattherewasa longmoyen that collapsedonlywiththeFrenchRevoâge lution.Giventhesestrikingly different to definea period,itis hardly attempts make a between to clear cut different helpful periodsand to look forgeneral labelsunderwhichauthorsbelongingto a certainperiodcouldbe subsumed. One shouldratherlook at individualauthorsand ask how theydealtwith framework oftheirtime.Thus,when specific problemswithinthetheoretical one not about should simplyopposeso-calledRenaissance talking psychology, in generalbut ask how a specificauthor, authorsto medievalphilosophers ofthesoul,howhe usedsomeAristotesay,LorenzoValla,developeda theory lian elementsand rejectedothers,how he criticizedsome predecessors and 3)SeeCharles H. Lohr, "Renaissance Latin Aristotle Studies intheRenaissance Commentaries", 21 (1974)andRenaissance in On the of Aristotelianism 28-35 (1975-82). presence Quarterly ofthesoul,seetheconcise "Renaissance Theories Renaissance theories Michael, survey byEmily inPsyche ofBody, andSoma. andMetaphysicians ontheMind-Body Soul,andMind", Physicians Problem to P. & P. Potter ed. , (Oxford, 2000),147-172. J. Wright from Enlightenment Antiquity 4)Foranoverview, seeChristia "TheVitality andImportance ofEarly Modern AristoMercer, in:TheRiseofModern ed.byT. Sorell telianism", 1993),33-67;M.W.E (Oxford, Philosophy, in: TheCambridge to "Scholastic Schools andEarly Modern Stone, Philosophy", Companion D. & New Modern ed. Rutherford 299-327. , York, 2006), Early Philosophy (Cambridge

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followedotherswhenexplainingvariousfeatures of thesoul. Likewise,it is to talk about a strict between the so-calledearly hardlyhelpful opposition modernphilosophers Descartesand Cureaude la Chambreand theirmedieval One shouldratherexaminewheretheyfollowedsome specific predecessors. and predecessors wheretheylefttheirpaths.Onlythenarewe able to drawa detailedpictureofthephilosophical controversies thattookplacein theyears between1250 and 1650- controversies thattook place betweenindividual notbetweensuchabstract and highlyartificial entities as "mediphilosophers, evalphilosophy", "Renaissance and modern philosophy" "early philosophy." When explainingthe ontologicalstatusof individualthings,Ockham defendedtheprinciplethateachsingular thingis byitselfsomething singular.5 this can also be to the of Perhaps principle applied study pastphilosophers: eachofthemis byhimself an individual whodefendsa certainpositionforhis own reasons.Ifwe wantto understand hisarguhim,we needto reconstruct ments,comparethemwitharguments presented byotherindividualphilosothatwas dominantin his time. phers,and assessthemwithintheframework Thisis themainreasonwhytheneutralexpression "from1250 to 1650" was chosenforthetide of thisissue.I hope thiswillenablereadersto approach each textwithoutbeingguidedby dubioushistoriographie and categories, allowthemto reacha deeperunderstanding ofhow and whytheAristotelian formanyindividualphilosophers was theorythatservedas the framework transformed. eventually The articlesincludedin thisissuearebasedon paperspresented at a workshop of theEuropeanScienceFoundation(ESF) program"FromNaturalPhilosoand the Berlin phyto Science,"whichtook place at HumboldtUniversity of Arts in and Science Berlin on November 16-18, Academy Brandenburg 2006. I am verygrateful to theESF foritsgenerousfinancial support,to the membersofthesteering committee formakingtheworkshoppossible,to my and collaborators at Humboldt forhelpingme to orgacolleagues University nizetheworkshop, and to all theparticipants fortheirstimulating presentationsand contributions to livelydiscussions.I owe a specialdebtto Simone taskofpreparing thepapersfor Ungererforhelpingmewiththeunrewarding to and the editors of Vivarium who to include themin publication, accepted a specialissue. 5)William inlibrum Sententiarum dist.2, q. 6, in Ockham, (Ordinario), Scriptum primum & G.Gài(NewYork, ressingularis II,ed.S. Brown 1970),196: . .quaelibet Operatheologica seipsaestsingularis."

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Bibliography 21 Studies intheRenaissance Latin Aristotle Charles Commentaries", H., "Renaissance Lohr, 28-35(1975-82). (1974)andRenaissance Quarterly in:The Rise ofEarly Modern "lheVitality andImportance Aristotelianism", Mercer, Christia, of T. Sorell ed. Modern 33-67. , 1993), (Oxford, Philosophy inPsyche andSoma. "Renaissance Theories ofBody, Soul,andMind", Michael, Physicians Emily, toEnlightenment andMetaphysicians onthe Problem ,ed.J.P.Wright Mind-Body from Antiquity & P.Potter (Oxford, 2000),147-172. imMittelalter amMain, Theorien derIntentionalität Perler, Dominile, 2002). (Frankfurt Revolution & London, TheScientific Steven, 1996). (Chicago Shapin, in:TheCambridge Modern M.W.F. "Scholastic Schools andEarly Stone, Philosophy", Compan& NewYork, Modern iontoEarly , ed.D. Rutherford 2006),299(Cambridge Philosophy 327. inlibrum Sententiarum dist.2,q. 6,inOpera William Ockham, (Ordinatio), Scriptum primum & G.Gài(NewYork, II,ed.S. Brown 1970). theologica

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Vivarium 46 (2008)232-252

Early Albertus Magnus and his Arabic on the Theory of the Soul

Sources

Dag NikolausHasse 1 University ofWürzburg Abstract ofthesoulas thefirst or Albertus theAristotelian definition actuality Magnusfavours life But he Aristotle's vocabof a natural bodyhaving potentially. interprets perfection withtheseparability ofthesoulfrom the ularyin a waythatitbecomes compatible to the s not The term is understood as soul activity only, to body. "perfectio" referring Theterm"forma" is avoidedas inadequate fordefining thesoulsessence. itsessence. ofitsactions Thesoulisunderstood as a substance whichexists andits independently a tradition Thearticle shows that Albertus' decisions continue reachbody. terminological inparticular, toAvicenna. theGreek andJohn commentators, Philoponos ingfrom onanother issueisalsoinfluenced sources. His Albertus' byArabic position important animalandrational on argudefense oftheunityofthesoul'svegetative, partsrests ItisshownthatAverroes' ontheproblem ments from Avicenna andAverroes. position of the he advocates theunitythesis, butalso teachestheplurality is notclearcut: inman.Thisdoublestanceisvisible intheLatinrecepforms andindividual generic whopresents Averroes bothassupporter tionofAverroes' andalsoinAlbertus, works, oftheplurality thesis. andopponent Keywords Latinphilosophy, Arabicphilosophy, Albertus medieval Avicenna, Averroes, Magnus, of the De anima soul , philosophy ofthesoulhasreceiveda goodamountofscholAlbertus Magnus*philosophy to understand attention. It has been Albertus arly always partoftheseefforts 1}I amgrateful forcriticism from Friedemann Müller andMatteo andadvice Buddensiek, Jörn inBerlin, im diGiovanni andfrom theparticipants ofcolloquia November 2005,andFreiburg where this was Research for this was funded 2007, by January paper presented. paper Breisgau, theVolkswagen Foundation. ©Koninklijke Brill 2008 NV, Leiden,

DOI:10.1 163/156853408X360902

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In hisearlyworks,such dependenceuponArabicsourcesin Latintranslation. as theDe homineand theCommentary on theSentences , whichhe wrotewhen he firstcame to Parisin theearly1240s,Albertusincorporates an enormous sources,amongthemmanyofArabicorigin,withthe rangeofphilosophical resultthathis standpointis colouredbyArabictheories.In laterworks,for instancein De animaof the 1250s,Albertusdistanceshimselffromsomeof thesephilosophical traditions. Itwashisapparentmotiveto formulate a philocloserto Aristotle's. sophicalstandpoint In theliterature on Albertus'psychology and itsArabicsourcesthereis a themewhichdeserves closerattention thanithashitherto received:theArabic of the soul. Scholarshipof the past few backgroundto Albertus'definition decadeshas focusedon othertopics:Albertus'intellect theoryand hisfaculty On the there does not seem to discuss.Albertus much surface, psychology.2 criticizes whathe callsPlato'sdefinition ofthesoulas an incorporeal substance whichis self-moving and,in virtueofthis,movesthebody,3and he distances himself fromSeneca'sandAlfredofSareshel's becausetheydo not definitions, definethesoulwithrespectto thebody.4As a result, Albertussideswith,or at 2)Examples areAlaindeLibera, Albert leGrand etlaphilosophie (Paris, 1990),DagNikolaus "DasLehrstück inderScholastik: vondenvierIntellekten vondenarabischen Hasse, Quellen biszuAlbertus Recherches de Théologie etPhilosophie médiévales 66 (1999),21-77, Magnus", undPerspektiven derSinneswahrnehmung imSystem Anzulewicz, Hendryk "Konzeptionen Alberts desGrossen", 10 und 199-238, Anzulewicz, (2002), Hendryk Micrologus "Entwicklung imSystem derIntellekttheorie Archives et desAlbertus d'histoire doctrinale Stellung Magnus", littéraire dumoyen AlaindeLibera, etnoétique: Albert le âge70 (2003),165-218, Métaphysique undGlück: dieLehre Grand vom unddie ,intellectus Sturlese, (Paris, 2005),Loris Vernunft adeptus mentale beiAlbert demGroßen Sturlese, ",Intellectus (Münster, 2005),Loris Glückseligkeit adepe i suoilimiti ilGrande inIntellect tus':L'intelletto secondo Alberto e lasuascuola", etimagination danslaPhilosophie ed.M.C.Pacheco & J.E Meirinhos, 3 vols(Turnhout, Médiévale, 2006), 1: 305-321, "DerEinfluß derarabischen aufdieEthik des Müller, Jörn Intellektspekulation inWissen Albertus über Arabisches Wissen undlateinisches Mittelalter Grenzen: , ed.A. Magnus", & L.Wegener & NewYork, (Berlin 2006),545-568. Speer 3)Albertus Dehomine decreaturis, secunda ed.A.Borgnet, omnia, (Summa Opera Magnus, pars), vol.35(Paris, enim Platoquodanima estsubstantia movens 1896),qu.3,20:"Dicit incorporea Cf.qu.3,a. 1,sol.,28:"Dicendum nonmovetur ut motus, corpus." quodanima aliquaspecie Aristoteles et et CollectaAvicenna, Averroes, Constabulinus, probant philosophi, Alpharabius nus[i.e.Gundisalvi] etmulti aliinaturales. Movet autem immobilis corpus ipsaexistens perse." 4)Albertus intelDe homine autem dicitquodanima estspiritus , qu.3,20:"Seneca Magnus, lectualis inseetincorpore In librosecundo sic ad habitudinem ordinatus. De motucordis diffinitur: Anima estsubstantia sunt a illuminationum, susceptiva incorporea, quae primo." Cf.qu.3,a. 2,sol.,30:"Dicendum incompaduaediffinitiones datae sunt deanima quodistae ratione etquiahocpercipit sinecorpore, hocnonfaciunt mentionem de adoptimum, propter corpore."

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leastshowshis clearsympathies in De definition as formulated for,Aristotle's anima ILI (4l2a27): "We shall therefore the definition of the soul, posit as statedat thebeginning ofthesecondbookofDe anima, wherethephilosoof a naturalbodyhavinglifepotenphersays:The soul is thefirstactuality Animaestprimusactuscorporis .5Albertus' tially": physici potentiavitamhabentis Arabicsources,Avicenna(Ibn Sīnā) and Averroes(Ibn Rushd)in particular, also adoptAristotle's definition. Albertusdoes not seemto do morethanto continuethePeripatetic tradition of defining thesoul as theactualityof the it is well known that Albertus body.Finally, Magnus- in linewithmanyother - is muchinfluenced scholastic writers Avicenna's De anima, butthemain by and not the body of thisinfluenceconcernsAvicenna'sfacultypsychology of the The soul first four of Avicenna's De anima, theory proper. chapters whichpresenthis conceptof thesoul,arerarelyquotedand discussedin the LatinWest- evenbyAlbertusMagnus,themostknowledgable of all Latin readersof Avicenna.6 The chapters1.1-4werenevertheless both influential, the masters of arts the and Several scholars have among theologians.7 pointed out the factthatAlbertus'definition and theoryof the soul is colouredby Arabicsources:AlbertusfollowsAvicennain teachingthat"one mustdistinguishwhatthesoulis in itselffromwhatitis in relationto thebody",8and he contention thatAristotle's adoptsAvicenna's analysisofthesoul "wasfocused on the functionand not the essenceof the soul".9These are generalstatewithevidence.Thisis theaim of the ments,whichneed to be supplemented presentpaper. theauthorof My focusis on theearlyAlbertusMagnus,and, specifically, theSummade homineand oftheCommentary on theSentences , who stilltreats Greekand Arabicsourceswith equal sympathy. Since the olderAlbertus notto confusehiswritings changeshismindon severalissues,it is important 5)Albertus De homine denMenschen: De homine ed.andGer, qu.4,31,Über , select Magnus, mantransi, & J.R.Söder 2004),46 (I citequ.4 a.l andqu.7 byH. Anzulewicz (Hamburg, a. 1after thislatter "Ponam usergo diffinitionem insecundo De animae, edition): quaeponitur inprincipio, anima ubisicdicit . . .". Philosophus: 6)Scholastic references to thefirst fourchapters ofAvicenna's De animaarelisted in Dag Nikolaus Avicenna's DeAnima intheLatinWest: The Formation a Hasse, of Peripatetic Philosophy & Turin, (London 2000),234-240. oftheSoul,1160-1300 7)Asshown Carlos "TheHuman Soul:Form andSubstance? Thomas Bazán, byBernardo Aquinas'Critique ofEclectic Archives d'histoire doctrinale etlittéraire dumoyen Aristotelianism", âge 64(1997),95-126. 8)Richard C. Dales,The Problem SoulintheThirteenth & New (Leiden oftheRational Century York & Cologne, 1995),90. 9)Markus L. Führer, "Albert theGreat", in TheStanford ed.E. N. Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy, Zalta(Spring 2006Edition).

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on whomAlbertus draws fromdifferent periods.ThethreemajorArabicfigures of eleventhand Ibn Gabirol,theJewishphilosopher areAvicenna,Averroes Ibn Gabirol, The latterwas knownin Latinas Avicebron. Andalusia.10 century in he is in histories ofJewish as a Jew,usuallyfigures philosophy; thiscontext, wereall becausehisphilosophical subsumedunderArabicphilosophy writings inArabic.

1. Albertus'Theoryof theSoul thesecond The first sectionofthisarticleis devotedto Albertus'theoryitself, in this sectionto the questionwhetherAlbertusprolongsArabictraditions willbe described withrespectto fourtopics:thedefimatter. Albertus'theory nitionofthesoul,thecompositeor simplenatureof thesoul,therelationof ofsubstance. and theunityor plurality thesoulto itsfaculties, in ofthesoul.As I haveindicatedabove,Albertus, (1) First:thedefinition as the first forthe Aristotelian definition De homine , showshis preference form of the calls the soul the of a natural But Albertus rarely actuality body. or actus is the term he the terms actus ( body.Instead, prefers primus perfectio ofAristotle, chosenbytheGreek-Latin translator bytheArabic-Latin perfectio because thesetermsmake the soul less dependentupon the translator),11 It is in accordancewiththisstandpointthatAlbertusdoes notmainbody.12 - whereasthisis exactly what to matter tainthatthesoul impartscorporeality insiststhatthesoul is the ThomasAquinasteacheslater.Aquinas,famously, formofthebodyon thegroundsthatitis thesouls essencewhichis unitedto thebody;thisis a majordividebetweenAlbertusand hispupil.13 10)Lessinfluential etanimar, three authors isQustâibnLùqâ,Dedifferentia thanthese spiritus insupport ofthethesis that of"Constabulinus", Albertus invokes hisauthority, under thename thesoulisincorpothesoulisa substance in:Dehomine ,qu.2,a. 1,sedcontra 1,lib,andthat Plato's definition ofthesoulasself-moving, 1-5,14,andagainst real, ibid., qu.2,a.2,sedcontra areinqu.1,a. 1,9bandinqu.4,a. 5,49b. references ibid., qu.3,a.l,sol.,28a.Further n) TheGreek-Latin in:Albertus De anima of11,14l2a27-28 isprinted translation , Magnus, vol.7.1,ed.C. Stroick Institutum Alberti omnia . . . edenda curavit Coloniense, Opera Magni De inAristotelis isin:Averroes, Commentarium (Münster, 1968),66;theArabic-Latin magnum of ArisSee the convenient list anima libros ed. F. S. Crawford 136. Mass., , (Cambridge, 1953), inDaniel A.Callus, in12thtranslation literature current and13th-century totelian definitions recueil d'études dephilosophie dAristote: "TheTreatise ofJohn Blund 'OntheSoul'",inAutour A.Mansion ancienne etmédiévale à Monseigneur (Louvain, 1955),490-491. offert ,2)Albertus Dehomine , qu.4,a. 1,ad6,35a. Magnus, 13)Forananalysis "TheHuman seeBazán, within itshistorical ofThomas' context, position

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(2) The secondtopic,thecompositenatureofthesoul,concernsthethesis The partisans whichis usuallytermed"universal of thisthehylomorphism". claim that all immaterial such as the soul and the are ory beings, intelligences, composedofmatterand form,so thattherearein mantwokindsofmatter:a to the soul and the corporealmatterof the body spiritualmatterintrinsic extrinsic to thesoul.Albertusrejectsthisdoctrine.He tracesitssourcesto the of Ibn Gabiroland DominicusGundisalvi,who is dependentupon writings Ibn Gabirol.14 As has long been shown,the doctrineof universalhylomorwas phism acceptedby a numberof Franciscanthinkers:Roger Bacon, Its main argumentative Bonaventure, JohnPechamand others.15 advantage wasthatitoffered an explanation ofthedifference betweencreatures and God, in particular betweenangelsand God, becauseangelscould be describedas of spiritualmatterand form,whereasGod is simple.The theory s consisting maindrawback,in theeyesofAlbertusMagnus,is thatit excludesthepossiIfeventhehumansoulis not bilitythatanybeingcouldexistwithoutmatter. it cannot have true What is intellectual immaterial, entirely knowledge.16 Albertus'ownviewon thequestionofwhetherthesoul is simpleor composite?He rejectsuniversal buthe doesnotmaintainthatthesoul hylomorphism, is simple.Rather,it is composedofquodestand quo est}7Albertushereusesa forananalytical seeRobert & Christopher The Pasnau Soul",113-126; Shields, interpretation On Albertus see Problem The 153-174. Colo., Dales, (Boulder, 2004), Philosophy ofAquinas of theRational Arthur DiePsychologie Alberts des SouU89-92,and,stillinformative, Schneider, zurGeschichte derPhilosophie desMittelalters, vol.4.6and4.6 (Münster, Grossen , Beiträge 1903and1906),20-21. 14)Albertus Dehomine Collectanus" , qu.7,a. 3,sol.,102b:„ethocdicit (i.e. expresse Magnus, Commentarii inlibros ed.A.Borgnet, vol.25-30 idem, Sententiarum, omnia, Gundisalvi); Opera inlibro dePlatone Fontis vitae. . .".Inlater (Paris, 1894),II,dist.1A,a. 4, 14b:„etsiobjicitur identifies Avicebron astheauthor ofFonsvitae: "Ab suchastheDe anima , Albertus writings, in libroquemFontem omnibus inductis dissentit Avicebron vitaeappellavit" {De superius anima ,lib.III,tr.2,cap.9, 189). 15)Erich DasProblem derhylomorphen der Substanzen im Kleineidam, Zusammensetzung geistigen bisThomas von "Albertus 13.Jahrhundert , behandelt (Breslau, 1930);James A.Weisheipl, Aquin A Noteon13th-Century andUniversal Avicebron. Hylomorphism: Magnus Augustinianism", inAlbert theGreat: Commemorative ed.F.J.Kovach & R.W.Shahan Okla., (Norman, Essaysy F.Wippel, in TheCambridge 'Essence andExistence', 1980),239-260; John History ofLater Medieval ed.N. Kretzmann etal.(Cambridge, with 1982),385-410, esp.408-410, Philosophy further literature. 16)Erich DasProblem derhylomorphen Alber,53-54; Kleineidam, Zusammensetzung Weisheipl, tusMagnus andUniversal 257. Hylomorphism', 17)Albertus Dehomine ,qu.7,a. 3;Sent., I,dist. 3,a. 33;Sent. , II,dist.1A,a.4;Sent. , Magnus, II,dist.3,a. 4.

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well-known distinction itselfis notfree byBoethius.The Boethiandistinction fromobscurity. One of Boethius'claimsis thatthequod estis thecarrieror In Alber, suchas man,whereasthequo estis theform,humanity.18 suppositum tus'adoption,thequodestis theindividualbeingwhichunderliestheessence whichis and in whichtheessenceexists;thequo estis theessencein actuality, the of the est .19 Albertus actualizedand individuated through properties quod concludes:"In thissenseI say thatthe soul is a compositesubstance":hoc mododicoanimamessesubstantiam .20Thispositionis notoriginal. compositam Albertussharestheadoptionof the Boethianformulawithmanyscholastic writers. Itsargumentative aimis to explaintheindividualexistence ofthesoul: itsessenceexistsand is individuated by thequod est.In sum,universal hyloan an Arabic which the of Ibn is of Gabirol, theory morphism, theory example hisownviewpoint. Albertusopposesin orderto formulate Alber(3) Thethirdthemeconcernstherelationofthesoulto thefaculties. in his Commentary on theSentences tusdistinguishes, , two respectsin which thisquestioncan be discussed:thesoul can be consideredwithrespectto its beingor withrespectto its operation.In the firstsense,withrespectto its followfromthesouls beingand arederivedfromit.The being,thefaculties oraccidents faculties thusdo notbelongto thesouls being;theyareproperties ofthesoul. In thesecondrespect, insofaras thesoul is a substancein action, a "totality ofpowers".Its thesoulis a totumpotestativum (or totum potentiate), in itsfaculties; itstotalpoweris composedoftheparticular poweris perfected of the hence the facultiesare substantial forthe soul, and faculties, powers in itspower:suntsubstantiates becausewithoutthemthesoul is notperfected forthesoul" ei sinequibusnoncompletur inperfectione suiposse.21 "Substantial meansthatthefaculties arenecessary of the soul as such,are and, properties as form. But it is that of the definition of the soul substantial important part 18)PiusKünzle, DasVerhältnis derSeele Potenzen: zuihren Problemgeschichtliche Untersuchungen von bis und mit Thomas Switzerland, 1956),32. (Freiburg, Augustin vonAquin 19)Albertus Sent. , I,dist.3,a. 33,138b:"Idenim quodpraeMagnus, quod estesthocaliquid, secundum dicabile estdeeoquodest.Quoest...Boetius esse ethocestessentia actum, ponit individuinipsoquodest velinistosupposito; undeintalibus , idestinhocaliquid quemhabet DasVerhältnis adoipsius Cf.Künzle, esse esta proprietatibus quaeconsequuntur ipsum quodest". derSeele zuihren Potenzen 50. , 149-1 20)Albertus Albertus uses Sent., I,dist.3,a. 33,138b.InSent., II,dist.3,a. 4,68-69, Magnus, theterms andesse. fiindamentum 21)Albertus ora ofa totum Sent., I,dist.3,a. 34,sol.,140a.Theconcept Magnus, potestativum inAlbertus' totum is discussed De homine, already quod qu.6, 87b("Exhispatet potentiate etrationale estdivisio totius divisio animae etsensibile ibid., qu.7, potentialis"); pervegetabile a. 1,ad8,95b;ibid., qu.8,a. 1,sol.,105a.

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Albertuswrites"notperfected in its power",suiposse. Becausehe thusdistanceshimselffromcontemporary Franciscanwriters, who claimedthatthe soul is not completedas a substancewithoutthefaculties. ForAlbertus,the soul is incompleteonlywithrespectto itspower,notwithrespectto itssub- to whichthefaculties stance do notbelong.22 of (4) Thisleadsto thefourthtopic:thequestionoftheunityor plurality substance. in De h ornine the idea that there arethree Albertus, ì rejects already in man,i.e. thevegetative, thesensitive and therational,because perfections thenmanwouldnotbe one.23As iswellknown,in thelaterthirteenth century thequestionwhether thereareone or severalformsin manwas thesubjectof one ofthemostheatedcontroversies in MiddleAges.In thecentreofthedisthatthereis onlyone substantial form putewas ThomasAquinas'contention in man.24This was not a problematic thesisin the decadesbeforeThomas halfofthethirteenth whenthegreatmajority of Aquinas,in thefirst century, and masters ofartsheldthatthereis onlyone substancein human theologians Albertus thatthethesisofa plurality ofsubstances saysveryexplicitly beings.25 is nottrueand is in conflict bothwiththephilosophers and thesanctiAugustineand Boethius.26 It is specificto Albertusthathe seesa consensusof phiin favouroftheunitythesis.Otherauthors,forinstance losophyand theology the commentator RichardRufus,countAristotleamongthe pluralists, the in that Aristotle De animalium II.3 (736a36-b29) argument being generatione maintainsthatin thedevelopment oftheembryothevegetative soulprecedes thesensitive soul.27 soul,whichin turnprecedestheintellectual Let us recapitulate. Aristotle s defiFirst,we haveseenthatAlbertusprefers nitionof thesoul as thefirstactuality of a naturalbodyto otherdefinitions, butavoidscallingthesoul theformofthebody.Second,AlbertusrejectsIbn 22)SeeOdonLottin, "L'identité del'âmeetdesesfacultés avant saintThomas in d'Aquin", OdonLottin, etmorale auxXII'etXIIIesiècles etal.,1942), ,vol.1 (Louvain 483-502, Psychologie DasVerhältnis derSeele zuihren Potenzen Künzle, , 150-154. esp.497-501; 23)Albertus Dehomine andibid., den ,qu.4,a. 1,ad7,35-36, Magnus, qu.7,a. 1,sol,93,Über Menschen secundum omnes sanctos etphilosophos etnaturales , 104:"Dicendum quodvegetaetrationale sunt inhomine substantia unaetanima unaetactus unus". bile,sensibile 24)Foranintroduction tothese see Étienne Christian inthe Gilson, disputes History of Philosophy Middle (NewYork, 1955),416-420. Ages 25)Asshown A.Callus, "TheOrigins oftheProblem oftheUnity ofForm", TheThobyDaniel mist 24(1961),257-285, esp.281-282. 26)Asinn.23above. Cf.alsoibid., qu.7,a. 1,ad1,97a. 27)DanielA. Callus, "TwoEarly Oxford Masters ontheProblem ofthePlurality ofForms: - Richard Adam ofBuckfìeld Rufus ofCornwall", Revue dePhilosophie 42(1939), Néoscolastique 411-445, 430and439. esp.422-423,

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Gabirols theorythat the soul is composedof formand spiritualmatter; theessenceofthe instead,he followstheBoethiantradition bydistinguishing soul,thequo est, fromitsindividualbeing,thequodest. Third,Albertus argues thatthefaculties, as accidents,are ontologically distinctfromthesoul; with forthesoul. Fourth, respectto thesouls power,however, theyaresubstantial Albertusis an advocateofthethesisthatthereis onlyone substancein man. To whatextentdo thesepositionsreflect the influenceof Arabicsources?I shalldiscussthe fouraspectsof Albertus'theoryin sequence,but leaveout universal becauseofitslimitedinfluence on Albertus. hylomorphism 2. lhe Definitionof theSoul It is an Arabicinheritance thatAlbertusprefers thetermsactusprimusorperIn to the term De homine in the solution to thequestion"On , fectio forma. whetherthesoul is theactuality of thebody",Albertusarguesthatit is substantialforthesoulto be theactusofthebody.He proceedsto explainthatthis is not a definition secundum esse withrespectto the body. , but a definition with a Albertus his citation from Avicenna s De anima1.1. justifies standpoint He adoptsfromAvicennatheidea thattheAristotelian ofthesoul definition as perfection does not definethesouls essence.28 Avicennahimselfsupports thisclaimwiththreearguments; thefirst twoarealso citedbyAlbertus:first, theterm"soul"is usedonlywithrespectto thesoul beingthecauseofactivities;it is notappliedbecauseit describesthesouls substance.Second,thereis a difference betweenour knowingthatthereexistsa moverforsomething movedand ourknowingwhatthismoveris in itsessence.29 Albertus concludes thatthedefinition ofthesoul as "theactuality or moverofthebody"30 differs fromthatof itsessence.Third,thetermperfection is what (kamãl,perfectio) 28)Albertus denMenschen De homine , 58:"Etideodicit , qu.4, a. 1,sol.,34a,Über Magnus, Avicenna inVI De naturalibus anima nonestnomen reiexeiusessenhuius quodhocnomen tia.. . Etcumanima diffinitur sicut diffinita estabAristotele, nonaffirmatur esseeiusnisisecundumquodestprincipium emanandi a seaffectiones". 29)Avicenna, Deanima Avicennas DeAnima the , 1.1:Avicenna, (Arabie text): being psychological etal.,1959),4-5;Avicenna, Liber deanima seu ed.E Rahman (London partofKitãb al-shifã' Sextus denaturalibus 2 vols.(Louvain etal.,1968-72), 15-16;Engl.tr.Lenn , ed.S. VanRiet, "ANoteonAvicennas EvanGoodman, oftheSubstantiality oftheSoul",ThePhiloTheory n.s.I,4 (1969),555. Forum sophical 30)Albertus etmotor". 34/58:"actus ibid., corporis Magnus,

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man in his species,31 and by whichman (or animal or plant) constitutes becomesan actualman. But thedefinition does not sayanything about the essenceof the soul; it does not evensaywhetherthe soul is a substanceor Albertusconcludes,together withAvicenna,thatthedefinition ofsoul not.32 to thecategory ofsubstance.33 as actusdoesnotapplyto thesoulas belonging s De animaII.l, wherehe equatesform{eidos) One maycompareAristotle and actuality{entelecheia) (4l2al0) and maintainsthatthesoul is substance ofa naturalbody.In contrast, Avicenna (ousia)becauseit is thefirst actuality substanceand actuality. and Albertusdisassociate In thesamequaestio,he Albertusmovesa further stepawayfromAristotle. thanas followsAvicennain sayingthatthesoul is betterdefinedas perfection .34 The form:meliusdicituractusvelperfectio argument givenby quamforma Avicennain De anima1.1 is as follows: While form isa perfection, notevery isa form. Fortheking istheperfecevery perfection istheperfection oftheship, istheform ofthe tionofthestate andthecaptain yetneither state ortheship Ithasbeensettled thattechnical dictates thatsomething bea usage form relative tomatter; anendandperfection relative tothewhole . . . Therefore itisclear inthecourse that ofdefining thesoul,wesaythatitisa perfection, itwillbethe when, ofitsmeaning. Whatismore, it[i.e.theterm all most indicative perfection] encompasses ofsoulsinalltheir with thesoulthat isseparable from matter notbeing thetypes aspects, anexception toit[i.e.tobeing a perfection].35 - because,as he says,thesoul in someof its Albertusembracesthisposition speciesis separatefromthebody:cum. . . animasecundum aliquamsuispeciem .36 separetur 31)Ibid., "ANoteonAvicennas ed.Rahman, tr.Goodman, 556. 18,Engl. 6,ed.VanRiet, Theory", 32)Ibid.,ed.Rahman, "ANoteonAvicennas 8,ed.VanRiet, 22,Engl.tr.Goodman, Theory", ofthesoulseeThérèse-Anne "TheHuman SoulsIndidefinition 557.OnAvicennas Druart, after theBody's Death:Avicenna ontheCausalRelation between viduation andItsSurvival andSoul", Arabic Sciences andPhilosophy 10(2000),259-273. Body 33)Albertus denMenschen De homine , qu.4,a. 1,sol.,34a,Über , 58:"...itaetanima Magnus, scilicet secundum est idest actus etmotor, etsecundiffiniri, anima, dupliciter potest quod corporis dumquodestsubstantia contenta inpraedicamento substantiae." secundum quaedam seipsam M)Ibid.,ad6,35a,Über denMenschen, 62. 35)Avicenna, Deanima TheEnglish translation isfrom , ed.Rahman, 6-7,ed.VanRiet,19-21. in Robert Avicennas Context 118-119. N.Y., (Ithaca, 2003), Wisnovsky, Metaphysics 36)Albertus De homine denMenschen: De hominey 62: , qu.4, a. 1,ad 6, 35a,Über Magnus, "Cumigitur animasecundum suispeciem convenit ei magis secundum aliquam separetur, omnem suipartem diciperfectionem quamformam".

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Albertusand Avicennathusdisassociatenot onlysubstanceand actuality, - and in thisagain theydifferfromAristotle. but also formand actuality is a more (perfectio ) "Actuality" generaltermthan"form";it also coverssouls separatefromthebody,suchas soulsafterthedeathof thebody- at least,if formis understood naturalem accordingto "technical usage"orsecundum phi, as Albertusputsit.37One mightobject:whatis thesoultheperfeclosophiam tion of if not of the body?Avicennasansweris thatthe perfection is the of thewhole.Perfection means"a relationto thecompletething perfection fromwhichtheactionsissue",a relationto the"composite whole".38 Albertus and this answer: dicit ad rem approves quotes perfectio comparationem perfectamexqua manantactiones .39 While Albertusstopsthe discussionat thispoint,Avicennaproceedsto hisposition.He explainswhyhe wantsto keepapartthetwoconcepts justify "substance" and "form". The reasonis thata substanceis definedas something whichneverexistsin anotherthingas in a substrate; otherwise itwouldbe an in itsordinary accident.The term"form", Avicenna, impliesthat usage,says the "formis impressedupon matterand subsiststhroughit".40The "Flying at theend of thefirstchapterof Man", thewell-known thought-experiment Avicennastreatise (a passagenotquotedbyAlbertus),is in linewiththisreamanis suspendedin theairin sucha waythathe does not soning.The flying have any sense-perception. This man would not affirm the existenceof his outerlimbsnorof his innerorgans,but he would affirm theexistenceof an inneressence:hissoul.The flying man thusservesto establishthethesisthat thesoul is independent ofthebody.41 DimitriGutasand RobertWisnovsky havearguedthatAvicennasgeneral insistence on theseparability ofthesoulfromthebodyis influenced byPhilothe Greek commentator. This is to difficult ponos, sixth-century prove,since on De animais notextantinArabictranslation, and Philoponos'commentary thereis no bibliographical recordinArabicsourcesofsucha translation. However,thetextualparallelsbetweenArabicand Greeksourcesmakeitverylikely 37)Ibid., ad6,35a,62. 38)Avicenna, Deanima comautem 7 and9,ed.VanRiet20("perfectio , ed.Rahman significai "A ad rem ex émanant and tr. Note 24, Goodman, actiones") parationem perfectam qua Engl. onAvicennas 557and558. Theory", 39)Albertus denMenschen Dehomine, , 64. qu.4,a. 1,ad6,35a,Über Magnus, 40)Avicenna, 24 and20,Engl.tr.Goodman, De anima, ed.Rahman, 9 and6, ed.VanRiet, Ä NoteonAvicennas 558and556. Theory', 41)Onthethought-experiment oftheflying itsdifferent versions andpurposes, seeHasse, man, Avicennas DeAnima, 80-92.

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be itthewholetextor thatArabicphilosophers had accessto thecommentary, a reworking of it.42The generalline of thesestudiesis thattheNeoplatonic to a largeextentvia the influences on Arabicphilosophyweretransmitted on Aristotle, especiallythe Alexandrianschool Neoplatoniccommentators fromAmmoniosto Olympiodoros,and thatone should not overestimate and the ProclanLiberde the influenceof the PlotinianTheology ofAristotle causisi beforehim,explicitly Philoponos,like otherNeoplatonistcommentators ofthesoul. He has a longsectionin hisprefaceto his stresses theseparability on De animain whichhe arguesforthesouls incorporeality.44 commentary comparedto moreradiPhiloponosis a moderateNeoplatoniccommentator, cal Neoplatonists suchas Pseudo-Simplikios. Hence,he does notdeny,in his on De anima 11,1,thatAristotle concludesthatthesoul is not commentary from the But when he body. proceedsto commenton Aristotles separable ofthebodyin this thesoulis actuality puzzlingsentence"Itis unclearwhether an as a sailor of a he (4l3a8-9), way ship" gives explanationof "actuality" whichmayhaveinfluenced Avicennaand,through Avicenna,AlbertusMagnus. For Philoponosassociates"actuality" (entelecheia ) with"activities" (enerthat "activities which the the animal". The activities soul is, by perfects geiai)y oftheshipareinseparable fromtheship,butthe ofthesteersman as steersman steersman is separatedas a man,and theactivities as stop soonas he leavesthe ship.And Philoponosproceeds:"In thisway,then,therationalsoultoo,inasis notactuality ofthebody,butinasmuch muchas ithasa separablesubstance, as it has acquiredthisrelationto thebody(byvirtueofwhichalso it can be to thebody),itis bothactuality ofthe called soul',foritis called soul'relative and from it".45 body inseparable 42)Dimitri ontheSeparability oftheIntellect", TheGreek andAvicenna Gutas, "Philoponos Review inGreek inthe Arabic TradiOrthodox 31(1986),121-129, repr. Philosophers Theological tion(Ashgate, n. Dimitri "Avicennas Glosses 22; Gutas, 2000),art.XI,121-129, esp. Marginal inPhilosophy, onDe anima Science andExegesis in andtheGreek Commentatorial Tradition", Arabic andLatinCommentaries 2 vols. & H. Baltussen & M.W.F. Greek, , ed.P.Adamson Stone, Avicennas ch.6. 83;Wisnovsky, (London, 2004),2: 77-88, Metaphysics, 43)SeeWisnovsky, Avicenna sMetaphysics , 113-114. 44)Philoponos, OnAristotle's Onthesoul1.1-2 vanderEijk(Ithaca, , transi. N.Y.,2005), P.J. ofthesoulseeHenry Aristotle andNeoplatonism 23-30.OnPhiloponos' J.Blumenthal, theory inlateantiquity: Deanima Avicen 74.Cf.alsoWisnovsky, 1996), (London, interpretations ofthe nasMetaphysics , 92-96. 45)Philoponos, OnAristotle's Onthesoul2.1-6' transi. W.Charlton N.Y.,2005),26. (Ithaca, Greek: InAristotelis deanima libros commentaria , ed.M. Hayduck (Berlin, 1897), Philoponos, 225.

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This textcontainsthreenotionsthatare important forAvicennastheory ofthesoul:first, theassociationof "actuality" withactivities (or "perfection") or functionsof the soul, second,the idea thatthe name "soul" is used to describetherelationto thebody,and third,a conceptof substancewhichis - althoughthislastpoint,thedistinction not tiedto actuality betweensubstanceand actualityis moredrasticin Avicenna.Philoponosdoes not,howdistinction betweenform ever,seemto pavethewayforAvicennasimportant and perfection. hasshownthatPhiloponosbequeathesto theArabictradition a Wisnovsky of as final cause.46 When we turn to Neoplatonicconcept "actuality": actuality thelaterLatinphaseofthistradition, otherfeatures becomemoreimportant: the associationof the term"actuality" withactivitiesor functions, and the disassociation of substanceand actuality. AlbertusMagnus,in his earlyDe homine tradition ofinterpreting theAristotelian , continuesthisGraeco-Arabic definition of thesoul,whichallowshimto stressthesouls separability from thebody.47 3. Hie Soul and itsFaculties As was pointedout above,forAlbertusthesoul is distinctfromitsfaculties With respectto thethesouls activities, it is a totum ontologically. potestati vum, a "totality of powers",whichis composedof the particularfaculties. Albertus'standpointowes much to the Boethiantradition.Boethiushad developedtheidea thatthesoul is thetotumof whichthecapacitiesare the In the earlyMiddle Ages and in the twelfth the dominant parts.48 century, - a thesiswhichwas attributed thesiswas theidentity ofsoul and faculties to was known,but was Augustine.The Boethianconceptof a totum potentiale not employedto keep soul and facultiesapartontologically. Albertus,howuses the for this end: the totum ever, concept exactly conceptallows potentiale

46)Asinn.42above. 47)I therefore do notagree withthose whomake Albertus a protagonist oftheanima forma asdoesIngrid Albertus formula, 1980),39;cf. (Munich, corporis Craemer-Ruegenberg, Magnus inGeorg thebalanced criticism Zwischen Natur undVernunft. desGroßen Alberts Wieland, Begriff vom Menschen 19. (Münster, 1999), 48)Boethius, Dedivisione Latina enim haeanimae sednonut , Patrologia 64,888c:"Partes sunt, inquantitate, sedutinaliquapotestate etvirtute" areparts ofthesoul,butnotasina ("These butasinsomecapacity orpower")quantity,

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himto connectthesouland thefaculties in therealmofpower,withoutmaintheir taining ontologicalidentity. Albertus'solutiontherefore appearsto be theresultofa medievaldevelopmentratherthanan exampleof Arabicinfluence.Here too, however, Avicennaexerts hisinfluence. Albertus his thesis with one of his favourite supports citationsfromAvicenna:"Fromone substance,whichis the soul, emanate some organiccapacitiesand some non-organic capacities,as Avicennasays": ab una substantiaquae estanima... fluuntquaedampotentiaeorganicaeet ut dicitAvicenna®Albertusdrawson a passagein quaedamnon organicae, AvicennasDe anima,chapterV.l whereAvicennawrites:"Not one of these (powers)is the humansoul, but the soul is a thingto whichthesepowers substance(jawhar belong;thesoulitselfis,as we haveshown,an independent which has an towards actions someofwhich ), (different) munfarid aptitude can onlybe perfected withorgans,. . . someofwhichdo notneedorgans".50 Avicennais thusa clearadvocateofan ontologicaldistinction betweenthe soul and thefaculties. The soul possessesmanypowers,butis essentially one. We can see thatthispositionfollowsfromAvicennasinsistence on theseparawhichexistsindepenbilityofthesoul.Ifthesoulis,in itsessence,a substance dentlyof its actionsand of itsbody,thenit followsthatthepowerscannot inherein thesoul itself. Avicennaspositionhasan additionaladvantageforAlbertus, one thatleads us to thefinaltopic:theunityor plurality ofsubstances in man. 4. lhe Unityor Pluralityof Substances as wassaidbefore, defendstheunitythesis:thethesisthatthesoulis Albertus, one and not severalsubstances,i.e. vegetative, sensitiveand rationalsubstances.But the drawbackof Albertus'positionis thatthe same substance and incorruptible, as he himself admits:in a human appearsto be corruptible the rational is the whereas and sensitive beingonly part immortal, vegetative 49)Thisquotation isfrom thelateSumma ed.A.Borgnet, II,qu.1-67, omnia, Opera theologiae, vol.32(Paris, here because oftheexplicit mention ofAvicenna), 87(itisquoted 11.13.77, 1895), inmany butsimilar sentences other seethelistofsuchsentences inHasse, appear writings; Avicenna s DeAnima thisbook,I wasnotyetaware ofthepassage inDe , 239.Whenwriting inthenext anima V.1quoted footnote. 50)Avicenna, De anima 80.Albertus , V.l,ed.Rahman, 208,ed.VanRiet, mayalsohavebeen inDeanima, autem declarabitur 64-65:"Postea 1.4,ed.VanRiet, inspired bya similar passage tibiquodanima unaestexquadefluunt inmembra". haevires

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Albertusreplieswiththe dictum,borrowedfrom partsdie withthe body.51 substancefromwhichemaAvicenna,thatthehumansoulis an incorruptible natesomepowerswhichoperatewithoutbodilyorgans.Corruptionconcerns organsonly,notthesoul.52 Avicennasdistinction betweenorganicand non-organic powerstherefore enablesAlbertusto remedya weaknessof his position.Albertussolvesthe bymakingthe problemthatthesamesubstanceappearsmortaland immortal soul essentially one, fromwhichflowdiversepowers,someofwhichsurvive thedeathof thebody,whereastheorganicpowersdie. Thisseemsan elegant wayto deal withtheproblemwhichAristotle posesin De animaII. 1, where he says:"Yetsomepartsofthesoulmaybe separable,becausetheyarenotthe to theAvicennianactualitiesof anybodyat all" (4l3a5-7). The alternative Albertinian solutionwouldbe to saythatthesubstanceoftherationalpartis and senwhereasthesubstanceofthevegetative separately, capableofexisting sitivepartsis notseparable.This,however, jeopardizestheunityofthesoul. who The otherimportant ArabicsourceforAlbertus'positionis Averroes, as a source influenced theLatinunityversusplurality debateinseveralrespects, in hisownright.In hisLong on Platos viewson theissueand as a philosopher divion De anima Averroes thePlatonictripartite 1.90, presents Commentary ofthepluralist sionofthesoul in sucha waythatPlatoappearsa protagonist doctrine:"theintellective partis in thebrain,thedesiring partin theheart,the of the thirteenth Some Latin commentators partin the liver."53 nourishing thesis of the with the Platonic centurysympathize compositenatureof the them of Buckfleld.54 The quotaAdam soulas formulated byAverroes, among thusbecamean important sourceforthepluralist tionfromAverroes camp.55 51)Albertus denMenschen De homine, , 88:"Rei 1,90b,Über qu.7,a. 1,sedcontra Magnus, rationessentia etsubstantia; sedsolaanima etincorruptibilis esteadem numquam corruptibilis estearum substantia una". vero alisincorruptibilis est,ceterae corruptibiles; ergonumquam 52)Albertus ad1,94a. ibid., Magnus, 53)Averroes inAristotle's De anima1.5:"Someholdthatthesoulis comments ona sentence De anima, comm. Commentarium divisible" 1.90,121:"Innuit (4llb5-7).Averroes, magnum incorpore divisionem dividitur secundum Platonem, quodanimaessentialiter quiopinatur in non communicatur inquibus sua s actiones diversas et membrorum membro, aliquo quod agit in incordetantum etnutriens etdesiderans itaquodparsintelligens estincerebro tantum epate". 54)Callus, "TwoEarly Oxford 419-420. Masters", 55)On theconsequences fortheWestern Hasse,"Plato imageofPlato,seeDag Nikolaus - Wisdom - Occult inThe Platonic Tradition Literature Arabico-Latinus: Sciences", Philosophy Hoenen & New A Doxographic & M.J.F.M. intheMiddle ed.S. Gersh (Berlin Ages: Approach, York, 2002),31-65, esp.34-45.

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46 (2008)232-252 D.N.Hasse/Vivarium

Platoin hislater AlbertusadoptsAverroes' pictureof Platowhenhe criticizes ofthelocalizationthesis.56 De animaforbeingtheoriginator thesis. forsupporting theplurality Averroes Albertus directly Magnusattacks in "Therefore As he saysin De hornině-, manyhavebeen erroron thisissue,the who saysthat[Aristode first ofwhomis thecommentator himself, Averroes, s] It that in and is clear fits the terms of the soul definition [of soul] prior posterior. in man,whichis thisis onlytrueifwe assumethattherewerethreeperfections thatAlbertuslaterin De In viewof this,it comesas a surprise impossible."57 "Averroes a of the thesis: Averroes as homine unity saysin this supporter quotes that itperforms is to substance and that the soul one according verycommentary be explained? Can thisdiscrepancy different different actsthrough powers."58 on De The latterquotationdrawson a passagein the Long Commentary Plato contrasts PlatosandAristodes anima1.7,whereAverroes places positions: thinks thethreepowersofthesoul in brain,heartand liver,whereasAristotle et thattheyareone in subjectand manywithrespectto powers:unamsubiecto Averroes assumed that would secundum vir tut es?9 Albertus always rightly plures sidewithAristotle againstPlato,and hencewithunityagainstplurality. a pluralist, comesfroma pasThe former quotation,whichmakesAverroes s remark that the nutritive Averroes comments on Aristotle where power sage in thesquare is as the contained is containedin thesensory powerjust triangle {De anima II.3, 4l4b28-30). Averroes explainsthatthisoughtto be underThe priorfigure, thetriangle, exists to priorand posterior": stood"according likewise the earlier nutritive in the later the and does potentially figure, square, in the latersensorypower.60 Albertussuspectsthat powerexistpotentially Averroesis advocatinga pluralistpositionin the footstepsof the abovementionedargumentfromAristotle s De generatoneanimaliumthatin the 56)Albertus in ofa similar De anima , lib.I, tr.2,cap.15,58.I amnotaware passage Magnus, beiAlbertus Eine "Dieplatonische Tradition De homine. Cf.Hendryk Anzulewicz, Magnus. & M.J.F.M. in ThePlatonic Tradition intheMiddle , ed.S. Gersh Hoenen, Ages Hinführung", 207-277, esp.258-259. 57)Albertus De homine denMenschen , 64-66:"Undehie , qu.4,a. 1, ad7,35a,Über Magnus, sunt estipsecommentator Averroes, quidicit quodhaecdiffiniquorum primus decepti plurimi nisi inhomine etposterius animae. non esse verum tioperprius Quod aptatur patet poneremus tres esseperfectiones, est". quodimpossibile 58)Albertus incommento denMenschen, 88:"Averroes Dehomine, qu.7,a. 1,90b,Über Magnus, etdiversa virtutibus". ibidem dicit estunasecundum substantiam quodanima agitdiversis 59)Averroes, enim Commentarium Deanima dicebat , comm. 1.7,10:"Plato quodvirmagnum incorde, inepate. etconcupiscibilis etnaturalis, scilicet tusintelligibilis estincerebro, nutritiva, subiecto etplures secundum virtutes." Aristoteles autem easesseunam opinatur 60)Averroes, infiguris comm. enim invenitur etposte176:"Quemadmodum ibid., 11.31, prius inposteriori, existit inpotentia itaestdevirtutibus animae." riusetprius

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embryothe vegetative precedesthe sensitiveand the sensitiveprecedesthe intellective ofperfections. soul,withtheconsequenceofa plurality ButAverroes In hiscommenton the does notadoptthislineofargument. ofthesouland definition triangle passage,he arguesthatthereis one universal severalspecialdefinitions ofeachofthepowersofthesoul.AsAverroes explains in hisMiddleCommentary onDe anima(nottranslated intoLatin),thegeneral definition ofthesoulis notpredicated ofall faculties ofthesoul:"It univocally one in respectto priority forsomeperfections of and posteriority, is, rather, thesouls faculties existpriorto others".61 Thatiswhythedefinition ofthesoul is analogousto thedefinition ofa figure to suchas thesquare.It is important notethatAverroes does notspeakofseveralperfections ofthesoul itselfor of In bothcommentaries, severalsubstances. he contrasts thegeneraldefinition of the of the soul withthe specialdefinition (or perfection) (or perfection) faculties. The first definition is one, thesecondis manyand orderedin terms a pluralist of ofpriorand posterior. ThuswhilethesepassagesmakeAverroes him not make a of souls or substances. do faculties, they yet pluralist ofAverroes shows.In thelater Butotherpassagesdo, as thelaterreception Averroes was invokedas an authority Middle Ages and in the Renaissance, The advocatesof bothforand againstplurality, as EmilyMichaelhasshown.62 claims orbis where Averroes theunitythesiscitea passagefromDe substantia , thatitis impossiblethatone subjecthas morethanone form;a formcan only be replacedif the previousformis destroyed.63 Those who favourplurality, suchas Williamde la Mare and RichardofMiddleton,quotea passagefrom ontheMetaphysics VIII. 10 on theconceptofan "ultimate theLongCommentary form.64 theultimate form": theunityofthecompoundis realizedonlythrough 61)Averroes, Talhïs kitãb Middle onAristotelis De Anima: , ed.A.L.Ivry an-nafi Commentary Utah, 2002). (Provo, 62)Emily ofForms", Franciscan Studies "Averroes andthePlurality 52(1992),155-182. Michael, ' deAverroes 63)Averroes, Comentario al 'Desubstantia orbis De substantia orbis , ed.M.Alonso, haberet deToledo formam, 1941),60:"Sienim (Aristotelismo (Madrid, yAverroismo) porAlvaro habere nisiunumsubiectum Unamenimformam nullam aliamreciperet nisiilladestructa. 160:"unum inMichael, 'Averroes andthePlurality ofForms', est"(cf.thewording impossibile "AristoCf.Arthur habere formam estimpossibile"). enim subiectum Hyman, plusquamunam in s andAverroes' Form' tle's'First Matter' andAvicenna ", 'Corporeal Harry Austryn Wolfion Volume , 3 vols(Jerusalem, 1965),1:385-406, Jubilee esp.404. 64)Averroes, onthe Arabic ed.M.Bouyges, 19383 vols.(Beirut, Long Commentary Metaphysics, inAristotle/Averroes, omnia Aristotelis 48),VIII.10,1067,Latinedition Stagirite quaeextant libri(Venice, inlogica, etmedicina . . . commentami philosophia aliique ipsius opera Averrois. "Nosautem a. M.,1962),vol.8,f.218rb: dicimus 1562),repr. (Frankfurt quod quodunum formam et scilicet definitio una,estunum perultimam persubstantiam queestforma, significat de inRoberto Richard differentiam." Cf.Richard ofMiddleton's discussion ultimam Zavalloni,

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These authorsunderstandthe De substantiaorbispassagedifferently: they has that Averroes here refers to the which to be form, only complete argue when another form arrives.65 destroyed The pluralists havea point:Averroes in two teachesa plurality apparently senses.First,withrespectto theformsoftheelements, he arguesthattheeleformsarecontainedin the"composedform"( sūramurakkaba, mentary forma but in a diminishedway,whichis possible ) of the compound,66 composita - this sincetheelementary formsarenotsubstantial formsin thefullsense67 is Averroes' well-known and remission of elementary theoryof theintention forms.68 with to and individual Averroes teaches Second, forms, respect generic thatmatter"first receivestheformof thegenus,receiving later,throughthe of the form of the all other forms intermediary genus, up to theindividual forms".69 Thelastformto be receivedis theso-called"ultimate form". Averroes not does sayclearlywhethertheformspriorto theultimateformremainin In viewofhisparalleltheoryofelementary thematteror aredestroyed. forms, it is possiblethathe thoughtthattheultimateformunitesall previousforms withouttheirbeingdestroyed. In viewofthis,itisnotsurprising inDe homine thatAlbertus Averroes presents bothas supporter andopponentoftheplurality thesis. Averroes' on the teaching issueallowsforbothinterpretations. Note thatAverroes himself doesnotlink thediscussionofthesouls unityto hisintellect becausehis theory, presumably - which,famously, intellecttheory makesthe materialintellectone forall Mediavilla etla controverse surlapluralité desformes. Textes inédits etétude (Louvain, critique 1951),144. 65)See Richard of Middleton, De gradu Richard de Mediavilla , in: Zavalloni, , formarum Richard "Exhissatis concludes: ut non fuit intendo Commenta153-154. videtur, quod patet, toris esset unaforma substantial tantum". quodinquolibet composito 66)Averroes, onMetaphysics , XII.22,ed.Bouyges, 1520,Latined.of1562, LongCommentary f.308ra, IbnRushd's A Translation with Introduction Engl.tr.Charles Genequand, Metaphysics: of IbnRushd's on Aristotle's Book Lãm Thecon118-119. (Leiden, 1986), Commentary Metaphysics, form" alsoinAverroes' onthe Latin edition ceptof"composed appears Long Commentary Physics, inAristotle/Averroes, Aristotelis omnia . . . Averrois. . . . commentarii Stagirite quaeextant opera. inlogica, etmedicina libri a.M.,1962), (Venice, 1562), (Frankfurt aliique ipsius philosopha repr. voi.4, f.6rb:"Queenimsuntpreter materiam et ultimam formam cuiuslibet rerum primam naturalium suntmaterie etforme composite composite". 67)Averroes, Commentum libro De cebetmundo ed.E J.Carmody & Aristotelis, magnum super R.Arnzen (Leuven, 2003),III.67,634-635. 68)Thistheory hada significant influence onlatemedieval scholastic seeAnneliese philosophy; AnderGrenze vonScholastik undNaturwissenschaft: Studien zurNaturphilosophie des14. Maier, (Rome, 1952). Jahrhunderts 69)Averroes, ontheMetaphysics, 1.17, ed.Bouyges, 97,Latined.of1562, LongCommentary f.I4vb.

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- is an epistemological humanbeings theoryin thefirst place.ThomasAquinascriticized Averroes forturning thematerial intellect intoa substance which cannotbe theformofthebody,withdetrimental for the unity consequences ofthesoul.Butit is notclearwhether Averroes abandonedtheconceptofthe unityofthesouls substancewhendevelopinghisintellect theory.70 5. Conclusion The first an interpretation ofAlbertus'theoryof partof thispaperpresented of thesoul,as developedin his earlywritings, thesecondpartan assessment his debtto theArabicphilosophers Ibn Gabirol,Averroes and Avicenna.We forAlbertus: have seen thatIbn Gabirolservedas an importantadversary Albertustracesthe doctrineof universalhylomorphism to its source,Ibn GabirolsFonsvitae, rejectsit and distinguishes insteadbetweena quo estand a quodestin thesoul. In Albertus' ofthe 1240s,Averroes is notyetperceivedas a philowritings is important for of the same rank as Aristotle or Avicenna. ButAverroes sopher thatthepartsofthesoulare as thesourceofthePlatonictheory Albertus, first, and localizedin different organs,and,second,in thedoubleroleas supporter alsoas opponentofAlbertus' positionthatthereis onlyone substancein man. It has emergedthatcentraltenetsofAlbertus'earlytheoryof thesoul are thesisthattheArismuchinfluenced byAvicenna.AlbertusadoptsAvicenna's does not pertainto the soul's toteliandefinition of the soul as perfection and he sharesAvicenna'scontentionthat essence,but only to its activity, of theessenceof thesoul.Albertusdraws "form"is an inadequatedefinition Avicenna when he tries to definethesoul'srelationto thefaculties. againon and betweenthesoulas a substance WithoutAvicenna's distinction ontological in avoidingsomesortofpluitspowers,Albertuswouldhavehad difficulties a mortaland an immortal thesisin orderto distinguish partofthesoul. rality traditionof Peripatetic Albertusthus continuesa Greek-Arabic-Latin Aristotelian the This tradition theoryof the soul, but accepts philosophy. in a that it becomes Aristotle's compatiblewiththe vocabulary way interprets from the of the soul body. separability of the soul is clearlya Neoplatonic The insistenceupon the separability It is trueto saythatPhiloponos,Avicennaand Albertusdo not inheritance. 70)Cf.Herbert "Averroes didnot Thomas' A. Davidsons defense ofAverroes critique: against A.Davidson, Avithematerial intellect isnotmansform" (Herbert Alfarabi, saythat explicitly Active andTheories Their Theories andAverroes, onIntellect: Intellect, cenna, of Cosmologies, ofthe & Oxford, Human Intellect 1992),300-302). (NewYork

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s definition of the term"actuality" followAristotle ) when they (
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inderScholastik: vondenvierIntellekten vondenarabi"DasLehrstück Hasse, DagNikolaus, Recherches de et médiévales 66 schen bis zu Albertus Quellen Théologie Philosophie Magnus'*, (1999),21-77. DeAnima inthe Latin West: The Formation Soul, , Avicennas ofa Peripatetic Philosophy ofthe & Turin, 1160-1300 (London 2000). - Wisdom - OccultSciences", in The Literature , "PlatoArabico-Latinus: Philosophy A ed. S. Gersh & Platonic Tradition intheMiddle , M.J.F.M. Ages: Doxographic Approach Hoenen & NewYork, (Berlin 2002),31-65. "Aristotle's 'First Matter Form' andAvicennas andAverroes' Arthur, ",in Hyman, 'Corporeal Volume , 3 vols.(Jerusalem, 1965),1:385-406. Jubilee Harry Austryn Wolfion DosProblem derhylomorphen dergeistigen Substanzen im Kleineidam, Erich, Zusammensetzung behandelt bisThomas von 13.Jahrhundert, (Breslau, 1930). Aquin derSeele DasVerhältnis zuihren Potenzen: von Künzle, Pius, Problemgeschichtliche Untersuchungen von bisundmitThomas Switzerland, 1956). (Freiburg, Aquin Augustin Alain leGrand etlaphilosophie Libera, de,Albert (Paris, 1990). etnoétique: Albert leGrand , Métaphysique (Paris, 2005). inOdonLotOdon"L'identité del'âmeetdesesfacultés avant saint Thomas ďAquin", Lottin, etmorale auxXIIeetXIIIesiècles etal.,1942),483-502. tin,Psychologie ,vol.1 (Louvain AnderGrenze vonScholastik undNaturwissenschaft: Studien zurNaturphilosoMaier, Anneliese, 14. des (Rome, 1952). Jahrhunderts phie "Averroes andthePlurality ofForms", Franciscan Studies 52(1992),155-182. Michael, Emily, "DerEinfluß derarabischen aufdieEthik desAlbertus Müller, Jörn, Intellektspekulation MagüberGrenzen: Arabisches Wissen undlateinisches Mittelalter nus",in Wissen , Miscellanea Mediaevalia & L.Wegener & NewYork, 33,ed.A.Speer (Berlin 2006),545-568. The Robert & Shields, Pasnau, Colo.,2004). (Boulder, ChristopherPhilosophy ofAquinas InAristotelis deanima libros ed.M.Hayduck commentarla, (Berlin, 1897). Philoponos, Onthesoul1.1-2 vanderEijk(Ithaca, , OnAristotle's , transi. N.Y.,2005). P.J. Onthesoul2.1-6,transi. W.Charlton , OnAristotle's N.Y.,2005). (Ithaca, DiePsychologie zurGeschichte Alberts desGrossen, derPhilosophie Schneider, Arthur, Beiträge desMittelalters, vol.4.6& 4.6(Münster, 1903& 1906). undGlück: dieLehre vom unddiementale ,intellectus Sturlese, Loris, Vernunft adeptus' Glückseligkeit beiAlbert demGroßen (Münster, 2005). " L'intelletto ei suoilimiti secondo Alberto ilGrande elasuascuola", , Tntellectus adeptus': inIntellect etimagination danslaPhilosophie ed.M.C.Pacheco & J.F.Meirinhos, Médiévale, 3 vols(Turnhout, 2006),1:305-321. A Noteon andUniversal Avicebron. A.,"Albertus James Weisheipl, Magnus Hylomorphism: 13th-Century inAlbert theGreat: Commemorative ed.F.J.Kovach & Augustinianism", Essays, R.W.Shahan Okla.,1980),239-60. (Norman, Zwischen Natur undVernunft. Alberts desGroßen vom Menschen Wieland, (MünGeorg, Begriff ster, 1999). Avicennas inContext Robert, NY,2003). (Ithaca, Wisnovsky, Metaphysics "Essence and in TheCambridge Medieval F., Existence", John Wippel, History ofLater Philosophy ed.N. Kretzmann etal.(Cambridge, 1982),385-410. Richard deMediavilla etlacontroverse surlapluralité des Textes inédits Zavalloni, Roberto, formes. etétude (Louvain, 1951). critique

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{Ê}'i*v BRILL


Vivarium 46 (2008)253-274

lhe Mental

Inner Cathedral:

Architecture

in High Scholasticism

PeterKing University ofToronto Abstract wasa "faculty a confederation ofsemiMediaeval theory psychological psychology": autonomous theinteraction ofwhichconstitutes ourpsychologisub-personal agents, thatis,thewill.On what calexperience. One suchfaculty wasintellective appetite, a brief ofAristotle's wasthewilltakento be a distinct After survey faculty? grounds I lookinsomedetailatthe foridentifying mental criteria anddistinguishing faculties, mainstream mediaeval view,givenclearexpression byThomasAquinas,andthenat with thedissenting viewsofJohnDunsScotusandWilliamofOckham.I conclude onwhythemainstream somereflections mediaeval viewwasdiscarded byDescartes. Keywords Ockham medieval will,mental faculties, Scotus, Aquinas, psychology, 1. Introduction ofmindis muchconcernedwithissuespertaining Contemporary philosophy - describinghow mentalprocessesare organized, to "mentalarchitecture" by identifying typically subpersonalfunctionalmechanismswhichcausally of a mentalrepresentation, oftenthroughtheintermediary interact, thereby internal mental mechanisms rise to Such phenomena. giving psychological if can be quitelow-leveland operatewitha degreeof relativeindependence; A ofmentalactivity. "modules"or minimalcentres so,theymaybe considered moduleor a setofmodulesmaybe specificto a givendomainofphenomena, visualdata.The wayin whicha setof mentalmodulesis e.g. onlyprocessing structure to "inner makes the architecture of the mind,offering arrayed up articulation of the mindoffers psychological space".The detailedstructural realmofthemental. theories sometraction on theslippery ©Koninklijke Brill 2008 Leiden, NV,

1 DOI:10.1 163/156853408X36091

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Mediaevalphilosophy ofmindwas likewiseconcernedwithissuespertainin muchthe same way and formuchthe same to mental architecture, ing reasons:sub-personal functional mechanisms areidentified and organizedinto thesefaculties suchthatone reducesanotherfrom faculties; causallyinteract to the of a mentalrepresentation act, potency perhapsthrough intermediary a s rise to (called pedes),thereby phenomena.Thesefaculgiving psychological tiesoperatewitha degreeofrelative as independence, centresofmentalactivof ity,each concernedwithitsown domainofphenomena.The arrangement thesefacultiesmakesup thementalarchitecture of humanbeingsas understoodin theperiodofHigh Scholasticism. In factthis Suchmediaevalmentalarchitecture hasa greatdealofstructure. bit of architecture, looks like so as a much vastinner appropriately, nothing as cathedral. our a hike the nave of the up TakingAquinas guide, long vegetativesoul, withits fundamental drivesand urges,bringsus to the realmof proper:thecentralareain whichthe"space"is partitioned bytwo psychology - on theone handa distinction distinctions thatcriss-cross betweentheclusterof principlesand capacitiesthataccountformovementand sensation, knownas thesensitive and capacpartofthesoul,and theclusterofprinciples itiesthataccountforthoughtand volition,knownas theintellective partof the soul; on the otherhand a distinction betweenthe apparatusof powers abouttheworldis acquiredand assimilated, knownas wherebyinformation thecognitive or apprehensive and theapparatusofpowerswhereby potencies, one engagestheworld,knownas theappetitive potencies.Each regionofthis "innercathedral"is markedoffby theintersection of thesedistinctions and coversa specificand uniquedomainof psychological withfaculexperience, tiesapportioned as follows: • sensitive whichincludesthe , betterknownas sense-perception, cognition five"outersenses"(sight,smell,hearing,touch,taste)as well as "inner sense"(thecommonsenseand perhapsimagination and memory) • intellective is the of domain intellect or reason,the faculty cognition behindthe operationsof thinking(concepts),judging(propositions), and ratiocination, withtheoretical and practicalsides;it is therealmof thesubordinate oftheagentintellect faculties and thepossibleintellect • sensitive includes the emotions ), dividedintotheconappetite (passiones and the each several kindsof emotions irascible, cupiscible comprising and actingsemiautonomously • intellective is thedomainofthewill,whichis thefaculty ofvoliappetite tion,decision,choice,and action

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Each regionis the focusof intensestudy,leadingto a wealthof detailed theorythatis oftenuniqueto a givenmentalregion.In addipsychological the interaction ofthedifferent tion, amongthefaculties regionsneedsclarifiwith link cation, specialattention beingpaid to threecases:the"transductive" betweensensitive and intellective the influence of on the emotions cognition; theintellect and conversely; and therelative and of intelstanding autonomy lectand will. In whatfollowsTil use a particular question,one thathas to do withthe of affective as a autonomy psychology, wayof raisinggeneralissuesaboutthe mediaevalaccountof mentalarchitecture. The particular questionis roughly this:Whatarethegrounds thatthewillisa distinct ? To answer forholding faculty thisquestionwe needto getstraight abouthow to identify facpsychological ultiesas well as how to judge their(degreeof) distinctness. Y11proceedas follows.In §2 I'll talkaboutAristotle's remarks on thefoundations of sketchy therawmaterials forconstructing theinnercathedral. We'llfade psychology, in to themediaevalaccountaround1250 in §3, whereI discussAquinasat somelengthas representative ofwhatI'll callthe"mainstream" viewofmental In §4 I'll talkabout the dissentfromthe mainstream architecture. view by Duns Scotusand Williamof Ockham.Scotussdissentis in theend minor, but Ockhamsis not; he inaugurates a radicalminority tradition opposedto themainstream. I'll of conclusion offer some for Byway suggestions whythe radicalminoritytraditioneventuallywon out and became the dominant in theCartesianaccountofthemindca. 1650. tradition majority 2. Aristotleand FacultyPsychology For Aristotle, was a branchof naturalphilosophy, the branch "psychology" with whose involves alive. Yet little of the natural dealing things physis being in the of the carries over to as found philosophy (say) Physics psychology De anima, apartfroma generalconcernwithmotionand the explanatory makesa newbeginning, workapparatusofthefourcauses.1Instead,Aristotle his "life" definitions of and accounts of senseing waythrough physiological in Now the of the anima Aristotle course De there are three perception. things and does notdo thatareworthnoting.First,apartfroma fewprogrammatic in De anima 1.1, Aristotle remarks doesn'toffermuchreflection on sketchy makespsychology a science,or the kindof scienceit is. what,if anything, 1}HieDeanima hasmuch more incommon with thebiological works that follow itthan with the"physical" works itinthetraditional ofthecorpus. preceding arrangement

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an accountof themindin termsof faculties, Second,he doesn'tput forward of its he does speak powersand capacities.Third,he doesn'thaveany although understoodit,namelya clear-cutnotionof "will"as mediaevalphilosophers ofvolition,choice,decision,and action.Thesethreeabsences distinctfaculty foreach passage make two passagesin the De anima extremely important, a systematic that invite on philosophical raisesgeneralreflections psychology - in particular, are to accountof mentalarchitecture they open a "faculty" and thesecondpassageseemsto suggest ofmentalarchitecture, interpretation in connection withchoiceand decision,that thefaculty approachspecifically in the case of the will. is, whenAristode concludeshis Thefirst passageislittlemorethana throwaway, oflifein De anima2.2 (4 13b11-16) :2 oftheconstituent elements discussion - principium Forthepresent letussayonlythis, thatsoulistheprinciple (arche ) ofthe the the them that aforementioned and is characterized is, by vegetative,sensiby things isa soulora partofa soul Whether eachofthese theintellective, andbymotion. tive, = anima in whether itisseparable ē morion autparsanimai) , andifa part psuchēs (psuchē - some = alone ofthese arenothard toknow, account things (logõirationé) oralsoinplace whereas forsomethere isdifficulty. Aristotle goeson to pointout thatthepowersand capacitiesofthesoul form is assoforthetimebeing,nutrition naturalclusters. Puttingasidemovement with ciatedwiththevegetative soul as foundin all livingthings,perception thesensitive soul in soul foundin animals,and thoughtwiththeintellective distinhumanbeings.Broadlyspeakingthesesoulsareorderedhierarchically, intellective the classes of to which the soul is theybelong; things guishedby perhapsseparable(4l3b24-27). Hence thereis some kindof realdifference amongthevarious"parts"ofthesoul,andthispassageinDe anima2.2 became of substantial the locusclassicusforarguments overthe unicityor plurality form.Moreimportant forourpurposes,though,is thefactthatAristotle associatesa clusterofpsychological powerswith"a soul or withpartofa soul"but he does not clearlysettletheissueof how thepowersare relatedto the 2)There intheMiddle were three Latin versions oftheDeanima available Theearliest was Ages. in ofVenice andisknown astheuetus, itwascomposed ca.1125-1 150,andisextant byJames as thealiatranslation some144 manuscripts. Thenext wasbyMichael Scotus andisknown in ca.1220-1235, insome62 manuscripts, andextant forthemostpartincluded composed Averroës s Great on the "De anima". the last and most influential translation Finally, Commentary ofMoerbeke asthenoua'itwascomposed ca.1265-1268, wasbyWilliam andisknown andis extant insome268manuscripts. butwithaneyeto Thetranslation hereis from theGreek Moerbeke's version.

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is thattheyare"parts"in somesense,a sense souls,thoughtheclearsuggestion read mediaeval thinkers as a psychological naturally by faculty. The secondpassageseesAristotle returnto thedeferred issueofmovement and itsstandingin thesoul,De anima3.9 (432a18-b13): Next wemust lookintowhat itisofthesoulthat movement: whether itisa part produces ofitseparate either inaccount orinmagnitude, orwhether itisthewhole soul;andifitis a part, whether itisa partdifferent from those described oralready mentioned usually by itisoneofthem. Theproblem arises ofhowwearetospeak of us,orwhether immediately =partes) ofthesoulandhowmany there are.On theonehandthere isan (moria "parts" indefinite number: notonlythose[parts] thatsomemention in distinguishing them, theratiocinative andpassionate anddesiderative,3 orasothers and do,therational namely theirrational; forinvirtue ofthedifferentiae4 these other bywhich they separate things, - the than seem tohavea greater theoneswehavementioned these, parts namely disparity which both to and to all the which cannot animals; sensitive, plants vegetative, belongs = beclassed aseither irrational orrational; theimaginative (tophantastikon easily yetagain = isdifferent initsbeing from them all(hotõimen einai heteron ywhich fantastica) pantõn abomnibus altera est itisvery difficult tosaywith which ofthe ),while quidem quaeperesse others itisthesameorisnotthesameifonewere topostulate ofthesoul;in separate parts tothese addition there istheappetitive, which inaccount different and is,onewould think, inpotentiality from allofthem. itwould beoutofplacetosplit the for latter, Surely up = uoluntas there iswishing in anddesire andpassion5 (boulesis [!])intheratiocinative part, theirrational; andifthesoulisthreefold there willbeappetite ineach. Toturn nowtothe matter athand, what isitthat inrespect ofplace? moves ananimal Aristotle beginsby askingaboutthesourcewithinthesoul of animalmovewhether thesoulas a wholeis responment,whichis a matterofdetermining ifnot,whichpartis responsible, sibleformovement; and how it is relatedto otherpartsofthesoul.Thismethodological pointleadshimto wondergenerwhat a about of the soul is. Yet rather thantreatthequestionin full ally "part" Aristotle several different divisions of thesoul: thePlagenerality, compares tonictripartite analysis,therational/irrational splitmobilizedin theNicomacheanEthics earlierin theDe anima, namely , andtheseriesofsoulsinvestigated thevegetative soul. Criteriafor soul, the sensitivesoul, and the intellective are to alluded but not differentiae parthood by which [various given("the 3)Here theLatin doesnotproperly match theGreek: for kaithumikon kaiepithumētikon , logistikon William ofMoerbeke hasrationatiuam etirascibilem etappetitiuam. Seealsonote5. 4)"Differentiae": tasdiaphoras meant here but (,differentiae ), likely non-technically byAristotle, later asa term ofart. interpreted strictly 5)Again there isa mismatch: forepithumia kaihothumos ofMoerbeke hasconcupiscen,William tiaetira.

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in notesthedifficulty thinkers] separatethesethings"),and Aristotle rightly of both and into the aforementioned any incorporating imagination appetite to thematschemes.Withthathe abandonsthegeneralquestionand returns terat hand.Threepointsto note. like notedin thefirst movement, First,thesuggestion passageis reinforced: In that to the the case stems from soul. of such something belongs perception, features the"something" fundamental belongingto thesoul is to be undercouldeasily stoodas a partofthesoulactingas a principle.In short,Aristotle to account for be readas lookingfora psychological movement, faculty though he does notsayso in so manywords. thatthesourceofanimalmovement is foundin Second,Aristotle suggests a the appetitivepower.He therefore sets generally "appetite"(as principle) whichlooksto thedistinction betweencognitive and affecagainstcognition, tivepsychology thatwillbe a leitmotiv ofmediaevalphilosophy. floatedtheidea thatone part Third,recallthatin thefirst passageAristotle ofa soul can be distinctfromanotherin account.Herehe explicitly saysthat partscan differin accountor essencewithoutthatsettlingthe ontological witha givenpartofthesoulor not; theyareto be identified questionwhether in theworldanswersto parts itis an openquestionwhether real difference any in definition. differing Thesetwopassagesin Aristotle do not put forward an accountof how to If a psychological Aristotle seemsto deliberately construct theory. anything, refrain fromgivingsuchan account.But thepassages,suggestive as theyare, withtherawmaterials withwhichto construct providedhismediaevalreaders the Lets fast-forward a built lines here. theories, implicit psychological along and a halfto watchthemin action. millennium

3. ThomasAquinas and theMainstreamView Fade in on Aquinasis representative of his generation of scholasticthinkers. Thedetailsofpresentation arehis,butthepositionsketched herecanbe found in his teacherAlberttheGreat,his fellow-student his renegade Bonaventure, Durand of Giles of of Rome,Godfrey Fontaines,and St.-Pourçain, disciple in hiscommenmanyothers.6 AquinasdiscussesbothpassagesfromAristotle 6)SeePiusKiinzle, DasVerhältnis derSeele zuihren Potenzen: Problemgeschichte Untersuchungen vonAugustin bisundmitThomas vonAquin(Freiburg, ofviews aboutthe 1956)fora survey relation ofthesoultoitspowers itsfaculties) from toAquinas. (andhence Augustine

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tary,theSententialibride anima, and coversmuchthe same groundin his Ia q.77 de animaq.l2 as well as in Summatheologiae Quaestiones disputatae lucid.7 is exceptionally art.1. As usual,hispresentation De anima3.9, 432al8AquinasdiscussesthesecondpassagefromAristotle, b13,in hisIn De anima3.8. He takestheopeningsentence,whereAristotle raisesthequestionwhatthesourcein thesoul ofmovement is,to layout the it is a partof it wholeagendaofAristotlessubsequentdiscussion:"whether or whetherit is thewholesoul" separateeitherin accountor in magnitude, movement is either(a) thewhole of choices: the three principle possible gives in is of the soul that a soul; (b) part separable magnitude;(c) a partofthesoul thatis separablein account. to be rejected,accordingto Aquinas,is (b). Aquinas The firstalternative ' as "in subject","as thePlatonistshold" "in interprets magnitude(megethei) is to think thatdistinct Their mistake (239A16-18). requiredistinct principles subjects,so thattherewouldbe at leasttwosoulsin a humanbeing,one that thinksand senses,theotherthatfeelsand moves.Aquinasrejectsthismove unities:thelifeof becausehumanbeings,as indeedall animals,aresubstantial which is to sayin Aristoas wellas perception, an animalinvolvesmovement tle'stermsthattheseprinciples prinbelongto a singlesoul (thefundamental does it What then soul". cannot mean "distinct of Hence life).8 "part" ciple arises." mean?Thatis theproblemAristotle says"immediately ofAristotle's secondpassageas addressedto Aquinastreatstheremainder thatproblem,in theformof a scholasticdebate:"Aristotle pursuesthepoint second and firstin the mannerof a disputation(,disputatio ), by settlingthe to first takes Aristotle (239A26-29).Roughly, Aquinas question(determinatio) threearguments presentcandidatesfordivisionsofthesoul,and thento offer has to be that movement them, explainedbypostulatthereby proving against division,one thatencompassesboth desiresand wants- the ing a different the and incorporates "part"ofthesoul,a conceptionthatsupersedes appetitive of the s divisions.But ratherthanfollowing traditional text, Aquinas exegesis with we can getto hissolutionoftheproblemaboutpsychicpartsbystarting hisfundamental principles. 7)SeeDavidGallagher, ontheWillasRational "Thomas Journal oftheHisAppetite" Aquinas will as rational account of the of for a 29 559-584 study Aquinass tory ofPhilosophy(1991): appetite. 8)Aquinas form: ofsubstantial toestablish theunicity same variant ofthis usesa close argument inthehuman andthought forperception accounts itmust beoneandthesamesoulthat being, willnotbea substantial thehuman since otherwise unity. being

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In Summatheologiae Ia q.77 art.3,Aquinasgivesthetheoretical background involvesbotha passiveaspect(emoto his analysis.The souls "movement" - something thesoul tion)and an activeaspect(choice).Thesearepotencies is ableto experience, wherethemodality hereis interpreted as roughly akinto themodernnotionsof an "ability" or "capacity." Thesemodernnotionscordistinction respondto a fundamental amongkindsof potencies:abilitiesto activepotencies,capacitiesto passivepotencies.Activepotenciesenabletheir whereaspassivepotenciesenabletheirpossessor possessorto "do" something, to "suffer" Thisintuitive senseis capturedin theidea or "undergo" something. thatthereductionof a potencyto act9requiresa causeor explanation:those is due to an internal potencieswhoseactualization principleareactivepotencies; thosepotencieswhoseactualizationis due to an externalprincipleare betweenthem,buta unified differences passivepotencies.Therearesystematic in A accountis nonetheless brief look is order. possible. so do thepotenciesthatareindiActshaveobjects(
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ityto be heatedis actualizedbya fireso longas it actively heatsup thewater. The external acts as the formal and final cause of the of actualization principle - its end.11As before,the end is the objectof the act. the passivepotency Hence theobjectofseeingis thethingseen;theobjectofbeingheatedis heat (moreexactlybeinghot),whichis impartedby the fire.The pointmaybe as follows: summarized (opp) The objectofa passivepotencyis theacts external principle. Actsarethemselves thekind bytheirobjects,whichdetermine distinguished ofactinquestion:"potencies aredistinguished inaccordance withtheaccounts (¡rationes ) oftheirobjects"(In De anima3.8 240B124-125). Sincetheactuality ofeitherkindofpotencyis defined, and (or realization) henceindividuated, to itsobject,thereareas manydistinct byreference potenciesas therearedistinct Yetwe do notwantto identify eachpotency objects.12 forthesouls movement as a principlethatis a distinctpartofthe responsible soul.Aquinastakesthisto be theproblemAristotle diagnosesat thebeginning ofthesecondpassage(In De anima3.8 L45.1, 239A38-B45):13

n) Inthis casetheexternal isalsotheefficient causeofthepassive reduction principle potency's from to act. The efficient cause a differ from itsformal potency passive potency may actualizing andfinal however. cause, 12)Following Aristotle's theendsofanactive intoroughly lead,Aquinas distinguishes potency twokinds Ethics where thegoaloftheactistheact 2.5and10.4):(a) activities, (Nicomachean suchasdancing orwalking; orachievements, where theendorcompleitself, (b)performances tionoftheactisthestate that obtains atorafter thetemporal limit oftheact,suchaswinning theraceorbeing married. Bothactivities andachievements arekinds ofactions. Passive potenareofa single Since theactuality ofa passive isan cies, (orrealization) bycontrast, type. potency actthat isdefined toanexternal toopp,suchactsmust therebyreference principle, according fore beoccurrent states ofthesubject: theexternal exercises itsinfluence onthesubject, principle a change within itinsomeway, onewhich so longas theexternal causing persists principle continues toexercise itsinfluence. Thesubject ofa passive potency maybeputintoa state by theexercise ofa passive that after thepotency isnolonger but exercised, potency persists being thestate isnotproperly theexercise ofthepassive itisinstead theresult ofitsexercise. potency; Since thepassive isonly actualized theactsofpassive potency byanexternal principle, potencies areexamples ofwhat thesubject suffers orundergoes. arenotactions butpassions. They 13)"Dicitergoprimo huiusinquisitionis habetdubitationem quoquodmoxinprincipio modooporteat et partes secundum modum animae, sint, quot distinguere quia aliquem viDENTUR esseINFINITAE, idestnonposse subaliquocerto ethocuerum numero; comprehendi si singulis animae etmotibus esset attribuere esset, operationibus quisuntab animanecesse diuersas animae." partes

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Aristotle first ofallthat immediately atthebeginning ofhisinvestigation theproblem says arisesofhowweought todistinguish the"parts" ofthesoulandhowmany there inonewaythereisan indefinite that are,since number, is,notabletobesummed up under number. Thiswould betrue ifitwere toattribute diverse anydefinite necessary parts ofthesoultoeachofthesouls operations andmovements from thesoul. stemming - theapparendyendlessfragmentation lhe properwayaroundthisdifficulty ofthesoulis to takeinspiration fromAristotle in De anima2.2 and s remark look not foreach proximatepotencyinvolvedin movementbut fortheir on the"primary principle. underlying Aquinasdoes thisbyfocussing object" ofthepotenciesforanimalmovement, a notionwhichitselfrestson theidea ofa "perseobject". Somethingcountsas theperseobjectofa potencyifit is theproperobject of thepotency.For instance,theperse objectof buildingis thehousethatis built.The buildermayalso becomestrongthroughhis physicallabor,but healthis notwhatbuildingis aboutbydefinition: healthis onlyan incidental or accidentalresultof construction. could takeplacewithoutany(Building one becominghealthy, but notwithoutsomething gettingbuilt.)Thusperse are in objects particularitems the world,such as the newly-constructed house. The "primary feature, object"ofa potencyis themostgeneralnonrelational orsetoffeatures, in virtueofwhichitsperseobjectcountsas itsperseobject.14 The primary themostgeneralcharacterization objectofa potencyis therefore that counts as the of the anything object potencycan fallunder;it is theconditionanyobjectmustsatisfy in orderto be intelligible as an objectof the whether the be potency, potency activeorpassive.The primary objectmustbe sinceotherwise itrisksbeingempty. To saythatJonessvisionis nonrelational, actualizedbyanything visibleis truebut trivial, since"visible"is a relational termthatmeans"ableto actualizethefaculty ofvision."The primary object mustequallybe general:to saythatJonessees theblacknessof thecats fiir in virtueofitsblacknessis truebutunhelpful, sincewe can see gingercatsas well as black ones. The most informative of what generalcharacterization can be seen is colour(or morepreciselythecoloured the , primaryobjectof theprimary isfigureratherthan,say, sight.(Analogously, objectofgeometry .) triangle 14)Thenotion seems derived from Aristotle's discussion ofcommensurate inPosterior subjects' s terminology isnotcompletely I amusing theaccep1.4,73b32-74a3. stable; Analytics Aquinas tedlater ofthevocabulary. He sometimes callstheprimary the'formal regimentation object object'.

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shouldnow be evident.He identifies a "part"ofthesoul Aquinass strategy as anypsychicprincipledefinedthroughitsprimary object,whichhe callsa In of for allowsus . the case sensitive faculty cognition, example,thisstrategy to identify visionand hearingas independentfaculties.The primaryobject of visionis thecoloured,and of hearingis toneand pitch;theseare clearly distinct,sincewe can neithersee soundsnor hearcolours.Hence each is a ofthesoul. faculty had in mindin objectis whatAristotle Accordingto Aquinas,theprimary in De anima3.9, listedas (c) at thebeginning histhirdalternative ofthissection:a partofthesoulthatis separate"in account."In thecaseat hand,then, powersis the Aquinasdeclaresthattheprimary objectofthevariouscognitive of the various true , whereastheprimary object appetitive powersis thegood 15 Ia 1 In art. ad the {Summatheologiae q.80 2). particular, primary objectofthe sensitive appetite,the appetiteis thesensible goodand thatof theintellective Ia q.80 art.2).Thesediffer as will,is theimmaterial good{Summatheologiae the sensitive is home to and active passive principles: appetite passivepotenwhereasthe intellective cies,the emotions,16 appetiteis home to the active betweencogniterms,thedifference potencythatis thewill.In contemporary an intensional He sums tivepsychology and affective is difference. psychology in in his on De anima his In De anima view 2.3 2.5 up pithily commenting (L45.1, 87A1-9):17 Buta ingeneral, Aristotle nowturns togiving anaccount ofitsparts. After "soul" defining inthiswaytheparts of as itspotencies arecalleditsparts; soulhas"parts" onlyinsofar canbecalled foreachofthem. ofmany capacities Accordingly, capable things something ofeachofitspowers. togiveanaccount ofparts ofthesoulistogiveanaccount

15)Remember, hemeans oftheappetite isthe when theprimary saysthat object Aquinas good, be characterized as not that that item that counts as an of must any object appetite good, goodthat ofappetite. nessitself (whatever maybe)istheobject 16)There isgiven Inkeeping with ofanyemotion isa further relevant difference. opp,thenature ofthese define distinct kinds thesensible asanobject under objects falling good.Thedifferentiae and desire and them. Thus the ofpotencies defined hate, (love concupiscible passions through taken sensible or evil and have the common aversion, sorrow) absolutely primary object good joy havethecommon confidence andfear, andtheirascible pri(hopeanddespair, anger) passions Iaq.81art.2). asdifficult orarduous sensible oreviltaken (.Summa mary object theologiae good 17)"Postquam incommuni, de animam nuncaccedit addeterminandum Aristoteles definiuit eius anima nisi secundum eius non autem habet aliter eius; partes quod potentiae partes partibus undedetermiadsingula; alicuius dicipossunt multa, dicuntur, potestates prout potentis partes eius." nare animae estdeterminare desingulis departibus potentiis

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The description ofthepsychological faculties spellsoutthe"partsofthesoul", eachin itsowndomainofpsychological phenomena. Thatmightseemto settlethematter: and affective are cognitive psychology thatit does not,fortwo interreTo his credit,Aquinasrecognizes different. distinclatedquestionshavenotyetbeenanswered. First,whilean intensional tionamongtheobjectsof potenciesmightbe enoughto showthattheyare distinctqua potencies,thatdoes notyetsettletheissueabouttheontological in thesoul.Second,Aquinashasyetto addressAristotle s standingoffaculties alternative (a) raisedin De anima3.9, namelywhetherthesourcein thesoul is thewholesoul ratherthana part. ofanimalmovement Aquinasaddressesboth problemswitha singleresponse,presentedvariIa q77 art.l,In on De anima2.2, Summatheologiae ouslyin hiscommentary de anima Sent. 1 d.3 q.4 art.2,and Quaestiones q.l2. He underdisputatae between faculties with an writesthe intensionaldifference psychological extensional difference betweenthesouland itsfaculties, and one faculty from whichhe another.His avowedtargetis theviewthat"thesoul is itsfaculties," de animaq.l2, 108B131-142):18 expoundsas follows( Quaestiones disputatae Those whoholdthat thesoulisitsfaculties that thevery essence ) haveinmind {potentine ofthesoulistheimmediate ofallthesoulsoperations, that itisthrough principle claiming ofthesoulthat a human ofthe theessence anddoesother understands, senses, being things names inlinewith ofthese andthat itisreferred tounder diverse thediversity sort, operainsofar asitistheprinciple ofsensing, "intellect" insofar asitistheprinciple tions: "sense" torefer totheheatoffire ofunderstanding, andsoon- justasifwewere asthe"melting since itdoesallthese and"drying power", "heating power", power", things. The appeal of thisviewis obvious:"sinceit is one and thesame mindthat thereseemsto be no advantagein regarding the wills,thatsenses,thatthinks," facultiesas separatepartsof themind.19The intensionaldifference between in fact neither and affective be nominal, purely cognitive psychology might 18)"Ponentes sitsuaepotentiae, hocintelligunt, animae sit quodanima quodipsaessentia igitur immediatum omnium dicentes homo essentiam anianimae, principium operationum quod per maeintelligit, etaliahuiusmodi etquodsecundum diuersitatem sentit, operatur, operationum inquantum diuersis nominibus nominatur: sensus estprincipium intellectus sentiendi, quidem inquantum autem estintelligendi etsiedealiis;utpote sicalorem nominareprincipium, ignis muspotentiam calefactiuam etdessicatiuam, quiahaecomnia operatur." liqufactiuam, 19)Descartes, Meditations 6 (Adam-Tannery etiam facilitates 7,86):"Neque uolendi, sentiendi, etc.eiuspartes dicipossunt, mens estquaeuult, quiaunaeteadem quaesentit, quae intelligendi intelligit."

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to nor in anyneed of a distinction a parterei. But thisview corresponding is as follows. doesn'twork,Aquinasdeclares.His reasoning An agentcausesan effect onlyto theextentthattheagentactuallyis or has thefeatures oftheeffect: firedoesn'tcauseheatbecauseit shines,butbecause in itselfit is actuallyhot.The principleof theactionand theactualeffect are "conformai"(
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we arenot,and so thesemustnotbelongto and willing;manifestly thinking between thesouls essence.The upshot,then,is thatthereis a realdifference thesoul and itsfaculties.22 mediaevalview:theminds mentalarchitecThis,then,is themainstream of itsfaculties, each of tureconsistsin thearrangement and interconnection a its and covers which is definedintensionally by unique primaryobject domainof psychological phenomena;thereis a realdifference amongthese severalfaculties, as wellas betweenanypsychological and thatofwhich faculty it is a faculty, the soul. This seems to have been the dominant viewin namely is clear: a distinction that seems borne Scholasticism. Its appeal High strategic in betweencognitive is underwritten out experience and affective psychology The soulis thefundamental bymetaphysics. subject,buttheeachpsychological faculty waslicensedto operateas a sub-personal locusofactivity (bynature connected with other defined and faculties, functionally separable),causally stream. linkedin an input-output 4. Scotus and Ockham For all itsvirtues,though,Aquinaslefttwo componentsof themainstream viewunacceptably metaphysically vague:(a) whatkindofentity, speaking,is a psychological betweenthe (b) whatexacdydoesthe"realdifference" faculty? in hisanswers.Psysoul and itsfaculties amountto?At best,Aquinaswaffles faculties are a word he from AlberttheGreat; "properties", adopted chological it is vague enough to mean almost anything,and Aquinass arguments, rehearsed offaculties as accidents, sinceAquinasis above,encouragethinking at suchpainsto contrastthemwithessentialfeatures.23 As fortheirdistinctarenotthesameas thesoulin reality; ness,allAquinasdoesis saythatfaculties he leavesitopenhowthisis to be understood. The usualconstrual tookAqui22)Aquinas forhisconclusion offers further that whereas thesoulisa single bynoting support and faculties must bemultiple, since someareactive (suchasintellect principle, psychological arepassive asperception andemotion); hence must stem from distinct will)andsome (such they "andsince theessence ofthesoulisa single itthus cannot betheimmediate principles: principle, ofallitsactions, butmust instead haveseveral diverse faculties" Since (110A2 14-220). principle thisdepends ontheclaimthatnothing cansimultaneously bethesource ofbothactive and it is as an not well-founded acts, passive though, argument. 23)Including totheessence." takes , which technically propria "pertain Aquinas "proprietates" from Alberts I d.3M (135),whousesittoexplain Sent. howAugustine s triad ofmemory, intela unity: "Iliaueratrianaturales sunt seuuires lect,andwillaredistinct yetform proprietates et a se inuicem differunt." mentis, ipsius

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thatis, to betweenthesoul and itsfaculties, nas to upholda realdistinction of the maintainthatone was metaphysically other, separableby independent divinepowerat theleast. on the latterscore.Henryof Ghent,for Therewas some dissatisfaction wererealrelational faculties that instance, aspectsofthe psychological argued ratherthan "intentional distinction" infamous his hence distinct and soul, by But the 3 q.l4). ( Quodlibets positionwiththe dissenting bya realdistinction was articulatedin the succeedinggenerationby JohnDuns mostfollowers 2 d.16 q.un. Scotus,who proposedthe followingaccountin his Reportatio nn.17-19(WV 13, 43A-44A):24 isnot thesoulanditsfaculties] I saythat "unitive containment" [ofthesort characterizing of norisita feature aren't thesame, sincethey that areentirely a feature ofitems united; butthose items their hadbefore remain distinct items that union; they bythedistinctness orarethesamebyrealidentity oneyetremain that arereally distinct, yetdistinct formally which aren't the of the intellect and in the case take it this . . . We can will, way formally. were in thesoulas though contained ofthesoulbutareunitively essential they parts - notthat itsacts thesoulisabletoperform andaccording towhich itsattributes,25 they the arereally andnevertheless butareformally arethesoul'sessence distinct, formally, inthatnone canevenbecalled"parts" . . . The[faculties] andunitively. sameidentically butonlypartial oftheessence thewhole ofthem them, containing perfection expresses [perfection]. distinctfrom Scotusis proposingthatthesoul is not reallybut onlyformally Thismightseemto explaintheobscurebythemoreobscure,but itsfaculties. it is notso bad as all that.The coreintuitionbehindScotussformaldistincin defidoes notentailidentity thatexistential tionis, roughly, inseparability the a fact about this is the that nition,backedup by conviction waythingsare Sinceformally distinctitems ratherthana matterofhowwe conceivethem.26 24)"Ideodicocontinentia sunt omnino nonesteorumquae unitua idem, quiailianonuniuntur; sed anteunionem; distincta ista fiierunt distinctione manent necesteorum distincta, qua quae idem identitāte siuequaesunt manent tarnen distincta unum reali, formaliter, realiter, quaesunt etuoluntate, deintellectu ... Sicergopossumus tarnen formaliter. distincta quaenon accipere in anima contenta sed sunt unitiue essentiales sunt eius, animae, quasipassiones propter partes sedsuntformaliter eiusformaliter, nonquodsintessentia estoperatiua, distinctae, quasanima secundum etiam dicipartes, etunitiue etpossunt identice idemtarnen quodnulladicit sedquasipartialem." essentiae totam continentis, perfectionem 25)"Attributes": ofsomething with the technical here , truly perse predicable meaning passiones ofbeing. areattributes and"good" ofanother, theway"one", secundo modo "true", 26)Scotus 1 d.8p.l q.4nn.172-188; inhisLectura exprofesso distinction discusses theformal Parisian andseveral andd.8p.lq.4nn.191-217; 1d.2p.2qq.1-4nn.388-410 Ordinatio lectures,

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areexistentially theyarereallyidentical,in thesensejustdefined. inseparable, Hence theformaldistinction onlyappliesto a singlerealthing.Now some in theirdefinitions. identical items differ Moreprecisely, may theymay really in account[in ratione of thestrictnotionof differ ), whichis a generalization or Aristotelian "definition": an account,likea definition, picksout thefeature setoffeatures thatmakesomething to be whatit is,thoughit neednotdo so All definitions are accountsbut not conby genusand specificdifferentia. that thereareitemsthatlackdefinitions versely: yetdo havea setof features makethemwhattheyare:thehighestgenera,potencies,thefourcauses,accidistincthave nondentalunities,and so on. Thus itemsthatare formally or accounts,thatis,theaccountofone does notinclude identicaldefinitions thatof theother.Nevertheless, theitemsthatareformally distinctare comthathas themin sucha wayas to makeup a binedtogether intosomething - "unitivecontainment". Hence Scotuss positionis thatthepsychologiunity cal faculties ofintellect and willarereallyidenticalwiththesoul,butformally distinctfromone another, sincewhatit is to be an intellect does notinclude thewill,and whatit is to be a willdoes notincludetheintellect. Exactlyhow thisworksout on themetaphysical sideis a bitofa mystery, buttheposition is clearenough;it maintainsintensional withextensional difference identity, in the intensional is somehow. difference underwritten reality although YetalthoughScotusexplicitly arguesagainstAquinasat length(nn.3-10), thedifference betweentheirpositionsis, I think,minor.WhateverAquinas have arenotthesame intended may bytheclaimthatthesouland itsfaculties in reality, itis clearhe thought thatthereis somerealdifference betweenthem. in reality. Scotuslikewisethinksthatthesouldiffers fromitsfaculties Indeed, is not a "distinction of reason"(a merelyconceptual the formaldistinction becauseit is basedin reality. Thisis apparentfromScodistinction) precisely tuss description of theformaldistinction. For bothrealidentity and definiWe discover tionalnon-identity areindependent ofanyactivity oftheintellect. the accountsof thingsthroughthinking; we do not therebycreatethem.27 Hence thedistinction betweenformally distinctitemsseemsto be presentin theworld,notevenpartially It is therefore causedbytheintellect. "real"in the broadsense.Thatis sufficient to be countedin themediaevalmainstream. instudent I willignore here thevexed mostly only surviving transcriptions (reportationes). question about whether Scotus hisaccount oftheformal distinction. changed 27)Scotus inOrdinario makes thispoint 1 d.8 p.l q.4n.193:"Furthermore, thedefiexplicitly nition indicates notonly anaspect that iscaused ofa thing; formal butthequiddity bythemind, istherefore exparte rei Seealsod.25q.un.n.10andhisQuaest. inMetaph. 7 q.13 non-identity nn.90-91.

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WilliamofOckhamdissentsfromthemainstream, a minority inaugurating tradition thatis radically to the "real difference" tradition opposed represented holdsthatthe byAquinasand others(includingScotus).Ockhamexplicitly He devoteshisReportatio 2 q.20 to the souljustis itspsychological faculties. and will are distinct facul"whether matter, intellect, memory, really asking at lengththeviewsof ThomasAquinas,Henryof ties";he statesand refutes Ghent,and Duns Scotus,beforedeclaringhisopinion(435.4-8):28 I saythat thefaculties ofthesoulthat wearespeaking intelofinthecaseathand, namely lectandwill(I'mnottalking about thesensitive willbea treatment nowsince there powers ofthem arereally thesameaseachother andwith theessence ofthesoul. later), Ockhamenunciatesthisconclusionafterhis mind-numbing detailedexaminationand refutation ofthephilosophers mentionedabove.Buthe doesoffer somepositivegroundsforadoptinghisview.When he turnsto thestrongest forthinking thatthereis a realdifference facargument amongpsychological that distinct must from distinct ulties,namely really really operations proceed and theoperationsofintellect and willarereallydistinct(425.5-7), faculties, he beginshisreplywitha flourish oftheRazor(444.2-8):29 Asfortheinitial I saythat sometimes distinct and operations require principles argument, sometimes do not. For sensitive and intellective a distincinstance, they bespeak cognition tionbetween sense andintellect. Butasfor when this tobepostulated andwhen not, ought weshould in turn backtoexperience oranevident Yetsinceneither ispresent argument. thecaseofintellect andwill], a plurality ofprinciples should not thecaseathand, [namely bepostulated duetotheplurality ofoperations. Ockham sketchesan accountof when such pluralityshouldbe postulated (444.17-445.12):30 28)"[Dico]quodpotentiae in proposito, scilicet intellectus et de quibusloquimur animae, - nonloquendo uoluntas depotentiis sensitiuis deeis- suntidem nunc, quiaaliaseritsermo realiter inter seetcumessentia animae." 29)"Adprimum dicoquodaliquando distinctae distincta principale operationes requirunt prinsicut sensitiua et intellectiua distinctionem inter sensum non; cipia, aliquando cognitio arguunt etintellectum. Sedquando istud estponendum etquando estadexperiennon,recurrendum tiamueladeuidentem rationem. Sedquiainproposito neutra est,ideoexpluralitate operationumnonestponenda pluralitas principiorum." 30)"Ideoadsciendum inferri exdistinctione distinctio potentiarum quando operationum potest sunt et quandonon,sciendum quoduniuersaliter quandoomniaextrínseca cognoscenti - putaquando etmedium uniformia obiectum estaequaliter uelplura obiecta, aequaliter praesens, - situnccognoscens extrínseca sehabent etomnia respectu dispositum aequaliter cognoscentis

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Inorder toknow when thedistinctness ofpowers canbeinferred from thedistinctness of note the and when not, operations following: - e.g.when Inevery casewhen allthefactors external areuniform totheknower the is equally areequally andthemedium is (orthemany objects present), object present - if inrespect andallexternal factors areequally related oftheknower equally disposed, atthatpoint theonewhoknows, andalsohasthepower canhaveoneactwith desires, to one and no other act with to the same itis appropriate to (if respect object respect havetheactwithregard tothatobject orwithregard tosomeother inrespect of object which itisappropriate tohaveit),suchthat itcannot haveanother actinanyother way, whether orappetitive orsensitive orintellective, then from thediseachactiscognitive tinctness ofsuchacts, thedistinctness ofthepowers arethesource oftheacts]follows [that ofnecessity. external On theother obstacle is removed, theonewhoknows, hand, if,when every andhasthepower hasoneactwith tosomeobject andbythat desires, fact, respect very with hisnature thesame, canhaveanother actwith tothesame or remaining object regard toanother, from thedistinctness oftheacts, thedistinctness ofthepowers are then, [that thesource oftheacts]never anidentity follows. andunity ofthepowers follows of Instead, inrespect ofthose acts. necessity Not forOckhamthe"evident" difference betweentheprimary objectsofintellectand will,suchas Aquinassaw,to underwrite a realdistinction. Ockham holds thata merelyintensionaldifference, in proper such as the difference a realdifference. To establisha realdisobjects,can neveras suchunderwrite tinctionamongpowers,and therefore Ockham faculties, amongpsychological invokesthestringent standardoutlinedin thispassage:ifit is notpossibleto elicitdistinctsimultaneous actsdirectedat thesameobject,holdingall other relevant circumstances fromwhichtheactsstemarereally fixed,thefaculties distinct;31 otherwise, ontologicalparsimonyholds sway,and the acts stem fromone and thesamefaculty or power. enunciated this criterion fortherealdistinction, Ockham Having stringent out that acts of intellect and will fail to since can it, points satisfy they be elicei appetens, habens habere actum unum circa unum obiectum etnonalium potentiam, potest - sinatus actum circa idem sithaberi circa illudobiectum uelcirca aliudobiectum circa quod - itaquodnullo natus esthaberi modopotest habere alium siueuterque actus sitcogniactum, tiuus siueappetitiuus siuesensitiuus siueintellectiuus, tunc exdistinctione talium actuum necessariosequitur distinctio Sedquando etappetens, habens potentiarum. cognoscens potentiam, amoto omni habet unum actum circa et extrínseco, obiectum, impedimento cognoscens aliquod eo ipso,stante natura habere aliumactum circaidemobiectum uelaliud,ibiex sua,potest distinctione actuum distinctio immo necessario idennunquam sequitur potentiarum, sequitur titas etunitas illorum actuum." potentiae respectu 31)Ockhams here isthat canonly elicit oneactata time, andhence anygiven faculty reasoning ifthesecond actinquestion canoccur itmust stem from a different andifnot,not. faculty,

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itedsimultaneously withrespectto thesame object.He does not botherto the since he believes,correctly, thatit is obvious.Likewise,there argue point, is no reasonto postulatea realdistinction betweenthesoul itselfas a whole and anyof itsvariousfaculties.Hence on Ockhamsalternative picture,the difference betweenthesouland itsvariousfaculties, and betweenthefaculties is merelyconceptual.Willingsomething and knowingit (say)are themselves, two that one and the same the has itselfto the ways just thing, soul, ofrelating thing.Nor is thereanyreasonto thinkthatthese"ways"aredistinctin themselves.Whatappearsconvexmaycometo appearconcavebychanging position; andwillingareno moredistinct thanthat;towantsomething perhapsthinking maybe nothingotherthatto makecertainjudgmentsaboutit,forinstance. Ockhamsradicalrejectionofthemainstream viewseemsto havehad some in at Oxford the Robert Holcot was apparently an adherent, 1320s; currency and WilliamCrathornidentified thesoul not onlywithitsfaculties but also - a mediaevalHume,indeed,finding withitsactions onlymentalactswithin: Sent. 1 q.l (74-97).32But it is notclearhow farOckhamsopinionextended. Eventhearch-nominalist JeanBuridan,whenhe discussedtherelationofthe soul to itsacts,optedto endorseAquinass viewratherthanOckhamsin his in De anima3.20:33 Quaestiones I firmly these themainstream tothe adhere Still, view]notwithstanding, replies [against I isneither that as as understand and know, myintellect contrary opinion: namely, long aredispositions intellection norknowledge; onthecontrary, intellection andknowledge init. distinct from itandinhering As forintellect and actofcognition, so too forthesouland anyofitsfaculties in general.Ockhamsoppositionwas strident but it did not evenbecomean entrenched of nominalism. dogma 5. Conclusion view of mentalarchitecture Despite Ockhams opposition,the mainstream all thewayto thepointwhereit vanishespractically seemsto predominate, 32)Heinrich contra II"inPhilosophisches "Holkot dicta Crathorn 79(1972), Jahrbuch Schepers, when hesays toOckhams view. Buthesurely describes Holkots adherence 106-136 goestoofar at time. that Ockhams view wasthe"common of Oxford the opinion" 33)Translation CorinJack ofMind"(Ph.D. dissertation, Buridans "John Zupko, Philosophy nellUniversity, 1989).

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withDescartes.It is no surprise to findCajetandefending Aquinass overnight thatSuárezdoes so. But it is a view,as he does; it is likewiseunderstandable view defendedby the independent-minded surpriseto see the mainstream Renaissance GiacomoZabarella,whotreatsthequestionatlength philosopher in hisLiberdefacultatibus animae- one of thethirty "books"makingup his Renaissance tome De rebus naturalibus in libros standards) weighty(evenby Aristotelis De anima of 1590. Zabarellaeven apologizesfordefendingthe mainstream viewat suchlength,sinceit is a traditional chestnut. Asidefrom a fewdiehardOckhamistsand a fewmaterialists who wantedto identify the far of bases of all too ahead their time the mainpsychology biological stream viewwaspartoftheprevailing intellectual instead climate;philosophers their into the relative of the put energies determining standing psychological in particular whethertheintellectis dependenton thewillor confaculties, The realdistinctness of thefaculties seemsnot evenon thetablefor versely. discussion. Whathappened?Descartescouldbreezily dismissthewholemediaevaltrain his with a throwaway thatseemsalmost alive and well dition,clearly day, 6 (86) :34 liftedfromOckhamat theend ofMeditation Neither canthefaculties ofwilling, andsoonbecalled of[the sensing, "parts" thinking, since itisoneandthesamemind that that that thinks. wills, senses, mind], A cartesiansoul is itselfa substance,relatedto but reallydistinctfromthe a "thinking substancewhichis itsassociatedbodilymachine.It is notoriously a res . to Meditation a is 2, thing," cogitansAccording thinking thing something that"doubts,understands, and also imagines affirms, denies,wills,refuses, in and senses{imaginans (28). Descartesdefines"thought" quoqueetsentiens)" theappendixto hisRepliestotheSecondObjections as "allthatofwhichwe are in us,and thatis whynotonlyunderstanding, consciousofoperating willing, and imaginingbut also sensingarethoughts" (160). Indeed,Descartesmore thanonce speaksofsensations as "confused", as whenhe statesin Meditation 6 that"allthesesensations ofhunger, and so on,arenothingother thirst, pain, thancertainconfusedmodesofthinking" and sensTherefore, (81). thinking are a as in treated on which are par phenomena equallygrounded thesame ing thecartesian soulitself, onlybydegreesofclarity thing,namely, distinguished and distinctness. Pains,perceptions, ideas,and truthsaretheimmediatesub34)"Neque etiam facultates etc.eiuspartes dicipossunt, uolendi, sentiendi, intelligendi quiauna eteadem mens estquaeuult, quaesentit, quaeintelligit."

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awareness;at leastsome of theseelementsare jectsof non-representational themselves where is analyzedas thepresence representational, "representation" of whatis represented in objectivebeing.The assimilation of sensations the pains and perceptions to ideas and truthsis motivatedby construing automaton;thedistinction livingbodyas a well-functioning amongpsychobetweendegrees logicalphenomenaseemsto be groundedon thedistinction of clarityand distinctness distinctions on (althoughtheremaybe non-trivial thebasisofrepresentative Withthelocationof (second-grade and character). on the side of the cartesian divorced from the soul, third-grade) sensing physof thebodilymachine,Descarteshas createda unitary iologicalsense-organs "innerspace":themind.A distinction ofsubjectand objectis possible,butthe articulated Scholastic framework ofdistinct faculties is notpresent; the highly cartesiansoul containsonlya selfand its "thoughts" (includingvolitions), confusedor otherwise. The factorthatbroughttheinnercathedralto ruins,I suggest, is eliminatthe between the sensitive and the intellective on the sideofthe souls, ing gap intellect. Once therealdistinction betweenanimalsoulsand humansoulshad - possiblesinceDescartesrejectedtheideathatanimalshavesoulscollapsed therewas no reasonto keep the otherfundamental thatof the distinction, the in and Descartes of affective, himself, course, cognitive place. hungonto thedistinction as wellas he could;we learnin Meditation for 4, instance,that theintellectis finitewhereasthewillis infinite. But withouta metaphysical distinction to supporttheirdistinctness, therewas no reasonto adopt the mainstreammediaevalview,and the successof Cartesianphilosophy,in essence,razedtheInnerCathedralto theground.35

Bibliography Sources Primary Albert theGreat, InSent. 1inB.Alberti omnia Paris 1893:torn. 25. ,ed.A.Borgnet. Magni opera Thomas Sententia libri deanima inS. Thomae Doctoris omnia Aquinas, Aquinatis Angelici opera tom.45.1,ed.R.Gauthier. Roma: Commissio Leonina 1984. de S. Thomae Doctoris omnia tom. , Quaestiones animay disputatae opera Aquinatis Angelici Roma: Commissio Leonina 1996. 24.1,ed.B.-C.Bazán. ed.P.Caramello, cumtextu exrecensione leonina. Torino: Marietti , Summa theologiaey 1962-1963. 35)Special thanks toAnnaGreco forassistance andcritical comments.

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libros Sententiarum andM. F.Moos.Paris:1929, Scriptum , eds.P.Mandonnet super 1947. inDeanima inJohn Buridans Ph.D. Buridan, ,ed.J.Zupko Jean Quaestiones Philosophy ofMind: Cornell 1989. dissertation, University William zumersten ed. F. Hoffman in Beiträge zur Crathorn, Sentenzenbuch, Quästionen Geschichte derPhilosophie undTheologie desMittelalters neuefolge Aschendorff 29,Münster: 1988. RenéDescartes, inOeuvres Meditationes deDescartes tom.7,eds.C. Adam andP.Tannery, Paris 1897. GilesofRome(Aegidius deanima. libros Venice Frankfurt-am1500.Reprint Romanus), Super Main:Minerva G.M.B.H. 1982. ofGhent, Badius Paris Leuven 1520.Reprint 1961. Ascensius, Quodlibeta. Jodocus Henry DunsScotus, Lectura inIohannis andOrdinatio DunsScoti Doctoris Subtilis etMariani John omnia Vaticanae 1950-. , eds.C. Balieetalii.Rome: opera Typis Polyglottis andReportatio inJoannis DunsScoti Doctoris Subtilis Ordinis Minorum , OpusOxoniense ed.L. Wadding, withslight omniay alterations, Lyon1639;republished, opera byL. Vivès, Paris 1891-1895 (abbreviated "WV"). inB.Ioannis subtilissimae inMetaphysicorum libros Aristotelis DunsScoti , Quaestiones opera etalii.St.Bonaventure, N.Y.:TheFranciscan Institute 3-4,eds.G. Etzkorn philosophica 1997. inGuillelmi William ofOckham, deOckham etphilosophica Reportatio opera theologica (Opera tom.5),ed.S. Brown, G. Gài.St.Bonaventure, N.Y.:lhe Franciscan Institute theologica 1967-1985. De rebus inlibros naturalibus Aristotelis deanima XXX(1590).Frankfurt libri Zabarella, Jacobus Liberde facultatibus animae Frankfurt-am-Main: Minerva 1506-1507. 683-728. Reprint G.M.B.H.1966. Sources Secondary D. "Thomas on theWillas Rational inJournal Gallagher, Aquinas Appetite" oftheHistory 29(1991),559-584. ofPhilosophy P.Das Verhältnis derSeelezu ihren Potenzen: von Kiinzle, Problemgeschichte Untersuchungen bisundmitThomas 1956. Augustin vonAquin. Freiburg Universitätsverlag H. "Holkot contra dicta Crathorn II"inPhilosophisches 79(1972),106-136. Jahrbuch Schepers,

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Some Varieties Duns

of Semantic

Scotus's

Cognitive

Externalism

in

Psychology

RichardCross Dame ofNotre University Abstract in the inherent to Scotus,an intelligible content, specieswithuniversal According selfis the whose immediate of an occurrent is a cause mind, partial object cognition ofthiscausal thepossibility to explainhowScotusdefends samespecies.I attempt makesno thatforms arecauses,andthatinherence Scotusclaims, activity. generally, this an He illustrates ofa form tocause effect. tothecapacity difference byexamining in theproduction ofa ofa substance is an instrument a casein whichan accident to isthattheaccident isrelevantly Allthatisrequired sortofeffect. certain joined the arebearinthesubstance. Sinceintelligible whether ornotitinheres substance, species canalsobethe ofthought thatnon-inherent itfollows ersofsemantic content, objects and inthemindwithout areincluded Suchobjects bearers ofsuchcontent. inherence, istothisextent broken down. themindandexternal theboundary between reality Keywords instrumental DunsScotus, cause,semantics, cognition species, intelligible 1. Introduction ofScotuss cognitive features One ofthemanymoreor lesscontroversial psythat the is the belief species accordingto Scotus the intelligible chology - hasan mentalobjectofan occurrent cognitionwhosecontentsareuniversal Thisbelief ofsucha cognition.1 causalroleto playin theformation efficiently nota subis an accidental becausean intelligible is controversial form, species thereis a evensettingasideitsnon-substiantiality, stance;and moregenerally, l) ForScotuss andSomeLateThirseemy"DunsScotus infavour ofthisclaim, arguments and in Word in Medieval The on the Mental , Theology, Word", Logic teenth-Century Opinions Charles Burnett Tetsuro Shimizu and ed. , (Turnhout: forthcoming). Brepols, Philosophy DOI:10.1 2008 163/156853408X360920 Brill ©Koninklijke NV, Leiden,

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ofa formimmanent, inherent or moregeneralquestionaboutthepossibility thinkof as the intrinsic to theagentor mindbeingwhatwe mightproperly ultimatecauseofa cognition:howcan sucha formbe an efficient causejoint withthe substanceor agentin whichit is immanent?Scotus attemptsto defendhisviewagainstthisgeneralworryas follows: thisintellect isaccidental insofarasitisa tothespecies, [A]That[thespecies] perfects cause with to the act of with the intellect astheother partial respect cognizing, concurring cause. Forevenifitperfects itdoesnotgivetheintellect [theintellect], partial anyactivity totheintellects themotive ina handcanusea knife causality. Example: pertaining power tocutupa body, insofaras [theknife] issharp. Ifthissharpness inthehandasits were then thehandcoulduseitforthesameoperation, andnevertheless itwould be substance, in accidental tothehand(insofar asthemotive is that is in and vice it, it) power sharpness because thesharpness thehandnoperfection to [motive] versa, gives power. pertaining Thisisapparent, because themotive isequally suchsharpness, without and power perfect inthesame ituses[the tothehand itisinsomeother sharpness] waywhen joined thing - asitwould inthehand. suchasa knife useitifitwere Ifthespecies Soitisinthecaseathand. intheintellect couldexist without in inhering ofexistence in[theintellect] itinthemanner ofform, andifbythat mode itwere orcould besufficiently totheintellect, these twopartial toeachother, causes, conjoined conjoined could[tend] tothesameoperation towhich nowcanwhen thespecies informs the they ifweposit intellect. Thisisalsoapparent someintelligible without a [object] present species.Thatobject isa partial causethatdoesnotinform theintellect istheother (which twopartial butthese closetoeachother without theinforming ofthe causes, cause); partial onebytheother, causeonecommon effect alone. bytheir required proximity Ifthislatter isposited, there isa reason forittobeimpossible that anaccident, perhaps which isanimmanent andnota transeunt be tothe (transiens) principle,sufficiently joined - which substrate unless itisinitsubjectively iswhy itiscalled anaccident. Butsurely the - which divine essence intheintellect ofa blessed isneither intheessence immanent [of - isa principle theblessed] norinsomething ofwhich itisa form ofintuitive cognition?2 2)"Accidit inquantum estcausapartialis actusintelligendi, concurrens cum speciei respectu intellectu utaliacausapartiali, intellectum, eum,non quodipsaperficiat quiaetsiperficiat tarnen datintellectui a causalitatem intellectus. activitatem, aliquam pertinentem Exemplum: inmanupotest motiva inquantum uticultello acutus est,ad dividendum potentia aliquod inmanu Istaacuties siesset utinsubiecto, manus utieaadeandum corpus. posset operationem, - inquantum - quodacuties ettarnen accideret manui estineapotentia ineaesset, motiva ete nullam daret manui adpotentiam motivam. converso, quiaacuties perfectionem pertinentem estpotentia motiva sinetaliacutie, etodemmodounitur ea Quodapparet, quiaaequeperfecta estinalio,coniuncto manui inmanu. sicut uteretur easiesset Itainpro(utcultello), quando Sispecies esseinexsistens intellectui inhaerentia siilio formae, posito. posset absque permodum modoinexsistens esset velposset essesufficienter conuincta istae duaecausae intellectui, possent intellectus etspecies, coniunctae sibiinvicem, ineandem inquammodo partiales, operationem informat intellectum. Quodetiam possunt quando species apparet ponendo aliquod intelligibile sinespecie: illudenim obiectum estcausapartialis, etnoninformat intellectum, praesens quiest

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In whatfollows,I shallpresentwhatis in effect an extendedcommentary on thisstriking to draw out some of its not and attempt implications, passage, but also forhis accountof themindonlyforScotusscognitivepsychology bodyrelationas such. [A] involvestwo generaland on thefaceof it unexpectedclaimsthatturnout to be instancesof generalbeliefsaboutcausation heldbyScotus:(1) thatthecauseofthemotionofa materialsubstanceis not thearm),buttheformofsuch thewholesubstanceitself(here,bysynecdoche, a whole(herethemotivepowerthatis in thearm);and further (2) thatboth in analoforms are used the cause extrinsic and intrinsic by objects/accidental in I in a deal with a knife and sharpness hand). gousways(here,sharpness in 1 2 to and then on thesegeneralclaims sections and respectively, apply go themto generalquestionsoftherelationbetweenmindand body(section3) and specificissuesin cognitive (section4). psychology 2. Formand Causal Power an On thefaceofit,itis surprising to be toldthatthecauseofsuch-and-such - is strictly - one composedofmatterand form effect ofa materialsubstance speakingtheformof thatsubstance,and not thesubstanceitself.But Scotus makesthepointexplicitly: inanother tothat that itisdenominated asa form form, Every [thing], gives thing existing tothething. Andalthough existence action, gives justas[theform] byits[viz.theforms] nevina suppositum isdenominated a form action, [i.e.a substance] byits[viz.theforms] ismore denomibutthesuppositum ertheless denomination, [itis]not[so]byfinal finally nated bythesameaction.3 alterius informatione altera causapartialis; sedistae duaecausae absque partiales approximatae, communem. Hoc causant unum effectum debitam ab altera, solam per approximationem immaestaccidens siponitur, nonsinecausaforte secundum, quodestprincipium impossibile dicitur coniuctum nentis etnontranseuntis essesufficienter quare passonisisitiniliosubiective, inintellectu beati estprincipium accidens. Nonne essentia divina intuitionis, quaenonimmanet nn.500-501, Vatican ed.III, Ord.1.3.3.2, illinecalicui essentiae cuius Scotus, ipsasitforma?": 296-297. 3)"Omnis denominari inalioutforma, sicut datilliesseitadatillialiquomodo exsistens forma, ultimata insupposito abactione etlicetforma denominaretur a suaactione, sua,nontarnen Ord . 1.12.1, actione": ab eadem sedulterius denominaretur Scotus, denominatione, suppositum inmyThe inmore detail thispassage n.51,Vatican ed.V,54.1discuss Metaphysics oftheIncarCommunicaand"Divisibility, toDunsScotus nation: Thomas 2002),222-23, (Oxford, Aquinas Medieval inDunsScotuss Theories oftheCommon andPredicability Nature", Philosophy bility, 11 (2003),43-63, andTheology 59-60.

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Actionsaredone byforms;theactionsoftheseformsbelongto thesubstance fromthe form,to the substance.This accountlocates by "piggy-backing": rather forsuch relations, causal explanations"at the levelof the principles" in of their all the richness thanat "thelevelofprimary substances, properties as we shallsee, inhereequallyin lhe relationsthemselves, and principles".4 boththeformand thecomposite,and it is thisjointinherencethatenables Scotussaccountto avoid possiblecausaloverdetermination. Presupposedto offorms:formsareas real,and or hypostatization Scotuss viewis a reification whichtheycompose.5Furthermore, as thecompositesubstances as particular, Scotussupposesthatat leastsome such formsare active-, that,forexample, A paradigm do things,or makethings,unlessprevented. theyautomatically or case,one muchbelovedof Scotus,mightbe heap,we sometimes(rightly rather than which heats of heat as that speakof things speak being wrongly) a hotthingbeingthatwhichheatsthings.6 To graspprecisely An activeformis one thatdoes or makessomething. between what Scotuswantsto say,we need to understandthe distinction and as Scotus or between and putsit. operation production, making doing theformer is "thatwhoseultimategoal is a doing(usus),not Fundamentally, theactivity about (actio)ofwhichremainsalsoin (actum), something brought ofactionbutto that theagent".7Scotusascribesoperationnotto thecategory fashionas the"secondact"ofsomeof quality,and talksof it in Aristotelian thingactual(of somethingin "firstact").8The latter,production,resultsin located Itisproduction whichisproperly somefurther objectorstateofaffairs. in the categoryof action.9Scotusdividesit into two sorts:immanentand arethosethatresultin someeffect Transeunt transeunt (transiens). productions to be (p,or simplymakingit to be.10 external to theagent:makingsomething 4)Peter inSelf-Motion Aristotle to ontheReality ofSelf-Change", from King,"DunsScotus G. Lennox Newton ed. Louise Gill and 261;notethat , Mary (Princeton, 1994),229-90, James which I offer here: seeKing, "Duns onthispoint isopposed tothat ofScotus Kingsreading ontheReality ofSelf-Change", 260-62. Scotus 5)On this, The seemyMetaphysics , 44-46;andThePhysics ofDunsScotus: oftheIncarnation Vision Context a 95-100. 34-41, 1998), Scientific of Theological (Oxford, 6)SeeScotus, below. Ord.1.7.1n.70,Vatican ed.IV,137-38, quoted 7)"Activa cuius etiam ... estcuius ultimus finis estusus(etnonaliquid actum), propria sumpta inagente": actiomanet Inmetaph. 9.11,n.8,OPhIV,607. Scotus, 8)Seee.g.Scotus, nn.14-15, referred Ord.1.6.un., Vatican ed.IV,92-94;seetoothepassages in theHistory ofPhilosophical to in myDunsScotus on God,Ashgate Studies Theology VA,2005),20,n.8. (Aldershot/Burlington, 9)Seen.8 above; seealsoInmetaph. n.49,OPhIV,557-58. 9.3-4, 10)SeeScotus, n.48,OPhIV,556-57. Inmetaph. 9.11,n.10,OPhIV,607;alsoInmetaph. 9.3-4,

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Immanentproductionis paradigmatically the productionof an operation: in an activestate.11 The technical itself to be such and such something making is "eliciting",12 and theelicitedproduct termforthissecondsortofproduction forourpsychological relevant purposeshereis an occurrent cognition.When we think,we makeourselvesto be in the stateof occurrently cognizingby in or that state occurrent ourselves.13 producing eliciting cognition The notionofan intrinsic mayseemat bestotiose,and at worst production - its incoherent.For we mightthink,first,that a substancesoperations isjustto be in a certain doings- do notneedto be produced(to do something willentaila we that the and state), mightthink,secondly, positing contrary sinceif operationsneed to be produced,it looks as though viciousregress, to be producedtoo, and so on ad infinitum. need Indeed,this productions is one oftheclassicarguments thatcan be offered secondconsideration against Scotusundermines bothobjections(parthewholenotionofagent-causation. how productionshouldbe simonyand incoherence)by clarifying precisely understood.For as he sees it theAristotelian categoryof actionis merelya or immanent . Specifically, therelationofproduction(whether kindofrelation is justwhatScotuscallsan "intrinsic" relation:itexistsjustso long transeunt) as itstermsdo. The relationofproductionthusarisesautomatically giventhe external or merely of theagentand of theproduct,be it something existence an immanentoperation.On thisanalysis,thinking(forexample)reallyis at and theproductiondoes notneedto be prorootjusta doing,nota making, duced;it simplyarises,giventheexistenceof theagentand theoperation.14 activlikethis:(i) productive Thelogical(nottemporal)ordergoessomething ityof producer(form);(ii) existenceof product;(iii) productionrelation betweenproducer(form)and product;(iv) productionrelation(identicalto thatin [iii])betweencompositeand product. is explainedby form,in thevery Scotusis clear,then,thatcausalactivity for strongsensethattheformofa compositematerialsubstanceis responsible thatthiscausalactivity He claims,nevertheless, theproductionof an effect. can be predicated ofthewholesubstance.In talkingaboutthispiggy-backing, thewhole substance. Scotususes a technicalterm:the activitydenominates butScotusmakesa stronger, Denominationis a logicalrelation, metaphysical - inheresin boththe - a quality claimas well: one and the same operation n) Seen.8 above; alsoScotus, Inmetaph. 9.3-4,n.48,OPhIV,556-57. 12)SeeScotus, Inmetaph. 9.3-4,n.49,OPhIV,557-58. 13)Seen.8 above. 14)Onthis, ed.VIII,796-97. seeScotus, Ord.4.13.1,n.12,Wadding

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- a relation formand thecomposite,15 and one and thesameproduction likewiseinheresin bothformand composite.Specifically, theseitemsinhere in theformdirectly, and in thecompositeindirectly, fromthe piggy-backing form: Sometimes there aresaidbythesameabstract term which denominatives many naturally denominate diverse towhich that diverse which issignified things, bytheabstract things term hasa relation. inmany ifprolixity Thiscouldbeshown didnotprevent it. examples that which andthat itprincipiates indifferent aredenominated Thus, bywhich principiates intheabstract, which iscalled iati forthatby on",signified ways bythisrelation "princip isdenominated] which and that which isdenom[itprincipiates immediately, [principiates Andinthis canbeappropriated tothese inated] mediately. waytwodenominatives things, suchthat that iscalled theprinciple, andthat which iscalled namely bywhich [principiates] theprincipiator.16 ElsewhereScotusmakesjustthesamepointfortherelationofcausing,propexternalto theagent.17 The idea is that erlyspeaking:producingsomething thesamerelation principiatinginheresin boththeformand numerically thecomposite,and it inheresin thecompositein virtueof itsinherence in a of the in the form. is the same relation part composite namely, Principiation as production.Bothrelationsarewiderthanthatof causing,because,unlike results.Elicitingis a causing,theycan have immanentas well as transeunt determinate of principiating; is another. Both relations are intrinsic causing the sense outlined once the and the (in exist, above): principiator principiated therelationofprincipiation obtainsbetweenthem.To thisextent, necessarily neitherprincipiation norproductionaredirectly causallyexplained:it is the factthatthe formis activethatexplainsthe existenceof the product,and thencetherelationof productionthatexistsbetweenproducerand product. And whatallowstheproductive of theform(in all casesotherthan activity voluntaryactivity)to resultin the existenceof the productis merelythe 15)SeeScotus, Inmetaph. nn.48-49, OPhIV,556-58. 9.3-4, 16)"Abeodem abstracto dicuntur natasunt denodenominativa, quandoque plura quaescilicet minare adquaediversa habet habitudinem illud abstractum Posset diversa, quodper significatur. inmultis siprolixitas nonobstaret. Sicabistarelatione exemplificari quaedicitur principiano inabstracto, diversimode denominatur 'illudquod'principiat, et'illudquo'princisignificata et'illud Etsecundum hocpossunt duodenomipiai,quia'illud quo'immediate, quod'mediate. nativa istis ut scilicet illud dicatur et illud dicatur appropriari, quo principium, quod principians": Inmetaph. seealsoTh.4,n.7,OPhII,626;Ord.1.7.1, Scotus, 9.3-4,n. 19,OPhIV,541-42; n.13,Vatican ed.IV,111. 17)SeeScotus, Th.4,n.2,OPhII,625.

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removalofblocks:forexample,oflocaldistancebetweensomesuitableextrinsic substrate and theproductive form,or theadditionof somesuitablejoint on the of kind ofthe cause,depending production envisaged.It is theidentity productionrelationin bothformand compositethatblocksanymisleading to viewtheformas something usedbythecompositein productemptation - something tion18 thatturnsout to be a centralin theaccountofpart-whole thatI givein thenextsection. instrumentality Aswe shallsee,Scotusinsiststhatnotall formsareactive,and thisturnsout to be important forhisaccountofinstrumental whichI considerin causality, thesenseof"active"is technical, thenextsection.Furthermore, and itis idenactiveforms(in therequiredsense)are thosethatare tifiedas "productive": and ofotherforms/substances ofthe productive productive, paradigmatically samekind- "univocal"causes,in thejargon: inevery Notonly isa relation ofactive notfounded butalso[itisnotfounded] power being, inevery itisclear that what isextended, asidevarious lessperfect form. For, setting things, another toit,tobe asextended, doesnotmake extended nearby previously unequal thing, inquantity, as what is hard does not make hard made likeitorequaltoitself just something what is isactive, that waspreviously nothard. Butwhat contrariwise, immediately changes inthe isremoved, asisclear itlikeitself, it,making [every] impediment nearby provided thatthere isnoactive form other thansome caseofwhatishot.Thusitcanbeargued some in the of substantial form and perhaps, genus quality.19 In fact,as we shallsee,univocity is nota requirement forbeingan activeform; is. butproduction(as opposedto mereoperation)certainly The lastsentencein the passagejust quoted assertsthatbothsubstantial - namely,qualities - can be active,and thuseffiformsand certainaccidents cientcausesof products.In thecomplexpassagethatfollowshere,Scotusis causes. formsareefficient to showthatbothaccidentaland substantial trying if if are and are is a worrythat forms causes, The background they onlyacci(be it matteror substance),thenit follows dentallyjoined to theirsubstrate 18)SeeScotus, 1h.4,n.3,OPhII,625. 19)"Nonsolum fundatur relatio sednecinquacumque noninquocumque forma, ente, poteninostendendo minus tiaeactivae. Necvidetur dificultas perfectis quoditasit.Namcaeteris siveadaequat sibiin nonassimilat inquantum quantum, praetermissis, patet quodquantum, aliudpriusnon necdurum indurai aliudquantum priusinaequale, quantitate proximatum ut statim sibiapproximatum modose habens, durum. Activum autem transmutat, opposito decalido. Itapotest sibicircumscripto assimilei quodnullaforma argui impedimento; apparet In metaph. forte etaliquadegenere activa estnisialiquasubstantial Scotus, 9.6, qualitatis": n.11,OPhIV,579-80.

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thatall (embodied)causesaremerelyaccidentalunities.The replyis thatthe statusof thecause as an essentialunityis irrelevant to itscapacityto cause. formsareunitiesin a waythatcompositesubBothaccidentsand substantial to thecausal stancesor accidentalunitiesarenot,butthismakesno difference question: anaccident with Itcanbeconceded that aloneisanefficient cause toitseffect, and respect anaccident aloneistheeffect, because anaccident isa being se its per completely having to another. ... It can anditisnotessentially be conceded [also] entity, belonging something that a substantial form alone causes . . . Hiecomposite [does this] really efficiently. primarily itdoesitthrough toit,anditisone Forthenotion perse,because something belonging ofefficient there isnotrequired that itisa subsistent butonly that itexists, or cause, being, isanact,fortheaccident.20 Theclaimaboutsubstantial formis thatitcausesdirectly; thecompositecauses becausea partof it causes- so it does notdo so directly, eventhoughit does itperse, thatis,as something thatis a substantial unity. Of course,Scotusdoes notmeanto suggestthatinactive(non-productive) formsaresimplystatic: There areproper ofnatural . . .- at leastifweextend operations perseexistent things whether immanent or or eventocausing a form, or transeunt, "operation'to any[activity], tolocalmotion. Andinthis isheavy hastheproper of downwaywhat operationtending wards itisoutside when itsproper Andwhen itisatrest, itissaidtohavea more place. than itmoves ButAristotle when doesnotseem toextend perfect operation "operation" inthis hesaysinDecáelo 2 that theimperfect lacks waywhen operation.21 Many such formswill be productiveof theirown (intrinsic)operations:of in kindfromthemselves thatis, different (and thusbe casesof productions, 20)"Potest concedi tantum estcausaefficiens suieffectus, etaccidens quodaccidens respectu tantum estperseenshabens suamentitatem etnonestesseneffectus, quiaaccidens complete tialiter alicuius - Potest concedi solaforma substantial efficit aliquid quodsimiliter primo realiter. . . . Compositum . . . perse,quiaperaliquid causae eius,etestunum Adrationem efficients nonrequiritur sedactuexsistens velactus": quodsitenssubsistens, proaccidente Ih.4,nn.11,13,OPhII,627-28. Scotus, 21)"Entium - ethocextendendo naturalium . . . suntpropriae perseexsistentium operationes adquamcumque siveimmanentem sivetranseuntem, siveetiam sitadformam 'operationern siveadubi.Etsicgrave habet tendere deorsum est causandam, operationem propriam quando extra locum etiam dicitur habere etperfectiorem suum; quando quiescit, operationem quam . . . Sedoperationem' movetur. nonvidetur Aristoteles itaextendere, II Decáelo etmundo, quando ubivultquodimperfectum caret In n. OPh referScotus, 9.6, 14, IV, 581, operatione": metaph. toAristotle, Decáelo seetooInmetaph. 2.12,292b17-21; 9.7,n.15,OPhIV,586. ring

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"equivocai"causes,in thejargon).Some formsare closeto static:but all the formsof materialbodies (bodilyforms)haveat leastsome directionto par- upwardsforlightthings,and downwardfor ticularplacesin the universe forthe heavythings.But it is transeunt productionthatassumesimportance of "active",and thus,as we shallsee, forthedistinction technicaldefinition betweeninstrumental and non-instrumental causality. In good philosophical fashion,Scotuswonderswhattheexplanationis for thefactthatsomeformsareactiveand othersnot,and forthefactthatsome areactivein one way,and othersin otherways.He concludesthatexplanatory bedrockliessimplyin thefactthatthevariousformsare thekindsof thing thattheyare: andsome forms areactive, reason Itisdifficult toassign a general whysomesubstantial not and some are substantial forms and are whereas some active; active, qualities qualities than and some incommon under havemore nevertheless concept qualities general qualities ofthe forms areactive, suchasthose substantial do.Likewise, somelessperfect substances ofcompound suchasa stone suchasthose onesinactive, andmore elements, things perfect such are of some those andother inanimate Also, compound perfect things active, things. of are not communicative other more whereas asthose ofanimate [forms] perfect things, does forms. There therefore bodies andangelic ofheavenly suchastheforms themselves, ingeneral areactive, andothers notseemtobea reason not,justas,in whysomeforms heat other than heat can cause to be some reason there does not seem why particular, "heat isproducisimmediate, that this[proposition] itseems because heatisheat; andthus . .. andallrelations inthegenus ofquantity, toothat allforms Thusitseems tiveofheat". areinactive.22 hereis inductive. I supposethesupportfortheclaimmadein thelastsentence it is had bythe form is that of an active of theactivity One crucialfeature or becauseofcircumstances formevenin thecasethattheformfails(whether 22)"Difficile suntactivae, formae substantiates rationem estassignare communem, quiaaliquae non etaliquae fomae substantiales autem suntactivae, etaliquae qualitates aliquae qualitates - ettarnen inaliquoconceptu communi etqualitates suntactivae, qualitates plusconveniunt suntactiformae substantiales etsubstantiae. Similiter, imperfectiores aliquae quamqualitates et sicut sicut nonsuntactivae, etperfectiores mixtorum, elementares, vae,sicut lapidis aliorum - aliquae alisicutanimatorum; suntactivae, mixtorum etperfectorum etiam inanimatorum, caelestium nonsuntcommunicativae sui,sicutformae corporum quaetamen perfectiores incommuni suntactivae, Nonvidetur etformae ergoratioquarealiquaeformae angelicae. - sicut nisiquia est ratio calor calefactivus inspeciali, nonvidetur etaliquae non, aliqua quare Itaetiam videeffectivus. estcaloris 'calor calor estcalor; etitavidetur quodhaecsitimmediata . . . nonsuntactivae": relationes etomneš formae degenere turquodomnes Scotus, quantitatis, OPhIV, Inmetaph. seetooScotus, ed.IV,137-38; Ord.1.7.1,n.70,Vatican 9.6,nn.12-13, 579-80.

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effect. The formhas theactivactuallyto producetherelevant opportunity) even in esse as Scotus its , ity putsit.23Claimingthat productivity quieto theformis alwaysactivein thissenserequiresus to talkaboutnaturalactivity A voluntarily activeformis one thatis (as opposed to voluntary activity). 1supposewe shouldsayofsuchactivity activewhenitchooses.24 thattheform is activein essequietoas and whenit chooses.Voluntary in essequieto activity is trying(and failing)to producethe relevanteffect.Havingsuch a capac- is sufficient forbeinga voluntary activeform. ity- thatoftrying None ofthisexplainswhyScotuswantsto ascribecausalactivity toformsin thissortofway.He presents a ratherquestion-begging argument: form thatissufficiently ifitexists ofsomeaction, Every productive perse[i.e.indepenthat about action andautomatically] (for dently], brings perse[i.e.independently example: ifheatissufficiently ofheat, then heatheats) Ifheat, that has productive separated perse were a miracle to exist it could [i.e. participated being, through perse independendy], perse andautomatically] aboutthat ofwhich itistheprin[i.e.independendy bring operation ciple[viz.heating].25 The ideahereis thatwe can inferfromthefactthatheatis sufficiently productiveof its effectthatheat if separatedfromits subjectwould stillcause its effect. And thissupportstheviewthatitis forms, notsubstances as such,that arecauses.Still,a lot dependson howwe understand thepremisethatheatis ofheat.Foritmightbe no morethana misleading sufficiently productive way of claimingthathot substancesaresufficiently of heat.So it may productive be thatScotusis movedbytheinitially appealingthoughtthatsomeaccidents to be causes for heat ofheat.But I suspectthatunderlying appear example, all thisaresomemorecomplextheological in the considerations, particularly doctrineof theTrinity, wherea desideratum Scotus is that by acknowledged threedivinepersonsshould not be threediscretecauses. Makingthe one - a form - thecause of divineeffects divineessence providesa wayto avoid theinference fromthreepersonsto threediscretecauses.26 23)Seee.g.thediscussion inInmetaph. OPhIV,553-54, where thisclaim is 9.3-4,nn.39-40, Fortalkof11 inesse inthenext discussed section ofthis , seethepassages presupposed. quieto* essay. 24)SeeScotus, Ord.4.49.9-10, n.3,ed.Wadding X,506. 25)"Omnis forma sufficienter elicitiva alicuius siperseest,perseagitillaactione actionis, (exemsicalor estsufficienter calor habens calefactiva, calefacit)Sicalor plum: potentia separatus per seessse esset illaoperatione cuiusest participatum permiraculum perse,posset perseoperari Ord.1.7.1,nn.11-12, Vatican ed.IV,110;seeTh.4,n.9,OPhII,626. Scotus, principium": 26)Onthis, seemyDunsScotus onGod andMetaphysics ,221-22, , 231-32. oftheIncarnation

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Forms,then,have accordingto Scotusa poweror powersto cause/elicit certainkindsof product.Scotusis clearthatthesepowersare reallyjust the sameas theformitself: inwhich than a non-relational ofpower other tothedefinition essence, Nothing belongs suchthatno relation to thething is immediately founded somerelation principiated, theprintoprincipiate which isactually determined [the actually precedes power] through without is from the non-relational the non-relational eifect But [essence], any cipiation. ina natural theactual isposited, there follows once[this relation; effect] sequence prior inneither ifoneof totheprinciple, which couldexist relation oftheprincipiated mutual theextremes were notposited.27 he is reallyusinga hyposWhenScotustalksabouta powerto do something, form the itself the shorthand for beingable to do someagent tatizing powersas thingsdistinctfrom thing.He does notin factwantto hypostatize wouldnotwantto thinkofcausesor formsusingtheir and he certainly forms, regress).28 powers(on painofinfinite thatbothformand compositeare,in virtueof Scotusbelieves,accordingly, theirrespectively beingactivepowers,or havingsuchpowersas parts,in passiveor receptive potency")to the potency(whatScotusherecalled"subjective inherence ofproductionrelations: existence ofits,and toactive andistosomerelational isapplied power, potency Subjective willbeinitwhen itacts, andisnotinitbefore which toanactual relation, [itacts].29 such as "the formis This inherencethus explainsthe truthof utterances and "thecompositeis a a principle"or "theformis actuallya principle",30 27)"Nihil aliinquaimmediate fiindatur nisiabsoluta estderatione aliquaessentia, potentiae in actu ita nullus ad principiatiorespectus praecedit ipsam quod quisrespectusprincipiatum, sineomnirespectu Sedab absoluto, ad principiandum. nemperquamquasideterminetur mutua relatio actualis natura esteffectus absolutus; sequitur quoposito, posterius praecedente, In extremo nonposito": essepotuit, altero adprincipium, Scotus, quaeinneutro principiati see also n. OPh n. OPh 565. IV, IV, 563; 18, 9.5, 13, metaph. 28)Onthis n.15,ed.Wadding seeScotus, XI,348a. Rep.2.16.un., 29)"Poten esseeiusnonabsolutum, etestadaliquid tiasubiectiva activae, potentiae applicatur Inmetaph. etprius noninest": sedadrelationem Scotus, actualem, quando quaesibiinerii aget, is thecorrect inherence whether herewonders 9.3-4,n. 45,OPhIV,536.NotethatScotus issomesortoftruthwhat isatstake thepossibility that relation fortheactivity, andconsiders inherence: seeIn metaph. relation thatdoesnotinvolve 9.3-4,n. 44,OPhIV,555. making here. norformyargument s general neither forScotus thematter iscrucial position Deciding 30)Forthetwopossibilities - Scotus seeInmetaph. 9.3-4,nn.39,42,44,OPhIV,553-5 here, heprefers. which locution doesnotdecide

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or "thecompositeis actuallya principiator". And,as outlined, principiator" orprincipiation relations obtainin thecaseofoperationtoo: suchproduction - say,theoperationthata livingsubstancehasof theoperationis principiated bytheform,and mediately bythecombeingalive and itis so immediately As notedabove,operationssuchas theseinherein the positesubstanceitself. in theform.31 compositein virtueoftheirpriorinherence Much thesamesituationobtains,mutatismutandis , forthecausalactivity of accidents.Heat, forexample,heats(causesheat),and in virtueof thiswe can saythata hot thingheats,on thebasisof thegeneralrulethatfirst-order in this predicatestrueof partsare trueof theirwholestoo.32The difference case is thatalthoughthe production heating is essentially one thing,its - is not;33thewhole composedof remotecause- the accidentalcomposite formand matteris essentially substantial one thing(thoughas we saw above, not as much of a unityas an accidentalformalone,or a substantial form alone).34

3. Varietiesof Instrumentality Now thatwe areclearon thesensein whicha formcan be said to be active, we arein a positionto understand thesecondimportant conceptrequiredto in the Scotus makes and that is the [A], grasp point conceptofa substanceor - fora keyclaimmadein [A] is thatthereis no difformusingan instrument ference betweenthecaseofusingsomething accidentalexternal to a bodyand usingsomethingaccidentalinternalto the body:sharpnessin a knife,and sharpnessin a hand.And it is thisclaimthatturnsout to be crucialforthe in cognitive innovation thatI examinein section4 ofthispaper. psychology In book 4 of the Ordination Scotus formulates an increasingly nuanced accountofthevarieties ofinstrumental The causality. fully-developed analysis, foundin distinction fivepossiblevarieties, towhichI givethefol6, identifies lowinglabels: 31)Seee.g.Inmetaph. OPhIV,556-57, where istreated 9.3-4,nn.48-49, eliciting analogously toproduction. 32)SeeScotus, Th.4,n.12,OPhII,627;notethat this rulecannot beasgeneral asScotus imagineshere, itdoesnotobtain inthecaseofproperties/predicates because inthecategory ofquanI am. areallsmaller than tity: myproper parts 33)SeeScotus, Th.4,n.12,OPhII,627. 34)On this, seemyPhysics Forthedegrees ofunity, seemy , 77-93,100-107. ofDunsScotus aresimple entities ina waythat neither substances 7-9.Forms Physics ofDunsScotusy (part-free) noraccidental unities are.

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(i) Secondarycausation (ii) Dispositiveinstrumentality (iii) Receivedinstrumentality (iv) Part-whole instrumentality (v) Artificial instrumentality.35 The orderis Scotuss,and the varietiesare arrangedin decreasingorderof I discusseachone in turn.36 causalactivity. independent in themostgeneralsensethat It is onlybyunderstanding "instrumentality" Scotuss theologiScotusincludessecondary causationas one ofitsvarieties.37 cal beliefslead him to hold thatGod is the primarycause of all creaturely betweenthingsthat orderedcausalrelations activity, thoughtherearecertainly for are themselves causes example,essentially-ordered genuinesecondary of efficient causes:Scotuss exampleis thesun and a fatherin thegeneration lhe basic idea is thatactivecauses(causeshavingor beingforms offspring, in essequieto)can be causallyrelatedto eachotherin producingan productive - whether to orwithone causallysubordinated effect cooperatively genuinely theother.38 As Scotusputsit,theorderis of"powerto powerin essequieto".39 The secondvariety ofinstrumentality is similarto this:twoformsactivein suchthatone in essequietosomehowcontributing jointlyto thesameeffect, or the somesenseusestheother.But unlikesecondary causation, instrument oftheeffect. subordinated causedoes nothavea directrolein theproduction thatis a necessary condition theinstrument causessomestateofaffairs Rather, forthe effect. Scotustalksofwhatis producedas a disposition fortherelevant thanthat finaleffect, butI do notthinkhe meansthatit is anything stronger As Scotusputsit,in suchcasesthere it is a necessary conditionforthiseffect. 35)Forthewhole seeScotus, Ord.4.6.5,nn.6-8,ed.Wadding, VIII,321-22. discussion, 36)Book4 oftheReportatio the lacks thefully-developed Ordination , almost certainly predating ofreceived asthough itisa straightforward andtreats artificial account, example instrumentality - anapproach intheOrdinatio : seeRep. asweshall abandons which, see,Scotus instrumentality andatRep.4.6.5,n.5,ed.Wadding XI,605a.InRep. XI,559b-60a 4.1.1,nn.8-9,ed.Wadding, ofartificial TheReportatio 4.1.4Scotus issilent onthequestion thus, account, instrumentality. s earlier, lesscomplex account ofinstrumentality. isa representative ofScotus 37)SeeScotus, n. 14,ed. Ord.4.1.1,n. 26,ed.Wadding VIII,47-48;seetooOrd.4.1.4-5, VIII,95. Wadding 38)Forthedifferent "DunsScotus onAutonoseeWilliam A.Frank, kinds ofcausal cooperation, 2 (1992)142-64. andTheology Medieval mous Freedom andDivine Co-causality", Philosophy 39)Scotus, ed.VIII, Ord. VIII,322;seetooOrd.4.1.1,n.26,Wadding 4.6.5,n.7,ed.Wadding, 47-48.

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is an orderof "effect to effect",40 ofa and hisparadigmcasesaretheactivities s accidentsin disposingsomesubstrate fortheunivocalgeneration substance - archetypically offire ofa newsubstance41 theroleofheatin thegeneration

or ofa humanbeingbyhumanbeings.43 byfire42 Neitherofthesetwovarieties is offurther interest here,sincetheyareboth markedbythefactthattherelevant formsexercise causalactivity in essequieto, ofeachother.The examplesofinstrumentality and do so independently given in [A] failto exhibitthesefeatures But theremaining varieties of conjointly. in are their different relevant to here. all, instrumentality ways, mypurposes In thecaseofreceivedinstrumentality, a formthatis inactive Scotusenvisages in essequietobut whichcan, whenmovedin theappropriate way,be made active:it "actsbysomething to it . . . but not so otherthanin does do proper virtueoftheactionoftheprincipalagent":44 theintrinsic formis "active... in a process{infieri),whenitis totallymovedbya higheragent".45 As in secondthe instrument "has a form ary causationand dispositiveinstrumentality, whichis a properprincipleof actingin itsorder".46 The difference is that,in thecaseofreceivedinstrumentality, thisformis activeonlyin theprocessitself. - itis notactivein essequieto.It mightbe It is notactiveoutsideoftheprocess is thatofan thoughtthatan obviousexampleofsuchreceivedinstrumentality artificial A knifehas a sharpblade;left suchas a knifein cutting. instrument, - itsformis inactivein esse - butwhenmoved to itselfit does nothing quieto in theappropriate in two- it forslicingsomething wayitsformis responsible is activewhenmoved,or whenin a process(infieri).Thiswouldmakeartici- the fifthon mylist- a case of receivedinstrumentalfialinstrumentality ity thethirdon thelist.The discussionat theverybeginningof book 4 of - in theveryfirst theOrdinatio 1- suggests thatthisis questionofdistinction indeedthecase,as does [A], fromtherather earlierbook 1 ofthesamework.47 40)Scotus, Ord.4.6.5,n.7,ed.Wadding, VIII,322. 41)Scotus, Ord.4.1.1,n.21,ed.Wadding, VIII,32-33. 42)Scotus, Ord.4.6.5,n.7,ed.Wadding, VIII,322. 43)Scotus, Ord.4.1.1,n.19,ed.Wadding, VIII,32. 44)".. .peraliquid sibiproprium . . . nectarnen agat perilludproprium agitnisiinvirtute prinOrd. n. ed. 13. Scotus, 4.1.1, 9, VIII, cipalis agentis": Wadding 45)"Necesse estipsum habere formam intrinsecam activam ... infieri, totaliter aliquam quando movetur a superiore Ord.4.1.1,n.26,ed.Wadding Scotus, VIII,48. agente": 46)"Habet...formam insuoordine": Ord.4.6.5,n.6,ed. Scotus, quaesitprincipium agendi 321. VIII, Wadding, 47)SeeScotus, Ord.4.1.1,nn.9-10,26,ed.Wadding VIII,13-14, 48;atOrd.4.1.1,n.31,ed. notes that notevery instrument isproperly active" VIII,52,Scotus ("Forte Wadding, "perhaps nonomne instrumentum estpropie activum").

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A littlelaterin distinction 1,Scotus(as we shallsee) comesup withan account that avoids ascribingany activityto artificial of artificialinstrumentality - thatis, as thisweakerview as "moreprobable" He classifies instruments. 6 of the in favourof it.48By distinction suchthattherearebetterarguments samebook Scotustreatstheweakerviewas thoughit is true.So hisexample is ratherdifferent, hereofreceivedinstrumentality avoidingthepossiblyconis this:an illuminated and it case of artificial troversial body instrumentality, formofthebody)and the to illuminated "colour",therelevant (Scotusrefers The ideais thatthebodyis seenbymeans in medioin relationto sight.49 species and so presumthe air- otherwise such that in medio ofthespecies invisible, , The exampleis ablyinactivein essequieto is givenan activeform:thespecies. of because the notentirely course, is, by generated thebody,but species happy, letthatpass. to therelationbetweena bodyand its caseis relevant The fourth specifically and relationis betweenthewholeform/substance organs.In [A],therelevant nottherelationbetweenanyof thatis, or is in, thehand/arm: theform/part thatis in theblade.As Scotustreatsofit theseand the(accidental)sharpness here,theorganshaveformswhichareactivein therequiredsense,evenin esse oftheformofthewhole- indeed, quieto, buttheseformsarenotindependent Scotusclaimsthatthe powerof the partand the powerof thewhole (and arethesamepower theformofthepartand theformofthewhole)50 therefore the same form)"participated[i.e. possessed]in different (and therefore In bythewhole.51 bythepartand "secondarily" ways" possessed"primarily" of thewholein thesensethattheformof thiscase,thepartsareinstruments - thatbelongprop- perhapsoperations thewholeproducescertainthings betweentheparts to theparts.In virtueoftherelationship erlyand primarily to the whole. Scotuss and the whole,theseoperationsbelongderivatively powerand thewholeanimalwithrespect exampleis "theorganofthenutritive to nutrition".52 Clearly,thepointhereis thattheformof theorganand the formofthewholeareone and thesame. a problemin the confronts On thefaceof it,part-whole instrumentality formswithinan animate on substantial shapeof Scotuss beliefin a plurality 48)Scotus, n.14,ed.Wadding, Ord.4.1.4-5, VIII,95. 49)Scotus, Ord.4.6.5,n.7,ed.Wadding, VIII,322. 50)I usethese form of form andofthesubstantial oftheorganic here totalkrespectively terms - notintheir on these andessence, form assubstantial senses technical thebody respectively: seemyPhysics , 87. senses, ofDunsScotus 51)Scotus, Ord.4.6.5,n.7,ed.Wadding, VIII,322. 52)Scotus, Ord.4.6.5,n.7,ed.Wadding, VIII,322.

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caninclude substance.Scotusholdsthatan essential suchas a substance, unity, morethanone substantial form.Forexample,a humanbeingincludesmatter, bodilyform,and soul.53Of these,onlythesoul is an activeform,explaining theimmanentand transeunt of thewholeperson.But activities/productions Scotuspuzzleshowone undifferentiated homogeneousformsuchas a bodily formcouldaccountforthedifferentiated and heterogeneous structure of,for In thinks that a Scotus there are human body. fact, example, good arguments in favourof theview thatthe different organsof the bodyhave theirown properforms.What unitestheseformsintoone substanceis thateachone is in potencyto a higherform(thesoul),and thateachone actualizesthepassive of theformofthewholeis potencyofprimematter.54 Perhapstheinherence sufficient fortheunityofpowereveniftheorganshaveproperforms. - is in somewaysmorepuzzling, The finalcase- artificial instrumentality at leastas it is distinctfromreceivedinstrumentality. I have alreadynoted inclinationto believethatat leastsome artificial Scotuss increasing instrumentshaveno properactivity at all. Buton thefaceofit,thisis an extremely implausible (efficiently) thingto think.Scotusreasonsthattheonlygenuinely causal agentis whatever wieldstheinstrument, and he does so by a careful ofa relevant case.Considertheuse of analysisofthephysicsand metaphysics a sawin dividingwood. The reasonwhythewood is dividedis thatthesawis placedwherea partofthewood oncewas. Now,it is naturally impossiblefor twobodiesto be in one and thesameplace.Butwe wouldnotusuallysay,in thecaseofsuchnaturalincompossibilities, thattheone formor stateofaffairs a s or as in a place) is theefficient such-and-such (e.g. body heap, body being causeofthedestruction ofanotherincompossible formorstateofaffairs (that a place). Rather,we would ; or bodyb's beingin such-and-such bodyscoldness (theagentcausing saythatitis theagentcausingtheformorthestateofaffairs a body'sheap,or theagentcausingbodyas beingin such-and-such a place)that is theefficient causeofthedestruction ofanotherincompossible formor state ofaffairs or bodyb'sbeingin such-and-such a place).55On (thatbodyscoldness-, thislineof argument, thesaw has no efficiently causalrolein thedivisionof thewood: itsbeingin theplacewherepartofthewood oncewasis merely the formalcauseofthedivisionofthewood.56Scotusclearlycomesto acceptthis 53)Onthis, seemyPhysics , ch.4. ofDunsScotus 54)On this, seemyPhysics Duns Scotus In metaph. , 69; seetooScotus, 7.20,nn.31-37, of OPhIV,387-89. 55)SeeScotus, Ord.4.1.4-5, n.15,ed.Wadding, VIII,96. 56)Scotus, Ord.4.1.4-5, n.15,ed.Wadding, VIII,96.

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accountas uncontroversial, and in distinction 6 characterizes suchan instrumentas something"moved,receptiveof an earliereffectorderedto a later - receptive effect" of themotion,and orderedto thedivisionof thewoodbutnotactive,since"itneither hasanypower(virtutem ) in essequieto, nor[has anypower]infieri".57 Forall Scotuss attemptto defendit,thisaccountofartificial instrumentalseems on the of it face even when viewedin the ity implausible, astonishingly lightofAristotelian-style physics,forit does notseemto includean explanationof whythewood is divided,ratherthan,say,thesaws beingprevented fromoccupyingtheplace once occupiedbythewood. Clearly,thenatureof thethingactedup cannotexplainthis,becauseon Scotuss accountit has no relevant activecausalpower,whetherin essequietoor infieri. Scotusattempts to dealwiththisbyascribing to harderobjectsnotanyactivecausalpowerbut - specifically, a certain"impassibility a corruptive one that resisting agent" allowsitsquantityto resistcorruption: Of course, i.e.,in thiscase,division.58 theresistor cannotbe an activepower(elsetheharderobject- thesaw- would havean activepowerin thedivisionof thewood: againstthehypothesis). In the late book 9 of the Metaphysics questions,Scotus considersAristotles - the powerof resisting - and seemsto "immobilitative power" corruption be thoughtofeitheras an activepoweror as suggestthatit couldlegitimately in such-and-such a principleof"resting a perfection".59 1 takeit thatifScotus is seriousabouthisaccountofartificial he shouldbelieveitto instrumentality, be merelythelatterof theseprinciples.In thiscase,whatis positedis that harderobjectshavemorepowerful non-active forremaining undiprinciples vided- forstaying are as they notmorepowerful activepowersfordividing otherobjects. accountof instrumentality foundin book 4 Clearly,the fully-developed oftheOrdinatiomakesthecomplexargument of [A] look strangely straightforward.For the discussionin [A] seems to treatreceivedand artificial - indeed,such that artificial as equivalent instrumentality instrumentality is simplya speciesof receivedinstrumentality. Still,nothingabout thegen- thekindultimately in the eralaccountof receivedinstrumentality relevant discussionof [A] requiresus to denythatartificial can exercise instruments receivedinstrumentality. That is to say,we could rejectScotuss mature accountofartificial withoutrejecting hisaccountof received instrumentality 57)Scotus, Ord.4.6.5n.8,ed.Wadding, VIII,322. 58)Scotus, Ord.4.1.4-5, n.14,ed.Wadding, VIII,96. 59)Scotus, Inmetaph. seen.38,OPhIV,553. 9.3-4,n.5,OPhIV,536;forthediscussion,

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And thecaseofintrinsic is nota caseofpart-whole instrumentality. sharpness because such is treated as an accidentin [A]. In this instrumentality, sharpness its is not identical with the of the case, activity whole,or ofthewhole activity form.And it is theactivity ofsomething movedbytheformofthe explicitly otherthanas receivedin thisway.So it is not whole,and thathas no activity ascribedto thewholesubstancein thewaythattheactivity ofan activeinherentaccidentis (namely, as outlined forgeneralcases bypart-whole prediction, in section1 above).So I shallproceedas ifbothcasesofaccidentalactivity thesharpness ofthehand- arecasesofreceived oftheknifeand thesharpness eventhoughScotus,had he revisited[A] in thelightof his instrumentality, later,more minimalist, instrumentality, thoughtson artificial mighthave modified[A] in someway.

4. Instrumentality and Causal RelationsbetweenSoul and Body In the remainingtwo sectionsof thispaper,I shallattemptto applythese to theissuesthatarisein [A]. In fact,[A] raisestwo generalcausalobservations distinctkindsof causalquestions.The firstis how theactivity of thesoul- a - relatesto thewholecompositebody.The secondis how thesoul cogform nizes- and in particular, whatitsrelationship to theintentional ofcogobjects nitionmightbe. The issuesare relatedin variouscomplexwaysthatwill becomeclear,and issuesabouttheinherence and intrinsicity offormto agent aremosteasilyseenin relationto thefirst that the of causalprocesses question, involvedin bodilymotionand activity. I deal withthisissuein Accordingly, section4, and withthoseinvolvedin cognitionin section5. On thefirst ofthesetwoissues,it shouldbe keptin mindthatthedistinctionbetweeninvoluntary and voluntary is,in termsofthecausalrelaactivity tionbetweensoul and body,unimportant. Scotuss lineis thatformscause,as we have seen,and in termsof the way in whichthe formscausal activity denominates thewhole,it makesno difference whethertheactivity is volunor For this distinction to one amounts of the conscious or tary involuntary. non-conscious controlmerely. ornaturalcausalactivity thenutriInvoluntary tiveand vegetative activities for fromvolunnecessary life,forexample,differ in ones the sense that are not to tary merely they (ordinarily) subject conscious control.Butas muchas voluntary are bodilyactions,they causedbythesoul, and denominatethewholecomposite. The mainaim ofthecurrent sectionofthisessayis to spellout thevarious causalrelations involvedin thetwocasesofthemotionofthesharpness out-

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seemsto be Scotuss linedat thebeginningof [A]. The firstpointof interest talkofthe"motivepowerofthehand".We mightexpect"motivepowerofthe (whole)body",or "ofthe(whole)composite".But thewayof talkinghereis withScotuss matureaccountofpart-whole instrumentality whollyconsistent in thewaythatit is outlinedabove.It is thefactthatthehand is structured knifecan be used:themotivepower,then,is in thatexplainshowtheextrinsic In fact,themotivepowerin thehandprimarily, and in thewholederivatively. thehandis justidenticalwiththeformofthehand;thisformis (presumably) thatmakes actualizedby the formof thewhole,and it is thisrelationship from distinct a case of bodilyactivity genuine part-wholeinstrumentality, receivedinstrumentality. Sharpnessis, of course,an accidentof the knife,and an accidentof the willnotbe itselfa case.So theuse ofthesharpness handin thecounterfactual were a case of instrumenit caseofpart-whole (If instrumentality. part-whole to to thecase thatScotusis trying itwouldnotbe an examplerelevant tality, in Scotus the role of the illustrate: namely, species cognition.) intelligible thatis moved,on theprinciplethatforms claimsthatit is theknifes sharpness are active,and that causal relationsproperlyobtain betweenforms,not it is formsthatareproperly betweensubstances.In receivedinstrumentality, it makes sense to thinkof theknifes sharpOn this activated. view, speaking nessbeingused- theimmediateuse of theformresultsin theremoteuse of theknife(cuttingor slicingis denominated of,or inheresin,theknifein virtue of itsbeingdenominatedof,or inheringin, theform).Accordingto the ifwe posit at all to thecausalrelationship analysishere,itmakesno difference thatthe sharpnessinheresdirectlyin the hand itself:"the counterfactually in thesamewaywhenitis in someother motivepower. . . uses[thesharpness] - as itwoulduse it ifitwerein the as a knife to the hand such thingjoined hand". Clearly,neitherof thesecan be cases of part-whole instrumentality. and this arereallydistinct, thesouland thesharpness, The tworelevant forms, inheresin theknifeor in thehand.Presumor notthesharpness is so whether in thiscase,thatthe spatialproximity: ably,all thatis requiredis therelevant in to make no difference knifeis heldbythehand.Inherencerelations, short, and thecuttingup thecausalstoryto be toldin themotionof thesharpness of thebody.One conclusionis thatthegeneralcausalrelationin production betweena soul/composite and itsaccidentsis one ofuse- be theinstrumentalin [A]) or artificial. in the hands sharpness ityreceived(as It is importantto note thatthe conclusionsthatwe can drawfrom[A] aboutthegeneralrelationsbetweensoul and bodyfromareon thefaceof it is an Fortheaccountrelieson thefactthatthesharpness somewhatrestricted.

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- be itofthehandoroftheknife - and as suchtheexampleis notan accident The sharpnessis used as an instrumentality. exampleof generalpart-whole where the relevant instrumental is received instruinstrument, relationship But one generallessonthatemergesclearlyis that,evenin cases mentality. ofpart-whole itis theformorformsthatdo all thework,lhe instrumentality, moves is moved (i.e. body by the soul) simplyin virtueof the factthat therelevant formsareactivein certainways.Forexample,thesoul can move thebody,and itdoesso standardly bymovingone organbymeansofanother60 (wherethebody,and an organ,arethemselves compositesofmatterand rele- specifically, vantbodilyor organicform) thesoul movesthebodythrough theheart,and thencebyphysiological processesto moreremoteorgans(i.e. thesoul movestheorgansthroughtheorganicforms).61 An angel,interest- suggesting can move an inanimate in the same that body just ingly, way62 casesof part-whole and received are not too instrumentality instrumentality dissimilar to eachother.

and CognitivePsychology 5. Instrumentality Much thesamesituationobtainsin thecaseofcognitive as obtainsin activity thecaseofaccidentalsharpness. Putin summary, it makesno difference at all to cognitionwhetheror not theobjectof cognitionis inherent in themind. Justthesamecausalstoryis toldin bothcases,and in bothcaseswe can think of themindas somehowor otherincludingitsobject- evenifthatobjectis external to it.At stakein [A] is theroleoftheintelligible speciesas an object of cognition.Accordingto Scotus, intelligiblespecies are (universalor of extramental and accidentsthat abstracted)representations particulars, inherein themind.The intelligible content"shinesout" fromtheinherent accident.63 But externalparticulars are likewiseaccidentsof the common nature.In thiswaythesamenaturecan be said to existin realityand in the or aspectsof suchexternal mind,and to thisextentextramental particulars, somehow"in the mind".But are,in a qualifiedway,themselves particulars thereis a muchstronger sensein which[A] licensesthethoughtthatexternal 60)SeeScotus, Ord.4.49.14, n.4,ed.Wadding, X,584-95. 61)SeeScotus, Ord.4.49.14, n.6,ed.Wadding, X,595. 62)SeeScotus, nn.3-6,ed.Wadding, seetooOrd.2.8.un., n. 10, XI,299a-300a; Rep.2.8.un., Vatican ed.VIII,127. 63)Forsome seeScotus, Ord.1.3.3.1, nn.375,382,386,Vatican ed.III, representative passages, n.54,Vatican ed.VI,86. 228,232-33, 235;Ord.1.27.1-3,

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objectscan be somehow"in"themind,and I willreturnto thissensebelow, sinceit turnsout to be centralto thekindsofexternalism thatScotusdefends in [A].64 Thisspeciesis supposedto be a partialcause- alongwiththeminditself of an occurrentcognition.(Note that the intelligible speciescountsas a not as a instrumental mutatis cause.65 mutandis cause, But, , secondary merely the relevantcausal insightsare the same in the cases of inherentand noninherent mentalobjects:inherent and non-inherent formscan be secondary causesin justthesameway.)The exprofesso problemthatScotussetshimself to solvein [A] is how exactlyan inherent formcan be a partialcauseofanyhow it can be a partialcauseof an effect thatis thing,and morespecifically And thegist producedwithinthesubstanceinwhichthespeciesitselfinheres. ofthesolutionis thatin termsoftherelevant causalstoryit makesno differencewhether theobjectofcognitionis inherent in themindor not,at leaston theassumption thatsuchan objectis accidentalto theminditself, and notan essential of it. this latter we would have an instance of case, (In part part-whole instrumentality, somethingthatScotus ignoresin thiscontext,as we have to see formsas causes,theanswerto the seen.)GivenScotuss globaltendency moregeneralpartof theexprofesso questionraisedin [A] shouldcomeas no - at forms are of cases inherent forms causes,so a fortiori surprise: paradigm forms active inherent can be or are causes. But since the idenleast, question tifiesinherence as creatingthe potentialcausal difficulty, Scotus understanforhispurposes dablytreatsthecaseofan external objectas lesscontroversial thanan internal or inherent The is that the inherence oftheobject idea object. inthemindmakesno difference totherelevant causalrelations, sinceinherence is independentof the entity'sstatusas an object of cognition.All thatis - theobject access epistemic requiredforan occurrent cognitionis appropriate close to themind.In [A], Scotustalksof suchaccessible mustbe relevantly in it.I willreturn to thisspaobjectsas being"in"themindwithoutinhering tialtalkin a moment.What theconditionsforsuchaccessmightbe Scotus does not specify. But he givesan examplein thelastparagraph:thatof the beatificvision,thedirectepistemicaccessthattheblessedin heavenhaveto access thedivineessence.Whatis notableaboutthiscaseis thatsuchepistemic

inThe Onthecommon seemy"Medieval Theories ofHaecceity nature, Stanford Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy) ed. Edward N. Zalta:. medieval-haecceity/ 65)SeeScotus, makes itclear thatthe Ord.1.3.3.3, n.560,Vatican ed.III,333,where Scotus isimplied hasa "naturally uniform" itisactive even inesse Muchthesame activity: species quieto. inthefirst few lines of[A].

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- thedivineessenceis notaccessibleto sucha personmerelyin is notnatural - it is somethingthatis grantedby the virtueof his or her naturalpowers divinewill,66 and thisbecauseall external divinecausalactivity is contingent on thedivinewill.67This is of coursean exampleof Scotusscelebrateddoctrineof intuitivecognition,and the lessonwe can learnis that,causally thanabstractive speaking,intuitivecognitionis less problematic cognition, and can be usedas a lesscontroversial illustration ofthecausalfactors involved in aspectsof abstractive cognition.Of course,theremay be otherwaysin whichintuitive in particular, in an Aristotelian unicognitionis problematic: areintelligible at all. Butthisrelatesto a more verse,howit is thatparticulars ofsemanticcontent,and I willreturn generalquestionabouttheexternalism to it in a moment. Of course,as justnoted,suchobjectsofdirect,intuitive areparcognition, because Scotus believes that all are ticulars, reallyexisting things particulars.68 ScotusthusbelievesPlatonismto be false.Buthisobjectionsto Platonismare not worriesabout thecoherenceof Platonism,but merelyworriesabout its failureto satisfy conditionsof explanatory universais of thekind parsimony: - extrinsic - are thatPlato envisaged to theparticulars thatexemplify them to requirements.69 Butifthereweresuchuniversais, and ifwe had superfluous access to them Plato to be under certain (as epistemic supposed possible clearly delineatedcircumstances), we could likewiseenvisagetheseobjectsas being relatedto the mind in just the way that intelligiblespeciesare, barring inherence. Thisis thepointof thefirst suppositionmadein thesecondpara- a universal, of that an or something graph [A], namely, intelligible species withuniversal content couldbe in theintellect, an objectofcognition, witin it. [A] is phrasedin a waythatmakesthesuppositioncounhoutinhering - as indeedit is, sincethereare in factno Platonicuniversais. terfactual But about or about s of Scotus Platonism makes this [A] nothing rejection suppositioncounterpossible. I undertook justnowto commenta littlemoreon Scotussclaimin [A] that someepistemically accessibleobjects,whether ornotinherent in themind,are nevertheless somehow"in" the mind,and are somehow"conjoined"to the mind.In [A],Scotuspositsa numberofoptions:thespecies(something with 66)Seee.g.Scotus, XII,369. Quod.14,nn.10-11,ed.Wadding, 67)Seee.g.Scotus, XII,382. Quod.14,n.17,ed.Wadding, 68)Heascribes some ofbeing kind tocommon butthis whatever itis,isnotthat natures; being, ofrealexistence, anditdoesnotseemtobecognitively initself: accessible onthis, seemy "Medieval Theories ofHaecceity". 69)SeeScotus, Inmetaph. 7.18,n.14,OPhIV,340-41.

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in it in existence)could be in themind"withoutinhering merelyintentional the mannerof form";an object (withrealextramental existence)could be or the to "close" the mind proximdirectly bybeing present having "required existence)could be ity";thedivineessence(an objectwithrealextramental suchan object"in"themind.I takeit thatin at leastsomeofthesecasesScornsis happyto sanctionthe claimthatan objectcan in the mindwithout inheringin it, whetherthisobjectis somethingwithmerelysome kindof existextramental or something withreal,independent, intentional existence it just ence.On thisview,inclusionin theminddoes not requireinherence; This claimseemsto be of considerequiresthe relevantcausal relationship. At theveryleast,Scotusclaimsthatthingsthatarediscrete rableimportance. in it,can fromthemind,in thesenseofneitherbeingthemindnorinhering ofexternalism. be "in"it,be partsofit.And thisgivesus a variety nevertheless in relationto semanticcontent Amongotherthings,itgivesus externalism to things in particular, theviewthatsemanticcontentneed notbe restricted semanticrole in themind.We can see thisbykeepingin mindthespecifically betweenthetwo cases species.The onlydifference playedby theintelligible - thatin whichthecognitive and that thatScotusconsiders objectis inherent in whichit is not is theinherence of theobject.The semanticcontent,and arenot,inScotuss example, thecapacity oftheobjecttobearsemantic content, contentin thesecases ascribes semantic I than he So infer expressly changed. A to itemsexternalto (non-inherent in) themind. consequenceof a general accountof the possibleintuitive(immediate)cognitionof all extramental objectsis thatall objectshaveor are semanticcontent:theuniverseis (just) information. account But the view gives us too more than merelythis externalist to itemswithintentioofsemanticcontent,suchthatcontentis notrestricted The viewthatsemanticcontentneed not be (indeed,is not, nal existence.70 accordingto Putnamand others)in themindhasbeenlabelledbyAndyClark forthereasonthat and David Chalmers"passiveexternalism", or ofcontent] external itisnotclearthatthese [viz.theexternality playa causal aspects where internal structure In cases in of action. counterfactual role the explanatory generation 70)Claiming content doesnotentail havesemantic external tothemind that might particulars inanysense or whether claim that thefurther semantic universais, words, particulars signifying that Scotus claims I know of a where do not external to the mind. place particular things signify even tosucha claim, himtocommit himself isnoreason for andthere words suchthings, signify claimisin Thepsychological ofcognitive hisexternalist instincts onissues psychology. given of of the of language. questions philosophy independent principle

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arechanged, looks so remains constant butthese external features behaviour justthesame; internal structure seems tobedoing allthework.71 Scotuss viewoutlinedin [A] is akintoo to a ratherdifferent kindofexternalas a "coupled ism, one thatsees the mind and its cognitiveenvironment system": - ifweretain Theexternal features ina coupled role internal system playanineliminable structure butchange theexternal behaviour Theexternal features, maychange completely. features relevant asthetypical internal features ofthebrain.72 here arejustascausally Thisgivesus whatClarkand Chalmerscall an "activeexternalism", an externalismwherethemindand itscognitive environment arecausallyinteractive. to theseauthors'radicalproposal,themindis notcontainedwithin According thebody,butcan be thoughtofas "extended" to includeitsimmediate cognitiveenvironment. In Scotuss case,themindis extendedin thesenseofincludthenotionofan external ingthingsthatdo notinherein it.We havein effect (non-inherent) objectofcognitionthatplaysan immediaterolein occurrent in themind.Botha cognition one thatis notplayedbyanyobjectinherent Platonicformand a createdparticular be replacedas cogcould,presumably, in themind- namely, nitiveobjectsbysomething inherent an intelligible species or some kind of intellectual of a particular. But in the representation is certainly paradigmcase,thatof thebeatificvision,therelevantparticular sinceno createdrepresentation can encompassall thesemantic ineliminable, contentofthedivineessence.73 It is worthtoo keepingin mindthatone oftherolesoftheintelligible species is to act as the storeof semanticcontent;it containsour dispositional andwhenorganized suchspeciescontainourdispositional beliefs.74 cognitions, 71)Andy Clark andDavidChalmers, "TheExtended Mind" 58(1998),7-19,9. Analysis 72)Clark andChalmers, "TheExtended 9. Mind", 73)SeeScotus, Ord.2.3.2.2, n.335,Vatican ed.VII,562.Aquinas makes a similar claim atST intellectus creatus videt Deumperessentiam, essentia Dei fit 1.12.5c: "Cum...aliquis ipsa forma A more intellectus". andwide-ranging ofthesemantics and intelligibilis study general indiscussing theimmediate vision ofthedivine essence ismuch cognitive psychology developed tobedesired. doesnotdevelop this account intoa more externalism intheway Aquinas general that Scotus doesin[A]. 74)Onthis, seemy"DunsScotus andSomeLateThirteenth-Century ontheMental Opinions Word". itshould benoted, doesnotclaimthatthere is anyrelevant hereto Scotus, syntax therelevant andisnotcommitted toanykind ofmental Indeed, explain organization, language. itishard toseehowhecould heholds that thesignificates ofwords aremental be,since concepts,

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can functionin a similarway,at leastforour Externalobjects,presumably, kindsofexternal and objects(e.g. presumably appropriate simplecognitions via an written can be words) syntaxto act as (thestore appropriate arranged beliefstoo.And thisis one oftheparadigmcaseswhere, of) ourdispositional can Clarkand Chalmersargue,theboundarybetweenmindand environment breakdown,suchthatthemindcan be thoughtofas extendedintoand inclu- itemssuchas external environment storagedevices,comdingitscognitive puters,notebooks,labels,and thelike.75 utilizedby Scotusin this themedievalnotionof inherence, Furthermore, for clearer accountofthedistincallows a much context, perhapsunexpected tionbetweenwhatis internalto themindand whatis external.For evenon mind-brain kind,talkof theories,at leastthoseof a non-reductive identity is a pretty "in" not the head content with semantic in) (or being something - itemswithsemanticcontentare not straightforcrudeway of proceeding views.And on an account wardlyphysicalitems,at leaston non-reductive with thesoul,talkof "in"the the mind is to be identified to which according and talkof "in"thesoul clearlynothingmorethanmetahead is irrelevant, developedaccountof inherence(vs. non-inherence) phorical.But a properly Itemswithsemancouldon eitheraccountprovideexactlywhatis required.76 or external to themind(inherent), ticcontentcan be internal (non-inherent). forceto theclaimthattheseitems In eithercase,thereis somemetaphorical are "in"themind.I will not tryto developthisthoughthere,forreasonsof ifwe decideto space,but I willcommentthat,as a merelysemanticmatter, view that attaches as semantic internalism any meaningto objects"in" classify thenScotuss ornotinherent, themind(in thesensesoutlinedin [A]),whether as a variety as well be classified mind thesis could of the extended just variety to thisextentbreaksdown. distinction ofinternalism. The mind-world is thenatureof thecausal Scotussversionof externalism What motivates thathe wantsto tell- specifically, storyon thelevelof cognitivepsychology that his insight,based on his generalaccountof receivedinstrumentality, formscan be used in causallyidenticalways.By inherent and non-inherent - accordingto Scotus- theinherence to an examplewhere drawingattention of the formis irrelevant (namely,the case of sharpness),Scotus is able to that suchconcepts realormental, there arenofurther holdthat andwould entities, presumably doesnot butthisconcept istheresutintellects couldthemselves (Themental concept signify. see as res ut intellect of words On the Pini, a> Giorgio "Speany significate further thing. signify andTheology Medieval andThing", , 8 (1999),21-52.) cies,Concept, Philosophy 75)SeeClark 12-18. "TheExtended andChalmers, Mind", 76)ForScotus seemyMetaphysics 34-35. oninherence, oftheIncarnationy

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theirrelevance oftheinternalism ofsemanticcontentin hisphilosohighlight of how mind. But Scotus phy respondto theAristotelian objectionthat might More how can universais? external intelligibility generally, particulars requires be the bearersof semanticcontent?Scotusis quite explicitin rejectingthe Aristotelian restriction ofsemanticcontentto universais, evenas earlyas this firstsetof questionson On interpretation , wherehe makesit clearthatthere are conceptsnot onlyof universais but also of individuals.77 On the more in a broadlyAristotelian generalquestion,itseemsthatthinkers (Aphrodisian) and Avicenniantraditionon the questionof universais have a ready-made in themindand theexternal response.As notedabove,theuniversal particularsarebothmerelyaccidentsofwhatwe mighthypothesize to be thebearer of intelligibility and semanticcontent,namely,thecommonnature.78 To the extentthatthecommonnatureis in, or in somesenseis, theparticular, the can be a of bearer semantic content.79 particular Does thispsychological externalism weakentheaccountof theself,such thattheselfis no longera self-contained wholebutextendsout intotheenvironmenttoo? In generalmetaphysical terms,Scotuss talkof thingsas (in - formscan collectionsofformsseemsto makeinherence lessrelevant effect) be connectedmoreor lesslooselyto eachotherwithoutthisnecessarily alterthe causal stories we tell about the interactions of these connected forms.80 ing Inherentformscan be efficient causeswitheffects on otherformsin thecollectionjustas wellas non-inherent formscan and viceversa.Andviewedin thisway,we can thinkof Scotuss accountof intuitive cognitionas partof a that involves talk of self the as an integrated whole. project precisely weakening Mentalcontentsare"in"themindwhether or nottheyinherein themind.To be in themind,all suchcontentshaveto be are actualobjectsof occurrent cognition.Equally,thisaccountenablesus to get a bettergraspof Scotuss 77)Scotus, Inperiherm. 85-86. (I) 5-8,nn.44,51,OPhII,83-84, 78)Thespeculation thatthecommon nature isthebearer ofsemantic content isentirely my own.Butthepoint ofthecommon nature isthat itisinsomesense thesameinparticular and inuniversal, andifweask"thesamewhat theonlyavailable answer seems tobe"thesame content". 79)Onthis, seeScotus, XI,873b. Rep.4.45.3,n.13,ed.Wadding, 80)Moretechnically, Scotuss account oftheconstitution ofsubstances allows forthefollowing relations between andtheir substances order oftightness and/or decreas(inincreasing properties ofgenerality): neither norcausal inform(with ingorder dependence informing requirements); real the first see the on inherence; three, (On Incarnation, 34-50; ing; identity. myMetaphysics of thelast, seemyDunsScotus onGod anobject ofcognition without satis, 112-13, 168-9.) Being relations on is,itturns out,another anyofthese fying wayofbeing partof("in")a substance Scotuss account.

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For on thisaccount,internalstatesare not necessarily representationalism. moreconsciously accessiblethanexternal.Innerand outertheatres havethe - themindor intelligence - and thisbreakdown sameobserver ofthedistinctionbetweenrepresentation and represented hingeson thelooseningofwhat itis to be "in"themind:notas suchinherent, butsimplypartofa causalstory with semantic contents and originating issuingin an occurrent cognition.

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litio iâ)'«»v BRILL

VIVA RIUM www.bnll.nl/viv

Vivarium 46 (2008)302-317

Why Is Thought Linguistic? Ockham's Two Conceptions of the Intellect

MartinLenz Humboldt-Universität zuBerlin

Abstract OneofOckhamsfundamental tenets aboutthehumanintellect isthatitsactsconstitutea mental this of shares someofthefeatures language. Although language thought ofconventional is considered as priorto conventional language, thought commonly This tries to show that this consensus is inOckseriously language. paper challenged I shallarguethat,in claiming hamsearlywritings. thepriority of conventional overmental Ockhamestablished a novelexplanation ofthesystelanguage language, of whichanticipates theideathatthought becomes maticitythoughtanexplanation theacquisition ofconventional systematic through language. Keywords mental oflanguage overthought, semantics, concepts, language, priority systematicity 1. Introduction One ofthecentralquestionsthatWilliamofOckhamtackledthroughout his academicwritings is how thehumanintellect what works,or moreprecisely, we have to assumeabout the intellectin orderto explaincognitionand As is well-known, Ockhamcouldappealto long-standing traditions thought. accordingto whichthoughtis likelanguage,sinceit is bymeansof language thatwe communicateour thoughts.Ockham,however, was rathercautious and readilyadmittedthatwe do not reallyknowwhatkindof entitiesarein the intellect.1 So ratherthan relyingon the analogybetweenthoughtand 1}SeeOckham, inlibrum d.27,q. 2,OThIV,196-197, where Sententiarumt Scriptum primum headdresses thisissue asa dificultas realis asopposed tomere (< terminological problems difficul tates vocales). ©Koninklijke Brill 2008 DOI:10.1 163/156853408X360939 NV, Leiden,

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and evendevelopeddiflanguage,Ockhamtookthisquestionveryseriously ferent accountsofwhatcameto be knownas mentallanguage. Yet,on thefaceofit,at leastone thingseemsto be certain:ifthoughtis like of concepts,thenthis languageor evena kindof mentallanguageconsisting mentallanguageis priorto conventional If, language. forinstance,I havea that can be the sentence expressed by 'Mypaperis notlong',thenthis thought of is évaluablein virtueofthethoughtthatit plainstring words semantically of thoughtis clearlystated expresses notviceversa.The idea of thepriority in Aristotle s third book of De anima : "For thecombination already ofconcepts is truthor falsity."2 Thisviewwas and is easilymarriedto Aristotle's famous semantic sketchdrawninthefirst ,whichaccounts chapterofDe interpretatione forthepriority ofthoughtoverconventional language. The basic idea is thatwrittensignssignify spokensounds,whichin turn thepassionsofthesoul or thesimilitudes ofthings.3 Around1250 we signify a newwayofinterpreting encounter thesesimilitudes orconcepts:theyareno of thingsbut as mentalsigns.And fromthe longersolelyseenas similitudes fourteenth at leastsinceOckhamsmatureworks,quite onwards, early century a majority ofmedievalphilosophers taketheseconceptsto be constituents of a compositionally structured mentallanguagewhichis bysomemoderncommentators likenedto the notionof an ideal languageand by some evento Fodors notionofa languageofthought.4 AlreadyBoethiuss readingof Aristotlemightpoint into thatdirection, whenhe saysthatconcepts{intellectus) aresignificative of thingsand thatthe of are not written and but also parts speech only spoken tacitly thoughtin the mind.5So whereasAristotle construed and thedivisionintoparts signification 2)Aristotle, III 8 (432a11-12):a')^i7C^OKiļ Deanima vèaxixòà^T10êç f'yeûSoç. yapvotinoci© Cf.Boethius, Commentarti inlibrum Aristotelis Perihermeneias intellec,28:"conplexio namque tuum estVeritas velfalsitas." 3)SeeAristotle, Deinterpretatione, Ahelpful ch.1(l6a3-8). overview isprovided byHansArens, Aristotle s Theory andItsTradition: Texts andcommen500to1750, sel.,trans, ofLanguage from H.Arens, 1984).1984. tary (Amsterdam/Philadelphia, 4)SeeClaude Ockham onConcepts Panaccio, Meier-Oeser, (Aldershot, 2004);cf.Stephan "SpraimGeist. cheundBilder Skizzen zu einem philosophischen Langzeitprojekt", Philosophisches 111.Jahrgang, 2. Halbband fora more critical assessment. (2004),312-342 Jahrbuch 5)SeeBoethius, Commentarii inlibrum Aristotelis Perihermeneias vero ,24:"intellectus ipsinihil aliudnisirerum sunt." Seeibid., autem verbum etnomen 30:"quare significativi principaliter orationis erunt aliaverba etnomina aliaquaedicantur, aliaquae sunt, partes quaescribantur, . . . triplex tacita mente tractentur autem nominum estatqueverborum . . ."Fora concise natura introduction toBoethius s semantics seeJohn Boethius Marenbon, (Oxford, 2003),34-37.

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46 (2008)302-317 M. Lenz/Vivarium

ofspeechas properties ofwritten or spokenlanguage,Boethiustreatedthem thathavementalcounterparts. as features Butalthoughmanycommentators disagreeaboutthenatureorfunctioning of conof concepts,thereseemsto be hardlyanydisputeabout thepriority Aristotle himself never seems to over written and spokenlanguage. quescepts tionwhetherthe reversemightbe trueand whetherwordsof our language ofsemanIndeed,itis a keyfeature mightbe priorto theconceptstheysignify. himthatconceptsare ticexplanationin Aristotle and thetradition following this idea when he claims thatthesemantic to words. Boethius epitomizes prior of and is orderofwritten things an inversion signs,spokensounds,concepts thenconcepts,thenspokensounds thenaturalorder,wherethingscomefirst, and finally written words.6 In thispaper,I wouldliketo addressone of thefewpositionswhichchalaccordingto whichconceptsarepriorto words lengedthisgeneralagreement lanor, moregenerally speaking,mentallanguageis priorto conventional to show some of the I Ockham s work and shall concentrate on try early guage. ofhisearlytheoryofmentallanguage;I willfinishwitha widerimplications ofturning theAristotelian discussionofthebenefits theoryupsidedown. of conventional I shallarguethat,in claimingthepriority languageover a novelexplanation ofthesystematicity mentallanguage,Ockhamestablished - an explanation theidea thatthoughtbecomes whichanticipates ofthought language. systematic throughtheacquisitionofconventional 2. FromConceptsto Termsin a Language ofAristotle's account.Spokensounds Letmebeginwitha briefreconstruction orwordsareconventional signsofourconceptsofthings.Andwhereaswords the conceptsof differin accordancewith different linguisticconventions, view that for all. This amounts to the are the same conceptsarenaturally things conceptsdependon thingsfortheir priorto words.Since,qua similitudes, ofwordsdependson concepts,notviceversa. whilethesignification content, Forthepurposesofthispaperwe mighttreatconceptsas unitsofthemental lexicon.Now Aristotlealso claimsthattheseconceptscan be mentally composedor divided,whichlatermedievalauthorstook to mean thatthe 6)SeeBoethius, inlibrum Aristotelis Perihermeneias Commentarii , 20-21: .litterae quidem res. . . quaehabent voces vero intellectus autem voces, intellectus, quandam concipiant significent naturae suaeordinatione consedterminata nonconfusam consequentiam, nequefortuitam .. autem resintellectum, intellectus vero voxlitteras stant praecedit vocem,

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Butwhereasit mightseem conceptscan be composedintomentalsentences. rather to that are to unproblematic say concepts prior words,itis quiteanother So itis to that mental sentences arepriorto conventional sentences. thing say worthwhile to examinehowthispriority is qualified. 2. 1 Epistemic orSemantic Priority As mentalsimilitudes ofthings,conceptsmaybe claimedto havesomeofthe the of properties thingsgraspedthroughthoseveryconcepts.If I havebeen standingin a gardenin frontofa greentreeI and formedtheconcept"tree", I can thinkaboutthetreebymeansof theconceptevenifI am no longerin the garden.My capacityof doing so can be explainedby appealingto the - the formal whichinclude- dependingon the theory conceptsproperties ifI hear to trees.Bycontrast, features oftreesorat leastsomesortofsimilitude theutterance "tree"I can also thinkof trees,butthereis nothingin thatvery whichwould explainmycapacityto do so; theworditselfhas no utterance relevant to explainingmycapacityof thinking abouttrees,unless, properties of course,we add theclaimthatthewordevokestheconcept"tree",which as a thenenablesme to thinkabouttrees.Accordingly, thewordsfunctioning placeholderof a thing as Aristotleclaimed in the SophisticRefutations to a concept.Thisis whyconcepts (l65a6-8)- is grantedbyitssubordination werelatercallednaturalsignsas opposedto wordswhichsignify conventionIf the word "tree" were to a different subordinated ally. concept,saytheconof "tree"would evoketheconcept"cat".So cept "cat",thenyourutterance have overwords,and thustheyarealso semanticoncepts epistemicpriority In other words: callyprior. conceptsgrantthe semanticidentitybetween wordsand things.7 2.2

Syntactic Priority

Commentators such as ThomasAquinas and JohnDuns Scotusdeveloped thisviewintoa logico-psychological doctrineofmentaloperations, bymergDe anima: theyclaimthattheformaing it withsome tenetsin Aristotle's tionofconceptsis thefirstoperationof theintellect, followedbythesecond or the of division and third operationof syllogizing.8 operation composition 7)SeeDominik amMain,2002), Theorien derIntentionalität imMittelalter Perler, (Frankfurt Mentale vonOckhams Thesen zurSprachandMartin Sätze.Wilhelm 361-374, Lenz, 319-342, lichkeit desDenkens 15. 2003),esp.107-1 (Stuttgart, 8)SeeThomas libri 1.1,ed.Gauthier, 5,andScotus, Quaestiones Aquinas, Peryermenias Expositio

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The explanatory powerofconceptsis thusextendedto therealmofsentences and arguments. Couchedin psychological termsand definedas mentaloperaI this seems tions, straightforward.form,say,a simpleconceptof man, I formanothersimpleconceptofanimal,and then- bymeansofthesecond - I combinethoseconceptsand forma mentalsentence, operation say"every man is an animal".However,thisextensionis not as harmlessas it might Forwe arenotonlydealingwithdifferent appearat first. typesofmentalacts; theseactsshouldalso havedifferent outcomes:thefirst rather, operationproduces a concept,the seconda sentence.In contrastto a concept,a mental sentenceprobablyhas quitedifferent it is complex,has a different properties: semantics and containscertainpartsthatarenotexplicablethrough a relation to things.In additionto the intentional relationsbetweenconceptsin the mindand thingsin theworld,we obviouslyhaveto takeintoaccountsyntacticrelations betweenconcepts. on De interpretatione we findstrongobjecAlreadyin Scotuss commentary tionsto the idea thattheAristotelian viewof conceptscan be extendedto on thegroundsthattherealmofthementaldoesnotcontainstrucsentences, notionofconcepts,however, turalparts.Appealingto theAristotelian Scotus defendstheviewthatthementalsentencehas priority overspokenand written sentences:the enuntiationes in menteare sentencesproperlyspeaking, in a derivedsense.9 whereasconventional sentences aresentences The interesting pointofthisdebate(risingin thelate 13thcentury)is that thisviewrequiresa justification at all.As we shallsee,theconsensusthatconare to words is shaken by the ( primafacie quite plausibleand cepts prior is congruous)attemptto extendthisviewto theclaimthatstructured thought to prior language.

octoinduoslibros Perihermeneias , prooemium (Vivés,1891),581,whoappealnotonlyto Aristotle's De interpretatione butalsotoDe anima : seeesp.De animaIII 6 (430a26-28) and III 8 (432al0-12). 9)SeeScotus, inlibros Perihermenias Aristotelis, II, ed. Quaestiones q. 1,Operaphilosophica R.Andrews etal.,44-45(cf.Vivès1891,539-540): ".. .Siautem istae [sc. proprietatesopposiinvoce,hocnonestperseprimo, enuntiationi sedinquantum est tio,habitudo etc.]insint inmente [Objection:] inmente, enuntiationis Item, signum quodnonestenuntiatio probatio:quiaillius nonsuntnomen etverbum cumutrumque sitvox;sedenuntiationis de partes, hic determinatur sunt illae . . . in dico sicut nomen et verbum voce sunt qua partes. [Reply:] quod enuntiationis invoce,sicipsainmente inmente. suntpartes enuntiationis Quaeenim partes inprima abintellectu eiusoperatione, insecunda, licet nechaecnec concipiuntur componuntur illaexpriman tur."

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The idea behindScotuss defenceseems straightforward: if you want a coherenttheorywhichexplainsthegeneralpriority of thementaloperations - and thisis whatyouwantifyouwishto say,for overconventional language of example,thatall logiciansstudythesame logicand not thepeculiarities different then better had account for the of , both, you priority languages thesemanticand thestructural ofthought. At thebeginning ofthe properties 14thcentury we consequently encountera seriousdebateaboutthepossible candidatesthatcoherently thesemanticand structural that satisfy properties hitherto havebeenascribedto thought.Things(res)as theyareconstruedin s accountof thepropositio in reareseenas semantically Burley unambiguous, buttheydo notfulfil thestructural whereasconventional requirements, spoken sounds (voces) lack semanticidentityunlesstheyare tied to concepts (conceptus).10 Now, obviouslythequoted criticisms againstScotusaffectthetraditional viewof conceptsas well.Conceptsqua constituent partsof thoughtseemto different from similitudes ofthings. require properties conceptsqua 3. Ockham'sAccountofMentalLanguage 3.1

Ockham'smature* Theory

This problemis spelledout in Ockhams earlywork,whichis stilllargely who favourOckhams ignoredor quicklydismissedbymanycommentators, laterpositionthathe presented around1323, notablyin hisSummaLogicae . The current viewof Ockhamsmaturetheoryrecognizes thatOckhamsolved theproblemsalludedto above by assigningtwo different rolesto concepts: are the basic units of semantics as well as constituents of structured they to this later content is thought.11 theory, According conceptual acquiredbya causalrelation betweentheworldandthemind;butsinceourmindisendowed withthecapacityto formstructured theseconceptscan function sentences, as constituent of mental sentences. parts Especiallythe latteraspectseems to renderOckhamsnotionof mentallanguagecomparableto Jerry Fodors 10)Seeonthisdebate Lenz2003,52-71andChristian undDinge.Diepropositio Rode,"Sätze inrebeiWalter undanderen", Bochumer undMittelalJahrbuch Burley Philosophisches fürAntike ter10(2005),67-91. n) Fora concise discussion ofthisdifferentiation seeDominik "DieSystematizität des Perler, Denkens. Zu Ockhams Theorie dermentalen 111.Jahrgang, Jahrbuch Sprache" Philosophisches 2. Halbband Cf.Panaccio 2004,5. (2004),291-311.

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Ockhams maintenetis: mentallanguage LanguageofThoughtHypothesis.12 is semantically and syntactically priorto spokenlanguage. is as as However, probably just wellknown,Ockhamadmittedevenin these laterworksthat,althoughwe are endowedwitha dispositionto formsentencesout ofnaturally concepts,thereis stillthetroubleto explain significant relevantpropertiesof concepts.13 the originof certainstructurally Typical terms are examples syncategorematic suchas "is","all"etc.Althoughtheyare sincetheyrendersentencestrueor false,theycannot semantically necessary, be derivedfromthe experienceof things.So wheredo theycome from?A likelyconclusionin line withOckhamsgeneralthesiswould be thatthese conceptsarepartofourmentalcapacitieswhichenableus to formsentences. Thisis indeedtheconclusionthathe seemsto suggestin severalpassagesofhis laterworks.14 theseinnatefeaPutin termsofFodors LanguageofThoughtHypothesis, of thought:theyaccountforthe turesof conceptsexplainthesystematicity between fact,forinstance,thatwe arenot onlycapableto tellthedifference suchas "allsheeparewhite"and "somesheeparewhite"butalso to sentences - whichis indeeda majorpointforOckham,too.15 thinkthisdifference of notderivefromfeatures ofthoughtdoes certainly But thesystematicity hasto be at least worldis like,thought theextramental theworld.So whatever 12)SeeJerry inthePhilosophy : The Problem A.Fodor, ofMind(CamofMeaning Psychosemantics toconcepts, Fodor alsoassigns bothroles Tobesure, 1987),1-26and135-154. bridge/Mass., see tobeinnate andphysically that Fodor takes oneofthecrucial differences real; concepts being Went Where Science A. 1-39. 1998), (Oxford, Wrong JerryFodor, Concepts: Cognitive 13)SeeOckham, dicitur intendo IV,q. 35,OThIX,471:"Similiter Quodlibeta large accipiendo, intentiones animae naturalia animae nonsolum secunda quaesunt quisignifìcat signa conceptus mentalia sedetiam ad stricte cuiusmodi suntintentiones rerum, potest primae acceptae, signa nonhabementalia. Etistomodoforte putasyncategoremata placitum significare, significantia a second intenintentioni secundae." musnisivocale [Likewise, loosely speaking, correspondens ofthesoulwhich arenatural notonly those intentions ofthesoulthat tionisa concept signifies itcanalsosignify mental inthestrict rather intentions taken ofthings, suchasfirst sense, signs mental terms. This such as which institution, waywe byvoluntary syncategorematic signify signs to the second haveperhaps but a sound intention.] nothing spoken corresponding 14)Seeforinstance inlibrum d. 2, q. 8, OThII, Sententiarum, Ockham, Scriptum primum 289-290. 15)SeeOckham, inlibrum Perihermeneias Aristotelis, § 6, OPhII,354prooemium, Expositio "Oratio mentalis undMentaCf.Perler 2004andMartin Lenz, 358,andFodor 1987,149-151. inHerbst Einspätmittelalterlicher Blick aufdiegegenwärtige desGeistes", lesisch. Philosophie des14.und15.Jahrhunderts, ed.J.Aertsen andM.Pickavé desMittelalters? zurBewertung Fragen Mediaevalia York {Miscellanea 31),2004),105-130. (Berlin/New

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as systematic as language,sinceotherwise we wouldnotbe ableto capturethe varieties and differences thatoccurin conventional languages. In somerespects subscribed to thisthesis,butevenin his Ockhamcertainly matureworkssomedoubtsstillremain,whichpointbackto hisearlytheory. accountis thathisacknowlReminiscent ofhisadherenceto theAristotelian of these doubts are accompaniedby phrasessuchas "improperly edgements buttheystillremainvital.Let us nowlook morecloselyat them. speaking", 3.2

Ockham s EarlyTheory

- as I see itis quite simple:we The basic idea of Ockhams earliertheory neitherhavean inbornmentallanguagenoran inbornsystematic capacityto Allwe can do as itwerefromtheoutset is to exercise menformsentences. is ratherderivedfromouracquaintalacts.The systematicity ofourthoughts is correct,then, tance with conventionallanguage.If this interpretation to whatOckhamlaterclaimed,conventional contrary languageis structurally priorto mentallanguage.16 Centralto Ockhamsearlyand laterpositionsis theidea thatmentalsentencesrequirecertaingrammatical and logicalfeatures just as conventional canonesdo. The mentalcounterpart oftheword"man"(homo),forinstance, ofthetermin thegenitive case:"of notbe thesameas thementalcounterpart can be man" (hominis).The problemis just how such grammatical features in We easilyrecognize thisproblem ourcommon saidto belongto concepts.17 wayofspeaking.Althoughwe mightcommonlysaythatwe havetheconcept of man,we are unlikelyto claim thatthe conceptappearsin a genitiveor in wordsare accusativecase. But we would stillagreethatsuch differences

16)Fora more seeLenz2003,98-130. detailed examination 17)Seeforinstance inlibrum Sententiarum , d.2,q. 1,OHi II,24: Ockham, Scriptum primum sedetiam illud "Undeper'hominis nontantum per'homo', importatur quodimportatur dominium illud Similiter, per super quodimportatur per'homo'. importatur aliquid quodhabet etuniversaliter 'homines' nonimportatur reseodem modoquoimportatur per'homo'; quaelibet frefalsificant etconceptui etnomini talesmodigrammaticales propositiones quiconveniunt Sed tales modi eas et non et reddunt qualiter quenter,frequenter incongruas intelligibiles notonly what 'ofman'conveys convenire [Thus, conceptui postpatebit." possunt grammaticales isconveyed that hasdominion over that which isconveyed butalsosomething by'man. by'man' inthesamewayinwhich itisconveyed 'mendoesnotconvey Likewise, by'man'. everything as to names freto as well those modes which Andgenerally, pertain concepts grammatical - But andunintelligible false render them make sentences andfrequently incongruent quently toconcepts willbeclarified inwhat modes canpertain later.] waythose grammatical

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so theyshouldoccurin thoughtin some relevant to themeaningofsentences, or another. way features come from?Ockhamsreplyis that So wheredo thesestructural discussesthecase of fromconventional theyareabstracted language.He first in theexternal since there is terms and that, nothing argues syncategorematic termssuchas "is"or "all",theyhaveto be worldfromwhichwe couldabstract fromconventional sentences.But in contrastto whatmanyand abstracted evenrecentcommentators claim,he goes on to saythat,generally speaking, and logicalmodescan be imposedonlyad placitumon conthegrammatical cepts,sincetheydo not naturally belongto any concept.Thus,in factwe alwaysabstractthese featuresfromspoken sounds and impose concepts accordingly.18 conto notethatthisis notjust trueof syncategorematic It is important modes all to and With of all grammatical concepts. regard logical ceptsbut fromconventional language.So withregardto therole conceptsareabstracted and imposedto functionin in syntactic all conceptsareabstracted contexts, wordsdo.19 thewaythatconventional 18)SeeOckham, Sententiarum inlibrum , d.2,q. 8,OThII,285-286:. .et primum Scriptum istis nec universaliter necmodi conceptibus possunt plusexsecompetere logicales grammaticales velabstrahi Possunt autem tales utentium. sed tantum ad illis, conceptus imponi placitum quam istivoci'homo' Verbi velsemper velcommuniter. a vocibus, etitafitdefacto competit gratia, etsic masculini nominativi talis modus casus, numeri, generis, quodestsingularis grammatical neither . . . and alii modi dealiis;etistivoci'hominis' [ generally, competunt grammaticales." than tothose, more tothese canbythemselves norlogical modes concepts pertain grammatical orabstracted from canbeimposed butonlybyvoluntary use.Suchconcepts, however, spoken Thegrammatical modethat orgenerally andthisiswhatinfactoralways sounds, happens. nominative issuchthat itisofsingular for tothespoken soundman', number, instance, pertains to modes while there are different and the like, case,masculine grammatical pertaining gender thespoken soundofman'.] 19)SeeOckham, abistis inlibrum Sententiarum ,d.2,q. 8,OThII,268:"Tunc Scriptum primum communes de eis,et abstrahit intellectus vocibus sicsignificantibus praedicabiles conceptus Eteodem voces extra. iliaeadem istos adsignificandum quaesignificant ipsae imponit conceptus consimiles consimiles ethabentes format modoetdetalibus proprietates quales propositions ita instituere tales adsicsignificandum, Etsicut habent conceptus prolatae. potest propositiones subeisdem modis abstractos a rebus adsignificandum instituere grammaipsos conceptus potest abstracHoctamen fitconvenientius subquibus ticalibus perconceptus ipsaevoces. significant illi sunt distincti sicut tosa vocibus vitandam, conceptus ipsae quia aequivocationem propter common insucha way, theintellect abstracts voces . . .".[From sounds then, spoken signifying thesameas these tosignify ofthem; anditimposes which canbepredicated concepts concepts in thesame from these the intellect extramental sounds. And issignified the forms, by spoken senwhich tothespoken haveproperties similar tothose similar sentences which pertain way, tosignify insuchandsucha way, it caninstitute suchconcepts tences. Andjustastheintellect

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ofHis EarlyTheory Consequences

An immediate consequenceofthisviewis thatconventional languageis strucon Ockhams recent commentators to mental turallyprior language.Many as rather It not would see this result unattractive. onlycontradicts philosophy of mentallanguageas a logicallyideal language the earlierinterpretations fromtheVienneseCirclebut also theviewof the lines of the models along mentallanguageas a Fodorianmentalese.20 viewof conceptsas theAristotelian Worsestillperhaps,it also contradicts of overwords.For if certainsemanticproperties havingsemanticpriority markersand if conceptshave to be abstracted termsare based on syntactic on theirsleeves,then fromlanguagebecausetheydo notwearthesemarkers conventional priorto mentallanguage. languageis also semantically thatsome conof this view is therefore Anotherimportant consequence it notcomeas a but instituted. So should are not naturally cepts significative ad to there certain thatOckhamadmits conceptus placituminstisurprise being it is rather aresomehowarbitrary, tutuThisdoes notmeanthatour thoughts as themind.Not a consequenceoftheviewthattheworldis notas systematic To thinkthatall we conceiveof is rootedin extramental reality. everything humansaremortal,forinstance,does notrequirean entitycalledallness.On with theotherhand,thefactthatall humansaremortal,can onlybe expressed term"all".21 thehelpofthesyncategorematic thevery samegrammatical tosignify caninstitute theconcepts abstracted from under things to avoidequivocameans of which the sounds themselves modes However, by spoken signify ofconcepts abstracted from moreconveniently sounds, tion,thishappens bymeans spoken themselves . . .] since these areasdistinct asthespoken sounds concepts 20)Seeforinstance in onSupposition andEquivocation Catarina Dutilh "Ockham Novaes, and Mental the Medieval 3 (2004), Proceedings of Society for Logic Metaphysics Language", CalvinG. URL=http://www.fordham.edu/gsas/phil/klima/SMLM/PSMLM3/PSMLM3.pdf, Summa ofOckhams "Material andtheMental Normore, Logicae'Topoi Supposition Language inOckhams Mental andEquivocation 16(1997),27-33andPaulVincent "Synonymy Spade, ofinterlines 18(1980),9-22.Onthedifferent Journal Language", oftheHistory ofPhilosophy seeLenz2003,13-16. pretation 21)SeeOckham, inlibrum Sententiarum , d. 30,q. 1,OThIV,317:"...iste primum Scriptum inanima, ettarnen sineisto velintentio 'omnis' esttantum quoddam conceptus syncategorema sitrisibilis omnis sineomniconceptu, omnis homoestrisibilis. homo, Quodtarnen conceptu orintention nonpossumus nisiperconceptum [.. .theconcept exprimere syncategorematicum." is human inthesoul,yeteven without this isonly a syncategorematic term every concept every' iscapable that without oflaughing. Butthefact whatsoever, human, anyconcept every capable SeealsoOckham, ofa syncategorematic oflaughing canbeexpressed concept.] only bymeans OTh and in librum d. Ockham, ibid., 405-407, Sententiarumi 31, 1, IV, q. Scriptum primum d.3,q. 2,OThII,403.Cf.Fodor 1998,26.

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A moreinteresting resultof thisview is- to adjusta phrasecoined by canthinkmoreclearlythanwe underAshworth thatwe sometimes Jennifer stand.We can use instituted with a certainsemanticvaguenessto concepts thinkabout somethingthatwe do not (fully)understand. Thisway certain as such "sun" or "weather" can be takenas pro"electron", "God", concepts have of to which we do not or distinct concepts22 things complete epistemic Thisopensup thepossibility thatconceptsdo notnecessarily access.23 needan To adopt a famoustermfrom epistemic,let alone ontological,foundation. Dennett:we can use conceptsjustlikewe usewordsas "toolsforthinking".24 we cannotdo withnaturally concepts,so (Again,thisis something significant of wordsgainspriority overtheepistemicvalueof concepts.) thearbitrarity institute a termthatmeanssomeWe can,to takeone ofOckhamsexamples, which is different from all other and name it'Goď justas we can thing things I meetnext'.So we can devisea linguistic institute a termto mean whomever precisionwithoutfoundingit on distinctepistemicaccessto certainobjects: is notalwaysthesameas intelligereP significare 22)Incontrast whose isfixed natural can toconcepts content bytheir signification, pro-concepts adhocinstitutions whose content iscontextually See Dan beseenona parwith specified. Sperber inLanguage "TheMapping between theMental andthePublic andDeirdre Lexicon", Wilson, Themes andThought: andJ.Boucher ,ed.P.Carruthers 1998),184Interdisciplinary (Cambridge, - tobe 200.I borrow thisterm from their relevance-theoretic account ofconcept-formation to a of this without Ockham kind. sure, ascribing fully fledged theory 23)SeeOckham, inlibrum Sententiarum , d.22,q. 1,OThIV,45-57;seeesp. Scriptum primum solemnondistincte vidět necintelligit solem distincte videns quianonvidět p. 57:"aliquis estipsius ettarnen istavoxsol'apudeumdistincte solem solis, quidquid quiasignificai significat thesunneither sibiillam remquamvidet confuse etnullam aliam." [Someone distinctly seeing since he not see that seesnorintellectually the does sun, distinctlyeverything cognizes belongs for himthespoken tothesunassuch. soundsundistinctly thesun,since Nevertheless, signifies forhimitsignifies thevery that heseesconfusedly andnoother Cf.Lenz2003, thing thing.] A Problem 118-124 thanI Understand? of andE. J.Ashworth, "CanI SpeakMoreClearly in in of Duns Studies in and Medieval Ghent, Scotus, Ockham", Religious Language Henry andR. H. Robins , ed.K. Koerner, (Amsterdam, 1980), H.-J.Niederehe Linguistic Thought 29-38.1980. 24)Notethat this viewisvery inlinewith Ockhams much tenet that areficta. See early concepts in librum Sententiarum d. OTh and 273 285. Ockham, 2, , 8, II, q. Scriptum primum 25)SeeOckham, inlibrum Sententiarum , d. 22,q. 1,OThIV,55.Cf.ibid.: primum Scriptum siviator nonposset instituere nomen addistincte divinam "Praeterea, essentiam, significandum nisiquianonpotest hocnonesset Deumdistincte Sedhocnonobstat, intelligere. quiavoxalidistincte fuit Patet distincte intellectum. dehac quapotest aliquid significare quodnumquam voce'homo' hominem futurum etiam sinenovaimpositione." [Furquoddistincte significabit ifa wayfarer were toinstitute a nametodistinctly unable thedivine thermore, essence, signify thiswould besosolely because hecannot God.Butthisdoesnotmake distincdy any cognize

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4. Benefitsof thisTheory Thisaccountclearlycontradicts Ockhams"mature" butneitheris this theory, a reasonto avoidthequestionof itshistorical impactin favourofa coherent viewof medievaltheoriesof mentallanguage,nordoes his earlytheoryneed to be seenas philosophically immature. Withregardto thehistoryof philosophywe seemto preferto thinkthat neverquestionedwhetherlanguagemightinfluence medievalphilosophers thought. But I do not thinkthatOckhamsearlyapproachwas justan embarrassed forlack of a bettertheory.So it willprobablybe rewarding to hand-waving to readingauthorssuchas Crathornor RichardBrinkley in orderto get return a bettergraspof alternatives to the commonview of mentalesewhichwas questionedagainin latescholasticand earlymodernphilosophy.26 To sharpenthephilosophical graspofOckhamsearlyapproach,itmightbe to look for not helpful parallels to Fodorbut to his opponents:mostnotably - "suggested to Daniel Dennett,who- as Fodor himselfremarked thatits that makes a mind systematic."27 learning language A standardobjectionto thisview is thatmentallanguagewould be as true,ifone ambiguousas conventional language.But thisis not necessarily takesintoaccountthedistinction betweenthehearers and speakers perspective.28 Of course,a hearermightneedto go througha processofdisambiguation,by listeningto othersentencesan so on. But thisis not trueforthe we normally do notwonderwhether speakerorforthefirst personperspective: we think(of) thisor thatwhilewe employthisor thatconcept.29 sinceanyspoken soundcandistinctly thatwasnever difference, distinctly signify something Thisisclear from thecaseofthespoken willdistinctly soundman'which cognized. any signify maninthefuture without anynewimposition.] 26)SeeLaurent '"Ubiestpropositio?' Richard surleslieuxdeleproposition Cesalli, Brinkley V. in Medieval Theories Assertive and Non-assertive Acts CSumma 1-5)", Logicae of Language: ofthe 14th onMedieval and Semantics ed. A. L. Valente Maieru and , (Rome, European Symposium Logic onBrinkley. OnCrathorn seePerler Fora con1997andLenz2003,179-181. 2004),445-471 ciseexamination oflater seeMeier-Oeser 2004. developments 27)Fodor1998,26.Fora succinct ofthisviewseeDanielC. Dennett, presentation "Learning andLabeling", MindandLanguage 8/4(1993),540-547. Cf.DanielC. Dennett, Consciousness (boston, 1991),218-228. Explained 28)Thisdefence isputforward, that "much others, byDavidCole,whoargues amongst thought isindeed internalized of a conventional see David Yourself Cole, speech" language: "Hearing Think: Natural Inner andThought", 1997(http://www.umn.edu/-dcole/ Speech Language, hearthot.htm). 29)Inthesame veinOckham between theintentio auctoris and ,theusus distinguishes loquentium

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Anothermoremodernobjectionis to pointout thatthisviewleadsto the of conceptualrelativism. But eventhisviewcan be counincompatibilities teredby appealingto a distinction betweena cognitiveand communicative function oflanguage.30 The mostchallenging objectionhoweveris thatit seemsincongruousto a languagewhoseverymeaningis said claimthatwe acquireconceptsthrough to dependon themeaningoftheconcepts.If I solelyperceivea word,thenI do not understand it, unlessit evokesa concept;it remainsa meresound. is thatwe indeed"mustclimbstepsin whichwe Dennetts idea,bycontrast, but dont understand oui ownrepresentations."31 So we learnto employ perceive we can use termssuchas "God" Similarly conceptsbyusingrepresentations. or "sun"without(fully)understanding them.Once we can employa representationad placitum itis notreallya distinctly , understanding epistemic process but also a matterof decision(whichis not stricdydependenton epistemic access).This idea is not properly spelledout in Ockham but it is certainly to theclassicalconception worthconsidering thisviewas a valuablealternative ofmentalese.

5. Conclusion On thisaccount,then,conventional languageis priorto mentallanguagein markthreerespects: it is (1) syntactically priorin thatitcontainstherelevant erswhichwe abstract and applyto concepts;(2) itis semantically priorin that thenon-ambiguity ofmental isgenerally thevirtus sermonis. since to However, language argued restonthenatural of its there is still room for as terms, syntactic signification equivocation, Ockham Summa admits that III.4,c.4,OPhI,763).Yetthisdoesnotentail (Ockham, Logicae Ockham iscommitted totheclaim that thethinker inquestion beconfused astowhether might for shethinks thisorthat. Remember wasconstrued alsoasa medium thatmental language communication between so can be the byinvoking angels, possible ambiguities explained distinction between hearer andspeaker. Cf.Lenz2003,162-165 and128-131. angelic 30)Thebasicideaofthecognitive isthat conscious isconducconception propositional thinking tedinandpartly evenconstituted Thisisargued conventional tobe by(internalized) language. tenable without to embrace the so-called Whorfian and its relativist consehypothesis having Fora detailed seePeter andConsciousness: An account Carruthers, quences. Language, Thought inPhilosophical 1996). Essay Psychology (Cambridge, 31)SeeDennett wehuman canachieve 1993,542: . .thesortoflearning beings justbyconin of not on our symbolic merely,somesense, representations depends templating knowledge inorder butalsounderstanding andmyrather curious isthat them, them, perceiving suggestion toarrive atthismarvellous wemust inwhich weperceive butdontunderclimb summit, steps stand ourownrepresentations."

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at leastsomesemanticrelationsdo dependon syntactic combinations; (3) it of a kindat least,in thatit enablesus to label can haveepistemicpriority, access.(We can mentally ofthedegreeofourcognitive objectsindependently of them.) "handle"objectswithouthavingto resortto an understanding thekindof mentallanguagethatOckhamdepicts UnlikeFodors mentalese, our cognitiveprocesses,ratherit in his earlytheoryis not one underlying thatwe use in thinking. ofrepresentations grantstheavailability in defending a This is probablywhythe earlyOckhamsaw no difficulty mental acts to means in re-theory. kindofpropositio things Thinking applying thususingbothres and applying themto conceptswhenno thingsarepresent, in thought. Whenthequestionarises as representations and conceptus cognitae of construingrelations are of how we capable using representations, just the answer is: itis becausewe have betweenontologically independent things, learneda languagewhichenablesus to turntheobjectswe havecognizedinto whichin turnallow forsome vitaleleconstituents. Constituents syntactic and recursion.32 mentsin thought:structure

Bibliography 1. EditionsofPrimary Sources 31963. Oxford Deanima, ed.W.D. Ross, Aristotle, 41966. Oxford etLiber deinterpretation, ed.L.Minio-Paluello, , Categoriae ed.C. Meiser, inlibrum Aristotelis Peri hermeneias Commentarii ,pars Boethius, Leipzig: posterior, Teubner 1880. Aristotelis inlibros Perihermenias DunsScotus, II, ed. , Operaphilosophica Quaestiones John N.Y.:TheFranciscan Institute 2004. R.Andrews etal.,St.Bonaventure, octoinduoslibros Perihermeneias , OperaomniaI, ed.L. Wadding, , Quaestiones Lyon Paris: Vivès1891. 1639;reprint Rome/ Leonina ed.R.-A.Gauthier, libri Thomas 1/1, , Editio Aquinas, Peryermenias Expositio Paris: Commmissio Leonina 1989. II-III, distinctiones inlibrum Sententiarum. William ofOckham, Ordinatio, primum Scriptum N. Y.: The FrancisG. St. ed. S. F. Brown adlaborante Bonaventure, II, Gài, Opera theologica canInstitute 1970(= OThII). 32)Earlier I would inCambridge andBerlin. ofthispaper were atconferences drafts presented for readers theparticipants aswellastwoanonymous liketothank bythisjournal appointed toJulia I amparticularly their valuable Cameron, comments; Borcherding, Margaret grateful Perler andMarkus Wildfor Dominik Laurent Meier-Oeser, Cesalli, Marenbon, John Stephan fortheir I amalsoindebted totheDeutsche discussions. Forschungsgemeinschaft inspiring ofmyresearch forthispaper. support generous

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G.Gài,S. F.Brown, St.BonavenI,ed.P.Boehner, , Summa Operaphilosophica Logicae, Institute N.Y.:TheFranciscan 1974(= OPhI). ture, Aristotelis inlibrum Perihermeneias , Operaphilosophica II, ed.A. Gambatese , Expositio Institute St.Bonaventure, N.Y.:TheFranciscan andS. F.Brown, 1978(= OPhII). distinctiones inlibrum Sententiarum. Ordinatio, XIX-XLVIII, , Scriptum Opera primum St. N.Y.:TheFranciscan InstiG. I. Etzkorn and F. E. ed. Bonaventure, IV, Kelley, theologica tute1979(= OThIV). N.Y.:TheFranSt.Bonaventure, IX,ed.J.C. Wey, , Quodlibeta , Operatheologica septem ciscan Institute 1980(= OThIX). 2. Secondary Sources and andItsTradition: Texts 500to1750, sel.,trans, H.,Aristotle's Arens, from Theory ofLanguage 1984). (Amsterdam/Philadelphia, commentary byH. Arens A Problem LanofReligious MoreClearly thanI Understand? E. J.,"CanI Speak Ashworth, in Studies in Medieval in of Duns and Linguistic guage Henry Ghent, Scotus, Ockham", andR.H. Robins Niederehe ,ed.K.Koerner, 1980),29-38. (Amsterdam, H.-J. Thought : AnEssay inPhilosophical andConsciousness Carruthers, P.,Language, (CamPsychology Thought 1996). bridge, surleslieux deleproposition Richard Cesalli, L.,"'Ubiestpropositio?' {Summa Brinkley Logicae Acts and Non-assertive Theories Assertive V.1-5)",inMedieval ofthe14th European Language: of Olschki andL. Valente andSemantics onMedieval , ed.A.Maieru (Rome, Logic Symposium 2004),445-471. URL= Inner andThought", Think: Natural Yourself 1997, Cole,D.,"Hearing Speech Language, -dcole/hearthot.htm. /www.d.umn.edu/ http:/ D. C.,Consciousness Dennett, (Boston, 1991). Explained 8/4(1993),540-547. andLabeling", MindandLanguage , "Learning inMental ProceedonSupposition andEquivocation Dutilh Novaes, C.,"Ockham Language", andMetaphysics 3 (2004),URL= http://www.fordham. Logic ings oftheSociety forMedieval edu/gsas/phil/klima/SMLM/PSMLM3/PSMLM3.pdf. inthePhilosophy TheProblem Fodor, J.A.,Psychosemantics: ofMind(Cambridge/ ofMeaning Mass.,1987). Went Where Science , Concepts: (Oxford, 1998). Cognitive Wrong desDenkens Wilhelm vonOckhams Thesen zurSprachlichkeit Sätze. Lenz, M.,Mentale (Stuttgart, 2003). " Einspätmittelalterlicher aufdiegegenwärtige Blick mentalis undMentalesisch. , Oratio inHerbst des14.und15.JahrdesMittelalters? zurBewertung desGeistes", Fragen Philosophie York{Miscellanea Mediaevalia andM. Pickavé ed.J.Aertsen hunderts, 31), (Berlin/New 2004),105-130. Marenbon, 2003). (Oxford, J.,Boethius imGeist. Skizzen zueinem undBilder Meier-Oeser, S.,"Sprache philosophischen Langzeitpro111. Jahrgang, 2. Halbband (2004),312-342. Jahrbuch jekt", Philosophisches ofOckhams Summa andtheMental C.,"Material Normore, Supposition Logicae' Language 16(1997),27-33. Topoi onConcepts Panaccio, C.,Ockham 2004). (Aldershot,

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in inVestigia, Semiotics andLogic onMental , Verba: Perler, D., "Crathorn Language", Imagines Medieval Texts Acts of the 11th on Medieval , (XIIth-XTVth Symposium Theological Century) andSemantics, SanMarino, 24-28May1994(Turnhout, 1997),337-353. Logic derIntentionalität imMittelalter amMain,2002). , Theorien (Frankfurt PhilosodesDenkens. Zu Ockhams Theorie dermentalen , "DieSystematizität Sprache", 111. 2. 1. Halbband 291-31 (2004), Jahrbuch Jahrgang, phisches undDinge.Diepropositio inrebeiWalter undanderen , Bochumer Rode,C., "Sätze Burley undMittelalter 10(2005),67-91. Jahrbuch furAntike Philosophisches inOckhams P.V.,"Synonymy Mental andEquivocation Journal Spade, Language", oftheHis18 9-22. (1980), tory ofPhilosophy in D. andD. Wilson, "TheMapping between theMental andthePublic Lexicon", Sperber, andJ.Boucher andThought: Themes ,ed.P.Carruthers (Cambridge, Language Interdisciplinary 1998),184-200.

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»KtG/^ i.Êj '»»v BRILL


Vivarium 46 (2008)318-341

Ame intellective, Jean de Jandun

âme cogitative:

et la duplex farma propria

de l'homme

Brenet Jean-Baptiste Université deParis X-Nanterre

Abstract Thearticle theideathataccording totheaverroist of Master JeandeJandun, analyses Artsin Parisat thebeginning ofthe14thcentury, humanbeingsarecomposed ofa «doubleform » theseparated intellect ontheonehand,thecogitative soulontheother After hand. several ofthetime,weexplore of Jeansreading recalling majoraccounts Averroes' theproblem. we challenge theidea majorconceptions Finally, concerning inhiswritings towhichweobserve theradical thesis ofa sometimes according cogitat«doublehumanbeing»thatmakesofthehomointelligens a ingsometimes thinking andexclusive newbeing, whichis accidentally whilethethinking punctual produced takesplace. Keywords soul,intellect, form, humanity cogitative, anthropology, 1. Introduction Dans le GrandCommentaire ďAverroés du livreDe l'âme, deuxphrasesparaissentse contredire, ou du moinsse faireconcurrence, surla questionmajeure de la spécification de l'homme.Dans le textequi ouvreson commentaire du livreIII, Averroès écritďabord ceci à proposde la facultérationnelle : « c'est des autresêtresvivants,commeil estdit en de par elle que l'hommediffère nombreuxpassages»1.L'idéeestordinaire, elle correspond à la évidemment; 1}Averroès, etlaPensée. Grand Commentaire du'Deanima'. III (429a 10-435 Livre L'Intelligence b 25)ytraduction, introduction etnotes cf. (Paris, 1998),49; pourle latin, parA. deLibera Averrois Cordubensis commentarium inAristotelis deanimalibros Averroès, , éd.F.S. magnum Crawford rationabilis (Mass.), 1953),379,21-23:«perhancvirtutem [lavirtus ] (Cambridge » Danssoncommentaire differt homo abaliisanimalibus, utdictum estinmultis locis. 6 dulivre ©Koninklijke Brill 2008 NV, Leiden,

DOI:10.1163/ 156853408X360948

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Mais quelques caractérisation courantede l'hommecommeanimalrationnel. fin Averroès à du commentaire l'extrême loin, parlede l'invingt, pagesplus assimile à «la faculté tellectpassible{intellectus imaginative passibilis)2,qu'il en tant de l'imagination aux « formes humaine»3,ou encore,plusexactement, il et écrit cette fois: à l'homme elles la sur »4; propre qu'agit facultécogitative les hommes «cet intellectqu'Aristoteappellepassibleest ce qui différencie énumère dans les Topiques selonles quatrefacultésmentionnées , qu'Alfarabi danslesElenchi» ; puisil ajoute: « cest[. . .] par cetintellect diffère que l'homme desautresanimaux, carsi teln'étaitpas le cas,il y auraitjonctionde l'intellect possibleavecles [autres]animaux,etde la mêmemanière agentetde l'intellect faitedu détailde ces thèses,le problèmeest [qu'avecl'homme].»5Abstraction des autresespèces,le texte clair: s'il s'agitde savoirpar quoi l'hommediffère n'articule deux d'Averroès pas de façonnette: réponses,qu'il paraîtindiquer en de l'autre,Xymaginatio d'un côté,la virtusrationalisa , ou plusprécisément, . De cettepossible elle,cettepuissanceindividuelle qu'estla virtuscogitativa les Latinsont faitune querelle,roulantsurla formede l'homme, ambiguïté, danslaquellele problèmenoétiquede la séparation ontologiqueetde l'unicité de l'intellectcroisela questiontrèsembrouilléede la pluralitédes formes «virtus homini» écrit rationalis Averroès 416, (ibid., III,parexemple, appropriatur également: 86-87). 2)Ilreprend, De l'âme d'Aristote dansletraité comme onsait, , III,5,430a24. l'expression 3)Averroès, etlaPensée , 120. L'Intelligence 4)Ibid.,118;noussoulignons; deanimalibros cf.Averroès, Commentarium , 449, magnum formas secundum «Etintendebat hicperintellectum 173-175: quod passibilem ymaginationis » Surla cogitative voir engénéral chezAverroès, ineasagitvirtus homini. propria cogitativa inAverroes" in Aristotelis De Commentarium Richard C.Taylor, "Remarks onCogitatio Magnum : Sources andReception inAverroes andthe Aristotelian Tradition Anima , Constitution Libros', ofthe & G. Endress Rushd 1999),217-255 (Leiden, ), éd.J.A.Aertsen (1126-1198 Philosophy oflbn in : Remarks ontheCogitative Power andCogitare etRichard C.Taylor, "Cogitatio, Cogitativus Hamesse & C. Steel au inL'élaboration duvocabulaire Aver , roes", Moyen AgeJ. philosophique totalement déformée enparticulier, etsareprise (Turnhout, 2000),111-146;surcepassage par laruine d'Averà l'espèce voir "Duphantasme deJandun, Brenet, Jean intelligible: Jean-Baptiste inIntellect etimagination dansla Philosophie médiévale. deJandun", roèsparl'averroïste Jean éd. naFilosofia Intellecto eimaginação Intellect andImagination inMedieval Medieval., Philosophy du etBrenet, M.C.Pacheco & J.F.Meirinhos 2006),vol.2, 1179-1190 (Turnhout, Transferts , 195-276. sujet 5)Averroès, deanima cf.Averroès, Commentarium etlaPensée , 122-123; magnum L'Intelligence diversantur vocavit Aristoteles : «Et istum intellectum libros 315-318 , 454, quem passibilem per inElenchis. Etper inTopicis, numeravit inquatuor virtutibus dictis homines quasAlfarabius esset utcontinuatio etsinon,tunenecesse differt homoabaliisanimalibus, istum intellectum » Noussoulignons. eodem modo. intellectus etrecipientis cumanimalibus esset, agentis

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substantielles. Dans ce qui suit,on examineà grandstraitsquelle futsurce la lecture de Jeande Jandun,maîtreès artsà Parisau débutdu XIV point et siècle, principaltenantde ce que, dans l'historiographie médiévale,on a « latin»6.Il ne s'agitnullement d'unearchéoloappelé l'averroïsme longtemps complète;on tâcheseulementde pointercertains gie et d'une présentation élémentsconceptuels d'unecomplexedisputedontl'histoire resteà écrire. 2. Deux antécédents: Thomasd'Aquin et Sigerde Brabant Si l'on s'entientà l'essentiel, l'intervention de Jeande Jandunestprécédéede ces deuxlecturesprincipales:(a) cellede Thomasd'Aquin,d'abord,i.e. celle à Averroès, etdontsa condamnation que Thomasattribue dépend; (b) cellede cellede son De animaintellectiva , Sigerde Brabant,ensuite;et en particulier et dont on fait De unitate une au intelleccite7, Jean que généralement réponse de l'Aquinate. ts l'ultimeattaqueanti-averroïste ces deuxinterprétations8. D'une certaine Rappelonsen brefquellesfurent la lecturecritiqueque Thomasd'Aquinfaitde la noétiqued'Averroès manière, tienten deuxphrases: dansla mesureoù il estséparédansl'être,l'intellect chez (1) premièrement, Averroèsn'estpas la formedu corps; et il fautentendrequ'il ne l'estnullement.C'est ce qu'on lit,parexemple,dansla Sommecontre lesGentils II, 59 : « ces raisonsont conduitAverroès et certainsanciens,d'aprèslui, à soutenir que l'intellect possible,parlequell'âmepense,estséparédu corpsselonl'être, et quii nestpas la formedu corps»9. C'est aussice qu'affirme le débutdu De unitateintellectus : «Averroès[. . .] tentede soutenirque l'intellect qu'Aristote appelle"possible"[. . .] estunesubstancedu corpsséparéedu corpsselonl'être, 6)SurJean deJandun, etnotamment sursanoétique, voirJean-Baptiste du Brenet, Transferts La d'Averroès selon de (Paris, 2003). Jean Jandun sujet. noétique 7)Jean deJandun, Ioannis deIanduno acutissimi libros Aristotelis deanima subtiphilosophi super lissimae a. M.,1966),III,5,col.245. (Venise, 1587); réimpr. (Frankfurt quaestiones 8)C'estvolontairement onn'entre dansl'examen del'éventuelle succinct; pas,parexemple, évolution dechacune despositions. les relativement Signalons simplement parmi publications AlaindeLibera, L'unité del'intellect. Commentaire duDe unitate intelrécentes, pourThomas, lectus contra averroistas deThomas Antonio Aristo(Paris, 2004); pourSiger, d'Aquin Petagine, telismo L'intelletto umano nella diAlberto Tommaso e Sideri difficile. prospettiva Magno, d'Aquino diBrabante (Milan, 2004). 9)Thomas Somme contre lesGentils. Livre surlavérité delafoicatholique contre leserreurs d'Aquin, desinfidèles. Traduction inédite C. Michon 4 vols.(Paris, etD. Moreau, 2: 1999), parV.Aubin, 59,241.

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Si forme.»10 qui nestd aucunefaçon (necaliquo modo)unieau corpscomme l'on en croitThomas,donc, l'intellectchez Averroèsn'esten rienla forme du corps. : si l'intel(2) La deuxièmeidéeestcommeuneconséquencede la première nestrienque la formedu corps,l'homme,chezAverroès, lectn estaucunement Thomasd'Aquin croitpouvoirl'écrire, le corpsanimédesfacultésinférieures. par exemple,dans la Sommecontreles GentilsII, 60: «Averroès[. . .] dit que des bêtespar l'intellectqu'Aristoteappelle l'hommediffère spécifiquement et la faculté est propreà l'homme[...]. [. . .] Et cetintelcogitative, passif qui lectpassifse trouvechezl'enfantdès le début,et lui confèrel'espècehumaine avantqu'il ne penseen acte.»n Le raisonnement de l'Aquinateestle suivant: si l'on pose avecAverroès que l'intellect n'estpas la formedu corpsmaisqu'il se jointà l'hommeparle biais des imageslors de l'opérationintellective (c'est-à-dire:si l'on soutientque l'hommen'estjoint à l'intellectque lorsqu'ilimagine),forceest d'admettre pas à l'espèce que l'êtrequi n'estpas sortidu sein materneln'appartient humaine(étantdonnéqu'il n'a pas encored'imagesen acteet qu'il n'estpas, voireque l'individuadulte,chaque foisqu'il ainsi,effectivement rationnel), cessed'imaginer, cesselui-mêmed'êtrehumain: l'humanitéde l'homme,susd'un intellect séparéde lui,seraità la fois pendueà l'exercice ontologiquement tardiveet intermittente12. Néanmoins,reconnaît Thomas,« il y a une réponse celle qui, précisément, aux arguments que nous venonsde développer»13: maisla facultécogitative consisteà poserque ce n'estpas l'intellect qui confère 10)Thomas lesaverroïstes contre Averroès L'Unité del'intellect contre , suividesTextes d'Aquin, notes antérieurs à 1270.Texte introduction, latin, traduction, bibliographie, chronologie, et index (Paris 1994),77. parA.deLibera n) Thomas constitué contre lesGentils idéedel'homme Somme , II,60,245.Cette par d'Aquin, intellectus à l'unedesthèses leseulcorps animé del'âmesensitive dansleDe unitate correspond : l'individu selon del'individu humain averroïstes selon surlanature Socrate, Thomas, possibles, «n'est comme cela semble âme et animé une cette sensitive, thèse, par qu'uncorps végétative constitué à ceuxquisoutiennent n'est inévitable parl'inquecethomme-ci passpécifiquement del'intellect oucouplage maisparl'âmesensitive ennoblie tellect, rayonnement paruncertain L'Unité del'intellect, 143). (Thomas d'Aquin, possible» 12)Thomas est intellectus. Ainsi note-t-il cette dans quesil'intellect reprend critique leDeunitate s'établir à supposer leprétend Averroès), (comme qu'une jonction puisse séparé ontologiquement «lamise avecl'homme ilconteste), encontact del'intellect desimages (cequ'envérité parlebiais » (Thomas L'Unité del'intellect, la lieu dès le moment de n'aurait d'Aquin, pas premier génération Aristote à cequedéfendent et serait contraire II, (enPhys. 137),cequi,assure-t-il, Théophraste ici. uneétude Salecture detelles autorités demande 4, 194b9-13). qu'onnepeutmener 13)Thomas Somme contre lesGentils , II,60,245. d'Aquin,

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à l'individuson espècehumaineet que, par conséquent,ni le caractère tardif ni sesfluctuations ne sontproblématiques. L'humade la jonctionintellective : l'hommed'Averroès, nitéseraità la foispré-et /«/^-intellectuelle certescapable d'une union à l'intellectextrinsèque, seraitfondamentalement le corps cogitant. La thèseestabsolument fausseauxyeuxde Thomas.Ce n'estpourluiqu'une tentative de absurde,vaine, compensercettepremièreidée insanequ'est la dansl'êtrede l'intellect séparation possible.Quoi qu'il en soit,telleestla premièrelecture(partiale,polémique)qui tranchel'apparenteindécisionqu'on l'hommedoitson espèceà l'âmecogitarelevait dansle GrandCommentaire: circuleau XIIIe tive;et cetteidée,plusou moinsassociéeau nomd'Averroès, textes la c'est siècle,commeparaissentl'attester dénoncent14; qui plusieurs elle,encore,que E. Tempiercondamneen 1277: Quodhomoesthomopraeter 15. animamrationalem d'Averroès crucialepourJean,issued'une Quant à l'autreinterprétation favorable à l'idée d'une séparationsubstantielle de l'intellecturealternative De anima intellectiva de elle est constituée la thèse du lect, par Sigerde Brabant.Ce derniersoutientce qui suit: ) du (1) premièrement, que l'intellectest séparé«selon l'être»(in essendo » « nature naturam suam mais lui est humain, ) et corps qu'il appliqué par (per » à titre d'« s'unità lui dansl'acteintellectif (in operando) opérantintrinsèque intrinsecum )16. (operans 14)C'estcette «averroïste ». Pourdes histoire sousl'angle dela cogitative quiestà faire, précis Guillaume deBaglione, Pseudo-Gilles à Pierre-Jean références Bacon, Olivi, Roger pertinentes und deRome, voirSylvain 'Olivietlesaverroïstes', Piron, fürPhilosophie Freiburger Zeitschrift XIVe certains ce Notons début du siècle de 251-309. 53 (2006), qu'au partisans que Theologie «radical » semblent Z. Kuksewicz avoir aumoins enpartie, lathèse l'averroïsme appelle adopté, ausujet del'homme comme Ce serait notamment lecasd'Antoine deParme, corps cogitant. à l'appui, Z. Kuksewicz : «l'homme nes'unit dèssanaissance, texte écrit duquel, pasà l'intellect maisseulement à partir sontsuffisamment dumoment oùsesfacultés sensitives déveparfaites, etexercées lesintentions dematériaux à l'intellect desintellects loppes poursaisir quiservent » (Zdzislaw etpossible DeSiger deBrabant à Jacques dePlaisance. La théorie de Kuksewicz, agent l'intellect latins desXIIIeetXIVesiècles & Varsovie & Cracovie, chezlesaverroïstes (Wroclaw cequedéfend Emanuele Coccia(quiétend lepropos à tout 1968),155).C'estaussi l'averroïsme) La trasparenza Averroè e l'averroismo notamdanssonlivre delle 2005)(voir (Milan, immagini. ment lechapitre intitulé "Puer. L'intelletto è separato", 57-82). 15)C'estle proposition 11:«quel'homme esthomme endehors del'âmerationnelle»; voir La condamnation texte introduction et comDavidPiché, de 1277, latin, traduction, parisienne à Paris mentaire surles219articles condamnés ; etRoland Hissette, (Paris, 1999),82-83 Enquête le7 man1277(Louvain & Paris, 1977),184-186. 16)Eneffet, «intellectus inintelligendo. a corpore Sunt anima intellectiva unum depend[et] igitur

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le corpsanimé,mais (2) deuxièmement, que l'hommenestpas simplement le composé de cet operansintrinsecum et du corps; ce qui expliqueque cet hommepense,puisquel'intellect comprisde cettefaçonconstituel'une des l'actede la partiesde l'hommeet que, en vertud'un principemétonymique, au tout17. récuse donc de Thomas partiepeuts'attribuer l'interprétation Siger l'homme réduit d'Averroès au son qui corpscogitantpour fustiger impuissanceà vérifier cetteproposition C'est pourtantindéniable: hichomointelligit. bien l'intellectqui faitl'homme(la cogitativen'estpas ici mentionnée18), mêmesi cetintellect n'estpas substantiellement uni à quelquematièreque ce soit19.Sur la questionde la formahominis les deux principaleslecturesdu , GrandCommentaire sontdonc lessuivantes : d'un côté,l'idée(le plussouvent dénoncée)que c'estla cogitative qui faitl'homme; de l'autre,dans une doctrineoptantpour la séparationontologiquede l'intellect,l'idée que c'est formedu corpsà titre l'intellect, nonobstant, l'homme,un intellect qui définit » et,en tantque tel,« partie» du composéhumain. d'«opérateur intrinsèque » {Deanima inopere, etcorpus intellectiva deBrabant, , in: Siger quiainunum opusconveniunt intertium deanima lemaître , 85,67-69);sibien,conclut Quaestiones brabançon, qu'onpeut » affirmer inintelligendo estoperans intrinsecum adcorpus que«intellectus persuamnáturám (ibid, 80-81). 17)Réponse évidente à Thomas Notons aussiqueThomas, danssonDeunitate intellec d'Aquin. tus cette théorie del'homme-composé délicate de , attaque (§ 68),ce quiposeunequestion danslaquelle nousn'entrons chronologie pas. 18)Reprenant cequ'ilécrivait danssesQuaestiones intertium deanima , Siger parle cependant d'une«âmecomposée» réunissant l'intellect d'uncôté,lesprincipes etsensitif de végétatif « l'autre. Voir : in tertium de de Dicendum enim 58-64 anima, 3, Brabant, Quaestiones quod Siger nonradicatur ineadem intellectivum anima etsensitivo, sicut cumvegetativo simplici Vegetativumetsensitivům ineadem radicantur sedradicatur cumipsisineadem anima comsimplici, Undecumintellectus tuminsuoadventu unitur et sit,cumadvenit, posita. simplex vegetativo »; etDeanima etsicipsaunita nonfaciunt unam sedcompositam intellecsensitivo, simplicem, deBrabant, intertium deanima tiva, , 110,30-36:«Sentit Quaestiones chap.8,in:Siger ergo intellectivum seupotentiam nonpertinere formam ad eamdem ad Philosophus intelligendi etsentiendi. Siautem dicatur hocnonestsimplicis quampertinet potentia vegetandi potentiae, sedquodammodo exintellectu deforis adveniente etunasubstantia formae, compositae vegetativietsensitivi educta depotentia materiae tertio deanimaintellectivum ; undePhilosophus » vocat animae. partem 19)Siger deBrabant, Deanima intellectiva intertium deanima, deBrabant, ,in: Siger Quaestiones deanimaintellectiva mundi & Paris, , deaeternitate , éd.B. Bazán(Louvain 1972),87,17-20: «Dicendum dit-il sansambiguïté, «nectarnen quodhomoesthomoperintellectum», propter hocoportet alteram huius uniri alteri utfigura cerae sedsufficit unitur, partem compositi parti modouniatur intrinsecum ab eo [i.e.comme ] uttotum quodpraedicto compositum operans » denominetur.

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3. La double formepropreselonJeande Jandun ce que futla solutionde Jean Ce rapidepréalablepermetde mieuxapprécier de Jandun.Quelle estselonluila formede l'homme? S'agit-ilde l'intellect (on la à stricte de de en ce une cas, s'attendre, position Siger)ou reprise pourrait assude la cogitative(ce qui seraitune thèseaudacieuse,sinonprovocatrice, mée à la barbede Thomasd'Aquin)? La réponseest: ni l'un ni l'autre,ou plutôt: l'un etl'autre.Car la thèsede Jean,promiseà une certainerenommée, consisteà direqu'il n'ya pas une seuleformeproprede l'homme,maisdeux: textesdu GrandCommensi bienque les différents l'intellect et la cogitative, maisdéfenou d'hésitant, tairen'ontriend'antinomique, de contradictoire, sait les une doctrine dentau contraire, .cohérente. articuler, pourqui est Voyonscommentil le justifie.Premierpointde son analyse: l'intellect bienla formede l'êtrehumain,ce parquoi l'hommeesthomme.Cetteseule que l'hommeest phraseesttoutà faitnette: « etj'ajouteque c'estparl'intellect . . »20Contraireou rationnelle . la nature intellectuelle à savoir homme, par de Thomas mentà ce que déduitl'exégèsespécieuse d'Aquin,parconséquent, l'intellect,bien qu'ontologiquement séparédu corps,n'estpas absolument générale séparéde lui. PourJean,il ne faitaucun doute que la définition dansson De animafinitpardonnerde l'âme,selonlaquellel'âme qu'Aristote de sorte estl'actepremierd'un corpsorganisé21, s'appliqueaussià l'intellect, En l'intellect est une âme . tant ce dernier est bien , tel, que aliquidcorporis que n'est donc au ou encore:forma. La définition pas équivoque point générale forme commed'uneâmeintellective d'exclurequ'on puisseparlerde l'intellect du corps. C'est évident,du reste,pourJeande Jandun; c'estla lettremêmedu Grand Il suffit 18 du livre de lire,dit-il,le commentaire Commentaire d'Averroès. comme III22,danslequelAverroès expliqueque si nousagissonsparl'intellect, est notreforme,puisqu'unechose c'estle cas, cet intellect, nécessairement, Ainsile problèmen'est-ilpas de savoirsi l'intellect n'agitque par sa forme23. 20)Jean libros Aristotelis deanima deJandun, , III,5,col.245: «etdicoulterius quodper Super ...» ; cf.Jean deJandun, scilicet natura intellectualis seurationalis intellectum homoesthomo, in10Ethico. ubi Aristotelis deanima libros , III,5,col.241: «item patet pereiusverba Super intellectus est,velmaxime vult, [ed.intelligit], quodnullo quodhomovelintellectus pluries » nonesset actus etforma hominis. modoverum estsiintellectus 21)Aristote, 4l2b4-6. Del'âme, II, 1, 22)Commentaire s'est lui-même eneffet, dontThomas inspiré. capital, largement 23)Voir ilestconstant etlaPensée , 108: «Comme Averroès, (cum quenousagissons L'Intelligence etpuisnosagere) invenimus ) del'intellect (virtutes quandnouslevoulons, parcesdeuxfacultés ilestapparu denousattribuer cesdeuxfacultés de sinon nécessaire parsaforme, querien n'agit

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estla formedu corps,maisďétabliren quel sensil l'est.Car « formacorporis », écritle maîtreparisien,s'entenddoublementdans la philosophied'Aristote. En premierlieu, est «forme»la perfection qui donne l'êtreau corpset lui confèreson actualité.C'est une âme inhérente, inscritedans le corpsqui, la constitue- et c'est,ditJean,le sensle plus courantqu'on corollairement, attribueà «forme».Mais en un secondsens,ajoute-t-il, on appelle«forme» du corps«l'opérateurintrinsèque appropriéà ce corps»24.Expressioncom: plexe,dontle détailestainsiformulé » désigne Enunautre sens«forme ducorps aucorps ; et l'opérateur intrinsèque approprié dis au est cet n'est distinct je quel'opérateur intrinsèque appropriécorps opérateur qui pas ducorps etdontl'acte etprécisément parlelieuetparlesujet, propre dépend proprement dececorps, oudequelque chose existant danscecorps, desorte quel'opérateur intrinsèque etcecorps, bienqu'ilsnesoient detellefaçon del'unserait pasundansl'être, quel'être l'être del'autre, sontnéanmoins undansuneopération immédiatement propre quidépend del'unetl'autre25. » (cf.Averroès, l'intellect Commentarium : «Etcum deanimalibros , III, 18,439-440 magnum nosagere has duas virtutes intellectus invenimus cum et nichil nisi voluerimus, per agit persuam ideofuit necesse attribuere nobis hasduasvirtutes intellectus. L'Intelliformam, ») Cf.Averroès, etlaPensée à cemodequenouspouvons desintel, III,36,167: «Etc'estgrâce gence engendrer à volonté. ceparquoiquelque chose effectue sonaction estlaforme, Car,puisque ligibles propre etquenouseffectuons l'intellect notre nostram ilfaut nécessairement ) action par agent ( propre, soitpournousforme» Commentarium deanima (cf.Averroès, quel'intellect agent magnum intellecta cum 585-590:«Etperhunemodum libros, III, 36,499-500, poterimus generare voluerimus. suampropriam actionem estforma, nos Quoniam, quiailludperquodagitaliquid autem nostram actionem necesse estutintellectus agimus perintellectum agentem propriam, innobis. sitforma ») agens 24)Cette distinction fondamentale estrécurrente dansl'oeuvre deJean deJandun. Cf.parexemdeJandun, libros Aristotelis deanima est , II, 1,col.69-70:«dicoquodduplex pleJean Super estforma dansesseetdansoperari, estanima et cuiusmodi forma, quiaquaedam vegetatiua sensitiua danssolum sicut estanima utdicitComintellectiua, [.. .] sedaliaestforma operari, mentator Surtoutcela,cf.Brenet, dusujet 3 huius». , 52-84. Transferts 25)Jean «aliomodosumitur deJandun, libros deanima Aristotelis , III,5,col.239-240: Super forma intrinseco intrinse; dicoautem corporis prooperante appropriato corpori quodoperans cumappropriatum estilludoperans a corpore locoetsubiecto, corpori quodnonestdistinctum cuiusactus etpraecise abiliocorpore, velabaliquoexistente inilio proprius proprie dependet itaquodoperans intrinsecum etilludcorpus, licet nonsintunum inesse, itaquodesse corpore, inunoopere unius sitessealterius, sunt tarnen unum immeproprio, quodabutroque dependet Cf.ibid., diate». col.246:« [.. .] operans sehabet adcorunite intrinsecum, quodinoperando naturam : «cumintellectus directement auDeanima intellectiva »,cequirenvoie pussecundum inoperando sitoperans sinemotu, estoperans unite sehabens adcorpus persuam intelligendo naturam» deBrabant, intertium deanima, 3,in:Siger 87,15-16). Quaestiones (chap.

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C'est de cettefaçon,précisément, humainestnotreperfection que l'intellect n'estpas la formesubstanet qu'il estla formede nos corps: l'âmeintellective tielledu corpshumain(si l'on entendpar là qu'ellele faitêtre),elle lui est Elle n'en est pas distincte«par le appropriéecommeopérateurintrinsèque. lieuet le sujet»; son acte,la pensée,dépendd'un élémentqui se trouveen lui, dans une réalisation communequi permetaux l'image,et les deuxs'unissent en propre. individusd'intelliger Il fautpasserici surlesparticularités etnotamment de cettecaractérisation, sur l'analogiecosmologiquequi la sous-tend.L'essentielconsisteen ce que l'intellect dansla définition Jeantientà réinscrire généralede l'âmedonnéepar Aristote.Il estvraique ce dernier, commeavecréticence, sa définiintroduit tiongénéraled'un « si»26; mais pourJeance n'estpas un moyend'excepter l'intellect de cetteformule, une manièrede suggérer qu'on ne devraitpas l'y inclure; cela tientau faitqu'Aristoten'a pas encoreprécisécommentchaque âmela vérifie. subconditione de cettedéfinition n'estdoncpas une L'expression la portée,maisle signequ'ilestnécessaire façond'indiquerqu'ilfauten limiter les modalités.L'intellect, d'en distinguer pourJean,estsanscontestela forme du corps; une formequi, certes,ne donnepas l'êtreau corps,maisqui s'unit à lui commele piloteau navire,à titred'opérateur et constitue, intrinsèque, C'est comme chez une d'un ainsi, composé. Sigerde Brabant, ipsofactOy partie est la forme l'homme. de qu'elle CependantJeann'ignorepas qu'unetellepositionprêtele flancà toutesles : que l'intellect soit ; à commencer critiques parcelle-ci,massive,et récurrente la formede l'hommesansfaireêtreson corpsimpliquenécessairement l'existenceet l'intervention d'une autreformechargée,elle,de conférer au corps son esse.Or, d'une part,quellepourraitêtrecetteautreforme? D'autrepart, n'ya-t-ilpas qu'uneseuleet uniqueformedu composé,à savoirl'âmeintellective?27Devantcetteévocationdu pluralisme des formes, que l'objecteurvou: draitdirimante, la réactionde Jeanestsanshésitation ditqu'ilfaut uneautre forme, Lorsqu'on qu'existe je réponds quecelaestvraiselonl'opiils'agit niond'Aristote etduCommentateur; eneffet del'âmecogitative quiestla plus noble desformes etparellel'homme estengendrable etcorruptible, comme le matérielles, 26)VoirAristote, De l'âme d'unedéfinition en , 4l2b4sqq.:«etsil'ona besoin quis'applique commun à toutâme...» 27)Voir libros Aristotelis deanima deJandun, intellectiua , III,5,col.241: «Sianima Jean Super nonesset forma substantial dansessecorpori aliam esseformam substantihumano, oporteret alemdantem essesubstantialem etquaeestillaforma, mirum etimpossibile est videtur, corpori, » essealiam nisianimam intellectiuam. formam,

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à ce ditleCommentateur danslecommentaire 33decelivre 3; etiln'ya riendegênant l'homme ait une double forme l'une donnant à son l'être substantiel, que propre, corps ilestditpensant étant delamanière susdite ; [l'autre] l'opérateur intrinsèque auquel grâce etcelasurtout estle plusparfait etle plusnobledesêtres parce quel'homme quisont ici-bas.28 Il est évident,autrement dit,quii fautoutrel'intellectune autreformequi inhérente à la matière, conférer l'être au puisse corps; une formeindividuelle, en vertude laquelleil revientà l'hommed'êtreengendrable et corruptible. l'intellect Pourdiverses raisons,qu'on litd'aborddansle De animad'Aristote, ne peutassumercettefonction(il ne peutavoird'organe,êtremélangé,etc.); cela revientà une âme sensitive, et plus exactement à la plus noble d'entre elles: la cogitative, laquelle,pourJean,constituedans l'échelledes formesla dernièredes formesmatérielles et se trouve,par son travaild'abstraction, au serviceimmédiatde l'intellect. Ainsiy a-t-ildeux formes,ou plutôt:deux formes de l'homme,c'est-à-dire deuxformes constitutives etcaractérispropres tiquesde son humanité. La précisionestimportante. Jeanesten effet partisande ce qu'il appelleluis'insérant dans une histoire même, déjà longue,«la pluralité»et «la gradation desformes »29.Il estconvaincu,parexemple,que la formeparlaquelleSocrate estanimal(la formedu genre),estréellement autreque la formeparlaquelle il esthomme(la formede l'espèce); son idée étantque la formedu genreest et imparfaite potentielle parrapportà la formede l'espèce,qu'ellelui estantél'information de la matièrepremière rieure,et qu'ellepréparenécessairement cette forme L'individu donc par enveloppe spécifique30. plusieursformes 28)Jean deJandun, libros Aristotelis deanima , III,5,col.245: «cumdicitur quodoportet Super aliam etCommentatoesseformam, dicoquodhocestverum secundum Aristotelis opinionem ris; namiliaestanima etperearn homo formarum materialium, quaeestnobilissima cogitatiua inisto3 comm. incoestgenerabilis etcorruptibilis, utdicit Commentator 33,necestaliquod una eius esse subsnueniens hominis sit forma det quodipsius duplex propria, quarum corpori et [alia]estintrinsecum a quadenominatur modosupradicto, tantial, operans, intelligens etperfectius omnium hie.» praecipue, quiahomoestensnobilius quaesunt 29)Nousnedonnons deJean. Unexadanscequisuitquequelques indications surlaposition Kukmenexhaustif demande untravail à part.Surcette voir Zdzislaw question, cependant, "Deprincipio individuations dutexte lems.Upsal. deJean deJandun. Edition sewiez, d'après 11(1963),93-106. Bibi.Univ. Polonorum C615",Mediaevalia Philosophica 30)VoirJean libros deanima forma deJandun, Aristotelis , II, 8,col.40: «namquamuis Super formae sit realiter diuersa a forma tamen est speciei speciei, ipsa potentialis respectu generis et intantum eamateria formas utdicitCommentator, quodmediante prima recipit specificas, » a formis cumhocipsaforma estsecundum subsistentiam specierum. nunquam separata generis « libros Aristotelis de anima col. : unius rei Ouencore de 43 Dico,quod , II,8, Jean Jandun, Super

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à une seule communesordonnéesles unesaux autres,et toutessubordonnées ultimedansTordrede la génération, formesubstantielle individuelle qui riest la médiation des autres31. la son véritable dans matière, reçue sujet,que par une pluralité Mais il fautdistinguer ce premierniveau,où se rencontre réellede formesaboutissantà une seule formesubstantielle proprede la de la d'un deuxièmeniveau,séparécettefois ontologiquement matière32, à sont et Ton seconde forme où trouve une matière, propre laquelle également ordonnéestouteslesautres.Ce qui signifie qu'il fautharmoniprincipalement ou incohérenserles autorités d'Averroès contradictoires, quon pouvaitjuger maisil en diffère bien des autresespècespar l'intellect, tes: l'hommediffère étantde aussipar la cogitative, toutel'affaire, pour éviterl'inconséquence, saisirque ce n'estpas sousle mêmerapport.C'est ce que Jean,danssa démarche concordataire, souligne: desautres sedistingue A la première onpeutrépondre [espèces] quel'homme objection, se dit,comme intrinsèque qui,enopérant, paruneopérateur proprement parl'intellect il et l'âme se distinmanière à ne faire au nature de ; qu'un par cogitative par rapportecorps dansl'être substantiel comme spéciparuneforme quileconstitue [espèces] guedesautres saforme.33 etainsil'uneetl'autre d'unemanière différente, sont, fique, Il n'y a qu'une seule formesubstantielle propresur un mode donné (celui de l'inhérence, par exemple),maisrienn'empêchequ'existeune autreforme

reibenepossunt esse etfinale, unius tamen etomnino actúale unicum estesseperfectissimum et alterum et et ordinatum ad aliud unum est esse diminutum esse, imperfectum plura quorum namesse etsiceritinproposito; etcomplementum, ad quodaliaordinantur, estperfectum estimperfectum etfinale, esseverogenerale etsimpliciter actúale estesseperfectum specificum etc.» sicut adactum adessespecificum, etpotentiale, etordinatur ; quare, potentia 31)Voir « col. 44 : etabsolute libros Aristotelis de anima deJandun, II, 8, , Jean Simpliciter Super sicquod simul habere diuersas formas estinconueniens unumsubiectum nullum ordinatas, sintdispositiones ad mediante unamrecipiat alia,velmediantibus aliis,velquodquaedam » aliam. 32)Jean deanima deJandun, libros Aristotelis , II,8,col.42: «SicSorestanimai perunam Super ettamen estunumens etperaliamcorpus; formam etesthomoperaliam, substantialem, » ultimam etperficientem. numero formam indiuidualem perunam 33)Jean anima col. 246: «Adprimam dici libros Aristotelis de deJandun, , III,5, potest Super intrinseab aliis intellectum homo dictum, tanquam peroperans proprie quod distinguitur per adcorpus secundum naturam unite sehabet ; etperanimam cum,quodinoperando cogitainessesubstantiali tiuam abaliissicut constituentem ipsum specifico, performam distinguitur » etsicutraque esteiusforma diuersimode.

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surle faitque Jeanle rediraplusbas35,en insistant propresurun autremode34. la cogitative et l'intellective sontbiendeuxâmes(et non pas deuxpuissances d'une mêmeâme),ou encoreque ce sontbiendeuxformessubstantielles (ce derniertermeétantéquivoque)36. 4. Deux sourcesde Jean: ThomasWyltonetAverroès Pourétayersa thèse,qui retrouve l'idéeanciennede l'hommeà la jointurede deuxmondes,et qui ainsicombineen lui le matérielet l'immatériel, Jeanse réfère clairement à ThomasWylton.Copiantla Quaestiode animaintelectiva du théologienanglais,qui séjourneet enseigneà Parisà peu prèsà la même il faitvaloirune exigencecosmique: non seulementil n'estpas période37, dansun mêmeêtre,ou plutôtdanscetêtreparticulier qu'est gênantd'imaginer selon deux modes distincts, sur deux l'homme,deux formessubstantielles 34)VoirJean deJandun, libros Aristotelis deanima cum , III, 12,col.291: «Adprimam Super unius reiunum estessesubstantiate et dicitur etindiuiduatum coniunctum materiae, proprium inmateria et ideo bene volunt hominis non est nisi una forma indiuiduareceptům, quodipsius lispropria inhaerens suaemateriae, sedhocnonobstante esse diuersae substanpossunt ipsius formae tiates ita una¿let esse adcorpus, etalianoninhaeret, sedpersubsistid yqmrum persuiinhaerentiam tarnen inclinationem habet ad corpus humanum adsuum quodpersuamnaturam tanquam » a quodependet eiusoperatio modoprius dicto. perfectibile, 35)Voir deJandun, libros Aristotelis de anima , III, 12,col.290:«Sedestnotandum Jean Super aliomodoestforma etaliomodoanima nam intellectiua hominis, sensitiua, quod[.. .] anima anima intellectiua estforma, idestprincipium utdeclaratum operationis appropriatum corpori, estprius, estforma sedanima sensitiua inhaerens etextensa secundum eius humano, ipsicorpori » extensionem accidens [...]. per 36)Voir deJandun, libros Aristotelis deanima, ad III, 12,col.289:«Tunediceretur Jean Super intentionem Aristotelis et Commentatoris et secundum quaestionem quodanimasensitiua inhomine suntdiuersae etJean deJandun, libros Aristotelis de intellectiua substantiae»; Super anima sunt diuersae unaestforma materiasubstantiae, ,III,12,col.290: «illaeanimae quarum » lisinhaerens et alia non. Dans la la démonstration se fait entrois humano, 12, corpori question libros Aristotelis deanima : «AdeuidendeJandun, ; voir , III,12,col.288-289 Jean temps Super tiam Primum humāni necesse estesse est,quodinmateria quaestionis praemitto aliqua. corporis formam indiuidualem etinhaerentem homini, [.. .] Secundo aliquam propriam ipsimateriae. uniuersali, intellectiua, suppono quodanima quiditatem comprehensione quacomprehendimus nonestforma est inhaerens materiae humāni. [.. .] Tertio corporis accipio, quodsiinhomine substantial etpropria indiuidualis homini, intellectum, praeter oportet quodilla aliquaforma » sitanima sensitiua. 37)Pourdesindications surlavieetl'œuvre voirLauge deThomas O.Nielsen, Timothy Wyton, to B.Noone, Cecilia "Thomas ton's ontheFormal Distinction asApplied Question Wyl Trifogli, 14(2003),327-388. theDivine", Documenti eStudi sullaTradizione Medievale Filosofica

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plans,maisla coïncidencede ces deuxaspectsestmêmerequisepar la cohérencede l'univers : un mondesanshiatusdemandeque s'ajointentl'immatérielet le matériel ; et c'esten l'hommeque cela se fait. Jeanécrit: a deuxperfections substantielles à savoir Ainsi onvoitbiencomment l'homme différentes, ce quisemble toutà faitrationnel enraison dela l'âmeintellective etl'âmecogitative, connexion desparties dumonde enunseulêtre.38 L'idée se retrouveplusieursfois. La nature«composée» de l'homme est conformeà l'ordreet à la cohérencede l'univers,qui exigel'existenced'un : et immatériels nœudaux confinsdes deuxmondesmatériels estcomposé leCommentateur, dirait d'unenature C'estpourquoi Averroès, quel'homme de la matière et etd'unenature non-individuée l'individuation individuée corporelle, par nécessairement dansl'homme enraison del'ordre dumonde quirequiert quecelaseproduit enl'homme . . .39 s'unissent enunêtre, à savoir etl'immatériel quelematériel la causefinalede cettecopulatio Ou encore,dansun texteoù il distingue , etla : il écrit,toujoursgrâceà ThomasWylton40 causeefficiente, 38)Jean homo libros deanima deJandun, Aristotelis , III,12,col.290: «sicpatet quomodo Super scilicet animam intellectiuam et animam habet duasdiuersas substantiates, perfectiones cogitainaliquouno connexionem uniuersi ethocvidetur multum rationabile tiuam, propter partium »; jesouligne. homo habet ente Voici letexte entier : «Sicpatet duasdiuersas quomodo perfectioethocuidetur multum nessubstantiates, scilicet animam etanimam intellectiuam, cogitatiuam, in ente Cum enim sunt rationabile connexionem uniuersi uno [...]. partium aliquo propter omnes suasperfectiones substaninuniuerso, secundum substantiae quaesunt perpetuae aliquae substantiae sintgenerabiles etcorruptibiles, scilicet substantiae etquaedam tiales, immateriales, omnes substantiae inferiores homini substantiates sicut adsuasperfectiones proprias, quantum et et est inordine elementa et rationabile ut animalia, mineralia, quodaliplantae, perfectionis, substantilis sitperpetua, etnonnumerabilis subunaspecuiusunaperfectio quasitsubstantia, sic estinsuperioribus, etaliagenerabilis etcorruptibilis, etnumerabilis subunaspecie, cie,sicut inaliquaunanatura, enim etinferiora multum conueniens erunt unita quoduidetur superiora uniuersi.» deJandun, libros Aristotelis deanima, ordini III,12,col.290). (Jean Super 39)Jean «diceret de : deJandun, libros Aristotelis anima col. Commenta267 III, 7, , itaque Super nonindiuiduata torAverroes estcompositus exnatura indiuiduata etnatura indiuiquodhomo duatione materiae etquodhocnecessario accidit inhomine ordinem uniuersi qui corporalis, propter inhomine etimmaterialia scilicet ...» ; jesouligne. uniantur, requirit quodinaliquomaterialia 40)VoirThomas in"Tomasza deanimaintellectiva Wiltona , éd.W.Señko, Quaestio Wylton, deanima Studia 5 (1964),75-116, 101-102, intellectiva'", 'Quaestio disputata Mediewistyczne cumquaeritur decausacopulationis intellectus materialis 38-5:«Adultimum, nobis, diceret, causa fìnalis est commixtio et ordo universi, quod partium quaeexigunt, quodsitaliquod

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surla causedecette leCommentateur dirait Lorsqu'on s'interroge jonction, quela cause finale estlaliaison nécessaire desparties dumonde, ait un intermédiaire quiexige qu'ily lecorporel entre etl'incorporel dela manière susdite. decette Quantà la causeefficiente C'estlamême en chose, conjonction, je crois qu'iln'ya decauseactive queparaccident. ilbrûlerait lefeu: enlui-même ilnebrûle maisqueparfois effet, qu'avec toujours, pastel decelailn'ya decauseefficiente c'est-àcombustible, puisqu'illebrûle, queparaccident, à quelqu'un il direquegrâce ce combustible du feu et en va même ici.41 de ; quiapproche MaisJean,sanssurprise, fondeégalement sa thèsesursa lectureďAverroés, en d'autres textes Grand ceux du Commentaire du De anima convoquant que surlesquels,on Ta vu, une grandepartiedu problèmerepose.Ses références principalessont toujoursles mêmes.Pour défendre, par exemple,la pluralité des formessubstantielles, on trouvesystématiquement, couplée à une medium inter insuicompositione etincorruptibilia corporalia corruptibilia, perpetua comprehendens naturam istorum extremorum. De causaeffectiva huiusmodi utramque copulationis nisiperaccidens. Sicut enim credo, quoddiceret, quodeiusnonestcausaeffectiva quanignis, tumestexparte nonardet modohoccombustibile, nihil aliud sua,semper arderei, quodautem etpostea huiusmodi noncausaeffectiva nisiperaccidens, scilicet ardet, quicombustibile apponit intellectus materialis itaquodexparte suanihil ; sicnaturaliter humanum, igni perficit corpus «Diceret ...» Voiraussicette deficit autre chezJean: Auerroes ratioséquence; quodhocmulto nabilius estetconvenientius alii.Namordo etconexio quamsitmodus quemponunt partium universi hocexigit. Cumentia sintimmaterialia aeterna etnonmultiplicabilia ineadem superiora et inferiora sunt materialia et in et eadem Rationabile specie, corruptibilia plura specie. ergoest sit universi in se intrinsece in naturam, quod aliquaspecies composita comprehendens utranque sicutetiam medium exextremis, constituitur etilla inferioribus, quoconiungantur superiora media estnumerabilis secundum differentias innumerabilis autem secundum species corporales » (Jean formam immaterialem deJandun, libros Aristotelis deanima, III,7,col.268-269 ; Super ChezThomas : «Diceret estrationabilius, Averroes, jesouligne). Wylton quodmultum quamsit catholici nolunt maledisponi, exfine 12Metaphysicae, modus, ; namexquoentia quemponunt ordoetconnexio universi hocexigit, cumsuperiora entia suntimmaterialia, aeterna et partium nonnumeralia ineadem inferiora autem sintmaterialia, ineadem etplura specie, corruptibilia inseintrinsece quodestdarealiamspeciem specie, compositam comprehendetem utramque inquacopulantur etcommittuntur sicut medium naturam, inferioribus, superiora componitur exextremis, etillaspecies media erit numerabilis secundum differentias innumerabicorporales, » (Thomas lisautem etnonmultiplicabilis secundum formam deanima intelQuaestio Wylton, lectiva, 101,1etsuiv.). 41)Jean deJandun, libros Aristotelis deanima, scilicet de III,7,col.269: «Cumquaeritur, Super causailliuscopulationis, diceret Commentator estconiunctio debita quodcausa finalis partium utsitaliquod medium inter etincorporalia modo Sedde uniuersi, quaeexigit corporalia supradicto. causaeffectiua huiusconiunctionis, credo nisiperaccidens, quodnonestaliquacausaactiua sicutenimignis, estexparte suasemper nonardet modohoc arderet, quantum quodautem etpostea huius nonestcausaeffectiua nisiperaccidens, scilicet combustibile, ardeat, respectu sedsicesthic...» ; noussoulignous. huius, quicombustibile apponit igni,

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du premierchapitredu De substantia référence aux quantitésindéterminées du traitéDu ciel, III, 8, 306b11-20, orbis , unecitationdu GrandCommentaire com. 6742; pourexpliquerque la matièrepremière reçoitďabord la formedu genre,puis,par son biais,la formede l'espèceet cellede l'individu(qui ne il cite,avecle précédentcomde la formespécifique), diffère pas réellement de la Métaphysique mentaire du De caelo, le GrandCommentaire , I, com. 1743; 42)Voicideuxpassages libros Aristotelis de Danslepremier, enJean deJandun, deJean. Super immédiat entre la forme mallerapport anima , I, 8,col.44,Jean explique quel'oncomprend «sivisperillam omnis medii etlamatière immediationem substantielle priuationem intelligere et contra veritatem et naturam hoc est contra Aristotelem et Commentatorem, rei, dispositiui, secundum suasessentias dimensiones illam utputo, secundum doctrinam, quaeponit praecipue eteismediantibus subforma manere easdem numero subforma quaefuerunt corrupti, generati, insuoTractato Commentator deSubstantia uniri materiae utdocet formas substantiates primae, « » Cf.Jean col. 44 : hoc eiquod libros Aristotelis de anima orbis. deJandun, I, , 8, répugnât Super in elementorum remanent substantiales in3 Caelietmundi, quodformae ipsedeterminauit » PourleGrand autraité Du ciel, voir AverCommentaire ďAverroès mixto remissae etrefractae. commentariis cum Averrois InDe coelo ; réimpr. , in:Aristotelis roès, 1562-1574) (Venise, opera etles f. «in hoc tarnen differunt vol. 226vM: am M., 5, [lamatière (Frankfurt 1962), première haec idest haec sunt materia sensibilium, éléments], corporum compositorum, quoniam quidem mediansecundo vero autem estmateria corporum compositorum corporum simplicium primo, »; cf.Averroès, libro Decelo Averrois commentum istis elementis. Cordubensis tibus magnum super edidit Francis etmundo Aristotelis ex Arnzen, t,inlucem , recognitione James Carmody Rüdiger InDe estGerhard Endress Editioni (Leuven, 2003),633,79-82.VoiraussiAverroès, praefatus formae eorum elementorum estquadecausanonremanent coelo , f.227rBC:«Etquaerendum cumiamposuistis inactu, aliasformas, deferentes quodnonsuntmateriae proquasrecipiunt, necesse essetut Dicamus formis nisipersuas formas. quod,si esset, igitur priaequibusdam inaccidentibus, abeiusinforma sedtantum ensgeneraretur exeisdiuersum nullum substantiali, formae eorum secundum unaforma, utcorrumpantur etideonecesse est,cumexeisgeneratur tune materia sicorrumperentur secundum totum, medietatem, reciperet primo prima quoniam, istis formas mediantibus etessentialiter omnes etnonreciperet formas, compositorum corporiDe celo libro Commentum , 634,96-105.Surle faitquela bus»;cf.Averroès magnum super deanimay cf.aussi deJandun, libros médiation estnécessaire, I, 8,col.43: Jean Super Aristotelis «forma nonunitur materiae nisimediantibus autem materialis dispositionibus aliquibus. primae inpotentia existente in2 huiusdicitquodactusuniuseuiusque determinate UndeAristoteles » fieri. materia estnatus etinpropria aptus disposita 43)VoirAverroès, InMetaph. , , in:Aristotelis primo reeipit operavol.8.,f.l4vK:«[materia] formas aliasusqueadindivietpostea mediante forma universali formam universalem, reeipit »; pourd'autres voirJean deJandun, textes deJean deJandun surcepoint, duales Quaestiones induodecim libros Ioannis deIanduno (Venise, 1553); Metaphysicae peripatetici perspicacissimi f.96ra-100rb; a.M.,1966), VII,17(«quidsitprincipium indiuiduationis»), (Frankfurt réimpr. uelperaliquod forma materiae immediate substantialis ibid.,VIII,11 («utrum coniungatur suntduo.Primo f.113ra-rb; medium (f.113rb):«Dicenda intrinsecum»), Jeanécrit quod dicendum forma noniungitur materiae intrinsecum [...]. Secundo permedium principale

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à pour répondreà l'objectionselon laquellela formede l'espèce,survenant un êtredéjà actué par la formedu genre,seraitun accident,il se réfère cettefoisau GrandCommentaire du De animaII, 444et proposeune distinction entrele faitďinformerune substanceen acte, et celui de l'informer en tantqu'elleesten acte,ou sous le rapportde son actualité45 ; enfin(mais cettelisten'estpas exhaustive), trouve dans le Grand Commentaire de Jean la Physique un passagequi, à sesyeux,développetrèsmanifestement la thèse de la double forme.C'est le texte,difficile, , II, qui commentePhysique 194bl046.Jeany repèreces deuxphrasesclés: medium intrinsecum Etcausaest:formae mixtorum quodrequiritur dispositum. recipiuntur inmateria mediante etformis elementorum 3 Coelidicencomplexione perCommentatorem temquodprima materia formas et illismediantibus formam elementorum, recipit recipit » mixtorum 44)Voir Commentarium deanima libros 32-38: «Etetiam Averroès, , 133-134, equivoce magnum dicitur forma esseinsubiecto, etaccidens esseinsubiecto. Subiectum enim accidentis estcorpus exmateria inactuetnonindiget etforma, etestaliquod existens insuoesseaccicompositum dente autem forme nonhabet esseinactu, secundum nisiper ; subiectum quodestsubiectum, » etindiget forma utsitinactu. formam, 45)Lamatière estcertes actuée dugenre, maislaforme nelui del'espèce première parlaforme arrive estenactey mais entant ; etcelaparce pasentant quelleestenpuissance quelaforme quelle dugenre n'est delamatière nereçoit del'espèce ; lamatière pasl'essence paslaforme parlaforme dugenre etprincipaliter' cen'est une«disposition». Voir de Jean primo qu'une «préparation», « libros Aristotelis de anima col. : dico ad hoc differt aduenire 43 , I, 8, Jandun, Super quod aliquid entiinactusecundum etaduenire entiinactu, nonsecundum sed quodinactu, quodinactu, secundum exmateria etforma [.. .] Mododicoquodquamuis quodinpotentia. compositum sitensactualiquo tamen forma nonunitur eiratione nec modo, generali speciei quaestensactu, illeactus, scilicet forma est ratio formam sed recipiendi propriam generalis,principalis speciei, solum estmedium in autem essentia materiae est est dispositum. Ipsa quae ipsocompositoprinsubiectum illius formae substantial etspeciei, etsubiectum etprincipale receptiuum primům ethocsufficit. Etadillam in2 huius intentionem dixit Commentator cipale, prope principium com.4 quodsubiectum formae secundum nonestaliquid substantial, eius, quodestsubiectum actunisiperillam etperillam unius dedit subiectum formam, reduplicationemintelligere quod formae substantial essealiquod modoensactuperaliquam formam sed substantialem, potest inratione nonerit subiectum formae substantial nechabebit illam formam subsprincipaliter, secundum etprincipale, itaquodforma sitratio tantialem, quodsubiectum primum principalis formam sed e sua natura eritsubiectum substantialem, converso, recipiendi potentialis magis etprincipale formae substantialis unaillarum sitdisposiprimum ipsius cuiuscumque, quamuis » noetpraeparatio adrecipiendum aliam. 46)Dansla traduction dugrec, nouslisons: donc,le Physicien française «Jusqu'à queldegré, connaître la forme etl'essence? doit-il N'est-ce comme le médecin le pas quidoitconnaître tendon etlefondeur d'airain ceenvuedequoiestchaque l'airain, chose, quidoitconnaître jusqu'à et leschoses etd'autre quisontd'unepartséparables parla forme partdans unematière ?Carc'estunhomme unhomme, etaussilesoleil. Cequ'ilenestdu quiengendre

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à uneforme à savoir Il estnécessaire abstraite, parvienne parsonexamen quelephysicien avant deparvenir à l'examen dela forme de la dernière, sisonêtreestdansla matière, l'homme.47 Et: à ladernière des cequ'elle considère l'être desformes, Laphysique, donc, parvienne jusqu'à ouauxformes desformes, des[formes] formes età lapremière abstraites, matérielles, qui forme de comme c'estlecasdeladernière intermédiaires entre dansl'être, celles-ci, sont, l'homme.48 Dans le De untiateintellectus® , ThomasďAquin, recourantà Théophraste s'étaitservide ce texteďAristotecontreAverroès d'Erèseà travers Thémistius, nécessairement en expliquantque l'intellect, compriscommeformesubstandansle cas de l'hommele termede l'examenphysitielledu corps,constituait voitles chosesautrement aidé du de ; il est Commentateur, que. Jean Jandun, substantielles de de formes clairement deux lui l'homme,l'une question pour l'autrerelativement inhérente, séparée. ? D'abord, ditJean,il exaFace à l'homme,en effet, que faitle Physicien mine les différentes formesdu corpspour arriverà la dernièredes formes la forme la plusnobledes formesmatérielles, à la plusspirituelle, matérielles, « ultime», à ce niveau,qu'on pourradire« abstracta» en vertu,précisément, de cette forme de de son haut degréde spiritualité; , première puis ajoute-t-il, l'hommele physicienaccéderaà sa deuxièmeet dernièreformeproprequi, et constitue, dansl'échelledes êtres,occupele rangimmédiatement supérieur des réalitésséparées. donc,la première À proposde la formeinhérente à la matière, Jeanécrit: dansl'être à savoir cellequileconstitue forme del'homme, Etausujet decette substantiel, II delaPhysique, commentaire cequ'ilsoutient aulivre leCommentateur a pensé 26,c'est» (Aristote, deledéterminer. dela philosophie etcequ'ilest,c'estl'affaire première séparable P. et index notes, ,traduction, 2000),127). (Paris, présentation,bibliographie par Pellegrin Physique 47)Averroès, Naturalem InPhys , vol.4,f.59rAB: ., in:Aristotelis «Oportet peruenire per opera ante siesseeiusestinmateria, scilicet adformam suamconsyderationem ultimam, abstractam, » hominis. deforma quodperueniat apudconsyderationem 48)Id.,f.59rCD: «Scientia ad de esse naturalis quousque perueniat consyderat formarum, igitur sunt autadformas ultimam formarum etprimam formarum, abstractarum, materialium, quae » hominis ultima. inesseinter existimatur deforma mediae sicut illas, 49)Voirlesparagraphes 53,54et63.

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à-dire lephysicien doitnécessairement à uneforme abstraite, queparsonexamen parvenir à savoir ladernière relativement à l'être a la avant à dans matière, qu'elle qu'ilneparvienne l'examen delaforme del'homme.50 Et il poursuit, : abordantle cas de l'intellect à l'examen laplusnoble de Lephysicien, avant deparvenir del'intellect, quiestlaforme laforme dernière : dansl'ordre delagénération) doitexaminer l'homme, séparée (ajoutez estdanslamatière dontl'être, cette forme estl'âmecogitative, ; etsansconteste cependant, dansla mesure oùellereçoit demanière très [...].Etc'est qu'ondit«séparée» spirituelle nousvoyons avant d'examiner l'intellect a danscelivre, immatériel, pourquoi qu'Aristote, il l'a examiné dans la de ainsi dit l'homme, qu'on l'imagination,laquelleplace cogitative plushaut. leCommentateur enpense del'homme Quantà laforme quiestopérateur intrinsèque, cequ'ildità lafindececommentaire. Laphysique examine doncl'être desformes naturellesjusqu'à cequ'ilparvienne à ladernière desformes à savoir l'âmecogitative, matérielles, età la première desséparées, à savoir l'intellective oubien, cequiestla même humaine, dans comme auxpremières formes desformes, chose, je lepense, quisontintermédiaires l'être entre comme on le pensepourla forme à savoir dernière de l'homme, celles-ci, l'intellective.51 Du pointde vue de Jean,toutestsensé,y compris,précisele maîtreès arts,la structure du De animaďAristotedanslequelchacunpeutnoterque l'examen de la phantasiaprécèdecelui de Xintellectus. Et tout conduità l'idée que l'hommearticuleen lui, commehomme,deux formespropresqui en font 50)Jean deJandun, libros Aristotelis deanima ,III,5,col.246: «... etdeistaforma hominis, Super in2 Phys. scilicet inessesubstantiali, intellexit Commentator constituit quoddicit quaeipsum naturalem com.26,quodoportet adformam abstractam, persuamconsiderationem peruenire scilicet ultimam secundum esseeiusinmateria, ad considerationem de antequam perueniat » forma hominis. 51)Jean deJandun, libros Aristotelis deanima, III,5,col.246: «Naturalis, antequam perueSuper nitadconsiderationem deintellectu, est forma hominis debet considerare de nobilissima, qui in forma abstracta via cuius tarnen esse est materia et haec indubiultima, ; ; supple generationis tanter estanima et dicitur abstracta, quiamultum spiritualiter recipit, cogitatiua, quaeprotanto omnes formas materiales. Etideovidemus Aristoteles inistolibroantequam super cognoscit immateriali considerauerit deintellectu considerasse dephantasia, subquacomprehendit cogitatiuam utprius declaratum fuit. De forma vero hominis intrinsecum hominis, quaeestoperans esse Commentator naturalis considérât quoddicitinfineilliuscom.Scientia intelligit igitur animam formarum formarum scilicet naturalium adultimam materialium, quousque perueniat etprimam scilicet intellectiuam humanam abstractarum, est,utputo, , autquodidem cogitatiuamy in ad formas sunt esse inter sicut existimatur deforma mediae formarum, illas, primas quae » hominis scilicet intellectiua. ultima,

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sanscoupure: la dernière l'élémentcruciald'un univers desformes matérielles, la première des formesséparées. 5. La méprisede l'hommedouble Nous avonslà l'essentiel de la positionde Jeande Jandunsurla questionde la et pouvaitêtre,du . Elle ne hominis manquepas d'êtreproblématique forma consiste à a déformée. La reste, méprise penserqu'il n'y pas chezJeanun simdu propre,mais un dualismede substancesconduisantà ple dimorphisme en chaqueindividu,de une doubledéfinition de l'homme,voireà l'existence, deuxhommes: l'hommequ'il seraitdansune formede vie quotidiennenonc'est-à-dire intellectuelle, lorsqu'ilcogite,lorsqu'ilimagine,lorsqu'ilsent,ou lorsqu'ilvit,toutsimplement;et un autrehomme,l'hommepensant,qu'il serait,à l'occasion , lorsquece corpscogitantse jointà l'intellect séparéet qu'il titre l'intellect à de L'homme à ce partie. pensantserait intègre, moment-là, alorsun agrégat, ponctuellement composédu corpscogitantet de l'intellect, maisau fonddistinctde cet individude discrètes, réalisé,lorsd'intellections de l'homme base qu'est l'hommedu sens et de l'image.Théoriefascinante l'homme serait comme l'accident d'uneautre dans double, laquelle qui pense Elle futeffectivement humanité,moinsnoble,maispermanente. attaquée52, excessive et à de une ses détracteurs Jean Jandun reprochant anthropologie déchiréedans laquelle,si l'hommepense,il n'estplusle mêmeque celuiqui sent.C'est encoreelle que, par exemple,dénonceraPaul de Venisedans son commentaire du De animalorsqu'ilécrit: leCommenLatroisième futcelledeJean deJandun disant opinion quel'intellect, d'après le estuniaucorps nonpascomme uneforme donnant maiscomme l'être, tateur, humain, à et aumobile à la manière dont est unie l'orbe moteur donnant l'opération, l'intelligence : l'unestcomposé et iladmet ducorps lepilote aunavire ; decefait qu'ilya deuxhommes estcomposé del'intellect etdetoutlereste del'âmecogitative ; proportionnelle; l'autre : l'homme deuxactes depenser leurcorrespondent, l'ununiversel, l'autre ment, particulier ilnepense nepense ; prisdelaseconde façon façon, prisdelapremière quelesparticuliers quelesuniversels.53 52)Nousl'avons étudié ailleurs enanalysant destextes de Grégoire de Rimini etde Pierre "Moiquipense, moiquisouffre : laquestion del'identité du d'Auriole ; cf.Jean-Baptiste Brenet, et in humain dans la anti-averroïste de Pierre d'Auriol de Rimini", composé riposte Grégoire Desaint à Malebranche* dusujet. Anselme éd.O. Boulnois (Paris, 2007),151-169. Généalogies 53)CitéparBruno diBrabante nelpensiero delrinascimento italiano Nardi, (Rome, 1945), Sideri fuit deianduno dicentis secundum Commentato123: «Tertia Joannis quodintellectus, opinio

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Sans doute,pourtant,n'était-ce En pas ce que Jeande Jandunvoulaitdire54. effet:la cogitativeet l'intellective vont ensemble,toujours.L'hommequi cogiten'existepas,s'il n'estpas,en mêmetemps,un êtredotéde la puissance de penser.L'erreur estde réifier cettedistinction des formes, lesquellesne sont mais ou nécessairement artialternatives, pas concurrentes, parallèles, toujours culéesl'uneà l'autre,la moinsparfaite s'orientant versla plusparfaite, etcelleci présupposantcelle-là.«J'admets»,écritJean dans ses questionssur la , «que les puissancesvégétative, sensitive,cogitativeet intellective Physique à des substances de l'âme différentes. appartiennent Cependantil estvraique fois l'une d'elles en une à chaque présuppose autre, savoirla plus parfaitela moins parfaite.»55 Puis il ajoute, quelques lignesaprès: «la végétativeest commeune préparation à la sensitive, la sensitive à la cogitative, et la cogita»56 tiveà l'intellective. estuneformedu corps,etuneformede l'homme,mais Certes,la cogitative c'estune formequi n'existequ'en tantqu'elles'ordonneà cetteautreforme, fut-elle L'hommecogitant, seulement n'est séparée,qu'estl'intellect. cogitant, fiction et l'homme n'est un accident. Une citation autre ; qu'une pensant pas à cetégard,étaitcapitalepourJean.Dans son GrandCommentaire d'Averroès, de la Métaphysique écritceci: « il esttoutà faitclairque , 12, com.38, Averroès Aristote la forme des en tant hommes, pour qu'ilssonthommes,n'existeque Ce qui par la jonctionde l'intellectavec eux»57.Jeany souscrittotalement. vautpourles formesinférieures vautaussipourla par rapportà la cogitative, unitur nonutforma dansesse, sedutmotor mobili eomodo dansoperari, rem, humano, corpori orbietnauta navi homo : ; concedens quounitur consequenter intelligentia quoddatur duplex unus excorpore etanima exintellectu ettoto ; etaliusquicomponitur quicomponitur cogitativa residuo scilicet universale etparticulare ; quibus ; proportionaliter respondet duplex intelligere, homosumptus solum secundo modointelligit modo, ; etsumptus primo particularia intelligit solum cf.également Zdzislaw "PauldeVenise etsathéorie del'âme", universalia»; Kuksewicz, inL. Olivieri veneto e scienza moderna , éd.L. Olivieri (éd.),Aristotelisme (Padova, 1983),130164,304-306. 54)Nousnepartageons deBradeZdzislaw De Siger Kuksewicz, l'analyse pas,parconséquent, bant àJacques dePlaisance. La théorie del'intellect chez lesaverroïstes latins desXIIIeetXIVesiècles & Varsovie & Cracovie, (Wroclaw 1968),208-209. 55)Jean deJandun, deJanduno dephysico auditu nouiter emendate (Venise, Quaestiones Joannis et sensitiuam et etintel1519),VII,8,f.98va:«Concedo potentiam vegetatiuam cogitatiuam lectiuam addiuersas substantias animae. Verum esttamen unaistarum pertinere quodsemper scilicet minus ». aliam, praesupponit perfectior perfecta. 56)Ibid.: «vegetatiua estsicut adsensitiuam etsensitiua adcogitatiuam etcogitatiua preparatio » adintellectiuam. 57)Averroès, InMetaph benequodAristoteles homi.,f.321rF:«apparet opinatur quodforma » ineoquodsunthomines, nonestnisipercontinuationem eorum cumintellectu. num,

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à l'intellect : de même,en effet, inférieures, parrapport cogitative que cesformes réellement distinctes dans le n'existent ne subsistent quoique corps, pas, pas sansla cogitative, à laquelleellessontordonnées(commeà leurachèvement)58, la cogitative n'existeet ne fonctionne commecogitative qu'en tantqu'ordonnée à cetteautreet dernièreforme(peu importequ'elle soit séparée)qu'est l'intellect : elleestà son service, et n'existeque danscettemesure.De son côté, l'intellect lui aussiestpar naturedestinéà dépendrede la cogitative ; ce pour quoi Jeande Jandunpeutécrire:«l'hommeindividueln'estdithommeselon l'intellect », que si se trouveen mêmetempsdanssoncorpsuneâmecogitative si bienque « si elleestlà, l'hommeestlà aussi,et si on la supprime, il estsupprimé»59.Deux formesde l'hommeaccordées,donc,et non pas deux homun mes,ou un dédoublementde l'individuqui feraitde l'homointelligens nouvelêtre,ponctuel,exclusif, tandis lieu la produit qu'a pensée. 6. Conclusion Cettethèse,assurément, ne manquepas d'antécédents dansla scolastiquedu XIIIe siècle.Mais il est frappant retrouver d'y presquemot à mot,outreles échosexplicites du De animaintellectiva donton a parlé,le Sigerde Brabant du De intellectu perduauquel A. Nifo,commeon sait,se réfèreà plusieurs Dans son De anima,Nifoécritceci,usantd'unplurielqui vautpour reprises60. Siger: 58)VoirJean deJandun, libros Aristotelis deanima , II, 8,col.40: «cumhocipsaforma Super est secundum a formis enim subsistentiam est ; nunquam nunquam separata generis specierum habeat formam animal formam alicuius nam animalis, [...]; aliquod per quin propriam speciei nonestaliquid secundum essesubsistentiae a speciebus suis,licetsit ipsum separatum genus realiter diuersum adsuamformam a formis tamen estsicutmateria resquantum specierum, etpotentialis formarum et earum, pectu quiaestforma imperfecta generis respectu specierum, » nisi cum forma Ou encore materiam, nunquam potest perficere aliqua specifica perfection. deJandun, libros Aristotelis deanima, nonerit III,12,col.291: «homo animata, Jean Super plura sedunum eoquodunaillarum animarum estpropter sicut finem et animatum, aliam, propter nonvalet. Etcumaccipitur, animae constituunt ; quare animata, perfectionem quodplures plura verum estplures unanonordinatur adaliam, sicut adsuamperfectionem, ad animae, quarum » etverum estindiuersis sednoninunocorpore. quamdisponitur, corporibus, 59)Jean deJandun, libros Aristotelis deanima, hominis non III,7,col.262: «indiuiduum Super dicitur homosecundum nisi in simul eius sitanima intellectum, [...]; qua corpore cogitatiua » etquaremota remouetur. homo, posita ponitur 60)Surcepoint, voir évidemment lelivre fondateur citéplushaut deB.Nardi, diBrabante Sigieri nelpensiero delRinascimento italiano. Ontrouvera danslelivre différentes decette reprises positiondansl'aristotélisme padouan.

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dicunt intellectum nonessetotam hominis sedquasisemianimam velsemiforanimam, mam. enim de mente illud anime ex semine deducitur, Averroys, quod Fingunt quoddicaessemedietatem anime humane. Alteram vero medietatem tur, exempli, gratia cogitativum, esseintellectum extrinsecus intellectivum.61 accedentem, quoddicatur Et dansson De intellectu , toujoursà proposdu maîtrebrabançon: Etilajoute: 'l'intellect nepeutpasinformer lamatière sansquelacogitative ne[1] 'informe nesetient constituée dansl'être [également], parce quelamatière passansuneforme par sonbiais;etl'intellect nepeut[1'] informer sanssadisposition etdernière prochaine qu'est ilditquelacogitative lacogitative. Raison estordonnée à l'intellective, bien pourlaquelle nesoitpasuneforme son la ne infor[De côté] quelacogitative peut générique. cogitative merlamatière sansquel'intellect ne[1'] Eneffet, informe sil'onposequelque [également]. chose etquelque dansunétatdepréparation chose d'informable, ultime, quipeutl'inforonposel'information: orla matière informée estuninformable mer, parla cogitative audernier à recevoir l'intellect. Ainsi uneforme substantielle prochain disposé degré peutelleêtre unepréparation à uneautre, danslamesure oùcette forme n'est préparante pasce Voicicomment l'être del'homme, entant reçoit. d'après quoilamatière qu'ilesthomme, à la findecetintellect; etcomment la différence entantqu'ilest del'homme, procède estfinalement tirée decetintellect.62 homme, B. Nardi,dans son grandlivresurSigerde Brabant,notaitque les formules semianimaet semiforma n'étaientpeut-êtrepas de Sigerlui-même63. Reste on sont et dont valoir quelles remarquables quelles pourraient pour Jean, mesurevitecombiensa reprised'Averroès dépendde médiationslatines.Sur cettequestionprécisede l'humanitéde l'homme,on le répète,l'histoirede l'intrication du problèmede la pluralité desformes etde celuide substantielles « » la noétique averroïsten'a pas encoreétéfaite.Entredeuxcritiquesextrêmes (celled'uneanthropologie amputée,où l'hommen'estqu'uncorps; celled'une où l'hommequi pense est un autremoi), elle dédoublante, anthropologie 61)CitéparNardi, diBrabante , 16. Sigieri 62)CitéparNardi, 18: «Etaddit di Brabante : necpotest intellectus informare materiam, , Sigieri noninformante inesseperearn sineforma constituía ; etnon quianonstatmateria cogitativa, intellectus informare sinesuapróxima etultima, Propter potest dispositione queestcogitativa'. inintellectivam, ordinari nonsitforma quod,inquit quamvis cogitativam cogitativa generica. Necpotest informare noninformante intellectu. Positis eniminformabili materiam, cogitativa : estautem ultimate etinformativo, informatio materia informata disposito ponitur cogitativa Etsicpotest una informabile etultimate adrecipiendum intellectum. propinquum dispositum forma illaforma sit materie ratio substantial essedispositio adaliam, dummodo non preparans ineoquodhomo, Eccequomodo essehominis, estultimo ; et recipiendi. perhuncintellectum » ineoquodhomo, differentia sumitur abhocintellectu ultimate hominis, quomodo 63)Nardi, diBrabante , 30; 76. Sigieri

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uneconceptionde l'hommealternative présenter qui n eutpas moins pourrait l'intellect et le souci d'une forme d'unité de du les autres corps.Dans cette que la placede Jeande Jandunn'estpas mineure. histoire,

Bibliographie notes etbibliographie De l'âme, traduction inédite, Aristote, (Paris, parR.Bodéüs présentation, 1993). etindex , Physique , traduction, notes, (Paris, présentation, parP.Pellegrin bibliographie 2000). InPhys cumAverrois commentariis Averroès, ., inAristotelis (Venise, 1562-1574); réimpr. opera a. M.,1962), vol.4. (Frankfurt cum Averrois commentariis ; réimpr. , InDe coelo,inAristotelis 1562-1574) (Venise, opera a. M.,1962), vol.5. (Frankfurt cumAverrois commentariis , InMetaph ., inAristotelis (Venise, 1562-1574); réimpr. opera a. M.,1962), vol.8. (Frankfurt inAristotelis deanima libros Cordubensis commentarium , éd.F.S. Craw,Averrois magnum ford Mass.,1953). (Cambridge, III (429a 10-435 etlaPensée. Grand Commentaire duDeanima'. Livre b25), ,L'Intelligence etnotes A. de Libera introduction traduction, 1998). (Paris, par libro De celoetmundo Aristotelis Cordubensis commentum , ed. , Averrois magnum super G.Endress (Leuven, 2003). dusujet. La noétique d'Averroès selon Brenet, (Paris, JeandeJandun Jean-Baptiste, Transferts 2003). à l'espèce : laruine d'Averroès deJandun", , "Duphantasme Jean parl'averroïste intelligible inIntellect etimagination danslaPhilosophie médiévale. Intellect andImagination inMedieval International eimaginação naFilosofia Medieval. Actes duXIeCongrès de Intellecto Philosophy. Internationale Médiévale delaSociété delaPhilosophie Médiévale Philosophie pourl'Étude & José F.Meirinhos du26 au31août2002,éd.M. C. Pacheco Porto, (Turn(S.I.E.P.M.), 190. hout, 2006),vol.2, 1179-1 moiquisouffre: la question del'identité ducomposé humain dansla , "Moiquipense, inGénéalogies dusujet. De anti-averroïste dePierre d'Auriol etGrégoire deRimini", riposte saint Anselme à Malebranche, éd.O. Boulnois 151-169. (Paris, 2007), La trasparenza delle Averroè e l'averroismo Coccia, Emanuele, (Milan, 2005). immagini. surles219articles condamnés à Paris le7 mars & Paris, 1277(Louvain Hissette, Roland, Enquête 1977). deJanduno dephysico auditu nouiter emendate (Venise, JeandeJandun, Quaestiones Joannis 1519). Ioannis deIanduno induodecim libros , Quaestiones perspicacissimi peripatetici Metaphysicae a. M.,1966). (Venise, 1553);réimpr. (Frankfurt deIanduno acutissimi libros Aristotelis deanima subtilissimae ,Ioannis philosophi super quaestiones a. M.,1966). (Venise, 1587);réimpr. (Frankfurt "Deprincipio individuationis deJean deJandun. Edition dutexte Kuksewicz, Zdzislaw, d'après lems.Upsal. 11 (1963),93-106. Bibi.Univ. Polonorum C615",Mediaevalia Phibsophica

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del'intellect latins deBrabant à Jacques dePlaisance. La théorie chezlesaverroïstes , De Siger & Cracovie, desXIIIeetXIVesiècles & Varsovie 1968). (Wroclaw inAristotelisme veneto e scienza moderna etsa théorie de l'âme", , éd. , "PauldeVenise L.Olivieri (Padova, 1983),130-164. de duDe unitate intellectus contra averroistas Alain eiel'intellect. Commentaire Libera, de,L'unité Thomas (Paris, 2004). d'Aquin nelpensiero delrinascimento italiano diBrabante Nardi, Bruno, (Rome, 1945). Sigieri "Thomas onthe B.& Trifogli, O. & Noone, Cecilia, Nielsen, Question Wylton's Timothy Lauge e Studi sullaTradizione Distinction asApplied totheDivine", Documenti Formal Filosofica 14(2003),327-388. Medievale L'intelletto umano nella diAlberto Aristotelismo , Antonio, Magno prospettiva difficile. Petagine, di Tommaso e Brabante (Milan, 2004). Sigieri d'Aquino etcomde1277 introduction La condamnation traduction, ',texte latin, Piché, David, parisienne mentaire (Paris, 1999). undTheologie "Olivietlesaverroïstes", 53 Pirón, Sylvain, Freiburger Zeitschrifi furPhilosophie (2006),251-309. mundi intertium deanima. deaeternitate deBrabant, ,deanima ,éd. intellectiva, Quaestiones Siger B.Bazán(Louvain & Paris, 1972). inAverroes' inAristotelis onCogitatio Commentarium Richard C.,"Remarks Taylor, Magnum Tradition: Constitution andRecepDeAnima Libros andtheAristotelian Sources, ",inAverroes A. & G. Endress Ibn Rushd 126-1 éd. Aertsen tionofthePhilosophy (Leiden, (1 198), J. of 1999),217-255. in inAverroes", : Remarks ontheCogitative Power andCogitare , "Cogitatio, Cogitativus auMoyen éd.J.Hamesse & C. Steel L'élaboration duvocabulaire (Turnhout, Âge, philosophique 2000),111-146. Averroès antéL'Unité del'intellect contre lesaverroïstes contre Thomas , suividesTextes d'Aquin, notes etindex rieurs à 1270.Texte introduction, latin, traduction, chronologie, bibliographie, (Paris 1994). parA.deLibera delafoicatholique contre leserreurs desinfidèles. contre lesGentils. Livre surla vérité ,Somme 4 vols. V. & C. Michon & D. Traduction inédite Aubin Moreau, (Paris, 1999). par in"Tomasza Wiltona deanima éd.W.Señko, Thomas intellectiva, Quaestio 'Quaestio Wylton, deanima intellectiva' 5 (1964),75-116. ",Studia disputata Mediewistyczne

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'íS^ BRILL


Vivarium 46 (2008)342-367

Diversité

des fonctions

psychologie

et unité de l'âme dans la

péripatéticienne

(xive-xvi<: siècle)

JoëlBiard Université Tours , François-Rabelais, d etudes de la UMR6576,CNRS Centre Renaissance, supérieures Abstract Thequestion oftheunity ofthesoulisposedintheMidleAges,atthecrossing point oftheAristotelician whichdistinguishes several evenseveral theory, potencies, parts in thesoul,andtheAugustinián whichunderlines theunityofthemind doctrine, whencommenting theTreatise ontheSoulof JohnBuridan, usingcorporeal powers. in of the reaction Aristotle, John Janduns emphasizes unity, probably against position. Fromthemiddleof 14thcentury tilltheendof 17th,thisproblem goeson being thetwoquestions ofthesubstantial debatedthrough unityof thesouland ofthe therelation between thesouland itspotencies. Thisarticlestudiessomestagesof in NicoleOresmes someof themimmediately afterBuridan, thisdevelopment, in AntoineRubioswork.It and Peterof Ailly s positions, another moredistant, in thatwe findstillthesameproblematics, reelaborated and transformed, suggests Descartes. Keywords substantial soul,form, intellect, unity, operation 1. Introduction La questionde l'unitéde l'âmesurgitdès l'époquedu traitéaristotélicien. La distinction de ces espècesd'âmesque sontl'âmevégétative, l'âmesensitive et l'intellects'accompagned'une réflexion surle statutde ces «parties».Ainsi, Aristotes'interroge surson caractère ce qui à «séparé»ou non de l'intellect, « l'évidencesignifie alors séparédes autresparties». D'autrestraditions viendront,au MoyenÂge,compliquerla question.Il fautnotamment prendreen influences la thèsearistotécomptecertaines qui contredisent augustiniennes, liciennede l'âme commeformeau bénéficed'un rapportplus instrumental ©Koninklijke Brill 2008 NV, Leiden,

DOI:10.1163/ 156853408X360957

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entreTâmeet le corps.Quoi quii en soitde ces influences on qui se croisent, XIVe chez certains du siècle à de auteurs une tendance accentuer l'unité repère l'âmelorsqu'ilsabordentlesquestionstraditionnellement dans les composées mentaires surAristote.La double questionde l'unitésubstantielle de l'âme d'unepart,du rapportde l'âmeà sespuissancesd'autrepartn'étaitassurément d'Albertle Grandou de Thomasd'Aquin; pas absentedes textesd'Avicenne, maisil semblequ'avecJeanBuridanun sautqualitatif soitopéré.La question est longuement comme en de la doctrineofficielle de si, dépit argumentée, avait défini lors du Concile de en l'âme Vienne, 1311-1312, l'Églisequi comme «formedu corps»,on devaitencorese confronter aux discussions récurrentes sursonstatut, surle rapportde l'âmeetdu corps,surl'unitéessentiellede l'âme,surle caractère des différents univoqueou non des définitions Il d'âmes. est dans le cas cette a été de discussion Buridan, types probableque, voireexacerbéeparla distinction à la suite relancée, opéréeparJeande Jandun, de Sigerde Brabant,entreplusieurstypesde formes, une formesubstantielle et donnel'êtred'unepart,une formeopéranted'autrepart,cette qui informe dernière le statutde l'intellect1. de définir Les moyensconceptuels permettant misen œuvreparBuridanpourrelever ce déficonduisentà une radicalisation desthèsessurl'unitéde l'âme,inflexion donton peutrepérer leseffets jusqu'au xviiesiècle.

2. La radicalisationde la thèsede l'unitéde l'âme au XIVe siècle Thomasd'Aquina déjà fortement de l'âme,à l'opsoulignél'unitéessentielle de la la théorie de des formes substantielles posé pluralité qui devaitdonner lieuà biendescontroverses durantlestroisdernières décenniesdu siècle.Dans la Sommede théologie , il le faità l'occasionde la questionLXXVI de la première partie,surl'unionde l'âme et du corps,dans les articles1, 3 et 4. Dans l'article3, il réfère la thèsede la pluralité desâmesà Platon2,etla meten 1}Voir deJandun, libros Aristotelis deanima subtilissimae (Venise, 1587); Jean Super quaestiones am livre Main, Minerva, III,qu.5; Jean-Baptiste Brenet, (Frankfurt 1966) réimpr. parexemple dusujet. La noétique d'Averroès selon deJandun en (Paris, 2003),chapitre Jean Transferts premier, part. p.33-41etp.53-59. 2)VoirThomas Summa Thomae doctoris d'Aquin, prima pars,Sancti Aquinitatis theologiae, omnia XIII P. M. V iussu Leonis t. edita, (Rome, 1889), Opera p. 220: angelici impensaque «Respondeo dicendum animas esseincorpore secundum diversas uno,etiam quodPlatoposuit vimnutritivam diversa vitae dicens esseinhepate, distinctas, attribuebat, organa quibus opera »; unexposé incorde, incerebro similaire setrouve dans concupiscibilem critique cogniscitivam la Somme contre lesGentils Summa contra Gentiles Sancti , , II,chap.57: voirThomas d'Aquin,

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relationavecla théoriede l'âmecommemoteur, déjà récuséedansl'article1 à de au de l'intellect comme formedu corpshumain3. l'intellect, propos profit Se fondantsurl'exigenced'unitéde l'êtrecomposé,surlesdifficultés qui résulteraient la contraire concernant formes de thèse les de prédication (attribution de formes de cesformes entreelles),etsurle risque diverses, rapportprédicatif il affirme de conflitentredes opérationsprovenant de formeshiérarchisées, : est en «Ainsidoncil fautdireque la mêmeâme,numériquement l'homme une, intellective et nutritive »4. sensitive, Mais cetteaffirmation doit êtrecomplétéepar l'analysedu rapportentre l'âmeet sespuissances, que l'on trouvedansla questionLXXVII, en particulierdans l'article1, «Est-ceque l'essencemêmede l'âme est identiqueà ses puissances?»,et dans l'article2, «Est-ce qu'il y a plusieurspuissancesde surl'âme.Là, le problèmedu l'âme?», ainsique dans les Questions disputées entre essence et et celui de la puissance, pluralitédes puissancessont rapport commedans dans la question11 en une seuleinterrogation, déjà rassemblés les commentaires ultérieurs : « Est-ceque, en l'homme,l'âmerationnelle, senDans la question12, «L'âme sibleetvégétative soutune uniquesubstance?»5. ?»6,l'argumentation est-elleidentiqueà sespuissances évoqueune thèseselon l'âme serait à ses et serait elle-mêmele principe identique puissances laquelle l'essencede l'âmeétantnomméepardivers immédiatde touteslesopérations, nomsselonla diversité : de ces opérations à sespuissances Doncceuxquiposent comprennent quel'âmeestidentique parlà que l'essence même del'âme estleprincipe immédiat detoutes sesopérations, endisant quepar choses l'essence del'âmel'homme etfait lesautres decette etque sent, sorte, comprend, selon ladiversité desopérations elleestappelée dedivers noms7. XIIIP.M.,t.XIII-XV Thomae doctoris iussueditaLeonis Aquinitatis Operaomnia angelici 1918-1940). (Rome, 3)Thomas Summa Ia pars, art.1,p. 209: «Quidam autem d'Aquin theologiae, qu. LXXVI, dicere voluerunt unitur utmotor vanum. [...].Sedhocestmultipliciter quodintellectus corpori exipsaoperatione intellectus unitur [.. .]Sicergo apparet quodintellectivum principium corpori » utforma. 4)«Sicergodicendum inhomine, sensitiva etintellectiva et estanima quodeademnumero Thomas Summa contra Gentiles nutritiva» art.3,p.221); voiraussi , II,chap.58. (ibid., d'Aquin 5)Thomas deanima Sancti Thomae deAquino , éd.C. Bazan, Questiones d'Aquin, disputatae fratrum tomus OperaomniaiussuLeonisXIII P. M. editacuraetstudio praedicatorum, XXTV-1 11: «Utrum inhomine anima sensibilis et rationalis, (Rome& Paris, 1996).Questio situnasubstantia», vegetabilis p.95-104. 6)Op.cit.,qu.12: «Utrum 12. animam sitsuepotentie», p. 105-1 7)«Ponentes sitsuepotentie, hocintelligunt, anime sit quodanima igitur quodipsaessentia

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Mais selonThomascettethèsene peutêtresoutenue.Il préfère parlerde forforme De mêmedans une substantielle. mesaccidentelles, qui présupposent l'article138,il poseque l'essencede l'âmen'estpas le principeimmédiatde ses réaffirmant maisquelle opèreau moyende principesaccidentels, opérations, en fonction des et de des des de genres puissances9, l'exigence distinguer degrés caractérisent donc les se Pour et des lui, par puissances opérations. objets de l'âme,si bienque de l'êtresubstantiel diverses qui se distinguent opérations avecl'essencemêmede l'âme.« L'essence leurprincipene sauraitse confondre maiselleopèrepar de l'âme n'estpas le principeimmédiatde ses opérations, la médiationde principesaccidentels»10. bien l'unitéessentielle de l'âme. Mais il Thomas,par conséquent,affirme de cetteunitéessentielle de distinguer estimedansle mêmetempsnécessaire de l'âme. la pluralité des puissancesou fonctions LesQuestionsdeJeanBuridan surl'unitéde l'âmeet de JeanBuridan,au sièclesuivant,insisteconstamment et sensitive dans Il affirme d'abordl'unitéde la formevégétative sesfacultés11. surl'âme12 : la question4 du livreII de ses Questions l'âmeestunique etqu'iln'ya pasenluiuneâme [.. .] je crois[.. .] quedansuncheval niuneâmesensitive del'âmevégétative13. distincte distincte del'âmesensitive, végétative dicentes immediatum omnium anime, quodhomoperessentiam operationum principium etquodsecundum diversitatem etaliahuiusmodi anime sentit, operationum operatur, intelligit, deanima, diversis nominibus nominatur» (Thomas Questiones d'Aquin, disputatole qu.12,p. 108). 8)Question 13:«Utrum potentie distinguantur perobiecta» (p.113-122). 9)Voirnotamment op.cit.,p. 120. 10)«Manifestum suarum anime nonestprincipium immediatum estigitur quodipsaessentia » (ibid., accidentalibus setoperatur mediantibus principiis p. 110); «[...]essentia operationum, setoportet omnium suarum esseimmediatum anime[.. .] nonpotest actionum, principium actionum» diversitati suarum habeat et diversas (p.110). correspondentes plures potentias quod n) Jereprends "Le deBiard, dansunepartie iciquelques éléments decequej'aidéveloppé Joël, Blaise siècle deJandun, naturelle duxrv* dessensdanslaphilosophe Buridan, Jean (Jean système deParme)", (2002),p.335-351. MicrologusX 12)Letexte II a étéédité Soboldans etdernière lecture surlelivre delatroisième John parPeter liber inAristotelis Deanima anEdition oftheQuaestiones Buridan onthe SoulandSensation ,with ineodem ani4 a pourtitre «Utrum lectura secundus , detertia 1984).Laquestion (AnnArbor, et sensitiva» malisiteadem anima cit., (éd. p.42-57). vegetativa 13)«[.. .] egocredo[.. .] quodinequounicasitanima etquodnonsitineoanima vegetativa deanima a vegetativa» Buridan a sensitiva necsensitiva distincta distincta , II,8, Questiones (Jean Buridan ontheSoul). Soboi, John p.48,dansPeter

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ses La questionsuivanteexaminel'identitéde Tâmeavecelle-mêmeà travers l'âme sensible et de l'âme encore surtout de Buridan y parle opérations14. végéAinsi,le tative,mais certainsarguments évoquentdéjà le cas de l'intellect. septièmeargumenten faveurde la distinctionfaitappel au caractèrenon étendude l'intellectalorsque les puissances(virtutes ) organiquessontétenLe huitième dues, de mêmequ'à son caractèreperpétuelet incorruptible15. distance entre les ou vertus introduit une puissances cognitives argument etsens)etlespuissancesou vertusnoncognitives (commel'imagina(intellect , tion)16.Le proposgénéralviseà affirmer que l'on ne doitpas,au senspropre l'âme humaine : dans plusieurspuissances distinguer ilya plusieurs ilya undoute : est-il dedirequ'enl'homme de Etalors correct puissances aussiselon ?Jecrois despuissances l'âme [.. .] etenparlant principales quenon,enparlant lesenspropre desmots17. en revanche, on peutbien On s'écartedoncde Thomas.En un sensimpropre, Buridan les selon leurs Jean appliquealors opérations. distinguer puissances commeil une analyselinguistique pourdémêlerun problèmede psychologie, dansla physique. le faitfréquemment ilya denombreuses nousconcédons Maisselon unsensimpropre puissanqu'enl'homme etqueselon desraisons cesdel'âme, encesensquel'âmepeutexercer diverses opérations, luisontattribués desnomsdivers de cesopérations, diverses, quenous représentatives lesensitif etlevégétatif nousdisons difdisons différer Ainsi, quel'intellect, parlaraison. raisons18. cesnoms lamême chose selon diverses laraison, fèrent selon puisque signifient 14)Question anime sintdistincte adipsaanima» 5: «Utrum (p.58-70). potentie 15)«Septimo necextensa suntorganice et nonestvirtus (alieautem quiaintellectus organica a corrumptibili» abaliissicud etquiaintellectus (II,qu.5,p.59). extense), separatur perpetuum 16)«Octavo etintellectiva, etalienon. utsensitiva suntpotentie quiaquedam cognoscitive, ut fantasia et alie sunt reservative non, 59). (ibid., Quedam p. specierum, ergo» 17)«Ettunc Et utrum sitbenedictum sintplures anime. estdubitatio quodinhomine potentie deproprietate depotentiis [.. .] etetiam principalibus loquendo quodnon,loquendo egocredo sur desQuestions surl'Éthique insiste encore sermonis» (ibid., p.63).Unpassage plusnettement non sit inconveniens l'unité del'âmeintellective etdel'âmesensitive: «Itaetiam putoquod sintidemrealiter animae sensitiva etpotentia intellectiva dicere [.. .] potentia quodexparte decern libros Ethicorum etinter se»(Jean Buridan, 1513), (Paris, Quaestiones ipsianimae super P 45rb- citéd'après Pour l'histoire dusens : lacontroverse entre de Adrian Pattin, agent Barthélemy Ancient series et de ses antécédents et son évolution and Medieval , Jean Jandun, Philosophy, Bruges 1,6 (Leuven, 1988),p.239). 18)«Sedsecundum inhomine anime sensum concedimus essemultas improprium potentias etquodsecundum adistum estpotens exercere diversas ratiosensum, operationes, quodanima

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estencore L'éditionLockert,compiléesansdouteà partirde plusieurs lectures, : plusexplicite A l'autre pourla même je réponds quelesnoms«sens»et«âme»supposent argument Le nom connotations etsontdediverses chose, catégories. cependant qu'ilsontdiverses » estunnomrelatif, «âme» estpeut-être à ditenrapport unnomabsolu ; etlenom«sens il rien la de la : ne en effet d'autre le mode de l'acte, puissance que par puissance signifie sentir19. Or on doit noterquune démarchesimilaireétaitévoquée (et refusée)par De spirituet au traitépseudo-augustinien Thomasd'Aquin,qui l'attribuait en faveurde l'identité de l'âme anima. Dans le premier etdeuxièmeargument en effetà ce traitéla doctrineselonlaquelle et de ses puissances,il attribuait nomsen raisonde ses difféune âme essentiellement uniquereçoitdifférents rentesopérations. : l'âmea sespuissances naturelles etelle Il estditeneffet De l'esprit etdel'âme danslelivre etvertus sontlamême chose estidentique à ellestoutes, carsespuissances [. qu'elle.. .] En lafonction estappelée ilestditdanslemême livre : l'âmeselon desonœuvre outre, pardes com: carelleestditeâmelorsqu'elle noms variés sent, vit,senslorsqu'elle lorsqu'elle esprit serappelle, volonté veut. mémoire raison discerne, lorsqu'elle lorsqu'elle prend, lorsqu'elle les à la elles diffèrent dans ces choses ne différent en dont substance, façon pas Cependant carellessontl'âme20. noms, diversa adistasoperationes, sibinomina nesdiversas quedicimus imponuntur representativas differre sensitivům et Vegetativum rationem. Sic dicimus differre secundum intellectum, rationes» remeandem secundum diversas secundum rationem, quiahecnomina significant deanima, II,5,p.63-64). (Buridan, Questiones 19)«Adaliam tamen habent sensus etanima hecnomina dicoquod,licet pereodem supponant, estforte nomen Hocnomen anima etsuntdiversorum aliasconnotationes praedicamentorum. sensus estnomen relativum dictum adactum absolutum ; ; ethocnomen permodum potentiae Le ad sentiendum» sensus nonenim aliudsignificai Benoît, cit., (op. dansPatar, quampotentia & Longueuil, Traité del'âmedeJeanBuridan lectura] (Louvain-la-Neuve [¿leprima Québec, 1991),p.640-641). 20)«Dicitur etillaomniaest, etanima : animahabetsuanaturalia eniminlibroDe spiritu ineodem : libro dicitur eiusidemsuntquidipsa.[.. .] Praeterea namque atquevires potentiae anima dicitur variis nominibus: animasecundum suioperis officium namque nuncupatur ratio dumdiscernit, mens dumintelligit, sensus dumsentit, animus dumsapit, dumvegetai, insubstantia, nondifferunt voluntas dumvult.īstatamen memoria dumrecordatur, quemadde innominibus, istasuntanima» modum (Thomas Questiones d'Aquin, disputatae quoniam estdûà Costaben etanima despiritu anima , citésansnomd'auteur, , qu.12,p. 110); leLiber cette onvalevoir, a misendoute à Augustin comme étéattribué ; Thomas, Luca,maisilavait attribution.

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De fait,la citationestassezprécisepuisqu'onlitdanscetouvrage: estappelée dedivers noms. Carelleestdite desonœuvre [.. .] selonla fonction [l'âme] senslorsqu'elle âmelorsqu'elle vit,esprit sent,animus ) lorsqu'elle (spiritus contemple, se rappelle mens, mémoire, sait,lorsqu'elle comprend lorsqu'elle lorsqu'elle lorsqu'elle ceschoses nediffèrent à lafaçon dontelles volonté. consent, pasensubstance, Cependant âme toutes ces choses sont une les sont diffèrent danslesnoms, puisque unique, propriétés maisl'essence estune21. diverses, certes, : assezcavalièrement cetteautorité Thomas,cependant,traitait Del'esprit etdel'âme n'est mais Aupremier pasd'Augustin jeréponds quecelivre argument, il certain Cistercien et ne faut se soucier de ce onditqu'ila étéécrit un ; pas beaucoup par quiestditenlui22. le convoqueraà l'appuide sa thèse.Il réactualise cette Buridan,au contraire, et différence et il peut d'appellations, approchequi combineunitéessentielle le rapcela mobiliser toutes les ressources de la terministe. Dans pour logique ni on n'a donc une comme on entre les facultés de l'âme, équivocité port ni à proprement l'avaitlu chez Averroès, du moinsà proposde l'intellect, maisune distincJeande Jandun23, parlerune analogiecommel'avaitsuggéré tionde raisonà entendre ici commedifférence de signesconceptuels. les réponsesaux arguments contraires. Nous pouvonsdès lorscomprendre L'uneadmetque lespuissancesou vertusinstrumentales sontbienétendueset diversesmaisqu'aucunevertuprincipalen'estétendueen l'homme: 21)« [.. .] secundum suioperis officium variis nominibus. Dicitur [anima] nuncupatur namque dumsentit; dumsapit; dumvégétât; dumcontemplatur; dum sensus, animus, anima, spiritus, dumconsentit, voluntas. īstatarnen nondifferunt dumrecordatur, mens; memoria; intelligit, insubstantia, innominibus omnia istaunaanima ; quoniam est,proprietates quemadmodum - ], Liber sedessentia una»(Augustin despiritu etanima, diverse, quidem [pseudo Patrologie XL(Paris, latine col.788-789) estaussi édité dansCariSigmund Barach, ; letexte 1845), Excerpta e libro 'Demotu cordis Costa-ben-Luca De differentia animae etspiritus* liber ' item Alfredi Anglici 2 translatus aJohanne Bibliotheca Mediae Ataris (Innsbruck, 1978), philosophorum Hispalensis, p. 120-139. 22)«Adprimům dicendum isteDespiritu etanima nonestAugustini, setdicitur quodliber ergo cuiusdam Cisterciensis necestmultum curandum dehiisquaeineodicuntur» fuisse; (Thomas deanima, Questiones d'Aquin, qu.12,p. 110). disputatae 23)L'idée d'uneprédication nonunivoque deladéfinition del'âme(prédication entre analogique etmême l'âmevégétative etl'âmesensitive entre l'âmeintellective etlesautres) équivoque provenait etelleseretrouve chezJean deJandun : voirà cepropos, libros d'Averroès, Jandun, Super Aristotelis dusujet , II,3,col.81; etBrenet, ,p.36-41. Transferts

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lesvertus instrumentales del'âmesontétendues maisqu'aucune [.. .]jedisqu'enl'homme ni ni vertu de à savoir la la vertu vertu l'âme, sensitive, principale principale principale n'est étendue enlui24. végétative, De même,le caractèreséparé,qu'Aristotesemblaitréserver à l'intellect, est étenduaux autresvertus.Mais que faut-ilentendreici? Il ne s'agitplusde la des partiesentreelles,maisde la séparabilité de l'âmeet du corps; séparation or cetteséparabilité n'estpas réservéeà l'intellect, elle vautégalementpour toutepartiede l'âme: sensitive etvégétative estperpétuelle etséparable du Jedisencore quelavertu principale autant la il intellective. Mais est de et façon corps que puissance possible séparée d'intelliger iln'est nidesentir desenourrir defaçon naturellement, paspossible sépaorganiquement, dumanque despuissances instrumentales25. rée,enraison Il ressortde ces passagesque pour Buridan,dès le livreII, c'est bien une mêmeâme, une même forme,à la foisintellective, sensitiveet végétative, qui peut êtreconsidéréesoit en relationavec les puissancesinstrumentales soiten elle-même. (on emploiealorspourla désignerdes termesconnotatifs), il De ce dernier a de de différences entre point vue, n'y pas partiescarl'âmeest unique. Le problèmeestreprisdansle livreIII en un seulequestion,la question17 : « On demande[. . .] si en l'hommeil y a une âme intellective autreque l'âme sensitive». initiaux,la conclusionestbrèvemaisnette: Aprèsles arguments Etjeposedanscette d'âme intellective cette conclusion, qu'iln'ya pasenl'homme question autre maisquec'estlamême [.. .]26. quelasensitive,

24)«[.. .] dicoquodinhomine virtutes anime sednulla virtus anime instrumentales, principalis ineoestextensa, scilicet necvirtus sensitiva necvirtus (Buriprincipalis principalis vegetativa» deanima, dan,Questiones p.69). 25)«Dicoetiam sensitiva etvegetativa etseparabilis a itaestperpetua quodvirtus principalis et non est sicud intellectiva. Sed est eam corpore potentia possipossibile separatam intelligere, bileeamseparatam nutrire naturaliter velsentire defectum instrupropter potentiarum organice men talium» (ibid., p.69). 26)«Etegoponoinistaquaestione istam anima intellecconclusionem quodnonestinhomine tivaaliaa sensitiva, sedeadem deanima Buridan, , III,qu.17,dansJack [.. .]» (Jean Questiones III ofhis"Questions Buridans AnEdition andTranslation John Zupko, Phibsophy ofMind. ofBook onAristoles De anima" Arbor, (Ann 1999),p. 192).

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« raisonsthéologiAprèsun renvoiau livreII27,Buridanajoutede nombreuses L'unité de l'âme à travers la de ses fonctions est fortement ques». pluralité dans une entre l'âme informe tout le exprimée comparaison qui corpset Dieu qui assistela totalitédu monde,ce qui conduità la conclusion: Etcette âmeestditeintellective selonqu'elle estapteà intelliger, etsensitive selonquelle estapteà sentir, etvégétative selon etmotrice selon estapte quelleestapteà nourrir, qu'elle à mouvoir lecorps selon lelieu,comme ila étéditailleurs28. Nous allonsau delà,semble-t-il, de la conceptionthomiste d'unefacultésupérieureintégrant lesfonctions desâmesinférieures. Car il fautprendre la mesure du nouvelensemblequi s'estmisen placedès le livreII29: âme uniqueet disinstrumentales. positionscorporelles Cependant,cettepuissanceuniquepeut êtredésignéede plusieursnoms,dans la mesureoù ses diversesopérations différentes Commele préimpliquent dispositions organiquesetmatérielles30. cisela réponseau premier dans la du livre 17 III, « la même argument question âme qui est sensitiveet intellective utiliseun organecorporeldans toutson actede sentirmaisnon dansson acted'intelliger»31. Une mêmepuissancese le cas échéantaux organescorporelssur un modeinstrumental , rapportant « différents noms selon différentes raisons telle est l'idée essen», par signifiée tielledu dispositif buridanien. CommesouventavecBuridan,le coup d'essaiestun coup de maître,et,dans sa radicalité, ce dispositif ne se retrouve pas intégralement parmises contemOn a cependanttracede démarchessimilaires. Preporainsou successeurs. nons commetémoinles questionsattribuées, avec quelque vraisemblance, à 27)«[•••]quodprobatur sicut insecundo libro deanima sensitiva etvegetativa inaniprobatur mali»(ibid.). 28)«Etillaanima dicitur intellectiva secundum estintelligere, etsensitiva secundum quodinnata estsentire, etvegetativa scundum estnutrire, etmotiva secundum quodinnata quodinnata estmovere secundum sicut aliasdictum fuit» locum, (ibid.p. 192-193). quodinnata corpus 29)«Sicdicimus sensitivům et Vegetativum differre secundum intellectum, rationem, quia hecnomina rem eandem secundum diversas rationes» deanima, (Buridan, Questiones significant II,5,p.64). 30)De la mêmefaçon naturelle ainsiqueplusieurs de l'âmeet quela chaleur dispositions «co-agissent ducorps la nutrition tout comme la et dansla », pour speciesl'organe co-agissent sensation. 31)«Eadem anima etintellectiva inomniactusuosentiendi utitur quaeestsensitiva organo » (Buridan, sednoninactusuointelligendi deanima, lib.III,p. 193). Questiones corporeo

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Nicole Oresmeet qui sontpostérieures à 134732.Le livreIII ne contientpas de questionportantsurl'identité de l'âmeintellective et de l'âmesensitive. En I on le livre trouve dans des considérations à celles revanche, que analogues l'on a vueschezBuridan.Il s'agittoujoursde se demandersi les puissancesse entreelleset si ellesse distinguent de l'âmeelle-même33. Oresme distinguent introduit un doublepointde vue,selonque l'on considèrel'âmecommesubset tance,activeou passive,ou bien selonque l'on considèreles dispositions accidentsau moyendesquelsellepeutagir,lesquelssont« quasiagendainstrumentaba». Or la première conclusioninsistesurl'identitésubstantielle: La première estqu'enprenant la puissance au premier lespuissances del'âmesont sens, l'âmemême ousesparties34. noussommestrèsprochesdesexpressions Parcontre, buridaniennes. Jusqu'ici, et c'estla troisième conclusion(la deuxièmeconcerneles animaux),en prenantla puissanceau secondsens,c'est-à-dire alors« les pourdes dispositions, puissancesde l'âmesontles accidentsdes corpset des organes»35.Le paragracettethèse.Ce par quoi une substancepeut phe qui suitjustifielonguement ou est une du disposition sujet,et cela peutêtreditpuissanceactive agir pâtir, ou passive;or l'âme peut cela par les dispositionsdes organes(mediantibus dispositionibus organorum)'de tellesdispositionspeuventdonc être dites de l'âme». Si l'on s'écarteun peu de Buridan,on doitmesurer les «puissances effetsproduitspar la doctrinedu maîtrepicard.L'âme resteune en tant en sontdes dispoque substanceet forme,tandisque les puissancesplurielles sitions.Si Oresme est attentif à soulignerla diversitéde ces dispositions, l'une des réponsesaux arguments initiauxconfirmeque nous sommestrès prochesdu vocabulaireet de la conceptualité repérésplushautchezBuridan. Il s'agitdansce passagede s'interroger surl'oppositiondu cognitif et du non cognitif:

32)Laquestion IIIsemble eneffet contenir uneallusion à Jean deMirecourt 9 dulivre (jeremercieJean ses informations surcetaspect). Celeyrette pour 33)Voirlaquestion II «Utrum animae sintipsaanima veldistinguantur 3 surlelivre potentiae abipsaetinter Nicolai Oresme etquaestiones inAristotelis De se»,dansNicole Oresme, expositio anima & Paris, , éd.B.Patar (Louvain 1995),p. 132-140. 34)«Prima estquodcapiendo animae suntipsaanima aut modo, potentiam primo potentiae eius»(ibid., partes p. 137). 35)«Tertia conclusio estquod,accipiendo secundo modoprodispositionibus etc., potentiam animae sunt etorganum» accidentia (ibid., potentiae corporis p. 138).

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Aucinquième l'onditque«l'une[.. .] estcognitive non», etc.,etl'autre argument, lorsque en admettant c'est la même la nutritive est âme, je réponds, que que cependant cognitive, le concept selonlequelelleestappelée nutritive ne raison, passousla même puisque connote connaît maisquellenourrit. aumoyen dediverses Ainsi, pasqu'elle dispositions, elleexerce différentes etd'après celaelleestappelée dedivers comme fonctions; noms, disent lesanciens36. La question5 reprenddirectement la questionde la pluralitédes âmes,ou de la multiplicité des formessubstantielles: «Est-ceque dans le mêmevivant, commeen l'homme,il y a plusieursâmes,à savoirvégétative, sensible,intellective?»37.Il convientďabord de distinguer plusieurssens en lesquelson « » de des formes et de en quel sensla questionest peutparler pluralité préciser : ici pertinente Au quatrième senssontposéesplusieurs formes en raison de diverses et puissances Etainsicertains danslemême vivant âmesparmi opérations. posent plusieurs lesquelles uneestvégétative, uneautre uneautre intellective. Et c'estce quiconcerne sensitive, celivre38. Les argumentsquon peut énuméreren faveurde la pluralitésont nombreux.On y trouved'abord des argumentsgénérauxsur la diversitédes surles propriétés opérations, propresà une espèce,surla pluralitédes intelligencespour les orbescélestes,mais surtout,alorsque nous sommesencore dans les questionssur le livreII, neufarguments qui concernentspécialementl'âme intellective: sur l'immatérialité et l'incorclassiques arguments sur le caractère à nouveausur la ruptibilité, organiquede l'âme végétative, diversité des opérations, maisaussisurl'infusion de l'âmeintellective dansun etc. La en est animé39, revanche, embryondéjà positionopposée renvoyée à l'autorité d'Averroès si l'on pensaità la (ce qui seraitsurprenant simplement noétique,maisil s'agitdu renvoiclassiqueau premier chapitredu De substan 36)«Adquintam, cumdicitur etc.etalianon»,dico,posito quod«una[...] estcognoscitiva, estcognoscitiva, tarnen nonsubillaratione, anima, quodsiteadem quodnutritiva quiaconceptussecundum vocatur nonconnotat earn nutritiva sednutrire. Etideomedianquem cognoscere tibus diversis diversa hocdiversis nominibus dispositionibus ipsaexercet opera;etsecundum utdicunt (ibid., appellatur, antiqui» p. 139). 37)Ibid.,p. 146-157. 38)«Quarto formae etoperationes diversas. Etsic ponuntur plures propter potentias in eodem animae una est alia alia intellective sensitiva, aliquiponunt plures quarum vegetativa, Ethocspectat adistum librum» II,qu.5,p. 146). (ibid, 39)Laquestion del'embryon tenait uneplaceimportante danslesQuestions surl'âme de disputées Thomas voirop.cit.,p.95sqq. d'Aquin:

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tia orbis,où le commentateur pose qu'un sujetne peutpas avoirplusquune forme40). et pose un certainnombrede D'emblée,Oresmeétablitdes suppositions conclusions. La première suppositionestquune opérationprovientd'une formeou est en raisond'une forme;la secondeest que dans une action,outreun agent desagentsinstruon peutavoirdesagentsspécifiques etdéterminés, principal, extérieures mentauxet que peuventmêmeêtrerequisescertaines dispositions ou la proximité41. tellesque l'éloignement La premièrethèseest que de la mêmeformeet du mêmeagentpeuvent provenirdes opérationsdiverseset même contraires.Des précisionssont ou en raisondesagentsqui concourent, apportées, qui déclinentlesvariations desinstruments des desdispositions, desagentsparticuliers, extrinsèques, parentrecause tiesde telleou telleforme,de la libertéhumaine,de la distinction La deuxièmethèseprincipaleestqu'il n'estpas parsoi et causeparaccident42. âmes de dans le mêmecorpspour rendrecomptede requis poserplusieurs différentes La diverses qu'à partirde l'âmese produisent opérations. troisième, recenvitales,bienplusnombreuses que les quatrehabituellement opérations sées.La quatrième,que dans un mêmesujet,commeun cheval,il n'ya pas le tout.Les conclusionssuiplusieursâmestotalesdontchacuneinformerait de l'âme d'un animal,et la nécessité vantesmontrent le caractère hétérogène des « parties» plusque des âmestotales. de distinguer à la verJusquelà, la démarchede Nicole Oresmeesttoutà faitconforme dansson principed'unifisionburidanienne de l'âmeunique- pas seulement mais encore dans le mode de cation des fonctionsinfra-intellectuelles, et causes des organes,dispositions faisantappel à la diversité raisonnement, est restée en susl'âme intellective la de concourantes. Cependant, question et le plus pens.C'est là que l'examende Nicole Oresmeestle plusminutieux prudent. affirme l'unitétotalede l'âme: Il présente La première plusieursthéories. iln'ya qu'une âmeayant Etilestuneopinion plusieurs unique quiposequ'enl'homme etc43. l'autre dontl'uneestintellective, sensitive, puissances, 40)Averroès, Desubstantia orbis 1562),P 3v. (Venise, 41 ) VoirOresme, Nicolai Oresme p. 149. exposition 42)Ibid., 149-150. p. 43)«Etestunaopinio anima habens nonestnisiunica plures potenquodinhomine quaeponit aliasensitiva, etc.» (ibid., unaestintellectiva, tias, p. 152). quarum

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cettepositionestassezsimple,rapide.Elle repose qui justifie L'argumentation surle principeďéconomie,appliquédans le cadredes suppositions initiales de unité de la forme et diversité des qui permettaient conjuguer opérations. Deux autresarguments rationnels sontajoutés: l'un pour direque plusieurs formesimpliqueraient l'autrefaisantappel à la plusieursêtressubstantiels, la divine de réalités différentes. Mais il n'estpas séparabilité par puissance Il indifférent noter autorités sont ici de quelles convoquées. s'agiten premier lieu d'Augustin ce qui confirme le rôleque jouentses textesdans le faitde et l'unité le caractère actif de l'âme44.L'autreautoritécitée est, souligner commechezJeanBuridan,le De differentia etanimae. spiritus une seconde Oresme,toutefois, exposeaussi,et un peu plus longuement, théorie(« aliavia»), selonlaquelleil yauraiten l'hommedeuxâmes45, uneâme matérielle à l'âme des et une âme immatérielle (semblable animaux) unique Il donneen faveurde cettethèseun certainnombred'ar(l'âmeintellective). comme«difficiles à réfuter»46. Le premier gumentsdontdeuxsontconsidérés « sur d'avoir chose constitue un repose l'exigence quelque qui supportparsoi» le terme de et donne forme à la matière, ce (il n'emploiepas «substance»), qui ). L'âmeorganiquen'auraitpas un qui supposequ'ellen'ensoitpas tirée(educta tel statut.Le secondargumentinsistesur les différences de formeentreles du des fonctions différentes. L'âme uniintellective, parties corpsremplissant en rendreraison,pas plusque la seulematière, que, ne pourrait qui,considérée en elle-même, estpartoutde mêmenature.Oresmeajouteencoredeuxautres et prendla peinede répondreaux arguments contraires arguments, (que j'ai le d'économie n'estévidemment rapportés plushaut).L'argument par principe des opérations, on accordel'exigenced'avoir si,outrela diversité pas suffisant une formematérielle. Celui de la pluralitédes êtresesten partieadmis: il y auraitun êtrecorruptible et un êtreincorruptible parla formesensitive parla formeintelligible, maisle composéestdénomméd'aprèsla formesupérieure (l'hommeestaussiun animal).On concèdeque Dieu pourraitséparerl'âme 44)Oresme nedonne Voir La Trinité, Œuvres de pasderéférence précise. parexemple Augustin, «Bibliothèque s.Augustin, del'édition traduction »,vol.XV: texte bénédictine, augustinienne etnotesM. Mellet, O.P.,etTh.Camelot, O.P.,introduction O.E.S.A.; parE. Hendrickx, vol.XVI: texte de l'édition traduction de P.Agaësse, bénédictine, S.J.,notesencoll.avec X,xi,18,p. 155-157. 1955), J.Moingt, S.J.(Paris, 45)«Aliaviaestquodinhomine suntduaeanimae etduaeformae sicut inequo tantummodo, autasinoestunica forma itaetiam inhomine, est et de materialis, quae corruptibilis generabilis materiae intellectiva materialis ; etcumhocestineoanima [.. .]» potentia quaenonestdeforma Nicolai Oresme (Oresme, exposition p. 152-153). 46)«Etistae duaerationes sunt difficiliores (ibid., proistaparte» p. 153).

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maisce n'estjamaisle cas naturellement avantla mort.Enfinles intellective, autoritéscitéesauraientpu admettrela présenteopinion.Quant aux arguilssontégalement mentsdu débutconcernant l'âmeintellective en particulier, estinterrécusés.Parexemple,celuisurl'impossibilité d'avoirplusieurs formes comme valant la forme mais un même matérielle, prété pour sujetpourrait avoirune formematérielle et une formeimmatérielle. NicoleOresmen'enrestetoutefois pas là. Aprèsavoiraccordétoutel'attentionqu'elle mériteà la thèsede la dualitédes âmes,il revientà la première Il ne s'agitpas d'avancerde nouveauxarguments en sa faveurpuisposition47. ont été au mais de ceux-ci que proposerun rapideexadéjà apportés début, mencritiquedes arguments qui viennentd'êtredonnésen faveurde la thèse Cela à admettre conduit que la mêmeâme immatérielle peutconféopposée. formeà rerdes êtressubstantiels et différents selon donne partiels qu'elle diverses : parties divers êtres substanforme comme immatérielle, l'âme, [.. .] lamême peutdonner partiels selon forme estendivers lieux etendiverses desorte tiellement, parties, qu'en quelamême unlieuelledonne l'être enunautre l'être chair, os,etainsidesuite48. C'est aussil'occasionde préciser à nouveaucomments'articulent unitéetpluon ralité.Dans lesfonctions etsensitives) parlerad'une organiques(végétatives » des partiesintégrales de (entendons pluralitéde « formespartielles intégrales la forme),maisd'uneseuleâme: estla forme etautre estla Auquatrième, autre dela chair je concède quedanslecheval forme formes del'os.C'estpourquoi ; etiln'est jedisqu'ilya plusieurs partielles intégrales chose sorte soituneâmemaisilsuffit cequesoit decette pasrequis quen'importe quelle unepartie d'âme49. et les autresque Mais c'estsurtoutà proposde l'unitéentrel'âmeintellective Parexemple: les formulations sontles plusfortes.

47)«Nuncergo, siquisveliet tenere aliam viam ...» (ibid., p. 155). 48)«[.. .] eadem darediversa essepartialia substantialiter forma sicut immaterialis, anima, potest itaquodinunolocodatesse hocquodipsaestindiversis locisetindiversis secundum partibus, carnem etinaliodatesseos,etitadealiis»(ibid., p. 155). 49)«Adquartam Etideodiccarnis etaliaestforma ossis. concedo quodinequoaliaestforma talissit etnonoportet tumestquodsuntplures formae quodquaelibet partiales integrales; anima sedsufficit (ibid., p. 156). quodsitparsanimae»

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Aupremier onrépondrait de [ausujetdel'âmeintellective] argument quel'âmesensitive l'homme estimmatérielle, est l'intellective50. puisqu'elle Tous les arguments sontainsiréexaminés pourallerdansle sensde l'affirmationd'uneâme unique,immatérielle, aux partiesdu s'appliquantdiversement corps. Si l'on faitle bilan,on voitque l'auteurde ce textene ditpas explicitement estaccordéeà chaquepartie. quellepositionil faitsienne.Autantd'attention Mais la disposition des arguments confèreuneplacede choixà ceuxqui affirmentl'unicitéde l'âme.Et le sensgénéraldanslequelcetteunicitéestprésentée estle mêmeque celuique nous avonsétudiéplus hautchez Buridan.Si doncOresmeestplusprudent, il partageavecle maîtrepicardla mêmeappréhensiondu problème. La structure du Traitéde l'âmede Pierred'Ailly,un quartde siècleplus tard, estun peu différente. D'embléePierred'Aillys'interroge surla définition etles divisionsde l'âme. En revanche,à la différence de ses prédécesseurs, il n'y revient sur pas à l'occasiondu livreII ni du livreIII. Il commenceparréfléchir le statutde la définition selonlaquellel'âmeestl'actesubstantiel d'un premier ce qui corpsorganiqueayantla vie en puissance,puis il examinebrièvement tombe sous cettedéfinition.De l'expériencede troissortesd'actes,nous concluonsque l'âmeestelle-même triple.De là, troisquestionsse posent: sur la distinction localedesâmesen un mêmesuppôt,ensuite,à supposerqu'il n'y ait pas de distinction selonle lieu,si néanmoinsellesse différencient réelleestdistincte de sespuissances. ment,et enfinsi l'âmeelle-même En ce qui concernela première question,Pierred'Aillyattribueà Platonla thèsed'unerépartition des âmesqui seraitlocalement etla récuse différenciée, assezrapidement. La deuxièmequestionen revanche doitêtreexaminéeun peu plusen détail. Le traitement de Pierred'Aillyesttoutefois trèsrapideen comparaisonà ce nous trouvons chez et à forte raisondans les textesde la Oresme, que plus Renaissance.L'auteurcommencepar évoquerla thèsede la pluralitédes formessubstantielles51. Un tel empilement de formesest rejetéau nom du 50)«Adprimam diceretur sensitiva hominis estimmaterialis, [deintellectiva], quodanima quia estintellectiva» (ibid., p. 156). 51)«[...] dixerunt nonsolum animam etsensitivám ineodem quidam veģetatīvam supposito ineodem sedtotesseformas substantiates diferre, quotsibicorrespondent praedicata quidditativaessentialiter subordinata» c. 1,dansOlafPluta, Diephilosophische (Pierre d'Ailly, Psychologie desPeter von (Amsterdam, 1987),p.9). Ailly

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raisonni autoriténe nous principed'économie,puisqueaucuneexpérience, C'est pourquoiunedeuxièmepositionparaîtplusprobable: forceà l'accepter. etde l'âme cellede l'identité réelle,dansun premier temps,de l'âmevégétative sensible: etl'âmesensiC'estpourquoi certains defaçon diront, quel'âmevégétative plusprobable, selon la leditAristote, ellesdiffèrent tive sontréellement lamême même si,comme chose, etque âmeestvégétative c'est-à-dire raison, quenouscomprenons paruneraison qu'une nouscomprenons raison âmeestsensitive52. quelamême paruneautre : Mais il fautencoreétendrecetteconclusionau cas de l'âmeintellective la enl'homme ensuivant Etla même chosesemble devoir êtreditedel'âmeintellective raison bienquesurcepoint nousn'ayons d'Aristote53. naturelle, pasdeclaire explication est peu approfondie,seul le problèmede l'embryonest L'argumentation en abordé, quelqueslignes.Ce qui estoriginal,c'estque Pierred'Aillycontisouunedifficulté nue en opposantà cetteconclusionselonla vériténaturelle sembleavoirdes attributs levéedu pointde vue de la foi: l'âme intellective à ceuxdesdeuxautres,à savoirqu'elleestindivisible, contraires inengendrable et incorruptible. C'est pourquoi,dit-il,certainssoutiennent qu'il y a deux âmes distinctes54. Cependant,il s'agitselon lui d'un problèmeindécidable lesdeuxpointsde vue,etqui veut On peutdoncsoutenir neutrum). ( problema et de l'hommeestindivisible soutenirl'identitédevradireque l'âmesensitive n'estpas de mêmenatureque celledes bêtes; c'estle composéqui estle sujet de la sensation,et non l'âme elle-même.On retiendra par conséquentl'affirmationde l'identité du pointde vue naturel, et le caractère indécidablesi l'on la foi. faitintervenir etl'on et dernière La troisième questionva encoredansle sensde l'identité, bien Cette Pierre sur la diversité des retrouve des accents connus. fois, y passe l'âme et la et celle de son choix : l'identité de de puissance. opinions expose 52)«Ideoprobabilius ineodem animam etsensitivám dixerunt supposito quidam vegetativam intelutdicit différant secundum idestaliaratione esserealiter rationem, idem, licet, Aristotiles, Le mot et alia ratione esse sensitivám» eandem animam esse (ibid., 9). p. vegetativam ligimus icipar littéralement ratio serait rendu «raison», plusprécisément parlequelnoustraduisons deconcevoir». oupar«manière «concept» 53)«Etidem naturainhomine rationem essedicendum deanima intellectiva videtur sequendo » (ibid., ciaram declarationem dehocnonhabeamus deAristotelis lem,quamvis p.9). 54)Voirparexemple C. Wey, Guillaume d'Ockham, , éd.Joseph Quodlibeta Operatheoseptem IX,St.Bonaventure 1980),II,qu.10,p. 156-161. (NewYork, logica

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46 (2008)342-367 Vivarium J.Biard/

desonopération. Orilya estprincipe actif oupassif [.. .] l'âmeestpuissance, puisqu'elle autre instrumentale : lapreune une de l'âme elle-même, principale, plusieurs puissances accidentelle55. estessentielle, laseconde mière Pierred'Aillyse livredonc à une doubleopérationqui n'estpas sansévoquer de l'âme et Buridan.D'un côté il écartela puissanceprincipaleet essentielle et estune,lessecondessontplurielles La première sespuissancesaccidentelles. de mulen leurexercice, se distinguent de l'essenceen ce quelles impliquent, estcorrélée avec De l'autre,l'identité essentielle corporelles. tiplesdispositions Cettefois,Pierred'Aillyne se contenteplusde une pluralitéde significations. clairement en un sens de raison», il l'interprète la notionvaguede « différence : linguistique de etselonellesplusieurs noms, [.. .] onditquel'âmepeutexercer plusieurs opérations, lecasdu c'est lapuissance del'âme, diverses raisons, pourelle,comme supposent signifiant etdel'intellectif56. dusensitif végétatif, Parfoismoinsprécis. Pierred'Aillyest plus succinctque ses prédécesseurs. Mais pardelàsa prudencequandle problèmeestconsidérédu pointde vuede la foi,sa positionpenchebien pour une conceptionde l'unitéde l'âme et dans les termesd'une d'une identitéde celle-ciavecses puissances,formulée « ». de raisons pluralité signifiantes de Il y a donc à Paris,au milieudu XIVesiècle,à Paris,une constellation une mêmetendance.Dans le cadredes commentaires textesqui expriment aristotéliciens (auxquelsje me suislimité),on trouveunenouvelleformed'arà la lettre en gumentation faveurde l'unitéde l'âme,qui n'estpas conforme la séparation de lectures d'Aristote, qui radicalisaient qui prendle contre-pied de l'âme intellective (commecellede Jeande Jandun),maisqui n'estplus la l'autorité positivement positionde Thomasd'Aquin.Cettedémarcheretourne en de raisons différences du Liberde spiritu etanima,et déploielesdifférences d'une analyselinguistique, de nomssusceptibles qui seramenéeau moyende la théoriede la suppositionet de la connotation.Buridanest sans doute le 55)«[.. .] anima suaeoperationis. activum velpassivum estpotentia, Ipsius quiaestprincipium estessentialis, aliainstrumentalis animae estmultiplex unaprincipalis, autem ; prima potentia, » (Pierre desPeter von c.1 dansPluta, Diephilosophische secunda accidentalis d'Ailly, Psychologie , 10). Aillyp. 56)«[.. .] dicitur illassupponunt exercere etsecundum estpotens plures operationes quodanima sicut suntVegetatinomina diversarum rationum animae, potentiam proeaplura significant^ » (ibid., sensitivům etintellectivum 10-1 vum, 1). p.

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des échos le plusradicalde cettedémarche.On trouvetoutefois représentant de cettefaçonďappréhenderla questionde l'unitéde l'âme non seulement chezNicoleOresme,maisencorechezPierreďAilly. 3. Echos lointains se retrouve chez des La démarchemenéepar Buridanet ses contemporains, Il xvie faudrait à cet siècle. le buridanisme auteursprolongeant égard jusqu'au examiner en détail,ce que je ne pourraifaireici,lesquestionsetcommentaires ou de JeanMair. de ThomasBricot,de Georgesde Bruxelles en contrepoint montrer un autre comment, Je prendrai exemple,pour le est mêmechezdes auteursde traditions différentes,problème marquépar Prenonsici commetémoinle richeet les termesque nousvenonsde repérer. d'AntoineRubio57.Né en 1548 et morten 1615, volumineuxcommentaire AntoineRubio (ou Ruvio)a enseignéau Meximembrede la sociétéde Jésus, surla logiqueet la philosophienatuque puisen Espagne.Ses commentaires du Traitéde l'âme, Dans son commentaire relleeurentune grandediffusion. de nombreusesquestionstouchentau problèmeque nous étudions.L'une du livreII qui demandeà d'entreellesestla question7 surle chapitrepremier de de l'âmecommeformedu corps: « Cettedéfinition proposde la définition l'âmeest-elleunivoqueà touteslesâmes?» Elle estsuivieparunequestionsur selon laquelle la définition c'est-à-dire l'autredéfinition ( posterior definitio), l'âme estle principepar lequelnousvivons,sentons,nous mouvonset comà l'âme suivantede l'âmeest-elleune,etconvient-elle prenons: « La définition en commun?» On y ajoutera,entreautres,la question1 surle chapitre3 du livreII : «Y a-t-iltroisespècesd'âmes,quatredegréset cinq genresde puissandansla senest-elleincluseformellement ces?», la question2 : « La végétative ou seulementde façonéminente?»,la sitiveet chacunedans la rationelle, distinctes et une âme sensitive une âme végétative question5 : «Trouve-t-on une sensibleet une rationnelle dansun mêmeanimal,et aussiunevégétative, dansun mêmehomme,ou y en a-t-ilseulementune dansun composé?» d'AntoineRubioestprochede cellede De façongénérale, l'argumentation l'unité Thomasd'Aquin.Comme nous l'avonsvu plushaut,Thomasaffirme entrelespuissancesetrefuse unedistinction essentielle de l'âmemaisintroduit l'âmeà sespuissances. d'identifier 57)VoirAntoine Aristotelis deanima inlibros Antonii Ruvio Rodensis Rubio, [ . .] commentarti deLyon, laversion datede1611à Alcala; édition 1613,estacces1613).Lapremière (Lugduni, nationale deFrance. Gallica delaBibliothèque sible surleserveur

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Mais AntoineRubios'écarteparfoisde ThomasďAquin. Tel sembleêtrele cas dansla question2 surle troisième estchapitredu livreII : « La végétative elle incluseformellement dans la sensitiveet chacunedans la rationelle, ou » seulement de façonéminente ? La questionestl'occasiond'uneprécisionterles sens en sur lesquels quelque chosepeutêtredit «contenir» minologique autrechose.La divisionmajeureestentrecontenirde façonformelle {formaliter ) et contenirde façonéminente(eminenter ). Une choseen contientformellement une autrequand elleestde mêmenature(ou raison,ratio)ysi bien ses opérations;c'esten ce sensqu'une qu'elle peut la produireou effectuer chaleurproduitune autrechaleur.En revanche,une choseen contientune autrede façonéminentequand lesdeuxne sontpas de mêmenatureet que la ; c'esten ce sensque la lumière plus parfaitepeutproduitela moinsparfaite de la chaleur58. Mais Rubio complexifie l'idée de ultérieurement, produit en contenance dans formelle, qui peutêtreentendue deuxsens: premièrement une sériedontles degréssontde mêmeespèce(et telétaitle cas des deuxchadans une sériedontles degréssontd'espèceet d'ordre leurs),deuxièmement divers59. Commentces distinctions sont-ellesinvestiesdans la conceptuelles questionde l'unitéde l'âme? Il estévidentpourtousque le degrévégétatif estcontenud'unemanièreou d'une autredansle degrésensitif : l'âmede l'animaln'estpas seulement sensiA ce stade,certaines ble maisaussivégétative. l'unité: expressions soulignent « [. . .] il estévidentque l'âmesensitive estle principeoriginaire de leursopérationsvégétatives»60. Mais AntoineRubio transposeimmédiatement cette relationà l'âme rationnelle : « et ce qui estprouvéde l'âme sensitive à l'égard de l'âmevégétative, à l'égard je penseque c'estaussiprouvéde l'âmerationelle 58)«Illuddici inseformaliter continere aliudformaliter esseeiusdem rationis, quodhabet illudproducere, veloperationes eiuspraestare, utcalor aiteunus, perquodpotest quiproducit illum formaliter. Eminenter vero continere aliudestperaliudessediversae dicitur continere rum, etideoperfectius illud velsaltem rationis, quodinsehabet posse producere, perfectius praestare, utluxdicitur continere calorem eminenter diversae rationis, quiaperseperfectius quodinse eumproducere» f® habet, (ibid., 135). potest 59)«Secundo notandum estdupliciter alterum formaliter. contingere, quodunumcontineat ingradu Primo eiusdem et in ordinis. Secundo diversae et Exemordinis. speciei gradu speciei, modi estcalor alium velpraestare, calorem, plum prioris potens producere quodillepraestat, qui illum dicitur continere sedingradu eiusdem etordinis. formaliter, [.. .] Unde propterea speciei sitduplicem essequoquemodum insuperiori continendi unum foreminenter, quidem gradu maliter formaliter non sed solum tali,aliomodoinsuperiori tali, virtualiter, quopacto gradu P"138-139). forma soliscontinet calorem» (ibid., 60)«[.. .] evidens estquodanima sensitiva eorum sitprincipium radicale operationum vegetatif*136). varum» (ibid.,

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de chacunedes deux»61.Il nest donc pas questiond'une coupureentrel'âme ; l'unitéde ces troisdegrésestadmise,de telle organiqueetl'âmeintellectuelle Il restemaintemanièreque c'estle degrésupérieur qui inclutles inférieurs. « » nantà savoirsi cetterelationde contenance estformelle ou éminente. AntoineRubioexposedeuxopinions.La première soutientque l'âmevégétativeest contenuede façonvirtuelleou éminentedans l'âme sensitive, et chacunedesdeuxsurle mêmemode(etnonpas de façonformelle) dansl'âme rationnelle. Si l'on se rappellela distinction faiteplushaut,cela signifie qu'elles ne sontpas de même« raison» et qu'il y a entreelleune hiérarchie de perfection.Parmiles autoritésen faveurde cetteposition,Rubio citeJavellus Javellus,dominicainthéologienné en 1470, morten 1538, (Chrysostome auteurde commentaires surles livresd'Aristote dans une tradition thomiste, dontun commentaire surle De animaa étépubliéà Veniseen 1555), Cajetan, PierreMartinez(PetrusMartinezde Osma, ca. l427-ca. 1480, qui futmaître ès artset professeur de théologieà Salamanque),FrançoisTolet; et il ajoute c'est ce semble que que penserThomasd'Aquindansla question76 de la premièrepartiede la Sommede théologié 2.En vérité,ce textede Thomaspourrait êtreinterprété dansle sensd'uneréduction c'estpeut-être plusstricte63, pour« » Antoine Rubio reste mais c'est sans doute l'idée de quoi prudent, perfection « nous avions rencontrée la dans définition de l'inclusion éminente ») qui (que emporteici la décision64. La secondeopinionaffirme à une inclusion que nousavonsaffaire formelle et nonpas seulement : virtuelle

61)«etquoddesensitiva simul de rationali respectu probatur vegetativae, respectu utriusque ř 136). censeo» (ibid., probatum 62)«[...] etidemvidetur 4 ubiait[...]» (ibid., D. Thomas I. par.quaest. sentire 76. artic. f>136). 63)VoirThomas art.4,p.224: «UndedicenSumma , Iapars, d'Aquin, qu.LXXVI, theologiae dumestquodnullaaliaforma substantial estinhomine, nisisolaanima etquod intellectiva; virtute continet animam sensitivám etnutritivam, itavirtute continet omnes inferioipsa,sicut resformas, etfacit inaliisfaciunt. Etsimiliter formae est ipsasolaquidquid imperfectiores dicendum deanima sensitiva inbrutis, etdenutritiva inplantis, etuniversaliter deomnibus » - Rubiociteexactement formis le texte, remplaçant perfectioribus respectu imperfectiorum » par«imperfectarum seulement à lafin«imperfectiorum ». 64)Onretrouve cethème fait danslaréponse au3eargument: «Adtertium dicenqueThomas sentire etinteldumquodinmateria considerantur diversi sicut vivere esse, perfectionis, gradus autem est.Forma secundum Semper ligere. superveniens priori, perfectius ergoquaedatsolum estimperfectissima, sedforma et materiae, primům perfectionis quaedatprimům gradům ettertium, etsicdeinceps, estperfectissima» secundum, (ibid., p.224).

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Ladeuxième Lapremière, affirme deuxchoses. inclut formelleopinion quel'âmesensitive et la le de rationnelle du sentir etdu ment ledegré duvégéter commune, pris façon degré La seconde inclut formellement l'âmevégétative demanière quel'âmesensitive végéter. etquel'âmerationnelle inclut l'âmevégétative etl'âmesensitive, desorte spéciale, que âmesensitive estformellement l'âmerationnelle estquel'âmerationnelle n'importe quelle etsensitive65. estformellement l'âmevégétative Cette positiondemandecependantà êtreexpliquée,et cest à ce moment la subdivision du formel.Le secondsensde l'inclusionformelle qu'intervient au cas celuid'un animalcontenant la perfection correspond précisément végédansce cas? tativede la plante.Que se passe-t-il estl'animal contenant laperfection delaplante, Unexemple dumodesuivant végétative elle selon une raison effectuer ses puisque peut propres opérations univoque, parlavertu a ensoiformellement etsurunmode qu'elle66. qu'elle plusnoble L'âmesensibleestla source«selonune raisonunivoque»de toutesles opérationssensiblesetvégétatives. Elle contientdoncen soiformaliter le degrévégétatif.Cependantelle accomplitces fonction«sur un mode plus noble» que dans un vivantnon sensible.Nous sommesdonc toujours,cela n'estpas mis en cause,dans des cas d'implication«formelle»,mais ce derniermode,en raisondes différences de degréet de perfection, peutêtreditaussi«éminent»! Etcette manière formellement estencore decontenir diteunemanière decontenir émise trouve dans un haut et élevé67. nemment, puisqu'elle degré plus plus L'inclusionéminenteapparaîtdonc en deuxoccurrences : soitau senspremier de ce qui estéminentet non formel{solumvirtualiter ), soitau sensque l'on vientde dire,c'est-à-dire commesubdivision du formel. 65)«Secunda duoasserit. Primům sensitiva formaliter includit opinio quodanima gradům vegetandi incommuni etrationalis sentiendi etvegetandi. Secundum acceptum, gradum quodanima sensitiva includit formaliter animam inspeciali, etanima rationalis animam veģetatīvam vegetativam etsensitivám, itautquelibet animasensitiva sitformaliter anima etanima vegetativa rationalis sitformaliter anima etsensitiva» Antonii Ruvio Rodensis Rubio, (Antoine vegetativa /,II,c.3,qu.2,f*137). [.. .] commentari 66)«Exemplum modiestanimai continens posterions perfectionem plantis, quia vegetativam eius rationem secundum univocam, proprias operationes praestare potest pervirtutem quam habet inseformaliter etnobiliori modoquamipsa[.. .]» (op.cit.,P 138). 67)«[.. .]etistemodus formaliter etiam continendi dicitur modus continendi cumsit eminenter, ingradu altiori etelevatiori» P 138). (ibid.,

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Qu'en retientnotreauteur?Immédiatement aprèsexposéla thèsede l'inil avaitdéjà indiquéque telleétaitla positiondominante, clusionformelle, et aussila siennepropre: « C'est la doctrinedéjà communeparmiles contemporainset elledoitêtretenueparnouscommela plusprobable»68.Les dévelopcettepositionmaisne la remettent pementsultérieurs précisent pas en cause. En ce qui concernela me rationnelle, elle contient«utrumquegradumet et éminente, au secondsensde utramqueanimam» de façonà la foisformelle l'éminence. La positionestassurément assezcomplexe.L'auteurveutévitertoutréductionnisme En mêmetemps,l'hommeestformellement desfonctions. etessentiellement animaletvivant,et pourcela il n'estpas d'autreformesubstantielle l'âme rationnelle. On comprendque le professeur de la Sociétéde Jésusse que soit différencié, fut-ceavec prudence,de Thomasd'Aquin: il ne s'agitpas d'inclusiondite«virtuelle », qui supposerait quelque chosequi soitformellementdifférent des objetset des ; la prioritén'estpas, à partirde la diversité d'accentuer la différence des Mon opérations, puissances. proposn'estpas ici d'accentuerl'écartavec la traditionthomiste,mêmesi elle est suggéréepar Rubiolui-même, etcelui-cine s'aventure d'unerelation pas dansl'exploration instrumentale. Mais mêmequelqu'uncommelui paraîtmarquéparune évolutionqui se manifeste de cettedoctrine« communeparmi parla présentation lesrecentiores lesprécisions destinées à « récupé», nonobstant supplémentaires rer»l'idéed'éminence.C'est une tendanceà la simplification et à l'accentuationde l'unitéd'une mêmeâme différenciée seulement ses par opérationsqui se manifeste encoreici. Parmiles Jésuites, FrançoisSuarezdonneralui aussi,sans équivoque,la à l'affirmation de l'unité: « Sittarnenconclusio: eademnumeroanima priorité estprincipium sentiendietvegetandiin homine»69. intelligendi, Descartes La doctrinecartésienne cettetenprolongeelle aussi,mais plus nettement, dancerepéréedès le XIVesiècle.Certes,les différences sontmanifestes, et bien connues.La premièreest le refusde l'idée de «formesubstantielle»;cela vautpour la physique,maisà plus forteraisonpour la questiondu rapport entrel'âmeetle corps.Il estvraique danslesRègles de l'esprit , pourla direction 68)«Haecestiamcommunis sententia inter Recentiores et tamquam a nobis probabilior f3137). tenenda» (ibid., 69)Francisco Commentaria unacumquestionibus inlibros Aristotelis deanima Suárez, , introducciónyedición critica Salvador 3 vol.(Madrid, Castellote, 1978,1981,1991),p.322.

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Descartesutilisele verbeinformare , maisparla suiteon ne retrouvera plusde tellesexpressions. Descartesprônel'indépendance de l'âmecommesubstance pensante,alors que pour Aristotela penséene sauraitêtreune substance. ďáme faisaitle partageentrele vivantet le Enfin,si la notionaristotélicienne ici la vie estjusticiabled'une explication non-vivant, purement mécanique70. On retrouvenéanmoinsd'étrangessimilitudesconcernantl'identitéà soi d'unemêmeâme qui sentet pense. De façongénérale,Descartesentreprend dansla règleXII un travailsurles schémasissusde la psychologie tellequ'ill'a reçuede l'enseignement scolaire71, l'imaincluantl'intellect, jésuite,au pointde proposerunethéoriedesfacultés lessensetla mémoire.Il ne m'intéresse pas ici de medemandersi cet gination, va ensuite ou non de la doctrine seulement de cartésienne, disparaître héritage voircomment,dans ce cadre,la réinterprétation cartésienne accentuecertaineslignesd'interprétation de cettetradition. Descartess'opposeà la traditionaristotélicienne de la pluralitédes âmes, et en toute rigueur,à la lettre,aucune variantene trouverait grâceà ses «âme» est nom lui un les inclut yeux: pour équivoquepuisqu'il puissances et sensitives des animaux; maisil affirme en mêmetemps,conforvégétatives mémentprécise-t-il à la doctrinede l'Églisecatholique(que ne manquaient d'ailleurspas de rappeleren la matièreles Jésuites telsque Rubio),que chez « il l'homme s'agitd'une seuleet mêmeâme: En l'hommel'âme estunique, à savoirrationnelle»72; c'estpourquoiil préfère employerle termede mens, esprit. Descartesmodifieprofondément la théoriedes sens,en séparantce qui relèvedu corpsetce qui relèvede l'esprit aussila théoriedu sens ; il transforme commeuneautrepartiedu corps73, ainsique la conception commun,présenté de l'imagination, unevraiepartiedu corps: qui estégalement Il faut sereprésenter troisièmement fonctionne à sontour comme un quelesenscommun à imprimer destiné cesfigures ouidées, lui cachet, quisousuneforme pureetsanscorps 70)Voir Lettre à Henri More du30juillet 1640,dansDescartes, Correspondance janvier 1640-juin & P.Tannery, vol.III (Paris, 1643, éd.C. Adam 1996),p. 182. 71)VoirMarion, Surl'ontologie deDescartes (Paris, 2000). Jean-Luc, grise 72)«Anima inhomine unicaest,nempe VoirDescartes, Lettres à Regiusy de mai rationalis»; & Tannery, vol.Ill,p.369-370 : ici,p.371. 1641,éd.Adam ; etp.371-375 73)VoirDescartes, ad directionem éd.Adam& Tannery, vol.X (Paris, 1996), Regulae ingenii, r.XII,p.413-414 : «[.. .]dumsensus externus movetur abobjecto, deferri quamrecipit figuram adaliam ensus communis Aristote [.. .]».Aucontraire quamdam corporis partem, quaevocatur niait unorgane sensoriel lessensibles communs» ,425a 13-14). (Del'âme «quiiexiste spécial pour

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dessensexternes, lelieuoùillesimprime comme enunecireétant lafantaisie parviennent ouimagination fantaisie estunevéritable . du ; etquecette [. .]74. partie corps En contrepartie il montre,en étudiantle rôle de ces différentes toutefois, facultés dansla connaissance, que toutreposesurl'unitéďune forcepurement : spirituelle Elleestcette seuleetmême force dontondit,si elles'applique avecl'imagination au senscommun, etc.; sielles'applique à l'imagination en voit, touche, seule, qu'elle qu'elle tant estcouverte dediverses sesouvient à elle ; sielles'applique quecelle-ci figures, qu'elle denouvelles, ouquellesereprésente elleagitseule, ; sienfin pourencréer qu'elle imagine Et cette même force le conformément à cesdiverses nom, [...]. reçoit qu'elle comprend tantôt d'entendement tantôt demémoire, tantôt de fonctions, pur,tantôt d'imagination, sens[.. .]75. Descartesen vientde ce faità récuserla notionla notionde « parties», objet chezlessuccesseurs ďAristotede biendesdiscussions, maisfinalement admise partousen sensdivers: De plus, lesfacultés deconnaître, devouloir, desentir, deconnaître, être etc.,nepeuvent dites sesparties c'est un seul et même connaît76. veut, sent, parce que esprit qui qui qui C'est uneseuleet mêmeforcequi, s'appliquantà telorgane,voit,c'estellequi se rappelle,c'estellequi imagineou conçoit,c'estellequi intellige. C'estpouralors d'un certain de vue sens sens, commun,imagination, quoi, que point 74)«Tertio communem etiam vicesigilli adeasdem vel est,sensum concipiendum fungi figuras a sensibus externis etsinecorpore inphantasia velimaginatione in veluti ideas, venientes, puras ceraformandas esseveram esse ; atquehancfantasiam ; atquehancphantasiam partem corporis veram & tantae vtdiversas abinvipartem corporis, magnitudinis, ejusportiones plures figuras cemdistinctas induere ad directionem éd. Adam & , (Descartes, possint» Tannery, Regulae ingenii vol.X, 1996,p. 414; RenéDescartes, del'esprit , trad. J.Brunschwig, Règles pourla direction dossier etglossaire (Paris, 2002),p. 135). préface, parK.S.Ong-Vac-Cung 75)«Atque vna& eadem estvis,quae,siapplicet secumimaginatione adsensum communem, dicitur &c.; siadimaginationem solam vtdiversis remidicitur videre, indutam, tangere, figuris nisci vtnovas dicitur vel si sola dicitur ; siadeandem ; fingat, imaginariconciperedenique agat, etiam idcirco hasfunctiones diversas vocatur velintellectus [.. .] Eteadem intelliger juxta purus, velimaginatio, velmemoria, velsensus & Tannery, vol.XI,p.415-416). ,éd.Adam [...]» (Regulae 76)«Ñequeetiam facultates &c.eiuspartes dicipossunt volendi, sentiendi, quiauna intelligendi & eadem mens estquasvult, Meditationes de sentit, (Descartes, quae quaeintelligit» prima philo& Tannery, vol.VII(Paris, Méditations ,éd.Adam , 1996), sophia p.86;Descartes, métaphysiques M.Beyssade trad. (Paris, 1990),p.247).

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sontdes partiesdu corps(et Descartesirajusqu'à tenterde les localiser),d'un autrepointde vuerienn'empêchede direque c'estun seuleetmêmeespritqui sent,imagineou conçoit. de danslesRègles En retravaillant la psychologie desfacultés pourla direction telleque l'avaient , c'està une traditionen elle-mêmetrèsdiversifiée, l'esprit rassembléeles textesjésuitesles plus détailléscommeceux de Rubio ou de Au seinde Suarez,maisaussilesmanuelsscolaires, que Descartesse confronte. il accentue,au pointde les retourner cettetradition, plusou moinsconsciemmentcontrecettetraditionelle-même,des tendancesqui, apparuesau XIVe dansle débatdu xvieetdu débutdu siècle,étaientencorefortement présentes xviiesiècle. commesouvent,lesfilsse croisent. En vérité,danscettehistoire, JeanBuridansle cadredu dan commentele Traitéde l'âmeen philosophequi travaille Mais discutant avecJeandeJandun, qui avaitaccentuéla corpusaristotélicien. ou d'opération entrela formequi donnel'êtreet la formeopérante distinction , l'âme doit l'unité de une de défend Buridan beaucoup, Jean qui conception : c'est au sensstrict à l'augustinisme, autantqu'à l'aristotélisme me semble-t-il, la doctrinede l'âme,forcespirituelle uniqueusantdes organeset dispositions Sans douteentreles deux termesde cette comme d'instruments. corporelles entre Buridan et Descartes, y a-t-ilune rencontreconceptuelle séquence, avérée.Il n'en restepas moinsque textuelle tradition imprévueplus qu'une tissantentreeux d'une nouvellemanière,ainsiqu'il l'inflexion buridanienne, ne se retrouve et augustiniens, vientd'êtrerappelé,des filsaristotéliciens pas le débat,elle chezquelquesémules; ellemarqueplusprofondément seulement elledonneuneimpulsionqui se dansdescourantsconcurrents, estintériorisée retrouve dansles texteslesplusvariés- et c'estpourquoij'ai souhaitéen marlisibledanscertains posé à la leçonthomiste, querl'échodans le contrepoint fil le de ces débatssurle bien suivre à on textesjésuites.De l'un l'autre, peut thèmede l'unitédes différentes puissancesde l'âmeentreelles,etde l'unitéde l'âmeavecsesfacultés.

Bibliographie deanima inlibros Aristotelis Antonii Ruvio Rodensis Antoine Rubio, [ . .] commentarii (Lugduni, 1613). - ],Liber latine XL(Paris, etanima, despiritu 1845). [pseudo Patrologie Augustin de La Trinité des.Augustin, »,vol.XV:texte , Œuvres «Bibliothèque augustinienne Augustin, M. Mellet, traduction etnotes l'édition O.P.,etT.Camelot, O.P.,introduction bénédictine, traduction deP.Agaësse, O.E.S.A. del'édition bénédictine, ; vol.XVI: texte parE.Hendrickx, notes encoll.avecJ.Moingt, 1955). S.J., S.J.(Paris,

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Desubstantia orbis Averroès, (Venise, 1562). CarlSigmund, 'De e libro 'Demotu item Costa-ben-Luca cordis', Barach, Excerpta Alfredi Anglici animae etspiritus' liber translatus a Johanne , Bibliotheca philosophorum differentia Hispalensis 2 (Innsbruck, iEtatis Mediae 1978). "Lesystème duXIVe siècle deJandun, dessensdanslaphilosophe naturelle Biard, (Jean Jean Joël, Blaise de 335-351. Buridan, Parme)", (2002),p. MicrologusX dusujet. La noétique d'Averroès selon Brenet, (Paris, JeandeJandun Jean-Baptiste, Transferts 2003). AdametPaulTannery, 1643, éd.Charles Descartes, René,Correspon¿iance janvier 1640-juin vol.III (Paris, 1996). deprima vol.VII (Paris, etP.Tannery, ,Meditationes , éd.C. Adam 1996). philosophia trad. M. ,Méditations , (Paris, 1990). Beyssade métaphysiques etglossaire del'esprit dossier ,Règles , trad. J.Brunschwig, parK.S. préface, pourladirection (Paris, 2002). Ong-Vac-Cung addirectionem & P.Tannery, vol.X (Paris, ,Regulae , éd.C. Adam 1996). ingenii Francisco Commentaria unacumquestionibus inlibros Aristotelis deanima Suárez, , introducción critica Salvador 3 vol.(Madrid, 1978,1981,1991). Castellote, yedición Guillaume C.Wey, IX,St.Bonavend'Ockham, ,éd.Joseph Quodlibeta Operatheologica septem ture (NewYork, 1980). decern libros Ethicorum Buridan, (Paris, 1513). Jean Quaestiones super deanima , Questiones , lib.II : voirSobol,1984. deanima 1999. , lib.III: voirZupko, , Questiones 1587); réimpr. libros Aristotelis deanima subtilissimae deJandun, (Venise, Jean Super quaestiones amMain,1966). (Frankfurt inAristotelis De anima NicoleOresme, NicolaiOresme etquaestiones , éd.B. Patar expositio (Louvain-Paris, 1995). & LonLeTraité del'âme deJean Buridan Patar, Benoît, lectura] [deprima (Louvain-la-Neuve 1991). Québec, gueuil, de Pourl'histoire dusens la controverse entre deBruges etJean Pattin, Adrian, Barthélemy agent: in 6 ses antécédents et son évolution Ancient and Medieval series , 1, , (Leuven, Jandun Philosophy 1988). Pierre Tractatus deanima : voirPluta1987. d'Ailly, von Diephilosophische desPeter Pluta, Olaf, (Amsterdam, 1987). Ailly Psychologie inAristhe Soul and Sensation anEdition oftheQuaestiones Buridan on ,with Sobol, Peter, John totelis Deanima liber lectura secundus Arbor, , detertia (Ann 1984). deanima Sancti Thomae deAquino Thomas ,éd.C. Bazan, Questiones Opera d'Aquin, disputatae 1 tomus XXIVXIIIP.M. editacuraetstudio fratrum omnia iussuLeonis praedicatorum, 1996). (Rome-Paris, doctoris contra Gentiles Thomae , Summa , dansSancti Operaomnia Aquinitatis angelici XIIIP.M.,t.XIII-XV iussu edita Leonis 1918-1940) (Rome, Thomae doctoris dansSancti , Summa , prima Opera Aquinitatis pars, angelici theologiae XIIIP.M.edita, omnia iussu Leonis t.V (Rome, 1889). impensaque andTranslation Buriilan's Jack, John Zupko, ofBookIII ofhis Philosophy ofMind.AnEdition De anima" onAristole's Arbor, (Ann 1999). "Questions

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c'0 (Ê)'6«V BRILL

VIVA RI UM www.brill.nl/viv

Vivarium 46 (2008)368-391

From an Outsider's Lorenzo

Point of View:

Valla on the Soul

Lodi Nauta University ofGroningen Abstract In hisRepastinatio a heavy attack onAristotelian-scholastic . . . Lorenzo Vallalaunched book is to andargumentaWhile most of this devoted metaphysics, language thought. on the soul and natural Valla also tion, incorporates chapters philosophy. Usingas he rejected muchof criteria goodLatin,commonsenseandcommonobservation, onthesoul,replacing thehylopmorphic account ofthe standard Aristotelian teaching one.Inthisarticle hisarguments onthesouls autonomy, scholastics byanAugustinián fromthebodyarestudiedandanalysed. His critique of andindependency nobility as beinguntrue to whatwe observe will Aristotles on natural opinions phenomena tobedeeporconsistent Hisarguments do notshowhimalways alsobebriefly studied. from somephiloreview ofAristotelian butthecritical thinker, philosophy proceeds his from a broader historical Moreover, perspective sophically assumptions. interesting ofAristode s authority as a contribution to thefinal maybe regarded undermining eventhough thehumanist wasjustone demiseoftheAristotelian critique paradigm, inthisprocess. factor Keywords Lorenzo Valla,soul,humanism, Augustianianism 1. Introduction:An Archcritic ofAristotelianPhilosophyin our Midst? humanismintoa discussionon Todayone no longerneedsto excusebringing Aristotelian traditions the scientia de anima} Humanistscontribregarding 0 SeeDennisDes Chene, LateAristotelian Form. N.Y, oftheSoul(Ithaca, Life's Conceptions w " deanima'. Theterm t"wascoined 2000),11n.3 onthetermscientia bytheGerpsychologu in 1575(Kathleen manhumanist Thomas ParkandEckhard "The Kessler, Joannes Freigius in TheCambridge ofPsychology", , ed.C. Schmitt, Concept History ofRenaissance Philosophy andE. Kessler 455. York, 1988),455-463, Q. Skinner (Cambridge/New ©Koninklijke Brill 2008 156853408X360966 DOI:10.1163/ NV, Leiden,

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uted significantly to the rediscovery, dissemination and understanding of a number of texts on natural mathand medicine, great important philosophy, ematics.Throughtextualstudies,theyalso influenced scientific practicesand as wellas fostered newideason scientific Humantechniques, methodology.2 istsinterested in Aristotelian turned to the Greek text of theDe psychology anima. New translations weremade,thougholderones,particularly thatof WilliamofMoerbeke,remainedin use.3Theyalso exploredtheancientcomtradition on Aristotle, theworksof,forexammentary editingand translating and Themistius. ple,Philoponus,Simplicius LorenzoValla(1406-1457),however, is notgenerally associatedwithnaturalphilosophy or psychology. Vallawas one ofthemostimportant Certainly, humanistsof QuattrocentoItaly.His ElegantiaelinguaeLatinaebecamean international bestseller and gavethehumanistprogramme some of itsmost trenchant and combativeformulations. Vallahas longbeenunderstood to be - someonewho accused an extremely hostilecriticof all thingsAristotelian theentirenatioperipatetica ofpresenting a skewedpictureofthesupernatural and naturalworld,and of man.Thispicture,he implied,was basedon their of Latinand of theworkingsof languagemore completemisunderstanding Valla thus attacked theAristotelian-scholastic traditiontoutcourt , generally. of their methods and disproving language, approaches.4 2)SeeAnnBlairandAnthony Humanism andScience", Grafton, Journal "Reassessing ofthe andAnthony Grafton andNancy in Siraisi, "Introduction", History ofIdeas53(1992)529-540, Natural Particulars. Nature andtheDisciplines inRenaissance andN. Sir, ed.A.Grafton Europe aisi(Cambridge, ofthehistoriographical with further litera1999),1-21,fora resumé debates, ture. Foranexcellent seeLucaBianchi, andChange intheAristotelian survey "Continuity inTheCambridge toRenaissance ed.J.Hankins Tradition", Companion Philosophy, (Cambridge, aswellashisStudi sull'Aristotelismo delRinascimento 2007),49-71, (Padua, 2003).Cf.alsoSte"TheIntellectual inTheCambridge PhilosoMenn, phen Setting", History ofSeventeenth-Century andMichael , ed.DanielGarbers York, 1998),33-86,esp.78 phy Ayers (Cambridge/New n.35. 3)Eugenio "Letraduzioni umanistiche diAristotele nelsecolo tlell'Acca¿Iemia Garin, XV",Atti discienze morali 'LaColombaria' 'G (1951)55-104; Ferdinand E. Cranz, fiorentina "Perspectives delaRenaissance surle'De Anima'", Platon etAristote à la Renaissance: XVIeColloque international deTours Charles B. Schmitt, Aristotle andtheRenaissance (Paris, 1976),359-76; (CamE. CranzandCharles B. Schmitt, A Bibliography 1983),64-88;Ferdinand bridge, ofAristotle ParkandKessler, 1501-1600 of EditionSy , 2nded.(Baden-Baden, 1984),165-67; "Concept De anima wastranslated 458.In thefifteenth Psychology", century bytheByzantine émigrés ofTrebizond andJohannes atleastfive more intoLatin translations folGeorge Argyropoulos; inthesixteenth lowed century. 4)A critical discussion ofValla's ispresented inmyforthcoming bookInDefense programme of Common Sense. Lorenzo Valla's Humanist in (I TattiStudies Critique ofScholastic Philosophy

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whichis not onlyspecifically anti-Aristotelian Althoughsuchan attitude, butalso generally not seem useful forconsidmay initially anti-philosophical, in transformations Aristotelian there are several reasons ering why psychology, itis interesting to bringVallaintothepicture.Valladid in factwriteaboutthe soul- namelyin thecontextofhisattackson Aristotelian-scholastic thought. As he himself hisreformation ofAristotelian anddialecobserves, metaphysics ticshad to includemoraland naturalphilosophy; indeedthechapteron natuinhisDialécticais amongthelongestin thework.5 ralphilosophy Thesearenot themostwidelystudiedpartsofVallascorpus,and it is worthwhile to explore bothhistreatment ofthesethemesand theirrelationship to hisbroadercritical aims.My contribution, is limitedto hisremarks on thesoul. however, VariousscholarshavearguedthatVallas criticisms of Aristotelian natural in the for innovation the and philosophy helpedpave way philosophy science ofthelaterRenaissance. Forinstance, CharlesTrinkaushasstressed thenature of Vallas empiricism, which appeals to common sense and observation. Thoughcarefulto avoidsecuring"a place forValla in thehistoryof natural science",TrinkausconcedesthatValla,"doeshavea placeas partoftheinternaldissidence withinthedominantnaturalphilosophy ofhisownage,thelate middleages and theRenaissance".6OtherscholarshavelocatedValla more withinthetradition of dissidentthinkers, whichfinally culminatedin firmly the riseof the new scienceof the late sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. GianniZippel thushas suggested thatVallaforeshadowed Renaissancenaturalismin formulating solutionsof positionswhich"preludelate-Renaissance Telesio".7Zippel viewsVallas positionas "thefirstconsciousanticipation in Renaissance March I, Harvard Press, Mass., 2009).Thisarticle History University Cambridge, isbasedonparts ofchapter 4. Someofthesameground inLodiNauta, iscovered "Lorenzo Valla's ofAristotelian 41 (2003),120-143. Vivarium I shallrefrain from Critique Psychology", extensive documentation here. Seeesp.C.Vasoli, Ladialettica elaretorica dell'Umanesimo giving P.Mack, Renaissance Renaissance Valla andAgricola (Milan, 1968),28-77, Argument. Argument. intheTraditions andDialectic Dialettica efilosofia in (Leiden, 1993),M. Lanfranchi, ofRhetoric Lorenzo Valla(Milan, "William ofOckham andLorenzo Valla:FalseFriends. 1999);L. Nauta, Semantics andOntological Renaissance "Val56(2003),613-651; Reduction", idem, Quarterly lasCritique"; "Lorenzo VallaandtheRiseofHumanist in TheCambridge idem, Dialectic", toRenaissance ed.J.Hankins York, 2007),193-210. Companion Philosophy, (Cambridge/New 5)Valla,Repastinatio dialectice etphilosophie Padua1982,2 vols(= Valla , ed.Gianni Zippel, vol.I,7. 1982), 6)Charles "Lorenzo Valla's Anti-Aristotelian 1 Tatti Natural Studies. Trinkaus, Philosophy", intheRenaissance 5 (1993),279-325, 322. Essays 7)Zippel s introduction toValla1982,1,cxviii storica del ("laprima consapevole anticipazione diBacone"). pensiero

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in naturalscience historyof Bacons thought",and claimsthathis interests Not diswerebased"on a verypreciseinductive and experimental approach".8 in the of "la via Riccardo Fubini Vallas tradition similarly, placed Repastinatio razionalistico moderno",despiteadmittingits limitedinfludell'empirismo ... enceon Vallascontemporaries. This"roadofmodernrationalist empiricism in the ambithe of Bacon and would become much later Descartes, only age tiousfoundation oftheNew Scienceofknowledge".9 in the Renaissance, Valla has been linkednot onlyto laterdevelopments but also to the so-called criticaltendenciesin later medievalthought, especiallythe nominalismof William of Ockham. Indeed, it has become ofan orthodoxy to callVallaa "nominalist" and an "Ockhamist" something on accountof his simpleontologyand his critiqueof abstractterms.Moreover,Vallasaccountofthesoul has beenlinkedto Ockham,sincebothseem in theprocessofcognition.10 to rejectspeciesas a kindofintermediary - an anti-philosophical The natureof Vallas generalprogramme crusade the worldview is also valuable to underthe Aristotelian-scholastic against his is carried out of Aristotelian because using psychology agenda standing of Afterall,thehistory somephilosophically ideasand approaches. interesting A its critics. its but also is not by onlyby practitioners philosophy shaped modernhistoriancan acknowledgeand analyseideas withoutnecessarily is to attackwhathe considersthe "fondaendorsingthem.Vallas strategy of menta"of theAristotelian edifice.11 This does not requirean examination to demonstrate thatthe each and everystone.Rather,forhimit is sufficient oftheedificearehighlyunstable;theywerebuiltuponthequickfoundations sand of a languageand methodology largelyunrelatedto thewaysin which strives to present view and describe the world.Vallatherefore peoplenormally theoretical an alternative to thatscholasticapproach,whichhe findsabstract, and argumenHe wantsto studywords,propositions and ratherunscientific. in each theoriginal tationsas theyoccurin reallifesituations, understanding 8)Zippels andcxviii-cxx introduction toValla1982,I, cxviii ("unapiùprecisa impostazione induttiva e sperimentale dellaricerca"). 9)Riccardo in di Lorenzo "Contributo dellaDialéctica Valla", Fubini, perl'interpretazione F. e l'età moderna ed. G. Vescovini e arabo-latina medievale scienza classica, , (Louvain-laFilosofia razionalistico 316("viadell'empirismo Neuve, moderno"). 1999),289-316, 10)Trinkaus, ofthisinterpre"Vallas Anti-Aristotelian Naturai 301.Forcriticisms Philosophy", Valla" and andLorenzo "William ofOckham tation ofVallaasa nominalist seeLodiNauta, InDefense Sense ch. Common 1-3. , idem, of n) Seee.g.thetitle univertotius dialectice etfundamentorum ofthesecond version Reconcinnatio inthree versions section salis Valla's text isextant 2). (seebelow, philosophie.

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The basisforVallas contextfromwhichit derivesitsmeaningand function.12 is thus two-fold: valid human knowledge of scholastic rejection thought - thatis, a sense of the world and both a common picture requires language and refinement necesgood classicalLatin whichpossessesall theresources The at was of humanist to describe that world. latter, least, fairly typical sary tastes. itconstituted Vallasobjectivewasmorethanmerely aesthetic; Significantly, basisof law,theology, a seriousphilosophical philosomessage:thelinguistic in all activities. The and fact of intellectual programmeaccordingly phy attemptsto make the studyof languageinto an incisivetool, one able to Vallaalsoassumesthatthe and misunderstandings. exposeall manneroferrors and writsinceit is essentialto thinking use oflanguageis farfromharmless, or misunderstands either words their use will whoever ing. Consequently, and It is not necesfallpreyto muddledthinking emptytheorizing. inevitably to allowthatVallas saryto agreewiththisas a diagnosisofscholastic thought, relevant. is position philosophically Thisdiscussion ofthesoulis butone ofthemanyquestionsand issuesraised norrelatively terribly byVallasposition.The accountis neither profound origof his inal. It is not evena particularly example representative generalprogramme:the bindingof philosophicalspeculationto what the sensescan - namely, classicalLatin- can and to thatwhicha particular language register it containssomethought-provoking expressthroughgrammar.Nevertheless ofthetraditional and ideas. Vallas simplification picture arguments thorough of to be as one answer the Aristotelian may regarded type paradigm:one can also reforma paradigmby simplyignoringthe questionsand issueswhich formitscore(whichis notto saythatthiswasVallasonlytactic.) Beforeturning ourfocusto Vallasdiscussionofthesoul,it maybe helpful to introduce hisDialéctica , inwhichhiscritiqueofAristotelian-scholastic philosophyis mainlyfound. 2. Valla'sDialéctica VallabeganhisDialécticain Paviain theearly1430s; thefirst versionis entitledRepastinatio dialectice etphilosophie or of the (therecultivating resowing

12)SeeNauta, "Lorenzo VallaandtheRiseofHumanist andidem, InDefense Dialectic", ofCommon Sense.

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The workis no lessambitraditional groundof dialecticand philosophy).13 In BookI Vallaattempts to undermine Aristoteliantiousthanitstitlesuggests. a of its tenets. Some scholastic number fundamental bycriticising metaphysics firefromValla include:theten of thepreceptswhichcome underparticular and the nine accidental substance, ones,includingquality,quancategories and the six transcendental terms such as "good","one" and relation); tity the such as and "true";concepts predicables, species,bywhicha thing genus can be definedand placedin theso-calledtreeofPorphyry; formand matter, to whenever these and actand potency. terms, Valla, concepts,and According or even rebarbative distinctions are couchedin ungrammatical Latin,they oftheworld,rather thanenlighten andconfuseones understanding complicate it.Vallamaintains thatones understanding shouldbe basedon comorclarify in good,classicalLatin.Book I further includeschapmonsenseandexpressed a critiqueof on substance. The former constitute ters materialand spiritual thelattertreatGod, thesouland thevirtues. Aristotelian naturalphilosophy; in BooksII and III to convertthe Vallafollowsthisanalysiswithan attempt Aristotelian into a rhetorical-grammatical diaformalscholastic of study logic lectic,one tailoredto the practicalneedsof publicdebate,communication extendthe rangeof admissible and argumentation. Seekingto considerably Valla draws Cicero, Quintilianand theRomanidealof the upon arguments, orator.Accordingly, he is lessconcernedwiththeformalvalidityofargumentation,whichhe findsrathernarrowifnotinsipid,and moreconcernedwith itspracticalefficacy. Does it convinceitsaudience?ThusVallarejectstheforin favourofa dialecticbasedon reallanguage, malapproachofthescholastics on arguments studiedin context.And whatcountsas contextforVallais far ofthescholasticexample. moreexpansivethanthesinglesentencestructure a majorrevisionin He continuedto workon theDialéctica, undertaking A was the1440swhileat thecourtofKingAlfonsoofAragon. secondrevision versionsofthe cutshortbyVallasdeathin 1457. None ofthethreesurviving to textachieveda breadthof circulation remotely comparable thatofVallas Book I ofthe Latinae . Nevertheless, handbookon Latin,theElegantiae linguae - is of as I preferto call it, afterthefirstversion Dialéctica or Repastinatio forourpurposes.14 specialrelevance " " 13)Orperhaps usedinthissense rather: out",repastinatio back", by "weeding being "cutting Debate Erika The inhisExhortatio noticed Tertullian Rummel, Humanist-Scholastic castitatis' by intheRenaissance andtheReformation 1995),156. (Cambridge, 14)Forthetext a third Vol.1 (pp.1-356) contains Vallas seeZippel's edition. version, including version. Vol.2 (pp.357-598) from thesecond critical which listsvariant apparatus readings contains thefirst version.

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- a rathergrandwordwhichhe an alternative Here,employing ontology would strongly dislike Valla challengesthatof the scholastics.His own is the verysimple: worldconsistsofthings;thesethingscan be analysedas substanceswiththeirrespective Theprimary therefore, qualitiesandacts.15 things, are not substances, sincesubstancecannotexistby itself;it is alwaysalready informed byquality.Thesearecalledthings(res)byValla,a simplecommon wordwhichhe obviouslylikes.The threecategories intowhicha thingcan be analysedare also calledthings:qualityis a thing,actionis a thingand substanceis a thing.Hence, "thing"is a transcendental the term,transcending in it is the transcendental term: the other or six five only categories; fact, To anotherbasic good,one,being,and so forth canall be reducedto thing.16 division,thatbetweenbodyand soul (or spirit),Vallaaddsa thirdclasswhich he calls "animal",consistingof both and rathersimilarto theAristotelian notionofthecomposite.17 Valla does not arriveat thispictureby systematically all of the reviewing doctrinesof thescholastics, but by assumingthatlanguagegivesus a direct - substance,qualityand actionapproachto the world.Behindhis triad ofnoun,adjectiveand adverb,and verb. clearlylie thegrammatical categories suchas relation, Hence,thereis no needforotheraccidentalcategories quanor time. these too are tity, place Grammatically, qualitiesofthings.Thusbeing twometerstallis a quality,as is beingwhiteor a father. Thisconclusionleads Vallato explorein detailthemultifarious whichthingsaretalked waysthrough he makesherearepertinent and interesting.18 about,and manyobservations Not thatthereis a simpleone to one relationship betweenlanguageand the world.Vallanotesmanyinstances wherethesuperficial ofan expresgrammar sioncan mislead;a verb,forinstancedoes notalwaysreferto an action.And whenone statesthatqualitiesarethingswhich"arepresentto thesubstance", thiswronglysuggeststhattheycan existapartfromone another,but,Valla In general, thegrammatical and however, says,"wecannotspeakotherwise".19 semantical features ofclassicalLatinoffer reliableguidelines forexpressing our viewsof theworld,ourselvesand ourbeliefs.In VallasmindtheLatinofthe 15)Repastinatio andinfact Fora good , ed.Zippel, 46-50,110-115, 127-134, 134-156, passim. discussion seeMack, Renaissance 22-116.Amore extensive treatment canbefound in Argument, Sense. 1-3ofmyInDefense chapters ofCommon 16)Repastinatio 11-21. , ed.Zippel, 17)Repastinatio , ed.Zippel, 49,422-424. 18)Seeesp.Repastinatio 134-156. , ed.Zippel, 19)Repastinatio 365. , ed.Zippel,

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is closelyconnectedwiththecommonspeechofthe greatauthorsofantiquity I to realise shall not butitis important discusshisrationale,20 people(populus). for classical Latin is not a suited for that, Valla, only language higherintellecsuchas oratory, butalso an tualand literary poetryand composition, pursuits forspeaking,writingand thinking abouttheworldin general.It instrument Whoever is semantically precise,syntactically complexand richin vocabulary. lacksthisfacultasloquendiis bound to go wrongin speaking,writingand Vallaletshimself be ruledbythisidea thediscussion, thinking.21 Throughout thatgood Latinis theperfect vehicleforexpressing our commonworldview, assumingthatwhatcommonsensetellsus is plainenough. 3. Valla'sDiscussion of theSoul HavingsketchedsomeofVallasmainideas,it is nowpossibleto considerhis discussionof the soul. This, togetherwithhis chapteron God, consitutes Vallas accountof "incorporeal substance"(or spirit),whichis followedby a long discussionof "corporealsubstance"(body). Valla advancesan underof similarto hisrepresentation standingofGod and thesoul thatis strikingly - by definition, and action. a thing of Thus,as consisting substance,quality versionofhiswork,God is divinesubstance thethree Vallasaysin thefirst couldeasilylead Sucha formulation Personsofwhichcan be calledqualities.22 oftheTrinto which each Person to accusations ofSabellianheresy, according it was not his or of the one Godhead. is a mode ity merely aspect Though intentionto givesupportto heretical views,Vallawas dulylinedup bylater criticsofTrinitarian such as Lelio Sozzini. theology is appliedto thesoul.23Valla The samemodelof substance-plus-qualities comparesboth God and the soul to the sun a favouriteand traditional 20)SeeMirko di unaquestione umanistica Storia Latino, Tavoni, (Padua, grammatica, volgare: "LeEleRicerche sullatino umanistico Rizzo, (Rome, 2002)Mariangela 1984),Silvia Regoliosi, italiana Studidigrammatica delVallacomegrammatica' 19 (2000), antinormativa", gantie InDefense Common Sense andNauta, 315-336, ("Conclusion"). of 21)Repastinatio , ed.Zippel, 5,145,278andelsewhere. 22)Repastinatio, seeSalvatore 402-408. ForValla's controversial ideasontheTrinity ed.Zippel, "Lorenzo e teologia Lorenzo Valla:Umanesimo Trinkaus, 1972);Charles (Florence, Camporeale, Ideas The the ofSpeaking about theTrinity", VallaontheProblem 57 (1996) Journal of History of 6. InDefense Common Sense ch. andNauta, 27-53, , of 23)Forhischapter and andthird onthesoulseeRepastinatio 59-73(second ,ed.Zippel, version) them here. I shall nottreat thedifferences between 408-419 (first version).

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lhe sun is substancewiththreeessentialqualities(or,as Vallapreanalogy.24 fersto say,naturalqualities):vibration, lightand heat.Thesequalitiesarealso foundin thethreePersonsof theTrinity, as wellas in thehumansoul- the threeessentialqualitiesofwhicharememory, reasonandwill.The activities of thesoul arethuscomparedto thevibrating and radiantbeamsof thesun by whichthingsaregrasped,illuminated and heated:25 sun

vibratus

lux

ardor

soul

memory eternitas

reason

will

sapientia

bonitas

God

Vallastresses thatthesoulis a substance, not Usingthismodeland argument, - thatis,a compositething - is madeofmata quality. As he says:a substance terand form,and thesoul is likewisea substance,beingmade of body (or ratheressence)and form.26 Valla thusdoes not accepttheAristotelian definition of the soul as "the substance(ousia) in thesenseoftheformofa naturalbodyhavinglifepotenanimamusiamesse,ut speciemcorporisnatutiallywithinit" ("necessarium ralispotentiavitamhabentis").ThoughValla quotesthedefinition, he does not reallydiscussit. Thisdefinition, was absolutely fundamental to however, thescholastics. Each word,as one scholarrecently became "a site of consaid, In Vallas tention,a point of heresydividingone school fromanother".27 - not account,formis thesameas qualityand thesoulis simplynota quality ofa humanor an animalbeing;callingita substantial formwouldnotchange 24)OntheplaceofthesuninRenaissance seeEugenio La cultura del Garin, thinking, filosofica Rinascimento italiano Charles "Italian Humanism and Trinkaus, (Florence, 1961),432-441; inRenaissance Scholastic Humanism: Forms andLegacy Foundations, , 3 vols.,ed. Theology", Albert Ilpensiero cristiano diLorenzo Valla nelquadro Rabil, Fois, 1988).Mario Jr., (Philadelphia, storico-culturale delsuoambiente toTertullian, Lactantius andStBasii (Rome, 1969),541points aspossible sources. 25)Repastinatio, ed.Zippel, 71and410. 26)Valla, vocetur ,46:"Quodcumitasit,primům (utBoetio libuit) Repastinatio predicamentum substantia'. Namcorpus e materia constat etforma, siveessentia etqualitate, etitem animam constare confitendum est".Cf.113:"etusitatius accomodatius estvocabulum multoque qualitas'quam'forma', sicut'essentia' In spiteofValla's towords, he quammateria'". sensitivity with"metaphysical" terms suchassubstance, matter inthefirst andquality: essence, struggles version hetalks ofa thing interms of"consubstance" ofsubstance inthe andquality; existing later versions thisbecomes substance ofessence andquality. existing 27)DesChene, Form 4l2a20. , 68onDeanima Life's

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Thisargument thatfact.28 raisesthequestionofthenatureoftherelationship - thatis, betweensubstanceand quality:is thesoulidenticalwithitsqualities - oraretheyontologically themselves withitspowers distinct? The scholastics weredividedon thispoint.Augustinians had initially arguedthatthedifferencebetweenthesouland itspowersis merely verbal;thesoulbeingidentical to itspowers,thesenamesreferonlyto thediverseactionsof a singleentity. Once thewritings ofAvicennaandAverroes becameknown,scholastic authors to the notion of an essential between the soul and its distinction accept began them Albert the Great and Thomas for described instance, powers. Aquinas, as substanceand its qualitiesor as essenceand its accidents.29 Nominalists, maintainedtheAugustiniánline thatno real difference however,generally exists.30 thanAristotelian, Vallas Thoughhis overallapproachis moreAugustinián its unwitof thesoul and itscapacitiesas substanceand qualities description sideswithThomisticteachings tingly againstOckhamistones. Qualitiescannotbe absentfromthesubstance, butarenotidenticalwithit. Nevertheless, Vallaalso saysthatit is one and thesamesoulwhichcarriesout all thefuncreasonand will. Memory,Valla tionsassignedto its threepowers:memory, and retains Reason examinesandjudgesthem.Will says,comprehends things. desiresor rejectsthem.But,sinceone and thesamesoul does all this,it does in factseemas thoughsubstanceand qualityareonlydifferent namesforthe Valla does not drawout fullythe consequencesof souls different actions.31 28)Vallarejects formulate thenotion ofsubstantial form buthetoomust (ed.Zippel, 112-113), inorder accidental a kind ofinseparability tosort essential outfrom ones, requirement qualities inhisdistinction between "natural" and"non-natural" which results (113)."Natural qualities a genus) sense: within both strict (intheir species qualities" comprise distinguishing differentiae Forhisideaisthat eachthing anduniversal suchascolour, touch andweight. accidents, shape, from itssubject, must have some colour andshape, andhence beinseparable justlikeheatinfire. heat of"natural isnotunproblematic, unlike Butthiscoupling ofdifferent for, qualities" types infire, a species from other whiteness does theexistence ofcolour doesnotdistinguish species: strict sense ofdifhegives thetraditional, notdistinguish manfrom horse. Elsewhere, however, a species from other viz.a quality which (169).Seech.1ofmyIn species ferentia, distinguishes Sense Renaissance 46-47. , and,more Mack, briefly, Argument, Defense ofCommon 29)E.g.Albert theGreat, De homine Thomas Summa I-I,q. 77, 1.73.2.2.2; Aquinas, theologiae der SeePiusKünzle, Das Verhältnis art.6 ("Utrum animae fluant abeiusessentia"). potentiae Seele zuihren Potenzen 1956),144-218. (Freiburg, 30)ForOckham's seeInLibros Sententiarum thesoulanditsfaculties, arguments concerning in on late medieval 11.24 Cf. Kathleen "Alberts influence Park, (Ockham 1981). psychology", and A. Albertus and the ed. 517-519 501-535, Sciences, 1980), (Toronto, J. Weisheipl Magnus DesChene, 143-154 Form, debate). (onthelate-scholastic Life's 31)Repastinatio, ed.Zippel, 66,75,410.

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thesevariousstatements or oftheirapparentcontradictions. He is verymuch concernedwiththeunityof thesoul,yethe also speaksaboutitsqualitiesin termsofautonomouspowerswhichhavetheabilityto act upon one another. - nottheconverse.32 The will,forinstance,is saidto teachtheintellect Therefore Valla is certainly a dualist;soul and bodyareverydifferent substances.For thisveryreasonValla reactsagainsttheTreeof Porphyry, which has substanceat thetop and itsfirst as corporealand incorporeal. differentiae Vallareplacesthiswithmultipletrees:one forbody,anotherforsoul,and even adds a thirdtreefor"animal"whichis thecompositeof thefirsttwo.33 Valla mustthenaccountforhow thegap betweenbodyand soul is bridged.The soul permeates thebody,he says;it is presentin thesenses,in theheartand the The soul (or ratheritspowthroughout body.It is thesoul thatperceives. therefore influences the The for will, instance, ers) body. providesthebody withitswarmth, whilereasongivesthebodyitsingenuoussystem ofhumours distributionem But the soul is also influenced (solertam humorum)?A by the a or headache drunkenness affects our mental When we body,e.g. capacities. aretiredwe becomeangrymoreeasily.Valladoes notdelvefarintohow the twosubstances whichis hardlysurprising interact, giventhatto thisdaytreatmentofthesubjectremainstricky at best.Buthiscontemporary philosophers did raisea question,one whichValladoes notconsider, whatthe concerning of the soul reveals about the in dependency physiological ontologicalcategory whichitshouldbe placed.35 does makeit clearthatthesoul mustnotbe consideredin Valla,however, thesamemanneras onewouldan ordinary thing.Forexample,restand movementare not termswe can applyto thesoul, nor,forthatmatter, to God. 32)Repastinatio 411andelsewhere. , ed.Zippel, 33)Repastinatio hemakes someinteresting Valla's ownpro46-50.Though , ed.Zippel, points, itsproblems. posalisnotwithout 34)Repastinatio 71-72. , ed.Zippel, 35)SeeKathleen "Theorganic in TheCambridge Park, soul", , History ofRenaissance Philosophy ed.C. Schmitt, andE. Kessler 468andDes York, 464-484, 1988), Q. Skinner (Cambridge/New ofwhether soulissubstance oraccident 71.Onthelate-scholastic Chene, Form> Life's question seeDesChene, Valla makes a brief remark on the status of animal soul 67-102. Form, Life's that itcannot bea quality, foronemayask:a quality ofwhat itmust Therefore, namely thing bea substance, which thatitis"created outofnothing, with divine than aid",rather implies from "the ofmatter" a section inthethird added version oftheRepasti(65:3-16, potency only Theideathat a soul(ofwhatever onorarise would outofmaterial was natio). body type) depend ananathema for Valla.Ingeneral, scholastics were lessadverse toit,since distinthey generally between human soul(created substantial forms guished byGod)andother bynatural (generated processes).

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he findsthe description of God as the unmovedmoverboth (Accordingly, and heat ridiculousand impious).The heartreceivesitsvibration, perception fromthesoul;hencetheheartis movedmorethananyotherpartofthebody oftheheat,causingbodilyeffects. Nevertheand responsible forthediffusion less,thesoul itselfis in neitherrestnormovement.36 YetevenVallacannotavoidterminology thattreatsthesoulan objectwhich thebody, is capableofvariousactions.Thusthesoul,permeating throughout thatthesoulcan (and often is also presentin thesenses.Vallahereemphasises does) activelyparticipatein the processof perception,ratherthanbeinga merepassiverecipient of an outsideworldactingupon it. He thusdiscusses thedirection ofperception: is it thepowerofthesenseswhichactively go out to meettheobjects(a positionknownas extramission) or,viceversa,arethe Valla theirimagesto the(passive)senses(intramission).37 objectssendingforth in easier for our soul because the is the it is much soul senses, saysthat, present to extend,bymeansoftheeyes rays,to coloursthanit is forcoloursto come into the eyes.He clearlyfavoursextramission, whichhe thinksdoes more of the soul than the alternative to the autonomous status theory.In justice Vallaseemsto suggestthatthesoul emits spiteofsomeambiguousphrasing, itsraysvia theeyes,whichrays,whenfallenon an object,are thenreflected as a kindof "mirror" and receivedbytheeye,theeyefunctioning {ad oculum velutad speculum).The soul thendoes not see the raysor imagescarried throughthe medium,but rathersees the objectin its own place, and, the therays,thebettertheobjectis seen.Thisdiscussiondoes and brighter sharper " Whiletheterm imago notemploytheterm"species"or "phantasm". ", which use here,is takenoverfromLactantius,it does not Valla does infrequently in thesameway. function on Vallas part.He This choice of wordsmay be a deliberatestratagem the and to mention and phantasms, ignores entirepanoplyof species neglects of souls,or as he Valla rejectstheexistenceof a plurality soulsand faculties. rational souls".38 He further and "the sensitive, says imaginative vegetative, 36)Repastinatio infact Aristotle butbothwere 72.Vallacriticises here, , ed.Zippel, quiteaware his own of the thesoulasa thing. Before ofthedanger oftreating presenting theory soul,in inbookI; hecriticised a number ofpertinent bookII oftheDeanimay Aristotle raised questions - notunlike that thesort ofcriticism fortaking thesoultobea magnitude forinstance, Plato, Vallamakes. 37)Repastinatio "Valla's is rather seeNauta, Vallasexplanation 155-156. obscure; yed.Zippel, InDefense Sense andidem, , ch.4. Critique", ofCommon 38)Repastinatio ofthe"imaginative soul"isodd,since mention 409.Theseparate , ed.Zippel, tothesensitive soul. asoneoftheinternal senses, belongs imagination,

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as thevisaestimativa and suchfaculties , omitting rejectsthesensuscommunis The result is an of uncomplicated, depiction the Augustinián imagination.39 substancewhichwas made in the soul as a whollyspiritualand immaterial intellect consistsofmemory, andwill. imageofGod, and,thoughitis a unity, Thisrepresentation does notexplaina numberof processes, includingsensationand cognition. ofthevegetative ThisAugustinián and hisrejection and senrepresentation sitivesouls do have some noteworthy consequencesforhis ideas about the soul of animals,the soul of plants,and about cognition.Of these,thefirst seemsto be themostsignificant. Men are not alone in possessinga rationalsoul; animalsalso do.40The debateoverwhetheranimalsarecapableof reasonwas,of course,longstandas RichardSorabjihas shown,thecase foranimal ing.In classicalAntiquity, reasonwas remarkably werebased on the strongand diverse.Its arguments had in commonwithmen- namely, capacitieswhichanimalssupposedly persome form of communicative emotion, ception,memory, preparation, speech, vicesand theliability to madness.41 ForVallathecaseforanimal skills,virtues, reasonwas different. It followsfromtheunityofthesoul.Sincethecapacities - likehumans - havea ofthesoulareso closelyconnected, and sinceanimals willand memory, theytoo mustpossessa rationalsoul.As is typicalofValla, he alsosupportshispositionbyintroducing considerations, linguistic quoting author.The Latinrhetor, Quintilian,hisfavourite arguingthat"animalshave to a certainextent",had regardedspeechas the thoughtand understanding main difference betweenman and animals.42 Valla adds thatlogoshad been confusedbylaterphilosophers whothoughtthat"a-loga"means"without reait meantonly"withoutspeech".The etymology oflogos son",thoughinitially fromlego(I speak,I say) is further evidence,saysValla. Thus,forhim,the - distinguishes to rather than the men capacity speak predicate"rational" fromanimals. Thislineof argument further impliesthatanimalsoulsarealso createdby God- thusa substancecreatedfromnothing,and not fashionedfrompre39)Repastinatio 73. , ed.Zippel, 40)Repastinatio, ed.Zippel, 67-68. 41)Richard Animal minds andhuman Theorigin morals: debate (Ithaca, Sorabji, oftheWestern 1993),30-96. 42)Quintilian, Institutio oratoria transi. Russell the 2.16.15-16, 2001,vol.1,373.Vallapresents inhisgloss same toQuintilian; LePostille alVInstituto Oratoria' diQuintiseeL.Valla, argument liáno Martinelli andA.Peroša theeditors comment on , ed.L.Cesarini (Padua, 1996),70,with pp.lvii-lviii.

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have denied existingmaterial.Valla claimsthatall schoolsof philosophers this.43 Butwhatthenis thedifference betweenhumanand animalsouls?Valla answersthattheformer aredirectly inspiredbyGod, havingbeenmadein his image;animalsoulsdo notsharethishonour.Moreover, thoughanimalsouls are createdwithdivineaid, theyare mortal.Valla thussafeguards thepriviof the human soul. his criterion for discriminatNevertheless, legedposition ing betweenthe two is unclear.What he rejectsis the notionthatone can fromreason,which,as instinct separateanimalfromhumanbydistinguishing Vallawrites, is "totakeshelterundertricksofterminology".44 Instinctis nothmore than a sort of which men also impulse(impetus), possesswhenthey ing " areexcited;hencetheyarecalled instinct f . Impulsearisesfromthewill, by whichassertionValla subvertsthe argumentthatthe presenceof instinct entailsa lack of reason . Aristotle, was wrong,Valla continues,to therefore, claim thatanimalsand youngchildrenlack the powerto choose (electio ) - perbecausetheylackreason.Thiscritique, Aristotle however, misrepresents sincehis opinionwas actuallythatreasondevelopsas chilhapsdeliberately, in theearlyyearsoftheir drengrowolder- appetitebeingtheprimary faculty s Politicson thistenet.45 life.In fact,Vallaelsewhere quotesAristotle A secondconsequenceofVallasrejectionoftheplurality ofsoulsconcerns theontologicalstatusof plants.While animalsare- so to speak- upgraded, theydo nothavea soul.Valladrawson theStoicsand plantsaredowngraded; for Epicureans support,claimingtheytoo deniedthatplantshavean ensouled His view on thegroundsthatplantslackappetite, souland reason.46 principle, modwas notuncontroversial. for wrote that "certain Later,Suarez, instance, erns(so I am told) havedaredto denythatthevegetative form,considered

43)Repastinatio 65. , ed.Zippel, 44)Repastinatio for which Avicenna wasanimportant 67and409.Acommon view, ,ed.Zippel, wasthat theseemingly rational behaviour ofanimals isduetotheestimative source, faculty; Dag intheLatin The Formation Nikolaus Avicennas 'Deanima* West: Hasse, ofa Peripatetic Philosophy ideathat tookupAvicennas (London/Turin, 2000),127-53. Aquinas oftheSoul1160-1300 the which forinstance enables a sheep toapprehend animals havea natural estimative faculty, Animal 64 ofthewolf Summa Mindsi I-I,q. 78,art.4.;cf.Sorabji, (Aquinas, theologiae danger Liber PaulofVenice's and75,86and113).Inthesource apparatus Zippel(67:21adloc.)cites . . . agunt exinstinctis naturae ... etitanonproprie deanima-, solum agunt "apesetformicae naturalis". sedsolum prudentiae opera prudentiae, 45)Politics atRepastinatio VII.15, 1334b22 asgiven , ed. (not1334al7-18 byZippel), quoted This is 1214 be or 62. Cf. Politics 1260a 1.13, (reason may completeincomplete). part Zippel, andothers somepeople never reason ofAristotle's toPlatowhohadsaidthat only acquire reply late{Republic SeeSorabji, Animal 70. Minds, 441A-B). 46)Repastinatio 60. , ed.Zippel,

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, is a soul; and consequently absolutely[praecise] theydenythatplantsare alive".47Valla is correctthat Stoics and Epicureansgenerallydenied an "ensouled"principleto plants;48 thequestionofhow plantsliveifnotbythe a of remains. Valla'sargument driveshimto thebrink presence soul,however, of concludingthattheyactuallydo not live,but therehe seemsto hesitate, wouldcontradict theordinary perhapsbecausesucha statement usageof the word "live".Hence, if theymustbe said to live at all, it can onlybe said (metaphorice ), justas we use "living"(vivus ) in othermeta"metaphorically" such as water" and viva) phoricalexpressions "flowing {aqua "glowingsulvivum References to in as the bibleand in ).49 phur"{suphur plants "living" of Gregorius Nyssa("theydo livebuttheydo notsense")makehimconclude thatplantsmay be said to live not by havinga soul but by theirviriditas liveliness or powerto grow).If by viriditas Vallameans or,rather, (greenness thepowerto grow,as thequotationpurportedly his suggests, positionmaybe said to comecloseto Aristotle's afterall,who had assignedsoulsto plantson accountoftheircapacityto feedand reproduce theirorganicstructure.50 A thirdconsequenceof hisAugustinián pictureconcernscognition.Since he does notaccepttheviewthatobjectsacton thesenseswithefficient causationto producecognition, he cannotacceptan abstractionist accountof any kind.His Augustinián picturewould entailthatthesoul,as an autonomous is universais and ideas.And substance, capableofdirectly spiritual perceiving indeedthereis one notoriouspassagein whichhe seemsto accepttheAugustiniándoctrineofdivineillumination. It is howeveran isolatedpassage,and it remainsunclearhowVallaenvisagedtheprocessofcognition.51 4. lhe Place ofValla'sCritiquewithinLate-Medievaland Renaissance Philosophy Valla'scritiqueoftheAristotelian-scholastic scientiade animais characterized a return to an of the soul as a whollyspiritualand by picture Augustinián immaterial substancewhichwas made in the imageof God, consistingof intellectand will. His basic convictionis thatthe soul is a much memory, 47)Quoted Form , 25n.31,andcf.57n.10. byDesChene, Life's 48)Onancient for soulstoplants seeSorabji, Animal 97-104. Minds, argumentsdenying 49)Repastinatio 60. , ed.Zippel, 50)Deanima 41Ob10-15,416a6-7. 51)SeeNauta, "William ofOckham andLorenzo Valla" andidem, InDefense Sense , ofCommon ch.2.

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morenoblethingthanthehylomorphic accountofAristotle implies,at least thataccount.He stresses, at variousplacesthe as Vallaunderstands therefore, souls dignified nature,itsimmortality, unity, autonomyand superior position vis-à-vis thebodyand vis-à-vis animalsoul,comparingit to thesuns central placein thecosmos.52 He does notattempt, to geta clearpictureofAristotle's however, position. in thelaterrevisions ofhiswork He citesvariousworksofAristotle, especially worksmorethoroughly, whenhe hasbecomeacquaintedwiththeAristotelian We findquotationsfromDe anima, De buthisuseofthemis highlyselective. animaanimalium , De partibusanimalium(called De membris generatione Ethicsand the Politics .53He thinkstheAristotelian theNicomachean liurrì), accountdefendsa pluralityof souls,and thatAristotleholds a composite ofa rationaland an irrational natureofthesoulconsisting part(herehe quotes that the soul is mortal,though He attacks Aristotle for his view thePolitica). of Aristotlefavourimmortality he also notesthatotherstatements (of the which Valla a rationalpart,whichstrongly nature, presupposes composite of a has Another rather tendentious example handling alreadybeen rejects).54 thatAristotle heldtheviewthatanimals i.e. whereVallasuggests mentioned, andyoungchildren lackthepowerto choose(electio ) becausetheylackreason. s opinionwasclearlythatreasondevelopsas children ButAristotle growolder; in faculty theearlyyearsoftheirlife.EarlierVallahimappetiteis theprimary his knowledgeof s Politicswhichreflects selfusesa quotationfromAristotle in thiscase. Aristotle's trueintention, butValladoesnotapplythatknowledge to his polemicalaimsratherthanapplyinghis impresHe thusgivespriority text. to Aristotles siveskillsin philology, Greekand Latinscholarship is at leastcited,thesamecannotbe said ofthescholastics. WhileAristotle evento mentionAlberttheGreat,ThomasAquinas,Williamof Vallaneglects in his Ockham,JohnBuridan,AlbertofSaxonyor othermedievalscholastics with book,thoughthereis evidencewhichsuggestshe had somefamiliarity He omitsdiscussionof thewealthof questionsthat themand theirworks.55 52)Repastinatio, ed.Zippel, 71. 53)I havenotyetfound orthe translation translation heused;itisnottheMoerbeke outwhich and translations oftheEthics VallausedLeonardo Brunis ofMoerbeke usedbyAquinas. version when became available tohiminthe1440s. Politics they 54)Repastinatio 61-62. , ed.Zippel, 55)Ina letter AlberVallalists somescholastic authors: "autillosdialécticos, tohisfriend Serra and Venetum" tůmutrunque, , ed. O. Besomi Occam,Paulum Strodem, (Valla,Epistole thatVallawaswell M. Regoliosi (Padua,1984),20).Thislisttoodoesnotnecessarily imply a number ofValla inmyforthcoming bookagainst their asI haveargued with works, acquainted

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scholastic authorsposedon thesoul,itspowers,and on theprocesses ofcognitionand sensation,and posesno argument the of the souls against panoply Ifhe is acquaintedwithconceptssuchas sensibleand faculties and functions. to be silent species,intuitiveand abstractcognition,he prefers intelligible aboutthem.Thus,primarily theprocessesofsensationand cogbyneglecting them. nition,he succeedsin simplifying This simplification, the notionof directperception, has led particularly scholarsto likenVallas positionto Ockhamsrejectionof sensiblespeciesas in theprocessofperceiving. intermediaries But,as I havenoted,Vallasdiscussiondoes notcontaintheterm"species"or "phantasms", nordoes it mention Ockhamsnotionsofintuitive and abstract cognition.Ockhammayhavesugas Eleanore that for intuitivecognition"thereare no writes, Stump gested, mechanisms or processes.Thereis just directepistemiccontactbetweenthe Directcognitioncannotbe explained, cognizerand the thingcognized".56 becauseitis directand thusdefiesfurther precisely analysis.Suchassumptions also account for Vallas omission. it is But nevertheless to realise may important unlike he does not seem to be motivated that, Ockham, by epistemological considerations. Vallaratheris concernedwiththeintramission theoryofperception,whichhe feelswould jeopardizethe souls noble and autonomous nature.Thatage-olddebateon intramission versusextramission is in factthe directcontextofhis remarks, and hisquestionaboutthedirectionofperception unrelatedto Ockhamstheory.Hence it incorrect to claim,as Trinkaus has done,thatValla "is undoubtedly to the scholastic controversy referring" about the existenceand natureof sensiblespecies.57 Valla would agreethat thereis directcontactbetweencognizerand object,and that- insofaras it is - itrequires directand immediate contact no explanation. However,hewould notallow,as Ockhamdoes,thattherearetwosouls- a rationaland sensitive one.Vallais quitefirmon thepointofone soul.ThusOckhamstheory would be as unacceptable to Vallaas anyotherscholastictheory. Vallas accountdoes containsome echoesof certainscholasticdebates betweensouland itspowersand on theontological namelyon therelationship someofthem sofartosaythat theRepastinatio makes careful useof scholars, going "knowing, scholastic andmethods ofargumentation" orthat "Valla meant toremake terminology seriously scholastic onitsownterms" "Lorenzo Valla: A Symposium. Intro(W.J.Connell, metaphysics duction5 the ',Journal of History ofIdeas57(1996),1-7,at5. 56)Eleanor "TheMechanisms ofCognition: Ockham onMediating in The Stump, Species", toOckham , ed.P.V.Spade,(Cambridge/New York, 1999),168-203, Cambridge Companion 184;cf.194-95. 57)Charles "Lorenzo Vallas Anti-Aristotelian Natural 301. Trinkaus, Philosophy",

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theseareveryfaint;it is doubtfulthathe did statusof thesoul. Nevertheless morethanleafthroughsome of thescholasticworks.As I havearguedelseofVallaas a rhetorical follower where,in spiteof thecommoninterpretation in of Ockham,no morethanthissameglancingknowledgeis present Vallas entirecritiqueofAristotelian-scholastic and dialectic. metaphysic But if one scarcelyengagesin criticaldiscussionof a paradigm,can one it?Some modernhistorians makemuchofVallas approachin his transform As mentionedin theintroduction, theyargue chapteron thenaturalworld.58 in naturalphilosophy which thelaterdevelopments thatValla foreshadowed not necesto scholasticism. does dismantle however, helped (Foreshadowing, and observation, sitateinfluencing.) Frequently appealingto dailyexperience He rejectsor qualifiesa Vallas approachshowsa kindof naïveempiricism. - namely tenetsof Aristotelian naturalphilosophy numberof fundamental thatmovement is thecauseofwarmth,thatone movementis alwayscaused intoone another, thateachelethatelementscan be transformed byanother, menthas itsown properqualities(fireis warmand dry,airwarmand moist, etc.), thatpure elementsexist,and that the combinationof warmthand of life.59 Vallas rejections oftenhave is sufficient forthegeneration humidity the character of a reductio ad absurdum ; ifAristotle's theoryweretrue,one Forinstance, wouldexpectquitedifferent phenomenathanthoseoneobserves. the moon claimed of a below Aristotles for the existence fiery sphere argument Vallacountersthis that"leadenmissilesshotout byforceliquefyin theair".60 In never see balls- whether we to common life, byappealing experience. daily a or a cannon heat iron or stone shot out of leaden, up in theair;even sling LaterGalileowoulduse a oflaunchedarrowsdo notcatchfire.61 thefeathers similarargument.62 However,does thiswarrantthe conclusionthatValla or in earlymodern ofRenaissancenaturalism occupiesa placein thetradition science? Valla'sappealto thesensesratherhas a polemicalaimofshowingthatAristoteliannaturalphilosophymakes,as he believes,gratuitousassumptions termsand theboundaryofsenseand introduces aboutthingswhichtranscend pictureofthenatural conceptswhicharefarremovedfromourdaily,ordinary

58)Repastinatio n.6-9. 98-110.Seeabove , ed.Zippel, 59)Cf.Mack, onwhich Vallacontradicts a number ofpoints Renaissance 69,wholists Argument, In Fordiscussion seeNauta, thescope ofhisstudy. falls outside butnatural Aristotle, philosophy 4. Common Sense ch. , Defense of Decáelo II.7,289a26-28. 61)Repastinatio, ed.Zippel, 98-99. 62)Trinkaus, 288n.15. Anti-Aristotelian Natural "Lorenzo Valla's Philosophy",

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is notan invitation to collectas muchdataas possible world.His "empiricism" and investigate theworkings ofnaturebutratherservesas a curbon speculaand pretensions tion,as an antidoteagainstwhathe seesas thepresumptions who aretoo inquisitive of thephilosophers, aboutGods artistry (artificium). ForValla it shouldbe enoughto knowthatGod madethestars,theheavens in and theelementsat thebeginning of time:we willlearnabouthis artistry thenextlife.God did notneedthespinningofthespheresin orderto create theelementsand givethemtheirplace.He is notboundbytheprinciplethat nothingcan ariseout of nothing,as is shownbythenatureoffire.ButValla was smartenoughto use the Bible as sourceof positiveknowledgeabout naturewhenit suitedhim:thebiblicalaccountof thecreationof man from as evidenceagainsttheview mud,whichis soil soakedin water,is presented thatthehumanbodyconsistsofall thefourelements.63 To evaluateVallas relationship withlaterRenaissancenaturalist thinkers, let us briefly considerhis argumentthatanimalsalso havea rationalsoul.64 This argumentdoes not reston a consistendy naturalist approachtowards menas partofthenaturalworld.Vallastilladheresto an Augustinián account ofthecreationofmanssoul,a reflection of theTrinity. As mentionedabove, Vallarather ascribes to animals a soul createdbydivine inconsistendy similarly aid. Moreover, a theoryof cognitionis conspicuously absentfromhiswork. A theoryof cognition, was ofcentralconcernto thescholastics and however, to thoseearlymodernphilosophers, suchas Telesioand Hobbes,advancing towarda mechanistic-naturalist philosophy.Hobbes reduced sense perin to local motions the bodycausedbyexternalobjects.The underception whichman standingis thusnothingbut a specialformof the imagination shareswithanimals.65 Telesiohad previously that the intellect is a conargued tinuationof thesenses,and thatthedifference betweenman and animalsis thusofdegreeonly- "humanspiritbeingmorefineand copiousthanthatof otheranimals".66 sinceValladoesnotpresent Therefore, anyseriousalternative 63)Repastinatio 100(spinning ofspheres), 102(nature offire), 98 (Godsartistry), , ed.Zippel, 109(four elements). 64)Theterm "naturalism" however israther andshould beusedwith forsome caution; vague comments seeBianchi, intheAristotelian andChange 68. Tradition', pertinent "Continuity 65)Hobbes, Leviathan 11.ForHobbesdebttoRenaissance naturalistic , ch.2,ed.Molesworth, thinkers seeCeesLeijenhorst, The Mechanisation TheLateAristotelian ofAristotelianism: Setting Thomas Hobbes' Natural , (Leiden, 2002). of Philosophy ^ Quoted "Hobbes andTelesio", 1 (1988),109-133, Hobbes Studies 116 byKarlSchuhmann, from s De rerum Telesio natura iuxta Telesio between anintellecpropria principia. distinguished immortal inmen)andanorganic soul(only soul(spiritus); seeDanielP.Walker, tive, Spiritual

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forthescholasticand naturalist accountsof sensationand cognition,it is by no meansintuitive thathe shouldbe regarded as having"a placeas partofthe internal withinthedominantnaturalphilosophy" ofhisownage.67 dissidence Furthermore, hardlyanyevidencesuggeststhatValla is on theroadto an razionalistico moderno".68 Vallawritesthatone and thesamesoul "empirismo wills. This is reminiscent ofDescartes,who stateslikewise and retains, judges, in theMeditations.69 But Descartescameto hisdualismbyanotherroad- by

thescholastictheoriesand notions.Moreover, Vallasworkhas no rethinking or for his for Descartes' clear and distinct ideas methodof doubt. equivalent Vallaand Descartesthusappropriated ofthesoul representations Augustinián in diversemanners. We should,therefore, resistthetemptation to assessValla,an earlycriticof in terms of the of later critics. Vallawas notdevelopingan Aristotle, agendas to Aristotelian alternative naturalphilosophy , and hencedid notas is often or "a newmentalenvironment", at claimed contribute to a "newmentality" naturalist and leastinsofaras "mentality" cultivated mathematical, empirical, mechanist strandsofthoughtin theRenaissance. themes Buteventhoughhisattitudeand positionon naturalphilosophical naturalist do not bear structural likeness with those of later phiusually any which losophers,yetit can be arguedthatValla gave ventto a sentiment saw thatArisVallarightly erodedfaithin theAristotelian ultimately system. observations. totle'sconclusionscould not be made to squarewitheveryday of the faithin withhindsight we can see thatany undermining Moreover, to its to itsdemiseand finally scholastic-Aristotelian worldviewcontributed to this mechanistic one. Valla surelycontributed bya different, replacement hermetic Ficino toCampanella andDemonic (London, 1958),190-194. Against Magic from Patrizi thatanimals havea rational , dissoul;Novadeuniversis Philosophia teachings, argues andonThomas Hobbes onRenaissance cussed Selected , eds. byK. Schuhmann, philosophy papers 164. P.Steenbakkers andC. Leijenhorst 157-170, 2004), (Dordrecht, 67)Trinkaus, to "Lorenzo Valla's Anti-Aristotelian Natural 322,butheiscareful Philosophy", inpositive terms" hisownnatural admit that"itwouldbehardtooutline (324); philosophy more difItismuch Valla"ispre-Copernican, moreover, (322-23). pre-Galilean" pre-Keplerian, ofboth ofAristotelian doctrines "aretheresult ficult toagree with Trinkaus that Valla's criticisms with ofscholastic with natural andhisknowledge hisfamiliarity teachings, together phenomena hisconcentrated about them" (325). thinking 68)Fubini, "Contributo 316. perl'interpretazione", 69)Repastinatio that VI:"itisoneandthesamemind Meditation 75.Cf.Descartes, , ed.Zippel, The R. andhassensory willsandunderstands Descartes, Philosophical Writing of perceptions"; 2 vols.(Cambridge/New R.StoothofF, andD. Murdoch, Descartes York, , transi. J.Cottingham, vol.II,59. 1984-85),

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necessary preparatory stageof doubtingtheAristotlesauthority. Thoughhe does notmentionValla,Menn'sjudgementon humanistanti-Aristotelianism maybe appliedtoVallatoo: "thoughtheirfirst stepstowardsa newphilosophy werestumblingand may be comparedunfavourably withthe accomplishmentsoflatescholasticism, we mayseewithhindsight thattheirbold experimentspreparedthe way forthe emergenceof mechanicalphilosophyand » science.70 In short,Vallascritiqueproveda necessary of a domistepin dismantling nantparadigm;ithelpedto undermine faithinAristotle and theAristotelianscholasticapproach.His rejections areoftenbasedon linguistic grounds,and extendto philosophical as wellas manyscholastic speculationand theorizing, and terms.While thisis typicalof a humanist,Vallas entities,distinctions critiquewentwell beyondthe usual diatribeon theiropponents'so-called barbarous and ungrammatical Latin.Language,forValla,cannotbe abstracted fromthelivingcontextin whichit functions and fromwhichit derivesits and Words and should not be takenout of conpower. meaning arguments - consequently for so alters their common text, doing normal, meaning giving rise to philosophicalproblemswherenone previouslyexisted.This, whatthephilosopher does. Philosophical accordingto Valla,is precisely spec- withits technicalabstruse, ulation and esoteric withits vague vocabulary, rulesand conventionsof the Latin tendencyto disregardthe grammatical language soon takeson a lifeof its own. Leavingthe worldof common farbehind,thephilosopher whichcan only experience employsterminology be handledand understood other by philosophers. Againstthis,Vallachampions the ordinaryconception(or "folk"conceptionas modernphilosophers wouldsay)oftheworldand ofthewayitis reflected in classicalLatin.He thus takesissuewithwhathe considersthephilosophers' ficta,theirabstractions and theories, whichtakeconceptsand termsout of theirordinary' semantic network.Hence,Valla'scritiqueof scholasticthoughtis essentially a critique oftheirlanguage,consciously and deliberately so. Thisimportant insightcan also be foundin manylaterphilosophers, and is prominent, forinstance,in 70)Menn, "Intellectual sense then Fubini A related 47.Inthis maybesaidtoberight. Setting", butbynomeans identical factor inthedecline ofAristotelianism iswhat hasbeencalled "her- ofAristotle's - orevenoverkill meneutic animmense increase ofknowledge hypertrophy": works anditslate-antique andmedieval wellattested ofedicommentators, bya hugenumber translations andcommentaries. Thisultimately ledtoa watering down ofthecontours of tions, whatwasoncea powerful SeeL. Bianchi, Studi sull'Aristotelismo delRinascimento paradigm. external factors ofnatural were also (Padua, 2003),136.Ofcourse, (e.g.discoveries phenomena) very important.

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theworkofThomasHobbes. (But,one mayadd, scholasticpilosophers were thefirstto recognizethepotentialfallacieswhicharisefromtheirtechnical terminology.) theAristotelian Thus,in fighting paradigm,Valla oftenappealedto common senseand everyday and observations. Forhim,thewisdom experiences ofthecommonpeopletookpriority overphilosophical analyses.Philosophical analysisis doomedto failurebecauseitsaimsat refining 'folk'notionsby and makingunwarranted claims speculativeargument,emptytheorising, whichtranscend theboundariesofsenseexperience and commonsense.It is notdifficult to throwdoubton thelegitimacy of thiscontrast. The concerns and questionsofphilosophers aresimplydifferent, and aim at theelucidation and analysisofconcepts.Thus,forthosefollowing theAristotelian dialectical and somedailyobsermethod,commonopinions,common-sense intuitions, vationsareimportant, butonlyas a starting reflecpointforrationalcriticism, at a correct accountofthe tion,and generalization. Bythisprocessone arrives would retort,thatthislaterstageof rational phenomenon.Valla,however, criticism and reflection has degenerated intoa languagegamewhichhardly bearsanyrelationship to theworldit allegedlyattempts to analyse.One may turnup ones nosein contempt ofsuchconvictions, butthisparticular convictiondoesin factsurfaceat variouspointsin history and undeniably hasphilosophicalrelevance. Vallasimportance shouldnot,therefore, be soughtat thelevelofargument; his with frequently engagement philosophicalenemiesor straw-men pierced littlemorethanskin-deep.Rather,his importance lies in recognizing thata completechangeof paradigmwas required.This is farfromeasyto accomin hischapteron thesoul.Vallamay plish,as hisworkbearsout- particularly havethoughtthathisAugustinián ofthesoulwas moresimple representation and truerto bothhumanexperience and Christianfaith.Nevertheless he is unableto avoidmakinga numberofstatements are which,on closeranalysis, not so simple,commonor straightforward. Even "commonsense"is shot - fortuthroughwith philosophicalassumptions,and thus it continues nately to be the job of the philosopherto articulateand analysethese and convictions.71 assumptions

71)I amgrateful Zinnforstylistic toPamela suggestions.

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efilosofia inLorenzo Valla(Milan, Laffranchi, M.,Dialettica 1999). TheLateAristotelian The Mechanisation Aristotelianism: C, Leijenhorst, of Setting ofThomas Hobbes' Natural 2002). (Leiden, Philosophy andDialectic VallaandAgricola intheTraditions Mack,P.,Renaissance Argument. ofRhetoric (Leiden, 1993). inTheCambridge Menn, S.,"TheIntellectual Philosophy, Setting", History ofSeventeenth-Century ed.D. Garbers andM.Ayers York, 1998),33-86. (Cambridge/New ofOckham andLorenzo Valla:FalseFriends. Semantics andOntological Nauta, L.,"William Renaissance 56(2003),613-651. Reduction", Quarterly 41 (2003),120-143. Valla's ofAristotelian Vivarium , "Lorenzo Critique Psychology", in TheCambridge to VallaandtheRiseofHumanist , "Lorenzo Dialectic", Companion Renaissance ed.J.Hankins York, 2007),193-210. (Cambridge/New Philosophy, Sense. Valla's Humanist Lorenzo , In Defense ofScholastic Philosophy ofCommon Critique March Mass., 2009). (Cambridge, inTheCambridge "TheConcept ofPsychology", K.andE. Kessler, Park, History ofRenaissance E. Skinner and Kessler ed. C. York,1988), , Schmitt, Q. (Cambridge/New Philosophy 455-463. inAlbertus andtheSciences influence onlatemedieval , Park, K.,"Alberts Magnus psychology", ed.J.A.Weisheipl (Toronto, 1980),501-535. in TheCambridge , ed.C. Schmitt, , "Theorganic soul", ofRenaissance Philosophy History 464-484. andE. Kessler York, 1988), Q. Skinner (Cambridge/New digrammatica Studi delVallacomegrammatica' antinormativa'", M.,"LeElegantie Regoliosi, italiana 19(2000),315-336. sullatino umanistico Rizzo, S.,Ricerche 2002). (Rome, andthe Debate inthe Renaissance Humanist-Scholastic Rummel, E.,The Reformation (Cambridge, 1995). C. B.,Aristotle andtheRenaissance Schmitt, 1983). (Cambridge, 1 (1988),109-133. Hobbes Studies andTelesio", Schuhmann, K.,"Hobbes and Hobbes andonThomas onRenaissance , eds.P.Steenbakkers , Selected philosophy papers C. Leijenhorst (Dordrecht, 2004),157-170. debate morals: Theorigin minds andhuman R.,Animal 1993). (Ithaca, oftheWestern Sorabji, inTheCambridge Ockham onMediating ofCognition: E.,"TheMechanisms Species", Stump, toOckham York, , ed.P.V.Spade(Cambridge/New 1999),168-203. Companion una umanistica Storia di Tavoni, M.,Latino, (Padua, 1984). volgare: questione grammatica, FoundainRenaissance Humanism: Humanism andScholastic Trinkaus, C.,"Italian Theology", Forms andLegacy, ed.A.Rabil, 3 vols., tions, 1988). Jr.(Philadelphia, inthe RenaisI Tatti Studies. Anti-Aristotelian Natural Valla's ,"Lorenzo Philosophy", Essays sance 5 (1993),279-325. theTrinity", The ofSpeaking about VallaontheProblem , "Lorenzo Journal oftheHistory ofIdeas57(1996),27-53. dell'Umanesimo e la retorica Vasoli, C.,Ladialettica (Milan, 1968). Ficino toCampanella andDemonic D. P.,Spiritimi 1958),(repr. Walker, (London, from Magic Press PA:Pennsylvania State Park, 2000). University University ed.G.Zippel inL.Valla, dialectice etphilosophie, (Padua, G.,"Introduzione", Zippel, Repastinatio 1982),ix-cxxxii.

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'àï BRILL

Cardano's

Vivarium 46 (2008)392-417

Eclectic

Psychology and its Critique by Julius Caesar Scaliger

Ian Maclean AllSoulsCollege , Oxford Abstract Thispaperexamines thetheories ofthesoulproposed CardanoinhisDe byGirolamo immortalitele animorum CaesarScaliger s (1545)andhisDe subtilitate (1550-4),Julius of theseviewsin theExercitationes exotericae de subtilitate comprehensive critique of 1557,andCardano's to thiscritique in hisActioin calumniatorem of 1559. reply Cardanoargues thatthepassive isindividuated intellect andmortal, andthattheagent intellect is immortal butsubject toconstant indifferent reincarnation humanbeings. His theory ofcognition leadshimto claimthatat itshighest is level,theintellect converted intotheobjectofitsperception. In hisrefutation ofthevarious elements ofCardano s theories, useshisknowledge oftheGreektextofAristotle to Scaliger stress thereflexive ofthesoul,itsability to conceive ofobjectsgreater than faculty anditsstatusas theindividuating ofthehylemorphic humanbeing. itself, principle In spiteofCardanospretention tonovelty andScaliger s humanist both credentials, thinkers areshownto conducttheirdiscussions in an inherited scholastic matrix of thought. Keywords Girolamo CaesarScaliger, Cardano, soul,intellect, Julius cognition ZweiSeelen wohnen ach!inmeiner Brust, Dieeinewillsichvonderandern trennen; Dieeinehält, inderber Liebeslust, SichandieWelt mitklammernden Organen; Dieandere hebt sichvomDust gewaltsam ZudenGefilden hoher Ahnen. Faust (Goethe, I)

©Koninklijke Brill 2008 NV, Leiden,

DOI:10.1163/ 156853408X360975

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1. Introduction in thenatureofthesoul lhe Renaissancewitnessed a strongrevivalofinterest The and of mentalactivity whichinvolvedboth theologyand philosophy.1 in the set of fifteenth had inherited addressed century questions Aquinass anima Summatheologiae on Aristotle's De , and , the medievalcommentaries These the investigation of cognitionby Duns Scotus and the nominalists. on materials wereenrichedbythenewlyavailablelateantiquecommentaries of thesoul and Aristotle whichreactivated thediscussionof theimmortality oftheintellect; theAverroistic doctrineoftheunicity and thesein turnrevived to religion, a numberofrelateddoctrines subversive notablytheclaimthatthe doctrineof immortality of thesoul was no morethana meansof enforcing compliancewithhumanpoliticalinstitutions throughthethreatof punishNiccolettoVerniaof Padua was thefirstscholarof mentin thelifehereafter. thelate fifteenth to century fallfoulof his local bishopin discussingthese his Pietro and suggestedthat issues; pupil Pomponazziwentmuchfurther, His De animaeimmort Aristotle had arguedforthesouls materiality. alitate, in after the Fifth Lateran Councils directives three 1516 years published and the necessary of philosophical about thesouls immortality consistency and theologicaltruth,unleasheda stormof protestand becamethepointof from forlaterdiscussions.2 Theseincludedhumanistcommentaries reference Luis theGreekof theDe animaand new monographs Vives, Philip byJuan and GirolamoCardano.3 Melanchthon, Are therenew A numberof questionsariseabout thesedevelopments. the ancients into the of the texts of throughthereadingof insights meaning Is a distinction theGreek(a questionofhermeneutics)? clearlydrawnbetween !) SeeEckhard inTheCambridge ofpsychology" Kessler & Katharine "Theconcept Park, history Dennis ed.C. B.Schmitt & Q. Skinner 455-534; 1988), (Cambridge, philosophy, ofRenaissance Les soul(Ithaca, DesChene, lateAristotelian Vidal, 2000);Fernando conceptions ofthe Life's form: del'âme : XVIe -XVIIIe siècle sciences 2006). (Paris, 2)Seetheworks inIanMaclean innote1,andtheliterature cited cited Gratarolo, "Pomponazzi, andreligion & I. Maclean inHeterodoxy inearly modern science ,ed.J.Brooke Cardano", (Oxford, 2006),10-31. 3)Juan deanima 1538);Philip Commentarius etvita(Basle, LuisVives, Deanima Melanchthon, deanima Liber Melanchthon, 1552).Onthese 1540)andPhilip recognitus (Wittenberg, (Lyon, De immortalitate del'âme twoworks, seeVidal,Lessciences Girolamo, , 50-8.AlsoCardano, references to I shall cite the M. García Valverde animorum ed. (Milan, 2006). (1545), J. pages Valverde the Garcia inCardano, omnia ed. C. thistext 456-536; , 1663), (Lyon, Spon Opera comApertinent ofa humanist asmarginalia. edition includes references tothese example pages isFrancesco diVimercate 1543. mentary

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theinterpretation ofAristotle and thefreeconstruction ofphilosophical argument?In otherwords,is scholastic Aristotelianism stillthedominantmatrix of thoughton theseissues?If newphilosophical do positionsareelaborated, thesearisefroma new agendaof questionsor fromnew configurations of or fromboth?Is thereevidenceof a growingdesireforliberation argument, fromtheologicalconstraints on philosophicalspeculation? Or rather, arewe theories of the nature and interaction of soul and merely composite witnessing in theworkofAverroes, bodywhoseelementshaveprecedents Aquinasand othermedievalmasters, eveniftheseelementsaremotivated bysubtlydifferentquestions,and informed different and princibyslighdy presuppositions The excellent section on Katharine Park and Eckhard ples? by psychology Kesslerin theCambridge History byitsnarofRenaissance Philosophy suggests rativethatthereis a significant evolutionin whichneoplatonism andAlexanderofAphrodisias s interpretation ofAristotle roles;Fernando playsignificant Vidals La science de l'âmeon theotherhandlocatesthedecisivedevelopments ofthenewsciencein theseventeenth One later,aftertheemergence century.4 of to choose between these is close)positions by way attempting (admittedly one ofthemostpublicand widelyconsulteddisagreements on the examining GirolamoCardano,who subject,thatbetweentwoself-promoting polymaths: claimsbothhermeneutical and philosophical and JuliusCaesarScalnovelty, who seems to be as a neo-Aristotelian for a peripatetic solution iger, arguing thatis notin conflict withtheChurch.Bothofthesewriters eschewtheprecisionofargument and thecloselogicaldevelopments oftheirmedievalpredeto cessors;theirdiscussionswill appearas a consequenceverybroad-brush scholarsofAquinas,Duns Scotusand thosewho followin theirwake. Throughouthis writingcareer,Cardano returned again and again to the of the his most sustained discussion is in theDe immortalifound soul;5 topic 4)Vidal, Lessciences del'âme-, Kessler & Park, "Theconcept ofpsychology", 476:"wecansee intheyears 1500a marked around ifgradual inemphasis shift which Renaisbeginning gives sance ontheorganic soulitsownflavour andprepared thewayfor thedevelopments that writing were totransform intheseventeenth tothe ibid., 494,referring radically psychology century"; ofhumanism andneoplatonism onlater Renaissance impact psychology. 5)According tothe1557edition ofCardano s De libris , ed.I. Maclean (Milan, 2004), propriis bookoftheunpublished DeFato, written between a chapter contained 177),thefourth 1533-4, entided "deanimae substantia" aeternitatis there arechapters onthe ; intheDearcanis (1538-9), soulanditsimmortality totheContradicentia medica between (ibid., 188);theadditions (written thequestions andetur. Etanresurrectio 1550and1562)contain mortuorum?" and "generatio "intellectus anexcerebri of vi.657-6l, (seeCardano, 668);theDe natura temperie?" Opera, contains a chapter onthesoul(ibid., bookfour oftheTheonoston 1561 written ii.283-98); (first between oftheimmortality ofthesoulindialogue 1555and1561)isa newaccount form (ibid.,

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tateanimorum of 1545. Thisworkis in parta responseto PomponazzisDe immortalitate animae(itevenhas thesamenumberofchapters), and similarly consistsin expositions ofphilosophical and positions independent argument.6 Fiveyearslater,Cardanos surveyof thewhole rangeof naturalphilosophy entitledDe subtilitate revisedin 1554) appeared;book 14 (substantially thequestionofthesoul and theintellect. addresses The De subtilitate was not if writtenas a formalacademicexercise.It was aimedat a non-professional, neither as a commentary, norbyquaestiones Latinate,audience;itis structured and dubia, butconsistsin a seriesoftopics(beginning withthemostgeneral issuesin naturalphilosophy) whicharefurther casualsort analysedbya rather of via divisiva whichstructure the textseemnot > in whichthe distinctions alwaysto be fullyworkedout. by the confusionsand errorshe perceivedin Scaligerwas so exacerbated Cardanosworkthathe produceda comprehensive of it entitled refutation Exotericae exercitationes whichappearedin 1557 and consistsin de Subtilitate, eacha dailyexercise). These 365 numberedsections(presumably representing in sequence,and subjectthemto a savage takepassagesfromtheDe Subtilitate is thelongestoftheexercritique.The riposteto book 14 oftheDe Subtilitate citationes it is subdivided into sectionsamountingto 39 ("practicepieces"); some 30,000 words.7Like theothers,Exercitatio 307 on the"animivireset is describedbytheirauthoras "exoteric", thatis,accessibleto nonnáturám" It attacksnotonlythetextoftheDe Subtilitate butalso Cardanos specialists. earlierDe immortalitate animorum(whichScaligerdescribesas a "confiisissima rhapsodia"),8 as well as recently publishedmonographsby two other JuanLuis Vivesand PhilipMelanchthon.9 contemporaries, Scaligers readers in1575-6 comment isfound intheDepropria vita thefinal onthesubject , written ii.403-33); scioesseimmortales, modonéscio." (ibid., i.49):"ánimos 6)SeeIanMaclean, ofthesoul", inCardano e la tradizione dei "Cardano ontheimmortality M. & De immortalitate animoed. Baldi G. Canziani 191-207; Cardano, , (Milan, 2004), saperi much ofPomponazzi s work; theearly Defato rum. Cardano seems tohavesetouttorefute onincantaattacks swork onthesametopic; a section oftheContradicentia medica Pomponazzi theissues De tions(2.2.7)which first in 1548addresses covered byPomponazzis appeared incantationibus vi.467-87). (Opera, 7)Scaliger, Exotericae exercitationes desubtilitate Caesar, (Frankfurt, 1592),307,916-97. Julius 8)Scaliger, 987. Exercitationes, 307.30, 9)Seeibid., ontheintellects ofitself)» 942(Vives 953 307.19, 307.2,918,307.13, knowledge onfaculty on the of the of the 955 307.20, (Vives (Vives unprovabilityimmortality psychology), on theagentintellect as the"autor omnium inventionum"); soul);307.953(Melanchthon lasttwo mistaken ofendelechia forentelechia). Onthese 307.39933-7(Melanchtons reading thecaseofPhilip Thetransformation seeSachiko Kusukawa, questions, ofnatural philosophy:

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arehoweverexpectedto be ableto understand Greek,and to makesenseofthe allusions to classical and medieval in thetext;thediscussions works are many not howeverpresented in strictsyllogistic nor do to comform, theyaspire however,Scaliger pleteness.Behindthejauntinessand linguisticvirtuosity, setsout to presenthimselfas orthodoxperipatetic whose interpretation of Aristotle is notat oddswiththatoftheChurch.10

2. Cardano,De immortalitate animorum(1545) As I havesuggested, animopartofCardanos projectin theDe immortalitate rumwastherefutation ofPomponazziin hisinterpretation ofAristotle, as well as thedemonstrative of the mind s its other proof immortality; explicitclaim is thatitusestheGreekmedicalcanon(principally Hippocratesand Galen)to theancientand medievaltextson thesoul and themind.As the supplement earliestmedievalsynthetic accountsof the soul had takeninto accountthe of both Avicenna and whoalso usedGreekmedicalsources, Averroes, writings notall ofCardanos materialis new;buttherearereferences to textsunknown to the medievais,notablyGalens Quod animi morestemperamenta corporis and De placitisHippocratis etPiatonis .n Thisdoes notstopScaliger sequantur fromaccusingCardanoofAverroism in (an accusationlevelledagainsthimself turnbyothers).12 Much ofthetextofCardanos De animorum immortalitate is takenup with revisionist of Aristotelian and other ancient texts,whichis interpretations done both to discreditpreviouswriterson the topic and to lay bare their Melanchthon "Between theDe animaand Kusukawa, 1995),90-1,andSachiko (Cambridge, - a prolegomenon dialectics to Philippo-Ramism", inSapientiam amemus: Humanismus und Aristotelismus inderRenaissance, ed.P.R.Blum(Munich, 1998),127-39, 131. 10)Scaliger, Exercitationes ex principiis , 307.29,985 ("declaravimus 307.20, Philosophi"); hisclaim tobeorthodox: seePaganinus 957-9.Butothers Depythagoraea Gaudentius, dispute animarum Accedunt Caesaris exercitationes [ . .] deAperipato transmigration opusculum, Scaligeri Kristián Rhetorical andphilosophical (Pisa,1641),200,quoted Jensen, by philosophy grammar: Caesar Julius (Munich, 1990),47. Scaligeri theory oflanguage n) Cardano, Seealso , ii.460,464,465-7, 475-6(Hippocrates). 474,512,514(Galen); Opera Manuel Garcia "ElGalenismo critico deGirolamo Cardano: análisis delapresenValverde, José ' Asclepio ciadeGaleno enelDe immortalitate animorum , 69(2007). 12)Scaliger, Exercitationes tuisdeanima Avenrois , 307.14,942:"tuinlibris sequutus atqueeo Themistii fecisti animam mortalem." Fortheclaim that isanAverrvaesaniam, prioris Scaliger seeJohannes Crato vonKrafltheim, Consilia etepistolae, ed.L.Scholzius, oist, 5vols.(Frankfurt, suum V.312: Averroem." 1591-4), sequitur magistrům "[Scaliger]

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a novel and arguments; but Cardanowantedalso to put forward premisses novel is viewofhisown.Whetherthisconstitutes entirely open to something of since all the elements Cardano's nearly question, compositetheoryhave in theworkofAlbert,Aquinas,Averroes, and thehumanistcomprecedents in each casearises he cites.The difficulty ofdetermining influence mentators and therelationbecausetheelementsof thetheoryofsoul-bodyinteraction questions,and shipof thepartsof thesoul aremotivatedbysubtlydifferent In thesearchfora yardinformed and principles. bydifferent presuppositions stick,a helpfultextis theThomistDominicusde Flandriasmanualentitled etannotationes in treslibros[Aristotelis] de anima, whichindicates Quaestiones whatan agreedsetofquaestiones and dubiamightbe around1500 (it continthesixteenth cenued to be publishedin Italyat regularintervals throughout the of is close to Its doctrines very tury).13 summary agreed positionadopted as Scaligerwas to pointout.14 byCardano,forall hisclaimsto novelty, to his workas "de animi immortali Cardano alwaysreferred tate",even of the with a title: the choice his work different appeared singular though as we shallsee. and theavoidanceoftheword"anima"is significant, "animus", A distinction wasgenerally madebetweentheorganicsoul("psyche", "anima"), weredefined thatis,theprincipleoflifein virtueofwhichanimatecreatures as animate,and the rationalsoul, or intellect,or mind ("nous","animus", 13)I citeheretheresolutions in S Thomae ofvarious locibyDominicus deFlandria, Aquinatis scilicum textus translatione: tres libros Aristotelis deanima expositio duplici antique, praeclarissima Dominici deFlandria adhaecacutissime etnova cet, [ . .] accedunt Maģistri Aegyropyli questiones willbevery closetotheresolutions offered which [...] (Venice, 1510),211-13, byCardano: non sedintellectus estseparatus "Sensitivům nonessesinecorpore [.. .] Intellectus possibilem nisi . enim non est unum cum Intellectus essea corpore .] [. intelligibili, separatum possibilis intellectus nonestforma estinactu[.. .] Species secundum intelligibilis quodintellectus igitur est,etnonsubstantia [.. .] Nonsolum [.. .] Intellectus separata parsanimae possibilis possibilis universale et tuncpotest alia,sedetiam [.. .] Intellectus seipsum intelligere potest intelligere sive et alio modo enim naturam sed alio est, speciei, quodquid particulate Cognoscit cognoscit, redit extendendo autem directe reflexionem, inquantum perquandam seipsum, ipsum singulare : abstrahuntur a quibus entries] [.. .]"; ibid,*6r[index super phantasmata, species intelligibiles estpotentia Nonestsubstantia "Intellectus separata; intelliguntur passiva; Singularia possibilis nonestillud, sedquointelligitur; nondirecte sedreflexive; quodintelligitur, Species intelligibilis Intellectio nonpersuamessentiam, sedperspeciem seipsum; intelligit possibilis, intelligibilem, abanima, sedestaliquid Intellectus nonseparatur Intellectus estsicut eius; habitus; agens agens etincorruptibilis; Intellectus Intellectus agensan estunusin omnibus; agensestperpetuus wereeditions ofthistextin 1503, There Intellectus Nequit absquephantasmata intelligere." 1518,1533,1549,1560,1565,1570,1587and1597. 14)Exercitationes nihil enim aliussunt, 989: "[tuicommentarii] ,307.31, praecepquamfarrago Domini meorum deFlandria." torum Suessani, Pomponatii,

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Cardano'susage "animaintellectiva", "mens","animarationalis", "intellectus"). in his textis fairlyconsistent. The title"De animorumimmortalitate" had Plotinus and beenusedbyMarsilioFicinoin thefifteenth century, following to Augustine.It was adoptedby PierNiccolò Castellaniforhis tractwritten refutePomponazziof 1524. Cardanos publisher,SebastianusGryphiusof Lyon,had publishednineyearsbeforeCardanos worka poembyAoniusPalIt seemsplausibletherefore thatthe publisher eariuswiththe same title.15 withoutconsultation, perhapsto simplyimposedthetitleon themanuscript stresstheorthodoxy ofthecontents. It is verydifficult to summarizeCardanosown position.His mostrecent editor,JoséManuel GarciaValverde,believesthatthe"Gordianknot"of the ofAristotle s book is to be foundin chapter11, whichis Cardanos statement on the which he to those of Plato. He sets to out prefers subject, arguments ofAlexander, Averroes showagainsttheinterpretation and Pomponazzithat thatthedisemis immortal, Aristotle arguesthatthesoul qua agentintellect bodiedagentintellect iswithoutsensationormemory, and hencethatitis not in theafterlife in fortheactionsit instigated apt to be punishedor rewarded thisworld.16 Thisplacesgreater on Cardanosre-interpretation of importance Such a view the Stagyrite than on the elaborationof his own arguments. in orderto recover accordswiththehumanist to return "adfontes" programme the pure doctrineof the ancients;in manycases,thishad the unintended effect ofdistracting scholarsfromresin favourofverba.A hermeneutic project ofthiskindis at variancewithCardanos own claimshowever. He sedulously devotesseparatesectionsto thedoctrinesof pastphilosophers ("sententiae") and theirrationalfoundations("rationes").Accordingto him, one of the lies in theconfusionof hermemajorcausesof erroramongrecentthinkers neuticsand truephilosophy;his contemporaries are accusedby him of not the two what did thephilosopher meanby distinguishing following questions: 15)SeeIanMaclean, ontheimmortality ofthesoul", De immortali"Cardano 192-3; Cardano, 11In. tate animorum^ 16)Ibid., ofthepunishment ofsoulsintheafterlife hastwodistinct 26-7.Thedoctrine applications: islinked tothepresupposition thatreligions havepurely thefirst human purely origins ofpunishment isoneoffour suchexplanations, theothers the evhemerism, (thedoctrine being divinsation ofnatural andthefear thesecond islinked to forces, events); provoked bycelestial in will thepresupposition ofthedivine of and the manner which God dispense origin religion, intheafterlife. Pietro De immortalitate animae , ed.G. Morra justice Pomponazzi, (Bologna, dwells more onthefirst; Cardano refers toboth: seeOpera, 471("plurima ii.460, 1954),200-8, in reipublicae inconvenientia necessarie administratione nonsupsequi[...] immortalitate 503. 488, posta")

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hiswords?And is it clearlythecase in thelightofnaturalreason?17 He is not as therefore ancient texts authorities, treating straightforwardly althoughhe is in to cite them when are with his own views. they happy agreement Cardanos own readingof Aristotle(whichsharplyopposesthatof Pomponazzi,eventhough,as GarciaValverdeand Scaligerpointout,he borrows to deniesimmortality muchfromhim)18leadshimto stressthattheStagyrite the passiveintellect{De anima, iii.5, 430a 23-5) and concedesit only to whichis individuatedand not the unique intellectof Averagentintellect, roes.19 The choiceofan Aristotelian framework entailstheacceptance,at least of theworldand as a hypothesis, of the(heterodox)doctrineof theeternity theequallyheterodoxprinciple"exnihilonihilfit".A consequenceofthisin numintellects ofan infinite wouldbe thegeneration respectofindividuated in berof them,whereasAristotleclearlydeniestheexistenceof anyinfinity that be a finite It follows therefore there must act CPhysics , iii.5, 204a 20). in individualhuman reincarnated numberofagentintellects beingconstantly bodies. Cardanospreferred position(whichhe claimsto havealreadysetout in a work)20 probablyalso appearsin a sectionentitledthe previousunpublished cerimmortalitate secundumnaturaliter de animi loquentes";21 "Digressio In be stated. own views to that is where assumes Cardanos tainly Scaliger in with the of and accordance directcontradiction Pomponazzi, injunctionof ofthe theLateranCouncilof 15 13,Cardanosetsoutto provetheimmortality and assertsthattheviewofthesoulheldbytheosoulfromnaturalreasoning, and viewis perfect is thesame,eveniftheformers' logiansand philosophers thattheend ofmanis seento be the he aversmoreover thelatters'imperfect; 17)Opera haecduoquaesita, erroris confuderunt, fuit, , ii.492:"Causatanti quod[Philosophi] ofRobinG. Readers estmanifestum?" naturali Qui ex ratione Philosophus? quidsenserit ofhis here anantecedent willrecognize Anautobiography (Oxford, 1939),29-43, Collingwood, of his claims about theOxford philosophy youth. 18)Seeabove note14. 19)Opera, nihilintelsinepatiente intellectum ii.520:"Triaproponit Philosophus: agentem intelintellectum actum sehabere; eodem modoadipsum ligere; intelligendi agentem semper lectum haec omnia ideo non obnoxium, patientem corruptioni atque atque semper intelligere, intra metam." parvi spatii 20)TheDearcanis aeternitatis: seeabove, note5. 21)Thetitle docta etarguta toGianfrancesco Deanimae immortalitate refer dellaMirándolas may in of which had a reference to the Albertine doctrine there also be 1541; appeared may digression andthe "denaturalibus onwhich seeWeisheipl, A. (ed.),Albertus naturaliter", James Magnus sciences: commemorative , ii.530(on"naturale 1980).SeealsoCardano, (Toronto, Opera essays lumen").

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In thischapterit is allegedthatour "mens"(or same in both disciplines.22 or "animus"),whichas an immaterial "intellectus" entityis not educedfrom materialsemen(as Alexanderhad alleged)buthas a divineorigin;23 thatit is thatthe"animus"is a sortofeternal nota substance, buta power("virtus");24 and impassive fromone source,distributed light,flowing amongthebodiesof theirbodies,as lightcan penindividualmen;and thatit is able to penetrate etratewater,butnotthebodiesofanimals.Thedifferences betweenthehuman intellect and thesoulsofanimalsconfirm the reason is this; whytheintellect not alwaysactive,and whyit is diversein its powerin different men,and absentfrombeastsaltogether, is theinterference ofmatter(whichis compared to cloudswhichobscurethesun).25The incorporated mindis a complexofthe the "total i.e. thecombinationof intellect contains substance": (which agent thelightand the "simulachra"), thematerialintellect(thelightitself)26 and the patientintellect(whichreceivesthe "simulachrarerum");the lightis in reason,imaginationand memory.The intellectcan governthe reflected will.It is in a certainsenseinfinite, becauseitcanconceiveofall things, includand eternity.27 The animalspirits, as therarestcorporealmatter, inginfinites 22)Opera atreligionis naturae deanima ferme sententia , ii.529:"unaigitur est, Philosophorum, differens solum velut a perfecto: a pietura"; De velut imperfectum puera viro;sicdelineatio immortalitate etPhilosophos hominis secundum animorum, 1545, Lyon, p.316:"finis Theologis etqualis sit." unus, 23)Ibid.,Ü.485ÍF. OnAlexanders viewoftheorigin ofthesoulinmatter, seeKessler andPark, ofpsychology", Lessciences "Theconcept del'âme 502.SeealsoVidal, , 62-5;GuidoCanziani lapalingenesi. lamens, sulterzo libro delTheonostorť e la tradi"L'anima, , inCardano Appunti deisaperi thelater zione of Cardano onthis 209-48(for , ed.M. Baldi& G.Canziani, thoughts subject). 24)Cardano touches twice ontheimage drawn from Deanima , ii.1 (413a7-8)ofthesoulasthe sailor ina ship;Opera and497:"Itaque hocargumento namaliudfortius ad , ii.475, (nifallor, hocdemonstrandum invenire nonqueo)adductus estGalenus, utfateretur, velhominem eundempermanere nonposse, autanimam naviuti,undeinv corpore ipsononsecusacnautam subtitulo iurisconsulti deIudiciis, Hominem sanxit, Alphenus, digestořům legeproponebatur: secundum omnem velut etsenatum, suctransmutetur, quamvis tempore partem quiperpetuo cessu etiam sécula eandem dicidebere." reparatur, postaliquot 25)Scaliger would nothavedisgreed with this: seehisHippocratis liber desomnis cumcommentariis instrumentis nonlaedianimam laesis sedimpediri." 1539),14:"[corporis] (Lyon, 26)ThisdoesnotseemtobeAverroes s version ofthematerial intellect: seeScaliger, Exercitathematerial intellect tobesynonymous seems with thepassive inteltionesy 307.19, 954,where when combined with theagent itbecomes theadept intellect lect; intellect, (seeThomas Aquinas, Summa la 79,10).Scaliger liststhefunctions ofthematerial intellect as "facultas theologiae, dividendi, componendi, separandi, colligendi." 27)Opera infinitus est , ii.496:"intellectus est",ibid.,500: "considerandum quoddammodo

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orthodoxGalenic ensuretheinteraction ofmindand body(thisis a perfectly finitein s singleintellect, Cardanos is individuated, view). UnlikeAverroes numberand separable;on the deathof one individual,each agentintellect whathe is to another.Cardanoslipsbackhereintoattributing transmigrates to to avoid accusation of Aristotle, heterodoxy.28 perhaps any claiming lhe virtueofthisview,in Cardanos mind,is thattheanimawhichhe recognizesas theformofthebody,canbe leftto carrywithitthepatientintellect, theimagination and thememory. The lattertwohaveproblematic corporeal whichis linksand locations,and carrythestoreofmemoriesand impressions a would not have to each disembodied intellect mortem individual; unique post accessto them.ScaligeraccusesCardanotherefore of adoptingtheAverroist The innovative and Themistianview thatthe soul qua "anima"is mortal.29 natureof Cardanos viewcan also be gaugedfromthestatement byhispredecessorGaetano da Thienethatthe intellective soul is eitherindividualor oftheThomistclaimthatthe immortal butnotboth,and byitscontradiction and reader soulhasa memory.30 Cardanospeakshereas a naturalphilosopher ofAristotle and claimsthathis viewis consistent withthatof a theologian, exceptin respectof theknowledgeof singulars(a pointwithwhichScaliger as we shallsee). It is verydifficult to see howsucha doctrinecould disagrees, withscholasticChristianity, be said to be consistent unlessCardanobelieves in it thatat theresurrection ofthebody,thepassiveintellect withreconstitute all ofitsstoreofmemories and sensations, and itsrecordofdecisionsmadeby itswillforwhichit can be held to accountand dulypunishedor rewarded. Thismaybe implied,butit is notexplicitly stated.31 hancnostram non animam infiniti aeternum etiam, undequaque prodere, tempus argumenta acnumerum." solum sedimaginamur, infinitam, intelligimus, maginitudinem quoque 28)Ibid.,529:"ñeque verum unum omnibus conveniebat sednumero certo esse,necinfinitos, autexunoprodire omnes innumerabiles etrevertentes" constitutos, existentes, [.. .] "peripatetici etaeternam, ferme etquaeratioipsanosdocet, mentem esselucem concordant, quandam, in etimpatibilem, etabunoprincipio et illorum numero distrinostra, proficiscentem corpora inaliacorpora buíam : exquibus etiam eadem mens revertatur." confiteri, cogimur quoddenuo Cf.thefollowing from thethird bookoftheTheonoston , ii.433):"Aristotelem (Opera passage in . : non definitae adhaesisse scilicet ut animae sed certo numero commisceantur, [. .] opinioni non : tarnen diversa suis ut sint idem homines descendant, prorsus corpora temporibus ñeque obidquenecpriores necposteriores dicipossunt." sedplusquam diversi, iunxit, aliis, specie 29)Seeabove, note12. 30)SeeKessler inSumma la & Park, "Theconcept ofpsychology", 486.Aquinas says theologiaeì intheseparated remains soul. 77,8that memory 31)Opera inlucisexemplo "concordant etreligio , ii.529-30: nostra] [i.e.John 1:9], [philosophi in inoriginis inimmortalitate, incognitione divinitate, beata, novit, quaecuncta postmortem

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leadshimto commentat length Cardanos discussionoftheagentintellect on cognition.Accordingto him,thereareeightdegreesof an objectsbeing, of the"resipsa",followedbythe"resin thefirstbeingthematerialexistence medio",the "res"separatedfromits materialbeing "in sensu",the "resin and ending the"resin ratione",the"resin patienteintellectu" imaginativa", For the "res" to reach this last withthe "resin intellectu state,its agente".32 intellect Alexander and be willed the (which Pomponby agent presencemust described as no morethantheaction azzi,accordingto Cardano,hadwrongly of the intellect);33 thiscreatesproblemsabout perpetualagency,about the which and abouttheirseparability of relationship patientand agentintellect, I shallpass overhere.34 At thishighestlevel,theagentintellectis converted but not in into the objectof itsperception(whichis a speciesintelligibility but in form,whichcan be substance(as theagentintellectis immaterial),35 is thuscapaThe "animaintellectiva" outsidetimeand placein a certainway.36 ble of assumingall forms(whichhere are immaterialand incorruptible), is a proofofitsimmortaland thispossibility includingtheformofinfinites; in is Cardano to The of this provethattherecan be ity.37 purpose argument in twodifferent thesamethoughts men,situatedin a certainway incorporated

abobitu eandam animam namreviviscere videtur resurrectionis quodcunque quodam, genere non nisi merito tarnen: autem retinet: etquamvis nonmeminerint, corpopatiuntur intelligunt hocest,inquoa lege existimabant: risannexi: hocautem haeretici Fraeticelli itaque parvum etpostmortem reminisciEtautem idtale, namsingularia nostra dissident. intellectus, agnoscit finem non intellectu etinitium noninaliudcorpus etvere habet, transeunte, homo, tur, resurgit et etiam nondum adiunctus." habiturus, patitur corpori 32)Ibid.,ii.508-9;inthe1554edition iii.585),thelastfive ofthis oftheDesubtilitate (ibid., ordinēs sensus": "exterior haveapparently beentranslated into"septem phantasia, sequence etuniversale universalis, iunctio, memoria, ipsum quod compraehensio generalis, propositio inthethird bookofTheonAlater ofthesequence istobefound est." version mentis proprium which include false andimaginary ii.417),discussing the"ximodicognoscendi", oston (ibid., perception. 33)Ibid.,ii.520, 526. 34)Ibid.,ii.482, 489,499,519,498. 35)Ibid.,ii.501:"recipiens inthistext with thisisnotlinked estdenudatimi a natura recepti": onwhich admodum theother madeclaim recipientis recipitur", "quicquid recipitur frequendy inthelateRenaissance", inPhilosointhemind: reflexive seeIanMaclean, thinking "Language & conversations with Aristotle andseventeenth centuries: , ed.C. Blackwell phyinthesixteenth incalumniatorem S. Kusukawa 313.SeealsoActio iii.708, , ibid., (Aldershot, 1999),296-321, ofpotency totheintellect). andactinrelation andii.524, 526,531(onproblems 36)Ibid.,ii.509, 520. 37)Ibid.,ii.500;De natura ii.297. , ibid.,

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in timeand space;in thissensethereis a unityofintellect betweenall men.38 in the Thisphilosophical is with some defended and subtlety position vigour De immortalitate animorum .

3. Cardano,De subtilitate(1550, 1554) The approachCardanoadoptsin theDe subtilitate aboutsevenyears , written and is partlydictatedbythethemeofthebook,which later,is quitedifferent, is to celebratesubtlety, definedas "certainformalrelationship ("ratio")in virtue of whichsensoryobjectsare graspedwithdifficulty by the senses,and, in book 14 the intellect":39 that is he by intelligibles probablywhy digresses anima et from to discuss the that the mind derives ("de intellectu") pleasure rarethings.He beginstherewitha surveyofthefaculties ofthemind,which fallintotwoparts:"[mens]connexa"(consisting ofreason,memory and imagand A and sixth is mentioned: ination) (intellect will). "separabilis" faculty thatbywhichthemindknowssensiblesin respectof themselves, but also of eachother.Therearesaidto be twoappetites, one withoutsense(i.e. immaterial)whichresidesin thewill,and thematerialappetitewhichis constituted animae".Fouryearslater,thesixthfaculty is subdividedinto bythe"affectus theninepartsof the "animasensífera" (to whichmemoryand imagination havebeenannexed);a longdigression is addedaboutthementalcapacitiesof animals;thepartsofthemindhavebecomefourfromtwo,namely"iunctio, et voluntas".40 Cardanonextconcentrates on theratioiudicium,intellectus, nal soul in respectof truthand falsity(includingfiction),and discussesthe pleasuresof reading,and the dutiesof responsible"sapientes"in respectof 38)Ibid.,ii. 506:"unitatem certe si de natura, etessentia illis intellectus, loquimur, origine, ofAverroes] concedimus: namnonplushomines inter sedifferunt, [supporters quamequi,vel canes: etiam videtur unaomnium omnes indita abineunte aetate eadem habent quoniam origo, ethirundinibus velut nidum construendi ratio omnibus eadem. Atvero siperintellecprincipia, tumpotentia dicitur nospatientem a natura, etreiproprietate apudaliquos, quamquam potius inomnibus utiamdiximus, eundem essefatemur hominibus: hunc, [.. .] namres appellemus, unaest,atqueiisdem mediis intellecta". ButCardano to scita, atque cognita goesontolinkthis thegrowth ofknowledge: "sedhaecscientia estaccidens suinatura quoddam perpetuum, atque sicunum, insingulis utautem hominibus necperpetua, incremencumindiesaccipiat diversa, tum:namquodexillaposthaecnosinvenimus nemointellexit". On "consuetudo" andthe of the see ii. 509-10. swallow, ibid., example 39)Ibid.,iii.359 : "ratio a sensibus, abintellectu, difficile quaedam, quasensibilia intelligibilia compraehenduntur." 40)Girolamo Desubtilitate iii.582. Cardano, (Paris, 1550),244-5;Opera,

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In 1554,thisis supplemented witha longpassageaboutspeakinterpretation. and with a of the criteria of knowledge(apparently description writing, ing thestoictrioofaisthesis which and Melanchthonalso citesat ,prolepsis , gnosis and ofanimalspirits.41 Therefolaboutthistime),ofspeciesand perception, lows an enumeration of the passionsof the soul and theirrelationto the the humoursof the bodyand an accountof theseparationof the intellect, of the intellect to its and artificial Cardano intermemory: object, relationship to the souls reflexive The poses herea briefreference knowledgeof itself.42 the of contain his claims about nature following strongest cognition, passages whichprovokeScaligers mostdetailedcritiques: I understand when a horse, Theintellect isthething itself which isunderstood, suchthat toprimary matter. istheform Itistherefore a general andsimilar ofa horse. form, mymind itiscarried Ontheother itisthewillwhen anditistherefore to hand, outside, posterior intwo butonly similar toit.Willandintellect differ theobject, northesame astheobject, similar totheobject, because theintellect consists thewillisonly andsecondly, ways: major intheobject thewillisposterior toit.Aslight anddark tothe intellected, simultaneously totheintellect. isof soishateandlovetothewill, andtrue andfalse [.. .]Theintellect eye, I ampresendy these itself from thebody. Forwhile my entirely separated writing things, which whenI write about mindis thosethings youareunderstanding bymywriting: I wrote itwasthen andit medical itismedicine; when aboutnumbers, number, matters, whowrite sothat follows that this toallothers ondiverse while necessarily happens topics, I seem I nowam[.. .]The I amre-reading tobedifferent from what tomyself mywritings, asyoureadandcontemplate these ourintelform oftheintellect iseternal, because things andspecies ofuniversais arethesameforall andtheforms lectremains andhasbeing, eternity.43 41)SeeIanMaclean, intheRenaissance: thecaseoflearned medicine andnature (CamLogic signs 2001),116,243-4. bridge, 42)Opera necpercipit medio velut homo, , iii.586: "verum tempore principia neque intelligit, sentire sepercipit, cumabstracta estmens [.. .]." semper 43)Ibid.,iii583-4: "intellectus, resestipsaquaeintelligitur, velut cumequum intelintelligo, lectus meus estforma estforma etvelut materia. Sedvoluntas est equi.Ideoque prima generalis, cumfertur estobiecto necestidem obiecto sedillisimilis. Differextra, tunc, ideoque posterior, induobus untigitur maxime: estresipsaintellecta, voluntas vero Primům, quodintellectus illisimilis. tantummodo intellectus eodem momento constat intellecta Secundo, res, quia quo nisivelquiacumratione voluntas eodem est.[.. .] Intellectus verononimmutat, et posterior ilium necesse delectatur totus est,velquiadumintelligit homo, operari ipseenim imaginatione intellectus omnino a corpore est.Nuncenim dumhaecscribo, meus intellectus perseseparatus haectuintelligis, numeris estea,quaeperscripta medica dum de medicina, dumque pertracto tuncnumerus erat. evenire necesse Adeoquodaliisomnibus scriberem, quidiversa scripserunt aliusmihi abilioquinunc Verum temfuisse videar sum. medio est,utdummearelego scripta, necpercipit velut sentire sepercipit, cumabstracta homo, pore principia neque semper intelligit,

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withitsinterpolaOverall,the1554 versionofthissectionoftheDe subtilitate tionscertainlyresemblesa hotchpotch;Cardano does not alwaysuse the habitualtermsfor mentalfacultiesand functions,his enumerations and dichotomiesare farfromclear,and his accountis not completely freefrom digression. 4. Scaliger,Exercitationes de subtilitate(1557) The wide-ranging natureof Cardanos textgaveScaligerthescopeto develop his own comprehensive accountof psychology: thisis structured by rubrics the which at one level makes it follow.44 The easier to indicating topic, progress oftheargument is notrigorously bymarginaorganized:thepointsidentified lia to be "subtilissima" areoftenincidentalto themainlineofargument, and intendedto be virtuosodisplaysof Scaligers "truly" subtlemind.His discusin nature;someofhiscritiquesaretrivialor sionsaredigressive and extensive thisbyinserting at variouspointsthemargin(he evenacknowledges flippant alium "jocus"),but he does not set out to misrepresent Cardanos thought. estmens noster dumhaeclegis et estforma intellectus intellectus, [.. .] Aeterna quoniam igitur manet etest,eaedemque suntformae scilicet etspecies rerum universalium contemplaris usque inaeternum." is a longdiscussion There ofthisissueinDe immortalitate animorum , Opera , nilsitnisiresintellecta" iii.7 doctrines "intellectus 531-2ontheAristotelian ii.519, (Deanima, and"anima intellectiva omnium formarum 431a18-20) iii.8,431b20ff.) (ibid., capax" 44)1.Expostulatio etCensura. 2.DeAnimo, Anima, Mente, Intellectu, Ratione, Ratiocinatione, Dianoea 4. De affectibus. toalogon. Ratio. natura 3.De appetitu. 5.Ansitinhumana Ingenium. fiat Iudicium. 6. Intellectus faciat 7. Quomodo intellectus, quama specie ipsa. speciem potius 8.Voluntas. acvoluntatis cumoculocomparano. 10.Anintellectus Cardani afficia9.Intellectus, 11.Falsa tur delectant. 12.Repetitiones entelechia. voluptate quomodo quorumdam quaesitorum anseipsam : etquomodo moveat moveat. 14.Anintellectus aliudsitabanima. 13.Anima corpus 16.Anintellectus situniversalis. naturae individuae. 15.Quidsitintellectus. 17.De principiis 18.Ansitnecessarium, De et Beatitudine. Intellectum intellectu 19. ponere adepto, agentem. 20. De Animae 21. Intellectio, immortalitate. et species Primum intelligibilis. cognitum. 22.Universalia 24.Anpossumus suntresextra intellectum. etappetere 23.De volúntate. velie, nonentia, etquaeessenonpossunt. voluntas habeat internum a quo 25.Utrum principium, moveatur: annon.26.Utrum sitnobilius, anvoluntas. Proton oikeion. 27.De obiintellectus, ectovoluntatis, etbono,acmultiplici Bonitate. 28.De memoria, reminiscentia. recordatione, anima informet sententia deintellectu. Cardani 29.Quomodo 30.Barbara 31. Anpraccorpus. ticusintellectus sitexiis,quaeopinione constant. sensecat membra. 32.Ancoranteomnia metus solius sensitivae sit.34.Quaremorituri discessum suum 33.Anmortis privilegium magis utaitCardanus. 37.An 35.Ansinttres 36.Ancorpus intellectus, edat,etbibat. praevident. memoria sitinomnibus verborum minus 38.Consequutio quorundam apta, corporis partibus. adanimae Entelechiae. definitionem. 39.Anabasis apudTrismegistium. Repetitio

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containexactquotations;whenScaligerchoosesto Manyoftheexercitationes or a theseareusuallyfair,at leaston theissueofthe paraphrase give summary, he soul.45Ratherthantreathis workas a narrowcritiqueor commentary, allowshimselfto addressothertextsand broaderissuesabouttheanimaand theinterpretation ofAristotle intellect.Like Cardano,he distinguishes (over as wellas Cardano),fromphilwithAquinasandAverroes whichhe disagrees Thatdoes notstophimciting perse whoseend is truth.46 osophicalreasoning ofsomeaspectsofStoicthought as sources:heclearly ancientthinkers approves and docand borrowsarguments the of (oftenthrough intermediary Cicero), ofAristotle and trinesfromit. He also claimsto offercorrectinterpretations shoulders" thoseof Cardano,especiallyhis "loadingon to Aristotle's refutes immortal of theindividuated thedoctrine("sententia") transmigratory agent whichhe comparesto a hermitcrabin searchof a newemptyshell intellect, stanceleads him intodetailed in whichto takerefuge.47 This interpretative and its conflict withCardanooverthenatureof thesoul,itsmentalfaculties modesofcognition. Therehad beena livelymedievaldebateaboutthedivisionofthesoul into Cardanoaccepts faculties and theubiquityofthesoulin all partsofthebody.48 of thatthesoulis in somesensenothingotherthanthevariousmanifestations relieson thematerial intellect itspowers,and thattheincorporated supportof oftheeleand memory. But this,forScaliger,is a reification theimagination and the ofthesoul (to whichhe givesvariousdesignations), mentsor faculties its immaterial and matebetween of an distinction inappropriate imposition to offeran analysisof setsout almostparadoxically rialparts;he therefore 45)E.g.Exercitationes animorum ofchapter 13oftheDeimmortalitate 987(asummary , ,307.30, nonesse itwasa quotation): "intellectum unum essesubluna:eumque as though presented inhominem: eo nisiquatenus abhominis materia humanuni, atque suscipi potest. Ingredi igitur ambire. Atipsinon etiam belluis Eundem intellectum uthomo imminere, fieri, easque intelligat. circum belluas hominem intus materiae irradiare, aditum, ineptitudinem. Igitur parere propter Iccirco differre belluarum. intellectum abintellectu extrinsecus collucere. Ñequealiarehominis sunt." eaomnia habere belluas inchoate, quaeinhomine perfecta 46)Seeforexample Averroes s commentary onMetaphysics Exercitationes 947(against , , 307.16, "hoc enim non solum Aristotelis viiandAquinas, Summa la 925: ibid., 307.4, , 56); theologiae veritati." sententiae adversatur sedetiam 47)Exercitationes illam exhumeris 955: "Quare Aristotelis, , 307.19, quoquesarcinam depones ad Inlibro enim tuoDe anima, exeiussententia, intellectum ilium onerasti. statuis, quatemere in illico non adsit reverti. ille si defuncto novum, faciet, Caesare, Quid corpus aliquod corpora inConchas ?" : sicuti vacuas Carcinades quodseseabdat 48)Kessler inthe Itsbeginnings areattributed & Park, "Theconcept ofpsychology", 468-79. ofNyssa tothetheologian Renaissance byMelanchthon. Gregory

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For Cardano,the disincorporated somethingindissoluble.49 agentintellect does not have memory;Scaligerassertsthatit does, as it can reflectupon itself.50 it is thesoul,nottheagentintellect, thatis theindividuatMoreover, humanbeing.51 It is thewholesoul which ingprincipleof thehylemorphic mental activities and the of notjustthe performs grasps objects itscognition, intellect. It is thewholemanwho is understands, notthesoul; thesoul is the instrument The soul is locatedin all partsof throughwhichhe understands. thatbeing;52 it is immortalin all of itsfaculties, whereasCardanomakesthe In section307.20 on thesouls immortality, animamortal.53 Scaligerasserts 49)E.g.Exercitationes andrefuting thefollowing from theDe , 307.35-6, 991,quoting passages immortalitate animorum: "intellectus estpars. substantiam continent. triplex Agens, quitotam lumen eius.Patiens, cumsimulacra rerum homini IntellecMaterialis, recipit"; "triplex operatio. bibere. hominis iustum tus,etestSapientia. edere, totius, esse";ibid.,307.2,921, Corporis, andrefuting thefollowing from book14ofDesubtilitate: "Mentis duae: quoting passage partes connexa, Rationem, memoriam, quaeinrestresdividitur: Separabilis, imaginationem. quae voluntas. Estpraetor haecsextum intellectus, virtutis, duplex: genus quosensibilia cognoscit: necsolum verumetiam invicem sitappetitus: hie ratione, propria comparata. Cumque duplex ille cum sensu: involúntate, sedent acsensili nimae affectus sensu, quidem absque parte ipsi: velutmisericordia, etreliqua"; crudelitas, ira,mansuetudo, audatia, timor, ibid.,307.2918 Tusculanae with "animus anima i.9.18-19 Cicero, continetur"; (quoting disputationes, approval): estmemoriam essefacultatem, etimaginationi etintellectui comibid.,307.2921:"necesse intellectus extensus adhabendum, autfacienmunem"; ibid.,307.3,923:"estenimvoluntas ofwillandintellect; 307.5 dum, ibid., 307.4,924,ontherelationship ibid., quodcongnoscit"; veroestvisanimae, seab effectibus ad caussas 928:"ratio ibid., quaemovet investigandas"; forma nostra estsubstantialis, 307.6,930:"[intellectus] aeternus"; separabilis, incorruptibilis, ofAlexanders thatintellectus materialis isa "praeparatio", 954:a refutation 307.19, argument because that would make itanaccident; forma sitintotoetin 985-7:"quomodo ibid., 307.29, "una enim in nobis suis omnibus 307.37 992: tota"; ibid., anima, quacumque parte undique essentialibus 4: "quid Desomnis, 994.AlsoHippocratis sibi"; 307.39, stipata potestatibus, nempe innobis enim nonproficiscatur?" fit, quoda concretione corporis 50)ibid., fortheimportance ofthereflexive function oftheintellect. 953:seealsobelow, 307.18, 51)ibid.,307.17,950:"ergo eritindividuano animam. Anima erit eius, per igitur principium Barbari scitissima voceindividuationem quodest:quamnostri appellarunt." 52)ibid., sitinomnibus Deimmor307,37992"anmemoria (written corporis partibus" against talitate animorum which asserts thatthefingers ona cithara move , Opera , ii.498, apparently memoria"). "absque 53)Scaliger "Anintellectus thesection entitled aliudsitabanima" the (307.14, 942)with begins accusation that"inlibris tuisDe anima, Themistii vaesaAvenrois, sequutus atqueeo prioris fecisti animam mortalem. Intellectum ensunum, omniimplens, niam, vero, primům, atquein entium sese insinuans: suo et et habeant ad admittant, unumquodque quaepro quaeque captu usum tuendae vitae. UtsitquasiSolincorporeus nulli aut sed oriens, occidens, quidam, semper, etubique, etomnibus Thisorigin ofthis view issaidbyScaliger nottobeAristotle, as praesens". Cardano butAnaxagoras Themistius andPlotinus claims, (whom follow).

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thatit is of a different essence(thecelestial"quintaessentia")fromthebody whichis composedof thefourmaterialelements, and has a different origin. of matterand the Like Cardano,Scaligeruses the doctrineof the eternity axiom"exnihilonihilfit"to arguethecaseforthesouls immortality.54 ofthesoul,andaredescribed lhe processes ofcognitionrevealthesefeatures at lengthbyScaligerto highlight theomissionsfromCardanos accountofthe as welllas universais, and of mind,namelyitsabilityto conceiveofsingulars itself.LikeCardano,Scaligeris a realist(section22 (963-5) is entitled"univerAs Kristián saliasuntresextraintellectum"). Jensenhaspointedout,one may in histhoughtin hisreferences to theperception of detecta Scotistinflection thatas thehigherfaculties havemoreperfect and in theargument singulars, the intellect is bound to have that the lower ones, cognitionofthe cognition the senses have of which perception.55 singulars ForScaliger,theassertion that"Caesaris a man"can onlyhaveanysenseif ofthecommon we perceiveCaesaras an individualas wellas a representative nature"man": isdifferent from theuniversal nature ofman.Nor TheCaesar whowrites this commentary ina different istheuniversal nature ofman.Heisother canyousay:thisCaesar wayfrom how from horse or this horse. So it is to understand Cato;andina different necessary way theparticulars. So there iscognition ofsingular Caesar differs from theuniversal through things.56 in Cardanos accountof theobjectsofcognitioncitedaboveis verydifferent, are universais. thathe seemsto implythatall intelligibles Againstthisview, of the intellects divides the object cognitionintothreemodes: Scaligerclearly real(the"individuum"), and (the"idea"or logical(the"species") metaphysical commonnature).57 54)Ibid., ofthesoul,including for certain 955-9.Quintessence 307.20, explains powers Scaliger andofmoving itself. that ofmoving left, upanddown, right, 55)Jensen, mentions ofScotus Rhetorical There areexplicit , 132-44. laudatory (e.g. philosophy vir ontheconcept of"configurado" attributed tothe"acutissimus Exercitationes 960-1, , 307.21, suchasthat over todisagreements between Scotus andThomas, Ioannes andreferences Duns"), ormodum onlogicasscientia sciendi 307.23, (ibid., 966-7). 56)ibid.,307.16,347:"hicCaesar estaliudquiddam a natura quinunchaeccommentatur, Caesar estnatura hominis universalis. Sicaliusestalio hominis universalis. Necpotesdicere: necesse modoa Catone; aliomodoabequoetabhocequo.HieCaesar est,Caesarem ergo cognosci: utdifferì abuniversali Seealsothediscusperparticularia: singularia igitur cognoscetur." sioninJensen, Rhetorical 139. philosophy, 57)Exercitationes three functions oftheintellect, ofwhich y307.23,964.He alsodistinguishes

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the mindcan conceiveof As well as beingable to conceiveof singulars, an and of itself. had material objects Scaliger given earlyaccountofthisin his : s on commentary HippocratesDe somnis thisintellecting takes andtheprocess Thething theintellected bywhich thing intellecting, its inseparated intellects. intellects [.. .]Theintellect corruptibles through placearea unity the Inthiswaytooweintellect a vacuum ownnature theirs. [.. .] notthrough through Ourminddoesnothowever become anda fiction thetruth. thereby plenum, through in in itself the mind becomes all It is this that either or fictive. way intellecting empty itself notthrough its moves allthings; itisallthese doesallthings, through things things, mental foritintellects these byitself.58 objects, things Scaligermakesthe issue whetherthe intellectcan know itselfand objects in hisexercitatio thanitself 307;59as Cardanoomitsto make primordial greater muchof it,he choosesto refutea texttakenfromtheepistemological pessithepossibility ofthesoulknowingitself.60 mistJuanLuisVives,whodismisses He claims "turnsitselfintotwins"to do this.61 Scaligerclaimsthattheintellect - not as does Aquinas,thatwe can knowthingsbeyondourselves moreover, Prithefirst isthecognition ofsingulars: intellectus ibid., 307.2,922:"estigitur opustriplex. statim rerum utLeonis. Haecduplex: mům, recta, apprequaeestinprima simplicium, cognitio : e quibus ubiconiuncta hensione: etreflexa, Secundum, quoties ipsam intelligimus. cognoscit Effata. iccirco nostri barnostri vocant Ciceroniani Hunc actum confiunt, Propositiones., quas : ut,homoestanimal. Tertium bariComplexum est,cumhisitaconiunctis appellant adiungiratiocinatio. Vocabuli aliudeducamus. Haecdicitur musalia:utexea compositione aliquid inhisquoSedetreflexa est.syllogismon Graeci a collectione vocant. inOriginibus dicta caussa queest." 51 ' Hippocratis esseinintellectibus 10:"intelligens, intellectionem unum desomnis, intellectum, [.. .] nonperilia.Sicquoque [.. .] illeintellectus corruptibilia perseipsum separatis intelligit Undefit, utanimus nosvacuum, noster, ficta, nequeinanis, pervera. perplenum: intelligimus omnia facit: omnia movet: omnia fictus ist.Itailleseseintelligendo, est,a se,nonabillis ñeque illaabseesseintelligit." quoniam 59)Thisisa standard from a locusinDeanima , iii.4:seeMaclean, "Language deriving quaestio inthemind". 6(0307.2,918:passim; estinlibertatem animas "contra Ludovici Vivis asserta 307.13, opinione, reflexionem". tothe"opus suicognoscendi" 953alsorefers 307.13, per 61)Scaliger, nonintelligit seperspeciem: sicuri noster Exercitationes, 307.2,920:"Intellectus altera eiusactiones duae:unarecta, caetera entia sedperreflexionem omnia; [.. .] Suntautem etcognoscendi Secunda seetcognoscere, reflexa. Prima quidem aliquid. cognoscit cognoscit tamen alsoibid.: tametsi non habere reflexione Qua potestatem. seipsum, disiungit, geminat." seintelligere: naturalis "intellectus autem ergaquatenus atqueintelligit philosophi cognoscit, sea se etintelligit a se,etseintelligere est.Atque iliaduodeseipso actuintellectus cognoscit: intelligi."

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firstprinciples and futureevents,but also God and his onlyindemonstrable in and moveourselves to greater and almost can, ourselves, angels knowing unlimitedknowledge:"thesoul is not limitedby itsfirstentelechy, nor is it restricted withinsuch narrowconfines, so thatit mighteverremainwhatit is. it But has the to only power developitself("sed habetquo sese promoand its without essence which veat"): beingchanged,it reachesitsperfection is called"suitedto its nature"("oikeion")by thewise [i.e. theStoics]"62In thisway the mind is different fromthe senses:human beingscannotsee themselves or see vision in the itself,but theycan knowthemselves seeing, of veryprocess knowing.63 The powerof the mindto discovernew things("inventio")is associated withits reflexive function.64 theminds reflexive Traditionally, knowledgeof itselfderivesfromknowingotherthings, and byreflecting on itsknowledge of In thisaccount,the them,comingto know itselfindirecdyor reflexively. mindsself-awareness is therefore an understanding of itselfofa hermeneutic kind:thatis to say,thatitmovesfromtheknown(theobjectofperception) to theunknown(themind)ofwhichtheknownis an object.Scaligerseemsto in yetmorepositiveterms,as self-induced. conceiveof themindsreflexivity Cardanowouldnotdissentfromthisviewofa self-moving intellect capableof not also but and entities than itself, comprehending onlyindividuals, greater commendsitforitsknowledge ofinfinite and eteritself;indeed,he explicitly nal things.65 But his accountof theintellectdoes not explainhow it knows of itself;indeed,his accountof cognitionappearsto excludethepossibility reflexive and to reduce all its to of the knowledge objects intelligible species highestorder. The refutation of Cardanos passageson theintellecttakesseveralcloselyin . VeryfewelementsofCardanos arguarguedpages Scaligers Exercitationes mentgo uncriticised. Amongotherthings,he accusesCardanoof confusing 62)Ibid.,307.2,918:"Intellectus enimnatura nonestpraescripta iliaentelechia sua, prima terminis cohibetur: uthocsemper est.Sedhabet sit,quodtantum nequetamangustis quosese summam illamadipiscatur essentia, promoveat: nequemutata perfectionem: quamoikeion vocant On oikeion see Cicero Académica ii.37-8. , , Sapientes". 63)SeealsoExercitationes between "lumen" , 307.9934,on thedistinction "opus"("visio") "color" and"voluntas "non video mevidere necvisionem." ("visum") ("volitio"): potentia" ("agens") 64)Ibid.,307.18953:"intellectum autorem esseomnium inventionum" (a marginalagentem iumrefers toMelanchthon: seeabove note9).Cardano hasa different to (complexional) theory thedifferent intellectual ofmen:seeOpera indicat , x.396("subtilitas explain capacites ingenii subtilem substantiam cerebri etecontra"). 65)Seeabove, note26.

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eternalwithperpetual,66 and of failingto graspAverroes s argument thatthe of the is in intellect the "modus similitudinis et and object receptionis", thatit is therefore not identicalwiththeintellect.67 Scaligeralso disagreeswiththe claimthattheintellect and itsobjectareboth"formaegenerales". Moreover, thesoul is priorto theobjectin theintellect; theintellect is notinternaland the will external,forthe intellectdirectsitselfto objectsoutsidethe soul, andthewillto objectsinsidethesoul.68 WhereCardanopostulates eightstages in thepassageof resto theintellect(see above,402) Scaligeronlymentions oftheintellect four,namelytheintentional ("dianoia")whichextracts activity thementalspeciesfromtheintendedobject,thespecieswhichis abstracted, theimpression ofthespecieson theintellect, and finally theactofintellecting in theintellect itself.69

5. Cardano,Actioin caluminiatorem(1559) and conclusionsis complexand Scaligers responseto Cardanos arguments ofCardanos positionseemsto me to be generally allusive;his understanding accurate.That is not how Cardanosaw matters, however.In 1559, he publishedanActioin calumniatorem in whichhe setsoutto librorum de Subtilitate dismissScaligers criticisms. He impliesat variouspointsthatScaligermaybe the truth on butclaimsthatitshouldhavebeenproduced occasions, uttering in a longand properly book. argued Scaligers wrongphilosophical approach to evidenceis revealedthrougha thoughtexperiment. Cardanorecordsthat an honest,straightforward and clever("minimestultus")farmer friendof his said thathe had hearda cow speakand say "alas,thispoor country"("heu a) ibid., tuusintellectus aeternus est:sedperpetuus intellectionum 307.6,931:"ñeque propter continuitatem." 67)SeeAverroes s commentary onDeanima iii.4429a16("the mind aspotentially thesameas itsobject, not identical to and Exercitationes "intel430a ibid., 2; , 307.6, it") 930-2): although lectum esseresintellectas . . . intellectum fieri nonsimpliciter, sed. . . permodum similiomnia, tudinis etreceptionis"; also307.16, accuse Cardano ofnotfully or 946-9.Others understanding about thisissue: seeNicolaus Commentari deVilanova, Taurellus, /,inArnau being wrong Opera differentiam inter idemetunum." Seealso simile, (Basle, 1585),1184:"[Cardanus] ignoravit inthemind". Maclean, "Language 68)Exercitationes eumvolo,atqueipsum intellexit , 307.8,934:"cumequum volo,nonaliter seealsoibid., 966-7. intellectus"; 307.23, 69)ibid., educit emateria : putaluxadvisionem, 307.21 ,959: "primům, quod[dianoia] speciem inintellectum. intellectus." Tertium, Quartum, species, quaeeducitur. ipsaimpression speciei Ondianoia , seealso307.2,922.

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patriaehuic"). The imaginedreactionsof variousphilosophicalschoolsare thenrecordedby Cardano. Epicuruswould have immediately accusedthe man of being stupid,or drunk,or mendacious;a theologianwould have to demons.A referred to God and our sins;a Platonistwould havereferred truecautiousperipatetic would havetriedto makedeductionsfromnatural as sensibly as possible.An astrologer wouldhavederivedthepower principles of speechin thecow fromthestars.If Cardanohad himselfbeen asked,he themansveracity, and thenprotellsus thathe would firsthaveestablished ceededfromthefactthatthecow could not havespokenof itsown nature. Thatdid notnecessarily meanthatithad beenpromptedbythedivinewill,as withmen withoutbreachingnaturallaws (theonly God can communicate similarcase knownto theologiansis Balaams ass, throughwhom an angel who heardthecow speak,heardit as he would have spoke).So thefarmer, in a heardwords dream,or in an ecstaticstate,or in greatfear;thecausesof such sensoryimpressions beingeithermaterialsuch as an imbalanceof the humours,or celestial.As theimbalanceofhumourscouldbe ruledout in the case in question,it must have been a celestialcause, the messagebeing or (moreplausibly)to mankindin addressedeitherto thefarmer personally in Cardano:to thevalue a commitment This reveals curious double general.70 on the of rationalenquiry,argument, observation and experiment empirical in belief the one hand,and,on theother,to an indemonstrable communicationby thesuperlunary aboutthepresentand future spheresof information it.Atthesametimeas occupystateoftheworldand ofindividuals inhabiting this Cardano complexposition, rejectsScaligersclaim thatthe soul is ing as inconsistent withtheperipatetic naturalphicomposedofthequintessence in he to There are of bad faith Cardanos which losophy purports espouse. signs of that when Cardano of his He accuses adversary. reading Scaliger declaring was thinking abouta horse,his soul was thesubstanceof a horse(a claim,if madeat all,madeonlyin jest).71He also bridlesat theaccusationofimpiety, ofwhichhe accusesScaligerin turnin a passagein whichhe is allegedto say "Deum essenaturam".72 70)Actio, inOpera , iii.707. 71)Exercitationes Cardani estequiforma. , 307.6,931:"intellectus equusest." ErgoCardanus 72)Opera, sectione intoleranda sunt. Deum denuo iii.708: "porro quaeinvigesimanova repetit, inipsis. essenaturam. Natura estinrebus, utPhilosophus ait,etDeuserit Quinquodevidentius fieri a Deo:anima ibidem naturam vultesseinanimatis, Deusest.Quaeatqueanimam igitur Anima enim eidem suntunum, unum etinter sesunt. cum Deus,quaecumfiat cunque igitur Porro ferat totimpietates huius hominis? Hocenim mihi sānus Deo,Deusa Deofiet. quismente nihil aliudestquamdicere, meusestsubstantia aut quodanimus equi,dumequum intelligit,

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6. Envoi and hisexplicit It seemsto methatin spitebothofCardanos claimsto novelty and constructive separationof hermeneutics argument,and of Scaligers no greatchangehas humanistcredentials and philosophicalself-confidence, occurredin therangeof questionsaskedabout thesoul and in theevidence adducedto determinetheiranswers.Nor has the use of textsin the Greek of radicallychangedtheirinterpretation, althoughthe Greekcommentaries stimulated thereconsideration ofcertainArisAlexander and otherscertainly toteliandoctrines. One can go backto themedievaloriginsofthedebate,and abouttheissuesunderconsidfindin Aquinasand hiscriticsas muchclarity erationas in thewritings ofthegeneration ofCardanoand Scaliger.An indito cationof thisis to be foundin thecontinueduse of theSummatheologiae contexts. discussthesoul,evenin medical(and hencenatural-philosophical) GermandoctorGregorHorstproduceda When,forexample,thecelebrated littlebook entitledDe naturahumanaforhisstudentsat Giessenin 1612, he was contentto structure his materialby usingAquinass questionsaboutthe and to acceptThomistsolutions.73 Nor does thereseem to be the intellect, here of a march towards the secularisation of knowledge. signs progressive Both partiesto the disputeclaim to be orthodoxin theirviews,and both accusetheotherofimpiety: thisin spiteofthefactthatbothhad beentrained in the naturalistic schoolsof NorthernItaly.Equally,both partiesclaim to betweenthe interpretation of Aristotle, and independent philodistinguish but bothend up by mappingtheirviewsback on to an sophicalargument, Aristotelian matrix.I do not meanto implybythisthattheywereunableto animalia illustret. illeutimpia accusai. Sedsiulla Quaetamen quodmens quaepiam equum esset eimens, essepossunt? anapudTheologos? anPhilosophos? [.. .] Ita quomodo impia rogo, In fact, videscalumniatoris inexcusabilem." hadwritten only"siNatura impietatem Scaliger Deum[.. Exercitationes , 307.21962. intelligis 73)Gregor, 1.An Horst De natura humana deintellectu): (Frankfurt, 1612),ii.2(quaestiones vel intellectus inintelligendo a corpore , la 84,7f.)2. Ansingulare {Summa pendeat theologiae la 85,1f)3. Numsingulare veluniveuniversale abintellectu (Summa cognoscantur theologiae, la 86,1)4. Ansingularia raleprimo abintellectu {Summa perspecies cognoscatur theologiae, la 85,1)5.Anspecies abintellectu (Summa cognoscantur theologiae, intelligibilis intelligibiles différant nobis actuinsint a natura la 84,3)6.Anintellectus etpatiens {Summa agens theologiae, etnumintelligere la 79,4ff.) diciqueat, 7. Numintellectus {Summa passiva potentia theologiae, etvoluntas différant sitpati{Summa la 79,2)8. Numintellectus {Summa practicus theologiae, intellectus etvoluntas différant , la , la 79,11)9. Anspeculativus {Summa theologiae theologiae intellectu 79,11;82,Iff.)10.Anvoluntas , la 82,3)11.Anhomini {Summa dignior theologiae insit liberum arbitrium , la 83,1). {Summa theologiae

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betweeninterpretation and philosophicalargument, whichthey distinguish could clearlydo; only,thatthe conceptualschemewhichtheyfoundmost no matterhow fartheywerepreparedto congenialwas thatof theStagyrite, modifyit. The unconventional viewsof GirolamoCardanoand theirexhaustive criin Caesar are not mentioned the section on tiquebyJulius Scaliger psychology in theCambridge . Theyarehowevernotonly ofRenaissance History Philosophy as expressions of a broadintellectual debateof themid-sixteenth important also as but influences much the context oftheirfirst century, beyond publication. Cardano acquiredthe reputation as a free-thinking proponentof the ofthesoul,andwasvilified afterhisdeathbysuchorthodoxdefendmortality ers of Christianity as FrançoisGarasseand Marin Mersenne.74 The antiauthoritarian toneofCardanos writings,75 with their presenceon the together Indexlibrorum he , mayhaveled to theposthumousreputation prohibitorum acquiredas a freethinker(althoughthiswas mainlyfuelledby the almost falseassertion Martindel Rio thathe had certainly bytheJesuitdemonologist writtena clandestinebook entidedDe mortalitate animi).76That,together in thefrenzied withthedenunciations of 1620s ParisbyGarasse atmosphere and Mersenne,and the approbatory citationof Cardano in worksby freethinkers suchas GiulioCesareVanini,77 incitedthemanuscript ofthe hunters earlyseventeenth centuryto searchforhis lostworkssuchas theDe arcanis 74)François La doctrine curieuse desbeaux decetemps, ouprétendus tels(Paris, Garasse, esprits l'undesplusraffinés atheistes Cardan, iamais"; 1624),24-5:"Hierosme quele monde porta desdéistes etlibertins decetemps Marin >athées Mersenne, (Paris, 1624),223-4:"[...] il L'impiété secachetantqu'il desonvenin comme laseche, depeurd'estre peutdansl'ancre pour recognu athee." 75)E.g.Opera nonquoniam illius , vi,62:"egoHippocrati credo, sit,sedquatenus Hippocrati rationibus adcredendum cogor." 76)Martin Del Rio,Disquisitiones 229: "sedetCardanus 1633),ii.26.2, magicae (Cologne, addit errorem errori error to claim that canbeperceived [theprevious spiritual by being beings thesenses], dumcenset deanimae immortalitate utindicant omnes fere illius dubius, (homo libri editi: etmaxime sednonediderat, amicis autem familioribus quemconscripserat, aliquando deanimae mortalitate omnes etspecies illarum ostendebat, esse, liber) apparitiones imaginarias tamtum in reference to this is found Paolo San; primas opinatur" imaginando concipi passage Cenni storici sulle dueUniversità doPaviaediMilano (Milan, 1831),170.Hedescribes giorgio, itasa "accusa which itis,prima indeed cf.themore in measured comment calunniosa", facie: DelRio,Disquisitiones deSubtilitate etVarietate libris latet , i.13,9: "inCardani magicae passim inherba, etindigent anguis "expurgatione." 77)SeeNicholas 'Leplusbeauetleplusmeschant science Davidson, esprit queieayecogneu': inthewritings andreligion inHeterodoxy ofGiulio Cesare Vanini" inearly modern science and & I. Maclean 59-80(68). , ed.J.Brooke (Oxford, 2006),59-80, religion

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aeternitatis and the De fato,whosetitleshad alreadyalarmedthe authority whichgrantedCardanohis firstlicenceto printin Milan 1538.78Scaligers Geron theotherhandwereadoptedbya numberofreformed Exercitationes manuniversities fromaboutthesametime,and usedas a textbookofperipaButevenhe cameto be teticphilosophy century.79 up to themid-seventeenth as one German doctoralstudentputit seenno longeras a trustworthy guide: "first let in whichhe comparedthetwothinkers: in 1645, in thedissertation Thisis theprinthetruth".80 us considerCardano;nextScaliger;and finally their in refer order to which both Cardano and to distinguish ciple Scaliger fromthoseproducedbyAristotleand others;it own rationalconstructions whichat leastCarcomeshereto be directedagainstthemin turn(something dano foresaw wouldhappen).81

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deVilanova, Commentari /,inArnau Taurellus, Nicolaus, 1585). Opera(Basle, siècle Lessciences del'âme: XVIe-XVIIIc Vidal, Fernando, (París, 2006). rationali Francesco di,Deanima 1543). Vimercate, (Paris, disceptatio peripatetica 1538). etvita(Basle, Vives, Luis,Deanima Juan andthesciences : commemorative A. (ed.),Albertus (Toronto, James essays Weisheipl, Magnus 1980).

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Vivarium 46 (2008)418-442

Cartesian

Scientia

and the Human

Soul

LilliAlanen University ofUppsala Abstract in terms of ofmatter theaccountofphysical nature Descartes s conception changed into animals were turned extension terms. Plants and andrelated species quantitative Thisarticle canbe explained ofmachines, whosenatural functions mechanistically. ofhumansoul. forthepsychology ofthistransformation reflects on theconsequences with thebodyand itlacksextension, it is also united In so farthesoulis rational yet matter. The article examines Desso it is able to act on extended affected and byit, andarguesthatthereis s conceptofscientia andhisdifferent usesofnature, cartes thanis usually Aristotelian andCartesian between muchmorecontinuity psychology embodied human of the functions of the when it comes to an explanation recognized in of its for the new science If unfit inclusion soul. thismakespsychology nature, within scientia as andhasan important place phenomenon objectis stilla natural Descartes conceived ofit. Keywords Descartes dualism, mind-body 1. Introduction thatDescartess mind-body dualismseta limitto Whileit is uncontroversial of nature,it is theuniversalistic demandsofthenewmechanistic philosophy lessclearto whatextenthisnotionofthehumansoulor mindqua embodied did. "Physics",or "naturalphilosophy"in Descartess timewas used in the would coveranything senseof "thescienceof nature".Nature,traditionally, or so rational at a nature essence, animals, being thetopofthehierarhaving the of inside Lunar chy natural,livingthings sphere,werepartofnature.Sciand so itdidwithinthe enceofnaturein thissensewouldincludepsychology, Aristotelian wherethestudyofall naturalthingsincludsystemofknowledge thelimits animated fell under physics.In spiteofredrawing ingliving, beings ©Koninklijke Brill 2008 Leiden, NV,

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betweenmindand matter, Descartes,it has beenclaimed,continuedto conceiveofthescopeofphysicsin thetraditional way,includingnotonlyanimal - notaandhumanphysiology, butalsoimportant partsofhumanpsychology of mindand body withinhisphilosobly,thepassionsand theinteraction of nature.1 phy Such claims,I haveargued,restin parton themistakenassumptionthat would treatthemindas supernatural or transcendent, anyotheralternative it inaccessible to natural means. Descartess definition making knowledgeby of soul as distinctfrommatterin combinationwithhis viewof thehuman beingas a mind-bodycompositedid bringabout a breakin thecontinuity betweenpsychology and the restof the philosophyof nature,but did not excludemindfromnature.Recognizing thatitis notpartofphysicalnatureas Descartesconceivedthelatteris notto makeit supernatural butto recognize thatDescartess conceptofnatureis lessrestrictive thanthatofcontemporary naturalists who oftenidentify naturewiththe domainof physics,or,more thatofsubsumption underthelawsofphysics.2 precisely, in Nature Descartesswide senseof the termincludesall createdthings, as muchas extended.Theyinstantiate the two kindsof natureor thinking essencesthereare,whicharealso radically different so thatthereis nothingin no between them. That common, continuity thinkingnatureand extended naturearemutually meansthattheyhaveexplanatory independent autonomy. The createdorderofthingsincludes,in addition,humanbeingscomposedof thesetwokindsofsubstanceand hencepartaking in twokindsofnatures with These mindmutuallyindependentand exclusiveessentialcharacteristics. areendowedwithnaturesoftheirowninyeta different sense bodycomposites of the termintroducedin the SixthMeditation.This senseof natureis far fromunproblematic itself.Qua compositesof two mutuallyexclusivesubessenceor essentialattristances,humanbeingshaveno distinctly intelligible buteof theirown,comparableto theessencesof thesubstancescomposing them.Embodiedhumannatureis thinkingand extended,and displays,in whichcan be derivedfromneitherof thesetwoessences addition,properties ^ Thus, while thatDescartes "wasn't clear whether thehuman mind considered by admitting itself fellwithin "he was Hatfield claims clear that union and interaction physics", mind-body were ofphysics orthescience ofnature". Descartes andthe Meditations Hatfield, (Lonpart Gary donandNewYork, "Descartes andtheCorporeal Mind. Wilson, 2003),284,seealsoCatherine inDescartes' SomeImplications oftheRegius Natural & Affair", , ed.S. Gaukroger Philosophy & NewYork, (London 2000),631-659. J.& J.Sutton 2)LilliAlanen, "Descartess inNaturalandNaturalism", Mind-Body Composites, Psychology isminModern vol.51,3(forthcoming). ed.byM.Kisner, issue ofInquiry Philosophy, special

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consideredapart,but dependon theirclose and intimateunion.3Including the phenomenadependingon the union- the actionsand passionsof the betweenmindand body- withinthesciembodiedmindand theinteraction ence of physicalnaturewould mean turningtheminto somethingthatby definition theycannotbe: merematerialprocessesor events. forpsycholOne mightaskhowclearDescarteswas abouttheimplications a he not dualism. Did of his mind-body marking departurefromhis ogy predecessorswritethat he was treatingof the passionsof the soul "en did he not,withhistheoryofthepinealgland,sketch Moreover, physicien"?4 ofa theory ormind-body thefoundations interaction, bywhichmentalstates, withsuitablebridging laws,couldbe subsumedunderphysics? Opinionswere on thisissue,someof dividedalreadyamongDescartess immediatefollowers thembeingless,some moresensitiveto the problemsthe inclusionwithin in termsofCartesianmindofhumannatureunderstood naturalphilosophy outright.He body compositesinvolved.Spinoza condemnsthe enterprise abouthuman Descartes"amongthosewho inwriting includes"thecelebrated affects and waysof livingseemto treatthemnot as naturalthingsfollowing whichareoutsidenature."5 as "things the"commonlawsofNature",butrather creditforat leasthavingsoughtto explainthehuman He giveshispredecessor affects theirfirst causes,and also to showthewaybywhichthemind "through What he showedhoweverwas have dominion overitsaffects". can absolute ofhisunderstanding" (E3pref.)IfDesnothingexceptperhapsthe"cleverness becausehis dualismhindered it was precisely cartesfailedin thisenterprise as merephysicalbodiesin a way himfromtreating hismind-body composites theapplicationofthecommonlawsofnaturerequired. 3)I differ thatDescartes atleastinsomecontexts heldthatthe from whoargues TadSchmalz inmind-body with anessence andmodes ofitsown.SeeTad unions come substances consisting ThePhilosophical Review ontheMind-Body M. Schmalz, "Descartes andMalebranche Union", Descartes's Mind I discuss thisinLilliAlanen, 101(1992),281-325. (Cambridge, Concept of inAlanen, 'Descartes s Mind-Body Mass.& London, Two,andmore 2003),Chapter recently, Composites'. 4)RenéDescartes, 12vols., revised edition Oeuvres deDescartes , ed.C. AdamandP.Tannery, as"AT"followed andpagenumber; 11:326- subsequently cited (Paris, 1964-76), byvolume translation ThePhilosophical RenéDescartes, byJ.Cottingham, Writings ofDescartes, English 2 vols.(Cambridge, citedas R. Stoothoff, andD. Murdoch, 1985),1: 327- subsequently "CSM"followed andpagenumber. byvolume 5)"Indeed Forthey asa dominion within a dominion. seemtoconceive maninNature they theorder of thanfollows believe thatmandisturbs, rather [magis perturbare, quamsequi], inBaruch Works Ethics TheCollected ed.andtransi, Nature." , 3 pref. by Spinoza, ofSpinoza, E. Curley vol.I,491(G II 137). (Princeton, 1985),

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- one thatSpinozapretty muchtakes Descartess newconceptionofmatter in the over- did bringwithit a fundamental conceptionof physical change forin related and what can be accounted it to mere extension nature,reducing terms.Thischangedthewaylivingthingswereto be conceived. quantitative Plants,animalsand in so faras theyare animals,humanbodies too, were can onlybe into speciesof machines,whosenaturalfunctions transformed not from extension were derivable Minds lacking explainedmechanistically. matterand could not be so explained,henceanyaccountof therelationof mindto bodydefinedin termsofextensionhad becomeutterly problematic, aware to fullyrealize.ButwasDescarteshimself as Spinozawasamongthefirst Ifso,where,on theCartesian oftheexplanatory gap hisdualismhad created? be located? shouldhumanpsychology treeofphilosophy, To shedsome lighton thesecomplexissuesand thekindof answerDesI proposeto considerDescartessphilosophyof cartescould have offered, ofhisnotionofScientiain thegeneralsenseof natureagainstthebackground sensesofnaturethathe close attention to thedifferent truephilosophy, paying and elsewhere. workswithin theMeditations is lhe first withthelatter, therearemainlyfoursensesto consider, Starting naturein thesenseofextendedmatterwhichis theobjectofnaturalphilosophy.The secondappliesto the natureof thinkingthings,and the thirdto all thingsthereare: God himself naturein a moregeneralsensecomprising includingtheorderof createdthings thinkingas well as extendedthings. - is naturein the senseof The fourthand last- a specialcase of the third Scienceof naturein has as God us mind-body composites.6 everything given Descartess senseofnaturalphilosophy cannot,I argue,be extendedto include also the interaction betweenmindand bodyand the mentalstatesensuing fromthisinteraction: naturein thefirstsensedoes not includenaturein the be an extensionof Cartecannottherefore fourth sense.Psychology properly sian physicsand henceis not partof his naturalphilosophy. Philosophyof natureon theotherhandis notforDescartesas itwouldbe forcontemporary all thereis to human science.CartesianScientiaproperlyhas physicalists naturein thethirdand mostgeneralsenseas itsobject,and naturalphilosophy 6)Thelasttwo, intheSixth inmyenumeration, Meditation areintroduced thethird andfourth inwhich arelisted insection 4. Theorder below (AT7,80;CSM2,56)andarediscussed they kinds ofconcerns, inwhich different ischronological, Descartes, i.e.,itistheorder confronting inthe whothen became interested ofnature, them. Hestarted outasa philosopher developed about his life also became concerned of and who at the end of order metaphysical things, general Descartess SeeAlanen, thenature ofhuman andmoral Concept ofMind, psychology. beings Two. Chapter

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concernsonlyone kindofthingsthatfallsunderit: thosethatcan be undertheattribute ofextension. stoodthrough In additionto thebasicmetaphysical on Scientia is not which it rests, just about extendedand thinking insights natureconsideredapart,but also includeswhatresultsfromtheirunion as by God, and that,as it turnsout, can onlybe known speciallyinstituted the senses lifeexperience. Forwhiledepriving and ordinary sensory through of its earlier foundational Descartes neverdenieditsimporrole, experience tanceas a sourceof information thatno mathematico-physical science(or can and that we have to on both as rely metaphysics) replace cognitiveand moralagents.As partof our naturalendowments whichare the objectsof theaspectsofsensoryexperience thatarerelevant herefalloutside psychology naturalphilosophy that in Descartess senseoftheterm,butsinceitis through that we obtain to this access actual it also has world, only experience cognitive in a legitimate within Scientia taken the of If broadest sense this term. place thisis granted,and if by CartesianScientiawe mean humansciencein the senseoftruephilosophy as usedin thePrefaceto thePrinciples , thennotonly ScientiaforDescartesbut moreparticularly does afterall humanpsychology I suggest, retainsomething oftheoverallAristotelian Whatitretains, project.7 is precisely theinductionbasedgeneralizations about involving assumptions endsand strivings thatDescartesmadea pointofbanishingfromhisphilosothecontinuity betweenCartesian phyof nature.But then,not surprisingly, andAristotelian is precisely whatmakesthedisciplineofpsycholpsychology in for the new of philosophyor scienceof nature unfit inclusion kind ogy Descartesis advocating. 2. Natureand theFabricationof theMan-Machinein theEarlyWork In hisearlierwritings Descartesmakesa pointofshowingthata wholerange of what within the Aristotelianscheme would count as lower psychic 7)Scientia inthesense hereintended comes closetotheidealofsapientia orhuman wisdom inRuleOneofRegulae outlined addirectionem Itisnot CSM 10, 359-360; 1, (AT 9-10). ingenii exhausted kindoftrueandevident alsocharacterized asscientia bythehighest knowledge by hecalls"good butincludes what sense" mente Descartes touniverDescartes, {bona ) that equates salwisdom Asthehighest endofallenquiries itispursued for itsownsake, (universali Sapientia). anditisbestpursued the ones natural of not for scholastic reason, byincreasing light solving asmuch asforpractical the intellect in "each of s conlife philosophical problems by guidance inthissense isnotonly oriented tothetrue but (AT10,361;CSM1,10)Scientia tingencies". alsotothegood, thegood, asitshould inthis bepursued andthus itstheoretical moreover, life, from whatthecasemaybeforAristode, areultimately subordinated toits differendy goals, moral practical, goal.

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to the animalsoul, notablyvisualperception, were phenomenaattributed in terms of causal mechanisms. It is to explainable law-governed important note whatexactlythesecausal mechanismsexplained.Theyconcernedthe conditionsof sensoryperceptions and their bodilyand neuro-physiological butdid notextendto theircontentsor theawareness variations, accompanyofhumanperception.8 Descartesin factneveras much ingthemcharacteristic as suggests thattheseexplanations would extendto thenatureof man propAs the observer of the erly. phenomenonoflight,man,afterall,staysoutside naturein theoriginalprojectof TheWorld?wherea trulyoriginalnewconceptionofnatureis invented.Once theidea had beendevelopedto includeman as a self-regulating machinewithinthescopeofthelawsofnature,thelawsof motionshad to be completedwithassumptionsabout regularconnections betweenbrainpatternsand theirmentalcorrelates.10 These regularities are be subsumedunderor reducedto thelaws positedbut could not themselves of naturethatexplainedtheformation of thebrain-patterns. The questionis whether suchregularities or correlations couldhavethestatusofnaturallaws in Descartess sense,thatis,whethertherearepsycho-physical lawsthatmeet therequirements Descartesputson clearand distinctexplanation.11 8)Theanimal-machine unlike thehuman doesnothavetheability toseeorthink that perceiver itsees.(ATI,413;Descartes, The vol.3: TheCorrespondence Philosophical Writings, (Cambridge, - subsequently in citedas "CSMK"followed Thatcapacity, 1991),61-62 bypagenumber) whatever isa prerequisite forthehigher order that Deswayitisexplicated, capacities cognitive cartes seesasessential inhissense tothinking oftheterm. 9)Itsfulltitle LeMonde, ouletraité delalumière. being 10)ThéoVerbeek that notes toinclude manasa self-regulating intheproject machine probably wasa latedevelopment. SeeThéoVerbeek, "TheInvention inDescartes' ofNature", Natural & Schuster & Sutton, toMersenne, I63n29.Cf.letter ,ed.Gaukroger 149-167, June Philosophy 1632(AT1,254-5;CSMK39). n) Thelawsofmotions donotapply here. Tostate a lawful connection a minimum requirement, onewould would bethat thephenomena toberelated canbeparameterized ordescribed think, incomparable E. Terence "Nonreductive Material(Cf. quantitative magnitudes.e.g., Horgan., - A Critical ismandtheExplanatory inNaturalism ofPsychology", ed.by Autonomy Appraisal, S.J.Wagner andR.Warner scholars 296if.)Yetmany Dame,Indiana, (Notre 1993),295-320, with would Hatfield that Descartes s mechanistic seesallbodily agree although prophysiology cesses "asinteractions between to the laws of there "wasnoconflict motion", particles according between dualism andpsycho-physical laws" forDescartes, oflawwhojust"extended thenotion fulregularity tomind-body a permanent relation between brain-states and interaction, positing thesensations, inthemind." andemotions Descartes and Hatfield, appetites, they produce (Gary theMeditations andNewYork, tobevery clear aboutthe (London 2003),284)Itisimportant this istrue. Farfrom that there wasnoconflict forDescartes between point uptowhich agreeing dualism andpsycho-physical I myself sdualism have claimed that Descartes iswhat Donald laws, Davidson calledanomalous is positing cannot be andhencethattheconnections Descartes

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Descartesis notveryexplicitin thesecontexts aboutthenatureofthepsychic phenomenahe is concernedwith,traditionally to the two attributed lowerkindsof Aristotelian souls. He describes,in his thought-experiments, machineswhichcould imitateall thesesamefunctions thatarefoundin real fromthemachinesimitating men,who differently them,are endowedwith rationalsouls.He talksofsensory as ideasbutis notveryclearon perceptions whethertheseideasare anything the tracedin thebrainby beyond patterns neuralmotions.In theearlyunpublishedTreatise onMan, sensory perceptions aredescribed as theeffects ofthewayGod setup themind-body union,giving themindhe unitedto thebodyitsmainseatin thebrainand makingit of a naturesuchas to giveitdifferent sensations (likethosewe have)dependingon thewaysin whichtheporeson thesurfaceofbrainareopenedbythenerves. (AT 11, 143; CSM 1,102) The regularconnections he positsbetweenparticular kindsofbrainmovementsand kindsof perceptionare explainedwithsome detailsboth in the or Regulae,l'Hommeand La Dioptrique.However,the'ideas'or perceptions', 'sentiments' arenotyetconceptualized as essentially distinct fromthepatterns ofmotionsin thebrainand themechanicalreactions to these,whicharefound in animalsas wellas humanbeings.It is onlylaterthathe explicitly speaksof as kinds of or modifications of the mind,more sensoryperceptions thought confusedmodesofmind,dependingon itsunionwiththebodyand precisely, causedbybodilymotions.One maythus,legitimately, askhowclearDescartes himself was aboutthelimitsofhisexplanatory schemein thiscontext.12 lawful relations ofthekindnatural science assumes between mental andphysical states. See Descarteis and "Descartes's ComAlanen, Mind, Two, Alanen, Chapter Mind-Body Concept of note25,andreferences there Fora clarifying assessment ofrecent discussions on posites", given. thisissue seeLoeb2006,65-85. 12)lheambiguity inhisuseofideaintheearlier work hasoften beenpointed out,most recently Desmond who voices about Descartes's at this dualism Clarke, (2002,50). by skepticism point IfDescartes didnotcomeoutclear onthisissue then theclaim that there aremechanical causal relations andideas, thelatter to between, objects sensory e.g.,external stimulating organs taking bepatterns orfigures inthebrain, thattheminddirectly wouldperhaps notbeso inspects, Hecouldhaveheldthat theconnections between stimulations ofsensory problematic. posited andpatters ofmotion inthebrain which arethebodily of"ideas" aresuborgans counterparts sumable under thelawsofnature. Butevenintheearliest work there arecontexts where the difference whatisinthemind between orthecognitive itself andthebodily of power organs is XII of the AT 1 CSM Rule stressed, 1, 415; 1, perception unambiguously e.g., Regulae. (e.g., ofhowthese ofmotion canberelated tothetrain ofideasonthe 42),andthequestion patterns - that mental levelremains unanswered answer seems tobeforthcoming thanthat is,noother Godputthem us such these correlations obtain ofnature". there, creating that by"institution

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itself"(AT 11, 37; CSM By nature'in Le MondeDescartesmeans"matter it are laws of motionand theyact through 1, 92), and the laws governing contactbetweentheextendedparticlesor chunksof matterthatmove.Laws ofnaturein thissensecanonlyexplainchangesofspeedorquantity ofmotion, etc. of extended matter. The first on of the Treatise configuration, paragraph Man (L'Homme)written as a complement to the Worldstatesthatthemenof theworldhe describesare "composed,as we are,of a soul and a body".His thehumanbodyon itsown,"thenthesoul,againon planwas to describefirst itsown";and finally "showhowthesetwonatures wouldhaveto be joinedand unitedin orderto constitute menwho resembleus" (AT 11,1 19-120; CSM is thefirst, aboutthefunctions 1, 99). The onlypartworkedout or preserved ofthebody,butthereis no explanation ofhowthemindisjoinedto thebody. Whathis thought-experiment withmachinesimitating humanscan showat and bodilymovements thoseoftheanimal most,is thatfunctions simulating all conative and functions common to humansand i.e., vital, body, cognitive animals,can be givena mechanistic account,in somebroadsenseofmachinemechanism thatpresupposes functions and endssetbythemachine-maker.13 In additionto biologicalfunctions of blood,nourish(digestion,circulation ment,growth,respiration, etc.),thelistincludessenseperception, imaginaand the "internalmovements of theappetitesand passions". tion,memory, No need henceto postulatevegetative or sensitivesouls or principlesof life and movementin the body-machine, "apartfromits blood and its spirits, - a whichareagitatedbytheheatofthefireburningcontinuously in itsheart firewhichhas thesamenatureas all thefiresthatoccurin inanimatebodies." (AT 11, 202; CSM 1, 108) Thesesamepointsarerepeatedin PartFiveofDiscoursde la méthode (AT 6, in so faras Descarteshas laid out, for 50- 59). The contextnow is different the firsttimemoreexplicitly, his dualisticthesisthatthe soul is essentially and fromthebody"(AT 6, 33). 14He startswitha distinct thinking "entirely in Le Monde and l'Homme ofsomeofhisdiscoveries , in particular summary hisaccountof theblood circulation and thevitaland cognitivefunctions we sharewith the animal-machine (AT 6, 52-56), i.e., the phenomenalisted above.15 Butnow,forthefirst realhuman time,he explainswhatdistinguishes 13)Cf.thelucidaccount ofDennis DesChene, & Clocks. Machines & Organisms inDesSpirits cartes & London, 6. (Ithaca 2001),Chapter 14)Thisisnottosaythat hadnotalways helda dualistic view. Thathedid,isobvious in already theearly But it is to that he not too much to the had say Regulae. given thought consequences for dualism ofhisnewconcept ofmatter. SeeAlanen, 1and2. Descartes's ofMind, Chapters Concept ,5)Fora clear account ofDescartes's non-finalistic commitment tomechanical, uncompromising

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theirmovements: namely,theposbeingsfrommechanicaldevisesimitating sessionof reasonrevealedthroughtheuse of meaningful speech(AT 6, 56to of his earlier work that has not he claimshe survived, 58). Referring parts had shownnotonlythattherationalsoulunliketheotherfunctions explained "cannotbe derivedin anywayfromthepotentiality of matter, but mustbe speciallycreated"butalso thatitis notenoughthatitis "lodgedin thehuman bodylikea helmsmanin a ship. . . butthatitmustbe morecloselyjoinedand unitedwiththebodyin orderto have and appetiteslikeoursand feelings thusto constitute a realman."(AT 6, 59; CSM 1, 141) Descarteshereadmitsthattheanimal-machine describedin thepartofthe L'Hommewe knowdiffers froma realmanon twoaccounts:in lackinga ratioin nothavingfeelings nal soul,and,moreover, and appetiteslikeours,which a more intimate union of the soul with itsbodythanthatofthepilot require in theshipofthePlatonicmetaphor. The pilot,likethefountainengineeror theorganplayerin themetaphors of l'Hommecan controlthemovements of thevesselor automatonit inhabits,but it cannotfeelthedamagedone to it norcan it experience in workingproperly. Ifitwerepossibleto itswell-being locatea rationalsoul withina machinein all respectssimilarto thehuman bodywe wouldstillnothavea realhumanbeing,buta machinewitha rational controlorgan. It is howevernotuntiltheMeditatìones deprimaphilosophiae thatDescartes in saysa bit moreabouttherealhumanbeing.What he now saysconfirms, line withthe remarkquoted above fromtheDiscours , thatthe union as he conceivesit goesfarbeyondwhatanyplatonicmetaphors couldcapture. 3. ThinkingNature BeforeconsideringDescartess more matureview of human nature,as it unfoldsin theSixthMeditation, and thequestionsconcerning ourknowledge aboutit,something whichby shouldbe saidabouthisviewofthinking itself, intoa thinking, humanbody. beingunitedto it changesthebody-machine the questionswe are concernedwithheredependson how one Answering this oressence interprets notions,i.e.,on whatone takesthenatureofthinking of mind(naturein thesecondsenseof theterm)to be, and whatdifference in thesenseone prefers, to matter, makes.Therearea number addingthought, ofvitalfunctions seeAnnie "Cartesian inDescartes explanation Bitbol-Hespériès, Physiology' Natural & Schuster & Sutton. , ed.Gaukroger Philosophy

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ofcandidates. whichis notone I prefer, is one ofthem.Agency Consciousness, is another.Beinga cognitive or a rationalagentare,to mymind,clearlymore suited(thanhavingconsciousawareness) to capturewhatitis forDescartesto be a thinking, Awareness forratiomaybe one prerequisite reasoningbeing. aremoreimportant, notleastthecapacityto use and nalitybutotherfeatures to and to form thatinvolves speech respond meaningful judgments, something thecapacityto distinguish to reasonand drawinferences. truthand falsity, Ideas as analyzedin theThirdMeditationhavean intentional structure, they have objectsor contents,and intentionalactionsare done forreasonsand ends.Rationalagencyas discussedbyphilosophers sinceAristotle presupposes notonlydesireforsomegoodmovingtheagentbuta capacityfordeliberation and decisionor choice involvingevaluativeand normativeconsiderations. Rationalagentsin deliberating about theend to pursueand decidingabout theappropriate to them are thoughtto be themselves activeor way pursue self-movers.16 None of thisis amenableto explanationin termsof efficient causesof thekindDescartess physicsoperateswith,and cannotbe included even in some extensionof mechanistic physics,fromwhichconsiderations aboutendsand intentionality areon principleexcluded.One mayarguethat Cartesiandualismleftroomfora purelyspeculative and scienceofrationality, Whatindeed,Descartesseemsto laythegroundsforthisin hismetaphysics. eversucha sciencemightrevealabout rationalnaturein generalit is not of muchhelp whenit comesto understanding the humanmindor predicting actionsofhumanagents,who arenotpurelyrational.Qua embodiedtheyare is affected bywhathappassiveand acteduponbyotherbodies:theirthinking as one with.17 This leavesus with pens to the bodies theyfindthemselves in which do not fall eithercamp,i.e., naturally composites, thought-matter in thatoftheobjectsofthescienceofphysicalnaturenorthatofrationeither nal souls.Let us now turnto considering theseand theaccesswe can haveto theseas objectsofcognition. 16)Descartes inthesense takes thisideatoitsextreme: ofa capacity forself-determinaActivity that hecallsliberum arbitrium voluntatis onesexternal oneresponsible notjustfor tion, , renders actions butforonesvery or beliefs and is essential to the human thinker, rendering thoughts intheFourth assuchis asDescartes animage ofGod.Theintellect her, Meditation, explains - a capacity - ittakes forseeing andunderstanding thetruth thewilltoendorse truth passive inmakthewilltogiveupthat andtocommit oneself toseeking it,asitalsotakes commitment, I develop inAlanen, these andassenting tobeliefs without points ingmistakes goodreasons. Descartes's and240-246. 224-233 Concept ofMind, 17)Formore ofDescartes's ofideasaswellasother ofhis extensive discussions concept aspects broad notion ofthinking seeAlanen, Descartes's Concept ofMind.

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4. Two New SensesofNature In the SixthMeditation,havinggivenhis finalproofforthe existenceand distinctness of mindand body,Descartesenquiresabouttheepistemicstatus ofsenseperceptions whichare"lessclearlyunderstood" thantheproperties of 4 bodieswhichcan be comprisedwithinthesubject-matter of mathematics" (AT 7, 80; CSM 2, 55). He worrieson theone handaboutbeliefsaboutparticularobjectsof senseperception, (how do we knowthatthesun is of such and such a size or shape),and, moregenerally, about sensoryphenomena "suchas lightor sound or pain" in themselves. Theyweredescribedin the ThirdMeditationas obscureand confusedto thepointthatwe do notalways knowwhattheyare about or whetherindeedtheyhave any objector not. (AT 7, 43-4; CSM 2, 29-30) Thesearehighlyuncertain, yet,he writes: ofthere ... thevery fact that andtheconsequent Godisnota deceiver, impossibility being inmyopinions which cannot becorrected anyfalsity bysomeother faculty by supplied I canattain inthese mea sure thetruth even matters. there is God,offers Indeed, hopethat that I am Italics nodoubt that nature contains some truth. 56. 2, (CSM everything taught by added.)18 What thendoes natureteachus and whattruthdoes thatteachingcontain? Two further sensesof"nature", naturegenerally (3) and mynaturein particular(4), areintroduced here: I understand Forifnature isconsidered initsgeneral (3),then bytheterm aspect nothing other thanGodhimself, ortheordered ofcreated established system byGod.And things inparticular other thanthetotality ofthings (4) I understand bymyownnature nothing bestowed me God. 56. 2, (CSM added.)19 upon by Numbering The first of thetwonewsensesof nature,naturein itsgeneralaspects,covers - thinking God himself orthewholecreatedsystem ofthings and extended withtheorderhe established. Here,in theSixthMeditation,Descartesis not concernedwithour knowledgeof thisorderedsystemas a whole but with whatwe can nowaboutnaturein thelattersense(thefourth and lastsenseon - the in in It stands for own all its nature list). my my particular complexity 18)"Etsanenondubium estquineaomnia a natura habeant veritatis." (AT quaedoceor aliquid 7,80). 19) . .pernaturam nihil nuncaliudquamvelDeum,ipsum, vel enim, spectatam, generaliter rerum creatarum coordinationem a Deo institūtam necaliudpernaturam meam in intelligo, a Deosunt eorum omnium tributa." (AT7,80). particulari, quamcomplexionem quaemihi

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ofthethingsI havebeengiven,includingmind,bodyand theirunion totality sense as instituted by God. Amongthe thingsthatnaturein thisrestricted with teachesis thatI have a body,thatthereis something mybody wrong the body needs food when I feelpain, "thatwhen I am hungryor thirsty and drink,and so on". By theaboveprinciplethereis sometruthin all this. Moreover: I am sensations ofpain, andthirst andsoon,that Nature alsoteaches me,bythese hunger inmybodyasa sailor ina ship, ispresent butthatI amvery notmerely closely present I andthebody with with it(quasi and,asitwere ), sothat permixtum joined intermingled form a unit. (AT7,81;CSM2,56) In feelingpain and othersensationsI feelmyself affected my bywhataffects and since there is some to the of not and self, body body point distinguishing withor likethis,it is truethatI am as itwereintermingled truthin teachings one withmybody.For,as he explains,ifthiswerenot so, ifI werea merely would not feelpain but would thinking thingin thebody,I, qua thinking, as an the insteadperceivethedamagesuffered bodythroughtheintellect, by if in his as "the sailor external observer, bysight anything shipis perceives just broken". Takeanyotherexample.Supposemyarmor legwas blownoffin an - something I wouldnoticeonlybyseeingthelimbthornawayfrom explosion or starving, whenmybodywas dehydrated therestofmybody.Similarly, sensations I should ofthefact, instead ofhaving confused haveanexplicit understanding but sensations ofhunger, ofhunger andthirst. Forthese thirst, painandsoonarenothing of which arise from theunion confused modes ofthinking and,asitwere, intermingling CSM themind andthebody. 7, 81; 2, (AT 56) In additionto teachingme about myown bodilystates,naturein thislast sensealso teachesme thatI, or mybody,is surrounded byotherbodies,some are to be soughtout and thelatter someharmful, thattheformer beneficial avoided. I perceive ofcolours, smells and thefact that a great Andfrom sounds, bymysenses variety I amcorrect ininferring that the inheat, aswellasdifferences hardness andthelike, tastes, corredifferences which arethesource ofthese various bodies sensory perceptions possess notresembling them. tothem, Also,thefactthatsomeofthe perhaps sponding though itquite certain that to me while others are makes are my disagreeable perceptionsagreeable me andmind, insofarasI form a composite orrather (sive potius body, ofbody mywhole self, beneficial etmente sumcompositus), canbeaffected excorpore totum, bythevarious quatenus it."(AT7,81;CSM2,56.Italics orharmful bodies which surround added).

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betweenteachings ofnatureof It importsto be veryclearaboutthedifference thiskind,whichpresupposeactualsensoryexperience, and whatwe can disofnaturein general(naturein thethirdsense), coverabouttheorderedsystem lhe latterincludesthetwogeneralattributes ofextensionand thought, from whichanything underthese(nature thatcanbe knownaboutthethingsfalling in thefirst and thesecondsense)can be derived.All thechangesthatcan hapto body consideredas a piece of mereextensioncan in principlebe pen - similarly, deducedmathematically pure,rationalthoughtscan be inferred fromthesimplenotionsgiventhenormsor lawsof thought.But thereis no thepain I wayone could deduceor predict,fromeitherof theseattributes, suffer whenmyarmis blownoff,or thewarmnessI enjoywhenthisbodyof on mysensory mineis seatedby thefire.I can findthisout onlyby relying which the stimulation of my sensoryorgansby experience, presupposes thusand so, with mymindor thinking affecting changesin myenvironment theseparticular vividbutconfusedthoughts thatsensations characteristically are forDescartes.20 The waysthoughtsand bodilymotionsare connected, - i.e., thewaysGod has joinedhumanminds of nature giventheinstitution or disto theirbodies can onlybe foundout byexperience. Understanding these connections eludes us. tinctly explaining in the SixthMeditation,what merely Descartesgoes on to distinguish, appearsto be taughtbynature,butis in facttheproductofhastyjudgments and prejudice,fromwhat naturereallyteachesand is reliable.Thus what of thingsis oftenfalse. natureappearsto teachme aboutthetrueproperties On the contrary, whatevernatureappearsto teachme thatmattersto the , is- at leastundernormal wellbeingofmywholeself,theselfas a compositum circumstancestrustworthy: Fortheproper ofthesensory mebynature issimply toinform purpose perception given ofwhich themind ofwhat isbeneficial orharmful forthecompositum themind isa part; clear andtothisextent are and distinct. CSM 7, 83; 2, (AT 57) they sufficiendy 20)Itdoesnotfollow, hasargued, thatsensations bemodes ofmind, asTadSchmalz cannot ifthey because would betransparent Toavoidthis, heproandwholly were, they intelligible. unionisa third kindofsubstance withanattribute ofitsown,of posesthatthemind-body which sensations aremodes. "Descartes andMalebranche", and298.)But 281-325 (Schmalz, in this Descartes s the Passions the Soul that aremodes of claims, explicit e.g., they goesagainst of inthebody, caused andthat there areonly twomain attributes for clear and bymotions thought distinct ofthings. onmyreading, arecomplex the states under Sensations, expressed knowledge twoattributes atonce:they aremodes ofthought thatresult from theunion ofthought with - asDescartes - beexperienced toRegius (Descartes bodyandcannot bypureminds. explains ina passage asI readhim, viewexpressed holdsthevery byMalebranche bySchmalz, quoted "Descartes andMalebranche", 305).

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as everyreaderoftheSixthMeditation Thingsarenotall thatsimplehowever, knows.Becauseof thewaysthemindand bodyareput together to formthe the mind indivisible" and the , body"byitsnature compositum being"utterly errors ofnatureareboundto happen.21 alwaysdivisible"ad infinitum, Errorshappenbecauseas thoseofyouwho havestudiedDescartess physithata givenmotioncaused ologyknow,"naturehaslaiditdown",forinstance, in nerves from the foot the should brain, by "producein themindthesensain thefoot".However,thereis somedistanceto the tionofpain,as occurring brainfromthefoot,and so theminddoes not distinguish at whichpointof theneuraltransmitters themotionhas begun.Suppose,forinstance,thatthe nerveis pulledat thelumbarregioninsteadofin thefoot: willoccurinthebrain as occurs whenthefootis hurt, andso it ...thesamemotion willnecessarily thesamesensation ofpain.(AT7, 87; comeaboutthatthemindfeels CSM2,60) It mayseemall setup formaddoctorsexperimenting withbrainsin a vatand forphilosophers to speculateaboutwhethertherestof thebodyapartform thecrucialregionsofthebrainhas anyseriousroleto playforourexperience But we need notworryaboutthatherebecause,as Desbeingwhatit is we can trustin a benevolent cartesdeclaresin a moodofLeibnizianoptimism, in thebestpossibleway,withourgoodas hisgoal. God whohasordainedthings inthepart . . .anygiven movement ofthebrain that affects themind immediately occurring be one and hence the best that could devised sensation; system produces just corresponding isthatitshould theonesensation ofallpossible ismost which, sensations, produce conducive tothepreservation ofthehealthy man. Andexperience shows that the frequently sensations which nature hasgiven isabsolutely usareallofthiskind; andsothere nothing inthem ofGod.(AT7, tobefound that doesnotbearwitness tothepower andgoodness 87-88;CSM2,60) The motionsoccurringin the brainare linkedwithsensationsthat(given the union) are mostusefulforpreserving the Gods purposesin instituting 21)Heexplains: "Themind isnotimmediately affected ofthebody, butonly bythe byallparts which to contain the orperhaps one small of the the is said brain, brain, namely part justby part thesamesignals common sense. time thispart ofthebrain isina given itpresents state, Every ofthebodymaybeina different atthetime." tothemind, eventhough other condition parts istheconarion orpineal sense forDescartes (AT7,86;CSM2,59-60)lheseatofthecommon connection of the and as he states somewhat carelessly, presumably, regular gland, speaking, "this is established brain states between andthesignals bycountless perceived bythemind, which there isnoneedtoreview here" observations, (!) (AT7,86;CSM2,60).

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continuedwellbeingofthebody,e.g.,thosesignifying thirst whenthelevelof is too low for the to CSM 7, 88; 2, 61). I am (AT liquid body stayhealthy over all this familiar to note how far Descartes has going very groundjust movedfromeffects thatcould be explainedby invokingmeremechanical causesand lawsofnaturein thesenseofnatureinventedin Le Monde, which is and remainstheproperdomainofCartesianphysics.Gods endsthatDescarteshasbannedfromhisphysics, becausetheyareand remainhiddento us22 are now invokedas something we are invitedto takeforgranted,relying on our dailyexperience. Descartesseemsto thinkthatwe mayconjecture about God s purposesin creating thingsforpracticaland ethicalpurposes,wherever - to back everyfinding we are not required as we arewhendoingphysics i.e., by clearand distinctproofs(AT 7, 375; by "thestrongest arguments", CSM 2, 258). Thatwe do nothavesuchproofsdoes notmeanthatourconThe ends and valueshereare not arbitrarily jecturesare groundless. posited - theyare,moreover, butinferred inductively bywhatwe canknow supported in generalaboutournatureand thatofourcreator whenwe do ourmetaphysI am taughtthroughrepeatedexperiences ics properly. thatifI neglectthat weak, tuggingfeelingin my stomachtoo long I will become increasingly or thatwheneverI feela certaindryness in mythroat,I needsomeintakeof liquid,and I mayrelyon thiseventhoughthesameexperience mayoccasionlead me I were to suffer fromdropsyand had better (forinstance, ally astray, avoidfollowing onceI knowhow myimpulse).I can alwayscorrect myerrors other I faculties.23 So have to on occur, they rely my experience usingmy on pain of starving or dyingof thirst, and I inferthatthefeelingsI relyon aregivenme,by God or nature,withthispurpose,to servemysurvivaland forone to rely wellbeing.Note thatthereis nothingelsethanpastexperience on here. Note also thatwhatever we discoverin following theteachings regularities of nature,and whatwe can inferfromour experience, arebetweenperceived 22)Fourth Meditation DesChene, Form: LateAristo(AT7,55;CSM2,39).Cf.Dennis, Life's telian andLondon, 2000). Conceptions oftheSoul(Ithaca 23)"Atque haecconsiderado nonmodouterrores omnes natura mea plurimum juvat, quibus abnoxia estanimadvertam, sedetiam utillosautemendare autvitare facile Namsane, possim. cumsciamomnes sensus circaea,quaead corporis commodum multo spectant, frequentius verum indicare utifere exiisadeandem remexamiquamfalsum, possimque semper pluribus etinsuper cumpraecedentibus etintellectu, nandam, memoria, connectit, quaepraesentia quijam omnes errandi causas nonamplius vereri debeoneilla,quaemihi a sensibus perspexit; quotidie sintfalsa, sedhyperbolicae dierum utrisudignae, sunt exhibentur, dubitationes, superiorum (AT7,89;CSM2,61) explodendae."

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external thingsor internalstatesofthebody,and ourdesiresand beliefs.The observedare thus, strictlyspeaking,betweensensations,i.e., regularities of a thoughts certainkind,and beliefsaboutwhatcausesthem,i.e., thoughts ofanotherkind.The thoughts and vivid, maybe clearin thesenseofmanifest none of them are and what matters here are distinct, very though regularpatternsofassociationbetweenthem,whichI havereliedon successfully before. The tuggingfeelingin mystomachunfailingly bringsthethoughtof foodto of natureDescartesinvokesin theSixthMeditation mymind.The teachings do notinvolveanyobservations aboutconnections betweenneuralmotionsor brainstatesand thoughts. The latterkindofregularities areand remainpurely aboutmybodilynaturein thesense speculative, theybelongto postulations in Cartesianphysics. ofnatureinvented Thisis notto saythatsuchsensations, theirvariationsof intensity and correlations withstimulicould not be the Butone mustaskwhatabouttheembodobjectsofempiricalinvestigations.24 in different ied mindapartfromtheoccurrences conditionsofdifferent types of sensationsand beliefssuch investigations could reveal.Theyinformus at bestoftheneuro-physiological mechanisms certainkindsofexpeunderlying no lighton the contentof thoseexperiences, which rience,but contribute on one s former and the whole context of wellbeliefs, depends experiences basedor not,thatprovidethemwiththeirmeaning. 5. Materialand FormalPrinciplesofExplanation Descartesmayhaverealizedthelimitsof his conceptof physicalnatureand henceof mathematical He physicsin his senseof thewordonlygradually. seemsto havecome out defeatedfromthequestioningon thistopicthathis smartestand most admiredstudent,PrincessElizabeth,put him through, whenshe demandedan explanationof themind-bodyinteraction. The best he can do is to spellout,in termsof thethreeprimary a distinction notions, kinds I, art. 48, when listingdifferent alreadyhintedat in the Principles of objectsof cognition.Thereare onlytwo ultimateclassesof things,thinkwiththeirrespective modes.He nowadds to these"certain ingand extended, otherthingswhichmustnot be referred eitherto the mind alone or the 24)Descartess abouttheneural connections instituted asHatfield speculations bynature may, havesettheframework for later century experargues, empirical investigations, e.g.,ofthe19th imental ofrelations between stimulus andsensation. SeeGary Hatfield, psychologists, physical inDescartes' "Descartess Naturalism abouttheMental", Natural , ed.Gaukroger, Philosophy Schuster andSutton, 644ff.

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body alone", but "arisefromthe close and intimateunion of our mind and body". Thislistincludes, likehunger andthirst; theemotions orpassions first, secondly, appetites ofthemind which donotconsist suchastheemotions ofanger, alone, joy,sadness ofthought andlove;andfinally, allthesensations, suchas thoseofpain,pleasure, colours, light, hardness andtheother tactile sounds, smells, tastes, heat, (AT8A,23;CSM2, qualities 209.Italics added) Thesearemodesdependingon bothmindand bodyas unitedand aresaid to be "experienced" as suchbyus- so taughtbynature.Theincreased beatofmy heartrateand thetrembling ofmylimbscan be independently but observed, I I can feel the fear that the of the threat am under and slim only my thoughts chancesof escapesimultaneously producesin me. This does not mean that othersobserving me could not also see thatI am frightened, but in orderto state as fear need to know about the contextand identify my they something thereasonforwhichI am trembling. Fearis a complexpsycho-somatic phenomenonthatcannotbe reducedto eithertypeofmode- mentalorbodilycomposingit.25 Contraryto whatDescartessuggestsin thisconnection,we do not learn muchlaterabouthowthesephenomenaarisefromtheunion.The reference is to articles188-203ofpartIV ofthePrinciples . We therelearnthathisoriginal planwas to writetwofurther parts:a fifth parton animalsand plants,and a sixthparton man. "But I am not yetcompletely clearaboutall thematters whichI wouldliketo dealwiththere,and I do notknowwhetherI shallever haveenoughfreetimeto completethesesections."(AT 8A,312; CSM 2, 279) So he borrowsagainfromhis earlierworkto explainwhatsensationis and how it operates.Addingto theearlieraccountshe now also mentionshow mentalstateslike imaginations can cause bodilychanges.Imaginingsomeor for instance, thingpleasant, receiving goodnewscausesjoy,and thesomatic this in involves contribute their turnto sustainthe emotionprochanges duced,keepingthemindfocusedon thethingsimagined.Emotionsare"confused thoughts,which the mind does not derivefromitselfalone but as a resultof something experiences happeningto thebodywithwhichit is and as such fromrational different closelyconjoined", theyare completely aboutwhatis worthy ofdesireand pursuitandwhatis not.(AT 8A, thoughts 117; CSM 2, 281) Descartesobviously appeals,withoutexplicitly mentioning 25)Compare theremarks innote29. from Aristode below quoted

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of nature.26 He explainsthatwhile"we understand it,to theinstitution very ofthebodycan wellhowthedifferent size,shapeand motionoftheparticles producevariouslocal motionsin anotherbody.. . thereis no wayof under(size, shape and motion)can produce standinghow thesesame attributes is fromtheirown."Yetwe know else whose nature different quite something that"thenatureofourmind"is suchthatthishappens,for"weactuallyexperiencethevarioussensationsas theyareproducedin thesoul,and we do not findthatanythingreachesthe brainfromthe externalsenseorgansexcept formotionsof thiskind".We thushave"everyreasonto conclude"thatthe propertiesin externalobjectsto whichwe apply the termsof sensations or sensoryqualitiesare "simplyvariousdispositionsin thoseobjectswhich makethemable to setup variouskindsofmotionsin ournerves"whichby - producethevarioussensationsin the soul. (AT 8A, dispositionof nature 322-323; CSM 2, 285) how it happensmerely We takeall thisforgrantedwithoutunderstanding it. One mightobjectthattheappealto theinstitution becausewe experience ofnaturein thiscontextis an appealto thegeneralorderofthingsestablished by God- i.e., to naturein thethirdsenseabove.That orderwould include thelawsofnaturelaid downbyGod in creatingextendedmatter(instantiatin Le monde). senseofnaturethatDescartesintroduces ingnaturein thefirst - naturein If so, the institution of naturehere(concerninghumannature thefourth sense)wouldbe buta specialcase oftheapplicationofthelawsof - suitablyextendedperhapswith psycho-physical nature bridging physical sucha readlaws.Thereare,as we haveseen,seriousreasonsforquestioning ofnaturetowhichDescartesappealsin thiscontextapplies ing.Theinstitution to the waysin whichthehumanmindand bodyhavebeen only particular God to composethe unitywe can onlyexperience(but not disjoined by tinctlyunderstand).It presupposes,of course,the generalorderof things establishedby God (naturein the thirdsense),but in so faras thatorder accessto it as wellas hiscreationofthingsourcognitive includesGod himself for we have The twomainattributes is limited.27 thingsclearlyand conceiving 26)Heclaims: occurrence issuchthat themere thenature ofourmind "Itcanalsobeproved that which haveno ofthoughts ittohaveallmanner inthebodycanstimulate ofcertain motions wecall true oftheconfused inquestions. Thisisespecially likeness tothemovements thoughts inusmerely ofpainisexcited orfeelingsWeclearly see. . . thatthesensation sensations by with sowemayconclude another ofourbodyincontact thelocalmotion ofsomeparts body; asa sensations toalltheother issuchthat itcanbesubject thenature ofourmind that merely CSM2,284) ofother localmotions." result (AT8A,320-321; 27)I discuss onourknowledge ofGodinLilliAlanen, Descartes sview Modality "Omnipotence,

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distinctly presentmaterialand thinking thingsas mutually independent separateobjectsof cognition,so do nothelp,buthinderus fromconceivingdis- unitiesof mind and tinctlythe unitytheycompose.Yet human beings ofGod too so arepartofthegeneralorderhe established. body arecreations This generalorderof things,consequently, extendsbeyondthatof the two naturesto whichwe can accesscognitively in termsofclearand distinct rational concepts:it is not exhaustedby the mechanicallaws determining the motionsof extendedmatteron theone hand,completedbyideologicaland morallawsgoverning rationalthinking on theother.It comprises phenomena we clearlyexperienceeven thoughwe cannotdistinctly accountforthem, hencetheappeal to yetanothernature(thefourthsenseof nature)specially instituted ofnaturein any byGod. Descartesneverappealsto theinstitution othercontextthanthatofhumannature, andhe needsithereprecisely because humannatureeludescomprehension in termsoftheconceptsofthoughtand extensionand cannotbe derivedfromeither.Human naturehad to be spefora specialpurposewe can at besthavemerelymoralcerciallyinstituted, about it does not flowfromGods immutability in the way the tainty ofmotionornecessity ofeternaltruths do. The regularities quantity governing it as wellas theendstheyservecannotbe derivedin anyotherwaythanby The teleologybanishedfromCartesianphilosophyof nature,reexperience. enterswithhis theodicyin theFourthand theSixthMeditationsin thecontextof accountingforour errorsas finite,willingand embodiedcreatures. aboutendsand purposesas we sawarealso acceptableforpractiSpeculations cal purposesin ethics.What is excludedfromphysicsis not onlyacceptable but a necessaryrequirement ethics (or postulation)forhumanpsychology, and practicalrationality. and practicalrationality Here,in so faras psychology areconcerned,Descartesseemssimplyto followtheverytradition he rejects in hisphilosophy ofnature. as it evolvedin thetradition ofScholasticDe AnimacommenPsychology - not becauseof any tarieswas indeedpartand parcelof naturalphilosophy reduction ofsoulto matterbutbecausetheveryprinciples ofnaturalphilosothehumansoulbeingtheformofthehumanbody phywereformand matter: belongswithotherthingscomposedofformand matteramongtheobjectsof naturalphilosophy.28 Des Chenes rightly stressesthe importanceof seeing andConceivability toDescartes andJ.Carriero ' inA Companion , ed.byJ.Broughton (Oxford, forthcoming). 28)Thusina presentation ofthesciences intheprolegomenon toToletus onAriscommentary - a work - thepartonDe anima totle's Descartes issaidtodealwith Physics mayhavestudied

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What he had to of thisliterature. Descartessprojectagainstthebackground no of a unified science where was an edifice phenomenon impressive replace to outlinea modern was leftbehind.Descartesis oftenseenas one ofthefirst to the versionofa unifiedscience.Whatis striking, comparinghisenterprise one he wantsto replace,is nothow muchis includedunderthenewphysics, how muchofwhatused to be includedin thetraditional but rather, philosoin thetraditional senseis one example: is leftout. Psychology pha naturalis soul or mindis severedfrommatteronce and forall and can thusnotbe the withmatterand motionand objectofCartesianphysicsthatdealsexclusively Ifwewant material and mechanicalprinciples. whatcan be explainedthrough oftheanimalmachine"animal ofthefunctions to callDescartess explanations we might himself or as Hatfield suggests,"bodypsychology", psychology", remembered but it should be well call it "machine as simply psychology", just himself can represent thatsuchexplanations onlyone aspectofwhatAristotle that the natural scientist phenomena psychological investigating thought of the shouldoccupyhimselfwith,the otherbeingthe formor definition that a "dialectician".29 phenomenon require onthesoul,likesleep, lhefunctions thesoulthat iscommon toalltheliving depending things, inParva themselves i.e. with naturalia. Animate were dealt youth, things age,lifedeath waking, inHistoria animalium andDe animalium andinDepartibus animals andplants, were treated in Natural inDennis DesChene, isquoted Toletus Philosophy Physiologia. commentary plantiis. for an invaluable source and LateAristotelian andCartesian London, 1996) (Ithaca Thought confronted andwanted toreplace. about thetradition Descartes knowledge 29)Consider ofemotions oraffections ofthesoulthathe characterizes Aristotle's account affections ofthebody. Their definitions involve concurrent accounts" because "emmattered they theformal the material cause but also and reflect this: should should importantly they provide bedefined asa certain modeofmovement writes: should orfinal causes. Aristotle "[E].g.anger end. orfaculty ofa body) causeforthisorthat ofsuchandsucha body(orpart bythisorthat - must - either fall soulorsoulsofthissort ofthesoul Thatisprecisely every whythestudy which It is Anima 1.1. Aristotelian ofnature" within thescience 403a26-28). {De hylomorphism is theframework ofwhich science ofnature ofAristotelian makes ita suitable {episteme) object inDesofnature ismuch than ashere defined Science ofnature philosophy larger teleological. accounts" them which andwith cartess sense excludes any"emmattered hylomorphism, teleology the material causes accounted that ofthekind Aristotle andhisfollowers with, comprises operate Aristotle those a narrow sense forbythephysicist and,inaddition, bythedialectician. given the from a dialectician; ofthesouldifferently woulddefine anaffection writes "...a physicist likethat, orsomething forreturning astheappetite latter would define painforpain, e.g.anger the ofthebloodorwarm substance itasa boiling while theformer would define surrounding oraccount; for what hestates theother theform thematerial heart. Theoneassigns conditions, ofitina there must beembodiment foritsactual existence ofthefact, istheaccount though Aristotle concludes material suchasitisdescribed {Deanima1.1.403a29-b33) bytheother."

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Farfromincludinganimaland humanphysiology as partofwhatwas traunderstood as a broader science of life ditionally includingbiology, physiology and psychology, Descartes,as Dennis des Chene has shown,eliminatedthe (orreduced)livingthingsto a species conceptoflifeas a kindand transformed ofmachines.Theyhavewhatlookslikea restricted but capacityofself-motion in factis nothingbut a passivepowerof beingheldin motionundercertain - foranimalsincludinghumans,as longas a certainfire,procircumstances requiredto keeptheanimalspiritsin motion,keepsburnducingthepressure in their . hearts . .30 ing The capacityforself-motion is reserved properly byDescartesforwhatthe Aristotelians took to be the highestkind of soul, humanmind or reason, whichin theCartesianstoryhad to be separately createdbyGod and joined to thehumanbody.31 Butthatdoes notmakeit supernatural, and thenatural - one,I takeit,doing thatthe"genuine ofnature inthesense science hethinks it physicist" - "ishewhoconcerns bedone should himself with alltheproperties active andpassive ofbodies ormaterials thus andsodefined" 1.1.403b8-13). Allthese arediscovered (DeAnima properties observation of the characteristic activities of the ensouled human through empirical beings. 30)SeeDesChene, & Clocks , Introduction p [2-3]and1998. Spirits 31)I havesuggested inother contexts thatDescartes's notion ofthemind-body union canbe seenasa paradigm instantiation oftheAristotelian ideaofanimmaterial form matter. informing SeeLilliAlanen, "Descartes's Dualism andthePhilosophy ofMind", Revue deMétaphysique etde Morale Cf.Schmalz, "Descartes andMalebranche". Thismayseem , No.3 (1989),391-413. theCartesian transformation oftheconcepts ofmatter andmind, with quite inappropriate given theensuing ofthehierarchy offorms theAristotelian kosmos. There areno rejection structuring inCartesian matter thatcouldbeactualized intheform ofthinking, lhe point potentialities Descartes ininvoking himself wants tomake with associated Scholastic in forms powers respondisthat thevery Aristotelian ideaofsouls andforms matter, ingtoElisabeths question, informing - stones, - asthefinal material andanimals causes oftheir is moving things organisms, changes, derived from ourhuman of moved desired orintended endsinacting. What experience by being Descartes inAristotelianism isnottherecognition ofthisfamiliar ofactopposes phenomenon ourbodyaccordingly, butitsillegitimate extension toserve as an ingforendsandmoving model fornatural motions Asheexplains toElisabeth, soisconfusexplanatory generally. doing wehaveofexperiencing ourselves united with andbeing acted i.e.,ofacting ingthenotion body, with the kind of force that on mindless like the bodies, uponbybody, operates supposed quality ofheaviness doesinstones: "Parexemple, ensupposant estunequalité réelle, quelapesanteur dontnousn'avons dautre sinon demouvoir lecorps, dans connaissance, point quellea laforce elleest, vers lecentre delaterre, nousnavons à concevoir comment ellemeut lequel pasdepeine ce corps, nicomment elleluiestjointe; etnousnepensons pointquecelase fasse parun attouchement réeldunesuperficie contre uneautre, carnousexpérimentons, ennous-mêmes, unenotion malde cela;etje crois quenousavons particulière pourconcevoir quenoususons cette enl'appliquant à la pesanteur, ducorps, notion; quinestriende réellement distingué comme montrer enlaPhysique, maisqu'elle nousa étédonnée lafaçon j'espère pourconcevoir dontl'âme meut lecorps." Letter toElisabeth, 21may1643(AT3,667;CSMK219).

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withthematerial world.32 Butphysics, worldforDescartesis notco-extensive as we haveseen,extendsto thelatterkindofnaturealone,natureas definedin Le mondein thepassagequoted above.So fromthefactthatDescartesand consideredsome aspectsof the humanmind to be, manyof his followers of the union mind and body,partofnature,itdoesnotfollowthathe through thattheseaspectswereexplainable thelawsofphysics ortheythought through as theyconceivedofit. 6. Scientiaand theMetaphorof Philosophyas a Tree Let me finally turnto Scientiain thewide sensewithwhichDescartesmust itis supposed havebeenfamiliar. He setsitup as an idealin hisearlywritings: also forpractical to providecertainknowledgethatcan serveas a foundation if it is at least worked out in the and never realized fully rationality, partly ď34with .33 to the Aristotelian ideal of It has been compared epistem Principles sciwhichit has morein commonthanwithmodernideasofa universalistic in thesenseof ence. LikeAristotle's ideal of episteme , it is all-encompassing includingan accountof thesubjectof knowledgeitselfand itsplace in the generalorderof things,and also an orderingaccordingto theirvalueof the different domainsof cognition.It is thisbroadsensewhichis intendedby Descarteswhenhe writesto Elisabeththatall humanscienceconsists"solely in properly notionsfromeachotherand these[threeprimitive] distinguishing Thissamebroad eachofthemonlyto thethingstheypertainto."35 attributing 32)Thisisalsopointed s Naturalism", outbyHatfield, "Descartes 636. 33)Cf.note6 above. 34)Asunderstood iswhat onehasingrasping inthePosterior (100al4-bl3). Analytics Episteme than a proof oftheconclusion, that Aristotelian domore provide granting syllogism syllogisms, ofwhy the inaddition, hasargued, toprovide aresupposed asMyles Burnyet understanding they in would be thinks that fact andforthisreason, conclusion holds, "understanding" a Burnyeat than"knowledge" or"scientific better translation ofepisteme (Cf.MilesBurnyeat, knowledge". : Proceedings inAristotle onScience "Aristotle onUnderstanding ofthe8thSymposium Knowledge", inanunpublished Carriero Aristo ed.byE. Berti 97-139, telicum, 1981), (Padua, byJohn quoted I Underto which owe this the Cartesian Circle" and Scientia, (1998) point.) paper, "Cognitio, Scientia than characterize with rather and certainty, justification, together standing explanation ForDescartes, theexplanatory inthissense, which withtheexplanatory order. isconcerned ofourthinkwhich istheobject ofphysics, matter order involves ofGod,ofextended cognition and of the which is the of nature as created God, phenomena belonging by object metaphysic ing which ofsensory nature aretheobject toourembodied experience. 35)"Jeconsidère ces neconsiste aussiquetoute la science deshommes qu'àbiendistinguer ellesappartiennent." età n'attribuer chacune d'elles notions, (AT3, qu'auxchoses auxquelles 665-666; CSMK218)

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sensecan be seen at workin the letterprefacing the Frencheditionof the where Descartes what explains Principles philosophyis, namely"thestudyof wisdom"where"wisdom'la sagesse] is takento mean"notonlyprudencein oureveryday affairs butalso a perfect ofall thingsthatmankindis knowledge of both for the conduct of life and thepreservation ofhealth capable knowing, and theinventionof all thearts."(AT 9B, 2-3; CSM 1, 180) All thethings mankindis capableofknowingforDescartesis comprehended bywhatcanbe deducedfromtheirfirst causesorprinciples whichmustthemselves be so clear and evidentthattheycannotbe doubted,i.e., thosethathe laysout in his in PartOne ofthePrinciples Meditations and summarizes (AT 9B, 3-20). Scientiain thisbroadsenserecognizes theroleandvalueofthethirdkindof,lets call it "practical constituted notjustofsensoryexperience ofthe knowledge", union also of whatever in the but lesson one have learnt itself, mind-body may courseof ones life.This experiencegatheredfromones ordinary life,from conversations and interactions withfellowhumanbeingsin dailyaffairs, interin the of dualism and the limits this on i.e., pretedproperly, puts the light and universalistic reductionist claimsof physicalscience,has its own legitimate partto playwithinScientiaor "truephilosophy".It constitutes, one could say,thesoil fromwhichtheCartesiantreeof philosophyspringsand thatitsfruitsin theirturnaresupposedto enrich.It is a kindof knowledge evenwhenit fallsshortof thecertainty and distinctness thatthescienceof naturehasas itsidealbutitcanat leastaspireat moralcertainty. A clearinsight intotheconditionsof perfect in handwith hand moreover, knowledge, goes therecognition thatitsidealscannotbe metin thedomainofdailylifewhere is exercised. practicalrationality thatgoesbeyondthephysiology ofperception Thus,thepartofpsychology andemotions, forinstance, theclassification andanalysisofconfusedthoughts likesensationsand passions,falloutsidethedomainswherestrictcriteria for evidenceand demonstration humanpassions apply.Qua modesof thinking - becauseof theirconfusednature - be arenot partof physics,norcan they of a rationalistic on or ratioobjects separate psychology relying introspection nal speculation.To the extenttheyhave bodilyexpressions and behavioral effects in somewide theymayindeedbe objectsofa behavioristic psychology senseof theword.But thattoo wouldhaveto relyheavilyon commonsense of and interaction experienceand whatwe learnthroughdailyobservation withfellowhumanbeings,and cannottherefore count as an extensionof ofnature. physicsin Descartess senseofphilosophy As hereunderstood, CartesianScientiais broaderthanphilosophy ofnature and rationalpsychologyor metaphysicstaken together.It encompasses

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bothand allowsin additionfora third,lessperfect but irreplaceable formof in which is also its irreducible kind. The moral and cognition psychology ethicsone findsin Lespassionsde l'âmeflowsneitherfromphysicsnorfromphysicsinanycombination withrationalpsychology, althoughtheymaypresuppose both.In Descartess familiar is comparedto a treewhich metaphor Philosophy can be dividedin threeparts,of whichthe first,metaphysics, providesthe rootsorthefirst of with all "the clear and principles knowledge simplenotions withinus", thesecond,physicscontains"theprinciplesof materialthings", in "alltheothersciences"(AT IIB, 14; CSM 1, 186). and thethirdconsisting The wordingis vagueenoughto leaveit open whetherthe investigation of manbelongsto physicsor to thespecialsciences,i.e., to thebranchesemergingfromthetrunk,ofwhichmedicine,mechanicsand moralsaretheprinci" " pal ones.Whicheverviewon takes,it mustbe recognizedthatif l'homme standsforanyhere,in thecontextofthemetaphorofthetreeofphilosophy, describedbymechanistic physiolthingaboveand beyondthebody-machine it owes a like the morals that out of the to thefirst lot, tree, just ogy, grows that constitute its roots and the soil of dailyexperiprinciples metaphysical encefromwhichtheyspring.It cannotbe stressed enoughthatthephysiology ofsenseperception and emotionswhichareobjectsofCartesianphysicsor its coversverylimitedaspectsof human nature.The extension, physiological of phenomenology perception,as well as beliefs,motivation,intentional - briefly ofreasonsand passions mostofthephenomena action,theinterplay thatpsychologyin general,and moral psychologyin particularaspireto explain,falloutsideCartesianscienceof nature.None of thisis to say that Descartesmaynothaveentertained theideaofextending hisscienceofnature to includehumannatureor aspectsofit at somepoints.He did not- indeed - takethatidea veryfar. couldnotas I haveargued

Bibliography ofMind", Revue deMétaphysique etde Dualism andthePhilosophy Alanen, Lilii,"Descartes's Morale , No.3 (1989),391-413. Mass.& London, , Descartes's 2003). Concept ofMind(Cambridge, inA Companion toDescartes, and ed.J.Brough,"Omnipotence, Modality Conceivability", tonandJ.Carriero (Oxford, a). forthcoming inNaturalism inModandNaturalism", ,"Descartes's Mind-Body Composites, Psychology ernPhilosophy issue ofInquiry vol.51,3(forthcoming , ed.byM.Kisner, b). special TheComplete Works ed.J.Barnes Aristotle, (Princeton, 1995). ofAristotle, Baruch TheCollected Works ed.andtransi, de,Spinoza, (Princeton, byE. Curley ofSpinoza, 1985).

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inDescartes "Cartesian Natural Annie, , ed.S. GaukBitbol-Hespériès, Physiology" Philosophy Schuster and 349-382. Sutton, J. J. roger, A Companion & Carnero, toDescartes (eds.), (Oxford, Janet John Broughton, forthcoming). Deborah andthePassionate Mind(Cambridge, Brown, 2006). J.,Descartes "Aristotle onUnderstanding inAristotle onScience : Proceedings Miles, Burnyeat, Knowledge", of the8thSymposium ed.byE. Berti 97-139. Aristotelicum, (Padua, 1981), Descartes's Clarke, Desmond, 2003) Theory ofMind(Oxford, ABiography , Descartes. 2006). (Cambridge, onActions andEvents Davidson, Donald, (Oxford, 1980). Essays inEssays onActions andEvents , "Mental Events", , 207-227. There Bea Science ofRationality", inNaturalism inQuestion, ed.M.deCaro& , "Could D. Macarthur Mass.& London, 2004),152-169. (Cambridge, Natural inLateAristotelian andCartesian DesChene, Dennis, Physiologia. Philosophy Thought & London, (Ithaca 1996). Form: LateAristotelian & London, , Life's 2000). Conceptions oftheSoul(Ithaca & Clocks. Machines & Organisms inDescartes & London, , Spirits (Ithaca 2001). deDescartes 12vols., revised edition Descartes, René,Oeuvres , ed.C. AdamandP.Tannery, (Paris, 1964-76). translation & R.StoothofF , The byJ.Cottingham Philosophical Writings ofDescartes, English & D. Murdoch, 2 vols.(Cambridge, 1985). vol.3: TheCorrespondence , The 1991). Philosophical Writings ofDescartes, (Cambridge, & Schuster, & Sutton, Descartes' Natural (eds.), (LonJohn John Gaukroger, Stephen Philosophy don& NewYork, 2000). Descartes andtheMeditations & NewYork, Hatfield, (London 2003), Gary, inDescartes' Naturalism about theMental", Natural ed.S. Gauk, "Descartes's Philosophy, & J.Schuster & J.Sutton, 630-658. roger Terence Materialism andtheExplanatory ofPsycholE.,"Nonreductive Horgan, Autonomy - A Critical in:Naturalism ed.S. J.Wagner & R. Warner Dame, (Notre ogy", Appraisal, Indiana, 1993),295-320. Interaction andSubsumption", in Early Moelern Loeb,LouisE., "TheMind-Body Union, - Mind, andE. O'Neill(Oxford & NewYork, Matter, , ed.C. Mercer Philosophy Metaphysics 2005),47-64. TadM.,"Descartes ontheMind-Body ThePhilosophical andMalebranche Schmalz, Union", Review 101(1992),281-325. inDescartes' ofNature", Natural ed.S. Gaukroger, Verbeek, Theo,"TheInvention Philosophy, andJ.Sutton, 149-167. J.Schuster "Descartes andtheCorporeal Mind.SomeImplications oftheRegius Wilson, Catherine, in Descartes' Natural ed. S. and Affair", Schuster, J. J. Sutton, Philosophy, Gaukroger, 631-659.

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y s* '»«v BRILL


Vivarium 46 (2008)443-461

Marin

Cureau

de la Chambre

on the Natural

Cognition of the Vegetative Soul: An Early Modern Theory of Instinct

MarkusWild Berlin Humboldt-Universität,

Abstract - steering between theAristoMarinCureaudeLa Chambre a middleway According and ofthesoul- everything thatlivescognizes totelian andtheCartesian conception of sticks with the distinction that is alive. Cureau tripart general cognizes everything of soul has its own and intellectual soul. Each the sensitive, part cognition. vegetative, andenvironisthewayinwhichliving bodilyequilibirum Cognition beingsregulate or is mentalnavigation. Thisregulative byacquired byinnate activity gouverned is innate Natural (or instinct) by imagesonly.Cureau cognition cognition images. instinct. His theory of natural a (or theory specialized') develops highly originel of instinct to five features (innateness, specialization, species-specifitiy, attemptsexplain a tomyinterpretation, Cureauproposes coerciveness, nature). According ideological a of innate of what is called 'teleosemantic theory' cognition. species Keywords teleosemantics sensitive instinct, soul,vegetative soul,cognition, image, 1. Introduction thenameof theFrenchphysiof the 17thcentury, Amongthephilosophers of René DescartesMarin Cureau de and contemporary cian, philosopher, we not themostillustrious.1 la Chambre(1594-1669) is certainly Therefore, 1}Forgeneral dela Chambre MarinCureau accounts ofCureaus work andlifeseeIlseFörster, inFrankreich Literatur EinBeitrag zurGeschichte derpsychomoralischen 1594-1675. (Breslau, "Marin Cureau deLaChambre", Diamond, 1936),Salomon Journal oftheHistory ofBehavioral dansl'oeuvre de Lescorps immatériels. etimages 4 (1968)40-54, Albert Science Darmon, Esprits dela Chambre Marin Cureau (Paris, 1985),5-16. (1594-1669) ©Koninklijke Brill 2008 Leiden, NV,

DOI:10.1 163/156853408X360993

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first haveto setthestageforhisentry.I willdo thisbya verybriefconsiderationofthetransformation fromtheAristotelian soul to theCartesianmind, followedby a more extensiveexaminationof the earlymodernnotionof instinct.2

2. AristotelianSoul, CartesianMind, and Cureau'sProposal The notionof the soul Descartesrejectsis not the same as Aristotle's but a historical claimthatthesoul is thatin descendantof it. WhileAristotelians virtueof whicha livingbeingis alive,Cartesianshold thatlivingbeingsare ofthesoul- suchas repropartofthephysicalworld,and thevitalfunctions duction,nutrition, appetite,sensationand pergrowth,decay,self-motion, The ception are to be explainedin termsof matterand its properties. and sensitive life-functions are no of the because soul, vegetative longerpart whenCartesianssay thataniTherefore, theyare explanatorily superfluous. malsdo nothavesouls,theyarenotdenyingthatanimalsliveand perceive.3 What theysayis something likethis:"Asfaras life-functions are concerned and are we sensitive souls can do betterwithuseless, explanatorily vegetative out them."4Still,Cartesiansretainsomething similarto theintellectual soul, 2)Inanappendix entitled estlaConnaissance desbestes etjusques oùellepeutaller'to "Quelle Lescharactères despassions asPassions) Cureau articulated thetheory ofinstinct forthefirst (cited time. Theappendix inthenewedition isreprinted ofTraité delaconnaissance desanimaux (cited as Traité, cf.Traité, After thesevere onCureaus viewthat animals reason 315-366). critique by theCartesian Pierre Chanet etdela connaissance desanimaux, avec {De L'instinct physician l'examen decequeM.delaChambre a écrit surcette matière defendend , 1646),Cureau extensively hisviewintheTraité further in In discussion over animal instinct. hisfinal , without engaging workSystème del'âme(citedas Système) hereasserted andexpanded theoriginal of theory instinct. 3)SeeHenri 11.12.1648: Moresletter toDescartes "Caeterum à nullâtuarum aniopinionum musmeus, eâ est mollitie ac ac ab internecinâ illâ & teneritudine, abhorret, pro quâ aeque brutis omnibus vitam sententiâ, tulisti, iugulatrice quamin Methodo sensumque eripiens, anpotius vixisse Desdicam, (ATV,243)Compare praeripiens? Nequeenim unquam pateris." cartes answer toMores "vitam enim nulli animali 21.02.1649: complaint utpote quam denego, insolocordis calore consistere statuo. etiam aborgano corsensum, [.. .] necdenego quatenus (ATV,278). poreo dependet." 4)In theworkTraité del'âmeetdela connaissance desbêtes Cartesian (1676)oftheradical Antoine oftheanimal soulhasa decisive function: "LaconoisDillythequestion demarcating sance decette estabsolument necessaire delaPhilosophie: question pourlaparfaite intelligence carsoitqu'onse range a costédesphilosophes ou qu'avec le grand nouveaux, qu'onappelle nombre & etlafoule ousetienne attaché à laphilosophie desAnciens & principalement à celle d'Aristote." Cf.Albert Studies Balz,Cartesian (NewYork, 1951),106.

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becausetheCartesiansoul is thethinking thing,distinctfromthebody,and thesubjectofmentalactssuchas believingor desiring. To clarify his rejectionof theAristotelian conceptionDescartesdismisses the notionof "soul" (anima), and recommendsthe use of "mind"(mens) instead.The mindis thesoul,and thesoul is themind.The Aristotelian soul is theprincipleoflife,5 theCartesianmindis thethinking substance.The soul makeslivingbeingsalive,themindmakesthinking beingsthink.Manyinters theoryof the soul withDescartes'theoryof the preterscontrastAristotele mindin termsoflifeversusthought.6 Thissetting, as itwere,seemsdramaticenough.EnterMarinCureaude la Chambre.His proposalrunsas follows:lifeisa formofthinking. "On peutdire que toutce qui estvivantconnoist,et que toutce qui connoistestvivant."7 thatlivescognizesand everything thatcognizesis alive.The prinEverything functions of life are . I will continue to translate "Connoissance" cipal cognitive by "Cognition"and "connaistre" by "to cognize".I hope thereasonsforthis choicewillbecomeclearenoughin thecourseofthispaper. Let me now set out Cureaus generalpicture.Cognitionis firstof all an " It is theactivity of forming or images' as Cureau activity.8 representations callsthem.Moreprecisely, theterm"cognition" refers to theactivity bywhich and information from the environment or from livingbeingsacquire process withinthelivingbeing.This information is storedin theformof imageson whichlivingbeingscan act.Cognitionis thewayin whichlivingbeingsregulateboth,theequilibrium insidetheirbodiesand thenavigation in theirnatural environments. This regulative is activity governedby acquiredor innate framework: thesoul is the images.CureaustickswiththegeneralAristotelian distinction ofvegetative, sensiprincipleof life.He also retainsthetripartite soul. Despitetheproblemsthiswayof speakingmight tive,and intellectual I shallcontinueto talkofthree"parts"ofthesoul.9 foster, 5)Cf.Garreth "DeAnima 2.2-4andtheMeaning inEssays ofLive", onAristoteles De Matthews, Anima andA.Oksenberg ,ed.M.C. Nussbaum (Oxford, 1992),185-194. Rorty 6)Fora critical ofthis discussion dialectic cf.Peter "Deanima andDescartes: Anstey, Making up Aristotle's 17 237-261. Mind", (2000), History ofPhilosophy Quarterly 7)Système 3.3.4,144 8)Passions , 545;Traité, 38,53-56;Système 1.1.1,22-24. 9)Forearly modern Aristotelian ofthesoulseeKathleen "TheOrganic Park, Soul", conceptions inTheCambridge to Renaissance ed. C. B. Schmitt and (CamQ. Skinner Companion Thinkings A.MarcSmith, theMind.TheRepresentation ofThought 1988),464-484. bridge, "Picturing intheMiddle 20 (1992),149-170, Dennis Des AgesandtheRenaissance", Philosophical Topics Form. LateAristotelian Chene, 2000). Life's Conceptions oftheSoul(Ithaca/London,

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de l'âmefrom1664 CureausownDe anima, ifyoulike,hisworkLe système continueswitha consistsof sixbooks.It beginswitha book on theintellect, The titlesof book on sensation,followedbya book on thevegetative faculty. "De la connoissance thesethreebooksare:"De la connoissance intellectuelle,' This means,thateach partof the "De la connoissancenaturelle". sensitive", - be it intellectual, or natural.And each soul has itsown cognition sensitive, innate or either the soul by acquired by images,withthe partof cognizes Naturalcognitionis moreor less- cognition ofnaturalcognition. exception byinnateimagesonly.I say"moreor 1ess",becauseCureauthinksthatevery in thelessperfect ofa higherpartofthesoulisforeshadowed cognitive activity activities ofthelowerparts.Fortworeasons,thisis a crucialpoint. First,Cureaudoesnotfollowwhatmightbe calledthe"MethodofLevels". In Cureaus systemof thesoul it is notthecase thatin everynewpartof the Cureauratherfolnewkindofactivity. soul therecan be founda completely in eachpart lowswhatmightbe calledthe"MethodofUnfolding Repetition": of thehigherpartscan be found. or levelof thesoul thecognitiveactivities has importantmethodological Second, the foreshadowing implicationsfor de l'âmedoes notbeginwiththe Cureau.As I havejustindicated,Le système soul. lowestpart,thevegetative soul,butwiththenoblestpart,theintellectual in the sensitive foreshadowed oftheintellectual are As theactivities part, part the examinationof intellectual cognitionis a meansper analogiamforthe ofthesensitive ofsensitive examination cognition.Likewise,theexamination for natural is an part cogniton.10 analogy As I have said, naturalcognitionis (more or less) cognitionby innate As natural images.Cognitionbyinnateimagesis whatCureaucalls"instinct". in each as it can be found of and is the most basic sort cognition, cognition of to the examination me now move on matters. Let of the instinct soul, part notion of instinct.11 someaspectsoftheearlymodern

10)"Lanature enquelque sorte à raisonner dansl'imagination." s'essaie , 560)Generally, CPassions T dansles makes de ses inthelower of the she nature excercises herself soul, essay ouvrages parts lesplusbasses." choses ,48). ( Traité 11)Forthehistory desInstinktes Ernst DerBegriff ofinstinct seeHeinrich oftheconcept Ziegler, derTierpsychologie dieGeschichte unddieGrundlagen einst und EineStudie über 1910), (Jena, jetzt. ScioftheInstinct Salomon "Gestation Diamond, Journal oftheHistory ofBehavioral Concept", YearofInstinct "FourHundred Salomon ence7 (1971),323-336, Diamond, Controversy", ofNature: Natural A(1974),237-252, Robert A.Greene, "Instinct Genetics Behavior Law,SynandtheMoral Sense", deresis, Journal oftheHistory ofIdeas58(1997),173-198.

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3. Four Kinds of Instinct "Instinctis a greatmatter",as WilliamShakespearsFalstaff points rightly out.12In earlymodernphilosophy, thenotionof instinct has different meanfourmeanings. ings.As I see it,we maydistinguish the s workDe ventate influence of Edward Herbertof Cherbury Through naturalis" becamea synonym fortheactions (1624) theconceptof"instinctus oftheinnatefaculty oftheintellect . In hisdescription oftheintellectual faculin that the that are classified addition to faculties under ties,Cherbury suggests thetraditional sensesand reason,thereis senses,internal headingsofexternal anotherevenmorefundamental whichis thesource natural instinct, faculty, of the so-called"notionescommunae".13 to common According Cherbury, notionsare givenuniversalassentby people in all places and at all times. Common People arriveat thesenotionswithoutreasoningor reflection. first and notionsare foundational, are they logically principles, theyexhibit are vital for the and ofhumanbeings.14 certainty. They preservation flourishing In a criticalnoteto Mersenne,Descartescommentson Cherburyin thefolthatone shouldaboveall follownaturalinstinct lowingway:"He recommends from which he all hiscommonnotions.Formypart,I disderives especially, two kinds of instinct. One is in us qua humanbeings,and is purely tinguish mentis intellctual: it is thenaturallightor mentalvision'intuitus ] . Thisis the I think Descartes is of course more instinct which we should trust."15 only thanCherburyto commithimselfto mattersof universalconsent. reluctant betweenthecriterion ofuniversal assentand the Forthereis a greatdifference criterion of naturallight,since,as Descartessays,hardlyanyonemakesgood An additionalmatterof disputeis thatDescartes'natural use of thatlight.16 shines on theoretical principles,whereasCherburysnaturalinstinct light bothagreethatthisinstinct detectsmoralandteleological However, principles. Let is purelyintellectual and,therefore, trustworthy. s followDescartesin callthis the "intellectual instinct". ing 12)William IV' II,4. Shakespeare, Henry 13)Edward Herbert ofCherbury, De veritate Cannstatt, 1966),44:"Instinctus (Stuttgart/Bad inomnihomine sano& integro a quibus naturales suntactus illarum facultatum existentium, internam circa Communes illaeNotitiae circa rerum causam, sunt, (cuiusmodi quae Analogiam atindividui, etfinem rerum medium bonarum, malum, etc.)maxime speciei, pulchrum, gratum sinediscursu conformantur." & universi conservationem facientes, perseetiam generis 14)Cherbury, savieetses F.deRémusat, Lord Herbert deCherbury: De veritate 63;Cf.Charles oevres (Paris, 1874),154f. 15)Descartes toMersenne 13.10.1639 (ATII 599). 16)Ibid.(ATII,598).

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to? His letterto Now, whatis the otherkindof instinctDescartesrefers Mersennecontinuesas follows:"Theother[kindofinstinct' belongsto us qua of our towards the is a certain of nature and animals, preservation impulse not and so on. This should of bodilypleasure, body,towardstheenjoyment even Thisnotionofinstinct seemsverylooseand general, alwaysbe followed." animals seek the and shun and other Humans instinctively good colloquial. theharmful. Lets callthis"lowerinstinct". whichhumanslack. instincts, However, manyanimalsdo haveveryspecialized work Characteristics from Hereis an exemplary (1711): Shaftesbury's passage haveindeed I said,haveinstincts that manhasnot.True, saidhe.They Butbeasts, percepifI mayusetheexpression, which forhispart, andpre-sentations, man, tions, sensations, andbefore habe Their hasnotinanyproportionable females, newly they pregnant degree. oftheir state which isto/follow, know borne havea clear orpre-sensation prospect young, inwhatmanner Howmany dothey whattoprovide andhow, andatwhattime. things Theseasons oftheyear, thecountry, the Howmany atoncecomprehend? preponderate? the the the basis of their materials, architecture, climate, situation, place, aspect, building, inshort oftheir thewhole oftheir andall dietandtreatement economy nursery, offspring, oftheir lifeafterwards.17 this asperfectly atfirst asatanytime andwhen inexperienced " instincts Lets call thisthirdspeciesofinstinctspecialized ', becausetheworkaredirected towards specialpurposes.Thebreedingsofthisspeciesofinstinct or martins isoneparadigmatic behaviour of swallows and ing,nesting, migrating in of debates. Animalcapacities for this kind instinct modern early example features. suchas theseexhibitfivecharacteristic 1. Theyareinnate . WhichmeansthattheyarenottheoutcomeofexperiIn Shaftesbury's orreasoning. habituation ence,learning, eyes,forexamifyou dislikethe is definitional. He writes:"Therefore, ple,thisfeature andcallinstinct word"innate",letus changeit,ifyouwill,for"instinct", thatwhichnatureteaches,exclusive ofart,cultureor discipline."18 2. Instincts arehighlyspecialized . Thisis a complexfeature. It meansthat thattheyare triggered theseinstinctsare domain-specific, by certain in certainregularbehavstimulionly,and thattheyexpressthemselves iouralsequences. 17)EarlofShaftesbury, Formore onShaftCharacteristics 1999),282-283. ofmen (Cambridge, notion ofinstinct seeRobert A.Greene, "Instinct ofNature: Natural Law,Synderesis, esbury's andtheChoral Sense"yJournal ofIdeas58(1997),173-198. oftheHistory 18)Shaftesbury, Characteristics 335.

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to a speciesof animals.Which meansthatthe same 3. Theyare specific can be foundin all healthyor normalmembersof a certain instincts species. the Once the behaviouralsequenceis triggered, 4. Theyare compelling. thoseacts. animalcannothelpperforming The behavioural flavour. 5. Theyhavea teleological sequenceis a purposeful animal seems to chooseappropriat a certain end. The sequence,aiming ate meansforcertainends,as ifbyintention. . In contemtheidea ofinnateness Letme briefly commenton thefirst feature, porarydiscussionsconcerningbiologythe conceptof innatenesscombines rather ideas.Hereis sucha bunchofideas:"innate"means(i) present different at birth,(ii) not learned,(iii) a distinctly organizedsequenceof behaviour not affected drivenfromwithin,(iv) by development,(v) a behavioural causedbya geneticdifference, difference (vi) adaptedoverthecourseofevolution,(vii) sharedby all membersof a species,(viii) intendedor meantto ofcourse,areirrelofadaptionand geneticinheritance, develop.The features innateness is notto be contextof Cureau.19Moreover, evantin thehistorical Therearetworeasonsforthis.First,thereis spontaconfusedwithheredity.20 and spontain earlymodernbiologicalthinking, neousand sexualgeneration instincts fromtheir inherit cannot specialized neouslygeneratedanimals oftheembryois controlled bythe parents.Second,althoughthedevelopment whether on and there is much debate of the life, soul, speculation principle Cureaude la Chambre,forone, fromoutside.21 thereis a kindof imprinting rejectsthe idea thatthe workingsof the specializedinstinctsare in every Cureausuggests ofthePrimeCause. i.e. God. Nevertheless, instancetheeffect thatthe principlesgoverningthe workingsof the specializedinstinctsare directly by God beforebirth.And of course,therelationbetween imprinted The earlymodern God and theanimalcreationis nota relationofinheritance. two ideas: itself is defined of innateness by specializedand intellectual concept 19)However sAcoount of Information: Gassendi ofGenetic "TheSoulasVehicle cf.SaulFisher, E. H. Smith ed. in Modern inThe Animal Generation Problem , Inheritance", J. Philosophy Early of 2006),103-123. (Cambridge, 20)Cf.Justin Modern inEarly Generation E. H. Smith, The Problem ,81:"In Philosophy ofAnimal Aristotelian toeradicate effort onthepartofthemechanist oftheintense physiologists spite interms inseeking toexplain account ofsexual formative virtues from their heredity generation, notion ofa formative much liketheAristotelian ofcongenital alone, very acquisition something under a newguise." virtue persists 21)Cf.Shaftesbury, Characteristics 335.

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arepresentat birth,and theyarenotlearned(as Shaftesbury instincts points ofNature.Nevertheless, thefaculties areteachings out). Instincts performing actionsstill the relevantinstinctive bodily(or,forthatmatter,intellectual) of membersof a have to developin the courseof the normaldevelopment species. In I willpointout a fourth Forthesakeofcompleteness, speciesifinstinct. on HumanNature(1739/40),David Hume distinguishes the Treatise specialfromthe"commoncapacities"ofanimals,suchas thecapability izedinstincts oflearning. Whenreferring to specializedinstincts Hume speaksofthe"more in instances of animal behaviour and usestheparadigextraordinary sagacity" maticexample,theswallow.22 As is well-known, Hume callsreasonitselfan instinct.More precisely, he is talkingaboutour causalinferences concerning reasonis nothing matters offact.Hume states:"To considerthematteraright, in oursouls."23 instinct Reasonis theprodbuta wonderful and unintelligible uct of experienceand habit,and of courseneitherexperiencenor habitis in thecourseofexperience innate.Thedisposition to establish causalinference is innate.Accordingto Hume,evenourbeliefin external and habit,however, instinctof nature".Nevertheless, thisvery objectsis "a blindand powerfull beliefhas to be learnedin the courseof experience.Hume and afterhim Frenchsensualists suchas Condillactakeinstincts to be thedispositionto be trainedbyexperience and habit.Lets call this,ratherparadoxically, "aquired instincts". in earlymodern Theseare the fourmeaningsof the notionof "instinct" The second and the fourth varieties instinct" and "aquired ("lower philosophy. in our context.However,thereareimporinstinct")are notveryinteresting tantsimilarities betweenintellectual instinctand specializedinstinct.Intellectualinstinct is theprivilege ofthehumankind,itis directed at God, eternal real and the instinct is to therealm confined truths, beauty, good. Specialized of theanimalkingdom,and it is directedat thebasic needsof life,suchas and reproduction. food,defence,security, Despite the fact,thatthesetwo to kindsofinstinct be rather theintellectual instinct seemsto different, appear sharesome of thecharacteristic of thespecializedinstinct.Bothare features innateand specific toa species . The intellectual instinct is domain-specific , forit a prioriknowledge. aimsat non-inferential, At leastin Cherburys view,natural instincthas a teleologial becauseit is ultimately directedat the flavour, in of human beatitude to be found all normal and and healthy promotion 22)Treatise 1.3.16,177. 23)Ibid.179.

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membersof our species.Once theintellector thenaturallighthitsupon an eternaltruthor an innateidea, "therefollows(as Descartesputsit) a great in thewill to giveassent".24 The intellectual is instinct, however, propensity notto thesamedegreecompelling as thespecializedinstinct. is usedto explaintheintellectual Up to thispoint,thenotionof "instinct" tendenciesof humanbeingsto arriveat firstprinciples, the generalanimal of the behavioural tendency self-preservation,specialized sequencesofcertain animals,or the innatecapacityto learncertainthingsor to acquirecertain habits.But instinctis theunexplainedexplainer. How is instinctitselfto be The similarities between intellectual and explained? specializedinstinctsugcoreto theworkings of "low" gestthatthereactuallyis a common explanatory and "high"instincts. thereseemsto be roomforthesuggestion that Therefore, intellectual and specializedinstincts share a common core. may explanatory Whatis thiscommonexplanatory coreaccordingto Cureaude La Chambre? 4. Cureau'sTheoryofAnimalSpecializedInstinct As instinctmanifests itselfmostobviouslyin animalbehaviour,and as the of the in thevegetative activities sensitive soulareforeshadowed part cognitive and refinedin the intellectual part,instinct(accordingto Cureau) should be examinedin animals.In animals,we can findmanymanifestations firstly of specializedinstincts. It seems,therefore, reasonableforCureauto explore in orderto establishan explanatory thiskindofinstinct schemefortheworkthestrategy Cureau ingsof instinctive cognitionin general.This is precisely willfollow. in theearlymodernera,Cureauis commitedtoAvicenLikemanythinkers nas and Aquinass explanationof specialized(or natural)instinct.His theory of instinctis bestintroduced as a continuation and critiqueofAvicennaand Cureaus is: what do animals do whentheyareconfronted Aquinas.25 question withperceivable withtheseobjectsin a purposeful way objects,and interact withoutanyaccessto experience The paradigmatic and learning? exampleAvicennaintroduced is thelambor thesheepfleeinga wolf.How can thelamb - say,in contrast to thesheep-dog? know,thatthewolfis dangerous Whydoes 24)ATVII,59. 25)Thefollowing "Intentionali isindebted totheaccount Perler, ty byDominik passage given inIntellect and ofAnimals", Discussions on theCognitive andAction. Medieval Capacities Acts International ed.M.C. Pacheco and Imagination. oftheXIth Congress ofMedieval Philosophy, (Turnhout, 2006),72-98. J.F.Meirinhos

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the lamb reactin an appropriate way and runsaway fromthe wolf- for to attacking thewolf? instance,in contrast Forcasessuchas this,Avicennadistinguishes betweentwoactivities. On the one hand,theanimalapprehends sensibleformswhenit perceives objects.In an intention(intentio addition,theanimalalso apprehends ).26The important betweenwhat is apprehendedby the point is thatAvicennadistinguishes externalsensesand theintention whichis not receivedthroughtheexternal senses.The intention is apprehended one bytheso called"estimative faculty", oftheinnersenses. In virtueof theestimative theactionsof thenon-rational animals faculty, "havea certainlikenessof reason",as Aquinasputsit27,becausetheyseemto be engagedin a processof categorization. The lamb categorizes thewolfas . The lamb flees the if wolf "as its nature were hostile". The beingdangerous lamb sees thewolfand apprehendsit as beinghostileor dangerous,which makesit flee.And it does so by instinct, as Aquinassays:"But as faras the intentions discussed are there is a difference: otheranimals concerned, just such intentions some natural instinct , [naturaliinstinctif perceive solelyby whereashumanbeingsperceivethemalso by a processof comparison."28 As Avicennarepeatedly theintention in theobjectand not is something stresses, in theperceiver. In hisstudyon Avicenna,Dag Hasse callsthiskindofintention"connotational It is an attribute attribute".29 to be foundin thesensible notin theperceiving lamb.However,it is connotational because objectitself, 26)Avicenna describes this second asfollows: "Anintention isthat which thesoulappreactivity hends with to the sensible even the exterior sense has not regard object, though previously apprehended it.Forexample, a sheepapprehends theintention which ithasofthewolf, namely that itought tofear itandtoflee from itssense doesnotapprehend thisinany it,eventhough /"intentio autem estidquodapprehendit anima desensibili, nonprius way." quamvis apprehendatilludsensus sicut ovisapprehendit intentionem delup,quaescilicet est exterior, quamhabet debeat eumtimere etfiigere, non hoc senus ullo modo." Avicenna quare quamvis apprehendat latinus deanima seuSextus denaturalibus , Liber 1.5,ed.S. VanRiet(Louvain/Leiden, 1972), vol.I, 86(quoted inPerler, andAction). Intentionality 27)Thomas, deveritate autem habent simil,q.24a.2 co.:"Bruta Queastiones disputatae aliquam itudinem inquantum secundum rationis, naturalem, participant quamdam prudentiam quod natura inferior adidquodestnaturae attingit aliqualiter superioris." 28)Thomas, Summa adintentiones differ, I,q. 78a. 4 co.:"Sedquantum theologiae praedicats entia intentiones solum naturali est,namaliaanimalia instinctu, percipiunt hujusmodi quodam homo autem etiam collationem." perquandam 29}Cf.DagN. Hasse, Avicennas DeAnima intheLatinWest. The Formation Phiofa Peripatetic Turin, (London/ 2000),132-134. losophy oftheSoul1160-1300

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extracted it is notjustanother sensibleformbutsomething bytheestimative of sensible forms. from the multitude faculty in Aquinass accountit is less clearwherethe lamb getsthe By contrast, thattheestimative from.Aquinasstresses extraintention poweris directedat in no that are intentions waygatheredthroughthesenses.As apprehending RobertPasnaupointsout:"Theanimaldoesnotlearnthatwolvesareharmful, mustsimplybe or inferas much fromtheirappearance.That information While Avicennastressesthat the lamb builtinto the estimativepower."30 in the sensibleforms, information extracts Aquinasallowsthelamb comprised Thisis therouteCureau thesensorydatabyinbuiltinformation. to transcend willfollow. ofthefaculties As we haveseen,Cureauthinksthatcognitionis an activity act on and use. For of thesoul. Images,then,are thevehiclesthesefaculties Cureau,as I will explainin a moment,theinstinct by ofanimalsis cognition innateimages.As the instinctof animalsis alwayscognition foraction(the suchas Avicennaand Aquinasconlambfleesthewolf),and as philosophers thewolf),theytendto sideranimalinstinctin actiononly(thelambisfleeing Thisis a mistake,or so Crueauargues. in theestimative faculty. placeinstinct The estimative like this. His faculty"decides"whether Why? argumentgoes in it to or harmful order is pursue or to avoidit. Thisis the something good a it is functionof theestimative faculty faculty, foraction.Like everyother mustbe informed theestimative byimages.As soon faculty faculty, cognitive as sucha facultyreceivescertainimages,it is activein a certainway,it is in instinctive behaviourare presentwithin action.Now, the imagesgoverning is in action,becauseinstincts or nottheanimals instinct theanimal,whether areinnate.Buttheimagesin questioncannotjustbe builtintotheestimative wouldbe in actionall thetime. theestimative otherwise faculty, behaviourlocated? Where, then,are the images governinginstinctive Cureauexploitsa parallelwithperceptual cognition.In thecaseofperceptual in whereresembling are stored sensible memory, imagestend images cognition, And thats how perceptualcognitionworks:Sensible to unitethemselves. 30)Robert isusing Nature onHuman Thomas 2002),268.Pasnau Pasnau, (Cambridge, Aquinas ofobjective ofa notion Theapplication inhisbookonAquinas. theconcept ofinformation seeFred tome.Forsucha notion seems tosuchtheories information content Dretske, adequate Smith and andtheFlowofKnowledge 1981),John Maynard (Cambridge/Mass., Information Paul E. see discussions For crititcal TheOrigins EörsSzathmáry, 1999). ofLife(Oxford, 68 inSearch A Metaphor ofa Theory", Information: "Genetic Griffiths, ofScience Philosophy (2001),394-412.

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sensibleimagesarestoredtogether, imagesarestoredin Memory,resembling and newlyentering sensible as membersofan resembling imagesareclassified collection. stored already image inMemory The samegoesfortheinstinct. thereis an innatecolImprinted - thesensiblefeatures lectionofimages.Theentering sensibleimages ofa wolf - arecollatedwiththeinnateimagecollection, forexample whichin turngets or as Cureaurepeatedly activated, says:theseinnateimagesare "wokenup". The imaginative actson thisinnateimagecollectionand thereafter the faculty estimative the in sets animal the lamb for action. faculty example Thisis theessenceof Cureaustheoryof animalinstinct: Instinctis a kind ofcognitiongovernedbya collectionofinnateimagesimprinted in Memory. Cureauhimself callstheseimages"ImagesConnaturelles". He writes:Instinctivecognitions stem from theimages mentioned before. must beinnate, because these are They cognitions totheanimal useful from thevery ofitslife.[...].There isnopoint inthelifebeginning ofthelambwhere ofthehostility ofthewolf would notbeuseful, lhe history congition chance butvery In lambwillgeta second order to the of wisdom God this, rarely. prevent hasimprinted stable inthelamb andunchangeable s soulfrom thebeginning ofits images life. Theinnate which cannot becognized thesenses and images represent things through which arenevertheless ofabsolute forthelambs oritsfurther ends necessity preservation andpurposes.31 Of course,Cureauis concernedwithwhatI called"specializedinstinct". The main the issues that were mentioned that earlier, passageemphasizes namely innateness arenotconceptually and heredity linkedin earlymodernthinking. Cureaus theory canaccountforthreeofthefivefeatures ofspecialized instincts. Those featuresare: innateness, and teleologicalflavour.The determination, them;theyhavea teleoimagecollectionsareinnatebecauseGod imprinted because sustain flavour the animal s and theyare they preservation; logical becausetheyare "fixeet immuables".Moreover, theanimalhas determining no choice,thereis no powerin thesensitive will such as free forinstance, part, able to inhibitinstinctive behaviour.Now, what about the last and most 31)Système venir dontnousparlons nais3.2.4,129: . .nepeuvent quedesimages quidoivent treaveclesAnimaux, leursontnécessaires déslepremier moment parce quecesConnoissances deleutvie[...].Cariln'ya point detemps oùlaBrebis n'ait besoin deconnoistre laviolence du et rarement en faire deux fois La Divine a donc à cela Loup; peut-elle l'espreuve.Sagesse pourveû dansTame desAnimaux aupoint deleurnaissance, lesimages fixes etimmuables des imprimant choses connoistre etquisontabsolument nécessaires à leurconqu'ilsnepeuvent parlesSens, servation ouà lafinà laquelle ilssontdestinez."

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? Specializedinstinctsare domain-specific, importantfeature:specialization in certain and theyexpressthemselves are certain stimuli, by they triggered thisfeaaccount of We can illustrate Cureaus behavioural sequences. regular turebyone ofhisfavourite examples,thestoragehabitsofants.32 In autumnantscollectgrains,wheatforexample.Accordingto thedoctrinesof earlymodernnaturalhistorythe followingsequenceof behaviour takesplace: antsfindsomewheat,theytakeit, theybiteoffthegerm,they and storeitinside.Whatdo antsdo thisfor? thegrainto theant-hill, transport of course.This is the functionof the entirebehavioural For stockpiling, collectwheatin sequence.It goeswithoutsayingthatantsdo notintentionally biteoffthegerm in winter, nordo theyintentionally orderto prevent starving in orderto avoidgermination. However,theyaredoingitforexactlythispurpose,withoutactuallyhavingthispurposein mind. The wholebehaviouralsequenceis triggered bya certainstimulus,i.e. the features of thewheatgrain,or a leastone of them.The detection perceptible ofthewolfbythelamb.The ofthewheatgrainis analogousto theperception ant formsan "image"of thewheatgrain,and thisimageis combinedwith to Cureau, soul.According similarimagesin theMemoryoftheantssensitive collection of an innate in theantsMemoryis thefirst thewheat-image image has a is the that of images.The important sequential point image-collection likea chain.33If you pull the it is- as Cureauputsit- structured structure, is linked willfollow.The innatewheat-image first link,theothersnecessarily and so on. The same to theanthill-image, thegerm-image to thegerm-image, avoidancebehaviouror theswalargumentappliesto the lambs instinctive is lows instinctive breedingbehaviour.In thefirstcase,theimage-collection of the These activities more in the second it is much complex. verysimple, becauseImaginationhas to produceactualimages soul arecognitive sensitive accordingto theinnatesequencein Memory.Onlytheseactualimagesarefor animalbehaviour. action, whichmeansthattheycausetheappropriate the feature of at least one by perceptible grainofwheat,antsperTriggered oftheinnateimageinstructions to the formbehavioural sequencesaccording collection.Theyact as Cureau says like a man,who acts in accordance devoidedof anyknowledgeof thepurposeof his withwritteninstructions, actions.The animalhas no need to knowthepurpose.However,theuniting As Cureauhas it: "celles elementoftheinnateimagecollectionis thepurpose. 32)Traité 3.2.4,132. , 345;Système 33)Traité, 345;Système 3.2.4,131.

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à unemesmefinsontliéesensemble."34 qui se rapportent Imagesthatservethe samepurposeor function areunitedin a collection. The image-collection has a purelysequentialstructure, howeverthewhole chainor structure is significant becauseof itsoverallpurposeor function. In virtueofthisinnatecollectiontheanimalis tunedto certainpiecesofpercepand to certainbehavioural tuallyreceivedinformation sequences.Specialized instinctsare explainedby innatefunctionally structures thatare significant sensitive to certainincomingpiecesofinformation. In modernparlancethisis a teleosemantic theoryof specializedinstinct. Teleosemantic theories the content oí internal statesorstructures explain partly The imagecollections havethefunction ofguiding byappealingto functions. theanimals behaviour. In Cureaustheory, theanimals behaviouris governed an thatrepresents a certainorder innate, structure, by functionally significant ofactions.35 Cureauonlysaysthismuch:ImagesrepreNow,howdo imagesrepresent? sentbya double-relation ofresemblance. Again,lets considerthecaseofperA theobjectit represents ceptualrepresentation.perceptualimageresembles theimagetheanimalhas stored(secondrela(firstrelation)and it resembles is therepresentational tion).The Memory-image type("le patron",as Cureau callsit),thesense-image ittherepresentational token . Imagination unifiesrepresentational and token for the of action. type representational purpose Only theunified isthegenuinerepresentation productoftheImagination ("image"). The activity of producingrepresentations is, as we knowby now,cognition in at least the first of Therearesev("connoissance") step cognitive activity. eralproblemswiththissketchy butinteresting proposal.The mostworrisome Therelationofresemblance is alsoemployed problemis its obviouscircularity. in theexplanation of thestorageof therepresentational but typein memory, of coursethe elementsin stockdo not represent each other.Moreover,the in Memorydoes not by itselfbuild up a storageof perceptualinformation butwhichpiecesof representational type.The animaljuststoresinformation, information haveto be connectedin orderto buildup a representational type? each otherhaveto be conWell,theobviousansweris: thepiecesresembling nected.But in orderto connectthem,the animals Memoryalreadyneeds 34)Système, 3.2.4,131. 35)Thevariety ofteleosemantics I hintatisbestcaptured inKaren "Dretske's Innate Neander, Australasian andKaren 7A(1995),258-274,, "Content Neander, Journal Modesty", ofPhilosophy forCognitive in Teleosemantics andD. Papineau Science", , ed.G. McDonald (Cambridge, 2006),167-194.

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is simplynot enoughto somesortof representational type.So, resemblance the and the relation, representational groundingof thisrelationis ground threatened a by regress. The beautyof Cureaus theoryof innatecognitionis thatit solvesthe relaand adds an additionalelementto therepresentational regress-problem is solvedby the fact,thatthe image-collection is tion.The regress-problem innate.The additionalelementforgenuinerepresentation is givenby the functionor purpose.Only the imagesthatregulatethe image-collections behaviourof theanimalaregenuinerepresentations. And thisis justthecase fortheinnateimage-collections. Wheredoes thefunctionality of theinnate structure derivefrom? As we havealreadyseen:from"La SagesseDivine".God or ultimatecauseof instinctive the is, so to speak,thestructuring behaviour, information fromoutsideis thetriggering or proximate cause.The innatecollectionofimagesis thestructuring causeofthebehaviour.36 - forthesensitive soul.HowThisis Cureaus accountofspecializedinstinct ever,whataretheanalogiesin theotherpartsofthesoul?In thefinalsection of mypaper,I will considerthespecializedinstincts thatare locatedin the soul. vegetative 5. Instinctin theVegetativeSoul Because of the astonishingly purposefulbehaviourof simpleanimals,the specializedinstinctsof the sensitivepartare moreevidentthanspecialized in thevegetative areforeshadinstinct ofhigherparts,however, part.Activities owed in thelowerparts.This is whytheexplanationof sensitiveinstinctive ask cognition.Let us first cognitionis a usefulanalogyfornaturalinstinctive to explain.Whatis cognitionin thevegetathequestionwhatCureauis trying to theactivAs I arguedin thefirst tivesoulanyway? section,cognitionrefers information from the which and process ity by living beings acquire is also the orfrominsidethelivingbeing.Cognition,therefore, environment . And itis theequilibirum insidetheirbodies wayin whichlivingbeingsregulate in that is other words: thisregulative instinctive, activity governedbyinnate images. 36)Cureau tothe isnotexplained reference stresses thepoint that instinct bydirect specialized lheterminology ofstructuring and Prime Cause a mediated causal factor, , i.e.God.Godisonly Behavior. Reasons ina World causeisFredDretske's cf.FredDretske, of Explaining triggering ofproximate andultimate causeis Ernst Causes 1988),theterminology (Cambridge/Mass., cf.Ernst Toward a NewPhilosophy 1988),25-37. Mayrs Mayr, ofBiology (Cambridge/Mass.,

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in plant-behaviour, Cureaupointsout someexamples Not muchinterested in our humans.37 ofregulative First, bodyretains goodhumoursand cognition betweenthepoint there is no difference sense of touch bad for the expels ones; a differnevertheless our of a needleand thestingof a bee, bodyrecognizes ence;our stomachjudgesfoodto be bad, thatour senseof tastedoes not;in sicknessour bodychoosesa certaintimeforattackingthe intruding germs of theimmunesystem,the thatmakeus sick.In otherwords:theactivities or our thegastrointestinal cardiovascular tract,theendocrinesystem, system, activities. These activare and for ability nociception thermoception cognitive i.e. governedby innatefuncitiesare governedby innateimage-collections, between differences Thereareseveralsignificant structures. tionallysignificant and vegetative sensitive specializedinstinct. specializedinstinct Firstof all, the sensitiveinstinctgovernsactionsof the whole animal, inpartsand organs ofthelivwhereasthevegetative instinct governsactivities The centralized. ing being.Second,the sensitiveinstinctis physiologically - whichare thefaculties of thesensitivesoul thatis relevant internalsenses - arelocatedin theCentralNervousSystem, i.e. in thebrain.One forinstinct implicationof Cureaus analogybetweensensitiveand vegetative important soul has itsown Memory.Now,thisMemoryis instinct is thatthevegetative all it is distributed not "dansle Cerveaucommeestla memoireSensitive"38, in are located therelevant overthebody,or moreprecisely: image-collections instinctin question.Cureau the partsor organsthatexhibitthevegetative s De remindsthereaderofthespecialstatusthesenseoftouchhasinAristotele all overthe anima. It is thelowestof theexternalsensesand it is distributed is a linkbetweenthe skin.In Cureaus view,the senseof touch,therefore, soul. soul and thesensitive kindsof cognitionto be foundin thevegetative Moreover,Cureau invokesa widelyused example,also mentionedby Descartes:theplayerofthelutehas his memoryin hisfingers. Third,thevegetain humours, tivefaculty poisons,food,or cognizesonlyverydimlydifferences sickness.The eye distinguishes manycoloursand shapes,the ear discerns between soul differentiates directions and pitches,and so on. The vegetative The whole "doucesetfâcheuse, bonneset mauvaises" sequenceof inputsonly. is triggered instinctive activities byjusta fewimages.Vegetative cognitionis built-incognition.It foreshadows moreor less single-cued, discriminatory, 37)Système seeHansWerner Geschichte oftheplant-soul 3.1.1,113f.Forthehistory Ingensiep, vonderAntike biszurGegenwart undbiologische derPflanzenseele. (StuttPhilosophische Entwürfe 2001). gart, 38)Système 3.4.7,147.

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moresophisticated sensitive activities bythefactthatvegetative cogcognitive well. information from outside the as nitionis triggered by livingbeing, Let me sumup bytakingup Cureausgeneralthesis,namely:lifeis a form of thinking. The formof thinkingCureau has in mindis cognitionin the to governbehaviour. senseof theactivationof significant internalstructures in instinctive is an innate The internalstructure functionally sigcognition to certainincomingpiecesof information. nificant sensitive image-collection in memory(and In thesensitive soul theseimagecollectionsare centralized In are the soul these notin theestimative power). vegetative image-collections aboutthesoultakesplacein a distributed all overthebody.Cureausthinking schemeofthesoul. However,he usesthisschemeas a verybroadAristotelian orto develop for hisowntheories, and notto preserve background developing in the firstplace. One of the most interesting Aristotelianism aspectsof in a his for consists Cureaus theoryofinstinct, however, suggestions theoryof animalaction innaterepresentational content. Accordingto Cureauinstinctive This is of innateimage-collections. is governedby the teleologicalstructure startsbuildingup an one of theraremomentsan earlymodernphilosopher content. explicittheoryofrepresentational

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Discussions ontheCognitive andAction. Medieval Dominik, Perler, Capacities "Intentionality andImagination. Acts inM.C. Pacheco Intellect ofAnimals", andJ.F.Meirinhos (eds.), ofthe Xlth International 2006,72-98. ,Turnhout: Brepols, Congress ofMedieval Philosophy savieetsesoevres, Paris: F.de,Lord Herbert deCherbury: Charles 1874. Didier, Rémusat, intheMiddle ofThought theMind.TheRepresentation A.Marc, Smith, Agesand "Picturing 20 theRenaissance", 149-170. Philosophical Topics (1992), in ofHeredityin Mechanist E. H.,"Imagination andtheProblem Smith, Justin Embriology", inEarly Modern Generation , Cam(ed.),TheProblem J.E. H. Smith Philosophy ofAnimal Press, 2006,80-101. University Cambridge bridge: über dieGeschichte einst undjetzt. EineStudie DerBegriff desInstinktes Heinrich Ernst, Ziegler, Gustav derTierpsychologie unddieGrundlagen 1910. Fischer, ,Jena:

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Contents Volume 46 (2008)/Vivarium 46 (2008)462-463 Peter King Richard Cross Martin Lenz Jean-BaptisteBrenet Joël Biard Lodi Nauta Ian Maclean Lilli Alanen Markus Wild

The InnerCathedral:Mental in High Scholasticism Architecture SomeVarieties ofSemanticExternalism in Duns ScotussCognitivePsychology Ockhams WhyIs ThoughtLinguistic? Two ConceptionsoftheIntellect Ameintellective, âme cogitative : Jeande Jandunet la duplex formapropriade Thomme Diversitédes fonctions et unitéde l'âme dansla psychologie péripatéticienne (xrv^-xvť siècle) Froman Outsiders PointofView: LorenzoVallaon theSoul Cardanos EclecticPsychology and its Caesar CritiquebyJulius Scaliger CartesianScientiaand theHuman Soul MarinCureaude la Chambreon the NaturalCognitionoftheVegetative Soul: An EarlyModernTheoryof Instinct

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463 253 275 302

318 342 368 392 418

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Vivarium - Vol Xlvi, No 3, 2008

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