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THE SOVIET MOTORIZED RIFLE COMPANY ocToBER1976
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THE SOVIET MOTORIZED RIFLE COMPAI{Y
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7-76 DDr-1lOO-7 Informatior Cut'Off Date: June 1975
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This document was Fepared by Major Robert M. Frasch6 of the Tactics and Organization Section, Ground Forc€s[vlBFR Branch, Soviet/WarsawPact Dvision, Drcctorate for Inteligenc€ (ResearchCenter), and is releasedfor publication by authodty of the Drector, Defens€lnteligenc€ Agency.
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\o PREFACE This study war *rittcn for the us€ of serviceschoolsandfor unit inteligence officeF ,s an aid in pr$€nting classeson the organization,biining, tactics,atrdequipm€ntofthe motodz€drifle company. Th€ material presert€d on unit organlzationshould be u!€d as a guide or y. Soviet organizationsvary widely d€p€ndingupon thetr manninglevels,weaponsand equipm€nt mix,locatton andother factors. Dff€rencesin squadarmam€nt,capabilities,andnumben of men per .rmor€d penonnel carrter (APC) exist betweenunits. Although old€r APC'S are dbcu$ed, this study concentrrtespdmarily on the BMP€quipp€dmotorized dfle comp8nies,sincethey gobably representthe d€sir€dst ndardThe list of Sovietsymbolsusedmey be found in Appendix I. Corunents, correctionsand suggestionsfor improvementof this study are requested. They slrculd be sent thmugh proper channelsto the DefenseIntelligenc€Agercy, Cround Forc€s/MBFRBranch,ATTN: DB-1B4, Washington,D.C.20301.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
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doctrineand the orSanistion, l lhis study examinesSovietoffcnsiveand defensive training,racticsand cquiprnentof the Sovietmotorizedritle company.Emphasisis placedon tlrc comp,rny equipped with the infantrycombalvehicle(BMP).Themotorized rifle companyis organized, trainedandcquippcdprimrily fol a wal of rapidmovemcnl and short durltion. Maneuverduringtacticaloperationsis restdctcdto wcil-rchcrn€d combal formrtions and is oficn dictated by hisher authodty. Tactical doctrin€ but usually cmph-asizes offensiveaction-Coordination of fire andmovement is practiccd, in clo!.ly regulated exercises.During operatioff, riflemen Sencrallyremain in lfteir personnel calriersuntil conionted with seriousanti-rrmorfire, thendismounlto assaolt positionswith supportfrom tanks,artillery,mortan,andt}lcil own pcrsonnel carriers. professional 2. Motorizedrine companyofficcrsreceive extensive andpoliticaltrainingin schools,but areSivenlittlc opportunityto exercise initiativeandlackcombalexperience, prc-induction prior to being assigncd to deir units.Although Conscripts rcceive tmining th€ effectivcncss pre'induction uneven, it has shown improvement in somc of trainingis ,Jcas and may eventually provide cons(ripts with the n€c€ssarybasic military skills befor€ they enter the army. About half of th€ consc.ipts,including sergea'tsand APC crew members, rcccivesix montl$ specialisttrainingbeforethey reportto their units. Other conscriptslcam thcir duties by repetitiveon-the-jobtrainmg and are not cross{rained. The lrainingprognm lrnddhciplinarymearure!produccsoldienwho can perforn their duticsadequately. initiaiivc.Tiaining, Thcy arenol expectedto exercise andhenceindividualandunil effectiveness, aredegadedby thc lacl tlut conscnpbserve only two ycars.Ncwtroopsarerotatcdinto unitssemi-annuauy. 3. Equipmentof thc motorizedriile companyprovidestlrc mems neededto conduct operationsand successfullyaccomplishlikely missions.Tlrc htroduction of the BMP is lhe most significantrecentimprovemenlin the companytequipffenldnd consrderably incrcascs its firepower.Shortcomings ofcompanycquipmcntinclude: a. Squadleade$,whendisrnounted from th€irpenonnclcarriers, haveno radios. b- Radiosavailablc to platoonleaders operations hav€limitcdrange. in dismounled c- ThemaingunoI the BMPdoesnor havc stabilizer. d Saggerantitank guided missilcsclnnol be effectivelyfired at night Mthout illumination. 4. Sovietmotorind rinc companies, particularlythoseequippedwith BMPS, arecapable of conductingeffectivccombatoperations. exist Althoughsomequalitativedeficicncies in trainhg,equipmcntdndofganization, the Sovietsapparendy considcrtllal quantitative superiorityis adequ,rte compensation.
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TABLEOF CONTENTS THESOVIETMOTORIZED RIFLECOMPANY P.rr
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ExecutiveSunrJn{y Tableof Corrcnts List of Figur€s Introduction CHAPTERI,
xin PERSONNEL AND TRAINING
CHAPTER2. Sectionl. [. I[.
v.
CTIAPTER3. HIGTIERLINITS
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CTIAPIER4. SectionI. II. llt.
lv. \{. CHA?TER5. SectionL [. llt. IV. VI.
vlI. YII. C}IAPTER6. Sectiorl. lI. IIIIV.
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TIIE MOTORIZEDRIFLE COMPANY G e D e r.a. l. . . . . . . . . . . . M i s s i o r. s. . . . . . . . . . . . O r g r n i z a t ,i o. .n. . . . . . . E q u i p n e n. .t . . . . . . . . . C o m m a na dn dC o n t r o. .l A d m i n i s t r a tai o nn dS u p p l y. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
.-.--------- r'1 ....-....... l? ............17 ..........,. 20 .-.-.---. --- 2l -........... 28
MOTORIZEDRIFLECOMPANYTRATNNG -...........3l I n t r o d u c t i.o. n. . . . . . . . W e a p oanns dE q u i p m eTnrta j n i n.g. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3l M o r a l P o l i t i cTarl a i n i n g ...........3? chemical ,....-........ 38 Training Eiological & Radiological I a n dN a v i g a t i.o. n. . . . . ...-........38 PhysicalTraining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 J u n i oO r f f i c earn dN C OT r a i n i n. g. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . --.... -.... 40 Tactica.lTraining . . - - . . . - . . . . . . . . . . 41 THE MOTORZED RIFLE SQUAD G e n e r.a, l. . . , . . . . . . . . M o v e m etnotc o n t a c t . . . F o r m a t i o.n. s. . . . . . . . . OffensiveAction DefenriveAction
......-...-.41 .-...,....,.45 ............45 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4I . . . - . . , . . . . . . . . . . . 5I
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MOTORZEDRIFLE PLATOON Introductlon .........,.......-..... M o v e m etnotC o n t a c. .t . . . - . . . - . . . . . . . . - - . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . Fornations. - . . . -..-......---..... OFensiA v ec t i o t r .. . .... ... .... .... . Dcfensive ... .. . ... . .. .. . .. . . Action
s5 55 57 60 6l
CTIAPTER8. S € c t i oLn II. IU. lV, V.
T}IE MOTORIZEDRIFLE COMPANYIN COMBAT M o v e m etnotC o n t a c t . . . . . . -. . . . . . . . . . . . . - , . . . . . . . . , . . - . . . The MeetingEngagemcnt. . . - - . . . . . , . . . - . - - - . . . . . . . - . . . . . . , BreaktfuoughOperations. . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . , . . . . . - - . . . . D e f e n s iO v ep e r a l i o n s ...,............ Withdrawal ........................
65 59 72 ?5 80
CIIAPTER9.
THE MOTORIZED RIFLE COMPANY OPERATING UNDER SPFCIAL CONDITIONS G € n e r.a.l. . . . . . . . . . . . .............83 OperationsUnderExtremeWeatherConditions- . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . E3 Operationsin Forests.nd Swarnpc. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - . . . 9l Opentionr io Mountaira ... . . ...... .. 93 W a t eBr a r r i eOr p e r a t i o n s .............99 C o m b aht B u i l t - u fpu e a.s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 0 5 Helibome .... . .. . . . -. .. . 110 op€rations N i e hO t peEtions .,..-.........--,. 115
Sectionl. II. I.
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CIIAPIER 7. S e c t i oI n. lI. IIL lV. V.
vt. v[. vm.
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Appcndix€s ...............,123.\24 l . L i s to f s y m b o l s . . . . . Patt€min BasicCombatDuty itr Peacetim€. II. A TypeCareer . . - -.... 125 I T I . ( X f i c eAr g eL i m i t a t i o n. .s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - - . . . - . - - . - . - - . . - 1 2 7
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LIST OF FIGURES page
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Figurc L Vanedelhnicslructureofthe SovietAnny . . . . . - . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . I 7 . P r ei n d u c r i ot n r a i n i nf ga c i l i tay t a s e c o n d asrcyh o o l . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . I 3 . A DOSAAF training facility for specialists . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Youngofficcrsat a conmissioning school . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 5 . C o m b i n cadr m st e a mi n t h ea t r a c k . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . 3 Basic order of march of a Soviet formation anticipatinga mccting e n g a g € m e.n. .t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . _. . . 4 7 . Dcploymcntof unitsfrom the line of rnarchinto a meetingcngagement. . 5 8 . T h eb r e a l t h r o u g h .................. _......6 9 . Dvision concentrationfor the breatthrough . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 0 . T h ep u r s u i t . . . . . . . . . .-..---............ 8 I t . Basicformsof maneuver . a. Frontalattack ,,.................,..,8 b- Doubleenveloprncnt \ritl frontalattack 12. T h cm o i o r i z er di f l er e g i m e (nBr M P a q u i p p e .d. ). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . n l l Principlcwcaponsh the motorizcdrifle regiment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . I 2 a . T h em e d i u nt a n kT 5 4 1 5 5 1 .6.2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -........... 12 b . 2 3 m mS P A AG u nZ S L2l 3 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . --............ 13 c. ATGM launchervehicleAT-3 . . - - . . . - . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . - - . . 13 d. l22mm howitzerD-30 , - - . . . . . . . . . . . . - I3 e. SAM SA-9 Gaskin . . . -. . . . . . . . . . -. . . . I3 t4. Themotorized (BMP+quipp€d) riflebattalion .........t4 1 5 .P r i n c i pwl ee a p o ni nst h em o t o r i z er idf l cb a t t d i o n. . . - - . . . . . . . . . - . . . . 1 4 r . 7 3 m mR c c o ei s s G uS n P C - g. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . b . M a n p a cAkT G MS e tS a g g (eAr T - 3 ) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . t5 c- l20mmmortar 15 ....-.........-...-1 6 .T h cm o t o r i z er d i f l ec o m p n n( yB M P € q u i p p e.d. .). . - - . . . - . . . . . . . . , . . 18 t 1 Principle weaponsof thc BMP and/or BTR€quippedmororizcd rifle c o m p a n r e. -s. . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . , , . , , . . . . 19 g€neral purposc (PK) .........Ie a. 7.62nrm machinegun, Kalashnikov (RPK) b. 7.62nrmlight rnaclincgun,Kalashnikov (AKM) l9 c. 7.62mmmod€rntedrinc Kalashnikov
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Page Figure 20. P c r s o nCaB e:u ........-..,...... - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 l Rp r o t e c t i 8v e a. ShMmask . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 b. St*lS mask. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . 23 c. OP.f proiectiv€coat-overall. . - . . . - . . . . . . . - - . . . . . . - . . , . . . . . . . 23 d . I n d i v i d udael c o n t a m i n aktiito,InP P. . . . . . , . . . . . . , . . . . . . . , , . - . . . 2 1 21. Sunner and winter licld uniforms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . 24 22. F i e l dC o m b apta c ka n da c c o u t r e m e n. .t.s. . . . . . - - - - . . . - - - - - - . . - - - . . u 23. R-ll3 vehicularrldio . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2s 24. R-123vehicularradtowith intercomunit . . . . . . . . - - . . , . . . . . . . , . . - . . . 26 25. R - 1 2 6m a n p a cr ka d i o ... -............. -...25 26. Th€ R-105ard Rlo? railios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 21. Reprcsentativc radionet ofa motorizedrifle company . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28 28. S o l d i eena t i nign t h cf i € l d .. ....... . .. ..... .29 D . hcliminary w€aponstraining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32 30. Trdningin firing from an APC . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . .32 3 1 . A n t i t a ntkr a i n i n g . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - _ . . . . . .- . . . 3 3 , 3 4 . - -...... -...... -...3s A T C M( S a g S ct ar )i n i n g 33. SA-7(SAM) tnining . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 34. Snip€r training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35 35. Political indoctination session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3? - 3E 36. C B Rt r a i n i n g ..............,............ 37. Ch€micslrecormaissance personncl preparhgfor an op€ration . .. . . - . . -. 38 . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - , . 39 38. Traffic regulator .,. . .. . . .. . .. . . .. .,. 39 39. Physical fitnesstraining rifl€ squad . . . . . . . . . . . - . , . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . - . 43 40. Thc BTR-equipped . . . . . . - . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . 44 4 t . Exiting the BMP 42. BMPSsupportinSsquadsby lre . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 Tank'borneinfantry in t]€ attack . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - 45 mission . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . 46 44. Squadon a night reconnaissance ..... -...... -.. -,...... -46 45. S q u a ad s s a ul il nt c 46. A t t a c k i nf gr o ma p o s i t i oinn c f o s ceo n t a c -t . . . . . . . - - . , . . - - - . . . . . . - - . 4 7 4 7 .SquadG)negotiatinga mircfield . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49 positionprcparedwith engineer support . . .. . . .. . ..52 48. The squaddef€nsive . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 49. Th€ MDK-2 ditching machine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . 53 50. The squadffte plan ... .... . .. . ... . .. . . .. . ..55 rifleplatoon(BMP€quipped) 5 1 .Themotorized rifl€platoonattackinS bchindl,nks -...-..- - -.- -..-...56 52. Th€motorized - 58 5 3 .M o t o r i z eddf l ep l a t o ofno r m a t i o (nms o u n t e d.). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54. Motorizedrifl€ platoonforrnations(disnounted) . .. . . .. . .. . . .,. . .. . . - 59 5 5 .The platoon def€nsiveposition . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 A reinforced motorized rifle company as the adidce guard of the . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . 65 b a t t a l i o n. . . . . . . . . . . . company reinforced motorized riflc company con. commanderof a 5 7 .Thc . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66 ductingreconnaissance a meeting engagement66 58. Organizationof a battalion march h anticipation of . g u m € r p o s i t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . .6 8 in firiru ............. 59. A n S A - 7
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.68 ghar. ................ Fisure ne g c o n t a m i n adt iuorni n a 6 0 . C B Ru n i tc o n d u c t i d 61. A feinforcedmotorizedriflc battalionconductinga meetingengaSem€nt. 71 -.... 76 in the defens€........... motodzed rifl€battalion 62. Thereinforced . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 63. The rnotorizedrillc cornpanystrongpoint . . . . . . . . . . . . --... -. 84 6 4 . G T - Sa n dG T S Mv e h i c l e .s- - . - - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . with sub65. Motorizedrifl€ companyconnanderconductingreconnaissance o r d i n a taen da t t a c h ec do n m . n d e r s. . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . - 8 s ..................... 86 6 6 . T a n k tso w i n ign f a n t r y 86 5 7 . T a n l ( - b o ri n e f a n t rayt t a c k i ni ngw i n t e r. . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -. 87 6 8 . M o t o r i z er idf l et r o o p isn a w i n t edr e f e n s ipvoes i t i o n. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 88,89 6 9 . M o t o r i z er idf l et r o o p tsf a i n i ni gn t } I ed e s e r .t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i. the descri -.... -...... 90 motorized riflebattalion attacking 70. Reinforced 71. Reinforced motorizedrifle bathlion attackingin forest€dswampyterain . e2 , 1966............ .............. 94 72.76rnm m o u n t a gi nu n M es 7 3 . M o t o r i z cr d i f i et r o o ptsr a i n h g i n t h em o u n l a i n .s. . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 rinecompany attacking in mountainoN terrain ..........-.. 74. Motonzed in mounruuusrerrm ...... 98 75. Themururvedrinecompan)in dc defense - -.... -.... -.... - 99 e n e p a1' 9 6 7 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 6 . E x e r c i s" D cericrs unloadingassaulttroops . . . . . r01 77- K'61 and PTStrackedamphibious motorized ifle battrtionforcinga waterbarrier .... -..... 102 78. A reinforced a riverbanl . ... . ..... . 704 79. Reinforcedmotodzedrifle battrlion defending -... -..... 106,10? 8 0 . C o m b a t - i n d ttiaecst i c e a xl c r c i s.e. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . 81. The rcinforcedmolorizcdrifle companyin the attackin a builfup arca 108 82.Mi4 Hound .. -.... lll ... --.... 111 8 3 . M i - 6H o o k .......... 111 8,4M . i - 8H i p ....... 111 8 5 . M i - 1 0H a r k e -......... 1r1 8 6 . M i 1 2H o m e r ................. ---..--.. rt2 8 7 . M i - lH a r e .......112 8 8 . M i - 2H o p l i t e . . _. . . _. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . _. . _. I 13 89. Mi-24Hind A .......... 1i4 90. Helicoptcr mockuptrainingdevice 116 9 1 . t R s i g h t i nsgy s . c mm, o d eNi S P - 2 . . - - . . - . . . . - . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - 116 9 2 . S o v i emt o d ePl P N - l2R s i g h t i nsgy s t e m. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . o pocd cTl K N - 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . rr1 93. Comrnande I Rr 'ps c r i l e l e s c m 9 4 - C h a r a c t e r i sotfiscosm ei l l u m i n a t i d oe n v i c c .s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -.. 11? 9 5 . M o t o r i z er idf l ec o m p a ni n y a n i g h at t t a c k. . . . . . . - . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . - . 1 1 8 96. Possible chxnges in lhe night defensive system of a motorned rifle b a t t a l i o n. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121
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INTRODUCTION Sovictwritershavecontinuallyemphasizcd thefrcl that the nextwarmustbe won by will nol be possiblc. forcesin bcingand that full mobilizationof a nation'srcsources policy armiesareseenasanachronisms, andthe of mainlainingsucha Small,profcssionrl forcc, "bankrupt." Consequentlythc Soviets€mphasizeblitzkrieg offensivcswith tank-hcaryforcessupponedbylargcamountsofartillery,whichwouldbe ablcto achieve points. the requircdiirc supeliorityat selectcd This study examinesthe organization,trainjng, tactics and equipmcntof the BMP-equipped motorizedrifle companywithin th€ contcxt of Sovietoffensiveand defensive conceprs.ln an effort to presenta rcalisticportrayal,weaknesses a! w€ll aj strenglhs areportrayedthroudout tlc study. fte study beginswilh a brief examination of thc hunzn elernent.Th€ first chapier des€ribespersonncland training. Sovict offensivedd defensiveconceptsarc then describcd. The link betweenthcscconc€plsandtheMR companyis chapterlhree,which descnbes the molorjzedrifle resimentand thc MR batblion. Chaptersfour and five describe equipmentand trainingof lhc MR company,andsetthestage the organization, for a closelook ar eachof its subordinale clcmcnts,the squadandplatoon(chaptensix ,nd seven).Chaptercight lies logetherthe preccdingscvcnchaptersby d€scribing the motorizedrifle companyin combat.Cfiaptcrninc dcscribes ihe MR companyop€rating urderspecialcombrtconditions. Thehistoricalda1lin thischapterareprovidedprimarily for two rcasons: described havebeenpracticed fust, to showthat the typcsof opcrations for many ycarsby the Sovietsand arc an importml nsp€ctof curent Sovietdocline; to haveon theSoviet s€condto illustratctlle sedng impactthat WorldWarll continues military. in chaptcrninc,tacticdlair support Althoughthereis a sectionon heliborneopcralions of groundopcrationsis not discussed. Sovicturutsbelowdivisionlevelhaveno dircct orgadcradiocommunications with supportingancrafl,rnd representatives oftacticalair forc€sarerarcly,ifever,sentto battalionandcompany.
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CHAPTER1. PERSONNEL AND TRAINING
1. General The pcrsonnel makeup of rhe motorized rifie company typifics rhe human elementin tie Soviet gound lbrccs (fieLre I). Th. rypicd muro[,ed rllc conpan) i. conrposedprimdily of conscripts,carccr cniistcd nren and office.s constituting a srnal perccnlagc01 th€ total strength.Nomally, the majorily ofofficers are members of thc Comnunisr Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU)or the Young Coinnunist League (Komsomol). Most eniisled men arc Party or Konsomol membe6 or belongto a subsidiary organization. All evidencethe advrntagcs of Sovict political and military sysand disadvantages tems. These systemsinvolvc continuous,but not necessarily effective, political indoctrinalioni comprehensive. b u r u n e t e n l \ i m p l " T e l r e d . p r e - . n J u c L i ornr " i n i . r gp r n gramsi and gener.lty adequatcactive duty training. On balance,soldien shrpcd by these systemsappearto be polirically reliableand capableof performingeffectively, although with limited initiatjve at battalion level and
effective as suggestedin officiai statcments.Only career enlistedand officer personnel,who havea vcstcdintcresl in the mi1itary, appear to react favorably to the indoctrination- Conscdpts are generally unenilusiasric dd, to somedegree,irntated by the training. r. r.e-rnoudron r rarntnq Theoretically, the eniisted personneiof the motorizcd ritlc company reccivcnilitary training prior to entenng service.The 1967 law governingnilitary servicein rhe USSR requirespre-induction training for all malesand o r e { n b e , a ( o m p r e h e n s r vceo u r s eo t i n s l r u r . u o-r- u p to 140 hou6 ofclassroomwork -in addition to training with weaponsand equiprnent.'The pros.am, beginning in the ninlh gade. is unevenlyconductedin schoolsand traini g ccnteB throughout the USSR (Figurc 2). pre-inductiontfain Aflcr 1967, fie USSRreemphasized ing to compensarefor the rcduction ofconscript se.vice from three to two yea6. It appeaB,however,that thc requirementis not uniformly appliedro all individuals, probably becauseof a lack offacilities in somearcas.As jt now operates, the program provides most Sovicl youths with rudimentary military skills, bu1 cannot . o n p l e r e l y c o m p e n \ a r et o r d r c d u c r o n o l o 1 e y e J r I n activeduty training time. Specialisttraining. commencingal agc 17, is the respon sibility of the AI'Union Volunlary Sociely for Coopera' tion with tlre Army, Avialion 8nd Fleel (DOSAAF) and ofthe vocarionaischoolsysicm(Fisure 3).
Figure 1. Vaded ethnic structure ofthe Soviet Army. 2. PoliticalTrainingand Control
i
Thc company is ihc lowcsi cchclon at which a political officer functions. The politicJl officer, whose cliain of command is s€pafateand €xtends to the Main Political Directorateof the Ministry ofDefense,is responsiblefor political hdoctrination and for ensuringloyalty to the civilian leadership.He conducts poiilical lraining, primarily in the form of lectufes. and monitors company actilities for indicationsof dissent.Th€ arnountof time devoted to polirical training is inordinate and not as
Figure2. Pre-induction trainingfacilityat a secondaryschool,
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Figure4. Youngofiicersat a commissionang school. 5. ConscriptTraining. Prior to cnrctmentof lhe 1967lawon universal military traininS,fie nujority of conscdpts weretraincdby the Figure3.A DOSAAFtraining facilityfor specialists. units to which they werc assigned. Sincethc!, x, d, effort to compcnsate for thc reduced tenn ofservicc,rhe 4. Ofiice.Training Soriclshaveexpandedtherr facilibeslor tiainingcon,'fficeIs Mort commrsroneLl arcobraiqed iom cornm6- scnptsprior to assignm€nr. Currcnlly,incrcasing num, sioningschools(Figure4), but a smallpercentage comes bcn uf conscriDrs. nordblyspe.ialisrr rnd non.comnis. from univcrsity.lev€l res€ € offic€r trainingprograns sioncd ofnce|s,receiveup 1o six monthsof tmining and from drre!t conmi\s,ons. The commissiuning beforcassignment 10a unitschoolscomparcto the U.S. Military Academyand Datagapsprecludcdefinitiveevaluation of the individual producecomparably trainedofficers.Subsequent educ!- soldierproducedby the trainingpmglams.Personnel in lional opportunitiesfor offic€rs include advanced rnotoriTcdnne companies probablyperformsatisfactocourses,mjd.carcerschoolinginvolflng threc to five nly. considedng thc relativelylow skill lcvelsinvolvcd yetrrsat a militaryacadeny,rnd r two-yearcouneat the and the emphasis on lepetitionin training.Conscriprs Military Academy of the cereral St3ff. In 8encral, sering in morc complexassignnents arclikely to vary Sovietofficersare reliableandequipped to functionin a considerablyin then effectiv€ncss. Specialists suffer contemporary but areprobably som€whatfrom aII extensive battlcfieldenyironmcnt, dcpendence on simulaton sonewhatinlibited, padicularlyst the lowcr command and l-romscvereconstrainlsgovemingthe usc of full l€vels,by the poiilicalsystem.Equallyimportant,most calibcr,live anmunition. Thc expansionof specialist Soviet officers hdve not had tle benefirof warrinre training lacilitics,however,is expectedgradualy to experiencc. A type of Sovietofliccr'scareerpattcrnis providecons.riph with an adequarebaseof skill for individualassignm€nil. includedin appcndixII.
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CONCEPTS CHAPTEF2. OFFENSIVEAND DEFENSIVE Sectionl. MOVEMENTTO CONTACT 6. Genelal Soviet doctrinc stressesthat the ofl-ensivcis the decisive forn of conbal; that the main purposc of offensive combat is the complete destrucrion ol tlle enemy s forces. To scl the stagefor successfuloftcnslveaction, the Sovietsstresslhc use of diversionaryunits (agents, parachutistsand heliborne infantry) deep in tlte encmy rea Jers and the achievementol surprisethtough thc the intensity and mobiljty ot usc of deceptionmeasures, l'iepowcr. a1o 'afid lrFs ol advance Sufces i5 achieled by tnc rapid concentrrtion of supefio. forces wiih massive air and artille.y support to disruPl, penetratc,and ultimately rout opposingforces(FiSure5). Air and ariilcry interdiction would occur thtoughout ihe depth of the eremy's defensivcposilion. Ifnuclcat chenricalwcapons are not used, conventionalartilcry would be used in grealcr quantitiesin order to .chieve dre desiredfirc superiority. Soviet forces are trained to go rapidly lion a nonnuclearto a nuclearenvironmcnt, and Soviel writcn stres the essenlial arld critical ifansition bctwcen these modesof conbat. Despitelhis ernphasison offensiveoperalions,thc Sovjelsrealizethat in son1esituationstheir forceswill haveto go over 1o the defensive,but stress that the primary purpose of ihe defenseis to prepare for the resumption of offensive operdtionsassoon as possible. 7. The March a. The Sovictsdescrjbea much asan organizedlroop movementconductedin column fomations on roads,or
crosscountry. Troops ale trarned to bc rcady 1br action at any time. If possible,the marchis conductcdat night or under conditions of limited visibility. The speed at which the march is conducted is dependcnton many facto^ : encmy, lerfain, weathcr. makcup of the colum, condition of v€hicles,the levcl of driver training, etc. (Figure 6). ,. Average spccds ibr vehiculal lrafiic by day are 3040 knttu and by night and dunng other conditions of limited visibility 20-30 km/tu. For foot movement averasespecdsare 4 km/hr and bctween 5'7 knthr on skis. c. The inrcrval between vehiclcs is 1550 merers during road movementmd 50-100metersdunng tacticd cross-country movem€nl. Both the interval md the spccd of l}e vehjclc, are in(ted'ed lvhcn crosing a contaminatedeea or when under air dttrck. d Control measures along rhe route of advance nrclude initial start points and casily recognizablecontlol or phase lines. Thc number and spacingof these control measuresis dcpendentupon the lcngtl of the march. dre condition of thc ioads and tlt weather. c. ln a motorized march, halts of up to one hour occur evcry three-four houis. ln foot mdches, io'minute hdts are made elery 50 minutes. During fie second hJlf of a motorized Inlch, a long halt of iwo four hours is held. Such Longhalts arc not held at nidt (so as to make maximunr use of Lhc hours of drkncss), nor are ilrcy made during foot marches tlhich can be coveredin a 24-hour period- Durine slort hdlls,
armsteamin the attack. Fioure5. Combined
column dist ncesbetwcenvehiclesin column fomation ,l. All-around sccurity is providcd on the march in are not changed;men snd vehiclesmaintain the proper order to ensureuninterruptedmovement,to prevent aredisperscd surpriseaatack,to keepenemyreconnissance marchintervals.Duringlonghrlts, vehiclcs unitsfroh observingthe main body and to crcare fie most andcamouflaged. , To asrnt thc conrnandorin organizingthe rnarch, favorableconditions for deploymentof the rnain body Advancc,Ilank, the Sovietsdividethe marchinto two distinctelemcnts, in a mectingengagement. andrearguard units ensure all-around security durinS march rhe march.In thc movementorganizationand security. addition, stationary flank outposts arc often used to & Movcrnent orSanizltion is formulated to ensure occupy pass€d. critical tcrain until the main body has high speed, rapid combat deployment, and effective control. Tank and artillery are usually towards the front, and antiaircraftweaponsaredistributedthrough-
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Sectionll. THE OFFENSE L The rwo rnethods mentioned in Soviet tactical writings for acconplishingthe trrnsilion to thc otttnsive ar€ a) fiom the march and b) from a posilion occupied in direct contact with the enemy- The rluee types of oflcnsivc action are the meetingengagement,the breakthough, and the pursuii. 9. The MeetingEngagemeni
10. The Breakthrough d. The classic breakltuough operatior is a frortal d * ! u l r r B ar . r " w r l l - D r c o " r cddc i c n s i \ co o ' i . i o r . .d s i n g d largc amount of artilcry and mancuvcr clemcnls on a narrow front (Figure8). The breakLuoushmay alsooccur against a hasly defense.Against each rype of defense, the Sovi€ts envision swift and deep envelopment,ihe bypassing of stubborn pockets of resistDce, decisive meeting engage ents with advancingcncmy reserves, continuation ()1-th€ dttack, and the subsequentdestruction of enemy strong points by second echelon uniis. Breakthroughs may now be accomplished r,n shor! pedods of tine due to nuclearslrikcs and the increased lethaliiy of conventional wcapons. Succcssfullyconducted meetingengagcments arld breakthroughsresultjn lhe pursuil and ultimate destruction of the enemy's
The mecting cngagcmcntj i.c., fte colision of two opposing forces, b stressedmore heavily in Soviet nr ,,rJ wi'irCs Mar ]|.) orher lorm ai o er.rve action. Becauseof the fluid nature of modenr var, the Soviels bclicvc that thc meeringereagemenrwill occur more often than any other type of combat action. Meetingengagcmcnls arc characicrizedby action ro seize and naintain ihc initialive; the developnrentof combat on a wide lront with ffeedom of naneuver md the presenceof open flanksi rupid depioymcnt of troops, ,. These Soviet-To-NATO fo.ce ratios aie reflected in chjefly lrom columnsj nrobile, high speedcombat, and Soviel doctrine as being necessaryto achicvcI brerkoften incomplete intelligence on enemy lbrccs. The through againsta preparedposition: Sovietsbelieve that it is both possiblcrnd nccessaryio 3-5:1 ( i p ! r e m e e | | n ge n g r g c m c n r sD. r r r h r o u g l v a ' ' " u s .+-5:1 Infantry "nr inteltigencegrthering rncans thcy will be preparedfor, Artillery 6-8:1 (Figur€ and wil aggessive]yseekout, suchengagements c. A Soyict divisionconcentratesils forcesto achieve 7). the desiredcombat ratios for thc bredkthroughagainsta prepareddefenseasshoM in Figure9.
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Figure7. Deplovmenr ol un ls lrom the ineol marcninroa meeLing engagement.
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1, Sovi€r first €ch.lon lorc.. achi.ving 6 br6Ekthrcughlnd holdlng the 3houlde6 op€. tor tuther p€nd.Etion an l srplohlrbn by ..cond 6h6lon 1orc.., 2. S€cond eh.lon forc.! srploiting $e p€n€tnijon.
Figure8. Thebr€akthrough.
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Il. Pu6uitOperations Pursuitoperatioosarc hiShlymobilein natur€andare best conductedon a wide front alongparullclroutes. They involvebotl frontal attacksand envelopment to cut off anddestroyeneDyforccs,Pu6uit opcrations are mademorc effectiveby the useof tacticalhcliborneand airborneforces,which occupyand d€fendlocationsin th€ enernyt rearand otherwisedjsorganizeand delayhis retrogrademovcment.The Sovietsstressthat the puFuit is to begin imrnediatcly upon the initiativc of the commander who dircovers the retreat(Figure10). 12. B$ic Formi ol Maneuvsr "i{aneuver" is definedin SovietmiliLaryliteraturc asOe movementofa forceinto a favonblcpositionin rclation to the enemy,from which it can launchan effective attack.Thc Soviclsmentiontwo b sic formsof maneuver, the frontal attackand thc cnvelopment, but favor th€ latter,which may be shallowor deep,depending on the size of th€ unit executingit (Figure 1I ). Shouldthe enemy no! have an assailablellanl, a frontal attack wouldbe used.A frontalassault mayoccuron a wideor narrow front wilh or without heaty luc support. Tankheary sccondechelonforcesattempt to exploit sny rupturein the enemy'sposition.Underfavorable conditions,howcver,the Sovietswould altcmpt an envclopment, possibly in conjunction vith a front.l attack to pin down encmy forces. Enveloprnentis lhe prefenedmcthod of mancuverin the mcctingengag€mentandis usedfrom platoonlcvclup.
(EY l. 2, 3. 4,
Wfthd6$n! .n mylq6 Puding Sovi.n lorc6 Helibdn. r.nding in o@ht @r Approachine on.ny
[email protected]
Figurc10. Th6 pursuit.
A. FBONTATA'TACK
S. OOUBLE ENVETOPMENT WIIH FRONTAL ATTACK !9!c A n e n v e l o p m e n t n 6 y b e s i n g l e o r d o u b l € , 6 h a l lhom w.oyr6d1e3e0pb. s accompanisd by! lronral.lrackd€ion.dto "lit"enemy forc.s.
Figure11. Basicforms of maneuver,
SectionI ll. T H E D E F E N S E 13. General Defcnsivc opcrations occuf when offeosive operations are nol expcdicnt or when econony offorce is desirablc in one areain ordcr to attack in anothcr. Therefofe,the Soviets try to limit defensiveoperations to areas of secondaryimportance-The purposeof th€ defenseis to inflict maximum damage on tlMttacker. to firmly hold the defendedarc!, ard to creatcfavorableconditions for thc rcsumptionof thc offcnsive. 14. DefeneiveConcepri a. Stabilit)). Thc Soviets definc this lerm as th€ abiljty oI thc defend€rs to rcpcl attacks, to prevcnt cncny airborne acrivilies in the rear a.eas, and 10 destroyany pen€hation! ofthe defensivepositions. ,. Seclrry. Combrt sccunly forces provide early warning, prevent cncmy reconnaissanceof the main dafensive posidon. Iorce the enemy to deploy prematurely, inflicl mcximum casu.lties, and coordinate long-rangc fircs on cncmy formations. c. Use of Kcr Tenain. By ptope]ly preparing kcy tenain which dominatesthc inain arcnucsof approach. the defendcr may offsct some oI the altackeis advanragcs.Onc aspecl of lhe proper use of key lerrarn is a Iire plan and obstacleplan which restrict the attacker's lrccdom of m.rn€uverwhile maxirnizingthe defendcis. Thc altacker is canrlized into preparedkilling grounds for fires of l types (includins nucleao. tl. Dispcrsiott. To allow for maximum protcction from nuclearand ch€micalweapons,the Sovictsdcfcnd on a wide front and in Ircat dcptl e. A aroutld Del€rxe At$ough onented primarily towards thc dircction of enemy advece, Soviet units
a
prcparcallernateand sopplementary posjlionsandprepare!o rcpcl attack from rny directjon.This includes the constructionof platoonandcompanystrongpoints, d€€plyecheloned positions, and cxlensivebarrierand fire ptaming. tllc atlackerwith t Dek,Ee in Depth. This presents a seriesof preparcdplatoonrnd companystrongpoints which absofbdrc attackeis momentumand provide timc for resefl/es to counterattack. Anntat* Defense. Afl€r stabilityand protection s. from weaponsof mnssdeslruction.a strongrntitank defenseis the most imporrant chaGclcnsticof the dcfcnse.Antibnk weaponsarc libcrallyuUocaied down 10 low levels,while antitankfcscrvcsaremaintaincdrl rcgimcnlallevelandabove.lncrcasin8 emphasis hasbeen placedin Sovietwritingson the importanceol ATGMS. h. &otdnated li|es. Fires are coordinated to destroy the attackcrwhnc approachin8 th€ defended area,in front of lhe lbrward edgeof thc bartledea (FEBA), on the flank, and in preparedkiling zones within the defcndcdaJea,Inclodedin thcscfire plds are artillery, antitank,and small arms fires. Excludedar€ nucl€arstrikes,which Sovietwritersmaintainshouldbe primarilydirectedagainstthc enemy'snuclearweapons, major enemy re\ewesand commJndpusr\. i- Mobile Counterattack l-or&s. The Soviets consider the countcrrttackto bc the d€cisivephaseof delensivecombat.SovietconrnrandcIs requireall unils flom battalionand up 1()hunch countcraltrcks. Thesc counterattackwill incfcas€in s€veriiyas tlle depthof th€enemys.lientincreases.
SectionlV, WITHDRAWAL prcss tlle withdrawing forces, the coveringforce withWithdrawalopcrationsare conduc.cdfor purposesof draws in a leap.frogmanner,renderingDutual firc regroupirg,occupyingmorefavorablcterrdn, or dueto support.Withdrawalof the mainbody is donewithout positions. cncmy pressu.€.Thc mftsion of a withdrawingunit is to delayingin intefmediate d. Actions of the Rear Guard. Prior to withdrawing preservcits integrity, to conduct an orderly withdrawal at thc d€signated time, thc rcar guard commandcr to a designatedarca, and to b€ ready to execua€ positions usualy located behind fiIst occupies defense off€nsive mission!. The Sovicts rccognize the compositions def€nsive plicatednatureof this operationandprefcrto withdraw cchelondefens€forces.Subscqucnt aJe designatedfor thc rcar guard, which conducts on multiplc rcu1eswithout occupyingintermcdiatc ambushesand crectsbaniersas it withdrawsto subphascLines. possible, Wh€never the Sovietswi withdraw sequentpositions.The rear guardmovcsto subs€quent at night of during other conditions of timited visibility. positionsin a leap.frogmaoner,renderingmulual support, ard aggcssively defending eachposilion. 15. Conductol rhe withdr6wal e. Establishmentof Nel' DefensiyePositions-Pnol a- Orsanizationof Fuces. The grouping of forces to arrival in the rcwl]. d€si$atcd area of defense, for a with&awsl hcludes coredngforces,the rcar guard reconnaissance groupsareformcd.Thcsegroupsconduct and the mainbody. Flanksecuritydetachments arealso a thoroughsurveyofthc ncw area,determine the areato established whennecessary. be occupiedby eachunit, designrterpproachroutcsto b. Diseryagenent ftom Contact. Normally, the thern,mark off any minedor contrminaiedarcas,and Sovietsleavcone-thirdof theirforcesin contactin order test the water in th€ area.As thc main body approaches to deceivcthc enemymd delayhis advance. thc meaits subordinate elem€niiarcmct by guidesfrotn Unengaged clemcnts the reconnaissancegroups and ar€ taken to ften c. Method of tlt,rdrawl (reserveand secondechclonforccs) are withdrawn lirst, designatedareas, follow€d by artilery and lirst echetonforces.Covering I Secudtyis organizcdassoonas the lcadelements forces depart rudd€nlyand as a rule simultancously.closeon thc ncw defensive work is areas, andengineering Thcy usually depai aft€r the main body has pastcd irnmediatcly bcgun. positionsoccupiedby the fearguard.Shouldthc cncmy 15. Genehl
l0
CHAPTER 3 . H I G H E RU N I T S
17. General
19. Th€ Motorized Rille Battalion
The molorized.ifle companyis the mmeuver elementof the nrotodzed rifle brttriion. Ar it is reintbrcedby bollr b ! r r a l r o na n d r c g i j n c n rl o m o s ro p c a r i o n s .d , c o r g " n i zation and equipment of the motorized dfle regiment md barmlion will be discussedin this chapter.
d. The motorjzed rifle batlalion usually operates under the dircct control of the regimenralcomm,nder. When us€das thc division reserve,it operatesunder the divisionconmandcr. The baltalion may also participate in helibornc and ship-to-shofeoperations. ,. Becauseit is reiativcly "light" nr terms of certain organic combat and support elemcnls, rhc battalion is reinforced when attacking or defending in the flrsl echelon oI the rcgnnent, or whcn conductingindependenl opcrations. Fof example. in addition to his own orgmic unils, lhe battaljon commandermay control r tank battalion, r 122-mn howitzer battalisn, the regimental antitank guided missile battery, an antiancraft missile md ulilery battery, .an cngineer platoon, a chemicdl plaioon and administrativeand logistics support troops. The baltrlion conma dci reinforces his ofganic motorized rifle companiesas requned with his attachedor suppodingunits. a fie Bwrquippcd motorized rifle battalon is organized ar shown in Figure 14. Principle battllion wcaponsare shorvnin Figure 15.
18. The Motorized Bifle Regimenl a Thougir capableofindependent action, the motoF ized rifle fegimeni normally opcrates as parr of a division. Thc diyision cornmanderalocatcs addiiionai supporl to thc rcgiments lts requiled. Regimentd rrt lery may be reinfofced with units ffom the divjsion\ rrtillery dnd rocket brttalions, forming a regimental anillery group (RAG). Becausehe does not poss€ss organic nuclear weapons, ihe reginrental comnandef requestsnucleartire suppoft from division.Tllc rcgimcnt may also be ren orccd with additional antiai.craft, aniilank, cngineer,signd, n€dical, chemicil, and supply ,. Th€ BMP-cquippedmotonzed rfie regiment is orsanizedi]s shown in Figure 12. Someofthe regiment\ principlc wcaponsare shown in Flgure 13.
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Figure12. Themotorized rifleregiment(BMP-equipped).
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Figure13. Principleweaponsin the motorizedrifteregiment.
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e. SAIMSA S Gaskin.
13
MOTORI2EO
C O M M I J N I C AOTN S MAINTENANCE
!9rq For a lsr ol th€ n!mbers 6nd iypes ol perconne.nd equpmenr ar baxalion,sse lS) SovrerGo!nd Forces . D l l l 0 O2 . 7 5d a r e oJ u r . 1 9 7 , , . O r g a n ? d n oG r u ' d eI L J ' D
Figure14. Themotorized riflebattalion IBMP-equipped).
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Figure15. Principleweaponsin the motorizedrifle battalion. l4
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CHAPTER4. THE MOTORIZEORIFLECOMPANY Sectionl. General 20. Tlc motorizcdiflc companicsoI the mobnzed on the tridngularconcePt nfle battalionare organized platoons, nfle €achcomposed of a with threemotorized ed three rifle squads. platoonheadquaners 21. The organizalionand equipmentfound in motorlaries.dependin8 on lhe rypecarricr ued nne compnnies they hav€ and the numb€r of troops available.Thc BMPaquippcdmotorizedrifle companyhasone more man tlan the BTR€quippedconrpanyand doesnot hive r m3chinetsun serrion (two PK machincSun Section ll.
whcrcasthe latter does.The company detachments), headquarlenof the BTRaquippedcompanyis smaller h€adquarten.Squadstrength than the BMP-€quipped vanesfron 6-11 men, althoughwe believethc desired standard is 8 mcn in the BMP€quippedunits. Squad armament also varics, with the BMP+quippedsquads bcing morc hcavily armcd. Moreover,within the BMPthe initial equipp€dcompanies, tholc squadsposs€ssing modelBMP-Iwil havcone RPK light machinegunand oneAKM pcr squadin lieu of the two PK machincguns found in the later model ot the BMP.
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22. a. Thc missionsof de motoriTedriflc comprn) in n]anderwould be under the baitalioncommdrderwho guafd.(2) Acting$ flankor rear the offcnscareto peletratethecncmydefe es,develop commandrthe advance the a(ack, neutGlizedefendingcneny troopsby llre detachmenton a tacticalmarch.In this situationthe areapproximately and in hand'to-hddcombator to takethemprisoner, company'sattachments doubled,and destroy equipmenr andwcapons, serze th€ companycommanderiakes his oral€lsfrom the or caplue eoemy and consolidatcdefensivepositions,repulsecounter- comnander of the division'sllank or rear guard. (3) Conducting a reconnaissance in force (usually sent attacks,andpursuea withdrawingcnemy. ,- Other missiomwhich may be givento the riflc out by division).(4) Providingsecurity during halts. comprnyinclude:(1.)opcratine as an advancesecurity (5) Participating in tactical airmobile operations. d€tachment within an adv,nceguard(usuay scnl out (6) Acting as an assaultgroup in an attack against by regim€nt).A typicaladvance detachment consistsof forti{ied positions.(7) Operatingas thc reglm€ntal a mototizedriflc companyreinforccd by a tankplatoon, chemicalreconnaissance squad,andan c. The compmy wiu be rcinJorcedas rcquircdlor t€am.anengincer drrlank squad.In ds siruationthe companycom-
Sectionlll. ORGANIZATION 23. The organization and maj{xitcns of equipnentof the BMP.cquipped motoriz€driflc companyareshown in Figures16.18. d. The companyheadquartcrs coflsistsof the companycommander, politicalofficer,and tcchnicalofficer
plus rine enlistcdmen (thc first serscant,messcngcr/ companyclerk, nredic,communications specialist,a three-manSA-7 Team, and the BMP crerv members (driverard sunner). ,. The nfle platoon consislsof a plaroonhcadquarters andttucc riflesquads.
MOTOFIZ€D HEADOUAFIEBS
EOUIPMENT
[email protected] rill.. SVO 7.62mm GProchinegun, PKM Anftanl gr6n.d€l.unch6r,RPG-7 SAM,{SA-7,GFAttlg.ip6rockl
[email protected] @rier,aMP-A Armorod R,t13/B-123 4,r26
25(15t 62€Ot 3 20 t2l 9 3 10 tot 1 t0
NOTES 1, Fisu6 in par€.rhesc repre*nr rh€ dilt.Gnc$ in nomb.6 ol peMnnd, equipmentand *apons tound in lhd ATR.equipp€d moroizedine comFny. 2. The aTR'equippedmotorizedrill€ conFny hds 3 machin.gonseciionconsistinsot rive enlistedperconn61, (BPK)sndl0rgT8-50/€0/152.mored peGonnelcaderslln lieuotlho AN|Pl. 9x7.62mmlisht machineguns
Figure16. Ths motorizedriflecompany{BMP equipped).
t8
,l
a. 7.62mmgeneralpurposemachinegun, (PK). Kalashnikov
(RPK). b. 7.62mmlightmachinegun, Kalashnikov
(RPG,7) d. Anti-tankgrenade launcher
c. 7.62mmmodernized rifleKalashnikov {AKM).
ft
e. 7.62mmsemiautomatic sniperrifle, (SVD). Dragunov
f. 9mm pistol,lvlakarov {PM).
FigurelT.PrincipleweaponsoftheBl!,lPand/orBTBequippedmotorizedriflecompanies.
rl
19
a. BTR50.
b. BTRM.
d, BMP, c. BTR 152. Figure18. APC'Sfoundin motorizedriflecompanies.
Section lV. EOUIPMENT have it. The BTR-60P8has a lurcr nounting one APCSstill found wirhin the Soviet ground forccs 14.5runKPVTand one 7.62nm PKT machinegun. Thc includethe BTR-50, 60 and 152 series,dnd thc BMP vchicleusuay carrics500 roundsof l4.5nlnrand2000 Th€ BTR-152,the standardSovict roundsof 7.62mrnammudrior.ThelrrestSovietAPCis witi modifications. A?C during thc 1950s and erly 1960s, is an .he BMP which was tust identificdin 1967. h is an annoredwheelednon-rnphibioustruck withoul ovcr- anphibioustrackedAPC armedwith a 73Jnmsmoolh. AT-3 missilclaunche!.anda co-axial head cover, and is usualy armed with a 7.62nm borc gun,a Sagger A lalermodelofrhe BMPha! two machinegun.Thc BTR'152Kaswellaslatternodclshas 7.62mmmachincgun. to accommodate overheadarmor cover. The BTR-50Pscricswith an ibrwardluing porls designed rhePKM thus eonsiderably incrcasingdlc squad\ amphibiou5capabiljt).htfoduced during llrc middle machin€gun. l95os, was the lilsl SovietstandardtrackedA.PC.Ire firepower.The BMPcafiiesforty roundsof HEAT and BTR'sOPKversionwith ovcrhcrd cover became$c HE ammunition lor the 73rn'n gur and five Sagger includingonemountedon thc launchcr. standardvehicle for motorized riflc units in tank missilcs, divisions. Like tbe BTRj52, il is armedwitha 7.62mm SGMB machinegun.The BTR'60Pscriesarrphibious 25. IndividualandcreBservedW.apons eiShtwheeled APC wasintroducedin 196l as.rreplacc- a. 9m pttol, ItIakznv fPn4l.This pistolis carricd BTR-i52V. Althoughdr€originalmodclof by the officers in the cornprny headquarrers, ment for the APC models drive6.and by SA-7 and RPC-?gunne$. the BTR-60lackedoverheadcover,subsequcnt Th€ PM is a
20
pistol with an eight round nuga. naredblastshieldat the rearof the tubeand the thick small,somiautomatic zine. lt is the most widcly issucdpistol in thc Sovict heat shield rround the center.The optical sight is markedfor ranges fron 200 to 500metersat intervals of b. 7.62nm modentized assaub nfle, KaJathnikov 100 meters.The RPG'7cu be equipp€d with the NSP-2 (AKtrl) The AK is capableof both seniautonaticand infrured night sightiDgdevices.TheRPG-7Vhasa folding full automaticfire. The improv€dmodel,designated the AI
2l
b. RG-42.
C. RKG-3M,
d. RGD-s. Figure19. Handgrenades.
22
b. Shl,,lSmask.
a. Shl, mask.
rt
d. lndividualdecontaminationkit, IPP
c. OP-1protectivecoat-overall.
gear' Fioure20. PerconalCBRprotectave
2 8 . S u m m e ta n dW i n t e rF i e l dU n i f o r m s Sum er Nnd wmtcr ficld unifornrs and accout.ements a[e sholvn nr Figurc l1 rnd 12. Each man is also issuedr .amouilagc cate. Spcciai canrouflagesui6 are issuedas rc.luircd Ior wint€r 3rd sunnner opcrations and i)r
Figure22. Fieldcombatpackandacco!trements.
Fioure21.Summerandwinterfielduniforms
24
I
t4f dismounted, the plaroonlcaderhasan R-l26 (Fisure25) which ha! limit€drangcandfrequencycoveragc. radio 4. The motorirednfle companyis wel supplicdwilh company commmdcr'sAPC containsan d. The radio sets. Theseradioc are ruggedand moisture-proof or R-123, an R-126,md an R-105or R-107 R-ll3 dnd arc desiped for easeof operationud naintcnance. probrbly The R-107 is drc replacement for the radio. Adcquateoverlapin frcquencies is providedfor comR-l08, rnd family of tansceivers. R-l05, R{09 It exists municationsamonginfantry, armor,and aJtillery. The b. EachsquadAPChaseitheran R-113(Figure23) in both the vehicularand nranpackconfigurations. or Rl23 radio (Figure24), the latter beingthc most R-105andR'10?ar€shownin Figurc26. e. The.eis no organicprovhionwithin tle moiorized modern,with a grcater frequencyband. When disl-ayingof land rine companyfor wirc communicatjons. mountcd,the squadleaderhasno ndio. pcrfomed by Other organic equipmcnt lines is battalion. c. Each platoon lcadcr has a vehiculai-mounlcd the company for signrling, are whistles, flags, used by R-ll3 or R 123 radiosct which,likc thoscin hissquad panels. traccr ammunition, md bugles, flar€s, APCS, monitors the company commard nct. Whcn 29. SisnalEquipment
Figure23. R-1l3vehicularradio.
25
t
Fioure24. R-123vehiculartadiowith intercomunit.
Figure25. R-126manpackradio.
26
R 105
R 107
Figure26. The R-105and R-107radios.
SectionV. COMMAND AND CONTBOL 30. a. The Soviets regard conmrnd lts the exerciseof constant and effec.ive control. Thc rnotorized nfle companycommanderis responsiblefor the ope tions of his unit. To assisthim he has a politicdl officer and a technicalofficer. Tle former aidsin the political training md indoctrination of the company, while the latter arsistsin adninistrative, maintenanceand supply martels. Thc scnior platoon leader is thc company connander's secondin com,'nand. ,. There re no platoon sergeuts. The senior squad leaderis the phtoon lerder'snext in command. a The squad leader, usudlly an 18 or 19 yearold conscipt sergeant,directly commandshis squad.There afe no fre teamieaders.
his platoonleadersis routinelor thedeiiveryofcombat ordersand for supeNisionof preparatio!for combat. Wirecommunications areprimarilyusedin the defcnse. Companymessengen are usedin both the offenscand
,. Rzdioneis(Fisurc27). (1) The companyconrnmd net, when esrrbLished, goesfronr the conpanycommander downto rhe squad leadersduring nou.ted operations.This net udizesthc Rl13 or R 123radio. (2) Du.ing mounted opcrations,the company commandermaintainscomnunicationswirh barbrio! throughthe R-ll3/R-123 dnd/ofthe R-107radio.when dismounted, the R 126 radio is used,althoughii hasa very short range. (Jr Auachedor .rppo||rngunirr usc orLanr. 31. Control of attachcdunitsar€normaly with u. The primary means of conrrol of the motodzed radios.Commdnders urc company comnande. in both ihe athck dnd the rifle cornpanyis radio, although personalcontact, wirc, ncssengcr,.nd a variety ofother nethods are rlso used. PeNonalcontact betweenthe company conxnanderand
27
F1t3/r23 COMPANYCOMMANDER
BATTALIONCOMMANDEF
NOTES 1, The raciicalcommandnetotan MR unit is contot€d sl the highesttevetpossibte.When lhe companyis houfr€o rn N APC s lheremay be no companynet p€r se. 2. Fegadlessotwherherornotrhereisacompanynel.rado ft'oned,andlsedprim..itvbvlhe barralioncommanderand his immedialesubordinaleand arsched unn commandeB ptatoonand squad edoe6 wolro pnm6rilyreceiveinstructionsand would lransmiri.iiequenity.
Figure27. Representative radjoner ol a motorizedriflecompany-
AND SUPPLY SectionVl. ADMINISTRATION 32. Adminittration
,. Ammudtion resupplyir accoDplishedby the At company level, adDinistrationis minimal. Thc battalion,whichdclivcrsan'nnunitonto designated com. poinrs.Platoonpcnonnclpick up th€ conrpanycommanderis assistedin his adnrinisrrativepanyanrmunition tasksby the politicat officcr, tcchnicalofficer, first platoon\ amnrunitione. The Sovietsoldiercarriesore{wo days rutions. sergeantmd the companyclerk. Forn$ and reports which are mdntain€d at companylevel include &c Usudly,combatunits receivetwo hot nreals(prcparcd companypersonnelbook (which containsa recordo[ by battalion)per day (Figurc28). Dry rationsarcissued pcrtincntfactspertrininglo r soldicr'scivilandmilitury tor thc otherrne3ls.Breadis bakedat divisionbak€ies. lifc), duty roste|s,the dany strengthrcport, and the 34. llledical trainingschedulc. 3:1.Supply a Normally highcr units, using their organic transportalion,dclivcrsupplies unils,although to subordinale thc laltcr may collectsupptiesin somesituations.The motorizedrifle companyhasno organicserviccpc6on. nel, and tlrcrcforedep€ndson battrlion tor resupply. Thc company technical officcr works closely with his counterpartat baltaLion.
Tle Sovierscaregorizcwounds ls Ighl. serious.u' critical. Only basictreatmenti-srenderedal conrpany level.Ambulatorycas€s areexpcctcdto ma.kcthcir way on foot to the batldion aid station.Stretchercasesare carricd to thc aid station for subsequcnr evacuarion. Senouslyand critically woundedpersonnel are evacuated by lhe baltalionambulanceand orher lvailable vefucles. Normalyhigherunitsprovidetansportfor thc of casudties. The cnticallywoundedmaybe evacuation .vacuatedby helicopter.
2a
35. Recovefyand Repan
capacity of thc REC. whether reinfo.ced or not, is Limited task rcquirjng nore than 30,60 nlinulcs wil Soviot recovery and repair policy places emphasison nomally noi bc ttempted. Vehicles requiring this r o u t e ! l e r r ; r g s u l l r d r d r m r g e dv e f u ! l e rJ n d e q u r p m e D l unounr ']1 llmc or more to repair nray bc towed away, do not impede dte rdvance. lf the drivcr/mcchanicsat or moved off the route for evacuation or rcpair by company cannot repair rheir vehiclesin t0-15 minutes, regimcnt or division. First echeloncompanicswhic.hlose the l€chnical deputy notifies the battalion technicat deputy who coordinatesihe baualion repair and evacu. a cert in percentageof rheir mcn and equipmentwoutd ation Sroup(REG). The battalion REG, consistingof tbc be replaced by second cchclon units, reiirrmed and supply and mainrcn cc platoon, may be reinforced w r h r r e p : r i rr c f l m I r o m r c g r r n e n tB. e ( r u s cr h c r c p a j r
Iil',''
{j,ir I ii,i
Figur€28. Soldierseating in rhe field.
29
CHAPTER5. IV]OTORIZED RIFLE COIVIPANY TBAINING Sectionl. INTBODUCTION in complcnly. However,"rggressors"1n theseexercises usesoviet rather thm NATO tdctics. d. There is a wide variaiion of trainins effectileness /,. i\.losreriercisesiiclud€ aspectsof CBR lraining. wjthin the Soviet AJmy's approlinutely 170 divisions. Frequenlly, men will welr then protec|]veclothing and The Soviel military prcss does,however, indicate what inask for long teriods ol tjme. cvcrr duing rhc should be taught and how it siould be llusht. It sas strenousphysicalexercise. conducr of discusses botb good and bad €ramlles of trainnrg.With regnrd to snrall unit tactics, some of the conclusions 37. New TacticalManual which we have drawn fron th€ Soviet lress arc as During the 1963-1973teriod, the Sovietsprobably uscd ,. Soviet mililary writings reflect olficial doclrine. ! sinslc marual for tactical rcthods at thc batlalion Sovlet nilitary litcraturc is wcighted in favor of ihe level. In late 1973 a rellaccnent wirs ro b€ published. offensivc. Delinsivc opcralions rcceive less altenrion. lmphrsis in the Dewverslonn lrobdbly on the offenslle and ,jso actiuly in close contlct with ll1e defender,and and retrosradcopcrationsrrc inlicqucntly discusscd. ihereaftcr on dcfcnsive operations and thc naJch. stress imponance of initldtivc xt c. Mosr arricles the Emphasis is placed on norc skjllfu y portrdying the n€ed eliminrte stereorI lelels of conrmand.and rhe to probablc ol cnennesand on the use ofclcclrificd aclions t y p c d u n i n r a g i n a t i vr rea i n i n g . tdcLical lrxining nc1ds. Conrbatunder stccial condilions placed d. lncreased€mphasisis being on ihe rrainilg junior i s , l s o c m p h a s i z c d . NCOS. possibly r€flecting the of officers and problms brought about by thc dccrcascdtinc ofactive dury service md fie difficulty of retainiig trained 38. The CompanySchedule NCOS.Alfiough l.1rcNCO is Fcquently descrlbedrs "the The conpany lr.rining schcdulcrs drawn up rvcckly by olliccr\ rcliablc dcputy," thcrc are few rclerencesio lhe conpantr conmnder under the supcrvisionof thc NCO'Siniriadng or piannmgiraining. batialion chief of staff. Tlt ob.jectiveof th€ scheduleis , . T h e e . r s r d e . p r e - Jd s c u r ! , n g : r J s I n - u n . ro reflect rhe coune ofthe trainingprocessby providing pmy lririning. These aids rrnge from smdl oplical for a logicalp.ogressionofclasscs.The scheduleincludes d e { e r " ' \ e . \ . g h r p r .| | " . , l J r . 1 9d r r i r . . \ e r . i F s the fo owing: !o weli establishedtraining areascompletewith a variety a. Trai'ringgoalsofelectric ly run targets,city mock-ups.etc. ,. The ropicsand tines lbr trrinnrg classes. r o i r' r ' s . I wir\'1 rlF 1^r'rlFd Ife.^TpJ,r. .. Typesofpoiiticd inlnnnirlion scssions. mosr often conducted by plaimns utiljzing the county d Specidlisttrai rlg. '.selfrrairing" to be conlair method. Platoon lcxdcrs dcvise the planned and superviscdby the ducted by cach ol their platoo! ntnrbea wilhin thc & Trajnjngis norrnally next higher corlnnrnder. The b.trralion commandcr tnnc aliocatedby tbe comprny conmnndcr. Thc hannrg supcrviscscompany trnining, thc company comrnandcr of scrgeanrsln ihe techniq es ofconn:rnd is conduclcd his platoons, etc. Tacticd trdning exercisesare con- whcn they are free from cl$ses with th€ir squads.Nol r o l l e d b ) r h e. e r i n ra L h o r i \ L . i r g d F b r l F ds . F 1 " 4 u s . included ivithin the company tranrnrgschcdulcarc thc Thcsc cxercrsesare umtired and evaluaredby officen of denilcd plans for seflicing equipment during special the next higher unlt. Unit prcparationlbr an exercrseis maintenmcc Periods. normally detailed and, lvhen done prcperly, progresses 36. Genetal
Sectionll. WEAPONS AND EOUIPIVIENT TRAINING 39 General
Machine gunne$ and RPC gunncrs mav riso receive NCOS.At C crew members.and ATCM olcralors receive prior trrlning. Upon assignmenrto a unit. conscriptl six months ofspecialisLlraining prior ro unit assignrnenl. receiveaboui onc nontlr ofbasic training-
I
o tions of poor visibility. He is lrxincd 1o fire when nounled in an A?C and in tl1e dismountedrcLeaswell. a. During ihis phase,training is desiSn€dto srve the c. Aficr mastcring t]rc basics, the individual is iaught soldier a thorough undersiandingof his weapon. Thc to tuc at stationary and moving l3igcls on known nomenclature, functioning, asscmbly and disassembly, disiance ranses. He is then taken to more advanced and carc and cleaningofthe weaponplecedemdkrnan' rangeswhere he musl rapidly engagemoving,stationary, ship training. Firing positions, sighl alignmeni, rangc and surprisetargetsat unknown ranges-Having success eslimation, trigs€r squccze. and extensivc dry-firing fully completcd this siage, the soldier is ready to fire exercisesafe closely supcrvisedby NCOSand otlicers from molkup A?Cs. Uve fire is conducted after the basic prhciples have d. Training in firing liom APCS is nornJlly conbeenmastefed(Figure 29). ducted by phloon, ulilizing the counly fair nefiod of ,. The gorl of markrnanship trahjng is ro devclop instruction. Teclbiques vary according to the type of thc soldier's ability to fire acculalely and undef condi A?C used.A nunber ofstrtions provide trainingaccording to specidty Gifleman, machine gunner, RPG, and SA 7 gunnet, mounting and dismountingfrom the A?C, and dryfidne exerciseswithin the vehicular mockup (Figure 30). Thc training progrcsscs from station-ary mockups to mockups mounted on a rocking ftarnc which simulatesthe movemenrof APCS.The men are trained to fire through the firing ports and, in the older model APCS,over the sides of the vehicle while the vehicle is stationary and on the move- Antitank grenadiersand SA-7 gunnersmay fife from the halt or on the move at 1ow speedswhen the ground is farrly level. APC drivers are trained to provide a slablc platform tbr lhose1iring. c. Riflemcn also rcccive instruction on the coordi nated use of infartry weapons lire againsl allacking aircrrfl- A varicty of aircrdft haining aids arc uscd 10 Figure29. Preliminaryweaponstraining. teach rapid idcniificalion ol thc air largc! and to hclp the rifleman anticipatcaircraft mancuvcrs.
40. PreliminaryWeaponsTtainins
Figure30. Trainingin firing from an APC. 32
4 1 . R P Ka n d P ( M T r a i n i n g Machinegun trainingfollows much the sane sequcnccas rifle trdning. Wren the gumer progressesto tuing from inside ihe APC. he is rlughr how lo conrpensatefor vehicLar movement. He also practices dismounlcd $sault tue. holding his weapon at hip lcvel and firing
42. Antitank Traininq
armor successfully.Antitank training attenpls to build both confidence and proficiency in combating armor and is usualty done in a county fair manner.Different shlions teach characleristicsof tanks and arnrored vchiclcs. and conduct practical exerciseswith antitdk grenades,RPC'Sand mines(Fisur€ 3l ). b. RPG gunnersarc lraincd to lirc ai stationary and moving tank silhouelles which measureapproximatcly threeby five mclcls.
d. Thc SoviersbeLievethat il tukes disciplincd,weltrained, and psychologcrly prepdred troops to engage
Figure31. Antitanktraining.
gunnersusullly conducttraining e ATCM (Sagger) on m elcctricsimulatormountedin I ZlL,l57 var. Real missilesarc rarcly fired. The SagScrcannotbe fir€d effectivclyduring darkness because of the problemof dcpthperceptionand the facl tlut fte effectivelangeof the infrffcd sightingdeviceis 350400 rctcrs.Thisdoes not givetlc gunncrcnoud tine to guidethe missileto its targct (Figure 32). Tlrc Saggermay, however,be eff€ctivclyfrcd at nightwrth illuniralion. Sagger opeF ators are caJefully selectedand reportedly fire up to 2300 simulatedfoundsto qualify as a gunner,Afi€r qualifying,Saggergunnersmay tuc 5060 simulated roundra weekto maintainproficiency.
velocity, altjtudc, and boundary of launch zone) are visualy dispjaycd. Both target trackrng and r ssilc launching are simulated-For dctcrmining thc rypc and idcntity ofair targels,silhoucttcsarc used. ,. Havhg learned how !o rccogrize targ€ts. rhe gunncr trairs wiih models placcd al diffefent dhtances lnd courseangles.Ifthe trrgctl silhouetteis equalto or lcss than the dialneler oI thc small cifcle on the front sighl thc target is outside the launch zone. When the targel ovc ills $e cncle, the missilccan be fired. Moving l!rgel eliccrs arc sho$n rtuuughthc u\e of nro!rng ta.gel simulalon. After the gunncr first learns how to track low vclocity targets on a horizonlrl counc, he is trainedto track spinningand diing targets.
tt:|. SA-7T.ainins 4 SA-7 gunnersare trainedon a simulatorwhere paramclcrsof movinStargets(rangc,cou6e, fli8hr
Figure32. ATGM {Sagger)training.
c Cunne6 lre warned ,bout bcing ioo slow in dctcrmining the novcmenl ol passagcol the targetsal]d also about bcnrg ioo abrupt when guidingthe missilcon to the iargel Aiter pressingtlle iire switeh, thcre is ! . h n , r J . l J ) b c l u r e' l , e m r r \ e r [ c s r l r d u r c J J r . d Very littlc t known about t}e conrrol ano employmeni of tlrc sA.7s. coordination and employment depend upon th€ mission, telrain. enemy, and
Figure34. Snipertraining. 45. BIVIP Training
F i g u r e3 .
SA 7 (SAM) training.
44. SniperTrainins For snipetS,thc Sovietst-avornrenwho possess ercellcnl vision and hcadng, good menrory, and qLrickreactions. Trlining lbr snipersis conducted periodicrlly a d l sts liom one and a half to tvo months. Sniper targcls mcntn)nedby the Sovicl military pressincludc officels, observers,:rnlitank ,nd reooiucssnfle crcws, machinc gunncrs! crews of disablcd tanks, and low'flying hcli copters. Initialy, the Soviet sniper conccntrates on targctsvirich are holding up attackingunits (Figure 34)-
BMPcrcwI]ternbers rec.i!esi\ nror!hstrainingnr special trainirg units prior 1o rcponingto their u it. Training includcsBMP cquip rcnt, 1ac1ics, poliiicalnrstrLrction. CBRwarlrre.rivcr crossings. ard physicaltruhing.Oniy tlre BjUP eommanderi! crosrtmined.Tlc BMP is presenlcd10 traineesas a fast. lrmorcd. all-tcraii tmnsport€fand a obile bascol iirc 1br diynounted infant.y. Dismountingand remountingthe vchiclearc doneal t shorthalt or on thc move.Thelehiclcslovsro approxnutclyfivc krn/hourandbolh rcardoorsrno urc commandcr's halch ale opcned.Thc comnrander eits rhougi rc top of the BMP, while the sqLradexrts througfidre reafdoors.ThetsIlPlhenfolows thcsquad al a dislanccof 400-500neters. and may nole by boundswith other BMP'S.usingfirc and nrovenent. Nornnlly the BMPengages h ir STOP,F'IREandMOVI paatcrn.Finng thc nraingun on the moveis inrccurale due 10 the lack of a gun slabililer.Whenahesquadis readyto renrounlthc vehicle.rhc platoonlcadernotifies the BMPS10 com€ ltrward. Tle Btr{Pdrivessiowly firough dle skirmishli]tc pickingup thesquadrDembers. Mounlinganddismounling aheBMPin thisnanncrtakes approxnnat€ly l0 s€conds.
36
rl
46. BTRTraining
rlained in their separxLespecirllies, progressinSfronr BTR tratring at comp,nylevelis similarto BMPtrain- fixed mockups 1{) moving nockups and nndly to the BTR. ing.T]rccountyfair methodof insructionis
enrployed with individualc.ew and squadnrembediint beins
TRAINING Sectionlll. MORAL-POLITICAL personalnutter, but tlrc obligation of a mcmber of thc The primary reasonslbr the heary enphasison what thc CPSU-" re'rel pdtirrca]rdeologrfr'l Irnrng is Sovietsterm "moral-poliUcd" training are to maintain ,. crmpr, party control over the Armed Forcesand to preparethe chiefly intended to do the fo owin8: popuhce foi mod€rn wa!. As Marshal Sokolovski (i) To pronrote solidarity around thc commumst pariy and drc Sovict governrncnl. Tne prepration of tbe popularionin fte norali (2) To nrculcate personnel with hatrcd for drc politi!:t aspeclnasdecisive inportancein presenl enemiesof tl1cussR. day condilions. sincethe .pplicationol neansof (3) To erstlre undersiandingol propcr security nass ilestruclidnin vr inposcs very lnEh, previouslyu.hcrd of demmdson thc politicalmor.l m,t€-upof th€population. (4) To inform soldieNofrcccnt CPSUmd sovern Suchtmining is an importrnl parl of the overallcfforl to ment activitiesas well ar intenational evenls. preparefor CBR warfrre. Thc ideologic prcparationof (5) To heighrcnthc disciplinemd political aware, Lhetroops at companylcvel is the prirnary responsibility nessof companymembers. oftie deputy comnranderlbr political :rffrirs. a. In addition, thc conpany politic,l officer trains his assistantswithin thc phtoons and sections,helps organize compctitio betw€en units. and aids in the displaysin thc hnin roorn (every uni. has such a room 48. The Deputy Commanderfor PoliticalAffats which combinesthe functions ofa readinsroom,liblary, The deputy comnander for poljtical affairs, wHie utiljzing his own separatechain ofcommand (he reports to thc batralion political officer), is responsibleto rhe conpany commandertor the orSanizalionmd statusof party-polilical work in rhe unit. He is aided by ofticers dnd enlisied party or Komsonrol nrembers in cach platoon (Figure 35). 49. ldeolosicaland Politi6l Traininq d. Ai thc company lcvc1daily idcolorjcal and political trainirg is tied in with nriljlary trainnrg.In addition to regularpolitical classes,ofticers and efltist€dparty or KOMSOMOL members must often spend Lheir "free" tinre incre:rsingtheir polilical rwareness.As one Soviet sourcc nrdicared, "polirical sclf+ducation is nor a
Figure35. Politicalindoctrinationsession.
37
TRAINING SectionlV. CHEMICAL.BIOLOGICALAND RADIOLOGICAL radiologicalinstruments,and the dulies of a squad unit. asa CBRreconnaissancc r. Motorizedrifle companies aJeassigned a teamof assigned abo includesthe followd. Company CBR training speciallytrained'chcmicalobserver signalers" €onsisting mg: of an NCOanal$ree or four men.Theleamis equipped (l) CBRroutercconnaissance. 10 det€ctand markcontaminated arcasand to givetne (2) Rcconnaissance alca. in a CBRcontaminated alert. chcmicalor radiological (3) chenical observaProcedures tor eslablishing ,. Individual training stressesthe use of protective rnasks,dothing, and CW and radiologicaldetec.ion e. Somca5pectof CBRtrainingis normalyinclud€d equipment(Figure16)(FiguIc37). excrcis€s in Qcrical c. Trahingposlershavedctailedinformationon {irst aid against CW sgents, the operation of chcmical and 50. CBa Orientation
personnel Figure37. Chemicalr€connaissance prepanngror an operalon.
Figure36. CBRtraining
SectionV. LAND NAVIGATION 51, lnrtrument3
ard 1r100,000 distinguish oine diffcrent types of highway bridgesand givc rheir load capacinesin lons, roadway width, length. and heighr abovewaler lcvel in m€ters. Fording points on rive6 are shown with width and depth in mel€rs, sr€am velocity in meters/second and typc of botlon (sandy,viscuous,or roclf). ,. Sovict military map! are tightly controled. Maps 52. MaF with a nrililary grid and gcographiccomer valuesare 4. Sovict military maps are rich in dctail. For usually classified SECRET or TOP SECRET .nd are of l:25,000,l:50,000 hand-receiptedto units. cxample,Sovietmapswith scales
and large fron coinpasscs knd navigationinstruments mapsto directionalryro highly detail€dtopographical driving aids for the A?Cs. Drectionrl S/ros provide an azimuthLoenablcthe dnverto hold 3 fi\ed couNein a givendirection.
38
c. Thc Sovieis rely on traffic legulators(Ofganicto regimentand division) to guide their fonnations(FiSure 38). Traffic regulaiorsfiont boih regin€nr ,nd division mole witi reconnaissance elenrentsor advancegual.l unils to mark roules and dilect the rdvdncingcolu'nns r1 criiical points alorg the route. Melhods of tr nsportation used by lrdflic rcgulatds lncludc moto.cycl€s, jeeps,light trucks dnd APCS53. Trainins We cannot determinchow ruch land navigationtraining is conducred al the compdny lcvcl. Duc to the secunly cLassificalions of nriiitary maps it is quilc possiblethat liule map Lrrining is conducted and lhat nap rcading skillshale sL!ffercdaccordingly.
Figure38. Traffic regulator.
SectionVl. PHYSIcALTBAINING 54. Exerciseand CompetitiveSports a. Ttc.soldiers' rrrining day nornrally begins with about 30 minutes of cdisthenics (Fjsufe 39). Troops receive about 150 hours of physicai lfaining per year. Monthly physic fitness training schedulesoutline the type of cnlisthenics ior cach day. b. Cornpetiriveathletics play an impo({nt pan in ihc company conditioning prcgram and are integr{ted wilh physical training. The conrpanycommander,aided by his sporis organizer and pady and KOMSOMOL organizriions, is rcsponsible lbr scejng thal everyone participates ]n sporis rctililles as laid dorvn by thc Military Sports Conrplex of the Anned Forces (MSC). MSC standards of achievement are nrclud€d in the w€ekly rraining schedulc. Edch soldicr musi nccl the standardsset for his agegroup.
fitnesstraining. Figure39. Physical
39
SectionVll. JUNIOROFFICERAND NCOTRAINING 57. lmpactot the PoliticalSystem in subordinates extendsup ihc har been placedby dr€ Soviel a. l,ack ol confidence Considcrable emphasis military press on officer and NCO leadetihip at thc chain of commandand is a by.product of thc Soviet company level. An analysisof many of these articlcs political system which stress€sful rcsponsibility and seemsto indicate that nmy jonior officers do not punishmentof thos€who male mistakes.Junior officers properly utilize drcir NCG, thlt is, th€y "assumeleader- arc often forc€dto acccptrerdy-madc solutions.Senior ship in everytldnglareeor smdl, oommandindividual commandcrs, fearing nistakes, oudine thcir soldiers,suggestready-made decisionsto the serSeanrsubordinates' assignmcnts in detailandleavelittle to the and attemptto do everythingthemselves." The NCO initiativ€ of thc junior. appers to be u!€d primadly as a trainer and sup€rvisor ,. Open pr€ssarticlesdescribedeficiencres in judor ralher than asa leadcr. lcadership and urge that posirive acrion be tak€n ro 56. TheNcO
e The responsibility of company gnde officers to train thorougl y their NCOSis sttcssed.Praponhchiki Upon arivd in his assigned unil, the NCO,normally (wrrant officers) aiso help,in this training and have 18-19ycan old, has rcceivedsix monthsof specialirt providedsomestability at the companylevel. appfently training. His leadcrshiptraining supposedlycommences with practicalwork in his assignedunit. In redity, how€vcr,platoon lcadersoften give detailedorden to 58. JuniorOfiice6 th€ squadmcmbersand usethe squadleaderto ensure To improvcjunior officertraining,two to four daysper th-atthe ordcrsrre carricdout. Theconscriptsergcant's monfi are ser asrdefor plaloon-a ofn".r "o.pany problemsarc compoundcdby the fact that he is oI the sameagc and educationas many of his squadmembers and. thoughhe hash?d si\ monttu training,is inexpe- thcmesfo' the$ scssjons. Ofticersarcalsoajlocatcddme rienced, cspecially in leadership fundamentals. for individudstudyeachwcek.
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SectionVlll. TACTICALTRAINING 59. G6n6ml
m. SquadTacticalTrainins
d. Company.level trainingbuildsup to battalionlcvcl andhigherej(ercises. Thatis,intensiv€ individual,squad, of thecompany and platoontraininSunderthc Suidance preced€s commandcr companylcvel exercises, whichare normaly under .he supcrvisionof the battalion com-
The squad normaly rrains as part of thc platoonsquadtlctics, Trainingcentersupoo individualweapons, Arc mounting and dismomting proc€dures,defensc agaiist CBR attack and lraining under specill condi-
,. Excrcises ar€dgidlycontroledby the next highcr 51. PlatoonTacticalTrainins echelon,and requirehigl y detailedand lcngthyprior Battledrillsarethe mainforrnof ractical rrainingfof the preparationfor successful complction.The lengthand platoonrnd company.Actionsof the soldicrs,squadand frcqucncy of companycxcrcisesvarieswidely, bul platoonandhow thcy fit into the overallconp ny plan usuallythcy do nol go for moretha oncday. are stressed.Phtoon lzcticai t.ahiry is .lso aimed at c Livefire is usedh sometacticalexefcises. Training tcachingthe platoon leaderto handlc v.rriousattached aids consisting of portable targets of thc pop-up rnd unils. Plaloonmountedanddisinounledfonnationsare ltationary type rcFesentingmen and cquipmenlIIr€ covercdbcfore the platoor conductsconlpanylevel utilized.Thesclids maybe usedin a varictyoloffensive conligurations anddefensivc to givcthc Sovietsmallunit leadcrtrai ing in rungeestimalion,tcmin apprecirtion, 62. companyTadicalTrainins targetanalysisandbattledrills.Sometrainingareasusc 4. Training at thc cotnpdnylevelcombincssquadand consoleswhich control movingtargets,someof which platoon trainingin fulf ling companyobjcctives aspart havctlrc ability to simulatcrctum fire. $e ul ballalion. Coordinaled hrc and mrneuvcr, in d Prcvalcnt tactical themes in the military press conjunction with attached armor, chemical, enginccr and concern thc the co.duct of a march, the mceting in companyballledrils. position.Delcnsc .artilleryunits,areinr€nsified engaSemenl, andrttackinga defensive For ,. training conducted underspecialcondilions, and retrogmdeoperationsreceivelessattention.CBR training md the overcomnrgof engine€robstaclesis includedin mosttacticaltrainingexerciscs.
4t
RIFLESOUAD CHAPTER6. THE IV]OTORIZED Sectionl. GENEBAL 53. Massion
,. The squad leader is anned with the AKN'Iassautt The rine squ d h dre infantrv\ basic taclical unil. I1 rifle: the lwo machinegunncrscdrry the PKM mrchine (lhe machine gunncr in the BTR and in thc crrlicr accomplishesits missi.rns by iire and movcmcnt .rs gun nrodel BMPrquippcd units ue armedwilh thc RPK lighr opposcdto fire 8nd nraneu!er.Thereare no firc rcanrsin gun); the anlilan] Eenldier is.nncd Nith botlr m.c[ne drc squad nrough ir normrll) fiBhts as part of rhe drc R?C-7 and the PM pislol, and the four itlerDcn have mororiTed rifle plaloon, tne squrd may be given indethe AK,\I assault dfle. Squad membersarc also armed pendentmissions.The squad: wiUr grenadesd. Conduclsreconnaissance and combal patrols. r. The approximalc baric load for each squad mempoirt, as ltrrlk or rear secLlnty during ! ,. Acts
( l ) S q u r dl e a d e r l 2 0 r o u n d s( A K N I ) (2) Two PKM mrchine sunneu 2,000 ri,unds. divided anrongsquadmenbers. (3) RPc-7 sunnef onc RtC.7 huncher, onc 64. Orqanization pistol with 16 rounds.and fou| RPG-7rcunds. d. Bolh tilc BltP-cquipped und BTR.equippedrifle (4) Four AKM rillcncn each with 120 rounds squadshale n $sault strength of ci-qhlmcn: r squad (AKM). plus some of fie nachine gun ammunition-One leader. two mrcNne gunncrs(onc nachine sunner and rineman mi-qhtcary four additional rounds of RPC-7 an extm AK[l rii]eman in the BTR-equippeddnd €lrli€r model BluP-equ'ppedsquads),onc antitanl grenadier. and four rinemen.Tlvo ofthe four rillcncn arc assislanl 65. Tactics machjne Sunners.and a thifd riilcman is an assislunt nere has been no fadical chimgein Soviersquadlactics R P G - 7g u n n e r ( F i s u r c , 1 0 ) . despile noticeableimprovcmentsin weaponr! and A?C .. Prolidessecufity for forccs at a halld. Acts rs thc compmy rcserve.
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Figure40. The BTR-equipped riflesquad.
43
a dcsign. Capabilitics of the squad have, howcver, mcnmaybc mountedon tanks(Figure43). In suchcascs improvedas a rcsultofthc introductionofthe BMP,the they dismount in thc last conccaledposition befor€ the issueof two PKM machinegunsper squad,ed the enemyFEBA. improved CBR protectivc gear.Whcreverpoltible, the sndfight fromi1svehjcle,dbmounling 56. Leadelship squad\ril assault orily whcn forced 10 do so. The dismountpoint js Thc Sovietsquadlc der,nonn,ily an l8 or 19 yearold dictatcd by the tcrrain and the enemyantitank defcnses conscript sergcant with sb( months of active duty andrnaybe up to 1000metersfrom theenemyposition. training,is rcsponsible lor the training,conduct,and When it must attack on foot, the squadoccupicsa contrololhis squad.H€hasno fire teamleadeGlo rssist frontageof 4060 mete6 with 6'8 meteB beaweenmen. him. His abiliry to leadis turtherhamper€d by the fact Soviet infanhymen are trained to exit from the BMP that whcn he is dismounted, he hasno radio contncl duringa short hslt or whiic movingat a rcducedsPecd \rith cither his APC or his platoonlcader-lle has no (Figure 4l). The BMP fires its main gun at lhc halt, or method to coordinateartillery support or the firc (far lessaccurately)on the movc.The mainmissionof thc supportfrom his own troop crrriet, althoughhe can BMPcrcw after the squaddismountsis to supportthe indicatetargctsfor thelatterby usingtracers. To control squadby fire, particularly .gainst enemytanksand other his squadin a disnountedassaultthe squadlcader armorcdvehiclcs.In most cases,thc BMPwil remrin normrlly placeshims€lfin thc centerand dightly,nead squad(Figure42). of thc assault 400-500metersbehindils dismountcd line.Hissssistant is thc APCgunncr. Should their APCSbecomeinoperative,Sovietinfantry
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Figure41. Exitingthe BMP.
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Figure42. B[IPs supportingsquadsby fire.
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Figure€. Tank born€infantryin the attack.
TO CONTACT Sectionll. ITIOVEMENT 67. General
squad to overcomc, it defendi and holds its position so
During the rnovemcntto contact,the motonzedriile 'a4er url]ls can maneuvcr. e Dudng the punuit, the squrd moves npidly to a marchsecurityor ieco raissquadmry bc assigned sece mission.Normally,however,it noves as part of maintain coniact. Ma\imum use is mrde of t]le APC, as rhe squadclbls muunredand rucs ftom lie caffier. the platoon in the platoon'scolurn fonnation. d The squad designatedas rear sccurity in thc march fo ows behind the unit it is protecting !t a distunce of primariiy .oughly 200 meters. a Vehicleand foot marchcsarcconduct€d
58. MarchSecutity
at dghl or dunngotherconditionsoflimited visibility. On a march,tlle squadmay be givena Poinl, flank, or rear upon the terain rnd condis€curitymission.D€pcnding tions of visibilty, the squadcrrrier is separatedfrom its 50 unit by up to 200 metersby day md approximately meteis at night or in forests. If disnounled, tlrc squad leadersendsout two-manpatrolsio thefront andflank to act as local sccurity along the line of movcment. of up to 100meters operateat a distance Theseelements by day and 30 mete$ at niahi or in forests. W}rcn dismounted during daylight hours, the squad lcader controlshismcn by arrnandhandsignals. ,. Thc squadattackssn I goups ofthe enemy,nd aakesprisoncn or attempts to desroy the enemy dnd continue the rnarch. If drc enemyis too strong lbr ihe
69. Re@nnai$ancePatrol a. A reconnaissmcepatrol js usualy composcdof a reinforccdsquador a platoon(Figure44). ,. A squad in this role is often reinforced wi r chemicrl and cngineertroops. If dismounted.the patrol leaderreceivesa ndio and possiblya radio operator. r- The squad is assigneda specific obj€ctivc aru/or route inst€ad of a zone and operatesaway fron ils parent unit al a distanc€ of rpproximately €ighr kilomel€rs duing the day and three kilom€lersat night. (Thesc distances aIe shortened wher the squad is dismounted)- The squad accomplishesits mission by means of observatjonand mrneuvcr, but may engag€ in limired combar ir necersary.r(ludrnts reconndissancc
45
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by fire. The patrolJeadergiveseachsquadmemberan ob!€rvation mission. Sp€cific individuals are rnade rcsponsiblefor front, flanl, redr and overhead obscrvation. patrolis alsofrequently The recoonaissance usedto captureprisonersfor intelligence exploitatior. d. Normaly the squadleaderpersonally reconnoitc$ lhe obiectivc. He employsthe squadto protcct himself or to ensurethc completionof the missionby combar. Rcconnaissance patroh normally maintain radio silencelf enemycontac! occuls,however,the squadleaderrhay brcakradiorilenceand reporrenemystrength, locauon, andactivity.
Figure44. Squadon a night reconnaissance mission.
Sectionll l. FORIVlATIONS 70. MountedFormations
colurnJ facililating movementand control. This formation is also uied in rcstrict€d lenain and during Mountedsquads movein variousplaroon formarions(see conditions of limitcdvisibility. Chapter7). a The skimish lne is th€ prescribed€ombat forma, don lt hasa frontageof 5060 met.6, with 6-8 mcters 71. Dismounted Fo.mations betwccnindividuals. The souadl€aderis in thecentcrof 4. Dismounled, the squads have only two the Line and has one of his PKM macline gunners on fotmations-- colunn and line. eithcr sidc,thus cnsuringtight control (Figurc45). b. Whendismounted.the squadnomaly movesin
l6s.l 50-60m
!!! (O P Pf A
Squadleader Machinesunnet RPG.Tgunnel Riflehan{AKM)
Figurerl5.Squadassauhline. 46
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\t SectionlV, OFFENSIVEACTION 72. General An attack may bc launchcd fron thc ma.ch or wh€n ir contact with thc cncmy. In thc lattcr case,thc squad moves as part of the plaioo to an initial posilion from which it launchesthe attack. The depth of ihe attack dependson ihc naturc of the defenses,and tlle terrain. A squadis assignedan attrck sector.
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during the attack; missions for t]rc squad machinc gunncrs!APC gumcr, grenrdier and aulomatic riflcmcn during the attack;conbat formation to bc uscd;tlre time of attack, signals, ,nd dcsignaiion of a second-in-
,. Due 1o his scanty training and short term ol scrvicc, thc Sovict squad Ieader does not function in batlle in thc as manv of his NATO T3 Troop L€adinsProcedores counterparts. ln practicc, it is tl€ platoon leader v,ho a Thc squad leader is taughl to issue r complete usually issu€sthe squad ordcn. lt is the squadleader's order. In his oider, the squrd leader includes enerny responsibility to execule these orders whcn thc plaaoon infornalion, to include locationsof penonnel,weapons, leadercmnot overseethe squddt dclions. and obstaclcs;the platoon ob.jectiveand dircction of further attack: thc squad direction of ailack rnd 74. Conductof the Auack mission:missionsof adjaccntsquads;ihe number of tlie ,. When rttacking from a posilion of closecontact, tank (it tanks are attachcd to th€ platoon) which win rhe squad waits h ttr€ assault trench until its assigned attack in front of thc squad; locations of passages tmk crosses the lrench, then folows it in the attack a6). through enemy obstacles,and the procedures10 bc uscd (Fisurc for negotiatingthemi proceduresfor tucs prior to and
Figure46. Attackingfrom a positionin closecontact-
47
,. When attackingmounted from the march,thc r€peatsthe objectiveof the assault,rcdistribut€sammusquadassumcs its positionwithin one of the platoon nition, and marks (by use of tracen) targersto bc formationsG€e Chapter7). Movernentof thc squ,rd altackedby APCandartilery firc. from thc departureposition to the assaultpositionis normally conduct€dunder cover of artilery f]Jc. If 75. Conductof ihe Assautr forced to dismount, the squrd does so in dcfilade or On the platoonleader\signal,thesquadleadcrgiv€sthe whil€ on the movc under cover of smokc,al a distance command."PRIjPAREFOR THE ASSAULT."Squad of 500.1000metersfrom the encmypositions.Phasc membeFchecktheir wcapons,fix bayonctsand fcady Iinesarc usedto aid the platoonleaderin controland their h"nd gr€nades. Then the squadleadergivcsthe fire supporrcoordination. commarrd"lnto the assadtFORWARDI"The squad, c. On foot, the squadfires on tlle move.On opcn firingon tie move,attempt!to advance rapidly gound andwhilc underenemyfirc, the squadmovcsby a NeSotiathga Minefield.Thc methodchosenby boundsh goups of two-thee men undercoveringfirc. the Soviet squd to crossa minc field depcndsupon rhe Although covq is used, speedin thc rttack is stresscd. naturc of the cnemy\ defensg,tlre rerrain snd weathcr, The squadleadercontroh rhe {ircsof his macfuneeunt and tank support.thc squadmay attackmount€dor 2.nd antitank genadier. By concentrating the fires of dismounted,dlthoughwhen attackingpositionswith thesc wcaponsand by the use of traccn, the squad antitanl defcnses, it will usually0ttackdismounted. Figleader indicatesto his supportingA?C and platoon ure47 illustrates fourmcthodsofdismountcd atrackwith leaderparticularstrongpoirts which ,re hinderinghis thc squadcarriersuppoflingthe attackby tue. Examplc (FOt allachedto oncshos thc squlda acUng advancc.Artilery forwad observers lhrouehr narrowopening the platoonand/orcompanymay thencal in supporting in thc mine neld without tank support. When attacking fircs on thesetarSets.lf the squadcomcsunder enemy with a tank,espccially in dccpsnow,thc squadasa rule ,rtillery or mortar fue, it advancesrapidly out of the attack behindthetank in a column oftwos followingin the tank'stracks(example2). In thc thhd €xrmpletwo d Use of SupportingFifcs. The squadadvanccs rifl€ squadsnttaokin a columnof twos bchinda tank. underthe covcrof suppoiingartillcryJnd mortarfirc. When the breach in the min€ field is suflicientlv widc, Soviet tactical doctrine emphasizcsspeedin the attack the squad attack on line behinda taok utilizineits ful and statcsthat casualtiessuffcrcd from fuendly adllcry tue power to thc front (example4). Shodd the cneny are or y a fraction of tlrc casualtiesincurrcd by antitnnl defenscsbe strong, fte infantry mav pr€cede infantrymon who jag b€hind in the attack. Thc driver the tank, whichwirh th€ A?Cs,wouldsupportby fire. moveshis vehicleby boundsfrom onecoveredposition b. Assaultof tle Objective. Whenthesquadis within to another,attemptingto mdntain a stcadygun plal- 20-30metersof thc enemyposition,it movesinto the fom for the gumer.Th€ gunnersupportstheattacking final assaultandattemptsto destroy encmyin the close squad by fire and att€mpts to kccp the squadleadcr in conbat. Upon discoveringa weak point in the encmy pocition, lh€ squadprcssesforward. e, Mutual Support. During t}le cou6e of thc attack, c Consolidation. ff the assaultis repulsedby the the squadlcadcrwatchesthe proSres!of adiacentsquads enemy, squad the consolidates nnd digsin. The squad and takcs advantageof their progrcss,nd fue to move leader,reor$nizcs his squad,attemptsto neutralize his own squad forward. If the adjacentsquadsare held enemyfire and, in cooperationwith adjacentunits, up, he helpsth€mwitl hissquad'sfire. i Thc assaultposition. The squadoccupiesan assault position closc to the en€my. The squad lcader then
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't 76. Battlefor Ra!€rvePositionrof rhe Deteffe a. Majntainingthe Momentum.Whenth€ enemy's forwardpositionshavebccnoverrun,the battlc for the rescrvepositionsbegins.The squadattemptsto exploit existingfo.tifications,nd lo hil the enemyfrom the flanks and rcar- Ernphasisis placcd on naintaining the momentumof the attack. ,. RepellinSEnemy Counterattacks. During rhjr phaseof thc battle, the squad is alert for en€my countcrattacks. It engages a counleradackby tue andby assaultas pa( of thc platoon.when adjacentunitsare counterattacked, the squadassisls wili lire, bul docsnot dackenils advance. Soviettacticrldoctrinestresscs that thc best defcNe against a slowdown in racrical monlenlumis 3n advance in anysector. 77. Pu6uit Thc squad'sAPCis caledforwardby th€ platoonleader. Thc squadrenrounlsxnd puNucslhe enenry.byplssing individualstrong points- Thescwil be attackcdby s€cond echebn (reserve)forces designatedfor this purpose.Retrealingcnemy forccsarc engaged by tie
squadwould alsobc given! radioandposibly a ndio operator.Raids arc lupporl€d by artillery firc. TIc .ssault €lement altack the obiective dir€cdy and capturesprisoners.The sec|.lalyelcmentprovidesfire supportfor the assault €lcment. (4) Due to thc cornplexity of a raid and the degrec of leadershipcaled for, the patrol leader probabfy i5 a career NCO, prapotxhchik, ot tunior officef. He is normaly in the assaultelement of the paror_ (5) A juniur commander. whensilen tJlemi\sron to conducta raid, organizes continuolsobservation of rhe objective aJer, makesan cstimatc of the situation andissueshis order,which includesthc followhg: (a) Enemydeploy,nent. (b) MissioD andnethod of cxecution. (c) Compositionand tasksof patrolelements. (d) Reference points. (e) Proccdures for the movcandactionsduring the attack. (l) Withdrawal procedurcsand actions to be followed h caseof an unexpectedencounterwith thc
(g) Pfocedures for requesting artilery and mortarfre. 78. R.id andAlnbu3h (h.) Procedurefor cdualty evacuation. (i) Patrolleadeisposi.ionwithin the patrol. Other forms of offensivccombat conductedby the squdd,eitler reirforcedor as part of the platoon,arc C) Signalsfor control. (k) Second-in{ommand. raidsandambushes. (6) Upon completionof the mission,the assault a. the Raid (l) A laid is usuallycarriedout on foot and elcment withdraws filst, followed by the security consistsof a concealcd approachto an objectiveand a clemenl(s)and finrlly the obstaclc-clearing clement. sudden attack to captureprisoners,documents,or Shouldthe 3ctiviticsof the assaultgroupbe djscovered, possiblcthe raid is conductedat jt withdrawsundcr€overof the securitygroupandcalls equipmcnt.Whenever night or underothcr conditio oflimted visibility. for artillery and mortar fire iI needed. (2) Prcparations for the raid and ambush aJe ,. TheAmbushconductedin d€tajlandsecrecy. (l) Soviet writings define rn ambushas fte Sortiesby smrllgoups miy be madeto gatherroute andobstaclcinforrnation, carefullyconccaled disposinonoI a unit ar a previously while reheaBrlssre held in rcar arcasposjlionfor rhepurposeof makin8a surprhc desiSnared (3) the raid elcrnenth usui ly organized into an attack on the €nemy in ord€r 10 captureprisoners, goup rnd a security documents, weapons, and military equipment. obstaclcclearinSgroup,an assault gloup-Thc obslacleclearinggor.lpconsistsof attached Ambushesare set up along the enemy'sprobable sappers(combatengine€6)who clearandmark a path movement routes, along corununication and rcsupply throughobstacles andremainat thegapto act as guides,lines,trafficcontrolpoints,etc. The security group may consist of additional nflem€n (2) A squadgivenan ambushmissionmay consist attach€dto the squadfor the mission.A rcinforced of assoult, secuity, and observation clements andmight
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\\'i md cquipment. proceduresshould the palrol be discoveled,and be reinforcedwith additionalpersonnel to bc cstablished. (3) Upon ardvingat the ambushlocations,the obslacles (4) Usingpfe-a(ang€d signals, observenwarnthe patrol leadcrorganucsobserlationand a ocatestasks, patrol leadcrof the cnemyl approach.The enemyis allowedto enter the cenler of thc patrcls'scctor,at (a) Reference points Upon complelion which time th€ ,mbushcomnrcnces. (b) Enemyinformation area (c) Posittunsof the patrol nembersand th€il of the mission,the patrolreturnsto its deployment or conducrs othernrissions. (s) the ambushparrolleaderwouldprobablybe (d) Procedures fof opcring fire, taking prisoners, opcrational n NCO.pmpotthcllik, ot junior officer. scizingdocumcnts andequipment,
SectionV. DEFENSIVEACTION 79. General
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it
pits for ammunition,anda latrinc(Figure48)recessed Thesquadgoeson thc defensive rs pan ofthe platoonin lf rhe squadis nor h conracrwilh the encnry.cnSineel ordcr to repulscan rttack, inflict loss€s, hold andcreate equipment such as the MDK.2 dirch digger from favorableconditionsfor resuming dreattrck.Defense at regjment(Figufe 49) may be usedto dig the squad lhc squad lcvcl stressesanti-CBR and antitank fo. the APCcouldbe prcparedby usc Theemplacemenl or othcr engineer cquipnent.If a ditching of explosives the machincis not rvailable, squadutilizesL\es, shovcls, 80- TroopLeadinsProcedures tools10prcparetic position. Althoughthe squadleaderm y issuedetailedinstruc. crowbrn,andentrenching positionsandan emplacedd firing tions to his squadafter reccivingrhe plaioonleader's lndividudlfoxloles for A?C are dug first- A squad trench ihe ordcr, usurly the platoonlcaderissues thc orderto aI ment positions the individual is t]€n constructed. personnel.Tlle squad lcader supe iscs to ensurc connecthg reinforce Revetmcnts are used to tbe tench systemif witn thc order. An obscfteris postcdto cornpliance positionis The squad the soil is unstabl€. defensive prevcntsurpriseithc platoon,squadand rdjacentunit pdnciples outlined in ro the missionsare cxplainedlcontact is establishedwith esrabtishedrccording s€ctoris Chapter2. adjac€nrsquadrith€ lenain in the assigned ,. AI or part of tlle rifle squadmayrct asa pirtoon studiedand cachman assigned a mission:fieldr of iitc the and are clcired: prim.ry and alternntefiring positions,slil securityclementto delayanddisorgaDize enemy the security approach. Normaly trenchcsand connectingtrenchcsare dug. Reference to give warning of bis day and 200 points,the areaof obscrvation, the principalsectorof elemcntis locarcdabout 600 mctersby position. platoon The from t]rc firc and secondary s€ctorswhich overlflpthe fieldsof metersby night away le dcr/securitycoDnandcr places a senlinei squad aredesignated. fire ofadjacentsquads, forwrd of the securitypositionat a djrtanceof 100 meten by day and 50 mciers at night. Whcnthe enemy 81. TheSquadDef.nsivePontion firing and atlempt to approachcs, the mcn commcn€e a. Thc motorizedrifle squ,d dcfendsaspaft of dre delay the eneny advancewithout prolongedcombai. phloon and occupiesa frontageof 50'60 merers(in The securityelementwilhdrawson orderoflhc outpost nuclearconditionsup to 150m€te$).Thcsquadengages commmdcror according plan. to a preananged th€ enemyforwardof, andon ftc llmks of, thc ptatoon on key tcrrainto block c. Positionsare estrblished position.The positionhaswcaponspils for the machine likely encnrylvcnuesof approlch while givingthe squad gun crews and the antitank grenadier,covercddit m -\imumcovcrandconcealent. tuenches which hold up to four people.nvo to threc
i
KEY 1. cove@dtningposition.
rninsposilio.. 3. Machinesun posnion. 4. Ahernare machinesu.
riins posirion. 7. M6chineo0n posirion 8. Ahehai. machinesunnrino
9. F i.s po.irionlot squd APC. 10.Ldine12. Ahemate nrino position for 3quad APc.
Figure€. The squaddelensivepositionpreparedwith engineersuppon. d Pioper dispersionin thc defcnseallowsfor protection from weaponsof massdestruction. In a nucl€ar environrnent the squad frontag€ is increascd to 150
Figure4g.The MDK-2 ditching machine.
e. All-round defense is assued by prcparation of positionr. primary,alternate, andsupplemcntary t Antitank defens€is providcd by the BMP with its 73mm gun and Saggernissjles and by tle squad grenadier.A squadt AIC may be in the rniddle of the position,on aflank,or up to 50 metcrsbchind defensivc the position.Shouldthe squadb€ situatcdalorga good armor avenue of approac:h,drc squad could receive additionalsupportfrom the battahontanlitankplatoon. The platoon lcader would position and control any ttachedantitank wcapons. & Coordinated fires ar€ planncd by inte ocking squad fucs wilh thc fires of adjacent units arrd by coveringall gapsin the squad'ssector of fiie with concentratcdfrontal, flanlong, and oblique fires. Squad fires are also supplcmentedby artillery and mortar concentations, which cover dead space and likely A squadis tssigned both a enemyavenues of approach. sectorof fire and a linal protcctiveline, Squadleaders preparea firing card which containsthe following data: (l) TIc squadpositionandits assigned sectorof fire. (2) Referercepoints and the distancesto thcm.
1
a
(3) l,ocarion of each squad weapon (includins secton of fir€ oeft or deht boundaryindicated)in ftont of the squad. tho6eon the APC)andits sectorof tue. (s) the platoon and squad sectors of concen' (4) The positions of adjac€nt squadsand then trated fiie (Figue 5O).
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KEY 1. Feferencepoint 1 ocks. 2. Ref@ncepoint2-bush6. 3. Squadnr€ concenrranon 1. 4, Befeencepoinr3 bddge. 5. Sq@d nre concenrrarion 2. 6. Fstersnc.point4looll. 7. Refe€n@poinrSlddmound. & RefeEne pointGsump. 9. neieE nce point 7-hjll. 10, Reierencepoint&pond: I 1. The prihary dn6ction ol fre trom one of schnanking squads m6chi.equnsare
Figure50. Thesquad{ireplan.
82. Conductof the D.l.ns!
squad wil distribute its strcngth to combat thc new a The lirst en€myelementto probe squaddefenses threat whil€ continuhg to cover its odginal scctor of may be reconnaissance. The plaloon lcaderis author?id fue. Should €nemy tanks overrun thc squadposition, patrolsand,ifordered, squsd m€mbersattempt to destroy them from the rcar to fuc on enemyreconnaissance tlrc men fire fron then altemate positions so as to with antitank genades. deceivethe encmy. D. DefensivefFes increas€in intcnsity as the enemy 83. lvhhdrawal approachesthe FEBA. Shouldthe €nemyas$ult include The squad may wilhdraw on ordcn from the platoon tank, antitarl< weaponsengagcthem, whil€ the other Ieader.The withdrawalbcginswith tle riflcm€nwho squrd membersconcenfare on the acconpanying movc undercoverof the squad'smachinegunsand of infantry. An effort is made to separatcenemy tanks the APC. They Mthdraw individualy or in goups, frorn thcir infantry suppon. dcpendingupon the terrainand thc enemysituation. a Thoughtllc squadmemben attempt to destroy Simultaneouswi$drawal of thc entire squadnormally enomy p€nefations irto th€ gapsbetw€cnsquds, they takesplaccundercoverof firc froln supportingunitsor nrelntain their positions and conc€ntrt€ on their undcrconditionsof limitcdiisibility. assignedscctor of fte, If attacked from a flanL, the
I
54
a
I j
CHAPTER7. THE MOTORIZEDRIFLE PLATOON Sectionl. INTRODUCTION 84. Mi$ions The motodzed rifle platoon accomplishesits primarv missions a3 part of the company by meansof fir€' naneuver and closecombat.lt nay bo gtuena varietv of
45. Organization a. Both the BTR and BMP equippedmotorized rifle platoonscontain one officer ard 30 erristedmen (Figure
andcombatPatrols. a. Recomaissance ,. Advanceparty, point, mobile, or statiotury flank security,or rearSuardin a marchsecuntyrnissiona Secudtyelernentduringhatts d. Battalionreserve.
sr).
,. ln addition to the squadal'nanent discr^sedin chaptcr 7, eachplatoon slsohason€ 7 62nm sniperdfle (Drasunov).
RIFLE MOTORIZED
EOUIPMENT
7.62mmsniperdfie,svD 7-62mmGPmachinesln,PKM Anniank s@mdelauncher,RPG'7 ArmoredpeEonnel€nier. BMP A
3
a 1 r 3 / F2 3 F 126
1. Figurcstn parenthesesreprAe equipp€dmoiorizedrifleplatoon.
6 18 l 6i0) 3 3 (0)
rhe diffecnces tn numbersol weaponsand equipmenrtound in rhe BTR
2. In lieuol rhe BMP,the B tB.equippedMR plaloonhasthreeollhe BTF 50/60or 152seies oiAPC'S3. In |te! ol the P(M, the BTR equippedMR platoonhas3 RPKlighl machineguns
ipped). Figure 51. The motori?edrifleplatoon{BlMP_equ
fq
46. Tactics
87. Leadership
d. The phloon usually aftacks on tnr€ as pari ot.the c o m o r J o r J f r o r r r r g eo r p r o t 0 0 n c r c r . . t - n c m ) defenscs and Drajn pennitring, ihe platoon attacks mounted in its APCS. Such employDrerlloceurs norl o f i c n d u r i n gl h e n o b j l e p h a s eos f o p e r a o n s s u c h a s t h e meetingengagementjexploirarjon oI a nuclcarstrrKc,or drdng lhe pursuit- Againsta strcng defense,the ltatoon rtlacks dismounted and. upon penctrating rl,e enejn) pontrons, remounts its APCS 10 cxptoj! the brcak through drd conducrpursuit operations_ b. In the defcnse.rhc ptaroon teadern ornra1l) ptaces aI tnree squadson ljne. tn boih lhe offcns€and defense, thc platoon leadcrreceivcsattactmeits (Figure 52).
The plaroon lcader. usualt) 2t or 22 ),cars old. n res!onsibtefor thc trrining, conrrol, a d disciptineofhis platoon. He has no heldquarrcrspersonnelro assisrhinr and carricshis own radrc whcr disnrou ted. Tnc senror squad lcader js normally designatcd ihe scco,d_ln. .ommand. The pldtd)n lcadcr €xercisescontrol bl radto and visual signlls. tlc ako uscs individLraldflcmen as nessengcrs.His control ovc. his assignedand attachcd unirs is llmired by his commuricarions, parricuhrly during the disnounted rliack when his sqLladlciders l a c kr a d i o s .
I
Figure52. The motorizedrifteplatoonattackingbehindtanks.
S e c t i o nl l . M O V E M E N TT O C O N T A C T 88. ceneral
89. Advance, Flank, and Hear t\4archSecrrity Detach-
During thc movemenrro conract,the irororized riflc p l a t o o lr o r n J l ) r r o \ e .a . o - r r u f r h c , , , 1 r p a nL) d. c .or. rilcJ rine pt" Lon ma\ be -..rgr r r. d e mrrch column. The plaloon may be assiErcdmarch J c v r l . e . t a J r k or rear SLrrJ w | ,h, .5.ur 01 securrlymissions or givcna reconnaissancc mjssior. preventiDgpererntion by ground .econnaissdncc and/or
56
{t\r
t prot€cting th€ column agaiist a sudden enemy auack. Plaloons glven such a mission tnay be reinforced with antilank wcapons, Inor1als, cngincc$ and chcnicat troops, dependinBupor ihe missior and the enenry situltion. A platoon assigncdas lhc rdvancc gurrd ol a column movins on a nuh ans of advancewould be given nue support then on a secondafyaxis ofadvance. ,. Advdce and rear nrarch security elenrentsleador follow the force which they are protecting at a djstance of up to one and one half kilometers.The flank march security elenrent tu)ves on a lire with the head of rhe column at a distanceofup to one kjlomerer to lhe flank. During coDditions of limited visibiiity, these disraDces aJe reduced. All types of march secuity elementsa.e d r , p a r c h ebd) . h ec o l p " n ) g j \ e nd s . c u r i r ) r n i ) ) i o n . c. The reinforced platoon execuling a security mission artempts to dcslroy snra enelny unils by firc and ag8resive auack. Should this not be possible, ihe platoon occupiesa falorable posjtion and resistsstubbornly in m effort to give the protectedcolunm tine to
at
deploy and enier ihe brtlle u dcr nrole favorable
Patrol 90. SeparateBeconnaissance d. The motorized rifle platoon may bc uscd to conduct a reconmissancepatrol up to five kilometers ahcad of the puent unit if dismounted or up to 15 kilometers if mounlcd. These distancesarc dccrcascd during conditions of rcduced visibillly. The ptdloc,n accomplishesits missionsby means of observdllonand maneuver,but may engagein linrjted conbal il neccs-
sary. ,. Thc plaloon may be re brccd wiih a vadety of suppor! to rnclude antitmk wcapo s, moftars or arllLlcry, and chemicdl md cnsincerpeAonnel. Reinforcnrs weapons usurlly move a5 part of rhe platoont rnajn body with t}rc platoon ieader.Conmandersof attached units also move with the plaloon leader.The melhod of o p e r a r i o li ' $ " d m e 1 \ L h f l o f d r P. q u J d e - o n n d . ' \ 1 n L e patrol-
S e c t i o nl l l . FORMATIONS 91. Mounted Formations
d. Thc invefted wcdge lormation prolidcs thc samc advantage as tbe wedge ard is often adopled with the d. Motorized rifle plaloon formationsusedduring the intention of execuling ! dorlble envelopnent of the approach narch and cornbat arc thc colum , wedge, objecrive. inverled wcdgc, cchclon (right or lcfl), dnd tllc linc. fte e. Echelon fornrations (right or lefo provide platoon l€aderllaces himself whcre he crn bcst control mL\imum tuepowcr 1() tne dght oefO lront and ar€ his squadsmd effects chngcs in lbrmation by lisudl oflen uscd on t}tc cxposcd llank ol r ldrgcr ibrmation. signJls.His choicc of iblmation dcpendsupon condiThey arc dilficult to control wilhoul good visual tions of visibility, the rerain and thc €nemy situalion. securityand control (Figure s3). /. ftc lnrc ibnnrtion provldcs mrrijmun] firepowcr ,. Ille platoon column formatbn is used during lhe secudty to fie front, but is diificult lor the platoon and m a l h , i n c o n d , i u r . u l r i f l | | c dr . \ i b i l i r ! s. h " r p J . i n g leaderto control unlesshe has good visual contact-It is $rough confining terain, ,nd during dre pursuil. usedin crossjngopen ground and in the assauli. Alihough it providcs only minimun fircpower and securily io the front, the colunn folmation allows tbr 92. DismouhtedFormations rapid movement, naximum control rnd pcrnirs rapid d. Dismounted fomations are similar to mounted deploymcnt to other fornatlons. lbrmations. The linc forrnation is uscdh ihc assaulland c. The plutoon wcdge is used lrior to contact or during the battle for the enemy\ rescffc positionswhen dre file for negotiatingminefields and for rapid crossthc plaroon leader wrnts to maintain maximum control county movement. ,. Disnounted plaroon attack is likely to occur whelr while dcployed. Ir providescxcclent tirepower to thc the enemy position is contiruous and unbroken. with front and to eachflank.
57
emplacedengineerobstaclcs weil covercdby are. Dismountcdattackis lcsslikely in a CBRenvjronmenr (Fisufe54). e In thc dismountedassautt.sqnadsoccupyfronf agesof about 50 mererswith six-eighrnercrs berwecn squadmembers,and 20 met€rsbetwcensquads.Thc piatoon attack frontagc is roushty 200 lnercrs.m a conventiondenvironmcntinrcrvalsbclwe€nindividual soldiefsin extendedLincarercducedto four-sa x,ctoa in ordcr to increasethe d€nsiryof fire. In dismounrcd assaults,t}Ie platoon A?Cs fo ow tieir squadsat a drslanccof from 400 ro 500 rnete6,depending on rhe terrain,and supportthenrwirh fire. A?Csarc nornuly spaccdup io 100metcrsaparr. d. The piatoonno.rndlyatrackson line(mounreoor dismounted). Squadtuc andrndeuvcris rafc.Normaly the platoonicaderis posjrionedro ihe rearofhis center squad.
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I 0 0 Figure53. Motorizedrifleplatoonformations(mounted).
58
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0=-,0o-_--*0--loom (ATTACHEDTANKSI F€ 5+60m +l
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t:
lr CRDsot6\
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{INVERTEDWEDGEI
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+
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. ISTSOUAD' SOUADIN THEASSAULT
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50 60 METEBS
o o
SOUAD LEAOER
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KEY Nol6 1. tnmounted 8nddasmoo.ted fomations, rhssquad.ndplatoon l6deB wouldposirion themselvB inrhebesttootioft ro 2 APC'Susuallyfollowthensquadsandsupponrhembyire ar s distlnceof betw€en300-500met66-
.cpc
Ll
Figure54. lvlotorizedrifleplatoonformations(dismountedl.
59
SectionlV. OFFENSIVEACTION 93. General
(l) Missionsot &e company,platoonalrd
A motDrizcdriflc plaloon i! ihc attack h normilly (2) Ref€rcDc€ poinls on rvhichthe plrtoon will assigncd an immcdiateand a secondaryobjeclive.The guide ns fo rrd movement. imnediate objective might be the penonnel and (3) Thc missiorsofclch squrdin the platoonand locited in the e emy'sfffwud dcfenlcs. weapons how theyareto be accomplished(4) Tasks to be pcrformcd by lttached and 94. TroopLeadingProcedures supportingwcapons,rnethodand types of hre, and a Troop lcadingprocedurcs arc considerably abbre- sequence of displaccment forwad. viatedwhen altackingf.om the maJch.Whcnattacking (5) Attackformations. an organized dcfensc,howcver,Sovietdoctdnespccilie! (6) Prucedurcs ro be tolluwedn o\crronung that thepreparations be thoroughanddetaned. ,. From the company commander'sorder, thc (7) hcation of thc arsaultlinc md the besl platoonleadcrnotesthefollowingi approach€s to it. (l) The objcctivesand dircctionof the platoons (8) Int€rmediate firingpositions. (9) Method of coordinationwitl armor in the (2) Attachmentslo the platoon dnd supporting tiresavailabie. (10) Locanonsof arlilleryard mortartargets. (3) Theencmysituation. ( I I ) Stepsto be takento rcpelcounlerattocls. (a) fte company\ mission,targcls,and objec(12) Signalsto be uscdin rcquesting, shiflinSor liftingsupporting luesandibr liaisonandreporting. (5) Misionsof adjacertunits(13) Supplyandevacuation routcs. (6) Iandmnks (code-names for localteaturet. (14) Hislocrtionin the attack. (7) Command andcontrolinstructions. (15) Designation oIa second-in-corumand. (8) Timcof the attack. ,. Afrer the pla(ounle3,lertordcrhar beengi!en. (9) Locationof thc compnnycommandcrund his the squadleaders prcparethcir nen. deputies. c. fime pcrmironB.a phlsiLal re'ronnJisqnces 96. Conductof th€ Attack conductedio tlEt the platoon leadcrand his squad a. whcn the attacksignulis giver,thc platoo!leavcs lcadedmaystudythe enemypositionsh detail. depa(ule posilion usingavailablecovcr and conceatils d The platoonleaderthen check thc statusofhis When no hidden approachexists,the platoon mcnt. equipmenrand that of his attachnentsand studicsdre into [n€ formationand movesto lhe firing deploys lire supportplanprovidedby the companycommander. position, trom whichit opentnre. He arrangesfor coordinationwithin the platoon and ,. When advarcnrgon an ob.jective250 to 300 wilh with adjacentplatoons.The companycommander meters away, the squadscovcr the firs. 150 to 200 capabiiityprobablycoordi his greatefcommunications walk.The dflcmencoverthe remaining meters at a fast weapons. natcsthe firesofattach€dandsuPporting rneters on the double. 100 a Tfuoughoutthe attrck, the platoonleadcrstudies platoon c. leadercloselycontrolsthc atlachThc the tcrrain 10 find rpproachesto the enemy firing go fotwrrd with thc rine eneine€rs positions,to implementobservalion andcamoulla8e, io ments. Combat of pick the most suitableposilionsfor weapons,and to squads,and conrmanders attachedelcmentsarewith thc platoonlcaderfor coordination. sclectthc bestattackroules, d. Up to thc assaultline, thc platoonmay usefire under tne and movement.witl lwo squadsadvancing 95. orders howevcr,is on speed. coverof the third. The emphasis, a. Thc platoonleadcr'soral ordefmight includethc c. Bclore rerchinS tie assaultlinc, thc platoon following: missions leadcr,on thc lastfiringposition,mayassign to
60
fiDi
the squadsandindicatctheirihrectionofmovementand 98. Battle for B6ervo PoliiionsoI rhe Oelenseano thel targetsafter the forcmostenemyfiring points have beentakcn.Ammunitionmayalsobe redirtdbuted. a. Action for enemyrcserveposition!develops into t Usingtracermmunition and flares,the plaloon an unevenadvance of unitsconducteddirectlyfrom t}le command€r signatsto thetanksandsupporting weapons assaultand without any consolidation on the objcctivefor the dcstruction of enemy weapons.He maintains FiIe and maneuver is strcssed, with particularcrnphni! with the companycotnmander on envclopment.Wlrcn th€ enemy\ antita* means radio communications andgivessituationfeportsto himhavebeenneutralized, the platoo! leadercals foMard his APCSin ord€rto regaintlle necessary mobility.Units puFue a witldrawing cnemy without awaiting orden. a. Squad teclniques for the aslault, participation Complete consolidation on thc objective is normaly with tanks,thc utilizationof artilcry, and the exploita- madeonly at night,whenthc platoonhasbcenaisigned a missionof scizingan isolatcdpoint or whcnthe assault tion ofwcak pointsapplylo thc platoon. ,. As soonasthe artillcryshiftsits fires,thc platoon has been stoppedby thc enemy. Othcrwise,only r movesro the objecrive.within 25 to 30 mcten of the momcntary regroupinglnd realigning is accomplished objective, the soldiers throw hand genades .nd, duing the attack. ,. During this phase,the platoonleaderis alertfor shouting"OOH-RAH!1."assaultthc positions .. After taking thc loremost strong points, the counterattacks.The phloon attcmpts to dcstroy a forceandcontinuethc pursuit.Should platoon continuesthe attack and assaultssucceedingcounte.attacking strongpoints.I}te assaultis supportedby mortarand this not be fcasible,the platoondefendsand providcs arti ery fires which areshifted so asto precedeat.acking the companywith a baic of fire for mancuveragainstthe forcc. riflemcnby countenttacking tanls by 100 to 200 metcrsandassaulting 200 to 400 metels.The momenrumof the attackis ofsrubbornpoints 99. RaidsandAmbushes mainraincd by leavingthe destruction of resistance to lbllowingunits. Thc squad techniquesfor thc raid ,nd and thc ambush d lf thc eneny succccdsitr haltinS the assault,the apply to the Platoon. platoonsurvivorsdefendon the mostforwardposition thc newlineofassault. they havereachcd.Thisbecomes lhe firesaledelivercd andprepatalory Airerregroupin8 97. Condustof the A33ault
V. DEFENSIVE AcTloN Section 100. General d. The motorizedrifle platoondelendsaspart of the comprny and usualy occupiesa strong point with a frontageol about 150 m€ters(up to 300 metcrsin nu€learconditions)with all threesquadson line. The plaloon\ strongpoint hascquadrrcnchcs.finng posi. carncrs tions(mainandalternate)for annoredpersonnel post, andattached weapons, a command andobscrvation a dug'outand a communicalion trenchto the rear(Figure 55).
,. The platoonmay def€ndan arcaon the mainline of rcsislenceor to the rear of it within the compMy is to defensive arca.Theplatoon'smnsionin the defcnse prevent tank from breaking through into the reservc positionsof the defendedareaand to destroyenemy infantrymcn before thcy reach the main Iine of resis. tcnce. Infantry which achievesa breakthroughis destroycdby fre and counterattack.The platoon wrthdmw) commandcr. on orderof thecornpanJ
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Y Figule55. The platoondefensiveposition.
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101. Troop LeadingProcsdur€,
102. ThePlatoonDetonsivo Position
d. The platoon defensivepositionencompasses the 4. Aftcr rcceiving the company comnedcr's order. asthesquadpositions. the platoonlcaderbeginswork oo his assienedarca. lfh€ samcfeatufes ,. The plaloo may bc dctailedby the battalion i! going into the defensc when in contct with the encrnyj the platoon lcrdcr organizesrudimenlary posi. commrnder10l]ct in aI| outpostsecurityrole.In sucha with mritank tnxs. He assignssquad tasksand orguniz€slhe fire plsn; roie, the platoon would bc augnrented hc dcvelops a plan 1br rcpeiljng enemy attacks and gJns or rank'. ri'rtrrs. rird chcmicaldnd engrneel mcthods ofprotecdon againslCBR weapons.Should thc elenrentsand would have the nrissionof preventirg mosl suitable line of dcfcnse be localed tblwafd ol surpriseattackson lhc FEBA ind of thrvartingenenly occupicd positioos, the plstoon may arternpt a rapid reconnaissance. In outpost support, the platoon is seizurcof this lire wilh lhc permissionol the comp ny assigned posilion up ro lwo kilometersin fronl ofthc a D. lf he is nor in closecontlct with the enemy, dr platoon leader cals his squad leldcrs and AIC ddvcrs and discussest]Ic platoon strong point with then. Thc rcnuining personnclrcmain in conccalcdpositions.Aflcr missionshale been assign€d,the squadleaden bring thc rcst of their men forwafd. c The phloon l€ader studics the enemyt strcnglh and activity and the terrain. His lerrain m,lysir includes the grcund in the vicinily of his dcfendedarer. His firc phn i" derr ed and includesl rncthod ol colering gaps in coordination wiLh adjacentunits and also the signals for conlro ing fire. A The platoon leadcfs order to his squadl€adersand atlachmentsincludesthc following: (1) The squadl primrry ud sccondary aress Gecto6) of fire; prinlry and secondarylocalions aDd arcas of fire for the APCsi phloon areasfor conccn. trated fires: designationof w€lpons to cover the gaps with adjacent unils: procedures lor occupying dre posilionsand the schcdulcior complctingengireerwork and camouflasemersurcs. (2) Misstuns ibr alrachcd uniis, to include primary and altcrnate locations and rreas of fire fof tanks and anti-tank guns. (3) Procedurcs for dcstroying eneny t{nks and inianlry in front of the foNard dcfensesisienalsfor CBR contaminrtion and cnenry air attack and proce. durcsfor repeling them. (a) Sequencc of rest for personnel, thc alert signal,and the method ofobtajning rations. (5) A skcich map of the platoon strong poinl is submittedto the companycommander.
lf
FEBAand occupies a frontagcof about50OmeteB.Thc platoonoccupiesa strcngpoinl locatedwithin muiull firc-supportrange ol the strcng poinls of adjacent plaloons, protectcdby obstacles, and supportcdby morlar and arlillery fire from rhc variouszores of defe sc. lhe outpost lbrcc attenrptsto desrroyor caplure the enemy- Upon the appfoachof sizcablc groupsof the enemy,outpostpe.sonnel inflict darnage and try to force Lhcmlo deploy-The plaloonlcader detcrminesthe encmy strengthand dncction(s)of attack and reports thc sittlalion to the batl lion connander-The platoonh withdrawnupon ordersof lhe commander whoestablishcd the outpost. c. The platon lcadcr,like the squadlexder,hasno
103. Conducto{ the D€f€nse a. Memben of thc platoon conduct conlinuous Pervlnnellake coverin dugouts,shelters obs€rvation. and on the bottomsof tr€nchcsfrom enemyartillery fire, and u€ ready to resumepositionsto repel fte altack. If someof thc platoon's\reaponsare put oul of nclion,the platoonlcrderattemptsio reslorchisfire plan by reiocatingwcapons supplementary andassigning iire tasks,. An encny rcconnaissance in force or rllacks by enemylcadclen€ntsareengaged by fi.e from dcsignatcd weaponsin the thcarcncdscclof.After the attackhas been repeled, tiose wcaponsthat revealedtheir posi. tionshaveiheir tuing positionschangcd. . c. Wlen &c atlack coninrences, the plaloor lcadcr signalshis personnelto man thcir positions.Adllery,
tank and urtitank weaponsf'r€ is increasedasthe enemy approacheslhe FEBA, with th€ maximumiires dnected at lank! and AFG. It€ plaroon sniper attemptsto pick off enemy officers, snip€n, observers,8nd machine gunrrers. d. lf th€ ercmy infantry attacks on foot, efforts are made to cut them off froh supporti4 lrmor ard dertroy th€m. Tanlc which succ€€din pen€kating the forward defensesare take! undei fire by th€ company recond echelon(t€sefl€) atrtit n& weeponsand artillery firing in the diiect fire rolc. e If the compary or battalion hunches a counterattrck, the platoon may furnish fire support or joifl th€ cou[terattackingf orce.
104. Withdnwal when maling a wilh&as,al, the platoon leadeiindicates to his squadr and attachmcnls lhe dircction of thc withdrswal, the intermedirte phnselines, ord€r of th€ withdrawal, security nsxrures, and thc signd for the start of th€ withdrawal. The platool withdmwsrapiauy, but when forced, defends a $rcc€ssionoI delayinS positionsa3p8rt of the corhpany.Methodofwithdrawd depends upon the enemy situstion, th€ terain, and weather.lf the platoon cannotwithdraw simultarcously, It does so by squads,with the platoon l€ad6r accomPrnying lhe lasl squd.
I
64
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CHAPTER8. THE MOTOBIZEDRIFLECOMPANYIN COIMBAT TO CONTACT Sectionl. IVIOVEMENT 105. General
depth of r€connaissancc rcsporNibility is 50 kiloneters the regimentmd 100 kilomcrcrsfor rhe division. ,. -. rL .y "u lic a\rgneJ mrrcn mi5.ior, rhe motorized rille company is rcinlorced with amror, artilery, enginccrand chemicalunits. Ihc companymay ,]so receivern rtiaircraft sectioniion) t-hcregiment-
Thjs chapter examin€slhe actiors ofrhe moto.ized rifle company in offersive and def€nsivecombat. 106. Missions During a taclical nurch. the motorized rill€ company nuy be assignedany ofdre folowing nrissions: d. Ax thc advanccguafd ofa motorized dfle battalion (Figure 56). The company conrm,uderis responsibl€for thc secudty of the batalion main body. The company operates fivc to tcn kilomete$ ahead of lhe unit ii is pro&cring- An advancedetachment.usudly a reinforc€d platoon, is sent from oDeto one and one-hrlf *ilometers Jlead ofthe co pmy. Flank securilyclcmcntsmay also
.!
107. Actions of the CompanyCommander a. Th€ conpany conrmander receives drc ftarch o r d - ' I ' o n f i " b : r | r r u r . u r , r , a i r d e ' - n Ja f , , i m p a n i e , hlrr 11 b rer,,nnar,)rncP e rior ru gurls Jn recor|llaisance,lhe conrpany com'nanderissucsa wrrning ordel to his platoon leadefs.ftis ordcr dcscnbesthe nrarch conditions,its length, personnelprcparation,equipment, units delailedas nrarchsecurity,thcn augmentrtion.and the time and place for lhc issunnceof rhe march order. ,. men time permits, thc conpxny conrmander takes his piatoon leaderso a rcconnaissdnce to check poinl, and olher obsttcies the m rch stalt trdtficability, (Figure 57) th€ march may affecl factors that .. ln nakrrg hjs cstimate of the situation, lhe compdny commander studies enemy activilies rnd the probable dJne of contaci- He anirLyzcsthe terain and considersthe w€ather. He outlines procedurcsfor ihc comt any formarion and rneasuresfor sccudty. He then completesrnarchcalculationsrviz.; (l) Tlle length oI the march. (2) Toral time for rhc naJch. (3) Tle averagespccdand thc spccdson portions
,. A-sa forurrd detucnncni for ! regiJncntdllacticdl march. The conpany pcrfornrsr spccificlaclical rnission indep€ndentof thc march unils. It may bc assigncdtlrc nission oI sccuringa critical terrair laalure dominating tllc arca through which thc rcgirnent wifl move. c. As r parl oL thc mdn body of a 1ac1ic!lmarch unit. In tiis orse the company may bc caled upon to furnbh flank secudty forc€s or the r€ar guard eiencnr. group for the d. To act as an ad'hoc reconnaissance r e & r, e n o r d i \ i . i o . ' . A r e c o r l " i s { 1 . p . u u p i . a lemporary tactical unit (usually a reirforced comprny) mission.Acfo.m€d to conduct a specilicrcconnaissance groups are cording ro Soviel doctrine, reconnaissance frequently employed on the march, duriDg d meeting engagemenland in the deiense.They are assignedaDaxis (4) fte tincs 1br passjngthc start and control o1 advrnce and m objective.The disranccthey operrte from the main combat force is dctcnnined by their points, and thc lime 1br securiiy dnd reconnarssance n i s ' r , n a n J . u n p r ' i r u n . a n d b y I n c r - r ' r i . t l - e r , T a l el€m€ntsto bc in assignedar€as.
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!!Y 2 Chemicalwarfaredelachmenl i e c o m p a n y . 10. Disiancesoi parrolvehicles 3 C o m m a n d el sr t m o r o r i z er d from the main body 128)would vary dependingupon rhe enemv,wearher,l€iiain rnd oiher laclors. 5. Fnsrmororizedrlleplatoon. Oisrances b€tweenother vehlcieswouldbe 6. Secondmororizedrlteplaloon. 7. Th rd motorzed ilepbroon
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guardof the battalion. motorized.ifle Figure56. A reinforced companyasthe advance 65
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(5) 'Ihe place,titne, and duration of halts for thc s€curityelementsand for the nuin body (if dcsignated by the highu commander). d llaving compl€tedhis study of the highercommandeisor;anirationlbr fie nrach{FjBU,e58) aniihis own estimate,the companycommanderformulatesa marchpianwhichincludesthe followingl (l) The order of marchand the distributionof personnel andweapons. (2) the composition and tasks of the elements dctailed for march security and rcconnaisssceand the times for them to passthe stait point and the control (3) The probableareaof contact with the en€my andthemethodot deploymint. (4) Th€ procedure for control of subordinare
Figur€t.
The compenycommanderof a rcinforc€d motorizedriflecompanyconducting teconnaiasance.
e. Normally tanks lttached to thc companyare located ncar thc head of rhe mdch colunn to allow tltem to bring fire quickiy to bear in a meeting engagement, to coverthc deploymentof the company andto cngagethc enemyt€fore he candcploy. Attached uaillery and mortar units movc behind tne infantry in lhe cenler of the main body. Attached air defense
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KEY 1. Feconnabs.ncedtDl. 2. Advancep3 yconsBlinoot lhe lsr moio.izeditlecomDanv,s isnkplaroo..an anll€rv batery, 3 plat@n of A/T gons,one engine. squ6dand chemic.lreonn8isncepeMnnd, 3. Themotoiled itle balralionltatl, sisn.lplaroon.andengi.eerpkloon lhinus onesquadl. 4. Anrirankb€nery. 5. Tankcomp.ny (min6one phroo.l. 7, Anilbry bnalion (minuson. banery), 8. S6condmotorizedJl6coh@nv (min!.on€ platoonL 9- Thnd moroized ritl. company. 10. F6ar*wicss of th. hororir€drille b.tr8lion. 12. Marchllanl *cu.iry detachm6nr(moroi2edrille plaroonl.om rhe s.cond nobnzed ille comp8ny).
of a battalionmarchin anticipationof a meetingengagement. Figure58. Organization
a
Thcsepointsareto be crosscd weaponsare distributedalong the column,ready to four hoursof movernent. Lime. b) lhc heador railoia rulurmal a designareJ aerirlr3rScrs cngage on rhe muveor durinshalls. (3) Halts. Halts depending eslimalc nay bc designated Aftcr completing his rcconnaissance, of I the situationandmarchpian,the companycommandel uponthe missionandt}lc lcngthofthe maJch. (4) Road suidcsand murk€$. Road suidesand issueshis ordcr to the platoon lead€rs.The ordcl routc rnarkersare utilizcd at key points ,long thc march includes: guidesto (l) lnformationaboulthc cncmyandthe possible routc.Normallyhigherhcrdquartendispatches mark the route for the company. areaof contactwith him. (2) Thc company rnbsion and the movcmcnt 109. AstionsDurirs ihe March (3) Informationabout adja€€ntunits and recond, Air attack. The company normrly continuesthe march during tl}c attack,incr€rsingits spccdand the (4) the compositionand missionof the march distancebetwccnvehicles.Designatcd pcrsonnel engage securitypatfol and the timc for passingthe start and low flying ancraft.SA-7gunngrsfirc whjlevehjclesare moving(Figure59),spccdandtefrainpermilling. (5) Thc compositionof thc column,movcmcnt ,. Artilleryait,rck.Shouldthe companycomeundcr proccdure artillery fire, it rapidly movesout of thc irnpact area. speed,locationsof halts,and thc operational in caseof an cncountefu,ith thc cnemy. and drivcrs Distarcesbetweenvehiclcsarc increased, (6) ft€ organization signals,and rcmainalen for clatelsalongthe roulc. The company of observation, comrnanderanticipatesan €nemy tank-infantry assault (7) Aclionsto be talcn on sjgnaisfor encmyair fouowingthc a ilery fire. raid waming,.nd CBR contamination. c Nudear attack. (8) Hislocarionandthat ofhis deputics. (l) In ordcr to minimizethe cficct of ao enemy ttuoughd€fiies & Pnor to the march, thc companycoinrnander nucl€arexplosion,ihc companypasses unit rcadiness, functioningof equipment,avail. l|nd over bndgeswilhoul stoppinglnd at increased inspects ability of mmunition and fucl, and the prescnccof spccds-lf the companyis warned on lhc march of person:lprot€ctiveequipment. imrninentnuclealattack,immcdiatestepsaretukcnto dispcrse the column,takingadvantaSe ofterain leaiurcs 108. Comm.ndandConirol that provide protectionfrom the effecls of nuclcar '. During thc march, tlle company commandcris detonation.Protectior mask and clothirg de pul on usually locatcd ncar the head of the column wher€ h€ andpenonnelliein thebotbm of drcnAPCS. (2) Shouldthc companybe takcnund€rnuclear car mnle a rapid estimateof the situation and quickly prioriticsareto assess attack,the companycommander's deployhis unit. ,. Methodsof communicationduring the march are the siutation, restore control, conduct rescuc and nessengcr,visual signals,and p€rsoml contact bctween cvacuationoperations,rcgrouphis platooosand con cornmandcn. As a rule,radiosilenceis enlorccdexcept (3) Ground ,tnd helicoplcr rcconnaissance (if includc: availablc)is conductedto learn the exlent ol damag€ c- Controlmeasures (1) Initi, point. The startingline for tle movc. and contamination.Shoulddamagcbe extensive, the ment is designated by onc or more initial points, 10 battalion secondechelon0eserve)unit replacesthc provide all elementswith a checkpointftom which they damaged one. (4) prearanged timcRcscucand evacuatjon teamsare formedby can start thc march according to a point, is consist of the conpany battalion and enginecr,mcdicaland CBR iabl€. When it reaclrcsthe initial penonncl.The tasksof th€seteamsincludetreatm€ntof ill its propermarchorder. roule rle!rancc.and radialron monitoring. (2) Control pointsand/orphaselines.Thesccon- casualties. trol measuresarc assignedby regimentfor evcry two lo Radiation doscratcsaremainlainedon all pelsorJl€|.We
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c ' o s s " da h j g hs p e e d rA . J r e ,l e d i n g a c o n , I n r n a r e o :re p a 1 € l p c r s o n j e ld e . e n r ! m m a t r n n r sc u n d u c r e o dn _ . mm e am o v € o r d u r i n gs h o . l h a l r , r F , B U , eo 0 r . r u m p t e r e oecunrr'ffauon b a.conpri.hed ,, _,rr_ s o n , o e c o n r ! m i n a r i npno L l l r d u n n g " g r " n , u t t o n 8h d l t so r i n r e \ r
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Figure59. An SA-7 gunnerin firing position.
Figurem. CBRunhconducring decontaminarrcn duringa halt.
qt 110. T6rminaiionof the March
supervises fue. The companycommander the establishmcnt of tlrc companypositions,establishes at del€nsc drangcsfor r€-supplyof the company,and measures, awaitsordcn from the battalion conmandcr. ,. lf the march terminatesin a meetinSengaSement, the motorircd rifle company operatesas oudined in sectiorlIc. Whenthe motorizcdrifle companymovesinto the position,tle companydeploysinto attackofa defensivc combatformationfrom the marchcolumnwell behind ihe ltue of contact(S€eSectionIII).
a Thc march t€rminat€sin the occupationof an ass€mbly rrca, a meetingengagement, or movement into an altack. In occupyinga conccntrationarea, the companyleavesthe routeof marchwithout haltingand occupiesa designated area as pan of a batlalion or rcginental perimeter. lftncdiate steps are tal(en to eslablish securitypositionscovering avenues of approach into the area.Thc companyesrablkhes defe0sivcpositions and coordinates with adjacentunits.Patrolsare sentout to coverareasnot coveredby obsenationor
Sectionll. THE MEETINGENGAGEMENT 111.G€n.ral
structurcs}Ii! forcc in accordnncevith the missiongivcn The meetingengagement is I type of offensivcaction by tfie regimentalcommandef.In his marchorder to that the Sovietsexpect to occur frcqucndy. 11 is subordinateand attachedcomma.ders,tln battalion cl'aracterized by its dynamicnature,uncertainty, sudden commandcr places emphasis on the importancc of charges in t]rc situation, an intensive stugglc to scize scizing the initiative, destroying thc cncmy forces,and and maintain the initiative, the developmentof combat continuingthe march. activities or a wide front and by the €xistence of c. Company planning for the meeting cngaScment exposcdfl.nks. Only miror ncelingcngagem€nts would will depetrdupon its missionas pan of the battalion. be fought by the companyindependent of its parent The organizrtion for combat and planningdone by thc unir. NormJly, thc battalionis the smdlEslunit to companycommandcr is in accordance wilh thc assigncd conductthe meetingcngagcrrent, The meetingengagc. missioD.The companymay provideflank securityfor ment may be dividcd into four pbases:planning, the colunmor maneuver a5partofthe mainbodyin the Whenthe comp.nyoperates reconnaissance, deploymcntandmaneuver,.nd termina. meetingcngagement. ar the battrlion (or regimental) advanceguard, the company conflarder plans for iniiial contact with the enemy column by keepinghis ur t alert to any eventuality. 112. Planning for the MeetingEngagement group of the regimenror a. If hc hasdecided10 conducta marchin erpecta. Operatingasthe reconnaissance division, t]rc reinforced opensthc sccondstage company lion of a meetiDgengagcmcnt, the fegimentdlcom. mee ting cngagement. of the mandcrdcfinesthe folowing: (l) The plan of operationson encountering thc 113. The Reconnai$.nce Phaie (2) The organ"ation of ttrc march formalion and thedistributionof weapors. (3) fte task ofthe forwarddetachment and the marchsecu.itytroops(4) the tasksofsubordinate el€mcnls. (5) fte movenentroutcs.line of depariurc,and the controllircs. ,. The battalion conmander also males dctailcd plans for the conduci of a meetingcngagement and
a The initial stagcof the me€titrgeigagcmcntoccurs whcn the regimental or battalion reconn:dssance and securiry elcmcnrsmeer the enemy'sreconnaissance units. This phasehsts flom initial contact until the main body entersthc battle.Its dumtionwill dcpendon the compositionof the much securityclemenlsand their distancefrom the main body and on the time nccdcdby the mainbody io advance anddeploy.
69
c. Whenthc motorizedrifle companyrcceivesthe thc enemyl forwardunits,thc ,. Uponencountering rcinforc€d motorized riflc company, acting a! the order, it attack in line, usuallybehindan attachedtank enemycolltact, platoon(9and abreastof otherrnotorizcdri{lc elemcnts r€gimcntalreconnairlance 8roup,rcPoras the composition and diection of the main body. An effort is nade to attack tlrc flank Th€ companycstablishcs 6f the cnemycolumn,attempt!to penctratethc main or rcar of the encmy force and to dcstroy it or force it body and locateenemychemicrlandnuclearwcapons, to withdraw. Speed in the attack b str$sed, and rinener remain mounaedwhen feasiblc.nd fight from and observesthe approachof cnemyrcserves. Enemyforcesarc destroyedor bypassed c. The motorizedrifle companyactingasth€ advance their caJrlers. guard of the tattalion att€mpts to destroy enemy and rnopped up by second echelon forces of the the rcgimert or by thc secondechelon(re!€rvo)of the reconnarssimce and secudtyelementsandcontinues march.Should it encountera superiorenemyforce, tlrc battalion. Should it be necessaryto dismount in the gurrdcompanytalesup d€fensiv€ and attack, infantrymenmovebehindthc attachedtanls and advancc Positions geining arc supported in the attack by thcir APCs.When the and inflicting casualties on the cnemy d€fends, enemyhasbeend€feat€d, the APCSarc caLled forward, to dcploy. time for the main body the troops remountand opcrati-or$continued, ff superiorenemyforcesnakc it impossibleto 114. Deployment andManeurcrPhale attack, the battalion commandcrattempts to hold the d. Thc meetingengagemcntusualy developdrapidly. enemy to establish favorableconditionsfor the deployNormsllypositionednearthc lrcadof the column,the rnent of th€ regirnent. battalion commander mak€s a rapid cstimate of th€ siruation, assrgnstasks to th€ attsched artillery unit 115. TethinaiionPhale comnander, d€velops a maneuvff plan for the main Thc meetingengagemcnt tcrminatcswhcn thc enemy body andissuesa sho( opentions order (Figurc 6 | ). force has been destro,€d, forced to withdraw, or whcn up and takcs firing ,- Attached artilery Positions guard the have been onto the defcnsive, In thc Soviets forced thc advancc opens fue in suppon of immediately evenl of formcr, the battalion continues its by tlic march;in tanks, followed Attached and lhe marn body. motorized riflc unitr mounted in th€k APCS,quickly thecaseofenernywithdrawal,a pursuitbegins. d€ployand attack the mainbody of rhe enemyforce.
70
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KEY 1. Motonzed nne banalion, reinforced with ranks and artirlory, actins as the sdvance guad of the @gimenr. 2. Seond snillery bttalion 3. Third motufted .ifle compahy. 4. Fi6rrankcompanyll5. Badalaon conmander,fnEtMFB, 6. Second mororiz€d dfle company. 7. Fi6r mobrized ifie company wnh an anached rank plaloon acrinq as rhe advanc€suard.
Figure61. A reinforcedmotorizedriflebattalionconductinga meetingengagement.
71
oPERATIONS Sectionlll. BREAKTHROUGH 116. Genoral z. Tle breakthroughis an attackplannedagainsta hasty or preparedd€fense.It may be Iaurchedby mouotedor dismountcd troops,from th€mdch or when in contact with enemyforces. ,. Attackinga dcfensivepositionfrom the maJch provides the attacker \rith security against nuclear strikes,minimizesroop exposurcto cnemy fue and the opportunityfor surprise, creates c. An attack whenin contact with thc enemyusu:illy occurswhen troops go over to the attack from thc defensc,when the defensescannot bc neutralized,and whcre tcrrain pr€cludes an attack from the line of march.Tlis type of attackfacilitatescoordination and planning.tlowever,it neccssitates dispersalto reduce enemyweaponseffectssnd requiresspecialeflorts to d. Sometimesforces may attack frorD the line of naJch in tlle main attack sectorand from a position in
tanl compames andup to a plaloonof combatcngincers (sappersr. ,. Compadesattackingaspart of the battalion'sfust echelon would be more heavily reinforced than the secondechelon(reservc)cornpany.A companyin the first echelonmaybe reinlorcedwith an artilery battery, one or two tank platoons,a mortar platoonand the battalion antitank platoon. 119. Attaci Fronla$sandFormations a Norrnaly, the companyattacksmounted willl aI thrce platooff abrcaston a frontageof about 500 mctersduringconvenuonal opcrationsand 800 meters dunngnuclcarconditions. . b. lf attackin8from the march,the companydeploys from a column into an approachmarch fomation and finaly into a combat formr.ion when the cnemy offcrs
120. Attackinsa Prepared P$irion lrom $e March e. In both modes of attrck the motonzedrifle d. Ceneral companyhasbasicallyihe samemission,combatformaBeforc tle anall is launchcdan aJscmblyarea is The tion, fire supportplan,and operationl procedures. occupiedbricfly. Companies arc separatcd by up to one rwo modesol atrackdrffcr rn rhe nrerhodof orSani-/a. one-hrlf kilometers from each other as protection and tion and thc proceduresfor movinSforcesto the FEBA. againstnuclearweapons. ,. Troop bading Procedures. r17. Mirsion (l) Tl1ecompanycornmander specifiestle locaa The company's mission is expressedin teflns oI tions of his platoonsand attachedunits. organizcs air the destfuctionof a specificenernygroupingand/orthe obserurtiooand esrablishes proceduresfor engrging or lue. A companyi! enemyaifcraft,issuesinrtructionsfor pfcparingpcnonscizurcof i groundobjecrive assignedan immcdiateobjectiveand a diraction of nel and w€apons,and rcplenishes the company'ssupfurfter attack. plies.He thcn gocson ! groundrcconnaissanc€ with the b. Thc depth of the companynission is d€termincd battalioncommander.During this reconnaissance, the by the type ofw€aponsus€d(nuclcaror non-nuclear) to companycommanderrecciveshis rnission,studiesthe neuhalizeenemydefenses, thc operationdconc€pt,thc deploymcntof encmyweapons,dctermines procedures compositionandeffectivcn€$of fri€ndlyforces,terrain, for neutralizing them,studicsapproaches to thc enemy and weathcr.The depth of thc nission is usualy greatcr defenses,the gound in the forward area lnd tbe undcrnuclearconditions. platoonmissions, immediatercar,dccides andselects the exacl locationsfor prssages throuShobstacles. 118.Attadrmenrs (2) when allocatingcombdtmissions,the cornd. Allocadon of supporting weaponsto a battalion panycommanderassigns hB plaioonsan obiecrivcand dependson tlle mission,the availability of suppodng a-\is for further advancc, tlre locations for pa$ag€s wcapons,and tle tcrrain. A motoriz€drifle battalion through obstacles,and thc procedurefor negotiating attacking in the fi|st €chelonof the r€gimcnt may be thcm. He assignstasks during the attack and the r€inforcedwith up to one artillcry baltalion, oneor two movementsequenceto his attach€delements.when
I
(2) Artilcry and morta$ fire on the enemy organizing coordhation, the company comrnander specifiesthc proccdurc for the company mov€ to the posrtionsin $e forwarddeiendedareasand the immeIi$e of dcparturc (or tlrc locationsfor disnounting for diate rear and thcn shift their fires to deeptargetswhen an attack on foot) md th€ methods of firing while the atracking troops are withio 200 meters of the moving into the attack and negotiating obstacles;he risk-distarc€line. (3) fte conpany commander obsefles the coordinatesthe activities of thc platoons and attached tasksto Uc artillcry and sLrbunibin thc dcstructionol personneland weapdns in progressof his units and assigns d!€ enemy strong points; h€ giv€sth€ signalsfor targcl morta6. Fte support of the attack consistsof thc identification and for rcquestiry, switchingand ceasinS successive neutralization and destructionof the enemy fires. by concentratedarullery and aii stritcs (if available)to (3) If hc is umble to take his platoon and the complete depth of fte mission and, for an attack atlachedleadcrswith hiin on a groundreconnflissancc. using conventionalweapons,by a barragcin dcpth or the compmy conxnandcr analyzesthe terrain from a succcssivc concentrations of fire to a depth ot tour mapor terrainmodel.Usualy.dueto the lack of time, kilometcrs. platoonleadersreccivctheir missionsin ter s of map (4) TJnk support each other with fire and, prccededby tank equippedwith minc.clcaring ittachc. Command andContlol. ments, negotiatethe ninefields in front of thc FEBA. (l) In the asembty arca, the company com- Attacking infmtry fo ows the 1an16throuShthe gaps, mander exercisescommand and control by p€rsona.l firing on the movcagainstcncmy personnel and weacontact and by ncssenger.Radios are used only for (5.) Aficr rcgotiating obstacl€sin front of the .eceivingwarningsignals. (2) On leaving the asscmblyarea, the compary FEBA, anacking squads and platoons deploy into conmandcr moves at the head of thc colurnn and extendcdline and advancewhile firing on thc movc to Whenmountedin AICS,thc plaloons conuolssubodinateunits from hn APC usingcstab' tleir objectives. lishcd signals.RadioconmHications de usedonly aftcr dcployinto extend€d lineformationaller obstaclcs have The companycorllrlandersupportsfus the startof preparatory fires. beennegotiated. (3) Aftcr deploymentinto platooncolumns,tllc attackingclcments with firesfrom attached md supportcompany commander moves to the main &\is and ing artilleryandmorta6.The destructionofanycncmy in the rearoI t]rcattackingsub'elements is left controls the deploymentof his unit into combat femaining to the secondcchclon(rescrve) units ol the battdionor formationandthe attack. (4) In the assault,tfie company commander regiment. (6) Shouldthe tanh be held up by obstacles or usuallycontrolshis subordinates from an APC.Duringa di$nountcdattack he movesin the extendedlinc of barrierr, thcy support the attacking infantry with frre. APCSbchindthe attackingirfartry, andfor a mountcd The infantry and attachedengin€ersclear the barriers attack, he positionshis APC 200-300rncten bchind the and supportthe advanccof the tank!. (7) When he seesthat his units have taken the attackinSplatoons.Shouldthe companyattackon foot and the companycommander abo be dismouoted, h€ encmyt forward positions the company commandcr would us€ .n additionrl R-126 radio to maintain issuesnew ordcn to his platoons by radio. Efforts are conrmunicationswith the battalion commandcr,as well madeto maintainthe attack nomentum. (8) Two najor facton aswith his platoons. .xploitation of the 4 Conductof the Attack. rcsultsof nuclearstrikesand the seizureor dcstrucdon - dominatethe battlcin the (l) Duringthe deploymentinto platooncolumns of enemynuclearweapons rhe combat formation, the company commandcr and Devastated areasand deplhs of the enemy defenses. amplifiesthe platoon missionsby radio. Thc platoon obstacles arebypassed or negotiatcd iluoughlanesmade leadersdo thc samcfor their squads.Unitsgo directly by attachcdcngincers. Strongpoin.sbehind$e FEBA into thc attackwithouthalting.
(
are attackcdliom the marchby unitsadvancing und€r 121. AttackWhenIn ConractWirhThe Enemy covcring fires from anillery. mortars,tek, and AlCs. a Unils noving up to attack through forcesin (9) The battalioncommander commitshissecond contlct occupyan asscmblyareawhich providesconechelonGcscrve) companyafter the initialobjective has cealmentand covcr againstdamagccausedby nuclear bccn taken. This companyis committedin a sector andconventronal wiapons.Usualy the asscmbly ar€ais whereenemyrcsistanc€ is weakestor whercthe great€st occupicdat night. successhas bccn attained.The mirsior may be the furtherdevelopment of the atlackin depthor an attack ,. Conlpanies dismounlat r desgnatcdlocationrnd on theflanl or rearofan enemystrongpoint holdingup pfoceedby concealed routesto attackpositions.A?Cs t]rc advance. ln hisorderto thesecondechclon(reserv€) afe lcft in cov€redareasready to move forward to commander,thc battalion commsnderindicatesth€ supportth€ atiack. €ncmyand frcindly positions,rhe line of deployment, c. Companics in the battaiion'sfirst echclonoccupy objcclivcs,the dircctio. of thc subsequent attack,.md the fi|st trcnch systen, while the sccond echclon coordinationwith &e fiIst echclorcompanies. During (reservc) element occupies the sccond and thnd its entry into battle, the secondechelor (rcscwe)is trenchcs.Tank units atlachedto the battalion occupy supported by artilleryandmonartirc. an assembly arcaprior to dle startof the attack.whjle e. EnenryCounterattacks. tank unitsalrcadypositionedin the defenscgo into the (1) Minor counterattacksre repulscdby fir€ attack from those positions.A coordinationline is while moving, nd major counterattackarc engrged assigned to lants for a changcofformation.ltsdistance with conccntrat€d lucs from thehllt. from thc encmyFEBAis dchrminedby thc terrain,but (2) llhcn the counterattlck force has been it is usualy fron one to two kiiometers. sighted.thc company cormandcr issuesordcrs (o d Thc companycommanderobsefles&e resultsof repulseir. Srlbunilsoc(up) hasr)posirion(antlorgaruzc prcpautoryfires,assigns rnissions for the destruction of fire plam, whiJc attach€dcngine€6sct up antitank survivinsor new tngets, and lcporls to the battalion commander on tllc company's rcadiness to attack. (3) Whcnthe enemyis within range.the subunits e. Tanksrnovefrom theirasscmbly areason rcceipt cngagethem witl fires fron all wc.rpons.lf a nuclear of a signal.As they approach theljneofdcparture,thcy slrike was dcliveredon tre countcrartackforcc, the deploy into platoon columns,rnd then into combat companyrcncwsthe attackimnredialely afterthc slrike fomation, movingat highspccd.As th€ tanl$ lpproach andcomplcles ihe dcstruction of the en€my. the liiendly trenches, givesthe the companycommand€f /. ThcPunuit. order "PREPARETO ATTACK." Afier the tankshave (1) When thc enemywithdraws,the motorized passcd, "INTO h€ orders TtlE rifle companystlrts pursuitopentions.For morespccd ATTACK - FORWARDI"Personnel leavcthe trenches and momentumand to creatc bexer conditionsfor and follow the tants in the atlack. Arcs follow their m,rneuver, thc companyformsinto platooncolurnns and squads md give firc support. Whe. thc enemy's continuesihc puFuil in approach nrarchformation. resistance hss beenbroken,AlCs arc remountcdand (2) If theenemyorganizes rcsistance by hdividual i}Ie attack into the deplhsis swifdy developcd. units on advantagcous lines to coverhis witndrawd, I W}lcna nuclcaror chcmicalstrike againstencmy subunitsby-pass themto reachthe flanls andrearofthe positionsin thc irnmediatcareahasbeenlaunchcd,rhe cncmy\ mainbody,cuning offhis routeolwithdrawcl. cornpanyin this zoneusuallyattack in APCS.
74
(
a
SectionlV. DEFENSIVEOPERATIONS 122. Genelal
hrcs, the rcgimcnul conronder double! thc width :lnd areas.In the dcpth of hn brttalion-defended Sovietdoctrincmakesro cleardistinctionbetweenstatic increases 'Ihe are U-stHped apertures and shields built at ,ddition, sizeand compositionof the and mobilc defense. cffccts of enemy intcrvals 10 decr€are the blast rcgular unit involvcd dererni.es the dcgrce of mobility grcaicr is the degree employed.Thc largerthe unit, the e. A arcutld Dcfe se. Allaroond dcfcnsewithin lhe of mobilily and flexibility p€rmitted.There is littlc positionis p.ovidedby thc conslructionof battalion Ilexibility at battalion lcvel ind below. A company alternate and supplementary firing positions,the emdefendingas part of the first echelonbattrlion is rigidly placementof barriersthroudout thc defendedarea,thc hcld ro delend an assigncdposition.No appreciablc is held at thjs level.The conrpanystrongpoint close coordination and integation of lues witlt reserve a seriesof in(erlockingtrench canonly be properlydnalyzedwithin thc frameworkof neighbofinSunits lnd shifting systems which cnsc tlrc of troopsfrom onearca position. thebattaliondcfensive areais I. D"k't:c in Deplh. Lr(h baltaliondclcnsive preparedwith thrcc or four trerich lincs with connecting communicationstrenches. The disbnce between trenchesis dctcrminedby the range of direct-lire weapons and thc gJound.Depending on tllc missionand mry the natureof thc tcrrain,*re brttalioncommander on tinc,with onecompanyup.md deployhis companies forwardandonein the two back,or with two companies rear. In the lattcr case,the first two ircnchesof the baltrlion defens€areaare occrlpicdby two .ifle comPrincipl$ In The Aatta. paniessideby side.Thc first lrench is the FEtsA.The 124. Applicitioo of Defensive lion Defendsd Area ofapproximately500 sscondtrcn€hjs dugal a distance a. Stabint!. The stability of the battalior defended metersto thc rcar of the fint tfench,so that elem€nts arer derivesfrom thc positioning in depth of its riflc defendingit can supporttroopsh thc tust trenchand compmies;the selectionof tcrrain,exploitationof thc covcr thc arca betweenth€ two trcnchcsby fire. The ground,concealmcn! of flring positionsandobstaclcs, a secondtrenchmay alsobe usedfor launchingcounterffe reinforcedwilh coordinatedfirc plan, and control of a$igncd and attacks-The two forwardcornpanies tanks,mortars, antitankBUnsand arc usuallyassigned ,. Se.?rnry.A systemof securityoutpostsis estrb- a{tillery,enginccrand chemicaltroops.The thid dfle of the main companyoccupiesthe third rrcnch,locatedabout1000 lisltcd to preventenemy rcconnaissnce defensiv€ sector. A company may serve within this mclcIs from the secondtrench.This trench may be uscd systema5 an oulpost,an outpostsuPPort,or as the for the posilioningof supportwcaponsas well :rs for henchesare Communicalions securitycompmyofan outpostbattalion. launchingcounteraltacksso that for eachplatoonthcrcis at leastone c. Utilizatiotl oJ Teftain. By tying in his iire support constructed tJlefiIst trenchwith thc sccond,andfof each and banier planswith ihe positionsof his deployed conrrecting trenchconnecting compani€sand platoon, th€ battalion cornmandcr companyat leastonecommunications cxploits defensivealpects of thc terrain in his lssigned thc sccondtrcnch with the third. Dufiuny positionsand area.Gapswhich cannot be coveredby dircct fue arc extensive obstacles supplcment these trench systcms mincd (other engineerobstaclcsmay also be con- duoughoutthe battaliondefensivcarca.The battalion structed)andcoveledby indftcctfire wc pons. reserve,usuallya reinforcedplat{}on.is locatedat a d. Dispetsion.To providehis forceswiih protection dislance of up io lwo kilomete6from thc FEBA. s conv€ntional nucl€ar atlack, well as massed ryainst Position 123. TheBattlion Defensive area(Figlrre62) is up to two and Thcbaitrliondcfcnsivc on€-halfkilomel€rswide (fivc lilom€ten h nuclcar deep. conditions)and up to rwo andone-halfkilometers The areaconsistsof platoonmd companystrongpoints and is part of the re8imentaldcfcnsivesector.The battaliont defcnsivcposinotr i5 organircd accordingto the pinciplesoutlincdin dtaptertwo.
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Figure62. Th€ reinforcedmotorizedriflebattalionin the delense.
76
I
g. Antitank Defense. Extcnsiv€employmentof anti. strong point!, their pdrn!ry and secondaryareasof frc; tenk min€sand engineerinSobstacl€scoveredby tues of main Jnd alternat€ firing positions for tanls, APCS, organic and attach€dartitanl weaponsProvidethe antitank and antiakcraft weapons,atd machine8uos,as wel as then main and secondaryarcs of firc; the fire battalion with an in'depth antitanl defensivesystem. sectorsof cachplatoon;obstacles, field h. Coofiinated F,'er. The battalion's defensivefire concentration the company dcfenses and shelters; and tlle location of use,andcoordhationol planconsists of the positioding, area.Thefire planorganizcs cll weaponsm lhe defendcd d Subsequenttasksar€ assignedto the platoons for zonesof high density fue in front of the FEBA, on the pmtectionagainstCBR weapons,and plan is reconnaissance, nanks and in the rear of the defense.The itre logistics. insepafablylinlcd wirh fie barrier plan. i. Mobik Auntetuttack Forces. The bsttalion has a limitcd count€rattack forcc, usudly one reinforced 126. Comm€ndAnd Control pletoon.Majorcounterattacks arelaunched by regimcdt In the defens.,the companycommander cortrols his and division,while forward battalionsdefendthef areas. organic and rttached units from a commandtnd obs€rvationpost. He normally brs two such post', a 125. CompanyT.oop LeadingProcedures primary and an .lternate. These posts arc chooento a. Aftcr receiving the battalion defcnsc order, the piovide the bcst obserystior of thc batde area, a companycommandcrcompleteshis plan andissucshis concealedlocation,and to facilitat€control of subof attached order from a point on thc ground from which the ordinatcunils. As a rule, the comtnanders artillery unit! are located with the and supporting dcfcnse and enemy avenues of approach can b€ while antitank sectioo leaders company conrmander, sufley€d. If trc plrtoon and attached leadcrs cannot units. remain with their assembl€at onc location, the order is given in thcir strongpoint locations. respective of tho Companysdong Points (l) To thc platoons:supportingweaponsand 127- Orsanization Inissions: areas of conccntrated fu€ and tasks for a. The companystrong point is organizcdaccording s€curirgthe flank. boundarics andgapsi to the sameprinciples!s the battalion\ aJeaof defens€. (2) To Ihc supponinSartilcry: areasol con. ,- The motorized rinc conpany occupiesa strong centrated firc; point up to 500 metcrsin width (1000 metersunder (3) To dre antitank weapons:l,liin and altemate nucled conditions)and 250 meten in depth (500 mcters fire positions,main and secondaryareasof fire, and thc unde. nuclear conditions). Normaly, all three platoons procedurcfor openinganddeliveringfue; defendon line,(Fisure63).Whcndeployed"two up and (4) Taslcsfor subuDitsin engagingenemyaircnft; one back", two rifle platoonsusualy occupythe first (5) th€ methodof engireerprcparation:where, main tench, while the third platoon occupiesthe s€cond *hen, and how to preparefield foftifications, sh€lters, main trench. A s€condarytrench localed 50 to 100 obstacles,and alsomeasures for camouflage; metersbehind eachmain trefth is occupiedby the third (6) The time for completionof thc fire plan. squadof cachplatoon,lhe PlatoonconmandPost,and any attachcdantitank weapons.Eachplaloon in the first ,. Aftcr issuinghis order, the companycomnandcr main trench has a cotununications trench leadhg back planscoordination, payingattention to thc coordination to the second rnain trench where the main company of the company fire plan with ihe artill€ry, othcr cornrnandpost is located. Each companylns a similar uniti. wcapons, andadjacent communicationstrcnch to the third main trench where c, The company commandergives a skctch of his the third rnotorized rifle compary and thc battalion defensiyestrong point to the battalion command€r.The conmand post are locatcd.The comPanystong point is following are usually shown on th€ skctch: reference normaly cenlered on tlrc platoon in tlt€ sccond mairl poinh anddjstances to them;enemypositions;platoon trench.The w€aponsof the companyare placedso that
77
(1) One motorizedrifle platoonis designated tiey covcr the cntire companyfront and have interthe lockingfire with adjaccntunils. main suppo( platoonand i! stationedbehindthe two c Antilark and anti nucled faclorsarc tlle prinlary forward s€curily platooru.thc conrpanycommandcr in thc companydefense plan.Theplanis remainswith this platoon, which may act asa rescrve. considerltions organized for atl-lroundantitanl defcnsein the critical (2) Tle two foNard platoonsact as the outpost se0torof the tcrruinnecessary for stabilizationof the line. The companyoommandef coordinates thc tuesof compai) sronts poinr. Thc anriranl dcfcnse i5 a theseplatoonswith units on the llanks. coordinatedbari€r and {irc systen conrislingof the (3) Ficld securitypostsmannedby rcinforccd antilankrocketlounchers of eachplatoonand attached riflc squadsare placcdforwrrd of tlle outpostIine to antitanl gunsandtanks. provid€early wardng. d. Antiaircnft and CBRdefenscplansarc organizcd (4) The conrpanyactingasa sccurityforcewithin accordrncewith the battalionplan- Thc company comrunder assignsthc nission of cngaginglow-flying aircraft 1o pcrsonnelmanning automatic wcapons. 128. ConduclOf TheDefense antidrcraftand Prrticuiarstressis placedon maintaining a. Th€ missionof repeling enemyrcconnaisanceand chcmical/radiologicllalcrl. supportingoutpostsis hrndledby specialydcsknated d. Changcslo terrain fealuresarc measrrred, and weuponsfiring from then dtemate positions.Surprise refercncepointsenicredo lhe platoonand company closcran8elucs repclsmallcnemyforlesandreconnaisnre plans.lf naturalrcfer€ncepointsee lacking,the sanccunits. L€rg€encmy forccsde eng'aged by machine companyconrmander establishes artificialones which guns,long rangcmtitanl weaponsand rttachcdtanks, are conccalcdfrom cnemyobsenation.Thoselaatur€s aI of which lue from their riternate positions.Sone of within rhc companystrongpoint which miShrserveas tlesepositionsmaybc locatedIorwardof thc FEBA. good rcferencepoinrs for th€ encmyafe dcstroyediI D. During thc enemyartillcry prcparation,company fcasible. personrcl remain under covcr, with or y rnachine I Belweencompanics.therc are inlcrv.ls varying gunnc and observcrs remainingat their posts.When accordingto the terrain. The companycommander enemy artillcry fircs shilt to engagetargets in thc enrurcsthat coordinationis madc with units on the brtlalion rear area,company pe$onnel in the foNard Ilanksto coverintcn,alsbetweenunitswith fire,patrols, positionoccupytheir stationsand meet the assaulting enemyvith file. As tlle encmyapproaches the FEBA, & Time permiuing, dummy fortifications and the intcnsity of fire is increasedto break up the assault. observationpostsare employedthroughoutthe comr. Should the encmy pcnetratcr oompanystrong prny strongpoint in order to misleadthe en€myas to poinl, personnel continueto def€ndtheir assi$cdarers thelocationsofthe companypositions. and attempt to dcstroy lhe p€netration by fire. The i. Thc company may bc given dr€ mission of battalion second echelon€ompany(reseryc)or tle providings€curityforwardofth€ FEBAasan outpostof reserve is committedaginst thebreakthrough. a5 a securitycompanyof a battalio. detailedas an d. Should the cnemy arsaultbe repclled, the com. a sccuritysector, pany outpost.Thc outpostforce is assigned commandcrconcentnteshis firc on the encmy ,onc. The a defensivcposition and a reconnaisMnce attacking the adjacenlconpany. Whentimc permits,he reinforcedcompanyreceiv€sa secudtysectorof oneand redistributeshis llring positions, shifts key weapon onc'half to two kilometersin width and conducts locations,ordcrsthc repair of trcnchesand obstacles, patrolsto d depthof fivekilomcten.The reconnaissance rcplenishesammunition ard prepar€sfor further enemy reinforccdplatoonstheir companycommanderassigns attacks. and sectors,dcsignates the oulpost line of rcsislanc€ indicalesthe stuongpointsofthe defensc.
78
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79
SectionV. WITHDRAWAL 129. G€neral d. A with&awalmay be cmployedto occupymore favorabledefensivcpositionsor to consolidatetho defense. Thc withdrawalof forcesin contactnomally consisrsof two stages:disengaScmcnt and retftcmcnt. ,. The withdrawal order specifics t}te route(s) of withdrawal,formation,and intefmediatcdelayingposi tates place tions. Whencverpossible,disengagement suddenlyat night or during othef conditions of limitcd visibility and on ordcr of higherheadquarten.
,. The companies(ninus dcsignatedplatoons)of the fiIst echelonbattalion withdraw on order through the positionsoccupicdby tlle baitalionof lhe regimcnial secondechelon.Thc secondcchelonbattalionbecomcs the covering force for th€ regiment after the detachmentsleft in $e forward ,Jea withdraw throughit. c. Under cover provided by the secondechelon baltalion,thc reinforccdplatoonsrejoin thcir compa. nies, and thc fint echelon brttalion(s) comrlencesrle
131. R.tirement l3). Disensasemont
a. buring thc reliemenr,a mororizedrifle company a The disengagemcntof the main body of the may be asipcd r rear.llank. or adlanccguardmission. platoons, In such a rol€ it would be r€inforcedwith a ilery, fi t-echelon bathlion is covercdby designated tank, andengincers. rcinforcedwith tank, adllery, mortars,lnd engineers. dtitank weapons, b. Duringany withdEwal,a "scorchcdearth"policy The covering force, consistingof ihese platoons, and norrnally led by the battalion command€r,remainsin is stricdyfolowed; people,livestockrnd equipmentare positionand scckrto preventthe enemyflom lcarning evacunted,roads,bridges,conmunicationslincs and andsupplicsaredcstroyed.Obstaclcs Shouldthe otherinstallations of the withdrawalby continuingoperations. including booby tr.ps and minesar€ usedto delaythe enemy attack, the higher cornmand may mount a the or nuclear strike before disengaging counterattack occursunderprotectionol main body. Dsengagemcnt the coveringforces,artillery fif€s, andsmoke.
80
secrion Vl. RELIEFlN PLACE 134. command
132. Generll
The relief of the companyis normally accomplishcdat The commanderof the companybeingrelievedcxcrcises ni8ht. In ord€r to acquainthinsclf with lhc dispositions control until the relief is completed.Should lhc enemy and d€f€ns€plan of the co'npany he is to rclicvc, lhe attack whilc lhe relief is in process, the rclieving cornmander of the relieving company analyses lhc company. undcl tlle command of the outgoing comdefens€swith his platoon leadcrs and mcssengcn.H€ marder, assjstsin rep€llingthe attack. receivcsthe availableinformation about the enemyand his dtpositions and studiesthe systemof outposts, 135. Conductof the Rolief distribution At the appointedtime lhe companycommsnderwho is def€nseinstallatioff, obstaclcsand passagcs, security, and raldng ov€r the defensebrings up his companyto the of liring points,roads,comrnunications, pohts. In r€lief areaby conc€alcdroutes.The relief is carriedout the p.otection of the flanks aod limitirg coordination with th€ outSoingcompafly conunander, succ€ssivelyby platoons. Cuid€s from the unit to be he plansthc relicf. reli€v€drn€et their rcplacementsat designatedlocations and lead them to their d€fensiy€positions. The com133. Actioff of the OutgoingCemmander manderof the outroingcomparytums over0 skctchof The companycornmandethandingovcr the defense th€ def€ns€s,defensivc installations, permancnt communicationsfacilities, and rcserveammunition on hand. indicatesthe fo owing to hi' subotdinates: for transferring the d€f€ns€. The platoonsof the outgoingcotnpany,havingtumed a. Procedures over their strong points, asemble in designatedarcas. D. Asscmblyarea(s)aficr thc relicf: mearures The outgoitrg company withdraws aftcr thc new comc. Deception pany has occupi€dtlrc dcfenses,after a ch€ckhas been ofguides d D€signation posts. conhol of l@ations for traffic nade on the functioning of cortununicationsandliaison e. Designation for starting completing the transfer. Mth supporling artillery, and after the outpostshavc and t The time posted. After thc relief, the n€w company procedures followed in the event of an been to be & The maintains th€ sameroutinc and lev€l of actiyitics that enemyattackwhil€the reliefis in Process.
8l
^l
CHAPTEB 9 . T H EM O T O B I Z E D B I F L EC O M P A N Y OPERATINU G N D E BS P E C I A C L ONDITIONS Section1. GENERAL 136. lntroduction Ile Soviet aptroach to the conduct of combrt opcrrtions in specialenviro nenls is to cnploy regular units wilh few TO&ti modificatiols. Thc notorized rifle company is expected to operat€ undef various condilions of lerrain ,nd wcrtncr. Therefore,Soviet docifine
coversa nrmber of operationsconductcdundcr specid conditions in whch details of tactics, proccdures. tecl]niqu€s, materiel dnd training nuy difter fronr normrl operations.This chpter describespeculiaritiesof cmployment of the motorlzed dfle company in slccidl
Sectionll. OPERATIONS UNDEBEXTREIV]E WEATHER CONDITIONS
.t
137. Operationsin Snow and ExtremeCold
139. Doctrine
The desreeof snow and cold can havea nrajoreffect on operations.Fof example,ir is difficult ro move or lool when snow cover reachcsa depth ol15-20 ccnlnncicrs dnd irnpossiblc to movc (unaidcd) whcn lt rerches a depth of 40 cenumeten. Althoush whe€ledlehiclesand tanks cdn normJly ope.ale i! snow 1040 centimeten deep, dccp snow covcr conplicrles mrneuver, thereby incfcasing the lactical nnportancc of roads and arcas with insigailicant accumulationsof snow. Deep snow also nrakesodenration and canrouflagcdifticull, while imp.oving visibility by day and niglt in clear weatlrer (although snotvblindnessbeconresa real problen). Deep snow dso reducesthe effectivenessof high explosile she s, mines,:rnd nonpersistenipoison gff, whilc iJrcrcasing lhc thcrnal radiation cffccl from nuclcar extlosions. Lxtreme cold jncreasesthc imporrance of shcltcr, hindcrs thc construction of dcfcnses,makes rivcrs and srvampspassable,(ice 60 centimete^ dnck wili hold a medium tank), rest.ictsair sutport, decreases the rangc of bulcis and sh€lls,und rcduccsthc abiliiy to lielr rfhen err nuffs and crps ,lre wom.
Sovicr doctrine stressesthat the wilter is no obstacleto a well trained unit- The coEecl evdLlaliondd exploilalion ol the specid winter leatures and adoption of nccessarycounlerneasurcs,such as spccialcdlouflage, warning, mainienanc€,and supply measurcs,pcrmits the assjgnmentof the sdre missions as in the sunxner, alihough ai reduc€d raics oI specd. Offensile rnd defensiveliontages and depths arc oftcn grcaterin the winter. Doctnne st.essesthat long wintef nights, snowfalls, blizzards, fogs and st.ong frosts can be used to achievesurprise.and afford the opportunity for rnajor successes by bold and carefully preparedforces. Opcrations to wear out Lhe cnemy by denynlg him shcltcr, desiroying supplics and instrlations and cuiiing conmrlnications,Je of pariicular importancc. Dccp infill.ation raidsare carriedou! by speciallytraincd troops.
138. HistoricalPe|spective Durnrg World Wa! lI, the Sovietsprefered to cary oul major offensives in winter becausetheir troops were equippcd and traincd lbr it. Casualiicsfrom ihc cold were the exception in the Soviel tumy. Soldiers with liostbite were severelypunished.A typicd expcdienl lbr prcparinglanesthrough forestscoveredwith deep snow was to ofganizerclays of about 1.000 nren, moving ien abreasl,to namp down thc snorv.
140. Equipmentand Training d. The motorized rifle company receives spccial e q u i D m c n ar n d l a n i n s r o c d | y o u r w i n r c o o c r - i o r J . The company is issuedprotective goggles,specirl cloth ing, footwear. waaning tents.skis.specialiubficanis, and hcating and lighiing cquipncni. To incrcasethe crossco ntry capabiiity of velxcles,chains ar€ used, APCS carry extra sandbags,while lanks carry woodenbeams. Trcadway bridgcs md mats arc prcpared.and entrenching tools issued.Cr€w-servedweaponsatached to the company ar€ equilped wirh ski/sled mounts. ski facks are constructcd on ihc sidcs of A?C\. Weaponslre cledned, g.eascd, and prcprrcd lbr liring al low
83
,. Some unitr which habituallyoperatein winter climates havcthe mcdiumcaterpillartractor,GT-S(CAZ 4?) of theinrproved cat€rpilhrtractorCT.SM(GAZ-?l) in lieu of APCS.Tlese vchiclesrre not armored,bul thcir very low groundprcssuremalcs them idealfor marshyor arcticrcgions(Fis re 64). Thescvehicles havc b€enusedas reconnaissance vehicles andprimemovers for l2onun mortan ind anti.tankguns.Thereis also! hcaly caleryillartractor,GT-T with twicethe payload of the GT-SM,and which h usedby thc Sovietsfor I variely of rolcs. The chassisof the GT-T forms the basis for the ncw arnloredartillerytracto4APc,the M1970. .. Trainingfor winleroperations is intcnsive. Drivers arc trainedin the operatioD andmainlenance ofvchiclcs underwinle. conditions. Penonnelaretaught10moveas ski-drawnand tank'borncinfartry, and to lir€ while movingon skis. Thcy arc truincdin crossingtrenches wilh rhc help of skj polcs.and in c'awlin8rnd running on skis.Menaretaughthowto prevenlfrostbite.to care and cleanthcir cquipment.andcamouflag€ lechniques.
:l]
Figure64. GT-Sand GT-SMvehicles. 141. Offsnse
(2) Determiningtrafficabiliiyand the cap bility oI mountedanddismounted operations in snowandicy
a As a rule, thc deciSon-malin8proccssrcmainstlrc in hisestimate of &e situation samein winter.However, (3) Organizing specia.l reconnaissance to locateicc the company cornmanderconsidc.sa number of holes, snow banks and othef obslacles. peculiaritics commonto rvinteroperations. Amongtlesc (4) Prcparir8for the clearingof routes.Open terrain is favoredin ile attackbccause the soowis less (l) Preparing andcamouilaging warmingsheltcrs deep than in wooils, ravines, depressions, etc. for personnel andequipmentin the assembly area.
84
.! prorec on). Altach€d trnks would pre.ede thc inlanll-v and eachrank would tow one oI moresqurds(liigure66) A?Cs wouldfollowat a distanceof tlp 1050 nreten behind Lhc nt-anrD and suptort by l-rrc.By alta.king in sucha maDner,si ultaneousarnval ofunks and iJnanlty at rhe assaultline is assurcd.Ai the assault line. the towcd (Figure inlanlrymcn rcleasethe ropes or crbles. lbrm m assault added crnphasis Reconnaissmcc rcceiv€s ,. rerm xssignedro 1e Linemd aiiack h coordinationwith the tdks. Attachcd 65). Frequently.rhe reconnaissance bartalion 1s augrnenredby pcrsonnel fl(nn each of the crew-seryedwcapons arc mounled on deds a d rdved firsr echclon attack oompanics.Up lo a platoon fronl e- When thc snow is dcc!, ih€ infantry mly aftack cach ot th€sc companies may be assigncda combat reconnaissancenission. Helicopten often assist by nrountedon ranks(Figur€ 67). Squadlcadcrs,posjrioned transporiing deep patrols and by augnenting ll.rnk behind the tank turels, rnainlain communicationswith the tark commnders o|cr ihe tank intefconD- At th€ proper time the squdd lcadcr notilles rhe tank conr nranderto slow down and ordcrs his squad to jump off , d k . t t . . q u a d, 1 . c 1r r o \ e ' b F h i l J r h Ft : r t . r,rre I During rhe battle behind the FEBA, ski troops and ianks attack stft g poinis liom thc flanks and rear. J p p u r . J b ) I n u | I J\ l n d o r i i l e ) . R * u n l r . s r f p r s conductcdby dcsignatedsquadsor platoons. s. Thc pursuii nray be conductedby lroops |tou tcd in AtCs; horvcvcr, in deep snow. the cornlNny cornmander mdy scnd }ns APCS by road and mount lxs infaniry on attach€d lanl$ and codtinue the pul$rir. W l . e nr I e ' e - r e 1 " r " . d . . L h .t r s u r . o . t e e n e r , !r , ; n . lank-borneinfantry might be at an rvciagc speedol8-12 (5) Furnishing p(ieclion iionl ihe cold and supplyinghoi food and drink. (6) i-rranging for rrpid bartlefield evacurtionirnd protcction from rhe cold fo[ casualties.Higlcr hcrdquartersmay provide dog sled telns and hclicopierstor
r!
142. Defense a. The depth of snow and ihe cold affect defensive posiiions (Figure 68). The FEBA is s€lectedclose to Figure65. Motorizedrifle companycommander with conductingreconnaissance nalural wintef obstacles-Ir deep snow, ice is used !o subordinateand attachedcommanders. ibrm slippcrybanksin liont ol the delensesand to build
c. The motodzedrjfle conrpanymay atlack on a frontageof up to 1000 mererswith all threephtoons However, abrcirsr anda rcinlorccdsquadin feserve. due nror€ to thc fact that wintcr opcrarions makemaneuvef are olicn difficult (espeoialyin deepsnow), res€rv€s largcrthanundcrnornal operatingconditions.A battaLionoperatingin deepsnow.may attackin one€chelon in reservc. andmainrainup 1oa conrpany d ln nonnuclcalcondiiions,the motofized rifle companyoften attacksdismounted and on skis(du.ing nuclear conditionsthey would remain nounlcd lbr
?
r b o \ e B r ' ' L n .r . r f h . . i n $ " r n p \ d I e , . .D L r i l C p u longed opefations.special snow-clearjngoperationsare organized !o keep mirefields and odrer obstacles ,. ln deep snow lionlagcs may be increas€d.The motorized riflc company nray be assignedr fronmgc ol up to 1.000 meters,rnd plaioons up to 500 n1elen.wi$r grps up to 300 mereN betweencompanicsand up ro 200 nretersbetweenplatoons. .. in organizinga defensiv€positior in ure snorv,tne . u r r p - r ) 1 ' r ' r . n J L r h l e . e r r sI p r c p l n . i o n ' i n addition to lhc nolmal ones:
85
(l) To aid thc construclionof dcfensive po$uons, (4) Wulningsh€trers _ u€ construcrcd. thc atrongcst delenscs !re placedalongroadsandin ureas d.- Engineerruppurt ro the companyis increa!€d. wiLh lighr snow cover. Poputited rrcrs and fur€sts (^ ombatcngineeause explusi\echnrges tu corarrucr provideshclterandareofrenused$ strongpoints. trenchesand shelters.AlCs usenaruralcovcror Lrcncnes (2) nanks arc srrengrhencd to counrerski-borne ar-econsrructcd for rhem.TaJ*saredugrn wir}l rhc.id altack. The secondcchetonlrcservelcompan)anq/ur or tiutldozcr a(achmenlr. Tank and ApCs are Oe ballaUonrese.vc may bc suppljedwirh skis. camouflagedwith winter camouflagesets. (3) Atlached tanks and artillcry areprovidedwith . specral equlpmenl to improve their cross_conntry mobility.
Figure66.Tankstowing infanry.
Figu1667. Tank bolne infantryattackingin winter.
Figure6a. Motorizedrifletroopsin a winte.defensiveposition. riencein dcsertoperations.The 6th Currds Tant Anny JI of drc problemsof desert D€se( operationsmay be chancterizedby tlrc lack of in prticular encountered Mongolia. Today, desert warfare movcment in dcvclopedroad networks,difficulty of movemcnlin najor feature of thc tnining programs sand,salt marshes and sanddunes,Linitedamountsof techniquesare a military districtscncompassing desertregions. in those Frequentwinds waterand fuel, andhigh temperatures. include thc Turkestan,Centrul Asian, Transbaikal These andduststormsinterferewith movementandadversely Far East nilitry districts as wel as the Mongolian affect comunications capabiiitiesand equipm€nt.At and People's Republic. night, t}te abiasiveeffect of dust on equipment,dif143. Operations in the DesertandExtremeHeat
ficulty in orientalionand crmouliageJnd a nurnberof olher factors exert a substanlinlinfluenceon dle actions of personnel and t]rc use of equipment in r dcse.t envi.onment.The desertalsoposesproblensfor CBR In a sandydesertregion,the levelof radiation defense. h a radioactivecloud is frequentlytwo three times higher thar in soil havingplant cover.Strongdust clouds to menandequipmay bringsecondary contamination, ncnt. Duc io .he extuemeheat dudng the day t.oops can safely wear their insulrted CBR protcctive clothing aoronly 15-20minutcs.
145. Doctrine
a. Sovict offensive doctrine for desert operations on a broad front, on nrultiple stressesreconnaissancc of latgeSapsir axesand in gear dep$. tlc cKisrence tcamsto the encrny'sdefenseenablesreconnaissance conduct deep pencirationmitsions.Us€ is rnade of penonncl.As a helicoptcrsto transportreconnaissance flrlc, units attack on a wider ftont and have deeper objcctives than in other types of terrain. Moreover attention is given to ensuretbal attackingrcgimenisand battalions can operate independerdy. A large part of 144. HinoricalPerspective availableartilery, engineer,and chemicaltroops are During the 1945 Manchudan Campaign against th€ attrched to ihem- Auxiliary communicationnctworks Japancsc,illc Sovict Army gaincd coNiderablc expc- may be sct up to maintain communicationswitl wid€iy dispersed units. 87
,. For a dcfense in thedesert,stong secondechelons r47. Offense are crcatedand disposedin geater depth In thc desert,the motorizedrifle companyusua[y and reserves thanundcrnormalcondilioDs. The battalionfrontageis altacks in one cchelon. A batlalion usLlrlly deploys in the samc as under normal conditions,except when companycolumnsat a distanceof 12-15km from the In the later FEBAandcompanics occupyinS a secondary avcnueof approach. deployinlo platooncolumnsat a case,the companiesand platoonswould defcndon a distanccof thr€eto five kilomcters-Depcndingupon the widerfrontage. statc of the dcfenses,the companyattacks either mounted or dismountedbehindattachedamor, and 146. Trainins pressesthc attack rapidly (Figure70). Trrining corcentrrteson basiccombatskills,landnavigation(using dnection.i ryros ai well ar mapsand 148. Delense other cquipneno in desert terrain and spccialired The motori/edril'lc companyon lhe dcfenseoccupies procedures (Figurc69). Physical mdntenance trainingis the samefrortagc as during normal operations,except also st.cssed. Enginecr, chemical, artillery, tanl, and whcn posted along a secondaryenemy avenueof infantry forcesconductspecinlized aswell ascombincd approach. Normally the defensc is organizedin one armsilaining.Coordinated hclibomeandgroundassault echelon. In organizing the defensive positions d operations in thc deserthavebcenreportcdin thc Soviet reinforcingthe wallsof foxioles.ltenches.communica press. dons trenchesand slrclters,usc is made of sandbags, Shcltersand dugoutsareusuallyofa mats,and fascines. light type. Siocksof arununition,waterand fuel arc built up. Weaponsandvchiclesarc regularlychcck€dand
ir
Figure69. [4otorizedri{letroopstrainingin the desert.
88
l'
LEVELSANDY
taEs€RvEl
7gq14r, *aorii . -.RTFIECO $ooE'
6
j
/++-\
6
vo".r,"a,tn" in rhe.ttaci
/n
\e/
ei.torc.d bvranks, "o.pany,
fi-t;--1
A
uotoiz"arrn.cmp.ny inrheatt cr
<-t|-rro'
Motoizeddn. comp.nyin m€rchcol|)mn
-=A
antp.e.nel
min6neld
--a---a- P.sgE lhreuqh.n aniiperionnelminetuld
l22Dm halEsr oberyadon pon
FigureTO.Reinforcedmotorizedriflebanalionattackingin rhe desen.
90
"lt AND SWAMPS Sectionlll. OPERATIONS lN FORESTS
2
149. General
151. Doctrine
ln lightly wooded areasoperationsre conduclcd in a normal manner- Howevef. thictly wooded arcas considemblyhrder thc conduct of tactical operatio's. Decausepiatoons,companies,and battalions must often operate independently in such t€rrain. the Soviets believ€ that decisiv€nessand boldnessare pa(icululy irnporiant. Op€rating in heavily fofesred and swampy terrain is characterizedby tle fo owing: d. Difficulties in observltion,onentdtion, and adjust-
In order to maintain rilpid .ates of advancc,Soviel doctrine stresscsthe bypassingofheavily forcsteda.easHowever, when such tcrdn must be negotialed, rhe Sovietsitfess thc usc of motonzed rifle rroops as fint echelon fo.ccs, wiih tank units lo owing. Regimental m d b d I J , u 1 g i o L p : . r e i n i o r c - d$ i r h : r n i ] l e r ye. n s i n c c r : . and chemicaitroops opeute on independentaxes.Tanks in motorized rifle regirnentsarc attached to battalions for closesupport. ln nucleu ope.ations,use is rnadeof tre€ blow-down in areas that will not inhibit future operrtions- In the defcnse,cnphl]Sisis placedon swift counteraitacks, oltcn by smdl] forces. Defenscsarc orgrnizedin depth and to provide all-aroundsecuriiy.
b. Compleniy of coinmnndand control. l]. Magnficd baricr cffccts r€sulting ftom the cmploymcnt of nuclearwcapons. d. Difiiculty in usingwire'guidedATGNIS. e. Abundanceofnatural obsracles. I Possibility of fofest fues. a. Concealnrentfrom aerialobservation. l. Greal rcLiancc on smdll unil leadership md initialivc. To overcome the problerns of lighting in foresled or swanrpy terain. speci trrining is required. P.oblem! may also be overcomeby proper use of tefrain, since excellenrcover and concealmentexist for the dtlackcr as as lveli as the delender. 150. HistoricalPenpective Dunng World War ll, thc Soviers conducted Duny successfuloperalions ngxinst thc Gcrrnansir forested, swamly terrain. The Soviels favorcd forcsts for approach nurches and assembly areas. oulskiJts of woods wcre uscd as ailack positions.Artillery and lanks moved ihrough forcsted areasconsideredimpassibleby ihc Germans-Such an operation occurrcd in June 1944 in a tracklessforest erst of Lvov. Although the German pmzer division commanden in the dreaconsidcrcdrhe foresl impcnctrablefor Soviettanks, a Sovietiank corps, aided by engineerswho lxid corduroy foads acrossthe swanrps, successfuly lassed thrcugh thc arca. The Soeietswcrc also adcpt at choosingand forlifying forcsr positions which cost the Ccrn ns healy casualties. Imporiant appfoaoh routes w€re blockcd by machine guns and aniitanl rveaponsechelonedin depth. Butke6 we.e p(nected by mincficlds and snipers.Bunkersand dcfcnse instalations wer€ so well camouflagcd that tlr€y were rarely spotled.
152. Ofiense a. During thc approach march and auack in heavily wooded or swrmpy lerrain, e motorized riflc conr pmy attacks as pdrt ol the battalion (Figure 71). It normally enploys the wedge fornrtion at shortened intcffals and distllnces,and under covcr ol two-nan combatpalrols. Thcsepalrols, maintainingvisuaicontact with their parent udt, t*e up positions to thc front, flank and rear of thc compaiy. MtI his usualreinforcemenl ,nd support when leadingthe attack, the company conmander usesautomatic fire to comb the woods. lf m FO rs assigned,he moves with the company conrmander in the lorward platoon ard adjusts atillery fire by dncct obsc ation. ,. Tllc company comnmder ules plldselines to aid in coordinaiion and control. Visual marken and the dtections to iniabitcd arcasare placedon roads,lanes, and in clearings. Platoon lcrders use azimutlrs and pre-arranged codcs1br designatingthen posilions. c. Closc suppod tank and antitank guns normally folow and supporl the infintry. A tank platoon may be liagmcntcd, with one tank moving with each platoon. Attrched oombat engineersare given missionsof cstablishing passages throughfo.ests,roadblock, and swampy d. Prior to the attack, the battdlion commander attachcsmost of thc availablcartillcry, mortaJs,trnks, a n . I u n \ w c r p u n , .a n d e n g i n e e rr\u L L ed f l e ( o m p a n j e r . Ihc cornpanv cotunrndcrs usualy maintain a smdll rcscflc. In an atlack on an cncmy dcploycdin a wooded area, tuing positions located on the edgeof the woods
91
are the first to be alsaulted.To aid initially in navigation a and control, the companycommmder designates guideplatoon,andplatoonleadcnassigna guidcsquad. ln the depth of a forest,the companyarcmpb both shalowanddeepcnvelopmcnts of lhe enemypositions. Fu[ fire support is utilizcd. Tanls and antitanl guns cngagecnemy weaponslocatcd on roads and lane!.
Designatedrifle units consolidate and defend seized roadjunctionsand lancs.Suchjunctionsmay be scized by helibome forces movinSaheadof ihe main attack. The attacking troops continue forward, destroyingor roulingth€ cnemyforcesuntil the objectivcs aretaken. Companyand battalion rcseflesarcmaintainedto defeat en€mycounlerattack.
1STMOTORIZEO RIFTE
(EY <-F-6
Motoizedille plaroontn DErchcolumn
@
J-
uorori.earirreco.panvinlrr€anack
_010. 6
@ ffi
D.f6.siv€ po3iio n
Morodzeditle companv,reinlorcedby b.ts,
,".-.on*0".",, Bulding
Figure71.Reinforcedmotorizedriflebattalionattackingin forestedswampyterrain.
92
r53. Delcms
construct rangc.As time permits,attachedengineers path probablc in the of €nemy advancc. a. The defenseof a battrlionin a forcstis basedon a obs.aclcs guns Antitank are kept well forward in or between systemof fir€s of fortificd companystrongpoints,a platoon positions the company. Monds ale 1o support systemof natural,nd camouflagcd artificialobstacles, posilioncd in clearings to the rcar of the lorward units so ambushes, and counterattacks. Dcpending on the situa. on thc tion, the FEBA is either organted in front of thc forest that then fucs can be brought to beareffectively or scvcralhundrednetcrs insidethe foresi.ln thelattel attackingenemyforces. e As the enemy attack develops,weaponsare ca!€,outposts,scrcening detachmcnts and sA-7gunncrs disruptand halt bis ar€ deploycdalongthe edgeof the woods.Thc batta- brought to bear to disorganizc, bcforehe reaches the conpanyposition.Should lion's secondecheloncompany(rcscrve)is normaly advancc is deployed ncar roads, lanes or openings.Though the enemypenetntethe position,a stubborndefense forces can cngage maintained until countcrattacking perineter prepared organizedfor dcfens€,it is also to counteraltack anlr/hcrein $e batlalion\ defensive area. him. Companysnipcn conc€ntrat€on officc$, machine weaponscrcws,andsnipers.In forests,hand-to' Someartilery may be attacfied to compeies and uscd Sunners! hnnd conbat is commonduc t6 the restrictedfield5of primarilyfor diect fire. Tanks,rntitank weapons, and poor visibility. fire and sef-propclled artillery conduct counterakck with the rcservesor are ritachcd to the first echcloncomeaniesto 194. rcinforce th€ir antitank capability. ,. Normaly, a company defensiveposirion in Tle conplexjtiesof fighting in swmpy and forest€d forcstcd areasconsistsol a preparedand camouflaged areaswould posedefinit€ problemsfor dle Soviet small strong point near or at thc edgeof th€ forest. Tarlksand unit lerder,particuhrlyin the arcasoI maprerd$g and APCSa.e positioned near roads or fire lancs with the cxercisinginitiative. missionof engaging encmytzn[s andA]fs at ma-\imum
lN MOUNTAINS S€ctionlV. OPERATIONS 155. eneral
(3) Fluchrations in weather. (4) wea. and tcar on equipmcnt,incrcased fuel 4 AlthouSh spccialized mountain hfantry toops andlogisticalrequicments. may exist in thc Sovi€t Amy, all motorizedrifle toops consumption, (5) Reduccdratesofadvance. are expectedto be able to opcratein the mountains. (6) Slidcsandtloods. During such operations,ihey may leavemuch of thcir (7) Dfficulty in bypassing zoncso[ chemicaland a brcalttuough armor andhcavyequipmentbehinduniil mdioactive contamination. until valley or plateau has bcen achievedor a widc has b€€n rcached. At such timcs, normal offensive and defensive operations would be conducted. Prior to 156. HistoricalPl6pective corducting mountain operationsttroops would receive DuringWorldWar ll, the SovietA[ny gaincdvalrable specidequipmentand,timc permitting,additionaltrain- experiencein mountajnoperationsin tlrc Transcaucasus, mg. Far East,and EasternEurope.Someof thcseoperations 6. Cumbat uperationsin mountainousleoain ale involved the usc of parachutiststo seizeard hold key banp€redby: mountainpasses,road junctions,airfieldsand supply (1) Thenumberandconditionof roa&. installations.Mountain training techniquesandexercrses (2) Thc screening effect of mountains on ar€ conducted today, particularly in the Transcaucasus electronicequipment. region.
157. Docarine
(evenwhensurrounded) .nd vigoruus counterartacks by forcesaredso strcssed. sccondcchelonandreserve
ln mountainous terrain, offensiveswill often bc conducted when troops ar€ in contact,sincet]rc terain 158. EqoipmentandT6inins limih the posribility of rapid deploynent frorn the for conduc! march. I}le oflcosive is launchedby regimentaland/or Specialequipment,nd tlainingb necessary battaliongoups operatingon severalarcs (mainlyn ing mountainopcrations.Suchequipmentrangesfrom to andtowingcablcsfor tra€kcdvehicles vall€ys,alongroadsandddges).Heliborneandairbome blocks,spades forcesareusedto seizcdcep objectives. Communication 76rnm mounlainguns,other light artiLlcrypieces,and betwecnseprratcdunits is accomplished by statlcand l60rnm mortars u lieu of heavierreginrcntaland artilery (Figure 72). Additional radiosand mobile communications means,to includethe useof divisional hclicoptcnnre dlso spccinlly equipp€d helicopters. Extensive use is dso sp€cillly equippedcornmunications madc of combat engincerswho are attacheddown to used. Special clothing aid rations are also issu€d. platoun lcvel. A delensein a mounrainousarea is B€causethe soldicrt encr$/ rcquiremcnt will be in4,000-5,000calories.p€r day,hiShcalorie,light organizedto cover possibleaxes of attack, particularly cr€as€d those which may be used by armof. Phtoon and wcight foods not rcquiringlcngtly cookingor lnrge CBR equipmentis corDpanystrong points arc mutually supportingand expenditureof watcl areadvocatcd. soldiersreceivea secondchemicaldeprovidefor atl-arounddefense. Patrollingis coDducted also increased; b€tweengapsin the d€fenscsand in the flank dnd rcar contaminationkit. Personnelare lrainedto ovcrconrc to firc underdifficult wealhercondi. areasto prevent flmldng movcmcnts.Sovict doctrin€ variousobstacles, shessesthc useof nuclearand ch€micalwcaponsin thc tions to orient lh€mselves,especiaUywhcn vjsibility is and to u* naturalcover(l-igulc73).Driversarc defense,particulay againsttroopc in n"Jrow val€ys, UmiLcd. gorgcs,and passcs. Tenacious dcfenseof strongpoints tau€htfo ascendand desccndsteepgndcsand to ford
gun,M1966. Figure72. 76mmmountain 94
'l (2) Act as m envelopinsforce of a battalion or regrment. (3) Conductheliborneopennons. .. The motorizedrifle comprny missionin mountainousrenrn moslofrenmcnLioncd b\ dreSo\ierpres,i" a flanking or envelopncnt opcntion. ln such a rolc, tlre companymay be given any of the folowing tasks: destroying nuclear delivery means, seizing critical heighrs. crosiings. roadjuncrions. and nrounlairpas{s in the€n€myrear areasandon his flmks, andretaining Tle e,rmpany rhemuntillink up wirf lhemainforces. is with lisht aftilery, mortar!, engin€ers and reinfofced other subunits and is supportedby th€ artillery of the
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d Normaly thc motorized.rifl€companyattacks carnen.JIdmovesalongroads(Fignountcdin personnel initial assaultbecomes impossible dueto ure 74)- tf the enemyfire or tlrc inabitity of tlrc vchiclesto dcploy, thc troops dismountand atlempt lo outfiank the eneny positions, whilc tllc tanls support by firc. Artack frontagesand fornations depend on ihe terain. ln a narfowvalleyor canyonthe company,-! a rule attacks on a 100-300meterf.ontage.On a mountainplateauor broad valleylhe frontagemay incre$eto 1,000meters in chapters or mofe-Any of the formationsdescnbed 7 and 8 may be used.The conpany commandermay
)
Figure73. lrotorized rifletroopstraining inthemountains. 159- Offense d. Becauseof the Limited routes availablein mountainousterrain,battilions oftcn attack indepen dently, in separalezoncs, moving in one or two echelons.They xre rssigncdmissionsextendingover a of longer period than usual,and rcc€iveattachments howirzcrs,lighi arti ery, mortnn, tanls, chemical,and engineerunils. Amounts and types of attrchmcnts dcpendprimarily uponthe importanceof the battarion mission. ,. The motorizedrifle companymaybe employedto (1) Maintdin conlact with a preparedenemy posiiion. defensive
e. Attachedtank opcratcunconventionally in the nountdns. AlLtmughthcy may precedethe infantry in the attrck, thcy arcoftcnusedin stationarypositionsto supporlallackinginfantrymenby fire. A tmk platoon erch may be fragmcnlcd,with onetank accompanying platoons in attacking of th€ nnto.ized rine company's an obj€ctivefrom differen.dircctions. I Becausethe tcnain in mountainousar€asis often suited for rmbushes,the compdnycommaldcriakes precautionsto avoid being caughl by enemy forces enlrenchedin flankrg positions.Flank securityele' mentsaredispatched whenthe companyis canalized. Thc motorizcd rillc company may move by & helicopterto seizeand defend a key position until link-up is achieved. In sucha situation,the company's APCScome folward with th€ link-up force.
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rm. Defense a The usurl defensive principles appti€d by the Soviets are not significardy rnodified in mountainous terrain. A stabledefensecanbc organizedin a shon time in tenain possessing rivers,vafl€ys,gorgcs,a number of heights, ridges and irnpassablesecton. Troops are normalty d€ployedalongroads,valleys,on flat mountain tops aIId on forward and rev€ne slopes, To protect personneland equipment,ravines,trenches,nanow and deep gorges,tumels and passageways ar€ uled (Figur€
7s). ,. The battalion d€f€nsi\€ sector is organizedinto companyand platoon strongpoints which coveravenues of approach.and ar€ organizedto provide afl-around secudty. Att€ntion is focusedon av€nuesof approach for taDis. At such points, antita ( ard anti,infarhy w€apons are coric€ntrated, Min€fields, rock inpedim€nts, and other obstaclesare inst lled. Duc ro the
lerain's inhbiting €ffecis or radio communicatioff, wide useof wne is made. c. Artillery, mortan, antitank, tank, engheer, ard chemical defense u ts ar€ normaly attached to a motorized rifle compsny occupyiry a forward def€nsive position. Attached mortars and anil€ry are nonnaly placed on reverseslop€s.Fire plansprovidc covengeof defiles, roadjunctioN and streamffossings.Significance is attached to the secudty ard prctection of gaps between strong pohts and at junctiorN. A combit security detachment(nornaly a squad) md listening postsfrom the platoonsffe dispatchedto coy€rgapr d CBR weaponsnay b€ employedby higher headquaners to block the en€myadvanceor in conjunction liith a counterattack. Although some tark fron the regirnentl t Jlk ". ar€ normaly alotted to the fust €chelon battalion battalions, shong counterattack forces de nahtained by 'egimenl and division.Batlalons and compdies maintainsmaler rese e forces,
97
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Fisure 75.Themotorized rifiecompanyjn the defense;n mountainous terrain.
98
t SectionV. WATERBARRIEROPERATIONS ,. SinceWorldWarII, the Sovictshaveconnnuedto place grearenphasis(]4 dl dspe.rsu, riter cro:sine The significanceof a nver as a nililary obstaclcdcpcnds Exercises"D epr" conductedir 1967, operations. upon a trunber of frctors, suchas the width, dcptl, and "Moldau" (1969), "Odcr-Neissc"(1969), "Dvina" speed of the curenti thc avaihbility of fords and (1970),"Brotherhoodin Anns" (1970), "Jus" (1971) bridges;the tralficability oI the dver va ey, banks and and "Shield" in 1972 aI emphasized offensiveopclabedi weathefi and the nature of th€ defenses.The invoived thc crossing of large water tions, and all Soviets classify fivers as narrow (up to 66 nreten), (Figure 76). obstacles medium (up to 333 mete6), md wide (nor€ than 333 161. General
rnete6)- Rivers are classifledby depdr as sha ow (up to onc and si\-tenths inet€rs).deep (up to five mete$) and very deep (norc illan fivc mcters). Current is classified as dow (up to one-halfmeterper second),modcratc(up to one meter per second)or very swift (nore than onc and eighttenths metels pe. second). Soviet military authod wriic that within the luropean theater of operations,riversup to 100 mctcrs wide are encountered every 35 to 60 kiloneters, watcr obstaclesbetwe€n 100 and 300 nreters wide ar€ found every 100 to 150 kilom€ters, and every 250 to 300 kilomet€rs wrter bafriers greater than 300 neters in width wi be cncountered. Soviel equipmcnt, training, and doctrine for dyer cfossing operations reflect World War II e \ p c r i c n c ca, n d r h e i lc u r r e n rJ f f e rc i v ed o c t r i n c .
)
162. HistoricalPelspective
I
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a During World WaJII, the Cennanswerc repeatedly surprisedby tbe speed witn which Soviet units crossed water obstacles.Cfossingthe Dncpr River in 1943, t}le Germanswere able to use only scven existing bridges. one float bndge md one improviscdfcrry in a sector300 miles long. Following closcly bchind lhe Geflnans,tne Sovi€tsdroppedseveralthousandparachutistsov€I a 200 mile long zone in order 1o cstablishbridgeheads.Soon thereafterthey built 57 bddges,9 foot bridgesand other river crossing facilitics for an average of one crossing elery 4 rniles of river (Thc Germansavefased1 crossing per 33 nilet. The rapidity rvith which the Soviels crossedthe Dnepr and other rivcrs, swampsand lakes placed tremendous prcssureon the retreating German forces. The Soviets, usudlly crossingwater barri€m at down cr du\k, used ilrc cover of darkness to the
99
Figure76. Exercise"Dnepr" 1967.
163. Doctrin.
occupicdand fortfied in orderto prcvcnlsurpdscand to subjcct attackcf to flanling fire. Th€ dcfense concentratcs panicularlyon suitablecrossingareasfor enemyforces.Antitankguns,tanks,andmtitanj(guided missilcsare movedcloseto thc bank to destroycncmy armorattemptingto c(xs. Nuclearandchemicaland/or convcntional artilery,air andmisrilestrikesareplanned on the approachesto, the wat€r obstacle and on significant crossingsitcs.
a Soviet doctrine strcsscs the forcing of water obstadesfrom the march on a broad front- Should the sttack from the mrJchfail, thc waterbarricrwouldbc crossedaftcr a shod pcriodof prepararion. Thc Soviets believethat success in suchoperaiions depends uponthe folowing: (l) Reconnaissaftc, to ircludc the oppositeside of thewatcrobstacle. (2) Plannine,bascdupon rcconnaissance reporls andTr.ining and conductcdw€[ bcfore troops reach the eater 164. Equipment d, The BMP+quipped and BTR€quippcdmotorized (3) D€struction of cnerDyforccs on both banks. rille companics(exceptfor thosewith drc BTR 152) (4) Rapidily n lhc arracl. ro includetic seizure have an amphibiouscapabilitywhich doesnot need of undamagcdcrossings,crossingon a broad front, aod augmcntation. The SovietAriny possesses a numberof dcvelopmentof the offensiveon the far bank. racked amphjbianswhich would be u$d in moving (5) Proper orSaniz-rtionof the assaultforces,and BTR-I52s and attached non-amphibious equipmcnt the timely uscof crossingcquipment. (suchas artillery,morlars,etc.)acrolsthe waterobsta(6) Successful overcomingof obstacles, bot}l in cle. Thc 10 ton K6l (GPT) witl a cargocapacityin the water and on the banks. exccssof Iive tons andthe 20 ton PTSwith a capacityin (7) Covcng€of thc crossingsitesand troops fron excessof l0 tons aft id€ally suited for transporting enemyair strikes, non-amphibiousequipmcnl (Figure 77). Medium tanks ,- Thc Sovietsalsostrcssthe useof tacticalh€libornc attachcdto the motodzedrifle compmyhavesnorkeling forcesto achievesurprisc,to seizekcy terrain,andaid deviccsfor crossing waterobstaclcs up to 5.5 meten in ih€ mainrttack. depth.If the wateri! too dcep,tankscrosson bridgcsor c- While CBR and/or conventiond strikes wil be feri€s erectcdby the regimentalor divisionenginecrs. planned agrirst enemy forc€s, the Soviets avoid the ,. The purposeof r'ver crossingtrainingis to train concentrationof their forcesby attackingon a broad unitsto crossa watcrobstacle underdifficultconditions, lront with minimumdelayin approaching and crorsing without slowingtlle attackand to rvoid concentration the water obstacle.Battalion crossingsectorsarechosen of troops. Motorizedrine battalions are nained to cross so that nol mor€ thrn one battalion could be destroyed water obstaclesfrom lhc march. Soldicn are taught to by a medium yicld nuclearburst. The battalion acthg lis follow thc orders of thc crossinScommandant(usually the advancegunrdof tle regitnentwould us€two to the engirccrunit commandet.DriversaretauShthow to thJee company.size crossingpoints. the number of preparcthcir vehiclesfor crossinS operations, and how crossing points might bc increased by succeeding to ncgotiatewater obstaclesby fording andwhcn afloat. Tanl drivers are trained in snorkeling operarionsand d ln the dcfenseof a watcr obstacle,the Soviet! driving over hastily erectedbridgesand only after thcy normally organizethcir main defenseon their sideof the havepracticedunderwaterdrivingarc they considered obstacle.Should defenseof a bridgeheadbe necessary, fuly trained. BMPShave bcen noted firing their main the Sovi€ts would defend on both bank. Islatrdsar€ armamcntduringa watcr crossinS-
100
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Figure77. K-61andPTStrackedamphibious carrierc unloading assauhtroops. 165- Offense
rl
thc attackcrsand 1o conccalthc locationsof thc crossing
d. The molodzed dfle comprny usuJly c.ossesr d- Should d1e near bank be securedby other forces, nve s pari ofa battalion, which may operaleaspad of moiorized rifle company c(xses f.onr ic march as the thc rcgimenlalrnain body or as an advanceguard(Figu.e pan of ihe bdltdion. Movement lo the crossingsite is 78). ln thc lattcr case the company could aci ai the in colLlmn to aid control md rnovement. normally fomard detachmentof the advanceguardmd be lasked to the water obstacle ue nrarked by Approaches to €nsurethe unhindefedadvanceofthe battalion to the to govern engineen. and control points are estabLislied prevent prior n) nrovement congestion. JLlst the and ,. Acting as the forward detachnrentof ihe advance last arer, the clearing the covered and conceal€d APCS guard, the notorizcd riflc conpany would havc attached with approximately 75 deploy on a broad front meters tank, artillcry. AAA, chcmical,and engineerunits. Using js its A?Cs and attachcd tracked amphibians(to nrovethe between vehicles.Conditionspermittjng, this inteNal artil€ry acfoss),the motorized rifle cotrpany would be m " i r l a r n e di n e n r c i n gd r c w o . c rr n d d u r i n gr h e . ' o s s r g . able to reach the river and cross it quickly undef the The crossingof thc company bcgi s on oidcr of the supportingfires of the tanks and arli €ry. By scizingthc battalio! commander with vehicles crossing simulta oplosite shore. the company would ensure the sxle neously on a bfoad ffont. Firing may be conductedfronr APCSduring thc crossing. crossingby thc battalion'smain forces. e. Tanks moving wnh fie molotu€d illc company c. Should the motorized riflc company encounier move inland to establishth€ beachhead.The company resistanceon the near bank. it altacks rnornted (il may either be ordered to organizethe beachheadand possible)in an effort ro seizethe nearbank quiokly and protect it from enemycounleraltackwhile other moto. r " J e r y L h e e n e m \ f e " p p o r r u n i r y r o o r g a j l i . ca ' r izcd riflc units cross, or may conrinue to move forward effectivedcfcnsc,or to destroy existingcfossingsites.If pursue withdrawing to the enemy. Tdnk md other ihc strcngth of the cncmy defenseprohibits a mounted wcapons initiauy rcmaning on lhe near bank dncct-tuc attack, the conrpary dismounh under covcr of arlillcry the flres on largelson the during crossing. increase thei. and rank fire and assaultsthe enemy posilions. Upon far bank. The artillery slifrs i|S fires behind the FEBA. seizureof the nearbank. rvailablcfirc is dnccted against whne Lhc AAA unit covers ihc crossing againsr lorv-lcvcl e n e r n )p o r i r i o n so n r h e f a " b a n k . o c o \ e r r h e f l o s c i n g . Smoke is lypicaly uscd to rcduce dre vulnenbility of
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Figufe78. A reinforcedmotorizedriflebattalionrorcrnga warer barrier
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t A dismountcdmororizcdriile companymay bc off oncefte tanJ(hasemergedfrom rhewater,rherank landcdby helicopterto scizckcy rerrainto assrsrLnc carnot engagein sustained combatunril de-sealinB has crossinSof tfie main body and to fonn a biocking tlten place- a proces lhat takesabout 20 mmures. position to cul off vithdrawing eftrny forces or ro Bccause of th€vulncrabilities prcscnred by deepfording, prcvcnt cncmy rcscrvcslrom counrcrallacking. whcn the Sovietspreferto transfertheirtanksto the opposire sufficientrsrault forceshave crossedover the warer bark by ferry. obstacleand moveclto exploit the crossing, the pcrsonncl cadcrs of thc helibornc unit are brought forward 166. D€r€nse andrhecompanyremountsllndcontinuesrheattack. a. Thc motorizedrifle companycommllnderorga & Expansionand improvementof crossingsitesare nies his dcfcnseon rhebarisola LarefulreLonnaissan,Je left to higherhcadquarrers. Bridgcsin lar8cnumbcrsand of the terrain,the mturc of the riverbanl6,and closc types ee ivailable for rransporting non-amphibious coordination with adjacerrunits. The FEBA is described vehicles. by thc baltalion command€r.The river bank oppositeis i. Wehavenoledseveral vulnerabilities duringSoviet bmught underconcentrated lre at tbe poinrssuitable rivc! cfossingopcrations.txact uossingsitesmay be for a crossingwhil€ the entireriverbank is coveredby prematurely revcalcd by Sovictrecoflnaissancc personncl flanling machhegun fire. Attempts by the cneny !o dlus enabling the dcfcndcr ro take effective reconnotter,to bring up or launchrivcr-crossinS material countermeasures. snorkelslre wlnerableto hostilefirc and equipment,ro cstablisha crossingor actuallyto and may be damugcdprior to the crossinS. Moreover, effect! crossing, aretakenunderfirc (Figurc79). once the tanl is sealedfor a riv€r crossin8 cannor ,. At night, conrbatoutpostsandobservarion posls fight, since the turrel is locked and the main gun tube are s€nt forward to the river banks to detect enemy blockcd.Althouti the snork€lmay be quickly blown
103
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104
2t SectionVl. COMBATlN BUILT-UPABEAS 167. Genefal
169. Doctrin€
a. Combat in built-up areaspresentsproblemsrequiF ing stccirl techniques.A built up arca nray quickly bc strongly loditicd becauscof its conc.ete, slone, brick and stccl structuresi widespreadundcrgrouod plssages and shelters: ll1e abund nce of inflammable materials; rnd the prcsenceof great numbcrsof civilianswho flr y
a. Soviet doctdne, strcssingas i! does high r!te! ol rdvance, seescombal i! buill-up as ufldcsirabl€.This doctrine stress€sthat, whenevcr possible.cities wlll be by-p3ss€d.lf Dis is not possibl€,the city is to be seized rapidly fron] the march, oftcn with thc aid of airbonre and/or heliborne aisaulL troops. An efiort is nude to destroy enenry forces beforc they can forti8 the aIea. Should rapid seizure liom th€ march provc inpossible, thc city wodd b€ blockaded. Nucleaf wcapons would not likcly be uscd on a city through which Sovict forceswanGd to pass. ,. In thc defenscof u lafgc town or cily tie Sovicts are mindlul of thc cllccls of nuclearwcaponsand brse their defcnse on prcventing by-passingof the arcr. Heavily augm€ntcdplatoon and conrpany stfongpoinls form the heart ofthe defensewithin the city, whilc lrrge tank forces initiatly opcrate outsidc the built-up areato countcraltack enemy tbrces allenrpting to bypass th€ city. e In both the offcnse and dcfense. irontlges arc considerablyreduced,and reseflc! naintrincd at !srious levels.Control of suppoding wcrpons is dccentralizcd, with some tanks and artillery attachcd ro infanky platoons and even squads. Up to 50 pcrcenl of a division's drlillery mry be assignedin this maoncr fd utiliz€d in a dtect-fire ro1e. Olher tank and artillely uni$ 'nainlain thcir integrity and tuIfil normal nlssrons. Lngincc. and chenical personnelarc alluched lo companiesand platoons-
D. The Sovicts classify cities as being large (thosc with population over 100,000 and a circunrferenccof about 50 kilometers) av€ragcsize (havinga population of 50,000 and a ctucumfercnceof about 50 kilorneteF). or snull (having! population smallcr thrn 50,000).The forces neededto lake a city dependupon the city's sirc, but would be greatcr than in other comparablcopcra
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.. Sovict open sourcelitcruture makesit clc:lJthat Sovicl plannersunderstrnd the level of urbanizalion in WestcrDEuropet that one or 1wo largc cities wil be encounteredevery 200 to 300 squarc kilomcters and th-atoperationsto over.rn a city can be erPcctedevery 40 to 60 kilometen ofadvance. d. The Sovietsbelicvc urban combat to be charac!€F ized by increaseddifficultics in command and control (and thereforc r need for gealer independenceby subordimte comndders), restrictions on n nuever. observalion and fields of tue, and fragmentafon of a battlc into numerousactions fought by combined arms
168. Hhtoriel Perspective a. To commcnorate thc detef'nined standsnade by Sovici forces at Moscow, l,eningrad, Kicv, Odesss, Volgograd (fornrerly Stating.ad),Scvastopol.Minsk and Novorussisk, these citics have bcen design ted "llcro Cites." The lcrocity and rnrgnitudc of thesc strugles is difficuh to compr€hend. The Soviets suffcred somc 600,000 carualtiesat Slaljngradalone. ,. ln thc off€nsivc tie Soviclsfought a gr€atnumber ol battlcs in built-up areas.According to Soviet {igures, from Decembcr l94l 10 Februrry 1942 during thc counter-oflensiveai Moscow,60 citieswcre liberated.In Januaryand Fcbruary 1945, the Germanswerc forced lo yield 300 cities to the Soliet AJmy.
1 7 0 . E q u i p m e nat n d T r a i n i n s a Prior to rhe attack of a built-up rrcr, riflemcn recejvc extru ammunition, Srenides,laddcrs. ropcs,rnd othcr implcnrcnts for assaulting buildings. Flarnettuowen, smokeand signalingdeviccs{e also used. D. Cornpany officcn are taugbt how 1() manage assaultgroupsand attachcdweapons;rifienten aJetaught how to throw hand grenadcs on the run through windows and doots, hand-to-handcombal, and obslaclencgoliating lcchniques.Demolition training is dlso gjven. A?C drivcrs are taught how 10 drive in narrow streets and dcal with obstacles.Platoon,company and battalion excrciscsare conducted in speciallrrining lfeas (Figurc 80).
7 105
Figure80.Combat-in'citiestactical exercise.
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I08
171. Offenre
pointi buildnrgslocaied at slrcel intcrs€clionsor on aregivcnljrst pdority. In eachsiror8point.fire a. ln planningan altack on a buill up arca,Sovicl squares in sevcraitien. with most wcaponslocated officersdorvnto companylevelstudy large-scale naps is organized Slructurcswhich andphotosof the area.Information is alsogleded front on thc lower floorsandin balements. thc localpopulace andrccomaissance. Thednectonlnd intcrferewith fieldsoffire areleveled. width of streetsandunderground passages, ,. Tllc defensivebatile within the builtup area the locations of ncjor adminhlralivc buildingr. communkurro'r ccn. usuallybrcaksup into scparateengagemenls lbr indi1en,utility buildings.train stationsandotherobjectivcs vidudl platoon and companystrongpoints wldch mLlst whoseseizurcwouldlssht in the capturcof tlle city arc often fidl independcndy. Consequ€ntly. rhe company studicdin detail(Figure8l). rr nomrll' rcLnlorccdwith tlnls. urilc'y. cngineers. ,- Bccause of fragmcntadon ofa battlefor a built-up and combat engineers, to includeflanrethrovcrs.ftc area.motodzedrifle companicsar€ lugmentedwilh company commrnder nor ally retains reinforced artillery,tanks,cngineen,chenicd, and flamethrowcr unitsto form assrullgroups. c. Sirongponrtsare organized lbr al-arcunddefense .. Attack frontrgcs are reduccd and a reservc and mutud firc supportwirh adiaccntstrong points. mainlain€d strongpoin(sarejuinedby communicz. at mosllevcls.Althoughattackfrontages and Whenfeaiible. formalionswould depcndupon the densiryandnarurc d. Antjtank and dtipclsonnel obsilclcsare estab of thc buildingsl|nd thc strengthof the dcfcnses, lhe motorizcdrifie corupunyusuallyattacksdhmountedin lishedin the strcets,in intcrvalsbetweenslrontpoints, onecchclonon a flonlagcof200'300melers.A squadis and on approach€s to baricadcs,which arc covcredby nonnallyretaincdin rcscrveat companylevcl;aphloon flankingand crosslue. Fla ctluowersandmachineguo positionsare established within the barricades, which to permit firing along slrccts and d. Thc depth of objcctiycsis alsorcducedin urban hrvc embrasures fidting. The objectiveof a reinforccdmotorizedrillc squarcs.Tank! md howitzen are attached!o platoons comPanymight be to scizepart of a larg€bunding,a for mbushesor to buttressstrongpoints.Theirliring or groundfloo$ of separatebuildingor sevcralsmall buildingswithin an positionsarepreparedin bascmenls buildingsor behind stonc walls rn which embmruresarc enemyslrongpoint. e. Artilery attach€dto companiesand platoonsis madcfor firingnndobservation. a Antiaircrdftwcaponslrom regimentand division usedto providedirectfire support.Aitachedtanksmd of antiaircrutlm,rchine' antitankweapons op€rrlcin thc maintrafficdlencs rnd Iurnish air d€fensc,consistnrg gunsand SA.?smountedon ih€ roofs of ligh buildings helpsealoffareasunderaltackby drecompanyt Withh the conrpanyzonc of operation,buildings and antiancraftgunsand nissilcsspreadthroughoutthe areclearcdsystematicJly. Trnls nay leadtheassaullin city in locrlions which pcrmit firing in .iI dircctions. postsafe alsosct up on high wedg€formalion.with one t rl in the middleof thc Antiaircraltobservation roadand two behindon cachside,with infantrymcnon buildingsprovidingall'aroundobseflation. and dfiv€ways,constructedwilhin city both sidcsof the streetmd tuing at buildingson th€ t Passas€s tunneh are usedlbr oppositcside.the BMPaddsvaluabi€ fire supportto tlre blocks,and existingunderground dismountedinfantrymen.Whcn cncmy resistlnccis the mrncuverof small unils- Obslaclcsare placedin passirgcs, andtheircxitsSuarded. brokcn,the companyeitherprepareslo repelcounteF unusedunderground attacksor continues the rdva ce. & Frequentsortiesand raidson thc cncmypositions of thc strong areconsidcrcd asimportant$ thc defense 172. Delense point iiself. r. The motorizedrifle company'ray defenda snal buih.up areaor a groupof buitdingswithtn a cily. One of morebuildingsare uscdfor the creationof a strong
l 109
r73. Vulnerabilities
advance for a shortpcriodoftimc. Moreovcr, thehighly individualistic naturc of city warfare may initially 1ax Urban combat,with its fughammunitioncxpenditurc grade conpany dnd battalion officers and NCOS not ratcsand long-duratlon combat,may poscconsid€rablc lo exercising initiativc. problems to a logistics systcm gearedto high rates of accustorncd
SectionVll. HELIBORNEOPEBATIONS 174. General
(6) ln logistical and cornmandand control roles. (7) Deliveryofponlon bridgingequipment. Tllcrc are curcntly severalhelicoplerregimcntsin thc d Heliborncforcesmay be committed15-50kiloSoeietordef of battle.From one to threercgimentsare subordinated to a tacticalair army,andsomcregiments mctelsalead of advancin8gound troops in orderto s€cn tailored to move onc reinforcedmotodzedriflc s€izekey objectives.Due to the difficulty, howcver,of air def€nscs in depthandthe desirabilityof battalionin a varietyof combatopcrations. In wanine, suppressing at least one helicopterregirnentmight be assigned to opcratingunder their own suirportinganillery, the eachSovietfront. Sovietswill oftcn conductheliborneopcrations10-15 knometers forward of thc FEBA. As Soviet helibome cxperience, doctrine,andequipmenldcvclop,they may I 75. HiitoricalPsrrpective deeper bchindenemylines,with tacticdaif and opcrate Ovcr the past lcw years, the Soviet militrry prcssha! helicopters fires. armed supplyingsuppressive publish€d'nany articl€son helibom€opcratioru.These aJticlesdcscribethe US cxperiencc in Vietnam,nd the 177. Equipmeot andTraining "tri-Cap" experimcnt. US Significantly, thc aiicles arc ,. Typcs oI Soviethclicoptelsarc shownin figures positivc towardsthe use of helicopteFand generally 82-89.The mostreccntlyd€velopcd Sovi€thelicopteris glossover the problemsand lin tations of heliborne the Ml-24 (HIND-A), t}le nost hcavily armedhelicopter in theworld. ,. Soviethclicoptersare more ruggedand simpler in 176. UtilizationandMissions havcgoodheary dcsignt}tan thcir westernequivalents, a. Helicoptermissionsde designedto complementlifi/ruge capabilily,andsomcal-wcathercepability. Soviet conceptsfor the useof motorized riflc and tank e Thosc motorized rille units rcquircd 10 train divisionsin achicvinghiShratcs of advance. peIsonnelin hcliborne operationsnormally practicc on ,. We do not know whctherthe Sovietswill acccpl mockups.Bccause the Sovietsaretaughrto beproiicient thc conceptof largcsoalehelibomc;perations.Curently in fifing their individu, weaponsfrom transports thcir low h€licopterinventodeswon't allow it, and (whethcrtrucks,APCor helicoptcrs), tiesemockupsare their tactical employment does not refl€ct a multi located on tuillg rang€sor in otlrcr comba! tmining missionuscofla.geheliborneelemcnls. arcas.Heliropter rnockupsarc strtiunary or m({ing c. 'Ih€ typesof missionsmost often mentioncdby gondolas. Fromthcsethesoldiercanfire hb wcaponand ihe Sovietsforhelibomeopcrations arc: on dnmountins, asraulta n€a6y objective(Fislre 90). (l) S€izing k€y tenain, particula y during river Soviet open source publications have mcntioned helicrorsings andmountainanddescrtoperations. copter training involving soldiersfiring |Iom HIP hcii(2) Aiding anphibiousforcesin thc seizureof a copteNat Sroundtargclsp.ior to landing.The Sovieis beachlpad. considcr4{ hoursin winter and 24 hoursin summer (3) Prev€nting llle movcmentof encmyres€rves.sufflcient to dcvelop the nccessaryskills in loadiry (4) lnserting and withdrrwiry raid and reconnars. combatequipmentand cargoes In addiin helicopters. tion, platoonleadersdriU their mcn in embarkingand (5) Exploitutionof ruclearstrikes. disernbarking iiom helicoptcrs-
lt0
Figure83. Mi-6 Hook. Figure82. Mi'4 Hound.
...*.''.'/. Figure85. Mi 10 Harke. Figure84. Mi-8Hip
Figure86. lvli-12Homer
111
.-],P|.;..
Figure87. Mi 1 Hare.
Figure88. Mi-2 Hoplite.
112
TII
'v purH tz ru! 68ern6u
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Figure90. Helicoprermockuptrainingdevice. 178. Ofianse
179. Defense
a. Tlr€molorizednflc comprnynorrnallyoperutes ds a. ln the dcfense. the hclibornecompany's mssionis px't of a b,rtihonrn hcliborreoperdrun'. Onc...asion to hold iis position,dclayLhecnemy.andintucr rosses it may operateindepcndently. Thehelicopters arrivein uponhim, thercbylurtherirgrhc accomplishnent ofthc thc departurearenwhereequipmentand personnct arc loaded.After landingthc force in the LZs, thc helib- The company's dcfenseis bascdon plaroonstrong coptersreturnto a safearcr,prcparcfor a secondlift or points and confornrswjth rire defcnsivcpdnciplcs rclum to theirbasearea. outlinedin previouschaplers. Sincetherewouldbc oily ,. TIle actioff of the force in rhe objcchvcarc!, a limited numbcrof mineswjth rhe company.fiey are duringthc attack,lnd duringthe rcoqantarionp}-xse plilcedonly on the mosl likely avenuesol approach. follow normalSovictgroundforcedoctrine. Helicopters rnaybe usedio enrplace antilankmines. .. The bdttaiion!ornnrlldcrnornrrU)r Jrnlan\J a Oncelink-up hrs beenachieved, the unit nounrs rcinforcednflc plaioonin rcservc. Thc rescrleivouldbe its APCSandcontinues the attack. gven a concenkrtionpoint uponlandirgandlvouldbe heldin fcrdincssto mectunforescen contingenciesI I4
SectionVIll- NIGHTOPERATIONS r80. General d. DrJknesshclps 10 conce preprrations for conl bat, 10 achicvc surprise and 1(r seize objectives with minimunr losscs.Drkncss also n.rkcs i1 ]nore difficult for the cnemy to identily targcislor nuclearslrikes. ,. NighL operallonsposeproblens for the attackerin thc areN ol conlrol rnd weaponsenployment. Because of restrictcd obscrvaiion, targct idcntification, ground orientatin, and coordindlion with neighboringunits are colnplicated- Successful night operations thereforc ' c r t J r e r r a i n e du o o p . . n e r i c u l o u p \ repara,ion of n:en Jrd materiel pdor to commitment, and rhorough
D. Nght training usualy involves weapons firing, movement training. logistics supporl. and prepdation for offensive operations at dawn. Ni8ht rrainng takes place infrequently at lorver level (brtr ion and iowet and on a small scalc,in spite of a varicty ofexcelcn1 night vrsion aids. Although the reason lbr this discrcpancy bctwccn doctrine and actual practiceis untnown, rhe folowing may be contributing factorsr (l) Reduction in seffice ironr three years 10 two, ihereby increasingthe dilficuiry in adequaiclyrraininga conscnptin night operaiions. (2) The night doctrine itself nray bc unrealistic, and staied mo.e ar a goai rrther than an achicvedno.m.
.. Ni911 operaLionsarc cha cterized by increascd grerler conlrol, mor€ detailedcoordinx- 183. Equipmentand Trainins reconnaissrnce, a. Generally.active IR dcvicesde found on irmored lion. and tlie extensive use of equipment sucb ds llghiing vehicles,and passivesystemsare incorporared d A night attack may be an exlension of daylight inlo sonc. Types of survci ance,trrget acquisition,and o p e r d r i o n \i r r r d p r r u m J i n l a ' n n ^ n e n r u m o r s e i , , e nighl obscrvarion (STANO) devices arc ilustrated in ob.jectives whch codd not b€ taken dunns daylighl. Thc F i g u r e s9 1 - 9 1 . Sovi€tsstressthat the t.dnsition fron d,tytighl 1o nighl ,. Nighi observation devicesarc primdrily used in operationsshould be done without interuption, so thrl company and platoon operations.STANO deviceswil Itre encmy ir dcnicd thc opporiunily lo reorganizc. play an inportant rolc in offensive ope|ations and in defensiveoperationsout to lbout one kilomcler beyond 181. Historiel Pe6pective the FLBA. a nlc Soviet motorized rjllc compnny in a night Durnrg World War Il, fie Soviets used darknessand attack couid usc a variety of iilunrinationdevices.Flares, othcr conditions of limited visibility for troop jlumination bombs, artillery flaresand specirl illuminamovcmcnt, aitack preparation,constfuction of foriifications rnd rcsupply. Night operationsconsistedofrecon- tion deviceslbr trnks and A?Cshavebccn mentionedin n{issance,raids. and aliacks in strength of up to a opcn sources.Chiracte.isticsofsomc Sovie1 illLlmination regimeni. Niglrt rttacks on r largerscrle wcrc cxceptions dcviccsare shownir Fisure 94. d. Most night combat training jr conducleo a. rnd were usually undertakenwhen Sovietunits friled to platoon, company and battalion level. Frmiliarization take rn importanl objcctire in a dayligit attack. wirh STANO equipment is accomplislied at squad level, and exercisesof increasingcomplexity conducted 182. Doctrine up through battalon level. Ernlhrsis is placed on d. Cu(enl SovieL doctrinc cmphasizesthat opera planning night operationsdudng daylight so tlul recontions at night and during othe. conditions of limitcd planning,and rehearsals may bc cotnpleted. naissance, visibility are to be considercd nonnal conditions of prcss militrry has b€en critic of ihc e. The Soviet combat which conlributc to high rat€s of adlance, ody non-combat night fact fiat on somc exefcises, achicvcmcnt ol surprise and reduclion in losscs.Unit t.rining is conducted,i.e., reorganization,mahtenance, objectivesar€ as deepas during daylight opcrations. prcparationsfo. a daylight attack, etc.
115
Figure9l.lR sightingsystem,modelNSP-2.
Figure92. SovietmodelPPN-2lR sightingsystem.
116
I
modelTKN-3. Figure93. Commander'slR peritelescope
Avg illuminance Period
Radiusof illuminance
Up to 200 m
7 seconds
120 m
30-mmillum cartridge
U p t o 5 0 0m
9 seconds
200m
50 mm illum cartridge
8 0 0 ' r 2 0 0m
120-mmillum mortar cartridge
100 - 5300m
40 seconds
Up ro 600 m
Air droppedflares
NA
6 minutes
Ovcr1,500m
Designalion
Range
26-mmillum cartridge
300 m
Figur€94. Charactennicsofsome illuminationdevices.
It7
illuminatedlape to aid in mLltualjdentificationand assicns eachplaloon a. Ge erul. The mototizedrifle companymay attack control.The compmycommandcr pocket irs own color. A flasl ilht fast€ned on the indepcndcnrlyl night,but normallyit attacksasparl of individual's back identifies his white unit. arm bmds in oneechelon.In orderto iid the battaliondismounted, (black in winter on white unif{rms) personnel oo and commandand control the altrck is made withoul whitc luninous cncles, squares or dianloods on the sides The comFny is nomally rein' complicaledmancuvcrofonc\ unit. lorcedwrth armor.id'jle'y ,nLl/ormnrtars. enginccr,of APCSand tanksprovidefor rccognition Movem€nt routcs ,nd passases tluough mineficlds are (Figure 95)andchemical units marked. b. Trpes of Night Attact Tbe night attack nay bc (3) Ihe companycomm.rnder formrialcsa night supportcd or ur$upporled, illuminated or non. vhion dcvice and plan. illumhltion Within tllc company, iltuminatcd.Normdly it \yill be launchedaftcr an illumination b cdrried out by rocket and iuuninxring prcparadon md wi]l involveextensiveusc of anillery flar€s uscd by designated teams. Sign l flares and lracer illuminationto cxposcenemypositions. nre used amrnunition for target identificaLion md c. Prcpafation hr Niglx Cotnbat. Due to the in. phise coordination, and to mark lines lcached by the creasedco cxlty of night operations,the conrpany platoons. Night tie vision used during equipmenl comnrandcrlakcs a numbe. of nreasures to cnsurc rd pcriuJs ,,f approach berween prclunlm!riun i5 conlrol of his unit andaccomplishment of his mission. (l) To xid in navieation,he desiSnates a lcad planncd. (4) thc conpmy conmanderand platoonleaders platoon for lhc conpmy. Withi. eachplatoona lend check for propcrfunctioninSof nightvisiondevices.nd platoon by tlle leader,a5 wcll .s squadis dcsignatcd the inlernal and externalvehicularlightingsystensitr who monitorthe directionofmovemcntand individuals the assernbly rea prior to thc attack. rcpon any dcviationfron the assigned dtcction to the (5) Thc cornpanycornnanderstudicsrhe terrain in detail, .eco.noiters,sclectsplatoon zon€sfor thc (2) In additionto th€ uscof radioandmessengers. designates platoonobjcctivcs, rssignsrcfcrcncc use b madeof a larictv of o&er signaldevicesand advance, 184. Offeffe
Figure95. lvlotorizedriflecompanyin a night attack.
ll8
I
I
points identifiable at nighr, inslrucis guidcsand coordi (2) Du.ing the night battle, the conpany comnateswith attachedand supportingunils. mander is ded to the possibility of enemy counter d Al1ack Formationsand Objcctivcs. attack, particularly dudng the consolidation phaseand (l) Ifenemy resistance is light. thc motorizcd ril1c the batile beyond ihe FEBA. Reconnaissanceand comprny nray attack mounted or on the back of secuity, especidllyon the fldtrks, is emphdsized.When attached tanks. Mor€ common. however, wiil be ihe attackedby supefiof enemy forcesdurins consolidation, dismounted atiack. The company normally attacks on the company attempts to d€stroythe enemy by firc and line $ith no.eseNe wlrile the battalion usualy maintains subsequentlyby attack on the flanks and rear.Should a a company in reseNe. The attack frontages for tlle counterattack be launched dudng the pursuit, thc company afe generally the same ai during daylight motorizcd nne company dcfcals it from the maJch, operationsand dependprimarily upon lhe nature ofdre thereby ensudng a high rate of advancc.Duing both terfain and wheiher of not nuciear weaponsare used. tyles of counterattrck, intensive nighl iilunination is Fof the cotnpany attack over very rugged terrarn rn non-nuclearconditions, fie frontageis slightly reduced I Trunsition ffom Night to Day OperatioN. The (400 to s00 mcicrs). overriding pdnciple in th€ transirion from night to day (2) ln hilly and woodcd tcrain whcn nuclcar operalionsb continuity oI the offensive-Before dawn, weapons aJe not used, the depth ol tnc comprny ddditional tasks are ,llocated to the attacking comobjectivenormrly is fronr one to one and one-hrlf km. panies,arnmunition is rcplenisltd. and measufestakcn In nore favorable terruin md wilh the use of nuclerr to protecl th€ lroops from enemy use of nuclcar weapons,thc dcp$ is incrcascd. wcapons.The ballalion reserve,ifnot connitted during c- Conduct of thc Arlack the right is pfepared for comnritment to maintain the (1) Pnor 10 the assault,the comprny atiempts 10 momcntum ol thc atlack. Rcconnaissancc is intcnsified. c a p r u r rn r J e \ l r i ) e n e T ) u u r p u : r J. n J ' F . o n n J r s $ n c .Anliancrall defense dnd cdnoufl€e clenrents by surprise, without opening fire. Obstxcles increasedwith the approachof daylight. Pu|suit begins rcconnoitcredby dayiighl are destroyedby specialunits prior to dayiight with additional instructions io coniusi bclbrc il}c assault.Thc company bcginsthe assault paniesand platoonsbeingissuedduring the nurch. rt a prcdcsi$atcd tnne, usualy prcccded by adillery and lnortar fire- Platoonsnonnally assaultofl iine. The 185. Defense assault forces move forward without stopping, over a. Gencral. Thc dcfcnder nay have an advantagc, rundng their objeclives and vigorously developingthe because he has had lhe oppoftunity lo organizelns artack in depth- The direction of the attack is position, to preparetue plans,and lo cstablishbarners pcriodicaly rnalked during the course of the battle by alons iikely avenuesof approach.fte defend€rknows aircraft, artilery. and rnorars utilizing illundnating his location while the attacker may experienceorientaamnunirion- To achieve greater coordination and problen1s.The defender, howevef. is hindered by tion mutual suppot, the attacled tanks nonnally attack the frct that darknessrcducestie effeclivenessof ainred within the combal formations of the platoons.However if the enemy\ rntitank means have been effectively fire ds weli ar observrtion rrd reconnaissrnce.When possible, unit begins its defensive phnning and suppressed and if there is nrtensiveground ilumination, " organization during daytight. ihc ianks attack slightly ahcad of the nfmtry. After the T1l€ Chdngeoler fron1 Duy to Night Defense.Two ,enemy defenseshave been olercome, personnelcarriers major considerations in lhe chmgcovcr from day to rrc calcd forward to support ihc pursuit or to take parl night delense are secu.jty xnd illumination. Listening h the reorganizationof the company's new defensive posilions. Should lhc assault tuil, thc company con- posts are organizcd and obscrvation of th€ enemy's h I n l e r \ r r e J s , , l h a l , l e p o 5 s i b i L l )o f s u r f r i s e solidates on the most forward posilion reached. T]le a f r r v j r e . is reduccd. Wiihin thc platoons,additional observersare company withdraws fronr this posjtion only on order of detailed to keep obstaclesand concealedapproachcs the batl.lion corrmander.
119
under observation. Patrollbgis increased. Weapons (2) The company'snighl visiondevicesare uscd are preparedduring daylightfor nighl fuing and drta arc extensively, with primaryand alternrtepositionsbeing compiledfor propcr use of all wcrpons.Crew-servcddesignatcd for every weaponwith m inJrarcddevice. weaponswhose positions were exposedduring daylight Coordinationbetwecninfraredspotlightand illuminaare trmsfenedto altematepositions.Light dd sound tion posts,andproccdures to b€ folowcd for individual signahare established and signalproccduresfor thc and group target detcction are established.Roving controlof fifes disseminated. Tracerrouddsand shella. ilumination posts,dummygun positionsind simulated flarcsand other meansof illumination areissucd. infrar€d sighb ar€ eslablishedin orde. to mislcad the .: Forwird DefensePosturc. In the night dcfcnse, enemyasto the actualprovisionsfor night defense. tanks,antitankguns,and rhe batialionrcserve(s€cond e. Organizationof thc Defense echelon)are normdly movedcloserto tlrc FEBA to (l) Organization of tne night defensivcposition incrcaic the density of fire in front of the FEBA. may bc done underdiffcrentcircumstances; the comMcther the entire battalion r€servei5 mov€d forward pany may or may not be ableto prepaftits def€nse dcpcndsupon the situation. The cornmandermost weigh duringdaylighthours.If the companymustprepareits the dangerof pr€scntingr better iarSetfor eremy defenses duringa periodof poor visibility,the task is nuclear flres apinst the necessityto hav€ adequalc rnoredifficult. In sucha situation,emphnsis is placedon combat powcr forward to repel attack. Basically,thc stepp€d-upreconnaiss.rncc, us€of illumination andnight batialioncommander must decidewh€therto position vision means,andon continousobservalion.The defense his sccondechelonGeserve) posture is organizcdaccordingto the principlcsoullined in in a counterattack or for fum retenrionof terrdn behindthc FEBA. If he chaptcr2. Frontages and dcpthsof defendingplatoons dccideson ihc former,the sccond€chelonGescnc)is and compdnicsar€ approxima.ely the same as during moved forward prior to darknessinro a concentation daylight operanons.The battalion second cchelon area favombl€for launchingcountcrattacks. Countcr. (resewc)however,is normdllyup closerto the forward attrck routesarc preparedduringdaylighthoun. lfhe dccideson the lattcr, the battulion cornmanderpositions (2) \lhen the companyhasorganizcdits defensivc his secondechelon(rescrvc)on favorableterrain astride position during daylighl houn, prepaJrtion cent€rson thc arcaofpossibleenemypenetration. the transition from day ao nidt combal. Daylighl d. I umination preparation alows for the improvement of theoccupied (1.) The company corcmander prepares his position and for chmgcs in thc defensivealignment ilunination plan in accordance with guidance from the (Figurc96). battalion conmander.Th€ plan includesmea.sules 10: (3) Tte cotnpany commander'sinstructions, (a) Iluminateth€ sector. issuedto his subordinatesin the form of an operations orderor separate instructions, encompass the following: O) Blindthe attackingenemy. (c) ht€rrnine rnutualrecognition signals. (a.) Analysisof possibleenemynight actions, (d) ldcntiry friendly positionsas well astarget (b) Cornpletiontime for the night dcfcnsive idcntificationandcontrolof fires. To accomplish thesetask, illuminationpostsareestab. (c) Designaiionof rccomaissance, raid and lished within the company perim€ter. Thcrc are nomally three two-rnar posts pff company, although (d) Method of employmcnt of night vision this numbcr increasesin forcsted and mountainous devices andi umination. icrrain.Thesepostsarelocaledfrom 4060 metenapart (e) D€signation points. of nightreference (0 hocedurcs for preparingweaponsfor night and all so situated as to provide full illumination coveragewhcn ordered by tlrc superior conmander. operations,and n€cessary chang€sin the fire plan. (g) Measuresto conbat fires within the defenIncendiary and tlE rouds may be uscd to start frcs forwardof th€ FEBAandb€hindthc attackirgtmopsin orderto silhoucttethem.
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Figure96. Possiblechang€sin the night de{ensivesvstemof a motorizedriflebattal'on
t21
(h) Protective neasures a8ainst weapons of (i) Recognition,control and warningsignals. 0) camouflaseproc€dures. (k) Irgistic support.proccdurcs. (l) Procedurcs for changing fron a nighl dcfcnscto daylight operations. i Conduct of the Defense.Enemy patrol activity, pariicularlyrecomaissance, h expectedto precedethc mah attack. Th*e forcesare engagedin such a way as to mask the nature of the defeosiveposition. Onty a poriion of the availableweaponsare usedto rcpel enemy probes,wfine the entne defensivesysterDis broughtto a ful state of rcadiness.Thc coordinatcd use of night vision devices and ilumination provides increased surveillanceand obseNationof the batde area.Efforts aremadeto captureindividualen€mypatfolmembels it o.der to leam the enemyplan of attack.As the main enemy force launchesits attack, supportingfires are concentratedto break up the attack. Nght visiondevices and illumination rnak€it possibleto engageener.y tanks and infantry at rangesin excessof 400 .neters. At a rangeof approxirnatcly150 mctcrs,cvcry cffort js made
to separateenemy infanty from tanks. In order to silhouettethe attackers,fires are startedbehindthen by an ,rrd artillery strikes. Every effort is rnade to destroy the atlacker bcfore hc penetratesthe defensiv€ position. Should tlrc enemyeffect a penetration,flaflking positions are held tenaciouslyand a strong effort is rnadeto prcvent the enernyfrom enlargingthe penetration. Counterattacks are laun€hed by battalion or regimentin mcordancewith thc ovcral defenseplan. In accordancewith the conpbntics of night fighting, the counterattackis norrnaly launchedin on€ echelonwith a shalow objcctive- Upon climhation of the pen€tration, consolidationtakes place and efforts are madeto repclthc cxpcctcdcncmycountenttack. & Trdisition frorn Night to Day DefensiveOperations. The companycorrunandcrplansfor the transition from night to day defenseand carricsout the n€cessary adjustnentsin his positionsprior to dayLighi.Casualties are evacuated,,rnrnunition rcplcnished,and personnel fed duringdarkness.To counterthe dangerof the €nemy enploying nuclear st.ikes prior to rcsuminghis atiack, camouflageand deception measuresare employed and protectivemeasures taken.
t22
APPENDIX I LISTOF SYIVEOLS a -i-
rr$ols.re
numerousand desc prive.r
G
UNITS ,<---{--
-ra
/b
aftde
--
Mobrized dfle platoon in m8'ch column tcommand tevet'sdpndted bv ho'izonrrt b3r3J
laun.her Mororized fle platoon in rh. anrck
3 O +
+a
rL-n6e
-
--.r.d
+
-
--ilra
gi-,wiu€,
O
v.r-""d
/.-*--\nth.ihi.|
grned missile
-r
--j-
'€nroreo ovd.G "r,".ompa.v
*'e ptaloonn rhed€f.ns6 "--""0
anrianc,arr sun drbwnh
IICTq
Fe.onnaisance panol {trofi a lank or motorized rifle unnl
anin.nk missiles
DNECTIONOF FIRE
"+-+O-
Tank company on the m.rch
)'--'"" -
--r
.rerion
of fte MORTAA/ARTILLERY/AAA
_
_
_
l_qiory
dnecrion o, tue
!tiicLEs
-l -C
ffi!-
^'.' ..o-."g o".
o I
Adirerybararionon th€ maEh
An lerybatalion in finngposilio.
u r"e sa*,ete,ence usea*as SovietArmedForcesM ta'v symbotstU), otA ociober 1970.
'Th€ Sov€rs use four differentsvmbolstor APCS For simplcitv rhis paiicuar svmbol is used rh.oushourrhe study, and des'gnates an APCwirhan amphibious capabrlIy
123
APPENDIX I LISTOF SYMEOLS Delensiveposirio.wirh tush m64soianred
/,T\ \!v
-*{Ir4{fu
AAA baueryon rhe march
'jlr-"1',"
Secrorot a tench wilh a comh!.i.ations rench
lo- o o ol
Anri peEonnelminetield
Arti|ank baueryon rhe march
faJ-..BARRAGE/CONCENIRATIONS
15 . o--l
Mired minefieldiami.p.rennel and .nri rankt Passe $rough an rEa
_-__Y_
%
ola l-----.
d m i r d dm i n e f i e l d o I P a s a q et h r o u s h {Jdipeenne and anrr6nkr
SOUNDARIE.
tanko.motoi?ed lle tte A@* ot con.€nrrated
-r -L
Bete.encepoinr lor adillery tne
ru'
Comm.nd/Ob6eruarionposls
--\-r
d_-----f-f
A
Resimenrar boundary DivGionboundary
MISCELLANEOUS Pldtoonleaderscommandposr
6 "*.."_..-*,
Codpanycommander's cdmmandposl
r
Batrelioncommander's comm€ndposl
A STRUCTURES/OBSTACLES
s *---r
88888ts889Bu,rd,ns
-
t-rr\
@l t24
Appendixll. A TYPE OF CAREERPATTERN lN BASICCOMBATDUTY lN PEACETIME SOVIETOFFICERPERSONNEL MANAGEMENT_GROUND FORCES Position
Timcrn Asslgnment (Yeas)
Plalooncommand€r. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3 Deputy CompanyCornmrndcr . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3 C o m p a nCyo r n r n a n d. e . .r. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 DeputyB.ttalionComrnandcr. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .3 Battalion Commrnder..., . , , , , , . . . . . . . . . . . . , , , .4 DeputyR€Simentd Commandcr or Regimcntal chiefof sraff. . .. . . .,. . ... ... . . .. .3 Regimental Commander .. . . . .. . . .. . -, -. .. . . . . . .5 25 TOTAL
Rank Agc
LT/SRLT SRLT CPT MAJ LTC
2t-25 25-28 28-32
LTC
3942 4247
35-39
coL
Polsible Schooling; . - . J r A d v a n c eCdo u r s e ...Sr Advance Cdo u n e ... Branch Acadcmy . . MilitaryAcadcmyof thc Ccncnl Staff
CPT/MAJ.. MAJ/LTC.. CPT/MAJ/LTC COL/MAJ-GEN Minimum Timein-Grde
Requirementsfor Promotion to Next Grade:
LT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2 Years sRLT.................................3Yean CPT....... -...,............... -.......4 Years MAJ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . .4 Years LTC ... -. -. -................ -,........5 years Minimum lime-in-glad€ requiremenb for thc rank of COL and aboveare not cstablished. Maximum Age for Active Military Servicoby Rank: U e u t c n a n. t. s. - . . . - . . . , . . . , . . , . - . - . - - - - - . . . . 4 0 C a p t a i n. s. . . . - . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . - . - - . . . - . . . . . . 4 0 M a j o r.s. . , . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -..............45 L i e u t e n aCnot l o n e l-s. . . . . . . . . . . . . - - . . - - . . . . . . 4 5 -......50 C o l o n e l. s- . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . Generakto L i e u t c n acnetn e r a l . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . - . . . . . . 5 5 Colon€lGenenlsard abov€ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .60 Mavjmum agesmay be exlcndcd in individunl cascsby orderofthe CouncilofMinistersot $e U.S.S.X Source: DIA lnte igence Study (C) "Soviet Offic€r Personnel Management GroundForces"(U) July 1974
Appendixlll. OFFICEBAGE LIM|TAT|ONS{ MILITARY R-ANK
ACTIVEDUTY
tst Class
New lnw
Old l-aw
New l,aw
Junior Lt and Lt
40
30
SeniorLt
40
Captain
Old I-aw
RESERVE 2nd Class New Old Law l,aw
3rd Class New Old Law hw
40
40
4s
50
50
55
35
45
45
50
55
55
60
40
40
45
50
50
55
55
60
Major
4s
40
45
50
50
55
55
60
Lr Colonel
45
45
50
50
55
55
60
60
Colonel
50
45
55
50
None 55
60
60
Major Generar
55
55
60
Non€
None
65
Lt G€neral
55
60
60
60
None
None
65
65
S€niorc€ftrals andMarsbrls
60
60
None 60
Nonc
None
LIMITS NOT ESTABLISHED Services +SOURCE: Vyacheslsv P. Artemie', "Soyie,trlititoy Satice Obtiganos," Infantry, Septect | 19681D.42.
127
o DISTRIBUTION DOD AND JOINI AGENCIES
A0l0
AFS COL
A065 At04 Al15
DIF NACLIJiR A(;CY N T DtrF UNIVI]RSITY OASD INI OASD ISA
A175 A300 4315 ,t325 A335 4340 A033 A100 A096
o
,{361 4362 A363 A368 A835 A9t6
ts040 !055 0080 B t3 2 BI34 BI59 ts162 8169 8485 0545 8565 8566 B5?I B5?3 B5?4 8579 8580 858I 8583 !584 B59t 8585 8586 !593 8594
"i:! :1'"s JCS JCS/S,ACA(2) JCS/J3
rcs/J4 tcs/J-sl!flLsEc ASSTTO D}:}SECDEF
osD NEACI DIA GR? .TN]ICC USLO S CLANT USDOCOLANDSOtrAST USNI1RSHA}L USR]\'ClNATO US T'IL LN TISNGF:R
DI /SC2 (DI0)(2) DIA/DT4B DrA/SWS D I A / D f li DIA/DD2 D I A / D TI A 1 DIA/DT1A2 DIA/DT2D DII/IS DIA/DI DIA/DIR-IFI DIA/DIR.IF2 DIA/DIR4GI DIA/DIR4EI DIA/DIR4C5 DI /DIB 2B2 DIA/DIR1C3(0t0) DIA/DIR,]B DIA/DIR.1D Dr /DrR 184{20) DIA/DIR-IIt DLA/DIR.IE DIA/DIR.4DI DIA/DIR1C2 DrI/DrR 1r (2)
8597 8615 1J122 B13t 8187 8825 8362 8363 8364 !s63 ts575 85?6 8582 8734 l]711 8855 8856 8859 8862 B87l ]]412 !876 8878 BII79 B88O 8882 8886 8893 B9O8 8912 B9I'1 E9I8 B9I9 I]93] ts934 A939
DtA/DlR lcl DIA/DIN-2C DIA/DIR58 (LrB)(5) DLA/DS4B4 D I A / D I R! F 3 DIA/DIR4C3 DTA/DIRIBl DTA/DIRIB2 DIA/DIR.IB3 DIA/DIR-IB5(PENT)(2) DIA/DIR-I DIA/DIR1,\ DIA/DTR1C DIA/DTR5E DrA/DIN-IBl USDAOAUSTRIA USDAOBELCIUM USDAOBULGARIA USDAOCANADA USDAOCZECHOSI-OV,{.(IA USDAODT'IIMAR( IJSD,\OENCLAND USDAOFINLAND USDAOFRANCI.] USDAOGI:RIIIANY USDAOGREECL HUNGARY USDAO USDAO ITALY USDAONETHERLANDS USDAONORWAY USDAOPOLAND USDAOIORTUGAL USDAOROII NIA USDAOTURXEY USDAOUSSR USDAOYUGOSLAVIA
Dl]33 D150 DJ59 D2O2 D2I7 D249 D280 D492 DsO? D900 D91\ D972 DO32 D496 D8l4
STRATANALSUPICRU CrrC0NT) (2) NAVAIRDEVCEN NAV1VARCOL NA1NWNCEN NAVICSCOL 0?{98D NAVSCOLEOII CONIINI]WARCOM NFOI0 O?-009F 0P-009lrIP NAVPHIISCOL DrR SSPO 1 2N D
t29
AIR FORCE EOI6 EIO? AIO8 D046 [054 [100 E2OO tr303 E4O8 E411 E429 E436 E451 E500 E4l0
AFIS/INC AF/RDXTR.W AF/RDXTR{ ?602ArG/rNXE AF/INAKB TAi{ (9THT|S/LDD)(3) AAC AIj/INAP AFWL ASD/FTD/DTID SAMSO0ND) AIIWC (SUR) AUL/LSI TECITTNCCtrN/TINXL ADTC
U & S COMMA.\DS c00s
ctNcAD
HOO5 II010 1t101 EOO?
USCINCI]UR soTFtriJ 3) usAFE49?RTG(tRC) SILKPURSE
]5]5 J5I? ,,99I
FICDURLANT CIINAVSUR|LANT TITCLANT
K005 K020 (1OO
ctNcP c cotltusTDc PACAF548 RTC
K300 rrAc(coDErc-L)
(5OO K515 (650 K619
CINCPACFLT CONSEVtrNTHFLT COIINAVSURFTAC FLTCORGRU I
LO4O
SAC544THARTW
NOOs
USRtrDCOM
OTHDR 1055 ?085 ?090
crA/cRs/ADD/SR(14) STATtr(5) NsA (5)
RI45
ACDA
SO3O
FRDLI} OFCONG
