Vivarium - Vol Xlvi, No 1, 2008

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VIVARIUM and Intellectual An International LifeoftheMiddle Journal forthePhilosophy Renaissance and Ages Aims& Scope and ofphilosophy is an international Vivarium journaldedicatedto thehistory the to Middle from the of ideas thehistory early-modern period.It Ages early with anditsrelationship sideofphilosohy in theprofane interest takesa particular fromtheseperiods.It is widelyrecognized and learning otherareasof thought It and metaphysics. oflogic,semantics forthehistory resource as an unrivalled texts and of studies historical well as as ideas, analyses publishesphilosophical It and learning. ofmedievaland early-modern context theinstitutional thought also welcomeseditionsof texts.It publishes annuallya specialissuedevotedto themeor philosopher. a particular Editor L.W. Nauta (Groningen) EditorialBoard C.H. Kneepkens HA.G. Braakhuis L.M. deRijk(Leiden), (Groningen), (Nijmegen), (Madison),E.P. Bos (Leiden)and D. Perler(Berlin). W.J.Courtenay AdvisoryCommittee T. Gregory MA). J.E.Murdoch(Cambridge, (Rome),A. Zimmermann (Cologne), forAuthors Instructions and paper to thejournalshouldbe sentas an e-mailattachment Contributions Oude of Groningen, versionto Lodi Nauta,Facultyof Philosophy, University A TheNetherlands 52, 9712 GL Groningen, ([email protected]). Boteringestraat the editor. from obtained be or can www.brill.nl/viv at is available sheet style orGerman; inEnglish(UK orUS), French mustbewritten Contributions they mustbe clearly correct. andstylistically mustbe grammatically typeManuscripts Use withnumbered written throughout. pages,doublespacingandwidemargins on a should the author name of and Title not endnotes. footnotes, appear separate Each articleshouldbe titlepage in orderto facilitate anonymous peer-review. conclusions whichshouldstatetheprincipal bya 10-lineabstract, accompanied andkeywords bothabstract forindexing ofthepaperand2-6keywords, purposes; shouldbe in English. receiveone setof proofsforproofreading. Authorsof acceptedcontributions madeto the therightto chargeauthorsforcorrections reserves The publisher orconverin thetypesetting thatoccurred oferrors otherthancorrections proofs sionprocess. receive1 complimentary Authors appears copyoftheissueinwhichtheirarticle contributions, (in thecaseof multi-authored copiesaresentto thefirst-named circulation. forprivate author)as wellas a PDF fileoftheircontribution a year ispublished 3 times onlineISSN 1568-5349) ISSN 0042-7543, Vivarium (print tel+31 (0)71 5353500, TheNetherlands, 2, 2321JCLeiden, byBrill,Plantijnstraat fax+31 (0)71 5317532.

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VIVARIUM

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VIVARIUM An International and Intellectual Journal forthePhilosophy LifeoftheMiddle and Renaissance Ages Aims& Scope Vivarium is an international ofphilosophy and journaldedicatedto thehistory thehistory of ideasfromtheearlyMiddleAgesto theearly-modern period.It takesa particular interest intheprofane with sideofphilosohy anditsrelationship otherareasof thought fromtheseperiods.It is widelyrecognized and learning as an unrivalled resource forthehistory of logic,semantics and metaphysics. It studiesof ideas,textsand publishesphilosophical analysesas wellas historical theinstitutional context ofmedievaland early-modern It and learning. thought also welcomeseditionsof texts.It publishesannuallya specialissuedevotedto a particular themeorphilosopher. Editor L.W.Nauta(Groningen) EditorialBoard L.M.deRijk(Leiden), H.A.G.Braakhuis C.H. Kneepkens (Nijmegen), (Groningen), (Madison),E.P.Bos (Leiden)andD. Perler (Berlin). W.J.Courtenay Committee Advisory T. Gregory (Rome),A. Zimmermann MA). (Cologne),J.E.Murdoch(Cambridge, forAuthors Instructions Contributions to thejournalshouldbe sentas an e-mailattachment and paper versionto Lodi Nauta,Facultyof Philosophy, of Groningen, Oude University A TheNetherlands 52, 9712 GL Groningen, Boteringestraat ([email protected]). sheet is available at www.brill.nl/viv or can be from the obtained editor. style inEnglish(UK orUS), French Contributions mustbewritten orGerman;they mustbe grammatically andstylistically correct. mustbe clearly Manuscripts typewritten withnumbered Use pages,doublespacingandwidemargins throughout. notendnotes. Titleandnameoftheauthorshouldappearon a separate footnotes, titlepage in orderto facilitate Each articleshouldbe anonymous peer-review. whichshouldstatetheprincipal conclusions accompanied bya 10-lineabstract, ofthepaperand2-6keywords, forindexing bothabstract andkeywords purposes; shouldbe in English. Authorsof acceptedcontributions receiveone setof proofsforproofreading, lhe publisher reserves therightto chargeauthorsforcorrections madeto the otherthancorrections in thetypesetting oferrors thatoccurred orconverproofs sionprocess. 1 complimentary Authors receive copyoftheissueinwhichtheirarticle appears contributions, (in thecaseof multi-authored copiesaresentto thefirst-named forprivate circulation. author)as wellas a PDF fileof theircontribution Vivarium ISSN 0042-7543, onlineISSN 1568-5349) ispublished a year 3 times (print tel+31 (0)71 5353500, 2, 2321JCLeiden,TheNetherlands, byBrill,Plantijnstraat fax+31 (0)71 5317532.

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VIVARIUM An International Journal for the Philosophy and Intellectual Life of the Middle Ages and Renaissance

VOLUME

XLVI (2008)

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BRILL

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BRILL LEIDEN • BOSTON TheNetherlands BrillNV,Leiden, © 2008byKoninklijke theimprints BrillNV incorporates BRILL,HoteiPublishing, Koninklijke andVSP. Martinus Publishers IDC Publishers, Nijhoff stored Allrights No partofthispublication reserved. translated, maybereproduced, inanyform orbyanymeans, ortransmitted ina retrieval electronic, system, written orotherwise, without mechanical, prior photocopying, recording ofthepublisher. permission orpersonal items forinternal tophotocopy Authorization that useisgranted bythepublisher provided toCopyright feesarepaiddirectly theappropriate Suite910, 222Rosewood Clearance Drive, Center, tochange. MA01923,USA.Feesaresubject Danvers, intheNetherlands Printed (onacid-free paper).

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Vivarium 46 (2008)1-23

Eriugenas

Innovation

SebastianF.Weiner Seminar derUniversität Zürich Philosophisches Abstract workPeriphyseon is commonly as havingintroduced JohnScotEriugenas regarded into medieval of of theory thereunification Neoplatonism early thinking. Eriugenas theCreator andhiscreation isthenviewed as beingbasedontheNeoplatonic scheme of procession and reversion. thisinterpretation fallsshortof Eriugenas However, intentions. Aboveall,hedeniesanyontological difference between Creator andcreationwithout recourse to the considerations of and taking Neoplatonic procession reversion. to is CreGod not the Surprisingly, according Eriugenas explanation, only atorbutheisalsocreated. He iscreated insofar as healone,possessing allbeing, isthe essence ofallcreated the fourfold division of at Moreover, nature, things. presentedthe of the is not own buta common beginning work, Eriugenas innovation, Carolingian Itis rather hisaimtoshowthatfrom an ontological concept. pointofviewthisdivisionhastobe resolved. Keywords division ofnature, JohnScot,Eriugena, Periphyseon, Neoplatonism Zu BeginnseinesHauptwerkes DenPeriphyseon legtderfrühmittelalterliche kerJohannesScottusEriugenaeine außergewöhnliche der Natur Vierteilung vor.Sie giltals eine entscheidende und bedeutsameInnovationin Eriugenas Denken.Ihrverdankt das Periphyseon auch seineStruktur. So gibtEriugena derNaturnachderanderenin je einemBuchzu untersuchen.1 an,einespecies SeineAngabenindes,wie er zu dieserEinteilunggelangt,sindspärlich,und kaummehrsagterzurBedeutung, welchederEinteilung derNaturzukommen 1}Eswären danneigentlich nurvierstatt derfíinf Bücher zuerwarten. istals gegeben Bislang dafür nur das das vierte Buchseiansonsten zulang worden, Erklärung Argument vorgebracht Zumindest Plansahzunächst nurvierBücher vor. geraten. Eriugenas eigener ©Koninklijke Brill 2008 NV, Leiden,

DOI:10.1 163/156853407X217614

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S.F.Weiner /Vivarium 46 (2008)1-23

soll. Man sollteannehmen,ein DenkergehemiteinemfürseineZeit neuen ihn ausführlich Gedankenandersum, rechtfertige und baue alles Nachfoldarauf auf. der derNatureinteilung gende Aufgrund exponierten Anfuhrung zu Anfangdes Werksund weildie Vierteilung derNaturim Periphyseon formale Bedeutunghat, nämlichdie inhaltliche der Bücher, Abfolge gehtdie von zwei Prämissen aus: mit dieser Viertei(i) Eriugenapräsentiert Forschung um nichtzu sagenneuen lungderNatureinenfürseineZeitungewöhnlichen, Gedanken(ii) erhältan dieserEinteilungdas gesamteWerküberfest. Prämisse(ii) istin gewisser WeiseeineFolgeaus (i). WennEriugenaeinen neuenGedankenetablieren will,wirder ihn kaumim LaufederWerkesin sicheinesolcheNaturein(i) ergibtsich,insofern Fragestellenodernegieren, bei Denkern nicht findet, weisteineähnlicheEvi(ii) teilung vorangehenden denz auf,geradeweil im Periphyseon die Natureinteilung ist. strukturgebend Im Folgendenwirdzu zeigensein,dass beide Prämissenzwarnahe liegend, aberdennochunzutreffend sind. Nun weistOttenin ihrenUntersuchungen zurreversio bei Eriugenabereits aufmöglicheQuellenhin,aus denenerseineVierteilung derNaturschöpft.2 Doch giltes, zwischender Vierteilung als solcherund der Vierteilung der Naturzu unterscheiden: Ersteres findetsichinAntikeundfrühem Mittelalter nicht.Dennochbehaupteich,Eriugenas Vorhabenwarnicht zuhauf,Letzteres die Etablierung, sonderndie Überwindung dieserNatureinteilung. Er glaubt, den Schlüsselgefundenzu haben,mit dem sich die vierNaturenin eine lassen. zurückführen Mit ,Zurückführung istdabeinichtan das Ende derWeltgedacht,an dem alles zum Schöpfungsgrund zurückkehrt (Otten hat diese finaleRückkehr bereitsausfuhrlich sondern an die Möglichkeit, die viergeteilte dargelegt),3 Naturhierundjetztals Einheitzu denken.Man könntedie Darlegungdieses GedankensbereitsfiirCarlosSteelund D. W. Hadleysowiezuvorschonfür WernerBeierwaltes aller annehmen,haltendiesedoch geradedie Auflösung Differenz mitseinemSchöpfer und Einswerdung des Geschöpfes fiirden entscheidenden Gedankenin EriugenasWerk.4

2)Willemien ofReturn inEriugenas Harvard TheoloOtten, ,TheDialectic , inThe Periphyseon 4 Review dort 400. 84, 399-421, (1991), gical 3)Dies.,The Scottus (Leiden 1991). Anthropology ofJohannes Eriugena 4)Siehe Steel inA Companion dazuCarlos undD.W.Hadley, Scotus toPhilosoJohn Eriugena', ed.byJorge Gracia sowie (Maldon/Oxford/Melbourne 2003),397-406, Ages, phyintheMiddle Werner sowie Denken desEinen Beierwaltes, ders., (Frankfurt 1984), (Frankfurt 1985). Eriugena

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die aktuelle Steelund Hadley,derenknappeund dochpräziseDarstellung Christian thinkers dazu: however, „When, gutabbildet,sagen Forschungslage thiscyclicalprocess theytendedto interpret adoptNeoplatonicMetaphysics, he [Eriugena]viewsthereturnas in a historical-temporal sense.(. . .) Further reversion ofall things(...), butalso as an eschatologinotjusta metaphyiscal So hatdie Natureinheit Dies istrichtig, und dochunvollständig. cal process."5 und eine Komponentedavon ist bei Eriugenaeinen doppeltenCharakter, sonderneinestatische. keineprozesshafte, reversio dertatsächlichen Die Natureinheit ergibtsichnichtalleinaufgrund derTatsache, des Geschöpfes zu seinemSchöpfer hin,sondernauchaufgrund Hinsichtvon einer Differenzzwischendiesen beiden dass in bestimmter Hinsichtistdas, Naturengarnichtdie Redeseinkann.Und diesebestimmte Denken vorlegt. Novum dem lateinischen was Eriugenaals herausragendes und Wiederauflösung der Welt,eigentlichein Die dialektische Entfaltung stoischer Gedanke,den Eriugenavon MaximusConfessorübernimmt, spielt eine traRückkehrdes Geschöpfesim Periphyseon zwarin der tatsächlichen derNatureinteilung.6 gendeRolle,abernichtbei derAuflösung von Eriugenaanalysis Diese letztgenannte genannt, vermagdie Auflösung, betrachtet. ratiojederzeitzu leisten,so sie die Naturontologisch Zudem,die in Wahrratioalleinhat die Natureinteilung überhauptersthervorgebracht; des vereesse,gibt es eine solche heit,das heißt bei Eriugenahinsichtlich Differenz zwischenSchöpferund Geschöpfnicht.Insofernistes eine Frage, wie und auf welcheWeise das Geschöpfam Ende der Welt zum Schöpfer rationem Und eineandereFrageistes,warumes secundum zurückkehrt. , so die zwischenSchöpferund ratiodie Dialektikzu Ende führt, nie eine Differenz isthiergenauerzu betrachten. Geschöpfgegebenhat.Letzteres 1. Die viergliedrige Einteilung Hilfreich istzunächsteine Übersetzung derPassageaus demAnfang,welche die EinteilungderNaturpräsentiert (Zeile 13-39). Die BuchstabenN. und als Abkürzungen und A. stehenin diesemDialog vermutlich fürnutritor J alumnus 5)dies., Scotus , 400. John Eriugena 6)Siehe adlohannem EriuzuMaximus Confessor dessen (MPG91)1177C-D,sowie Ambigua imProöm derselben 1061/62. genas Wertschätzung 7)SiehedazudieEinleitung - Periphyseon Iohannis seuEriugenae zuJeauneaus Edition Scotti Christianorum Series Latina CLXI-CLXV Libri1-5,édité Edouard (Paris Jeauneau, par Corpus

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N. Quoniaminternosconvenitde hoc vocábulo generaleesse, velím in dicasdivisionis eiusperdifferentias species rationem;aut, si tibi übet, prius conabor dividere,tuum vero eritrecteiudicare. A. Ingrederequaeso. Impatiens a enimsumde hac reveramrationem te audirevolens. N. Videturmihi divisio naturae quattuor per quattuor differentias quarumprimaestin speciesrecipere, secunda earnquae créâtetnoncreatur, in earnquae et creaturet créât,tertia in earn quae creaturet non créât, quarta quae nec créât nec creatur. Harumveroquattuorbinaesibiinvicem opponuntur.Nam tertiaopponiturprimae,quartavero secundae; sed quartainterimpossibilia ponitur, cuiusesseestnon posseesse.Rectane tibitalisdivisiovideturan non?

A. Rectequidem.Sed velimrépéformar umoppotas,utpraedictarum sitioclariuselucescat. N. Vides, ni fallor,tertiaespeciei Primananque primaeoppositionem.

N. Da wirunsalso einigsind,dass diesesWort allgemeinist, will ich, dassdu den GrundseinerEinteilung in Artenangibst; durchDifferenzen oder,wennes dirbeliebt,beginneich dann aberwirdes zuersteinzuteilen, an dirsein,richtig zu urteilen. A. Ich bittedich, voranzugehen. Ungeduldignämlichwill ich einen wahrenGedankenüberdiesenSachverhaltvon dirhören. N. Mir scheintdie Einteilungder vier NaturdurchvierUnterschiende Artenanzunehmen,von denen die erstediejenigeist, welche erschafft und nichterschaffen wird,die zweite sowohl erschaffen welche diejenige, wirdals aucherschafft, die drittediewird und welche erschaffen jenige, nicht erschafft, die vierte,welche wedererschafft nocherschaffen wird. Von diesenvierabersindjeweilszwei Denn die einanderentgegengesetzt. drittestehtder erstenentgegen,die vierteaber der zweiten;die vierte jedoch, als Unmöglichesaufgestellt, hat ein Sein, das nicht sein kann. Scheintdir diese Einteilungrichtig odernicht? A. Gewissrichtig.Doch will ich, damit der dass du sie wiederholst, Arten der zuvor genannten Gegensatz klarhervortritt. N. Du siehst,wennich nichtirre, der drittenArt die Entgegensetzung

derSynopwieinsgesamt dieser anschließende Diehier 1996-2003). folgen Beitrag Übersetzung Zeilen dieser Edition. sich auf die Sämtliche beziehen sisVersionum Jeauneaus. Stellenangaben

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zurersten.Denn die ersteschafft und wird nichterschaffen, welcherkonträrdiejenigeentgegengesetzt ist,die erschaffen istund nichterschafft; die zweiten aber der (Entgegensetzung) zur vierten,da die zweiteerschaffen wirdund erschafft, derallgemeindie viertewiderspricht, die wederschafft nocherschaffen wird. A. Klar sehe ich dies. Aber sehr A. Clare video. Sed multumme Art,dievondir movetquarta quae a te addita est. bewegtmichdievierte ist.Denn an denanderen Nam de aliistribusnullomodo hae- hinzugefiigt zu zweifeln, sitareausim,cum prima,ut arbitror, dreiwageich keineswegs in causa omnium quae sunt, quae da die erste,wie ich meine,in der deusest,intelligatur; secundaveroin UrsacheallerSeienden,welcheGott causis; tertiain his ist,gedachtwird;die zweiteaber in primordialibus Ursachen;die dritte quae in generationetemporibusque den erstrangigen in im die Werdenund zu denen, et lociscognoscuntur. ideo de Atque Zeiten sowie an Orten erkanntwersingulisdisputarisubtiliusnecessaden. Und darum ist es, wie ich sehe, riumest,utvideo. notwendig,sich mit den einzelnen Artengründlich auseinanderzusetzen. créâtet non creatur, cui e contrario ilia creatur et non quae opponitur créât;secundaevero quartae,siquidem secundaet creaturet créât,cui universaliter quartacontradicit, quae neccréâtnequecreatur.

Dem angeführten AbsatzgehteineAussagevoran,wonachsichdasWortnatura aufdie Gesamtheit allerGegenstände erstreckt. NachdemzwischenN undA über den des Wortes ,Natur herrscht („da wir Einigkeit Benennungsumfang N also übereinkommen"), geht zurEinteilungdesselbenüber. Die Formulierung „seinerEinteilung"(divisionis eius) beziehtsich dabei zweifelsfrei aufdas Wort,Natur,wie auch bereitszuvor,Natur mehrfach als Wort(vocabulum bezeichnet wurde. Doch wie hat man sich die ) Einteilung einesWortesin Artenzu denken?Man sollteannehmen,ein Wortlassesich, wennüberhaupt,nurin Silbenoder Buchstabeneinteilenoder unterteilen. Doch Derartigesist hier nichtgemeint.Erschwerend hinzu kommt,dass zumindestnachden RegelnderDialektik,wiesie Eriugenaaus denArtesliberalesvertraut Differenz eineGatsind,jederArtund artbildenden notwendig Die fur das Wort ,Natur ) tungvorangeht. Bezeichnung»Gattung'{genus findetsichjedochwederhiernoch irgendwosonstim Periphyseon. Lediglich als generalevocabulumist es im erstenSatz bezeichnet,wonach,Natur, so wirktes, Name einerGattungist.Daher liegtderSchlussnahe,es gebeeine

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46 (2008)1-23 /Vivarium S.F.Weiner

Gattungnamens,Natur, welchein derFolgeinvierArteneingeallgemeinste teiltwird.8 mihivideturmachtdabei wohl kaum Die hiereinleitendeFormulierung Stilrhetorisches sondernistein klassisches einebloßeVermutung kenntlich, sich einzuleiten. Sie findet mittel,um fiirdie Untersuchung Grundlegendes und Topica fürEriugenain CicerosWerkenwie De inventione ,9 und auch aufsolcheWeise.10 den Beginnder Timaios-Rede Calcidiusübersetzt Als Vorlage Ebenso klassischist die Formder verwendeten Vierteilung. in derarietwa den Westen lateinischen sie dem Vermittlerquellen begegnet vierfache Struktur die dort beinhaltet Auch stotelischen Kategorienschrift.11 auftritt. und ein ,Sowohl-als-auch' ein ,Weder-noch' , wie es im Periphyseon einDenkeneinenhohenStellenwert im karolingischen Dass dieseStruktur dassdie viernahm,weistGiuliod'Onofrionach.12Darauslässtsichersehen, bereitsin die sichhierzu Beginndes Periphyseon findet, Einteilung, gliedrige ist.Was sichin den Quellenindesnichtfinden EriugenasQuellenverbreitetet aufdie Natur. lässt,istdieAnwendungderViererstruktur der Struktur der Einteilungist eine weitere,fünfte Aufgrund gegebenen Naturbereitslogischunmöglich.Formalist demnachdie Gesamtheitaller Dabei istim christlichen Denken,in dessenRahmenes einen Dinge umfasst. es gebe etwasunerdie Geschaffenes und Aussagevertraut, gibt, Schöpfer Geschaffenes. etwas und schaffenes Schaffendes Ungewöhnunschöpferisches als species derselben lichaberistdie Behauptung, Schöpferund Geschaffenes Darf Eriugenaeine so brisanteAussage,derSchöpfersei Naturaufzufassen. eine speciesderNatur,überhauptunbegründet Bringter damit vorbringen? etwasfürseineZeit Ungewöhnliches vor,so wirder dies nichtohne Rechtist sein ganzes zu autoritätsorientiert oder tun; Quellenverweis fertigung Denken.13 8)Siehe dieNatur derEinteiauchGiulio zudieser d'Onofrio, ,Über Interpretationsschwierigkeit - Sprachform des undMetapher Denken vonEriugenas Diedialektische ,inBegriff Entfaltung lung. BadHomburg desVII.internationalen beiEriugena Denkens , Vorträge Eriugena-Colloquiums Beierwaltes 26.-29. 1990),17-38. Juli1989,hg.vonWerner (Heidelberg 9)Siehe De inventione II,II 6. I,II 3;I,IV 5 Topica 10)Calcidius IV(ed.Waszink), inPlato Latinus 20,15-16. Commentarius, H)BeiAristoteles waren diepseudo-augustinische fürdieKarolinger lai9-22.Hauptquellen von sowie De Aristotelis Schrift Decategoriis decern) (Decategoriae Capeila. nuptiis Martianus 12)SieheGiuliod'Onofrio, von Die dialektische derEinteilung. dieNatur ,Über Entfaltung insbes. Denken, p.34. Eriugenas 13)Siehezu Eriugenas auch:J.C.Marler, Autoritäten mitdenchristlichen ,Useof Umgang of and Concordia und Giulio in the d'Onofrio, ,The , AugustineDionysius: Authority Periphyseon

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WennsichEriugenagegengängigeAnsichten wendet,sagterdiesstetsmit durchN vorIndemer zu Beginndie Natureinteilung allerDeutlichkeit.14 einen bedeutsamen, lässt,hätteer,so erdiesfür erklärungsbedürftigen bringen die Aussage derDialogstruktur Gedankenhielte,aufgrund guteGelegenheit, zur Einteizu lassen.K s unbedingte N s durchA hinterfragen Zustimmung Zweifel an dem hin. Der auf das vielmehr deutet der Natur Gegenteil lung wirdsichnuraufdie vierteArtderNaturbezieGesagten,den A vorbringt, hen.An allemÜbrigenwagternichtzu zweifeln(nullomodohaesitare ausirri). es nicht. verbaleZustimmung Eine stärkere gibt istnichtwenig.Erstensstimmter Dieses Übrige,woraner nichtzweifelt, zu, dass sichdie Naturüberhauptin specieseinteilenlasse,also als Gattung sei.Zweitenssindihmdie differentiae aufzufassen , diejeweiligeBejaspecificae drittens creatur offensichtlich von creat und und , geläufig, Verneinung hung die als erstederspecies hat er keineBedenken,den Schöpfergott aufzufassen, als die Geschaffene sichtbar und das als die Ursachen zweite, erstrangigen entden einzelnenspecies derFrage,welcheGegenstände dritte.Hinsichtlich alsVorlagegedient. hatsicherAugustinus sprechen, nichtdie Ursachenunterteilt, Dem Inhaltnachsindbei diesemallerdings indemereineOrdnungderUrsachen{ordo So sagtAugustinus, Gesamtnatur. causarum)vorgibt:„Daher ist die Ursacheder Dinge, die machtund nicht wird,Gott,andereshingegensinddie Ursachen,die sowohlmachen,als auch Geister. am meistenrationalen (gemacht)werden,wie etwaallegeschaffenen, Ursachenaber,die mehr(gemacht)werdenals machen,sind Die körperlichen Dies decktsichmitdem,was im zu zählen."15 nichtunterdie Wirkursachen denerstenbeiausirri) (nullomodohaesitare ganzselbstverständlich Periphyseon welcheGottist,undjene rationes wird:dieAllursache, denArtenzugewiesen , Ursachen(
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/Vivarium 46 (2008)1-23 S.F.Weiner

so trittauchdie dritteArtderNaturimPeriphyseon als mehrals causaauffasst, A erklärt sich dieser warum auf.16 Vor dem auch, Vorlage effectus Hintergrund Art ist: sie bei addita einer vierten unklar findet dieAnfügung est) Augu{quae Die zuvorgenannteUnterscheidung istübrigens stinuskeineEntsprechung. sicheine aufBejahungund Verneikeineaugustinische Innovation,insofern Verbs erschaffen aufbauende des , Einteilungschonbei PhilonvonAlenung xandrienfindet.17 auch Nebendergenannten Einteilung gibtes beiAugustinus dreigliedrigen mitdem EriuSo heißtes in dessenGenesis-Kommentar, eineviergliedrige. vertraut war:„Diese SeiendensindaufeineWeiseimWort genanachweislich Gottes,wo sie nichtgemacht,sondernewigsind;aufeineanderein den ElementenderWelt,wo alle zugleichgemachtzukünftig sind,wiederandersin Ursachennichtschon die durchdie zugleichgeschaffenen den Gegenständen, werden ihrer Zeit erschaffen (...), undanders jeweiligen zugleich,sondernzu UrsachenwievonNeuemdie erstrangigen in denSamen,in denengleichsam derholtwerden(...)." 18Bei Beda findetsicheine daranoffensichtlich ange19 lehnteviergliedrige Einteilungdes göttlichenWirkens(operariodivina). hinsichtlich des Einteilungsgegenstandes Doch fuhrenbeide Vierteilungen von derdesPeriphyseon weg. Beispielenenntdie Naturdas Wichtigistvorallem:Keinerdergenannten einemitdemGeschöpf nennt es den denn Einzuteilende, Schöpfer geschweige dessen wirdoftaufOrígenesverwiesen, . In derForschung species gleichrangige auch EriugenabekanntesWerkPeri archôneine Einteilungin vierBücher aufweist.Doch ist bereitsdiese Einteilungin vierBücherwohl eine unpasauchdarum,weiles keineinhaltliche sendeundnachträgliche, Viergliederung

16)EtwaIII,227-236. 17)Deopificio mundi , § 99. 18)Degenesi resvariis dieÜberschrift: adlitteram VI, 10,17(PL34,346;derAbschnitt trägt ineiealiter sedaeterna inverbo Sedhaecaliter modis sunt; dei,ubiistanonfacta, existentes): simul inrebus secundum causas aliter simul facta futura ubiomnia mentis sunt; mundi, quae inquibus inseminibus, creantur sedsuoquaeque noniamsimul creatas, (...), aliter tempore causae rursus (...). repetuntur quasiprimordiales 19)De natura creavit etgubernat, rerum divina, (PL90,187A-188A): Operatio quaesaecula sed non in verbi dei haec ratione dispensationefacta, quod primo, quadriformi distinguitur: facta sint informi elementa mundi in materia aeterna sunt(...); secundo, (...); pariter quod sex seddistinctione noniamsimul, causas simul creatas secundum materia, tertio, quodeadem creaturam incoelestem dierum formatur; quodexeiusdem quarto, terrestemque primorum cursu naturali totius saeculi etprimordialibus causis creaturae seminibus tempus peragitur.

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in diesemWerkgibt.20 ZwarzitiertEriugenaspäterin seinemfünften Buch auf ihm mit dem Verweis dessen liber tertium wonach die Schrift , Orígenes wohlviergeteilt vorlag.Doch wederistklar,ob er das Werkschonbei AbfassungseineserstenBucheskannte,noch istseineAngabedessen,wovondas dritteBuchbei Orígeneshandelt,deckungsgleich mitseinemeigenenVorhaben.21Zudemliegtbei OrígenesauchkeineVierteilung derNaturvor.Bringt vor? Eriugenahieralso doch eineinnovative Einteilung Ein Blickaufeinewenigerim FokusliegendeQuelle zeigtzumindestteilweiseAnderes.So heißtes beiAlkuinin De fidetrinitatis : „Dahergibtes unter den Dingen der Naturzweierlei,den Schöpferund die Geschöpfe."22 Auch hierstehtdie Aussagevölligunbegründet und ohne Hinweisdarauf,es handelesichdabeium Ungewöhnliches. Damithabenzumindest zweispecies von eine Wie er zu des zweiten Buchs EriugenasEinteilung Entsprechung. Beginn derNaturfurdie ,gröbere'die sichweiterverzeigt,hälterdieseZweiteilung feinern lässt.23 WeilauchAlkuinkeineErklärung oderQuelle angibt,aufgrund dererdiese statthaft odergarevidentist,bleibtdie Fragenacheinermöglichen Einteilung EinQuelle bestehen.Zunächstistallerdings Eriugenas,feinere', viergliedrige zu klären. Wie beschreibt er die einzelnen bzw. wie teilung species rechtfertigt erihrenStatus?Zur erstenspecies lässterA im erstenBuchsagen,siewerdein Gott gedacht,genauerin der Ursachealler.Eine nähereAngabehierüber etwasspäterim Text:„Die ersteDifferenz also der zuvorgenannten erfolgt in der Natur scheint dem zu und nicht bestehen,was schafft Einteilungen erschaffen wird. Und zurecht,weil diese Art der Natur allein von Gott zutreffend als anarchos(das ausgesagtwerdenkann,der allein allschaffend heißtohneAnfang)zu denkenist,weilnurerdie höchsteUrsacheallerist,die aus ihmund durchihngemachtsind."24 20)SiehezurGliederungsschwierigkeit - traité desprincipes établi , texte Origene parM. Harl, G. Doviral, A.LeBoulluec (Paris 1976),intr. p.9. 2,)Siehe dazuPeriphyseon V,3095-3097. 22)PL 101,28C:Ideoinrerum naturis haecduotantum idestcreator, etcreaturae. sunt, 23)II, 103-105. 24)I,402-407: Praedictarum naturae divisionum differentia nobis visaestinearn itaque prima etnoncreatur. Necimmerito, naturae dedeosolorecte quaecréât quiatalis species praedicatur, ANAPXOC esse,quiaprincipalis (hocestsineprincipio) quisolusomniacreans intelligitur causaomnium facta sunt solusest. quaeexipsoetperipsum Dassolus heißt dabeinicht, dassGottnurdiesundnichts anderes dassnurerallein ist,sondern dieses ist.Eriugena trennt nicht immer zwischen anarchos undanaitios sine , lateinisch sorgfaltig undsinecausa undursachenlos , alsozwischen (etwaI, 3103),wasbeiden principio anfanglos

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so gehtderAusdruckfìirdessenBezugsgegenWas die zweiteArtbetrifft, andersalses Sheldon-Williams Ursachen), stand,causaeprimordiales (vorrangige im Zusammenhang mitder er Dort ist zurück.25 auf behauptet, Augustinus viertenFormderSeiendenangeführt: „(. . .) aufandereWeisein den Samen, Ursachenwiederholt vonNeuemdie vorrangigen in denengleichsam werden, existiedievondenUrsachenher,die erzuerstgründete, durchDingegeleitet, Pflanze."26 aus der ren,wie etwadie Pflanzeaus derErdeund derSamen Zwar istdamitgesagt,dass die Samenkraft gleichsameineWiederholung Ursachenist,doch was dieseselbstsindund in welcherder dervorrangigen ist vierFormensie sichwiederfinden wiederfinden), (wennsie sichüberhaupt dei innerhalbderUrsachenordnichtangegeben.Indessindsie in De civitate fìirEriugenavon es wahrscheinlich weshalb als zweites angeführt, nung und was ,schafft zu solches denken sie als an offensichtlich müssen, ist, Anfang wird'.27 erschaffen hat mit dem Verweisauf DionysiusAreopagitaals Sheldon-Williams insofernrecht,als die einzelnenBenencausae für die Quelle primordiales im Periphyseon sie sich wie dieser finden,aufdiesenTheoUrsachen, nungen logenzurückgehen.28

vonNazianz das beiGregor wird. Sobenennt differenziert durchaus Kirchenvätern griechischen ist aber so einen Der Sohn hat den Sohn. der den Vater, Anfang, hingegen Anfang Anfanglose Chrétiennes sieheOratio 284,82, 15-16):"Ovojia§è icojxèv 42, 16 (Sources ursachenlos, derSohnursachenlos 30,11 (SC250, ist,Oratio Yióç,wenngleich rcarnp, if'Seàp%fj àvápxq) dafür als und Kai ekeiÖev àXka 246,12-13): axpóvcoç àvavuÍGúç Begründung -imápxovxoç cbç Oratio 29,4 (SC250,182,24-25):Oùyotp 0eòçtòktiÇó^evov. 25)SieheGoulven beiAugualsVorlage Scotetsesauteurs Madec 1988),74;erfuhrt (Paris ,Jean SheldonPatrick ad litteram stinus an:Degenesi VI, 10,17(PL34,346),ZurAussage Inglis zur BookI (Dublin1968),223.Eineweitere sieheders., Williams' Aufstellung Periphyseon 4Primordiales in s Causae D. sich bei: Robert findet Crouse, InterpretaEriugena Begriffsgenese - theBible andHermeScottus in:Iohannes Sources andSignificance', tionofGenesis: Eriugena International neutics, of forthePromotion oftheSociety Colloquium Proceedings oftheNinth ed.byGerdvan and at Leuven held 1995; 7-10, Louvain-la-Neuve, Studies, June Eriugenian Steel andJames 1996),209-220. Riel,Carlos (Leuven McEvoy 26)Degenesi inquibus rursus inseminibus, ad litteram VI, 10,17 (PL34,346):aliter quasi ductae derebus causae condidit, causas, quasprimum quaesecundum repetuntur, primordiales zu Ausdruck diesen AuchBedagebraucht exherba. semen exterra, velutherba existerunt, rerum De natura von 90, 188A). (PL Beginn 27)Decivitate sicut etfiunt, etfaciunt Aliae vero causae deiV,9,4 (CCSLXLVII, 139,138-142): maxime rationales. omnes creati sunt spiritus, 28)Ders., I (Dublin Book 1968),223. Periphyseon

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NamendesDionysiuszu erschaffenen ersten Eriugenamachtdiegöttlichen Ursachen(causaeprimordiales ), benenntdieseUrsachenabererstim zweiten - essentia - vita- ratio - intelligentia - sapientia - virtus - beatiBuch'bonum tudo veritas aeternitas magnitudo amor pax unitas perfection Zur Bestimmung von causaprimordialis lassensich zudem verschiedene im Ausdrücke die Laufe des verwendet anführen, Periphyseon gleichbedeutend werden:etwaprincipaleexemplum , bei den Griechenprototyposis genannt,30 sowierationes omniumrerum?1 rerum und divinae voluntates ,32zudem principii das griechische idea?0 Die vorrangigen Ursachensind demnachUrbilder, WillesowieGedankenGottes.34 göttlicher offensichtlich fürso geläufig EriugenahältdenAusdruckcausaprimordialis oderselbsterklärend, dasserihnbei seinererstenNennungnichtnähererläutertundes alszweifelsfrei ansieht,die zweiteNaturdaraufbeziehenzu können nähereDeutungsowiedie angeführten {nullomodohaesitare ausim).Jegliche im erst weiteren Verlauf des Textes.Dennoch legt die Synonymefolgen Unmittelbarkeit der Natureinteilung zu Beginndes Periphyseon die VermuDenkerhabe schonvor Eriugenaeine tungnahe, irgendeinkarolingischer solcheVierteilung derNaturvorgenommen. Sonstwärewohlwenigstens der Hinweis gegeben,hier mithilfevon einer augustinischen Darstellungdie schonbekannteZweiteilung derNaturweiterzu verästeln.

29)II, 3168-3178 - dasWesen - das undIII, 133-191, aufDeutsch dasGute sinngemäss: - die Leben derVerstand das DenkendedieWeisheitdasVermögen die Schönheit - dieEwigkeit - dieLiebe - derFrieden - dieEinheit - dieVollendung. - dieGröße Wahrheit 30)I, 147-159. 31)EtwaI, 174-178. 32)III,9/17. 33)II, 140;dieVorlage fïir ideainderVerwendung vonexemplum lieferte wohlCalcidius inseinemKommentar zumplatonischen Timaios Commentari , sieheCalcidii us,ed.Waszink, 306, ideaesunt 4-7:(...) porro naturalium rerum. Eineweitere istMacrobius, exempla Quelledafür Insomnium I,2, 14. scipionis 34)Indem siediessind,entziehen siesichallerFassbarkeit. Siesindalsonichts Intelligibles. Worauf sichderIntellekt beziehen bleibt aufdieFormen derPlatoniker kann, unklar; überhaupt sicher insofern diesezudenvorranigen Ursachen rechnet. Ebenso entnicht, Eriugena gerade zieht sichdieessentia demIntellekt. Formen wie^Ähnlichkeit' oder,Vielheit' imPeriphytreten seon höchstens alsAkzidenzien auf.Esistindieser Hinsicht inwiefern alsein fraglich, Eriugena Vertreter desIdealismus werden wiediesetwaDermot Moran siehe kann, vertritt, angesehen The Scottus A Idealism in the Middle ders., John Philosophy of Eriugena, study of Ages (Cambridge inMedieval 'Idealism TheCaseofJohannes Scottus ders., 1989);sowie Philosophy: Eriugena', inMedieval andTheology 8 (1999),53-82. Philosophy

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Die dritteArtschließlich sollsichaufsolchesbeziehen,was „imWerdenzu . Dies ist fürEriugena Zeiten und an Orten"erkanntwird (cognoscuntur) mit der wie seine Welt, spätereAbhandlung geschaffenen gleichbedeutend überOrt und Zeit zeigt:„Ortund Zeit nämlichsindzu allemGeschaffenen In diesenbeidenbestehtdie gesamtejetzigeWeltund kann hinzuzuzählen. ohnesie nichtsein,weswegensie bei den Griechenhonaneutopan (das heißt ohnedie das Gesamtenichtseinkann)heißen."35 bleibtdie viertespecies , von der es zuvorheißt,sie sei „als Merkwürdig ihr solches da ein Sein zukomme,das nichtsein Unmöglichesaufgestellt", könne.Nähereszu dieserUnmöglichkeit sagtEriugenanicht.Wie die späteren Bücherzeigen,wirddiesespecies gleichdererstenaufGottbezogen,undzwar Den GedankeneinesEndes,das mitdem als Ziel und Ende derSchöpfung.36 erhält er dabei vorallemvon MaximusConfessor.37 zusammenfällt, Anfang 2. Quellen fürdie Natureinteilung Demnachlässtsichzwardas, was Eriugenaden einzelnenspecieszuweist,in derNatur doch bleibtdie Frage,ob die Vierteilung seinenQuellenverorten, in ist. Eine Suche der Gedanke nichtdochEriugenas Patrologia-Latinaeigener Datenbankbleibtergebnislos, gleich,inwelchemKasusmannaturaunddivisio als Suchbegriffe einsetzt. Naheliegendals möglicheQuelle istHrabanusMauihmfindetsichebensowenigein Hinweiswie bei bei doch rus De universo , Walafried Strabo.Keinelateinische Quelle des 8. oder9. Jahrhunderts präsennicht. ähnlicheVierteilung, auchBedasDe naturarerum tierteinezumindest an derAnnahme,Eriuein Festhalten WarumistvordiesemHintergrund genasZeit sei diese Einteilungbereitsbekanntgewesen,dennochsinnvoll? undein inhaltein quellenbezogenes ZweiArgumente lassensichvorbringen, bekannten und den Karolingern liches.Es gibteinenlateinischen Autor,der im so unverder naturaespricht, von denspecies Ausdruck, Periphyseon jenem

35)I, 1131-1135: Inhis suntcomputantur. ettempus inter omnia Locussiquidem quaecreata a essenonpotest, etsinequibus mundus totus duobus ideoque quinuncestconsistit nanque All essenonvalet). Dasgeschaffene QNANEYTOI1AN(idestsineuniversitas dicuntur graecis So weist Gesamtheit mitderkörperlichen istdabeinicht Eriugena gleichzusetzen. unbedingt inderSeele(I, 1396-1419). Ortzu,nämlich Wissenschaft einen etwaauchaller 36)EtwaII, 65-69;siehedazuauchWillemien inEriugenas ofReturn Otten: ,TheDialectic . Periphyseon 37)Ambigua adIohannemìAVGVX , 1257D.

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/Vivarium 46 (2008)1-23 S.F.Werner

mittelt auftaucht: Lukrez.38 Diese Parallelebeweistfürsichgenommenwenig, nichtunwesentlicher doch ist es ein fürdieseUntersuchung Gedanke,dass in Lukrez De naturarerumdie Gesamtheitaller Dinge als Natur auffasst, ein Vorgehen, das Eriugenawie selbstverständlich zu Beginndes Periphyseon sowie Alkuins Zweiteilung zugrundeliegt.Auch sprichtLukrezvon vorträgt einerschaffenden Natur(naturacreetres, I, 56), ja er setztdie GöttinVenus als schöpferische Naturan (naturacreatrix , 629). Damit gibter das vor,was als eine Art Alkuin und der Natur ansetzen,nämlichdie später Eriugena schöpferische. Nun istLukrezkeineQuelle,die gemeinhin als einefürEriugenawichtige wird.Zum einenliegtdiesdaran,dassEriugenasieselbstimPeriphyaufgefasst seonnichtnennt.Doch ist dies insofern keintriftiger Einwand,als er seine lateinischen ohnehin kaum anführt: weder Martianus Quellen Capella,noch CicerooderAlkuin,auchnichtFridugisus vonTourstauchennamentlich auf, der Einfluss Werke dieser der Autoren nachweisbar ist.39 Zum wenngleich anderenhatmannichtden Eindruck,dassEriugenademepikureischen Denken zugeneigtwar.Warumalso sollteer eine Einteilungsvorlage, die in der mit Lukrezund Augustinusentstanden karolingischen Auseinandersetzung Da die Karolinger und mitihnenauch Eriugenadie lateiist,übernehmen? nischeDichtunghochschätzten, hatmanLukrezzumindest wegenderliterarischenFormund Sprachegelesen.Zudem ist auch eine inhaltlich-formale Einwirkung naheliegend.So weistetwa Bedas De naturarerumschondem TitelnachaufLukrezalsVorlagehin. ist dabei keinArgument:Seine EriugenasAblehnungdes Epikureismus hinischtlich derÜbernahmevonLehrinhalten undMethodik Unterscheidung im sich Falle der Stoiker deutlich: Seine für zeigt Wertschätzung den Stoiker er dadurch zum insofern erdiesenals Urheberder Ausdruck, Chrysippbringt Verfahrens Bezeichnenderweise , also des rückauflösenden analysis anpreist.40 istes genaudiesesVerfahren, mithilfe dessenerzu BeginndeszweitenBuches die Einteilungder Natur aufzulösengedenkt.Hingegenpolemisiert er im erstenBuch des Periphyseon die stoische wonachdie ousia gegen Auffassung, des KörpersderKörperselbstsei.41 Lukrezder Fall sein: Eriugenawürdedann Selbigeskönntehinsichtlich Lukrez'formalen Werkaufbau nachahmenundeineVierteilung derNatur,die 38)Denatura rerum derAusdruck tritt wiederholt zuBeginn desBuches VIauf. I, 148(ed.Bailey); 39)Siehe zudiesen Goulven Scotetsesauteurs. Madec, Jean Quellen 40)Annotationes admarcianum , ed.CoraLutz, 93,2-9. 41)1,2010-2015.

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miteineraugustinischen denlukretischen verbindet, Vierteilung Naturbegriff er den epikureischen seinemWerkan den Anfangstellen.Zugleichverwirft Damit ist die Atomismusauf gleicheWeisewie die stoischeKörperlehre.42 allerunsbekannten wahrscheinlichste Vorlagenangegeben. 3. Die AuflösungderNatur das Nebendemdargelegten Argument, Quellenargument gibtes einweiteres bezieht.Dieses stelltdie sich auf die Art der Darstellungim Periphyseon eine uneingein welche der Prämisse (ii) Natureinteilung Frage, anfängliche zukommenließ. Eriugena schränktgültigeBedeutungfurdas Periphyseon konsederNaturseinerUntersuchung die Einteilung zeigtsichweniggewillt, quentzugrundezu legen,im Gegenteil,schonzu Beginndes zweitenBuches hebter sie wiederauf.Dabei sagenschonSteelund Hadley,die Natureinteiof thisthoughtis his absolut:„Themostoriginalfeature lungsei keineswegs and thecreatednature betweenthecreative thatthedistincition demonstration desAberwas istdieses„originalfeature", can neverbe absolute."43 aufgrund sen die Einteilungbloß relativgilt?Steel/ Hadley fuhrenzwei Einschränwonach nichtsin sich selbst kungenan: einerseitsden Teilhabegedanken, die causaeprimordiales kannund andererseits existieren , welchedas Schaffen in sichvereinen.Dies magrichtig und das Erschaffenwerden sein,bleibtaber tieferund reißt deutlich an der Oberfläche.EriugenasEinheitsgedanke geht zwischenSchöpferund Geschöpfein. Und diesenlegter überdie Differenz imPeriphyseon vonAnfangan seinenÜberlegungen raschenderweise zugrunde. unerschaffen als schaffend und wiederholt die erste Natur nachdem Sogleich und erläutert bestimmt wird,kommtderEinwandvon FigurA, warumdie Theologen(gemeintsindDionysiusund Gregorvon Nazianz) die göttlichen und als schaffend Natur zugleichals creareund crearibestimmten, göttliche der die Anders erschaffen (I, 545-557). Theologenwidersprechen gesagt, N. zustimInsofern die Natur. der zuvorgeleisteten Eriugena Figur Einteilung Naturseitatsächlich menunderklären beides,kipptbereits lässt,die göttliche fürdie erstespecies.Und die Differenzierung schaffendund unerschaffen 42)Kenney Latin istheearliest rerum : „Lucretius vonDe natura denAufbau surviving sagtüber in the unit and as an artistic the 'book' is handled in which literary part plays integral poem derPhilosophie in Grundriss derGeschichte zitiert nachMichael , Erler, ,Lukrez' architecture", ein. auchimPeriphyseon nimmt das,Buch' formale Antike 4/1,413;eineähnliche Bedeutung 43)Dies.,John Scotus 399. Eriugena',

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zuvorschon,bei derDarlegungderUnfassbarkeit dercausaeprimordiales , heißt Wennsie es,sie seienin dercausaomnium , also dererstenNatur,enthalten.44 darinenthaltensind,so ist die zweitespeciesin der erstenenthalten, etwas, dassderDialektiknachfürspeciesnichtgeltendarf.Verstrickt Eriugenasich Im Gegenteil,er machtsichdaran,die augenscheinhierin Widersprüchen? lichenWidersprüche zwischenderseinerZeit geläufigen und Natureinteilung denAussagendergriechischen Theologenzu lösen.In einerHinsichtnämlich sei die Natureinteilung zwargültig,in eineranderenaberobsolet. Die Antwort, inwiefern Gottauch als erschaffen angesehenwerdenkann, im sich etwas ersten findet Buch,und dieserdortangeja sogarmuss, später gebeneGrundwirdletztlichauch die vierspeciesder Naturaufhebenbzw. vereinen. So heißtes dort:„erschaffen wird(Gott)aber,weilnichtsaußerihm essentiale er nämlich ist die essentia von allem."45 ist; Diese metaphysisch So aufgeladene Aussageisthiernichtnäherausführbar. immenswichtig, wie sie ist,bedarfsie einerausführlicheren als Darlegung, es hiergeleistetwerdenkann.46Wenigstenslässtsich zeigen,dass eben dieser Gedankezu Beginndes zweitenBuchesdie Rückauflösung derNatureinsehbar macht.Dort heißtes, die viergliedrige Einteilunglasse sich auflösenin einezweigliedrige, und Schöpfer Geschöpf,und diesewiederumin göttliche Einheit:„N. Verneinst du etwa,dass Schöpferund Geschöpfeinessind?- N. Die Gesamtheit A. Schwerlich könnteich diesverneinen. also,die Gott und das Geschöpfbeinhaltet, welchezuerstin vierArteneingeteilt ist,wird danach zu einem Unteilbaren, nämlich Ursache und und Ende, Anfang und sind demnach aber inwieeines, Schöpfer Geschöpf zurückgeführt."47 fern?Die folgende darauf: Aussageantwortet Wenn dudasGeschöpf wirst demSchöpfer dudaanetwas anderes als denken, hinzufügst, dasserallein wahrhaft ist?Nichts nämlich außerhalb vonihmselbst heißt wahrhaft daran, essentiale nurindemMaßesind, alssieandemteilhaben, der , weilalle,dievonihmsind,

44)I, 174-178. 45)I, 499-500: autem essentialiter estpraeter estenimomnium (...) creatur quianihil ipsam, DasWort essentia. essentia halte ichimPeriphyseon letztlich für unübersetzbar. 46)Siehe dazu:Sebastian Studien zurPhilosophie, Weiner, ,Bochumer Eriugenas negative Ontologie Bd.46(Amsterdam: imDruck). Benjamins, 47)II, 109-119: - A.Nonfacile N. Numnegabis creatorem etcreaturam unum esse? negarim - N.Universitas huicenim collectioni resistere mihi videtur ridiculosum esse. itaque quaedeoet inquattuor creatura continetur formas veluti divisa iterum adunum individuum, prius princirevocatur. pium quippe causamque finemque

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S.F.Weiner /Vivarium 46 (2008)1-23 Verneinst dualso,dassSchöpfer allein durch sichselbst besteht. vonsichselbst ausgehend 48 eines sind? undGeschöpf

A.'s anschließende EriugenadieZustimmung zeigtdabei,welcheSchlagkraft ZwarsprichtEriubeimisst.Zwei Dinge sind anzumerken: serBegründung gena von der Teilhabe, also einem neuplatonischemGedanken, doch dassdasjenige,was am Seinteilhat, erdieTeilhabedahingehend, interpretiert woranes teilhat. selbstgarnichtist.Dessen Sein istin demjenigenenthalten, Gott alleinbesitzt sondern Die Geschöpfehabenwederessenochsubstantia , Modellvon Auchklingtdas Gesagtesehrnachdemneuplatonischen dieses.49 in und wurde der und Rückkehr Verharren Forschung bislang Hervorgang, Dennoch denktEriugenahierbeivorrangig immerwiederso interpretiert. nichtan diese neuplatonische Trias,sondernan einen anderenGedanken des Pseudo DionysiusAreopagita,den er immerwiederim Periphyseon anfuhrt: Esseenimomniumestsuperessedivinitas , „das Sein von allemnämlichist Wie das enim, griechisch die überseiendeGottheit".50 gar zeigt,handeltes abereineBegründung wofür?Ein sichbei diesemSatz um eineBegründung, Blick auf den Zusammenhang,in dem der Satz bei Dionysiussteht,hilft also hat alles Unbelebteam Sein desselben[des Hervorweiter:„Einerseits sprudelnden]teil,denn das Sein von allem ist die überdem Sein liegende Gottheit(. . .)."51Wenn der mit„denn"beginnendeNebensatzsichaufdas bezieht,dann begründetdas „Sein von allem"die Teilhabe Vorangehende Demnach allesUnbelebtenam Sein des zuvorgenannten Sich-Ergießenden. ist nichtder Teilhabegedanke dasjenige,was die Aussagestützt,sondern beiDionysiusgerade so vielzitierte Satzerläutert von der Eriugena umgekehrt, denTeilhabegedanken.52 48)II, 269-277(Angaben N. Quidsi creaturam creatori nachJeauneaus' Kolumnenedition): vere Nilenim extra vere est? nisiipsum itautnilaliudineaintelligas adiunxeris ipsum quisolus suntnisiparticipado essentiale dicitur, quaeabeosuntnilaliudsuntinquantum quiaomnia unum Numnegabis creatorem etcreaturam subsistit. ipsius quia seipsosolusperseipsum esse? 49)Vgl.hierzu auchI, 59-70. 50)EtwaI,61undI,3190. 51)De coelesti eivai xà (lèvo'>vaÇcoamvxaxcp III (IV),ed.Heil/Ritter, hierarchia 20,15-16: . . xò eivai xà 5è mvxcov èaxlv eivai .). ( (xò 0eóxr|ç), 'mep aúxfjç iieiéxei yàp 52)DieseTatsache unddessen aufDionysius auchimHinblick istbemerkenswert, Areopagita istmirbeidenvorangehenden Einederartige Neuplatonikern Rechtfertigung Neuplatonismus. nicht bekannt.

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Wie istdieses„Seinvonallem"zu verstehen, kausal,finalodersubstanziell? insofern erdiesesesseomnium Bei Eriugenaenthältes alledreiKomponenten, Und hinsichtlich rerum bestimmt.53 omnium substantia bzw. als essentia auch dieses Seins, einem Sein von allem, das zugleichals die dem Einzelnen zwischenSchöpgibtes keineDifferenz zugrundeliegendeSubstanzauftritt, desferund Geschöpf.Es gibtnurzweiAspekteim Periphyseon , hinsichtlich schaffenden hinsichtlich der Erstens senGottsichvomGeschöpfunterscheidet: und unerschaffenen Natur,„die nurvon Gott mit Rechtausgesagtwerden An keinerStellemachter dabei eine Differenz kann."54 geltend,die sichauf ergeradeunermüdlich bezieht.Vielmehrwiederholt das essebzw.die essentia Zweitensbezeichneter die sichtbareSchöpfungein die Einheitderessential. umsandereMal als imagooderWiderhall{echô)des Schöpfers.55 wennwirunsden Differenz eineontologische Damitistsicherlich gegeben, der auch den Neuplatoniszu Eigenmachen, aristotelischen Ontologiebegriff mus prägte.Abereine Seinsdifferenz vermagEriugenahiergarnichtauszumachen,weiles seinerAnsichtnachnichtzweiSeiendegibt,die ontologisch von allem,die sichin den sondernnurein Seiendes,die essentia differieren, Gott hat sich nach Eriugenaim Sinnlichen Abbildernoffenbart. sinnlichen indemer sichdarinzeigt.Ontologischgesehengibtes also selbsterschaffen, zwischenden Seienden,sondernes gibtnureinenwahrhaft keineDifferenz Seienden,der sich in allem,das wir ,seiend'nennen,als Daseinsfundament WeildiesesModellnichtdem neuplatonischen entspricht, Eriugena verbirgt. Denkereingeordnet aberzumeistalsneuplatonischer wird,bleibtdieserPunkt in seinemDenkenzumeistungesehen. WelcheFunktionnimmtso die EinteilungderNaturüberhauptnochein, essentiam aufzulösenist?Sie ist,so heißtes zu Beginndes wennsie secundum universitatis zweitenBuches,einecomtemplatio , also eineBetrachintelligibilis was nicht Zwar macht Gesamtheit.56 deutlich, Eriugena tungderintelligiblen umfassen versteht und was das Intelligible genauer unterdiesercontemplano nichtals soll, doch ist zumindestso viel klar,dass er die Natureinteilung indes den Wird diese ansieht. oder Regeln contemplano unsinnig garunzulässig Natur so ergibtsich eine indifferente der Dialektikgemäßvervollständigt, heißtes zu Beginndes Es gebegenerellkeineEinteilung, mittelsderanalysis.

53)I, 59-70. 54)I,404-405: naturae dedeosolorecte (...) quiatalis praedicatur. species 55)EtwaI, 193-198; V,2437-2450. 56)II,3.

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zweitenBuches,die sichnichtwiederin jene Einheitrückauflösen ließe,aus der sie hervorgegangen ist (II, 36-46). Dieses Verfahren nenntN zuvordas also wörtlich,rück-auflösende' Wie istdieseRückauflösung der analytische, wurdeschonangeführt: „Wenndu das Natureinteilung möglich?Die Antwort dem wirst du da an etwas anderes denken,als Geschöpf Schöpferhinzufügst, dass er allein wahrhaft ist?" daran, zwischenSchöpfer SpringenwirzurnächstenStelle,wo von derDifferenz und Geschöpfund damitvonderNatureinteilung die Redeist.Sie findetsich in derMittedes dritten Buchesund behandeltdie Lehredes DionysiusAreoA pagita.Dialogfigur sagtdarüber: Undunvergleichlich höher undverwunderlicher alsalldiesscheint mirdaszusein, wasdu derAutorität desheiligen dassnämlich Gottselbst zuerkennst, Dionysius Areopagita sowohl derMacher vonallem istalsauchinallem istnicht nur ist;diesnämlich gemacht sondern auchvielen, vonmirbisjetztunvernommen undmirunbekannt, ja fastallen. indiese Dennwenn diessoist,werwird dannnicht Worte ausbrechen und unverzüglich verkünden: GottistsoallesundallesistGott!57 Die Ungeheuerlichkeit dieserAussagehebt Eriugenadeutlichhervor.Fast imAnschlussheißtes: „Was allensei sie bislangunbekannt. Und unmittelbar die sichfurweisehalten,in derBetrachauchdenenungeheuerlich erscheint, Vielheitendersichtbaren und unsichtbaren tungderverschiedenen Dinge."58 DennochwirderdieseAussagegegenalleEinwändeverteidigen. Nehmenwir seineWortwahlernst,so müssenwir diese Behauptungdes Dionysiusals das Kernproblem des Periphyseon sonstpräsentiert ansehen,dennnirgendwo starken Kontrast zwischen sensus solch einen dem communis undder Eriugena autoritären Wahrheit. Seine Rechtfertigung derdionysischen werAussagesoll hierübergangen in interessanter ist die Rückkehr zu zitiert 2595. den, Dionysius III, Eriugena V und fugtdieseran: „Werimmer einelangePassageaus De divinisnominibus die MachtdieserWortebetrachtet, wirdnichtsanderesals die Überzeugung

57)III,1328-1334: etmirabilius mihi Ethisomnibus altius videtur incomparabiliter quodsancti esseet auctoritate utens videlicet deum etomnium factorem asseris, ipsum Dionysii Ariopagitae inomnibus nonsolum sedetmultis ac hocenim adhuc inauditum etincognitum mihi, factum; non in Nam si sic confestim hanc vocem et Deus omnibus. est, quis erumpat proclamet: paene omnia estetomnia deus! itaque 58)III,1335-1337: etiam hisquiputantur essesapientes, aestimabitur muliQuodmonstrosum etinvisibilium varietate considerata. rerum visibilium tipici

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dass Gott selbstder Machervon allemist finden,ja sogardieseverkünden, und in allemgemachtist."59 des Pseudo-Dionysius AreoDiese Aussagefindetsich in den Schriften istjedoch,was Eriugenain der pagitaexplizitan keinerStelle.Entscheidend Er wendetsie aufdie Folge(ab III, 2818) aus seinerBehauptungentwickelt. Differenz zwischenSchöpfernatur und Geschöpfnatur an: „Und wenn das ist,wirdGott Ursachesein,das Geschöpf Geschöpfaus Gott entsprungen aberdieWirkung. Wennaberdas GeschöpfWirkungist,undWirkungnichts sichin anderesals die gemachteUrsache,dann folgt,dass die Gott-Ursache ihrenWirkungen hat. Denn was seiner Natur nach verschieden ist, gemacht über.So wiein derWärmeund gehtnichtaus derUrsachein seineWirkungen demLichtnichtsanderesals dieselbeKraftdes Feuersauftritt."60 Das GemachtseinGottes,genauerdas der göttlichen Ursache,wirdhier näherbestimmt: Sie istin ihrenWirkungen erschaffen. Was das fürdie Natur Gottesheißt,zeigtsichim Folgenden:„SiehstDu nichtdurchdie Vernunft, dasswirein und dieselbeNatur,die göttliche sicherlich, gemässdemBetrachtendesAnfangsnichterschaffen sondernschaffend, gemässderErforschung des Endesaberwedererschaffen nochschaffend nennenmüssen?"61 Was bedeutetdas?Die EinteilungderNaturin Anfangund Ende istnur Es istein und dieselbegöttgegebendurchdenje verschiedenen Standpunkt. licheNatur,die einerseits schaffend andererseits wederschaffend erscheint, nocherschaffen. Genau dasselbegiltim Hinblickauf das Erschaffen-Sein der göttlichen Natur: Wieichmeine, bleibt allein dasvermittelnde dasdurch zweierlei Maßseinen Argument, Betrachtern einleuchtet. Das erste Naturalserschaffen und Maß,wenndiegöttliche schaffend betrachtet Erschaffen nämlich indenerstrangigen wird. istsievonsichselbst underschafft so sichselbst, dasheißt, siefängt zu Ursachen, an,inihren Theophanien erscheinen ausdenverborgensten ausderen Tiefen siehervortreten will(...). Das Naturen, 59)III,2633-2635: horum verborum nilaliudreperiet virtutem suadere, Quisquís perspexerit, immo etiam nisi in deum omnium factorem esse et omnibus factum. pronuntiare,ipsum 60)III,2827-2832: Atsicreatura exdeo,erit deuscausa, creatura autem effectus. Siautem creatura esteffectus, etnilaliudesteffectus nisicausafacta, ineffectibus deum causam suis sequitur fieri. Nonenimexcausaineffectus suosprocedit, in alienum sit.Siquidem quoda suinatura calorem etinlucem nilaliudnisiipsavisignea erumpit. 61)III, 2892-2895: unameandemque Videsne divinam naturam, videlicet, ergoquaratione iuxta considerationem noncreatam sedcreatricem, iuxta verofinis nec principii speculationem creatam neccreatricem possumus appellare?

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/Vivarium S.F.Weiner 46 (2008)1-23 zweite Maßaber, wenn sieindenäußersten dererstrangigen Ursachen betrachWirkungen indenen tetwird, sielediglich alserschaffen, nicht aberalsschaffend benannt rechtmäßig Erschaffen nämlich wird. siehinab bisindieäußersten außerhalb derer steigt Wirkungen, mansienurerschaffen nichts daher nennt undnicht schaffend. erschafft; (...) Erschaffen inihren alsoundschaffend aberistsie istsieindenerstrangigen Ursachen; Wirkungen nicht.62 erschaffen undschafft

Die Betrachtung des Intelligiblen (contemplano ), von derwiederintelligibilis holt die Rede ist (II, 3 & III, 2898), betrachtetGott als unerschaffen insofern sieaufdenAnfangschaut,alserschaffend underschaffen Schaffendes, bzw.als nurerschaffen mitBlickaufdie Ursachenund das Physische, durch als subsitieren und weder noch schaffend Aufrechterhaltene, göttliches mit Blick auf das Ende. Die Betrachtung Gottesmisstalso mit erschaffen zweierleiMaß, je nachdem,ob sie auf die Allursacheoder das Geschaffene schaut.Wie demnachdie EinteilungderNaturaus demAnfangvon Buch I zu verstehen ist,legterhierim drittenBuchdar. Die göttliche NaturistallevierNaturenzugleich.Betrachtet mansiein den essentiam nurin Gottbestehen, dannist Ursachen,die secundum erstrangigen er schaffendund erschaffen. Betrachtetman sie hingegenin den nichtwo sie als Substanzzugegenist,dannistsielediglich schaffenden Wirkungen, Die vierArtender Natursind demnachvierBetrachtungsstanderschaffen. In istdie NaturderWirkung,also des Geschöpfes, Wahrheit dieselbe punkte. wie die derUrsache.Schöpferund Geschöpfsindeins.All das basiertaufder des Geschöpfes sei das subsistere und essedesselben, Annahme,das Erschaffen etwasGöttlichesist. gründetalso auf EriugenasOntologie,wonachessentia AllesSeiende,soferneswahrhaft Seiendesist,bestehenurin Gottundniemals außerhalbvon ihm.63 Daher gebe es genau genommengar nichts,was außerhalbvon Gott von Seibesteht.Folglichmussdas Erschaffen Gottes,so es ein Erschaffen sein. Die DarlegungdiesesGedankens endemist,ein Sich-selbst-Erschaffen 62)III,2897-2914: Rationem restare solummodo modoconmedietatis arbitror, quaeduplici etcreari etcreare divina suisarridet. Primo natura. quando templatoribus quidem, conspicitur enim a seipsainprimordialibus acperhocseipsam hocest,insuistheoCreatur causis, creat, exoccultissimis naturae suaesinibus volens (...). Secundo phaniis emergere incipit apparere inquibus effectibus causarum creari tantumduminextremis vero, primordialium perspicitur, nonautem creare recte Creatur enim inextremos ultra descendens effectus, modo, praedicatur. in solummodo etnoncreare dicitur creari (...). Creatur quosnilcreat; ideoque ergoetcreat in earum vero effectibus creatur et non creat. causis; primordialibus 63)Siehe ZitatausI,499-500. dazuobiges

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in den sowieseineVerteidigung gegenmöglicheEinwändefindetsichverteilt erstendreiBüchern.

4. Ein UmsturzderNatureinteilung? als nichtigerklärt, Dies Wirddamitdie Natureinteilung wirdsie aufgehoben? sicherlich wiesiewiederaufzulösen ist. nicht,docheswirdeinWegaufgezeigt, so manderratiofolge.Wie Eriugenavorgibt, Und dieserWegsei notwendig, von je einerNaturhandeln.Doch mitkeiwirdje ein Buch des Periphyseon nemWortsagter,mittelsdiesemUnternehmen die Differenzen dereinzelnen Sein Vorgehenverfolgtdas umgekehrteZiel: Naturenherauszuarbeiten. allervierNaturen,uminfolgedessen ihreIndifferenz Die Präsentation nachzuoder des weisen,was das Sein angeht.Dabei soll es der Weg derVernunft von via der der sein, ( ratiocinandi) Schlussfolgerns viergliedrigen Einteilung zurEinheitzurückfuhrt. seiennocheinmaldieArgumente Zusammenfassend fürdie Interpretation wonach eine der angeführt, Eriugena Auflösung Natureinteilung verfolgt: als unmittelbar 1. Die Darstellungin I, 19-39 wertetdie Natureinteilung oderwohl bekannt.MöglicheQuellenvorlagen wurdendareinsichtig ist sicherlich die Alkuin. gelegt, überzeugendste 2. Bereitsin II, 64-106 löst Eriugenadie Einteilungder Naturwieder auf.Wäreer ein bedingungsloser Befürworter dieserEinteilung,dann wäre eine Erklärungzu erwarten,warumdennochfürdie restliche an ihrfestzuhalten ist. Dergleichenfindetsichnicht. Untersuchung letztlichvon Gott,wo zu 3. Warumhandelnalle Bücherdes Periphyseon erwarten wäre,dasslediglichdie BücherI, IV undV von ihmhandeln, die übrigenindesvon den Ursachenund derenWirkungen? Wird in allenBücherndieselbegöttliche Naturbetrachtet, aus vierunterschiedlichenPerspektiven, dann istdas Vorgeheneinsichtig. seiensprachliche Hinweiseim Periphyseon. In I, 17-18 verlangt A Angefügt vonseinemGegenüber N, einenwahrenGedanken(veraratio)überdieNaturzu hören.Wo immerinderFolgevonderAuflösung derDifferenzen einteilung zwischenSchöpfer undGeschöpfdie Redeseinwird,bringtEriugenadie ratio insSpiel.Zunächstin I, 413-557,wo dieAuffassung vertreten wird,die göttlicheNatursei auch erschaffen. Dort bittetN um einenwahrenGedanken dieserAuffassung, A jedoch ziehtes vor, (I, 426, veraratio)zur Erläuterung

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N s Weg des Schlussfolgerns zu folgen,der auch (I, 429, via ratiocinandî) schonin I, 40 als Richtschnur wurde. ausgegeben In Buch II, 40-46,wo es wiederum die EinteilungderNaturgeht,meint welchedie veraratiobetrachte, seinichtwiederauflösbar. A, keineEinteilung, SchließlichBuchIII, wo A seineZweifelhervorbringt bezüglichderInterpreEr wonach Gott alles sei. von N eineErklärung, daraufhin die tation, verlangt demWegderVernunft oderdesSchlussfolgerns (III, 1349: ratiocinationis via) Ab 2818 dann das höchste maximum III, ( nachgeht. folgt Argument argumenGottsei auch erschaffen und daherin allemzugetum)fürdie Behauptung, N, ob A nicht gen.Und in derobenangeführten PassageIII, 2892-2895 fragt Artender qua rationeeinsehe,dass eine göttlicheNaturdie verschiedenen Naturzugleichsei. Ist dies ein sprachlicher Zufall?An fastallen Stellenim Periphyseon, an denen sich Eriugenaexplizitauf die ratioberuft,legter entweder, wie zu die der Natur oder das Erschaffensein der dar, Beginn, Einteilung göttlichen Naturund damitdie Wiederauflösung derNatureinteilung. Und diesesVorgehennennter via rationis. WelcheArgumente sprechengegendieseTheseeinersolchenEinteilungsauflösung? Zunächstistnirgendwo explizitim Periphyseon gesagt,dassdie Einteilung derNaturvon nunan aufgehoben sei.Verwirft Eriugenasie,sollteDerartiges zu findensein. Doch die Sacheverhältsichnichtso einseitig.Er erklärt nichtdie Naturhält es fürnichtig, sondern fixr wasgemäßder einteilung vernünftig, dasjenige, ratio(I, 17-18) zunächsteinzuteilen ist,auch wiederin Eineszurückfuhren. Andersgesagt,im Periphyseon denktEriugenadie Einteilungder Naturzu seiner und das dialektischen nurheißen,erlöstsie Ende, kann, Regelfolgend, wiederauf.Die EinteilungderNaturwirddadurchnichtabsurd,sondernist nurderersteTeil einervollkommenen derWirkBetrachtung {contemplano) lichkeit.Nichtdie Einteilungals solchehältA in II, 115-116 fürlächerlich ihrerWiederauflösung. (ridiculosum esse),sonderndas Zögernhinsichtlich Ein zweiterEinwandbetrifft den lateinischen TiteldesWerks:De divisione naturae . Warumheißtes nichtDe divisione etresolutione naturae ? Dem lateinischenTitel nach hält Eriugenaüber das gesamteWerkhinweguneingeschränkt an derEinteilungderNaturfest. IndeszeigtJeauneauin derEinleitungzurEditiondes erstenBuches,dass Titelerstin den Bibliothekskatalogen dieserlateinische des 16. Jahrhunderts Werk zuvor De während das natura , , De naturisoder findet, Physica Eingang selbst nennt die ersten Bücherdes Periwurde. genannt Eriugena Periphyseon

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in BuchIV schlichtPhysiologia (IV, 1), und in seinemspäterenKomphyseon mentarzu den himmlischen Hierarchiendes DionysiusAreopagitagibter seinemWerk den Titel Periphyseon , wörtlich„Von Naturen"oder „Über Naturen".64 Man könntesichdabei an dem Pluralstoßen,deraufeine Mehrzahlvon Naturenund damitauf eine eingeteilte Gesamtnatur verweist.Darum sei nocheinmalgesagt:FürallevierNaturenweistEriugenaeinzelnnach,dasssie „VonNaturen"zu ontologisch gesehennichtsanderessindals eine göttliche. desTitels.Hingegenistdernachträghandeln,istalso das rechteVersprechen licheTitelDe divisione naturaewie auch das griechische PendantPeriphyseos merismou unpassend,da es nichtalleinum die Einteilungder Naturgeht, sondernauch und vor allemum ihreAuflösungmittelsdes Nachweisesder Titel göttlichenNatur in allem. Wie Jeauneauzu diesem letztgenannten ist er nachträglich in den erhaltenen und anmerkt, Autographen eingefügt bezeichnet auch nurden erstenAbschnitt aus BuchI (Zeile 1-50),nichthingegendas gesamteWerk. Es sind zwei Argumente,auf denen Eriugenaseine Darstellungder aufbaut:Das Erschaffensein Gottesund die PräsenzGottesin Rückauflösung allemSeienden,genauerbestimmt als esse,essentia bzw.substantia von allem. Beide Argumentesind und waren ungewöhnlich, und aus genau diesem GrundführtEriugenasie im Periphyseon immerwiederan und erläutert sie. Diese sowieihreRechtfertigung machendie eigentliche Innovationin EriugenasDenkenaus.

^ Siehe dazuJeauneaus inseiner zurEdition vonBuchI,p.4-7. Ausführungen Einleitung

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íZ' v«/ brill


46 (2008)24-58 Vivarium

The Unity of Semantics

and Ontology

Wyclif's Treatment of the fallacia accidentis

JokeSpruyt TheNetherlands University ofMaastricht, Abstract To a certain accountof thefallaciaaccidentis. ThispaperdealswithJohnWyclif's of Aristotle fit in with Aristotle's extent understanding language. Wyclifs explanations in we can introduce different that we can talk about substances many ways; recognises from thesubstances' butalsobyusingnamesderived thembyusingsubstantial' names, ofalltheseexpressions. aretheultimate foundation Thesubstances accidental features. account oflanguage. isnotopposedtoa conceptualist Thisideainitself JohnBuridan forhimthe to show how but of usesAristotle's works, language principle categorisation in terms of our mental activities is to be of only. activity categorising explained things disthatallourlinguistic ontheother hand,readsmuchintotherequirement Wyclif, not our basisinextramental tinctions shouldhavetheir reality: conceptualisationsonly their distinct onticlayers. butalsoparallel toindividual substances, pertain Keywords medieval John JohnBuridan, Wyclif, logic,fallacies betweensubstanceand accidentgave distinction As is wellknown,Aristotle's riseto considerable debatein medievallogic.Sometimeago,Ebbesenshowed to explainthemeaningof concreteaccidental thatmanylogiciansstruggled What is terms,such as album, as theyoccur in all kindsof propositions.1 in is that the which medieval notion of accident the about way intriguing !) Forthecomplexity seeStenEbbesen, 'Conofaccidental thesemantics terms, surrounding Terms toSuch Problems Debates About Terms: LateThirteenth-Century crete Accidental Relating inMemory ofJan Studies inMedieval inMeaning andInference as"Album", Pinborg, Philosophy. Kretzmann ed.Norman (Dordrecht, 1988),107-174. 2008 Brill ©Koninklijke NV, Leiden,

DOI:10.1 163/156853408X255891

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46 (2008)24-58 /Vivarium J.Spruyt

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between authorsdealtwithit can revealhow theyconsideredtherelationship be terms accidental world. Should and the simply underexpressions linguistic or do with the of in terms of our stood world, theyalso havean ways dealing ontologicalbasis? One wayto findout moreaboutmedievalconceptionsofaccidentalterms is bylookingat theiraccountsoftheso-calledfallacyofaccident.In hisexplawho nationof this fallacy,the logicianPeterof Spain refersto Aristotle, is describedit as follows:"thefallacyof accidentoccurswhenever something in same the in of the an accident' in the and to inhere subject subject assigned etaccifueritreisubiecte assignatum way"(accidens fitquandosimiliter quidlibet dentiinesse).2 of thenotionof accidentclearlycomesto theforein the The complexity of writings JohnWyclif(ca. 1330-1380).In a recentarticle,Cesallihasdrawn attentionto the authors decidedlyrealistway of interpreting linguisticdisthatexistsis ofa propositional In Wyclifs vieweverything tinctions.3 nature, musthavetheircounand functions structures and thismeansthatlinguistic In thispaper refer.4 in thethingsto whichtheselinguistic expressions terpart I shallconsiderwhatthe authorhas to say about thefallaciaaccidentis. By we can an even of this s on fallacy, get specifically focusing Wyclif portrait distinctions and ontological clearerpictureofhowin hisphilosophy linguistic connected. areintimately structures thatare erroneous In his logic the authorlistsa numberof inferences To a certainextentthewayin whichWyclif becauseof thefallaciaaccidentis. whichdoes semantics, neatlyfitsin withAristotelian analysestheseinferences and entaila realistoutlook.Yeton a deeperlevelconceptualists notnecessarily for Ockham Buridan For someone like realists their different (as John ways. go be explainedin termsofourmental can primarily too),semanticdistinctions backedup byan ontowhereasin Wyclifs systemtheyarefirmly operations, of the of accidentgivesclear account The structure. fallacy logicians logical that universais5 and ofhisinsistence evidenceofhis realistpositionregarding have an extramental must of semantic distinction kind counterpart.6 any 2)Peter Summule Tractatus Called ofSpain, , ed.L.M.deRijk(Assen, 1972); logicales Afterwards Tractates VII,102(p.146211). 3)Laurent » deJean Vivarium 'Le«pan-propositionalisme 43 (2005),124-155. Cesalli, Wyclif, 4)Cesalli cit. n. 133. 2005(op. above, 3),p. 5)Fora recent 'TheProblem onuniversais, seePaulVincent onWyclif s position Spade, study Vivarium andWyclif sAlleged ofUniversais 43 (2005),111-123. "Ultrarealism"', 6)Conti D. Conti, seeAlessandro towards s "strong ofWyclif propensity hypostatisation"; speaks

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/Vivarium 46 (2008)24-58 J.Spruyt

The firstpartof thispaperwill presenta briefoutlineof theAristotelian ofthefallacyofaccident(1), followedbythetraditional account background ofthisfallacygivenbyPeterofSpain(2). Nextwe shallturntoWyclifs examofaccident,and showhowhisanalysesofthepropositions that plesoffallacies can lead to thisfallacyare on a par withan ontologicallyneutral'kind of Aristotelian butarethenultimately accountedforbymakingrefersemantics, ence to the ontologicalmake up of the world(3). To gatherthe extentof realistoutlook,we shallbriefly considerJohnBuridans Wyclifs specifically and with an conclude assessment of the two (4), analyses positions. FortheAristotelian ofthisfallacy, we shallfirst turnto itsoribackground elenchis . ginsin De sophisticis 1. The Backgroundof thefallada accidentis Throughoutall his works,and notablythoseon logic and argumentation, Aristotle tellsus howwe shouldhandleourselves in discussions. In repeatedly orderto producegood arguments, a personshouldbe able to bringup his the namesand/ordescriptions forit.This byusing appropriate subject-matter meansthata personneedsto knowwhathisuseofparticular characterisations forthingsentails.Forexample,supposewe arediscussing thathapsomething to be a tree we it as and a i.e. pens green bring up greenthing, by usinga characterisation derivedfromone of its accidentalfeatures: in thatcase we other that follow fromits being green,for automatically bringup things instancethatit is coloured,or whatever. ifwe bringit up as a Alternatively, we do tree,by usinga namederivedfromone of itsessentialcharacteristics, not haveto worryabout thethingsthatwould followfromitsbeingsome. In a word,oncewe havedecidedto use a particular for thinggreen expression a certain of the s we are then byhighlighting aspect something thing identity, committed to what(theuse of) thatexpression entails. In De sophisticis elenchis Aristotle discussesall kindsoffallacies, one ofwhich is whatlaterbecameknownas thefallada accidentis or thefallada secundum

The N.Zalta, 2005Edition ),ed.Edward (Winter 'John Wyclif, Stanford Encyclopedia ofPhilosophy URL= http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2005/entries/wyclif/. Itisprecisely conquestions the limits of which feature in medieval debates about For hypostisation intentionality. cerning anextensive discussion ofthis seeL.M.deRijk, Giraldus Odonis issue, OFM,Opera philosophica. Vol.II: 'De intentionibus . Critical Edition with a Study ontheMedieval Debate Intentionality 2005). uptoca.1350(Leiden,

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occurswhenyouintroaccidens. As we cangatherfromhisaccount,thefallacy characterisation forit- itsbeingF- , ducesomesubjectbyusinga particular - , even asscribesomeotherproperty to it- itsbeing-G and thenmistakenly to itgiventhatcharthoughthesubjects being-Gis accidental(coincidental) In started off with. this acterisation, fallacythekeyparticular being-F,you termis (in theLatintranslation) accidens. The accidensor coincidencespoken ofshouldnotbe takenin themetaphysical sense;insteadit concernsthelogis being cal relationship betweenwaysofspeakingaboutsomething. Something of thatentityin itself, a man,forexample,maybe an essentialcharacteristic follow butwhenit is introducedas a whiteshape,it does not automatically thatit is rational.So whatis essentialin thecontextof one particular wayof in can come from be accidental (which anycategory) may namingsomething thecontextof another.You shouldalwaysstickto whatyou startedoffwith elsethatmayhappento be the and shouldnotbecomedistracted byanything in thecourseof somediscussion.Ifyou do not, case,butwhichis irrelevant thefallacyofaccident. youruntheriskofcommitting betweenlinguistic ThisAristotelian of semantic system relationhips expressionscan be explainedas follows.When we talkabout thingswe can bring themup in different ways,by focusingon different aspectsof thosethings. This kind of localization can lead us to use different categoriesforone and thesamething;howwe wishto categorise dependson whatwe something in something. In itselfthissemantical wishto highlight is ontologically system neutral.Of courseforAristotleit does have an ontologicalfoundation:the features we can concentrate on in ourwaysoftalkingaboutthingsareindeed includedin thosesubstances.But thatis all thereis to it.Aristotles worldis lesscluttered thanPlatos.What it containsis concreteindividualsubstances But even thoughwe can distinguish only,whichhave different properties. betweenthesedifferent aspectsofa things nature,thisdoesnotmeanthatthe Whathissemanticsystemmerelyshowsis thatifwe itself is not a unity. thing in conceive certain ways,we arecommittedto acceptingotherconofthings that with it.7 ceptions go along In theMiddleAges,thefallacies becamea standardtopicin workson logic. in hisinfluential PeterofSpainpaysattention to thefallaciaaccidentis manual 7)Fora detailed ofthese seeL.M.deRijk, Aristotle. Semantics andOntology, matters, explanation 2 vols.Vol.I: General TheWorks onLogic, Introduction. Vol.II: TheMetaphysics. Semantics in Aristotle's De shows how Aristotle's dis(Leiden, 2002). Strategy ofArgument Rijkconvincingly tinction between different ofoneandthesameindividual its doesnotthreaten aspects thing inanyway. unity

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of logic,the Tractatus. Peters accountis worthlookingat becauseit is one of how semantic and ontologicallevelscan becomeconfused.Thisis example in his evident wayoftalkingaboutaccidens. particularly 2. Peterof Spain on theFallacyofAccident In hisexplanation ofthefallada accidentis , PeterofSpaindulypaysattention to thequestionhowwe shouldtaketheexpressionaccident'in thisconnection.Firsthe presents thedefinition handeddownin thetradition byAristotle:"thefallacyofaccidentoccurswhenanyattribute is claimedto inherein a thesubstanceand in theaccident".8 likemannerin boththethingunderlying Forstarters he explainsthataccident'in thisconnectionis identicaltowhatis This meansthatthefallacyof accidentoccurs not necessary in conseguendo? which is to followdoes notnecessarily whenever said follow.To be something can be appliedto all otherkindsof fallaciesas well,so sure,thisdescription Peterhas to be a littlemorespecificaboutwhatit is we aredealingwithhere. That it is not simplyfallaciousreasoningin generalwe are talkingabout can emergein becomesobviouswhenhe tellsus how thefallaciaaccidentis ofaccidentis suchthatit ofargument. Firstofall,Petersays,thefallacy streams twoaccidents, i.e. twooccurrences of an acciinvolvesarguments containing dent.Of thesetwoaccidentsone is suchthatitappliesto thethingunderlying thesubject-term ), and theotheris assignedto inherein thething (ressubiecti eteiusaccidens the and itsaccident(ressubiecti ). The underlying subject-term It shouldnot,Peter questionis howwe areto takeaccident'in thisconnection. in be terms of understood , nor shouldit be Porphyry's explains, predicabilia in the Topics so-calledpredicates' takenas one ofAristotle's , noras an accident in thisparticular casetheexpresas opposedto substance.10 Again,he repeats, .n in consequendo sion accident'is usedto indicatethatwhichis non-necessary 8)Peter n.2),VII,102,p. 1462"5: "Ponitur ofSpain, Tractatused.De Rijk(op.cit.,above, fitquando similiter fuerit accidens autem abAristotile talisratio accidentis: quidlibet assignaetaccidenti inesse'." tumreisubiecte 9)Peter n.2),VII,103,p. 14625"26: "Sed ofSpain,Tractatused.De Rijk(op.cit.,above, inconsequendo'." estidem illudaccidens quodnon-necessarium 10)Clearly about thepredicates' Peter istalking Aristotle here. Foronething, Peter misreads of the to but after one as he seems arenotsentential mean, appellations categorical predicates, here either. What isatissue, Aristotle istalking about this isnotwhat modes ofbeing. However, ofassignment"; isoneofthe"paradigms inAristotle's ofthe atleast accidentisy conception fallada n.3),Vol.I,pp.476-498. cf.De Rijk2002(opcit.,above, n) Peter "Etnota n.2),VII,103,p.14612"26: ofSpain, Tractatused.De Rijk(op.cit.,above,

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Butthatstilldoesnotgetus veryfar,forwhatdoesitmeanto saythatsomeIn orderto be ableto settlethatquestion, in consequendo} thingis notnecessary Peterbeginsbylistingtwowaysoftakingtheexpression "non-necessary": - first in termsofbeingpositedas a subjector as a we havethenon-necessary is a man), animalestsubstantia Sortes est homo (ani('Sortes predicate:e.g. malis a substance') , inwhichthesuperiorin one wayappliesto theinferior, cases to the superior;in theseparticular and in anotherway the inferior a man,but nottheotherwayround,and an animalis Sortesis necessarily a butnottheotherwayround; substance, necessarily - secondlywe havethenon-necessary in termsof inference; in thisconnecofnecestionaccidensis opposedto thatwhich applies(i.e. to something) of refers to what and the necessarily necessityspoken applies to sity', the insofar as the of inference (or necessity necessary implicasomething likein logic,or on therelationtion)is basedupon a topicalrelationship, likein proofs.Peterexplainsthatit is thesecond shipof causeand effect, in thefallada accidentis }2 which features of type necessity Thewaysin whichthisfallacy can occurarederivedfromthemannerin which intheargument: sometimes theaccidentia thatapplytothesubjectarepositioned unum reisubiestsophisma accidens, accidentis, duplex quodaccidit quodubicumque exigitur in Etutrumque ecteetaliudquodassignatur reisubiecte etaccidenti eiusinesse. assignatur ratione communi accidentis. Si sumatur querat qualiter predicta paralogismorum ergoaliquis istamultiplex estpropter illudduplex accidens hieaccidens', dicendum quodquestio quod Etideodicendum secundum accidens. deilio adparalogismum quodsiquerat semper exigitur nonestprout a Porfirio inesse tuncilludaccidens sumitur accidente quodassignatur utrique, ab Aristotile de dequinqué secundum sumitur unum unum quatuor predicabilibus, ñeque quod in Topicis, contra dividitur cum substantiam, nequeestaccidens quodexopposito predicatis etaccidentis'. Sed dicimus: autaccidens, autCreator substantie est,autestsubstantia, quicquid inconsequendo'." illudaccidens estidemquodnon-necessarium 12)Peter n.2),VII,103,p. 14626-I47n: ofSpain,Tractatused.De Rijk(op.cit.,above, in dicitur. Uno modo velinsubiciendo, ut'Sornon-necessarium' "Quia predicando dupliciter et velanimal estsubstantia', unomodoaccidit inferiori tesesthomo' secundum quodsuperius inconsequendo, Alioautem aliomodoeconverso inferius modoestnon-necessarium superiori. inesse Undeaccidens hocmodo utdiximus; etsicsumitur hicaccidens quodassignatur utrique'. ei est ex necessitate accidere'. . Sed dico ex necessitate accidere' neces[. .] opponitur quod prout vela causavelabeffectu, sitas inferendi causatur abhabitudinibus utindialeticis, ut localibus, indemonstrativis; ethuicnecessitati inesse inferendi accidens opponitur quodassignatur utrique, exnecessitate accidere'. hocmodoidemestquod Undeaccidens' quiasicdicitur dupliciter inconsequendo' non-necessarium contra istam necessitatem inferendi quamdiximus."

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likeSortes,whichappliesto man (in whichcase the accident'is antecedent, to sometimes itis consequent, likefigure, which an inferior its superior); applies to which case a to its and sometimes inferior), (in superior applies applies triangle . itis one ofa pairofconvertibles.13 Of thelattertypearehomoand risibile In accordancewiththe distinction cases of betweenthesethreedifferent - thatis,somethings uccidere else- we applyingto (belongingto) something . The first can distinguish threekindsoffallaciaaccidentis kindoccurswhenan likein, manis a species; antecedent appliesto thatto whichit is antecedent, Sortesis a species.In thisinstanceSortes,whichis Sortesis a man;therefore to homo is assignedto inherein both antecedent , appliesto homo, and species terms,in the firstsentence, (i.e. in both Sortesand man).14In Aristotelian is singledout,and to that of someindividualtheuniversalnaturehumanity themodeof being naturehumanity), modeof being(i.e. beingtheuniversal a speciesis said to apply.So farso good,but thenin thesecondsentence,an modeofbeinga manis singledout,viz.themode accidental(i.e. coincidental) it Socrates.Fromthesetwoassumptions ofbeingin theformofan individual, concludedthatthe(essential)modeofbeinga species is thenmistakenly applies to one oftheaccidentalmodesof beinga man, viz. to theaccidentalmodeof beingSortes. occurswhena consequentappliesto The secondtypeoffallaciaaccidentis An exampleofthesecondtypeis: everytriangle has three whatis antecedent. every anglesequal to tworightones; now everytriangleis a figure;therefore which is to trianthree etc. Here has consequent,applies figurei figure angles whilehavingthree onesis said anglesequaltotworight gle,whichis antecedent, In thiscase,in to inherein bothtriangle andfigureas in itspropersubiect.15 is is singled of a mathematical what thefirstsentencethetriangularity figure 13)Peter "Modi n.2),VII,108,p. 149925: ofSpain,Tractatused.De Rijk(op.cit.,above, a accidentis accidit rei accidens huius fallacie autem subiecte, quod quia quod parte distinguuntur convertibile. estantecedens, accidit reisubiecte aliquando consequens, aliquando aliquando modo Sortes inferius accidit [.. .]quiahomini [ ] Alioautem Quiaunomodoaccidit superiori essefiguram inferiori. UndeAristotiles accidit [.. .] dicitquodaccidit [.. .] triangulo superius accidit suo convertibili." accidens' secundum convertibile Tertio autem modosumitur quod 14)Peter n.2),VII,109,pp.14930-1503: ofSpain,Tractatused.De Rijk(op.cit.,above, Ut:'homo estspecies; accidit eicuiantecedit. "Primus modus accidentis fitquando antecedens "Inprimo enimparalogismo estspecies"; esthomo; Sortes Sortes, qui p. 150,24"25: ergoSortes eietspecies inesse antecedit adhominem , accidit assignatur utrique". 15)Peter "Secunn.2),VII,113,pp.15215"17: ofSpain, Tractatused.De Rijk(op.cit., above, antecedenti. fitquando accidit accidentis dusautem modus [.. .] Ut:omnis tranguconsequens habet tres estfigura; duobus sedomnis loshabet tres rectis; equales triangulus ergo figura ángulos

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mode of being,beinga triangle out,and of thatparticular , it is said thatit is identicalto (or thatit has theattribute three of) having anglesequal to two In ones. the second the mode of sentence, generic right beinga mathematical thathas the mode of beinga triangle.From figureis appliedto everything thesetwoassumptions it is mistakenly concludedthattheattribute ofhaving three to two ones to a mathematanglesequal right belongs something qua being icalfigure. thethirdmodeoccurswhena convertible Finally, appliesto itsconvertible. Forinstance,in manis a species;something thatcan laughis man;therefore thatcan laughis a species',theproperty ofbeingsomething thatcan something and speciesis assignedto laughis assignedto man, whichis its convertible, to both that can In and man}6 thisthirdexample,in the apply something laugh first sentencethemodeof beinga species is assignedto thespecies man,and in thesecondsentencesome concreteindividualthingis singledout as having theattribute ofwhichit is said thatitis a man;from beingcapableoflaughter, thereit is mistakenly concludedthatthe something, i.e. the concretething underscrutiny, whichis capableoflaughter, is a species. ThusfarPeterhas notmadeanyreference to an ontologicalfoundation for hisdistinctions. Yethe does seemto thinkthattheoccurrence oífallaciaaccidentisis based upon the modesof beingfoundin extramental things.This from a remarkabout the distinction betweenthefallaciaaccidentis appears and thefallacyoffigure ofspeech(fallaciafigure dictionis thereis ): "Wherever afiguradictionis', ourauthorsays,"thereis alwaysafallaciasecundum accidens , butnottheotherwayround,becausethemodeofbeingofa thing(ratiorei) does not depend on its verbaldescription(ratiodictionis),but the verbal doesdependon themodeofbeingofthething;fora word(dictio) description is a signof thething(res)and is finally orderedto thething".17 So forPeter, whatwe sayaboutthingsareexpressions ofhowthosethingsreallyare.

etc .' p. 1533"5: "Insecundo autem accidit Sedhabere tres etc.assignatur ángulos figura trangulo. inesse utsubiecto etsicsimiliter." utrique proprio adequato; 16)Peter ofSpain, Tractatus n.2),VII,114,p. 15321"28: "Tertius , ed.De Rijk(op.cit.,above, autem modus fitquando accidentis convertibile accidit suoconvertibili. Ut:'homoestspecies; risibile esthomo; risibile estspecies'; homo enim subicitur secundum suam essentiam ergo speciei etnonratione etsicaccidit homini huius quaestrisibile; respectu predicati quodestspecies'." 17)Peter ofSpain, Tractatus - , ed.De Rijk(op.cit.,above, n.2),VII,116,p. 15510"13: "Unde estfigura ibiestsemper etnoneconverso, ratio rei non dictionis, accidens, ubicumque quia a ratione sedratio dictionis a ratione sitsignum rei dictionis, rei,cumdictio dependet dependet etadrem finaliter ordinetur [.. .]."

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As an exampleof the thirdkind offallada accidentis , Peterpresentsthe 'I I know do not knowtheonewho famous(Aristotelian) Coriscus; sophisma, I knowand do is coming;and Coriscusis theone who is coming;therefore In thisparticular notknowtheone who is coming'.18 theproperty syllogism, withCoriscusas thatto whichtheone of theonewhois comingis convertible I am awareof, is notsomething whois coming applies.However,thisidentity and therefore theconclusionis arrivedat througha fallada accidentis. theaccountWyclifpresents of Comparedto PeterofSpain'sbriefremarks, in hisLogicais farmoreelaborate.Furthermore, itclearly thefallada accidentis we use showsus thatit is thecomplexnatureof certainkindsof expressions error.19 forthingsthatformsthebasisofthisparticular 3. JohnWyclifon thefallada accidentis In De logicaI, cap. VI, Wyclifspeaksaboutwhatit meansto committhefallacia accidentis. Like Peterof Spain,Wycliffirstexplainswhatis meantby accidentaltermsin thisconnection.The authordescribesthemas follows: be saidin thenominative ofa singular a. ifa termcan trulyand affirmatively subject,and itsoppositetoo canbe trulysaidofthatsamesubject(although in thatcasethetermis accidental; notsimultaneously), b. suchtermsarespecificdenominative terms,denominating accidents,e.g. And thesame 'thatwhichis nowsitting can at anothertimebe not-sitting'. suchas albus(white),calvus(bald).20 goesforotheraccidents,

18)Peter 22:"cogn.2),VII,119,pp.15619 ofSpain, Tractatused.De Rijk(op.cit.,above, est et et Coriscus eundem nosco veniens; Coriscum; venientem; ergo cognoscoignoro." ignoro 19)Ioannis Tractatus delogica 3 vols.(London, Dziewicki, ,ed.Michael 1893-99). Henry Wyclif, from a disastrously anduse Thisedition suffers misleading (including punctuation typography infull, willbequoted atissue ofitalics). Sothepassages corrected, (wherbyusing thoroughly Professor ms.662,ff.lr-109v. themanuscript Biblioteca comunale diAssisi, ever John possible) hismicrofilm. wassokindastoletmeborrow Murdoch 20)Ioannis n. 19),Vol.I, cap.VI, Tractatus delogica , ed.Dziewicki (op.cit.,above, Wyclif, vere terminus estprimo "[.. .] notandum quipossit quodsifuerit aliquis proregula p. 11219"28: vere cum hoc suum inrecto de subiecto etaffirmative quod oppositum prepredicari singulari, adsophismata. talis terminus estaccidentalis conformiter deeodem, dicabitur quantum pertinet denominantes ut'illudquodiamest denominativi sunttermini Cuiusmodi accidentia, speciales etceteris concretis accidentium." alias essenonsedens'; etsicde'albo', sedens 'calvo', specialibus potest

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once we knowthesethingsabout accidentalterms,we Accordingto Wyclif, sentences like arein thepositionto understand problematic - 'thebishopimmediately afterthismomentwillsee Sortes,who willnever be seenbythebishop; - 'thiskinghas been begottenby a woman,who has neverbegottenthat king'; - notat anytimewillthiskingdie,whononetheless willdie at sometime'; - 'thispriesthasbeenwoundedbysomeone,who nevercausedthispriestany harm;indeedhe hasneverbeennearthatpriestin a thousandyears';and so on foran infinite numberoflikephrases.21 To interpret sentencesliketheones listedabove,we need to observethefolWyclifsays: lowingguideline, When anaccidental term verb (ofwhatever kind)isa predicate qualified byanaffirmative inthepasttense orinthefuture thesignificatum ofthat nameisconfined toinhere tense, inthesomething thatisreferred toforthesametime thatisconnoted bytheverb; e.g.if then hewillbebishop, orifthis youwillseethisbishop, youwillseehimintheinstant himintheinstant woman hasbegotten thisking, then shehasbegotten hewasking, orif him in in which a Sortes hitthat then he hit the instant he was priest, priest.22 In theseexamples,thecharacterisation ofentitiesin termsofone oftheiraccidentalmodesof beingis crucial.In modernterms,theaccidentaltermsare in used attributively. For such statements to be true,the characterisations questionmustapplyat thetimethatis connotedbythetenseoftheverb.

21)Ioannis Tractatus delogica n. 19),Vol.I, cap.VII, , ed.Dziewicki Wyclif, (op.cit.,above, "Istocognito, intellectus talium immediate p. 11229"36: patet sophismatum: episcopus posthoc videbit ab 'iste rex videbitur fuit a Sortem, muliere, quinunquam episcopo', quenungenitus inaliquotempore istum neeunquam morietur isterex, moriequamgenuit quitamen regem', fuit vulneratus abaliquo, nocuit istisacerdoti, immo tur,'istesacerdos quinunquam nunquam fuit istisacerdoti etsicdeinfinitis similibus." milaria', propinquus permille 22)Ioannis Tractatus de Dziewicki ed. n. 19),Vol.I, cap.VII, , cit., above, Wyclif, logica (op. terminus verbi affirmativi de 139:" [.. .]quicumque accidentalis, pp.11237-1 predicatus respectu veldefuturo, limitât radone differentie connotati suumsignificatum inesse preterito temporis subiecto utsividebis istum tunc videbis eumpro connotato; proconformi tempore episcopum, instanti erit ista si mulier istum tunc proquo episcopus', ipsum genuit regem, genuit proinstanti 'siSorpercussit istum tunc eumproinstanti rex', sacerdotem, proquofu.it percussit proquofuit sacerdos'."

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The analysisjustpresented, Wyclifshows,does not obtainwhentheword is merelyused to orderhas been changedin such a waythattheexpression the under discussion: identify subject ifthose terms areinsubject Forifthat aredifferent accidental position. youwillsee Things then itisthecasethatitisthe iswhatisorwillbethatbishop, , andthat (sihocvide bis) thestatement 'Youwillseethatbishop' should whom youwillsee.Contrariwise, bishop 'Then will see that theantecedent Andthen leadtothefollowing conclusion, you bishop'. itwillbethecasethatyouseethat isproved bythefactthatatthattimeinthefuture bishop.23 In the firstexample,the suppositum itselfis what matters,and it can be thatdoes not necessarily identified by usinga description applyat thetime is connotedby theverbit is adjoinedto. In modernterms,thedescription In thesecondexample,thesamedescription ofwhatyouare usedreferentially. to whichit and so it mustapplyto thesomething aboutto see is highlighted, is ascribedat thetimeconnotedbytheverb. ofverbscan lead In thenextparagraphs, we shallsee how thedistribution to incorrect conversions(3.1), and thata combinationof accidentalterms interforus to correctly withadverbsof timeand place can makeit difficult in a combination occurs. the which such (3.2). pret propositions Conversions 3.1. TheImpactofDistribution uponIncorrect lookedat different examplesofstatements containingaccidental Havingfirst terms', every propositions: Wyclifstatesanotherruleforcorrectly converting in tense whose the or future past proposition simple(i.e. single)categorical ofthesame verbis notdistributed , can be substituted byitsmodalproposition tense,in whichmodal propositionthe dictumis put in the presenttense.24 23)Ioannis n. 19),Vol.I, cap.VII, Tractatus delogica , ed.Dziewicki (op.cit.,above, Wyclif, iste Namsihocvidebis, ethocestvelerit "Etsicnonest,ipsis a parte subiecti. positis p. 1139"14: sicinferri: Sedista, 'tuvidebis istum debet tunc istum videbis. episcopum', episcopum episcopus, erit itaquod antecedens Ettunc 'tunc tuvidebis istum probatur perhocquodtunc episcopum'. istum tuvides episcopum." 24)By'modal inwhich anadverb ofa particular a proposition ismeant here type, proposition atissue. These thecomposition oftheproposition viz.anadverb ofquality, modifies proposia proposition suchas'Sortes est deinesse. Onthis from tions aredistinguished view, propositions currere' isthecorrespondVerum estSortem isapropositio deinesse currens' ,andtheproposition is that thetype ofproposition Someauthors would deny justmentioned proposition. ingmodal inwhich thecomposition ordivision is topropositions thelabel'modal' a modal one,confining

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at sometimeitwillbe thecase E.g.,itfollows,youwillseethepope; therefore thatyou see the pope', and the otherway round; you have hit the priest; therefore at some timeit has been thecase thatyou werehittingthepriest', and theotherwayround.25 However,it does notfollow,at sometimeit will be thecaseforeverymanthathe is in thishouse;therefore at sometimeevery manwillbe in thishouse',becausein thesentencetheconclusionis inferred forevery future time.26 from,theverbis distributed In two subsequentexamplesthe conversionfailsbecausethe description used forsome stateof affairs is composite.It does not follow,you will see thosetwo(pointingto a manand an ass); therefore at someparticular timeit willbe thecasethatyouseethosetwo'.Nor does itfollow,youhavebegotten thosetwosons;therefore at sometimeithasbeenthusthatyouwerebegetting thosetwosons'.27In thefirst ofthecharacteriexample,thetwocomponents sation,viz. the havingof a man-visionand the havingof an ass-vision,is fordiversefutureinstants.Somethingsimilarhappensin thesecond verified ifone saysthatyouhavebegottenthosetwosons,thisis notto say inference: thatthishappenedat one and thesametime.So thebegetting ofson number one and the begetting of son numbertwo,the two thingsascribedto you, need not actuallybe thecase at thesameinstant.The inferences at issueare because the are from are not derived incorrect, propositions they simpleones in ofAristotle's).28 (i.e. singlepropositions theterminology likenecessarium, modified oftheways , andsoon.Fora discussion bywords contingens, possibile inwhich earlier ontheexpression modalterm' wasexplained, seeJoke 'ThirteenthSpruyt, Discussions onModalTerms', Vivarium 32(1994),196-226. century 25)Ioannis Tractatus de n. 19),Vol.I, cap.VII, , Wyclif, (op.cit.,above, logicaed.Dziewicki 22:"Undepotest observari omnis depreterito vel p. 11315 proregula quod simplex kategorica inqua futuro cuiusverbum nondistribuitur, convertitur cummodali deconformi tempore, estdictitranslatio modali depresenti. Verbi benesequitur 'tuvidebis papam, gratia, ergoalierititaquodtuvides eteconverso; 'tupercussisti sacerdotem, quando papam', ergoaliquando fuit itaquodtupercutis sacerdotem' eteconverso." 26)Ioannis delogica Tractatus n. 19),Vol.I, cap.VII, , ed.Dziewicki Wyclif, (op.cit.,above, "Nontarnen erititaquodomnis homoestinistadomo;ergo p. 11322'25: sequitur: 'aliquando inistadomo', omnis homo erit distribuitur futuro." aliquando quiaverbum proomni tempore 27)Ioannis Tractatus de Dziewicki n. ed. Vol. , cit., above, I, 19), Wyclif, logica (op. cap.VII, "Necsequitur: 'tuvidebis istos duos(demonstrando hominem etasinum); p. 11325'33: ergoalierititaquodtuvidesistosduos'.Necsequitur: 'tugenuisti istosduosfilios; quando ergoalifuit itaquodtugignis istos duosfilios', estdecopulato extremo [vel quando quiapredicatum Et sic non est cum sit Sed synonimo]. simplex categorica, predicatumcompositum.verificatur instantibus futuris." copulatum prodiversis 28)What ismeant statement isAristotle's here see utterance; bya single single statement-making Deinterpr. haddifferent ofexplaining theunity insuch 5,17al5-16.Medievais ways propositions;

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In thenextparagraph(3.2) we shallturnto a sectionfurther alongin the in which the author discusses how adverbsof , propositions Logica containing timecan lead to thefallacyofaccident. Adverbs 3.2. Thefallaciaaccidentisin Inferences Containing ofTimeand Place In chapterX of thethirdvolumeof his Logica, Wyclifcomesto speakabout ofthetype'thecarpenter was aboutto buildthehouse',uttered propositions at thetimein whichthepersonreferred to by theexpression 'thecarpenter was not yeta carpenter.29 The questionof courseis whatwe are to makeof theseutterances; it seemssomewhatodd to be talkingabout a carpenters buildingof thehouseat a timewhenhe has notevenjoinedthetheguildof yet. carpenters sentenceswitha warning:ifa Wyclifbeginshis discussionof problematic contains an of or adverb an adverb ofplace,one shouldtake time, proposition noteoftheverbor participle that It is whattheseadverbs adverb. qualifiedby are combinedwith,the authorsays,thatwill inevitably changeour underin of what the which occur are propositions they standing saying.As to the firstkind,the authordemonstrates how sentencescontainingthe adverbs now' and 'tomorrow' can be misunderstood. For instance,it is now possible foran instantof tomorrow to exist,but it is not possibleforthatinstantto existnow, becausean instantof timecan onlyexistwhenit actuallyis.30The 4Itis now possibleforan instantof tomorrow to exist'contains proposition, theadverboftimenow';in orderto properly understand whatis beingsaidin thisparticular must to which examine time sentence, you critically particular what in theadverbrefers. is is that this us about Obviously Wyclif warning casetheadverbnow' {nunc)is conjoinedwiththecompletephrase'is possible to existtomorrow', and thatfromsomething's (in our case a futureinstant's)

seeJoke "TheSemantics ofComplex inAristotle's Perihermeneias inthe Expressions', Spruyt, LatinMiddle ontheCommentary Tradition Vol.10], [=Artistarium Ages. Essays supplemental 2003),275-303. (Groningen-Haren, 29)Ioannis Tractatus delogica n. 19),Vol.III,cap.X, , ed.Dziewicki Wyclif, (op.cit.,above, iste "Et idem fu.it facturus istam ettarnen 14840-1492: domum, per sequitur quod carpentarius p. necfacit necfaciet istam istam domum erit domum, posito quodfaciat antequam carpentarius." 30)Ioannis Tractatus delogica, ed.Dziewicki n. 19),Vol.III,cap.X, Wyclif, (op.cit.,above, notare 14222"28: velparticipium "Unde loycum oportet p. prozophismatibus diligenter verbum loci vel hoc notabiliter variat adverbium intellectum. Utnunc determinat, temporis quia quod instans dieiesse, ettarnen nonestpossible essenunc, cumnullum estmedium crastine possible instans veltempus essenisiquando est." potest

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now beingpossibleto exist , you cannotinferthesame things(i.e. thefuture to instants)beingpossible existnow.This conclusionis based upon a fallacy, becausethe nowhas been changed;hencethepossibilities spokenof are no longerthesame. Therearemanyotherfallacies ofthistype,forinstancein thesophism,you willknowsomething to be thecase whenyou will not knowthatto be the case' (tu sciesaliquid essequandononsciesilludesse).31 The samegoes forthe 'thiswillbe thecase whenit will not be thecase thatthiswillbe; inference, therefore thiswillbe thecasewhenitwillnotbe thecase' (hoceritquandonon eritita quodhocerit state; ergohoceritquandohocnonerit)?1The following 'thiswillbe whenit is notfuture'(hocerit ment,on theotherhand,is correct, non est because the is an indi),33 futurum phrasequodnonestfuturum quando cationof thetimeat whichthe'this'is in thepresent(and no longerin the a transition has beenmadein thecharacfuture).In thefallaciousstatement, terisation ofthefuture the ofquando. In the instant, bychanging qualification is as a time in which the premise,quando qualified being 'beingfutureofA willno longerapply,whereasin theconclusionquandois qualifiedas a timein whichthe'beingofA willnotapply. The kindoffallaciousreasoning we justmentioned, ourauthorcomplains, willbe future, leadssomesmartalecksto grantthatwhenever then something it will continuously be. However,ifyou acceptthatyou can saysomething aboutthefuture, youareunderno obligationto acceptthatwhatyouaresayingaboutthefutureshouldbe thecase at theverymomentyou aresayingit. Forexample,grantedyoucan saythatsomething beginsto be or ceasesto be, Wyclifsays, this doesnotmean that admit that that tobeorceases tobe, youshould everything begins should to be and cease to nor that white is black be, always begin something completely andthesame other that denominations tosomething to contrary goesfor belong according inplaceandtime. differences fora white tobeblack, and [.. .] Norisita problem thing

31)Ioannis Tractatus delogica, ed.Dziewicki n. 19),Vol.III,cap.X, Wyclif, (op.cit.,above, 14228"31: intalibus "Sedulterius fiunt michi modo zophisticationes percaptiones quevidentur utintalibus 'tuscies essequando nonsciesilludesse'[.. .]." inutiles, aliquid 32)Ioannis Tractatus delogica, ed.Dziewicki n. 19),Vol.III,cap.X, Wyclif, (op.cit.,above, "Necsequitur: 'hoceritquando nonerititaquodhocerit; hoc p. 1457"9: ergohoceritquando noneriť." 33)Ioannis Tractatus delogica n. 19),Vol.III,cap.X, , ed.Dziewicki Wyclif, (op.cit.,above, "Sedbenesequitur nonestfuturum." p. 1459"10: quodhocerit quando

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46 (2008)24-58 /Vivarium J.Spruyt other forittobedifferent from black andtobesomething nevertheless atthesameinstant orat orotherness itissufficient that atsometime than because forsucha difference black, itisnotblack.34 someinstant thething should bewhite atwhich

whatwe say about the same thingseventhough The keyto understanding of the some changehas occurred,or will occur,is thecorrectinterpretation timesor different characterisations we use. We mustrealisethatat different themin to thingsbychacacterising places,we areentitledto makereference Whenwe cataccidentalfeatures). different ways(i.e. in termsofsomethings in after one of its accidents' usesthe a certain (Wyclif way egorisesomething ' thatthevery we shouldnotmakethemistakeofthinking termdenominano), shouldapplyin some othercontextas well.When we same characterisation talkabout Sortesat different stagesof his life,likewhenhe was youngand to hisbeingin different whenhewillbe old,orwhenwe makereference places, what is orat themarket likein thetheatre place, goingon,he says,is that as a young theoldmanis different from himself man,andformally formally speaking inthetheatre thanheisinthemarket; andyoucansaythesamefor isdifferent Sortes inAutumn, whoarelesssanethanthemselves andsoonforhowever melancholies, many it does not follow that thesamething ofphilosophers. . statements other Nevertheless, [. .] itself as(being) such-and-such.35 itdoesdiffer from differs from itself, although So farwe havelookedintoWyclifs analysisofsemanticdistinctions featuring thatcontainaccidentalterms.His recipyforinferring in propositions things the comesdownto correctly fromsuchpropositions interpreting expressions In itself in termsoftheiraccidentalproperties. bywhichthingsarecategorised to ourdifferent thiscouldsimplybe explainedwithreference waysoffocusing whole that is not the or However, story.In De things. upon, conceptualising 34)Ioannis n. 19),Vol.III,cap.X, delogica Tractatus , ed.Dziewicki (op.cit.,above, Wyclif, esseveldesinens esse concedere "[...] sicnonoportet quodomneincipiens pp.14530-1462: etsicdealiisdenominasitnigrum, veldesinit esse,etquodalbum pertotum incipit semper instanti inexistentibus cumnonproeodem locoettempore eidem contrariis tionibus prodiversis illud essenigrum ettarnen album etnigrum esthocalbum [.. .]Necobest proeodem pertotum. velalietatem differentiam etessealiudquamnigrum, a nigro instanti differre quiaad talem nonsitnigrum." instanti sitalbum velproaliquo sufficit proquoipsum tempore quodproaliquo 35)Ioannis n. 19),Vol.III,cap.X, delogica Tractatus , ed.Dziewicki (op.cit.,above, Wyclif, in melanSor alter teatro a se senex differt est "Et sic formaliter 1461"7: quaminforo, puero, pp. etsicdequodibet inautumpno; colici sunt dementiores propositionibus philosophorum. seipsis a se,licet a setali." differt différât nonsequitur existis [.. .]Verumtamen quodidem

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of universalibus , theauthorgivesus an in-depthaccountof thefoundations is more .36 As has been shown attribution Cesalli,37 by predication {praedicatio) thanjust a linguisticor conceptualdevice.For our purposesit is usefulto mentionthekindsofpraedicatio briefly Wycliftalksabout. Foundation Distinctions : De universalibus 3.3. TheOntological ofSemantic As we saw in theprevioussection,thecentralidea in Wyclifs analysisis that thingscan undergochangesin their"formal being.Whatthiskindofchange fromhisaccountoftheactivity ofpraedicatio amountsto can be gathered , or 4 ( For Wyclif,the expressionspraedicatioand propositioare not attribution. confinedto mentalactivities wouldhaveit. Insteadhe alone,as themoderni maintainsthatthe truthof everytrue(linguistic)propositionis ultimately in the based upon thecorresponding or attributive predicative relationships realworld.In hiswords,praedicatio termini de termino is baseduponpraedicatiorealis , whichequalsbeingsharedbyor beingsaid ofmanythingsin common (participanveldicicommunicative de multis ).38 The authordistinguishes threekindsofattribution ): (praedicatio 1. One kindis thepraedicatio : thisis thepraedicatio bywhichsomeformalis in thesubjectis attributed thingformally existing (praedicatio qua praedicaturformaliter inexistens subiecto 'to formally existin is ). The expression meantforwhateveridentically to the subjectaccordingto the belongs of which is. This of mode beingby it kind attribution is includeswhatever said primarily andperse of itsinferior, or anyaccidentsaid of itssubject. are:cThedivinepersonis God', because Examplesofthistypeofpraedicatio is the form which divine deity by any personis God; man is an animal', because animalityis the formby which everyman is an animal; and ť Peteris a musician,because beingmusicalis the formby whichPeter

36)John deuniversalibus, Tractatus ed.IvanJ.Mueller 1986[19851]). (Oxford, Wyclif, 37)SeeCesalli n. 3),pp.135-137, andtheliterature inhis mentioned 2005(op.cit.,above, note23. 38)John Tractatus deuniversalibus n.36),cap.I,p. 1727"37: , ed.Mueller Wyclif, (op.cit.,above, "Estautem ad tria. . Secundo ad termini determino. praedicari' aequivocum [. .] praedicationem Etistaestfamosa nullam aliamesse, licetsecundum veritatem istaexemmodernis, quiputant sita praedicatione etestparticipari veldicicomreali, plata quaeesttertium praedicandi, genus municative demultis."

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is a musician,and thesamegoesforanyotheraccidentsaidofits formally substance.39 2. Anotherkindis thepraedicatio secundum essentiam : in thiskindofattribution thesubjectand thatwhichis said of thesubjectare thesame,even thoughthe ratio(mode of being)of whatis said is otherthanthe ratio ofthesubject,as in ťGodis a man, 'fireis water, a uni(modeofbeing)40 versalis a singular'.Our authorexplainsthiskindofpraedicatio as follows. In thetheological modeofbeingor form exampleyoucan see thatthefirst is deity,whereasthe secondmode of beingor formis humanity. So the contains a formal contradiction between and proposition deity humanity. In thesecondexample(in whichreference is made to thefourelements betweenbeingfire earth,air,fireand water)thereis a formalcontradiction and beingwater;so theformaof waterand fireis not thesame,nor are waterand firethe same in theirexistenceas a particular entity;instead waterand fireareessentially thesame,or accordingto theirmatter, forthe same essence'is now a fire,and thenwater.And thethirdexample,taken fromlogic,containsa contradiction betweenan abilityto be sharedby manysuppositaand an inabilityto be sharedby manysupposita.So we cannottakethesepropositions as expressions ofa formalidentity, because

39)John Tractatus deuniversalibus n.36),cap.I,pp.28171, ed.Mueller Wyclif, (op.cit.,above, "£st formalis autem formaliter inexistens subiecto. 29184: praedicatio praedicatio quapraedicatur EtvocoTormaliter inexistere' illudquodidentice convenit subiecto secundum rationem quaest, utpersona divina estDeus,'homo estanimal', et'Petrus estmusicus', etbreviter quandocumque desuoinferiori, velaccidens Namdeitas desuosubiecto. est perseprimo superius praedicatur divina estDeus.Etanimalitas estforma, homoest forma, quaquaelibet persona quaomnis animai. Etsicdeterminis suorum Etcorrespondenter inferiorum. esse superioribus respectu estforma, formaliter estmusicus. Etitadequolibet musicum accidente inhaerente quaPetrus substantia e." 40)Inthis n.41)into'mode ofbeing' ismore ratio case,totranslate below, (seeforthequotation inthetranslation thaninto'notion, asisdonebyKenny ofDe universalibus , parappropriate ofpraedicatio secundum s description essentiam. theexpresIndeed, ticularly Wyclif considering tooexclusively tothehuman sion'notion seems confined intellect's ofconceiving ways things whereas toWyclif, theactivity ofcategorisation makes senseonly (focalisation), according intheextra-mental InWyclif because itrepresents ofinherence s world. relationships featuring theactofcategorisation isthusdirected torepresenting realstates ofaffairs intheworld. view, intheinterpretation of'ratioinlatermedieval see Forthedifficulties involved philosophy, 'ASpecial in13th inRatio. UseofRatio and14th VIIColL.M.deRijk, Century Metaphysics', Internazionale. andM.L.Bianchi 9-11gennaio, 1992, eds.M. Fatturi Roma, (Rome, loquio 1994),197-219.

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in thatcase theywould be false.What thepropositions do mean is that thosemodesofbeingorsubstantial in inhere the sameessence, dispositions e.g. beinghumanand beingthishumaninherein the same essence.And beinghumanappliesto all humanbeings,butbeingthishumanis individuto thisessence.41 In thiscase,theexpressionessence'can only allyconfined be takento meana materialsubstrate. So, to takeup thesecondexample, thefireand thewaterhavethesamematerialsubstrate, some beingwhich is capableofreceiving theformsof beingwaterand beingfire .42 secundum habitudinem is which 3. The finaltypeispraedicatio describedby , ofsomething s relationship to something else;bythis Wyclifaspraedicatio kindofrelationship fromsomecategory thatpertainsto thethingin question,thisthingin itselfis notsubjectedto anychange.Whatthismeansis thattheformconnotedbytheattribution in questiondoes not inherein theessencedesignated to it. bythesubject,butonlyhas somerelationship Forinstance, a thingcanbe understood, orloved,oritcancauseindifferent and whatever otherrelationship, withwaysand acquiresomewhere-ness, out it thereby as suchchangingor beingchanged.Thisis thetypeofattributionwe findin theology, whenwe speakof God doingthings,making

41)John Tractatus deuniversali ed.Mueller n.36),cap.I,pp.30194bus, Wyclif, (op.cit.,above, "Praedicatio vero secundum essentiam estpraedicatio inquaeadem 32218: essentia estsubiectum etpraedicatum, licet aliasitratio hic sit ratio ut 'Deus est subiecti, homo', praedicati quam 'ignis estaqua, 'universale estsingulare'. Inprimo igitur exemplo theologico patet quodaliaestratio subiecti cumprima ratio velforma sitdeitas quaDeusest,etaliaratio praedicati quaesthomo, etsecunda humanitas etclaudit contradictionem formalem deitatem essehumanitatem. In secundo naturali claudit contradictionem formalem esse exemplo patet quod igneitatemaquaeitatem. Ideoignis nonestaquasecundum formam velformaliter secundum ultimum singulare, sedessentialiter velmaterialiter, essentia estignis, nunc estaqua.Etquoad quiaeadem quaenunc tertium contradictionem communicabilitatem multis exemplum logicům patetquodclaudit esseincommunicabilitatem multis Ideointelligitur essentiae suppositis suppositis. quodeidem insunt istae rationes velsubstantiales uteidem essentia e inest essehominem etesse dispositiones, istum hominem. Etessehominem estcommune omnihomini etsicuniversale sed formaliter, esseistum hominem estindividualiter istiessentiae." appropriatum 42)cf.Alessandro D. Conti, andFormal Distinction: OntheLogical BasisofWyclif s 'Analogy inMedieval and 6 The 146-147. 133-165, (1997), Metaphysics', PhilosophyTheology especially useoftheexpression 'essentia' isreminiscent oftwelfth-century seeL.M.deRijk, century usage; 'Abailard s Semantic intheLight Views ofLater inEnglish andSemantics Developments' Logic theEndofthe12thCentury totheTime andBurleigh , eds.H.A.G.Braakhuis, from ofOckham C.H.Kneepkens andL.M.deRijk(Leiden-Nijmegen, reference 1981),1-58;esp.p.20,where ismadetotheuseof'essentia toindicate oneparticular asactually thing given.

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/Vivarium 46 (2008)24-58 J.Spruyt orbeingchanged,because thingsandwhatnot,withoutHim everchanging in itselfbelongsto one ofthetencategories.43 noneofthoserelationships

For our purposesthefirsttypeofpraedicatiois important. to his Returning in the between Sort ess about difference the theatre and his example being in the claimed two First of the market, all, Wyclif being things. subjectof remains the even Sortes one and timeshe maybe same, thoughat different affected at the differently by someaccident.So whetherhe is in thetheatre, orwherever, Sorteswillbe Sortes.The difference underconsideration market, then- andthisis thesecondpoint- is notbetweenSortesandhimself; instead Sortess beingin the marketis onlyformally different fromhis beingin the in thesecasesis notof Sortesperse, but of Sortesbeingstreet.The diversity such-and-such. Of courseone mightbeginto wondernow whattheaccidentsreallyare. likesubstances, refuses to saythattheyarethingsin themselves, because Wyclif ifhe did not,hewouldnotbe ableto explainhowsubjectand accidentareone thing,as he sayslateron.44 To beginwith,Wyclifexplainshow sentencessuchas theones previously oftheworld.To undermentionedarebackedup bytheontologicalstructure standa sentencelike'Sorteswillbe white',in whichan accidentthatdoes not thereare a fewthingswe must yetapplynow is said to applyin thefuture, ofacciacceptabouttheworld.In Wyclifs ownwords,"Besidesa multitude dentsand (successive)degreesof thingssharedin,we mustposita common is thesubject-substrate ofsucha multiplicity ofaccisubjectwhichprimarily dents".Our authornextgivestheexampleofa fire,whichcan grow,become Andthiscanonlyhappen,accordsmallerandevenbe extinguished altogether. if to we assume there is one fire common to thataccidentalfireand ing Wyclif, all partsofthefire.Thatfireis thesubjectofchangein itsmultiplemanifestaand thenfollowit tions.So ifwe considera firethatis partially generated, 43)John n.36),cap.I,pp.34235Tractatus deuniversalibus , ed.Mueller Wyclif, (op.cit.,above, secundum exquasecundum adveniente subi: "Tertia estpraedicatio habitudinem 35249 genus rem varie causare utcontingit ectononoportet utsicesseproprie mobile, amari, intelligi, ipsum sinehocquod sibiubicationem, etquodibet relationes etacquirere rationis, quandalitatem et a quotlibet vel sit mobile. Patet ex hoc Deus ut sic moveatur quod intelligitur diligitur ipsum - acquirit etiam sibiquodsitper multa bona creaturis etfacit etfinaliter efficienter, exemplariter - sinehocquod cuiuslibet creaturae mundi etperomnetempus etDominus omnem situm in talium habitudinum est se decern nulla moveatur velsitmobilis, per aliquo quia generum." 44)Seethequotation n.51. below,

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fromthestartuntilthetimeitwillbe fullygenerated, and fromthenon to the timeit beginsto be extinguished, we shouldassumethereis one firethroughout thecourseoftime,he says,madeup ofall thosefires, as thesubjectofall thatgeneration and extinction. Of thisfireWyclifsaysthatit is applicableto eachsingleone ofitscomponents; thefirecan becomelargeor small,and can be affected accidents at different times.45 byopposite In Chapter7 of the Tractatus de univers alibus,Wyclifexplainsthediverse modesofbeingofcreatures, one ofwhichis theaccidentalmodeofbeing.He describesit as beingsupervenient withthe upon a substance,corresponding distinction of beingintotheninecategoriesotherthansubstance.46 Now in theexampleofthefire, Wyclifstatedthatwe should"positone commonfire", as (a) the subjectof generationand extinction, and as (b) thatwhichcan be affected in accidents different now by ways: beingsmall,thenbeinglarge, and so on. The waysin whichthesubstancefireis qualifiedbyaccidentsthus amountto itsdifferent modesofbeingofthatfire,i.e. itsdifferent manifestations.Whatremainsin thecourseof timeis thesubstancefiresharedbythis fireand all itsoccurrences. particular Butthatis notall we needto assume.Forbesidessuchcommonsubjectsof accidentswe justspokeof,Wyclifcontinues, we shouldalso assumethereare likequalityandquantity takenas accidentsin theirsuccessive accidents, stages, whicharenowgreator intenseand nowtheopposite.We needto assumethis to explainhow quantitiescan change:a quantity, forexample,can in turn some accidental to which it is formally acquire quantityowing large,and ifit it which it is changes, acquirespartsby successively quantifiedin different

45)Ioannis Tractatus delogica n. 19),Vol.III,cap.X, , ed.Dziewicki Wyclif, (op.cit.,above, "Unde iuxta dicta demultitudine accidentium etdegradibus rerum est communium p. 1468"21: dareunum subiectum commune subiectat tale accidens Verbi quodprimo multiplicatum.gratia, estdareunum communem adistum accidentalem etquamlibet suarum ignem ignem partium, motus Namposito a quiestsubiectum multiplicati pertotum. quodignis partibiliter generetur nongradu fuerit etabhinc ubidesinit est quousque piene generatus, incipiat corrumpi generari, dareunum exomnibus istisignibus subiectantem omnem illamgeneratioignem aggregatum nemetistam Etignis communis adsingulum istorum estnunc corruptionem. componentium nuncparvus, nuncsicaccidentatus etnuncmodoopposito." magnus, 46)John Tractatus deuniversalibus n.36),cap.VII,pp.12765, ed.Mueller above, Wyclif, (op.cit., - idest 12869: "Etpraeter istos tres modos essendi esse habet sc.esseintelcreatura, multiplexquod - satis essesuiscausis, etesseexistere individuum estdaremodum creaturae, ligibile aequivocos essendi accidentalem substantiae adistos secundum distinctionem novem consequentem praedicamentorum. Etnullum taleesseestsubstantia, sedmodus accidentalis subsantiae."

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thatthisquantityshouldcontinually be ways.Thisdoes not mean,however, ofthesamesize,becausein thecourseoftimeitcanhappenthatithasdifferent parts.47 Afterhavingmentionedsome examplesof how accidentscan be affected, therelationship between Wyclif proceedsto showus howwe shouldunderstand in and the itself. that successive something Assuming somechange something in thata bodycan undergochange, thingcan change time,and specifically as thebearerof a "multiplied acciand assumingthatthereis one substrate dent",it does not followthatwhateverpartof a successivebodyis anypart to every whatsoever. Instead,whatthismeansis thatwhatever partis common comesintoexis(bodily)part.Nor doesitfollowthata body,whichgradually tencewithits partssucceedingone another,is one of thoseparts,but we shouldrealisethatit is one body,composedofthoseparts.48 we can also interpret proposiBy makinguse oftheanalysisjustpresented tionsaboutchange.All thepreviousexamplesaremeantto showthattheway thatthe can change,withoutitbeingnecessary inwhicha substanceis affected substanceas suchshouldchangetoo. ButWyclifdoes notleaveit at that.He also wantsto showus how thesechangescan be accountedforin different he likedto cases.To thisend, our authordiscussessome of the arguments All mentionwhensomeonewantedto provethatchangewouldbe impossible. In we shall of accident. the section arefallacies of thesearguments following look at a fewexamplesand showhowWyclifrespondsto them. aboutChange 3.4. Misgivings s colourchangingintoan opposite is aboutsomething Wyclifs first argument colour: I usedtosweettalk B willbeblack, whoisnowwhite, andatinstant that Sortes, Supposing inthat sameinstant that hewillbewhite intobelieving B; andbythesame myaudience 47)Ioannis n. 19),Vol.III,cap.X, Tractatus delógica , ed.Dziewicki (op.cit.,above, Wyclif, vel accidentia 14621"29: "Et est dare successiva, quenuncsunt magna quantitatem qualitatem, p. sibi accidentalem Et sic licet intensa etnunc modo qua quantitatem opposito. quantitas, acquirat Necsequitur ex varie successive. tamen sitmagna, formaliter quantificatur partes quibus acquirit utcontingit detempore illasitcontinue istoquodquantitas quiaillaquantitas equemagna habeat différentes [.. .]." partes 48)Ioannis n. 19),Vol.III,cap.X, delogica, ed.Dziewicki TractaPus (op.cit.,above, Wyclif, sedcomsitquelibet, existoquodquelibet "Nonautem corporis pars gradatim sequitur p.14711"15: Necsequitur estquelibet munis adquamlibet eiuspartem existens, quodcorpus gradatim gradatim. sedunum exilliscompositum." sitaliqua sibisuccedentibus, illius earum, partibus

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ofwhatever willever Foronly a white token, be,itwillbesocontinually. quality something Sortes will and white besomething other than be, thing everything willalways something therefore Sortes willnever beblack insucha waythat hewillnotbeanalbino. For black; inthiscase,onlya not-white willbeSortes, while atthesametime willbe thing nothing Sortes butthewhite ifthere because issomething willbecome or Sortes, else,thenthat tobeSortes. Andso,itisnotthecasethatwhatever willbeSortes nowisSortes, begin because black Sortes willbeSortes, whountil nowisnotSortes. Andheisorwillbesometherefore will be Sortes who at is not Sortes. Forinthese cases one thing; something present from aninferius toitssuperius with theconstancy ofa subject,49 with thenegation in argues second position.50 In thistypeoffaulty (whichis basedupontheclaimthatblackis the reasoning of white and therefore whiteequalsnot-black),theidea is thatifwe opposite assumea changein Sortesfromwhitetoblack,itcannotbe Sortes whochanges. Eitherit is Sorteswho is white,but thengiventhatwhatever is whiteis not black,and a changefromwhiteinto blackshouldoccur,thenit cannotbe Sorteswhowillchange.Or,youcouldsaythatitwasnotSorteswhowaswhite to beginwith,becausewe assumedthatSorteswillbe black,andwhatiswhite is notblack.So in thatcasetoo it cannotbe Sorteswho has changed.So havthechange,one canconcludethat ingprovedthatis notSorteswhoundergoes changeis impossible. A littlelateron Wycliflistsotherfallaciousinferences: Likewise thatnoonehasengendered thatking, hasbaptized orhitthat [.. .] itfollows has andsoon.Andyetthat wasengendered andthat priest, seenthat bishop, king priest wasactually that wasseenbyhowever andsoon.Andyet wounded, bishop many people, hebecame isgeneration; andallbecoming fora farshorter time king; justasa manisking 49)Forthenotion of'constantia inmedieval subiecď seetheintroduction logicandsemantics, oftheedition ofGiraldus Odonis ed.L.M.deRijk(2 vols.), Vol.I: OFM,Opera Philosophical Critical from Edition the The in notion is used 49-54. (Leiden, 1997), Logica. Manuscripts of'theactual existence ofthesubject'. Inourcasethen the fourteenth-century logicinthesense actual existence ofSortes ismeant. 50)Ioannis Tractatus debgica n. 19),Vol.Ill,cap.X, , ed.Dziewicki Wyclif, (op.cit.,above, 1 "Ut etinB instand 4718"31: eritniger, suadebam Sors, p. posito quod quiiamestalbus, quod erit albusineodem B instand; etperidem: erit continue qualecumque aliquid unquam ipsum, esttale.Namtantum albumeritSors,etsemper eritomnealbumaliuda nigro; ergoSors eritniger sicquodnonestalbinus. Tuncenimtantum nonalbum eritSors,cum numquam tamen nichil erit SorsnisiSorsalbus, tunc illudfiet etincipiet esseSors. Etsicnon quiasialiud, erit SorsiamestSors, eritSors, nonestSors.Etipseestvel quicquid quiaSorsniger quiadhuc erit erit SorsquodnuncnonestSors. enim abinferiori ad aliquid. Igitur aliquid Argumentatur suum cumconstantia subiecti, superius negatione postposita."

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/Vivarium 46 (2008)24-58 J.Spruyt isanabsolute ismore, ifanaccidental ora popethan heisa man.Andwhat entity quality that beformed from itisimpossible, asa result, onething could onitsown, which canexist own the still would have its an because accident a subject anditself asinformed accident, by a Andthen without anditsother accidents, justasithasitsownbeing. density quantity, onaccount ofsuchanaccident, a substance doubt noonewould justasnoone perceive ofitassomething or onaccount ofa sensation a soulormatter would composite, perceive For of it as clothed. sensation on of a sensation clothed account any something something intheaccident, even thesubject itstermination would continue tofind ofthat kind though hasbeencorrupted.51

areadducedto scorethesamepoint. subtlearguments Manyother,seemingly is thataccidentaland subWhat theyhavein common,accordingto Wyclif, ofthingsaretreatedas iftheywereofthesametype.And stantialdesignations ifwe confusethetwo,we can go on forever producingthesamesortoffallaaccident?1 i.e. a fallaciessecundum ciousinferences, Our authortellsus thatone can respondin different waysto such argutheopinionthata presenttenseshouldnotbe ampliatedto ments,following theentirepastor future.In responseto theargumentabout Sortess change inferwhiteintosomething fromsomething black,Wyclif repeatsthatthefirst encedoesnotobtain;on thecontrary, onlya whitething,a blackthing,somein a certainstate will be and so something so not-white Sortes; on) (and thing Sortes willbe Sortes,whichin anotherwaywillnotbe whiteSortes;therefore otherthanthewhiteperson.But thisdoes not meanthat willbe something Sorteswillnotbe Sortes.It merelyfollowsthatat sometimeSorteswillbe of a certain quality(aliquale),ofwhichquality{quale)Sortesnowis not.Fortobe buttobea something-in-a-certain-state.50 whiteis nottobesomethings 51)Ioannis n. 19),Vol.III,cap.X, delogica Tractatus , ed.Dziewicki (op.cit.,above, Wyclif, 14 : "Similiter istum illam iuxta regem, sequitur quodnemo generavit sophisticationem p. 148 31 isterex etsicdealiis.Ettarnen vidit istum velpercussit istum sacerdotem, episcopum, baptizavit a quotlibet hominibus illeepiscopus fuit actualiter etillesacerdos fuit visus, vulneratus, genitus, minor sicut homo estlonge factio estgeneratio, fiebat etomnis Ettamen etsicdesimilibus. rex, sitresabsoluta rexvelpapaquamipseesthomo. existere, Ymo,siaccidens quepersepotest habecumaccidens et accidente ex subiecto fiat unum est corollarie informato, quod impossibile Et entitatem. habet et alia eius sicut retpropriam accidentia, densitatem, propriam quantitatem, vel necsentiret animam taleaccidens, sicut sentiret substantiam tuncsinedubionemo propter sensationem indumenti. autindutum sensationem materiam Quelipropter compositi, propter subiecto." terminata ad sensatio manere betenim talis accidens, posset corrupto 52)Ioannis n. 19),Vol.III,cap.X, ed.Dziewicki Tractatus delogicai (op.cit.,above, Wyclif, etparalofaciendum esset talibus terminis "[.. .] patet sophisma, quodcumomnibus p. 1512'3: fallaciam accidentis." secundum gizandum 53)Ioannis n. 19),Vol.III,cap.X, delogica Tractatus , ed.Dziewicki (op.cit.,above, Wyclif,

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- to theeffect As to anotherargument thatSorteswho is nowwhitewillbe blackat instantB; therefore Sortesat instantB differs froma whitething; therefore at thatinstanteverything whitediffers fromhim;and therefore he - Wyclif differs fromhimself inference thatSortes saysthathe rejectedthefirst - , but thatit does followthat at instantB differs fromhimself everything whiteat instantB is different fromSortes.54 In theend,Wyclifsays,we should be mindful thatinwhatever derived waythetermsat issue(i.e. categorisations fromaccidentalfeatures)are used, such termscan likewisesuppositforan of substrance and accident,or (as somewould liketo say) fortheaggregate accident.55 To takeup theexampleofwhiteSortes,he is butone thing.Hence whatis denotedby an expression such as album, is onlyone thing.But by on different states of thatthingtheaggregate is formally concentrating split in and this it can either for the substrate as such,or forthat up, way supposit substrate insofaras it is categorised ofwhiteness. accordingto itsproperty The explanation when the at justpresented particularly applies expression issueis an abstract term,ora termthatis notwellin itselfthesubjectofa verb. In thislineof argument a philosopher could agreethatthereis a distinction betweena statueand brassin termsof theirbeing(justas beingshapedas a statueis somethingotherthanmerelybeingshapedin anykindofaccidental way).Hencetermssuchas thesearelikelyto causeequivocations, owingto the factthattheyhavebothsimpleor personalsupposition.56 The distinctions at "Inistamateria iuxta et differenter, p.15115"26: respondendum opinionem restringentem tempus nonlaxantem adomnepreteritum velfuturum. Adprimům dixiquodprima tempus presens nonvalet: tantum nonalbum et album, Sortes; (etsicdealiis)erit consequentia ymmo nigrum, sicaliquale eritSortes aliter non erit Sortes erit aliud ab sed nichil aliud albus; albo, quod ergo abalboeritSortes. Etistud infallacia accidentis, argumentum sequens peccat queperitissimos fallit expremissis. erit Sortes Igitur sequitur quodaliquale aliquando qualenuncnonestSortes, nonestessealiquid, sedestessealiquale. quiaessealbum 54)Ioannis Tractatus delogica n. 19),Vol.III,cap.X, , ed.Dziewicki Wyclif, (op.cit.,above, "Adsecundum sed bene p. 15128"30: negavi primam consequentiam, sequitur quodomne quod erit inB instanti album differet a Sorte." 55)Ioannis Tractatus delogica n. 19),Vol.III,cap.X, , ed.Dziewicki Wyclif, (op.cit.,above, "Etproulteriori inilioargumento estnotandum subip. 15130"34: responsione quodtama parte ectiquama parte términos similiter accidente vel aliis (ut predicati contingit supponere pro exsubiecto etaccidente." placet) proaggregato 56)Ioannis Tractatus delogica n. 19),Vol.III,cap.X, , ed.Dziewicki Wyclif, (op.cit.,above, "Et si fuerit 15134"40: velterminus abstractus, p. specialiter terminus quinonbenepersesupponit verbo. Sicut enim concederei etesdifferunt inesse.Etcumaliisconphilosophus quodstatua sicutessestatuatum estaliudquamaccidentatum, fiunt cretis, secundum equivocationes supautpersonalem." positionem simplicem

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issueareformalones,whereasin eachcaseit is one and thesamethingthatis spokenof.57 - in whichit was concludedthatno one has As to the thirdargument a king,andso on ,Wyclif statesthathe disagreed withit,because engendered themakingofa kingequalsthegeneration ofan accidentalstate,in thesame wayas it is an electionthatcreatesa pope.And in thiswaywe can saythereis a baptismor thatthereis a cleansing,becauseit is alwayssomeoneunclean whois baptised.And itdoesnotmatterthatitis bya substantial or generation a of water so that a was or a was (and on) by baptism king engendered priest baptised(and so on).58In all thesecases you shouldbe awareof whatthe is usedfor:is it thesubstrate as such,i.e. as considered apartfrom expression of its a or a or is it the substrate (as any categorisations being king being pope), in insofar as it characterised the admonby qualities question? Wyclif precisely in logic and not to concentrate ishesjudgesto be awareof thisdistinction on accidents'whentheyexaminewitnesses:theyshouldmakea distinction betweenthequestionwhethertheaccusedhas hitthisman,or whetherthe hitbythedelinquent.59 personwho is nowa priestwas formerly Abovewe haveseenthatWyclifexplainstheequivocationin propositions in termsof the typeof supposition thatcould lead to thefallada accidentis The thesetwoexpressions can have,viz.eithersimpleorpersonalsupposition. these as we have is factthatyoucandistinguish between two, seen, basedupon the ontologicalstructure of theworldas consistingof substancesand accithatit is a formaldistinction we are talking dents.But it was also remarked states what the distinction at does notentail. about.Wyclif first issue explicitly 57)Indeed, thathavemadesuchdistinctions, Abelard and there arephilosophers suchasPeter n.42). Alberic ofParis; cf.De Rijk1981(op.cit.,above, 58)Ioannis n. 19),Vol.Ill,cap.X, Tractatus delogica , ed.Dziewicki Wyclif, (op.cit.,above, cum factio sitgeneratio : "Ad tertium 1529"15 conclusionem, accidentis, primam regis p. negavi velmundationem, créant Etitaestdarebaptizatum sicut electiones bappapam. quiacontinue substantial velbaptismate tizatur immundus. Necobest aque(etsicdesimiquodgeneratione isterexvelsacerdos." velbaptizabatur libus) generabatur 59)Ioannis n. 19),Vol.Ill,cap.X, Tractatus de , ed.Dziewicki Wyclif, (op.cit.,above, logica neexaminent testes utputa nosse deaccidentibus, "Unde decet iudices suam, loycam p. 1525"18: vel both read'hominem'], ilium sacrdotem andtheedition siaccusatus [the manuscript percussit is to the a Here it that the author fuit siistesacerdos referring percussus delinquente." appears sentences suchas percussi andpapam famous distinction between (Forthe percussi'. papam' n.7), tiff with thepope,seeDe Rijk2002(op.cit.,above, anecdote aboutBuridans amusing ofsentences isthat areequivocal saidearlier aboutthese types they Wyclif p.74,n.217.What andpersonal because theaccidental term (inthiscasepapa)canhavesimple supposition.

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Althoughan accidentaltermcan be takenin thesetwo senses,he says,that absolute.Because be something doesnotmeanthatan accidentcouldtherefore he ifitwerepossibleforan accidentto be something absolute, says,onewould on accountof which as an intermediary, haveto assumesome in-formation withan acciis so and so endowed involved the and formally directly subject dent.He thenexplainswhatitis to be an accident,in thiscasebyconsidering itis the ofsomething, s colour:whenwe havea sensoryexperience something or accidentsthesensesareawareof.For instance,whenI perceivewhiteness, some otheraccident,I perceivea thingas endowedwithsuch and such an accident.Butwhetherthisthingis a substance,a man or someotherspecies, And therefore, is not up to thesensesto decide,but a higherfaculty. Wyclif concludes,Aristotlesaysthata substanceis onlyperceivedvia an accident, becausean accidentis perceivedunderthemode ofbeingan accident,and it onlyappliesto a substanceto be so and so endowedwithaccidents.60 a detailedaccountofwhyit is thatyoucan talkabout Wyclifnextpresents had to a timein whichthebegotten a like things begettingkingwithreference notyetbeencrowned.When theseedis sown,so to speak,therewas a begettingofa man.And justas we can admitthatat sometimewe wereall in the to some timebeforethat,we loinsof our ancestors, likewise,withreference ofcourse,theauthor canadmitthata manis earth.Butyoushouldunderstand of a man takesplace in theuterus, says,thatthemoreproximate generation ofmantakesplacewhenthesoulis hypoand themostproximate generation Once with the united body.61 statically againWyclifadducestheexampleof until startsto be generated a fire,askingus to considera fireA, thatpartially theend of thehourwhenthefirewillbe fullygrownto eightfeet,and that

60)Ioannis n. 19),Vol.III,cap.X, delogica, ed.Dziewicki Tractatus (op.cit.,above, Wyclif, fore tale "Non credo fore accidens 15218"29: absolutum, quiasinedubiooporpossibile p. ergo a formaliter etimmediate subiecinformationem mediare iliodato, teret, qua quandam ponere sentiam velquodcumque aliudaccidens, Etita,sentiendo accidentatum. tumesttaliter album, aliaspecies, homo velquecumque Utrum autem illaressitsubstantia, remtaliter accidentatam. nonsentiAristo tiles Ideodicit nonestsensus sedvirtutis discutere, quodsubstantia superioris. ratione et accidit substantie accidens sentitur sub turnisiperaccidens, huiusmodi, qua quia taliter esseaccidentatam." 61)Ioannis n. 19),Vol.III,cap.X, Tractatus delogica, ed.Dziewicki (op.cit.,above, Wyclif, estinalterilludsemen "Unde est;utputa homo, quando quandocumque gignitur, p. 15320"26: in fuit lumbis vel Et concedi nostrum utro sicut potest quodquilibet progeniparente utroque. fit verogeneratio hominis sicconceditur torum nostrorum, quodhomoestterra. Propinqua anime cumcorpore." inutero, veroinunione successive ypostatica propinquissima

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afterwards it beginsto be extinguished: then,ourauthorsaysthatitwillcontinueto be thesamefireA. And itremainsso whentheextinction is removed. In fact,itwouldremainthesamewhentheextinction accompaniedthegeneration.62 AlthoughWyclifdoes not explicitly sayit,whattheexamplesjust dealtwithshowis thata substrate in thesenseofsome(material) iswhat entity remainsthroughtime,and thatitsaccidentschange. 'sAnalysis 3.5. Summary of Wyclif The fallacies we havelookedat areall theresultofsomeone'sgetting confused the that are used for the under discussion. This by expressions things particularmistakecan easilyoccurifwe drawconclusionsfrompropositions containderivedfromaccidentalterms. ingcategorisations What is it in Wyclifs view,thatsetsaccidentaltermsapartfromthesubstantialones?We have alreadyseen thathe refusesto admitthataccidents could be something absolute.Butwhatare theythen?For starters, accidents area kindof universal.In De universalibus fivekindsof Wyclifdistinguishes i.e.: 1. theDivineIdeas,2. thereflections oftheDivineIdeasin the universal', and the common substantial formpresentin 3. intelligences heavenly spheres; theonesAristotle callssubstantial individuals, generaand species;4. thecommonnon-substantial formsin theiraccidents;and 5. universais in thesenseof and mental In acts.63 the fourth classof unisigns(i.e. linguistic expressions) versaisreference is madeto accidents. In De entepraedicamentali threeways , cap. I, pp. 6-8,Wyclifdistinguishes ť of takingaccidens.64(1) In the mostgeneralsenseťaccidenscoversall that

62)Ioannis Tractatus delogica n. 19),Vol.III,cap.X, , ed.Dziewicki Wyclif, (op.cit.,above, "Utposito adfinem istius hore inquo p.15329"34: quodAignis incipiat partialiter generari usque eritignis etquodpostincipiat tuncmanebit continue octupedalis plenegeneratus, corrumpi, idemA ignis; subducta concomquimaneret, corruptione, ymmo quimaneret, corruptione mitante generationem." 63)John Tractatus deuniversalibus n.36),cap.II,p.59165, ed.Mueller Wyclif, (op.cit.,above, maneries 176:"Primo unversalium Primum etsupremum est [.. .] estdarequinqué [...]. genus ratio velideaexemplaris aeterna inDeo.Secundum est ratio in communis creatura causis genus utintelligentiis etorbibus caelestibus. Tertium universalium estforma comsuperioribus, genus munis insuisindividuis. fiindata Etilla[.. .]sunt etspecies dequibus Aristotiles. genera loquitur forma communis insuisaccidentibus, abintellectu estuniversale." infimo, Quarto: apprehensa 64)Joannis Deente from theunique Vienna XIIIlogicae Wiclif, MS;Quaestiones praedicamentali etphilosophiae from theunique Beer(London, Frankfurt MS,ed.Rudolf 1891;repr. Prague amMain).

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46 (2008)24-58 /Vivarium ]. Spruyt

else. whichsecondarily ) fallsto (adiacet)or inheresin something {a posteriori In thissensethepropriapassiocan be calledan accidentof thesubject.For and singlecreaexample,wealthhappensto (is an accidentof) thewealthy, tureshappento (are an accidentof) God. (2) In thesecondsense,accidens inheresin something formcontingently refers to whatever else,whetherthis itcan be changedbytheacquisitionofa form, orin time,whether be eternally orcan not-bean accidentofthatin whichitinheres;and in thiswaytheturnAnd manysuchaccidentsinherein ingofthingstowardthedivineexemplar. and mostpropersenseof theword,an God. (3) In the third,and strictest in a substance, accidens is everyforminhering bywhoseacquisitionorlossthe understandthe notion thingcan change;and thisis how the philosophers can be called accithe past-nessand future-ness accidens ; and analogically, forinallideas,Wyclif theirintelligibility; dents'ofthethingas regards explains, or has-been is all theideas,the will-being just as in God too,who essentially inheres.And it is takenin thisthirdsense,Wyclifsays,thatwe contingently in thepropersenseoftheword.65 Fromthisaccountitappears haveaccidentia thatforWyclif, 'to be accidentalto somethingshould,properly speaking,be takenin an ontologicalsense. whichcan lead to the Butwhatthento sayoftheproblematic propositions, a of What are the occasions such accident? fallacycan occur?As we fallacy haveseen,one suchoccasionis whenan accidentalterm'is combinedwithan indicatorof time(an adverbof time,or a verbin thepresentor pasttense). arevalidor not in suchcasesdependsupon how Whetherspecificinferences the accidentaltermshouldbe understood.If the accidentaltermis merely used as to identify somesubject(thatat some timehappensto be endowed in theexpression withtheaccidentalproperty bywhichitis brought signified at thetime the need not to that substrate then accidental apply up), property

65)Joannis n.64),pp.7l'S:"Primo De ente , ed.Beer(op.cit.,above, Wiclif, praedicamentali Et omne velinest alteri dicisibiaccidens. modocommunissime adiacet potest quoda posteriori etistomodo istomodopropria dicitur accidens utpatet 5°Metaphysice subiecto, ultimo; passio diviti etDeosingule creature mododicitur divicie dicuntur accidere, [.. .] Secundo quecumque ex sive moveri forma alteri sive eternaliter sive inexistens, tempore, possit performe contingenter sivenonesseaccidens illicuiinest; ettaliter volutacio rerum diviadexemplum adquisicionem taliainsunt Deo [.. .] Sedtercio strictissime etpropriissime forma num.Etquotlibet quelibet inherens veldeperdicionem estipsamobilis; etistomodo substantie, percuiusadquisicionem nichil obest obest concedere Sic locuntur accidens [...]. philosophi ergointelligendo analoyce etfuturicionem esseaccidencia reisecundum esseintelligibile. Namomniydee, pretericionem sicut etDeo,quiessencialiter estomnis inest fore autfuisse." ydea, contingenter

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withthetenseof theverb.If,on theotherhand,thetermis corresponding thentheaccidentalproperty usedattributively, mustapplyto thesubstrate at withthe tenseof the verb.The fallacyof accident the timecorresponding occurswhenyou concludethatan accident'inheresin somesubstrate, when in factthatis notthecaseat thetimeoftheutterance. Accordingto Wyclif,theaccidentaltermsthatcould lead one to commit thefallacyofaccidentincludenotonlyconcreteaccidentalterms, butabstract the position accidentaltermsas well. It should be recalledthatregardless of theaccidentaltermsin propositions, (a partesubiectior a partepraedicatt) ofsubjectand theycan likewisesuppositforan accident,or fortheaggregate accident.Thiskindofequivocationcan comeup becauseaccidentaltermscan in twoways:theycan haveeithersimpleor personalsupposibe interpreted The semanticstructure ofsuchtermsis suchthattheyincludeboththe tion.66 considered as such and thesuppositumas characterised byanyof suppositum itsaccidentalproperties. Thus farwe havelookedat Wyclifs discussionsof thefallacyof accident. how theaccidentaltermsin We haveseen thathe cautionsus to determine are These terms are because used. tricky theycan havebothperpropositions in turnis basedupon the sonaland simplesupposition, and thisdistinction structure of the we talk about. things ontological itis useTo getan evenclearerpictureofWyclifs ontologicalcommitment, we havedealtwith. fulto considerhowJohnBuridanexplainsthesentences In thelatter s expositionis it is thesemanticfunctionof appellatiothatplays thekeyrole. 4. An Alternative Analysisof theProblematicPropositions: Buridan John we lookedat inWyclifs logicarediscussedbyBuriThe kindsofpropositions semanticproperties dan in thepartoftheSummulae dealingwiththedifferent we need to The semanticproperty termsin propositions. of categorematic In theSummulaehe first thefollowing look at is thatof'appellatio.67 presents terms: of description appellative 66)Others = suppositio as opposed tosignificatio havesignificatif) materialis jbrmalis significati = Doctrine of Connotation Cf. L.M. de 'Buridans , in TheLogic of Rijk, appellatio. significati Buridan , ed.JanPinborg 1976),89-100; John esp.96. (Copenhagen, 67)Johannes Desuppositionibus, ed.R.vandeLecq(Nijmegen, Summulae Buridanus, 1998), esp. of inrelation tosuppositio Forthenature ofappellatio anda discussion ch.4.5,Deapellationibus.

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inthenominative atallbeyond . . .substantial terms caseorterms notconnoting anything Butevery thethings forwhich are not terms they supposit appellative properly speaking. which it for is and term other than that called supposits appellative', connoting something as which itsupposits that which itconnnotes assomething tothat for, adjacent appellates whiteness as something tothatwhich theterm ' appellates adjacent e.g.white for.68 'white isapttosupposit ' What appellanoexplainsthenis how some expression includesnot onlythe itsvirtual but also indirectly actualsuppositionit has in some proposition, i.e. the that are included to the virtually supposita, supposita owing signification oftheexpression as such. betweentheappellatio and suppositio ofa term Buridanusesthisdistinction to showhow sentencesof thetypesenexeritpuerandpapampercussi can be as true.An appellativeterm,Buridanexplains,alwaysappellatesits regarded form,whetherit comesbeforeor aftertheverb,but it can do so in different ways: ... ifitcomes after iftheverbisofthepresent tense is not theverb: andthepredicate ifitcomes then itappellates itsform forthetense oftheverb; before ampliative, precisely iftheverb theverb: isofthepresent tense andthepredicate isnotampliative, then itappellates itsform for the if the verb is of another tense or if the tense; precisely present predicate isampliative, then theterm after theverb itsform forthe indifferently, placed appellates timeofthepresent oftheverborforthetimetowhich andforthetense thepredicate 69 ifitisampliative. ampliates,

thedifferent modes ofappellatio, seeDe Rijk1976(op.cit.,above, The n.66),passim. different of Buridan s use of to is and appellatio'analyse very carefully originality epistemic propositions in'Ockham andBuridan onepistemic sentences: byClaudePanaccio, convincingly challenged oftheform andappellation ofreason article, 1999). appellation (unpublished 68)Johannes Summulae Desuppositionibus n.67),4.5.1,p.80:"terBuridanus, (op.cit.,above, mini enim nihil substantiales recti automnino connotantes ultra eaproquibus non supponant, suntappellativi Sed omnis terminus connotans aliud ab eo dicitur proprie. proquosupponit, etapellat illudquodconnotat ei proquosupponit, adiacentis ut appellativus; permodum 'album' albedinem adiacentem eiproquaisteterminus innatus est 'album' appellai tamquam supponere." 69)Johannes Summulae De suppositionibus n.67),4.5.2,p. 816'10: Buridanus, (op.cit.,above, "Seddifferenter earn anteetpost, formam suampraecise aliquando appellat quiapostappellat sedante, siverbum sitpraesentis etpraedicatum nonsitampliativerbi; protempore temporis tuncappellat formam suampraecise Sedsiverbum fuerit alterius vum, propraesenti tempore. velsi praedicatum fuerit tunc terminus ante verbum temporis ampliativum, positus appellat formam suamindifferenter, etprotempore verbi velad quasidisiunctive, protempore praesenti sisitampliativum." quodpraedicatum ampliai

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The crucialelementin Buridansaccount(and indeedin Ockhamssayingthat "a predicateappellatesits form")70 is theexpression 'form'.He explainsthat 'form'in thiscontextshouldbe takenas whatever singular thingsa termappelthisbe an accidentor a substance, matteror formor a composlates,whether ite substance,or something made up of manythings.For example,theterm and itappellates wealthysuppositsfora man,and so man is calleditsmatter, and landsand money,and otherthingshe posessesas adjacentto him houses, as to theirpossessor. as theyareconHence,he concludes,suchthingsinsofar ceivedofas beingpossessed(ea rationequa possidentur) arecalledtheformof thetermwealthy.71 As we can see,Buridansaccountof'form'includesbothan extensional and an intensional The form is identified with the individual themaspect. things selves,butthesearethingsconceivedofin a certainway. It is on thebasisofthedistinctions in appellationthatBuridancan explain whya sentenceofthekind'thepope is theone I hit',is true.In thislocution, in whichthe noun 'the pope' precedesthe verb,the expression'the pope' as adjacentto thesuppositum. On appellatestheformpope-nessdisjunctively theotherhand,ifyou say ťI hit thepope' theexpression 'thepope',which comesaftertheverb,appellatestheformprecisely forthetimeconnotedby theverb.It is theextensionof thetermpope' whichis different in thesetwo cases.A similaranalysisappliesto theexpressionan old man willbe a boy senexappellatestheformofsenec{senexeritpuer).In thiscasetheexpresssion tusas adjacentto a suppositum. Theexpression can thusbe interpreted as who is orwillbe an old manwillbe a boy {qui estveleritsenexeritpuer). a specialcaseofappellation As iswellknown,Buridanintroduces to explain sentencescontaining verbsrelatingto actsof themind.72 Suchverbsinclude like 'to epistemicverbs,like 'to know' and 'to opine', but also expressions even in the and 'to see'. have often been with dealt (The specifics promise', so I shallconfinemyselfto some basic features of his proposal.) literature, In Buridansview,thereis a difference betweenappellationin thecontextof 70)Cf.Panaccio, n.67). 1999(op.cit.,above, article, unpublished 71)Johannes De suppositionibus Summulae n.71),4.5.2,p. 8120 25: Buridanus, (op.cit.,above, "Sedperformam termini solemus terminus siveilludsitaccidens intelligere quidquid appellat, etsivesitmateria autsubstantia sivesubstantia, autforma autexmultis composita, aggregatum. Utisteterminus ideo 'homo' dicitur materia etappellat domos 'dives' homine, eius, pro supponit etaliaquaeillepossidet adiacentium illitamquam etagros etpecunias, possidenti. permodum forma illius terminus 'dives'." Ideotaliaearatione dicuntur quapossidentur 72)Johannes Desuppositionibus Summulae n.71),4.5.3. Buridanus, (op.cit.,above,

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actsof themind,and in thecontextof thosethatdo not verbsthatsignify actsofthemind,appelofverbsthatdo notsignify on theother.In thecontext or connote.In lativetermsonlyappellatethethingstheyimmediately signify actsof the mind,thesituationis different: thecontextof verbsthatsignify iftheappellativetermcomesaftersucha verb,it appellatestheconceptions ifitprethethingsitsignifies; {rationes) accordingto whichthetermsignifies The kindofappelcedessuchverbs,it does notappellatesuchconceptions.73 latioin questionis whatis knownas appellatiorationis. to explainthedifference between Buridanusesthisspecialkindofappellatio in Venientem the former venientem' and theexpressions cognosco': cognosco the termVenientem'has appellatiorationis.The propositionsaysthatyou know the personunderthe conceptionof his beingthe one approaching, whom whereasin thelatterit is thepersonwho happensto be approaching him undertheconceptionof his beingthe you know,butyou do not know one who is coming. thefunction In contexts Buridanclearlyseparates liketheonesmentioned, Ifan expression has appellatiorationis fromthatofsuppositio. ofappellatio , he itforsomeotherexpression, explains,thismeansyoucannotsimplysubstitute eventhoughthetwotermsin questionsuppositforthesamethings.You can or iftheconceptof thename aresynonymous, onlydo so iftheexpressions in in used the consequentis included the conceptof the name used in the in such a waythatit is impossiblefortheconceptof thename antecedent, to be in themindwithouttheconceptofthenameused usedin theantecedent 1 knoweverytriangle; in theconsequent. Thisis whyitdoesnotfollow, thereI knowa triangle.74 itdoesfollow, 'therefore foreI knowan isosceles'; however, 73)Johannes Desuppositionibus n.71),4.5.3,pp.8319-846: Summulae above, Buridanus, (op.cit., inter verba actus animae estdifferentia adappellationes quantum significantia cognos"Magna et sicut suntistaverba: citivae, promittere', significare', supponere', cognoscere', intelligere', ethuiusmodi. Nam etinter aliaverba, cuiusmodi essent monere' huiusmodi, secare, urere', actus animae nonappellant nisires termini verborum nonsignificantium huiusmodi respectu rationes ultimate velconnotant; etnonappellant secundum quas quasimmediate significant actus sisequanTermini autem verborum huiusmodi animae, respectu significantium significant. rationes eaquaesignificant. Siveroilli turiliaverba secundum [.. .] appellant quassignificant iliaverba, nonsicappellant illasrationes." termini praecedant 74)Johannes Summulae De suppositionibus n.71),4.5.3,p. 8420"26: Buridanus, (op.cit.,above, "Etideoconcluditur a cum talibus verbis non inferre exunonomine quod parte post possumus alterum nisiilianomina sintsynonyma, vel nomen, quantumcumque supponant proeodem, inratione nisiratio nominis nominis talimodoquodimposincludatur antecedentis, sequentis sibile sitrationem nominis antecedentis esseapudanimam sineratione nominis Unde sequentis.

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in theaccountsofbothappellano The notionof' ratiofeatures formaeand in connecthe 'form' this roles. As we different rationis but saw, , play appellatio withtheindividualthingsthatare appellated,undersome tionis identified theextensionof conception(ratio)of thesethings.This ratiocan determine thesupposita,and howthisis donedependson thepositionoftheappellative too relatesto a wayofconceiving The appellatiorationis termin a proposition. the rationis If has , wayof conceiving something something. a term appellatio is crucial.Whatis appellatedhere,is someconcept,thatis to say,someactof themind. UnlikeBuridan,Wyclifdoes not makeuse of theidea of appellatioat all, acciof sentencesfeaturing nor does he explainthedifferent interpretations what ofsupposita.In hisanalysis, in termsoftheextension dentalexpressions witha verbofthepastorfuture comesto theforeis thatin sentences tense,or to can be ampliatedifthat thetimereferred indeedcontaininga possibility, verbis combinedwithan accidentalterm.However,it makesa difference whetheran accidentaltermcomesbeforeor aftertheverb,and thedifference i.e. as havingeitherpersonal forthings, hasto do withtheirwayofsuppositing as such considered case it is thesubstratum or simplesupposition.In thefirst as itis characterised insofar thatis suppositedfor,whileitis thesubstratum by that is in the substratum some an expression supsignifying formainhering positedforin thesecondcase.To accountforthissecondcase,we mustassume butalso of (accidental)formsthatcan apply notonlythebeingofa substrate, ofsomesuchformin a substrate It is therealinherence to thatverysubstrate. at some timethatcan accountforthiskindof supposition.In a word,the itwouldseem,an ontologicalbasis ofaccidentaltermspresuppose, semantics in whichaccidentalformscan eitherinhereor notinherein a substrate. elementsofa we haveseen,aretheconstitutive Theseaccidentalproperties, s a or arrangement formalattribution ). (in Wyclif terms, praedicatio formalis In realitytheyare the kindsof beingby whichtwo concretethingsof the fromeach other,and evenbywhichone different samespeciesare formally fromhimselfwhenhe is consideredin different individualcan be formally These times. or at different different bywhichthingscan be properties places oftheindividual fromone anotherarerealconstituents formally distinguished its accidentalpropand an individual inhere in.75 thing Although thingsthey fromone different are nevertheless ertiescoincide,theseproperties formally isoschelem' omnem nonsequitur , sedbenesequitur ergo ergocognosco triangulum; cognosco [.. triangulum' cognosco 75)Conti1997(op.cit.,above, n.42).

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anotherbecauseoftheirown natures.As Contiputsit,"ifwhatdifferentiates thenthey them[i.e.objects]is one oftheirabstract components, metaphysical '76 differ formaliter 5. ConcludingRemarks at issuefitsin withthe basicsof Wyclifs way of analysingthepropositions his awarenessthatthere Aristotle's semantics.This kindof semanticsreflects in theworld.We can entities in can about which we are manyways speak concentateupon different aspectsof thosesubstances,and categorisethem in categorisation ofthings thedifferences In s Aristotle philosophy, accordingly. makesensebecausesubstancescan be conceivedof in manyways,owingto orbecausewe can we can distinguish, thefactthattheyhavecertainproperties comparethemwithothersubstances.Ultimatelyit is the existenceof subthataccountsforour conceivingof themin such stancesas such-and-suches and such a way; thatis the real foundationof our linguisticdistinctions. thisconnectionwithsubstanceswas realfoundationenough. For Aristotle, in hisontology, the substances, Byfavouring concretethings,i.e. theprimary he believedhe had succeededin reducingthe amountof entitiesPlato had introduced. semanticsis not opposed to a conceptualist As we have seen,Aristotle's we haveanalysedareusedto accountlikeBuridans.In Buridan,thesentences wordshave severaldistinct show how languageworks,how categorematic a theorderofwordsin a proposition, semanticlayers,and howbyorganising of The can be an of such expression highlighted. highlighting specificlayer of is describedin termsoftheappellatio thesesemanticlayersofan expression the comes to of an Likesupposition theappellatio an expression. only expression ofsupposiis thecounterpart in a proposition. forewhenit features Appellatio i.e. thatwhich ofan expression, is thematerialsignificate tio.The suppositum is The appellatioofthatsameexpression a termsuppositsforin an expression. oftheformin themodeofsomething , whichis to adjacentto thesuppositum not as such the does all those that it covers for, supposit expression say things butwhichare includedin thethingsthetermcan suppositforowingto its Buridanultimately explainsthisfunctionof appellatioextensignification. i.e. in termsofthethingsa termdoes notsuppositfor,butwhichare sionally, includedin thedomainof thingsa personcould havein mind nevertheless 76)Conti1997(op.cit.,above, n.42),p. 163.

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whenhe usesthetermin question.Of courseforBuridanall semanticfunchavetheirbasisnotin spokenorwritten tionsofexpressions languageas such, ofthe butin mentallanguage,whichis foundedupon ourconceptualisations areours,but likein we areconfronted with.Thus our categorisations reality i.e. on the substancesas conAristotle, theyare foundedupon something, ceivedofin certainways. Forexample, principleofcategorisation. Wycliftoo adoptstheAristotelian can applyto a subject we haveseenhowhe explainsthata certainrelationship in a discuswhich it is introduced to the by categorialexpression according sion.However,forWyclifour use oflanguageinvolvesmuchmorethanthat. should thatlinguistic oftherequirement It is in hisinterpretation expressions in rewhichsetshimapartfrompeoplelikeBuridan.As havea fiindamentum of we haveshown,our authorturnsto a moreelaborateontologicalstructure whatis goingon in propositions theworldin orderto demonstrate involving not onlypertainto individualsubaccidentalterms.Our conceptualisations onticlayers.The worldis madeup of stances,but also paralleltheirdifferent accidental forms. Andeventheaccidencan have substantial and which beings, in accidental forms.Hence his their turn can tal formsthemselves acquire accountof changeand thewaysin whichchangecan takeplace.A substrate oran essence)is thatwhichremains an individual substance, (whether through aresubjectto change. the formal while its accidents, time, beingofsomething, We have seen thatWyclifdeniesthatan accidentis somethingabsolute. Whatthisclaimamountsto is thataccidentscannotbe be foundin theworld us in separationfromthesubstancetheyapplyto. Neverthethatsurrounds his less, accountclearlyindicatesthataccidentsdo havean ontologicalstatus of theirown. Forone thing,theuse of accidentaltermscan causecomplications,Wyclifsays,becausetheycan havebothpersonaland simplesupposia kindofexistence tion:byspeakingofsimplesuppositionin thisconnection, of accidentsis broughtto mind.In Wyclifs viewthen,whenwe conceiveof an accidentas separatefroma substance,it forcesus to recognisethatthis withtheontologicalstatusoftheaccident corresponds conceptualseparation form.Theseaccidentalformshave i.e. as an accidental as an ensintelligibile , beingas ideas in God. Once we realisethe divinesourceof all meaningful ourlinwe can cometo termswiththeproperwayof interpreting discourse, of foundathis kind because It is utterances. Wyclifprovides precisely guistic but thatit is no longerAristotle, tion forour use of accidentalexpressions Platohe remindsus of.

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KtC'a f*' v«/ brill

Francisco


Vivarium 46 (2008)59-81

Suárez

on Consent

and Political

Obligation

Daniel Schwartz Aston UK University, Abstract on theorigin thatFrancisco Suárezassigns topolitical Interpreters disagree obligation andcorrelative to as socialcontract political subjection. Accordingsome,Suárez, other believes thatitis theconsent oftheindividuals thatcausespolitical theorists, obligation.Others, claim that for isunderived from the however, Suárez, political obligation individuals' consent whichcreates thecity. Insupport ofthisclaimthey invoke s Suárez viewthatpolitical emanates from the of I argue power citybyway "natural resultane/'. thatanalysis ofSuárezslessstudied De votoandDe iuramento reveals that,forSuárez, consent causesboththecityand thecitizenspoliticalobligation. close Moreover, ofthenotion ofcausation within Suárez s metaphysics inspection bynatural resultancy shows thatwhatemanates from thebodypolitic inthisfashion isnot,asclaimed, politicalsubjection andpolitical butrather thecity's to self-mastership. obligation, right Becauseforhimpolitical doesoriginate in consent it is notincorrect to obligation Suárezas a socialcontract theorist. regard Keywords Francisco natural Suárez, consent, political obligation, resultancy, political power FranciscoSuárezassignsa centralrole to consentin his explanationof the originofthebodypolitic.1Butwhatis theprecisecausalpaththatleadsfrom theindividual s consentto politicalcommunity to theemergence ofpolitical 1}"[Pjotestas inuno,etsubjectio inaliosuntcorrelativa." Francisco De legibus, acDeo Suárez, inRoman followed ,III.33.4(hereafter D.L.,booknumber numerals, legislatore given bychapter inArabic andsection Allreferences andLatin from Suárez aretaken from numerals). quotations Omnia 28 vols, translations from Vivès, (Paris: 1856-1868) (hereafter Opera Opera). English D.L.aretaken from Selections Three Works Brown Scott ed. Sudrez, 5./., James from ofFrancisco corrections whennecessary.) Alltranslations from other (Oxford, 1944)vol.2. (with slight works aremine. ©Koninklijke Brill 2008 NV, Leiden,

DOI:10.1 163/156853408X252768

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46 (2008)59-81 D. Schwartz /Vivarium

such as Otto Gierke,Paulo Merêa,IgnacioGómez obligation?Interpreters Alves ThomasF. Schröckand othersarguethat,for Paulo Durau, Robledo, causepoliticalobligation.In thisinterpretaSuárez,consentdoes notdirectly results" from tion,justas therightofa personto ruleoverhisbody"naturally fromthemeansbywhichhe wasgenerhisbeinga personand is independent flowsfromits ated,so therightof thecityto ruleoverthecitizensnaturally beinga cityand is independentfromthe mode in whichit was produced (namelyconsent).As Gierkeputsit,Suárez(and Luis de Molina) "vindicate a powerofcontrol forthesocialWhole,onceithasbeencalledintoexistence, its contractual overitspartswhich,notwithstanding origin,is none theless ofthewillsofindividuals."2 independent As Gierkeand Schröcknote,thismeansthatSuárezshouldnotbe classed It is a centraltenetofthesocialcontract amongthesocialcontracttheorists.3 schoolthatthecitizenscontractan obligationtowardsthepoliticalauthority consentto it.4According tacitorhypothetical becausetheyhavegivenexpress, of Suárezcited the"traditional to whatI call forconvenience interpretation" consentis not themeansof above (by no meanssharedby all interpreters), contracting politicalobligation.Ratherit is the meansof creatinga being overitsparts. whichnaturally possessespoliticalauthority ofSuárezis basedon a deficient understandI arguethatthisinterpretation andDefensio fideuSuárezs textson politicalobligaingoftextsfromDe legibus assessedifone directsones attentionto his less tioncan be moreaccurately studiednon-political , whichdiscuss works,suchas De votoand De iuramento assumedmoralobligations. Thisanalysis themoregeneraltopicofvoluntarily revealsthat,forSuárez,consentproducesboththecityand thecitizensobliga2)OttoGierke, trans, andnotes Natural LawandtheTheory 1500-1800 Barker, ,Ernest ofSociety 1958),51. (Cambridge, 3)ThatSuárez contract ofthesocial theorist isa socialcontract school) (oratleasta precursor inDavidMiller Blackwell 'Social Contract' for hasbeenargued ed.,The byPatrick Riley, example TheFoundations Skinner, 1987)479,Quentin (Oxford, of Thought Encyclopaedia ofPolitical P.Monahan, Personal From Modern Political ,vol.2 (Cambridge, 1988)162,andArthur Thought Political LateMedieval andEarly Modern Personal 1300-1600 Duties towards Thought, Rights: has tothecontractarian andKingston, Gierke, Ont.,1994)182.Contrary (Montreal reading, that heisa "ChrisLaw, 45),andSchröck isaneclectic that Suárez (Natural organicist argued AllAround: 'Anachronism Thomas S. Schröck, natural lawholist". tian-Aristotelian Quentin onFrancisco 92. Skinner 25 Suárez', (1997) Interpretation 4)Patrick istheideathat ofthesocial contract "[a]ttheheart theory governlegitimate Riley says - that there isno offree moral ofthevoluntary ment istheartificial agents product agreement 'Social asa natural 478. suchthing Contract', authority." Riley, political

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tion towardsit. As a resultSuárezshould not be excludedfromthe social contractschoolon thegroundssuggested byGierkeand thosewho sharehis interpretation. is Suárezs viewthatpolitical The linchpinofthetraditional interpretation is the "natural caused (a formofemanaresultane/' by citythrough subjection which constitute thecity.Close than the individuals' consent rather tion), by ofthiscausalmodewithinitsnaturalhabitat Suárezsmetaphysics analysis ofthecity's"naturalresultane/'is not,as the thattheeffect reveals, however, thecitizens'politicalsubjection.Rather,the traditional holds, interpretation effect is thecity'soriginalbutalienablerightto be itsown master.Hence it is and thecityas causescompeting mistaken to regardtheconsentofindividuals forone and thesameeffect. Thisarticleaddressesfourdifferent objectionsto theviewthat,forSuárez, The it is consentwhichcreatespoliticalobligationand politicalauthority. no on the claims: that consent does are based (i) justifollowing objections workin thechapterofDe legibusin whichSuárezdeclareshisintenficatory ofpoliticalpotestas' tionto establish themorallegitimacy (ii) thatSuárezoften is independent fromthewillsthatcreatethecity;5 arguesthatthecity's potestas to transfer or alienation (iii) thatSuáreznoticeablyabstainsfromresorting the when the of of self-rule sovereign's rightto rule;6 explaining origin rights thecom(iv) thatwhile,forSuárez,consentcreatesthepoliticalcommunity, munity's rightto ruleoveritsmembersis saidto emanatefromthecommunioftheindividuals' consent.7 ratherthanbeinga directeffect nature, ty'svery and have been made The claimssupporting (iv) bythe objections(ii), (iii) a non-contractarian readingof Suárez.Whileclaim(i) interpreters defending has not,it seemsplausibleenoughto meritaddressing.

5)PauloMerêa, inSobre civil' a origem dopoder O problema daorigem dopoder 'Suárez, Jurista. XVII 40 e dos séculos XVI e civil: Estudos sobre opensamiento 2003), (Coimbra, jurídico político Afilosofia inRevista deCoimbra da Universidade ,vol.VI,1917); PauloDurau Alves, (originally El origen delpoder deSuárez Gómez Robledo, (Porto, 1949),29;Ignacio político según política 'AnachroFrancisco Natural Suárez Law., 51; 108-109; Gierke, Schröck, (Mexico 1948), City, 110. nism', 6)Schröck, 103. Anachronism', 7)Merêa, O problema e 'Escolástica e jusnaturalismo: da origem do podercivilemSuárez ' inSobre inBoletim dopoder daFacultade deDireito da UniPufendorf o origem civil(originally volXIX,1943),Gierke, Natural Law, 51,Schröck, Anachroversidade deCoimbra , Coimbra, Afilosofia deSuárez Elorigen delpoder Durau nism', 102-6, Alves, , 29,Gómez Robledo, política 127. , 113-114, político

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Two thingsareimportant to noteat theoutset.First,Suárezdiscussestwo different acts of consent:the individualsconsentto constitutea political consentrequired consent")and the community's community("constitutive The discrepancy betweendefenders and by a would-berulerto hold office.8 criticsof a contractarian of concerns the role of constiSuárez causal reading tutiveconsentin the creationof politicalpower.It does not concernthe natureofthatwhichis consentedto (whichin all casesis "toforma political community"). to Second,thereis a degreeoflatitudewhichattachesto Suárezs references to a of voliconstitutive consent.He refers act variously "consent", "special tion"bywhichthecommunity is constituted,9 a "tacitor expresspact",10 and "theintervention of thehumanwill"thatactualizesthecommunity.11 Suárez seemsto use thesetermsto referto one and thesamething.Hence,all these abouthisviewson consent. phrasesaretakenhereas informative I. Consentand theNaturalnessof PoliticalObligation In thissectionI discusstheintriguing factthatconsentplaysno conspicuous of themoraljustirolein whatappearsto be Suárezscentraldemonstration fication ofpoliticalsubjectionin theopeningchapterofthethirdbookofDe . Such omissionmaybe seento supporttheviewthatSuárezdid not legibus believethatitis consentthatcreatespoliticalobligation.I arguethata reassessmentof Suárezspurposein thatchaptershowsthisdeductionto be unwarranted. In introducing whatannouncesitselfas an effort to givemoralclearanceto Suárez starts whether "is it byasking possible[. . .] formento politicalpotestas commandothermen,bindingthemby [mans]ownlaws?"12 Whatmakesthis is his belief that "man is his nature free a pertinent and subjectto by question no one, save onlyto the Creator."Such beliefrisestheworrythatpotestas 8)These inSkinners inhisFoundaofconsent areconflated ofSuárez twotypes presentation tions, II, 162. 9)D.L. III.2.4mentions actofconsent" orcommon volúntate volition, , seu "special {speciali communi consensu ). 10)AsinDeopere voi.3). sexdierum (hereafter O.S.D.)V.7.3.(inOpera, n) D.L.III.1.11.Consent toasidentical totheintervention ofhuman wills involved isreferred inD.L.II.14.7,II.l4.11. inthemaking and(their ofpacts, consequent) agreements obligations SeealsoO.S.D.V.7.7. 12)D.L.III.1.1.

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to theorderofnature"andperhaps,becauseofthis,involve mightbe "contrary In tyranny.13sayingthat"manis bynaturefree,"Suárezcould be thoughtto be restating hisviewthatmanhas a naturalrightoverhisfreedom. Thisright he can laterrelinquish, forexample,bysellinghisliberty.14 Suárezapproachesthe problemby distinguishing betweena pre-political and a politicalstate.In thepre-political who is "a socialanimal", state,man, associatesin domesticcommunities orfamilies. Familiesarenotselfnaturally however:accordingto Suáreztheycontainneithertheoffices and sufficient, artsnecessary forhumanlifenor the knowledgeof all the thingsthatneed be known. Suárezthenadds that,if familiesweredividedfromone another,peace couldnotbe preserved averted amongmen,andwrongscouldnotbe properly or avenged.15 Here Suárezmaybe hintingat theidea ofwhat,riskinganachwe maycalla stateofwarthatprecedesandjustifies theappointing of ronism, a sovereign. The intimation of a stateof war (and of injustice)is surprising extended giventhathe laterassertsthatthistheoryappliesto a hypothetically stateofinnocence.16 Thatis,accordingto Suárez,evenifOriginalSin had not beencommitted, it wouldstillbe thecase thatfamilieshaveenoughreasons in somesortofpolitical (including"stateofwarreasons")to assembletogether community. Suárezarguesthatinhabitants of thepre-political statearecapableof conof a not in whichcooperation actualized, state, possible, yet ceiving political betweenthefamiliesexistsforsome commonpurpose.Theywould also be ableto realizethat,justas in any"domesticcommunity, or family, thereexists forthegovernment ofthatcommunity, a byitsverynature,a suitablepotestas in the of head the so it is with the potestas principally family", residing political because"no bodycan be preserved unlessthereexistssomeprincommunity is to provideforand seekitscommongood."17 ciplewhosefunction FromthisSuárezconcludesthatalthoughitis truethatmanwas bornwith a naturalrightto freedom, he has also been bornwiththecapacityto place 13)Fora parallel discussion seeDefensio etapostolicae adversus sectae fideicatholicae, anglicanae errores Suárez states this insimilar terms ,vol.24,hereafter (inOpera D.F) III.1.2,where worry theaddedconcern that from thedignity owedtohuman (with political maydetract subjection oftheir inGodsimage). created byvirtue beings being 14)"[F]or thevery reason that manislordofhisownliberty, itispossible for himtoselloralienatethesame." D.L.II.14.18. 15)D.L.III.1.4. 16)D.L.III.1.12. 17)D.L.III.1.4-5citing Thomas De regimine , I,i. Aquinas, principům

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himselfunderthedutyto obeyotherhumanbeings(presumably by having a situationin whichindithefaculty to establishcommunities).18 Therefore, ofnatuvidualsplacethemselves underthisdutyis notagainsttheinjunctions rallaw,eventhoughsuchdutydoes not belongto theoriginalallocationof rightsand duties.19 of politicalrule Suárezscentralattemptto showthemoralpermissibility the need forit and its convenience.It does not focuseson demonstrating accorda salientroleto consent,whichis puzzling,becauseifthereis one place whereconsentshouldbe called upon it is preciselyhere.The same puzzle presentsitselfin Súarezsparallelaccountof the originof politicalrule in Defensio fideiP In boththeseinstances, we mightexpectSuárezto say,in agreement with Locke: "Men being,as has beensaid,byNature,all free,equal and independent,no one can be putout ofhisEstate,and subjectedto thePoliticalPower "21Insteadof withouthis own Consent of another, solvingtheproblemthus, offorming a political theconvenience Suárezfocusessolelyon demonstrating fromprovingthat is convenient is different state.Butshowingthatsomething it does no violenceto our naturalrights.The factthatconsentplaysso marginala rolein thechapterin whichitseemsmostneededwouldseemto place ofthesocialcontracttradition. Suárezfarfromtheprinciples of Suárezs chosentaskin thischapterallowsus to Yeta corrected appraisal dismissthatconclusion.For,whatis Suárezspurposein thisopeningchapter? One replyis thathispurposein thischapteris to showthatpoliticalsubjection Read in thislight,thechaptercan be does notviolateones originalfreedom. 18)Bysubjection torule means thatissomebody's Suárez allalong subjection, right legitimate that the that Suárezs to him. Note and,correlatively, somebody's duty obey question prompts lawinways that bind them cancommand others iswhether someindividuals discussion through havethecapacity than whether someindividuals eosobligando) toobey , rather {per proprias leges to. inthewaythey wish them others behave tomake 19)SeeD.L.III.1.11:"though he tothepotestas ofa prince, manwasnotcreated orborn subject Thereei(utsicdicam)' tosuch wasborncapable ofsubjection (asitwere) [subjicibilis potestas. flow from isnotinopposiitdoesnotimmediately infact, even nature, fore, though subjection human itisconsonant with natural reason that law.Onthecontrary, natural tiontopreceptive we shall natural law has not besubjected tosomeone,although should commonwealth see) (as Aswillbe ofhuman theintervention ofitself, andwithout will,created political subjection." law. alluded natural reason forSuárez natural discussed here, is,inthesense later, 20)D.F.111.15. eta deosit." is"Utrum lhetitle ofthesection politicus principatus legitimus 21)John New Peter ed. Treatises Two York, Government, Laslett, 1965)II.8.95, Locke, (Mentor: of 374. p.

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seenpowerfully to demandtheuse oftheconsentargument; it baffles us then when it accordsconsentonlya marginalrole.I believethatSuárezis concernedwitha different task,however:to showthatpoliticalsubjectionis no lessnaturalthanpoliticalnon-subjection. Thishe does byarguingthatwe are inclined towards and thata community ofthis naturally politicalcommunity sortcannotfunction withoutgovernment. We therefore havea naturalinclinationto placeourselves underpoliticalduty. Our originalliberty features hereas a reasonto inspectthe"naturalness" of It is not the act which is lost that by politicalsubjection. originalliberty preocwhether theinclination to loseitcan be ascribed cupiesSuárezhere,butrather to humannature.Sincethisis themainpreoccupation of thechapterunder it is notnecessary forhimto deployhisconsenttheory. examination, II. Consentand theGenerationof theCity ConsententersSuárezsdiscussionwhenhe setsout to determine, in chapter tworelatedroles: two,whohastherightto makelaws.Hereconsentperforms it allowsus to distinguish social unitsthathave the rightto legislateover themselves fromsocialunitsthatlackthisright, and itallowsus to individuate socialunitsfallingwithintheformer category. Suárezdistinguishes betweena mereaggregation ofindividuals and a proper what he calls "a moral union": politicalbodypossessing Themultitude ofmankind beviewed tothespecial should, then, volition, [.. .]with regard orcommon aregathered intoonepolitical consent, bywhich they together body through onebondoffellowship andforthepurpose ofaiding oneanother intheattainment ofa end. Thus form a viewed, which, political they mystical body22 morally single single speakasessential diciperseunum).20 (moraliter unity ing,maybeconsidered potest " 22)In Suárezs timethesacramental term waswidely usedinreference to corpus mysticum' human associations. Forthetransformations inthemeaning ofthisnotion seeErnst KantorowA Study Two Bodies: inMediaeval Also icz,The (Princeton, NJ,1957),193-232. Kings Theology inFrancis ofParis', andtheDivines American Historical 75 Constance, Review, Oakley, 'Figgis, 'Natural TheCorpus inConciliar andConsent from 369-386; Law, (1969), Mysticum, Thought ofParistoMathias '"Anxieties ofInfluence": , 56 (1981),786-810; John Ugonius', Speculum Conciliarism and Modern Past and Skinner, 151(1996), Constitutionalism', Present, Figgis, Early Foundations TheContribution the 105andBrian Tierney, oftheConciliar Theory: of Medieval Canonists Gratian totheGreat Schism 1955). from (Cambridge, 23)D.L.III.2.4,preceded hominum duobus modis considest,multitudinem by:"advertendum solum ut est sineilioordine, velunione velmorali, eran; primům quoddam aggregatum physica,

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havereasonto forma politicalbody,theydo notconstiAlthoughindividuals tutea politicalbody untiltheydecide to endorsethesereasonsand act on thecity?ForSuárez,thisactcanthem.Whatsortofactis neededto generate and peacefulinteracnotsimplybe thefamilies'decisionto livein proximity or evenfriendship, tion.Suchproximity creates,at most,a certainfamiliarity with"combutfailsto yielda moralunion(which,forSuárez,is synonymous in instead the of Themoralunionoriginates munity").24 assumption theduties and obligationsthatmake politicallifepossible.This is done throughan "expressor tacitpact" betweenthe would-becitizensto help each other, themselves to a superior.25 Without withtheirconsentto subordinate together cannotbecomea "moralunity".26 thispact,thesocialconglomerate ForSuárez,moralentitiescomein twosorts.Denominativemoralentities actions.Theydiffer arisefromvoluntary onlybyreasonoforiginfrommerely moralentityis notin itselfseparate a denominative entities. Hence, physical A houseis botha physicalentity, froma physicalentity. and,ifbuiltbyuncoor "entitaa moralentity. ercedbuilders,also, denominatively, Substantially in can on the other occur moral hand, entities, conjunctionwith tively" fromthemand havetrueseparateens. Suárez butaredistinct physicalentities, transthose as property obligationsbornout of promises, provides examples of the matrimonial bond and the the will of the ferred owner, price goods by as determined bylaw.27 is a moralentity, Itseemsfairly clearthatforSuárezthepoliticalcommunity as itarisesfromthewilloftheheadsoffamiat theveryleastdenominatively, be lies.28However,in sayingthatthepoliticalbodymay,"morally speaking",

unum necmoraliter: etideononsuntproprie unum nonefficiunt quidnecphysice, quomodo nonindigent unocapite, autprincipe." acproinde corpus politicum, 24)"Geographical a a community] . From itcanonly isinsufficient [tocreate emerge proximity butnota moral a sortoffriendship orfamiliarity, induce certain which can,atmost, vicinity O.S.D.V.7.3. orcommunity." unity 25)Suárez "some inO.S.D.V.7.3.A community thismostdirectly requires political expresses each nor without subanexpress ortacit to which cannot exist without other, union, pact help canwhich suchcommunity ora ruler ofthecommunity, without ordination tosomesuperior, notexist". 26)Thephrase ormystical, calla community occurs alsoinD.F.1.6.18: "youcantruly political, Associations in that is one a the virtue of [...]". conjunction congregation morally by special societies themore have"perfectobeing comecloser andcollegia suchasuniversities they perfect SccO.S.D. unionem". etmoralem tumreeimen V.7.3. 27)De bonitate actuum humanorum etmalitia ,vol.4. , d. 1.3.inOpera " t canbesaidthat 28)Wilenius ofsociety the essence' that of Suárez (theperfect [i] Reijosays

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termeda unityper se, Suárezhintsthatthe stateis not just denominatively moral.It is moralin itselfzná not onlyby reasonof origin,just as are the ofrightsand duties(promises, variousstructures contracts, property marriage Suárezs civitascauses contracts).In thisview,the consentthatconstitutes undera structure ofobligations and rights that unitybyplacingtheconsenters bindsthemtogether. Additionalsupportforthisinterpretation is providedby his viewthatit is mostconvenientthatscholarsshouldjoin the Societyof solemnvows so thattheybe "substanJesusthroughobligation-generating a moral withit".29 united union tially through truly the Prominent duties and among rightswhichgeneratemoralunityis the citizens'obligationto subordinate themselves to a commonsuperior, and the correlative of the over them. The of the citizen is, superior obligation right Suárezsays,"toobey[theruler]as to honestactswhichredoundin hisprivate It is subjectionwhichproducestheunityofthe good or thecommongood."30 because city tooneandthesame inlarge thisunity rule andtosome commeasure, arises, subjection from if mon while there were no such this could furthermore, body superior potestas' government, notbedirected a [common] endandthegeneral welfare.31 towards Hence we can safelysaythat,forSuárez,consentis a cause of thesharedof whichmakesthemintoa moralunityor a city.Furrightsand obligations, forhim,theunityof thecitydependson thecitizens'consentto thermore, to somesuperior. Politicalobligationand thecorrelasubordinate themselves are tivepoliticalrightdo notflowfromthecityas consequences, but,rather, to its into necessary coming being. III. lhe Independenceof PoliticalObligationfromWills The aim ofthefollowing threesectionsis to refutethreeinterpretative claims in the connection between consent and Suárez, political concerning obligation

isthelegalnorms thatregulate itslife." Wilenius community) Reijo,TheSocialandPolitical Acta Fennica XV(Helsinski, Suárez, 1963),36. Thought ofFrancisco Philosophica 29)De admissione scholarium Societatis III.1.4,in Opera , in De religione , Jesuinparticulars vol.16B. 30)O.S.D.V.7.13. 31)D.L.III.2.4.

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associatedwithwhatI havetermed"thetraditional interpretation" espoused Gómez Durau Alves and Schröck. This Merêa, Robledo, Gierke, interpreby tationholdsthat,forSuárez,politicalobligationand thecity'spoliticalright fromthe do notderivefromtheactofconsentthatcreatesthecity,but,rather, cityitself.In theanalogyproposedbyDurau Alvesand Gómez Robledo,just as one cannotdrawa triangle and prevent thatthesumofitsanglesequals180 an of one cannotcreatea city property triangles), degrees(thisbeing necessary In Merêasinterpretation, withoutthereby "[p]ower politicalpower.32 creating the of the human but its as a condition concourse wills, presupposed originis in favourof thehumangenre,madethepossesin God, who,providentially, inherentto the verynatureof society."33 sion of the necessarygovernment Understoodin thisfashion(incorSchröckproposesa similarinterpretation.34 strikes Gierke as paradoxical.CitingDe I s Suárez rectly, believe), thought Gierke writes: "There were,indeed,some of the natural-law legibusIII.3.6, in spiteoftheirindividualistic to attainthe whoattempted, theorists premises, idea of a Universalwhichexistedin itsown right,and to believein a Whole writerson thephilosophyof whichdependedupon itself.The ecclesiastical ofthePeople,though law,in particular, soughtto provethatthecommunity it was freely createdby individuals, did not deriveitsrightsfromthem;but thisparadoxeventheabilityof a Suárezcould onlyproducea jeu defending "35 d'esprit One ofthegroundsgivenin supportoftheclaimthatpoliticalobligationis not derivedfromconsentis Suárezassertionthat"once individualswill to it is notin theirpower{nonsit intoone politicalcommunity, gathertogether and thatin a properly in hominum to impedethisjurisdiction",36 potestate) "thispotestas existsfromtheverynatureof thingsso constituted community and to impedethispotesthatitis notin thepowerofmenbothto congregate tas'37 Gierkeconcludesfromthisthat,forSuárez,thecityhas "a powerof

32)PauloDurauAlves, El origen delpoder Afilosofia deSuárez, 29,GómezRobledo, política 120. político, 33)PauloMerêa, , 40. 'Suárez, Jurista 34)Schröck, 110. 'Anachronism', 35)Gierke, Latu Natural , 51. 36)D.L.III.3.2"supposita inunapolitica non hominum conveniendi volúntate communitate, est non ex hanc iurisdictionem: estinpotestate eorum provenire impedire ergo signum proxime causaefficienti." eorum voluntatibus quasiexpropria 37)"[E]st itacongregari etimpehaecpotestas exnatura rei,itautnonsitinhominum potestate D.L.III.2.4. direhancpotestatem."

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controloveritspartswhich,notwithstanding its contractual origin,is none theless,independent ofthewillsofindividuals."38 I believethatthiscommoninterpretation of Suárezis mistaken.Suárezs beliefin theincapacityof humanwillsto impedepoliticalpotestasonce the cityis in placefailsto yieldGierke'sconclusion.Thisbecomesclearwhenone examinesSuárezsviewson theinevitability of rightsand correlative political obligationwithinthecontextofhis discussionson moralobligation.Thereis an almostliteralresemblance betweentheexpressions used by Suárezin his discussionof politicalobligationand thosethathe used in his treatment of oaths iuramenta Suárez while it ( promissory saysthat, promissoria). repeatedly is in ones powerto makeor not to make an oath,it is not in ones power to impedethebindingobligationsthatare,as itwere,the"naturaleffects" of oathmaking,theoccurrence ofwhichis independent ofones will.A cursory examination ofthefollowing it,39 passage,and thoseresembling supportsthis reading: itisuptoa manswilltomake ornotmake anoath, itisnotinhispower notto [W]hile himself the oath made. The is since hewhocanapply the evident, by oblige consequence andwhocannot the if he wills to the cause so out cause, effect, (and impede apply brings - evenifhefeels theeffect) wills theeffect it;justastheperson necessarily strongly against whowills tosetfire toa house, thecausevoluntarily, buttheeffect follows necessupplies from hiswill.40 sarily independently

38)Gierke, Natural Law,51.Seealson.5. 39)Consider, forinstance thefollowing additional "Anoath[.. .]outofitsvery nature passages: an will of the of the oath-maker." De II .7.4 produces obligation independently juramento, in itisuptothewilloftheperson a vowtopromise ornotto , vol.14.:"[W]hile Opera making a given oncethepromise hasbeenmadehehasnopower over suchobligation, promise thing, noristheobligation, born from hiswill, butrather from that divine ornatuproperly speaking, rallawsaying: 'GivetheLordwhat have De voto vowed'." in , IV.4.3inOpera ,vol.14.Also, you Dejuramento writes thatobligation naturaliter follows from the act , II.7.16,Suárez ( ) naturally ofmaking anoath.He argues further that thefact thatthelegaleffects ofoathmaking cannot beimpeded that"this doesnotdepend andproximately from byusshows obligation directly ones will, butrather itsroots intheact,from which itnecessarily and follows, remotely, having cannot beimpeded." SeealsoDe voto , 1.3.5. 40)"[QJuia licet involúntate hominis sitjurare velnonjurare, inpotestate nonesttarnen hominisexjuramento nonobligari; estevidens, adhibere praestito consequentia quiaquipotest causam etnonpotest effectum sivultapplicare eteiuseffectum causam, ejusimpedire, applicai, necessario vulteffectum, etiamsi maxime utquivultapplicare voluntarie nolit; domui, ignem sedeffectus necessario tera volúntate Dejuracausam, quidem ponit sequitur independen ejus." II.7.12. mento,

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of theobligation(moralor Thesepassagesmakeclearthattheindependence to the ofsubsequent voliwill relates from a only incapacity persons political) created. tionalattitudesto canceltheobligationonce it has beenvoluntarily thattheobligationhas not "Independence"in thiscontextdoes not signify been caused by an act of will.When Suárezsaysthatpotestasis a "natural he maybe describing or "naturalconsequence"ofsocialcongregation, effect" oftheactofgivingconsent.As he putsit,an obligationborn themoraleffects on ones will,but and proximately out ofa promise"doesnotdependdirectly in it the from which it roots ratherremotely, follows, act, necessarily having It is in thissensethatSuárezassertsthatoathsand and cannotbe impeded."41 as a matterof naturaleffect , bindingobligationsindepenpromisesgenerate, the wantedduring,or after, dentofwhethertheseobligationsarethemselves 42 the act. of performance IV. PoliticalRightWithoutAlienationof Rights ofSuárezbelievethatsince,forSuárez,politicalrightis not Some interpreters of rightsit followsthatpoliticalrightcannotbe derived a resultof a transfer fromhumanconsent.Schröck,forone,believesthattheabsenceofa transfer of rightsprovesthat,forSuárez,consentdoes not endowthepoliticalcomHe argues,"[G]iventhatpoliticalright"doesnotexistin eachindimunity.43 that"[persons]are unableto givewhattheydo not possess,"44 and vidual," ofright, as a putativetransfer understood howcan theconsentofindividuals, Thisleadshimto askwhether succeedin endowinga politicalcommunity?" theremightnot be "a holisticqualityto Suárezsconsentdoctrine,a quality transfer of politicalrightthrough thatobviatesthe need forindividualistic consent?"45

41)De voto , 1.3.5. 42)Insupport that the Suárez alsoD.L.III.33.4where onecanconsult ofthisreading suggests totheperforinfull isidentical a jurisdiction actofentering awareness) (ifperformed voluntary of Asa consequence onsuch tobeobliged mative actofwilling bythelawsbinding jurisdiction. oftheactisin evenifthismoral weincur thisactofconsent, consequence political obligation, unwanted. itself 43)Schröck transfers Suárez D.L.III.2.1astheplaceinwhich 103)cites ('Anachronism', rejects rule that is Suárez butinthat asthebasisofpolitical ofrights rule, only place rejecting political totheright toself-rule. others torule over ofa right outofthetransfer canbeborn , asopposed 44>Citing D.L.111.2.1. 45)Schröck, 103. Anachronism',

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of rightas a device The transfer seemspremature. Thisholisticcelebration to Suárez.He resortsto to createa rightin a personis not at all unfamiliar of self-rule transfers rights(conceivedof as thesale of dominiumoverones as wellas themannerbywhichthe to explainjustself-enslaving, freedom)46 of the can lose ownership politicalpowerto a foreignrulerin a community obliwar. incurring rightsis nottheonlywayofvoluntarily Transferring just Consideroaths,vowsand promises.IfI promiseto helpmy gations,however. has a rightto thathelp.But she is not eo motherin herold age,she thereby of a over the partofmyfreetimeduringherold age: she ipso possessor right she thatI shalluse thattimeto helpa charity cannot,forinstance,determine hersupposedrightoverpartof myfreetimeto fancies,norcan she transfer anotherpersonby donationor sale. Rightsarisingfrompromisesare somefromsayingthatrightscan onlybe but thisis different timestransferable, a transference. createdthrough assumedobligaand pointedlyassertsthatvoluntarily Suárezrepeatedly in a transfer ofright.He does so in his tionsneedneitherentailnororiginate discussionof thevowsrequiredfromorderedmembersof the Companyof these and obedience),wherehe inquiresaboutwhether Jesus(chastity, poverty of a traditio or donatio themselves a vowspresupposeor effect rightover by thatthe denies will. He or ones ones body,ones possessions, consistently moralobligationsgeneratedby vows understoodby him to be promises froma madeto God- can be identified with,or reducedto,thoseoriginating ofones rightsovera thing.47 transfer of to describethemoraleffects We haveseenthatSuárezschosenphrasings of the moral constitutive consentresemblealmostverbatimhis description is understoodas effects ofpromises.If,then,consentto politicalcommunity we can a a sortofpromiseto obey community's speakofpolitical politicalrule, ofrights. obligationwithoutneedingto presupposea transfer of rights, Not onlydoes creatingpoliticalrightnot requirea transfer but, suchright. ofrightsis nota desirablemeansof creating forSuárez,a transfer from Suárezbelievesthattherulerspoliticalrightovera personis different the for whom the Unlike over or total Hobbes, person.48 partial property right 46)D.L.III.3.7. 47)SeeDe voto X.5.5-7. 1.14.4,1.14.8-10, II. 7.1,II.7.9,II.7.12,II.8.12, , 1.14.1, 48)Defending manneistate: "Political dominium a hypothetical deprives political pre-lapsarian overhisactions. Neither does[political ther ofhisliberty taken , norofhismastery simpliciter himtothat Rather himtoanother soastoserve dominium] persons advantage. person subject in in those honest acts which result so as to dominium ruler] him] [the obey subjects [political O.S.D.V.7.12. hisprivate orcollective goodandadvantage."

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forSuárez,as seen,citicitizensays:I "giveup therightto [govern]myself",49 zens'consent"toobey[theruler]as to honestactswhichredoundin hispriHence therights oftheHobbesianand the vategood or thecommongood."50 between(i) having Thereis an appreciabledissimilarity Suarezianrulersdiffer. therightto governoversomeonebecauseis itconducivetowardsan advantage, and (ii) havingtherightto directsomeoneto actin a certainwaysolelywhen In thefirst theact is advantageous. instance,theadvantageis thejustification overpartofour freedomto theruler.The comforthetransfer ofdominium becauseofthedominium oftherulerquite mandsto thecitizenarelegitimate each of those acts contributes the of whether from indepenquestion apart dentlyto theadvantage.ForSuárezeachoftherulers commands(givenin the to theadvantage.Similarly, formofa law) has to passthetestofcontributing a physicianmayhavetherightto myobedienceforthoseof his commands thatare likelyto heal me, but she does not havean unrestricted rightto be that would on that her me myhealth. improve obeyedby having right grounds V. What Does the CityCause by "NaturalResultancy"? suchas Merêa,GómezRobledo,DurauAlves,Gierkeand Schröck Interpreters defendtheirviewthatforSuárezpoliticalrightand obligationdo notfollow fromconsentby relyingon Suárezsthesisthatpowerflowsfromthe city, ratherthanfromthewillswhichhelp generateit.51The citycausespolitical suchas Otherinterpreters, powerbywhatSuárezterms"naturalresultancy". Vidal AbrilCastello,PedroCalafateand Luis RecasénsSiches,seemto conthata thingcan produceforitselfa rightbythiscausal sideritselfexplanatory lack of curiosityabout the This mode.52 assumptiondisplaysa remarkable foritselfa right. idea ofsomething creating intriguing 49)Thomas Leviathan , II,ch.17,§13. Hobbes, 50)O.S.D.V.7.13. 51)Seen.7. 52)Thislackofinquisitiveness Vidal Abril inmost for isthenorm works, example: interpretative Comillas Miscelánea 'La obligación 67 (1977),229-296(see Suárez, Castello, política según Bilanet in'L'Obligation chezSuárez. French version 257,270-1)(Shorter politique especially 'Aideiadesoberania 42 [1979],179-203); Pedro dePhilosophie Archives Calafate, perspectives', e modernidade inFrancisco Suárez emFrancisco Suárez' (Lisbon, 1999), (1548-1617): Tradiçao Suárez delderecho deFrancisco Lafilosofia Siches, (Madrid, 1927),134.Tomy 256;LuisRecaséns inmetaphysics andin of"natural tolinkupthenotion theonly resultancy" attempt knowledge, Francisco de la Cátedra Anales resultancia en 'La acción de is Eleuterio Suárez', Elorduy, politics

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The purposeofthissectionis to attackthe"traditional at its interpretation" core.Theeffect natural resultan is as most internot, producedby cy arguedby therulersrightoverthecitizens,but,rather, it is the city'soriginal preters, rightto be itsownmaster.Hence,forSuárez,politicalobligationand thecorrelative Rather,as rightarenotwhatflowsfromthecitybynaturalresultancy. are a of the individuals' consent. arguedabove,they consequence Suárezarguesin De legibusIII. 3.5 that"God confersthepowerin theway ofa property thatresults , in thesamefashionthathe whogivesthe fromnature also what is on God generates thecity,and form, gives consequent theform."53 thepoliticalpower"emanates" fromit. LikeothertermsthatSuárezusesin hispoliticalworks,"naturalresultancy" is a termborrowed fromhismetaphysics. Naturalresultancy is a peculiarmode of causationbywhicha substanceproducesitsown accidentor property. A substance canactnotjustas a material and formalcause,butalsoas an efficient cause of some of its properties.54 The property causedby naturalresultancy cannotexistapartfromthesubstance, and mustbe one thatin somerespects it.55Hence naturalresultancy consummatesthe act of generation perfects becausethesubstanceproducesforitselftheseproperties thatcompleteit.56 Suárezstypicalexampleof naturalresultancy is the soul,which,he argues, producesitsownpowersonce it has beencreated.57

Suárez 3 (1963),45-71.Thevalueofthisarticle resides inthecollection ofsomeofthe mostly relevant texts. 53)D.L.3.3.5.:"hanc daria Deopermodum eo naturam, potestatem proprietatis consequentis modoquodandoformam datconsequentia adformam." D.L.3.3.6.:"therefore itiscorrectly understood that[this asa property from sucha mystical s]exists potestà resulting body, already constituted with ithas]andnototherwise." D.F.III.2.6:"lhefact [that justthemodeofbeing that onceindividuals ina city orrepublic, results without congregate politically political power theintervention ofsome willshows created that this from Godand power proceeds immediately from thedictate ofreason demonstrates intervenes a natural (which it)andthat only resultancy orconsequence ofnature." 54)D.M.XIIX.3.4,5,6,7. 55)D.M.XIIX.3. 11,14. 56)ForSuárez onsubstance s causation ofitsownaccidents, andhisdiscrepancy with ofSt. John Thomas onthis, seeDennis DesChene, Natural inLateAristotelian and Physiologia: Philosophy Cartesian NY,1996),159-61. (Ithaca, Thought 57)DeAnima d.3 q.3.§ 8,14from thecritical edition Commentaria una Castellote, bySalvador cumquaestionibus inlibros Aristotelis 'DeAnima' On (Madrid, 1981)vol.2. D.M.XIIX.3.8,13. Suárez onthesoulscausation ofitspowers seeDesChene, Form: LateAristotelian Life's Conceptions NY/London, 2000),148-9. oftheSoul(Ithaca,

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The metaphysical axiomthat"hewho givestheformgivesalsowhatis conon the form" meansthatthe generator of the substanceis the first sequent cause of the properties caused by naturalresultancy.58 The substanceis the causeof theseproperties. As Suárezsays,substanceis in a wayan proximate "instrument" ofthegenerator thatbringstheproperties about.59 Moreexactly, theproximate causeis theformofthesubstancewhich,as a principleofoperationcreatestheproperty.60 Hence theproperties broughtabout by natural aresaid to be "consequent on theform". resultancy A property thatresultsbywayof naturalresultancy can appearsimultanein with the substance which it as inheres, lightappearssimultaneously ously withthecreationof thesun.61Yet,accordingto Suárez,thesubstanceshould be able to existwithouthavingthisproperty. That is, it mustbe possiblein to the effect the sub(the property)withoutdestroying principle impede stance.62 thecoolness Althoughwaterproducescoolnessbynaturalresultancy, can be impededbyexternal action(say,heating). How doescausationbynaturalresultancy applyto thepoliticalcase?Suárez uses naturalresultancy to forestall an unwelcomeimplicationof the firstly viewthatpoliticalpowercomesfromGod: thatHe expressly donated(by a In to the order to act) city. supernatural politicalpower precludethisimplicationSuárezarguesthatpoliticalpoweremanatesfromthecityitselfbynatural Thatis,thecityis a substancethatproducesfromand foritselfthe resultancy.

58)"Quidatformam datconsequentia adformam", D.M.XIIX.3.14, deAnima d. 3 q. 3,§ 5, 14.AlsoinD.L.III.3.1,D.F.III.1.7.Suárez attributes theprinciple toAristotle. Earlier, Jean Buridan attributed ittooneofAverröes' commentaries onPhysics to VIII,probably referring in formam suam et omnia accidentia formae" dat corpori simplici "generans contingentia Long cumAverrois commentariis VIII,32 inAristotelis (Venice: Commentary, ApudJunctas, opera edition s usedinSuárez 1562-1574) [facsimile (Frankfurt, 1962)]vol.4,p.370G.Hiepassage sense occurs alsoinFrancisco Relectio depostestate issomeone Vitoria, civilis § 6.Hiegenerator whoalters theform ofa thing so thatitbecomes a newkindofthing, asan (orsomething) artisan turns a block ofwoodintoa chair. 59)D.M.XIIX.3.10. 60)The"accidental those thatfollow orareowedto [consequuntur aut properties, especially ina fashion notonly material thereason oftheform, arecaused and debentur] bythesubstance itiseasier tounderstand that butalsoeffective final, [.. .] Inthismanner resultancy bynatural between theform andtheproperties, andtheorder natural connection persebetween holding ofwater isthesubthetwo." Forexample, theprinciple forthenatural responsible self-cooling ofwater. D.M.XIIX.3.7 AlsoinD.M.XIIX.3.10, D.M.XIIX.3.13. stantial form 61)D.M.XIIX.3.8. ofthesuninAnima d.3 q. 3. § 7. Example 62)D.M.XIIX.3.13.

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Suárezto maintainthatGod remains ofpoliticalpower.Thispermits property God s workbyproThe cityconsummates causeofpoliticalpower.63 thefirst foritssuccessthat are natural necessary resultancy properties ducingthrough fulsubsistence. blocks ofSuárezholdsthatnaturalresultancy Thetraditional interpretation wills between human and connection direct causal politicalobligation. any of thecity.It is The influence ofhumanwillsextendsonlyto thegeneration thecitythatsomehowcausespoliticalruleovercitizens.In an analogythat Suárezhimselfproposes,while the parentsare the proximatecause of the and limbsnotbya specialwillofthe child,thechildhasruleoverhismembers In insofaras he has use of reason.64 parents,but ratherbynaturalresultancy, comthepoliticalpowerproducedby naturalresultancy thisinterpretation therightof thecityoverthecitizens,and theircorprisesfirstand foremost relative obligations. Suárezcould not have I willsuggest,however, thatgivenhis metaphysics, were causedbythecityactheldthatpoliticalobligationand correlative right the cause.Therefore "politicalpower"whichemanatesfrom ingas proximate the citymusthave meantsomethingelse forhim.We need a morerefined thatthecitycausesbynaturalresultancy. graspoftheeffect For Suárez,thecityis generatedby an act of humanwill in conjunction thisby sayingthathumanwills withan act ofwillby God. Suárezexpresses for the but it is God who the matter city,65 grantstheform.The "matsupply to createit.Buttheindividuals' ter"ofthecityis theconsentoftheindividuals 63)Forreasons on I amexcluding from thepresent Suarez views ofscopeandlength analysis in both to God creatures and what form. can be attributed and whether efficient causal powers is thecityand thecreature These views Suárezs ontheissueatstake underlie (here position on Metaphysical On thissee:Alfred 'Suárez thecreated Freddoso, Inquiry, thing). potestas inFrancisco OnCreation andDivine Efficient , Conservation , and Suárez, Action, Causality, andhis'Gods 20-22(South Concurrence: Bend, IN,2002),lxxxvi-cv, Metaphysical Disputations Causes: isnotEnough', General Concurrence with Secondary WhyConservation Philosophical 5 553-585. , (1991), Perspectives 64)"[J] with togeneration butnoact u.st as [.. .] thewilloftheparent onlyisnecessary, respect which arenotessenthechild with orwith theother natural faculties ofwillendowing freedom, a actofwillonthepartoftheparent, onthecontrary tially dependent upona special being the will is natural even with to matter under human discussion, ; so, necessary respect consequence inorder ina single actofvolition ontheir that menmay unite butnospecial community, perfect this shall thesaidpotestas arises rather isrequired totheendthat ,which community possess part inthis ofthings, theprovidence oftheAuthor ofnature, sothat from thevery nature andfrom sense itisrightly saidtohavebeenconferred immediately byHim."D.L.III.3.6. 65)D.L.III.3.2.

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to achievethis.How does God informthese consentalone is insufficient humanvolitions?In Suárezsphilosophyof law,humanvolitioncannotbe effective and rights) withoutdivineinflux. (itcannotcreateobligations morally The bindingness of a moralobligationis derivedfromnaturallaw.66Natural law prescribes whatGod judgesas good,and is good.Yet,thesourceofbindofit.67Thereingnessis nottheacts goodnessas such,butGods prescription moralefficacy totheconsent foreGod providestheformofthecitybygranting so thatit is able to causetherightsand correlative of theindividuals, obligaforthemoralunionofwhicha cityconsists. tionsnecessary is a property thatpresents itself"in Suárezwritesthatpotestas Accordingly, a dictateofnatural themodeofa consequenceofnature,thatis to say,through thepower reason,68and thatK[o]ncethisbodyhasbeenconstituted, however, ."69 in questionexistsin it,withoutdelayand by the forceof naturalreason which we command discernand "Naturalreason"is the mediumthrough ourselvesto act accordingto thepreceptsof naturallaw.70Thus,to saythat of "theformof thecity"meansthatthatpolitical politicalpoweris an effect is an effect of the citizens sharedmoralbonds.Thesebonds,in turn, power consentto bindthemin a resultfromthefactthatGod s willstheindividuals' of rightsand obligations.Thus,accordingto Suarez,by commonstructure 66)Fora succinct Natural Lawand ofSuárezs ofnatural lawseeJohn Finnis, theory presentation inWilliam E. May,'TheNatural treatment Natural (Oxford, 1982),42-48.A detailed Rights ofFrancis NewScholasticism LawDoctrine 58(1984),409-425,esp.418. Suárez', 67)Thisisa claim oftheprescriptions ofnatural thesource ofbindingness about law,andleaves on its own for there is a "natural the that, Suárez, independently Tightness" right, open possibility Forrecent a strong voluntarism onSuárezs I amnotpresupposing ofGods will.Hence, part. H. Irwin, ofSuárez seeTerence criticism ofthevoluntarist , interpretation Obligation persuasive On thisseealso andsome critics law:Suarez andnatural draft). (unpublished paper rightness, TheInvention 1997),60-1,KnudHaakonssen, J.B.Schneewind, (Cambridge, ofAutonomy TheBritish andStephen Natural lawandmoral Darwall, 19-23, 1996), (Cambridge, philosophy moralists andthe'internal 1640-1740 1995),25-6. (Cambridge, ought': 68)D.L.III.3.5. 69)D.L.III.3.6. 70)"Thelegaleffects a dictate ofthereason, from inthecaseofnatural lawproceed immediately what is orapproves which censures andisa ruleofconscience directs andbinds forthat dictate inthesaiddictate." D.L.II.5.12. consists lawofthekindinquestion sothat done, [i.e.natural] inusobligations because itisGods toSuárez, ofnatural Thedictates reason, according generate Reason tothem. D.L.II.6.8.SeeJaime willthat weactaccording Fernández-Castañeda, 'Right Since isa The Modern Schoolman inFrancis 45(1968),105-122 Suárez, (esp.115-122). potestas sotospeak" itis"anatural akintonatural result ofnatural law,isonly {utsic property property: D.L.III.3.7. dicam ) anda "quasi-natural property".

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to createa city,individualscreateboththecity(thesharedmoral consenting whether and, bonds) theywantit or not,thecitys rightto ruleoverthem. withSuárez'sbeliefthatpolitical This conclusionmayseem inconsistent ratherthanby the poweris caused by the citythroughnaturalresultancy, individuals'consentto createa city.The cityand consent,mayseemas two I shall to themselves one and the same effect. competingcausesattributing Suárezas holdingthatin thatit is moreplausibleto interpret argue,however, fora different effect. fact,eachofthiscausesareresponsible causedbythecitybynaturalresulCould politicalsubjectionbe thepotestas tancy?Thiscannotbe thecase.The citycannotexistwithouthavingpolitical rightoverthecitizens,sincethisrightis essentialto itsbeinga politicalcomsomeIt cannotbe thecase thatthecitycausesbynaturalresultancy munity. which it cannot exist. that it and without must alreadypossess thing mustbe someIf,then,thepoliticalpowerproducedbynaturalresultancy We timesotherthan politicalsubjection,we may consideran alternative. and to say thatthe could distinguish betweentwo setsof rights/obligations webofmoralbonds first set,whichgivestheformto thecity(say,a horizontal betweencitizens)producesa secondset (say,theverticalrelationofeach citiwhocharacterzento theruler).Butthisoptionis ruledoutbySuárezhimself, andforemost izestheconstitutive moralbondsthatgivetheformtothecityfirst as bondsofsubjectionon thepartofthecitizensto theruleror city.71 ofthepoliticalpowerthatemanates We needa different wayofconceiving fromthecitybynaturalresultancy. We shouldstartbynotingthatin thetexts in whichnaturalresultancy playsa centralpart,Suárezdoes nottryto explain theobligationsof thecitizensto thecity.Ratherthequestionthatconcerns himis this:whencitizensconstitute thecityas a unifiedwhole,who has masover is conceivedbySuáreznotso this whole? Hence politicalpotestas tership muchas thecitys rightsoverthecitizensbut ratheras thecity'srightagainst otherpotentialrulers,suchas foreign powers. In Suárezs analogyofthechild,theparentsgenerate a livingbeingendowed withreason.The questionpresents itselfas to whohasmastership ) (dominium ofthisperson.The newhumanbeingis declaredbySuárezto be hisownmasterand to acquirethisrightbynaturalresultancy. is a rightnot Self-mastership the constituent of the but body, parts against againstpotentialaspirantsto over the mastership person.

71)D.L.IIL2.4.

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Considernowthecaseofthecity.In assembling consent, together through thecitizenscreatea being.Theyconstitute itbygenerating between obligations citizensand theruler(whoeverholdsthisoffice).As a consequence,thecity has rightsnot onlyagainsteach partof thewhole(i.e. thecitizens),but also to mastership overthebodypolitic,suchas foreign againstaspirants powers. To thequestion,whohasa rightto mastership overthecity,Suárezresponds thatit is the citysown original,alienableright.This allowsus to say that thepoliticalpowercausedthroughnaturalresultancy is a non essentialpropof the as it can it alienate s or be forceerty city, byself-enslaving mastership enslaved without a as the in the child fullyjustly ceasingbeing city(just analogycan). The crucialpointmadehereis thatSuárezdoes not makepoliticalobligation and right(i.e. politicalsubjection)an effectof naturalresultancy. It is therefore incorrectto claim as the traditionalinterpretation does that becauseSuárezbelievesthatpoliticalpowerfollowsbynaturalresultancy, then does not follow from individual consent. politicalobligation Accordingto what fails to follow from the s individual consent is not Suárez, politicaloblior mastership ofthecityoveritself. gation,butrathertheownership We mayask:how is naturalresultancy helpfulto explainthecitysoriginal of own its answerto thisquestionis not Suárezs acquisition mastership? Let us recasthis strategy. He startsfromthepremisethat entirely satisfying. therightofself-ownership doesbelongto thecity.Wheredoestherightcome from?He proceedsby elimination.The rightcannotcome froma human individual,because,in a pre-political situation,individualshaveno political to thecity.The alternative candidateis God, but powerthattheycan transfer thereis no recordedeventofdonationofownership overthecity.Suárezinfers thatit mustbe thecitywhichcausestherightforitselfbynaturalresultancy. Suárezdoes not tellus whatis theallegedactionthatthecityperforms to In over and none can be it observed. should be itself, reply producemastership notedthat,forSuárez,an actionleadingto productionofsomething doesnot real existence as a Rather in the action "exists the possess separatething. product":it differs fromtheproductonlyin a modalsense.72 "Action"simplydes72)Suárez inhisanalysis discusses these ofthedifference between creature andcrequestions ation.In many thequestion is thesameas thatconcerning thedifference between respects, ForSuárez, isnotabsolutely inreality from action andeffect. thecreature distinct theterminus oftheaction ofcreation, butonlya different modeexnatura reiofthesameterminus {modus 15 andD.M.XX.4. exnatura reidistinctus abipso termino can 17.Thesame ). D.M.XX.4. quidam "intheheating besaidofnon-creative action: offire, andsimilar thedependence cases, bywhich

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thathasa suchand suchorigin. ignatestheproductconceivedofas something a chair made of of which wood bulk Imagine planks proceedfroma particular ofwood. Supposethechairis miraculously with an God identical replacedby becausetheiroriginsaredifferent.73 Simireplica.The twochairsaredifferent for the of itself is from different Suárez, larly, city'sownership any other such as to the (or products, possibleownerships ownershipgranted cityby donationfromGod), in thatit proceedsfromthecityitself. Thereis no action"outside"theproduct.The actionis simplya mode of existence oftheproduct.Hence,we neednotlookforsomeobservable action the which would how comes about. by city performed explain politicalpower Considerthe analogyof fire.Fireinevitably heats,fromtheveryinstantin whichitcomesabout.Butheatis notfire.Now we mayask:whatactiondoes in orderto produceheat?The actionis simplyits cominginto fireperform existence. or ownershipof the cityis caused by natural Sayingthatthe mastership is a of resultancy mainly way sayingthatno externalcause can be foundfor thismastership. Naturalresultancy does notpositively disclosean intelligible mechanism bywhichthecitybecomesitsown master. Suárezsuse of the metaphysics of causationhas an avowedlyanalogical to it.74 The of notionsis intendedto allow aspect borrowing metaphysical conversant readersto graspbettercertainaspectsofhispolitimetaphysically cal and moraltheory. Thisnotto saythattheseborrowednotionscan be used withthesamerigourin theirnewmoralandpoliticalcontext(as indeedSuárez seemsto be awareof). To providean example:supposea politicalscientist fromphysicsthe notionof "chain explainsa politicalprocessby borrowing reaction".To understand thisassertionwe need to examinethe conceptof

inthepatient theheating isproduced istheaction oftheheatthat inthefire, exists because of no other reason thanthatit is a certain flowthatemanates from it."D.M. XX.4.21. See Creation inD.M.XIIX.3.13 Notethat , Conservation Freddoso,Ow , andConcurrence , lxxii-lxxiii. Suárez this:"that which natural addstotheentity oftheinherent already resultancy suggests accidental form isnothing buta particular modeofintrinsic is,theproduct] [that dependence oftheproperty with toitsform asanactive considered butthedependence [of respect principle; theproperty] ontheagent andtheaction arethesamething". principle 73)Fora classic modern treatment ofthis sort ofmodality seeSaulKripke, andNecessity Naming (Oxford, 1980),112-116. 74)Thisbecomes clear when Suárez asa result ofnatural law,isonlyakinto saysthat potestas, natural "anatural sotospeak" anda "quasi-natural (utsicdicam) property: property property." D.L.III.3.7.

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thesimilarities thatthe chainreactionin itsoriginalsettingand thenidentify in have mind when this notion to scientist had may political physics using describethepoliticalprocess.I havearguedthatSuárezborrowsthenotionof to allowus to seehowtheoriginalcitysself-mastership naturalresultancy does notrequireanyactsbeyonditsveryconstitution. To sum up thissection:whatSuárezassertsto be a resultof naturalresultancyis not thecitizenspoliticalobligationand thecityspoliticalrightover them,ratherit is thecitysrightto initiallyto own itself.Hence,despitethe claimsto thecontrary, politicalobligationremains,forSuárez,a directresult ofconsent.

VI. Summary In thisarticleI attemptto defuseobjectionslevelled,or capable of being levelled,againsttheclaimthat,forSuárez,it is consentthatcreatespolitical obligation. ofconsentin thechapter discusstheseemingly (i) I first non-saliency baffling the of De legibusin whichSuárezannounceshis intentionto demonstrate ofpotestas. Such bafflement is a consequenceof misplaced morallegitimacy in thatchapteris to showthatwe arenaturally Suárezs intention expectations. inclinedtowardspoliticalsubjection,not to outlinethewaysin whichsuch introduced. subjectioncan be legitimately thecitybycreating (ii) ForSuárez,itis consentthatconstitutes bindingmoral obligationsthat unite citizensin a "moralunion". Suárez'sdescriptionof similarto his descriptionof the the moraleffects of consentis strikingly - namelyobligations andrights ofpromises. Thesemoraleffects moraleffects oncetheyhavebeen volitionalattitudes cannotbe impededbyanysubsequent act.Suárezmakesa similar thecarrying out ofa performative createdthrough that cannot be when he says impededonce thecitizens subjection argument to impedepoliticalsubjectionover constitute thecity.Hence our incapacity thecityshouldnot be used us once we haveconsentedto it by constituting as groundsforseveringa possiblecausal linkbetweenconsentand political obligation. oralienas a resultofa transfer to speakofthispotestas (iii) Suárez'sreluctance withhis oftstatedviewthat ationof individualself-rule rightsis consistent

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vowsand promisesneednotappearjointlywith,or presuppose, rights'alienation.Politicalobligationand rightareproducedbya humanactsimilarin its fromothersocial moralconsequencesto a promise.Suárezstheorydiffers contract theoriesin thattherightoftheruleroverthecitizensdoes notresult froma transfer ofrightsfromthem.Hence theruleris not,as in Hobbes,the ownerofpartofthecitizens'rightoverthemselves. notionofcausationbynaturalresul(iv) Suárezs relianceon themetaphysical flows fromthe cityis shownnot to to how tancy explain politicalpotestas contradict theviewthatitis consentthatcausespoliticalobligationand right. It is not therightsof theruleroverthecitizensand thecorrelative political thecity'sorigbut,rather, obligationthatthecitycausesbynaturalresultancy, thatis createdsimultaneously withtheforming of inalrightto self-mastership thecity,and thisis done through consent. The fourobjectionslevelled,or capableof beinglevelled,againstthe claim thatforSuárezconsentcausespoliticalobligationsand correlative political in a of the fail. consent-based Suárez fact, proposes, explanation origin right, his explanationis oftenarticulatedin of politicalobligation.Admittedly, Since socialconmetaphysical languagethatis proneto be misunderstood. tracttheoryis a theorythatmakespoliticalobligationdirectly dependenton to regardFranciscoSuárez consent,itfollowsfromthisarticlethatitis correct as a socialcontracttheorist.75

75)Theresearch this isbased ICALAStipenonwhich article wasmadepossible from bya grant dienwerk andwascompleted with thehelpofanadditional research Lateinamerika-Deutschland, I would ofForeign Affairs oftheKingdom ofSpain. liketothank fortheir bytheMinistry grant Terence Asher andCarlosSteel. Freddoso, Irwin, Salah,Christopher Shields, helptoAlfred Thanks areduealsotoEduardo Arborio Mellaatthelibrary ofthePontifical Biblical of Institute andtoElizabeth Pearlman and Donald Strachan for their editorial Miles, Jerusalem Wendy assistance. PabloDa Silveira Cassaroti atUniversidad Católica delUruguay encourandEduardo inthewarm onthisresearch which wascompleted environment agedmetoembark collégial de Filosofía delDerecho, Moraly Política at Universidad CombyDepartmento provided de Madrid and the S. Truman Institute for the of Peace of the Advancement plutense Harry Hebrew ofJerusalem. University

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Human

Will, Human

Dignity, and Freedom: A Study of Giorgio Benigno Salviati's of the Will, Urbino 1474-1482 Early Discussion

AmosEdelheit De Wulf-Mansion Katholieke Universiteit Leuven Centre, Abstract Thisarticle thefirst detailed account ofGiorgio Salviati's discussion presents Benigno inUrbinoduring ofthewillwritten themid-1470sandtheearly1480s.A Franciscan friar oftheology and a prominent and philosophy, Salviati wasa prolific professor central in of in author and Bessarion RomeandofLorenzo figure thecircles Cardinal Thisarticle focuses on hisdefense oftheScotist ofthe de'MediciinFlorence. theory inwhichbothhumanist will.Itconsiders itsfifteenth-century andscholastic context, thinkers oftheintellect dealtwiththequestion andthewill.Whilebasinghimself on authorities suchas Aristotle, andThomasAquinas,Salviatiis partly Augustine, awareofthenovelty ofhistheory, anditsimportant forethics and clearly implications theology. Keywords Ficino scholasticism, Salviati, Intellect, will,humanism,

While theItalianhumanistsof thefifteenth centuryhavebeen theobjectof their scholastic have been relatively detailed studies, many contemporaries Thoughthereis stillmuch more neglectedin modernscholarlyliterature.1 1}Thispoint intheworks ofthetwogreatest historians ofRenaissance ismost evident thought inthetwentieth Garin and Paul Oskar Kristeller. While Garin the century, emphasized Eugenio of thus the humaand of "the novelty non-philosophers", importance philosophy contrasting eRinascimento nists andthescholastics, Bari, 1954;reprinted 1973), (Bari, e.g.,inhisMedioevo toexclude thehumanists from mostofthephilosophical tried 38-39,Kristeller disciplines, Platonism withthescholastics; anditsRelations which heidentified see,e.g.,his'Florentine inhis in Church 8 withHumanism andScholasticism', 201-211, (1939), reprinted History Brill DOI:10.1 ©Koninklijke 2008 163/156853407X246081 NV, Leiden,

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workto be doneon humanistthinkers, withregardto theeditingof especially in are still texts which available many only manuscriptform,2the corpus of fifteenth-century scholasticthinkersis generallyignored.The prevailing underwent a seriousdeclineat theend of the assumptionthatscholasticism thirteenth has no doubt affected century scholarly opinion,and thehumanists have been regardedas able criticsof thisdecliningphilosophicaldiscourse, thusoffering newmethodsand modesofthought whichhavebeenconnected withthedawnofmodernity. Thereis no doubtthatsomehumanists werevery criticaltowardsscholasticphilosophicaldiscoursebut we should be more cautiouswithregardto thesharpdichotomiesunderlining historiographical We shouldfirst realizethatwe arestillquitefarfroma clearand assumptions.3 in thefifteenth detailedpictureofthescholastic Thus,for century. philosophy terms like 'Thomism' and 'Scotism' receive must careful definitions instance, in different historicalcontextsbeforewe are in a positionto make more Studies inRenaissance andLetters III (Roma, 1993),39-48;seeespecially Thought p.40,andhis Renaissance anditsSources , ed.Michael (NewYork, 1979),p. 23.Although Mooney Thought Kristeller theimportance ofdetailed stressed studies offifteenth-century literature", "religious in his Tradition and Florentine in Studies in Renaissance Platonism', 'LayReligious e.g., Thought andLetters seep. 121,hededicated most ofhisstudies toFicino and (Roma, 1969),99-122, Renaissance andtothehumanists. Hisaccounts offifteenth-century scholasticism Platonism, areusually andmuch his ofGilson, very depended general, upontheconceptual e.g,., paradigm 'Thomism andtheItalian of the in Medieval Renaissance LearRenaissance', Thought Aspects of P.Mahoney Edward inmodern 29-91.Forthelacuna ,ed.andtrans. NC,1974), (Durham, ning. scholastic on47-48,52see,e.g.,theremarks scholarship fifteenth-century regarding thinking Fora critique ofthis with tothe'intellectualists53,55-57. conceptual mainly paradigm, regard voluntarists see Martin F.W. 'Moral After DidtheParisian 1277. , Stone, controversy Psychology Condemnation Makea Difference toPhilosophical Discussions inJanA. ofHuman Agency?', KentEmery, NachderVerurteilung von1277.Philosopie Aertsen, (eds.), Jr.andAndreas Speer undTheologie anderUniversität von Paris imletzten Viertel des13.Jahrhunderts. Studien undTexte see809and826;forreferences totheworks ofEhrle, and (Berlin, Mandonnet, 2001),795-826; see795-796, n.2. SeealsoStone's critical remarks inhis'TheOrigins in ofProbabilism Gilson, LateScholastic Moral A Prolegomenon toFurther inRecherches deThéologie et Thought: Study', médiévales seen.35on126-127. ForKristeller s imporLXVII,1 (2000),114-157; Philosophie tant ofVincenzo discussion seen.5 below. Bandello 2)Thispoint wasemphasized S. Celenza inhisTheLost Italian Renaisrecently byChristopher - Humanists, sance Historians intheintroduc, andLatins (Baltimore, 2004),especially Legacy tionandinchapter one,forthehumanists. 3)Forsomegeneral remarks ontraces ofThomas' work left inthewritings ofItalian humanists andsomecritical accounts ofThomas andThomists seeKristeller, "Ihomism andtheItalian Oneshould that humanist thinkers likePetrarch, 59-91. note, however, Salutati, Bruni, Thought', andPicoforinstance, eachrepresents different attitudes towards scholastic Ficino, philosophy.

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aboutsuchterms.We shouldalso reexamine thecompligeneralassessments catedrelationsbetweenhumanistphilosophers and scholasticphilosophers, thereareimportant mutualinfluences, since,beyondtheobviousdifferences bothin styleand contents, betweenthesetwogroupsofintellectuals. My basic here is that without such reexamination of the relations between argument humanists and scholastics, we shallnothavea balancedand reliablepictureof theintellectual in thefifteenth history century. In thepresentarticleI intendto offera detailedstudyof an earlyworkby theFranciscan and theologianGiorgioBenignoSalviati(c. 1448philosopher on the of 1520) importance thewill in thehumansoul.4Thisphilosophical issuewhichis ofcourserelatedto an established questionin medievalphilosothe two dominant in faculties the humansoul- the intellect phyregarding and the will- oftenregardedas the disputebetweenthe 'intellectualists' as 'Thomists')and the Voluntarists' as (usuallyidentified (usuallyidentified 'Scotists'),seemsto haveacquireda newdimensionin thefifteenth century.5 Salviatihimselfhas alreadybeen a subjectof debateamongsomehistorians, thequestionofwhether he shouldbe classified as a humanistor as a regarding

4)Thisearly indialogue form written Salviati's sometime discussion, stayinUrbino during 1474and1482,andentitled between OnthePrince Fridericus, , canbe oftheSoulsKingship inP.Zvonimir found Cornelius hominis et ŠojatO.F.M.,De volúntate praeeminentia eiusque dominatione inanima secundum studium et historico-doctrinale (c. 1448-1520), Georgium Dragisic editio Tractatus: Deanimae fora biographical Fridericus, (Roma, 1972),139-219; regni principe' sketch anda listofSalviati's works see27-63;a doctrinal ofthedialogue canbefound on study Fora more sketch detailed andanintellectual seeCesare 69-128. Vasoli, biographical profile, e ragione. Studi sullacultura delCinquecento e delSeicento 1974),17-127. Profezia (Napoli, SeealsoVasoli s Filosofia e religione nella cultura delRinascimento fora 1988),139-182, (Napoli, detailed account ofSalviati's Scotist onLorenzo de'Medici's sonnet. Foranother commentary work which iscritically onfuture seeGirard edited, (ed.), J.Etzkorn bySalviati contingencies, De arcanis Dei.Card. Bessarion anno socii : card. delaRovere Franciscus 1471 eiusque disputantes OFMCom Gattus deCordoba etJoannes FoxalOFMConv. Secretarius: ; Joannes OP,Fernandus Salviati OFMConv. (Rome, 1997). Georgius Benignus 5)Inthecourse I shall ofthis article bereferring toa dispute between Marsilio Ficino andLorezo de'Medici, andtothecritical account ofFicino's Vincenzo on the intellect Bandello, partby andthewill.Fora more detailed account ofthisdispute seeKristeller, Ä Thomist of Critique Marsilio ofWillandIntellect', inHarry Ficino's Volume , English Jubilee Theory Austryn Wolfion vol.II (Jerusalem, section Seealsomy'Vincenzo Marsilio and 463-494. Bandello, Ficino, 1965), inRinascimento theIntellect/Will For another the discussion of same Dialectic', [forthcoming]. student ofFicino, Alamanno seehisDe intellectus excelDonati, bya young topic voluntatisque in lentia waswritten between 1482-148 andpublished , which 7,edited byLambertus Borghi, I hopetopresent XLII(1940),108-1 a detailed account ofthistext. 15.Elsewhere Bibliofilia

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scholasticthinker.6 Such a debateis alreadyan indicationof Salviatis unique in historical position theintellectual historyof Italyin thelastthreedecades of thefifteenth in and the first twodecadesof thesixteenth century century. I hope thatthe presentdiscussionwill offera contribution to the studyof oftherelations scholasticism and to theassessment between fifteenth-century thehumanists ofthatperiod. and thescholastics GiorgioBenignoSalviati(or in his originalnameJurajDragišič)was born in Srebrenica in Bosniain thelate 1440s,and joinedtheconventualFranciscans.AftertheTurkishconquestin 1463 he movedto Ragusa(Dubrovnik), and thenon to Italy,wherehe studiedin thestudiaof his orderin Padova, Pavia,and Ferrara, finally residingin Parisand in Oxford.He was trainedin scholastic and mentionsone ofhisteachers, Joannes philosophy, he especially Foxoles(1415/6-1475),an Englishtheologianand philosopher in theScotist tradition.7 We thenfindSalviatiin thecircleofCardinalBessarionin Romein theearly1470s,at thecourtof Federicoof Montefeltro in Urbinobetween 1472 and 1482, in Florenceof Lorenzode' Medici fromaroundi486 until to Rome in 1500, 1494. Then,aftera shortperiodin Ragusa,he returned becomingbishopof Cagli in 1507, and finallythe archbishopof Nazareth in 1512. He died in Rome in 1520. Duringhislongcareer,Salviatiplayeda and philosophical debates(e.g.,Bessarionvs. leadingrolein manytheological in futurecontingencies Georgeof Trebizondand the controversy regarding in Florence,as wellas Rome,or thedebateon eviland theSavonarolaaffair theReuchlinaffair), whileteachingtheologyand philosophy, and preaching, manytexts.8 writing As alreadymentioned(seen. 4) Salviatis discussionofthewillwhichwe are aboutto examinewas written, likemostofhisworks,in dialogueform.This

6)Seethecritical in'Umanisti remarks ofCarloDionisotti Secret dimenticati?', François against inGiuseppe Carlo and Paolo Sambin Italia Billanovich, Dionisotti, (eds.), Campana, Augusto eumanistica medioevale IV(1961)(Padova seee.g.,287-292. Wemay out 287-321; 1961), point thatmost ofSalviati s texts havenotyetbeencritically somearestillavailable edited, onlyin there arehardly discussions ofthem, andwedonothave form, manuscript anydetailed yeta full modern of this author. biography 7)OnFoxoles seee.g.,with further Girard O.F.M.:HisLife references, Foxal, J.Etzkorn, 'John andWritings', inFranciscan Studies Di Fonzo, 'Il minorita 49 (1989),17-24;Lorenzo inglese Giovanni Foxholes. Maestro e arcivescovo scotista inMiscellanea Francescana (ca.1415-1475)', 99/I-II (1999),320-346. 8)Vasoli, e ragione, withfurther Profezia e.g.,21-28,35-39,57,83-85,100,109,117-120, references.

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friar.9 influence factmightsuggestalreadya humanistic upon our Franciscan to stressthatSalviatiwas byno meansuniquein choosing Butit is important In thesecondhalfofthefifteenth treatises. formforhisspeculative thisliterary numberof dialogueswrittenbyscholastic we possessa considerable century likeFicinoand Pico did not thinkers. (On theotherhand,humanistthinkers notonlysomeinfluence writedialogues.)I wouldcontendthatthisfactreflects in but also an internaldevelopment of thehumanistsupon the scholastics, late-scholastic style.Butwe needmanymoredetailedaccounts philosophical of suchtextsand theircontextsbeforewe can reachsomemoregeneralconclusionsaboutthisstylistic development.10 waswritten On thePrinceoftheSoul'sKingship Salviati's dialogueFridericus, theson of and it is dedicated to his at Guidubaldo, Urbino, during sojourn in the are The two interlocutors of Urbino.11 duke Federico, dialogue Frideriof thewill,and Salviatis own accountof thesuperiority cus,who represents Octavianus(OttavianoUbaldini),whoarguesforthesuperiorhisclosefriend in thedialogue Aftera shortproem,eachoftheparticipants ityoftheintellect.

9)Thispoint inhis'Umanisti dimenticati?' wasalready 301-303, byDionisotti emphasized 314-315. 10)Someexamples himself statera between and s De mystica areAntonio , a dialogue degli Agli thatChristian inwhich exhorts Fecinus toremember "Antonius whowashisstudent, Ficino, inmanuscript: MS a textwhich stillremains before aretobeplaced studies paganstudies", - The inRenaissance Florence andPythagoras seeCelenza, BNVIII.F.9,ff.19-33; Piety Naples Another Nesianum 2001),p. 27 andnn.99 and100there. (Leiden, professional Symbolům, Lorenzo wrote three s early whowasoneofFicino teachers, Pisano, prodialogues, theologian De amore entitled: thelate1450sandtheearly between humilitatis, , and 1460s, Dialogi bably seeArthur arestillinmanuscripts; Field,TheOrigins , which ofthePlatonic Dialogi quinqué Another seeespecially 1988),158-174, (Princeton, p. 162,and277-279. Academy ofFlorence a whoin1480wrote a Dominican ofSantaMariaNovella, isFrancesco diTommaso, example in to and which he to which he dedicated De Poliziano, , attempted explogico dialogue negocio Politian inProphyrys SeeJonathan aspresented ofuniversais laintheproblem Hunt, Isagoge. Friar diCastello, AnUnknown andScolastic 1995).I am (Città Dialogue bya Dominican Logic: theLiber ofyetanother aneditio nowpreparing bya Dominican theologian, dialogue princeps inthe the Ciceronian On the revival of Caroli. Giovanni dierum lucensium (1461/2) dialogue by InnoClassical Tradition andHumanist TheQuattrocento seeDavidMarsh, Renaissance Dialogue: scholastic form ofthedialogue vation MA,1980).Butthisrevival byprofessional (Cambridge, still tobestudied. needs ofthefifteenth inthelastdecades century theologians n) Salviati, sacrae Ordinis . . p. 139:"Georgii Fridericus. Minorum, profestheologiae Benigni, ad indolis De animae , sons,inFridericum, maximaeque speipuerum optimae regni principe details on feliciter." Somegeneral Guidonem dominum comitem, Ubaldum, incipit prooemium e ragione inVasoli, canbefound thistext , 35-39. Profezia

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presentshis generalthesis(chapters1-2), then Octavianuspresentsmore oftheintellect detailedarguments forthesuperiority 3-7), and then, (chapters his for Fridericus case the of the will,and itsimportance presents superiority forethicsand theology(chapters8-21). The lastpart(chapters22-24) containsa refutation of Octavianus'arguments. Let us now moveon to a more detailedaccountofthedialogueand itsphilosophical context. Whilein Ficinos disputewithLorenzode' Mediciand VincenzoBandello thewill and theintellect, whichwas held in 1474, boththeterm regarding and thenotionoflibertas hisemphasisis on amorand on beingor aremissing, the of to merelyknowing becominggood through power thewillin contrast whatis good through thepoweroftheintellect. Salviatis discussionalso containssomesimilararguments the role of amorand thefunctionof regarding the will.12But, as we shall see in the presentdiscussion,in contradiction to Ficino,Salviatiemphasizeslibertas as thequalityof thehumanwillperse, andhisdiscussionoflibertas hisdiscussionofliberum arbitrium , in anticipates whichwe findthestandarddistinction betweenarbitrium rationis and arbitriumvoluntatis. Onlythelatteris relatedto libertas throughthewill.At first sight,whatwe havehereis a richerphilosophicalaccountthanFicinos letter on thehumanwilland itsimportance to humanlife,to ethicsand to theology, in whichbothThomasAquinasand JohnDuns Scotus,as well as Aristotle areusedas authorities. (amongotherancientand medievalthinkers) In chapter12,entitled:quodhomomagisdistetabeluisvolúntate quamintellectuvoluntasque ea ratione sitpraestantior , Salviatistatesthatthewillis what in to to nature,to the givespreeminence nature man. The will is contrasted

12)Ficino inthis spart isincluded inhisletter toLorenzo entitled: Quidest dispute felicitas, quod habet inOpera omnia vol.1,662-665; I shall refer ,2 vols.(Torino, 1962), gradus, quodesteterna, here tothecritical I - Epistolarum edition in:Lettere liber Gentile /,ed.Sebastiano familiarium seee.g.,p.205: . .quemadmodum deterius estodisse Deumquam (Firenze, 1990),201-210; sicmelius amare nonquividět sedquivult bonům, ignorare, quamnosse"; p.206:".. .etsicut fitbonus, sicanimus nonexeoquodDeumconsidérât, sedexeoquodamat fitdivinus, quemadmodum materia nonquialucem abignecapiat, sedquiacalorem, evadit"; ignis p.207:"Quod cummulto amare Deumardenter amatoria viaethominiplures possint quamclare cognoscere, bustutior vultquamplurimis est,etad infinitum bonum, quodse ipsum impertire, longe accomodatior: ad voluntatem consecutio." withSalviati, Fridericus, pertinet igitur Compare vero voluntatis estamor siveodium; atveluti voluntas nonintelligit, itanecintelp.167:"Actus lectsamat: sienimnonessent actus sed distinctae distincti, ñequepotentiae distinguerentur; sunt intellectus voluntas intellectionem amorem, potentiae; neque igitur neque producet"; p. 169: "...quiaveluti scire itaetiudicare bonum nonfacit nosessebonos, sedidacceptare etvelie."

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sensesand to theintellect; it is a dominant,active,and rulingelementwhich is free.The intellect, on theotherhand,is notpeculiarto man: Since inturn, andunderstanding, isthegenus ofreason and understands, every living being theintellect falls under thesame asthe therefore, [i.e.,asa species] sense-perception; genus since allthese aredefined as apprehensive andthey areallnatural sense; powers' principles. Butonly thewilldiffers from them astotheir common and thewillisseparated genus, only andopposed tothem, andiscalled active that from, is,free. byitsownintention, . . .butonlythewillisbyitself reason isnomore than andthus while free, vision; man, hisintellect, hissense, isacting tonature. acting through justlikeacting through according asa free hiswill,[just] manchiefly himself Only[while acting] through agent, separates from beasts. manseparates Butthemore himself from hebecomes more beasts, man;therethisthing willbemorenoble, which heis mostremoved from thebaser fore, through Andthus thewill, when manwould beseenathismost beregarded should human, things. asthemost excellent element inman.13 Franciscantheologianand philosopher, thespiritual Salviati,theprominent heirofCardinalBessarionwho laterplayedsucha leadingrolein Lorenzode' Medicis circlein Florence,is makingherehis own important contribution to fifteenth-century discussions of thedignityofman,a themewhichis usuSalviatiis thusrejectingthe idea allyrelatedto the humanistmovement.14 13)Salviati, Fridericus estad p. 173:"Omneenimanimal cognoscit, cognitio quoquegenus rationis intellectus cum sensu sub eodem cadit. Vocantur enim notitiam; sensusque igitur genere omnes cunctae naturales causae. Atsolavoluntas abeisquovis potentiae apprehensivae', suntque eiscommuni e contra a proposito sivelibedifferì, dividitur, genere solaque vocaturque agens "...solavero voluntas exselibera nonmagis homo rum"; est,ratio quamvisus; itaque perintellectum Solavolúntate, libero a beluis sicut etpersensum. tamquam agitnatura, potissime agente, eo magis esthomo;magis id erit a distat; distat, nobile, quoveromagis igitur quomaxime vilioribus removetur. Voluntas cummaxime homovideatur, itaque praestabilissimum quid'in homine sitfatendum est." Onthis seealsothegeneral remarks inhisProfezia ofVasoli e ragione 36. p. 14)Whiledealing witha historical likeSalviati, onecannot usetoostrict orschematic figure definitions ofhumanism orscholasticism inn. 1 andreferences (onthisissueseetheremarks aswellasDionisotti s remarks referred toinn.6 above. Foronesuchtoostrict andvery above, influential tothehumanist seeRonald G.Witt, 'TheHumanism ofPaul movement, approach inJohn Oskar Monfasani Reconsidered. on his and ScholarKristeller', (ed.),Kristeller Essays Life seeespecially weneeda more flexible and 258-259. Rather, 2006),257-267; ship(NewYork, inwhich alsotheFranciscan friar whowasso active intheintellectual and notion, dynamic lifeinRome andFlorence, forinstance, andhadcloserelations with religious prominent figures ofthetime inbothCardinal Bessarions circle diCordoba, Giovanni Cardinal Gatto, (Fernando andthefuture dellaRovere, andSalviati s teacher andinLorenzo Foxoles) John popeFrancesco de'Medici's circle andPicoamong other humanists andscholastics), couldbe (Ficino many

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inAristotle s Politics1253a9-10:ÀxSyov 8è pxSvov formulated âvGpomoç ë%eitcòv an that became so central the later ancient and medieval idea Çcpcov, among of andwasso dominantin manycontexts Greek,Latin,andArabinterpreters, s notionofrationalis scholastic He also rejectsAugustine animaas philosophy. innaturetoman.15 Whilehissolutionisquitedifferent whatgivespreeminence fromFicinos,who,in hisDe Christiana of 1474,regarded religione religionas mostcharacteristic of man and of humansocietyand culture,it is in a way ofthisthemein theopeninglinesofhisoracloserto Picos famoustreatment tionof i486, laterentitledDe hominis ate,in whichmanreceivedfrom dignit to his own fate God thepossibility choose and wayof life.16 But Salviati,on

a theologian whostudied inParis studied. hewas"only" anda philosopher adequately Though him a philologist, hissocialandintellectual involvement andOxford, andnotstrictly placed inside thehumanist milieu. Itisenough tomention here hisdefense ofPicoorReuchlin, but inorder alsoofSavonarola, toshow thehistorical wehavetodealwith. is complexity Mypoint that notthat Salviati intoa humanist, butrather weshould usemore sensitive weshould turn historical beabletofollow himthrough thedifferent historical terms which wewould through contexts inwhich hewasactive. 15)Augustine, Dedoctrina Christiana enim resesthomo ad I,XXII,20:"Magna quaedam ,factus etsimilitudinem Dei, noninquantum mortali sedinquantum includitur, corpore imaginem bestias rationalis animae honore praecedit." 16)ForFicino oftheimportance inhuman snotion ofreligion seehisDe Christiana life, religione, of inOpera omnia answers tothequestion ofthepre, vol.1,p. 2. Ficinos critiqueprevious innature, eminence ofmankind aswellashisownsolution, arerepeated anddiscussed alsoin bookXIV,chapter SeeTheologia deimmortalitate animoIX,ofhisPlatonic Theology. platonica rum Hankins withWilliam trans. Michael , 6 vols.,eds.James Bowen, J.B.Allenwith John Warden See vol. SeealsoJames 290-298. 292-296. MA, 4, 2001-2006), (Cambridge, especially Hankins' inhis'Religion inAngelo discussion andtheModernity ofRenaissance Humanism', Mazzocco Humanism (ed.),Interpretations (Leiden, 2006),137-153; especially ofRenaissance ForPico'snotion seeDe hominis vari 147-148. , De enteetunoe scritti , dignitate, Heptaplus ed.Eugenio Garin(Firenze, Itisimportant tonotice thatPicodoesnotuse 1942),104-106. inSalviati voluntas orlibertas central terms s discussion, butonly arbitrium andarbitrarius. here, Ontheother wemay haveanechoofa common biblical source for both PicoandSalviati, hand, citedonlybytheFranciscan; see:Fridericus hocestidquodEccli.15dicit: 169-170: "Atque Abinitio Deushominem etdimisit euminmanu consilii sui, idestdimisit eipotestatem et fecit libertatem aut consilium sive rationis arbitrium. Unde et tibi subdit: sequi fiigere Apposui aquam etignem rationes ad quodvolueris, manum tuam , hocestvarias , hocest contrariasque; oppone sententiam." Thebiblical verses from Ecclus. 15,14-17receive quamtibiplacet, sponte sequaris here aninterpretation toSalviati s ownphilosophical according justlikethecitation terminology, inn.18below. from Aristotle alsoinPicotheexpression Wefind incuius manu teposui. Onthe ofhuman theme witha different ofbothFicino andPico)see dignity (though interpretation inKristeller, thegeneral discussion Renaissance Itissymptomatic toKristeller s 169-181. Thought,

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theone hand,presentsa fulleraccountbased on thenotionsof humanwill and freedom as developedin scholasticphilosophy up to hisownday.On the otherhand,hismethodis to reconciledifferent, and sometimeopposedopinions,showingtheirconcord,again,in a quitesimilarwayto bothFicinoand Pico, as wellas to otherhumanists.17 Thus,Salviatidoes not explicitly reject or other He justpresents an interpretation Aristotle, Augustine, any authority. ofAristotle, forinstance,in whichhe is alreadyusinghisown notionsofwill and freedom, whichare themselves the productof the latestdevelopments but quitedifferent (a pointto whichwe shallreturn)in scholasticthinking, fromAristotle s.18Thisis of coursethestandardway,in scholastic philosophy, that hementions onp.171thefacts that theearliest humanist treatment ofthedignity approach ofmanbyBartolomeo Faciowasencouraged Antonio daBarga, and monk, bya Benedictine that thissubject istreated him "in a and but that he context", by strongly religious theological doesnotdealatallwiththecontributions ofthescholastic in to this theme the philosophers fifteenth A more detailed ofthistheme, discussion witha yetdifferent in century. approach, which thescholastic tradition isbetter canbefound inCharles In Our Trinkaus, appreciated, - Humanity andLikeness andDivinity inItalian Humanist , 2 vols.(London, Image Thought vol.1,179-321. 1970), 17)ForSalviati - veluti s method seeFridericus Veritas necbono (idnosti) p. 157:"Atveritati - opponitur bonum Seealsothecitations inŠojatsintroduction, Fridericus numquam." p. 35, n.56,from Salviati s Opus denatura caelestium vocamus : "Mihi certo Thospirituum quosangebs masnonminus carus Scoto. enim sacrae fidei validus doctus, Uterque praestans, uterque uterque Ubiconvaluero idfacere andfrom hisPropheticae solutiones conciliare, enitar"; propugnator. pro Savonarola : "Verum est. . . ilium modum a supra dictodoctore multifariam [Scoto] Hieronymo forsan tamen conciliari Thomas etScotus veleoinloco,sedhaecpraetereunda impugnari; posset inpraesenti iudico." SeealsoŠojat sremarks onp.65.Onthis same issue seealsoVasoli s remarks inhisProfezia eragione, 41-42. This method is close to Pico's in his method famous 34, e.g., very Conclusiones ofi486.SeeGiovanni PicodellaMirandola, Conclusiones Kieszkowski ,ed.Bohdan numero XVIIsecundum (Genève, 1973),p.54:"Conclusiones paradoxe propriam opinionem, dicta Aristotelis etPiatonis, deinde aliorum doctorum discorconciliantes, primum quimaxime darevidentur." ForSalviati s useofthesame inanother inhiscommentary on context, principle Lorenzo de'Medici's seeVasoli, ereligione Onthis seealsoFredeissue , 164-165. poem, Filosofia rick ofPhilosophic ť1heTheme Concord andtheSources ofFicino s Platonism', in Purnell, Jr., GianCarloGarfagnini Ficino e il ritorno diPlatone: e documenti studi , 2 vols. (ed.),Marsilio voi.2,397-415. (Firenze, 1986), 18)See,e.g.,Fridericus totam inintellectivam animam cuius vocat, p.174:'"Mentem' Philosophus haesunt duaepotentiae: voluntas etratio. Undequiamens senon proratione saepissime capitur, itacapere Xlibro, ostendit felicitas estprofluens consen'Quodsi inquiens: operario pervirtutem, taneum estrationi utsiteaoperatio hoc autem eius erit quaeperoprimam proficiscitur; profecto - siveigitur mens sithoc,sivealiquid aliudquod quodestpraestabilissimum atqueoptimum, natura dominari videtur acimperare'. Atvoluntas estillaquaepraecipit, domiquidem naturaque indistincte etabsque delectu mentis' vocábulo natur; itaque utramque potentiam comprehendit."

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somehowmanagesto relatehisnew ofpresenting newideas.If somethinker thenthisis how this notionofthehumanwilland freedom, say,to Aristotle, new notionshouldbe presented.But as we shallsee, throughthe dramatic thesenseofnovelty dynamicofthedialogue,Salviatimanagedalso to preserve the he regarding theory presents. and liberSalviati,then,emphasizestheessentialrelationbetweenvoluntas ratio which are not free. he is not to naturaand But tas,as contrasted willing as canbe found to neglecttheimportance ofreasonorofrationalproceedings, a broader forinstancein Ficinoslettercitedin n. 12 above.He ratherprefers of the rationalsoul, presentedas an interpretation of Aristotle's definition notionof anima rationalis butwhichin factincludeshis new conceptionof his own ideas thewill,and whichcould havehelpedhim also in reconciling will with s : the human and freedom regarding Augustine indiscussing thewhole of ButAristotle uses[theterms] rational orintellectual part power isdescribed Butonlytherational soulisfree thesoul,that which as'rational'. yetnotas 'free or'intenwill.Henceheoften uses[theexpression] butasbeing reason, agent' being tional' inthesamesense. isfirm volition ofsomething.19 Butintention froma widerconception Herewe haveanotherkindofrationality, stemming oftherationalsoul,whichis freeand containsbothreasonand will.Now we arereadyforSalviatis accountof ratio,voluntas, and arbitrium. libertas, reason,as wellas all sensesand powersin the Accordingto theFranciscan, in reason,can be describedas freeonlythrough humansoulwhichparticipate ( perparticipationem ), whereasthewillis theonlypowerwhich participation is byitself(exsese)free.20 or Butwhatdoes freedommeanhere?It is mastery, 19)Ibid.,165-166: "Aristoteles autem rationalem siveintellectivam potentiam prototaillaanima dicitur Anima vero rationalis solalibera sedvolúnest,nontarnen ratione, quae'rationalis' capit. tate. Undeagens liberum sivea proposito eodem autem pro saepenumero accipit. Propositum estfirma alicuius reivolitio." 20)Ibid.,p. 168:"Ratio sensus rationis liberi quoqueetomnes viresque, participes, perparticiatsolavoluntas exseseuttalissitoportet." dicipossunt, Thisisa standard Scotist pationem "Potentia libera libertati nonmagis detervoluntatis, position: perparticipationem, quaesubest minatur secundum actum suumcircaminimum obiectum ut de maximum, quam patet visu, determinatur ad videndum solemquamaliudvisibile; multo fortius quodnonmagis igitur estperessentiam, nonmagis determinabitur advolendum unum voluntas, quaelibera quam aliud." Thiscitation from Scotus' first ontheSentences , d. 1 p. 2 (.Lectura commentary prima inGuidoAlliney, anddiscussed 'Lacontingenza dellafruizione beatifica q. 2,n.99)isquoted nellosviluppo inViaScoti. delpensiero diDunsScoto', admentem Duns Joannis Methodologica Scoti. AttidelCongresso Scotistico Roma Sileo 9-11marzo Internazionale, 1993,ed.Leonardo

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itsownacts.Onlythewillis therulerofthis theabilityto controlor perform in all the other our soul; powersshouldbe regardedonlyas handkingdom of thisruler.21 Salviatimoveson to presentan argument maidsor followers withThomashere,sinceno one,includshowingthatthereis no disagreement everask whetherreasoncan be comDoctor would the himself, ing angelic in act this or that but to manner, onlywhetherthewill can be thus pelled compelled.Thus,compulsionis relatedby everyone to reason,whileacting is theway of thewill.Withoutthisdistinction, {contingenter) contingently someone cannecessarSalviatiargues,howcansomeDoctorsdiscusswhether In the will the such discussions ily assumptionis alwaysthat supremegood? related.All thisproves,Salviaticoncludes, freedomand thewillarestrongly in us,itconsistsin thewill.Hence,ifsomeonedeclares thatifwe havefreedom It and ourfaith.22 thatourwillis notfree,thisgoesagainstreason,experience constituted therelationbetweenfreeis important to noticethatSalviatifirst dom and thewill,definingeach of theseelementsin the humansoul, and elements themfromall the othernaturaland thusnecessary distinguishing such as reasonand the senses.Only thendoes he go on to discussanother relatedterm:arbitrium. The discussionof arbitrium beginswitha questionraisedby Octavianus, in thedialogue,who,as mentionedabove,tried one of thetwointerlocutors who repthesecondinterlocutor in thefirst to persuadeFridericus, chapters23 resentsSalviatis own views,thattheintellectis themostnoblepowerin the

A discussion willin oftherational seep.636andn. 13there. (Roma, 1995),vol.2,633-660; Will:DunsScotus and inMary BethIngham, 'TheBirth oftheRational Scotus canbefound in XXX Book Medioevo Aristotelů libros theQuaestiones 15', , IX, Quaestio Metaphysicorum super (2005),139-170. 21)Ibid.:"Cumautem actum eliciendum autproducendum libertas nilaliudsitquamadsuum sive voluntas suas dominium ad ceteras potestas, potentiasoperationes reducendum) (peridque nostri domina certo solahuius erit, regni reliquae potentiae pedissequae putabuntur." 22)Ibid.:"Neque(ultra nonesseperse abhaeresi estdicere voluntatem dictas rationes) longe 'anratio liberam. Adquidquoquenequesanctus Thomas, umquam nequeullusaliusquaesivit ferri ad earn solam omnes an sed voluntas', dicuntque contingenter omnia compelli potest', dicunt ut summo in de hoc dissentit bono, ullus, obiecta, quodquidam praeterquam neque Underatilibertas necessario velit? Haecsunt est,easitinvolúntate. quodsiquainnobis signa nonesseliberam nostrani si quisvoluntatem nostra onibus, fideique répugnât experimento, as suchasThomas ofSalviati s argument atthebackground Forthesources dicat." here, Aquinas andcitations seeŠojaťsreferences GilesofRomeorPeter wellasHenry ofGhent, Olivi, John on168-169. 23>Ibid.,144-156.

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thathe . humansoul. Consistentwithhis line of thought,thoughadmitting Octavianus mustacceptFridericus' says: arguments, I amnowforced toaccept these Butwhy dowesometimes wehave saythat [arguments]. free when togive ortojudge, be would justliketohaveanopinion judgment, judgment, theactofreason?24 A good question,originating fromthedistinction betweenreasonand will, as freewill.Octavianusis and also fromthecommonuseofliberum arbitrium in to voluntas libera thelightof theprevious the but , phrase willing accept thephraseliberum arbitrium seemsnow misleadand distinctions arguments Here takes recourse to the other kind ofrationality we Fridericus/Salviati ing. discussedearlier: sivearbitrium' isfree both while Human thewillandwhile 'iudicium judgment preceding it:for, while wehavethis 'this isindeed determination betbytheintellect following thing inpursuing what isworse, butthat isworse', andalsoinnotwilling ter, yetthewillisfree what isbetter, orcertainly intaking anindifferent Whence Ovidrepresented this position. inbooksixofhisMetamorphoses asthus 'I Medea see and the better / approve saying: things, I follow theworse a most clear andtrue sentence! Andsofree isour [but] Certainly things'. soalsotojudgewhat isgooddoesnotmake usgood, because, judgment, justastoknow, butonly andwilling it.Andsofree isthefree election oracceptance of accepting judgment judgment.25 24)Ibid., hisiamadhaerere. Sedcurdicimus arbitrium noshabere interdum p. 169:"Compellor etopinari cumarbitrari, sicut autiudicare, sitrationis actus?" liberum, 25)Ibid.:"Humanuni iudicium sivearbitrium liberum estutpraecedit etutsequitur voluntatem eandem: dataenimabintellectu sententia 'hocquidem essemelius, idverodeterius', voluntas libera estad prosequendum autcerto ad standum deterius, melius, atquead nonvolendum indifferenter. UndeMedeam illam VI [this reference iscorrected betobook byŠojat:itshould Ovidius introducit sicdicentem: 'Videomeliora / VII,20-21]libro Metamorphoseos proboque, deteriora Praeclara sententia! Liberum estnostrum certo arbitrium, sequor'. veraque itaque quia veluti itaetiudicare scire bonum nonfacit nosessebonos, sedidacceptare etvelie[Šojat proa reference toScotus] vides here . Liberum estlibera arbitrium iudicii electio siveacceptaitaque tionForthe ofthisexample ofMedeaasa caseofakrasia inthelater tradition, fortuna starting with Lévefre seeRisto 'Weakness ofWillinRenaissance andReformation Saarinen, , d'Étaples, inTobias andMatthias Perkams Problem Hoffmann, Müller, (eds.),The Jörn ofWeakness ofWill inMedieval 1; especially 1. Butaswecansee 334-3 47,350-35 (Leuven, 2006),329-35 Philosophy wefind theexample ofMedeaalready before inSalviati Lévefre s scholastic dishere, d'Étaples, cussion ofthewill.Thus, Saarinen's conclusions onp.337,forinstance, wecan against general thescholastic thinkers were lessrestrictive intheir andthat neither Lévefre illustrations, saythat norJosse Clichtove "have beenthefirst commentators tohaveemployed this d'Étaples example". scholasticism anditsdialectical relations andmutual influence with, on, Fifteenth-century

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Onlywhenfreeelectionor acceptanceareinvolvedcan we speakoffreejudgment.And this,as we haveseen,is peculiarto man. Salviatiemphasizesthe factthathe discussesherethehumanjudgment.We are beyondthedichotomyrational/irrational throughthenew notionsof freedomand will in the humansoul,whichpresentsa morecomplexpictureof humanpsychology. Butthiscomplexity givesus a betteraccountofmosthumanactionsin reality, lhe and it bearsalso some importantethicaland theologicalimplications, of to commit an evil a deed or sin deliberately possibility choosing givenby willis exactlywhatgivesus as humanbeingsthe our freeand post-lapsarian ofbecominggood and as Christians ofbeingsaved.Anotherimplipossibility cationis thatin facttherearetwokindsofjudgments: one ofthereason{arbitriumrationis) and one ofthewill{arbitrium voluntatis is of ). Thisobservation coursenotnew.Buthumanjudgmentas we haveseenin Salviatis arguments derivesonlyfromthewilland thusis free.Salviatiis usingthebiblicalverses of Sirach(Ecclesiasticus)15, 14-17,to showthatman can escapethejudgIn fact,manreceivedthisabilityfromGod mentofreasonand thusactfreely. Whenwe consider, forinstance, Thomas'viewofarbitrium rationis Himself.26 in which,so it seems,theAristotelian we see a whollydifferent psychology, notionsofhomorationalis andprudentiaarestillstrongly reflected.27 Thomas' rationisis declarationthathomoestdominussuorumactuumper arbitrium Butduringthetwohundredyearsbetween totallyopposedto Salviatis view.28 Thomas'deathin 1274 and theactivity of Salviati,a wholenew psychology is clearly had emergedin scholasticphilosophy,and this new psychology the in Salviatis discussionofthehumanwillwritten reflected during 1470s.29 movement is stilla taskforfurther basedonunstudied works suchas thehumanist studies Salviati's. 26)I havealready inn.16above. this from Fridericus , 169-170 quoted passage 27)See,e.g.,Thomas Summa 2a2ae,q. 47,a. 12:"Sedquiaquilibet homo, Aquinas, theologiae, deregimine secundum arbitrium intantum estrationis, rationis, aliquid inquantum participât eiprudentiam habere." convenit 28)Ibid.,q. 158,a. 2: "Adtertium actuum dicendum suorum perarbiquodhomoestdominus inpotestate hominis in rationis nonsunt trium etideomotus rationis; quipraeveniunt judicium ratio nullus eorum utscilicet impedire, quamvis possit quemlibet singulariter insurgat; generali, siinsurgat." 29)Fordetailed inscholastic thelater ofthis newpsychology discussions philosophy part during ofGuido ofthefourteenth seethestudies andthefirst decades ofthethirteenth century, century Giovanni e ťFra Scotoe Ockham: diReading 'Lacontingenza dellafruizione beatifica'; Alliney, inDocumenti e studi sullatradizione il dibattito a Oxford sullalibertà (1310-1320)', filosofica teo'Laricezione scotiana dellavolontà nell'ambiente dellateoria medievale 7 (1996),243-368; 14(2005), inDocumenti sullatradizione medievale estudi (1307-1316)', fibsofica logico parigino

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forourpresent Twopointsin thisnewpsychology areessential discussion: first, thehumanwillis notboundbyanynecessity to achievethesupremegood,or evento aim it,and thisis an expression of itsfreedom(as opposedto natural whichmancanalsoturnhimself andthusnecessary causes),through awayfrom which he can thesupreme and man s condition, second, primary through good; his will. turnhimself towardsthesupremegood,is determined free onlyby This secondpointimpliedsome restriction on thelateAugustine s severe notionofgracein thepost-lapsarian state.Bothpointsreflect different notions of humanrationality thanwhatwe had in Thomas.Some one likeHenryof in the act of thewill towardsthe Ghent,thoughstillmaintaining necessity in developingthesenewemphases.30 Thinkfinalend,is extremely important erslikePeterJohnOlivi and Gonsalvusof Spain in Parisseemto haveexercised some influenceupon the philosophicalformation of the best-known in scholasticism: thinker relatedto thislaterdevelopment JohnDuns Scotus.31 Whilethefirstgeneration of Scotistsin theearlyfourteenth centurytriedto reconcilethemoreextreme of himself thepossibilScotus position (regarding ityofusingfreewilland turning awayfromGod also inpatria)withthemore traditional doctrinalview(thusmaintaining somekindof necessity inpatria inordernottooffend Gods perfection and theperfect of the beatific happiness it will be to see what Salviatis view on this is. As we issue vision), interesting haveseen,he seemsto acceptScotus'positionin via?1Sincewe do nothave scholasticism and Scotism,we yetenoughdetailedstudiesoffifteenth-century

'TheTreatise ontheHuman WillintheCollationes oxonienses Attributed toJohn Duns 339-404; inMedioevo SeealsoStone, 'Moral After 30(2005),209-269. 1277'. Scotus', Psychology 30)Alliney, 'Lacontingenza dellafruizione beatifica, p. 634.SeealsoC. G. Normore, 'Picking andChoosing: Anselm onChoice', inVivarium andOckham XXXVI (1998),23-39;seeespe31-33. cially 31)Alliney, 'FraScotoe Ockham', ofthewillismuch Scotus' more 251-253. theory complicated inthepresent than what isprovided it but is the presentation, beyond scopeofthisdiscussion, is focused which onSalviati andthefifteenth-century context. Scotus between distinguishes andnature andbetween eachpower andnecessary canacteither liberty activity: contingent tonature oraccording Allpowers toliberty. thewillarenatural andthus necesaccording except and not free. The will is a free which acts It is to sary power contingently. impossible, according that thesamepower willactina different inviaorinpatria. the Scotus, Thus, waywhile being willactsfreely andcontigently alsoinpatria towards thesupreme andcan goodandbeatitude, 'notwill'it.Butthis'notwilling' inpatria doesnotimply the towards anyeviloranyoffence of the See: 'La della fruizione beatifica 639. , perfection supreme good. Alliney, contingenza p. 32)On these tensions Scotist thinkers intheearly fourteenth seeAlliney, 'La among century ricezione dellateoria 371-372. scotiana',

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our generalobservations.33 Let us now turnback to Salviatis mustrestrict in this orientation. mind discussion, bearing general libeAs we haveseenin thecase of arbitrium , wherethephrasearbitrium was requiredin the rumseemedat first and a newdefinition sightmisleading, of the other Salviati is the same methodalso in his distinctions, using light in chapter13. Whilepresenting Thomas'viewofappediscussionofappetitus in thisdiscussion he arguesthatthereis a confussion between titusand voluntas It is rightto relatethenaturalappetiteto the naturalis and voluntas. appetitus as necessary, but it is wrongto identify and to describethisactivity intellect, seems to be aboutthisobscuwith the will. Salviati concerned everyappetite in thecommonwayofusingtheseterms.34 Thus, rityand abouttheconfusion forinstance, we findin the1474 disputebetweenFicinoand Bandelloa ratioand a sensualappetitewhichis nal appetitewhichis relatedto theintellect, relatedto thewill.SinceFicinois not relatinghis notionof thewillto freeit withnatureor withnaturaland necesnot contrasting dom,and certainly for as the causes senses, instance)he is leftwithan diminished (such sary and sensualappetite,and notionof thewill,whichis ruledby an irrational in thushe is justlycriticized byhis Dominicanrival,whowas onlyinterested in the intellect the human soul.35 This be of the might restoring preeminence 'ScotusandScotist 33)Yetoneshould Maarten Hoenens mention hereforinstance, J.F.M. intheMedieval inE.P.Bos andEarly Modern ofScotist School. TheTradition Period', Thought withregard to DunsScotus. Renewal (Amsterdam, 1988),197-210; (ed.),John ofPhilosophy onlogic, theAlbertists between andThomists, debates heldinCologne mainly fifteenth-century Textbooks. The intheMirror ofUniversity Schools ofThought 'LateMedieval seeHoenens in Maarten Schneider, Hoenen, 1492)', J.EM. J.H.Josef (Cologne, Promptuarium Argumentorum intheMiddle andLearning. Universities Wieland (Leiden, 1995), (eds.), Ages Philosophy Georg Moninfifteenth-century seeJohn withregard toonecentral scholasticism, 329-369; figure A Biographical andIntellectual Fernando 1992).With fasani, Profile (Philadelphia, ofCordova: AProfile ofMessina: Gatti minor seeMonfasani's 'Giovanni toa more [i.e.,Gatto] figure regard and Studies on Humanism andLatins inRenaissance nowinGreeks andanUnedited Text', Italy. VII. inthe15thCentury 2004),article (Aldershot Phibsophy 34)Salviati, intellectui omnem Fridericus naturali], perfectionem [appetitu p. 175:"Hocappetitu uniri eo anima suo similiter et voluntati, semper ipso tamquam perfectibili expetimus; possibilem, hoc sed nolumus Paulus dicebat isto appetitu expoliari,supervestiri' cupit; appetitu corpori Thomas ait:Voluntas utnatura hieestilledequosanctus necessario ducimur, ferimur, agimur; omnem Vocat enim communi modo siveinsummum bonum. inultimum necessario fertur finem, involuta confusa." in haec enim voluntatem': sunt nomina, atque Šojat ambigua vulgo appetitum II Cor5,4,aswell references andcitations from therelevant inhisfootnotes on175-176 gives, intheOrdinatio. Scotus' discussion andDe mah Summa asfrom Thomas' , against theologiae 35)Vincenzo PraediOrdinis Fratris Vincentii deCastronovo daCastelnuovo, Bandello Opusculum inactu beatitudo hominis Medicem virum Laurentium acgenerosum admagnificum catorum quod

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an exampleofwhatwouldhavebeenregardedbySalviatias a confusedconand thewill. discussionoftheappetite,theintellect, temporary Salviati betweenhisnotion this confusion immediately distinguishes Against of thewill whichis a freepowerand opposed to nature,and thatkindof in putting As we haveseenalready, Salviatihasno difficulty naturalappetite.36 intothemouthofhissourceshis own notionof thewill.Thus,Paul himself, talkedaboutthefreewilland notaboutthe friar, accordingto ourFranciscan naturalappetitewhenhe said: I longto be dissolvedand to be withChrist.37 The most importantelementhere is election(electio)whichreceivesboth and theologicaland ethicaldimensionsthroughtheexamplesof themartyrs thebravemoralmen(virifortes ). Thewillis definedhereas a power(vis)in the ofour whichwe becomefreeand masters soulcreatedbyGod forus,through ownactions.All otherthingslackthisuniquepower,and becauseofthisthey We shouldnotuseappetere forvelie thatpower arenotfree.38 , sinceitdescribes in which are is itself an innate ornatural we and led, necessarily through being norshouldwe useappetere foranyoperationofthewill.39 Salviati inclination, essentialiter consistit Le thomisme etlapensée intellect usetnonvoluntatis , in Kristeller, incipit italienne delarenaissance seep.249:"Nonestautem existimandum (Montréal, 1967),187-278; talesecundum sensitivi sedmagis ordinem secundum ordinem simpliciter aliquid appetitus sideusintellectum a volúntate esset intellectivi"; appetitus p.264:"Namutisasserit, seiungeret, forma vero esset carens. intellectus voluntas rationalis, Quisenim appetitus quaedam cognitione formam rationalem omnem carentem dubitat appetitum praecedere?" cognitione dignitate nullus rem Thesecritical remarks should be referred toFicino, Lettere /,p. 208:"Appetitus sufficeret absentis bonimemoria sedsubstantialem, alioquin appetenti querit, imaginariam visioautem Deiinnobis resestet,utsupra finita. dixi, Quocirca atqueimaginado; imaginaria in est Deum infinitum conversio voluntatis rationem infinitatis actus, diffusio, qui substantialisque habet quamactus quiestDeinotio quedam promentis capacitate." magis intelligendi, 36)Salviati, nostra haecvoluntas, dequadisputamus, nullaincondicione Fridericus p. 176:"Ast cumappetitu dicto convenit: enim estnaturalis (nisi neque potentia, nequeinclinatio quaedam mediante actuquemlibere etiubendo forsan, elicit, inclinet); imperando estque quodesiderailliappetitui." musfrequenter opposita 37)Ibid.:"Volúntate enim nonappetitu dicebat Paulus: dissolvi etesse cum libera, naturali, Cupio Christo ." Šojatgives thesource inhisnotes: Ph1,23. 38)Ibid.:"Etutbrevi hacfitomnis illisubdebant electio: hacenim plurima, martyres congeram sedoloribus etneci,hacvirifortes sibipotius mortem adsciscunt vitam. quamturpem gerere nilaliudestquamvisquaedam Undevoluntas a Deoinnobis animae, creatae, qualiberi operanostrarum domini sumus. Atceterae neclibertatem, sicnehancquidem, veluti res, tionumque liber voluntatem." est,habent quaquisque potentiam; neque itaque 39)Ibid.:"Unde non dici cumappetere vimquandam volumus, quae proprie appetere debemus, - necessario ea ipsainclinatio innata, quaducimur designet, sitque nequeullaeiusoperatio." A completely different inwhich theappetite is related tofreedom andwill,ina approach,

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presentsa typicalscholasticconcernforaccuracyin the use of terms:while shouldonlybe related desiderare and cuperecan be relatedto thewill,appetere which someone is that to thatinclination through seeking thingwhichhas a His critiquehereofmostlearned nature,and thisis ofcoursethewill.40 perfect contextin which men {dottissimi viri)shouldremindus of the intellectual where humanists and scholastics Salviatiwas active:fifteenth-century Italy, in philosophical and theologicalquestions.Such a shareda commoninterest in theuse of terms.41 commoninterest mayproducealso some inaccuracies

inwhich aneternal willisdescribed assomekind ofcosmic framework law,canbe Neoplatonic inFicino animae vol.1, p. 296:"Quonam s Theologia found pactocaelestes sphaeras platonica anima sicut tuum tuaperappeProfecto suasmovent? Platonicis, placet corpus quemadmodum animae illicquoquea cogitatione ibidem a fatali illius titum. excitatur, Quiappetitus cogitatio movet et innata in libro De 'Caelum fatum Ideo Plato Quodaccecupiditas'. regno inquit: lege. veterum Illeenim ubide a Zoroastre, a quoomnis manavit videtur theologorum sapientia. pisse àeì ipé%et idest:'Sempiterna cáeloloquitur, cpépexai, àváyicriç", ßou^rj epycp "aíÔícp inquit: si itarerum necessitatis volúntate fertur, Quodperspicue operacurriť. intellegemus, semper ordinem considerabimus." 40)Ibid.:"Seddoctissimi etreliquas resinsensibiles veliebeluas consentientes, viri, saepe vulgo - similiter velforsan ethominem volúntate Sedhomodesiderare dicunt, cupere quoappetere. illainclinatione idquodsibiestnatura solum dicipotest; quapetit perappetere quevolúntate levecircumferentiam)." est(veluti dicendus centrum, fectum, grave 41)Wemay in ofthewilltotheintellect sdiscussion ofthesuperiority think ofColuccio Salutati Michael et medicinae ed. Peter De nobilitate hisfamous andinfluential , legum composition between voluntas andappetiasanexample ofa confusion Schenkel (Munich, 1990),182-196, ille velsensitivus seep. 182:"Voluntatis tosa appetitus, quorum inquam, quenonsitnaturalis boni cuius libesed istevero cuiusdam movetur sinecognitione, noticia, voluntatis, particularis Namcumilleprimum naturalis voluntatis etrationis. rumsitarbitrium, [seil, quodestactus insensibilibus, tamen hectertia sensitivus sitinplantis, secundus [seil, [seil, appetitus] appetitus] estomnium ratione utentibus invenitur. increaturis voluntas] potentiaipsavoluntas Siquidem cause a confusion, Hectertia rum anime, may imperatrix." cognoscimus, quaseminere vegetative which of and not a will a third kind that the is unique power isessenspecial appetite, implying iswellaware ofthisessential thatSalutati from alltherest. Butitis obvious different tially the relation between critical anddialectical aninteresting andthissuggests difference, dialogue with between Salutati andsomeofthehumanists Ontherelation humanist andthescholastic. and inhisProfezia e ragione ofVasoli seethegeneral remark Scotist masters , p.37.OnSalutati A much more confused andLikeness In OurImage thewillseealsoTrinkaus, , vol.1,51-102. arbitrio omnia inLorenzo Valla's De libero canbefound discussion , inOpera , 2 vols.(Torino, ubiais,sideusfutura breviter tamen dehocposteriore vol.1,p. 1003:"Prius satisfaciam, 1962), Hoc cuinecesse esteventura necessitate illum laborare, sunt, prospicere. quiafutura prospicit, Fora critical dissedpotentiae" sednaturae, sedvoluntati, verononesttribuendum necessitati, of 'TheTheology issues seeJohn treatments oftheological Valla's cussion ofLorenzo Monfasani, Modern andEarly Stone(eds.), Humanism andM.W.F. Lorenzo Valla, inJillKraye Philosophy

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and voluntas Salviatis conclusionis thusthatappetitus belongto completely to theintellectbut and that the should be related different appetite species, fromthefreeagent.42 strictly distinguished In thebeginning ofchapter14 we finda rhetorical oftheimpordescription tanceofthewill: allother Whoindeed doesnotknow that GodHimself tothewill? Cersubjected powers command isissued whois allintentions, every every bythewill.Indeed, tainly persuasion, orhisintellect theonewhohasever toldhiseye'donotsee',ortohishand'donotgrasp, 'think ofthis, butnotofthat'?43 Salviati Afteragainreadinghis notionof thewillintosomebiblicalverses,44 will in is that the is the the soul which related to both onlypower argues sinnersand piousmen;thisis thecentralqualityfortheologyand ethicsand it controlsall our actionsand deeds.45While rejectingthe opinionof the Doctor FranciscusBaconis (DoctorSublimis)whichwas fourteenth-century into the discussion by Octavianusto showthatthewill is directed, brought ofthehumanist's alsoincluding anevalucontribution, (London, 2000),1-23.Another critique in inregard todivine can be found Chris 'Divine ation ofPomponazzi Schabel, foreknowledge, on"Scholastic SubtleandHuman Freedom: andLuther Auriol, Pomponazzi, Foreknowledge inRussell L. Friedman andLaugeO. Nielsen Medieval inEarly Modties'", (eds.),The Heritage ernMetaphysics andMoralTheory, 1400-1700 (Dordrecht, 2003),165-189. 42)Salviati, Fridericus omnis subeodem cumpotentiis p. 177:"Appetitus itaque appregenere hensivis suntenim natura Voluntas cadit: unaexaltera liberum manet, agentia. parte agensque cumappetitu concordiam. Sedintellectus etiam vocitatur, habetque quandam pertenuem cumappetitu maiorem videtur habere exquo unacumipsolibero convenientiam, agente condividitur." 43)Ibid.:"Quisveroignorât Deumipsum omnes vires aliascommisisse Omnia enim voluntad? omnis omnepraeceptum voluntad fit.Quisenimestquiumquam dixerit Consilia, persuasio, oculononinspicias', 'nonrapias', autmanui autintellectui minime'?" hoc,illudvero 'cogites 44)Ibid.,177-178: etDeusitapraecipit: "Unde Dominum Deumtuum extoto extota core, Diliges exomnibus viribus tuis. Voluntad dicitur: Honora tuum et matrem. Sibi dicitur: mente, patrem Nonoccides, nonmechaberis ."Thebiblical references aregiven inp. 178. byŠojatinthenotes 45)Ibid., enim nolens autpeccat autmeretur, voluntas etmereri p.178:"Nullus solaque peccare acnulla ceterarum inhisquaepraevirium volúntate. Undeneclaudeautprobro potest, absque ternostrani fiunt voluntatem nisiinterdum forsan utcumnolentes afficimur, peraccidens, quidcuiuscausam autnollepoteramus is quiebrius voluimus, (veluti piamefficimus, quempiam - autcerto - tantum nolens idagit, sedvoluit nonpotuit nolle vinisumere). percutit, quidem estigitur Voluntas omnium motionum nostrarum It is tofindthesame regina." interesting alsoinSalutati's De nobilitate sed habemus, example p. 194:"Undenonbibimus quiavinum bibere cumhabemus; habere vinum etbibendi occasio possumus quidem spatium atquelocum voluntas sedbibendi estcausa." sunt,

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and thatit is not subjectedonlyto and arrangedby theintellect, regulated, intothediscussionthedivinewill,thus Fridericus introduces anotherwill,46 or ratio , showinganothercommonsophism{sophisma)betweenintellectus seem to controlthe will,and divinavoluntas whichmistakenly , whichthe Salviatiis willingto givetheintellecta muchmore humanwillmustobey.47 of thewill, modestrolein comparisonwiththewill: a spyor a messenger an This Salviati an opporof army.48 gives whichis comparedto a commander s famousverse(SatireVI, 223: ofJuvenal hisinterpretation to introduce tunity in whichhe seesa critiqueof voluntas ratione Hoc volo,sic iubeoy ), sitquepro humanarroganceand of thosewho are not subjectingtheirown will to the theirownwillinto or to thewillofthegods,thusturning willoftheirmasters thereis no But accordingto thetheologians, thesupremereasonand rule.49 the relation We now have to determine the will of God.50 reason than higher will. betweenthehumanand thedivine

46)Ibid.,178-179: rationi "Attuleram subiici obedire, (diuest)voluntatem quia- Doctore atque - intellectu earn conformatur unde Sublimi teste etiam voluntas, eique ipsa, etrégulât dirigitur tamen Dixisti huic adversatur. schola Subtilis ut ordinat. ante, dixi, paulo opinioni Neque, atque onp. 178Fridericus nisiforsan subiici nullo voluntatem voluntati"; argued posse cuipiam, pacto Deimaiovoluntatis eiusveronutus commissae sunt etomnes vires that "Mens nutibus; igitur atvoluntatem Inventi voluntatem subiici debent. nutibus voluntati; itaque obtemperare rumque Baconis seeŠojaťsnoteon178OnFranciscus estimpossibile." autsubesse, nonvoluntati subdi onfifteenth-century onBaconis andhisinfluence isrequired more detailed 179.A much study onthe inBaconis' thisopinion ofthewill.Thus, disussions commentary Šojatcouldnotfind here between Doctheobvious rhetorical notignore, Weshould Sentences. however, word-play of Salviati s humanistic a andschola Subtilis torSublimis , part style. 47)Ibid., humana debet. voluntas ethuicrationi ratio talis dicisolet: parere p.179:"Bonautique Intellectus voluntas. nonestintellectus Haecveroratio quod itaque agnoscit ipse,seddivina maximum id attinet. Estitaque adipsum debet voluntas subesse humana divinae, idquescire hancsubiici debere seitvoluntatem 'intellectus voluntati, primae atqueconforman sophisma sciotesubiici veluti sidicerem intellectui haecsubiicitur voluntas atqueconformatur, igitur mihi subdere'." igitur regi, 48)Ibid.,p. 180:"Estitaque sedspeculator huiusregni nonprinceps intellectus, qui quidam, - atquenuntius moliantur hostes exercitus insinuât, quidam quidve quidamici, imperatori voluntatis dicipotest." 49)Ibid.:"Earn maiorum voluntatem homines eosipsos illeobiurgat etSatyrus obrem quisuam 'Hocvolo,siciubeo, noncurabant, itainquiens: subiicere voluntati proratisitque deorumque - quodprosuamvoluntatem idesthabent onevoluntas', ratione, primaque regula, proprima s useofOvid. Salviati andcontext) seen(inn.25above Wehavealready esseliquet." fanum 50)Ibid.:"Undeettheologi, curaliquid sit,hancultireplicatam quaestionem postmultotiens aliaquavis hancrationem autquiasicipsevoluit'; rationem: mamponunt quiaDeo placuit, ratione carere aiunt."

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Essentialto thisrelationbetweenhumanand divinewillis,ofcourse,divine ScotusagainstThomas,arguesthatthegraceofGod grace.Salviati,following shouldbe relatedonlyto thepowersof thesoul and not to itsessence,and amongthesepowersonlyto thewill.51He goeson to discussthethreetheoas belongingto thewill.52 In hisdiscussionof logicalvirtueswhichhe regards faithwe haveagaina good exampleofthenewpsychology and anthropology, accordingto whichpowersand acts,all ruledby thewill,replacethedominance of essenceand the virtuesin the more traditional Aristotelian and Thomisticpsychology. The human soul containspowerswhich underthe commandofthewill,and withsomehelpofthevirtues, arerousedto action. The willcreatestheimpulse(conatus)withoutwhichnothingcan takeplace. The mostbasicact ofbelievingis completely dependenton thisimpulse.The here is that since matters of faith are mancannotuse assumption supernatural, a naturalpowerlikereason(and thus,sinceanyhowmanslimitedmindcannot understand theobjectsof faith,understanding is replacedby movement initiatedbya certaininclination and impulse),butonlya non-natural power likethewillcan makeman movetowardsfaith.This dynamicpsychology is whichis oftencontrasted to intellectual tendenveryfarfrompassivefideism, ciesin theologicalthinking.53 Salviatidoes not missanotheropportunity for biblicalinterpretation, thistimeofa more"philological" nature.54 51)Ibid., animae involúntate Dei],siinaliqua p. 181:"Atipsa[Gratia potentia ponitur, profecto utponatur arbitrantur omnes. hie est discutiendum an essentiam animae sivepotentiam Neque enim ostensum a plerisque earn nonposse nisimediante uniri animae. Et exstat, perficiat: potentia vero voluntas." references toboth inhisnotes Scotus andThomas onp. 181. potentia Šojatgives 52)Ibid.,p. 182:"Tres, virtutes: fidem, caritatem, denique, ponunt spem, theologi praecipuas omnes fere voluntatis." suntque 53)Ibid.:"Atfides volúntate adactum suum nonprogreditur: cumenim, utaitApostoabsque nonapparentium vero lus,sitsubstantia rerum, [Heb11,1],speranda sperandarum argumentum credere etargumentis nonapparentibus moveri exseseimpossibile est(sunt enim ipsirationi eiusmodi intellectui sedidquodneutrum idestnequeverum neutra; apparet, nequefalsum, mentem neutram ad ullam flectit reddit, enimvero, quoque neque partem: propter spemquae voluntas intellectui uteiparti seseconiungat promittitur, imperat quaea tammagna pollicente dicitur essevera), constat nosnilcredere nisiapplicemur, immo ab igitur posse quasividucamur - volúntate. - cuipraemia Credimus enim ipsa promittuntur pleraque quorum opposita magis mentem movent: conatu fieri nonpotest." Salviati sfamous contemquodsinevoluntatis magno whoareusually as "fideists" areGirolamo Savonarola andGiovanfrancesco poraries regarded PicodellaMirandola. 54)Ibid.:"UndeetSalvator incredulitatem etduritiam cordis , hocest exprobravit Apostolorum - ait- ettardi inEmmaus, voluntatis. Eteuntibus O stulti corde ad credendum. Sedinsacra cordis' nomine voluntas Fidei actus a voluntatis inparte iussu Scriptura intelligitur. igitur magna toMc16,14,andLe24,25,isinthenotes onp. 182. dependet." Šojaťsreferece

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In the discussionof caritasOctavianusis the one who bringsin Scotus' discussionof lumengloriaeand caritas .55What seemsmoreinteresting is the conclusion: YetinChrist thewayfarer both vision andlove[caritas] were notwithout [viatore] injury.56 Whatwe do nothavehereis a discussionofthewillin Christ,and whether it too was injuredwhilebeingin via. Thisis whythisdiscussionin chapter16 endswithOctavianus'questionregarding thewayin whichthewilloperates: can it operateupon objectswhichwereapprehendedby thesenses,or only knownby reason?57 Fromthe pointof upon objectswhichwerepreviously viewof all thepreviousdistinctions, thisis an eristicquestion,sinceit takes into consideration eithera sensualway of operatingupon singulars, or an of in intellectual But fact,as Fridericus way operating upon universais. points out in chapter17, entitled:quod voluntas sinoperari potestcircaquodcumque dicatur a man who knows this , gularequomodocumque cognitum specificpicturecan expresshis love towardsit, fromwhichpleasurefollows;whereasa mancannotlovethingsunknownto him,yethe can lovein somewaythings knownto him.58 Sinceas we haveseen,Salviatipresents a psychology ofpowers,nothingcan preventa man fromwillingwhathe sees. Since all these ad id cognitivepowersare arrangedtowardsthisthing(potentiae cognitivae ordinatae ), theyoperateupon objectswhicharepresentin thewill,and thus theyareall subjectedto thewill.59 In thenextchapter, entitled:rationes quibuscontemplationem effert philoso ad voluntatem hicapertius ostenditur , Salviatidealswithanother phus,omnes referri of Octavianus: does Aristotle seem to why question praiseonlytheintellect, of the will.60This should be and he hardlyevermentionsthe superiority 55)Ibid.,p. 184.References toScotus areinŠojaťsnotes. 56)Ibid.:"InChristo tarnen viatore etvisioetcaritas nonsinecalamitate erant." 57)Ibid.,p. 188:"Sedid unum, utdiscutiamus dubitavi, quodmulto tempore cupio:possit inaliquid visuapprehensum autquopiam ineafertur necne voluntas ferri aliosensu, ansolum ratio modo quae quopiam praenovit?" 58)Ibid.,p. 191:"Curigitur nonpoterit homo, quihancpicturam agnoscit, ergaeamelicere Undequamvis homononpossit amare exquosequitur amorem, voluptas? potest incognita, tarnen diligere quoquomodocognita." 59)Ibid.:"Omnes enim sunt hominis facit homini utnonpossit, idquod Quiditaque potentiae. Omnes adidordinatae utobiecta faciant voluntati velie? sunt, videt, itaque potentiae cognitivae - etitasuaeservitutis submissae." sunt praesentia, iugocunctae 60)Ibid., intellectum adsidera devoluntatis Aristoteles, efferendo, usque semper p.192:"cur ipsum

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on thedramaticlevelofthephilosophical regarded dialogueas a criticalquesof all the discussions and of tioning previous praises thewillwe haveseen;but it also presentsSalviatis own awarenessof thisproblematic factwhichis a issuealso formodernscholars.61 Thismayreflect Salviatis awarecomplicated nessofthenoveltyof thetheoryof thewillhe presents here;butat thesame he cannotjust neglectsuch an authority like time,as a scholasticthinker, Aristotle. As impliedin thetitleofthischapter, thesolutionwillbe presenting whichshowthatwhatAristotle ascribesto contemplation (and to arguments theintellect) shouldin factbe ascribed,as moreclearly(apertius ) shownbyall or interpreters ofAristotle), to thewill.Thisstillmeansthata (philosophers detailedinterpretative effort is requiredin orderto modifysomebasicAristoteliannotionsand bringin thenewnotionofthewill.Sucha criticalquestion and awareness ofnovelty ofhumanistic methods mayalso implytheinfluence andwaysofthoughtin whichdetailedtextualcomparisons and a clearercritical notionofthepastwithregardto thepresentcan be found.We aremoving bothin timeand in philosophicalnotions,and theproawayfromAristotle cessofreconciliation can presentalso a historical and philosophical awareness ofthisgrowing Aristotelian distincgap.Salviaticontinuesto breaktraditional tions:we havejustseenhis critiqueof thedistinction betweensensualoperationsuponsingulars and intellectual herewe have operationsupon universais; a critiqueof the distinction betweentheoretical and practicalknowledge.62

velminimam fecit mentionem? Mirum estenimutdetanta sublimitate praestantia numquam eiusnilumquam dixerit." 61)Theproblem ofthewillinAristotle andinancient ingeneral hasbeenthesubject philosophy ofmany discussions inrecent Seee.g.,thedetailed with further in discussion, references, years. Albrecht inClassical Dihle,TheTheory (LosAngeles, 1982).SeealsothediscusofWill Antiquity sionofRichard inhis'TheConcept oftheWillFrom PlatotoMaximus theConfessor, Sorabji inThomas PinkandM.W.F. Stone(eds.),TheWillandHuman Action From tothe Antiquity Present 2004),6-28. Day(London, 62)Thiscritique ismost inOctavianus' first critical atthevery clearly expressed question beginofthechapter; seeSalviati, Fridericus illainquaPhilosophus sumning p. 192:"Contemplano mumbonum collocasse Christi Salvatoris testimonio est videtur, , in quae quoque optima pars intellectu est.Virtutes veromorales, nonsuntipsa ipsoquidem quaeadvoluntatem spectant, - utplacet - praestantiores." omnibus inhisnotes totherelevant contemplatione Šojatrefers sources here: Aristotle's Ethics andThomas' ontheEthics , aswellas Lc 10,43. commentary Salviati s solution isonp. 195:"'Virtutes morales hisquaeadvitam suntnecesmagis indigent saria acsidicat: eoquominor curavoluntad sibonum sitaequeut datur, quamcontemplativus'; carius sibigratiusque fit. Sicvero sesehabent virtutes morales adipsum aliud, contemplationem. causavoluntatis." Quare praestabit contemplatio

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SinceAristotle as thebestpartin us,itshouldbe regarded theintellect regarded as extremely loveable(summeamabilis).Thisimmediately bringsthewillinto the picturesince,Salviatiargues,the good, the better,and the bestare all objectsof thewill (and theoperationof thewill is love); and so, nothingis loveableforus whichis not underthepowerof thewill,sincewe can love onlythroughthewill.The powerofthewillis thusthereasonfor something which is bestin us,and withoutit therewillbe no good or bestpart anything in us.63Salviatipresents in whichhe identifies thiskindof arguments, terms suchas mens,intellectus, with summum bonum , contemplatioy sapientia, felicitas in of in which he can amor and course voluntas the rest of this , , bring through chapter.64 In chapter19, entitled:quodverabeatitudo in voluntatis consistât operatione etsineilla nullusbeatusessepossit hisclearanswerto thesame , Salviatipresents questiondiscussedalso by Ficino,Lorenzode' Medici,and VincenzoBanwe haveseenin thepreviouschapdello.He usesthesamekindofarguments of hiscritiqueofThomas'view, ter.65 the end the Salviati By chapter presents to which a Thomas (and thusa stable)act prefers non-contingent according likevisionto thecontingent act of thewill in regardto thesupremegood.66 Salviatiusesagainthesamerhetorical argument: . . .should a manbedescribed asblessed whosees, andyetdoesnotlove? Butthis isimpossible: since isblessed from thepoint ofview[sub of the someone ratione] supreme good;but 63)Salviati, "'Mensquippe ait[Aristoteles] estoptima Fridericus eorum 193-194: quaenobis veluti aut certo eorum ad insunť. Bonum obiecta, melius, optimumque, respectus, namque, est hoc est maxime utdiximus, referuntur. mens, amabilis, voluntatem, praeclarisOptima igitur Summe enimpraeclarum simaestmens, idestvoluntati est;quodvero optimum gratíssima. universis intellectus Unde idamore nempe potentiis expetitur. optimum, magis dignissimum: iamquodipsePhilosophus nondistinguit voluntatem abhomine, sicut ceteras remopotentias nilvero nobis hocestsumme nobis amabile tas? estintellectus, amabilis; quod Optimus namque nobis nonetvoluntati volúntate idvoluntatis (nosenim diligimus); quidquid igitur optimum, innobis enim volúntate exsistente nulla resautbonanobis ratione dicitur omnino, (nulla utique autoptima foret)." ^ Ibid.,194-198. 65)Ibid., finis etsummum bonum ultimus felicitas, (utpauloante diximus) p.200:"Beatitudo, bonum voluntatis estsubea ratione: idemsunt; atsummum nequeenimestobiectum ipsum estsummum eiusestet cuiusitaque obiectum utbonum bonum, intellectus, est,quidpiam; finis ultimus." eiusetfelicitas beatitudo, atque 665 sehabet enim: voluntas actum, Ibid.,p.202:"Ait[Thomas] quoadeliciendum contingenter sehabent, nonfieri; obiectum; possunt posita quaeautem contingenter igitur erga quodcumque noneliciet actum circa summum bonum." voluntas necessario visione,

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ifitisnotinus,indeed weshallhaveno tothewill,which thesupreme goodisrelated in of alsothose think that the last most day judgment Many sagacious people happiness. conwillintuitively seeGodbutyetwillnotloveHim.Thus, whoaredamned happiness inlove.67 sists of loveto visionand understanding. The emphasishereis on thesuperiority We havealreadyseenthatloveis an actofthewill.As we shallsee in thenext a dispositionwithoutwhichwe cannot chapterofSalviatis text,it represents Thischapter, and understanding. use contemplation too,endswitha critical questionby Octavianus:if love is so essentialto happiness,how come that This is Aristotlediscussedhappinessby usingotherterms(and not love)?68 of thefactthatwe are dealingherewitha new theoryof anotherreminder whichAristotle knewnothingthroughthe dramaticpersonaof Octavianus. Fridericus is nottheobjectofcriticism. ButAristotle admits,at thebeginning beatitudo dicaturconsistere ofchapter20, entitled:quomodoin contemplatione on Thomas was that activa vita sit , wrong justthis atquecontemplativa quidve It is essentialforSalviatito showthatthewillshouldnotbe identified point.69 withpracticallifeonly.Thus,he is not willingto accepta sharpdistinction betweenpracticaland contemplative life;on theotherhand,hisappreciation of activelifeshouldbe regardedas a resultof boththehumanistmovement in scholastictradition. and thelaterdevelopments ofpowers:contemplaSalviatibeginsbyemphasizing againthepsychology tionis not in itselfa power,but ratherit needsa powerin orderto contemora disposition whichshouldbe present plate.Thispoweris likea precondition in orderto makeintellectual activities beforehand Likewise,Salviati possible.70 movable is an for operationadequate observing objectsand argues,seeing a free can be while God, being object, presentwithout quantitative qualities, 67)Ibid.,202-203: ettarnen nonamat? Atidfieri beatus "dicetur beatus siquividet, nequit: vero voluntatem sub ratione summi boni summum bonum ad enim refertur, est; quae quisque viriutultima illa erit. Tenent acutissimi estinnobis, nulla etbeatitudo sinulla profecto plerique Inamore amabunt. dieiudicii damnandi videbunt, quoqueDeumintuitive nequetamen igitur inhisnotes viri areofcourse andŠojatgives consistit beatitudo." These acutissimi Scotus, mainly therelevant references. 68)Ibid.,p.203:"Quidadipsum Aristotelem eiusmodi dicendum?" aliosque 69)Ibid., fieri obiectum beatitudinis contemplatione praesens." p.204:"Errant quidicunt igitur inthenotes from Thomas. therelevant Šojatgives passages 70)Ibid.,203-204: sitpotentiae "Cumveronil,nisipraesens ipsiquasapimus, contemplari non fit reipraesentia 'id contemplatione quodintelligitur' praesens: praecedit namque possimus, sediamidquodestpraesens, nonfitperquodpiam eiquepraeponitur; postecontemplationem riuspraesens."

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and thuscannotbe seen.71 The properoperationis,ofcourse, anymovement, the of whichalonecan pleasure love, power through willingthrough unifying of ourwilllove {amor)and and delightfollow.72 God poursintotheactivity ), throughwhich the mind becomesfullof marvellous enjoyment( fruitio laetitia {mira ).73Thisaspectin theoperationofthewillis essentialfor delight theinternalbeatitude{beatitudo interior ), whichis basedupon theabilityto some contemplation, enjoyGod as itsobject,whereasthrough justas through first naturalinstinct, theobjectofthisbeatitudeis keptin a constantactivity ofmovement.74 Octavianusin hisreplytriesto identify thewillwithpractical if this is onlyan operation bypresenting argument: contemplation knowledge whichthemovableobjectwouldbe keptin thewill,itmeansthatany through is alreadypractical,and thusanyknowledge(whichwe have contemplation is practicaltoo,sinceit is stretched this out towards through contemplation) theactivity ofthewillwhichis a practice.Butthen,Fridericus shouldexplain how come thatso manythinkers(mainlyAristotleand Thomas)preferred speculativesciences.The existenceof this kind of speculativeknowledge whichshouldnotbe means,accordingto Octavianus,thatthereis knowledge referred to thewill as its own end or purpose.75 Fridericus' replymakesan point: interesting 71)Ibid.,p.204:"Ipsaigitur novanilaliudestquamipsius obiecti motio: estenim praesentia nec inexsistens dum tarnen Deusliberum inesse, movere; obiectum, potestque igitur libuerit intellecnonmovebit etinspicietur minime. Visioigitur erit movebit etvidebitur, ipsa operatio movens Haecverooperatio estsolum tusabipsomotiobiecto. quacognoscitur quidsitipsum atvidere bonitatis, felicitatis, beatitudinis; obiectum, quantae quale,quantaeque quantae neminem." nec beatitudinem facit beatum quemadmodumcognoscere 72)Ibid.:"Dataveroeiusmodi abeodem movetur etipsavoluntas obiecto, ipsaque cognitione, etadhaeret, fitmutua; . .. volendi siveamoris, etoperatur etconiunctio libere idelicit actum erga sed nonposseullopactovoluptatem autullamiocunditatem intellectus, sequiexoperatione habita voluntatis solum operatione." 73)Ibid.,204-205: velquovis siDeusipsevoluntati nostrae amorem sivesuifruitionem "Unde - nisiut eoquodintellectus aliomodonomines voluntatis actum infunderet, absque quidquam Atsiomnem mira laetitia mentem. iamipsohabito quaedam ipsam perfunderet priusvideret, niloperante, oblectatio nulla." volúntate autanimi infundat voluptas sequetur cognitionem, 74)Ibid.,p.205:"Beatitudo in in interior in fruitione Deo ut contemerit, obiecto, ipsa igitur ineo quodetinetur beatitudinis inquodam etveluti veluti naturali ipsum praevio, platione obiectum incontinuo motionis actu." 75)Ibid.:"Sienim iampractica utvoluntati motivům obiectum earn obrem detineat, poneretur notitia cum ad voluntatis actum omnis extenderetur, esset, quiestvere omnisque contemplatio Non hae ab omnibus conceduntur. sunt scientiae dictae, Enimvero, speculativae atque praxis. sibibona." torelevant referetur omnis notitia advoluntatem passatamquam Šojatrefers itaque inthenotes. andThomas gesinAristotle

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notthrough andskill strives after somegoodthrough thewill, asitwere, Every knowledge thegoodofthat, the theintellect; ithasbeeninstituted, andisdisposed, towards andthus or a certain of of which is the itself, [its] disposition object.76 object good to Salviati,knowledge(cognitio ) and skill(ars)arealso "acting"just According as iftheyhad a will.Thushe rejectstherelationbetweentheoperationofthe willthrough loveand practicalknowledge above.Sincethesepractisuggested cal sciencesare morepopularin thecommonuse and havemoreinfluence, forhimselfsuch mankindwouldlovethemmore.Thus,each man can prefer sciencewhichthewillregards as morevaluable.Salviaticlaimsthatthesyllogism:"thisscienceis beingloved,theobjectofthisscienceis beingloved,and so thisscienceis practical"is false,sinceit falselyassumesthatanyoperation ofthewillis practical.77 Accordingto ourFranciscan theologianthewillis not A science which is relatedto practicalknowledge only. solelypracticalpresents withregardto whichthewilldetermines to thewilltherelevant information whatis rightorwrong,a good or an evilwayofactingbyusingthatgoodness is ofthiskind.The operationofthe whichwe callmoral.78 Butnoteverything willwithregardto thiskindofknowledgewhichis presented bytheintellect is called practice.79 The implicationis thatthe operationof the will is far It is relatedto practical whenin moral beyondpractical knowledge. knowledge will in orderto decisionsthepracticaldataarepresented the intellect to the by reachtherightdecision.Butthewillcan alsoactdifferently, forinstance, as we shallshortly lovein contemplative see,through life,whichbringsin theology and thespeculative (as opposedto practical)element.Salviaticoncludesthat thisvolitionwouldbe practicalwhenit commandsus to do something with

76)Ibid.:"Omnis - nonintellectu - bonum arsveluti volúntate omnisque quoddam cognitio ita et ad cuius obiectum est bonum bonum sivecondicio illius, obiecti, appétit, ipsum quaedam instituta estetordinatur." Wehavehereofcourse a clear echooftheopening ofthe sentence Nicomachean Ethics. 77)Ibid.,205-206: fitutillaescientiae sintinusucommuni, obtine"Quare potius vigoremque humanum amet. Etquisque earn sibipraeficit ant,quasmagis genus quamvoluntas gratiorem habet. Nullaitaqueconsequentia est:amatur haecscientia, scientiae est obiectum, huiusque enim falso ut voluntatis sit Notice that usus practica'; ponit quaelibet igitur operatio praxis." communis humanum arecontrasted inOctavianus' andgenus toomnes conceduntur argument. 78)Ibid.,p. 206:"Eanamque solum scientia estpractica, eaipsacirca voluntad quaeostendit etrecte etnonrecte etessebonaautnonbonaea bonitate quaevoluntas poterit agere quam moralem' appellamus." 79)Ibid.:"Atnonomnia sunttalia.Etvoluntatis circa abintellectu eiusmodi, ostensa, operatio dicisolet." praxis

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regardto externalthings.He followsFranciscusBaconiswho, accordingto or a mereintenSalviati,includedin practicalvolitionalso a merepossibility tionto effect external or a to effect them.80 need things, sciences?It is possibleto lovetheknowledge What,then,aboutspeculative of themovementof thestars,to knowthe reasonsof naturalthings,which whichexists.Allthesesciencesare wouldbe knowingtheessenceofsomething notpracticaland do notdeal withwhatis relatedto thepracticeof thewill; or love.81Herewe meetagainthesensitivity butwe stillfindin themactivity of Salviatiregarding thecommonuse of terms:he claimsthatnot everyone in commonspeechordiscourse(communis locutio ) betweencondistinguishes thisdistinction is uniqueonlyto theschool andactivity, butrather, templation to establish of FranciscusBaconis.82 Salviatiis not usinganyotherauthority his critiqueof Baconisand his school,but onlythecommonwayof speech: dicimusenimcommuniter. Thiscommonuse,in thiscase,seemssufficient for shiftin both a philosophical and itmayrepresent an important argumentation who tryto be moresensitive to the styleand focusoflaterscholasticthinkers, also withregardto the commonuse of language(and morecommunicative in dealingwithpracticalas and thuslesstechnical, newhumanistreadership), wellas withspeculative problems.83 betweencontemplation and activity, Salviati Withregardto thisdistinction that those who live an active life act that we do commonlysay (agunt) argues or use ( faciunt ) prudenceor skill.Butwe also do notsaythatthosewho use

80)Ibid.:"Concludamus iamutomnis eavolitio sitpractica adextra quaimperante quidquam etsi nil extra omnis ea secundum Doctorem Sublimem ad efficiat, efficimus, quae, atque isquiliberalitatis sivelposset, velsiefficere officium exercere efficeret tamen (veluti opusesset adexsequendum omnia etsiquiDeumamatetvult, nectamen vellet, promptus quae potest; isusedintheexample, tonotice howamor with Itisimportant suoproamore regard oportet)." inFranciscus Baconis. therelevant toGod.Šojatcouldnotfind passage 81)Ibid.:"Amare verosiderum cursus rerum naturalium notitiam, causas, quidsit cognoscere fittamen actus sive entis haenequepracticae sunt, nequeergaeafitvoluntatis praxis; quiditas: amor." 82)Ibid.:"Nontamen abactione omneš: sed itacommuni locutione contemplationem séparant schola tantum Sublimium." 83)Thispoint, comcommon canberelated tothediscussions however, concerning principles, .. inHoenen, 'LateMedieval Schools inthecontext ofmedieval discussed munia, compendia in Lodi and of terms onconventional Seealsotheremarks 341-345. language ordinary usage RedValla:FalseFriends. Semantics andOntological ofOckham andLorenzo 'William Nauta, inRenaissance seeespecially 56 (2003),613-651; 624-625, 630-634, 636, uction, Quarterly 645-648. 641-642,

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life (otiosamvitamdegani)like the and live contemplative contemplation we say loveand abundantly use caritas : rather, monks,would not supremely in theircontemplative thattheyarenotexercising lifejustice,generosity, and commonskills.84 love,whichis theoperationofthewill,playsan Apparently in role also the life;in otherwords,thewill is not important contemplative amor relatedonlyto moralconcernsin activelife,itis deeplyrelated(through sciences. and caritas)also to contemplative life,to theologyand to speculative fromanykindofactivThisis whyone shouldnotdistinguish contemplation is not relatedto actionswithregardto practicaldecisions ity:contemplation or politics,butit is stillrelatedto activities likelove. SalviatimentionsAugustinesfamousdistinction betweenactionand conto Martha Peter activelife and represent templation:according Augustine, whileMaryand Johnrepresent life.85 But after immediately contemplative thisSalviatiindicatesthataccordingto ScotusMaryand Johnrepresent the a tendency moreimportant Thisinterpretation partofactivelife.86 represents forgreaterappreciationof the activelife,or at leastforan extensionof its It is striking thatŠojat,theeditorofSalviatis text,couldnotfindthis range.87

84)Salviati, Fridericus "Dicimus enimcommuniter, activam vitam eosagere 206-207: quiprusivearte sive dentia faciunt de virtutibus artibus (ut quidquam agunt ipsis illiberalibusque patet); veroeosquiotiosam vitam non dicimus, (utmonachos contemplari degant contemplativos) liberalitatem ament etcaritate sedquiañeque iustitiam abundent, quianonsumme ñeque ñeque artes communes exercent." 85)Ibid., a contemplatione vocat enim distinxit: p.207:"Eomodo quoque ipseactionem Augustinus Marthae vitam circa audiebat ministerium Mariae , actionem', vero, quaesatagebat frequens quae verbum homine etIoannem dulcissimum laborabat, Zebedaeum, , contemplationem'; quiinteriore - Petrum, vitam activam." multa ait, faciebat, contemplativam quiexercitio significare corporali Šojat inthenotes therelevant references andpassages from andAugustine. gives Scripture 86)Ibid.,p. 208:"Atexopinione Subtilis Doctoris MariaetIoannes estnobiliorem dicendus vitae activae tenuisse." partem 87)Wecanfind thesametendency inoneofSavonarola's with thesamebiblical theme sermons delivered onMarch Prediche Italiane AiFiorentini 18,1496;see:Girolamo Savonarola, , 4 vols. Venezia andFirenze, eds.Francesco 1930-1935), (vols.1and2) andRoberto (PerugiaCognasso Palmarocchi e Maria, chesignificano e li (vols.3a and3b),voi.3b,p. 173:"Marta adunque e liperfetti dellavitaattiva e contemplativa . . ."Perfection isrelated notonly toconproficienti lifebutalsotoactive life. ThesickLazarus thebetter oftheFlorentines templative signifies part is and he active andMary, andcontemplative life. (ibid., p. 177) bybothMartha helped being Theconnection between active andcontemplative lifeis described inanother bySavonarola sermon oftheScriptures. Infact, active andcontemplative life (ibid., 109)asanimportant part oneanother andthepreacher canaskhisaudience vol.3a,p.53)toassist one (ibid., complement inboth another ways.

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in Scotus.Thismightbe an originalinterpretation reference ofSalviatiunder theincreasing influenceof thehumanistsin fifteenth-century Italy,but also ofsomeinteresting in thelater undertheinfluence and changes developments scholastic discourse. We know,forinstance,thatalso in thecase philosophical ofAdrianofUtrecht(1459-1523),a leadingand influential in theacafigure demicand intellectual lifein Louvainand in theLow Countries,in thelast twodecadesofthefifteenth and thefirst decadeofthesixteenth cencentury tury,who laterbecamepope, we can finda similartendencyin whichthe activelifeand practicalquestionsbecamethearenaand basisformoraldiscusin theQuodlibetal sionsofcasusconscientiae disputations.88 In hisconclusionto chapter20 Salviatifirst reconciles theopinionsofAriswithregardto contemplation, totle,Thomas,and Augustine, clearlyleaving the "opinionof Scotus"whichhe has just menout of thisreconciliation tioned.89 liferepreThen,he claims,it is rightto saythatthecontemplative sentsourhappiness(felicitas sincethewillis in accordwithitsobject: nostra), thewilldrivestheintellectto be occupiedwiththeoperationof contemplation.90 The activity ofboththewilland theintellect cometogether necessarily towards butthereis an essential difference betweenthem:while contemplation; theactivity ofthewillis whatcausesunion(
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and is independent lifeas such.As we haveseen,thisactivity contemplative distinction betweenactive free,and to some extentit breaksthe traditional lifesinceit is dominantin both,eitherthroughitsability and contemplative ofethics,or throughitsunifyto maketherightdecisionin practicalmatters matters of to the or with supremegood God, in speculative ingpower regard nobilior of view the between "Scotus"' From this difference point theology. can be contemplano parsvitaeactivaeand themoreacceptedopinionregarding seenas onlysemantic. The nextchapter,number21, is in factthelastone in thedialogue,since ofthemainarguthethreeclosingchapters(22, 23, 24),92containa summary to theproposedarguments mentsin theformofresponses byOctapresented werewritten vianusin chapters3-7.93Theseclosingchapters accordingto the from Salviati himself he of Octavianus specificrequest (though promisesthat willhelphim).94 bothhe and Fridericus And so, chapter21 containsOctaviathe duke of Urbino,and as expected,it is fullof nus' praisesof Fridericus, rhetoricalgestures.95 Moreover,it containsnot only obvious comparisons betweenFridericus and AlexandertheGreatorJuliusCaesar,withan emphaunder sison Caesars eloquenceandon AlexandersfamousrelationtoAristotle ofall,a comparison with theimageofthephilosopher-king, butalso,and first of Hermes This is of course another the mythological figure Trismegistus.96 humanisticfeature.The figureof Hermesor Mercurius,a Greek important versionoftheEgyptiangodThoth,becamea sourceofinspiration fortheidea oftheancientwisdomin theFlorentine circleofFicinoduringthe1460s and was 1470s. A manuscript containingsome partsof the CorpusHermeticum 92)Ibid., 210-219. 93)Ibid.,144-157. 94)Ibid., haecquaedicta sunt etmenti etlitteris manda. Iuvabo p.210:"Tuque, Georgi Benigne, etipse, iuvabit etLazarus siquidforsan tibiexcidisset." noster, 95)E.g.,ibid., Montefeltrea haecdomus duces, p.209:"Habuit imperatores atque ipsius quidem omni militaris reietgloria etmaxima laudedecoratos. Sedquitanta referta eloquentia, sapientia simul etarmis, idneque e Graecis ullineque e Romanis fasfuit." valuerit, ipsis umquam assequi 96)Ibid.:"Trismegistum etphilosophum forsan tibiconilium, ferunt, quemetregem magnum Atquaerudibus illisannis feremus? fictilis contenti Quaeve philosophiae praestantia? paucisque fuisse FuitCaesar clarus. Sedquaesibiimmortapotuit? ipseeloquentiae splendore regni gloria liumdivinarum rerum Alexandrům Macedonem hausisse peritia? quoqueilium quidem plurimumexAristotele sed ei omnia cumvitapariter ex constat, philosophiam quamraptissime Withregard inthenotes oculis hominum defluxerunt." toAlexander, therelevant Šojatgives from intheLatintranslation ofGuarino Veronese. Onceagainweseehow Plutarch, passage Salviati combines humanistic andscholastic traditions.

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/Vivarium 46 (2008)82-114 A.Edelheit

translated givento FicinobyCosimoin 1462, and thehumanistphilosopher it by 1463. It wentto printtwice:in 1471, and in an improvedversionin an essential 1472. Hermeswas thenincludedamongFicinos priscitheologu in hisDe ofspiritual renovation elementin Ficinos ownprogramme presented in in as well as other minor his Christiana and , Theologia platonica religione which were soon translated into These Hermetic and letters. writings, writings had enormous influence vernacular during languagesand printedmanytimes, thecourseofthenextcenturies upon manyEuropeanintellectuals.97 The mentionof Hermesby Salviatishouldnot be regardedas rhetorical in which development, onlyin the lightof his laterworksand intellectual in at least influence ofspiritualmysticism, we findtheincreasing originating tradition of the nova threedirectsources:theFranciscan prophetic Apocalypsis to beatoAmadeo (João da Silva y Menezes) and his followers; attributed an echo of Cardinal Ficinos Neoplatonicprojectof Christianrenovation, andprophet Dominicanpreacher Bessarions earlier andtheinfluential influence; can ofthepiagnoni?*Suchlaterdevelopments Savonarolaand themovement be foundalreadyin thisearlyworkofSalviation thewill,inwhich,as we have which role,through seen,amorsunifying qualitywas assignedan important thewilloperates. All thesesourcesof influence, althoughtheyhad theirdeep rootsin the oflateantiquity, or in the Christian and Neoplatonismand mysticism pagan arestillalsoa uniqueproduct andprophetic medievalapocalyptic movements, of humanismand scholasoffifteenth-century Italy,mainly fifteenth-century in the ticism.We can say that'Scotisrnor the Scotisticschoolas reflected worksand intellectual developmentof Salviatiis merelya generaltitlefor someofwhicharequitefarfromScotusor trendsofthought, manydifferent 'Scotisrnin thiscontextmeansa very theScotistsin thefourteenth century. and cultural phenomenon;it is relatedto manydifferent open philosophical movementwhichembraced and sources,a verylivelyintellectual traditions Membersin thisschoolstillkeptsomeuniquefeatures muchoftheZeitgeist. 97)On thisseee.g.,theclassical Bruno andtheHermetic A.Yates, Giordano studies byFrances TheAncient andbyD.P.Walker, thefirst four Tradition 1964),especially (London, chapters; totheEighteenth theFifieenth Platonism Studies inChristian (London, Century from Theology: with further references A goodaccount ofthese matters twochapters. thefirst 1972),especially B. Schmitt, Renaissance inBrian P.Copenhaver andCharles canbefound (Oxford, Philosophy 1992),146-148. 98)These in atlength withfurther references arediscussed inSalviati s works later tendencies e Vasoli's 17-120. , ragione Profezia

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withregardto Scotusor to moretraditional versionof Scotism,suchas the obsessionwiththewill(beyondusingthenameofScotusand beingregarded and by othersas Scotists),but theyincludedmanydifferent by themselves laterdevelopments, as wellas takingintoaccountmanyaspectsand authorsin therichscholastictraditionup to thefifteenth in whatin factwas century, an In and school of a contextitwas such quite original independent thought. to the Franciscan possible regard prophetbeatoAmadeo or the Dominican on piagnoneDomenicoBenivienias Scotists,to writea Scotisticcommentary one ofLorenzode' Medicissonnets,and to marryPlatonismto Scotism." Salviati,who, as we have seen,shouldbe regardedas princepsvoluntatis , in his discussionthetwogreatcontemporary traditions: theschorepresents lasticand thehumanistic.100 choiceto protectFicino Thus,he was theperfect the "wolves" in some critics the Curia of Ficinos approachto (i.e., against in as his De in in discussed Rome 1489.101But in fact,Ficino vita) astrology "wouldhaveneeded"his helpearlier, in his disputewithLorenzode' Medici heldin 1474 regarding thewilland theintellect, againstthecritiqueofVincenzo Bandello.Ficinowas not attckedby a wolfthen,but he was sharply criticized scholasticphilosopher. bya Dominicanfriarwho was a prominent and mainlya developedtheory ofthewillas the Manyanswersto thiscritique, dominantpowerin thehumansoul,as wellas ofitsimportance in ethicsand in theology, are presentedin Salviatisdiscussion.As we haveseen fromthe 99)Onbeato Amadeo asa Scotist seeVasoli, eragione ,especially 88-89, 93;onDomenico Profezia Benivieni sScotism inFicino scircle seeibid., n.54onp.42andcontext; ontherelation between Platonism andScotism see:ibid., for Salviatis Scotist to Loren102-106; especially commentary zo'spoemseen.4 above. 100) hewasobviously a scholastic a product ofthelater scholastic thinker, Though philosophy, Salviati s relations with thehumanist culture hadvery ascanbeseenalsoinhiscrideeproots, ofthepoetsofamor aspuernudus etcaecus , caused tiqueofthemisrepresentations bytheir since donotknow that amor isinfact to the see Frideriwill; Salviati, improbity, they subjected cusp.211:"Pingunt autem amorem nudum etcaecum, obeorum poetae puerum improbitatem voluntatis divinae voluntati . Onthis subdi. well-known Renaissance quinolunt superiorumque theme both inliterature andart, seeEdgar inthe Renaissance Wind, (NewHaven, Pagan Mysteries four. 1958;revised edition, Oxford, 1980),especially chapter 101) Onthisaffair seeFicino s letter inhisOpera mnia.. . vol.1,574-575; thisletter wasedited andtranslated inMarsilio Three Books OnLife andJohn R.Clarck Ficino, , eds.CarolV.Kaske Moredetails onthis with further canbefound in (NewYork, affair, 1989),402-405. references, intheFiring 'Ficino Line:A Renaissance and his in Michael Critics', JillKraye, Neoplatonist andValéry Reeswith Davies(eds.), Ficino: HisTheology, HisPhilosoMartin Marsilio J.B.Allen HisLegacy seeespecially Thisletter isalsomentioned in ^ 377-378. (Leiden, 2002),377-397; phy, e ragione Vasoli, , p.42,n.55. Profezia

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dramaticdynamicofthedialogue,Salviati(mainlythrough Octavianus' critical remarks and questions)is quiteawareofthefactthathe presents a theory ofthewillwhichis quitenewand different fromwhatcan be foundinAristoandThomas.Thisis anothercaseofthewayinwhichscholastitle,Augustine, cismand humanismin fifteenth-century Italyinfluenceand conditionone another. Yetwe mustremember thatmanyofSalviatis writings arestillavailthat most of his have not been able onlyin manuscript and form, writings attention and empathyfortheirown merits. studiedwithsufficient scholarly I hope thatthepresentdiscussionhas shownthatthistaskis indeeda desideratumforthestudentsof bothscholasticism and humanismin thefifteenth century.102

102) useful ofVivarium for some I would Prof. Martin W.F.Stone andtheeditors likethank very remarks andsuggestions.

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in andNecessity It CouldHaveBeenOtherwise. Hester Gelber, Contingency Goodenough Brill: Leidenetc.,2004.400pp.ISBN90-04Dominican at Oxford, 1300-1350. Theology zurGeistesgeschichte desMittelalters, undTexte 13907-9(cl.)(Studien 81). in bookrefers tothenewtrend Thefirst Gelber's partofthetitleofHester Goodenough from Duns whichreceived decisive latemedieval andtheology John impetus philosophy ofthe basedonanassumption ofthenecessity s criticism ofearlier modalsemantics Scotus the an between and what does not and necessity equation change. Applying new present conresulted intoa picture ofa radically modalideastotheology andnatural philosophy from a free choiceofGodthecontent ofwhich couldhave world which derived tingent between in infinitely distinction beenotherwise manyways.Thesystematic logicaland to natural necessities andpossibilities ledtoa newwayofformulating questions pertaining ofnatural andthe ofGod,thefreedom ofthewill,theprinciples thedoctrine philosophy, book'NewDirections theories ofconsequence andargumentation. 3 ofGelber's Chapter inModalTheory' describes thischange andresearch onitincontemporary scholarship. wasveryinfluential, habitsof thenewcontingency traditional approach Although in also thus to the of late medieval remained plurality powerful, adding thought thinking Gelber's workshedslighton theearly as wellas inorders andschooltraditions. general ofthephilosophy ofradical four Oxford Dominiandtheology stage contingency among ofStrelley, cansfrom thefirst Arnold century: partofthefourteenth HughofLawton, in Holcot.Whiletheinfluence ofnewmodalconceptions William Crathorn andRobert Chatton and isoften associated withFranciscan thinkers suchasScotus, Ockham, England inthisdiscusGelber shows thatthese Dominican friars weredeeply involved Wodeham, sionwithoriginal andsometimes influential andtheological contributions. philosophical inthesecondpartofthebook.Thefirst ofa history of Theseareanalysed partconsists inOxford Dominicans from account ofwhatisknown ofthe 1300to1350witha detailed Dominican lifeandworks ofthefourmainfigures aswellas their immediate contemporaries atOxford. intheearly Thehistory ofEnglish Dominicans fourteenth andtheimpressive century on more than Dominicans form a valuable basis and data 70 biographical bibliographical ofthewebsofinfluence within communiforfurther studies theDominican anduniversity ties.Eventhough thetwoparts ofthebookmaybeofvarying interest todifferent readers, thatthey Thefirst herjustification for theauthor alsobelong together. partcontains argues texts to the main the choice of the main research subfour and particular ascribing figures ofactualandpossible relations, lhe broadscopeof personal jectsaswellas a description in thefirst withmethodological aims.Inevaluating various methods partisalsoassociated thehistory ofthought, Gelber forseeing intellectual asthehistory ofconverhistory argues inanacademic sational 'Thosewhospendtimetalking communities. andwriting waydo Brill ©Koninklijke 2008 DOI:10.1 163/156853407X246108 NV, Leiden,

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/Vivarium 46 (2008)115-119 Review Essay

Hie Dominicans at Oxford constituted an so as partofa conversational community.' of the thinkers the historical context four conversational identifiable community, being ofthe historical construction in thesecondpartofthebook.Thepioneering studied ofthemonasteriscomplicated conversational Dominican bythedestruction community documents oflibraries andhistorical destruction iesandfriaries withtheaccompanying by havesurthe Oxford Dominicans Hie of works VIII. by manuscript copies KingHenry ofthese thanin GreatBritain. Gelbers libraries rather vivedinvarious study European ofpermanent value. achievement isa considerable documents scholarly inmodalparadigms theolonthechange andtheScotist ofrecent studies After a survey ofthenewmodal inchapter dealswiththeimpact 3, Gelber contingency ogyofradical variant ofthelogicofdiscourse, ontherulesofobligations semantics logic,themedieval toGelber, ofthisconceptual toolintheology andtheapplication 4). According (chapter shared theScotist andsecular withtheirScotist Dominicans theOxford counterparts acts ofGods freely willed because theworld ascompletely inheritance ofseeing contingent s interest tookastheir Scotus SomeDominicans ofcreation andsustenance. special legacy a there 'Outofthatinterest, inobligations emerged applications. logicanditstheological inthecourse ofexploring theparadoxes andpuzzles newobligational developed theology, doctrine' raised whenjoinedwithtraditional thenotion ofcontingency (153). religious from ScoofanObligational 4 isinfacttitled Theology'. Beginning 'Emergence Chapter conand the of the divine between tus'sobligational foreknowledge analysis compatibility ofthisexample discussion themoreelaborated theauthor ofthefuture, analyses tingency ofDominican in Strelley andHolcotas paradigmatic Whyspeak obligational theology. from other theisdistinguished ask.'Ifa theology aboutobligational , onemight theology theoland of methods its vocabulary imagery, obligational analysis, by assumptions, ologies (190). ogyissodistinguishable' ofthecreated world anditsbasisinGod'swillwas inthecontingency Whiletheinterest ofobliasrepresentatives andHolcotaretreated toallfour common Dominicans, Strelley hasearlier forthe thatGelber tomention (Itmaybe inorder argued theology. gational attriband of the is the author that , previously variously Centiloquium hypothesis Strelley from Erfurt. Some Sentences andananonymous andHolcot, utedtoOckham commentary inthefirst takes itfor Gelber texts arediscussed ofanonymous further identifications part.) orivariants owetheir anditsobligational oriented thatthecontingency theology granted so I it was the influence If as believe this is to Duns Scotus. is, true, why strong among gin Ifthe thisquestion. dataforanswering there isnohistorical Dominicans? Oxford Perhaps asGelber isregarded ashistorically ofobligational does,a important, theology emergence inDominitheobligational between moresystematic somewhat terminology comparison the Gelber discussed have been canauthors andothertheologians illuminating. might case the as and future of divine contingency paradigmatic of foreknowledge analysis inwhich Franciscan contexts Dominican analyobligational Typical theology. obligational where thecounterfactual theTrinity thequestions alsoincluded siswasapplied concerning inGelber s donotfigure discussions Sincethese weretheologically impossible. assumptions Dominican is a between there such difference oftheDominican account why approach, andFranciscan theology? obligations foreofdivine is thecompatibility ofchapter Thesubject 5 ('Troubling Necessities') conbelieved that future like future and Scotus, Ockham, knowledge genuine contingency. and free causes wills are non-determined that created are or true false, propositions tingent

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thatGodknows future without their tohim. contingent things beingatemporally present WhileScotus to God s eternal andchoice from thetempopreferred distinguish knowledge ralordersharply, Ockhamthought thattheymaybe treated as temporally past.Even ispast,itscontent Gods foreknowledge isfuture, andthepasttruth offuture conthough doesnotfallunder thenecessity ofthepast.Future tingent propositions contingent propositions which areunchangingly truecanbefalseandcannever havebeentrueandGods other than it is. After a of these Gelber that foreknowledge description positions, argues andHolcotaccepted themainpartofOckhams solution. Shealsoanalyses the Strelley useofthedistinction between determinate andindeterminate early fourteenth-century truth andfalsity. Ockham characterized alltruepropositions asdeterminately truebecause oftheir immutable butthere wereother aswell. truth-value, temporally suggestions Thebackground ofthisdistinction canbedescribed s summary of byThomas Aquinas earlier inhiscommentary onAristotle's De interpretations. Assertorie approaches propositions arerelated inthesamewayastheir totruth orfalsity correlates arerelated tobeing or Whenfuture areindeterminate withrespect tobeing andnon-being, the non-being. things aboutthemmustalsobe indeterminate withrespect totruth contradictory propositions A future andfalsity. anditsdenialform a disjunction whichis contingent proposition trueandwhose members aredisjunctively trueorfalse. Theindeterminate truth necessarily orfalsity ofa member ofthedisjunction doesnotimply thatitistrueorthatitisfalse. It is merely true-or-false. oftheprospective Because indeterminateness ofa sea-battle, the to it mustbe trueor falseunderdisjunction, to propositions pertaining beingrelated nottothisorthatdeterminately either, 1.15,202-3). {InPeriherm. Whilemanyauthors before andafter viewin De Aquinastookthisto beAristotle's thatitwasnottruein theology. Themostnotable 9, theyusually interpretatione taught wasPeter whoaccepted thecriticism ofthenon-temporal ofall Auriol, exception presence times toGod'seternal visionandargued thatonecouldconclude from God'satemporal thatfuture weretrueorfalse. Gelber dealswithearly knowledge contingent propositions Franciscan reactions to Auriol's andthedistinction between determinate and position indeterminate truth. Eventhough andHolcotshared Ockhams ofthe Strelley analysis ofGod'spastknowledge offuture thedivision of contingency they qualified contingents, intotrueorfalse. toStrelley, anassertorie isdetermipropositions According proposition true(aboutnon-necessary future true, false, nately determinately indeterminately possibilities whichwillbe actual)or indeterminately false(aboutfuture which possibilities willnotbeactual). Gelber callsthisa four-valued classification. There isno propositional suchthing as'justtruth'. Itseems thatthisterminology which from differs thethirteenthideaofmerely truth orfalsity isa result ofproviding thetruth-values of century disjunctive with oftheir truth-makers. Thisinnovative forms propositions particular properties chapter a historically andphilosophically centre forGelber s book.Thetalkaboutthe interesting fullfour-fold matrix ofthetruth tables ofpropositions issomewhat (239-41); misleading theterm 'truth-table' isnotusedinthesamesenseasinmodern logic. 4 ('TheLimits ofLying') dealswiththeideaofcovenantal Chapter theology among Oxford Dominicans as thebackground to thequestion ofwhether Godcantellpeople andintend them tobelieve iteventhough itisfalse. InAuriol's something analysis, taking theprophecies aboutfuture astrueinanordinary senseisa mistake, for contingent things toexpress else(206-7;thedescription ofAuriol's on theyaremeant something position thathishearers believe truenorfalse', should page210,'Godcanintend pi andp isneither

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bequalified Auriols wasnotaccepted inOxford, where apparently accordingly.) position theScotist viewthatanyprophecy couldbefalse created with problems certainty regarding to revealed future andHolcotargued thatGod Strelley respect propositions. contingent totheBible, couldtellfalsehoods andactually haddonesoaccording without lied having inthestrict inwhatwastruewouldthusbenotnecessarily senseoftheword.Belief commerit totheviator forbelieving withsalvation. 'Rather accrued whatGodhadtold patible himtobelieve eventhough allthewhiletheviator wouldknowthatwhatGodhadsaid thatthebeliever couldbeotherwise. Faithmeant mustnevertheless adhere toGods word astrueand"asif"itcouldnotbeotherwise' Holcot s concept (221).lhe lastruleexpresses a matter ofcommitment offaith without andintention. Gelber refers certitude, epistemic tothesimilarities ofHolcot s formulations tothepositio rules which dependens obligations norms ofa disputation of dealwiththeinternal (195-8).Whiletheexplicit applications inthischapter, arenotmany there arelotsofcounterfactual examreasoning obligational withobligations assumes 7 which maybeassociated pleshereandinchapter logic.Gelber was meant to the thatunderlining theepistemic uncertainty perhaps strengthenroleof in the learned order (222). theologians continues thematter ofcertitude. After a discussion 7 ('Invincible Ignorance') Chapter Gelber ofScotus's dealswiththeDominican discussion of scepticism, argument against inthenatural ofdivine intervention which inductive andthepossibility order, knowledge inHolcot's viewprevents absolute aboutanycausaleffects. Holcotdiscusses varicertainty in identifying ofan invincible ousexamples objects, ignorance amongthemtheVirgin incasethedivine haslefthim.Shewoulderrinso theliving Jesus Maryadoring person caseserring peoplearesaidtoactmeritoridoingandyetinnowaysin.Insomeanalogous commands to asbestonecould For divine Holcot, ously(294-304). required befollowed intrying eventhough onecouldnotbeabsolutely surewhether oneerred todoso. remarks on themodern on early fourteenthcritical 7 involves scholarship Chapter whichhasnotsufficiently attended to theDominican discussion of century scepticism 8 ('God'sAbsolute andOrdained invincible factual andcounterfactual Chapter ignorance. thistimeofthestudies on latermedieval alsobegins witha critical evaluation, Power') ofthedistinction between absolute andordained Gelber offers a painstaking views power. theScyllaof ofhowtheOxford Dominicans triedto chartthecourse between analysis of chaoticindeterminacy determinism (absolute (ordained power)andtheCharybdis Allfour Godtosuspend hiscurrent ordination. eachindifferent waysallowing power), Lawton is in Dominicans aredealt withinthischapter. discussed 5 previously Hugh chapter 6 often somewhat different from thoseoftheothers, ischapters and7, Crathorn's views, and7,andStrelley andHolcotinallchapters. ofpalaeographical historical scholars pioneering work isa combination Gelber studies, It is characterized historical and and analysis. by philoship philosophical argumentation inmedieval lhe references toearlier intellectual andgreat history, accuracy expertise logical areoften discussions ofvarious research arecomprehensive, andthecritical interpretations inusing couldhavebeena little morecareful Insomeplacestheauthor useful. contempo'multi-valued suchas 'truthtable','possible worlds', sysrary philosophical terminology, lhe fascinating anachronism, butthisisa minor andnota signofdisturbing tem', thing intotheconversational ofearly fourteenthanimpressive bookoffers community insight both and It alsoposes Dominicans at Oxford, century palaeographicallyphilosophically. above. of which are mentioned One further various newresearch some example questions,

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isfrom thequotation onthelasttext Holcotsaysthat Aristotle dealtwith page(360),where theinfinite andthevacuum andso understood thusunderstanding evenwhatis them, tobe.WhatdoesHolcotmeanbyimpossibility andunderstanding inthisconimpossible text? inevaluating authors wereinterested Aristotelian Manyfourteenth-century impossiinthelight bilities oftheir newmodalsemantics. In dealing withignorance, Gelber pays attention totheviewofStrelley, Lawton andCrathorn thatsincethere isnonatural possitoknowthatthesubstance ofthebread onthealtarisnotpresent after thetransubbility no onecanbe surethatGodhasnotchanged theunderlying substances of stantiation, other aswell(288).Iftheabsence ofthemetaphysical substance ofthebreaddoes things notcauseanyempirical inthebread, thatthere areanysubstances? whyassume changes Thesequestions werealsodiscussed other thinkers. by contemporary University ofHelsinki

SimoKnuuttila

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46 (2008)120-121 Vivarium

Review

T. Sulavik. Postilla Ionam. Ed.Andrew Guillelmi deLuxiPostilla Baruch, Corpus super super 2006. continuatio mediaeualis 219.Turnhout: Christianorum, Brepols, inthirteenth-century ofthe wastherise Oneofthemost developments postil important exegesis on the entire Bible that combined textual with moral and were commentaries lae.These analysis established theliteral sense astheir basichermeneutical doctrinal They principle, application. oftheBiblical beregarded theideathat much text should butthis literal sense often incorporated These Postillae reflected thescholastic ofthemedieval with asmetaphor. universities, practice their incortheir Aristotelian ontext division asa method ofinterpretation, andwith emphasis intotheverse-by-verse commentaries. Thegreatest center of ofthematic poration quaestiones in massive the Dominican convent of Saint where was Paris, activity probably Jacques exegetical ontheentire Biblewere under thedirection ofHughofSaintCher. commentaries composed Nicholas ofLyra, and scholastic ofJohn While someofthese Olivi, (suchasPeter postillato« ofconferences andanthologies, much scholarship HughofSaintCher)havebeenthesubject works still await andmany ofthepostillators' remains tobedoneonthirteenth-century exegesis, the of William of Luxi on Thismakes thepresent critical editions. edition, containingpostillae allthemore welcome. Baruch andJonah, ofLuxi(alsoLissey,orLyssi; as Sulavik Little is known aboutthelifeofWilliam shows, inBurgundy), andmostofwhatis known abouthimis from William wasprobably Lucey, inhisintroduction. Theearly modern BaleandLuke asSulavik shows John biographers wrong, him a of but the work ofmore to be Franciscan incorrectly English origin, Wadding thought himas more scholars suchasBartheélemy Hauréau andJean Bataillon recent identify correctly master inParis sometime between Dominican a French andregent 1267and1275.Heisknown and ofvarious aswellaspostillae onJeremiah, tobetheauthor Lamentations, Baruch, sermons, to offers the editio of Luxi s commentaries Baruch This volume theMinor Prophets. princeps tothe insixmanuscripts), andJeromes (onemanuscript (transmitted Jonah only), prologues andtheTwelve books ofJeremiah, Lamentations (onemanuscript). (five Prophets manuscripts), from s Inaddition, theBiblical text ofBaruch andJonah, reconstructed Luxi Sulavik presents three Bible collated with thirteenth-century manuscripts. commentary, Even commentaries onthebookoftheTwelve There arenotmany extant medieval Prophets. onthebookofBaruch. choice tocomment Untilthethirteenth more wasWilliams unusual for scoma matter ofdispute. Themain source Luxi ofthis bookwasstill thecanonicity century, in to of Saint Cher's is the late on addition , Baruch, twelfth-century gloss postilla mentary Hugh s work isclosely related tothe William ofLuxi DeanofSalisbury. onBaruch bytheanonymous ofhismaterial sections andheincorporated ofWilliam ofMiddleton (orMeliton), large postillae Williams inparallel columns. Sulavik s edition thework ofboth intohiswork. Sulavik compares while the oftheVulgate text isofgreat interest forthehistory ofLuxis Biblical ofWilliam text, Brill 2008 ©Koninklijke NV, Leiden,

DOI:10.1 17 163/156853407X2461

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ontheBiblical areparticularly ofmedieval commentaries forthestudy prologues interesting hermeneutics. isa solidandamply Sulavik's edition documented criticus , for (lheapparatus pieceofwork, listsallindividual ofallmanuscripts, This instance, readings excluding spelling divergences.) itthemore makes thattheeditions ratio edendi atlength onminor , while surprising dwelling ofspelling issues andpunctuation, doesnotoffer thereader into the on anyinsight principles which these arebased. Theeditor states that isbased onthesameprinciples editions theedition astheLeonine butthathardly answers suchas: edition ofThomas works, questions Aquinas' Whatmanuscript wastaken asthereference text forthecollation? Whatprinciples the guided choice between thevariant of the different The editor claims that the edimanuscripts? readings tiononly the"restored butwhat text isexacdy "restored" here? Sulavik text", presents says being thatthetextbeenhascorrected for"grammatical nonsensical omisincongruities, readings, ifthecaseisnotasclear-cut? andsoon,butwhat isinp. 19,1.76, forinstance, sions," Why, "Hieostendit orandi ubiprimo reducit ad memoriam" modum, (thereadbeneficium antiquum than beneficia" (inMSSA,T,andN)?Orwhy inginMSSP,Z andM)a better reading "antiqua is"radice caritatis" than"caritatis radice" andN) in (inMSSP andZ) better (inMSSA,T,M, P andZ areusedastheeditions basetext? edendi. Wearenottoldintheratio p.20,1.130,unless Sulavik that no a stands out as were explains single manuscript clearly they copied superior copy; closeintime, withfewsteps between thetextual witness andthearchetype, which makes it toestablish a stemma. difficult Theindividual areneither numerous, readings, though spectacularnoroften Eventhough Sulavik thesixmanuscripts intothree divides very significant. loosely different on which he admits that the these families are seem based hardly groups, readings thereadings ofcertain inMSSofother andoften "families" areattested as families significant, well. Thismakes theedition butitwould benicetohavemore into selective, necessarily insight what theprocess ofselection. guided theedition a readable andwellpunctuated withanample Overall, however, text, presents thatallows toreconstruct thereader thereadings oftheindividual MSS,andtrace apparatus choices. Allinall,this offers a wealth ofmaterial inthehiseditorial volume forthose interested ofthirteenth-century tory exegesis. Calvin College Grand , Michigan Rapids

Frans vanLiere

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