DDB.lrettt-78
DEFENSEINTEIIIGEIICE
REPORT
THESO\TET MOTORTT.FDRIFIT BATTALION
1978 SEPTEMBER
.,)2)
TIIE SOWET MOTORIZED RIFII
BATTALION
DDB-11dt197-78
InformationCutoff Date: '197, Z) Dec€mber
This oublicationsuDersedes Sovist Tactics: The Motorized nifle Battalion. AP-1-22G3+04, November1964, which shouldbedestroyed.
Thi. i5 a Depa.nnmr of Osl6ns6 lf,rellisene Docum6nr Pact Divbion. Pr€oacd bv th. Sovi.Vw.r$w Oiroctoralo for Int.llig.nc. R...!rch, Defen* Intelligenco Ag6ncy author: Mdor FoblnM. Frasche, Tacljcalnd Or$nl!8don Secrion, G,olnd Forc€. Bdnch
PREFACE This study, a follow-up to Ihe Soviet Motorized Rifle Company {DD|-1100-7/-76},was written to familiarizethe reader with the organization. training, tactics, and equipmentof the Souet motorizedrifle banalion (lvlRB).lt was especiallywritten for troops, troop commanders,unit intelligenceofficers, seruiceschools,and othercwho requiredet8iledknowledgeof the SovietMRB. The study concentrateson the operationsof those MRBS equippedwhh the BMP (infantry combat vehicle). The organization,training, tactics, and equipment of the BlvlPequippedMRB are analyzedwithin the context of Soviet doctrine. Soviet tacticaltrends since the October 1973War are also considered.The scopeof the study is restrictedto those operations(nuclearand nonnuclear)relevant to northernand centralEurope, Studies which addressin greater detail some of the subiectscovered in this 'L
Soviet Offensive Doctine: Combined Atms Operations Veaus Antitank Deterses{U), DDI-1100'138 76, July 1976. 2. Soviet TacticalTrcndsSince the October lgn Wat (Ul, DDI-11@-160-77, Aoril 197/. 3. TheSovietMoto zed RifleCompanylul, DDl1100--n-76,October1976. 4. Soviet Military Opeetions in Built-Up Areas (U), DDI-1100-I5S77,July 1977. 5. Soviet and Warsaw Pact niver Crcssing: Doctine and Capabilhies lul DDI-1150-7-76, September1976. 6. Evaluation of Soviet Night Combat Capabilhies(U), DDI-1i00'173-7/, February1978. (Ul, DDI-I200-74-76, 7. SovietAmphibiousWaiare Capabilities May 1976. 8. Soviet TacticalLevelloglstlcs {U), DDI-1150-co1+n,Decetnbet1gn. 9. Soviet Field Anilery Tactics and Techniqueslul, {DDB-1130878to be published). Addresseesare requestedto lorward informationwhich will supplementor correct this report, Ouestions6nd comments should be refered in writing to the DefenseIntelligenceAgency{ATTN: DA-184),Washlngton,D.C. 20301.
S U MM A R Y lll€ Sovietsstressthe decisivenatureof the offensiveand emphasi2e the meetingengagementmorethan a.y othertype of offensiveaction, High ratesof advanceare anticipatedfrom the actionsof combinedarms unirsoperatingin coniunctionwith airborne,airmobile,and specialoperationsforcesin theenemyreararea. Sincethe October1973War, the Sovietshaveplacedeven moreemphasison combinedarms operations, and have rnadenumerousorganizationaland tacticaladjustmentsto increasethe suruivabilityof their tank forces.The tank ramainsthebackboneol combinedarmsdoctrine. Though relativelysmall, the BMP-squippedldRA is highly maneuverableand possessesconsiderable organicfirepower,particularlyin antitankweaponry.The MRB is often augmentedby motorizedrifle regi, rnentand/or divisionalassetsto form a heavilyreinforcedcombinedarms groupingto carry out a varietyof The battalioncommander'sage, education,and politicalawarenessprovidethe theoreticalbasisfor effecirve command.Frequentfield trainingand lengthypeacetimecommandassignmentspartiallyoffset his lack ot combatexperi6nce.Thoughtechnicallywell trained,the IMRBcommandefoften failsto exploitthe strong pointsof his men and equipmentduring fiold exercises.Moreover,his initiativeis constrictedwithin narrow paramete.sby institutionaland operationalconstraints. Eattalion-leveltraining is highly centralized,stressesfundmentals,and results in effective battle drill. "Moral political"training,while boringfor many, is probablyeffeclive.Trainingeffectivenessis complicated bYthe 2 vsar term ofservice, The MRB is capableotconductingoperationsunderspecialconditions,althoughthe amountofsuch train ing variesaccordingto geographiclocationand mission, Th€ BlrP-equipped MRB normally operatesas part of the regiment and is mosr effective when so employed.Discrepancies betweendoctrineand practicehavebeennotedin severaltypesof fulRBoperations. Thesediscrepancios, along with constraintson battalionlevelleadership,resultin vulnerabilities which may b€ erDlokedbv Westerncommanders,
TABLEOFCONTENTS
SUMMARY 1. INTFODUCTION CHAPTER CHAPTER 2, D O C T R | N E , T A C T | C S , T R E. N ..D ..S ........ SectionA - Doctrine. . . . . , . , . , . SecrionB SeclionC - TacticalTrendsSinceThe Ocloberl973War
3 3 7 12
CIiAPTER 3. THEMOTORIZED RIFLEDIVISiON AND I\4OTORIZEO RIFLEREGII\4ENT . :8APTER4. THEMOTORIZED RIFLEEATTALION SectionA - Op8rationalPrincipl€sand lvlissions. . . . . . . . . SecrionI - Organization,R€sponsibilities, and Equipment Commandand Conrol SectionD BattalionRearServices.
25 25 26
SHAPTER 5. SectionA SectionB -
BATTALION LEVELLEADERSHIP ,.,.......,. Iniroduction T h e H i s t o r i c a l P e r s p € c. .t .i .v.e. The Present
€ € € 52
CHAPTER 6. SectionA SeciionC SeciionO SecdonE
B A T T A L I O N I R A I N I N G A N D S U B U N I T T A C. .T. .I .C. .S. . , . , . . . . . TrainrngPhilosophyand Obiectives TrainingSchedules. . . CompanyandSectionTraining andTactics B a t t a l i o n T a c t i c a l T r a h. .i .n. s. . . . . Evalu8tionof BatalionTraining.....
57 57 57 59
36
@
70
SHAPTER 7. T H E M O T O R I Z E D R I F L E B A T T A L I O N I N C O M B A T . . . . . . . . . , . , . , . . . . SecrionA Offen6iveOperations SectionI - DefensiveOperation6
71 71 9o
CHAPTER 8. SecrionA SectionB SectionC SectionD SectionF :HAPTER9.
APPENDIX .........,.13s
S o v i eSt y m b o l s , v11
LISTOF ILLUSTRATIONS
1 . S o v i eO t f f e n s i vDeo c t r i nl es B a s e o d n C o m b i n eAdr m sC o m b a t .........3 2 . Airborneand Heliborne TroopsAre Sel€ctively UsedTo MaintainOffensive Momefltum........... 4 a . A i r b o r nDe r o pi n t h eE n e m R y earArea ................ 4 b . H e l i b o r nFeo r c eR s u s hT o E s t a b l i a s hB r i d g e h e a. .d. . . . . . . . . . . . . . BasicFormsof Maneuve ..................... 5 a. FrontalAttack .......................... s b. Shallow E n v e l o p m e{ S n ti n g l e .) . . . . . . . . . ................ 5 c. DeepEnvelopment(Double)............ ................ 5 The MeetingEngagement ................... ....................... 6 5. B a t t a l i o n A n t i t a n k R e s e r v e s R e s p o n d D i r e c t l y t o t h e B a t t a l i o n C o m m a n d e r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . , . , I a . A n t i t a nR keserve i nsa B T R - E q u i p pUendi t ....................... 8 b. ABIMPEquipped lvlotorized RifleBattalion AntitankReserve ......... 9 6. T f a f f i R c e g u l a t o r s ACi o d m m a n d ei n heiU r nits ...........9 r sC o n t r o l l i T ng 7. The RegimentalChiefof Artillery(on the right)CoordinatesRegimentalAnillery During P h a sO e n eF i r e. , , , . , . .....,.,, ro 8. H i g h P e r f o r m a n c e A i r c r a { t i n S u p p o r t o f t h e M a i n A t t a c k . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . r . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 9. The MotorizedRifleDivision . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 10. T h e l v l o t o r i z e d R i l l e D i v i s i o n ' s P r i n c i p a l w e a p o n s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 a . 7 6 m mD i v i s i o nGa ul n Z , I S3 . . . . . ..........14 b . 1 o o m m A T c u n[ ,. 4 - 5 5 /112 . . . . . . . . . . . . . ........14 c. 122mm H o w i t z eN r ,4 - 1 9 3 8 / D -.3.0. .. . . . . . . ........14 d. 122mm R o c k eLt a u n c h €BrI M2 1 . . . . . . .. -..........15 €. 152mm H o w i t z eD r ,- 1 .. .............15 f. FROGTEL,FROGT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 , 6 ..... .. ............. 16 s . G A I N F U L T ESL A r t _ The MotorizedRifleDivision'sPrincipalEquipment . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 a . T r u c kM , i n eD e t e c t oD r ,i m . . . . . . - . . . . . . . ,.,.,.,.16 b. TrackedFerry,GSP. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 c - P o n t o oP n M Po n K R A Z . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16 d . T r a c k eAdm p h i b i a K n ,6 1 . . . . . . . . . . . ......................... i7 e. lr.4ine ClearerBTR-5oPK,l\r-1972. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 f . t ! 4 i n e f a ySePr ,A r m o r e d. . . . . . . . .........17 g . T r u c kD , e c o nT, M S - 6 5. . . . . . . . . ......... 18 ' 2 The l,lotorizedRifleRegiment(B[IP-Equipped) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18 PrincipalWeaponsin the MotorizedRifleRegiment(BlvlPEquipped). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 a. MediumTank,T-62164/72................. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1s b . l 2 2 m mS PH o w i t z e r ........20 ..........20 c . 2 3 m mS PA A G u n Z , SU-23-4 ... d. SAI\4 ........ 21 {SA-9IGASK|N e . A T G ML a u n c h e r v e h i c l e3A T. . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 ' a Principal (BlvlP-Equipped) Equipment ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 in the Motorized RifleRegiment , e c o nA, R S 1 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . a T r u c kD .........21 5 Truck, Decon,DDA-66 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 : . B i d g e ,T a n kL a u n c h e ld\ ,4 T U. . . . . . . . . . . . . .........21 a Bridge,TruckLaunched,Tl\rl\r....... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 e. Ditchinglvlachine { 1 ) l \ 4 D K - 2. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 (2) lvlDK2in Operation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 1 . D o z e ra, A T / B A l - l v l / P K -.T. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .........23 ...........23 g . M i n eC l e a r i nPgl o w K , l \ 4 T - 4. . . . . . . . . . . . ..........23 , MR'3.............. " . M i n eL a y e rT, o w e dP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ... . . .23 . M i n eR o l l e K r , l v l T -.s. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i ;
1 5 . T h el v l o t o r i zR ed i f l eB a t t a l i o{ nB M P - E q u i p p e. d , .}. . - . . . - . . . . . . . . 26 16. PrincipalWeaponsand Equipmentof The MotorizedRifleBattalion{BMP-Equippod) a. lmmm Mortar I b. 8MP ............ 27 c. Truck, UAZ-@ 27 d. Truck, GM-66 a e. Truck,ZIL 130 2A f . T r u c kV, a n ,Z l L i M a i n t e n a n c. e . .). . . a g. Truck, POL{4,000or5,200Liters} B h. Truck, FieldKitchen,Van PAK-200. . . E i. Ambulance,UAz-450 30 j. Trailer-lrounrEdFieldKitchen.KP-125 30 1 7 . B a t t a l i o n H e a d q u a r.t.e. .r,s. . . . . . . . . . . 30 1 8 . T h el \ r o r o r i z R e di f l eC o m p a n(yB M P - E q u i p p e . .d. .). . . . . . . . 19. The Monsr Batt€ry I 2 0 . T h oC o m m u n i c a l i oPnl a s t o o n. . . . . . . . . . . & g nepresentative Ritle 21. Communications Net in a Motorized Battallon 22. TheUseof LineCommunicarions by a lrotofizedRitleBattalion in the Detens€, . , . -............. 23. MotorizedRifleBsttalionRearServiceElemontsin an Ass€mblyAret 24. MotorizedRifleEanalionRearServiceSupportEiementsDuringthe March . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . cl 25. RearServiceSupportDuringthe A$ack 26. RearSeruiceSupportin the Defense 27. The SupplyPlatoon 40 28, AmmunitionResupply to the Companies in the Defense.......... 2 9 . R e l u e l i nt hgel v l o t o r i zR ed i f l eB a t t a l i o nC' so m b aEt l e m e nD l su r i n g t hM 6 a r c h. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . 42 30. The SupplyPlatoonDeliveringFoodto AuackingCompanias € . .l. . . . . . . . . . . , 3 1 . D i v i s i oBna k e rP yersonne 3 2 . T h e M e d i c € l ASi dt a t i o n. . . . . . . . . 3. MedicalEvacuationDuringan Attack . . . . . . . a6 T h s R e p a i r w o r k s h o . , p . . . . , . . . , . . . . . , 34. 6 35. Repairand Evacuationof Weaponsand EquipmentOuringan Atack ........ 3 6 . S e n i o r S o v i e t \ A / V l l C o m m a n d e r s w e r e F l e x i b l e , E n e r g e t i c a n d F u l l o f l n i l i a t i v e . . - . . .50 a. MarshalZhukov,Chielof the Gener6lStafl in E€rly1941and DeputySupremeCommander Thereafter. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 b. FrontCohmandersEremenko,Konev.Rokossovsky,andTimoshenko...................... 37. UntilOctoberl94l,TheUnitPoliticalOfficerHadToCountersignTheCommender'sOrders........6 38. Batt6iionCommandersAre Young lvlenwith Considerablg PeacetimeCommandExperience. . . . . . . . 52 *). The RegimentalCommanderand His Staff ErerciseTight ControlOver
S u b o r d i nU a tnei t s ..-............,....,...54 4. A R e p r e s e n t a t i v e S i x - M o n t h T r a i n i n g S c h e d u l e l o r a B M P - E q u i p p e d U n i t . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41. A Typicalweek-Day TrainingSchedul€ . . . . . . . . 69 42. TheMo(ar BatteryCommander 6t HisForward Obs€rvation Post ........ @ 4ii. FlagSignalsUsedby the lvlonarBattory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 60 4, Thelvlortar Duringthe Battery March ..-...... @ a . A sP a n o f t h B eattalio F no r m a t i o n ......... 62 b. BatteryMarchOrder - . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . 62 ,15. M o r t aBr a t t e rDye p l o y m lernotmt h eM a r c .h. . . ..................... €B
-. -...... u 4 6 . l v f o r t aPro s i t i oi n t h eD e f e n s.e. . . . . 4 7 . O o e r a l i o n s o f tM r a t t e r vF ' so r w a rO d b s e r v a t iP .....,.,.,,65 h eo r t a B oo ns t 48.Moral-PoliticalTraininginaCombinedArmsUnitPriortoanExercise.........................6€ 49. CombinedArms Combat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . - . 6s r crhd e r o f al v l o t o r i z R e di f l eB a t t a l i o.n. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -72 5 0 . T a c t i c a f l M aO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73 51. ControllileasuresDuringthe March . . . . . - . r ei s p e r s e -... -.......74 5 2 . V e h i c l e s aD ad n dC a m o u f l a gD ed u r i n gL o n gH a l t s . . . . . . . . . . . . . - . . . . . . . . . . 7E 53. SecurityDuringthe March . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54. SA-7 GunnersAreThe MotorizedRifleBattalionCommander'sPrimaryl/lsansof Air Defense . . . . . . 78 ls Conductedby lvlotorizedRilleBattalionAssetsand/orby 55. NBC Reconnaissance BRDM-Equipped . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 SpecialistsfromRegiment 56. ChemicP a le r c o n nM e la r k i nag C o n t a m i n a tAerde a . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79 L se a d i ntgo a l , 4 e e t i n Egn g a g e m e .n. t. . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57.Condition 80 58. A ReinforcedMotorizedRifleBattalionConductinga lvleetingEngagement. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 82 59.SovietFigu.esforNATODefensivePositions............................................ 83 60. ArtillerySupportfor FirstEchelonBattalionsinthe Breakthrough ........84 61. A ReinforcedMotorizedRifleBattalionDeploying{rom the lvlerchto Panicipatein a Division B r e a k t h r o uOg ph e r a t i o n ........... Ea 62. U Z - 2B a n glao r eT o r p e d o ........89 63. T a n k s C l e B areachesThrou Mgi n h eF i e l dfso r[ I o t o r i z eRdi f l e T r o o p s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . @ T h el / l o t o r i z eRdi f l eB a t t a l i oi n t h eD e f e n s e ........................ 94 A R e i n t o r c e d l M o t o r i z e d R i f l e B a t t a l i o n A c t i n g a s t h e F o r w a r d A r e a S e c u r i t y F o r c. e. ..9. .7. . . . . . . . 66. A ReinforcedN4otorized RifleBattalionActing as th€ RearGuardDuringa RegimentalWhhdrawal . . . s9 67. R e l i ei nf P l a c e ....... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 68. T h sl J r b a n i z a t F i oanc t o r .................... r03 69. A R e i n f o r c eMdo t o r i z eRdi f l eB a t t a l i oAnt t a c k i nagB u i l t - U p A r e a .. -.........105 70. Combat-in-Cities Exercises ................. ..... -. - . . . . . . . . . . . . . 106 7 1 . Flamelhrower Personnel Playan lmportantRolsin UrbanCombat ........107 72. A Reinforced l,4otorized RifleBattalion Defendinga Built'lJpArea ........10€ 73. A B T R - E q u i p p e d M o t o r i z e d R i f l e B a t t a l i o n P r e p a r i n g f o r a H e l i b o r n e O p e r a t i o n . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . l 14. I n e F L U U b E H S e n e s r r o v r d e A f - G r o u n d S u o D o n , , , , . , , , . , . , . , , , . , . , , . , . , . , . , . , . , . , . , , , 1 1 0 75. H e l i c o p t e r c u n s h i p / T r o o p C a r r i e r s . . . . . . . . . . ..................... i11 a. HIND ........... . -. -. -.............. i11 b . H t P. . . . . . . . . . . . . .................... l]1 76. T h eH O P L I TPEe r f o r mTsa c t i c aRl e c o n n a i sn sc ae. ..... -. -. -. -. - -.....112 n. T h e H I P C a n C o n d u c t A e r i a l l v l i n e l a y i n g . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112 74. T h eH e a v y T r a n s pHo er tl i c o p t eHr O , oK ......... r13 79. C o m m u n i c a t i oi nnt sh eA s s e m b l y A r e a .,......114 80. A M o t o r i z e d R i f l e B a t t a l i o n i n a H e l i b o r n e A s s a u h . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . r r 5 8 1 . Reconnaissance of BothRiverBanks lJsually Precedes th€ MainAss€ult... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 a. T h e s e n i o r E n g i n e e r o f f i c e r c o n l r o l s t h e C r o s s i n g . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 1 8 SelfPropolledArtiileryandzSU-23-4sSupportingaRiverCrossing...........................1t9 u. T-62sPreparingfor a RiverCrossing. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119 85. SA-TGunnersSupplementOtherAirDefenseWeaponsDuringaWater-crossingoperation........r20 86. A ReinforcedlvlotorizedBifleBattalionAssauhinga Water Barrierand Establishing -. -. -. -.121 a Bridgehead 4 1 .AttachedArmor RejoinslvlotorizedBifleTroopsAs Soon As Possiblein a RiveFcrossing Operation. . , . . , . , . , . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122 88. A R e i n f o r c e d M o t o r i z e d R i f l e B a t t a l i o n D e f e n d i n g a R i v e r L i n e . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . l 2 3
u.
x1
89. A Roinforced Motorized Rffl6 Battalion Conducting a Night Attack . . . , . , , .127 Sn. A Reintorced Motorized Rifle Battalion in a Night Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . i29 91. NavalInfantryon Paradein Moscow . . . . . . . . . . . .130 92. NavalIntantryOft€n Formthe FirstEchelonin a Se€bomoAssauh. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13r 9 3 . E m b a r k a t iaonndo e b a r k a t i oPno i n t s ............132 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . , . .13' Sl4.AmDhibiousShios . .. .. .. .. .. .. .. ...,... -133 a . A L L I G A T OCRl a s s .,. -.................133 b , R O P U C HCAl . s s .. . . .. . - .. .. .. .. .. .. .. .1ir4 c. POLNOCNYC|aSS.. 9 5 . A m p h i b i o uAs$ a u l t sM a yB eC o n d u c t oWd i t hA i rC u s h i oVne h i c l €.s. . . . . . . . . . . . , . . . . . . . . . . . . r34 96. A Roinforced Motorized Rifle Sattalion Conducting an Amphibious Assault - . - . . . . . . . . . . . . . , . , . . 138
xli
1. INTRODUCTION CHAPTER 1. RELEVANCE
2. CONCEPTUALAPPROACH
Flvl lO0-5examin6sthe basicdoct nal concepts of the United States Army and pres€ntsthe principlesdeemednoc$sary for winning the land battle. For thos€ m6n tasked with directing and fighring th6 battle {that is, for colonelsand captainal, The Soviet Moton2ed Rille Eattalion is par ticularlyrelBvant.BMP-equippedMRBs are widely distributedthroughoutthe ground forces, poss€ss mobility and firepowor superior to that ol BTRequipped MRBS, and allow mol€ flaxibility in employment. The MRB is the major maneuver elementof the molorizedrffle r€gimont(according to the Soviets, tho most irhportant unit in rh€ ground forces) and plays 6n irnportantrole in oflensive and defensivo ooerationa. Studv oI the MRB reveals strongths to be countered and weaknessesto be exploited; and providesan insight into Soviet op6rationalprocsdures at the nsxt higherlevel.
A straightlorwardanalysisof MRB opsrations per se would b6 hisleadingand dangerous,as the [/lRB normallyoperatesas part of the MRR and, in addilion, may receiveadditionalsupport frcm the motorized rifle divlsion (MRD). Accordingly, this studv analyzesthe MRB within the context of regimentaloperations,and illustraressome of the whichmay€lsobe in support. MRD'sequipm€nt 3. DIAGRAMS The tactical diagrams arc not templates and should not be used as such. lroreover, while illustratingSovi€t tactical concepts, they arg not intended to portray rigidly how ths Soviets will conductevervooeration.
CHAPTER2. DOCTRINE.TACTICS,AND TRENDS SectionA - Docttine 1 .G E N E R A L
2. OFFENSIVE PRINCIPLES
Soviet doctrine sl.esses that the offensive ts ihe decisivefofm of combat. To achievesuccess, the Soviets stress high averagerates of advance r30 50 kilometersper day in nonnuclearsituations and 50-m kilometels per day when nuclear weapons are used) by combin€d arms units lilgure1).
Soviet olfensive doctrine is based upon combined arms operations,that is the closely coordinatedefforts of the missile,tank, motorizedrifle, attillery,and combatsupportunits.This doctrine does not separat€ fire and maneuverj it seeks ways to improve their integration and effec,
To achieve such high rates of advance, the Sovietsadvocatethe concentrationof numerically superiorlorces and firepowerw;thin selectedsec:ofs; the use ot airborne, heliborne,and special 3perstionsforces throughout the depth of the enemyreararea;and the achievement of surprise figure2). Shouldnuclear/chemical weaponsnot 3e used, conventionalartillerywould be used to schievethe desired density of firepower. Soviet {r tings stress the crilical transition from non-!c ear to nuclearoperations, and frequendyex:'cise going from one mode of combat to the
In fo"ning combined arms group,ngs,the Soviets do not cross-attach units as in some Western armies. Within a Soviet motorized rifle regim€ntfor example,one tank companymay be assigned1o a MFB, but that I\,'lRB will not, in turn, assignone of its N4Rcompaniesto the tank battalion. In the Soviet Army, units are often at tached or placed in support of othe. units, Attachm€nts are more responsiveto the com mander of the unit to which they are attached, while units placed in support are controlied throughtheirparentunitcommander.
Detensiveconcepts are less frequentlydescrib.l and practiced.Ahhough they acknowledge '-ar a parricularsitualionmay diclaredefensive ::ton, the Sovietsstressthat the primarypur::se ol the defenseis to preparefor the resump::. of offensiveoperationsassoon as possible.
The Soviets idenrify rhree types of combat action''tl:e meeting engagement,* the offense, 6nd the defense.The offenseis funher subdivid' ed into the attackand its exploitation, and the pJrsuitculm:natiag in encirce.nent.The offensive is conductedby maximizingmaneuver,firepower, and shock action. Approximately80 percentof a
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rh. meeling ehgaoementis ofiensiv6in nature, the Soviers,in order Io emphaszeiG frpodance, r€cosnizeit as a : . rormol combar.
battalion'stactical training is offensive in nature, a biasalsor€flectedin the Sovietpress.
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are the basic types of haneuver describedby the Soviets, who clearly favor the latter (figure 3). Envelopmentis often employed in the meeting engagementand generallywhenever the enemy has an assailabl€flank. Envelopmentis also often conducted in conjunction wilh a frontal attack designedto pin down enemyforces. 8€'caused rheir perceptionsof the fluid nature ot modern war, the Soviets place more emphasis on the rne€ting€ngagement(combatbeween op posing columns rdpidly advancing toward each oth€d than on any other form of offensiveaction (figure 4). Meeting engagem€ntsrequire a high degree of;nitiativ€ because of their inherent -- Th€ n€ed to seizeand haintain the initiative. -- Freedornol .n€neuver,often with open flanks.- Comb€ron a wadefront. Rapidtroop deploym€nt. .. tr4obile,highspeedcombat.
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Drop in the Ene6y Reot Ateo.
b. Ho,ibo.ne Forc€s Flsh 16trtobli5l'd Brdg.h.od. Fieure2. Anborneand HeliborneTroopsAre Set€ctivety Usedto MainiainOtlensiv€ Monentum. The Soviets define maneuver as the movement of a forco into a favorable position {in relation to the enemy), from which it can launch an effective
aftack.The frontal attack and the enveloDment
Although th€ Soviets believe th€t their numerousintelligencegarhering means will help commanders ptepate tor the meeting engagement, they acknowledgethat planningmust often be conducted with incomplete data on enemy forces. Soviet comrnandersare encouraged1o aggressively seek rne€ting engagements and to make rapid decisions based upon availabte intelligence. Nuclear and nonnucl€ar breakthrough operations may be conducted against hasty, prepared, or fortified defenses. In the breakthrough,the Soviets envision penetration, accompanied wheneverpossibl€by envelopment,the relegation of pockets of resistance for destruction to second-echelon formations,meetingengsgements with advancing enemy reserves,and pursuit of withdrawing enemy forces. Against a prepared defensive position, and when nuclear weapons are not used, the soviets concentratea reinforced battalionand the fire of m-100 artillerypiecesper kilometer of breakthroughsector, while exerting pressureall along the remaining portion of the
In nuclearbreakthroughop€rations,the Soviets rely primarilyon nuclear weapons and penetratE enemy defenses in column. Pursuit operations, conductedon frontal, parallel,or combinedaxes, have the purpose of cutting off and de6troying enemy forces. Tactical hgliborne and airborne lorces occupy and hold locationsin the snemy's re€r and otherwise attempt to disorganizeand delayhiswithdrawal.
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3. DEFENSIVE PBINCIPLES
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For the Soviets,the purposeof the dgfenseis ro inflict maximumcasualties,to hold the defended area,and to creat€favorableconditionsfor the resumptionof the offensive. Sovietdefensiveconceplsinclude: Stabrrt-Achieved by d€fensein depth, clos6coordinat€d tire and obstacleplans, and strong V Secuity-Providdd by combat secuity lorces which give e€rly waming, prevent enemy reconnaissanceof the main defensive position, forcg fi€ enemy to deploy prematurely, inflict max.num casualties,and coordinatelong-rangefires on enemylormations. Use of key te'/ain-lncludes a fire and obstaclo dan which restricts the enemy's freedom of -aneuver and canalizeshis lorces into prepared xillinggrounds.
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Dispersion-Ailows maximum protection from huclear and chemical weapons by posi1bning ttoops on a wide front dnd in grcat depth. All-rcund detense-Pteparedalternateand supp€menrary positions provide 3mo defensive ..p€bilities. Battalion strongpoints, echolonedin oepth wirh €xtensivebarriersEnd fire pbnning, xovide the backboneofthe regirhentaldefense.
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Delensein depth-Echelonedbattalionstrongtdnts absorb the momentum of the attack and tolride time for mobilEreservesto counterattack, Antitank defense-Ptovided by the liberal a4ocatjonof antitankweaponsdown to all levels, and $e formation of strong antitank reservesat Sanalionleveland above. Cootdinated fircs-Planned to destroy the at. tackerapproachingthe defendedarea, in tront of
.. DeapE^velop eht (Doeble). Figure3. BasicFofmsol Maneuver
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Figure4. TheMeetinS E.gagem€nr (FEBA), the forward 6dg€ oI the battle arga on rain, or to escap€ enemy pressure. Du€ to th6 the flanks, and in prepared killing zones within complexity and inherent danger of withdrawal the defendedarea. Nuclearstrikssare plannedby operations,panicularlyunder snehy pressure,the division and higher units agains! the en6my's Soviets try to achieve su.prise by conducring nucl9ar weapons, major reserves,€nd command them on multiple rout€s at night or during other and controlposts. condirionsof limiredvisibiliry.
Mobile countenftack to.ces-Requirodto launchcountetattacks, Sovietcommanderc from trattalionand up maintainreservesfor this puF pos€ Approximatety 20 percentof th6 battation.s tac ticaltrainingconcerns dgfensiveoperations.
The groupingof forces for a withdrawalincludes convering{orces, the rear guard, main body, and flank security dotachmentslwhen necessary). Normally,the Sovietsleaveone-third to doceivethe enemv :1"il1:fi':::J:"contact Covering torcesdepartsuddenlyand.as a rule, Aft€r the main body has passsd simultaneously. then withdraws through' the covering -force lhroughthe rear-guardshouldthe enemypress lhe withdrawingforces'lhe rearguardwithdraws
4. WTTHDRAWAL Withdrawaloperations,initiatedonly by the next highercommander,are conductedby rhe sovists to regroup.occupymore favorabli ter6
designated area of d€fense, reconnaissance groups are formed. These groups conduct a survey oI the new ar€a, determinethe area to be occupiedby each unit, designat€approachroutes to them, mark off any mined or contamanated areas,and test the water, As the main body approachesthe area, its subordinateelementsare met by guides from the reconnaissancegroups and ars takento theirdesignatedareas.
in a leapfrog manner, rend€ringmutual fire support. lf the rear guard is successful,withdrawalof the main body is unimpeded. The rear guard occupies defensavepositions b6hind first-echelondefense forces. Subsequent defensive positions ar€ designatedfor the rear guard, wh;ch conducts ambushesand erects bar rigrsas it withdraws to subsequentpositaons.The rear guard moves to subsaquentpositions in a leapfrog manner, rendering mutual support and defendingeachposition.
Security is organized as soon as the lead elementsclose on the new defensiveareas, and engineering work is begun,
Prior to arrivsl of the rear guard in the newly
Section B - Tactics tjon of the Soviet deployhent system, as well as confusion' over how the system, particularly echelonment,works. Basically,the Soviet syst€m of echelonmentwhh "t!vo up" and "one back" is sihilar to our own and seeksthe same effects in theattac(r
1. GENERAL In spite of the superiorqualitiesof the BMP visa-vis the BTR, we are not aware of any new regulations governing employment of 8MPequipped and BTR-equippedunits. Soviet commanders still seem to be debating the tactical €mploymentof the BMP in an effort to maximize ns principalsrrengthsvis a vrs the BTR: superior lirepower {panicularlyanthank)and cross'country mobility, and better crcw protecrion.Training as also being condricted to determinethe optimum with use of BMPSoperatingin close coordinataon tanksandartillery.
- Timelybuildup of ths attackeffort. '' Beating the enemy in th€ use of correspondrngreserves. - Preventingan overdensityof lroops and eqlipment {thereby denying the enerny lucrativenucleartargets).
The BMP'S superiorityover the BTR makes |t units of a motorized likelythat the BN4P-equipped rifle division {MRDI wiil be assigned these key
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- Reconnaissance.
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-- Usein the forwarddetachment.
tin en to
Achievinghigh rates of advanceby attacks in depth. And in the defensel - Presenting the enemy with a series of defensiveposilions. - Preventingan overdensityof lroops and equipment. The difterence beoveen the Soviet and US systemsconcernsexactnessin terminologyand preparation.
- Positioning in the first echelon during nuclea. conditions,and/or if enemy delenses have been sufficiently neutGlized; otherwise in th€ second echelonas an exploitationforce {The BTR-equippedregimen(s) would {orm the MBD'sfirstechelon).
b. Definitions The firsi echelon is the most important echelonand normallyconsistsof up to two-thardt of the forces available.In the attack it comprises the leading assaultunits; in the defense,it comprisesthe forwardd6fenseunitson the FEBA.
- Operatingon the mainaxisof attack. 2. ECHEIONSANO RESERVES ed
a. Geneal In the West, there has been an overdramatiza_
'Byl@quenrlywrrting'secondechelonkerudl,"Sovietw.heBhaveconrriburedbrhecontusio..
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The second echelon, normally consisting oI about one-third ot the availablelorces, gives the commanderthe capabilityto intensifythe attack, to shift rapidly the attack effort from one axis to another,to repulsecounterattacks,and to replace heavilyattritedf irst-echelonun;ts. The commanders of the first and second echelonsreceive their missionsprior to combat. First-echeloncommandersare assignedimmedi6te and subseouentobiectivesand an axis of further advance, while second-echelon commanders receive an immediate objective and an axis for further adv6nce. Commandersmust get permission from the next higher commanderto commit their second echelon. A second echelon as not committ€din a piecemealfashion. Reseruesclearly differ from echelons.Wh€n the Soviets wrile "second echelon (res€rvol," they are not equating the two; they m€an that sometimes a cohmander will have a second echelon and at other times a reserve, Starting at battalion level, commandersnormally haintain reserves,usuallyconsistingof l6ss than one'third of the forces available. Reserves may be of severaltypes lantitank, branch, combined arms) and be employed separatelyor together, The commander ot the reserverac€ives no specific mission prior to battle, but must be pfeparedto carryout a numberof contingsncies, c. Employment of Echelonsand Reserves The commander's decision tor the emDlovment of his force deoendsuoon lVlETT.rFor example, bec€usea hasty defense does not have well-coordinatedfire and obstacleplans, speed in rhe atrack, combined with maximum combat power forward, is preferred to echeloning, Accordingly, a single echelon and a reservowould mostprobrblybe us€dto attacka hastydef6ns6. Moreover, unless a commander r€ceives augmentation, he must weaken his assault elements in ordsr to have tlvo echelons and a branch or combined arms reserve. For thas reason,units at regimentallevel and abov€ may, when attacking in two echelons,have chemical, engineer,and antitank reserves,but no moto zed rifle, tank, or combined arms reserve.lf sullably augmented, they may have two echelons plus branch,combinedarms,and/orother reserv€s, 'MBsion, 6n€hy, r6iiain€ndwoarher,troopsdvailabl6.
The MRB is the lowest level where echelonmeni occurs in the Soviet Army (the Sovietshave experimented with echelonment within companies,but this practicehas been discouragedby general officers who wrote that such practice dis$pates the company's combat power and increasesthe command and control problems of the comoanvcommander), When two ech€lons and a reserve are employed,reserveslor BTR- and BMP-equippad battalionscould consjsrof 6 designatedMR unit {normallya plaroon), usually taken from the second echelon,or a olatoonfrom an attachedtank The antitank reserve of the BTR-equipped [,4R8is normallyils antirankplatoon of manpack SAGGERSand SPG9s, whilefor a BMP- equioped MRB it may be pan of an attachedtank company or an anached platoon of rhe MRR'S antitank missile ban€ry (figur€ 5). Both types ol reserves ar€ usuelly under the battalion commander'sdirectcontrol. Dependingupon METT, the banalion'ssecond echelon{reserveloperatesfrom 1 to 3 kilometers behind the first echelon in order ro avoid unnecessarylosses, while being close enough for timely commitment to banle. When a second echelon passes through a firsr €chelon. the former lights independentlyof the latter, and is usually supponed by fjre froh the first echelon. Reserves and the second echelon are reconstituted as soon as possiblefollowing theh commitment.
d. Anriron*t6ov.! Jt o 8lR-Equtppod Uni,. RespondDirectly Figur€5. &ttalion AnlitanhReserves io the BattallonCommander.
The battalion'schief of staff, the deputy com mandersfor politicalaffairs and technicalaffaiis, and the headsof the variousrear serviceelements communicatewith their countelpartsat regiment, thus relievingthe battalioncommanderof many administrative and supplydetailsand allowinghim to concentrate on implementingregimentaltac4. TRAFFICREGULATORS
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A B[P.Equipped lAototi2ed RIll. B.nolton Antttank
: g!re5. Battalion Reserves Respond Antitank Drrecllyto (Contnued) Commander. theBatialon 3. COMMAND AND STAFF In the Soviet Army, position and branch are ..ore importantthan rank, lt is not unheardof for 3 Commanderto be junior to his chief of staff A 3nd/or one or moresubordinate commanders, Soviet major commandinga regimentcould have eutenantcolonelsas his deputies,Moreover,the :cmbined arms commandercommandsattach-ents, regardlessof whether or not the com-rander of the attached unit is superior in rank. Shouldan aftilleryor tank battalioncommanded ay a major or lieutenantcolonel be attachedto a r,!RBcommandedby a captain,the IVIRBcom -3nder would commandboth battalions. .
ChainofCommand
lo reconstitute a destroyed command ele-*_1. the Sovietsfirst attenpt to util;zethe unit's !.3 3ble assets.shouldthe battalioncommander :E -epacitated, he would normallybe succeedr: .v his chief of staff and the first N4Rcompany ::--'13nder (who is normallythe senior company ::Tmander), respectively. The battajion comnander may designatehis political officer to be 'ris successor, since this man is well trained .nilitaily. The regimentalcommandermay appoint one of his staff officers to temporarilycommand :hebattalion,
Extensiveuse of tmffic regulators(figure 6) by the Soviet ground forces is often interpretedas indicating a weakness in mapreadingskills. Thoughmapreading seemsto be a problemat the lower levelsdue to a number of factors (see 7re Soviet Motorized Rille Conpany, DDI-1100-T|-76, October1976,paragraphs51.53),the extensive use of traffic regulatorsrnay aid the achievement of high rates of adv6nce-Traffic regulatorsmove out with the advanceguard battalion,and their placementat key locationsspeedsup the movein ment of Sovietcolumnsby aidingcommanders the control of their subordinate elements, Because the Soviets move under vinual radio enemyconsilenceduringthe march (preceding tact), traffic controllers are panicularly useful. if ihey ate inlvloreover. Theyare alsovulnerable. capacitated, advancing columns may have difficulty.
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5. ATTACKTIME AND OBJECTIVES In the Soviet Army the at'racktime (H hour) is the time the first man reachesthe enemy FEBA, whereas in most Western armiesthe attack time refersto crossingthe lineof departure. A unit is given intermediateand subsequentob jectives and a direction for fufther attack. The depths of these objectivesdepends upon IIETT and whetheror not nuclearweaponsare used, The unit's immediate objective includes the enemy'sforward positions;the subsequentobjec tive, his reserves.The battalion'ssubsequentob-
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one), fires in support of an attack (phasetwo), and fires in support o{ operations within the depths of the enemy's dafenses {phase three), The battalion commander's control over his organic monars and attached artilleryvarieswith
iective is included in the immediateobjective of the regiment; the subsequent objective of the regimentis within the immediateobjectiveof the division, etc. 6. COMBINEDARMS OPERATIONS Sovietemohasison combinedarms oDe.alions has increasedover the last 5 years. [Iotorized rifle r€giments and divisions and tank divisions are units with an excellentmix ol motorizedrifle, aF tillery. tank, and engineer troops. Recently, motorized rifl€ comoanies have been added to tank regimentswithin tank divisions.These companies may be the p€cursors ot liR battalions becoming organic to tank regiments. Combined arms conceDtsand how thev affect the [lRB are describedb€lowi
The MRB commander,though responsiblefor rhe lraining and €mploymentof his organic moF tar battery, does not always have control over this unit. The regimentalchief of artillery plans and supervisesthe training of the mortar batterigs (as well as the regiment'santitank means)in thg regiftent s subordinatebattalionsand supervases execution of the fire plan by organic regimental artillery,to includemortars{figure7}. Artilleryfire planning is centrally coordanatedwith flexibility built in to allow lor close suD9ort ol maneuver
a. Tanks A tank unit(s) is usuallyattachedto or in support of a MRB, Normally, however, tanks are placed in support, thus allowing lhe rank comrnander to maintain control over his subunits. Such an afi6ngementfacilitatesmassing of pla toon and companytireson particularobjectives,
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When cenlralizedcontrol of tanks is not practical {for example,in combat in built-up areas6nd in forests), however, tank platoons may bs decentralizedand rqspondto l/lR company com' manders. b. Attilery To achieve desired fire suooort in a breakthrough,the Soviets form regimental,divisional, and 6rmy anillery groupings {respectively RAG, DAG, and AAG). An anillerygroupingis temoorarvin nature and consistsof two or more artillerybattalions.Wh6n a RAG is formed it does not includo the lrRR's organic artillery battaljon. The battalionis, howsv€r, normallyplacedin supoort of the MRR'Ssubordinatemotoriz€drifle battalions. In some cases each of the artillery battalion's battsries may bs attached to a lvlRB. In such cases. coordinalion of arlillerv fire is accomplishedby the aftillery battery commander {working wilh the MRB commanded under the close suosrvisionoI thg artillerv battalion commsnder(workingwith th€ IVIRRcommander)Artillerysupportfor an ofiensivsmay be divided into thr€€ phasesr preparatorylires {phase
Figu.eT-TheR€timental ChElol Artillery(onthe rieht) C@rdinat€s Resimerial ArtilleryDurinsPhase During phase one, all artillery, including mor tars, and all weapons {tanks and antitank guns) firing in th€ preparation,are centrally controlled by means of a fire plan. During phas€ two, the MRB'S organic mortars are controlled by the MRB, The attached anillerv battery, while less centralized.is responsiveto requests for fires from rhe IMRB, while still being controlled by higher headquaners.During phase thGe. attached anillery, whh the senior commander's approvsl, could advancewith the [lRB to provide close support, In the aftack, the mortgr battery displacesaccording to the tactical situation {see chapt€r 6 for details). Firing oltside a maneuver
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unit's boundariesis not permittedwithout approvalf romhigherauthority.
trained for specific rnissions.The latter type of engineeris normallyorganicro atmy andftunt
Duringtraining,when employedin an indirect fife role,Sovietanillery(depending upon the type of artillerybeing fired) will not fire within 300 rrelers of friendlytroops mou4teo in APCs or within 200 meters of friendly tanks. Artillery will not fire within 400 meters of dismountedtroops. Artilleryfired in the difect fire mode will fire much closer, Peacetimefire restrictionswould be considerablyreducedin wartime.
Ffom his seniorcommanders, the MHB commander receivesengineer support to enable his unit to crossnaturaland manmadeobstacles, and 1o colstruct defensivepositionsand barrierc. N4RBIroopsare trainedto performson'eengineer tasks such as buildingweaponsemplacements and trenches,emplacingand clearingminesby hand,andcamouflaging weaponsandequipment.
Dufing the pursuit, attachedartillerywoutd Direct air support to an l,4RB commander provide close support and on call fires. Owing to would be a rarity, since the IMB division comthe speedof pursuit operations,a continuingbar mander normally directs supporting air assets rage of fire foMard of the maneuverunits is not through air liaison staffs. Forwardair controllers deemedpractical. could, however,be assignedto a regimentattack, ingon a division s mainaxis, The prol;feration,types, and quality of Soviet engineer equipment complement their doctrine stressing high rates of adv6nce. Rivercross;ng equipment,mineclearers,and minelayersare par ticularlyimpressive(seechapter3). There are two types of Soviet engineers:Sapper, or combatengineers found at regimentand division,and moreskilledengineers organized and
This is not to say that Soviet tacticalair assets wouid not be used to "prep" an area prior to an i.4RB attack. For example, Soviet high peF formanceaircraft{suchas the FLOGGER seri€s) and or helicoptergunshipsoften "prep" areas prior to a fiver crossing,on the main axis of attack, €nd in other selectiveoperations{figure 8). Th€ l\lBB commander has no directorganiccom, municationwith high-performance aircraftor attack helicopters.
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SectionC - TacticalTrcndsSincetheOctober198 War combined arms operationsbuil! primarily around the tank. lt should be noted rhat in the 1973w6r. Thg Octob6r1973War had considerable imDsct tank gunnery destroyed rhree to four times as on the tacticaldoctrineof someW€sterncoun- manvtanksas did antitankmissiles.
1.GENERAL
lries, but did not c€useany ladicalchangeain Sovietdoctrineor tactics,in spite of a dgofous examination oI basicdoctrinalprinciples.Th€se principlgs lor the mostpartgo backto WorldWar ll. and rcmainthe primaryoriginof curent Soviet doctrinalthinking.Sovietoffensivedoctrine,built high€tes of adaroundths tank and enMsioning vance,remains basically unchanged. 2. SOVIETANALYSISOFTHEWAR
3. TRENOSSINCETHEWAR Sinc€ October 1!m, rhe Soviets have tak6n numeroussteos lo incr€se the viabilitv of their tank forces and to allow for anticipated losseSoI armored vehicl€s. Th6y have incroased the numbers of ranls and anillery pieces {especially self-propelled artileryl within the MRD. and ar6 stressingthe use ot combined arms units oven more than previoudy. Moreover, ther€ are clear indications that hdi:opters will be assign6d a greatsr role in ofiefldv€ op€radons.
While impr€5sedwith the increas€dcomplgxity of modern defens€s.the high exponditur€of munitions,and the lothalityof antitankweaponry, Nowherc aa6 dEse tr€ids morc apparent lhan the Soviets werc equary impressed by the ot Sovbt battalionand regimensnhanced otf€nsive capabilitiesp.osentedby in the op€radroaE mobileair defgnsesvstemsand wellcoordinated tal comb€t groupa€6.
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R I F L ED I V I S I O N C H A P T E R3 . T H E M O T O R I Z E D H I F L ER E G I M E N T AND MOTORIZED 1 .G E N E B A L
dependentop€rations.The lvlRD is organiz€das shown in fjgure L The tvlBD'sprincipalweapons andequipment areshownin figures10and 11.
Although the N4RBhas considerablefirepower, it lacks sufficient organic combat and combat support elementsfor many types of operations, 3. THE MOTORIZEDRIFLEREGIMENT For this reasonit usuallyoperatesas part of the Though capable of independentaction, the f RR. Since the MRB is normallyreinforcedor rifle regimentnormallyoperatesas part motorized supported by regiment, and sometimes by diviof a division, The division commanderallocates sion, the organizationsand equipment of the additional support to his regimentsas required. MRD and the MRR will be covered in this Regimentalattillery,for example,may be reinforc chapter. ed with units from the division's artillery and muk;ple rocket launcherbattalions,forming a 2, THE MOTORIZEDRIFLEDIVISION regimental artiherygrouping(RAG).The regimenunit possessing tal commanderrequestsnuclearfire supportfrom The MRD is a well.balanced sufficient combat, combat suppon, and combat division. service suppon units to enable it to conduct a The BMP-equipped MRR;s organized as shown variety of offensive and defensive operations the regiment'sprincipal under conventional or nuclear conditions- ln figure 12. Some of part or of corps weapons and equipmentare shown in figures 13 Although it normallyoperatesas army, the l\4RD;s fully capableof conductingin- and 14.
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(8MP Equpped) RilleRegimeni Fipure12 TheMotorized
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' Alsoioundin otherunitsln ihe motorized rilledNision Fi€ure13.Pr ncipalweapons inthe Motorized ued) RilleRegime.i(BMP.Equipped).(Contin
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o lfuck, De.or, ARS-,1.
b.Iruck, De.on, DDA 66.
Eridse,f onk Lolnched,Mf U
Figure 1 4 .P r n c r p a l E qpum e n t i n t h le\ , l o t o r i zReidi l eR e gn r e n t ( B MEPq up p e d ) .
2r
:11*
d Bnd\e. rru.kLounched ltuA
*Er--''-'
.. (t ) MDK-2DitchtngAo.hine.
e. (2)MDK 2OitchinsMd.hine(inopaatran) Figure 14. PrincipaI Equipment in the Molorzed RiileReg ment(BMP Eq!rpped).(Continued)
22
g. Lrihe Cleori^g Pl6w, KMf.l
i. Min. Rollet, KJAI.5
NOTE A l o l t h e a b o v e e q u i p m esnats o l o u n d i n o t h e r u n tnst h e m o l o r z e d r i l l e d i v i s o n . (BMP'Equipped). RilleRecimeni (Cofiin!ed) Figure14.Principa I Equipnenlinthe Motorized
2i
CHAPTER 4. THEMOTORIZED RIFLEBATTALION SectionA - OperationalPinciplesand Missions 1, OPERATIONALPRINCIPLES
A second-echelonbattalion may be given any of thefollowing missions:
Although it normally operates as paft of the regiment, the [r1RBmay aiso be designatedthe division reserve. In the latter role, the battalion op€ratesunder the division commander.In addi tion to their normal operations,IMRBSmay also participalein operationsunder specialconditions (seechapter8).
- Assuming the mission of severelyattrited firct-echelonunits. -- Exploitingthesuccessof the first echelon, - Eliminating bypassed pockets of enemy resistance,
Becauseit is relatively"light" in combat and 'Counterattacking. combat-supportelements,the battalionis normal iy reinforced by regiment and/or division. This -. Destroyingenemyforces on the flanks and augmentationmay occur when the battalionacts in the intervalsbetweenaxes of attack and in as a forward detachment,advance,flank, or rear the rearofattackingtroops, guard; when it attacks or defends in the first -- Attackingin a newdirection. echelonof the regiment;or when it conducts independent operations. For such operations, a As a divisionreserve,the l\,4R8would be given Sovietbattalioncommander couldbe allocated, in no mission p of to combat, but would be addition to his own assets,one tank company* a prepared to executea numberof contingencies: l22mm howitzer battaiion, an antitank guided missileplatoon, an antiaircraftmissileand anillery -- Flepulsing enemycounterattacks, platoon,an engineerplatoon,and a chemicalpla-- Combatting airbornelandings. 2. MtSStONS The missionof the MRB dependsupon the role it has been assignedwithin the regimentalcombat formation, lt may attack or defend as part of the first echelon,be placedin the secondechelon,be designatedas pad of the division res€rve,or be assignedspecial missions. As part of the regi ment's first echelon in the attack, the battalion would have the mission of penetrating enemy defenses,neutralizing enemv toops and equipment, and seizingand consolidatingthe enemy's defensivepositions.Fhstechelonbattalionswould also take pa.t in repellingenemy counterattacks and pursuinga withdrawingenemyforce. ln the def€nse,first-echelonbattalionshave the m|ssron of defeatingor wearing down the enemy's initial assaultelements.
- Beplacing weakened first-echelon units (rarely done). -- Intensifyingthe attackeffort. '- Exploitingsuccess, The MRB may also be assigneda numberof special missions:forward detachment or recon naissanceelement (the N,4RB would be the basis group)for division,advance for a reconnaissance guard of the regiment,and flank or rear security guard for the division (see chapter 7, section A, paragraph4 for further details). lt may also be given a variety of missionsin heliborneoperations and, on occasion,in ship-to-shoreoperations
'< panoi the regimenfsinstechelonin a bre.kihroughoperation,the MBB commandermay b€ sivonmorolanksuppon.
25
Section B * Organization, Responsibilities,and Equipment 1. THE MOTORIZEDRIFLEBATTALION The organizationand principal weapons and equipmentof the BMP,equippedMRB are shown
in figures 15 and 16. For a detailedlist and photos of weaponsand equipmentat companylevel,see The Soviet Motorized Rifle Company, DDt 11q0,7/,76.
1h..upp|Yehton|.d.l,ulu.
FiC!re 15. The Motorzed R lle Battalron(BMP.Eq!rpped)
o.l20nnMor,ar. Figure16.Principa I WeaponsandEquipment oflhe MotortedRitteBartation (BMp,Equpped).
26
.r.. ''fi,; . nZ'
..ftutk,UAZ.69. Figure 16. Principa Weaponsa nd Equipmentoi the Motonzed Rille Batlalion(BMP Equ ipped).(Continued)
27
:..s-
28
g. Irr.k,
POL (1,000 ot 5,20OLitett)
l. ftuck, v6^, ztL (Mointeha^.e).
!E::
ft ( B M PE q u i p p e d( )C. o n t i n u e d ) d i f l eB a t l a l o n eo i o r z eR a i e a p osran dE q ! i p m e n t o l t hM F c u r e1 6 .P r i n c i p W
29
for technicalaffairs,the battalioncommunications officer {who is also the communicationsplatoon leader,and the supply platoon leader la pEpotsrch,:k.roughlyequivalentto warreniotlicerl
i Anhulonce, UAZ a50.
FiEUre 1 7 B € t l a l o nH e a d q u a r t e r s .
ll) The battalion commander is resoonsible for his unit's mobilizationreadiness,combat and political training, €ducarion, military discipline, and morale.He is also responsible for the units eouiDmentandfacilities. (21 The battalion chief of staff is the commander's"rjght arm.' He has the authorityto give orders to all subordinateelementsand insures compliancewith orderc from the batlalion commanderand highercommanders.The chief of stalf draws up the combat and training plans ibasedupon the regimentalplan and the baltalion commander'sguidance)for the unit and insures FitL,re16.Principal Weaponsand Equipment ofthe Molorired that they are carriedout, He also insurcsthat reR(le Aattalion(BMP-Equ ipped).(Continued) quired reports are preparedand dlspatchedon time to regimentalheadquarters.He is principal 2. SUEONDINATEELEMENTS organizerofaear servicesupportfor the battalion. a. Th6 Battalion Headquafterc {3) The deoutu battalion commander for The battalionstaff consistsof six officersand political affairs organizesand conducts political 6ight enlisted men (figure 17). Office. personnel trainingdesignedto rally rhe battalion'spersonnel includ€ the battalion commander, the battalion eround the Communist Pafty and th€ Soviet chief of statf, the deputy battalioncommanderfor Government. He repons through the battalion politicalaffairs, the deputy battalion commander commanderto the regimentalpoliticalofficer,
30
(4) The deputy battalion commander for functions as the head of the forward observer technical aff6irs supervises the battalion's {FOl/reconnaissance section, maintenanceseruiceelement and reports direcdy to the botblion commanderor chief of staff. The technicalaffahs officer is responsiblefor the combat, political,and specializedtraining of rear servic€s personnel,and for the technicalconditionof rheirequipmsnt. {5) The communicationsofficer is a battalion staff officer and the communications platoon leader.lt is his responsibilityto train banalionper' sonnelin signalproceduresand to supervisecorhmunicationstraining of the battalion, to include the conduct of classesfor radio operators and periodicinspectionsof communications equiprnent. In combat, the battalion signal officer receivesinslfuctions from the senior regimental signal officer, as well as from the battalioncommanderand chiefof staff. (6) The supply platoon leader may be a prapotshchik or senior NCO. He works closely with the battalion chief of staff on all aspectsof banalionsupply. (7) Enlistedpersonnelin the battalion headquart€rsincludea sergeantmajor and his driver,a chemicalinstructor/dosimeler operator,a senior nedic lthe feld'sheL who headsthe medicalsec:ion, is a medical assistant whose skills fall Equrpped). RlleCompaiy(BMP Frgure l8 TheMoiorlzed somewhere between those of a nurse and a !hysician), two clerks,a driverand gunnerfor the aattalioncomfiander's BMP, and a driver for the Each mortar platoon contains wvo squads, :hiefof staff'sAPC. each of which containsa crew chi€f, a gunnef, one telephone opbrator, a loader, one ammo b. TheMotoized Rifle Company anda vehicledriver, bearer, The battalion'sprimarymaneuverelementsare d. TheCommunications Platoon s lhree motorized rifle (l/lR) companies. The 3MP-equippedirR company is organizedas The communicationplatoon'sorganizationand srown in figure 18- For detailed information on equipment are depicted in figure 20. The com'-6 unit, the reader should .efet to The Soviet municationsplatoon leader has an NCO assistant \.otorized Ritle Company. DDl1100-77-76, and tlvo sectionleadels. ::rober 1976, e. Battalion Rear ServiceSupport c. The Battalion Mortat Battery The deputy battalioncommanderfor technical The mortar battery contains six l20mm moF affairs is assistedin supervisingrear seruicesupr.s and is organized and equippedas shown in port elementsby the supply platoon leader, the . S J r e1 9 . NCos responsiblefor the repair workshop, and the medicalaid station. The mortar battery commanderis assistedby -€ headquartersbatlery platoon leader,who also
3I
FBufeI9 TheMortaraaltery
Figure20.TheComhunicationsPtat@n
32
SectionC - Commandand Control 1.COMMAND Tho Sovlatsroggrdcornmandas the exorcla€ot conotrntand offactivecontrol.ThebattElioncomntanderleliosprlmarilyuponhis chiefof 8taff,but b roluctant to dal€g€te authority, pref6rdng to nlake most docisiong hirns€ff. Company confiEnders and the command6rsof other oqanic a.d atboh€d uniE ara clogelysupervis€dby th€ hgttalioncommanderand/or the chiel of statf.
zco tnol In th6 offuiEiw, th€ p.irmry rneansc'f oont ol
of th6 MBB is radio,althoughm668engeE, p€raonElcontactbelwe€ncommsnde6,aignglfh.e6. tlags, snd s vadetyof oth6r methods6rs a|so us6d. Prior to contacti radio silonceb Etrictlv ob3€rued,excoptingreporE from loconnsissanc€ olslh€ntsand th6 crossingot phaselln63.A typs ot battalionradionet is shownin figur62l . In tfi€ detense,the battalionr€lir6 primsrily on wire. although messengeGrsignsl flar6, and radio6ar6 also usedext€nsiv€ly.A battalionin th€ d€fons€would employa wire sryatemas shown in lburc2'
,1
ELEMENTS MOTOR Z'D RIFT€BA'TALION
cosMNDEF r:-^r --:-Phror)
toRr^R l Fr ' z3 )| E A T E R Y
-rl KEY -------S..----.D"'Nd'dN"i!
-----S"=-co*-ar"r.
--.-S--
----S-----F,,.
suoonna. NOIES
r Radd ued mry be rh. Flotro7
Rtr37L23
-- h,v. R1z65tor dEtu^ted @n
*,, . ,i if$!iiJ:T;Ti"i$i iii iiiriiii pl'r'""". 'r'" arnquop.d N'd'.d i iiil ""iijl";;;o
*n' rrtr'*.r
''ir' ban'bnmu a - 5 @t o' ' ( ' e N B ch r l i ' 3 t
icalionsN€l lna MolorizedRitleBattalion Commun Fieure2l Representatlve
34
d
P
+ A
KEY Pratoonr@&r'6 Mmad
o6sda o. Fs1
@
A'
r
M.drr bareryji fin4 @iiionozonn)
>.l
A
Telephme non onn8 or mtor
*rion
NOTES r. $iE euld ak b€laidlrcm @n
deqtrcn pbr@nb6deBlo squad
2 ououts aE rod. Mry 5c70 mdie6 abo! virc in op€n leraii to pmvidd sh;her ror wn€ t6ns .hekinc ihe iins in mb.t
Figure22.TheUseol lineCommuni6tionstyalvotorazed RirreBattalionin the Delense.
Section D - Battalion Rear Setvices and combat servicesupportelementshave normal spacing between vehicles in the column {figure Pfior to the march. the lvlRBnormallyoccupies 24). During the attack (figure 25), €nd in the an asssmblyarea, For operationalconven:ence, delense {figure26}, the rear servicesare position reliabledefense,and protectionof the rear service ed closelybehindthe combatunits. elemenls,the latter normallyoccupy the center of The battalion's administrative 6nd logistics the MRB area{figure23}. respon$bilitiesare purposely minimizedlo allow During offensiveand delensiveop€rations,the the battalion commander to concentrate on his MRB'S rear seruice elements are positioned to primary mission'defeating the enemy in combat. enable them to provide rapid material,technical, The regimentassumesmost of the battalion'sadand medical support, In order to maintain minist€tive burden and augments the battalion, frsedom of mansuverduring the marc as required,logistically. 1. GENERAL
AA)
A A
&h. m,nnunr6n
appt Fnr
P
A
A
A\
in an AssembyArea Fi8ure23MolorizedRilleBatialDnRearS€rviceElements
36
----Ttr--rsr # # fi # c''d c4a d"d c-tt9 #-Jt +--H{r
I(EY
"'tu
dL bdt lh, t.ido'tld n@i!drhi btri. tnd adill..Y in dd
Fdd knn.n lqn 9|d r7olnDt
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"* ,n,.n*",-,".
58'.*
|||n
t-/
*,r"rion..'uni,io",*.r
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rd
*,1h fJlr
rni.r
SQo',"-*"**,*,*
NOTES ., rruds,6 ons pr€d{ ftrns|#:fr.;tr-f,lffi, €h '8..^d i Dn.^6 bk.n r.2{I) tErd dunn. tdbl('!r}fui4
|i1oM'
""€rE
o5,.5odldi du.m,!.dnffie,.id
Ouringlhe March Figure24. ltoto'i2ed RitleEsftalion R€r S€ruic! SupportElements
37
so
v E
tr
al
-rrl
A
d
o( I
E
4
*rrl
n .010. F
A A A A A
A
N I
F gure25.RearServrce SupporlD!rinCth€ Atlack
38
g
.-r.;i*.
R 'v(
'.:.'.ln
':r,ii',
KEY
6il
A A A
@
E@
comtsry,hmunitbi spot @'nr
Mld minele]d lafr'ts&im|:nd
sotu.o20nm)miflisposron
Fi8ure26. RearServiceSupport in the Deiense
39
|nii'nk)
necessary,the batlalion's supply pl€toon (ligure 271 picks up suppliesfrom regiment. Priorlty lor The regimentalassistantchiel of staff for psr- resupply is ammunition, POL, technical supplies 6onnelis responsiblofor maintainingall personnel {repair parts), rations, and nontechnicaleupplies. records.such as officers' leavesof absence{bat' Resupplynormallytakos place prior to battle and talion keeps records of enlisted perconnel on at the end of the day. The Sovierstry to r6upply l6ave), daily strength r6ports, and peBonnol at night or during other periods of limired visibilawards. In combst, h6 is also responsiblefor ad' ity. Emptyvehiclesreturningto battalionand regiministrationre$rding POWS, captured m8teriel, ment are used to evacuatepersonnolend aquipand processingof personnelreplacements. 2. ADMINISTRATION
Forms and reoorts maintainedat battalion include strength r6porte,training schedules,supply and maintenancerequisitionforms, and political reoorts. Ths battalion commande. is assistedin hiB administrativeresponsibilitiesby his principal staff officersand clericalpsrsonnel.
The battalion chief of staff. assistedby the battalion t€chnical officer, the supply pl6toon feader.and the hatlalionfeld'sheL has the overall responsibility for coordinating the battalion's logisticrequirements.
There is no forrnal re3r service element at company level, where the company commander, assistedby his technicalofficer and lirst sgrgeant, a. Genenl handle all logisticsfunctions. Normally, the batits organic talion delivers supplies to its subordanate Normally the r€giment, using assets, deliverc supplies to the battalions. This principle is flexible, however, and whsn 3. SUPPLY
rlEr'mLotd'Ui^!80[d ldr'ndr6h,f.p*l'/:o
Fi8ur€27 TheSupplyPlatoon
40
During a high-spe€doffBnsive,platoon guides lead the battalion ammunition carri€rs lo individual combat vehicles. In the del€ns€, comp€ny ammunirion supply point6 (RPBS)may be €stablished(figure 28). This procedu16reduces theexposureof supplyvehicleslo enemyfire.
The chi6l of th6 battElionammunitionsupply point (BPB) is usually an NCO from the supply platoon. He signsfor the ammunitiondeliveredby regiment,deliversrequestedamounts to the companies, and keeps the remainder on trucks The battallon's support platoon lgader and {th6r6bylacilitatingrapid delivery)at the battalion BPB. Additional excess ammunition may be company lirst sergeants maintain ammunition stored on lhe ground, particularlywhen ths bat statusteDorts. talionis occupyinga delensiveposition.
t\\ -----:: GlJ
|; l tj::r
4
\
s/9
-d^
KKEY
5
Badi|ionanmutritbi9',|yFni
@ J't
cdFiy
P
annunrbn suprt Fir
@ NOTES
idtr'durr @nbar shrcr.s
dt io the bad.riona6m!i,rbi !up
niesInI heDelense Fi8ure28 Ammunition Resupplyto the Compa
a
I C. POL The deputy battalioncommanderfor technical affahs is r€sponsiblefor allocatingfuel to the bat' talion's subordinateelements, The motor transport squad leadero{ the supply platoon normallY point{BZP). .unsthe battalion refueling
In combat, Soviet soldiers are supposed to receiveat least trivohot mealsper day. When this is not possible,they eat dry rations and bread. Four hundred grams of bread and 3 dry combat rationsprovideover4,000caloriesper dsy.
To decreasethe need for refueling, vehicles have supplementaryPOL containers which are refilled after use, only in €xtreme emergencyare vehicles refueled in combat. The Soviets make every effort to refuel prior to an engagement,at the end of the day, after the cohbat mission,and prior to a river crossing.When on the march, the preferredhethod of refuelingis to simultaneously refuel v€hicles positioned on both sides of the POLtankers{figure29).
The MRB has 4 mobilelield kitchenswhich prepare hot meals and transport them to subordinate units {figure 30). Sealed thermos con tainersfor each platoon are picked up by platoon represent6tiveswhen soldierscannot individually pick up lheir radons.The divisionbakeryprovides fresh bread {figure 31), which may be baked on
CCCCC
CCCCCC
KEY -6i
--J;l
IE-:;F{!J
a_l
tue
kld
$,'h k&r
c*.
F glte 29. R e t l eI n E l h eM o t o r i z eRdi ie B a i t a l i osnC o m b aEl l e m e n D t su rn g t h eM a r c h
42
Lr^.. ::8 Fq^i i,., In^("""$ F-[^', ,$
t-(^tfl
I-{r'""." KEY
lgj
.fil
fl{
+ olo
NOTES
Foodto AtiackinsCompanies Figure30.TheSupplyPlatoonDeliv€ring
43
is responsiblefor the distributionot clothing and for bath and laundry services,Soviet regulations specifythat active duty personnelmust bathe and change their underwearat least once a week, a period extendedto every 10-12days during combat operatrons.
The battalionmedicalaid station (tigure 32) is the lowest level of organizedmedical support in the Soviel Army. The section ot four men is headed by the feld'sher. The aid station's function is to provide firct aid and to prepare casualliesfor evacuation to the regimental aid station {figure:l:l). Although subordinateto his battalion commander,the /e/d1rrel takes instructionsfromtheregimentalmedicalofficer.
Fieure 31.Division Bakery Personner. The battalion food supply point (BPP) is run by the head of the supply platoon's ralion sec' tion. A water supply point is constructednear the BPP or, when this is not practical,a centralwater distributionpoint is used. Water is deliveredwith food to the companies. lndividual water consumptionis figured on the basisof l0 liters of water per d6y (15litersin hot climates).
Medical aid at battalion level is rudimentary and includesbandaging.splints, morphine injections, and simple operationsto preparewounded for evacuation.The two medical orderliesin the section are aided by regimental orderlies in collectingthe wounded from the battle area and carryingthem to the battalionaid station.
It is the responsibilityof the chief engineerat regimentto establishwater supply points, which are then maintainedby subordinateunits. Rubber ized materialwhich protects the water from contaminationis usedfof storage, e. Clothing In combat, the battalionrequestsreplacement clothing on the basis of worn-out, lost, or contaminated. The clothing supply chief at regiment
44
F i E 0 r3e2 . T h eM e dc a l a i dS l a l i o n .
d
-----\5
fu*.t.*" f
A .r;t
G\
\-Fs/
v-
Lna sheher(Ficurcsrherunermlnded) crouporwdundcd
6 =.
EI LI I ourin8theAtta,k. 33 M€di6l Evacuation
45
I
4. MAINTENANCE
The deputy battalion commandertor technical af{airscontrols r€pairand €vacuationof damaged For some time, the Soviets have had a field €quipment from a technical observ€tion point. maintgn€ncedoctrine str€ssing rapid battlofield . This obseruationpoint, normallvlocatod I to I h reoair as close to the frontlinesas oossible.ouF kibmeters from the frontlino, includes a radio ing World War ll, 7t&) percenr of the disabled ooerator and attachedmaintenanceDorsonnel. Soviet vehicles r€turned to combat; of these, m-90 percent were repairedin 1 to 2 days (the lf a vshiclecannot be repeiredin plece, or is in lsraelisenjoyed a similar high repair rate in the danger of capture, it is evacuatedby regimental Ocrober1973Warl. Such raoid reoak is of critical assets to previouslydesignatsdlocations {figuro importance,panicularlyin a war with high r€tes of attrition. This emphasison rapid repah as an essential element of soviet offensive doctrine with itsanticipatedhigh ratesofadvance. The d6puw battalion commanderfor technical affairs direcrly supervises the repair workshop {figure 34). A repair or repair-evacuatergroup {BG, or REG)may be createdby augmentingbattalion asseb with regimentalvehicles. Sattalion BEGsnormallyonly conduct repairswhich can be comoletedin a veryshorttime (5 hou|sor less). Figure34 Th€Repanworkshop,
46
t
-..-
)
)r&
F=-a=
l1^"*"
J%<
n(
ltl]\
I
n
s,bbn
6mmds\
mnm
4:L\
6,trt'0. .eru.r"3 F d
o..
l!!A
8.n'ron rd suoet@r,
c"
ll!!\
sdsroi anmui,di sppry@'nt
Zq\
6"ia o 'ednc
ob$rydm
@d
E "",.,"",,.,", :;;H"ii,i%", EE" r,ir:itf %1:#,i"J."1,'i:t
ft **."*"
x#""*,"'"-
-Ei
a X
x €
r+ I
I
/----r-1
)6 t urin€theAttack F i 8 u r e 3 5R. e p ar a n dE v a c u a t | o inW e a p o n s a E n dq up m e nD
q
CHAPTER 5. BATTALION.LEVEL LEADERSHIP SectionA - lntrcduction 1 .G E N E B A L
initiative, and as suffering from institutional restrainls and lack of recenlcombatexperience, It is difficult to generalizeabour an army's Usuallysuch analysesconcenlrateon the negaleadership.lt cannot be n€atly wrapped in a box rive aspectsof Soviet military eadershipwithour and labeled "outstanding," "average," or differentiatingbetween various leadershipleveis, 'medioc,e."Wioe vdriarionsn education,r'ain and witho!t consideringthe frarneworkwithin ing, personalities, exper;ence,operationalcon whichleadership ls exercised in the SovietArmy. cepts,as well as numerousother factors,make generalizations This chapter, which begins with a brief concerningleadershipboth dif' ficult 6nd dangerous,For example,]t has been historicalperspective, analyzesthe Soviet IMRB and institutional the practice oI some Western analyststo depict commanderand the operatjonal Soviet military leadershipas lackingflexibjlityand factorswhich affect his eadership-
SectionB - TheHistoical Percpective for it !!as greater than the urge to take
1, WOBLDWAR II World War ll providespadicularly relevantdata performance of Soviet comon the combat Although the impodance of this hismanders. perspecive ir ca1 be overe-nphasired. rorical must be realizedthat in spite of Soviet lessons learnedfrom the VietnamWar and the ast two conflictsin the MiddleFast,WorldWa' ll remairs by far the primary origin of cufient Soviet doc trina and leadership concepts.World War ll doc were carried out by junior comtrina concepts who today constitute the seniorleadermanders in the Soviet Army. ship
The reasonsfor this dichotornyof responsibil jty, flexibility,and initiativewhich separatedthe (armyand lrora level) seniorSovletcommanders (divisionleve and below) from theirsubordinates may be primarily attributedto two faciors:(1) the Sovieitheoryof commandand (2)the high losses of officers(pafticularly divisionleve and beow) suffered in the first year of World War ll. These factors often resuked in better qualified highel commandersbeing flexibleand exercisinginit iative,while restrictingless experienced subor
2, THE EASTERNFRONT(1941.1945I Sov;etfeld orde.swere 1ot o' rhe Amefcan "mission" type, but specified in considerable Campaignson the eastern front are replete detail how a mlssionwas to be accompiished, of commandand highiydetai with examples of a striking lack of initiative Overcentralization predictable ed ofders had a effect on the ower displayedby Soviet commanders,pafticularly level leadership; initiative was stifled, and comthose at division level and below, as opposedto were very reluctant to do €nythingwithmanders the flexibiljtyevidencedat higher evels.The Ger mans had a high regardfor the senior Soviet out an order--preferably a written order. (armyand tort level),characterizing commanders Soviet commandersat divisionleve and below thern as flex;ble,energetic,and full of initiative were primafily imp ementors rather than (figure36). At divisionleveland below,however, innovators/planners, The battalioncommander's Soviet Leadershipwas for a long time considered duties were cleary and narrowy prescribed. by the Germansto be inflexibleand indecisive,as Orderswere usuallyfolowed without any devia responsibility: wellasdesirous of avoiding tion and under the closestcontrolof the next a. H;ghetand Lawet Level SovietLeaderchip
Spiritedapplication to a lask, born of the highercommander. decisionof an individua,was a rarity.. . The fear of doing Russiansmallunit commander's something wrongand beingcalledto account
49
d. Mor.hdl Zhuk6v, Chj6l ol the Ge^e.dl St.ll in Eddy t94t ond Doputy Suptehe Con1oadet lh..&lre..
h Fron, Comno^det
b FrcntCtnndndq Ronev.
Etenenko.
FrcntCommoid€r Potols. ky. Pololeo4 b. Frcnt b Commond€r
Figure36.SeniorSovietWWllComma ndersWereFlexibleEnereeirc and Full of Initiaiive.
50
pertise in the technical aspects of their trade, Soviet leaders were in fact well trained along technical and lactical lines, but often failed to grasp the spirit of doctrinal concepts and there fore often acted in a ste.eotypedmanner rather than in responseto circumstances, d. The Political Otficet and the Commander Fro.n 22 June 1941(the date rhe Germ€nsinvaded the Soviet Union) to October 1942 (when Stalin decreedthat military commanderswere to be solely responsiblefor the conduct of battles), rhe polirical officer often complicated decrsion. making, for he had to countersign the commander'sorders(fig'rre37). This dual command system was inefficient and often tactically in thewar'sinitialstages. disastrous
b Fto^tCoDmond.r rinosh.nko FiSure 36.senior Soviet WWlrComanders wereFexble, (Continued) Enersetic andFul ol Intialive. b. Soviet Regulations Soviet field service regulations of the lare 1930sand early war period also contributedsignificantly to the lack of initiativeand responsibilhy at the lower levels- These regulationstried to have it both ways; they paid lipserviceto the need for exercisinginitialive while making clear the dangersof failurewhen exercisjnginitiative.lf a battalion commanderexercisedinhiativewithin th€ context of the regimentalcommander'splan and was successful, he (the battalion commander) was safe. On the other hand, initiative exercisedoutside the establishedplan and which r6suhed in f€ilure, left the battalion commander op€nlo severepun|shment,
The October 1942 decree eliminatedthe dual command system by subordinatingthe political officer to the military commander. lt should be added, however, that the role played by the political officer was an imponant one, and con tributed to ultimateSoviet victory. In general,the political officer was a fanatical and brave man who set an inspirjngexample for troops, often, the pol,trcalofficer was more prone to act in a criticalshuation thanthe commander. The question is, how'much have conditions changedsinceWorldWar ll? Do Sovietcommand procedures, regulations,discipline, and training continLreto stifle the leaderchipat battalionlevel, or hasthis leadershjpimproved?
c. Trcining and Discipline German officers also concludedthar the rigid pattern of Soviel training and severe discipline resulted in lethargy, as w€ll as lack of initiative and flexibility at the lower levels. The Germans also noted, however,that as the war progressed, Sovietlower levelleadershipimprovedsomewhat. Significantly,German writers do not criticize F gufe 37. Untll ocrober1941 The Un t potiic? Oitic€r Bad to Count€rsignTheConmandefs Orders the Soviet lower level leadershipfor lacking ex-
5I
SectionC-ThePresent I, THE SOVIETMRB COMMANDER a. Age and Rank
sions from commissioning schools (somewhat similarto Wesr Point). Other sourcesof commis sion include reserveofficer training programsand direct commissions;the former produce junior lieutenants who are commissioned in the reserves, while the latter are probably not extensively used in peacetime.Therefore,the ma;ority of Soviet battalion commanderswould be graduates of 3 to 5 y€ar commissioningschools. Graduatesof the 4 and 5 year train;ng schools are most prevalent,and receivemore deta;ledand higher level training than graduatesof the 3-year schools,Both systemspreparepersonnelfor compositions. mandaswell as technical-specialist
Today's Soviet NllRBcommander is between the ages of 27 and 39 and varies in rank from seniorlieutenantto lieutenantcolonel,A senior lieutenant commanding a battalion would prgbably be 25-28years old and be on the list for pro motion to captain. While few senior lieutenants command battalions,the soviets have for some time been attempting to place younger, more energeticmen in command(figure 38). [4ost battalion commandsseemto be held by captainsand m€jors, althoughthe authorizedrank is lieutenant colonel {at regimentallevel and below, over 65 Battalioncommandersin the rank o{ captain, percentoI the officersare under30 yearsof age). major, and lieutenant colonel may have also at tended the junior or senior advancecourse of 10 months' duration. Noimally, the former are attended by captains and majors; the latter by maiorsand lieutenantcolonels.The junior course is primarilygearedto tactical and staff training at ihe battalion level, whereas the s€nior course is concernedwith regimentaloperations,upon completing these courses, officers return to their units. c. Political Awareness The battalion commanderis politicallyaware, and is probably either a candidate member or member of the CPSU. Nonparty afiiliation is a realdet mentto an officer'scare€r.
Although it is probable that no Soviet battalion commandershave had combat experience, this factor can be overemphasized when judging the capabilitiesand limitations of battalionlevel leadership.Lack of combat experiencemay be Fisure38. BattallonCommanders Are Your8Menwilh offset to a certaindegree by extensivepeacetime Considerable Peacetime Com mandExperence. commandand field training. The maio ty of bat talion commanders have probably had lengthy platoon and companycommand. h would not be The battalioncommandertoday is much bet unusualfor an officer to be a platoon leaderfor 3 ter educatedthan his World War ll predecessor. years and a company commanderfor about the At the outbreakof World War ll, about 7 percent same length of time prior to becominga battalion of the Soviet olficer corps had receiveda higher education; today, the figure is well over 50 perBattalionfield trainingexercisesare numerous, cent (excludingreserveofficers, the figure would particularly junior whhin those units in a high state of be much higher),Almostall the current ofreadiness. The battalion commanderpanicipates receivedtheir commis ficers {lieutenant-captain)
52
in a minimum of wo field training exercisesof at least2 days' durationper year, and may parti cipate in as many as six FTXS;that is, two bat talion exercises,two as part of the regiment,and two as part of the division.
AND PRO3. OPERATIONALCONCEPTS CEDURES
Becausethe Soviets, in the event of war, anticipate deploying a force of great magnitude, they apparently believe that highly centralized control may be the only effectivemethod. Soviet e. Responsibilities operationalproceduresseem centeredaround the for his regiment,whjch is describedas the most impoF The battalioncommander is responsible unit's combat readiness,its combat and political tanr maneuverunir in rhe Sovietarmy.The regitraining,and the education,militarydiscipline, nen( is fte lowesrlevelunil whh a tull plannirg politicalawareness,and morale of the personnel staff and combinedarms and rear serviceunits. under his command. His principal assistantsin Whereas the regiment has the capabilityto plan fulfilling these responsibilitiesare his chief of operations, its subordinate battalions do not and, staff, deputy commanderfor polhicalaffairs, and subsequently,implementregimentalorders, deputycommanderfor technicalaffairs, Accordingly, vi.tually all aspects of battalion level training are closely controlled by the his staff (figure39). Despiteperiodiccompla;ntsin the Soviet pfess regimentalcommanderand political, artjllery, communications,and rear The concerninginstructionin the serviceschoolsand serviceofficerson the regimentalstaff are respon relations between the military and the party's siblefor the training,supervision, and often the representativeswithin the battalion, the com level, contro of their counterpartsat battalion mander'sage, education,and politicalawareness provid€ the theoretical basis for effective Soviet regimentalcommandercget minutelyinb6ttalionlevel leadership.Soviet battalion com- volved in the handling of their subordinate mandersmust be considered educated,poiiticaly elements.Although the regimentalorder contains aware men who have dedicatedtheir lives to the generallythe sam€ data found in the combat military profession. Lengthy periods of platoon orders of most Westernarmies,the implementing and companycommandand frequentfield exer- instructionsissued by Soviet regimentalcomcisespfovide a good foundationfor technicaland mandersare more detailed,and illustratethe pentactical proficiency, Let us now examine the chant for close control over battalion operations. operational and instructional framework within The Soviet regimentalcommanderwill sometimes which the battalioncommanderoperates. designate a specf/b subelement within a subordinate battalion to perform a cenain task. 2, SOVIETCOMMAND THEORY Ratherthan order that the first battalionprovidea or a platoonto guard the left flank, company The Soviets regard command as continuous Soviet regimental commandershave been known control and direcdonof units and the organization to designate which cornmander or platoonshould of their combat activities. Centralizedcontrol at the task. The regimental commandel accomplish the highest possiblelevel is an importantelement pJaalso states where each battalion, company, of Soviet command theory as is the principleof toon, and squad will deploy into columns and one-man command, which will be discussedin the section dealingwith the [,4R8commandef final attackpositions. andthe pady. Having received the regimental commander's The concept of centralized control at the order and guidance,subordinatebattalioncomhighestpossibleleveland how it affects battalion- mandersd€w up plansto implementthem. Prior level operations becomes clear when examined to issuingthese plans to thek subordinates,bat' within the framework of Soviet operationalcon- talion commandersare required !o get final approvalf romthe fegimental commander. ceptsand procedures.
53
FiSure39.TheResim€ntal Comma nderand HisStatlExercise TishtConlrolover Subordinate Units.
During the attack, control is so centralazed at r€gimentthat there is litrle direct lateralcoordination betwe€n two attacking first-echelon battalions {coordination is done at regiment). ltloreover, using all of his communicationscapabililies, regimentalcommanderswill, on occasion, address specific companies rather than go through the battalioncommanders.The degfeeto which this is done varieswith the Dersonalitaes involved,but it doesoccur. During the aitack, the battalioncommande.has the authority to allow his subordinatesto bypass an enemy position. but he needs the regimental comm6nder'sapprovaltor the batralionto bypass a position or to commit the battalion's second echelon {reserve). Should the battalion commander be unable to talk to regiment, he would be expect€d to commit his second echelon (reserve)on his own initiative and inform reoam€nt as soon as possible, This highly c€ntralizedcontrol by regimentover battalion operationspenains in normal offensive and defensiveoperations,The situation is some, what more flexible in the hasty defensebecause the regimentalcommanderdoes not have time to
give lengthy, detail€d orders. Battalion com mandersare given the forward edge ot the banle area and have more latilude in positioningtheir men and conducting the battle with;n theh assignedareaof responsibility. Not surp.isingly,the battalion commanderexerts the same close control over his subordinates. In the field,companycommanders are told what to do and how to do it. Fire planningand coordanation,and logisticsresupplyare handledat batlalion level. While centralizedcontrol at battalion levelsimplifiesproblemsof commandat company level, it is more difficull and time consumingfor companies,platoons,and squadsto receivetimely fire support. A squad requ€stfor artillery fhe would go up the chajn of command to th€ battalaon commander, who would then coordinate the r€questwith attached or supporting artillery. Such a system makes high casualitiesat the lower levels probableand could adverselvaffect
-The battalion political officer, at present subordinateto the battalion commander,has the right to issue orders to others in the battalion. Although one man command is an important Moreov€r,the deputy regimentalcommanderfor principle of Soviet command theory, disagrce polltical affahs may issue orders to subordinate ment betweenthe militaryand the party has been battalions. This dual chain of command could noted, and centers around the latter's interpreta complicatethe battalion commander'siob. tion of one-man command, Whereas the profsssional military believesin one-mancommand, the On the posiiive side (from the Soviet view party inforcesthe concept of one-man command point), it should be noted that in addition to his political skills, the battalion political officer is a trainedmilitaryman and probablycapableof leadThe party's r€prgsentatives at battalionlevel in- ing the battalion in military operations. Furtherclude th6 deputy battalion commanderlor polimore, by handling political and other duties tical affairs; a party group headedby an elected assignedby the battalion commander, he frees soldier, NCO, or officer; a komsomol organizathat individualtoconcentrateon other matters, tion; and a people'scontrol group. The missions ''Also on the positive side, the party's of these individualsand organizationsare to insure party control over the battalion, to aid the representatives at battalionlevel may aid the combattalioncommanderin unit training, and to help manderby assistinghim in maintainingunil readi maintaindisciplineand politicalawarenessamong ness, training, and discipline.lt would, therefore, battalion personn€|. While it is difficult to be inaccurateto depict the influenceof the party heasure the full impact oI the party on the bat- representatives as strictlynegative, talion commander's leadership,a few observaNevertheless the basisfor conflict betweenthe tions may be mad6: party and the military exists and should not be -The most important criteriafor officer promo disrnissed.The often strident and bitter disagreetion is a high degree of political awarenessand ment beween the militaryand the party;n the the fulfillment of politicalduties, not military and 1960s continues today albeit at a much lower technical Droficiencv.As an article in Red Star lev€l of intensity. Should either the party or the made cle€r, an officer lacking "party passionand military gain in authority at the expenseof the fhmness" will not make a good commander no other, latent resenlmentcould surface with submatter how brillant his knowledgeof military at- sequent impact on combat readiness-asituation fairs. The importance of ideology and party which hasoccufiedthroughoutSoviethistory. loy8lty has resulted in the incursion of political objsctives and criteria into the battalion com- 5, REGULATIONS mander'snontacticalwork (it is doubtful that parfhe 1975 Disciplinary Regulations of the A hed tv reDresentatives interfere in the tactical deciFotces of the USSB ate remarkablysimilarin tone sionsoI the battalioncommanderl. to thosethey replaced: -The number of party representatives and the Exact, timely and incontrovertiblefulfi,, zealous manner in which they attempt to carry ment of orders is the fundamentalconr out their duties is irrilating to sohe battalionand bat activity of the commander. (The comoanv commandeE. Recommendationsmade 1942-1gS lnfantry Combat Regutations.) by these party representativesmay be closer to orderc, as cohmanders have been criticized by An order from a superior is law to the higher politicalorgansfor not carryingout recom subordinate.An order must be fulfilled mendations made by party representatives,0n absolutely, exactly, and immediately. the other hand, some battalion and company 119{8 Disciplinaty Regulations of the commanders assign duties to their political Amed Forcesof the USSR. deouties which hinder their oolitical work. Fre quent transf€rof politicaldeputiesfrom one company to another,with the appar€ntaim of rendeF ing them moreinnocuous, is alsoa frequenlprac flce, 4. THE MRB COMMANDERAND THE PARTY
The suoerior'sorder is a law for subordinates. The order must be carried out without demur. exactlvand on time- {The 1975 Disciplinary negulations of the Amed Forcesof the USSR.)
methodically planning for the me6ring engagement and trying to for€see €very possiblecontingency, only to fail when somethingunforeseen
These new regulationsemphasizethe necessity for strict compliancewith orders and regulations and restrictcommandchoicesby spellingolt prescribod actions in great detail. While dem6nding full obediencs and compliancewith orders, the regllations at the same time give lipseruiceto the importance of initiarive. Battalion commanders and their subordinatesare continuouslyurged in the Soviet or€ss to use their initiative and to be flexible. This is easiersaid than done, however, within a svstem which oreachessubordinationto authority, conformity,and exacts severepenalties for not obeying orders. lvlarshalGrechko, whil6 urging more initiative and flexibility by Soviet commanders, also wrote, "The display of initiativeas a rule is connectedwith risk," A variety of sourcesindicatesthat ba(alion and lower level commanders associate initiative with career jeopardy and prefer to act accordingly; that is, within the narrowconfinesof regimentalorders,
Combat In built.up areasand fonested regions, river crossings,and retrogradeoperationsalso demand a high d€gree of initiativeand flexibilityat 6ll levels.lroreover, in nuclearwar rh6 disruption and destruction of command and control echelonsworild be far greaterthan under conventional circumslances and would place even greaterdemand ontacticalinitiativeandflexibility.
The operational and lnstitutional lramework within which the battalion commanderoDerates hardly encouragesthe inhiativgand flexibility required in independentoperatons, To the contrary, it emphasizesoperating under close r€gimental supervisionand control. Ahhough it cannot be definitively stated how Soviet battalion commanderswould react, they would probably oerformwell when under the direct suoervisionof regiment, but less efiectively when acting independsndy.Tacticalopponunitiesshould, therefore, exist for more floxibleWesterncommand6rs. In the meeting engagementthese Western com5. TACTICALIMPLICATIONSOFTHEABOVE manderc, through initiative and daring, could The narrow oarameterswithin which the bat- "pile up" Soviet forward detachftents and adtalion commanderoperales are expeciallyimpor- vance guards, and force regiments,and possibly todeployprematurelyorinconfusion. tant when examinedwithin the context of opera- divisions, tions which place a premium on flexibility and Manv Soviet militarv men seem worried over initiative. The meeting engagementis a case in rhe lack of flexibility6nd initiativeat the battalion pornr. and lower levelsand have, panicularlyin the last The early phase of the meeting engagement few years, pressedfor gr€ater initiative at thgse (that is. belore the regimental commander can levels. Concrete results Irom these effons have com€ forward and control the battle) placescon- yet to be soen. Becauseinitiative and flgxibility siderable stress on the banalion commander's have politicalas well as military implications,the ability to respondquickly to rapidly changingcir- problem of instillingthese traits has been especcumstances.To be successful,he must be fl€xi- ially ditficult. 11shorild be not6d, however, that ble and be able to exploit succ€ssachievedby in- the Soviets have made progrossin this area, In atiativeand surprisewhile maintainingmomentum accordancewith rheir post-World War ll operathrough high-speedmaneuverand corectly ap- tional concepts,they have allowedmore flexibility plied firepower.And yet the Soviet presscontains and initiativeat divisionand regimentallevelsthan numerous examples of batlalion commanders was the caseduringthe war.
56
CHAPTER 6. BATTALION TRAININGAND SUBUNITTACTICS Section A - TrainingPhilosophyAnd Objectives I. PHILOSOPHY
a combat skill, preparationfor instruction,exercises,and the organizationof th€ir life and leisufetime.
Trainingis centraliz6dat the highestlevel possible and stresses.to a degree unparalleledin the West, thg closest superyisionby superiorsover 2. OBJECTIVES subordinates.This philosophyis clearly reflectod Broad training objectivesare designedto insure at battalionlevel. politicalreliabilityand to achievea high state of While the battalion commanderhas some say combat readiness.Another objectiveseemsto be as to how his unit will be trained,a great deal of to keep the troops fully occupied under the battalionlev€l training is planned and controlled closestpossiblesupervision,even during so-called by the r€gimentalcommanderand hisstaff. freetime, Within the battalion, supervisionjs very clos€, evenfor juniorofficerc:
Although there aro some notablediscrepanciss, training reflectsSoviet doctrine in that it conc€ntrates on offensive combat 0196nizedaround The lieurenantsf€el the expsrioncedguiding combined arms operations,with tanks providing hand of their seniorsat every step-mastering the backbonewithin combinedarmsgroup;ngs.
Section B - Training Schedules (political training, tactical training, etc.) to be taught by the battalion.Priorto informinghis batTraining programsvary in accordancewith the talion coftmandersof what they will teach during unit's readinessstatus, the weather, geography, a training phase, the regimental commander and with troop rotalion {May and November). checkswirhthe division for aooroval. command€r There are two training peridds {summer and winterlwhichareeachofO months'duration. The regimental commander is responsiblefor the training of his banalioncommandersand their The yearly training program for the ground deputies, while rhe first deputy regimentalcomforces is established at Ministry of De{ense mander is responsiblefor the training oI the bat' (MOD) l6vel and subsequently refined and talions' companv commanders. Moreover, the elaboratgd upon by the N4ilitaryDistricts, the political, artillery, comrnunications,and rear ser Groups of Forces,and divisioncommanders.For vice officers on the regimentalstalt are responsia typical dmonth schedulelor a BMP-equipped ble for the trainingand supervision(and often the unit, seefigurerK). control) of their counterpans at battalion level. The rEgimentalcommanderand his staff br€ak Trainingprogramsfor many battalionsubelements down the numberot hourslor each broad subject 6nd individualsare accordinglydrawn up by the regimentalstaff. 1. GENERAL
NUMEER OF IIOURSTAUGHTPEf,SUBJECT
'{///#/,#ff NOTES
lora BMPEq!rppedUnil Freure40A Rep.esenlalive S &MonthTrarnngSchedule
The seftiannual training plan is the battalion commander'sbasictraining document, He checks Although the regimentalcommanderplans and with the regimentalcommanderto insurethat lhe supervisesmuch of the trsining of his battalions, latter's goals will be met. Figure41 reprosentsa a battalion commandermay {with the regimental typical dey within a we€kly {Monday-Friday) commander's approval) change the number of schedule.Although new regulationsreduced the hours designatedwithin a particular block. He amount of military tralning {exclusive oI PT, may, for example,want his companiesto spend maintenance,and sports) per day lrom 7 hours to less time on reconnaissance and more time on th€ 6, ths length of th6 duty day remainedabout the meeting engagementand request approval from same, because unlike the old system, political his regimentalcommander, training {up to 4 hours per week) is not counted The battalion command€ralso tains and cor as part of milirarytrajning. rccts his subordinateson a daily basis, concenSixty to sixty-fivepercentof the trainingtime is tEting primarily on his Mn companies.Twacea supposedto be spent on fi6ld training and pracyear, lor 4 to 5 days at a time, he conducts tical exercises with weapons and equipment, classesfor his platoon leeders. In addition, and Moreover about ,1()percent ot the tactical firing usuallyprior to the beginningof a winter or sum- and tactical exercis€sare suDDosedto be conmer training period, he garhers his ofiicers and ductedat night. NCOS and explains the training program/ its goals,and instructionaltechniquesto be used.To Soldiersnormallywork half a day on Saturday his company commande.s he gives the total {maintenanceand/or organizedsporF) and have number of hours per subject, Company com- the rest ot th€ we€kend ofI. This tim€ off is. mandersorganizetheir weekly training plans bas- however, usually supervised, particularly tor 6d upon specificguidancefrom battalion. forcesstationedoutsidethe USSR. 2. THE BATTALIONTRAININGSCHEDULE
58
GR€ANDCLE^N NC OF M L TARY EOUIPMENI
F r C ! r e 4 1A T y p i c aW e e kD a y T r a r r r n g S c h e d ! l e
Section C - Companyand Section Trcining and Tactics regimental artiliery commander, the battation commander, and the battalionchiefof staff. MorCompanycommandersdraw up theif training tar battery training is designedto achieve pfofischedulesbasedupon detailedguidanceby the ciency in assignedduties, familiarization wirh battalioncommanderand the battalionchief of other-than-assigned duties (cross-training), and staff. Companyvainingmay be dividedinto four tactical proficiencyof the battery operatingas the individual(to inclLde eadership categories: traln battalion s primarymeansof indirectfiresupport, ing for sergeants),weapons and equipment, b. Individual Duties and Trcining moral-political, andtactical. 1 ,T H EM O T O R I Z E D R I F L EC O M P A N Y
Becauseof the semiannual troop rotationsin May and November,;t is difricJkfo' !€iring ar the company level to proceed logically from squadand platoon up to companylevel. Probaby most of May and \overrbe. are spe'rrir ar artempt to assimilatethe new recruits (who have completed4 weels of basicrrailing i1 rhe regimenfs ad hoc training company) and get them ready as quicklyas possiblefor f;eld ere.cises. whichrravo, maynot be in logicalsequence, The companyannuallyconducts,at leastfive companylevel field exercisesof 1 to 1 '/, days each under the direct supervisionof the battalion For fuftherdetailson MB companytrainingand tactics, see lre Soviet Motoized Rifle Company, DDt 1100Z-76. 2. THE MORTAR BATTERY a, Genetal The mortar battery,normallycommandedby a captain, is supervised in its training by the
11)Thebatterycommander The morrarbattey com.nanderis rhe principal fire controllerof his unit. From his forward observationpost he computesfire data and relays other fke miss;ons recdved from his banalion commander and the regimental fire controicenter {figure 42). He directly supervisesthe training of his battery. (2) The headquartersand headquartersplaThis platoon leader has administrativeand tactical functions. He assists the batte.y commanderin administrativetasksand headsthe battery's forward observer/reconnaissance section, This latter responsiblilitvgives the battery the capability to establish wvo forward observer posts, aithough normally there is only one. The headquartersplatoon leader trains the forward observer/reconnaissance sectionin targetacquisition and fire missiontechniques.He also trains the radio telephonesection, with the help of the pi6toonleader, battalion communications
59
mal, over, or under weight-necessitatingcorrec tions by the fuze setted, placing the correct chargeon the round, and setting the fuzesfor in' stant or delayaction; loadercand carriers,in 6ddition to their normal function, receive cross training as gunners. The driver of the section's GAZ 66 truck is trained in vehicularmaintenance and digging in his vehicle in the defense,as well as antitank tactics (the driver is armed with an RPG-7and is responsiblefor providinghis section with antitank protection), Battery personnelare alsotrainedin the useof flag signals(figure43).
lo,
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I-Y
A
Fi8ure42.The MortarBattery Comnrander at hisFo ard Observation Post (3)Themortarplatoonleader
FI
D-\or
In addition to supervisory responsibilities \ regardinghis own platoon, the {irst platoon leader ,^ normallyis in chargeof the battery on the march {the battery commander, with his forward gnas LJsed observer/reconnaissancesection, during the bythervortar Battery F8ure43FIaBS march precedeshis battery looking for suitable deploymentpositions and an observationpoint), and is the designatedreplacementshouldthe batt6ry commanderbe incapacitated.Platoonleaders (1)General feceive fire commands from the battery commandef and pass them directly lo their gun crew lvlonar banery training concentratesprimafily commandeE. Platoon leaders are trained in all on offensive operations of the N4RBand N4RR. aspects of mortar equipment and fke computaPositioning dtiring the march and deployment tion, and as replacementslor the battery comfrom the march, battery fire positions,and types mandershouldthe needarise, of fkes arepartacu larly emphasized. {4)The mortarcrew {2)lvlission Membersof the mortar crew, headedby an The missionof the battalionmortar battery is NCO, receivetheir primary specialtytraining and provide the banalionwilh close-inindirect fire to some cross-training.The NCO is trained to per' suppo(, to include high explosive,illumination, form each frJnctionof his section, to include the andsmoke. technical aspectsof the hortar and its ammunition. setting up, fire commands, and low-level (3)Themarch lactics. Gunners receivetraining in sighting and On the march, the mortar battery comsight corrections. Fuze setters are trained in mander is at the head of his eight-vehiclecolumn checking the shell weight {mort6r rounds have markingsindicatingwh€theror notlhey areof nor-
60
within the battalionformation {figurerl4). Normally, the headquartersand headquartersplatoon per leader,the foNard observer/reconnaissance sonnel, and communicationspersonneLaccompany the battery commander.The first platoon leaderridesin the secondvehicleand is in actualchargeof the batterycolumn.Within the battery, orders on the march are normally transmitted by flags;gnal.
platoon l€ader. lf a second OP is tactically desirable, the headquarters pla, and headquaders toon leader, aided by an RTO, could establish {5) Communications
Although radios are the primary method of sendlngfire missions from the OP(s)to the guns during the offensive,wire is also used, time and tactical situation permitting. In the defense,wire fromthe march is the primary m€ans of communicationbetween {4) Oeployment the OP and gun positions.Two R105/107radios Whenever possible, the battery cornmander a.e wirh ihe OP and rwo are ar the badery posiselectsthe battery positionsand the observation tion, in addition to telephones and several post (OP) prior to the march, and proceeds kilometers of wire, providing a sufficient com, directly to the OP, leavingbattery deploymentto m!nica onscapability. his first platoon leader,When unexpectedand (6) Typesoffires rapid deploymentfrom the march is calledfor, the battery commanderfirst selects the deployMortar crews practiceblockingfires againsta mentareaandthenoccupies hisOP. hostileassduli,openng cofiidorsthroughmineIndividual mortarpositionsare designated by fields, destructionof fixed targets, and zonal ba.the batlery commande.{or first platoon leader)by rage fires as patt of regimentalartilJeryprepara using a r€d flag which indicatesthe directionand tion. Althoughthe rangeof the 120mmmortaris lire rhe .no4arsare to occupy.Urlessoil.erwise about 5,700 meters, opt;mum distances for ordered,gun conmandersposltiontheir mortars engagementlie between4,000and 4,500meters. along the indicatediine at 20 meter intervals (7) Antitankprotectionand batterydefens€ theirmonars,vehicle {figure45).Alter detaching drivercoffload ammunitionand (time permitting) The battery's primaryantitank protectionlies revettheirvehicles. in the RPG-7firesof the vehicledrivers.All other gmm In the offensive, individual modar positions battery personne are armed either with the usuallyconsistof a small pit for proper setting of pistol {lvlakarov) or the 7.62mm modernized (AKM). No lookout posts or orh€r the base plate. In the defense, more elaborate assault rifle (figure46). ln both the specia security measuresare known to exist for positionsare constructed olfense and defense, the mortars are normally deployedin a straightline.
(8) Displacement
The OP, normally located on an elevated Displacementof the batteryvaries.lf the batposition (figure 47), is occupied by the battery talion has attachedartillery (or can be supported commander,the forward observer/reconnaissanceby regimental artillery) the mortars normally section, designatedradio teephone operators,displacetogether; otherwise, the battery would and possibly the headquartersand headquarters displaceone platoonat a tim€, so that two platoonsareproviding continuous f iresupport,
67
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FiEwe47. Operations Post. of the MortarBalterys Foruard Observation
65
Ererh-e*r
scenariosto test his men, the exercisesafe actually planned and conducted undef the close supervasion of the deputy regamentalcommander Communications personnel receive specialist for rear services,When the battalionwants to use training prior to reporting to their assignedunit. some of its organic rear servicesequipmenl/ it Such lraining lasts 6 months and is divided into must requestpermissionfrom regimentbasic, spec;alized,6nd general military subjects, with specializedrraining accounting for most of the instruction, The deputy battalion commander for 3. THE BATTALIONCOMMUNICATIONS PLATOON
In addationto supervisinghis platoon'straining, the battalioncommunicationsofficef, jn conjunction with the battalion chief of staff and the regimental communicationsofficer, draws up a signaltrain;ngprogramfor the battalion.This program concentrateson the operation, care and cleaningof radios and telephones,and on com municationssecuritYmeasuresand procedures.In training and combat, personnel from the battalion's communications platoon operate the radios of the battalioncommander,chief of staff, the company commanders, medical point, and supply platoon, as well as lay wke and perform messengerservices,The plaroon is also responsi ble for the care, cleaning,and storing of the bat talion'sNBCequipment.
technjcal affairs is respor.3iblefor the technical training of his repairworkshop personneland for supervisingthe technical training within the fulR companies.In lhis latter task he is assistedby the conpany technicaloff icers, After induction, personnel designated 1o become mechanicsand driversare trained either on the job or in training units within the anduclee's division or mjlitary djstrict. ln addition, eachman is requiredto attenda 1%, ro 2-monrh course on repairingmilitary vehicles. orivers are designated"driver-mechanics,"and as such, are authorized to go beyond those first-€chelon maintenance procedures allowed their counterparlsin manyWesternarmies,
On paper, approximately35 perc€nt of unit raining is devoted to specialty training. Each motorpoolis supposedto have classroohsreplete a. Genenl with trainingaids to conduct this training,as well The battalion chiel of staff has the respon- as cross-trainingin c€rtain skills. Evidenc€sugsibility of supervising the training of battalion gests, however, that cross-training is seldom headquarterspersonnel,His primaryassistantsare practiced and that classroom maintenance inthe deputy battalioncommanderlor technicalaf- structionis often perfunctory, fairs, who supervisesthe technical training at Field maintenancetraining, however,is oft6n companylevel {the companytechnicalofficer promor€ thorough and realistic, DriveFmechanics vides the trainingl, the supply platoon leader and the battalion repak workshop actively par(responsiblefor the battalion's materielsupport), ticipate in field training exercisesand have been and the b6ltalionteld'tl,e/, responsiblefor sanitaknown to take inoperableequipment with thgm tion and medicaltrainingof battalionpersonnel. f or r€pakunderfield conditions. b. Supply Driver-mechanicstake p€raodic proficiency The supplyplatoonleaderrrainshrsammuni- tests. Those who do well receive a specialty tion, POL, and ration personnel.ln the field he is rating and increased pay, These ratings are primarilyan implementorof his supedors'instruc, transferableto civilian occupations, resuhing in salaries, tions regarding the localions of the battalion better than-average distribution points for ammunition, rations, and Battalion training for v€hicle operators inPOL. and supervisesthe activatiesat these locaperiodic classes on maintenance and volves tions, vehicularcomponenis.The quality ol this iraining Special supply platoon exercises normally varies widely and in some units is frequently igprecedebatralionexercises.While the supply pla- nored. The requiremenls, however, for vehiclo toon leader may provide input for exercase operatorsto remainwith their vehiclesand assist 4. BATTALIONREARSERVICES
maintenancepersonnel in effecting repahs provides additionalon-the-jobtraining for drivercand increasesthe driver's mechanicalknowledge.The difficulty of ke€ping adequatelytrained futl-time mechanicsis aggrevar€dby the 2-year term of servic€ in th6 ground forces. l/lost of the mechanics are 2-year conscripts who often become proficientjust in time to rotate back to civilianlife.
The deputy battalioncommanderfor political affairs recervestraining guidanceand supeNision from the doputy regimentalcommanderfor poli, tical affairc. The battalion political officer then supervisesthe effods of the companypolhjcalofficers. Though political indoctrination is often presentedby the politicalofiicers at companyand battalion level, commanders at these echetons alsopresentpoliticalinstruction.
The primary organizerof modicaltraining at battalion level is the chief of the regimental MRB personnel receive up to 4 hours ol medicalservice.In addition to organizingthe barmoral-political training per week. Subject matter talion's medical Vaining, he also supervjsesit, includes the unit history, selected foreign and working cfosely with the batlalion feld'she. ano domestic news items and their impact on the histhree-mansection. CPSU and Soviel policies,NATO mehbership Ar baftalion level. medical training is and policies(wirh heavy emphasison the Unit€d rudimentaryand stressesfirst aid and evacuation States and West cerrnany), The People's procedures as well as personal hygiene and Republicof China, and id€ology.The last- mensanitation, MRB personnelreceive approximately lioned classeslocus on Nrarxism-Leninism and its 12hoursof medicaltraining peryear. principal"corrupters"-ThePeople'sRepublicof China,Albania,and occasionally the Yugoslavs, 5. MORAL-POLITICAL TRAINING dependingupon the politicalclimateat the time. a. Genercl lrovies, usually of World War ll vintage and which glorityrhe SovietArmy,are often shown. Hea\,yemphasisis p,acedby the Sov;etson what they term "moral-polkical"training in order Generalthemeswhich pervadethese l€ctures to help maintain party control over the armed forces and to prepare men for the increased demandsplacedupon them in modernwar ({igure {1) The West, generally described as the 4at. villain, ringed the USSR with hostile alliances, and forced the peace-lovingWarsaw Pact coun lroral-political training attempts to ac' trjes into a strong defensive posture, thereby complishthe followingtasks: necessitating large defense expenditures. The {1) Promotesolidarityaround the Communist USSR and irs allieswant peace;Chinaand the Palty ol the Sovjet Union (CPSU)and supportfor the obiectivesof the Sovietstate. (2) China, once a peace-loving Socialist (2) Explainrecent CPSU and governmentac- country like the ussR, is now an enemy of socialismand covetsSovietterrhory. tivitres,as wellas certaininternationaleven!s. (3) Increase the discipline and awarenessof personnel.
political
(4) Insure proper understandingof security proceoures. {5} Inculcate personnelwhh hatred for the oI the USSB. enemios
{3} Warsaw Pact nations are friendly to the USSR, equal in rights, and voluntarilylinked politicallyand economicallyto the USSR. (4) The eventual decline of the West and capitalisft and th6 worldwide victory of socialism are inevitable.
67
ArmsUnil Priortoan Exerose. in a Combined Fisure48.Mora PolilicalTraioing
d. Aftitude Towatd Morcl-Political Trcining Since the MRE s membershave no accessto for€i€n publications, lhey are laughl in an in. tellectual vacuum and are therefore unable to form objectiveopinionsabout the actual slate ol affairsabroad. Becauseof these constraints,they probably believe most of the information pre sented on foreign affaks, while perhaps being morc skepticaI about domesticmatters, For the professional oflicets, pftpotshchiki, and NCOS,moral-politicaltfaining must be taken s€riously, since lheir careers depend on b€ing politicallyaware. For the 2-yeardraftees,many of whom do not want to serve in the first place, the attitude is far less lntense, and often depends upon the topic and the mannerin which the political officer pres€nts his lectures. While movies are usually enjoyed, the stereotypedand all-toooften repetitious presentation of morafpolilical lecturss (especiallythose on Marxism-Leninism) often induces sleep among those forced to at tend. AND NCOTRAINING 6, OFFICER Ahhough the Soviet pressemphasizesthe train_ ing oI iunior officers and noncomissionedofficers (NCOS)within units, the training of NCOSseems more organizedand formalizod, and with good rea6on.The SovietNCO is 18-19yearcold lthat is, the same age as the men he leads),has had 6 months oI specializedNCo training, and linle or no leadershipexperience.The junior officers have receivedfar moretrainingpriorto commissioning,
Soviet reluctance to del6gate authorhy manifests itself in the treatment of NCOS. Evidenceindicatesthat Soviet NCOSare misused and overlysupervised,In reality,lip serviceis pajd to the grade of NCO, while more experienc€d pnpo$hchik and officers carry out NCO as well as officer duties. [,'loretrainingand a higher NCO retentionrate (the majorityof NCOSleavethe service Lrponcompleringtheir 2-yearservicerequire ment) may not alleviatethe problemswith NCO leadership,due to the Soviet penchantfor control at the highestpossiblelevel. ln keepingwith Sovietbel;efin commandand control centralizedat the high€st level practical, much of the baftalionofficer and NCO training is conducted by regiment. This is particulaflytrue regardingthe officers and NCOSof the battalion's communications,mortar, and rear service units, as w€ll as the politicaloff icers. Training is provided through methodological training cources, independentstudy, and exercises conducted by omnipresent senior commandeE. The training is very detailed, even for the most basic subjects.Ouite often the training precedesdrilland trainingexercises, Company commanders and platoon leadeE tlain their NCOs. In some units companyfirst sergoants receive leaderchip training Ovice a month. Battalionlevel NCO trainingis conducted aboutoncea month,
68
Section D - Battalion Tactical Training 1. COMMAND AND CONTROL
allocatedto the MR companiesin order to provide company commandorsand platoon leaders In the field, all available meansof communica- with combinedarmsexperience. tions are used to insurecentralizedcommandand control at the highest level possibleand also to Tactical drills repeatedlypracticed include the insure command and control if a command post march, the meeting engagement,water-crossing is "knockedout." operations,negotiationof min€Ii€lds,antiair (with increasing emphasis on antihelicopter tactics) Battalion operationsare conducted under th€ defense,and operationsin an NBC envhonment, close supervisionof the regimentalcommander, The battalion may also receive helibornetraining This supervision is such that on occasion the (at least one battalionper l,'lRD is trainedto conregimentalcommander will bypass his battalion duct heliborne operationsl. Combat in cities, commandersand give orderc to thek subordinat€ whilenot particularlystressed,is practiced. companies.Battalioncohmanders, ofren bypassing their subordinalecommandersto give orders During defensiveexercises,the battalion comto individual vehicle commanders, exercise the manderalso practiceswith combinedarms groupsamedegreeof supervision. ings, H€ may also receivemore engineersuppo( to help his unit dig in, and to place minefieldsand 2. FREOUENCY OFTRAINING The lvlnB in a high readinessstatus conductsa minimum of two battalionfield training exercises of at least 2 days' duration per year. A battalion could be involvedin as many as six field exercises (two battalion,two as part of the regiment,and two as part of the division)a year. 3. FIELDTRAININGEXERCISES
Over the past 3 or 4 years,there has been more emphasis on dismounted attacks and on air gfound support,primarilyby FLOGGERDs and the HIND assaulthelicopter.Air support seemsto be largely preplannedand primarilyemployeclon a division'sprimarydirectionof attack, in suppo( of a river crossing, and in support of heliborne operations.
Battalionfield training concentratesprimarilvon L;veJire exercisesand demonstrationsand exoffensivecombat with combinedarms groupi;gs. tensive use of field training aids are also Normaltv.the battationcommanderwi have;rcharacteristic of battalionexercises' tachedtanks 6nd anillery,in support, Air defense, chemical,and engineerunits are provided as required (figure 4!')- Anachments may be funher
Fisu.e49.Combin€d ArmsCombat 69
Section E - Evaluation of Battalion Tnining While technicallywell trained, Soviet battalion and company commandersoften fail to exploit With the caveatthat the quantitYand quality of ths strong points of their men and €quipment in battalion field training varies considsrablyin the lield situations.They experienceproblemswhen Soviet Army, those banalionsin a high readiness tacedwith the unexDected. statussDenda lot of time on practicalexercises. ln at least one afea there is a cle€r discreoancv Battalionfi6ld training stressesoffensive com- beoveenwhat is suoDosedto be done and what bat with combinedarms groupingsand is, for the is actuallydone. Doctrinally,the Soviersmaintain most part, consistentwith soviel doclrine, which that night time and other condi{ons of reduced envisions high rates of advanca bY combined visabilityare no impediment to operations. Batarrhs units in both nuclearand nonnuclearsitua- talions are accordingly supposed to conduct tions. The critical transitionbetw€sn nuclearand about 4{) percentof their firing and tactical exernonnuclear operations is panicularly stressed. cises at night. During their field vaining, batThough often st€reotypedand repetitious, bat- talions often use the night to preparofor daylight talion training stressesfundament6lsand r€sults exercises; that is, they conduct 6dministrative in €ffectivebattledrill. moves by road to position men and suppliesfor an anack th€ next day. Night firing is conducted, Battalionotficers must be consideredpolhically rsliableand well trained in the technical asp€cts but 6ctual tactical training involvingcross-country movement aooears to be seldom conducted, oftheirtrade. When it is, vehicle headlighlsand flashlightsere often used as orientationaids, despitea variety of 2. PROBLEMAREAS exc6llsntnightvisiondevicesin the battalion. Battalionand company-levelofficers are havang problemscoordinatingl R-tankattacksand effecThese problem are€s must be w€ighed wirhin tanks out BMP. Frequently, the tiv€ use of lhe context of Soviet doctrinal concepts. Rigid will or the MR troops and stereotvDeddrills do t6ach basic fundamendistancetheh lvlR support rear to suptals, but when combined with centralizedcontrol adequately dismount too far to the protactical pon the tanks. In addhion to these at the highest level and lack ot inidariveat the op lower levels, will probably initially result in high blems, the Sovietsare still trying to deiermine casu6lties. lt should be noted, however, that of the BMP. timumemolovment quantitiative superiority has often outweighed qualitativesuperiorityin pastcampaigns, 1. STRENGIHS
70
CHAPTER7. THE MOTORIZEDRIFLEBATTALIONIN COMBAT Section A - Offensive Operations .I, FOBMATIONS
km/hr. lf tanks, and aftilleryare attached,the averagespeedtor day marchesis 20 to 30 km. hr ^ The three basic formations used by the s o u ' e I a t n i g h r I. 5 t o 2 0 k m / h r . ground forcesare lhe march, approach and combatformations. The interual between vehicles is up to 50 meters during road movement and 50 to 10O The march is organizedto insure high speed meters during tactical cross-countrymovement, and rapid unit deploymentinto the approach Both the interval and the speed ot the vehicles march and combat formations. lt involves iask- are increasedwhen crossinga contaminatedarea organizedunils. This lormation is used when con- orwhenunderairattack, tact with an intact enemy force is not imminenl, to penetrategaps in enemydefenses,and to conContfol measuresalong the route of advance duct the exploitationand pursuit. includeinitialstart pointsand easilyrecognizable conrrol(phase)lines(tigure51). The numberand When contact whh lhe enemy is imminent, spacing ol these control measuresis dependent Soviet units deploy from the march to the ap- upon the lengthof the march,the conditionof proach march formalronrtha( is, d'visionsize the roads,and the weather-Comm!nications durunits deploy successively into regimental-, ing the marchare accomplished by messengers, battalion-, and company-sizeformations, Thes€ fiags,andradio(whenphaselinesarecrossed). formations are dispersedlaterally,in depth, and with meansof reinforcement. They may be in ln a motorizedmarch, hahs of up to 30 minutes line, echelon(right or left), wedge, or inverted occurevery2 to 3 hours.Dufingthe secondh6lf wedge. While possibleto penetratedisrupted or of a motorizedmarch, a long halt of 2 to 4 hours overly extendeddefensesin the approachmarch is held. Such long halrsare not held at night so formation, Soviet units will deploy into combar as to make maximum use of the hours of dalkformation10overcomestrongerdefenses, ness. During sho( halts, distances between vehiclesin column formationare not changed; The combat formation is formed when Soviet men and vehiclesmaintainthe propermarch incolumns deploy into lanearformations echeloned iervals. Ouring long halts, vehiclesare dispersed in depth. These formations include first and se' andcamouflaged (figure52). cond echelons, reserves(combined arms, tank, eng;neer. chem'cal). and arlille,y groupings The Soviets divide the march into two distinct Should the attack be successtul, Soviet units elements:the movementorganization and march would redeploy into march tormation for more security. Movement organizationis designed to rapidconductof the pursuitandexploitation. insurehigh speed,rapidcombatdeployment. and effective control. Tanks and artillery are usually 2, THE MARCH toward the front, and antiakcraft weapons are throughout thecolumn(s). The Sovietsdescribethe march as an organized distributed troop movementconductedin column formations on roads or crosscountry {figure 50). Troops are trainedto be ready for action at any time. ll possible, the march is conducted at night or under conditionsof limited visibility.The speedal which the marchis conducteddependson many factors: enemy, terrain, weather, makeup of the column, condition of vehicles,the level of driver rrarnrng, erc. Averagespeedslor a EiMPequipppedbattalion by day are 30 to 40 km/hr and by night and dur ing other conditions of limited visibility 25 to 30
7I
All-roundsecurityis providedduringthe march movement,to lfigure53) to insureuninterrupted prevent surpnse attack, lo keep enemy reconnaissanceunits from observing the main body, and to create the most favorableconditions for deploymentof the main body in a meeting engagement,Advance, flank, and rear guard units insureall-roundsecurityduringthe march, In addition, stationary flank outposts often occupy crilicaltefiainunrilthe main body has passed.
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preparepersonneland equipment,designationof security elem€nts, information regarding attachBased upon METT, the regimentalcommander ments,and the time and locationfor receiving the allocates tank, artillery, air defense, antitank, engineer, and chemical units to his battalions. (3) The regimentalcommander'smarch order Battalion commandersthen organize their units to his battalioncommanderincludes: for the march. Whenever feasible, attachments .. Informationon enemyand friendlyforces, aremadepriortothe march, 3. ORGANIZATIONFORCOMBAT
Becausg of the need to act decisively and quickly, and because the meeting engagement may be conducted against a force equal io or greater then their own, Soviet battalion commanders normally place attached tank, anillery, and antitank forces near or at the head of their marchformation. 4. MOVEMENTTOCONTACT
-. Topographica I data, I and met€orologica - The mission. -- Executionof the mission {start time and location, coded referenceand control points, securityinformation,and coordination). -- Administration data. andlogistics -' Comm6ndand signalinformation.
(4) AftEr reading th€ regimental com(ll For ihe march, rhe MRB may be given mander's march order, the ba[alion commander the missionof advanceor flank guard, forward or completeshis €stimateof the situationand deter' rear detachment, or be designated part of the mines: mainbody of the regiment. - Column formation and composition of {2} As the regiment's advance or flank secuntye|ements, guard, the MRB has the mission of insuring the - Actions to be conducred by security uninterruptedmovement and the security of the main body. lt must also prevent enemy reconelementsand the main body where contact naissanceelementsfrom reachingthe main body, with the enemyis possible. and most importantof all, insurefavorablecondi-- use ofattachments, tionsfor the mainbodytod€ploy. - NBC, air d€fence,and cover and conceal(3) When acting as a forward detachment, ment measures, the MRB has the mission of conducting reconnaissanceor to seizeand hold koy terrainuntil the (5) The battalion commandef and his stafl arrivalofthe mainbody. then draw up the march order. Since reconnaissanceof the route is usually impossible,the b. Planning the March battalion commander makes a detailed map (1) The lvlRB commandef and his chief of analysis of the terrain through which his unit staff begin planningfor ihe march after receivhg must pass. Prio. to issuing the combat ordef to a regimentalwarning order. The battalion com" his unit, lhe battalioncommanderhas his march mander studies the mission, briefs his chief of orderapprovedby the regimentalcommander. staff and technicaldeputies,calculatesmovement {6) The march order is a highly detailedplan tables (or directs h;s chief of staff to do so), and in which the battalion commander attempts to issu€s{throughthe chief of staffl a warning ordar toresee and pre'plan for actaonswith the enemy to his subordinate elements. The IIRB commander meets his attached artillery commander along the march route. and to control the actions and coordinateshis movement plan with the ar- of his subordinatecommandersas much as possible. Along with the regimentalorder, the MRB'S tilleryfire plan. march order forms the basis for the battalion (2) The battalioncommander'swarning order command€r's combat order to his subordinate to his unit describesthe conditionsunder which elements.Tho narch order states the battalion's the march will be made, its l6ngth, actions lo mission, control measures,command and signal 16
instructions, the informationlistedin paragraph c, Commandand Contrcl 4.b.{4)above,and detailedinstructions to each (l ) The battalioncommander and the attachsubordinaleunit on actionsto be taken in the ed artilery commander are normally locatedwell event of enemy action at the most critical points the forward in the march, either with advance along the march route. This detajledapproach (when the battalionacts as the addetachment often becomesmechanicalin nature and is indi cative of the battalion commander's efforts to vanceguard of the regiment)or at the head of controlthe actionsof his companycommanders. the battalion's main body. His posltion with the He not only tellsthem what to do, but when and advancedetachmentenableshim to best observe how to do it. When the "enemy" does the unex- enemyaction,formulatehis plans,and deployhis pected, Soviet companycommandersoften fail to unit. (2) To controlhis unit duringthe marchthe The battalionmarch order gives the regirren- battalion commander relies upon messenger, tal commander a clearindication as to whetheror fl€gs, traffic controllers,and to a lesserdegree, generallystays on radio not his orderwas understood. Once the regimen. radio. While the battalion passingof phaselinesand listening watch, the tal commander has confirmed the [,'lRB comare reportedby radio.NBC and mander's march order, the latter is then free to othercheckpoints air warnings are also transmitted by radio. issue verbal combat orders (which are recorded fof the record by the battalion chief of staff) to d. Canductofthe March hissubordinateelements, (1) The march is controlledas tightly as {7) The verbal combat order from the N,4RB possible,with the starting times, passageof conis a combina- trol points, and the speedand spacingof vehicles commander to his unit commandefs tion of data defivedfrom the regimentalorder and rigidlysupervised. lf a vehiclefalls out due to the battalioncommander'smarch plan. lt in' recrncal diificdlty,rhe commander or drivergives the designated signal to prevent following vehiclesfrom slowingdown. lf the vehiclecan be -- Enemyandfriendlyforces. .epai'edby rhe crew and/or tf'e baitalionmain- Themission. tenancesection, it will rejoin the column, resuming its corect place at a designatedrest a.ea; -- Detailed instruction for each of the bat otheMise the vehicle will be evacuatedby regi' intalion'ssubordinare elemenls,coordinating structions, actions upon enemy contact and i2) Gorges. b.idges, builtup areas, riveF antiaircraft andNBCdefense. crossing points, and other such potentially hazardousareas for the column are crossed - Command andsignal. without haltingand at maximumspeed.Special - Logisticsdetails. eifort is made to bypassbuilt up 6reas.Attached engineefsuppon, usually part of the combat (8) often, however,the battalioncommander patrol when the battalionacts as reconnaissance must organizethe march under more difficult cir- the advanceguard of the regiment,supervisesthe cumstances. Duringthe defense,for example,he removalof obstacles, may oe assigneda counterattackmissionbv regi (3) During shon halts, the column halts in ment or division,and may have considerablyless plan for the march and meeting engageorder and at intervalsestablishedin the battalion time to He commander's order, Crews of air defense ment, His actions are accordinglyabbreviated. is aided in rapid dissem;nationof orderc by his weaponsand des;gnaiedair seniriesremainon communicationsnet, which includeseveryvehicle alert. in the battalion; therefore, data concerning the (4) During long halts, companiesdisperseto enemy and the mission passed to the battalion preparedto move out on commanderon his frequencywould not have to asslgnedareas,but are notice, These are selectedto take adshort areas be relayed individuallyto platoon and company vantage of natural tefiain features for protection commanders,
77
against nuclear weapons. Hot food is prepared glovss in addition to their masks. lf it is not f6asiwhilethe menchecktheireouipmentand res ble to bypassa contaminatedzone, the battalion passesthroughas quicklyas possible. (5) Higher headquartersor an elementwithin the MRB m6y inform the battalioncommanderof Personnel exposed to loxic agents b6gin approachingenemy aircraft. The battalion'sreac- preliminarytreatmenl immecliately;equipmenl is tions dopend upon the terrain it is ini if cover is decontaminated when decontamination Doints sufficient along the route oI march, the battalion can be established. halts and attemDts to conceal itself {rom aerial (7) Actions taken during the march by batobservation; othelwise. vehicles increase their peFonnel reacting to a nuclear attack de talion speod, lengthenthe intervalbetweenvehiclesand pend upon the status of the battalion{wherherit €ngage the aircraft with every availableweapon, to include attachedair defenseweapons, organic is moving or in a rest area, and in the latter case, SA-7s {figure 54), tank machineguns,and small whether personnelare mounted or dismounted), arms. ATGMS mountedon the BMP may be used and the time of day, and the location of the against attacking helicopters.At night, vehicular nuclear burst. For example, if during movement night vision devicesare used, and porsonnelfire the battalionis alertedto a nuclearburst upwind, at enemy aircraft only on order of their company personnelwould don protectiv€gear and increase speed in an effort to cross as rapidly as posslble or battalioncommander. that section of the route threatened by radio (6) NBC reconnaissanceis conducted con activhy; if the battalionis "nukod" during rhe halt tinuously throughout the column (figure 55). and personnelare outside thejr vehicles,p€rsonal Although warning of an NBC attack normally is proteCtivemeasuresafe taken, After the snocK recelvedfrom higher headquanersover the NBC weve passes,protectiveeqLlipmentis put on and warnang net, the bafialion commander may re- aid provided to casualties,The battalion comceivs biological/chemicalwarnings from attached mander assessesthe damage, attempts to rechemicalpergonnel{dosimetersare organacto the establishcontact whh subordinatesand regiment, battalion as are peBonnel trained in monitodng and issuesorders for rescueand recoveryoperaNBC eff6cts). When the battalionacts as the ad- tions, As a rule, the aftereffects of a nuclear vance guard of the regiment, attached chemical strike are deah with by the battalioncommande/s personnelfrom the regimenralchemical defense own resou.ces. lf the banalion sustains heaw company are normally located with the recon- casualties,it is reolaced, naissancepatrol. Contaminat6dareasa.e marked e. Temination of the March accordingly{figure56). By properly organizing and conducting the NBC warnings are transmittedat once using m8rch, the battalion commandersets the stag€ all availablecommunicationsmeans. Personnelin for the meeting engagement,the first phase of clossd vehiclesput on their gas masks, while all destroying the enemy'sforces, othe6 put on protective capes, leggings and
FiSure54.SA'TGunners AreTheMotorized RitleBattalionConmandefsPrimaryMeansol Ai D€lense.
78
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5. THE MEETINGENGAGEMENT a. Chancteistics The meeting engagementis describedby the Sovietsas combat beNveentwo rapidlyadvancing columns, resultingin an intensestruggledesigned to seize and maintain the initiative. The rapidly changing situation, the presence of gaps and open flanks, and freedom of maneuverallow the more able and aggressivecommanderto defeat forces of equal and even superior strength. Incomplete intelligence regarding the enemy's forces is no excusefor the Soviet battalioncommander,who is trained to anticipatethe meeting engagementat likely locations along his march route. The meeting engagement(figure 57) may - In a surpriseattack when the enemy is attempting to occupy forward defensive positions. -. During a breakthroughwhen approaching enemyreservesate €ncounteted. Figure56.Chemica I PersonnelMarkinEa Contaminated
79
- Duringthe pursuit.
- In the defeGive. when a counterattack ig orderedtodestrcy an €nemypenetration,
ryF
To achigvesucce$ in the meoting engagement, the Soviots str€ss:
- lmmediate reEctions of battalion commanders. 'd
- Beatingthe enemy to the punch with fire and maneuver.
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- Well-organized combatsupport. b, Objective The objective of the meeting engagemgntis the destruction of the engmy's forces and continuation oI thg march, or the seizureof terrain which will insure {avorableconditionsfor subsequent oparations.From the point of contact, the depth of the objectivecould theo.eticallybe up to 8 kilometers, the length {computed by the Sovietsl of an snemy battalion column in march Iormation, In actuality,the depth of the objectivg would probably be l6ss. as en€my lorces would be moving rapidly forward upon contact. lf it is unable to achieve this objectivs, the advancs guard of the regimentis raskedwith delayingthe largestpossibleenemy fo.ce, and giving th€ rest oI the r€gimentthe time and intolligencedata ro enableh to enter the battle offectively. c, Commandand Contol
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The battalion, acting as th6 regiment'6 adD COUXIERAIT^CXOT N €NEMYPENNR^TION vance guard, operatas5 ro 10 kiloneto6 ah€adof th6 rcgimontal main body. The battalion comKEY mander c€nnol be as tighrly supervised as is -
Once contacl has been made, radio is the primary m6ans of control. Instructions by the battalion commanderare. ol n€cessity,bri€f, Tactics are based on well-rehealsed battle drill.
80
d. Conduct ot the Meeting Engagement
mally a(acks molnted, with tanks precedinqthe MR troops and supponed by artilleryand mortar (1, Initialstage fire. Should enemy antitankfire be heavy,the The meeting engagementcommenceswhen MRB would attackdismounted.When attacking the advanceguard's advancedetachmentclashes dismounted,the infantry attempts to stay within with enemy security forces {figure 58). The ad- 200 meterc of the tanks in order to render effecvance detachmentattemptsto destroythe enemy rivemutuarsuppo(, BMPssupporrthe arror- in and continue its mission, or, ;f forced on the fantry atack by fire. lf antitankfhe is exceptional deleneveby a sup€riorenemy,to hold,ts posi. ly strong, attached tanks would stay back with the B[{Ps and support the attacking djsmounlecl tion and supportthe attackby the mainbody. infantryby fire. (2) Deployment The final deploymentline is selectedas close The battalion commande.moves forward as as possibleto the enemy in order to reduce his quickly as possible, makes an estimate of the opponun;tyfor using nuclearweapons,Whenever situation, and issues o.ders to his attached ar- possible,a concealedapproachto the deployment tilleryto supportthe advancedetachment,The lineis used. artillerydeploysfrom the march, supportsthe ad Specificattack fiontagesdependupon [rETT vance detachm€ntby {ire, and preparesto sup' and whether nuclear or nonnuclearconditions pon the deploymentand attack of the main body. prevail, In a nonnuclearsituationand whh two Havingformulatedhis plan, the lvlRBcommander in the first echelonand one acting as companies gives any necessarychanges regarding aftach second echelon or reserve,the battalionfrontage ments and orders lhe deploymentof h's unit would be about 1 kilometer.UndernuclearcondiNormally, he attacks in one echelon, retaining tions, ihe frontage would be about 2 kilometers. one or t1]voplatoonsin reserva,To facilitaterapid When three all companies attack abreast, these resupplv, th€ battalion rear se.vice elementsare frontages wolrld increased be wilh the following moved well torward. The banalion commander's guidelines; in nonnuclear conditions, 500 meters coordinating instructions include: per company front with 200 meters lateral interval -- Missionof the advancedetachmentof the under between companies; nuclear conditions, guard, advance 800 meters per company front and 4O0 to 500 -- Artillery (to include mortar) fire suppo( metersbetweencompanies, plan. Ierarn restraintsmay 1oi allow t\e bar -. Sequenceof deploymentfof the tank and tarions subele.nents to atack on l;nejcompanies tulRunits. a.e accordinglyecheloned{right, left) or anack in wedge lormation.The attack is developed,nto - Combined armscoordination. the depths of the enemy formation as rapidly as Thereis no moppingup of smallenemy - Coordinaronsignals(madeorigrnally prior possible. to rhe march, they a.e given last minute groups; this task is handled by the regimental mainbody. refinement), The regimentalcommanderis notified of his advance guard commander's plans for the meeting engag€ment,and supports him with artillerytireswhen within range. (31Theattack
{4) Termination The meeting engagementat battalion level terminateswhen the enemy has been destroyed, lorced to retire, or when the fu1RBhas to assume the defensive.In the first two situationsthe lrRB resumes lhe march or launches pursuit operarions. lf forced on the defensive,the battalionattempts to inflict maximum casualtiesand buy rirnefor ihe regimertto dep'oy.ln the l6nercase, the advance guard l\rRB supports the attack of the mainbodybyfire.
In most fteeting engagements,the enemy may not have had time to properly preparethe terrain, to create a complete fire plan, or to deploy his antitank weapons. In order to take maximum advanlageof these factors, as well as the characterisricsof the BN4P,the battalionnor 8l-
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82
6. THE BREAKTHROUGH a- Characteistics The Soviers only reluctantly conduct breakthroughoperations,preferringinsteadto exploit gaps in the defensesand defeat the enemy in a series of meeting engagements. Breakthrough operationsare often time-consumingand attritional. They are conducted against three lypes of defensesrhasty, positional,and fortified. The hasty defenseis the easiestto bre6chsince il lacks closelycoordinatedfire and obstacleplans. The difference between positional and fonified defensesis on€ of degree, with the latter being better prepared,more complex, in greaterdepth, and therefore more difiicult to breach. Whether or not nuclearweaponsare employedalso affects Soviet attack frontagesand formationsin a break lhrough operation. When nuclear weapons are employed,they are directedagainstthe strongest pan of the defense,throughwhich the attacking force proceeds as rapidly as possible, often in battalioncolumns.Thus,in nuclearconditions the breakthroughmay more closely resemblea pur suit, since nuclear and other weapons of mass destructioncan so disrupt defensesthat units in column formation may penetrate them, When nonnuclearconditionsprevail,large amountsof conventionalartilleryare concentratedto support th€ breakthrougheffort, which is usuallydirect€d pointin theenemy'sdefenses, at theweakest
positions. The [,4R8's subsequentobjective encompassesenemy reservesto a depth of up to 4 kilomelers from the FEBA.ln nuclearoperations, the MRB's immediate objective is up to 2,500 meters; its subsequent objective is up io I kalometers,
Dosrlors f ' B L a 5 9 S o v r e'rr g u r e rl o r N A r O O e i e r s r v e
c. Oryanization fot Combat The Sovietsachievedesiredsuperiorityin men and equipmentfor the breakthroughby concentrating (for a relativelysho( period of time) on a na.row frontage. The N4RBis heavily reinforced with up to two tank companies,one or more arrrlery battalions,a platoonof combai engineers {equippedwith flame throwers, obstacle-clearing equipment,etc), and a.chemicaldetachment, As describedin chapler 2. when aftacking on a lkilometerffontage,the [4RB commandercould have 60 100 moriar and artille.y tubes in supporl (fisure@).
The breakthrough,regardlessof the type of defenseit is directedagainst.attemptsto concentrate numericalsuperiorityin men and equipmenl on a narrow sector, whalepressureis maintained alongnonbreakthrough sectorsas well.
d. Aftack Frcntagesand Fomations
The l,4RBmay attack as part of the regimenfs lirst or second echelon. As part of the first echelon, it normally attacks with three heavily reinforcedcompanies:two in the first echelon{or with all three companies in the first echelon against a hasty defense)attacking on a frontage b. Objective of about 1,000 meters, and one in the second The objectiveof the breakthroughis threefold: echelon (reserve).lf the enemy's defenses,parto split and dispersethe €nemy'sdefense,to con- ticularly his antitank defenses, have been suftiduct the pursuit, and to completethe destruction ciently neutralized, the battalion would attack ol enemy forces. The assigned depth of the mounted''otherwise dismounted. lvlETT deterlvlRB'simmediateand subsequentobjectivesis, in minesthe batalion formation,althoughfor conpart, based upon Soviet calculations of NATO trol purposes,an attack on line is preferredover defenses {figure 59), and on whether or not echelon{left, right) formations. nuclearweaponsare used. In nonnuclear operations, the MRg is assignedan immediateobjective of 1,000to 1,500 meters;that is, a distance just beyond the depth of the enemy's fomard defending companies but short of h;s reserve
83
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84
- Antiaircraftdefense,
e. Attack Planning Whether he is attacking from the march ol through friendly forces in close contact with the enemy, the battalion commander performs basically thesameplanning tasks:
Othertypesofsupport. l. Commandand Contrcl The battalion commander exercises control personallyand through his chief of staff, and at all times is supposedto be within 500 meters of his firct echelon. The battalion chief of staff is located with the battaiion commander.When an artilleryunit isattached to the MRB, the artillery commanderwill normallyaccompanythe l\rRB commandef; the mortar battery commanderwill also be close by, while forward obseNers ifrom the attached artillery) will accompany the firstecheloncompanies,When the MRB leavesthe assemblyarea,the battalioncommander,with the attachedartilleryand mortar batterycommanders, is located where he can best control his unit. Companyand platoonleadersare at the headof their respective elements. Guides are also employed to insure speed and aid in control of the battalion.
Analyzes the mission, - Disseminates thewarningorder. - lvlakesan estimat€of the situation, - Conducts reconnaissance,lwith suoordinatecommanderswheneverpossible), -- Formulates hisplan. - Checkshjs plan with the regimental com- lssuesthe attackorder, -- Supervisespreparations. - Notifies the regimentai commander of readrness status,
Though rad;o is the primary means of control in the atlack, flags, flares, and messengersare
plan, while not in The battalioncommanderrs NATO format, covers basicallythe same informa tion. -- Enemyandf riendlysituation.
- Firesupport. - Readiness time (for the battalionattack).
The command post (CP) is located on terrain from which the commandermay best observethe attack. The CP is rarely moved ouring a counterattack,upon commitment of the reserve, phase(i.e., switchingfiom dufing a transitional the attack to the defense),or during heavyenemy
'' Command andsignalinstructions.
g. Breakthtough frcm the March
-- Resupply.
Normally,when the MRB, acting as pan of the regiment, attempts a breakth.oughfrom the It is given orally and recorded by the battalion march, it will first occupy an assemblyarea to chief of staf{. After the order is given, suppreparationsfor the assault. When make final plementaryinstructionsare issued.These instruc properly chosen, the assembly area provides tionsare highlydetailed, and involveeveryaspect dispersion,offers security from enemy observaof the operation: tion and fke, and makes it more possible to -' lvlutualsupport. achieve surprise, - Politicalwork. - Reconnaissance, - ProtectionagainstNBCweapons. - Reafservice support,
Attempting a breakthroughfrom the march entails strict coordination of deployment times with nuclear and/or conventional fire support, engineersupport, and movement control, lt may also be conductedthrough forces in contact, thus involving a passageof lines. This type of operation involvesextensivecoordinationwith the unit to be passedthrough.
85
In addition to METT, the determinanrfor the battalion's attack frontage is the nec€ssity to cr€areth€ requiredsuperiofityin men and eqLripm€nt from the enemy FEBA all the way to the battalion'ssubsequentobjective.The deprh of the batlalion's immediateand subsequentobjectiv€s also vari€s according to lvlETT; under nuclear conditions,these objectivesare deeper than during conv6ntionaloperations.
lvlR troops follow tanks through br6aches made in minefields(figure 63) and lh€n d€ploy in line behindthe tanks and assaultthe enemy'sforward positions. The actions of th€ battalion change most dramatically after th€ fowvard delenses have been breached. Tank supported first-€cheloncompaniesattempt to exploit successand widen the gaps in th€ defens€sas rapidly as possible. Efforts are made to prevent the enemy from re€stablishinghis defenses,or wathThe MRB'Sformation also deoendson lllETT. drawing in an orderly fashion. Strongpoints Line formationis usuallyused in open terrainand establishedin the depth of the defenses are when the enemy FEBA is comparativelystraight. bypassedwheneverpossible. The line formation allows maximum firepower to the front and facilitatescommandand control. ln The reinforcedsecond-echelon{rcseru€}comother 6ituations, the battalion commander may pany would be committed to aid a faltsring fkstgchelon (right or left) his companies.The w6d9e echelon unit, to exploit the success ot th€ first is commonly used in the depth of the enemy's echelonby continuingthe attack into the depths, d€f€n6es,after the breakthfoughhas been achiev- or to dealwitha counterattack. ed, Norrnallythe battalionattacksfrom the march h. Brcakhrcugh frcm a Position in Close mount€d in BlvlPs,althoughenemyfire may force Contact a dismounted of "mixed" attack. In the latter Factors increasing the complexities of this case, part of the l\4RBfights from BMPS,whjl€ the oth€rpan tightsdismounted. type of attackare: When the MRB leavesthe assemblyarea, il moves as rapidlyas possibleto the enemy FEBA, and deploys according to the regimental commander's order. Guidelinefigures are rhat battalions deolov into columns I to 12 kilonelers Irom the FEBA; companiesform columns4 to 6 kiloh6ters lrom the FEBA, and platoonsI % to 4 kilom€tersfrom the FEBA. Squads form assaull linEs as close as possibl€to the enemy lusually within 300 to 1,000 meters of the FEBA-s6e figure61). A 30-45minute anillery preparationis planned to inflict maximum damage on the defender up unlil the time lhat the assaultline is reached;artillery and monar fires are then shifted into the d€oths of the enemv's defenses. Ereachssare madEthrough minefieldsby a combinationof artillery fire, ranks, and s:rppers.Tanks {equipped with KMT-4 mine olows and KMT-5 mine .oller assemblieslof the leading battalion in the main attack, with supporting infantry and sapperc, clear one path per attacking platoon (three per company). BTR-50 PKs. hurling explosive line charg€s, clear paths several meters wids and a few hundred meters long, and are supplemented by sappersarmed with the UZ seriesof bangalore torpedoes{figure 62}, each of which can clear a lan€2-to 3"meterswide.
- The constant threat of nuclear and conventaonalfire, nedessitatingthe dispercalol personnel- Assault positions must, thereforc, be only brieflyoccupied. -- The difficulty of concealing attack preparations; elaboraterusesmust be devisedto achieve - The threat of suddenenemycount€rattackduF ing the passageof lines. - Elaborateengineer pfeparationof the assauh ltne, In addition to the problems he deall with when organizingan attack from the march, the battalaoncommanderalso determinesthe following: -- The assauhposition his battalionwill occupy, and the routesthey will use to occupy it, - B[rP locationsand proc€duresfor using them in supportof the dismountedattack. ldeally,the [4RB occupiesthe assauhposition during darkness or other periods of reduced visibility.BMPs are ;nitiallyleft in the r€ar lmoving up to revetmentswhen given the sign6ll, while
86
dismounted infantry move to their assault positions bv wav of concealed.outesand communications trenches. To achieve surprise, the MRB's first-echelonassault companies will occupy the second trench of the defendingforces. During preparatoryfires, the first-echelonassauh companies occupy the firct trench, while the second-echeloncompany (reserve)occupies the second trench; attached tanks occupy a desig nated assemblyarea and are given a start line, normally located 1-2 kilometersfrom the FEBA; attachedengineersare locatedin communications trenches close to the companiesthey will sup port; the battalion mortar battery and attached and supportinganillery occupy positionsprior to the time the MRB occupies its assaultposjtions; the battalionmedical Doint is located iust behind the second-echelon{reserve) company; the remainingbattalionrear serviceelementsare further back, but generally within 4 kilometerc of the FEBA.
Forces relieved by the ft.4R8 during the passageof lineswill do on€ of three things: retire to the rear, supportthe attack by fire, and/or join in the attack. In the firct case,they may be formed as a reserveor sent further to the rear for rest; in the second, their organic and attached weaponswould participatein the preparatoryfires in support of the attack; in the third case, they would support the initlal assault by fire and participate in one of the regimenfs attacking When given the attack signal, first eche'on assaultcompanies,following closgly behind thek attached tanks and supported by BIMP fires, penetratethe enemy's forward defensesand attack his reserves,The battalion commanderand his staff follow closely behind the first echelon and, in turn, are followed by the battalion's second echelon lrcserve). Mortars, attached ar tillery, and air defense forces move on order to supportiheattackintothedeprhof thedefenses.
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89
3l'
7. THE PURSUIT
coveringforce. Having done so, the IVIRBeither deploys into a single column ln march formation a. Obiective or conducts the pursuit on paralielaxes. In tho former case, a company reinforced with tanks, The objoctive oI the puGujt is to prsvent an enganeers, and chemicaltroops forms the forward organizedwithdrawal and complete the destrucpatrol of the advance guard, and a seriqs oI tion ot enemy forces as rapidly as possible.The meetrng 6ngag9ments take place. ln a pursuit on ldRB anemp6 to achievethese objectivesby exparallel €xes, the battalion sends out stronger ploiting nucloarandlor nonnuclearstrikes,and by the mobility 6nd lirepower of the battalionand its security eloments to the thr€atgned flank(s). attachments. The MRB normally conducts th6 Thes€ elements consist ol r€inforced mobile personnel. pursuit (as part of the regiment) frontally, on patrolsand reconnaissance parallelrout€s,o. bya combinationrhereof. Attached engineer and artillery units play a key role in purcuitoperations,as do helibohe end b. Conduct of the Pursuit or airborne troops. Engineersremove obstacles, Aware that the enemy is withdrawing, th€ help prepare detours around damaged parts of |\IRB commander reorganizes his forces as the route, and lay mines on th€ en€my's withnecessary/ maintains close contact with the drawal routes and probable counterattackdxes. enemy ithereby making it more difiicult for thE Artillery lires up to maximum range, deploying enemy to use nuclearweaponsagainstthe MRB), from columns into often less-thsn,idealliring and informsrogimentot his actions. positions.Artillery must be able to quickly come out of action and reioin the march formation, The regimental commander then radios his Prompt receipt of target data largely d€termanes ordersto the MRB commanderfor the conduct of the successof the artilleryduring the pursuit. Th€ the pursuit, A battalionis usuallyassigneda pur- new self-propellodartilleryunits ar6 especiattywell suit 6xis, told what enemv torces are to b6 suited for pursuit operations. Heliborne and/or destroyed,and given objectivgsto be seizedand airborne forces seize key terrain in the enemy the s€quencgin which to act, The battalioncom- rear, ther€bydisruptingenemywithdrawal. mander, personallyor through his staft, raoros missionsto his organic and attached units while Rear servics personnel of th€ battalion also on the move. The depth of obj6ctivesd€pends play a key rols during pursuit op€rations. They uponthe situation. follow closelybehindthe combat formations,and keep their counterpartsat regim€nt informed re, The banalion, attacking initially in its form€r garding the medical, supply, and maintanance {ormation-a first and sscond 6chelon kesewel-- status of the MRB and itsattachments. fkst attemptsto desnoy the withdrawingenemy's
Section8 - DefensiveOperations -- During an advanc€ in order to repel counterattacks by superior forces,
1. GENERAL
The Soviets view the defense as involuntary -' Tosecuretheflanksot themainbody. and temporary. lt is resortedto when off€nsiv€ operationsare not possibleor advisable.The aim - To consolidate previously won gainspriorto of ths defon6e is to defeat the ensmy at the furtheradvance. FEBA and cr€ate favorableconditionsfor renewing the offen6ive. -
As a t€mporary measure to priorto 6 withdrawal. reorganization
2. CONDITIONSFORTHE DEFENSIVE
"mask"
- As a resuh of an unsuccoss{ul meeting Usually the battalion go€s on the delensavs when in close contact with th6 enemy and undgr engagement, the f ollowingconditions:
90
3 . P O S I T I O N I N GO F T H E M B B I N T H E DEFENSE
allowedthe banalioncommander,the planning sequence,and the inhial natufe of the defensive position. Doctrine stresses the need to vary defensive alignments to avoid presenting stereotypeddefensesto the enemy.
The N4RBin the defensemay be position€d: -' ln the division'sforward afeasecurityzone.
-- As part of the regiment's first or second After receivingthe missionfor the regimental echelon in the prirnary or secondary area of commander, the battalion command€r begins organizing his assigned sector, The regimental order will be as complete as possible. As a Independently of the regiment. minimum,it containsthe battalion's mission,trace of the FEBA,andbattalion boundaries. As part ofthe divisionreserve. h. The Hasty Defense Normally the battalion defends as part of the regiment,althoughit may act independently in Due to necessity,the MHB commanderis very broken,woody, or swarylpyterrain,or in a allowedmore initiative and flexibilityin organizing lessimportantsectionof the defense. a hdsry detersp: there :s no tine for rhe regimen tal commander to issue an order with detailed 4. MtSStONS supplemenlary instructions andsupervision. An lvlFB assigned the fotuard are6 security The battalion first attempts to consolidateon zone has the mission of delayingthe enemy as the line it has reachedor tries to seize more ad long as possible while inflicting n_axirnJn vantageous terrain, Enemy counterattacksmust casualities, be repelled.renforcementsreceivedfrom regiAs pan of the regiment'sfirst'echelondefense, ment, and the positionstabilizedand organized to doctrine. the MRB has the missionof holdingits assigned according area,and inflicringmaximumoamageon r.le atc, The Positional Defense tacker.When locatedin rhe 'egimelts p'imarv area of defense,rhe IVRB receivesgrealelein Organizationof a positionaldefenseis central forcement and is assigned a small€r area of ized by regiment. Orders are detailed and responsibility.Operating in a secondary sector, defensespreparedin a logicalorder and according the MRB has a largerarea of responsibility and to doctrine. Positionaldefensesare characterized less reinforcement, In the regiment's second by well-coordinated fire and obstacleplanning,exechelon, the battalion def€nds its assignedposi- tensivefield fortifications,great depth, and strong tion and participatesin counteratt6ckslaunched by regiment and/ordivision. d. Fotmation.Frcntage,and Depth As the divisionreserve,the fvlRBmay be used The battalion defensivearea {figure 64) is up to reinforce foMard defensesor as a counteF ro 2ll, kilometers wide (5 kilomererc undernuclear conditions)and up to 2'l, kilometersdeep- lt is 5. ORGANIZINGTHE DEFENSE organizedaccordingto the principlesoutlinedin chapter2. The Sovietsbelievethat modernwarfareoften allows little time to plan and organizea properly coordinated defensive position. While 't is sometimespossibleto organizea defense when units are not in contact, more often the l,4BB commander must quickly assume the delensive while in contact with the enemy (hasty defense). The circumstances under which rhe defenseis assumed determinesthe flexibility and initiative
Although the battalion'sdefensivealignm€nt dependsupon lVlETT,the l\,4R8usuallydefendsin on line(minus one echelonwith all l,4Rcompanies platoon a in reserve). Single-echelonalignment permits the greatest simultaneousconcentration of firepower, bur reducesrhe depth of the posi tion. When the IMRBdefends on a narrow frontage and/or greaterdepth is required,the MRB deploysin two echelons,with two reinforcedMR
91
companiesin the first echelonand one in the second. Reservoswould be located funher back, Th€ distance between the first and s€cond echelonsis up to 2 kilometers.This gap makes it more difficult for the enemy to destroy both the tirst and second echelons with tactical nuclear weapons, while enabling the second echelon to rapidly reinforce the first echelon or to quickly counterattackp9netratrons, e. Positioning of Subotdinate Elements {ll The molorizedriflecompanies
- The number of tank approacheswithin the batralions AO. - The regimentalcommander'santitankpl6n, - The assesshent ot the enemy's armor capability. {4) Mortars The battalion mortar battery is deployed in accordance with th€ overalllire plan and is posi tioned to provide close-in suppon for the companystrongpoints.
Each lVlR company organizesa strongpoint (5) Rearservic€s up to 500 meters in width {1,000 meters under nuclear conditions)and 250 meters in depth (500 The MRB'S rear serviceelementsare located metercfor nuclearconditions).Normally,all three in covered and concealed positions within the platoons defend in one echelon. For more inforbattalion area of operation {AOl. Rear service mation on the company in the defense,see lre elements are responsiblefor their own security Soviet Motoized Rifle Conpany, DDl1100-n-76. and defense,and frequently change locationsto avoiddestructionfrom enemyairand artilleryfire. {2) Attachmgnts Armor, anillery, engineer, and chemical troops attachedto the MRB are further allocated to the MR companies, depending upon the numberand types ol attachmentsreceivedby bat talion, and according to the importance ot the sectors the compani€s are defending, Priority would go to the company{s) defending in the main sector. Though artillerymay be assignedto the companiesfor di.ect fhe support, anillery is usuallypositionedto provideindhectfiresuppo(.
The fire plan is regarded as the principal means of defeating the enemy and insuring the stability of the defense. Indirect and direct (par' ticularlyantitank)fires are closelytied in with the barrierplan, and given first priorityin the defense. lMassedfires are organizedin coniunctionwith sir strikes on the mosl dangerousavenues of approach in accordancewith the regimentalcommander'splan. The fire plan attemptsto lorce the enemy into killing zonesand separatehis infantry {3) Reserves from supporting armor. To confuse the enemy The l/lRB commanderpositions his res€rves and increase the survivability of crew-serv€d wh€re they can most rapidly and effectively weapons, dummy positions are constructedand stabilizethe d€fEnse.Key terrain, enemy avenues rovingcrew-serv€d weaponsdesignated. of approach,and commitmentcalculationsfor the De{ensive fhes forward of the FEBA are reseryes are key factors in determining where res€rueswill be posilion€d within the batalion organizedby the battalioncommander'ssuperaols are6 of operation(AO). Commitmenttime for the to as great a depth 6s possible.Firesare primarily reserves.when mounted, is based on speedsoI concentratedon tank approacheson previously m-30 kilometersper hour in daytime and 1t20 selectedfire lines, usuallyunder ground observakilometersper hour at night. lvlovingon foot, four tion. The distance between lines is 400 to 600 meters on high-speedavenues of approach; on tofivetimestheamountoftimei6 required. less favorableavenuesof approach,the distance In addition to his regular reserve(usuallya is less. Along a line 2m to 400 meters from the platoon), the MRB commander often maintains FEBA, artillery fire is used to separateattacking an antitank reserve.The size and compositionof infantry from their tanks and to stop secondthe antitank ressruedependsupon the following echelon forces. Final protectivefir6s are planned factors: within 100 metersof the FEBA, while concentra- The importanceattachedby the regimental tions are plannedthroughout the battalionAO to Iacilitate defeat of enemy lorces which have commanderto the battalion'sdefensivearea, 92
The battalion'santitank defensesare situated broken through the defenses.The battalioncommander has the authority to call for or swhch to provide fire 2 to 3 kilometersforward of the FEBA. The Blt P's ATGI4S are the primary supporting fire in his area, while company cohmandershave the authority to do so only r€gar- weapon for long-rangeantitank fires. On open ground there may be up to 20O meters between dingfire immediatelyin front of the FEBA. tanks in defensiveoositionsand uo to 100 meters The battalion's fire plan,includingantitank,ar between antitank guns. Tanks and antitank guns tillery, mortar, and small arms fire, is primarily may be located up to 600 metersfiom the FEBA, based on tank-defeatingweapons. The plan pro- although terrain is an imponant determinant. Each antitank weapon has a primary and secondary sector of fire as well as primaryand alt€rnate - Suppon for the first and second echelon postt|ons. {roserve),with priorityto theformer. g. The Ba er Plan '' Destructionof enemypenetrations. Bafiier and fire olans comolementeech other. - Protectionof flanks and gaps not occripigd Engineer obstacles are constructed to restrict by friendlyforces. enemy maneuverabilityand disrupt his combat formations. lMixedminefieldsare laid forlvard of Cov€rageof barriers. the FEBAand throughoutthe d€pth of the defen- Overlappingconcentrationsof fire in front sive position, particularlyalong tank approaches. perimeterof antitankobstaclesis within of the FEBA, on the flanks, and ;n key areas The outer 400 metercof the FEBA so that thev may 200 to within th6 banalion'sAO. be easilyobservedand coveredby fire from anti- Rapid maneuver of fire along the FEBA tank weapons, lJse ol natlral obstacles.such as rivers, canals, lakes, swamps, ravines, dense andwilhin the AO. woods, high embankments, rocky ridges, and deeosnow, is siressed,
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enemy on the fudh€st approachesto the fotward area security zone, These fires concentrate on nucleardeliverysystemsand armor, and become Conduct of the defensive battle by the bat- more intenseas the enemy advances.Reconelementsfrom r€gimentand division, talion beginswith the detection of enemy forces naissance by special reconnaissance detach augmented and theiradvancewithin range of the battalion's from MBB in th€ security zone, r€port ments the weapons.The baiialionmav conducta defenseir en emy's size, locatio n a nd activities. on the , the forward area securityzone, in the regiment's firstorsecond echelon, orasthe division reserve. The MRB in defense of the forward area zone att€mpts to hold its positions and security h. Actions of the Battalion in the Forr/ad Arca force the enemy main body to deploy, while in Secu ty Zone flictingmaximumcasualties. Initi6lenemyprobes by reconnaissance elements are engaged from a forward area In assigning a battalion to positions guns, with the by roving alternate and securityzone, tne divisioncomrranderassignsa objectives of deceiving the enemy regardingthe frontage.The NrBBaccordinglarger-than-normal true nature of the defenses and of forcing the ly normalydefendsin one echelonard reiainsan (figure main body to deploy. when the enemy's MR platoonin reserue 65). The battalion enemy's MBB attempts to sepa' commanderis given his zone of responsibility,main body deploys,the prevent platoon rate attackingtanks from their infantry, to told where he will establishcompanyand strongpoints, the sequenc€ in which he will penelr€iior. and to bLy tirre for the main organizehis positions,the obstacleand fke plans, defenses.Penetrationsare dealt with by the bat plan. The MRB withdrawson orderof talion'sreserves. andthewithdrawal the cornmanderwho is commandingth€ forward The planningand conductof the defenseof a forward area security zone may be divided into c. The Battalion Defense as Paft of the Regitwo parts: the first encompassesthe positions and plansto defendthem,whilethe seconddeals ment's Fitst Echelon with conductinga fighting withdrawalthrough the maindefenses on the FEBA. After friendiy reconnaissanceforces and the Becauseof the extendedfrontages assigned, battaion which defended the forward security the MRB is heavilyreinforcedwith a.mor, aF area have passed through the first-echelon tillery, engineer.cherrical.and sometimesair defenses, enemypfobesof the FEBAare handled defenseforces, particularlywhen defendingin the much the sameway as alreadydescribed. Unlike primary sector; in a secondarysecior, reinforced tne secLrilyarea.however.the 'irst echeonposicompanies{ratherthan a banalion)are used. In tions are to be held at all cost, for the entire both cases,arr;lle.yfire f.om the n"aindefensesis defensivepositionrestsupon their retention. "on call," The battaion commanderand his staff and Companies and platoons occupy normal subordinate commanders in the first echelon defensivefrontages {500 meters and 150 mete6 observethe enemy's preparatoryfires and try to respectively, under nonnuclearconditions)but detefminethe directionof the main attack so that have larger gaps betweencompanies,Such a men and equipmentmay be repositloned accorddefense is made possibleby greaterdecentraliza- ingly. Final protectivefires are used to stop the tion of the baiialions anached and o ganic enemyshort of the FEBA,Penetrations are dealt weapons; companies receive artillery, mortars, wih with'n the individ,ral corrpanyslrongpoints and antitankweaponswhile platoonsreceive6d and/or by the fu1RBcommander'sinfantryand ditionalantitank weapons.Attached tanks are usin tank ambushesthroughoutthe ed extensively When defendingas part of the regimenfsfirst echelon,the MRB's counterattackcapabilityis artillery limited.Only when smallnumbersof the enemy The divisioncommander's long-range and supportingair begin the destructionof the 6. CONDUCTOFTHE DEFENSE
have penetrated,or when these penetrationshave resulted in heaw losses1o the attacker. do the batlalion reserves,when launched independently of regiment, have a good chance of succgss, lf such favorableconditions do not exist, tha bat talion reservesengage the enemy from prepared positions. The destructionof farsuperior enemy Iorces which have penetratedthe battalion'sAO would fall mainly to the regimentalcommander and reserveforces. and hissecond-echolon The IMRB commander fhst informs the regimentalcommanderof his counterattackdecision. lf the decision is apDroved,the battalion reseruesnormallyattacr'mountedand use concealedroutes to their attack positions{if they at' tack dismounted, extensiv€ use is made of trenches, communicationstrenches, and other concealed aoDroaches).Antit6nk and other res€rves may be employed separatelyor togother, The attack is suppodedby regimentalweaponsas well as bv the MRB'S firsl-echelon companies. When the battalion'sdefenseshave been reestablished, the lvlRB commander reconstitutes his res€rves,usuallyfrom units which have not been seriouslvdeoleted.
battalion commander must fely on his organic assets to conduct r€scueand firefighting operations, Eattalion reserves reinforce the st cken are6as soon as possible.The battalionmay move to alt€rnatedefensiveareasonly on order of the r€gimEntal(or high€r)commander. d. The Eattalion Defmding as the Regiment's In this role, lhe lr4RB is located near the enemy's main avenue oI approach into the regiments position and is organi.ed in depth. The banalion is assignedmissionsto destroy enerny penetrations.The lvlRB may accomplishits mission fiom its fortified positions,by counterattacking independently,with the divisioncommander's reserves,or in coordinationwhh adjacentsecond echelons.Regimentaland divisionalartillerywoutd support the second-echelon MRB in any countefatlack, e. The MRB as Division Reserve
As division reserve, the IVIRBwould be ap propraatelyreinforced and assigned no specific mission prior to combat; it is ordered ro be lf the delending battalion is subjected to preparedto react to a number of contingencies, nucl€ar and/or chemical attack, ad hoc NBC but would most often be used as a counterattack _reconnaiss€nceparties {formed from MRB peF force. In this role it would be supportedby the division and army. sonnel) are sent into the affected area to r€port tilleryof radiation/chemicalreadings.Command and con trol and the fire and obstacle plans afe reestablishedas quickly as possible-Ammunition resupply and medicalaid are also increased.Initially,the
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7. DISENGAGEMENT AND WITHDRAWAL
Acting as the second echelon of the regiment, an MRB is usually designatedthe rear guard of The Soviets recognize that retrogradeopera- the regament.lt is heavilyreinforcedfor this role ljons, particularlywhen forces ar€ in contact, are and occupies previously prepared positions, lts very difficult, and subsequently require con, mission is to delay the enemy and gain time for siderable planning, coordination, and control. the withdrawal of the main body. After the regiWithdrawal occrirs on order of the senior com- ment's main body has passed through the rear mander and, whenever possible,is conducted at guard, the coveringforces attempt to break connight or during other periodsof reducedvisibility. tact wilh the enemy, passthrough the rear guard, Withdrawals are employ€d to buy time for the and rejoin the main body. Rear guard operations main defenses,to occupy mor€ favorabledefen- are conducted along a series of delaying posisavepositions,or to consolidatethe defense. tions, lvlaximumuse is made of artillery, monar, The regimentalcommander'swithdrawatoroer and long-range ATGM fires to prevent enemy is detailedand includesthe mission, routes, and interference with the withdrawat. formation to be used. intermedialedelayingposi The main body commanderorganizesreinforctions, control measures,and specifics regarding ed flank guards to counteract envelopment the new defensiveAO. Wathdrawalfollows dis- forces. Flank guards lay antipersonneland antiongagement,and involvesa covering force, rear tank minesalonglikely avenuesof approacnano guard,andmainbody. delay the ene..r until the main body has passed. The disengagementof the batt6lionmain body Forward secunty detachmentsare also used to is coveredby designatedplatoonsreinforcodwith occupy critical terfain along the withdrawal route tanks. anillery. mortars,and engineersthat try to until passage of the main body. During wkhpresentan unchangeddefensivealignmentto the drawal, reconnaissanceactiviries, paniculady at enemy, COunterattacks, air, artillerv,and nuclear night, are intensified lo ascenain the location. enemy. fires as well as smoke, are employed by the size,andintentionsofthe covering force to halt enemy attacks before the Withdrawalsar€ also characterizedby a scormain body withdraws. The coveringforce, under ched earth" policy; people, livestock,and equiDcommandof the MRB commander,remarnstn ment are evacuated,while roads, bridges, comoccupiedpositionsand tries to delay and decetve municationslines and supplies, and installations the enemvand oreventintorferencewith th€ main body. The main body withdraws in the following order: rear services, designatedmonar and aitached towed a(illery, and mixed teams of motorized rifle troops, SP artillery, and tank troops{figu.e66).
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The commanderof the battalionbeing relieved exercises control until the relief is completed. The relief of the battalion is normally ac- Shouldthe enemyattack while the reliefis in procomplishedat night {figure 67). In order to ac- cess, the relievingbattalion, under the command quaint himself with the dispositionsand defense of the outgoing commander,assistsin repelling plan of the IMRBhe is to relieve,the commander theattack, of the.elieving battalion analyzesthe defenses At the aDoointedtime the battalioncommander with his company commanders and platoon leaders. He receives the available information who is taking over the defensemoves his unatto about the enemy and his dispositionsand studies the reliel area by concealedroutes. The relief is the systeh of outposts, defense installations, carriedout successivelyby platoons,Guidesfrom obstacles and passages, distribution of firing the unit to be relievedmeet their replacementsat points, roads, communications,security,and the designatedlocationsand leadthem to their defenprotection of the flanks and limitng points. In sive positions, The commander of the outgoing coordinationwith the outgoing commander, he battalion turns over a skeich of the defenses, plansthe relief. defensive installations, permanent communications facilities,and reserveammunitionon hand. The MRB commander handing over the The companiesof the outgoing battalion,having defense indicates the following to his subor turned over their strongpoints, assemble in otnates: designatedareas. The outgoing battalion withdraws after the new MRB has occupied the -- Proceduresfor transferringthe defense. defenses, confhmed the functioning of com- Assemblyarea{s)afterthe relief. munications, made liaison with supporting ar tillery, and manned security outposts. After the - Deceptionmeasures. relief, the new battalion maintains the same routine and level of activitiesthat existedprior to - Designationof guides. the relief. - Designationof locationsfor traffic control posts, 8. RELIEFIN PLACE
- The time for starting and completing the tmnsfer. - The proceduresro be followed in the event of an enemy attack while the relief is in pro-
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U N D E RS P E C I A LC O N D I T I O N S C H A P T E R8 . T H E M R B O P E R A T I N G SectionA - General This chapter will concentrateon the following battalion offensiveand defensiveoperationsconductedundef specialconditionswhich have particular applicability to Northern and Central operaEurope:combatin built-upareas,heliborne tions, water barrier operations, night combat, seaborneassault,and defenseof a coastline,
Soviel doctrine cov€rs a number of operations conductedunderspecialconditionsin which procedures,planning,and tacticsdifferfrom normal operations,
The doctrine,specialequipment,training,and historicalexamplesfor these operations(excepting seaborneassaultand defense of a coastline) The Soviet approach to conducting combat were discussed in The Soviet Motoized Rifle operationsunder special conditions is to emploY Conpany, DDt1100-n-76,which also contains as data on operationsunder extremeweather condi regularunitswith as few TO+E modifications possible.Since the l\4RB is expected to operate fions, mounran operations,and operalionsin undervariousconditionsof terrainand w€ather, forestsand swamps,
Section B - Combat in Built-up Areas Small, widely scattered, lightly defended settlements may often be attacked by company- or Urban combat differc from combat in the fie d battalion-size units acting as foMard detach in severalimportantaspects:higherthan-normalments, thus freeing the main forces to continue slower the march. Wdl-defended vill6ges and towns, ammunitionexpenditures and casualt;es, rates of advance{5 to 15 kilometersper day anti- however,which lie astride the regiment'saxis of cipatedby Sovietplanners),reducedcentralized advanceand which cannotbe otherwiseneutralazcontrol with correspondinglygreater demands ed or bypassed,will be subjectedto full scale atplaced on small unit leadership, restraints on tack, rnaneuver, observation, and weaponsdnd equip opment usage, and limited reconnaissance portunrtres, 1 ,G E N E R A L
Signif;cantly, Soviettrainingfor urban combat with the rapidand continu is not commensurat€ of WesternEurope(figure68); ing urbanization this trainingseemsto be sporadicand conducted primarilyup throughcompanylevel.The Soviets seem to believethat, for the most part, they c6n urban areas avoid urban combat by neutralizing with chemicaiand/or nuclearweapons,rapidly bypassingthem, or quickly seizingthem from the march. In both the offensive and defensiv€phasesof urban combat, frontagesare considerablyreduced F , g u r6e8 .T h eU r b a fzl a t r c iF a c l o r . and combinedarms combat strongly emphasized, Supporting weapons and equipment are decentralizedmore than normally, with some 2, OFFENSE tanks and artillerypiecesbeing attacheddown to squad level. up to 50 percent of a division'sarThe battaiion officers study large-scalemaps tillerymay be used in this mannerand utilized (to include city maps) oi the urban complex, primarilyin a directfire role. Flamethrower units intelligence, and numberblocks as w6ll as other engineerand chemicalpersonnel analyzeavailable their maps. PrepaEtionis and objectiveson arealsoattacheddown to the lowestlevels.
103
hindered by the fact that effective prior reconnaissanceis difficult to obtain; normally reconnasissanceelementsmust fight to obtain data on the city's defenses-a slow and costly proc€ss. Pafticularattention is paid to the dirsction and width of streets, key buildings (communications centers, train stations, utility buildings,factories, etc,), and other areas whose seizure would aid theattacker, b. Command and Control Becauseof the decentralizednature of urban combat, the IMBB commander is given g.eater authority than is normally the case to plan and conduct the battle. Although allowed the flexibility and initiative he is normally denied, the IVIRBcommanderpossessesa very smallstaff and must often organizea very difficult operationin a shod periodoftime.
the march, the battalion normally attacks dismounted. when it has only one obiective, the MRB usuallyattacks in assaultgroups;wh€n it is given a subsequentobjectiveprior to attack, two lor more) groups may be used, with the second having the missionof seizingthe subsequentob j€ctive. In both cases, a platoon is normally rctainedasa reserveforce. d. AssaultGroups Due to the localizednature of urban combat, supportingweaponsand equipmentare decentralized to make possiblethe formation ol combined arms assault groups. Nrotorizedrifle troops form the basis for these groups. Within the battalion, the l/lR company is the basis for an assault group. Reinforcementis heavy. Typical assault groupswithin the battalionwould consistof :
- A motorizedriflecompany. Commandand control in urban combat is com.. Oneor tlvo tank platoons, plicated by the reduction of fadio efficiency. Although radio is the primary means of control, - One artillerybattery (which may in turn be considerableuse is also made of messengersand subdivid€damongplatoonsl. wire. Limited observationalso afi€cts command .- A combatengineer(sapper)platoon, and control. The battalioncommandersets up his command post {CP) where he can best control - ChemicaI and flamethrowerspecialists . the actions of his unit. The CP is situated closer than normally to the first echelon due to the - One bridge platoon or section (if a water problems imposed by rcduced observationand obstaclemust be crossed). reduced radio effectiveness.Observationposts, e. Conductof the Attack located in attics and other high places. are con' nectedby wire io the CP. After the attack begins, Direct and indirect anillery fire precedesthe the battalion commander and his staff advance battalion attack. The duration of the artilleryfire groups. behindthecompanyassault variesconsiderablyand dependsupon the nature c. Objectives. Frcntages, and Fonations of the defensesand amount of structuraldamage Depth of obiectives,attack frontages,and for- required. Too much artillery fire can create mations depend upon the forces available, the obstaclesfor the attacker.Smoke is often used to nsture and density o{ structureswithin the urban aid the attacker in reachingthe first buildings. lf area, and enemy defenses,As a planning guide. antitank fire is not too heavy, infantry and saphowever, the battalion attacks on a frontage of pers follow closely behind their attached tanks (equippedwith mine rollersor plows if minefields up to 600 meters {200 to 300 meterc for an MR company). lts objective may be to seize one or are present).Sappersaid tho tanks in mine cleartwo city blocks. lvlain attack axes are located ing. They also help clear barricades,eliminate along th6 major routes into the urban area to booby traps, destroy or create openingsin buildfacilitatethe capture of key areas and the cross- ings, and construct CPs, medical stations, and ing of the area as rapidly as possible(figure @). storageareas.Sappersare w6ll oquippodwith exWhen it cannot rapidly seizethe urban area from plosivesand minedetectiondevices,
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Once inside th€ town {figure 70), the ass6ult gfoups attack along parallel streets. Tanks mey lead the assaultin wedge formationwith one tank in the middle of a .oad and two behind on each side. with infantrvhgn on both sides ol the street firing at buildings on the opposite side. Flamethrower personnel {figure 71) assist in the destniction of heavily fortified strong poinG. BfulPs remain farther back and suooort the infantryandarmorbvfhe, Artillerv attach€d to the comoaniss lollows closelybehindth€ infantryand tanks and provides direct lire support. Indirectfire support is provided by the battalion mortars and regimental/divi sionartillery.
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The MRB commander keeDs anv attached bridging equipment under his control until an assaultgroup is rcady to attempt the water crossing. At that time, the bridging equipment is 6ttached to the assaultgroup commander;it reverts to the battalion commander'scontrol upon coftpletionof thecrossing, The battalionrear services,limited as they are in manpower and equipment, have a particula y difficult task in urban combat in keepingthe l\4RB suppliedand mainlainsd.Supply prioritiesare ammunition, water, and food, with the {irst placing especially heaw demands. Supply dumps are eslablishedas far forward as possible,and regimental rear servic€sprobably deliver suppliesto the battalionsupply dumps once they are €stablished. Battalion mess areas. ammunition. w6ter vehicles and traileB, and the aid station are establishedbelow ground level whenever possible. Fi6r aid lreatment and evacuationstations areestablished behind€achMR comDanv. When the battalion's objectiveis seized. it is fortified and either providesthe basisfor regimen. tal defense along th6 line newly gained, or the jump-off point f or continuingthe attack. 3. DEFENSE Not surpisingly, the Soviets have w tt6n relativelylitlle on defsnseof an urban area. Since defense of an urban area resticts maneuver,it takes fewer taooosto defend it than to attack at. Those principlesalready describedr€arding decentralizedcontrol and heavv reinforcement of subordinateunitsapplyto the defense.
106
Figore70.Combat.in-Cil iesExercis€s.
FiSrre71.FlamethrorerPeEonnolPlayan lmportantRolein UrbanConbat.
A battalion's frcntage v6ri66 according to its mission as part of the regiment, but normally it will defend in two echelons,with iivo reinforcod comoanieslorward and one back. The battalion defensive ar€a (figure 72) b bas6d on company strongpointssupplementedby ambushesthroughout the battalion's AO. Th€ battalion CP is locatedwithin th€ most important6trongpoint.
4. VULNERABILITIES Becauseot the major emphasison field maneuvers, a lack of larg4scaleurban training, and a logistics€ffon gearedtor blitzkriegwar, it is doubtfulthat Sovietgroundfo.ces€rewell p.€paredlor urbancombat.
The MRB commanderwith his small Bteff havs a particularly ditficulttask in urban would The company strongpoint, containing inIantry, Heavily reinforced with all-armssupport. combat. personngl, armor, artilleay.sapperc,and ch€mical iime to he has relativoly linle Dlan a very drlficult is organizedfo. all-rounddel6ns6and mutual fire givon and b suddenly the flexibilityand opsration sripportwith olher strongpoints,lt rnay consistol in initiative he is denied other operations.This one or morebuildihgs, pertainsto his subordinatecommandersand Engineersuppon for the defenseb greaterthan NCOsaswoll. in the attack. Exlensiveantr'tanktnd anlioersonnel obstaclosare establishd in the streets, in intgrualsbetweon slrongpointsand on approaches to barric€dss,A battalion dofending in the r6gim€nt s main d€fensiveareacould roceivsenoingor 5!pportfrom both regimentand division.
DuringWorldWar ll, the SoviEtArmygaineda formidable r€putalion ior urb6n combat. Whil€ currentSovietdoctrineseeksto svoidurbancombat, the rapidly increasingurbanizationof WesternEuropemakessuch combatalmo6tinovitablewith subseouenl advers€sffecl on Soviet ratesof advanco.
Eecause ti6 delender can intlict greater loss€s on the enemylrom prepa€d positions{particularThe MRB musr be judg6d capabieof conly in a buill-up arqa), counteraltacksar€ rarely ducting urbancombatoperations,Due to limitalaunchedbelow rcgimentallevel In urban combat. how€vsr,suchoperations tions already discussed, Strong mobib.eserves are msintainod st both could be verv costv and slow. regimentaland divisionleveltor this purpo6e.
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108
Section C - Helibone Operations 1. GENERAL Ovgr the past few yearsthere has b€en a marked increasein numbeF and types oI helicopterc within the Groups of Soviet Forces Germany (GSFG) with a correspondingincreasein capabiliti€slor heliborneoDerations.The Soviets currently have the capability to conduct simultaneously several battalion-size heliborne oo€rations in Central Europe with airbotn€, special purpose, and/or motorized ifle troops. This section addressesthe use of the ltlRB in heliborneopsrations. In wartime, Soviet helicopterregim6nts,subordinate to tactical air armies,are assignedto each front. Some ot these regimentsseem specifically lailored to lifr motorizedrifle battalionsin a variety of combat operations, Although heliborne operationsin regimentrlstrcngth are occasionally described.the MRB is consideredbv the Soviets to be most suited for a variety of missions.At leasl one MRB per motorizedrifle divisionis train€d to conductheliborneoperations.
helibornEoperation,the MRB could operateup to m kilom6ters behind the FEBA. lt could also operateto the s:rmedistanceacting independently. although a more normal operationaldepth is I to 10 kilometers-thal is, within range of supporting artillery. The Soviets want linkup by advance guard elemenls with the heliborne MRB within a few hou6, and prefer to conduct the operationwithin range ol friendly artillory,These factors, however,will not precludethe MRB from being inserted up to 80 kilometers beyond the FEBA to seize an important objective. ln such a situarion, the lrRB could receive additional helicoptergunship support and/or be rginforced with artilleryand/ or additionalmortars. 4. FORCEORGANIZATION
The organization and capabilities of BMPequippedforces and BTR equippedforces clearly favor the latter (figure73) Ior heliborneop€rations. In additionto the tacticaladvantagespossessedby the BMP vis-a'visthe BTR (seeChapter2, Section regimsnt'sself' 11,the 8MP-equipped B, paragraph propelledartillery cannot be transportedby helicopter, while the towed artill€ry (minus atsprime 2. MtSSTONS movers)of BTR-equippedregihents is h€licopter H€libornemissionswhich are given to the [,4R8 transportable.APca are also not transportableby includea;dingin maintainingoffensivemomentum helicopter.Becaus€the Sovietsare stillformulating by capturingkey terrain,blockingenemy resetues doctrine for the optimum employment of BMPand resupply efforts, interdicting withdrawal equippedunits, and sincetheseunits also havethe routes, aiding amphibiousforces in th€ seizureof capabilityto conduct heliborneoperations,such a bgachhead,and attackingcommandand control operations will be addressed here. Moreover, sitgs. principlesof employmentare generallythe samefo. and BMP-equipped units. BTR-€quipped 3. DEPTHOF OPERATIONS Although lvlETT determinosthe augmEnration The operational depth ot an [,4R8 heliborne IVIRBreceivesin conductinga heliborneoperaan operation depends upon severalfactors: the imtion, the MRB normally operates with few portanceof the objective,whether the MRB acts In addition to saDoerand NBC t€amsatvehicl€s. ind€pendentlyor as pan of the regiment, the regimgnt,the MRB can rec€ivean air tachod from amount of supponing anillery and/or close air of three-tofiv6 men from army to control element suoport assets available,lhe estimated time for coordinateair support from gunshipsand tactical linkup,and the natureof enemydispositions aircraft. Close air-groundsupport is provided by helicoptergunships, while tactical air strikes are the overThe importance of the objective is prepranned. riding lactor in determiningthe operationaldepth of th6 mission.Acting as part of the regimentin a
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5. AERIALEMPLOYMENTCONCEPTS
can iay mines on likely enemy avenues of approach into the obiectivearea. The [iRB is transHigh performance aircrcftsuch as the FLOG. ported by HlPs to the LZ{s) and receivesrernGER s€ri€s(figure74) and the HIND and HIP forcements,supplies,and additionalcombat suphelicopter gunships {figure 75) suppress enemy port (Iield artilleryand antitank guns as requiredl defenseswithanthe flight corridorand provide air fromH0OKs{figure78). support for the l\ilRB.HOPLITESperform taciical (figure76), while HIPS(figure77) reconnaissance
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helicopterforce commanderduing the planning phase of the operation, Helicopters remain separate fromthe MBB untilloadingtime.
Planningis very thorough for a heliborne h. Command and Contrcl operation, and is centralized at the highestlevels. Having receivedhelicopterassets frcm front, rhe Sppcial i.nportanceis arrachedro ensuring in conjunctionwith air force secrecy and uninterruptedcontro, In the army headquarters, personnel,does the detailedplanningregarding assemblyarea, communications are conducted the heliborne force, fightersupport,coordination primarilyby wire and messenger, with radioson of artileryfires,and controlof friendlyair defense listeningsilence(figure79). Duringflight and in radiosareprimarily reliedupon. systemsalong the flight corridor.The operation theassault, probably on would be in supportof a first-eche The fvlFB commanderrides with the com divisionon the army's rnainaxis of attack.The mander of the helicopt€rforce, while his com probably N4RBwould corne from the division's pany commanders ride with the helicoptercomsecondecheon regiment,or from the army's mander's subordinate commanders.The IMRB secondech€iondivision,dependingupon METT. commander ands and occupiesa place in the Army planningis fudher refinedat divisionand he assault from which can bestcontfolhisunit, regimental level. The N4RBcomnanderiakes pari n planring the assaukphaseof lhe ope aiion and sJpervises Once landed, the battaiion often attacks in his unit'spreparation for the operation. The plan one ech€|o1,as th,s fo,mationplacesmaximum ningsequence for the command€r and his staff is combatpower.orwa'd.O1e platoonrs in reserve essentially the sameas organizing an attackunder (figure80). In some situations, two echeionsare norrnalconditions.,q specialfeatureof this p ann ing, however,is the landingphasein which the MRB commandergivesthe andingsequenceof After landingthe l\.4R8in the landingzones his unit and coordinating instructions. troopand equipmentcarriers Usualythe (LZs),the helicopter I\y'FlB commanderconducrsno p':o. recon'rais return to a safe are6, preparefor a second lift, or sanceof the landingareaor objective.The MRB returnto their basearea,Gunshipsremainin the commander and his chief of staft work closely objectivearea as long as possibleto render close with regimentaloperationsofficers and the airsupport. 113
The actions of the MFB during attack, in the 7. DEFENSE objective area, and during the reorganization In the defense, the IVIRBhas the mission of phasefollow normalSovietdoctrine. holding its positions while inflicting max,mum casualtieson the enemy. In addition to its at, tachments, it can be aided in this task by helicopters laying mines along likely enemy avenuesof approach,and by on-callgunship{and possiblyfighter) support. The MRB's defensesare organizedgenerallyasdescribedin Chapter5. Once linkup has been achieved with the ad, vance guard, the lvlRB, from its defensiveposi, tions, supports the movement of the advance guard. The lvlRB's vehicles are brought forward by its parent unit and, atter linkup, the heliborne IMRBremounts its BIMPSand conducts mounted 8. VULNERABILITIES KEY
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Section D - Water Bariet ODerations 1. GENERAL Whenever possible,the Soviets try to force a wat€r barrierfromths marchon a broadfront, with minimum delay in appro6chingand crossingthe obstacle.Th;s type of hasty crossingis usuallyattemptgdagainstnonexistentorweak defens€s,and when the curent and condhion ol the banks on both sides of the obs€cle are favorable. Hasty crossings reduce the attacker's vulnerabilify to nuclearfires and enablohim to raoidlvcontinuethe
lf a forward detachment has been designated and has accomplishedits missionof 6stablishinga bridgehead,an MRB, acting as th6 lead regi rnent's advancoguard, would be given lhe mission of expandingthe bridgehead(in conjunction with the forward detachment)or passingthrough the bridgeheadand continuing the €ttack. l{ a crossing cannot be accomplished,the advance guardhasthe missionotclearingthe nearbank,
In the absonc€ ot a forward detachmenr,the lead regiment's advance guard would be given the mission of linkup with airborne/heliborne When a hasty crossinghas failed due to €n6my forces and/or securing and oxpanding a def€nses and/or unprepared or poor crossing bridgehead. sites, the crossingis methodicallyplannedand a deliberatecrossing attempted, Deliberatecro$Whetheracting as the division'sIorwa.d detachings are time-consumingand costly. Moreover, menl or the rggiments advanceguard, the MRB they slow offensivemomentum and increasethe would be h€avily6ugmented,containingup to: attackor'svuInerabilityto nuclear fires. - Onea.till€rybattalion. The BMP equippedMRB is paniculaflyw€ll - Two tank companies. sujtsd to conduct a river crossingbecauseof the BIMP's antitank capabiliti€s.The BlvlP'equipp€d - Oneairdefense platoon{twoZSU-234s). MRB needs lewer tanks (and, therefore, less - Oneantitank platoon(BRDMS). engineersupport)than a non-BMP-equipped unit, and can- therefore,cross a water obstaclelaster - Onebridgeplatoon{or section). than a BTR-equippedN4RBwith armorsupport. - Onesapperplatoon, 2. ROLESAND MISSIONS .. OnechemicaI detachment, The IVIRBmay cross 6 w6te. obstacleas a division's forward detachment.as the advanceguard Acting as part of the main body, the lvlRB of a regiment, or as part of the regimentalmain would approach crossingsiles on a broad front and in marchformation. Knowing that his unit musl cross one of more The remainderof this section will discussthe water obstacles,a division commanderwill nor- MRB acting as the advance guard of the divi mally task a regiment (most probably a regiment sion's lead regimentmaking a hasty crossingand in the division'smain body during the march) to establishing a bridgehead. providean llRB to serv€ as the nucleusof a lorward detachment(in some circumstances,an en- 3. THE CROSSING tire rcgimentcouldact as a f orwarddetachmentl, As the division'sforward detachment.the IVIRB would have the missionof linkupwith a heliborne or airborne force, or to seize and exDand a bridgehead from the march. The bridgehead could be up to 7 kilometersdeep on the lar bank. Forward detachments,in their race to seize and oxpand bridgeheads,try to avoid contact with withdrawingenemyf orces.
Planningfor the crossing of a water barfier beginsas early as possible,prefsrablybefore the rnarch. Basedupon all availableintelljgenceand a careful, detailed map study, the senior commander designatesthe number and approximate locationsof crossingsites. developsa concept of operations,and insures that prior to the march. torward detachments,advance guards, and lead
116
regimentshave adequate6ngineersupport. In accordance with new int€llig€nceand changes in the tactical situation {otten provided by combat and engineer reconnaissancepersonnel,figurg 81), the olan is refined and new instructions issuedduring th€ march. No formal combat order is issued {or a hasty crossing. Regimentaland divisioncommandersofien €xerciseclosesupervision of the crossingtrom commandposts located nearth€ waterobstacle. The regimentalcommandergives detailed instmctionsto his advanceguard commanderas to how he is to preparefor and accomplishhis massion, Though he carriesout his missionsepamtely from the regimentalmain body, the MBB advance guard commanderis still closelysupervisedby his senior commander. He maintainsconstant radio communicationswith the regimentalcommander and may have a regimentalstaff officer whh him to makE sure that everythinggoes according to plan,
crossing.In addition, he givesfire missionsfor aF tillery and mortars in coveringthe assaultand in support of aclions on the opposite tank, assemblyarea for lanks to carry out snorkeling (or ferry crossing)operations,details of logistics support,and comrhandandcontrolinstructions, The advanceguard is heavilyrcintorcedfor its mission. The ord6r of march of the advance guard is organizsdto place the bulk of the combat power and key engineer uni6 and items of equipmentas far torwardas possible, b. CommandandContol
During the march, the battalion commander and staff, along with the attached artill€ry battalion cornmander, are well torward. situated behind the advance party. During the assault crossing.the battalioncommanderexercisesclose personal control from a command oost located near the water ba(ier. The organizationand conVol of rhe crossing sites are delegated by the To his organic and attached commandersthe senior engineer officer present {figurg 82). The advance guard commander gives the mission, battalion command€r and the attach€d artillery march order, reconnaissancedata. location of battalioncommanderprobably cross th€ obstacle cro6sing sites, assault sch€dule. and order of behindthe {irsrecheloncomDanies.
ol BothRiv€rBanksUsuallyPrecedes Fisure8l. Reconnaissanc€ the MainAseult
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c. Secuing the Neat Eank lf the near bank has not been seizedby a fo.ward detachmentor heliborneforce, the advance guard accomplishesthis task and establishscrossing sites. Every effort is made by the advance guard to sdze the near bank quickly and to prevent the enemy from organizing an effective defenseor destroyingexistingcrossing$tes. The patrol crossesas soon as possible reconnaissance and conducts active reconnaissanceof the far bankand bridgeheadobjectives. Attached engineercestablishandlor improve crossingsites. Trackedamphibiousferriesgo into assemblyareas and wait until the far bank has been seized belore transportingthe artillery battalion. (Bridge-layingtanks go into position and aid in getting the advance party across narrow water obstaclesup to 20 meters in width.) Approachesto the water obstacleare marked, and control points are establishedto maintain movementand preventcongestion. The advanceparty crossesas rapidlyas possi ble and continuesits missionon the far bank. lf it is unable to cross, it takes the enemy under fire and awaits the arival of the advance guard's main body. Smoke is used to conceal crossing locaflons.
An MRB will normally cross a water obsracte in one echelon with all three companiesabreast (two abreastif the advanceparty crossesearlier) and 50 to 100 meters betweenvehicles.This foF mation places maximum combat power forward and allows for the mosr rapid crossing of the obstacle. BlvlPs, white in the water, fire th€ir mainarmament andSAGGERS as required. Attached artilleryand mortarsprovidetire support (figure 83) and smoke, and displaceby battery on order. Attached tanks go into an assemblyareaand preparetor the crossing{figure 84) or, if the enemy fires trom the far shore are particularlyheavy,they provide direct lire support for the [4R8. Air defense elements set up on ground from which they can provide air defenso and direct fire support for the entire crossing,Air defensefires are supplementedby the battation,s SA-7 gunnersatop the BMPSduring the c.ossing (ligure85). Havingcrossedthe obstacle,the MRB pushes rapidly inland 5 to 7 kilometersand establisnesa bridgehead{figure86). The MRB's attachedranks and anillery cross as soon as possible(figure 87) and lake up assignedpositionswithin the bridgehead. The sappe.platoonaids the MRB In rmproving its defenses,while other engineerpersonnel remainbehind to further improvethe crossing sitesfor the regimentalmainbody.
118
Fisure83.Self-propelled Art rleryardZSU-23.4s Supportine a RiverCrossing.
FiSure 84.T52s Preparingfor a Riv€rCrossing.
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4. DEFENSE OFA BRIDGEHEAD When the enemy is too strong lor the regiment's advanceguard to continue the march, it defends the bridgeheadand waits for ihe regi mentalmain body. Normallythe bridgeheadhas a radius of 5 to 7 kilometers (depending upon IVIETT)and denies the enemy observationof the crossingsites. Usually the l,,lRB has the bulk ol its combat power on the enemy side of the obstacle,but it leavesa small securityforce with engineerson thefriendlysideof the river. Special features of the MRB'S defense of a bridgeheadare: - Flanksrest on the water barrierto increase the stabilityof the defense. .. Antitank, air defense, and artillery within the bridgehead are greater than in normal - Large reserves of ammunition, rations, POL, and other suppliesare bought into the bridgeheadas rapidly as possible(helicopters can play a key role here until the regimental mainbodyarrives). - Specialcamouflagemeasuresaie taken at the crossingsites.
The defenseof any bridgeheadis expectedto be mafted by particulardetermination.Acting on jts own, far in front of the regiment'smain body, the MRB conductscounterattacksas necessaryto preservethe integrity of the FEBA. Though considerablyaugmenled, the l\4RB is still stretched p.etty thin and, with its back to the water, conductsa desperatedefense, 5. DEFENSE OF A RIVERLINE In organizingth€ defenseof a river line on only one bank, the Soviets normally designate the FEBA as the water's edge of the friendly oank (figure 88). Regimentand division normallysend reconnaissance forces and combat securityforces to the far bank. lslandsin the river are occupied and fonified to prevent surpriseenemy crossings and to provide flanking fires against enemy forces. Crossingsites on the far bank and fords are mined, obstacles constructed in the water, and banksscarped.Antitank and artilleryfhes are closely tied in to the obstacle plan. Dams and other installationswhich could be used to llood the river are guarded and doslroyed on ord€r of the regimental commander, The MRB, as part of the regiment's {irs! echelon defenses,has the mission of preventing the enemy from establishinga bridgehead.The organizationand conduct of the defenseis similar to th€talreadvdescribedin ChaDter5.
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combat until after unsealing,which takes about 20 minutes. lt may, however,fire atter emerging While formidablg, Soviet river crossingtechni- from a snorkelcrossing. quescontaincertainvulnerabilities: - Convary to doct.ine, the Soviets seldom - Intended crossingsites may be prematurely practiceriver crossingsduring night or other conrevealedby reconnaissancepersonnel, ditions of limited visibility- lt is more likely that - Although heavilyreinforced,the lVlRB,when ths Soviets conduct rcconnaissance,resupply, preparationunder conditions of establishing and defending a bridgeh€ad, is and engineering limited vasibilityand conduct crossings durang vulnerable to counterattack, particularly in the early stages,when it is separatedfrom its attach- daylighthours. 6. VULNERABILITIES
ed tanks and rear services, ln the absence of - River crossingsare very complex operations bridges.rhe tanks must sno*el or be transportsd requiring close timing and coordination. Some by lerry, while the rear servicesmusl also be fer- lack of control, congestionat crossingsites, and riedacrosslate arrival of crossing equipment is inevitable -- Snorkels are vulnerableto fire and may be (particularlyduring operarionswith high rates of damaged prior to crossing. While under water, advance),with subsequentopportunitiesfor the tanks are vulnerable to a numbef of defensive defense. measures, to include undercut banks, tetrahedrons, floating logs, and napalm (napalm detonatedon the water's surface would suck all the sif out of the lanks under water, causingsutfocation), Moreover, once a tank is sealedfor a water crossing, it cannot engage in sustained
.- Regardlessof the Soviet's formidable afiay of amphibious vehicles and their excellent engineerequipment,water barriersar€ obstacles which will slow down the tempo of attack, par ticularlywhen the barriersarewelldefended.
SectionE-NightCombat 1 .G E N E R A L
2. THE NIGHTMARCH
The Sovier view on the importance of night operationsis containedin this typicalquote:
While the planningsequenceand operations order format are the same for night and day movements, the MRB commander takes additional measuresto cope with difficukiesposed by nighl operations. These measures prilharily involve commandand control, and security,and includethefollowing:
Under contemporaryconditions, there is an incr€asein the significanceand expansion of the night altack which requires persistent training of troops for operationsundernight conditions. In spite of this written emphasis on night operations, actual pfactice of night combat techniques is spor6dic and often unrealistic. Although this section concentrateson how the Soviets say night operations should 6e conduct6d, the vulnerabilitiesparagraphat the end of the section illustrat€sthe disparity betw€en doctrineand practice. Night attacks may be supported or unsup' ported, illurninated or nonit\$minated. Norma\\y a Soviet night attack occurs after an artillery preparationand will involve extensiveuse of illumination,
.- The march column is shonened, with 25 to 30 meters between vehicles,and reconnaissance and secudty units operatecloser than normal to the mainbody. - Reconnaissance and security units are larger and more numerousdue to the greater threat of surPriseattackby enemyforces, - Speed is reducedto 15 to 20 kilometersper houf for a mixed column of BlvlPs, tanks, and wheeled vehlcles lthls speed also depondsupon the condition of the vehiclesand roads, and on the traininglevelof drivers).
124
- Shon halts of 20 to 30 minutesevery 2 to 3 hoursare plannedto help reducedriverfatigue not allowedat nigh0. {longhaltsarenormally -- Observerswith njght vision devicesare placthecolumn. ed throughout -- The regimentalcommander'splan for traffic control is augmented as necessaryby the battalion commander. Exlra vaffic controllers are detaiLedand posted a! road junctions and other keyfeatures alongthe route,
when possible,pr6parationsfor night combat are done during daylight.This allowsthe battalion commanderthe time and visibilityto point out the objectives, control features, and targets to has subordinatecommanders.ln addition to normal attack preparations, rhe battalion commander doesthefollowing:
.. Signalsfor control,warning,and target indication primarily involve the use of light and pyrotechnics.As during day marches,radios are on listeningsilence,althoughNBC and air warn' ings, as well as the crossingof important phase lines,are reported. lf organizedproperly,the march formation provideslor the rapidmovement,security,and command and controlof the column,while avoiding the need to reform in the event of a night meetingengagement.
.. Designatesa guad6companyand compass bearingfor the advance. Determinesthe method of employingnight visionequipmentand plansto supplement his superiors' iilumination plans {see paragraph ol, ' lssues instructionsfor mutual recognition, target identificationand coordination,and the method of signaling when phase lines hav€ beenreachedand objoctivestaken. -- Ordersthe checkingof nighr visionequip. mentandvehiclelights. Requestsaddition6l illumination,signalin0 equipment, and tracer ammunition as r€qurred.
3, THE NIGHTMEETINGENGAGEMENT
Although gen€rally conducted in the sam€ manneras in daylight, the night meeting€ngage' c, Augmentation ment is more complicated.lts successprimarily depends upon the initiaiive and flexibility of the As in other types of operations,the MnB is battalioncommanderand his subordinates, as augmented with tank, artillery, engineer, and well as upon the skillful use of night vision chemica' unils. A typical battalion grouping devices andillumination equipment. would, in additionto th€ MRB assets,contain: While helping to conceal the battalions ad' vance,night also slows down the MRB's initial deploymentand complicatescommand and controldue to observationand orientationdifficulries.
-- Onetankcompany. - Oneattilleryba(ery.
- Ones€pperplatoon. placed lrore emphasisis upon reconnaissance - Onechemical detachment, to the flanks, and guides may be detachedlrom groupsand securityforces to help reconnaissance lf enemy minefieldshave to be negotiated,at the MRBdeploy. least one tank per platoon would havo 6 4. THE NIGHTATTACK d. Thellumination Plan tn" -T-":99t and his steff The M88 engages an night operataonsin atr .,|."q',t"1'"1. preparethe plan This planincludes: illumination phases of combat. Nighr operations may be a cont;nuationof a daytimeoperationor the precur- lllumination of obiectives,axes of attack, sor of a new skge of combat. The IMBB may be obstaclesand reler€ncepoints. nighi attackslor expectedio launchindependent - Blindingof enemynight visionequipment. limited objectivesor to attack as part of the regi'
125
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Battalionnight anack frontagesover moderate terrain are the same as during daylight: 1 to 2 - Designationot sp€cificbatteriesto provide kilometers, In rugged terrain, however, int€rvals illumination. betweenBMPSare reduced,€nd the lvlR8 attacks llluminarion is planned so as to silhouene on a n€rrowerfrontage. enemy forces and to interferewith the enemy's g. Conductof the Attack nighrvisiondEvices. An artill€ry preparationof 20 to 30 minutes The battalion commander supplements the usuallyprecedesahenight ass6ult.{When secrecy regimentalcorhmander'silluminationplan wirh his oulweighsother fectors, there may be a silenrfire own 6ssets, White arm bands are used by the plan. i.€., artilleryon call, or th6 artillerypreparacompanies for mutual recognition; luminous tion may be ot shoner duration,)Sappers,closely designs are put on combat vehicles to identify {ollowed by tanks and dismounledinfantry, move unils; flares arc used to signal the crossing of out to prepare passagesthrough enemy minephas6 lines and the capture of objecrives;movefields. Under optimum conditions (i.e., good m6nt routes and passagesthrough minefieldsar€ trafilcabilityof the ground, light and/or neutralizusu8lly mark€d with luminous markers turned ed enemy antitank defenses,and good illumanatowardsthe attackingtroops. tion). tanks may prece€ddismountedinfsntry by 150 meters. Normally, how6ver, tanks and in e. CommandandConttul fantry attack closely togeth€r, separatedby only In the altack, the battalion commandercon- 10 to 20 meters, therebyfacilit6tingclose coordtrols the advance of the guide company and ination, command, and control. BMPSalso move movesdirectlybehindit. closer behind their infantry than during daylight and suppo.t the attackby fire (figure89). L Objectives, Rates ot Advance. Attack FomaOrganic mortarsand attachodartillery provida tions and Frcntages illuminationand direct and indirecr lire suooort. Under favorableconditions,the d€pth of th€ The anached anillery commander accompanies in the anack. lvlRB'sobjectiveswill be the same as during day- the MRBcommander light operations.Under less favorablecondirions, The battalion commanderrEportsto regiment Ior example, when the attack musl occur over the crossingof phaselines and the seizurooI obbroken rerrain, the banalion objective may be lt is the batralion commander'srgsponshortensd. lf enemy resistance is light or if iectives, initiate pursuit of withdrawing ensmy sibility to nuclgarweaponsare used, the N'IRBmay attack forces. Should the enemy be too strong, the mounted and aim for deeper objoctives 8nd MRB establishesnight defensive positions and higher rates of advance. The Soviets antjcipate preparesto repulseenemycounterattacks, night rates of advanceof 1.5 to 2 kilometercper hour, and faster rates over especially level, h. Trcnsition lrcm Nighttime to Daytime Operctreeless ground without extensive manmado obslacles. The major factor in changing from nighttime Usually, the MRB will attack dismounted in to daytime operations is continuing the attack. on€ echelon,all three companiesabr€ast,with a Belors davbreak. additional t6sks are allocated platoon in rese.ve.This formation placesthe bulk and ammunition rcolenished. The battalion reof the battalion's combat power foNvard and serve, if not committed during $e night. is used facilitatescommandand control. When the lvlRB to maintSinthe momentum of the attack, Beconcommander is less sr.ire of his flanks and the naissanceis intensified,and antiaircraft dofense enemysituarion,he may attack with two reinforc- 6nd c€mouflage measuresincreasedas daylight ed companiesin the first echelon and one rean- aooroaches, ll his first-echelon battalions are forc€d cohpany in the second echelon {reserve). unable to immediatelyconduct the pursuit, the In night attEcks the second echelon {reseruelis regimental commander commits his secondclos6rto the first echelonthan during daylightat- echelon battalion or reserve to continuo the tacks. momentumof the atteck.
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Prior to daylight, the l/lFB commander plans for the transition to daytime defense; casualtaes Thr6€ major factors involvedin a night defense are evacuated,resupplyis accomplished,personare security, illumination, and forward defenses nel are fed, and the manningof defensesis again (Jigure 90). The lvlRB, ;n addition to normal changed,resultingin more depth to the defensive defensivemeasures,makes the following special preparatrons: 6, VULNERABILITIES - Listening posts and foot patrols to the {ront and flanks are increased in order to The discrepencybetlveendoctrine and practice reducethe possibilityofsurpriseattack. is considerable.Although they are supposed to spend about 40 percentof their tacticalfiring and -- A larger percentageof pe.sonnel on the tactical exercisesat night, Soviet units often do FEBA are maintainedat full combat readi- not meet the requirement.Frequently,night tactical exercisesare unrealistic;despite a variety of - The manningof daytimedefenseschanges; night vision devices, vehicular headlights and crew-servedweapons are moved to alternate flashlightsare often used to help maintaincontrol fi.ing positionsand attached and supporting and orientation, artillery and tanks are moved closer 1o the As in World War ll, the Soviets will probably FEBA. The IMRB'Srear services also move continue to use the night primariiy for troop 5. NIGHTDEFENSE
movement, attack preparation, construction of fortifications, and resupply. Night attacks in greater than regimentalstrength will probablybe a rarity {at least initially) and be undertaken -. Periodicilluminadonof the terrain forward primarilyto take an objectivewhich could not be of the FEBA is scheduled.The senior com- takenduringdaylight. mander'silluminationplan is supplementedby The complexitiesof night operationsare par battalionassets,as in the offensive. ticularly evident at battalion level and below. - Guide posts are established within the Two-year conscripts. inexperiencedNCOs, and junior officers unaccustomedto flexibilityand in MRB s AO to aid counteratiacking forces. itiative, make night combat a costly affair. Higher The IVIRB commander positions his second commanders seem reluctant to comm;t their echelon (reserve) on key terrain astride the forces at night. Soviet commandersare, however, enemy's must likely avenue of penetration. aware of their deficienciesin night operationsand Counterattacksare launchedby the battalion'sse are attemptrngto cofiect them, cond echelon {reserve)in accordancewith the regimentalcommander'sdefense plan, CounteF attacking forces nofmally have a shallow objective. Upon elimination of the penetration, consolidationtakes placealong with further efforts to improvedefenses, -- The availabilityand serviceabilityof night visiondevicesarechecked.
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Section F - Seabone Assault and Defense of a Coastline 1. GENERAL Although rslalivslylittl€ has been written about th6 MRB conducting Seaborneassaultsand cl€f€nding a coastline, thes€ are probably current missions of some motorized rifle troops, Moreov6r, there is sound historicalprecedentfor using army troopsin this manner. 2. HISTORICATPEBSPECTIVE
- Seaborne assaults were rarely conducted by units largsr than a regiment. This was an part du€ to a criticalshortageof landingcraft, and the subsequent use of fishing boats, launches, and whatever else was available, Seaborn€assaultswere freouentlvconducted st night and usually successful in spite of highcasualties. - The existence of seaborneassault forcss immobilizedlargenumbersoI Germantroops,
During World War ll, th6 Soviets conduct6d ovor 100 seaborneassaults.Twenty-fivenaval an- The naval commanderwas usuallyin comprovided each usually brigades of 3000 nen fantry mand whjle forces were afloat, while the thg first-echelonassault forces in these opelasenior landing force commander w6s in tions. Special naval detachments (armed and changeoncethelandingsitewassecured. lrained for land combat, but separatefrom the Today, the Soviet naval infantry {figu16 9l), naval inlantry) and army units often comprised consisting of approximately15,000men organized for these reserves operathe second echelonand in 6 regiments, has the primary lnission of lrons, seaborne assault, ln event of war, because of Five factors in World Waf ll Soviet seaborne their small numbers and light equipment, Soviet assault operationshavecurrentrelevance: naval infantry would probably be augmented by specially trained ermy units. Dus to r€lalively - Soviet naval infanlry, relatively lew in small numbers of amohibious craft. sea assault number. had to be sugmented by naval operationswould probably be conductod in batdetachmentsand army units. talion and regimentalstrength. Wh6n6ver possi. '- The naval intantry were usuallywithdrawn ble, navalinfantry would form the first echslonoI the assaultforce (figure 92), with motorizedrifle oncethe beachheadwas secured, units comprisingthe second echelonand reserve; in other cases,sp€ciallytlained army forc€s might comprisethe wholeassaultforce.
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and transit phases to decreasethe damage of nuclearattack. In addition to normal attack planning,the MRB commanderconductsreconnaissance of the waiting area, embarkationpoint, and ths alternate sites, preparesmen and equipment for loading aboard ships, and conducts loading and beach assaultexercissswilh the naly, b. Augmentation As in most other operations, the MRB receivesreinforcementaccordingto l{ETT. In this case,it hasbe€nreinforcedasfollows: One tank company {PT-76 amphibious tanks). - Oneartillerybattery. - Oneairdefense platoon, rna Fi€ure92. NavallniantryOllenFormTheFifst Echelon
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-- Onesapperplatoon, - One ground'air-navysuppon team {to adjustnavalgunfire andairsuppo().
The [4RB in a seaborneassaultcould have the following missions: Loading principles include unit integrity and -- The capture of key teffain and installations reverce loading (first off, last on). Logistical (islands,land areasborderingstrategicstraits, elementsload first, followed by the reserve,sepo s, coastaI airfields,etc), cond echelon, and first echelon. The battalion .' The conduct of divErsionaryraids and commanderprobably lands wiih (or immediately reconnaissance. behind) his fi|st echelon. Whenever possible, loading and moving to the objectivearea is done -- Securinga beachheadfor the openingof a at nrght. d. Trcnsport Craft Thes€ opefationswould be primarily designed The Soviet Navy uses three principletypes of to aid land offensivesalreadyin progressor about amphibious ships: the ALL|GAToR ctass LsT, to stan, Ouite often, seaborneassaults involve the ROPUCHAClassLST, and the POLNOCNY heliborn6and/ or airborneforces, ClassLslvl ({ig!re 94). The Sovieis are also using air-cushionvehicleswhich, becauseof their speed 4. THE ASSAULT and ability to operate over land and water, provide a new dimensionto amphibiousoperations (figure95l. Strategic seaborneassaultmissionswould be planned primarilyat frcnt level by a joint operae. Tftnsit and fueassault Phases tions group consistingof naval,air, and army per ldeally, transit of the amphibioustask force sonnel. The landing force is assigneda wailing '15 occtirs during darknessor other periodsof l;mited to kilometets from the embarkation area, l0 point, a main embarkationpoint with one or two visibility.l\,4issile and antisubmarineescort vessels protect point provide and cover for lhe assaultforces. alternates,and a main debarkation with one Ships armedwith missiles,guns, and rocketsproor two altarnates{figure 93).Unnecessary concenpreparatory vide fire and navalguniire suppoft for tration of forces is avoided during embarkalion l3l
the assault troops during th€ latter's inland ad' vance. Minesweepers,under cover of naval and clear channelsthtough mine_ air bombardment, fields and are {ollowed by hydrographic and hydfometeorological vessels, which provide weather data, take soundings,determinethe bottom contours in approachesto landing sites, and mark the cleared channels through minetields. NaW undeMater demolition teams are transported by high speedwatercraftand/or helicopter to clear water and b€ach obstacles,lf possible,a minimum of one channel is clearedfor each MR
The assault may be preceded by a heliborne/airborneoperation in conjunction wath air attacks in the objective area (figure 96). Heliborne/airborneforces often have the mission of blocking the arrival of enemy reinlorcements into the beachhead. In an unopposedlandingor against light resistance,the MRB in most cases offloadson the beach. In an opposed landing, BlvlPs, amphibious tanks, and/or tanks equippedwith snorkelsleave their landingships at sea and swim ashore.Once ashore,the lvlRB'sattack is similarto that aheady described-
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Figure95.Amphibious AssautisMayBeConducred WithAnC!shionvehictes.
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5. DEFENSE OFASEA COAST
The defenseof a sea coast is very simatarto the defenseof a river line. Normatlythe MRB wijl def€nd a coastline as part of the regiment, though it may defend isolated sectors indepen
ground-basednaval air power, In the latter case, ai.-ground support liaison personnel are also assignedto the MRB. Naval engineers,whjte not attachedto the MR8, constructwater and oeacn obstaclesin frontof the FEBA. e. The Baftalion Defensive Position
As an normal operations,reinfo.cedcompany strongpoints form the basis of the battalion's defensiveposition.Time permitting,alternateand arealsoorganized, The [/lRB's missionis to prevent amphibious, dummystrongpoints airborne,and helibornelandingswithin ;ts area of L Conduct of the Defense operations. The conduct of a coastaldefenseis practically c. Frontages, Depths and Fotmations the same as defenseof a ver line. Everyeffort is When the battalionis assignedits normalfron- takenro destroytheenemvin thewaterandro wipe forces beforethey move tage of 2.5 kilometers {5 kilometers in nuctear out his airborne/heliborne out of their landing and drop zones. conditions), it usually defends in two echelons; when given a wider frontage, it defends In one 6. VULNERABILITIES echelon,with all threecompanies on lineand one platoon in reserue.Depth of the battalionforma Amphibiousiandingsare unlikelyunless the taonis up to 2.5 kilometers.The FEBA is tocated Sovietshavelocarair and navalsup'emacy-adifas close as possibleto the water's edge and is ficult task in somegeographicalareasin l;ghrof the usually not more than 500 meters from k. The presentlack of sufficientseaborneairpower.Naval missionof the battalionreseruereflectsa greater air and otherair forces,when within range,support than normal concern for enemy airborne, heli mostamphibious operations, bLltmay not be as efborne, and diversionaryforces in the baftalion,s fectiveas air supportprovidedby carrierbaseda|lrear area.The missionof the reserveis to combat power of certainwesrer4 rations, due to the proxj theseforces,as well as to destroy penetrationsby mityofthe carriers pilottraining. andspecialized amphibiousforces. d. Augmentation
The relativelysmall numberof amphibiouscraft also limits Soviet seaborne assauli capabilities, Along with the usual artittery, air defense, althoughthe large Soviet merchantmarineparl|ararmor,engineer, and chemicalsupport,the MBB ly offsetsthis problem. can be supported by coastal batteries and
136
CHAPTER 9. CONCLUSIONS The Soviets recognizethree types of combat actionr the offense,the defense,and the meeting engagement,with the latestpracticedmost often, Soviet doctrihe stressesthat the offensive is the only decisivstorm of combal and ihat rhe main purposeof the offensiveis lhe completedestruc. tion of the enemy's forces. The Soviets hope to achievehigh rates of advance(30 to 50 kilometers per day in conventionaloperationsand 60 lo 80 kilometersper dav under nuclearconditions)from combined arms units operating in conjunction with aarborne,heliborne.and special opemtions torcesin the enemyreararea. Since the October 1973War, the Soviets have olaced €ven more emDhasison combined arms operations and have made numerous organizational and tactical adiustments to increase the survivabilitv of thejr tank fofces. Numbers of tanks and artillery pieces {especiallySP anillery) whhin the l\.4RDhave increased.The tank rema,ns the backboneofcombinedarmsoperations. The BlvlP.equipped IMRB is a highly maneu verable, but relatively small, combat unit with considerableorganic firepower, particula y anantitank weaponry. lt normally ope.at€sas part of the [4RR. The MRB's si2e and limited organic logisticalassetsmake augmentationnec€ssaryfor many operarions.The MRB is often augmented by motorized rifle regimeni and/or divisional assets to form a heavily reinforc€d combined armsgroupingto carryout a varietyof missions. The battalioncommander'sage, educataon,and oolitical awarenessorovide the theoretical basis for effective command. His field training and peacetimecommand assignmentspanially offset his lack of combat experience.Soviet command theory and operationalconcepts, however, result in haghlycentralizedcontrol at regimental level and constrict the MRB commander's initiative within the nanow parametersof highly derail€d orders. Though technically well trained, Soviet battalionand comoanv commandersoften fail to exploatthe strong points of their men and equip ment during field training ex€rcises.Training procedures indicate the limhed flexibility of tunior officers and NCOS. lrore flexible Western com manders should be able to exploit these weaknesses,particularlyduring operationswhich place a Dromiumon initiativeand flexibilitv. Battalion-level training, technically thorough
and highly centralized,stresseslundamentatsand results in etf€ctive banle drill. Taclical training which asrepeatedlypracticedincludesthe march, the meeting engagement,wateFcrossingop€rations, negotiating minefields, 6ntiair and antihelicoptertactics, and operating in an NBC environment. Moral-politicaltraining is stressedand, while boring for many, probablysucceedsin conveying th€ propagandaof the CPSU. Trainingeffectivenessis complicat€dby the 2-year term of servaceand the subsequenthigh turnover ot conscriots. The N4RBis capable of conducting offensive and defensiv€ oDerationsunder Special condi tions: combat in buih'up arcas, heliborneopera_ tions, water barrier ope.atlons, night combat, seaborne assault. and defense of a coastline. Training for these operationsv6ries. Though the lvlRB musl be judged capable of conducting urban combat operations,these operationscould be costlv and slow. At l€astone NIFB per IVIRDis trained to conduct heliborne operations. Thes6 operationsare normally conduct€d whhin range of Soviet arlillery, due to the limited staying power and mobility of the heliborne force. Though formidable, Soviet river crossing capabilhies also possesslimitations. Crossing operations are complexand would slow down the tempo of attack, particularlywhen the water obstacle is well defended.When eslablishinga bridgehead, the [rRB is esoeciallvvulne€ble to count€ratGck. Battalion night combat training is not consistent with doct nal requirements,which call for more night tactical training than is actually conducted. Two-year conscipts, inexperiencedNCOS, and iunior officers not accustomedto flexibilityand initiative would initially mske night combat costly. Very few IvlRBs receive training in seaborn€ assault. In wartim€, MF troops would probably provide the second echslon tor naval infantry assaultforcesandsecurethe obiective. The MRB is most effective when ope€ting 6s part of the regiment,The institutionaland operational frameworkwithin which the battalioncommander operates, however. is not conducive to the flexibilityand initiativerequiredin independent battalion oDerationsand in other ooerations in which the regimentalcommanderand his staff are not present.This would be especiallytrue during nuclearconditions,
137
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DISTBIBUTIONLIST DOD AND JOTNT AGENCIF,S AOO9 AOIO A016 AO24 AO85 4100 A1T5 AI1? A137 A300 4315 4325 A335 A34O 4353 436T A36,( .{096 AO9? A1o4 A362 4363 .136A ,\835 49T6
OASDATOMENERGY AFSCOL DABPA DEF NUCLEANACCY NATDEF UNIVERSITY osD OASDTSA OASDPA&E OASDA/MBF8.PP JCS JCS/SAGA JCS/J-3 JCS/J-1 JCS/J.5MILSEC JSTPS USLOSACLANT USR&DCOORDSHAPE NEACP DIAGRPANMCC OASD(CCC&r) USDOCOLANDSOEAST USNMRSTIAPE USNMC/NATO UNITMM MAAGIBAN
I I I I I I I I I I
2 I I I I
DIA 8010 BO55 8080 BIOO BT32 BT34 BI55 8159 8162 8169 8322 8351 8363 836,I 8485 85.!5 8565 8566 B57I 8573 8674 86?9 B58O B58I 8682 8583 B58! 8586 8693 B59il 859? 8615 8722 8731 B?3? 8?63 B?87 8262
DIA,aDIO DIA,'DT.4B DIA/SWS DIA,IDB DIA/DE.I DIA,'DE.2 DIA/RDS3A4PP DIA,IDT.IAI DIA,IDT'IA2 DIA,'DT.2D DIA,'DN.2G1 DIA/RDS.3D2 DIA/DB.IB2 DIA,'DB-189 DIA/IS DIA/VP DIA,/DB.IFI DIA/DB.IT2 DIA/DB.4G1 DIA/DB.4E DIA/DB.4G5 DTA/DN.2B2 DTA,/DB.IBs DTA,/DB.IB DTA/DB.1C DIAIDB{D DIA,IDB.TB4 DTA,/DB.4D1 DIA/DB.IG2 DIA/DB-II' DTA/DB.IGI Dh/DN-2C DIAIDB.6B DIATDB.sF DIA/RDS.3B3(LTB) DINJDB.4Cs DIA/DB.IF3 DIAMS$3B
I I I I 1 I I I
t I I I I I I I 30 I I 2 1 1 I I 6 I 1 I
8362 8576 85?6 8591 B?34 8663 B??? 8552 8856 8856 8869 8862 B8?1 8872 88?6 B8?8 B8?9 B88O 8882 8886 8693 B9O8 8912 891? 8918 8919 8933 8934 8939
DIA,IDB.l8l DIA/DB.I DIA,'DB.IA DIATIDB.IE DIAT|DB.SE DIAr'DB.1E2 DIA,IDN.2BI DIA/I|SS-2 USDAOAUSTRTA USDAOBELGIUM USDAOBULGARTA USDAOCANADA USDAOCZECTTOSTOVAK USDAODENMARK USDAOENGLAND USDAOFINI,AI\ID USDAOFRANCE USDAOGEBMANY USDAOGBEECE USDAOHUNGAiY USDAOITALY USDAONETHEA.LANDS USDAONORWAY USDAOPOLAND' USDAOPORTUCAL USDAOROMANIA USDAOTUBKEY USDAOUSSR USDAOYUGOSLAVIA
I I
D008 DO32 Dr50 D15T D162 D159 D2O2 D2T6 D21? D246 D24? D249 D263 D280 D492 D6O? D6TO D56O D?66 DgOO D9?1 D9?2 D058 D496 D8T4
NISC NAVPHIBSCOL cMc{INT) NA\'EODFACIND HEAD NISCCBDDET OOO3 NAVAIRDEVCEN NAVWARCOL NAWVPNSUPPCEN NAVWPNCEN NAVSUBFWPNCENDAHL NAVSURFWPNCENWOAK NAVPGSCOL NOSC 0P-098D NAVSCOLEOD COMINEWABCOM CHNAII\'AA(MAT{90 NMEDITSCHINSTBETH NAVCOASTSYSLAB NFOIO 0P{09F 0P{09U 0P404 DTRSSPO NAVSUPPACTTI
I I
t 1 I 2 I I I I I I I I I I I 1 I 1 I I t I I I I I
AIB FIOBCE EO16 EOl? EO18 EOi|6 EO63 EO64 E1OO E2OO
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AFIS/INC AFIS/TNSA.W AFIS/TNSA{ ?602AINTELG/INOAA AF/INAI(A AI'/INAKB TAC {460BTSI|LDD) AAC
I I I I I I 3 t
E3O3 E'08 E4IT Er29 E436 E{3? E438 E461 E6OO E552 8663 E659 E660 E663 8665 8566 E567 E?OC 8lo9 E4r0
AF/TNAP AF TL ASDMDAICD SAMSO(It{Dl AI'EWC/EST AFISIINI USAI'SACS/TTVL AULILSE s42OTCHTG/IIMNL 69rr g€TYS{Mt 6912SCTYS 69318C',IYS 694,{SCTYW 6948SCTYS(M) 6964SCTYS 698rSCTYS 6986SCTYS USAFSS/TN AMD ADIC
I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I I
U&S COMMANDS COO6 HOO6 H(x)6 H0r0 Hrol 1t007
J615 J6I7 J576 J991 K005 KOO?
FICEU&I-ANT COMNAVSURFLANT COMPTTIBGRU2 FITCLANT clNcPAc COMUSJAPAN
K1OO K115 13(x) K4O8 K5fl) K5O5 K515 K65O K658 It6?9 I'05 w14 NOO5
PACAFS48ETG 6TH AF IPAC (CODEIC.LI COMLATNTINGPAC{'282) CINCPACFLT FTCPAC COMSEVENTHFLT COMNAVSURFPAC COMUSNAI?HIL FLTCOBG&U 1 CINCSAC SAC 5!l TMSfTGOML USBEDCOM
K020 coMusTDc
OTHM
CINCAD USCINCEUR USEUCOMDEFANAICTR S0TFE tJ.3) USAFEag?ErE{tRC} sll-t( PURSE
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CIA/OCR/ADD/SD STATE _ NSA ACDA FRDLIBOFCONG
'TDTALDIA DISTRIBUTION
1{ 1 6 2 I
42a
AIMY DISTRIBUTION Active Any. USAR: To he dirlributed iD accordlDc. with DA Foh (qty requireb&t bL.t No.33?).ARNG: NoD tltelisaeB
l2-9A requir€hdts fd Militlry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7,900
MANTIIE COBPSDISTBIBUTION Distributio!cod€:Lgl
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1,4?5
DISTRIBUTION LIST (MICROFICHE) DIA 8852 873?
DrAr|&DS.9A2CSTOCK DIA/RDS'3B8ILIB}
5 1
AI,MY C20o
VSAAG PUBCTR
50
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AIB FORCE
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U&SCOMMANDS K4OE
COMT,ATWINGPAC{42B2)
69
TSTAL PRINT
DL-2
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