Pascual v. Pascual-Bautista
People v. Amigo
Case No. 198
Case No. 201
G.R. No. 84240 (March 25, 1992)
G.R. No. 116719 (January 18, 1996)
Chapter IV, Page 127, Footnote No.16
Chapter IV, Page 127, Footnote No.16
FACTS:
FACTS:
Petitioners are the acknowledged natural children of the late EligioPascual,
The Regional Trial Court rendered a decision finding the Accused guilty
the latter being the full blood brother of the decedent Don Andres Pascual, who died
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of murder, and sentenced to the penalty of
intestate without any issue, legitimate, acknowledged natural, adopted or spurious
reclusionperpetua. Accused-Appellant argues that error was committed by the trial court in
children. ISSUE:
imposing or meting out the penalty of reclusion perpetua against him despite the
W/N Art. 992 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, which states that ³An illegitimate child has no right to inherit abintestato from the legitimate children and relatives of his father or mother; nor shall such children or relatives inherit in the same manner from the illegitimate child´, interpreted to exclude recognized natural children deceased.
from
the
inheritance
fact that Sec. 19 (1), Art. 3 of the 1987 Constitution was already in effect when the offense was committed. Accused-Appellant contends that under the 1987 Constitution and prior to
can
be
the promulgation of RA 7659, the death penalty had been abolished and hence, the
of
the
penalty that should have been imposed for the crime of murder committed by
HELD: In Diaz v. IAC, this Court ruled that ³Art. 992 of the Civil Code provides a barrier or iron curtain in that it prohibits absolutely a succession ab intestate between the illegitimate child and the legitimate children and relatives of th e father or mother of said legitimate child. They may have a natural natural tie of blood, but this is not
Accused-Appellant should be reclusion temporal in its medium period to 20 years of reclusion temporal. ISSUE: W/N Sec. 19 (1), Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution means to require a corresponding modification in the other periods as a result of the prohibition against the death penalty.
recognized by law for the purposes of Art. 992.´ HELD: EligioPascual is a legitimate child but petitioners are his illegitimate children. Petitioners herein cannot represent their father in the succession of the latter to the intestate estate of the decedent Andres Pascual, full blood brother of their father.
In People vs. Muñoz, the Court held that ³A reading of Section 19 (1) of Article III will readily show that there is really nothing therein which expressly declares the abolition of the death penalty.
Globe-Mackay v. NLRC and Salazar
merely insinuated that since Respondent Salazar had a special relationship with
Case No. 112 G.R. No. 82511 (March 3, 1992)
Saldivar, she might have had direct knowledge of Saldivar¶s questionable activities.
Chapter IV, Page 124, Footnote No.3
Basbacio v. Office of the Secretary, Dept. of Justice
FACTS:
Case No.
Petitioner placed Respondent preventive suspension because it
Salazar
under
G.R. No. 109445 (November 7, 1994) FACTS:
appeared that she had full knowledge of the loss and whereabouts of an air conditioner that DelfinSaldivar had stolen from the company but failed to inform her employer. Respondent Salazar filed a complaint for illegal suspension and for other damages. On appeal, the Respondent Court affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter with respect to the reinstatement of Private Respondent but limited back wages to 2 years and deleted award for moral damages. ISSUE: 1. W/N the Labor Tribunal committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the reinstatement of Respondent Salazar. 2. W/N there existed independent legal grounds to hold Respondent Salazar answerable as well and, thereby, justify her dismissal. HELD: The Labor Code clearly provides that an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement and to his full back wages. An exception to this is when the reinstatement inadmissible due to strained relations
may
be
between the employer and the employee. The position of Private Respondent as systems analyst is not one that may characterized as such. Moreover, Petitioner
be
RA 7309, among other things, compensation of persons unjustly
provides
for
accused, convicted, and imprisoned. Petitioner and his son-in-law Balderrama were charged with murder and frustrated murder for killing Boyon and wounding his wife and son, due to a land dispute and thus imprisoned. However, on appeal to the CA, Petitioner was acquitted on the ground that conspiracy between him and his son-inlaw was not proven. What was proven was that he was at the scene of the crime with Petitioner when the shooting happened and left the place with his son-in-law. Petitioner claims he was unjustly accused and is entitled to compensation. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner is entitled to compensation pursuant to RA 7309. HELD: No, he is not. For one to be ³unjustly accused´ one must be wrongly accused from the very beginning, unjustly convicted (when a judge knowingly and deliberately rendered an unjust judgment, whimsical and capricious devoid of any basis for judgment) and imprisoned. In the case at bar, Petitioner was acquitted because the prosecution was unable to prove beyond reasonable doubt that Petitioner was guilty. Thus, he does not fall under RA 7309.
JMM Promotions v. NLRC
Radiola-Toshiba Appellate
Phils.
Inc.
v.
Intermediate
Case No. 136 Case No. 249 G.R. No. 109835 (November 22, 1993) G.R. No. 75222 (July 18, 1991) Chapter VI, Page 251, Footnote No. 21 Chapter VI, Page 252, Footnote No. 20 FACTS: FACTS: JMM Promotions paid license fee amounting to P30, 000 and posted a cash bond of P100, 000 and a surety bond of P50,000, as required by the POEA Rules. When JMM Promotions appealed to regarding a decision rendered by POEA,
The levy on attachment against the subject properties of spouses Carlos and TeresitaGatmaytan was issued on March 4, 1980 by the Court of First Instance of
NLRC
the NLRC dismissed the petition for failure to post the required appeal bond as
Pasig. However, the insolvency proceeding in the Court of First Instance of Angeles City was commenced more than four months after the issuance of the said
required by Art. 223 of the Labor Code. ISSUE:
attachment. Under the circumstances, Petitioner Radiola-Toshiba Phils.contended
Is JMM Promotions still required to post the required appeal bond, as required
that its lien on the subject properties overrode the insolvency proceeding and was
by Art. 223 of the Labor Code, considering it has already posted a cash bond and
not dissolved thereby. ISSUE:
surety bond, as requir ed by the POEA? HELD:
W/N the levy on attachment insolvency proceedings against
Yes. The POEA Rules regarding monetary appeals are clear. A reading of the
Respondent spouses even though it commenced four months after said attachment.
POEA Rules shows that, in addition to the cash and surety bonds and the escrow
HELD:
money, an appeal bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary award is required to perfect an appeal from a decision of the POEA
dissolved
the
No. Sec. 32 of the Insolvency Law is clear that there is a cut off period ± one month in attachment cases and thirty days in judgments entered in actions commenced prior to the insolvency proceedings. Also, there is no conflict between Sec. 32 and Sec. 79. Where a statute is susceptible to more than one interpretation, the court should adopt such reasonable and beneficial construction as will render the provision thereof operative and effective and harmonious with each other
De Guia v. COMELEC
Salenillas v. Court of Appeals
Case No. 30
G.R. No. 78687 (January 31, 1989)
G.R. No. 104712 (May 6, 1992)
Chapter IV, Page 135, Footnote No.47
FACTS:
FACTS:
Petitioner contends that under Par (d) of Sec. 3 of RA 7166, members of the
On December 4, 1973, the property of Petitioners was mortgaged to
SangguniangPanlulungsod and Bayan shall be elected at large.
Philippine National Bank as security for a loan of P2,500. For failure to pay their loan,
Sangguniang
ISSUE:
the property was foreclosed by PNB and was bought at a public auction by Private
W/N par (d) Sec. 3 of RA 7166 should be interpreted to mean that elective officials of the SangguniangPanlulungsod Sangguniang Bayan shall be elected
Respondent. Petitioner maintains that they have a right to repurchase the property
and under Sec.119 of the Public Land Act. Respondent states that the sale of the property
at large. HELD:
disqualified Petitioners from being legal heirs vis-àvis the said property. Respondent
No. Par (d) Sec.3 of the RA refers only to elective officials of the Sangguniang
also maintains that the period for repurchase has already prescribed based on
Panlulungsod of single district cities and elective officials of the Sangguniang Bayan
Monge et al. vs. Angeles. ISSUE:
for municipalities outside Metro Manila. The law specifically stated that provinces with only one legislative district should be divided into two and therefore should
1. W/N petitioners have the right to repurchase the property under the said Act. 2. W/N the prescribed.
prescription
period
had
already
necessarily be elected by districts. Par (d) should be interpreted in line with the rest of
Held:
the statute and to follow the interpretation of the petitioner there would have been
The provision makes no distinction between the legal heirs. The distinction
no reason for the RA to single out the single district provinces. The court realized that
made by Respondent contravenes the very purpose of the Act. Petitioners¶
the language of the law in this case seems abstruse and the key to determine what
contention would be more in keeping with the spirit of the law.
legislature intended is the purpose or reason which induced it to enact the statute.
With regard to prescription, the Monge case involved a pacto de retro sale
The explanatory note in the proposed bill provided that the reason for the division
and not a foreclosure sale and so the rules under the transaction would be different.
into two legislative districts is to reduce the number of candidates to be voted for in
For foreclosure sales, the prescription period starts on the day after the expiration of
the 1992 elections.
the period of redemption when the deed of absolute sale was executed.
Chua v. Civil Service Commission
government employees who are similarly situated as those covered by the said law.
Case No. 60 The court applied the doctrine of necessary implication in deciding this case.
G.R. No. 88979 (February 7, 1992) Chapter IV, Page 164, Footnote No.146 FACTS: RA 6683 provided benefits for early retirement and voluntary separation as
City of Manila Philippines
well as for involuntary separation due reorganization. Section 2 covers those who
Case No. 23
to
v.
Judge Gomez and Esso
G. R. No. L-37251 (August 31, 1981) are qualified: FACTS: Sec. 2. Coverage. ± This Act shall cover all appointive officials and employees of the National Government. authorized under this Act shall apply to all regular, temporary, emergency employees, regardless
The
The Revised Charter of Manila took effect on June 18, 1949. It fixes the annual
benefits realty tax at one and one-half percent. The Special Education Fund Law (RA 5447),
casual
and
of age, who have rendered at least a total of two (2) consecutive years of
which took effect on Jan. 1, 1969, imposed an annual additional one percent tax and fixes the total realty tax at three percent. With the three percent maximum limit
government service as of the date of separation«´ Petitioner Lydia Chua, believing that she is qualified to avail of the benefits of the program, filed an application on January 30, 1989 with Respondent Administration, which, however, denied the same. Recourse by the petitioner to Respondent Commission yielded the same result. ISSUE: W/N Petitioner¶s status as a co-terminus employee is excluded from the
set by RA 5447, the municipal board of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 7125, effective beginning the third quarter of 1972, imposing an additional one-half percent realty tax. Respondent Corporation paid the tax, but protested the Ordinance; the Court of First Instance of Manila ruled that the tax ordinance is void as it is not authorized by the city charter or by any law, and that the city of Manila should reimburse Respondent Corporation said tax.
benefits of RA 6683 (Early Retirement Law).
ISSUE:
HELD:
W/N the tax ordinance is valid.
The petition is granted. The Early Retirement Law would violate the equal
HELD:
protection clause of the constitution if the Supreme Court were to sustain Respondent¶s submission that the benefits of said law are to be denied a class of
The Court holds that the doctrine of implications in Statutory Construction sustains the City of Manila¶s contention that the additional one-half percent realty tax is sanctioned by the provision of the Special Education Fund Law that ³the total real
property tax shall not exceed a maximum of three per centum´. While the 1949
J.M. Tuason& Co. v. Mariano &Aquial& Cordova Case No. 64
Revised Charter of Manila fixed the realty tax at one and one-half percent, the 1969 Special Education Fund Law fixed three percent as the maximum real property tax. The obvious implication is that an additional onehalf percent tax could be imposed by municipal corporations. Inferentially, that law fixed at two percent the realty tax that would accrue to the city or municipality. The fact that the 1974 Real Property Tax Code specially fixes the real property tax at two percent confirms the prior intention of the lawmaker to impose two percent as the realty tax proper. That was also the avowed intent of the questioned ordinance.
G.R. No. L-33140 (October 23, 19 78) FACTS: Plaintiffs Aquial (herein Respondents) claimed ownership of a parcel of land located in QC having an area of 383 hectares. They alleged that it had been fraudulently or erroneously included in OCT No. 735 of the Registry of Deeds of Rizal and that it was registered in the names of Defendants Tuason (herein Petitioners) pursuant to a decree issued on July 6, 1914 in Case No. 7681 of the Court of Land Registration. Plaintiffs Aquial prayed that OCT No. 735 and the titles derived therefrom be declared void due to certain irregularities in the land registration proceeding. The Tuason¶s prayed that the petition be dismissed on the ground that the court has no jurisdiction over the case, improper prescription, laches and prior judgment.
venue,
Respondents Cordova spouses were allowed to intervene in the case since they were able to purchase 11 hectares from the Aquials. ISSUE: W/N OCT No. 735 is valid. HELD: OCT No. 735 is valid. The validity of OCT No. 735 was already decided upon by the Supreme Court in the cases of Benin vs. Tuason, Alcantara vs. Tuason and Pili vs. Tuason. The ruling in these cases was also applied in other cases involving the validity of OCT No. 735.
Philippine British Appelate Court
Assurance
v.
Intermediate
Case No. 234
attachment shall be charged with the payment of any judgment that is returned unsatisfied. It covers not only a final and executory judgment but also the execution
G.R. No. L-72005 (May 29, 1987) of a judgment of pending appeal. Chapter 5, Page 200, Footnote No.99 FACTS: Sycwin Coating& Wires Inc, filed a complaint for a collection of money against Varian Industrial Corporation. During the pendency, Respondent attached
Pilar v. Commission on Elections Case No. 242
some of the properties of Varian Industrial Corp upon the posting of a supersedes bond. The latter in turn posted a counter bond through Petitioner so the attached properties were released. Sycwin filed a petition for execution pending appeal against the properties of Varian, which was granted. However, the writ of execution was returned unsatisfied as Varian failed to deliver the previously attached personal properties upon demand. Sycwin prayed that Petitioner Corporation be ordered to pay the value of its bond which was granted.
G. R. No. 115245 (July 11, 1995) Chapter 5, Page 201, Footnote No.100 FACTS: On March 22, 1992, Petitioner filed his certificate of candidacy for the position of member of the SangguniangPanlalawigan of the Province of Isabela. Three days later, he withdrew his certificate of candidacy. As a result, Respondent Commission imposed a fine of P10,000 pesos for failure to file his statement of contributions and expenditures. Petitioner contends that it is clear from the law that the candidat e must
ISSUE:
have entered the political contest, and should have either won or lost.
W/N the counter bond issued was valid. HELD:
ISSUE: The counter bond was issued in accordance with Sec. 5, Rule 57 of the Rules of Court. Neither the rules nor provisions of the counter bond limited its application to a final and executory judgment. It appllies to the payment of any judgment that may be recovered by Plaintiff. The only conclusion is that an execution of any
logical
judgment including one pending appeal if returned unsatisfied may be charged against such counter bond. The rule therefore, is that the counter bond to life
W/N Petitioner can be held liable for failure to file a statement of contributions and expenditures since he was a ³non-candidate´, having withdrawn his certificate of candidacy three days after its filing. HELD: Yes. Sec. 14 of RA 7166 states that ³every candidate´ has the obligation to file his statement of contributions and expenditures. As the law makes no distinction or qualification as to whether the candidate pursued his candidacy or withdrew the
same, the term ³every candidate´ must be deemed to refer not only to a candidate
De Villa v. CA Case No. 88
who pursued his campaign, but also to one who withdrew his candidacy. Sec. 13 of Resolution No. 2348 categorically refers to ³all candidates who filed their certificate of candidacy´
G.R. No. 87416 (April 8, 1991) Chapter III, Page 96, Footnote No.110 FACTS: Petitioner was charged with a violation of BP 22 (Bouncing Checks Law) for issuing a worthless check. However, he contends that the check was drawn against a dollar account with a foreign bank, and is therefore, not covered by the said law. ISSUE: W/N the Makati Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the case in question. HELD: The Makati Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction. The determinative factor (in determining venue) is the place of the issuance of the check. The offense was committed in Makati and therefore, the same is controlling and sufficient to vest jurisdiction in the Makati Regional Trial Court. The Court acquires jurisdiction over the case and over the person of the accused upon the filing of a complaint or information in court which initiates a criminal action. With regard to Petitioner¶s allegation that the check is not covered by BP 22, it will be noted that the law does not distinguish the currency involved in the case. Thus, the Court revealed that the records of Batasan, Vol. III unmistakably show that the intention of the lawmakers is to apply the law to whatever currency may be the subject thereof.
Colgate-Palmolive Phil, Inc v. Gimenez
products. Because such items will be used for toothpaste, it is not a food product and
Case No. 67 therefore not subject to exemption G.R. No. L-14787 (January 28, 1961) Petitioner¶s arguments effected the grant of the refund:
Chapter V, Page 199, Footnote No.95 FACTS: Petitioner Corporation engages in manufacturing toilet preparations and household remedies. Importation including ³stabilizers and flavors´ is
of
materials
among those Petitioner imports. For importation, Petitioner pays the Central
every
RA 601 does not categorize the exceptions as stated above. Though ³stabilizers and flavors´ are preceded by items that might fall under food products, the following which were included are hardly such: fertilizer, poultry feed, vitamin concentrate, cattle, and industrial starch.
Bank of the Philippines 17% special excise tax on the foreign exchange used for the
Therefore, the law must be seen in its entire context, not the parts and
payment of the cost, transportation and other charges pursuant to RA 601, the
categorizations posited by the respondent.
Exchange Tax Law. Under such law, it was also provided that: ³Foreign exchanged used for the payment of cost, transportation and/or other charges incident to the importation Philippines of « stabilizer and flavors « shall be refunded to application therefore.´
any
importer
into
the
making
The petitioner therefore seeks a refund of the 17% special excise tax ISSUE: W/N the imports of ³dental cream stabilizers and flavors´ are subject to a 17% transportation tax exemption under the Exchange Tax Law. HELD: No. The refusal to deny refund was based on the following argument: All the items enumerated for the tax exemption fall under one specific class, namely: food products, books supplies/ materials and medical supplies. The ³stabilizers and flavors´ the petitions refer to are items which must fall under the category of food
Rep. of the Philippines vs. Hon. Migrinio and Tecson
Buenaseda v. Secretary Flavier Case No. 40
Case No. 257 G.R. No. 106719 (September 21, 1993) FACTS: Chapter III, Page 104, Footnote No.141 Acting on information received, which indicated the acquisition of wealth
FACTS:
beyond his lawful income, the Philippine Anti-Graft Board required Private
The Private Respondents filed an administrative complaint with the
Respondent to submit his explanation or comment, together with his supporting
Ombudsman against the Petitioner for the violation of the Anti-graft and Corrupt
evidence. Private Respondent, a retired lt. colonel, was unable to produce his
Practices Act. In response, the Ombudsman filed an order directing the preventive
supporting evidence, despite several postponements, because they were allegedly
suspension of the Petitioners, who were employees of the national center for mental
in the custody of his bookkeeper who had gone abroad. The anti-graft Board was
health. The Respondent argue that the preventive suspension laid by the
created by the PCGG to ³investigate unexplained wealth and corrupt practices
the
Ombudsman under Sec. 24 of RA 6770 is contemplated in by Sec. 13(8) of Art. 9 of
of AFP personnel, both retired and in active service.´
the 1987 Constitution, while the Petitioner contends that the Ombudsman can only
ISSUE:
recommend to the Heads of Departments and other agencies the preventive
W/N Private Respondent may be investigated and prosecuted by the Board,
suspension of officials and employees facing administrative investigation conducted
an agency of the PCGG, for violation of RA 3019 and 1379.
by his office.
HELD:
ISSUE:
No. Applying the rule in statutory construction, the term ³subordinate´ as used
W/N the Ombudsman has the power to preventively suspend government
in EO 1 and 2 would refer to one who enjoys a close association or relation with
officials working in other offices other than that of the Ombudsman pending the
former President Marcos and/or his wife, similar to the immediate family member,
investigation of administrative complaints.
relative, and close associate in EO 1 and the close relative, business associate, dummy, agent, or nominee in EO 2.
HELD: Yes. The Ombudsman has the power to suspend the employees of the said institution may it be in punitive or preventive suspension. Sec. 13(3) of the Constitution refers to ³suspension´ in its punitive sense, as the same speaks of penalties in administrative cases, while Sec. 24 of RA 6770 grants the Ombudsman the power to
preventively suspend public officials and employees facing administrative charges.
Fule v. Court of Appeals G.R. No. L-79094 (June 22, 1988)
This statute is procedural and may arise in order to facilitate a speedy and efficient investigation on cases filed against the officers. A preventive measure is not in itself a punishment but a preliminary administrative investigation.
step
in
an
Chapter VIII, Page 337, Footnote No. 37 FACTS: Petitioner, an agent of the Towers Assurance Corporation, issued and made out check No. 26741 in favor of Roy Nadera. Said check was dishonored for the reason that the said checking account was already closed, thus in violation of BP 22, the Bouncing Checks Law. Upon the hearing, prosecution presented its evidence and the Petitioner waived his right. Instead, he submitted a memorandum confirming the Stipulation of Facts. He was convicted by the trial court, and on appeal, the Appellate Court. ISSUE: W/N the CA erred in affirming the decision of the RTC based on the Stipulation of Facts that was not signed by the Petitioner nor his counsel. HELD: The CA erred. Case is re-opened to receive evidence of Petitioner. Sec. 4 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure provides, ³No agreement or admission made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be used in evidence against the accused unless reduced to writing and signed by him and his counsel´. Because of the word ³shall´, in its language, the rule is mandatory. Negative words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely directory. Therefore, the signature of the Petitioner and the counsel is mandatory. Also, penal statues are to be liberally construed in favor of the accused.
Bersabal v. Salvador
Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Court of Appeals
(South)
G.R. No. L-35910 (July 21, 1978) G.R. No. 117188 (August 7, 1997) Chapter VIII, Page 335, Footnote No. 25 FACTS: FACTS: Private Respondents filed an ejectment suit against the Petitioner. The subsequent decision was appealed by the Petitioner and during its pendency, the court issued an order stating that ³«counsels for both parties are given 30 days from receipt of this order within which to file their memoranda in order for this case to be submitted for decision by the court.´ After receipt, Petitioner filed a motion ex parte to submit memorandum within 30 days from receipt of notice of submission of the transcript of stenographic notes taken during the hearing of the case which was granted by the court. But the Respondent judge issued an order dismissing the case for failure to prosecute Petitioner filed a motion for
Petitioner¶s
appeal.
reconsideration citing the submitted ex parte motion but the court denied it.
The Loyola Grand Villas Homeowners Association Inc. (LGVHAI) was registered with Respondent Home Insurance and Guaranty Corporation (HIGC) as the sole homeowners¶ organization in the said subdivision but it did not file its corporate bylaws. Later, it was discovered that there were two other organizations within the subdivision: the North and South Associations. Respondent HIGC then informed the president of LGVHAI that the latter has been automatically dissolved because of non-submission of its by-laws as required by the Corporation Code. This resulted in the registration of Petitioner association. complained and got a favorable
LGVHAI
result from Respondent HIGC declaring registration of Petitioner association cancelled and Respondent CA affirmed the said decision. Hence,
the
subsequently
Petitioner association filed a petition for certiorari.
ISSUE:
ISSUE:
W/N the mere failure of an Appellant to submit the mentioned memorandum
W/N the failure of a corporation to file its by-laws within one month from the
would empower the CFI to dismiss the appeal on the ground of failure to prosecute.
date of its incorporation results in its automatic dissolution.
HELD:
HELD:
The court is not empowered by law to dismiss the appeal on the mere failure
No. The legislature¶s intent is not to automatically dissolve a corporation for its
of an Appellant to submit his memorandum. The law provides that ³Courts« shall
failure to pass its by-laws. The word ³must´ in a statute is not always imperative but it
decide« cases on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted from the city«
may be consistent with an exercise of discretion. The language of the statute should
courts: Provided« parties may submit memoranda« if so requested«´ It cannot be
be considered as a whole while ascertaining the intent of the legislature in using the
interpreted otherwise than that the submission of memoranda is optional.
word ³must´ or ³shall´.
ALU-TUCP v. NLRC
Acting Commissioner of Customs v. Manila Electric Company
G.R. No. 109328 (August 16, 1 994) Case No. 3 FACTS: G.R. No. L-23623 (June 30, 1977) Petitioners were employed by the National Steel Corporation for their five year expansion program. The workers contend that they should be considered regular workers as opposed to project workers, as the NSC and NLRC ruled. ALU-TUCP claims that they have been working in NSC for more than 6 years and that their work is
Chapter VII, Page 301, Footnote No. 85 FACTS: RA 1394 exempted payment of special import tax for spare parts used for industries and also insulators from all taxes of whatever nature. Respondent contends that their insulating oils are exempt from taxes.
necessary for the business, and that would have been more than enough to consider
ISSUE:
them as regular employees. Petitioners¶ contentions stemmed from Art. 280 of the
W/N insulating oil is an insulator Respondent exempt from paying its
Labor Code.
taxes.
ISSUE:
HELD:
W/N Petitioners should be considered regular employees.
No, insulating oil is different from insulators. The Supreme Court looked into
HELD:
the definition of ³insulating oils´ under Materials Handbook by George J. Brady, 8
No. The provision calls for casual employees. Since Petitioners were
th
considered project employees, this provision does not apply to them. Moreover, the fact that they have been working in NSC for more than a year does not mean they are automatically converted into regular employees. (They were hired as project employees for the 5-year expansion program. Once that ³project´ is done, their services will no longer be needed.) In Mercado, Sr. vs. NLRC, the proviso in par. 2 of Art.280 relates only to casual employees and is not applicable to those who do not qualify under the definition of such workers in par. 1. The proviso is to be construed with reference to the immediately preceding part of the provision to which it is attached, and not to other secti ons thereof.
making
Edition. The court found out that insulating oils are used for cooling as well as insulating. And there is no question that the insulating oil that Respondent is importing is used for cooling instead of insulating. The law frowns on exemption from taxation; hence an exempting provision must be construed stictissimijuris.
Paras v. COMELEC Case No. 196 G.R. No. 123169 (November 4, 1996) Chapter VI, Page 259, Footnote No. 50 FACTS: A petition for recall was filed against Paras, who is the incumbent Punong Barangay. The recall election was deferred due to Petitioner¶s opposition that under Sec. 74 of RA No. 7160, no recall shall take place within one year from the date of the official¶s assumption to office or immediately preceding a regular local
one
year
election. Since the SangguniangKabataan (SK) election was set on the first Monday of May 2006, no recall may be instituted. ISSUE: W/N the SK election is a local election. HELD: No. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to its context, and it must be considered together and kept subservient to its general intent. The evident intent of Sec. 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall once during his term, as provided in par. (a) and par. (b). The spirit, rather than the letter of a law, determines its construction. Thus, interpreting the phrase ³regular local election´ to include SK election will unduly circumscribe the Code for there will never be a recall election rendering inutile the provision. interpreting a statute, the Court assumed
In
that the legislature intended to enact an effective law. An interpretation should be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, meaningless, inoperative or nugatory.
