Statement of the Rule The "Neypes Rule," Rule ," otherwise known as the “Fresh “Fresh Period Rule,” Rule ,” states that “a party litigant may either file his notice of appeal within 15 days from receipt of the Regional Trial Court’s decision or file it within 15 days from receipt of the order the "final order"! denying his motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration” Domingo Domingo Neypes versus Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 141!4 "eptem#er 14, !$$ !
Purpose of the Rule
To standardi#e the appeal periods pro$ided in the Rules and to afford litigants fair opportunity to appeal their cases, the Court deems it practical to allow a fresh period of 15 days within which to file the notice of appeal in the Regional Trial Court, counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for a new trial or motion for reconsideration supra supra!! The raison d’%tre for the "fresh period rule" is to standardi#e the appeal period pro$ided in the Rules and do away with the confusion as to when the 15&day appeal period should 'e counted Thus, the 15&day period to appeal is no longer interrupted 'y the filing of a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration( litigants today need not concern themsel$es with counting the 'alance of the 15&day period to appeal since the 15&day period is now counted from receipt of the order dismissing a motion for new trial or motion motion for reconsideration or any final order or or resolution %udith &u versus 'on. Rosa "amson()atad, G.R. No. 1*$+*+, $+ Fe#. !$11 !
The Rule Prior to Neypes
)efore the *upreme Court prmulgated +eypes, the rules mandate that the filing of a motion for reconsideration interrupts the running of the period to appeal( and that an appeal should 'e taken within 15 days from the notice of udgment or final order appealed from -hile the period to file an appeal appeal is counted from the denial of the motion for reconsideration, the appellant does not ha$e the full fifteen 15! days The appellant only has the remaining time of the 15&day appeal period to file the notice of appeal appeal Thus, some rules on appeals are. *ec /0 )2 1304 ppeals 6 The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, udgments, or decisions of any court in all these cases shall 'e fifteen 15! days counted fr om the notice of the final order, resolution, award, udgment, or decision decision appealed from 2ro$ided, 2ro$ided, howe$er, that in ha'eas corpus cases, the period period for appeal shall 'e 78! forty&eight forty&eight hours from the notice of udgment appealed from 9 9 9 *:C / Rule 714 2eriod of ordinary appeal & The appeal shall 'e taken within fifteen 15! days from the notice of the udgment or final order appealed from -here a record on appeal is re;uired, the appellant s hall file a notice of appeal and a record on appeal within thirty / n appeal must 'e taken within fifteen 15! days from promulgation of the udgment or from notice of the final order appealed fr om This period for perfecting an appeal shall 'e suspended from the time a motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed until notice of the order o$erruling the motion has 'een ser$ed upon the accused or his counsel at which time the 'alance of the period 'egins to run
In What Cases Applicable
?@enceforth, this "fresh period rule" shall also apply to Rule 7< go$erning appeals from the Aunicipal Trial Courts to t he Regional Trial Courts( Rule 73 on petitions for re$iew from the Regional Trial Courts to the Court of ppeals( Rule 7/ on appeals from ;uasi&udicial agencies/1 to the Court of ppeals and Rule 75 go$erning appeals 'y certiorari to the *upreme Court/3 The new rule aims to regiment or make the appeal period uniform, to 'e counted from receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial, motion for reconsideration whether full or partial! or any final order or resolution Neypes, supra! supra! B'$iously, the new 15&day period may 'e a$ailed of only if either motion is filed( otherwise, the decision 'ecomes final and e9ecutory after the lapse of the original appeal period pro$ided in Rule Rule 71, *ection / Neypes, supra! supra! The fresh period of 15 days 'ecomes significant only when a party opts to file a motion for new trial or motion for reconsideration n this manner, the trial court which rendered the assailed decision is gi$en another opportunity to re$iew the case and, in the process, minimi#e andDor rectify any error of udgment -hile we aim to resol$e cases with dispatch and to ha$e udgments of courts 'ecome final at some definite time, we likewise aspire to deli$er ustice fairly Neypes, supra! supra!
Application in Criminal Cases
-hile +eypes in$ol$ed the period to appeal in ci$il cases, the Court’s pronouncement of a "fresh period" to appeal should e;ually apply to the period f or appeal in criminal cases under *ection = of Rule 133 of the Re$ised Rules of Criminal 2rocedure, for the following reasons. Eirst, )2 130, as amended, the su'stanti$e law on which the Rules of Court is 'ased, makes no distinction 'etween the periods to appeal in a ci$il case and in a criminal case *ection /0 of )2 130 categorically states that "t4he period for appeal
from final orders, resolutions, awards, udgments, or decisions of any court in all cases shall 'e fifteen 15! days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution, award, udgment, or decision appealed from" #i le- non distinguit ne nos distinguere de#emos. -hen the law makes no distinction, we this Court! also ought not to recogni#e any distinction1F *econd, the pro$isions of *ection / of Rule 71 of the 100F Rules of Ci$il 2rocedure and *ection = of Rule 133 of the Re$ised Rules of Criminal 2rocedure, though differently worded, mean e9actly the same There is no su'stantial difference 'etween the two pro$isions insofar as legal results are concerned 6 the appeal period stops running upon the filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration and starts to run again upon receipt of the order denying said motion for new trial or reconsideration t was this situation that +eypes addressed in ci$il cases +o reason e9ists why this situation in criminal cases cannot 'e similarly addressed Third, while the Court did not consider in +eypes the ordinary appeal period in criminal cases under *ection =, Rule 133 of the Re$ised Rules of Criminal 2rocedure since it in$ol$ed a purely ci$il case, it did include Rule 73 of the 100F Rules of Ci$il 2rocedure on petitions for re$iew from the RTCs to the Court of ppeals C!, and Rule 75 of the 100F Rules of Ci$il 2rocedure go$erning appeals 'y certiorari to this Court, 'oth of which also apply to appeals in criminal cases, as pro$ided 'y *ection / of Rule 133 of the Re$ised Rules of Criminal 2rocedure, thus. *:C / @ow appeal taken > 9 9 9 9 '! The appeal to the Court of ppeals in cases decided 'y the Regional Trial Court in the e9ercise of its appellate urisdiction shall 'e 'y petition for re$iew under Rule 73 9999 :9cept as pro$ided in the last paragraph of section 1/, Rule 137, all other appeals to the *upreme Court shall 'e 'y petition for re$iew on certiorari under Rule 75 Clearly, if the modes of appeal to the C in cases where the RTC e9ercised its appellate urisdiction! and to this Court in ci$il and criminal cases are the same, no cogent reason e9ists why the periods to appeal from the RTC in the e9ercise of its original urisdiction! to the C in ci$il and criminal cases under *ection / of Rule 71 of the 100F Rules of Ci$il 2rocedure and *ection = of Rule 133 of the Re$ised Rules of Criminal 2rocedure should 'e tr eated differently -ere we to strictly interpret the "fresh period rule" in +eypes and make it applica'le only to the period to appeal in ci$il cases, we shall effecti$ely foster and encourage an a'surd situation where a litigant in a ci$il case will ha$e a 'etter right to appeal than an accused in a criminal case 6 a situation that gi$es undue fa$or to ci$il litigants and unustly discriminates against the accused&appellants t suggests a dou'le standard of treatment when we fa$or a situation where property interests are at stake, as against a situation where li'erty stands to 'e preudiced -e must emphatically reect this dou'le and une;ual standard for 'eing contrary to reason B$er time, courts ha$e recogni#ed with almost pedantic adherence that what is contrary to reason is not allowed in law 6 /uod est inonveniens, aut ontra rationem non permissum est in lege. 18 %udith &u versus 'on. Rosa "amson()atad, G.R. No. 1*$+*+, $+ Fe#. !$11 !
Retroactive Effect
The determinati$e issue is whether the "fresh period" rule announced in Neypes could retroacti$ely apply in cases where the period for appeal had lapsed prior to 17 *eptem'er 3<<5 when +eypes was promulgated That ;uestion may 'e answered with the guidance of the general rule that procedural laws may 'e gi$en retroacti$e effect to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, there 'eing no $ested rights in the rules of procedure1F mendments to procedural rules are procedural or remedial in character as they do not create new or remo$e $ested rights, 'ut only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already e9isting18 "ps. De los "antos reaffirms these principles and categorically warrants that Neypes 'ears the ;uested retroacti$e effect, to wit. 2rocedural law refers to the adecti$e law which prescri'es rules and forms of procedure in order that courts may 'e a'le to administer ustice 2rocedural laws do not come within the legal conception of a retroacti$e law, or the general rule against the retroacti$e operation of statues G they may 'e gi$en retroacti$e effect on actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage and this will not $iolate any right of a person who may feel that he is ad$ersely affected, insomuch as there are no $ested rights in rules of procedure The "fresh period rule" is a procedural law as it prescri'es a fresh period of 15 days within which an appeal may 'e made in the e$ent that the motion for reconsideration is denied 'y the lower court Eollowing the rule on retroacti$ity of procedural laws, the "fresh period rule" should 'e applied to pending actions, such as the present case lso, to deny herein petitioners the 'enefit of the "fresh period rule" will amount to inustice, if not a'surdity, since the su'ect notice of udgment and final order were issued two years later or in the year 3<<<, as compared to the notice of udgment and final order in Neypes which were issued in 1008 t will 'e incongruous and illogical that parties recei$ing notices of udgment and final orders issued in the year 1008 will enoy the 'enefit of the "fresh period rule" while those later rulings of the lower courts such as in the instant case, will not10 +ota'ly, the su'ect incidents in "ps. De los "antos occurred in ugust 3<<<, at the same month as the rele$ant incidents at 'ar There is no reason to adopt herein a rule that is di$ergent from that in "ps. De los "antos Fil(0state Properties, n. versus 'on. 2arietta 'omena %. 3alenia, G.R. No. 1*+4!, ! %une !$$5 !
Not Inconsistent With Rules of Court
This pronouncement is not inconsistent with Rule 71, *ection / of the Rules which states that the appeal shall 'e taken within 15 days from notice of udgment or final order appealed from T he use of the disuncti$e word "or" signifies disassociation and independence of one thing from another t should, as a rule, 'e construed in the sense in which it ordinarily implies// @ence, the use of "or" in the a'o$e pro$ision supposes that the notice of appeal may 'e filed within 15 days from the notice of udgment or within 15 days from notice of the "final order," which we already determined to refer to the Huly 1, 1008 order denying the motion for a new trial or reconsideration Neypes, supra!
Neypes Rule Not Applied
2etitioner was charged with and found guilty of perury @e was sentenced to suffer imprisonment of 7 months and 1 day to 1 year, a period which is considered as a correct ional penalty Inder rticle 0 of the Re$ised 2enal Code, light felonies are those infractions of law for the commission of which the penalty of arresto menor one to thirty days of imprisonment! or a fine not e9ceeding two hundred pesos 23<
