Abellana v. Marave G.R. No.L-27760 (May 29, 1974) Fernando , J. FACTS:
Petitioner was prosecuted of the crime of physical injuries through reckless imprudence. The criminal case was filed with the city court of Ozamis City, which found Petitioner guilty as charged. Petitioner appealed such decision to the CFI. At this stage, the Private Respondents as the offended parties filed with another branch of the CFI of Misamis Occidental presided by Respondent Judge, a separate and independent civil action for damages. Petitioner sought for the dismissal of such action principally on the ground that there was no reservation for the filing thereof in the City Court of Ozamis Respondent Judge was not persuaded and issued the order to deny Pet itioners’ motion to dismiss. ISSUE:
W/N the order was issued with grave abuse of discretion. HELD:
Petition for certiorari is dismissed. Petitioner’s literal reading of the Sec. 1 of Rule 111 of the Rules of Court ignores the de novo aspect of appealed cases from city courts as provided in Sec. 7 of Rule 123. Such interpretation, does likewise, give rise to a constitutional question that may trench on a substantive 2 right in accordance to Art. 33 of the Civil Code. As stated in Art. X, Sec. 5, par.5 of the 1973 Constitution, the grant of power to this Court does not extend to any diminution, increase or modification of substantive rights. Thus, it is a well-settled doctrine that a court is to avoid construing a statute or legal norm in such a manner as would give rise to a constitutional doubt. Lastly, in the case at bar, literal construction of the law is not favored. The law as an instrument of social control will fail in its function if through an ingenious construction sought to be fastened on a legal norm, particularly a procedural rule, there is placed an impediment to a litigant being given an opportunity of vindicating an alleged right.
Maniago v. CA G.R. No. 104392, February 20, 1996 Mendoza, J.
FACTS: Petitioner Ruben Maniago was the owner of shuttle buses which were used in transporting employees of the Texas Instruments, (Phils.), Inc. from Baguio City proper to its plant site at the Export Processing Authority. In 1990, one of his buses f igured in a vehicular accident with a passenger jeepney owned by private respondent Alfredo Boado. As a result of the accident, a criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property and multiple physical injuries against petitioner’s driver, Herminio Andaya. A month later, a civil case for damages was filed b y private respondent Boado against petitioner Maniago. Petitioner moved for the suspension of the proceedings in the civil case against him, citing the pendency of the criminal case against his driver and because no reservation of the right to bring it (civil case) separately had been made in the criminal case. But the lower court denied petitioner’s motion on the ground that pursuant to the Civil Code, the action could proceed independently of the criminal action.
ISSUE: Whether or not despite the absence of reservation, private respondent may nonetheless bring an action for damages against petitioner under the following provisions of the Civil Code: Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed by the provisions of this Chapter. Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
HELD: No. The right to bring an action for damages under the Civil Code must be reserved as required by Rule 111, § 1, otherwise it should be dismissed. To begin with, §1 quite clearly requires that a reservation must be made to institute separately all civil actions for the recovery of civil liability, otherwise they will be deemed to have been instituted with the criminal case. Such civil actions are not limited to those which arise “from the offense charged.” In other words the right of the injured party to sue separately for the recovery of the civil liability whether arising from crimes (ex delicto ) or from quasi delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code must be reserved otherwise they will be deemed instituted with the criminal action. On the basis of Rule 111, §§1-3, a civil action for the recovery of civil liability is, as a general rule, impliedly instituted with the criminal action, except only (1) when such action arising from the same act or omission, which is the subject of the criminal action, is waived; (2) the right to bring it separately is reserved or (3) such action has been instituted prior to the criminal action. Even if an action has not been reserved or it was brought before the institution of the criminal case, the acquittal of the accused will not bar recovery of civil liability unless the acquittal is based on a finding that the act from which the civil liability might arise did not exist because of Art. 29 of the Civil Code.
Though not an accused in the criminal case, the employer is very much a party, as long as the right to 26 bring or institute a separate action (whether arising from crime or from quasi delict) is not reserved. The ruling that a decision convicting the employee is binding and conclusive upon the employer "not only with regard to its civil liability but also with regard to its amount because the liability of an employer cannot be separated but follows that of his employee" is true not only with respect to the civil liability arising from
crime but also with respect to the civil liability under the Civil Code. Since whatever is recoverable against the employer is ultimately recoverable by him from the employee, the policy against double recovery requires that only one action be maintained for the same act or omission whether the action is brought against the employee or against his employer. ,
In Dulay v . Court of Appeals the Court held that an employer may be sued under Art. 2180 of the Civil Code and that the right to bring the action did not have to be reserved because, having been instituted before the criminal case against the employee, the filing of the civil action against the employer constituted an express reservation of the right to institute it separately.
Gan vs. Reyes G.R. No.145527, May 28, 2002 Bellosilo, J.
Facts: Quite apprehensive that she would not be able to send her 3-year old daughter Francheska Joy S. Pontevida, to school, Bernadette S. Pontevida demanded from petitioner support for their love child to which the petitioner denied paternity. In exasperation, Bernadette in a complaint instituted in behalf of her daughter a complaint against peti tioner for support with prayer for support pendente lite. Petitio ner contends that there was no cause of action for the support since Fran cheska’s birth certificate indicated her father as “Unknown” which was eventually denied by the court. Having denied his motion, petitioner failed to file his answer within the reglementary period. Petitioner's Motion to Admit Answer was filed more than ninety (90) days after the expiration of the reglementary period, and only after private respondent moved that petitioner be declared in default, which motion was granted. Hence, the court received the evidence of private respondent ex parte. The claim of filiation and support was adequately proved, thus, the trial court ordered petitioner to recognize private respondent Francheska Joy S. Pondevida as his illegitimate child and support her with P20,000.00 every month to be paid on or before the 15th of each month starting 15 April 2000. Likewise petitioner was ordered to pay Francheska Joy S. Pondevida the accumulated arrears ofP20,000.00 per month from the day she was born, P50,000.00 as attorney's fees and P25,000.00 for expenses of litigation, plus P20,000.00 on or before the 15th of every month from 15 May 2000 as alimony pendente lite should he desire to pursue further remedies against private respondent. Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals imputing grave abuse of discretion to the trial court for ordering the immediate execution of the judgment. Petitioner averred that the writ of execution was issued despite the absence of a good reason for immediate enforcement. Petitioner insisted that as the judgment sought to be executed did not yet attain finality there should be an exceptional reason to warrant its execution. He further alleged that the writ proceeded from an order of default and a judgment rendered by the trial court in complete disregard of his "highly meritorious defense." Finally, petitioner impugned the validity of the writ as he argued that it was issued without notice to him. Petitioner stressed the fact that he received copy of the motion for immediate execution two (2) weeks after its scheduled hearing.
Issue: Whether or not the Court acted in grave abuse of discretion for ordering the immediate execution of the judgment without due notice and hearing to petitioner. Held: Court of Appeals dismissed the petition on the ratiocination that under Sec. 4, Rule 39 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure judgments for support are immediately executory and cannot be stayed by an appeal. The second challenge hurled against the validity of the writ concerning the lack of notice and hearing was likewise dismissed with the appeals court favoring substantial justice over technicalities. Lastly, petitioner's justification for belatedly filing his answer, i.e., miscommunication with his lawyer, was disregarded since it fell short of the statutory requirements of "fraud, accident, mistake or excusable 10 negligence." Section 4, Rule 39, of the Rules of Court clearly states that, unless ordered by the trial court, judgments in actions for support are immediately executory and cannot be stayed by an appeal. This is an exception to the general rule which provides that the taking of an appeal stays the execution of the judgment and that advance executions will only be allowed if there are urgent reasons therefor. The aforesaid provision preemptorily calls for immediate execution of all judgments for support and makes no distinction between those which are the subject of an appeal and those which are not. To consider then petitioner's argument that there should be good reasons for the advance execution of a judgment would violate the clear and explicit language of the rule mandating immediate execution.
Petitioner is reminded that to the plain words of a legal provision we should make no further explanation. Absoluta sententia expositore non indiget. Indeed, the interpretation which petitioner attempts to foist upon us would only lead to absurdity, its acceptance negating the plain meaning of the provision subject of the petition. In all cases involving a child, his interest and welfare are always the paramount concerns. There may be instances where, in view of the poverty of the child, it would be a travesty of justice to refuse him support until the decision of the trial court attains finality while time continues to slip away. An excerpt from the 16 early case of De Leon v. Soriano is relevant, thus: The money and property adjudged for support and education should and must be given presently and without delay because if it had to wait the final judgment, the children may in the meantime have suffered because of lack of food or have missed and lost years in school because of lack of funds. One cannot delay the payment of such funds for support and education for the reason that if paid long afterwards, however much the accumulated amount, its payment cannot cure the evil and repair the damage caused. The children with such belated payment for support and education cannot act as gluttons and eat voraciously and unwisely, afterwards, to make up for the years of hunger and starvation. Neither may they enrol in several classes and schools and take up numerous subjects all at once to make up for the years they missed in school, due to nonpayment of the funds when needed.
Sps. Quisumbing vs MERALCO GR No. 142943 April 3, 2002 Panganiban , J.
FACTS: Spouses Quisumbing are owners of a house and lot located at No. 94 Greenmeadows Avenue, Quezon City. They alleged to be business entrepreneurs engaged in the export of furnitures under the business name 'Loran Industries' and recipient of the 1993 Agora Award and 1994 Golden Shell Award. Mrs. Quisumbing is a member of the Innerwheel Club while Mr. Quisumbing is a member of the Rotary Club, Chairman of Cebu Chamber of Commerce, and Director of Chamber of Furniture. On March 3, 1995, MERALCO’s inspectors headed by Emmanuel C. Orlino were assigned to conduct a routine-on-the-spot inspection of all single phase meters at Greenmeadows Avenue it is a standard operating procedure of asking permission from the spouses, through their secretary which was granted. The secretary witnessed the inspection. After the inspection, MERALCO 's inspectors discovered that the terminal seal of the meter was missing; the meter cover seal was deformed; the meter dials of the meter was mis-aligned and there were scratches on the meter base plate. Lorna Quisumbing, who was outraged of the result of the inspection and denied liability as to the tampering of the meter. The spouses were advised by MERALCO's inspectors that they had to detach the meter and bring it to their laboratory for verification/confirmation of their findings. In the event the meter turned out to be tampered, MERALCO had to temporarily disconnect the electric services of the spouses unless they pay the amount of P178,875.01 representing the differential billing, their electric supply would be disconnected. Orlina informed the spouses that they were just following their standard operating procedure. An action for damages by the spouses alleging that MERALCO acted with wanton, capricious, malicious and malevolent manner in disconnecting their power supply which was done without due process, and without due regard for their rights, feelings, peace of mind, social and business reputation.
ISSUE: Whether MERALCO observed the requisites of law when it disconnected the electric supply of the spouses?
HELD: Under the law, MERALCO may immediately disconnect any electric services on the ground of meter tampering. However, they may do only in the presence of an officer of law or by a duly authorized representative of the energy regulatory board where they can personally witnessed and attested the discovery of the tampering. If there’s no government representative, the prima facie authority to disconnect granted to MERALCO by RA 7832 can’t apply. The presence of government agents w ho may authorize immediate disconnection goes into the essence of due process. MERALCO can’t be prosecutor and judge in imposing the penalty of disconnection due to alleged meter tampering. MERALCO can’t rely on the contractual right to disconnect if there is non-payment of bills. An adjusted bill shall be prepared and only upon failure to pay the company disconnect or discontinue service. This is also true in regard with the provision of the revised order no. 1 of the former public service commission which requires a 46 hour written notice before the disconnection may be justified. Hence, this case is partially granted wherein both of the parties are to pay each other.
