SOE and Repatriation

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SOE and Repatriation Christopher J. Murphy Journal of Contemporary History 2001 36: 309 DOI: 10.1177/002200940103600205 The online The online version of this article can be found foun d at: http://jch.sagepub.com/content/36/2/309

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2001 SAGE Publication Publications, s, London, London, Thousand Oaks, Oaks, CA and Journal of Contemporary History Copyright © 2001 SAGE New Delhi, Vol 36(2), 309–323. [0022-0094(200104)36:2;309–323;016718]

Christopher J. Murphy

SOE and Repatriation

The subject of the forced repatriation, repatriation , by British forces, of anti-Soviet Cossacks and anti-Tito Yugoslavs at the end of the second world war continues to throw up new revelations, the latest a consequence of the release of the Mitrokhin Archive, which substantiated for Nikolai Tolstoy — a name now synonymous with the subject — a piece of evidence suggesting that British officers were offered a bribe of gold by Smersh for the handover of certain White Russian generals. 1 While such controversy continues, it does so with a particular focus on 1945, the act of repatriation and its consequences. Very little analysis is given to the period during 1944 when repatriation was discussed by the British government. Typically, this period will warrant no more than a brief mention, with the note that there was some disagreement amongst ministers regarding repatriation, highlighting the protest made by Lord Selborne to the Foreign Secretary, held up as an example of human decency. The recently-released papers of the Special Operations Executive prompt a reappraisal of the events of 1944, particularly Selborne’s protest against the policy of repatriation and its interpretation as a humanitarian gesture. SOE was interested in subverting the Russians who were fighting for the Germans in western Europe, and given Selborne’s position as Minister of Economic Warfare, with responsibility for SOE, the file material indicates that his protest could be better viewed within a context which is far more morallyneutral. An incident on the Eastern Front in September 1943 ended Hitler’s tolerance of the Soviet soldiers who were fighting alongside the Germans there. 2 They were transferred to western and southern Europe, where they came to SOE’s attention. The Russian (D/P) Section was alerted to the presence of Russians in the west by a newspaper report of 3 January 1944, which noted that: Large numbers of Russian troops under the Quisling General Vlasov have moved into Southern France and have been distributed to various coastal positions. These men are recruited mainly from Georgians, Turcomans, Tartars and men from the Transural Republics. . . . The men . . . come from prisoner-of-war camps, where they were given the choice of joining the ‘Ostlegionen’, as the Germans now call them, or rotting with their comrades behind barbed wire. 3

1 Jamie Wilson and James Meek, ‘Historian Backs Defector’s War Bribery Claim’, The Guardian, Guardian, 15 September 1999. 2 Richard Overy, Russia’s War (London 1998), 130–1. 3 HS4/330, extract from the Evening Standard , 3 January 1944.


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Journal of Contemporary History Vol 36 No 2

An investigation was instigated, and the results reported to Colonel Seddon, D/P Section Head, by Major Manderstam, who noted that ‘a great deal of information’ had been found, which confirmed that the Germans had indeed formed a number of units ‘consisting of nationals of USSR’, under the command of German officers. There was considerable evidence of a Russian presence in France. Further intelligence accumulated by Manderstam noted that ‘troops of Russian origin are being used for guerrilla warfare against the Maquis Groups in the Toulouse area’, corroborated by another report which noted that Russian troops were ‘stationed along the Mediterranean coast and in the Bordeaux and Toulouse area’. area’ . The threat these units posed to the French resistance was clear: (e) They are being engaged in assisting the Gestapo in combatting the various ‘Free movements’ in the occupied areas. On various occasions the Germans have apparently availed themselves of the knowledge of guerrilla warfare which some of the POWs possess.

Manderstam concluded that the presence of these Russian troops ‘should warrant close consideration from the SOE point of view’, the main objects being to: (1) Neutralise by subversive means any assistance which the Germans could derive from the use of Russian troops when ‘the day comes’. (2) Prevent the Germans from using the Russians as police force for maintaining order in the occupied territory and against the various resistance movements. (3) Avail ourselves of the Russian troops after our bridgeheads are established in Europe, to prevent demolition of objectives strategically important to the Allied High Command. (4) Suborn, if at all possible, the Russians to turn t urn against the Germans at an appropriate and decisive moment.

To achieve these goals, Manderstam believed the issue of repatriation would be a useful weapon: A promise of ‘pardon’, if secured from NKVD, to the POWs on their repatriation to USSR, might in some cases (not necessarily in all) facilitate the successful achieving of our objectives.4

Seddon forwarded Manderstam’s paper to Colonel Taylor, who forwarded it to Commander Milne and Colonel Keswick for their comments. Initial thoughts were mixed. Seddon, although conceding that ‘this might well constitute a SOE target’, was largely sceptical of inviting NKVD involvement, believing that the situation ‘would only be used by them as another means of infiltrating their own men into Western Europe’. 5 Taylor was ‘not particularly impressed’, but believed the idea was worth further consideration. 6 Milne noted that ‘a proposal should be made to the Russians to make full use of their 4 5 6

HS4/330, W.20 to D/P, 31.01.44. HS4/330, D/P to A/D, 01.02.44. HS4/330, AD to AD/E, AD/H, 09.02.44.


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Russian nationals in Europe’, but had little hope of action: ‘I imagine they will reply in their usual style by saying that they have no organisation in Europe’. 7 Keswick doubted whether any advantage could be gained from the action suggested. 8 Meanwhile, Russian repression of French resistance continued. The SOE history of resistance in France notes how: From December 1943 to March 1944, several Maquis units . . . installed themselves on the Plateau de MILLEVACHES, in CORREZE. They soon attracted the attention of the German Police. During March, these CORREZE Maquis were attacked and scattered by a Georgian punitive expedition from the SS Division garrisoned at MONTAUBAN.9

On 24 March, Seddon re-emphasized the fact that the Russians presented a threat to the war effort, and that SOE’s object: . . . must be to turn the situation to our own account by neutralising these potentially hostile factors, either by attracting them to our side or by removing their claws . . . we must take the matter of these Russians seriously as they are contributing to the relief of Reichswehr Germans . . . it would be wrong to ignore them. 10

A telegram was sent to the SOE Moscow Mission (code-named SAM) on 12 April, asking for a tentative approach to be made to the NKVD, to ascertain if they had any plans to deal with the Russians in western Europe themselves and, if so, to offer SOE’s assistance. 11 The NKVD made no immediate response. Manderstam continued to consider ways in which SOE could turn the situation to its advantage. On 9 May, he presented an outline of his ‘murderous scheme’. This proposed that SOE should exploit the fear present amongst the Russians fighting for the Germans of the reprisals that awaited them in the Soviet Union by offering them protection from repatriation — at a price: The suggested method of procedure would be to distribute . . . some form of certificates or discs which should state that the bearer of the certificate, if he will surrender to or be taken by the allied or Soviet troops, will get sympathetic consideration, if he is in possession of some proof that he has killed a German belonging to the armed forces or a member of the Nazi Party.12

The plan was considered by Milne to be outside ‘the bounds of practical politics’.13 Manderstam’s second scheme received a more favourable reception. This proposed compromising the Russians who were working for the Germans 7 HS4/330, AD/E to A/D (Copy to AD/H), 15.02.44. 8 HS4/330, AD/H to A/D (Copy to AD/E), 11.02.44. 9 HS7/129, France: Participation of French Forces of Interior in Liberation of France, 1944–1945. 10 HS4/330, D/P to AD, 24.03.44. 11 HS4/330, Telegram to SAM, 12.04.44. 12 HS4/330, DP/W.20 to A/D, 09.05.44. 13 HS4/330, AD/E to A/D, 05.44.


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in France, by dropping information and equipment for a phantom Russian dissident movement, thereby casting suspicion upon their loyalty: The suggested method of procedure would be to carry out false parachute operations in to near areas occupied by Russian troops, delivering W/T sets and other material ostensibly destined for members of a dissident movement headed by Russian senior officers at present trusted by the Germans. It is hoped that these despatches would fall into the hands of the Gestapo.14

SAM was asked to obtain the NKVD’s thoughts on ‘creating’ a dissident Russian movement in France, 15 as it was considered desirable for SOE to act with NKVD consent. 16 A response from the Moscow Mission arrived the next day, which noted that the NKVD had given a broadly favourable reaction, re action, and promised an early reply. 17 The plan also received the blessing of the Foreign Office, which made the Russian Section more eager to proceed. A telegram to Moscow noted that, due to the assent of the Foreign Office, SOE planned to go ahead with the plan immediately, regardless of the lack of any further response from the NKVD. SAM was told to advise its Soviet Sovi et contacts that SOE was proceeding with its plans, ‘irrespective of their coming in or not’. 18 On 17 May, the plans were given their own code-names. Operating under the umbrella title Mamba, Mamba, a Russian dissident movement was code-named Restinga, Restinga, while the plan to induce surrender under a promise of sympathetic treatment was called Cafeka. Cafeka.19 A meeting with Colonel Chichaev, SOE’s NKVD contact in London, on 27 May, finally provided an NKVD response, but it was not what SOE had hoped for. Chichaev noted that such action was ‘being undertaken without the knowledge and consent of our organisation’ and was ‘causing a great deal of astonishment in Moscow’. 20 Nevertheless, Restinga was inaugurated the same day. From the available material, it is clear that the operation proceeded successfully, and was soon expanded to other countries in occupied Europe. 21 Restinga was soon followed by Overlord . The Allied invasion of France further emphasized the importance of neutralizing the Soviet soldiers fighting there. Following the Normandy landings, the French Resistance was charged with delaying the movement of German reserves to Normandy, and inaugurated an extensive programme of sabotage and ambush operations. 22 The 14 HS4/330, DP/W.20 to RF (Copy to AD4), 19.05.44. 15 HS4/330, Telegram to SAM, 09.05.44. 16 HS4/330, A/D to AD/E and AD/H.1, 09.05.44. 17 HS4/330, Telegram to London, 10.05.44. 18 HS4/330, D/PW.20 to DR (Copies to AD4 and RF), 25.05.44. 19 HS4/330, D/PW.20 to D/CE1 (Copies to AD4 and RF), 17.05.44. 20 HS4/330, Report of Meeting Between D/PW.20 and Chichaev, 27.05.44. 21 A note from Manderstam to AD4 of 8 June 1944 stated that T Section had requested the extension of Restinga to Belgium, whilst a note from Manderstam to SD, 10 June 1944, stated that packages were being prepared for Denmark and Norway (HS4/330). 22 HS7/127, France: Participation of French Forces of Interior in Liberation of France, 1944–1945.



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Russians played a significant part in countering this activity; in the Dordogne, vital for German communications with Normandy, heightened resistance activity was met with brutal reprisals committed, at least in part, by Soviet troops: All reports . . . tell of the large number of villages burned, hostages killed and atrocities committed in DORDOGNE by North African units controlled by the Milice, as well as by Georgian troops.

Under the heading ‘Summary of the more important attacks against the Maquis’ in the Morvan area, the SOE history of the French Resistance notes: On 26 June an enemy column of approximatively [sic] 400 strong, from the 654th Battalion of the ‘Russian Army of Liberation,’ again attacked the LORMED Maquis where 150 FFI were gathered. After a night of fighting, the Maquis successfully withdrew to the North. 23

As a consequence of Overlord , considerable numbers of Russians who had been fighting for the Germans were taken prisoner. 24 Twenty such prisoners were interrogated by Manderstam for SOE on 14 June, at a camp which held approximately two hundred Russians. The random selection proved to be ‘very fortunate . . . the twenty men chosen were in fact a very interesting group in which various types belonging to different walks of life were represented’, including a doctor, a shoe-maker, a student, a clerk, a schoolboy, two mechanics and six peasants. The origins of the prisoners were also varied — a mixture of Ukrainians, Central Russians, White Russians, Siberians and Mongols. In addition to the prisoners, Manderstam interrogated Oberleutnant Hessel, Company Commander of the 1st Coy. 441st Ost Battalion, to which, along with the 642 Ost Battalion, many of the Russian prisoners belonged. These interrogations presented SOE with first-hand information, from Russians who had been fighting for the Germans, on the conditions required for their rebellion. Manderstam recorded the ordeal these men had been through, and provided considerable detail on the ‘preliminary treatment’ meted out at the German POW camps: To start with, the prisoners were usually huddled together in a camp behind barbed wire, some of them after many days of marching or train journeys, without food or water. . . . Beating up and shooting at random was obviously part of the carefully premeditated treatment. After a few months in these hideous places, the morale was obviously completely broken and the camps depleted by executions, starvation, sta rvation, illness, etc.

It was within this context that the decision to ‘support’ the German war effort was taken in order to ensure continued survival. As the book-keeper told Manderstam: 23 HS7/129, France: Participation of French Forces of Interior in Liberation of France, 1944–1945. 24 A letter from Cadogan to Gubbins, 21.07.44, indicates that by this time some 1600 Soviet troops had been taken prisoner (HS4/339).


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In my camp near KREMENCHUG, about 50,000 men died in nine months. Our spirit was broken but we still wanted to live and, above all, to get away from the beating up by the Germans, eat and have a bath, as we were eaten alive by the vermin; when the offer came to join a labour battalion which was eventually converted into a fighting unit, I simply did not have the strength to say no.

Having the strength to say ‘no’ to German offers of employment meant immediate death. As the shoe-maker noted: We were assembled one day in the camp and offered admission into the GOMEL Police Force. Those who refused were immediately shot. The rest of us, including myself accepted the ‘offer’.

Yet the immediate issue of surviving the Prisoner of War camps was not the only factor which motivated the Russians. As the clerk told Manderstam: . . . they are afraid of the uncertainty that awaits them if t hey surrender. We were told by the Germans repeatedly and also by the few Russian officers who visited us on behalf of General VLASSOV, that if we were taken prisoners, we would be handed over immediately to the Russian Government. We are in no doubt as to what awaits us there.

Fear of the fate which awaited them in the Soviet Union, should Germany lose the war, kept the Russians fighting. Manderstam quoted from his interrogation of ‘an extremely intelligent boy of 23, son of a doctor’, who had been taken prisoner by the Germans, escaped, and joined the Russian partisans, before being recaptured. By the time he spoke to Manderstam, he appeared resigned to his fate: My question to him was: ‘Did you try to get away again?’ Answer: ‘It would be of no use, as, if successful, I would be shot by my own people.’ Question: ‘What for?’ Answer: ‘For being a traitor. Stalin’s order which has been published to the troops sta ted: ‘We have no prisoners, only traitors — the last bullet should always be kept for yourself.’

His concerns transcended the question of his own life: To-day, as far as my parents and friends in Russia are concerned, I am dead, killed in action as a hero in the struggle against the Germans. My family cherishes the memory of me, they are getting an allowance and are entitled to various privileges. Should I return, I would immediately be thrown into jail and eventually be faced with a court martial. If very lucky, I might not be shot but sent to penal servitude. . . . The repercussion on my family would be severe. It is not a light matter in Russia to have a traitor in the family. The allowance would immediately be stopped. My father would most probably lose his job. My family would be branded through no fault of their own. No! I cannot go back.

Manderstam was fully aware that his reports were based upon the views of a minority of Russian prisoners, but while he considered the fact that they possibly provided the answers they thought he wanted to hear, he found himself willing to accept most of what he was told, and concluded that the Russians would ‘fight well and stubbornly for the Germans and should not be



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disregarded as a serious military factor in the battles to come’. They had been through a considerable ordeal, but the fact remained that they were now in the employ of the Wehrmacht and as such they were dangerous, due largely to the fact that their German ‘allies’ left them in no doubt of the fate that awaited them, should the Allies win the war: They are convinced that in such an event they would be handed over to their government which would deal with them mercilessly.

To overcome this belief, a straightforward incentive was required: I asked him [the miner] what he suggested we should do to induce his compatriots to turn against the Germans and to surrender to us in battle; ‘Just let the other fellows know that you will not hand them over to the Soviet S oviet and that they will be humanly treated’ t reated’ was his answer.

The doctor provided a similarly explicit answer to the same question: You don’t seem to realise the desperate position our men are in; we know that the road back to our own people is irretrievably lost; we dislike and distrust the Germans. Give our men just a glimpse of a hope of existence and work in your colonies and they are yours.

In conclusion, Manderstam emphasized that, although there was certainly scope for SOE activity, this was dependent upon one very necessary condition: An assurance will have to be given to the Russian nationals which would allay their anxiety as to their fate in the event of their falling into our hands during hostilities or after. 25

Gubbins sent a copy of Manderstam’s report to Selborne, with a covering letter which noted that: It is an excellent report; D/P has covered all the aspects of interrogation as far as SOE is concerned and his report suggests that the Russian units in France are an excellent target for SOE subversive action.26

Selborne took particular interest in Manderstam’s report, a letter to Gubbins noting that Selborne ‘regards the question as important’. 27 He requested a meeting with Manderstam, which took place on 12 July. Manderstam wrote a report on the meeting the following day. The issue of Russian soldiers occupied a considerable part of the discussion: The Minister said that, should the organisation require any support in connection with putting into effect the scheme for suborning the Russian P/Ws, we should not hesitate to appeal to him. He also mentioned that the future of the Russian P/Ws was discussed by him with the French and that the French were extremely receptive to t he idea of cooperating with us.

25 26 27

HS4/354. All interrogation quotations from Report, D/P to A/D (through A/D4), 06.44. HS4/354, CD to SO, 28.06.44. HS4/354, AD/S.1 to CD, 03.07.44.


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S.O. then enquired what was the position with regard to the proposed suborning and whether it had reached a more advanced stage. I gave him a brief outline and assured him that no time was being lost and that this section was obtaining all the necessary cooperation within the organisation. . . . The discussion concluded by the Minister’s remarking that if there was any help we needed from him, we should not hesitate in any way to draw his attention to it and also that he would like to be informed of any further interrogations of Russian P/Ws. 28

On 17 July, the War Cabinet decided that Russian prisoners would have to be returned to the Soviet Union, ‘if this was what the Soviet government wanted’. 29 It would be difficult for SOE to persuade the Soviet soldiers to change sides in the light of such a decision. With their plans in jeopardy, Selborne appears to have been true to his word: on 21 July he wrote to Eden, protesting at the decision, and the effect this would have upon SOE’s plans. The letter had been drafted two days earlier by Manderstam. 30 When this exchange between Selborne and Eden is discussed in Nicholas Bethell’s The Last Secret and Nikolai Tolstoy’s Victims of Yalta, Yalta, the SOE context outlined above is ignored, producing a distorted picture in which the desire for a promise of safety for the Russians in order to relieve pressure on the French Resistance, and facilitate further sabotage and subversion, is lost; rather, it becomes a ‘humanitarian’ crusade on Selborne’s part, without due examination of the more amoral stance taken by SOE. Even Manderstam’s own memoir, From the Red Army to SOE, SOE , recalls these events in such a fashion as to distance them from his consideration of the advantages of using these Russians, although the reports he prepared contain little in the way of moral argument.31 Tolstoy describes Selborne as a ‘staunch Christian and a high-principled statesman’ who wrote ‘in strong terms’ as he ‘felt a rising horror at the crime he sensed was about to take place’. 32 A similar description can be found in The Last Secret , as Bethell notes that Selborne protested ‘in strong letters’, and contrasts the feelings of Selborne and Eden: Unlike Selborne . . . who seemed to appreciate the sufferings which the Russians had endured . . . Eden expressed little sympathy towards them. 33

The same imagery also comes from Manderstam, who describes Selborne as a ‘compassionate man’ who was ‘horrified’ when informed of the circumstances of the Russians. 34 It is easy to succumb to the supposed opposition between a Foreign Secre28 HS4/328, D/P to AD (through AD4), 13.07.44. Secret (London 1974), 7. 29 Nicholas Bethell, The Last Secret (London 30 See HS4/339 for both the draft and final version of the letter. The final version varied only slightly from the draft, giving greater detail of the treatment the Soviet soldiers had received in the German POW camps. 31 L.H. Manderstam (with Roy Heron), From the Red Army to SOE (London 1985). 32 Nikolai Tolstoy, Victims of Yalta (London 1977), 52. 33 Bethell, op. cit., 8. 34 Manderstam, op. cit., 139.



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tary who pursued a morally repugnant policy, and the objections of the humanitarian Minister of Economic Warfare. Certainly, Selborne would have appreciated what the Russians had endured — Manderstam’s reports were explicitly clear on this point — but such information in itself was not at the heart of the reports; it merely merel y provided the context within which SOE could do its work. Selborne’s letter to Eden of 21 July did note the ‘humane aspect’ involved; the prospect of sending thousands of men to their deaths, something which ‘must be repellent to every Englishman’. Yet, as it turned to SOErelated matters, humanitarian considerations were lost to wartime expediency — to return these Russians would . . . play right into the hands of the German propagandists, and would make it impossible for us to win the sympathy and support of the many Russian subjects in German hands . . . . Any hope of their laying down their arms, let alone their fighting with the United Nations, would immediately be dissipated if it became known that they were eventually to be sent back to Russia.35

In conclusion, the letter returned briefly to the humanitarian question, before restating the point that ‘there is a real chance of mass desertions of the Russians still in France to the Maquis’, should the issue be handled properly. The ‘interests of humanity’, although present, were not Selborne’s sole concern here. The covering letter attached to a copy of the protest Selborne sent to Major Desmond Morton is even more explicit in its defence of SOE’s plans. When Tolstoy refers to the letter, this defence is lost, as he notes: Lord Selborne sent a copy of this letter to Major Desmond Morton, who was then Personal Assistant to Winston Churchill. In his covering letter he stressed: ‘I feel very strongly on this matter’.36

The reason Selborne felt strongly on this matter is made quite explicit in the following lines of the letter, which Tolstoy does not quote: I feel very strongly on this matter. If it becomes known that we are going to send these men back to Russia, we shall get no Russian recruits in France. If, on the other hand, d’Astier’s policy is followed we may get scores of thousands of them coming over to us. 37

D’Astier’s proposals were made clear in the attached letter: M. d’Astier expressed to me his view that if these Russians will fight for Free France, then France, true to her tradition, will offer them asylum, and he mentioned to me the possibility of enrolling them in the Foreign Legion, L egion, or even giving them refuge in Madagascar, or some other unpopulated French Colony. 38

35 36 37 38

HS4/339, Selborne to Eden (Copies to All Council Members), 21.07.44. Tolstoy, op. cit., 53. HS4/339, Selborne to Major Morton (Copies to CD, AD, K/POL, D/P), 21.07.44. HS4/339, Selborne to Eden, 21.07.44.


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The desire to reduce the pressure upon the French Resistance — and, if possible, to swell its numbers — was the main motivating factor here, safety from repatriation the reward should the Russians turn on the Germans and join up with the Maquis. It is curious that Tolstoy did not make more of this covering letter which, in its entirety, clearly shows that there was more to the issue than ‘humane’ concerns. Yet Tolstoy maintains that Selborne’s objections ‘rested largely on a moral basis’, 39 and notes how Selborne denounced repatriation some years after the war. Yet at the same time as moving Selborne’s motives away from wartime expediency toward a moral explanation for his protest, he refers to the fact that Selborne made a ‘final attempt to use the largely antiNazi captured Russian prisoners to further Allied war aims’. 40 Tolstoy does not expand upon this brief acknowledgement of a degree of amorality in Selborne’s attitude towards the Russians in France, by linking SOE’s aims of using these Russians to a promise of their safety from repatriation, which clearly formed a very necessary quid pro quo for the Russians involved. Regardless of whether Selborne did feel a sense of personal repugnance towards repatriation or not, the dimension added by the SOE material means any emphasis upon this as an overriding explanation of his actions at the time is dubious. In his reply to Selborne’s letter, Eden managed to completely ignore the fact that these men could be used by the Allied war effort. He noted that there were . . . a number of strong reasons for adhering to the decision reached by the Cabinet on the 17th July and for handing back to the Soviet Government all of these men. . . . I realise that many of them must have suffered terribly while they were in German hands, but the fact remains that their presence in the German formations is at the least helping to retard our own forces.41

Eden attached his minute to Churchill, defending the decision of 17 July, which continued to emphasize that the Russians . . . were captured while serving in German military or para-military formations, the behaviour of which in France has often been revolting. We cannot afford to be sentimental about this.

Although he pointed out the fact that the Russians were fighting for the Germans, Eden avoided any reference to proposals to subvert them. His reference to sentimental behaviour ignored the bulk of Selborne’s letter, which was far from sentimental. SOE was acutely aware of the fact that these Russians were dangerous, and had to be neutralized in some way — this was the whole point of their interest; their concern with repatriation was a means to an end, rather than a humanitarian aim. Eden’s chief concern was for the British 39 40 41

Tolstoy, op. cit., 60. Ibid., 64. HS4/354, Eden to Selborne (Copies to Council Members), 12.08.44.



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prisoners of war held in Germany and Poland, who were ‘likely to be released by the Russians in the course of their advance’. He considered the implications for these prisoners of upsetting the Soviet government to be clear: . . . we must rely to a great extent upon Soviet goodwill and if we make difficulty over returning to them their own nationals I feel sure it will react adversely upon their willingness to help in restoring to us as soon as possible our own prisoners whom they release. 42

The file material does not reveal any drafts of Selborne’s response to Eden, which continued to highlight SOE’s wartime concerns by emphasizing the threat the Russians posed to the French Resistance: ‘These men are at present being employed by the Germans to hunt down the Maquis’. He asked whether the Russian government could ‘consider making a declaration that those who deserted from the German army and came over to us should be leniently treated’, an action which ‘might be of considerable assistance’ to the French Resistance.43 As such, the debate can be interpreted as being over the best use to which these Russians could be put, pawns in a much bigger game: should they be utilized for the immediate war effort, or should they be used as some kind of insurance for continued good relations with the Soviet Union? The opposition created by Tolstoy and others between Selborne and Eden, as the respective representatives of humanity and ruthlessness, becomes redundant, replaced by the opposition of wartime versus postwar expediency. The debate certainly did not help SOE’s relationship with the Foreign Office, which, as Wilkinson and Astley note, had gone through a period of improvement. 44 A meeting on the subject took place on 28 July, with Christopher Warner representing the Foreign Office, at which Manderstam was present. Warner noted that Eden wanted the Russians to be handed over to the Soviet authorities, ‘to dispose of as they will’, and accused Manderstam of attempting to sabotage this plan by ‘interviewing Russian Ps/W. and either persuading them to say that they did not wish to go back to Russia or putting leading questions to them’, an accusation which Manderstam denied. 45 At the end of the meeting, Warner and Manderstam continued to discuss the subject. Manderstam later recalled a ‘blazing row with Warner, which ended in him banging his desk and shouting at me to get out of his office’. He noted how Warner accused him of lying in his interrogation reports, and producing a paper which was not objective, to

42 HS4/354, Eden to Selborne, Copy of Minute to the Prime Minister, PM/44/566, 12.08.44. The actual validity of Eden’s argument has itself been questioned; Victor Rothwell notes that repatriation policy was little more than a way ‘of showing Britain’s sincere goodwill towards the Soviet Union in a matter to which the Soviet Government was known to attach considerable importance, but in which no British interest of any consequence was held to be at stake’ (Victor 1941–1947 [London 1982], 18). Rothwell, Britain and the Cold War 1941–1947 [London 43 HS4/354, Selborne to Eden (Copies to All Council Members), 18.08.44. 44 Peter Wilkinson and Joan Bright Astley, Gubbins & SOE (London 1993), 197. 45 HS4/339, AD4 to AD, 28.07.44.


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which Manderstam retorted: ‘I said the trouble was it was too objective for him and contained too many unpalatable truths’. 46 Events overtook the debate, and further subversion of Soviet troops in France by SOE-trained Soviet POWs never took place. 47 However, a new subversive avenue soon presented itself; suborning Russians working in Germany. Sporborg wrote to Warner on 30 August, noting the result of further interrogations of Russians captured in France: . . . two in particular stand out. One of them claims to have commanded a Division of the Red Army before he was captured and the other was in private life a Professor of Physics and is obviously an exceptionally able and intelligent person.

More important than their prior careers was the information they provided ‘about a secret sabotage organisation . . . organised amongst Russians in Germany’, which they alleged to be widely spread, and in need of assistance — assistance which SOE was ‘most anxious to give’. The two prisoners volunteered to return to Germany, along with a few others, qualified wireless operators, to establish a link for SOE. As Sporborg noted, this was an opportunity SOE was ‘particularly anxious to seize’. 48 The plan, however, was compromised by the War Cabinet’s final decision of 4 September to accede to the Soviet request for the return of its citizens. Sporborg received a reply from Warner on 9 September, who noted that the decision made it difficult difficul t to ‘at the same time tell Colonel Chichaev that we proposed to use certain of them for our own purposes whether they liked it or not’. The plan was not wholly dismissed, as Warner suggested that Chichaev should be informed, frankly, of what was being planned, and given a period to consider it: ‘If the Russians do not express their dissent within say, seven days, we shall assume that we have their agreement to proceed.’ 49 Gaining the support of the NKVD proved to be an impossible task. The reports exist of a series of interviews with Chichaev, which effectively chart the disintegration of the plan, as the NKVD proved to have little interest in ideas which involved Russian prisoners in operations, as opposed to their being returned to the Soviet Union. 50 The meetings resulted in 46 Manderstam, op. cit., 141. 47 A plan had been worked out in conjunction with SHAEF and EMFFI (Etat-major des Forces Françaises de l’Intérieur) which gave SOE responsibility for the training of Russian prisoners to return to France to subvert others. A letter of 29 August noted: ‘The area to which we had intended to send Russian personnel with the mission of subverting Russians fighting for the Wehrmacht is now in the process of being liberated, and it would therefore serve no useful purpose to send the Russian personnel there’ (HS4/354, H. Redman, Deputy Commander EMFFI, to GFM Whitely, G-3 SHAEF). 48 HS4/339, Sporborg to Warner (Copies to AD/4, D/P), 30.08.44. 49 HS4/339, Warner to Sporborg, 09.09.44. 50 The first meeting took place on 16 September, between Chichaev, Major Benham and Captain Graham (HS4/339, D/P.103 to W, 16.09.44). The other meetings were all held between Manderstam and Chichaev, on 21 September (HS4/339, ( HS4/339, D/PW to AD4, 21.09.44); 26 September (HS4/339, D/PW to AD4, 28.09.44); 2 October (HS4/339, D/P to AD4, 02.10.44) and 9 October (HS4/339, D/PW to AD4).



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a deadlock, and were reported as such to Gubbins on 10 October, in a paper which noted that: We have reached an impasse, and I suggest that the only way in which this impasse can be broken is for you . . . to go to the Foreign Office and report that we cannot get any further with the NKVD in London or in Moscow; that in our view there is still a large potential resistance movement among Russians in Germany; and to ask for Foreign Office permission to go forward in defiance of NKVD protests.

Next to the question of going to the Foreign Office, proposing to defy the NKVD stance on not using Russian nationals in operations, Gubbins scribbled ‘NO’.51 The British government’s deference to the Soviet authorities in the matter meant there was little point in any such further protest. The final nail came on 16 October when, at another meeting with Manderstam, Chichaev ‘delivered his organisation’s final verdict’, stating that: . . . not only do we not agree to your organisation’s using Russian prisoners of war for work in Germany, but we would also like to make it quite clear that we are not prepared to associate ourselves with your organisation in the contemplated actions, and would strongly advise you to ‘forget’ about the Russians in Germany. . . . The sooner you forget about them and leave them to us, the better it will be for our future relations. 52

There was little SOE could do but accede to the NKVD request, and ‘forget’ about the Russian POWs. While action of some form remained a possibility, SOE had acquired a group of some 40 Russian POWs, a fact which it did its best to conceal, keeping the exact number from both the Foreign Office and its Mission in Moscow.53 SOE did not co-operate with the handover of these POWs for return to the Soviet Union. Although it is clear that questions of morality were not SOE’s main concern as it tried to save Soviet soldiers from repatriation, the organization’s inability to use them for its own ends did not result in a complete loss of interest. Taylor wrote to Gubbins on 23 October, attaching a memo from Manderstam, noting how he conveyed the decision to the four Russian prisoners earmarked for a recce party to Germany ‘that they were to be returned to the Prisoner of War Camp and thence to the Soviet’. Taylor noted that one of the prisoners had since attempted suicide. 54 Manderstam noted in his memorandum how he broke the news to the two wireless operators, both of whom ‘expressed great apprehensiveness as to the fate that awaited them on their arrival in USSR’. He tried to remain optimistic,

51 HS4/339, A/D4 to CD, 10.10.44. 52 Quoted in Tolstoy, op. cit., 66. 53 HS4/354, AD/S1 to SO, 18.10.44. An irate memo, dated 17 February 1945, from D/P101 to D/P complained that SAM had been kept in the dark about ‘the existence of 36 other Russian Ps/W in our schools’, in addition to the four earmarked for the recce party to Germany (HS4/339, D/P101 to D/P [Copies to V/CD, AD/4], 17.02.45). 54 HS4/339, AD to CD, 23.10.44.


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and told them that the Soviet government’s attitude had undergone a ‘radical change’, and they would no longer be seen simply as traitors: SAVIN’s reply to my tirade was: ‘We will naturally go, if you insist, but with regard to the Soviet assurances, I know their value. I remember when 32,000 Russian prisoners-of-war were exchanged against Finns during the Russo-Finnish campaign. All of them were shot by a machine-gun company, which in their turn were liquidated by the NKVD . . . . I registered my disbelief and enquired how on earth he knew about it. He said that he was at that time stationed near the place where the execution was carried out and, furthermore, that he knew one of the NKVD men who took part in the operation.

His story was confirmed by the other wireless operator, Sergienko, who continued to state that ‘Once they get us back to Russia, they will settle their score with us all right’. Manderstam then spoke with Maskiewitz, a prisoner suspected of having links with the NKVD. He asked him what he thought would happen to the fourth man, Kozlov, who had served as a major for the German army and ‘from time to time expressed somewhat anti-Soviet views’. Maskiewitz mapped out his fate: ‘He will be liquidated.’ I asked him whether he thought that KOZLOV would be shot immediately on his arrival in USSR. MASKIEWITZ smiled and said: ‘Oh, no, we don’t do it that way. He will probably be given a fortnight’s leave; then a note will be taken of the persons with whom he associated during that leave. On his return to his unit he will disappear and the people with whom he associated will also disappear.’ I said, ‘Does it not seem to you to be tough on the men?’ He said, ‘Not in the least. It is just realism.’

Manderstam then spoke with Kozlov himself, who ‘turned absolutely pale when told that he was to be returned to USSR’, and asked if there was any chance of his remaining in Britain. Manderstam’s negative reply concluded the interviews.55 SOE had also concealed from Chichaev the actual number of Russian POWs in its possession. However, Chichaev persisted in his desire to interrogate any Russians SOE had earmarked and, as Manderstam notes, the NKVD representative was put off ‘for as long as possible, but we reached a point when his visit to the prisoners could be delayed no further’. What happened next is recorded by Manderstam in his memoir — nothing gave him ‘greater pleasure’ during the war . . . than the disappearance of my forty Russian parachutists from the Kempton Park POW camp. . . . Even now I refuse to disclose how the prisoners ‘disappeared’ and where they went . . . suffice to say that t hat on the morning of Chichaev’s visit a British officer . . . drew himself to attention and said, ‘I am sorry to report, sir, forty prisoners have escaped.’ And we both sported broad smiles for the rest of the morning. 56

The failure of SOE’s plans to use Soviet prisoners for its own ends meant that 55 56

HS4/339, D/P to AD, 21.10.44. Manderstam, op. cit., 150–1.



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it was able to help secure the safety of some of the Russians it had come into contact with. However, even though Manderstam notes how he ‘resolved to save the lives’ 57 of SOE’s Soviet prisoners, it is possible to suggest that interagency tension was more important than humanitarian concern; Chichaev, as representative of the NKVD, had thwarted SOE’s plans — SOE could do little less than return the favour. As such, these POWs were used right up to the end by SOE, and it remains difficult to consider their escape as little more than an afterthought, albeit one which proved most favourable for the Russians concerned.

Christopher J. Murphy is a PhD student at Reading University, researching the organization/administration of the Special Operations Executive during the second world war.

57

Ibid., 145.


SOE and Repatriation

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