CHAPTER ONE: Statutes ENACTMENT OF STATUTES IN GENERAL
Laws, generally A whole body or system of law • • Rule of conduct formulated and made obligatory by legitimate power of the state Includes RA, PD, EO (president in the e of legislati!e • power", Presidential issuances (ordinance power" #urisprud #urisprudence ence,, ordinance ordinancess passed passed by sanggunia sanggunians ns of local go!ernment units$ %tatutes, generally An act of legislatu legislature re (Philipp (Philippine ine &ommissi &ommission, on, Phil$ Phil$ • Legislature, 'atasang Pambansa, &ongress" PDs of )arcos during the period of martial law *+• &onstitution EO of A.ui A.uino no re!o re!olu luti tion onar ary y peri period od /ree /reedo dom m • &onstitution
Public 0 affects the public at large gene genera rall 0 appl applie iess to the the whol wholee stat statee and and • operates throughout the state ali1e upon all people or all of a class$ • %pecial 0 relates to particular person or things of a clas classs or to a part partic icul ular ar comm commun unit ity, y, indi!idual or thing$ Loca Locall Law Law 0 oper operat atio ion n is conf confin ined ed to a • specif specific ic place place or locali locality ty (e$g (e$g munici municipal pal ordinance" Pri!at Pri!atee 0 appli applies es only only to a specif specific ic person person or sub2ect$
Permanent and temporary statutes • Perman Permanent ent 3 one whose whose operat operation ion is not limite limited d in duration but continues until repealed$ 4emporary 3 duration is for a limited period of time • fied in the statute itself or whose life ceases upon the happening of an e!ent$ E$g$ statute answering to an emergency o Other classes of statutes Prospecti!e or retroacti!e 0 accdg$ to application • Decl Declar arat ator ory, y, cura curati ti!e !e,, mand mandat ator ory, y, dire direct ctor ory, y, • substanti!e, remedial, remedial, penal 0 accdg$ to operation According to form • Affirmati!e o 5egati!e o )anner of referring to statutes Public Acts 0 Phil &ommission and Phil Legislature • *+6*3 *+-7 &ommonwealth &ommonwealth Acts 0 *+-83 *+98 • Republic Acts 0 &ongress *+983 *+:, *+; < • • 'atas Pambansa 0 'atasang Pambansa • Identification Identification of laws 0 serial number and=or title
Legislati!e power, generally Power to ma1e, alter and repeal laws • >ested in congress 0 *+; &onstitution • Pre Preside sident nt 0 *+*+- ? /reedo eedom m (PD and and EO • respecti!ely" • %ang %anggu guni nian ang g bara barang ngay ay,, baya bayan, n, pang panglu lung ngso sod, d, panlalawigan 0 only within respecti!e 2urisdiction 0 ordinances Administrati!e Administrati!e or eecuti!e officer • Delegated power • Issue Issue rules rules and regulations regulations to implement implement a • specific law &ongress legislati!e power 4he determinatio determination n of the legislati!e legislati!e policy and its • formulation and promulgation as a defined and binding rule of conduct$ • Legi Legisl slat ati! i!ee powe powerr 3 plen plenar ary y ece ecept pt only only to such such limitations as are found in the constitution Procedural re.uirements, generally • Pro!ided in the constitution (for 'ills, RA" • Pro!ided by congress 0 enactment of laws Rules of both houses of congress (pro!ided also also by the &onstitution" &onstitution" Passage of bill Proposed legislati!e measure introduced by a member • of congress for enactment into law • %hal %halll embr embrac acee only only one one sub2 sub2ec ectt whic which h shal shalll be epressed in the title %inged by authors • • /ile with the %ecretary of the @ouse • 'ills may originate from either lower or upper @ouse • Eclusi!e to lower house Appropriation Re!enue= tariff bills 'ills authoriing increase of public debt 'ills of local application Pri!ate bills After - readings, readings, appro!al of either house house (see Art 8 • %ec :8 (*"" %ecretary reports the bill for first reading • /irst reading 0 reading the number and title, referral to • the appropriate committee for study and recommendation • &omm &ommit itte teee 0 hold hold publ public ic hear hearin ings gs and and subm submit itss repo report rt and and reco recomm mmen enda dati tion on for for calendar for second reading %econd reading 0 bill is read in full (with amendments • proposed by the committee" 0 unless copies are distributed and such reading is is dispensed with with 'ill will be sub2ect to debates, motions and o amendments 'ill will be !oted on o
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A bill bill appr appro! o!ed ed shal shalll be incl includ uded ed in the the rd calendar of bills for - reading nd
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4hird reading 0 bill appro!ed on : reading will be submitted for final !ote by yeas and nays,
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'ill appro!ed on the - rd reading will be transmitted to the BOther @ouseC for concurrence (same process as the first passage" If the the BOth BOther er @ous @ouseC eC appr appro! o!es es with withou outt o amendment it is passed to the President If the BOther @ouseC introduces amendments, o and disagreement arises, differences will be settled by the &onference &ommittees of both houses Repor eportt and recom commend mendaatio tion of the the : o &onf &onfer eren ence ce &omm &ommit itte tees es will will ha!e ha!e to be appr appro! o!ed ed by both both hous houses es in orde orderr to be considered pass President Appro!es and signs o o >etoes (within -6 days after receipt" Inaction o If the President !etoes 0 send bac1 to the @ouse where it originated with recommendation :=- of all members appro!es, it will be sent to o the other house for appro!al :=- of the other other house house appro!es appro!es 0 it shall shall o become a law If president did not act on the bill with in -6 o days after receipt, bill becomes a law %ummary - ways of how a bill becomes a law$ President signs inaction of president with in -6 days after receipt !etoed bill is repassed by congress by :=- !otes of all its members, each house !oting separately$
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Appropriations and re!enue bills %ame as procedure for the enactment of ordinary bills • Only difference is that they can only originate from the • Lower @ouse but the %enate may propose= concur with the amendments • Limitations of passage (as per &onstitution" Art 8 %ec$ : (:" congress may not increase the appropriation o recommended by the President particular appropriation appropriation limited limited o procedure for &ongress is the same to all o other other depart departmen ment= t= agenci agencies es (proce (procedur duree for appro!ing appropriations " special special appropria appropriations tions 0 national national treasure treasurer= r= o re!enue proposal no transfer of appropriations authority to o augment discretionary funds 0 for public purposes o general appropriations bills 0 when re3enacted o President my !eto any particular item=s in an o appropriation re!enue, or tariff bill$ Authentication Authentication of bills • 'efore passed to the President
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Indispensable 'y signing of %pea1er and %enate President
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Fnimpeachability Fnimpeachability of legislati!e 2ournals • #ournal of proceedings • &onclu &onclusi! si!ee with with respec respectt to other other matter matterss that that are are re.uired by the &onstitution Disputable with respect to all other matters • 'y reason of public policy, authenticity of laws should • rest upon public public memorial memorialss of the most permanent permanent character • %hould be public Enrolled bill 'ills passed by congress authenticated by the %pea1er • and and the the %ena %enate te Pres Presid iden entt and and appr appro! o!ed ed by the the President Importing absolute !erity and is binding on the courts • It carries on its face a solemn assurance that it o was passed by the assembly by the legislati!e and eecuti!e departments$ &ourts cannot go behind the enrolled act to disco!er • what really happened If only only for for resp respec ectt to the the legi legisl slat ati! i!ee and and o eecuti!e departments 4hus, if there has been any mista1e in the printing of • the bill before it was certified by the officer of the assembly and appro!ed by the &hief Eecuti!e, the reme remedy dy is by amen amendm dmen entt by enac enacti ting ng a cura curati ti!e !e legislation not by 2udicial decree$ • Enrolled bill and legislati!e 2ournals 3 &onclusi!e upon the courts • If there there is discre discrepan pancy cy betwee between n enroll enrolled ed bill bill and 2ournal, enrolled bill pre!ails$ pre!ails$ Githdrawal of authentication, effect of %pea1er and %enate President may withdraw if there is • discrepancy between the tet of the bill as deliberated and the enrolled bill$ • Effect 5ullifies the bill as enrolled enrolled o Losses absolute !erity o &ourts may consult 2ournals o
PARTS OF STATUTES
4itle of statute • )andatory law 3 E!ery bill passed by &ongress shall embrace only one sub2ect which shall be epressed in the title thereof (Art 8, %ec :8 (*" *+; &onstitution" : limitations upon legislation • 4o refrain refrain from conglomerati conglomeration, on, under one o statute, of heterogeneous sub2ects 4itl 4itlee of the the bill bill shou should ld be couc couche hed d in a o language language sufficie sufficient nt to notify notify the legislato legislators rs and the publi publicc and those concern concerned ed of the import of the single sub2ect$
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A bill bill appr appro! o!ed ed shal shalll be incl includ uded ed in the the rd calendar of bills for - reading nd
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4hird reading 0 bill appro!ed on : reading will be submitted for final !ote by yeas and nays,
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'ill appro!ed on the - rd reading will be transmitted to the BOther @ouseC for concurrence (same process as the first passage" If the the BOth BOther er @ous @ouseC eC appr appro! o!es es with withou outt o amendment it is passed to the President If the BOther @ouseC introduces amendments, o and disagreement arises, differences will be settled by the &onference &ommittees of both houses Repor eportt and recom commend mendaatio tion of the the : o &onf &onfer eren ence ce &omm &ommit itte tees es will will ha!e ha!e to be appr appro! o!ed ed by both both hous houses es in orde orderr to be considered pass President Appro!es and signs o o >etoes (within -6 days after receipt" Inaction o If the President !etoes 0 send bac1 to the @ouse where it originated with recommendation :=- of all members appro!es, it will be sent to o the other house for appro!al :=- of the other other house house appro!es appro!es 0 it shall shall o become a law If president did not act on the bill with in -6 o days after receipt, bill becomes a law %ummary - ways of how a bill becomes a law$ President signs inaction of president with in -6 days after receipt !etoed bill is repassed by congress by :=- !otes of all its members, each house !oting separately$
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Appropriations and re!enue bills %ame as procedure for the enactment of ordinary bills • Only difference is that they can only originate from the • Lower @ouse but the %enate may propose= concur with the amendments • Limitations of passage (as per &onstitution" Art 8 %ec$ : (:" congress may not increase the appropriation o recommended by the President particular appropriation appropriation limited limited o procedure for &ongress is the same to all o other other depart departmen ment= t= agenci agencies es (proce (procedur duree for appro!ing appropriations " special special appropria appropriations tions 0 national national treasure treasurer= r= o re!enue proposal no transfer of appropriations authority to o augment discretionary funds 0 for public purposes o general appropriations bills 0 when re3enacted o President my !eto any particular item=s in an o appropriation re!enue, or tariff bill$ Authentication Authentication of bills • 'efore passed to the President
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Indispensable 'y signing of %pea1er and %enate President
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Fnimpeachability Fnimpeachability of legislati!e 2ournals • #ournal of proceedings • &onclu &onclusi! si!ee with with respec respectt to other other matter matterss that that are are re.uired by the &onstitution Disputable with respect to all other matters • 'y reason of public policy, authenticity of laws should • rest upon public public memorial memorialss of the most permanent permanent character • %hould be public Enrolled bill 'ills passed by congress authenticated by the %pea1er • and and the the %ena %enate te Pres Presid iden entt and and appr appro! o!ed ed by the the President Importing absolute !erity and is binding on the courts • It carries on its face a solemn assurance that it o was passed by the assembly by the legislati!e and eecuti!e departments$ &ourts cannot go behind the enrolled act to disco!er • what really happened If only only for for resp respec ectt to the the legi legisl slat ati! i!ee and and o eecuti!e departments 4hus, if there has been any mista1e in the printing of • the bill before it was certified by the officer of the assembly and appro!ed by the &hief Eecuti!e, the reme remedy dy is by amen amendm dmen entt by enac enacti ting ng a cura curati ti!e !e legislation not by 2udicial decree$ • Enrolled bill and legislati!e 2ournals 3 &onclusi!e upon the courts • If there there is discre discrepan pancy cy betwee between n enroll enrolled ed bill bill and 2ournal, enrolled bill pre!ails$ pre!ails$ Githdrawal of authentication, effect of %pea1er and %enate President may withdraw if there is • discrepancy between the tet of the bill as deliberated and the enrolled bill$ • Effect 5ullifies the bill as enrolled enrolled o Losses absolute !erity o &ourts may consult 2ournals o
PARTS OF STATUTES
4itle of statute • )andatory law 3 E!ery bill passed by &ongress shall embrace only one sub2ect which shall be epressed in the title thereof (Art 8, %ec :8 (*" *+; &onstitution" : limitations upon legislation • 4o refrain refrain from conglomerati conglomeration, on, under one o statute, of heterogeneous sub2ects 4itl 4itlee of the the bill bill shou should ld be couc couche hed d in a o language language sufficie sufficient nt to notify notify the legislato legislators rs and the publi publicc and those concern concerned ed of the import of the single sub2ect$
Purposes of re.uirement (on * sub2ect" Principa Principall purpose purpose to apprise apprise the legislato legislators rs of the • ob2ect, nature, and scope of the pro!ision of the bill and to pre!ent the enactment into law of matters which ha!e not recei!ed the notice, action and study of the legislators$ 4o prohibit duplicity in legislation o In sum of the purpose • 4o pre! pre!eent hodg hodgeepodg podgee= log3 log3rrolli olling ng o legislation 4o pre! pre!en entt surp surpri rise se or frau fraud d upon upon the the o legislature 4o fair fairly ly appr appris isee the the peop people le,, thro throug ugh h o publication of the the sub2ects of the legislation Fsed as a guide in ascertai ascertaining ning legislati!e legislati!e o intent when the language of the act does not clearly epress its purposeH may clarify doubt or ambiguity$
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@ow re.uirement construed Liberally construed • If there there is doubt, doubt, it should should be resol! resol!ed ed agains againstt the • doubt and in fa!or of the constitutionality of the statute Ghen there is compliance with re.uirement &omprehensi!e enough 3 Include general ob2ect • If all parts of the law are related, and are are germane to • the sub2ect matter epressed in the title 4itle 4itle is !alid !alid where where it indica indicates tes in broad broad but clear • terms, the nature, scope and conse.uences of the law and its operations • 4itle should not be a catalogue or inde of the bill • Principles apply to titles of amendatory acts$ Enough if it states Ban act to amend a specific o statuteC 5eed not state the precise nature of the • amendatory act$ • F% Legislators Legislators ha!e titles ending ending with the words words Band for other purposesC ( F% is not sub2ect to the same &onsti &onstitut tution ional al restr restrict iction ion as that that embodi embodied ed in the Philippine &onstitution" Ghen re.uirement not applicable Apply only to bills which may thereafter be enacted • into law Does not apply to laws in force and eisting at the time • the *+-7 &onstitution too1 effect$ 5o application to to municipal or city ordinances$ • Effect of insufficiency of title • %tatute is null and !oid • Gher Ghere, e, the the sub2 sub2ec ectt mat matter ter of a stat statut utee is not not sufficiently epressed in its title, only so much of the sub2ec sub2ectt matte matterr as is not epres epressed sed therei therein n is !oid, !oid, lea!ing the rest in force, unless the in!alid pro!isions are insepa inseparab rable le from from the others others,, in which which case case the nullity the former !itiates the latter Enacting clause Gritten immediately after the title •
%tates the authority by which the act is enacted
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* 3 Phil &ommission 0 B 'y authority of the President of the the F%, F%, be it enac enacte ted d by the the F% Phil Philip ippi pine ne &ommissionC : 3 Philippine Legislature3 B by authority of the F%, be it enacted by the the Philippine LegislatureC - 3 Ghen : became bicameral B'e it enacted by the %enate and @ouse of Representati!es of the Philippines in legislature assembled and by authority of the sameC 9 3 &ommonwealth3 B'e it enacted by the 5ational Assembly of the Philippines 7 0 when 9 became bicameral Bbe it enacted by the %enate %enate and @ouse @ouse of Repre Represen sentat tati!e i!ess in congre congress ss assembledC 0 same *+983*+:=*+;3present$ *+983*+:=*+;3present$ 8 0 'ata 'atasa sang ng Pamb Pamban ansa sa B'e B'e it enac enacte ted d by the the 'atasang Pambansa in session assembledC 0 PD B 5OG 4@ERE/ORE, I JJJJJJ President of the Philippines, by the powers !ested in me by the &onstitution do hereby decree as followsC ; 0 EO B5ow, therefore, I, JJJJ hereby orderC
Preamble • Define Defined d 0 prefat prefatory ory statem statement ent or eplan eplanati ation on or a findin finding g of facts facts,, reciti reciting ng the purpos purpose, e, reason reason,, or occasion for ma1ing the law to which it is prefiedC /ound after enacting clause and before the body of the • law$ • Fsually not used by legislations because content of the preamble is written written in the eplanatory eplanatory note$ • 'ut PDs and EOs ha!e preambles$ Pur!iew of statute that part which tells what the law is about • body of statute should embrace only one sub2ect • should only one sub2ect matter, e!en there pro!isions shou should ld be alli allied ed and and germ german anee to the the sub2 sub2ec ectt and and purpose of the bill$ bill$ %tatue is usually di!ided into section$ w=c contains a • single proposition$ • Parts short title o policy section o definition section o administrati!e section o sections prescribing standards of conduct o sections imposing sanctions for !iolation of o its pro!isions transitory pro!ision o separability clause o effecti!ity clause o %eparability clause it states that if any pro!ision of the act is declared • in!alid, the remainder shall not be affected thereby$ It is not controlling and the courts may in!alidate the • whole statute where what is left, after the !oid part, is not complete and wor1able Presumption 0 statute is effecti!e as a whole •
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its effect to create in the place of such presumption the opposite of separability$
PRESIDENTIAL ORDINANCES
ISSUANCES,
RULES
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Presidential issuances are those which the president issues in the eercise of • ordinance power$ i$e$ EO, AO (adminis (administrat trati!e i!e orders", orders", proclamat proclamations, ions, • )O (mem (memor oran andu dum m orde orders rs", ", )& (mem (memor oran andu dum m circulars", and general or special orders$ @a!e force and effect of laws$ • EO • acts of the President pro!iding for rules of a o gene genera rall or perm perman anen entt char charac acte terr in the the implementation or eecution of constitutional= statutory powers$ do not not ha!e ha!e the the forc forcee and and effe effect ct of laws laws o enacted by congress different from EO issued by the President in o the e of her legislat legislati!e i!e power power during during the re!olu re!olutio tion n Presid President ential ial decree decree under under the freedom constitution AO • acts of the President which relate to particular o aspe aspect ctss of go!e go!ern rnme ment ntal al oper operat atio ions ns in pursuance of his duties duties as administrati!e administrati!e head Proclamations • acts of the President fiing a date or declaring o a statute or condition of public moment or intere interest, st, upon upon the eiste eistence nce of which which the operation of a specific law or regulation is made to depend )O • acts of the President on matters of o administra administrati!e ti!e details details or of subordinat subordinatee or tempor temporar ary y intere interest st which which only only concer concern n a particular officer officer or office of go!ernment • )& acts of the president on matters relating to o internal internal administr administration ation which which the President President desires to bring to the attention of all or some of the depar departme tments nts,, agenci agencies, es, bureau bureaus, s, or offices of the go!ernment, for information of compliance Keneral or %pecific Order • Acts and commands of the President in his o capacity as &ommander3in3&hief of the A/P %upreme &ourt circularsH rules and regulations %ee Art ;, %ec$ 7(7" *+; &onstitution • %ee Art$ 8, %ec$ -6 *+; &onstitution • It has been been held held that that a law which which pro!id pro!ides es that a • decision of a .uasi32udicial body be appealable directly to the the %&, %&, if enac enacte ted d with withou outt the the ad!i ad!ice ce and and concurrence of the %&, ineffecti!e Remedy or applicable procedure 0 go to &A o • Rules of &ourt 0 product of the rule3ma1ing power of the %&
Power to repeal procedural rules o 5o power to promulgate rules substanti!e in nature (unli1e the legislati!e department" %ubstanti!e rules 0 if it affects or ta1es away !ested rightsH right to appeal Procedura Procedurall rules rules 0 means of implemen implementing ting eisting rightH where to file an appeal for transferring the !enue Rules and regulations issued by the administrati!e or eecuti!e officers in accordance with and authoried by law, ha!e the force and effect effect of law Re.uisites for !alidity o Rule Ruless shou should ld be germ german anee to the the ob2ects and purposes of the law Regulations be not in contradiction with, but conform to, the standards that the law prescribes 4he 4he be for for the the sole sole purp purpos osee of carr carryi ying ng into into effe effect ct the the gene genera rall pro!isions of the law Law cannot be restricted or etended o Law pre!ails pre!ails o!er regulations regulations,, if there there are o discrepancies Rule3ma1ing power of public administrati!e agency is a delegated legislati!e power 0 if it enlarges or restricts such statute is in!alid Re.ui Re.uisit sites es for delega delegatin ting g a statut statutee by legisl legislati ati!e !e branch to another branch of go!ernment to fill in details, details, eecution eecution,, enforcemen enforcement, t, or administr administration ation of law$ the law must be &omplete in itself o /i /i a stan standa dard rd whic which h may may be epr epres esss or o implied Eample of BstandardC 0 simplicity and dignityH dignityH public public interestH interestH public welfareH welfareH interest interest of law and orderH orderH 2ustice and e.uity and substantial meri meritt of the the case caseHH ade. ade.ua uate te and and efficient instruction Eample &hange of Band=orC to BorC 0 in!alid o &hange &hange of BmayC BmayC(pe (permi rmissi ssi!e" !e" to Bshall BshallCC o (mandatory" 0 in!alid (Krego ! &O)ELE& pp ::" o
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Administrati!e Administrati!e rule and interpretation distinguished Rule 0 Bma1esC new law with the force and effect of a • !alid lawH binding on the courts e!en if they are not in agreement with the policy stated therein or with its innate wisdom Interpretation 0 merely ad!isory for it is the courts that • finally determine what the law means • Administrati!e construction is not necessarily binding upon upon the the cour courts tsHH it may may be set set asid asidee by 2udi 2udici cial al department (if there is an error of law, or abuse of power or lac1 of 2urisdiction or KAD 0 gra!e abuse of discretion" 'arangay ordinance
%angguniang barangay 0 smallest legislati!e bodyH may pass an ordinance by ma2ority of all its membersH sub2ect to re!iew by %angguniang bayan= panglungsod %angguniang bayan= panglungsod 0 ta1e action on the • ordinance within -6 days from submissionH if theres inaction, it is presumed to be consistent with the municipal or city ordinanceH if inconsistency is found, it will remand to the %angguniang barangay )unicipal ordinance Lodged in the %angguniang bayan • )a2ority of the .uorum !oting, ordinance is passed • Ordinance sent to )ayor within *6 days for appro!al • or !etoH if theres mayors inaction, ordinance is presumed appro!edH if !etoed and o!erridden by :=- of all members, ordinance is appro!ed Appro!ed ordinance is passed to %angguniang • panlalawigan for re!iew Githin -6 days may in!alidate in whole or in o part and its action is finalH if theres inaction within -6 days, it is deemed !alid •
&ity ordinance >ested in %angguniang panglungsod • )a2ority of the .uorum !oting, ordinance is passed • %ubmitted to )ayor within *6 days • Appro!e o >eto 0 :=- of all members 0 appro!ed o Inaction 0 deemed appro!ed o • If city or component city 0 submit to %angguniang panlalawigan for re!iew which shall ta1e action within -6 days, otherwise, it will be deemed !alid Pro!incial ordinance %angguniang panlalawigan 0 ma2ority of .uorum • !oting, passage of ordinance /orwarded to the Ko!ernor who within *7 days from • receipt shall Appro!e o >eto 0 :=- of all members 0 appro!ed o Inaction 0 deemed appro!ed o VALIDITY
Presumption of constitutionality E!ery statute is presumed !alid • Lies on how a law is enacted o Due respect to the legislati!e who passed and o eecuti!e who appro!ed Responsibility of upholding the constitution o rests not on the courts alone but on the legislati!e and eecuti!e branches as well &ourts cannot in.uire into the wisdom or propriety of • laws 4o declare a law unconstitutional, the repugnancy of • the law to the constitution must be clear and une.ui!ocal All reasonable doubts should be resol!ed in fa!or of • the constitutionality of lawH to doubt is to sustain
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/inal arbiter of unconstitutionality of law is the %upreme &ourt E5 'A5& (ma2ority who too1 part and !oted thereon" 5onetheless, trial courts ha!e 2urisdiction to initially decide the issue of constitutionality of a law in appropriate cases
Re.uisites for eercise of 2udicial power 4he eistence of an appropriate case • • Interest personal and substantial by the party raising the constitutional .uestion Plea that the function be eercised at the earliest • opportunity 5ecessity that the constitutional .uestion be passed • upon in order to decide the case Appropriate case • 'ona fide case 0 one which raises a 2usticiable contro!ersy • #udicial power is limited only to real, actual, earnest, and !ital contro!ersy &ontro!ersy is 2usticiable when it refers to matter • which is appropriate for court re!iewH pertains to issues which are inherently susceptible of being decided on grounds recognied by law &ourts cannot rule on Bpolitical .uestionsC 0 .uestions • which are concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom (!$ legality" of a particular act or measure being assailed Bseparation of powersC o @owe!er, &onstitution epands the concept o of 2udicial re!iew 0 2udicial power includes the duty of the courts of 2ustice to settle actual contro!ersies in!ol!ing rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine whether or not there has been KAD amounting to lac1 or ecess of 2urisdiction on the branch or the part of any branch= instrumentality of the Ko!ernment %tanding to sue Legal standing or locus standi 0 personal= substantial • interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct in2ury as a result of go!ernmental act that is being challenged BinterestC 0 an interest in issue affected by the decree • • &itien 0 ac.uires standing only if he can establish that he has suffered some actual or threatened concrete in2ury as a result of the allegedly illegal conduct of the go!ernment E$g$ tapayer 0 when it is shown that public o funds ha!e been illegally disbursed • )ember of the %enate or of the @ouse has legal standing to .uestion the !alidity of the Presidential !eto or a condition imposed on an item in an appropriations bills • %& may, in its discretion, ta1e cogniance of a suit which does not satisfy the re.uirement of legal standing
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E$g$ calling by the President for the deployment of the Philippine )arines to 2oin the P5P in !isibility patrols around the metro
Ghen to raise constitutionality at the earliest possible opportunity 0 i$e$ in the • pleading it may be raised in a motion for reconsideration = new • trial in the lower courtH or • in criminal cases 0 at any stage of the proceedings or on appeal • in ci!il cases, where it appears clearly that a determination of the .uestion is necessary to a decision, and in cases where it in!ol!es the 2urisdiction of the court below
5ecessity of deciding constitutionality where the constitutional .uestion is of paramount • public interest and time is of the essence in the resolution of such .uestion, adherence to the strict procedural standard may be relaed and the court, in its discretion, may s.uarely decide the case • where the .uestion of !alidity, though apparently has become moot, has become of paramount interest and there is undeniable necessity for a ruling, strong reasons of public policy may demand that its constitutionality be resol!ed 4est of constitutionality is what the &onstitution pro!ides in relation to what • can or may be done under the statute, and not by what it has been done under it$ If not within the legislati!e power to enact o If !ague 0 unconstitutional in : respects o >iolates due process Lea!es law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its pro!isions Ghere theres a change of circumstances 0 o i$e$ emergency laws Ordinances (test of !alidity are" • It must not contra!ene the &onstitution or any o statute It must not be unfair or oppressi!e o It must not be partial or discriminatory o It must not prohibit but may regulate trade o It must be general and consistent with public o policy It must not be unreasonable o Effects of unconstitutionality It confers no rights • Imposes no duties • Affords no protection • &reates no office • In general, inoperati!e as if it had ne!er been passed • • : !iews
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Orthodo !iew 0 unconstitutional act is not a lawH decision affect ALL )odern !iew 0 less stringentH the court in passing upon the .uestion of unconstitutionality does not annul or repeal the statute if it finds it in conflict with the &onstitutionH decisions affects parties O5LM and no 2udgment against the statuteH opinion of court may operate as a precedentH it does not repeal, supersede, re!o1e, or annul the statute
In!alidity due to change of conditions Emergency laws • It is deemed !alid at the time of its enactment as an • eercise of police power It becomes in!alid only because the change of • conditions ma1es its continued operation !iolati!e of the &onstitution, and accordingly, the declaration of its nullity should only affect the parties in!ol!ed in the case and its effects applied prospecti!ely Partial in!alidity Keneral rule that where part of a statute is !oid as • repugnant to the &onstitution, while another part is !alid, the !alid portion, if separable from the in!alid, may stand and be enforced •
Eception 0 that when parts of a statute are so mutually dependent and connected, as conditions, considerations, inducements, or compensations for each other, as to warrant a belief that the legislature intended them as a whole, the nullity of one part will !itiate the rest 0 such as in the case of Tatad v Sec of Department of Energy and Antonio v. COMELEC
EFFECT AND OPERATION
Ghen laws ta1e effect Art : && 3 B laws to be effecti!e must be published • either in the Official Kaette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the countryC 4he effecti!ity pro!ision refers to all statutes, o including those local and pri!ate, unless there are special laws pro!iding a different effecti!ity mechanism for particular statutes %ec *; &hapter 7 'oo1 * of Administrati!e &ode • Effecti!ity of laws • default rule 0 *73day period o must be published either in the OK or o newspaper of general circulation in the countryH publication must be full 4he clause Bunless it is otherwise pro!idedC 0 solely • refers to the *73day period and not to the re.uirement of publication Ghen Presidential issuances, rules and regulations ta1e effect 4he Presidents ordinance power includes the authority • to issue EO, AO, Proclamations, )O, )& and general or specific orders
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Re.uirement of publication applies ecept if it is merely interpretati!e or internal in nature not concerning the public : types 4hose whose purpose is to enforce or o implement eisting law pursuant to a !alid delegation or to fill in the details of a statuteH re.uires publication 4hose which are merely interpretati!e in o nature or internalH does not re.uire publication Re.uirements of filing (*+; Administrati!e &ode" E!ery agency shall file with the FP Law o &enter - certified copies of e!ery rule adopted by it$ Rules in force on the date of effecti!ity of this &ode which are not filed within - months from that date shall not thereafter be the basis of any sanction against any party= persons
Ghen local ordinance ta1es effect Fnless otherwise stated, the same shall ta1e effect *6 • days from the date a copy is posted in a bulletin board at the entrance of the pro!incial capitol or city, municipality or barangay hall, A5D in at least : other conspicuous places in the local go!ernment unit concerned 4he secretary to the %angguinian concerned shall cause • the posting not later than 7 days after appro!alH tet will be disseminated in English or 4agalogH the secretary to the %angguinian concerned shall record such fact in a boo1 1ept for that purpose, stating the dates of appro!al and posting Kist of ordinance with penal sanctions shall be • published in a newspaper of general circulation within the respecti!e pro!ince concernedH if 5O newspaper of general circulation in the pro!ince, PO%4I5K shall be made in all municipalities and cities of the pro!ince where the %anggunian of origin is situated • /or highly urbanied and independent component cities, main features of the ordinance, in addition to the posting re.uirement shall be published once in a local newspaper$ In the absence of local newspaper, in any newspaper of general circulation @ighly urbanied city 0 minimum population o of :66,666 and with latest annual income of at least 76) Php %tatutes continue in force until repealed Permanent= indefinite 0 law once established continues • until changed by competent legislati!e power$ It is not changed by the change of so!ereignty, ecept that of political nature 4emporary 0 in force only for a limited period, and • they terminate upon epiration of the term stated or upon occurrence of certain e!entsH no repealing statute is needed 4erritorial and personal effect of statutes All people within the 2urisdiction of the Philippines •
)anner of computing time • %ee Art$ *- && Ghere a statute re.uires the doing of an act within a • specified number of days, such as ten days from notice, it means ten calendar days and 5O4 ten wor1ing days • E$g$ * year from Oct$ 9, *+98 is Oct$ 9, *+9 • If last day falls on a %unday or holiday, the act can still be done the following day • Principle of Beclude the first, include the lastC DOE% 5O4 APPLM to the computation of the period of prescription of a crime, in which rule, is that if the last day in the period of prescription of a felony falls on a %unday or legal holiday, the information concerning said felony cannot be filed on the net wor1ing day, as the offense has by then already prescribed
CHAPTER TWO: Construt!on an" Inter#retat!on NATURE AND PURPOSE
&onstruction defined &onstruction is the art or process of disco!ering and • epounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law, where that intention rendered doubtfully reason of ambiguity in its language or of the fact that the gi!en case is not eplicitly pro!ided for in the law$ &onstruction is drawing of warranted conclusions • beyond direct epression of the tet epressions which are in spirit though not within the tet$ • ine!itably, there enters into the construction of statutes the play of #FDI&IAL #FDK)E54 within the limits of the rele!ant legislati!e materials it in!ol!es the EER&I%E O/ &@OI&E 'M 4@E • #FDI&IARM &onstruction and interpretation distinguished 4hey are so ali1e in practical results and so are used • interchangeablyH synonymous$ &onstruction 3 process of drawing warranted conclusions not always included in direct epressions, or determining the application of words to facts in litigation
Interpretation 3 art of finding the true meaning and sense of any form of words
Rules of construction, generally Rules of statutory construction are tools used to • ascertain legislati!e intent$ 5O4 rules of law but mere aioms of eperience • In enacting a statute, the legislature is presumed to • 1now the rules of statutory construction, in case of doubt, be construed in accordance with the settled principles of interpretation$
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Legislature sometimes adopts rules of statutory construction as part of the pro!isions of the statute 3 see eamples page 9+376 Legislature also defines to ascertain the meaning of !ague, broad words= terms
Purpose of ob2ect of construction • 4he purpose is to ascertain and gi!e effect to the intent of the law$ • 4he ob2ect of all 2udicial interpretation of a statute is to determine legislati!e intent, either epressly or impliedly, by the language usedH to determine the meaning and will of the law ma1ing body and disco!er its true interpretations of law$ Legislati!e intent, generally is the essence of the law • Intent is the spirit which gi!es life to legislati!e • enactment$ It must be enforced when ascertained, although it may not be consistent with the strict letter of the statute$ It has been held, howe!er, that that the ascertainment of legislati!e intent depend more on a determination of the purpose and ob2ect of the law$ • Intent is sometimes e.uated with the word Bspirit$C • Ghile the terms purpose, meaning, intent, and spirit are oftentimes interchangeably used by the courts, not entirely synonymous Legislati!e purpose A legislati!e purpose is the reason why a particular • statute was enacted by legislature$ Legislation Bis an acti!e instrument and go!ernment • which, for the purpose of interpretation means that laws ha!e ends to be achie!edC Legislati!e meaning • Legislati!e meaning is what the law, by its language, means$ Ghat it comprehendsH • Ghat it co!ers or embracesH • Ghat its limits or confines are$ • • Intent and )eaning 0 synonymous • If there is ambiguity in the language used in a statute, its purpose may indicate the meaning of the language and lead to what the legislati!e intent is Kraphical illustration 0 Federation of Free Farmers v CA. • RA 5o$ ;6+ %ec$ * 0 BIn absence of a written milling agreements between the ma2ority of the planters and the millers, the unrefined sugar as well as all by3 products shall be di!ided between themC • RA ;6+ %ec$ + 0 B4he proceeds of any increase in participation granted by the planters under this act and abo!e their present share shall be di!ided between the planter and his laborer in the proportion of 86N laborer and 96N planterC 4o gi!e literal import in interpreting the two section • will defeat the purpose of the Act
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4he purpose &ontinuous production of sugar o 4o grant the laborers a share in the increased o participation of planters in the sugar produce 4he legislati!e intent is, thus to ma1e the act operati!e irrespecti!e of whether there eists a milling agreement between central and the sugar planters$
)atters in.uired into in construing a statute • BIt is not enough to ascertain the intention of the statuteH it is also necessary to see whether the intention or meaning has been epressed in such a way as to gi!e it legal effect or !alidityC • 4hus 4he ob2ect of in.uiry is not only to 1now what the legislature used sufficiently epresses that meaning$ 4he legal act is made up of : elements internal 0 intention o eternal3 epression o /ailure of the latter may defeat the former •
Ghere legislati!e intent is ascertained • 4he primary source of legislati!e intent is the statute itself$ If the statute as a whole fails to indicate the legislati!e • intent because of ambiguity, the court may loo1 beyond the statute such as Legislati!e history 0 what was in the o legislati!e mind at the time the statute was enactedH what the circumstances wereH what e!il was meant to be redressed Purpose of the statute 0 the reason or cause o which induced the enactment of the law, the mischief to be suppressed, and the policy which dictated its passage when all these means fail, loo1 into the effect o of the law$
If the -rd means (effect of the law" is first used, it will be 2udicial legislation
POWER TO CONSTRUE
&onstruction is a 2udicial function • It is the court that has the final word as to what the law means$ It construes laws as it decide cases based on fact and • the law in!ol!ed Laws are interpreted in the contet of a peculiar factual • situation of each case • &ircumstances of time, place, e!ent, person and particularly attendant circumstances and actions before, during and after the operati!e fact ha!e ta1en their totality so that 2ustice can be rationally and fairly dispensed$ )oot and academic 0 • Purpose has become stale o 5o practical relief can be granted o Relief has no practical effect o
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Keneral rule (on mootness" 0 dismiss the case Eception o If capable of repetition, yet e!ading re!iew Public interest re.uires its resolution Rendering decision on the merits would be of practical !alue
Legislati!e cannot o!errule 2udicial construction • It cannot preclude the courts from gi!ing the statute different interpretation • Legislati!e 0 enact laws • Eecuti!e3 to eecute laws #udicial3 interpretation and application • If the legislature may declare what a law means 0 it • will cause confusionit will be !iolati!e of the fundamental principles of the constitution of separation powers$ Legislati!e construction is called resolution or • declaratory act
Endencia v David Eplains why legislati!e cannot o!errule %upreme • &ourts decision Perfecto v. Meer Art$ ; %ec$ + *+-7 &onstitution 0 %&s interpretation • Bshall recei!e such compensation as may be fied by law, which shall not be diminished during their continuance in officeC 0 eempt from income ta Legislati!e passed RA 7+6 %ec$ *- 0 Bno salary • whene!er recei!ed by any public officer of the Republic shall be considered eempt from the income ta, payment of which is hereby declared not to be a diminution of his compensation fied by the &onstitution or by lawC %ource of confusion • >iolati!e of principle on separation of powers • RA 7+6 %ec *- 0 unconstitutional • Art ; %ec$ + *+-7 0 repealed by Art$ *7 %ec$ 8 *+• &onstitution 0 Bno salary or any form of emolument of any public officer or employee, including constitutional officers, shall be eempt from payment of income taC 4hus, 2udiciary is not eempt from payment of ta • anymore Ghen 2udicial interpretation may be set aside BInterpretations may be set aside$C 4he interpretation • of a statute or a constitutional pro!ision by the courts is not so sacrosanct as to be beyond modification or nullification$ 4he %upreme &ourt itself may, in an appropriate case • change or o!errule its pre!ious construction$ 4he rule that the %upreme &ourt has the final word in • the interpretation or construction of a stature merely means that the legislature cannot, by law or resolution, modify or annul the 2udicial construction without
modifying or repealing the !ery statute which has been the sub2ect of construction$ It can, and it has done so, by amending or repealing the statute, the conse.uence of which is that the pre!ious 2udicial construction of the statute is modified or set aside accordingly$ Ghen court may construe statute • B4he court may construe or interpret a statute under the condition that 4@ERE I% DOF'4 OR A)'IKFI4MC Ambiguity 0 a condition of admitting : or more • meanings$ %usceptible of more than one interpretation$ Only when the law is ambiguous or doubtful of • meaning may the court interpret or construe its intent$ &ourt may not construe where statute is clear • A statute that is clear and unambiguous is not susceptible of interpretations$ • /irst and fundamental duty of court 0 to apply the law • &onstruction 0 !ery last function which the court should eercise Law is clear 0 no room for interpretation, only room • for application &ourts cannot enlarge or limit the law if it is clear and • free from ambiguity (e!en if law is harsh or onerous • A meaning that does not appear nor is intended or reflected in the !ery language of the statute cannot be placed therein by construction Manikan v. Tanodbayan %ec$ PD **83A 0 Bsole police authorityC of EPA • officials may not be construed as an eception to, or limitation on, the authority of the 4anodbayan to in!estigate complaints for !iolation of the anti3graft law committed by the EPA officials EPAs power 0 not eclusi!eH BsoleC refers to police • authority not emplyed to describe other power Lapid v. CA Issue whether or not the decision of the Ombudsman • imposing a penalty of suspension of one year without pay is immediately eecutory Administrati!e &ode and LK& 0 not suppletory to • Ombudsman Act 4hese three laws are related or deal with public • officers, but are totally different statutes •
An administrati!e agency tas1ed to implement a statute may not construe it by epanding its meaning where its pro!isions are clear and unambiguous
Land ank v. CA DAR interpreted BdepositsC to include trust accountsC • %& held that BdepositsC is limited only to cash and • L'P bonds Libanan v. !"ET Issue whether ballots not signed at the bac1 by the • chairman of the 'oard of Election Inspectors ('EI" are spurious, since it !iolated %ec$ :9 RA *88
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Rulings of %upreme &ourt part of legal system Art$ ; && 0 B#udicial decisions applying or • interpreting the laws or the &onstitution shall form part of the legal system of the PhilippinesC •
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Legis interpretato #egis vim obtinet 0 authoritati!e interpretation of the %& of a statute ac.uires the force of law by becoming a part thereof as of the date of its enactment , since the courts interpretation merely establishes the contemporaneous legislati!e intent that the statute thus construed intends to effectuate Stare decisis et non $%ieta novere & when the %& has once laid down a principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply it to all future casese where the facts are substantially the same /or stability and certainty o %upreme &ourt becomes, to the etent applicable, the criteria that must control the actuations not only of those called upon to abide thereby but also of those duty3bound to enforce obedience thereto$ %& rulings are binding on inferior courts
#udicial rulings ha!e no retroacti!e effect • Le prospicit not respicit 3 the law loo1s forward, not bac1ward • Rationale Retroacti!e application of a law usually di!est rights that ha!e already become !ested or impairs he obligations of contract and hence is unconstitutional$ Peo !$ #abinal • Peo ! )acarandang 0 peace officer eempted from issuance of license of firearms 0 included a secret agent hired by a go!ernor Peo$ !$ )apa 0 abandoned doctrine of )acarandang in • *+8 4he present case, #abinal was arraigned while the • )acarandang Doctrine was still pre!ailing, howe!er, the decision was promulgated when the )apa doctrine was in place • 4he &ourt held that #abinal is ac.uitted using stare decisis doctrine and retroacti!ity doctrine Co. v. CA On 'P ::, &o is ac.uitted in relying on the &ircular • issuedH ue doctrine, which con!icted ue under 'P ::, was not gi!en retroacti!e application "oa v. Co##ector of C%stoms • Fsed 2us soli (place of birth" • %& fa!ored 2us sanguinis (by blood" @owe!er, the abandonment of the principle of 2us soli • did not di!est the citienship of those who, by !irtue of the principle before its re2ection, became of were declared citiens of the Philippines en'onan v. CA Issue when to count the 73year period to repurchase • land granted &A *9*
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)onge ! Angeles (*+7" and 4upas ! Damaso (*+;9" 0 from the date of con!eyance or foreclosure sale 'elisario !$ IA& (*+;;" 0 from the period after the epiration of the *3year period of repurchase 4he %& held that the doctrine that should apply is that which was enunciated in )onge and 4upas because the transactions in!ol!ed too1 place prior to 'elisario and not that which was laid down in the latter case which should be applied prospecti!ely
&ourt may issue guidelines in construing statute • In construing a statute, the enforcement of which may tread on sensiti!e areas of constitutional rights, the court may issue guidelines in applying the statute, not to enlarge or restrict it but to clearly delineate what the law is$ Peo. v. Ferrer • Ghat acts that may be considered liable under the Anti3%ub!ersion Act Mora#es v. Enri#e Rights of a person under custodial in!estigation •
"P v. CA( Mo#ina Kuidelines for ascertaining psychological incapacity of • an erring spouse in a !oid marriage under Art$ -8 /& LIMITATIONS ON POWER TO CONSTRUE
&ourts may not enlarge nor restrict statutes • &ourts are not authoried to insert into the law what they thin1 should be in it or to supply what they the legislature would ha!e supplied if its intention had been called to the omission$ • 4hey should not by construction, re!ise e!en the most arbitrary or unfair action of the legislature, nor rewrite the law to conform to what they thin1 should be the law$ 5either should the courts construe statutes which are • perfectly !ague for it !iolates due process /ailure to accord persons fair notice of the o conduct to a!oid Lea!e law enforcers unbridled discretion in o carrying out its pro!isions • : leading stars on 2udicial construction Kood faith o commonsense o • an utterly !ague act on its face cannot be clarified by either a sa!ing clause or by construction &ourts not to be influenced by .uestions of wisdom • &ourts do not sit to resol!e the merit of conflicting theories &ourts do not pass upon .uestion of wisdom, 2ustice or • epediency of legislation, for its not within their pro!ince to super!ise legislation and 1eep it within the bounds of common sense$
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CHAPTER THREE: A!"s to Construt!on •
IN GENERAL
Kenerally • Ghere the meaning of a statue is ambiguous, the court is warranted in a!ailing itself of all illegitimate aids to construction in order that it can ascertain the true intent of the statute$ •
4he aids to construction are those found in the printed page of the statute itselfH 1now as the intrinsic aids, and those etraneous facts and circumstances outside the printed page, called e)trinsic aids$
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It is used as an aid, in case of doubt in its language to its construction and to ascertaining legislati!e will$ If the meaning of the statute is obscure, courts may resort to the title to clear the obscurity$ 4he title may indicate the legislati!e intent to etend or restrict the scope of law, and a statute couched in a language of doubtful import will be constructed to conform to the legislati!e intent as disclosed in its title$ Resorted as an aid where there is doubt as to the meaning of the law or as to the intention of the legislature in enacting it, and not otherwise$ %er!e as a guide to ascertaining legislati!e intent carries more weight in this 2urisdiction because of the constitutional re.uirement that Be!ery bill shall embrace only one sub2ect who shall be epressed in the title thereof$ 4he constitutional in2unction ma1es the title an indispensable part of a statute$
ag%io v. Marcos 4he .uestion raised is when to count the 96 yr period • to file a petition for reopening of cadastral proceedings (to settle and ad2udicate the titles to the !arious lots embraced in the sur!ey" as authoried by RA +-* co!ering the lands that ha!e been or about to be declared land of public domain, by !irtue of 2udicial proceedings instituted w=in the 96 years net preceding the appro!al of this act$ • 4he .uestion is as1ed if the proceeding be reopened originally instituted in court April *:, *+*: or 5o!ember :7, *+::, the counted date form which the decision therein rendered became final$ Petition was filed on #uly :7, *+8* 4itle of the Law BAn Act to authorie the filing in the • proper court under certain conditions of certain claims of title to parcels of land that ha!e been declared public land, by !irtue of the appro!al of this act$C 4here was an apparent inconsistency between the title • and body of the law$ It ruled that the starting date to count the period is the • date the final decision was rendered$
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It recites that it authories court proceedings of claims to parcels of land declared public by !irtue of 2udicial decisions rendered within forty years net preceding the appro!al of this act$ 4hat title written in capital letters by &ongress itselfH such 1ind of title then is not to be classed with words or titles used by compilers of statues because it is the legislature spea1ing$ Gords by !irtue of 2udicial decisions rendered in the title of the law stand in e.ual importance to the phrase in %ections * thereof by !irtue of 2udicial proceedings instituted$ 4he court ruled that eamining Act no$ :;9 in detail was intended to apply to public lands only for the title of the act, always indicati!e of legislati!e intent$ 5o bill shall embrace more than one sub2ect, which sub2ect shall be epressed in the title of the bill, the words and for other purposes when found in the title ha!e been held to be without force or effect whatsoe!er and ha!e been altogether discarded in construing the Act$
Ebar#e v. S%ca#dito 4he issue is raised whether Eecuti!e order no$ :89 • entitled B Outlining the procedure by which complaints charging go!ernment officials and employees with commission of irregularities should be guidedC applies to criminal actions, to the end that no preliminary in!estigation thereof can be underta1en or information file in court unless there is pre!ious compliance with the eecuti!e order$ EO only applies to administrati!e and not to criminal • complaints$ 4he !ery title spea1s of commission of irregularities$ • Ghen resort to title not authoried • 4he tet of the statute is clear and free from doubt, it is improper to resort to its title to ma1e it obscure$ 4he title may be resorted to in order to remo!e, but not • to create doubt$ Preamble It is a part of the statute written immediately after its • title, which states the purpose, reason for the enactment of the law$ • Fsually epress in whereas clauses$ • Kenerally omitted in statutes passed by Phil$ &ommission • Phil$ Legislature • 5ational Assembly • &ongress of the Phil • 'atasang Pambansa • 4hese legislati!e bodies used the eplanatory note to • eplain the reasons for the enactment of statutes$ Etensi!ely used if Presidential decrees issued by the • President in the eercise of his legislati!e power$ Ghen the meaning of a statute is clear and • unambiguous, the preamble can neither epand nor restrict its operation, much less pre!ail o!er its tet$
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5or can be used as basis for gi!ing a statute a meaning$ Ghen the statute is ambiguous, the preamble can be resorted to clarify the ambiguity$ Preamble is the 1ey of the statute, to open the minds of the lawma1ers as to the purpose is achie!ed, the mischief to be remedied, and the ob2ect to be accomplished, by the pro!isions of the legislature$ )ay decide the proper construction to be gi!en to the statute$ )ay restrict to what otherwise appears to be a broad scope of law$ It may epress the legislati!e intent to ma1e the law apply retroacti!ely in which case the law has to be gi!en retroacti!e effect$
Illustration of rule Peop#e v. P%risima • A person was charged w= !iolation of PD + which penalies, among others, the carrying outside of ones residence any bladed, blunt or pointed weapon not used as a necessary tool or implement for li!elihood, with imprisonment ranging from fi!e to ten years$ uestion rose whether the carrying of such weapon • should be in relation to sub!ersion, rebellion, insurrection, lawless !iolence, criminality, chaos or public disorder as a necessary element of the crime$ 4he mere carrying of such weapon outside ones • residence is sufficient to constitute a !iolation of the law Pursuant to the preamble which spelled out the e!ents • that led to the enactment of the decree the clear intent and spirit of the decree is to re.uire the moti!ation mentioned in the preamble as in indispensable element of the crime$ 4he se!erity of the penalty for the !iolation of the • decree suggests that it is a serious offense, which may only be 2ustified by associating the carrying out of such bladed of blunt weapon with any of the purposes stated in its preamble$ Peo v. Ec*ave' • Issue whether a person who s.uatted on a pastoral land could be held criminally liable for the !iolation of PD : Bany person who, with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or ta1ing ad!antage of the absence or tolerance of the land owner, succeeds in occupying or possessing the property of the latter against his will for residential, commercial or any other purposes$ 4he decree was promulgated to sol!e the s.uatting • problem which according to its preamble is still a ma2or problem in urban communities all o!er the country and because many persons and entities found to ha!e been unlawfully occupying public and pri!ate lands belong to the affluent class$ 4he court said that crime may only be committed in • urban communities and not in agricultural and pastural lands because the preamble of the decree shows that it
was intended to apply for s.uatting in urban lands, more particularly to illegal constructions$ &ontet of whole tet 4o ascertain legislati!e intent is the statute itself ta1en • as a whole and in relation to one another considering the whole contet of the statute and not from an isolated part of the pro!ision$ • 4he meaning dictated by the contet pre!ails$ E!ery section, pro!ision, or clause of the statute must • be epounded by reference to each other in order to arri!e at the effect contemplated by the legislature$ Punctuation mar1s %emi3 colon 0 used to indicate a separation in the • relation of the thought, what follows must ha!e a relation to the same matter it precedes it$ • &omma and semi3 colon are use for the same purpose to di!ide sentences, but the semi 0 colon ma1es the di!ision a little more pronounce$ 'oth are not used to introduce a new idea$ Punctuation mar1s are aids of low degree and can • ne!er control against the intelligible meaning of written words$ An ambiguity of a statute which may be partially or • wholly sol!ed by a punctuation mar1 may be considered in the construction of a statute$ • 4he .ualifying effect of a word or phrase may be confined to its last antecedent if the latter is separated by a comma from the other antecedents$ An argument based on punctuation is not persuasi!e$ • Illustrati!e eamples F#orentino v. P+ • Bwho may be willing to accept the same for such settlementC 0 this implies discretion %& held only the last antecedent 0 Bany citien of the • Philippines or any association or corporation organied under the laws of the PhilippinesC pursuant to which bac1pay certificate3holders can • compel go!ernment3owned ban1s to accept said certificates for payment of their obligations subsisting at the time of the amendatory act was appro!ed +era v. ,arcia Bif the charge against such subordinate or employee • in!ol!es dishonesty, oppression, or gra!e misconduct or neglect in the performance of his dutyC BdishonestyC and BoppressionC 0 need not be • committed in the course of the performance of duty by the person charges Peo. v. S%bido %ubsidiary imprisonment in case of insol!ency • .ualifies both non3payment of indemnity and non3 payment of fine &apitaliation of letters • An aid of low degree in the construction of statute$
@eadnotes or epigraphs %econdary aids • 4hey are prefied to sections, or chapters of a statute • for ready reference or classification$ 5ot entitled too much weight, and inferences drawn • there from are of little !alue and they can ne!er control the plain terms of the enacting clauses, for they are not part of the law$ • 4he pro!isions of each article are controlling upon the sub2ect thereof and operate as a general rule for settling such .uestions as are embraced therein$ Ghen the tet of a statute is clear and unambiguous, • there is neither necessity nor propriety to resort to the headings or epigraphs of a section for interpretation of the tet, especially when they are mere reference aids indicating the general nature of the tet that follows$ Lingual tet Rule is that, unless pro!ided, where a statute is • promulgated in English and %panish, English shall go!ern but in case of ambiguity, %panish may be consulted to eplain the English tet$ A statute is officially promulgated in %panish or in • English, or in /ilipino • BIn the interpretation of a law or administrati!e issuance promulgated in all the official languages, the English tet shall control, unless otherwise pro!ided$ Intent or spirit of law • •
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It is the law itself$ &ontrolling factor, leading star and guiding light in the application and interpretation of a statute$ A statute must be according to its spirit or intent$ 4he courts cannot assume an intent in no way epressed and then construe the statute to accomplish the supposed intentionH otherwise they would pass beyond the bounds of 2udicial power to usurp legislati!e power$
Policy of law • %hould be gi!en effect by the 2udiciary$ • One way to accomplish this mandate is to gi!e a statute of doubtful meaning, a construction that will promote public policy$ Tinio v. Francis Policy of the law 0 to conser!e the land of the • homesteader not be sub2ect to encumbrance= alienation from the • date of the appro!al of the application and for a term of 7 years from and after the date of the issuance of the patent or grant from the ORDER for the issuance of patent o if literal interpretation is to be used, policy o will be defeated Ca-i%at v. Mat*ay policy 0 against double pensions for the same ser!ices •
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a law which grants retirable employees certain gratuity Bin addition to other benefits which they are entitled under eisting lawsC &A55O4 be construed as to authorie the grant of double gratuity Bother benefitsC may be Refund of contributions o Payment of the money !alue of accumulated o !acation and sic1 lea!es
Purpose of law or mischief to be suppressed •
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Intended to be remo!ed or suppressed and the causes which induced the enactment of the law are important factors to be considered in this construction$ Purpose or ob2ect of the law o )ischief intended to be remo!ed o &auses which induced the enactment of the o law )ust be read in such a way as to gi!e effect to the purpose pro2ected in the statute$ 4he purpose of the general rule is not determinati!e of the proper construction to be gi!en to the eceptions$ Purpose of statute is more important than the rules of grammar and logic in ascertaining the meaning
Dictionaries A statute does not define word or phrases used$ • Kenerally define words in their natural plain and • ordinary acceptance and significance$ &onse.uences of !arious constructions In.uired as an additional aid to interpretation$ • A construction of a statute should be re2ected that will • cause in2ustice and hardship, result in absurdity, defeat legislati!e intent or spirit, preclude accomplishment of legislati!e purpose or ob2ect, render certain words or phrases a surplusage, nullify the statute or ma1e any of its pro!isions nugatory$ Presumptions • 'ased on logic, eperience, and common sense, and in the absence of compelling reasons to the contrary, doubts as to the proper and correct construction of a statute will be resol!ed in fa!or of that construction which is in accord with the presumption on the matter$ &onstitutionality of a statute o &ompleteness o Prospecti!e operation o Right and 2ustice o Effecti!e, sensible, beneficial and reasonable o operation as a whole Against inconsistency and implied repeal o unnecessary changes in law impossibility absurdity in2ustice and hardship incon!enience ineffecti!eness$
LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
Kenerally A statute is susceptible of se!eral interpretations or • where there is ambiguity in the language, there is no better means of ascertaining the will and intention of the legislature than that which is afforded by the history of the statute$ Ghat constitutes legislati!e history @istory of a statute refers to all its antecedents from its • inception until its enactment into law$ Its history proper co!ers the period and the steps done • from the time the bill is introduced until it is finally passed by the legislature$ Ghat it includes • Presidents message if the bill is enacted in o response thereto, 4he eplanatory note accompanying the bill o &ommittee reports of legislati!e o in!estigations Public hearings on the sub2ect of the bill o %ponsorship speech o Debates and deliberations concerning the bill o Amendments and changes in phraseology in o which it undergoes before final appro!al thereof$ If the statute is based from a re!ision, a prior o statute, the latters practical application and 2udicial construction, >arious amendments it underwent o &ontemporary e!ents at the o Presidents message to legislature 4he president shall address the congress at the opening • of its regular session or appear before it at any other time$ • Fsually contains proposed legal measures$ Indicates his thin1ing on the proposed legislation, • when enacted into law, follows his line of thin1ing on the matter$ Eplanatory note A short eposition of eplanation accompanying a • proposed legislation by its author or proponent$ Ghere there is ambiguity in a statute or where a statute • is susceptible of more than one interpretation, courts may resort to the eplanatory note to clarify the ambiguity and ascertain the purpose or intent of the statute$ • Fsed to gi!e effect to the purpose or intent as disclosed in its eplanatory note$ A statute affected or changed an eisting law and the • eplanatory note to the bill which has e!entually enacted into a law states that the purpose is too simply to secure the prompt action on a certain matter by the officer concerned and not to change the eisting lawH the statute should be construed to carry out such purpose$
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It may be used as a basis for gi!ing a statute a meaning that is inconsistent with what is epressed in the tet of the statute$
Legislati!e debates, !iews and deliberations &ourts may a!ail to themsel!es the actual proceedings • of the legislati!e body to assist in determining the construction of a statute of doubtful meaning$ 4here is doubt to what a pro!ision of a statute means, • that meaning which was put to the pro!ision during the legislati!e deliberation or discussion on the bill may be adopted$ >iews epressed are as to the bills purpose, meaning • or effect are not controlling in the interpretation of the law$ • It is impossible to determine with authority what construction was put upon an act by the members of the legislati!e body that passed the bill$ 4he opinions epressed by legislators in the course of • debates concerning the application of eisting laws are not also gi!en decisi!e weight, especially where the legislator was not a member of the assembly that enacted the said laws$ • Ghen a statute is clear and free from ambiguity, courts will not in.uire into the moti!es which influence the legislature or indi!idual members, in !oting for its passageH no indeed as to the intention of the draftsman, or the legislators, so far as it has not been epressed into the act$ Reports of commissions &ommissions are usually formed to compile and • collate all laws on a particular sub2ect and to prepare the draft of the proposed code$ Prior laws from which statute is based • &ourts are permitted to prior laws on the same sub2ect and to in!estigate the antecedents of the statute in!ol!ed$ 4his is applicable in the interpretation of codes, • re!ised or compiled statutes, for the prior law which ha!e been codified, compiled or re!ised will show the legislati!e history that will clarify the intent of the law or shed light on the meaning and scope of the codified or re!ised statute$ Peo. v. Manantan Issue whether or not 2ustice of peace is included • &ontention of )anantan, who is a 2ustice of peace, is • that the omission of B2ustice of peaceC re!ealed the intention of the legislature to eclude such from its operation @eld contention denied$ In holding that the word • B2udgeC includes B2ustice of peaceC, the &ourt said that Ba re!iew of the history of the Re!ised Election &ode will help 2ustify and clarify the abo!e conclusionC Director of Lands v. Abaya • Ghen to count the *63year period, either from the date the decision was rendered or from the date 2udicial proceedings instituted in cadastral cases
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@eld court resol!ed the issue by referring to 9 older laws which ha!e in common that counting of the period starts from the date of the institution of the 2udicial proceeding and not from the date the 2udgment is rendered
Sa#aysay v. Castro • BActually holdingC < Blastly electedC 4hus, a !ice mayor acting as mayor is not included in • the pro!ision &hange in phraseology by amendments Intents to change the meaning of the pro!ision$ • A statute has undergone se!eral amendments, each • amendment using different phraseology, the deliberate selection of language differing from that of the earlier act on the sub2ect indicates that a change in meaning of the law was intended and courts should so construe that statute as to reflect such change in meaning$ Commissioner of C%stoms v. CTA Bnational portC (new law" not the same as Bany portC • (old law"H otherwise, BnationalC will be a surplusage Amendment by deletion Deletion of certain words or phrases in a statute • indicates that the legislature intended to change the meaning of the statute, for the presumption is that the legislation would not ha!e made the deletion had the intention been not effect a change in its meaning$ A statute containing a pro!ision prohibiting the doing • of a certain thing is amended by deleting such pro!ision$ ,#oria v. CA • Issue whether a public officer or employee, who has been pre!enti!ely suspended pending in!estigation of the administrati!e charges against him, is entitled to his salary and other benefits during such pre!enti!e suspension @eld &ourt answered in the negati!e because such • pro!ision with regard to payment of salaries during suspension was deleted in the new law %enaseda v. F#avier • Ombusman and his deputy can only pre!enti!ely suspend respondents in administrati!e cases who are employed in his office, and not those who are employees in other department or offices of the go!ernment Eceptions to the rule (of amendment by deletion" • An amendment of the statue indicates a change in meaning from that which the statute originally had applies only when the intention is clear to change the pre!ious meaning of the old law$ Rules dont apply when the intent is clear that the • amendment is precisely to plainly epress the construction of the act prior to its amendment because
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its language is not sufficiently epressi!e of such construction$ /re.uently, words do not materially affect the sense will be omitted from the statute as incorporated in the code or re!ised statute, or that some general idea will be epressed in brief phrases$
Adopted statutes • /oreign statutes are adopted in this country or from local laws are patterned form parts of the legislati!e history of the latter$ Local statutes are patterned after or copied from those • of another country, the decision of the courts in such country construing those laws are entitled to great weight in the interpretation of such local statutes$ Limitations of rule A statute which has been adopted from that of a • foreign country should be construed in accordance with the construction gi!en it in the country of origin is not without limitations$ Principles of common law • Qnown as Anglo3American 2urisprudence which is no in force in this country, sa!e only insofar as it is founded on sound principles applicable to local conditions and is not in conflict with eisting law, ne!ertheless, many of the principles of the common law ha!e been imported into this 2urisdiction as a result of the enactment of laws and establishment of institutions similar to those of the F%$
&onditions at time of enactment In enacting a statute, the legislature is presumed to • ha!e ta1en into account the eisting conditions of things at the time of its enactment$ In the interpretations of a statute, consider the physical • conditions of the country and the circumstances then obtain understanding as to the intent of the legislature or as to the meaning of the statute$ @istory of the times • A court may loo1 to the history of the times, eamining the state of things eisting when the statute was enacted$ A statute should not be construed in a spirit as if it • were a protoplasm floating around in space$ • In determining the meaning, intent, and purpose of a law or constitutional pro!ision, the history of the times of which I grew and to which it may be rationally supposed to bear some direct relationship, the e!ils intended to be remedied and the good to be accomplished are proper sub2ects of in.uiry$ Law being a manifestation of social culture and • progress must be interpreted ta1ing into consideration the stage of such culture and progress including all the concomitant circumstances$
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opinion that the go!ernment is entitled to ha!e and recei!e the money in .uestion, e!en though the sugar was shipped from a pri!ate wharf
Law is not a watertight compartment sealed or shut off from the contact with the drama of life which unfolds before our eyes$
CONTEMPORARY CONSTRUCTION
Kenerally Are the constructions placed upon statutes at the time • of, or after their enactment by the eecuti!e, legislati!e or 2udicial authorities, as well as by those who in!ol!e in the process of legislation are 1nowledgeable of the intent and purpose of the law$ &ontemporary construction is strongest in law$ • Eecuti!e construction, generallyH 1inds of Is the construction placed upon the statute by an • eecuti!e or administrati!e officer$ • 4hree types of interpretation &onstruction by an eecuti!e or o administrati!e officer directly called to implement the law$ &onstruction by the secretary of 2ustice in his o capacity as the chief legal ad!iser of the go!ernment$ @anded down in an ad!ersary proceeding in o the form of a ruling by an eecuti!e officer eercising .uasi32udicial power$ Geight accorded to contemporaneous construction • Ghere there is doubt as to the proper interpretation of a statute, the uniform construction placed upon it by the eecuti!e or administrati!e officer charged with its enforcement will be adopted if necessary to resol!e the doubt$ 4rue epression of the legislati!e purpose, especially if • the construction is followed for a considerable period of time$ +est#e P*i#ippines /nc. v. CA • Reasons for why interpretation of an administrati!e agency is generally accorded great respect Emergence of multifarious needs of a o moderniing society Also relates to eperience and growth of o specialied capabilities by the administrati!e agency 4hey ha!e the competence, epertness, o eperience and informed 2udgment, and the fact that they fre.uently are the drafters of the law they interpret P*i#ippine S%gar Centra# v. Co##ector of C%stoms Issue whether the go!ernment can legally collect • duties Bas a charge for wharfageC re.uired by a statute upon all articles eported through pri!ately3owned whar!es • @eld the court reasoned in the affirmati!e by saying Bthe language of the Act could ha!e been made more specific and certain, but in !iew of its history, its long continuous construction, and what has been done and accomplished by and under it, we are clearly of the
Geight accorded to usage and practice &ommon usage and practice under the statute, or a • course of conduct indicating a particular underta1ing of it, especially where the usage has been ac.uiesced in by all the parties concerned and has etended o!er a long period of time$ •
Optim%s interpres rer%m %s%s & the best interpretation of the law is usage$
&onstruction of rules and regulations 4his rule3ma1ing power, authorities sustain the • principle that the interpretation by those charged with their enforcement is entitled to great weight by the court in the latters construction of such rules and regulations$ Reasons why contemporaneous construction is gi!en much weight It is entitled to great weight because it comes from the • particular branch of go!ernment called upon to implement the law thus construed$ Are presumed to ha!e familiaried themsel!es with all • the considerations pertinent to the meaning and purpose of the law, and to ha!e formed an independent, conscientious and competent epert opinion thereon
Ghen contemporaneous construction disregarded Ghen there is no ambiguity in the law$ • If it is clearly erroneous, the same must be declared • null and !oid$ Erroneous contemporaneous construction does not preclude correction nor create rightsH eceptions 4he doctrine of estoppel does not preclude correction • of the erroneous construction by the officer himself by his successor or by the court in an appropriate case$ An erroneous contemporeaneous construction creates • no !ested right on the part of those relied upon, and followed such construction$ Legislati!e interpretation 4a1e form of an implied ac.uiescence to, or appro!al • of, an eecuti!e or 2udicial construction of a statute$ 4he legislature cannot limit or restrict the power • granted to the courts by the constitution$ Legislati!e appro!al • Legislati!e is presumed to ha!e full 1nowledge of a contemporaneous or practical construction of a statute by an administrati!e or eecuti!e officer charged with its enforcement$
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4he legislature may appro!e or ratify such contemporaneous construction$ )ay also be showmen by the legislature appropriating money for the officer designated to perform a tas1 pursuant to interpretation of a statute$ Legislati!e ratification is e.ui!alent to a mandate$
Reenactment • )ost common act of appro!al$ 4he re3enactment of a statute, pre!iously gi!en a • contemporaneous construction is persuasi!e indication of the adoption by the legislature of the prior construction$ Re3enactment if accorded greater weight and respect • than the contemporaneous construction of the statute before its ratification$ %tare decisis • #udicial interpretation of a statute and is of greater weight than that of an eecuti!e or administrati!e officer in the construction of other statutes of similar import$ It is an in!aluable aid in the construction or • interpretation of statutes of doubtful meaning$ %tare decisis et non .uieta mo!ere 0 one should follow • past precedents and should not disturb what has been settled$ • %upreme &ourt has the constitutional duty not only of interpreting and applying the law in accordance with prior doctrines but also of protecting society from the impro!idence and wantonness wrought by needless uphea!als in such interpretations and applications •
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In order that it will come within the doctrine of stare decisis, must be categorically stated on an issue epressly raised by the partiesH it must be a direct ruling, not merely an obiter dictum Obiter dictum 0 opinion epressed by a court upon some .uestion of law which is not necessary to the decision of the case before itH not binding as a precedent 4he principle presupposes that the facts of the precedent and the case to which it is applied are substantially the same$ Ghere the facts are dissimilar, then the principle of stare decisis does not apply$ 4he rule of stare decisis is not absolute$ It does not apply when there is a conflict between the precedent and the law$ 4he duty of the court is to forsa1e and abandon any doctrine or rule found to be in !iolation of law in force Inferior courts as well as the legislature cannot abandon a precedent enunciated by the %& ecept by way of repeal or amendment of the law itself
CHAPTER FOUR: A"$erene to, or "e#arture %ro&, 'an(ua(e o% statute LITERAL INTERPRETATION
Literal meaning or plain3meaning rule
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Keneral rule if statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be gi!en its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation >erba legis o Inde animi sermo 0 speech is the inde of o intention Gords employed by the legislature in a o statute correctly epress its intent or will >erba legis non est recedendum 0 from the o words of a statute there should be no departure 4hus, what is not clearly pro!ided in the law o cannot be etended to those matters outside its scope #udicial legislation 0 an encroachment upon legislati!e prerogati!e to define the wisdom of the law &ourts must administer the law as they find it o without regard to conse.uences
+ationa# Federation of Labor v. +L"C Employees were claiming separation pay on the basis • of Art$ :;- Labor &ode which states that Bemployer )AM also terminate the employment of an employeeC for reasons therein by ser!ing notice thereof and paying separation pay to affected employees • 4here was compulsory ac.uisition by the go!ernment of the employers land (Patalon &oconut Estate" for purposes of agrarian reform which forced the employer to cease his operation • Issue whether or not employer is liable for separation pay @eld 5O, employer is not liable for separation payS • It is a unilateral and !oluntary act by the o employer if he wants to gi!e separation pay 4his is gleaned from the wording B)AMC in o the statute B)AMC denotes that it is directory in nature o and generally permissi!e only Plain3meaning rule is applicable o Ano yun, ipapasara ng go!ernment tapos o magbabayad pa ang employer ng separation payS Ang daya3dayaS Lugi na nga si employer, 1i1ita pa si employeeS FnfairS &annot beS 5oS 5oS 4o depart from the meaning epressed by the o words is to alter the statute, to legislate and not interpret )aledicta est eposition .uae corrumpit o tetum 0 dangerous construction which is against the tet Dura le sed le Dura le sed le 0 the law may be harsh but it is still • the law • Absoluta sentential epositore non indigent 0 when the language of the law is clear, no eplanation of it is re.uired Ghen the law is clear, it is not susceptible of • interpretation$ It must be applied regardless of who may be affected, e!en if it may be harsh or onerous
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@oc .uidem per.uam durum est, sed ital e scripta est 0 it is eceedingly hard but so the law is written A decent regard to the legislati!e will shoud inhibit the court from engaging in 2udicial legislation to change what it thin1s are unrealistic statutes that do not conform with ordinary eperience or practice (respeto nalang sa ating mga mambabatasS Ghate!erS @aha 2o1e only" If there is a need to change the law, amend or repeal it, remedy may be done through a legislati!e process, not by 2udicial decree Ghere the law is clear, appeals to 2ustice and e.uity as 2ustification to construe it differently are una!ailing 0 Philippines is go!erned by &I>IL LAG or PO%I4I>E LAG, not common law E.uity is a!ailable only in the absence of law and not its replacement 0 (so, pag may law, walang e.uity e.uityS Pero pag walang law, pwedeng mag3e.uity, getsS$$$ important toS" Ae.uitas nun.uam contra!enit legis 0 e.uity ne!er acts in contra!ention of the law
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Ratio legis 0 interpretation according to the spirit or reason of the law %pirit or intention of a statute pre!ails o!er the letter A law should accordingly be so construed as to be in accordance with, and not repugnant to, the spirit of the law Presumption undesirable conse.uences were ne!er intended by a legislati!e measure
Literal import must yield to intent • >erba intentioni, non e contra, debent inser!ire 0 words ought to be more subser!ient to the intent and not the intent to the words (ahhh parang intent is to woman as word is to man 0 so man is subser!ient to woman logicalS" Kuide in ascertaining intent 0 conscience and e.uity • %o it is possible that a statute may be etended to cases • not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent Limitation of rule &onstrue (intent o!er letter" only if there is ambiguityS •
DEPARTURE FROM LITERAL INTERPRETATION
%tatute must be capable of interpretation, otherwise inoperati!e • If no 2udicial certainty can be had as to its meaning, the court is not at liberty to supply nor to ma1e one Santiago v. COMELEC In this case, the &ourt adopted a literal meaning thus, • concluded that RA 8-7 is inade.uate to implement the power of the people to amend the &onstitution (initiati!e on amendments" for the following reasons Does not suggest an initiati!e on amendments o on to the &onstitution because it is silent as to amendments on the &onstitution and the word B&onstitutionC is neither germane nor rele!ant to said section Does not pro!ide for the contents of a petition o for initiati!e on the &onstitution Does not pro!ide for subtitles for initiati!e on o the &onstitution RA is incomplete and does not pro!ide a o sufficient standard #ustice Puno (anoS #ustice 4reeS" dissents • Legislati!e intent is also shown by the o deliberations on the bill that became RA 8-7 (there are 9 more reasons 0 see page *-63*-*, which are not so important" • Interpretation of RA 8-7 was not in 1eeping with the maim interpretation fienda est ut res magis !aleat .uam pereat 0 that interpretation as will gi!e the thing efficacy is to be adopted Ghat is within the spirit is within the law • Dont literally construe the law if it will render it meaningless, lead to ambiguity, in2ustice or contradiction 4he spirit of the law controls its letter •
&onstruction to accomplish purpose PFRPO%E or REA%O5 which induced the enactment • of the statute 0 1ey to open the brain of the legislature= legislati!e intentS • %tatutes should be construed in the light of the ob2ect to be achie!ed and the e!il or mischief to be suppressed As between two statutory interpretations, that which • better ser!es the purpose of the law should pre!ail Sarcos v. Casti##o • 4his case eplains why legislati!e purpose to determine legislati!e intent • /ran1furter Legislati!e words are not inert but deri!ed o !itality from the ob!ious purposes at which they are aimed Legislation 0 wor1ing instrument of o go!ernment and not merely as a collection of English words 'en2amin 5atham &ardoo • Legislation is more than a composition o It is an acti!e instrument of go!ernment o which means that laws ha!e ends to be achie!ed • @olmes Gords are fleible o 4he general purpose is a more important aid o to the meaning than any rule which grammar or formal logic may lay down &ourts are apt to err by stic1ing too closely to o the words of law where those words import a policy that goes beyond them Soriano v. Offs*ore S*ipping and Manning Corp • A literal interpretation is to be re2ected if it would be un2ust or lead to absurd results
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Illustration of rule 0ing v. !ernande' •
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Issue whether or not a &hinese (parang si RA and %erge" may be employed in a non3control position in a retail establishment, a wholly nationalied business under RA **;6 Retail 4rade Law (btw, wala na tong law na Tto$ It has been repealed by the Retail 4rade Liberaliation Act 0 my thesisS " @eld 5oS (1asi duduraan 1a lang ng mga intsi1S #o1e onlyS" the law has to be construed with the Anti3 Dummy Law 0 prohibiting an alien from inter!ening in the management, operation, administration or control thereof Ghen the law says you cannot employ such alien, you cannot employ an alienS 4he unscrupulous alien may resort to flout the law or defeat its purposeS (maggulang daw mga intsi1 ultimo tubig sa pasig ri!er, which is supposed to be free, bottles it and then sells itS @uwatS" It is imperati!e that the law be interpreted in a manner that would sta!e off any attempt at circum!ention of the legislati!e purpose
%stamante v. +L"C Issue how to compute for bac1wages to which an • illegally dismissed employee would be entitled until his actual reinstatement (ta1e note of this case$$ its a labor case 1iliti ni Kolangco" - ways • o *st 0 before Labor &ode 0 to be deducted from the amount of bac1wages is the earnings elsewhere during the period of illegal dismissal :nd 0 Labor &ode Art$ :+ 0 the amount of o bac1wages is fied without deductions or .ualifications but limited to not more than years o -rd 0 amended Art$ :+ 0 full bac1wages or without deductions from the time the laborers compensation was withheld until his actual reinstatement •
4he clear legislati!e intent of the amendment in RA 8*7 (Labor &ode" is to gi!e more benefits to wor1ers than was pre!iously gi!en them under the )ercury Drug rule or the * st way
1S v. Toribio • 4he prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption so long as these animals are fit for agricultural wor1= draft purposes was a Breasonable necessary limitationC on pri!ate ownership Purpose or ob2ect of the law 0 to protect large cattle • against theft and to ma1e easy reco!ery and return of such cattle to their owners, when lost, strayed or stolen •
Issue whether the slaughter of large cattle outside the municipal slaughterhouse without a permit by the municipal treasurer is prohibited
@eld ME%S Outside or inside without permit is prohibited
ocobo v. Estanis#ao Issue whether the &/I and a municipal court in the • capital of a pro!ince ha!e concurrent 2urisdiction o!er the crime of libel • RP& 0 grants 2urisdiction with &/I • #udiciary Act grants 2urisdiction with the municipal court in the capital of a pro!ince in offenses where the penalty is not more than prission correctional or fine not eceeding 8,666Php (penalty for libel" %o ano naS • ,odines v. CA Patent Law 0 grants the patentee the eclusi!e right to • ma1e, use, and sell his patented machine, article or product • Doctrine of e.ui!alents 0 when a de!ice appropriates a prior in!ention by incorporating its inno!ati!e concept, and albeit with some modification and change, performs substantially the same function in substantially the same way to achie!e substantially the same result (ano ba TtoS Puro substantially" P#anters Association of So%t*ern +egros /nc. v. Ponferrada : apparently conflicting pro!isions should be • construed as to realie the purpose of the law • 4he purpose of the law is to I5&REA%E the wor1ers benefits 'enefits under RA 8+;: shall be I5 ADDI4IO5 to the • benefits under RA ;6+ and PD 8:* B%ubstitutedC cannot be gi!en literal interpretation • Ghen reason of law ceases, law itself ceases • 4he reason which induced the legislature to enact a law is the heart of the law &essante ratione legis, cessat et ipsa le 0 when the • reason of the law ceases, the law itself ceases Ratio legis est anima 0 reason of the law is its soul • Peo v. A#m%ete Agricultural 4enancy Act is repealed by the • Agricultural Land Reform &ode Agricultural 4enancy Act 0 punishes prereaping or • prethreshing of palay on a date other than that pre!iously set without the mutual consent of the landlord and tenant %hare tenancy relationship o Agricultural Land Reform &ode 0 abolished share • tenancy relationship, thus does not punish prereaping or prethreshing of palay on a date other than that pre!iously set without the mutual consent of the landlord and tenant anymore Leasehold system o Commendador v. De 2i##a Issue whether PD -+, which withdrew the right to • peremptorily challenge members of a military tribunal,
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had been rendered inoperati!e by PD :697 proclaiming the termination of a state of martial law @eld ME%S 4he termination of the martial law and the dissolution of military tribunals created thereunder, the reason for the eistence of PD -+ ceased automatically and the decree itself ceased
2as$%e' v. ,iap • Ghere the mischief sought to be remedied by a statute has already been remo!ed in a gi!en situation, the statute may no longer apply in such case 4he law bans aliens from ac.uiring and owning lands, • the purpose is to preser!e the nations lands for future generations of /ilipinos A sale of land in fa!or of an alien, in !iolation of the • said law, no longer be .uestioned after the alien becomes a /ilipino citien %upplying legislati!e omission • if it is clearly ascertainable from the &O54E4S • )ay supply legislati!e omission to ma1e the statute conform to ob!ious intent of the legislature or to pre!ent the act from being absurd 5ote differentiate from 2udicial legislation •
&orrecting clerical errors As long as the meaning intended is apparent on the • face of the whole enactment and no specific pro!ision is abrogated 4his is not 2udicial legislation •
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'ecause the President is not a Blocal chief eecuti!eC but under %ec$ 76 of the Local Ko!ernment &ode, the BPresident, Ko!ernor, )ayor ha!e the eecuti!e power to appoint in order to fill !acancies in local councils or to suspend local officials
ualification of rule (of correcting clerical errors" Only those which are clearly clerical errors or ob!ious • mista1es, omissions, and misprintsH otherwise, is to rewrite the law and in!ade the domain of the legislature, it is 2udicial legislation in the guise of interpretation &onstruction to a!oid absurdity Reason it is always presumed that the legislature • intended eceptions to its language which would a!oid conse.uences of this character 4hus, statutes may be etended to co!er cases not • within the literal meaning of the terms if their eact and literal import would lead to absurd or mischie!ous results Interpretation talis in ambiguis simper fienda est ut • e!itetur incon!eniens et absurdum 0 where there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will a!oid incon!enience and absurdity is to be adopted &ourts test the law by its results 0 if law appears to be • arbitrary, courts are not bound to apply it in sla!ish disobedience to its language • &ourts should construe a statute to effectuate, and not to defeat, its pro!isionsH nor render compliance with its pro!isions impossible to perform
Illustration rule "%fino Lope' 3 Sons /nc. v. CTA • &ourt change the phrase Bcollector of customsC to Bcommissioner of customsC to correct an ob!ious mista1e in law %ec 0 Bcommissioner of customsC 0 grants the &4A • 2urisdiction to re!iew decisions of the &ommissioner of &ustoms %ec ** 0 Bcollector of customsC 0 refers to the decision • of the &ollector of &ustoms that may be appealed to the ta court • B&ommissionerC pre!ails 0 &ommissioner of &ustoms has super!ision and control o!er &ollectors of &ustoms and the decisions of the latter are re!iewable by the &ommissioner of &ustoms Lamp v. P*ipps BOrdinary &OFR4% of lawC to BOrdinary &OFR%E of • lawC Farinas v. arba Issue who is the appointing power to fill a !acancy • created by the sanggunian member who did not belong to any political party, under the pro!ision of the Local Ko!ernment &ode Blocal chief eecuti!eC 0 a misnomer • It should be Bauthorities concernedC •
Peo v. D%$%e %urplusageSSS • %ec$ : of Act 5o$ --:8 0 prescription of offenses • Prescription shall begin to run from o 4he day of the commission of the !iolation /rom the time of disco!ery A5D institution of 2udicial proceedings for in!estigation and punishment 'ut the pre!ailing rule is that prescripti!e period is • tolled upon the institution of 2udicial proceedings 0 an act of grace by the %tate &ourt held that the phrase Binstitution of 2udicial • proceedings for its in!estigation and punishmentC may be either disregarded as surplusage or should be deemed preceded by the word BuntilC O#iveros v. 2i##a#%' • Issue whether or not the suspension order against an electi!e official following an information for !iolation of the Anti3Kraft law filed against him, applies not only to the current term of office but also to another term if the accused run for reelection and won %ec *- of the Anti3Kraft Law 0 suspension unless • ac.uitted, reinstatedS @eld only refers to the current term of the suspended • officer (and not to a future un1nown and uncertain new term unless supplemented by a new suspension order
in the e!ent of reelection" for if his term shall ha!e epired at the time of ac.uittal, he would ob!iously be no longer entitled to reinstatementH otherwise it will lead to absurdities Peo v. 4% !ai Issue when does a crime punishable by arresto menor • prescribe • %tate says *6 years as pro!ided for in Art +6 RP& o Art$ :8 (correctional offenses" 0 ma fine of :66Php 0 correctional penalty 0 prescribes in *6 years (Art$ +6" • &ourt held that this is not rightSSSS It is wrongS Art$ + (light offenses" 0 not more than :66Php o 0 light felonies 0 : months *Php ma1es a difference of + years and *6 o monthsS (huwatS" o Arresto mayor (correctional penalty" prescribes in 7 years Less gra!e 0 prescribe e!en shorter o Also, prescripti!e period cannot be o ascertained not until the court decides which of the alternati!e penalties should be imposed 0 imprisonment ba or fine lang yun lang poS Peo v. "eyes Dangerous Drugs Act • RA 87+ • U :66 grams 0 ma penalty is reclusion o perpetua V :66 grams 0 min penalty is reclusion o perpetua &ourt ruled that • U :66 grams 0 penalty ranging from prision o correctional to reclusion temporal *-93*++grams 0 reclusion temporal 883*-- 0 prison mayor Less than 88 grams 0 prision correcional %tat&on 0 duty of the court to harmonie conflicting • pro!isions to gi!e effect to the whole lawH to effectuate the intention of legislature
Ma#on'o v. 5amora &ontention the &ity &ounsel of &aloocan cannot • !alidly pass an ordinance appropriating a supplemental budget for the purpose of epropriating a certain parcel of land, without first adopting or updating its house rules of procedure within the first +6 days following the election of its members, as re.uired by %ecs$ 76 and 7: of the LK& &ourt said this is absurdSSSS &ontention is re2ectedS • Adoption or updating of house rules would o necessarily entail wor1 local councils hands were tied and could not act on any other matter if we hold the absurd contentionS %o much incon!enienceS %hioS And this o could not ha!e been intended by the law
&onstruction to a!oid in2ustice • Presumption 0 legislature did not intend to wor1 a hardship or an oppressi!e result, a possible abuse of authority or act of oppression, arming one person with a weapon to impose hardship on the other • Ea est accipienda interpretation .uae !itio caret 0 that interpretation is to be adopted which is free from e!il or in2ustice Amatan v. A%-ero Rodrigo Fmpad was charged with homicide • Pursuant to some pro!ision in criminal procedure, he • entered into a plea bargaining agreement, which the 2udge appro!ed of, downgrading the offense charge of homicide to attempted homicide to which Fmpad pleaded guilty thereto$ • @elloS 5amatay na nga tapos attempted langS )ababaliw a1o sayo, 2udge, whoe!er you areSSS • /iat 2usticia, ruat coelum 0 let the right be done, though the hea!ens fall (ano dawS" %tated differently, when a pro!ision of the law is silent • or ambiguougs, 2udges ought to in!o1e a solution responsi!e to the !ehement urge of conscience (ahhh ano daw ulitS" Peo v. P%risima • It was contended that PD +(-" 0 is a malum prohibitumH thus intent to use such prohibited weapons is immaterial by reason of public policy &ourt said that use the preamble to construe such act • whether penalied or not • )oreo!er the court said that legislature did not intend in2ustice, absurdity and contradiction &ourt ga!e an eample • %o if I borrowed a bolo then I return this to o my lender, then in the course or my 2ourney Im caught, Im penalied under the Decree for 73*6 years imprisonmentS (ang labo namanS" 1rs%a v. CA • Issue whether or not the isolated use, at one instance, of a name other than a persons true name to secure a copy of a document from a go!ernment agency, constitutes !iolation of &A *9: 0 Anti3alias Law • @eld 5OS (isang beses lang naman eh$$ hehehe 2o1e langS" 4he purpose of the Anti3alias Law is to o pre!ent confusion and fraud in business transactions %uch isolated use of a different name is not o prohibited by the lawH otherwise, in2ustice, absurdity and contradiction will result &onstruction to a!oid danger to public interest Co 0im C*am v. 2a#de' Tan 0e* %a &onsti Tto ahS La lang hehe (yihee, %ergeS" •
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BprocessesC in the proclamation that Ball laws regulations and processesC of the so3called RP during the #apanese occupation of the country Bare null and !oid and without legal effectC )AM 5O4 be construed to embrace #FDI&IAL PRO&E%%E% as this would lead to great incon!enience and public hardship and public interest would be endangered &riminals freed o >ested right, impaired o
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Art$ *6 && In case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the law3ma1ing body intended right and 2ustice to pre!ail Art$ + && 4he fact that a statute is silent, obscure, or insufficient with respect to a .uestion before the court will not 2ustify the latter from declining to render 2udgment thereon In balancing conflicting solutions, that one is percei!ed to tip the scales which the court belie!es will best promote the public welfare is its probable operation as a general rule or principle
Sa#vacion v. SP Kreg 'artelli raped his alleged niece *6 times and • detained her in his apartment for 9 days &ourt ga!e a fa!orable 2udgment of more than *)Php • '%P re2ected the writ of attachment alleging %ec **• of the &entral 'an1 &ircular 5o$ +86 (applicable to transient foreigners" Issue whether the dollar ban1 deposit in a Philippine • ban1 of a foreign tourist can be attached to satisfy the moral damages awarded in fa!or of the latters *:3 year3old rape !ictim '%P did not honor the writ of attachment pursuant to • RA89:8 %ec ; 0 Bforeign currency deposits shall be eempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislati!e body, go!ernment agency or any administrati!e body whatsoe!erC &ourt held that A5O 'AS 5a3rape na nga ayaw • pang magbayad ng moral damages dahil lang sa isang silly lawS (hehe$$ 2o1e lang$$ Im so bored na ehS" &ourt applied the principles of right and o 2ustice to pre!ail o!er the strict and literal words of the statute 4he purpose of RA 89:8 to eempt such o assets from attachment at the time the said law was enacted, the countrys economy was in a shambles$ 'ut in the present time it is still in shambles$$$ hehe 2o1e lang but in the present time, the country has reco!ered economically$ 5o reason why such assets cannot be attached especially if it would satisfy a 2udgment to award moral damages to a *:3year3old rape !ictimS %urplusage and superfluity disregarded • Ghere a word, phrase or clause in a statute is de!oid of meaning in relation to the contet or intent of the
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statute, or where it suggests a meaning that nullifies the statute or renders it without sense, the word, phrase or clause may be re2ected as surplusage and entirely ignored %urplusagium non noceat 0 surplusage does not !itiate a statute Ftile per inutile non !itiatur 0 nor is the useful !itated by the non3useful
Demafi#es v. COMELEC • Issue whether a pre3proclamation election case has become moot because the proclaimed winner had immediately ta1en his oath pursuant to %ec : RA 9;6 which pro!ides that the Bfirst mayor, !ice3mayor and councilors of the municipality of %ebaste shall be elected in the net general elections for local officials and shall ha!e .ualifiedC It was contended that Bshall ha!e .ualifiedC begins • immediately after their proclamationS &ourt held that this is wrongS • 4he said phrase is a 2argon and does not o warrant the respondents reading that the term of office of the first municipal officials of %ebaste begins immediately after their proclamation 4he Qing in TAlice in Gonderland if there is o no meaning in it, that sa!es a world of trouble, you 1now, as we need not try to find any Apply the general rule when such term begin o 0 the term of municipal officials shall begin on the *st day of #anuary following their election Redundant words may be re2ected • %elf3eplanatory, ano buS Obscure or missing word or false description may not preclude construction /alsa demonstration non nocet, cum de corpore constat • 0 false description does not preclude construction nor !itiate the meaning of the statute which is otherwise clear Eemption from rigid application of law Ibi .uid generaliter conceditur 0 e!ery rule is not • without an eception • Inest haec eception, si non ali.uid sit contras 2us bas.ue 0 where anything is granted generally, this eception is implied &ompelling reasons may 2ustify reading an eception • to a rule e!en where the latter does not pro!ide anyH otherwise the rigor of the law would become the highest in2ustice 0 summum 2us, summa in2uria Law does not re.uire the impossible 5emo tenetur ad impossible 0 the law obliges no one • to perform an impossibility Impossibilium nulla obligation est 0 no obligation to • do an impossible thing
Impossible compliance !ersus %ubstantial compliance (as re.uired by law"
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Lim co C*%i v Posadas Publication in the Official Kaette wee1ly, for three • times and consecuti!ely, to ac.uire 2urisdiction o!er naturaliation case • It was an impossibility to fulfill such re.uirement as the OK was not, at the time, published wee1ly • 4hus, &ourt held that compliance with the other : re.uirements would be deemed sufficient to ac.uire 2urisdiction o!er the naturaliation case
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Akbayan v. COMELEC 4his case is about the statutory grant of stand3by • power to the &O)ELE& as pro!ided for in %ec$ :; RA ;9-8 Petitioners were as1ing the respondent to eercise such • power so as to accommodate potential !oters who were not able to register for the upcoming election • &O)ELE& denied the petition alleging the impossibility of late registration to accommodate potential !oters &ourt ruled that the pro!ision must be gi!en such • interpretation that is in accordance with logic, common sense, reasonableness and practicality Ghere time constraint and the surrounding • circumstances ma1e it impossible or the &O)ELE& to conduct special registration of !oters, the &O)ELE& cannot be faulted for refusing to do so, for the law does not re.uire the impossible to be doneH there is no obligation to ho the impossible thing • &O)ELE&s decision is sustained 5umber and gender of words Ghen the contet of a statute so indicates, words in • plural include the singular, and !ice !ersa$ • A plural word in a statute may thus apply to a singular person or thing, 2ust as a singular word may embrace two or more persons or things Art$ ++8 && 0 (law on succession" such article also • applies to a situation where there is only one child because BchildrenC includes BchildC Election &ode 0 BcandidateC comprehends Bsome • candidatesC or Ball candidatesC On gender 0 the masculine, but not the feminine, • includes all genders, unless the contet in which the word is used in the statute indicates otherwise
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E!ery statutory grant of power, right or pri!ilege is deemed to include all incidental power, right or pri!ilege In eo .uod plus sit, simper inest et minus 0 greater includes the lesser 5ecessity 0 includes such inferences as may be logically o be drawn from the purpose or ob2ect of the statute, from what the legislature must be presumed to ha!e intended, and from the necessity of ma1ing the statute effecti!e and operati!e ecludes what is merely plausible, beneficial, o or desirable must be consistent with the &onstitution or to eisting laws an implication which is !iolati!e of the law is un2ustified or unwarranted
C*%a v. Civi# Service Commission Issue whether a coterminous employee, or one whose • appointment is co3eistent with the duration of a go!ernment pro2ect, who has been employed as such for more than : years, is entitled to early retirement benefits under %ec : RA 88;• &ourt held that ME%, &hua is entitledS A coterminous employee is no different from o a casual or temporary employee, and by necessary implication, the inclusion of the latter in the class of go!ernment employees entitled to the benefits of the law necessarily implies that the former should also be entitled to such benefits Grong application of the maim Bepresio o uniusest eclusion alteriusC Remedy implied from a right Fbi 2us, ibi remedium 3 where there is a right, there is • a remedy for !iolation thereof Right 3V Obligation 3V Remedy • 4he fact that the statute is silent as to the remedy does • not preclude him from !indicating his right, for such remedy is implied from such right Once a right is established, the way must be cleared for • its enforcement, and technicalities in procedure, 2udicial as well as administrati!e, must gi!e way • Ghere there is Bwrong,C (depri!ation or !iolation of a right" there is a remedy • If theres no right, principle does not apply
IMPLICATIONS
Doctrine of necessary implication %o3called gaps in the law de!elop as the law is • enforced • %tat&on rule to fill in the gap is the doctrine of necessary implication Doctrine states that what is implied in a statute is as • much a part thereof as that which is epressed E necessitate legis 0 from the necessity of the law •
at%ngbaka# v +ationa# Deve#opment Co Petitioner was suspended and remo!ed from office • which pro!ed to be illegal and !iolati!e not only of the Administrati!e &ode but of the &onstitution itself &ourt ruled that to remedy the e!il and wrong • committed, there should be reinstatement and payment of bac1wages, among other things • @owe!er, there was a legal problem as to his reinstatement, for when he was suspended and
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e!entually dismissed, somebody was appointed to his position Issue whether remedy is denied petitioner @eld position was ne!er B!acantC$ %ince there is no !acancy, the present incumbent cannot be appointed permanently$ 4he incumbent is only holding a temporary position$ )oreo!er, the incumbents being made to lea!e the post to gi!e way to the employees superior right may be considered as remo!al for cause
Krant of 2urisdiction &onferred only by the &onstitution or by statute • &annot be conferred by the Rules of &ourt • &annot be implied from the language of a statute, in • the absence of clear legislati!e intent to that effect Pimente# v. COMELEC &O)ELE& has appellate 2urisdiction o!er election • cases filed with and decided by the R4& in!ol!ing municipal electi!e officials DOE% 5O4 I)PLM the grant of authority upon the &O)ELE& to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition or mandamus concerning said election cases Peo v. Pa#ana • %tatute grants a special court 2urisdiction o!er criminal cases in!ol!ing offenders under *8 at the time of the filing of the action, a subse.uent statute defining a youthful offender as one who is o!er + but below :* years of age may not be so construed as to confer by implication upon said special court the authority to try cases in!ol!ing offenders *8 but below :* years of age Ghat may be implied from grant of 2urisdiction • 4he grant of 2urisdiction to try actions carries with it all necessary and incidental powers to employ all writs, processes and other means essential to ma1e its 2urisdiction effecti!e Ghere a court has 2urisdiction o!er the main cause of • action, it can grant reliefs incidental thereto, e!en if they would otherwise be outside its 2urisdiction E$g$ forcible entry and detainer is cogniable o in )4& )4& can order payment of rentals e!en though the amount eceeds the 2urisdictional amount cogniable by them, the same merely incidental to the principal action %tatutes conferring 2urisdiction to an administrati!e • agency must be liberally construed to enable the agency to discharge its assigned duties in accordance with the legislati!e purpose o E$g$ the power granted the 5@A to hear and decide claims in!ol!ing refund and any other claims filed , include attorneys fees and other damages Krant of power includes incidental power • Ghere a general power is conferred or duty en2oined, e!ery particular power necessary for the eercise of one or the performance of the other is also conferred
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4he incidental powers are those which are necessarily included in, and are therefore of lesser degree than the power granted Eamples o Power to establish an office includes authority to abolish it, unless Garrant issued shall be made upon probable cause determined by the 2udge implies the grant of power to the 2udge to conduct preliminary in!estigations Power to appro!e a license includes by implication the power to re!o1e it Power to re!o1e is limited • by the authority to grant license, from which it is deri!ed Power to deport includes the power to arrest undesirable aliens after in!estigation Power to appoint !ested in the President includes the power to ma1e temporary appointments , unless Power to appropriate money includes power to withdraw unepended money already appropriated Etc see page **3*:
Krant of power ecludes greater power 4he principle that the grant of power includes all • incidental powers necessary to ma1e the eercise thereof effecti!e implies the eclusion of those which are greater than that conferred Power of super!ision DOE% 5O4 I5&LFDE o power to suspend or remo!al Power to reorganie DOE% 5O4 I5&LFDE o the authority to depri!e the courts certain 2urisdiction and to transfer it to a .uasi3 2udicial tribunal Power to regulate business DOE% 5O4 o I5&LFDE power to prohibit Ghat is implied should not be against the law • Power to appoint includes power to suspend or remo!e 0 &onstitutional restriction of &I>IL %ER>I&E o E)PLOMEE%, that it must be a cause pro!ided for by law precludes such implication (unless the appointment was made outside the ci!il ser!ice law Power to appoint a public officer by the President • includes power to remo!e Pro!ided that such remo!al is made with 2ust o cause Ecept is such statute pro!ides that term of o office to be at the pleasure of the appointing officer, power to appoint carries with it power to remo!e anytime
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Power to in!estigate officials DOE% 5O4 I5&LFDE the power to delegate the authority to ta1e testimony of witnesses whose appearance may be re.uired by the compulsory process of subpoena$ 5or does such power to in!estigate include the power to delegate the authority to administer oath
Authority to charge against public funds may not be implied • It is well3settled that unless a statute epressly so authories, no claim against public funds may be allowed %tatute grants lea!e pri!ileges to o APPOI54I>E officials, this cannot be construed to include ELE&4I>E officials o BemployerC to pay *-th month pay, does not imply that it includes Bgo!ernment
Illegality of act implied from prohibition • In pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis 3 where a statute prohibits the doing of an act, the act done in !iolation thereof is by implication null and !oid Prohibited act cannot ser!e as foundation of a cause of • action for relief • E dolo malo non oritur actio 0 no man can be allowed to found a claim upon his own wrongdoing or ine.uity 5ullus coomodum capere potest de in2uria sua propria • 0 no man should be allowed to ta1e ad!antage of his own wrong Public policy re.uires that parties to an act prohibited • by statute be left where they are, to ma1e the statute effecti!e and to accomplish its ob2ect Party to an illegal contract cannot come to o court of law and as1 that his illegal ob2ect be carried out A citien who sold his land to an alien in o !iolation of the constitutional restriction cannot annul the same and reco!er the land, for both seller and buyer are guilty of ha!ing !iolated the &onstitution 4wo (:" Eceptions to the rule •
Pari delicto doctrine will not apply when its enforcement or application will !iolate an a!owed %un"a&enta' #o'!) or #u*'! !nterest
De#os Santos v. "oman Cat*o#ic C*%rc* • @omestead Law 0 to gi!e and preser!e in the homesteader and his family a piece of land for his house and culti!ation 4he law prohibits the alienation of a homestead within • 7 years following the issuance of the patent and pro!ides that any contract of a con!eyance in contra!ention thereof shall be null and !oid 4he seller or his heirs, although in pari delicto, may • reco!er the land sub2ect of such illegal sale arsobia v. C%enco •
Another eception is that when the transat!on !s not !''e(a' #er se *ut &ere') #ro$!*!te" and the
prohibition by law is designed for protection of one party, the court may grant relief in fa!or of the latter Ghat cannot be done directly cannot be done indirectly uando ali.uid prohibetur e directo, prohibetur et per • obli.uum 0 what cannot, by law, be done directly cannot be done indirectly Peo v. Concepcion • Ghere a corporation is forbidden from doing an act, the prohibition etends to the board of directors and to each director separately and indi!idually Ghere the board of directors is prohibited from • granting loans to its director, a loan to a partnership of which the wife of a director is a partner falls within the prohibition Peop#es ank and Tr%st Co. v. P+ Ghere a statute prohibits the payment of the principal • obligation during a fied period, the interest thereon during the eistence of the restriction is not demandable Cr%' v. Tant%ico Law eempts retirement benefits of a public officer or • employee from attachment, garnishment etc Earlier law authories the go!ernment to withhold an • amount due such officer or employee to pay his indebtedness to the go!ernment %@OFLD 5O4 'E &O5%4RFED to withhold so much of his retirement benefits as this amount to attachment garnishment etc$ Tant%ico 6r. v Domingo • Law eempts retirement benefits of a public officer or employee from attachment, garnishment etc • Ko!ernment cannot withhold payment of retirement benefits of a public officer until his accountabilities with the go!ernment shall ha!e been cleared, as such action is doing indirectly what the go!ernment is prohibited from doing directly 4here should be no penalty from compliance with law A person who complies with what a statute re.uires • cannot, by implication, be penalied thereby •
/or Bsimple logic and fairness and reason cannot countenance an eaction or a penalty for an act faithfully done in compliance with the lawC
CHAPTER FIVE: Inter#retat!on o% +or"s an" #$rases IN GENERAL
Kenerally
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A word or phrase used in a statute may ha!e an ordinary, generic, restricted, technical, legal, commercial or trading meaning )ay be defined in the statute 0 if this is done, use such definition because this is what the legislature intended 4as1 ascertain intent from statute o ascertain intent from etraneous ? rele!ant o circumstance construe word or phrase to effectuate such o intent Keneral rule in interpreting the meaning and scope of a term used in the law Re!iew of the G@OLE law in!ol!ed as well o as the I54E5D)E54 of law (not of an isolated part or a particular pro!ision alone"
%tatutory definition Ghen statute defines words ? phrase3 legislati!e • definition controls the meaning of statutory word, irrespecti!e of any other meaning word ha!e in ordinary usual sense$ Ghere a statute defines a word or phrase, the word or • phrase, should not by construction, be gi!en a different meaning$ Legislature restricted meaning as it adopted specific • definition, thus, this should be used 4erm or phrase specifically defined in particular law, • definition must be adopted$ • 5o usurpation of court function in interpreting but it merely legislates what should form part of the law itself 2ictorias Mi##ing Co. v. Socia# Sec%rity Commission 7compensation8 RA **8*, %ec$ ;(f"V 9compensation: to inc#%de a## ren%merations e)cept • bon%ses a##o;ances 3 overtime pay • Definition was amended deleted BeceptionsC Legislati!e Intent the amendment shows legislati!e • intent that bonuses ? o!ertime pay now included in employees renumeration$ Principle by !irtue of epress substantial change in • phraseology, whate!er prior 2udicial or eecuti!e construction should gi!e way to mandate of new law$ Peo. v. 2envia-e 7 C*iropractic< • Issue Ghether person who practiced chiropractic without ha!ing been duly licensed, may be criminally liable for !iolation of medical law$ @eld 4hough term Bpractice of medicine,C • chiropractic may in ordinary sense fall within its meaningH statutorily defined 3 includes manipulations employed in chiropracticH thus, one who practices chiropractic without license is criminally liable$
C*ang 4%ng Fa v. ,ian'on7 a#ien< • Issue whether alien who comes into country as temporary !isitor is an BimmigrantC
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@eld while BimmigrantC in ordinary definition3 Ban alien who comes to the Philippines for permanent residenceCH 4he Immigration Act ma1es own definition of term, which is Bany alien departing from any place outside the Philippines destined for the Philippines, other than a non3immigrant$
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(so 1elangan part siya nung Bother than a non3 immigrantC$" 3V yep yep, %ergeS 'ut more importantly, the definition emphasies an immigrant, who is an alien, who comes to the Philippines either to reside 4E)PORARILM or PER)A5E54LM 0 no distinction
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definition of terms gi!en weight in construction
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terms ? phrases, being part ? parcel of whole statute, gi!en effect in their E54IR4M, as harmonious, coordinated, and integrated unit words ? phrases construed in light of contet of G@OLE statute$
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ualification of rule %tatutory definition of word or term controlling only as • used in the ActH not conclusi!e as to the meaning of same word or term • in other statutes Especially to transactions that too1 place prior to • enactment of act$ •
%tatutory definition controlling statutory words does not apply when application creates incongruities o destroy its ma2or purposes o becomes illogical as result of change in its o factual basis$
Ernest v. CA 7 RA 9*88 ? EO +66, +6*V Bsugarcane planterC is defined as a planter3owner of • sugarcane plantation w=in particular sugar mill district, who has been allocated eport and=or domestic ? reser!e sugar .uotas$ • %tatutory definition ecludes emergency, non3.uota, non3district and accommodation planters, they ha!ing no sugar .uota$ @owe!er, in *+77, .uota system abolished Gith change in situation, illogical to continue adhering • to pre!ious definition that had lost their legal effect$ Amadora v. CA •
@owe!er, where statute remains unchanged, interpreted according to its clear and original mandateH until legislature ta1ing into account changes sub2ected to be regulated, sees fit to enact necessary amendment$
Gords construed in their ordinary sense Keneral rule In the absence of legislati!e intent, words • and phrases should be gi!en their plain, ordinary, and common usage meaning$ %hould be read and considered in their natural, • ordinary, commonly accepted, and most ob!ious signification, according to good and appro!ed usage and without resulting to forced or subtle construction$
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Centra# A'%carera Don Pedro v. Centra# ank • A statute Beempts certain importations from ta and foreign echange, which are actually used in the manufacture or preparation of local products, forming part thereof$C • B/orming part thereofC not to mean that the imported products ha!e to be mied mechanically, chemically, materially into the local product ? lose its identity$ )eans that the imported article is needed to • accomplish the locally manufactured product for eport$ C/" v. Mani#a %siness Lodge =>? BbusinessC (if un.ualified" in ta statute plain and • ordinary meaning to embrace acti!ity or affair where profit is the purpose ? li!elihood is the moti!e$ • In this case, a fraternal social club selling li.uor at its clubhouse in a limited scale only to its members, without intention to obtain profit 5ot engaged in business$ • P*iippine# Association of ,overnment "etirees v. ,S/S 7 9present va#%e:< •
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%tatute Bfor those who are at least 87 yrs of age, lump sum payment of present !alue of annuity for the first 7 years, and future annuity to be paid monthly$ Provided *o;ever that there shall be no discount from annuity for the first 7 yrs$ of those who are 87 yrs or o!er, on the day the law too1 effect$C >ocabulary lump sum 3 amount of money gi!en in single o payment annuity 3 amount of money paid to somebody o yearly or at some other regular inter!al %hould there be discount from the present !alue of his annuity 5O$ Fsed in ordinary sense as said law grants to the retired employee substantial sum for his sustenance considering his age$ Any doubt in this law should be ruled in his fa!or$
Mat%g%ina /ntegrated @ood Prod%cts /nc. v. CA • Ghether transferee of a forest concession is liable for obligations arising from transferors illegal encroachment into another forest concessionaire, which was committed prior to the transfer • %ec$ 8* of PD 67 Bthe transferee shall assume all the obligations of the transferor$C • &ourt held that the transferee is 5O4 liable and eplained BObligationsC construed to mean obligations incurred by transferor in the ordinary course of business$ 5ot those as a result of transgressions of the law, as these are personal obligations of transferor$ • Principle &onstrue using ordinary meaning ? a!oid absurdity$
M%stang L%mber /nc. v CA
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%tatute %ec$ 8; PD 67 3 penalies the cutting, gathering ? or collecting timber or other forest products without a license$ Is BlumberC included in BtimberC
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Re!ersing *st ruling, %& says lumber is included in timber$
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B4he Re!ised /orestry &ode contains no definition of timber or lumber$ 4imber is included in definition of forestry prod%cts par (." %ec$-$ Lumber 3 same definitions as Bprocessing plantsC
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Processing plant is any mechanical set3up, machine or combination of machine used for processing of logs ? other forest raw materials into #%mber !eneer, plywood etc p$ *;-$
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%imply means, #%mber is a processed log or forest raw material$ 4he &ode uses lumber in ordinary common usage$ In *++- ed$ of Gebsters International Dictionary, #%mber is defined as timber or logs after being prepared for the mar1et$ 4herefore, lumber is a processed log or timber$ %ec 8; of PD 67 ma1es no distinction between raw ? processed timber$
Keneral words construed generally •
,enera#ia verba s%nt genera#iter inte##igenda what is generally spo1en shall be generally understoodH general words shall be understood in a general sense$
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,enera#e dict%m genera#iter est interpretand%m a general statement is understood in a general sense
In case word in statute has both restricted and general meaning, KE5ERAL must pre!ailH Fnless nature of the sub2ect matter ? contet in which it is employed clearly indicates that the limited sense is intended$ •Keneral words should not be gi!en a restricted meaning when no restriction is indicated$ Rationale if the legislature intended to limit the • meaning of a word, it would ha!e been easy for it to ha!e done so$ •
Application of rule ,atc*a#ian v. COMELEC • BforeignerC3 in Election &ode, prohibiting any foreigner from contributing campaign funds includes 2uridical person BpersonC3 comprehends pri!ate 2uridical person • BpersonC3 in penal statute, must be a Bperson in law,C • an artificial or natural person 2argas v. "i##aro'a B2udgeC without any modifying word or phrase • accompanying it is to be construed in generic sense to comprehend all 1inds of 2udgesH inferior courts or 2ustices of %&$ C 3 C Commercia# Corp v. +A@ASA Bgo!ernmentC 3 without .ualification should be • understood in implied or generic sense including KO&&s$
Centra# ank v. CA •
B5ational Ko!ernmentC 3 refers only to central go!ernment, consisting of eecuti!e, legislati!e and 2udiciary, as well as constitutional bodies ( as distinguished from local go!ernment ? other go!ernmental entities" 2ers%s<
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94he Ko!ernment of the Republic of the PhilippinesC or BPhilippine Ko!ernmentC 0 including central go!ernments as well as local go!ernment ? KO&&s$
"ep%b#ic F#o%r Mi##s v. Commissioner of C%stoms Bproduct of the PhilippinesC 0 any product produced in • the country, e$g$ bran (ipa" ? pollard (dara1" produced from wheat imported into the country are Bproducts of the PhilippinesC Keneric term includes things that arise thereafter •
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Progressi!e interpretation 3 A word of general signification employed in a statute, in absence of legislati!e intent, to comprehend not only peculiar conditions obtaining at its time of enactment but those that may normally arise after its appro!al as well Progressi!e interpretation etends to the application of statute to all sub2ects or conditions within its general purpose or scope that come into eistence subse.uent from its passage Rationale to 1eep statute from becoming ephemeral (short3li!ed" and transitory (not permanent or lasting"$ %tatutes framed in general terms apply to new cases and sub2ects that arise$ Keneral rule in %tat&on Legislati!e enactments in general comprehensi!e operation, apply to persons, sub2ects and businesses within their general pur!iew and scope coming into eistence subse.uent to their passage$
,eotina v. CA Barticles of prohibited importationC 3 used in 4ariff and • &ustoms &ode embrace not only those declared prohibited at time of adoption, but also goods and articles sub2ect of acti!ities underta1en in subse.uent laws$ ,atc*a#ian v. COMELEC • Bany electionC 3 not only the election pro!ided by law at that time, but also to future elections including election of delegates to &onstitutional &on!ention Gords with commercial or trade meaning •Gords or phrases common among merchants and traders, ac.uire commercial meanings$ •Ghen any of words used in statute, should be gi!en such trade or commercial meaning as has been generally understood among merchants$ •Fsed in the following tariff laws, laws of commerce, laws for the go!ernment of the importer$ •4he law to be applicable to his class, should be construed as uni!ersally understood by importer or trader$
Asiatic Petro#e%m Co. v. C/" 5o ta shall be collected on articles which, before its ta1ing effect, shall ha!e been Bdisposed of C •Lay parting away w= something •)erchant to sell (this must be used" •
San Mig%e# Corp. v. M%nicipa# Co%nci# of Manda%e •Bgross !alue of moneyC •)erchant Bgross selling priceC which is the total amount of money or its e.ui!alent which purchaser pays to the !endor to recei!e the goods$ Gords with technical or legal meaning •Keneral rule words that ha!e, or ha!e been used in, a technical sense or those that ha!e been 2udicially construed to ha!e a certain meaning should be interpreted according to the sense in which they ha!e been PRE>IOF%LM used, although the sense may !ary from the strict or literal meaning of the words •Presumption language used in a statute, which has a technical or well31nown meaning, is used in that sense by the legislature Mani#a !era#d P%b#is*ing Co. v. "amos •%ec *9 of Rule 7+ of Rules of &ourt which prescribes the steps to be ta1en when property attached is claimed by a person other than the defendant or his agent •
%tatute Bnothing herein contained shall pre!ent such third person from !indicating his claim to the property by any proper action.C
Issue Bproper actionC limits the - rd partys remedy to inter!ene in the action in which the writ of attachment is issued •@eld BactionC has ac.uired a well3defined meaning as an Bordinary suit in a court of 2ustice by which one party prosecutes another for the enforcement or protection of a right or pre!ent redress or wrong •
Ghile •%ec : Rule : of Rules of &ourtH B&ommencement of ActionC •%tatute B&i!il action may be commenced by filing a complaint with the proper courtC •Gord commencement 3 indicates the origination of entire proceeding •
It was appropriate to use proper action (in * st statute" than inter!ention, since asserted right of -rd party claimant necessarily flows out of pending suitH if the word Tinter!ention is used, it becomes strange$
Ma#anyaon v. Lising %ec$ *- of Anti3Kraft Law • %tatute B if a public officer is ac.uitted, he shall be • entitled to reinstatement and to his salaries and benefits which he failed to recei!e during the suspensionC Issue Gill a public officer whose case has been • dismissed not Bac.uittedC be entitled to benefits in %ec$ *-
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@eld 5o$ Ac.uittal B#ega# meaning finding of not guilty based on the merit$ Dismissal does not amount to ac.uittal ecept when, the dismissal comes after the prosecution has presented all its e!idence and is based on insufficiency of such e!idence$
"%ra v. Lopena •Probation law 3 Dis.ualified from probation those Bwho ha!e been pre!iously con!icted by final 2udgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of not less than * month ? a fine of no less than Php :66$C •Issue Bpre!iously con!ictedC •@eld it refers to date of con!iction, not date of commission of crimeH thus a person con!icted on same date of se!eral offenses committed in different dates is not dis.ualified$
Gord or phrase construed in relation to other pro!isions Keneral rule word, phrase, pro!ision, should not be • construed in isolation but must be interpreted in relation to other pro!isions of the law$ • 4his is a >ARIA4IO5 of the rule that, statute should be construed as a whole, and each of its pro!ision must be gi!en effect$ C#a%dio v. COMELEC %tatute (LK&" B5o recall shall ta1e place within * yr • from the date of the officials assumption of office or * year immediately preceding a regular electionC •
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@ow identical terms in the statute construed • Keneral rule a word or phrase repeatedly used in a statute will bear the same meaning throughout the statuteH unless a different intention is clearly epressed$ • Rationale word used in statute in a gi!en sense presumed to be used in same sense throughout the law$ 4hough rigid and peremptory, this is applicable where in the statute the words appear so near each other physically, particularly where the word has a technical meaning and that meaning has been defined in the statute$ De #a Pa' v. Co%rt of Agrarian "e#ations UBRicelandCV • share tenancy 3 a!erage produce per hectare for the agricultural years net preceding the current har!est leasehold 3 according to normal a!erage har!est of the • - preceding yrs BMearC3 agricultural year not calendar year • BAgricultural yearC 3 represents * cropH if in * calendar • yr : crops are raised thats : agricultural years$
0rivenko v. "egister of Deeds %tatute In %ec$* , Art$ III of *+-7 &onstitution 3 • Bpublic agricultural lands shall not be alienatedC ecept in fa!or of /ilipinos, %A)E as %ec$ 7 Bno pri!ate agricultural land shall be transferred or assigned$C both ha!e same meaning being based on same policy • of nationaliation and ha!ing same sub2ect$ )eaning of word .ualified by purpose of statute Purpose may indicate whether to gi!e word, phrase, • ordinary, technical, commercial restricted or epansi!e meaning$ • In construing, court adopts interpretation that accords best with the manifest purpose of statuteH e!en disregard technical or legal meaning in fa!or of construction which will effectuate intent or purpose$
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Issue Does the *st limitation embraces the entire recall proceedings (e$g$ preparatory recall assemblies" or only the recall election @eld the &ourt construed BrecallC in relation to %ec$8+ which states that, Bthe power of recall shall be eercised by the registered !oters of an LKF to which the local electi!e official belongs$C @ence, not apply to all recall proceedings since power !ested in electorate is power to elect an official to office and not power to initiate recall proceedings$ Gord or pro!ision should not be construed in isolation form but should be interpreted in relation to other pro!isions of a statute, or other statutes dealing on same sub2ect in order to effectuate what has been intended$
,arcia v. COMELEC • @istory of statute In the &onstitution, it re.uires that legislature o shall pro!ide a system of initiati!e and referendum whereby people can directly appro!e or re2ect any act or law or part thereof passed by &ongress or local legislati!e body$ Local Ko!t$ &ode, a later law, defines #oca# o initiative as Bprocess whereby registered !oters of an LKF may directly propose, enact, or amend any ordinance$C It is claimed by respondents that since resolution is not included in this definition, then the same cannot be sub2ect of an initiati!e$ Issue whether a local resolution of a municipal • council can be sub2ect to an initiati!e and referendum @eld Ge re2ect respondents narrow and literal • reading of abo!e pro!ision for it will collide with the &onstitution and will sub!ert the intent of the lawma1ers in enacting the pro!isions of the Local Ko!ernment &ode (LK&" of *++* on initiati!e ? referendum •
4he subse.uent enactment of the LK& did not change the scope of its co!erage$ In %ec$ *:9 of the same code$ It states (b" /nitiative s*a## e)tend on#y to s%b-ects or matters ;*ic* are ;it*in t*e #ega# po;ers of t*e Sangg%nians to enact.:
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4his pro!ision clearly does not limit the application of local initiati!e to ordinances, but to all Bsub2ects or matters which are within the legal powers of the Sangg%nians to enact, which undoubtedly includes resolutions$C
,e#ano v. C.A. In &orporation Law, authories a dissol!ed corporation • to continue as a body corporate for - yrs$ for the purpose of defending and prosecuting suits by or against it, and during said period to con!ey all its properties to a BtrusteeC for benefits of its members, stoc1holders, creditors and other interested persons, the transfer of the properties to the trustee being for the protection of its creditors and stoc1holders$ • Gord BtrusteeC 3 not to be understood in legal or technical sense, but in KE5ERAL concept which would include a lawyer to whom was entrusted the prosecution of the cases for reco!ery of sums of money against corporations debtors$
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Mottom%# v. de #a Pa' Issue Ghether the word BcourtC refers to the &ourt of • Appeals or the trial court •
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"ep%b#ic v. As%ncion •
Issue Ghether the Sandiganbayan is a regular court within the meaning of R$A$ 8+7
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%tatute RA 8+7 which ma1es criminal actions in!ol!ing members of the P5P come Bwithin the eclusi!e 2urisdiction of the reg%#ar co%rts. Fsed Bregular courtsC ? Bci!il courtsC interchangeably &ourt martial 3 not courts within the Philippine #udicial %ystemH they pertain to the eecuti!e department and simply instrumentalities of the eecuti!e power$
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Regular courts 3 those within the 2udicial department of the go!ernment namely the %& and lower courts which includes the Sandiganbayan. @eld &ourts considered the purpose of the law which is to remo!e from the court martial, the 2urisdiction o!er criminal cases in!ol!ing members of the P5P and to !est it in the courts within the 2udicial system$
Mo#ina v. "afferty • Issue Ghether BAgricultural productsC includes domesticated animals and fish grown in ponds$ %tatute Phrase used in ta statute which eempts such • products from payment of taes, purpose is to encourage the de!elopment of such resources$ @eld phrase not only includes !egetable substances • but also domestic and domesticated animals, animal products, and fish or bangus grown in ponds$ &ourt ga!e epansi!e meaning to promote ob2ect of law$ M%no' 3 Co. v. !ord • Issue B&onsumptionC limited or broad meaning %tatute word is used in statute which pro!ides that • Becept as herein specifically eempted, there shall be paid by each merchant and manufacturer a ta at the rate of *=- of *N on gross !alue of money in all goods, wares and merchandise sold, bartered, or echanged for domestic consumption$
@eld &onsidering the purpose of the law, which is to ta all merchants ecept those epressly eempted, it is reasonable and fair to conclude that legislature used in commercial use and not in limited sense of total destruction of thing sold$
%tatute RA 7-9- Effect of Appea# Appeal shall not stay the award, order, ruling, decision or 2udgment unless the officer or body rendering the same or t*e co%rt , on motion, after hearing ? on such terms as it may deem 2ust should pro!ide otherwise$ @eld It refers to the 4RIAL &OFR4$ If the ad!erse party intends to appeal from a decision of the %E& and pending appeal desires to stay the eecution of the decision, then the motion must be filed with and be heard by the %E& before the ad!erse party perfects its appeal to the &ourt of Appeals$ Purpose of the law the need for immediacy of eecution of decisions arri!ed at by said bodies was imperati!e$
)eaning of term dictated by contet 4he contet in which the word or term is employed • may dictate a different sense •
2erba accipienda s%nt sec%nd%m materiam a word is to be understood in the contet in which it is used$
Peop#e v. C*ave' %tatute /amily home etra2udicially formed shall be • eempt from eecution, forced sale or attachment, ecept for Bnon payment of debtsC • Gord BdebtsC 0 means obligations in general$ 0rivenko v. "egister of Deeds %tatute lands were classified into timber, mineral and • agricultural • Gord BagriculturalC 0 used in broad sense to include all lands that are neither timber, nor mineral, such being the contet in which the term is used$ Sant%#an v. E)ec%tive. Secretary. %tatute A riparian owner of the property ad2oining • foreshore lands, marshy lands or lands co!ered with water bordering upon shores of ban1s of na!igable la1es shall ha!e preference to apply for such lands ad2oining his property$ • /act Riparian 3 one who owns land situated on the ban1s of ri!er$ • @eld Fsed in a more broader sense referring to a property ha!ing a water frontage, when it mentioned Bforeshore lands,C Bmarshy lands,C or Blands co!ered with water$C Peo. v. Ferrer • Bcase ;*ere conte)t may #imit t*e meaning • Gord BO!erthrowC
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%tatute Anti3%ub!ersion Act B1nowingly ? willfully and by o!ert acts$C Re2ects the metaphorical BpeacefulC sense ? limits its meaning to Bo!erthrowC by force or !iolence$
Peo. v. +a'ario %tatute )unicipal ta ordinance pro!ides Bany owner • or manager of fishpondsC shall pay an annual ta of a fied amount per hectare and it appears that the owner of the fishponds is the go!ernment which leased them to a pri!ate person who operates them Gord BOwnerC 0 does not include go!ernment as the • ancient principle that go!ernment is immune from taes$ Ghere the law does not distinguish 1bi #e) non disting%it nec nos disting%ere debem%s where the law does not distinguish, courts should not distinguish$ &orollary principle Keneral words or phrases in a • statute should ordinarily be accorded their natural and general significance Keneral term or phrase should not be reduced into • parts and one part distinguished from the other to 2ustify its eclusion from operation$ • &orollary principle where the law does not ma1e any eception, courts may not ecept something therefrom, unless there a compelling reason to 2ustify it$ Application when legislature laid down a rule for one • class, no difference to other class$ Presumption that the legislature made no .ualification in the general use of a term$ •
"ob#es v. 5amba#es C*romite Co. %tatute grants a person against whom the possession • of Bany landC is unlawfully withheld the right to bring an action for unlawful detainer$ • @eld any land not eclusi!e to pri!ate or not eclusi!ely to publicH hence, includes all 1inds of land$ Director of Lands v. ,on'a#es %tatute authories the director of lands to file petitions • for cancellation of patents co!ering public lands on the ground therein pro!ided$ • @eld not distinguished whether lands belong to national or local go!ernment
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Co#gatePa#mo#ive P*i#s v. ,imene' %tatute does not distinguish between Bstabilier and • fla!orsC used in the preparation of food and those used in the manufacture of toothpaste or dental cream
O#iva v. Lamadrid • %tatute allows the redemption or repurchase of a homestead property w=in 7 years from its con!eyance @eld Bcon!eyanceC not distinguished 3 !oluntary or • in!oluntary$ Escos%ra v. San Mig%e# re;ery /nc. %tatute grants employee Blea!es of absence with payC • @eld Bwith payC refers to full pay and not to half or • less than full payH to all lea!es of absence and not merely to sic1 or !acation lea!es$ O#fato v. COMELEC %tatute ma1es &O)ELE& the sole 2udge of Ball pre3 • proclamation contro!ersiesC • @eld BallC 0 co!ers national, pro!incial, city or municipal P*i#. ritis* Ass%rance Co. v. /ntermediate Ape##ate Co%rt • %tatute A counterbond is to secure the payment of Bany 2udgment,C when eecution is returned unsatisfied @eld Bany 2udgmentC includes not only final and • eecutory but also 2udgment pending appeal whose eecution ordered is returned unsatisfied$ "amire' v. CA • %tatute BAct to Prohibit ? Penalie Gire 4apping and Other related >iolations of Pri!ate &ommunications and Other PurposesC BIt shall be unlawful, not being authoried by all the • parties to any pri!ate communication or spo1en word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other de!ice or arrangementC •
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SSS v. City of aco#od Issue eempts the payment of realty taes to • Bproperties owned by RPC @eld no distinction between properties held in • so!ereign, go!ernmental, or political capacity and those possessed in proprietary or patrimonial character$ 2e#asco v. Lope' %tatute certain BformalitiesC be followed in order that • act may be considered !alid$
@eld no distinction between essential or non3essential formalities
Issue Ghether !iolation thereof refers to the taping of a communication ot*er t*an a participant to the communication or e!en to the taping by a participant who did not secure the consent of the party to the con!ersations$ @eld Law did not distinguish whether the party sought to be penalied ought to be party other than or different from those in!ol!ed in the pri!ate communication$ 4he intent is to penalie all persons unauthoried to ma1e any such recording, underscored by BanyC
Ligget 3 Myers Tobacco Co. v. C/" %tatute imposes a Bspecific taC on cigarettes • containing >irginia tobacco $ Pro!ided that of the length eceeds * millimeters or the weight per
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thousand eceeds *W 1ilos, the ta shall be increased by *66N$ Issue whether measuring length or weight of cigars, filters should be ecluded therefrom, so that ta would come under the general pro!ision and not under the pro!iso @eld 5ot ha!ing distinguished between filter and non3 filter cigars, court should not distinguish$
Ti% San v. "ep%b#ic Issue whether the con!iction of an applicant for • naturaliation for !iolation of a municipal ordinance would dis.ualify him from ta1ing his oath as a citien$ %tatute An applicant may be allowed to ta1e his oath • as a citien after : years from the promulgation of the decision granting his petition for naturaliation if he can show that during the inter!ening period Bhe has not been con!icted of any offense or !iolation of go!ernment rulesC •
@eld law did not ma1e any distinction between ma#a in se and ma#a pro*ibita. &on!iction of the applicant from !iolation of municipal ordinance is comprehended within the statute and precludes applicant from ta1ing his oath$
Pera#ta v. CSC Issue whether pro!ision of RA :8:7, that go!ernment • employees are entitled to *7 days !acation lea!es of absence with full pay and *7 days sic1 lea!es with full pay, eclusi!es of %aturday, %undays or holidays in both cases, applies only to those who ha!e lea!e credits and not to those who ha!e none$ @eld Law spea1s of granting of a right and does not • distinguish between those who ha!e accumulated and those who ha!e none$ Pi#ar v. COMELEC %tatute RA *88 pro!ides that BE!ery candidate shall, • within -6 days after the day of the election file true and itemied statement of all contributions and ependitures in connection with the election$ @eld Law did not distinguish between a candidate • who pushed through and one who withdrew it$ • BE!ery candidateC refers to one who pursued and e!en to those who withdrew his candidacy$ Sanciagco v. "ono • B;*ere t*e distinction appears from t*e stat%te t*e co%rts s*o%#d make t*e distinction •
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%tatute %ec *- of 'P 'lg$ 8+ which pro!ides that 9Any person holding public appointi!e or position shall ipso facto cease in office or position as of the time he filed his certificate of candidacyC Ko!ernors, mayors, members of !arious sangg%nians or barangay officia#s shall upon the filing of candidacy, be considered on forced lea!e of absence from office
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/acts an electi!e 'arangay$ &aptain was elected President of Association of 'arangay &ouncils and pursuant thereto appointed by the President as member of the Sangg%nian Pan#%ngsod. @e ran for &ongress but lost$
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Issue @e then wants to resume his duties as member of sangg%iniang pan#%ngsod. @e was merely forced on lea!e when he ran for &ongress$
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@eld the %ecretary of Local Ko!ernment denied his re.uestH being an appointi!e sangg%nian member, he was deemed automatically resigned when he filed his certificate of candidacy$
,arvida v. Sa#es 6r. Issue whether petitioner who was o!er :* but below • :: was .ualified to be an electi!e %Q member •
%tatute %ec$9:9 of the LK& pro!ides that a member of the 0atip%nan ng 0abataan must not be :* yrs old$
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%ec$ 9:; as additional re.uirement pro!ides that electi!e official of Sangg%niang 0abataan must not be more than :* yrs$ Bon the day of electionC
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@eld the distinction is apparent the member may be more than :* years of age on election day or on the day he registers as member of 0atip%nan ng 0abataan. 'ut the electi!e official, must not be more than :* years of age on the day of election$
Dis2uncti!e and con2uncti!e words • Gord BorC is a dis2uncti!e term signifying disassociation and independence of one thing from each other$ Peo v. Martin %tatute %ec$ 96 of &ommonwealth Act 8*, punishes • Bany indi!idual who shall bring into or land in the Philippines or conceals or harbors any alien not duly admitted by any immigration officer •
does not 2ustify gi!ing the word a dis2uncti!e meaning, since the words Bbring intoC BlandC, BconcealsC and BharborsC being four separate acts each possessing its distincti!e, different and disparate meaning$
C/" v. Mani#a 6ockey C#%b • %tatute imposes amusement taes on gross receipts of Bproprietor, lessee, or operator of amusement placeC @eld BorC implies that ta should be paid by either • proprietor, lessee, or operator, as the case may be, single ? not by all at the same time$ •
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Fse of BorC between : phrases connotes that either phrase ser!es as .ualifying phrase$ BorC means BandC, G@E5 4@E %PIRI4 OR &O54E4 O/ 4@E LAG %O GARRA54%
Trinidad v. erm%de' (e$g$ of BorC to mean BandC" %tatute %ec$ :, Rule **: of Rules of &ourt authoriing • municipal 2udges to conduct Bpreliminary eamination or in!estigationC
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BorC e.ui!alent of Bthat is to sayC
SMC v. M%nicipa#ity of Manda%e (e$g$ of BorC e.ui!alent of Bthat is to sayC" Ordinance imposes graduated .uarterly fied ta • Bbased on the gross !alue in money or actual mar1et • !alueC of articlesH phrase Bor actual mar1et !alueC intended to eplain Bgross !alue in money$C • •
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BorC means successi!ely %tatute Art$ -99 of the Re!ised Penal &ode 3 Bthe offenses of seduction, abduction, rape or acts of lasci!iousness, shall not be prosecuted ecept upon a complaint by the offended party or her parents, grandparents or guardian$C Although these persons are mentioned dis2uncti!ely, pro!ision must be construed as meaning that the right to institute a criminal proceeding is eclusi!ely and successi!ely reposed in said persons in the order mentioned, no one shall proceed if there is any person pre!iously mentioned therein with legal capacity to institute the action$ BAndC is a con2unction pertinently defined as meaning Btogether with,C B2oined with,C Balong with,C Badded to or lin1ed toC 5e!er to mean BorC o Fsed to denote 2oinder or union o Band=orC 3 means that effect should be gi!e to both con2uncti!e and dis2uncti!e term term used to a!oid construction which by use o of dis2uncti!e BorC alone will eclude the combination of se!eral of the alternati!es or by the use of con2uncti!e BandC will eclude the efficacy of any one of the alternati!es standing alone$
ASSOCIATED WORDS
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where a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or e.ually susceptible of !arious meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it is found or with which it is associated$ to remo!e doubt refer to the meaning of associated or companion words
%enaseda v. F#avier %tatute %ec$ *-(-", Art I of the &onstitution grants • Ombudsman power to BDirect the officer concerned to ta1e appropriate action against a public official or employee at fault, and recommend his remo!al, suspension, demotion, fine censure or prosecution$ BsuspensionC 0 is a penalty or puniti!e measure not • pre!enti!e Magta-as v. Pryce Properties Corp.
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%tat %ec$ 97; of LK& authoried local go!ernment units to pre!ent or suppress BKambling ? other prohibited games of chance$C BKamblingC 0 refers only to illegal gambling, li1e other prohibited games of chance, must be pre!ented or suppressed ? not to gambling authoried by specific statutes$
Carandang v. Santiago Issue Ghether an offended party can file a separate • and independent ci!il action for damages arising from physical in2uries during pendency of criminal action for frustrated homicide$ %tatute Art$ -- of &i!il &ode Bin case of defamation, • fraud, ? physical in2uriesC • @eld &ourt ruled that Bphysical in2uriesC not as one defined in RP&, but to mean bodily harm or in2ury such as physical in2uries, frustrate homicide, or e!en death$ Co 0im C*an v. 2a#de' Tan 0e* Issue Ghether proceedings in ci!il cases pending in • court under the so called Republic of the Philippines established during the #apanese military occupation are affected by the proclamation of Ken$ )cArthur issued on October :-, *+99 that Ball laws, regulations and processes of any other go!ernment in the Philippines than that of the said &ommonwealth are null and !oid and without legal effect$C BProcessesC does not refer to 2udicial processes but to • the eecuti!e orders of the &hairman of the Philippine Eecuti!e &ommittee, ordinances promulgated by the President of so3called RP, and others that are of the same class as the laws and regulations with which the word BprocessesC is associated$
Commissioner of C%stoms v. P*i#. Acety#ene Co. %tatute %ec$ 8 of RA *-+9 pro!ides that Bta • pro!ided for in %ec$ * of this Act shall not be imposed against the importation into the Philippines of machinery or raw materials to be used by new and necessary industry H machinery e.uipment, spare parts, for use of industriesC Issue Is the word BindustriesC used in ordinary, • generic sense, which means enterprises employing relati!ely large amounts of capital and=or labor •
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@eld %ince BindustriesC used in the law for the : nd time Bis classified togetherC with the terms miners, mining industries, planters and farmers, ob!ious legislati!e intent is to confine the meaning of the term to acti!ities that tend to produce or create or manufacture such as those miners, mining enterprises, planters and farmers$ If used in ordinary sense, it becomes inconsistent and illogical
Peo. v. Santiago
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Issue Ghether defamatory statements through the medium of an amplifier system constitutes slander or libel Libel committed by means of Bwriting, printing, lithography, engra!ing, radio, cinematographic ehibiton$C It is argued that BamplifierC similar to radio @eld 5o$ Radio should be considered as same terms with writing and printing whose common characteristic is the Bpermanent means of publication$C
San Mig%e# Corp. v. +L"C Issue Ghether claim of an employee against his • employer for cash reward or submitting process to eliminate defects in .uality ? taste of %an )iguel product falls within 2urisdiction of the labor arbiter of 5LR& @eld 5o$ Outside of 2urisdiction$ 5ot necessary that • entire uni!erse of money claims under 2urisdiction of labor arbiter but only those to *$" unfair labor practices, :$" claims concerning terms ? conditions of employment 9$" claims relating to household ser!ices 7$" acti!ities prohibited to employers ? employees$ %tatute B2urisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the • 5LR&, as last amended by 'P 'lg$ :: including paragraph - Ball money claims of wor1ers, including hose based on nonpayment or underpayment of wages, o!ertime compensation, separation pay, and other benefits pro!ided by law or appropriate agreement, ecept claims for employees compensation, social security, medicare and maternity benefits$C
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pro!ide otherwise$ 4he propriety of a stay granted by the officer or body rendering the award, order, ruling, decision or 2udgment may be raised only by motion in the main case,C refers to the &A or to the &ourt of Agrarian Relations @eld &orrect construction made clear with reference to %ec$ * of RA 79-9, where the court, officers or bodies whose decision, award are appealable to the &ourt of Appeals, enumerated as follows &ourt of Agrarian Relations, %ec$ of Labor, %ocial %ecurity &ommission etcH /rom grouping, the enumeration in %ec$ 7 means &ourt of Agrarian Relations not &A$
E2usdem generis (or the same 1ind or species" Keneral rule where a general word or phrase follows • an enumeration of particular and specific words of the same class or where the latter follow the former, the general word or phrase is to be construed to include, or to be restricted to, persons, things or cases a1in to, resembling, or of the same 1ind or class as those specifically mentioned$ Purpose gi!e effect to both particular or general • words, by treating the particular words as indicating the class and the general words as indicating all that is embraced in said class, although not specifically named by the particular words$ Principle based on proposition that had the • legislature intended the general words to be used in their generic and unrestricted sense, it would ha!e not enumerated the specific words$ Presumption legislators addressed specifically to the • particulariation Illustration
Ebar#e v. S%ca#dito • %tatute EO :87 outlines the procedure which complainants charging go!ernment officials and employees with commission of irregularities should be guided, applies to criminal actions or complaints$ EO :87 0 Bcomplaints against public officials and • employees shall be promptly acted upon and disposed of by the officials or authorities concerned in accordance with pertinent laws and regulations so that the erring officials and employees can be soonest remo!ed or otherwise disciplines and the innocent, eonerated or !indicated in li1e manner, and to the end also that other remedies, including court action, may be pursued forthwith by the interested parties, after administrati!e remedies shall ha!e been ehaustedC •
@eld eecuti!e order does not apply to criminal actions$ 4he term is closely o!ershadowed by the .ualification 3 9After administrative remedies s*a## *ave been e)*a%sted: which suggest ci!il suits sub2ect to pre!ious administrati!e actions$
Mottom%# v. de#a Pa' Issue Ghether the word Tcourt in %ec 7, Art 79-9 • Appeal shall not stay the award, order, ruling, decision or 2udgment unless the officer or body rendering the same or the court, on motion after hearing, and on such terms as it may deem 2ust should
M%t%c v. COMELEC •
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%tatute Act ma1es unlawful the distribution of electoral propaganda gadgets, pens, lighters, fans, flashlights, athletic goods, materials and t*e #ike: @eld and the li1e, does not embrace taped 2ingles for campaign purposes
M%rp*y Morris 3 Co. v. Co##ector of C%stoms %tatute Dynamos, generators, eciters, and other • machinery for the generation of electricity for lighting or for powerH • @eld phrase Bother machineryC would not include steam turbines, pumps, condensers, because not same 1ind of machinery with dynamos, generators and eciters$ 2era v. C%evas %tatute all condensed s1immed mil1 and all mil1 in • whate!er form shall be clearly and legibly mar1ed on its immediate containers with words B4his mil1 is not suitable for nourishment for infants less than * year of ageC • @eld restricts the phrase Ball mil1 in whate!er form,C ecluded filled mil1$ ,rap*i#on v. M%nicipa# Co%rt of Cigara
%tatute the !ice3mayor shall be entitled to assume the office of the mayor during the absence, suspension or other temporary disability @eld anything which disables the mayor from • eercising the power and prerogati!es of his office, since Btheir temporary disabilityC follows the words BabsenceC and BsuspensionC Peo. v. Maga##anes Ghere a law grants a court eclusi!e 2urisdiction to • hear and decide Boffenses or felonies committed by public officials and employees in relation to their office,C the phrase BI5 RELA4IO5 4O 4@EIR O//I&EC .ualifies or restricts the offense to one which cannot eist without the office, or the office is a constituent element of the crime defined in the statute or one perpetuated in the performance, though improper or irregular, of his official functions •
C% 1n-ieng Sons /nc. v. ord of Ta) Appea#s Issue whether losses due to the war were to be • deductible from gross income of *+97 when they were sustained, or in *+76 when Philippine Gar Damage &ommission ad!ised that no payment would be made for said losses • %tatute BIn the case of a corporation, all losses actually sustained and not charged off within the taable year and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise$C &ontention the assurances of responsible public • officials before the end of *+97 that property owners would be compensated for their losses as a result of the war sufficed to place the losses within the phrase Bcompensated otherwiseC than by insurance •
@eld Re2ectedS BOtherwiseC in the clause 9compensated for by ins%rance or ot*er;ise: refers to compensation due under a title analogous or similar to insurance$ Inasmuch as the latter is a contract establishing a legal obligation, it follows that in order to be deemed Bcompensated for Totherwise, the losses sustained by a tapayer must be co!ered by a 2udicially enforceable right, springing from any of the 2uridical sources of obligations, namely, law, contract, .uasi3contract, torts, or crimes,C and not mere pronouncement of public officials
Ceb% /nstit%te of Tec*no#ogy v. Op#e Issue Ghether teachers hired on contract basis are • entitled to ser!ice incenti!e lea!e benefits as against the claim that they are not so %tatute Rule > of IRR of Labor &ode B4his rule (on • ser!ice incenti!e lea!es" shall apply to all employees, ecept Bfiled personnel and other employees whose performance is unsuper!ised by the employer including those who are engaged on tas1 or contract basis$C • @eld Bthose who were employed on tas1 or contract basisC should be related with Bfield personnel,C apply the principle, clearly teachers are not field personnel and therefore entitled to ser!ice incenti!e lea!e benefits$
Cagayan 2a##ey Enterprises v. CA • Issue whether the phrase Bother lawful be!eragesC which gi!es protection to manufacturer with the Phil$ Patent Office its duly stamped or mar1ed bottles used for Bsoda water, mineral or aerated waters, cider, mil1, cream or other lawful be!erages,C includes hard li.uor • %tatute title BAn Act to regulate the use of stamped or mar1ed bottles, boes, cas1s, 1egs, barrels, ? other similar containers$C @eld 4he title clearly shows intent to gi!e protection • to all mar1ed bottles of all lawful be!erages regardless of nature of contents$ +ationa# Po;er Corp. v. Angas • Issue whether the term 2udgment, refers to any 2udgment directing the payment of legal interest$ • %tatute &entral 'an1 &ircular 9*8 0 Bby !irtue of the authority granted to it under %ec$ * of Act 5umber :877, as amended, otherwise 1nown as Fsury Law, the )onetary 'oard in a resolution prescribed that the rate of interest for loan or forbearance of any money, good or credit ? the rate allowed in 2udgment in the absence of epress contract shall be *:N per annum$ @eld #udgments should mean only 2udgments • in!ol!ing loans or forbearance money, goods or credit, these later specific terms ha!ing restricted the meaning B2udgmentsC to those same class or the same nature as those specifically enumerated$ "ep%b#ic v. Migrino /acts retired military officer was in!estigated by the • P&KK for !iolation of Anti3Kraft Act in relation to EO * ? : authoriing the P&KK to reco!er ill3gotten wealth from the former Presidents Bsubordinates and close associatesC • Issue Does P&KK ha!e 2urisdiction to in!estigate such military officer for being in ser!ice during the administration of the former President @eld B%ubordinatesC refers only to one who en2oys • close association or relation to the former President and his wifeH term Bclose associatesC restricted the meaning of BsubordinatesC Limitations of e2usdem generis Re.uisites • %tatute contains an enumeration of particular o ? specific words, followed by general word or phrase o Particular and specific words constitute a class or are the same 1ind Enumeration of the particular ? specific o words is not ehausti!e or is not merely by eamples o 4here is no indication of legislati!e intent to gi!e the general words or phrases a broader meaning
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Rule of e-%sdem generis is not of uni!ersal applicationH it should use to carry out, not defeat the intent of the law$
1S v. Santo +ino •
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%tatute It shall be unlawful to for any person to carry concealed about his person any bowie, 1nife, dagger, 1ris or other deadly weapon$ Provided prohibition shall not apply to firearms who ha!e secured a license or who are entitled to carry the same under the pro!isions of this Act$C Issue does Bthe deadly weaponC include an unlicensed re!ol!er @eld MesS &arrying such would be in !iolation of statute$ 'y the pro!iso, it manifested its intention to include in the prohibition weapons other than armas blancas therein specified$
Cagayan 2a##ey Enterprises /nc. v. CA & previo%s page sa 1abilang column "oman Cat*o#ic Arc*bis*op of Mani#a v. Socia# Sec%rity Commission •
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Issue a religious institution in!o1ing e-%sdem generi whether TemployerC be limited to underta1ing an acti!ity which has an element of profit or gain %tatute Bany person, natural or 2uridical, domestic or foreign, who carried in the Philippines any trade, business, industry$ and uses the ser!ices of another person, who under his orders as regard the employment, ecept the Ko!ernment, and any of its political subdi!isions branches or instrumentalities and KO&&sC$ @eld 5o$ the rule of e-%sdem generis applies only when there is uncertainty$ 4he definition is sufficiently comprehensi!e to include charitable institutions and charities not for profitH it contained eceptions which said institutions and entities are not included$
Epressio unius est eclusion alterius 4he epress mention of one person, thing or • conse.uence implies the eclusion of all others$ Rule may be epressed in a number of ways • o E)press%m facit cessare tacit%m what is epressed puts an end to that which is implied where a statute, by its terms, is epressly limited to certain matters, it may not, by interpretation or construction, be etended to other matters$ o E)ceptio firmat reg%#am in casib%s non e)ceptis 3 A thing not being ecepted must be regarded as coming within the pur!iew of the general rule o E)pressio %ni%s est e)c#%sion a#teri%s 3 4he epression of one or more things of a class implies the eclusion of all not epressed, e!en though all would ha!e been implied had none been epressedH opposite the doctrine of necessary implication
5egati!e3opposite doctrine •
Arg%ment%m a contrario what is epressed puts an end to what is implied$
C*%ng Fook v. @*ite %tatute case eempts the wife of a naturalied • American from detention, for treatment in a hospital, who is afflicted with a contagious disease$ @eld &ourt denied petition for writ of habeas corpus • (filed by the nati!e3born American citien on behalf of wife detained in hospital", court resorted to negati!e3 opposite doctrine, stating that statute plainly relates to wife of a naturalied citien ? cannot interpolate Bnati!e3bornC citien$ • Analysis courts application results to in2ustice (as should not discriminate against nati!e3born citiens", which is not intent of law, should ha!e used doctrine of necessary implication$ Application of e)pression %ni%s rule • Kenerally used in construction of statutes granting powers, creating rights and remedies, restricting common rights, imposing rights ? forfeitures, as well as statutes strictly construed$ Acosta v. F#or •
%tatute specifically designates the persons who may bring actions for $%o ;arranto ecludes others from bringing such actions$
Escribano v. Avi#a • %tatute for libel, Bpreliminary in!estigations of criminal actions for written defamation shall be conducted by the city fiscal of pro!ince or city or by municipal court of city or capital of the pro!ince where such actions may be instituted precludes all other municipal courts from conducting such preliminary in!estigations Peo. v. Lantin •
%tatute crimes which cannot be prosecuted de oficio namely adultery, concubinage, seduction, rape or acts of lasci!iousnessH crimes such as slander can be prosecuted de oficio.
)ore short eamples on p$ ::7 Mani#a Lodge +o. =>? v. CA Santos v. CA Ler%m v. Cr%' Centra# arrio v. City Treas%rer of Davao 2era v. Fernande' %tatute All claims for money against the decedent, • arising from contracts, epress or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral epenses and epenses for the last sic1ness of the decedent, and 2udgment for money against decedent, must be filled within the time limit of the notice, otherwise barred fore!er$
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@eld 4he taes due to the go!ernment, not being mentioned in the rule are ecluded from the operation of the rule$
Mendeni##a v. Omandia %tatute changed the form of go!ernment of a • municipality into a city pro!ides that the incumbent mayor, !ice3mayor and members of the municipal board shall continue in office until the epiration of their terms$ • @eld all other municipal offices are abolished$ %tte v. Man%e# 1y 3 Sons /nc. %tatute Legislature deliberately selected a particular • method of gi!ing notice, as when a co3owner is gi!en the right of legal redemption within -6 days from notice in writing by the !endor in case the other co3 owner sells his share is the co3owned property, • @eld the method of gi!ing notice must be deemed ecusi!e ? a notice sent by !endee is ineffecti!e$
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company to include death resulting from murder or assault among the prohibited ris1s lead ine!itably to the conclusion that it did not intend to limit or eempt itself from liability for such death Insurance company still liable for the in2ury, disability and loss suffered by the insured$ (sobra Tto, I swearS )inurder na nga, ayaw pang bayaranS %obraS @indi daw accidental eh di mas lalo ng 1ailangang bayaran dahil murderS %usS %usS"
Centeno v. 2i##a#onPorni##os • Issue whether the solicitation for religious purposes, i$e$, reno!ation of church without securing permit fro Department of %ocial %er!ices, is a !iolation of PD *789, ma1ing it a criminal offense for a person to solicit or recei!e contributions for charitable or public welfare purposes$ • @eld 5o$ &haritable and religious specifically enumerated only goes to show that the framers of the law in .uestion ne!er intended to include solicitations for religious purposes within its co!erage$
2i##an%eva v. City of /#oi#o •
%tatute Local Autonomy Act, local go!ernments are gi!en broad powers to ta e!erything, ecept those which are specifically mentioned therein$ If a sub2ect matter does not come within the eceptions, an ordinance imposing a ta on such sub2ect matter is deemed to come within the broad taing power, e)ception firmat reg%#am in casib%s non e)ceptis.
Samson v. Co%rt of Appea#s Ghere the law pro!ides that positions in the • go!ernment belong to the competiti!e ser!ice, ecept those declared by law to be in the noncompetiti!e ser!ice and those which are policy3determining, primarily confidential or highly technical in nature and enumerates those in the noncompetiti!e as including %E&RE4ARIE% O/ KO>ER5OR% A5D )AMOR%, the clear intent is that assistant secretaries of go!ernors and mayors fall under the competiti!e ser!ice, for by ma1ing an enumeration, the legislature is presumed to ha!e intended to eclude those not enumerated, for otherwise it would ha!e included them in the enumeration
Limitations of the rule *$ It is not a rule of law, but merely a tool in statutory construction 2. E)pressio %ni%s est e)c#%sion a#teri%s no more than auiliary rule of interpretation to be ignored where other circumstances indicate that the enumeration was not intended to be eclusi!e$ -$ Does not apply where enumeration is by way of eample or to remo!e doubts only$ ,ome' v. 2ent%ra • Issue whether the prescription by a physician of opium for a patient whose physical condition did not re.uire the use of such drug constitutes Bunprofessional conductC as to 2ustify re!ocation of physicians license to practice •
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Firman ,enera# /ns%rance Corp. v. CA •
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4he insurance company disclaimed liability since death resulting from murder was impliedly ecluded in the insurance policy as the cause of death is not accidental but rather a deliberate and intentional act, ecluded by the !ery nature of a personal accident insurance$ @eld the principle Bepresssio unius est eclusio 3 the mention of one thing implies the eclusion of the other thing 3 not ha!ing been epressly included in the enumeration of circumstances that would negate liability in said insurance policy cannot be considered by implication to discharge the petitioner insurance
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@eld %till liableS Rule of e)pressio %ni%s not applicable &ourt said, I cannot be seriously contended that aside from the fi!e eamples specified, there can be no other conduct of a physician deemed Tunprofessional$ 5or can it be con!incingly argued that the legislature intended to wipe out all other forms of Tunprofessional conduct therefore deemed grounds for re!ocation of licenses
Does not apply when in case a statute appears upon its face to limit the operation of its pro!ision to particular persons or things enumerating them, but no reason eists why other persons or things not so enumerated should not ha!e been included and manifest in2ustice will follow by not including them$ 7$ If it will result in incongruities or a !iolation of the e.ual protection clause of the &onstitution$ 8$ If adherence thereto would cause incon!enience, hardship and in2ury to the public interest$
Doctrine of casus omissus • A person, ob2ect or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to ha!e been omitted intentionally$ 4he maim operates only if and when the omission has • been clearly established, and in such a case what is omitted in the enumeration may not, by construction, be included therein$ Eception where legislature did not intend to eclude • the person, thing or ob2ect from the enumeration$ If such legislati!e intent is clearly indicated, the court may supply the omission if to do so will carry out the clear intent of the legislature and will not do !iolence to its language Doctrine of last antecedent • ualifying words restrict or modify only the words or phrases to which they are immediately associated not those which are distantly or remotely located$ •
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Ad pro)im%m antecedens fiat re#atio nisi impediat%r sententia & relati!e words refer to the nearest antecedents, unless the contet otherwise re.uires Rule use of a comma to separate an antecedent from the rest eerts a dominant influence in the application of the doctrine of last antecedent$
Illustration of rule Pangi#inan v. A#vendia )embers of the family of the tenant includes the • tenants son, son3in3law, or grandson, e!en though they are not dependent upon him for support and li!ing separately from him 'E&AF%E the .ualifying phrase Bwho are dependent upon him for supportC refers solely to its last antecedent, namely, Bsuch other person or persons, whether related to the tenant or notC F#orentino v. P+ Issue whether holders of bac1pay certificates can • compel go!ernment3owned ban1s to accept said certificates in payment of the holders obligations to the ban1$ •
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%tatute Bobligations subsisting at the time of the appro!al of this amendatory act for which the applicant may directly be liable to the go!ernment or to any of its branches or instrumentalities, or to corporations owned or controlled by the go!ernment, or to any citiens of the Philippines or to any association or corporation organied under the laws of the Philippines, who may be wiling to accept the same for such settlementC @eld the court, in!o1ing the doctrine of last antecedent, ruled that the phrase .ualify only to its last antecedent namely Bany citien of the Philippines or association or corporation organied under the laws of the PhilippinesC 4he court held that bac1pay certificate holders can compel go!ernment3owned ban1s to accept said certificates for payment of their obligations with the ban1$
ualifications of the doctrine$ *$ %ub2ect to the eception that where the intention of the law is to apply the phrase to all antecedents embraced in the pro!ision, the same should be made etensi!e to the whole$ :$ Doctrine does not apply where the intention is not to .ualify the antecedent at all$ Reddendo singular singuilis >ariation of the doctrine of last antecedent • Referring each to eachH • Referring each phrase or epression to its appropriate • ob2ect, or let each be put in its proper place, that is, the word should be ta1en distributi!ely$ Peo. v Tamani • Issue when to count the *73day period within which to appeal a 2udgment of con!iction of criminal actionX date of promulgation of 2udgment or date of receipt of notice of 2udgment$ • %tatute %ec$ 8, Rule *:: of the Rules of &ourt @eld %hould be from Tpromulgation should be • referring to T2udgment, while notice refer to order$ 0ing v. !ernande' • Issue Ghether a &hinese holding a noncontrol position in a retail establishment, comes within the prohibition against aliens inter!ening Bin the management, operation, administration or controlC followed by the phrase Bwhether as an officer, employee or laborer @eld /ollowing the principle, the entire scope of • personnel acti!ity, including that of laborers, is co!ered by the prohibition against the employment of aliens$ Amadora v. CA Issue whether Art :*;6 of &i!il &ode, which states • that Blastly teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trade shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custodyC applies to all schools, academic as well as non3academic •
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@eld teachers pupils and studentsH heads of establishments of arts and trades to apprentices Keneral rule responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the teacher in charge of such student (where school is academic" Eception responsibility for the tort committed by the student will attach to the head, and only he, (who" shall be held liable (in case of the establishments of arts and tradesH technical or !ocational in nature"
PROVISOS, ECEPTIONS AND CLAUSES
Pro!isos, generally • to limit the application of the enacting clause, section or pro!ision of a statute, or ecept something, or to .ualify or restrain its generality, or eclude some possible ground of misinterpretation of it, as etending
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to cases not intended by legislature to be brought within its pur!iew$ Rule restrain or .ualify the generality of the enacting clause or section which it refers$ Purpose limit or restrict the general language or operation of the statute, not to enlarge it$ Location commonly found at the end of a statute, or pro!ision ? introduced, as a rule, by the word BPro!idedC$ Determined by Ghat determines whether a clause is a pro!iso is its substance rather than its form$ If it performs any of the functions of a pro!iso, then it will be regarded as such, irrespecti!e of what word or phrase is used to introduce it$
Pro!iso may enlarge scope of law It is still the duty of the courts to ascertain the • legislati!e intention and it pre!ails o!er pro!iso$ 4hus it may enlarge, than restrict • 1.S. v. Santo +ino •
%tatute it shall be unlawful for any person to carry concealed about his person any bowie, 1nife, dagger, 1ris or any other deadly weapon Provided that this pro!ision shall not apply to firearms in the possession of persons who ha!e secured a license therefore or who are entitled to same under pro!isions of this Act$
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@eld through the Pro!iso it manifested the intention to include in the prohibition weapons other than armas b#ancas as specified$
Pro!iso as additional legislation Epressed in the opening statement of a section of a • statute Gould mean eactly the re!erse of what is necessarily • implied when read in connection with the limitation • Purpose 4o limit generalities o Eclude from the scope of the statute that o which otherwise would be within its terms Ghat pro!iso .ualifies • Keneral rule .ualifies or modifies only the phrase immediately preceding itH or restrains or limits the generality of the clause that it immediately follows$ • Eception unless it clearly appears that the legislature intended to ha!e a wider scope C*inese F#o%r /mporters Assn v. Price Stabi#i'ation oard •
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%tatute %ec$ *7 RA 9:8 3 Any eisting law, eecuti!e order or regulation to the contrary notwithstanding, no go!ernment agency ecept the Import &ontrol &ommission shall allocate the import .uota among the !arious importers$ Provided 4hat the Philippine Rehabilitation and 4rade Administration shall ha!e eclusi!e power and authority to determine and regulate the allocation of wheat flour among importers$C Issue whether or not the pro!iso ecluded wheat flour from the scope of act itself$
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@eld 5OS Pro!iso refer to the clause immediately preceding it and can ha!e no other meaning than that the function of allocating the wheat flour instead of assigning to Import &ontrol &ommission was assigned to PR4A$ If wheat flour is eempted from the pro!isions of the Act, the pro!iso would ha!e been placed in the section containing the repealing clause
Co##ector of /nterna# "even%e v. Ange#es • Ghen an earlier section of statute contains pro!iso, not embodied in later section, the pro!iso, not embodied in a later section thereof, in the absence of legislati!e intent, be confined to .ualify only the section to which it has been appended$ F#ores v. Miranda Issue Petitioner that appro!al of the Public %er!ice • &ommission of the sale of public ser!ice !ehicle was not necessary because of pro!iso in %ec$ :6 of &ommonwealth Act 5o$ *98 •
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%tatute It shall be unlawful for any public ser!ice !ehicle or for the owner, lessee or operator thereof, without the pre!ious appro!al and authority of the &ommission pre!iously had to sell, alienate its property, franchiseH Provided *o;ever that nothing herein contained shall be construed to pre!ent the transaction from being negotiated or completed before its appro!al or to pre!ent the sale, alienation, or lease by any public ser!ice of any of its property in the ordinary course of businessC @eld the pro!iso means only that the sale o without the re.uired appro!al is still !alid and binding between the partiesH also the phrase Bin the ordinary course of business o could not ha!e been intended to include sale of !ehicle itself, but at most may refer only to such property that may be concei!ably disposed of by the carrier in the ordinary course of its business, li1e 2un1ed e.uipment$
Mercado Sr. v. +L"C • @eld the pro!iso in par : of Art :;6 relates only to casual employeesH not to pro2ect employees$ Applying rule that pro!iso to be construed with • reference to immediately preceding part of the pro!ision which it is attached and not to other sections thereof, unless legislati!e intent was to restrict or .ualify$ Eception to the rule Pro!iso construed to .ualify only the immediately • preceding part of the section to which it is attachedH if no contrary legislati!e intent is indicated$ • Ghere intent is to .ualify or restrict the phrase preceding it or the earlier pro!isions of the statute or e!en the statute itself as a whole, then the pro!iso will be construed in that manner, in order that the intent of the law may be carried out
Repugnancy between pro!iso and main pro!ision Ghere there is a conflict between the pro!iso and the • main pro!ision, that which is located in a later portion of the statute pre!ails, unless there is legislati!e intent to the contrary$ Latter pro!ision, whether pro!ision or not, is gi!en • preference for it is the latest epression of the intent of the legislation$ Eceptions, generally • Eception consists of that which would otherwise be included in the pro!ision from which it is ecepted$ It is a clause which eempts something from the • operation of a statute by epress words$ Becept,C Bunless otherwise,C and Bshall not applyC • )ay not be introduced by words mentioned abo!e, as • long as if such remo!es something from the operation of a pro!ision of law$ • /unction to confirm the general ruleH .ualify the words or phrases constituting the general rule$ •
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E)ceptio firmat reg%#am in casib%s e)ceptis A thing not being ecepted, must be regarded as coming within the pur!iew of the general rule$ Doubts resol!ed in fa!or of general rule
Eception and Pro!iso distinguished Eception • Eempts something absolutely from the operation of statute • 4a1es out of the statute something that otherwise would be a part of the sub2ect matter of it$ Part of the enactment itself, absolutely ecluding from • its operation some sub2ect or thing that would otherwise fall within the scope$ Pro!iso Defeats its operation conditionally$ • A!oids by way of defeasance or ecuse • • If the enactment is modified by engrafting upon it a new pro!ision, by way of amendment, pro!iding conditionally for a new case3 this is the nature of pro!iso$ %imilar in a way since one of the functions of pro!iso is to ecept something from an enacting clause$ Illustration of eception ME"ALCO v. P%b#ic 1ti#ities Emp#oyees Association •
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%tatute 5o person, firm, or corporation, business establishment or place shall compel an employee or laborer to wor1 on %undays? legal holidays, unless paid an additional sum of at least :7N of his renumeration Provided that this prohibition shall not apply to public utilities performing public ser!ice, e$g$ supplying gas, electricity, power, water etc Issue Is )ERAL&O liable to pay the :7N for employees who wor1 during holidays and %undays
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@eld 5egati!e$ :nd part is an eception although introduced by BPro!ided$C As appellant is a public utility that supplies electricity ? pro!ides means of transportation, it is e!ident that appellant is eempt from .ualified prohibition established in the enactment clause$
To#entino v. Secretary of Finance •
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%tatute 5o bill shall be passed by either @ouse shall become a law unless it has passed - readings on separate days, ? printed copies thereof in its final form ha!e been distributed to its )embers - days before its passage, e)cept when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency$ @eld it .ualifies only its nearest antecedent, which is the distribution of the printed bill in its final form days from its final passage$? not the - readings on separate days$
Pendon v. Diasnes Issue whether a person con!icted of a crime against • property, who was granted absolute pardon by the President, is entitled to !ote %tatute A person shall not be .ualified to !ote Bwho • has been sentenced by final 2udgment to suffer one year or more from imprisonment, such disability not ha!ing been remo!ed any plenary pardonC or Bwho has been declared by final 2udgment guilty of any crime against property$C •
*st clause3 : ecpetions 0 (a" Person penalied by less than * yr$H and (:" Person granted an absolute pardon
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:nd clause 3 creates eception to * st but not to :nd that a person con!icted of crime against property cannot !ote unless theres pardon$ @eld absolute pardon for any crime for which one year of imprisonment or more was meted out restores the prisoner to his political rights$ If penalty less * yr, dis.ualification not apply, ecept when against property3 needs pardon$
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4he :nd clause creates the eception to the *st
,orospe v. CA Be)ception need not be introd%ced by 9e)cept: or 9%n#ess: %tatute Rule : of Rules of &ourt, Bser!ice by • registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addresseeH but if fail to claim his mail from the post office within 7 days from ate of first notice of the postmaster, ser!ice shall ta1e effect at the epiration of such time$C Issue Ghether actual receipt the date of a registered • mail after 7 day period, is the date from which to count the prescripti!e period to comply with certain re.uirements$ •
@eld %er!ice is completed on the 7 th day after the * st notice, e!en if he actually recei!ed the mail months later$
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:nd part is separated by semicolon, and begins with Tbut which indicates eception$
Yremember t*is story to memori'e t*e ma)im Optima at %tatuti /rutti where interpreting as to why when coc1roaches(IPI%" when added results to %F) (ipsum" a stadium (statutum"Z 0 sorry bloc1mates, weird si cherryS Do not in.uire too much into the moti!es which influenced the legislati!e body unless the moti!e is stated or disclosed in the statute themsel!es$ o
%a!ing clause • Pro!ision of law which operates to ecept from the effect of the law what the clause pro!ides, or sa!e something which would otherwise be lost$ Fsed to sa!e something from effect of repeal of statute • Legislature, in repealing a statute, may preser!e in the • form of a sa!ing clause, the right of the state to prosecute and punish offenses committed in !iolation of the repealed law$ Ghere eisting procedure is altered or substituted by • another, usual to sa!e proceedings under the old law at the time the new law ta1es effect, by means of sa!ing clause &onstrued in light of intent by legislature • Ki!en strict or liberal meaning depending on nature of • statute$ CHAPTER SI: Statute Construe" as W$o'e an" !n Re'at!on to ot$er Statutes STATUTE CONSTRUED AS WHOLE
Kenerally %tatute is passed as a whole • It should ha!e one purpose and one intent o &onstrue its parts and section in connection o with other parts o Ghy 4o BproduceC a harmonious whole •
5e!er Di!ide by process of etymological dissertation (why 'ecause there are instances when the intention of the legislati!e body is different from that of the definition in its original sense" %eparate the words (remember that the whole o point of this chapter is to construe it as a whole" %eparate contet o 'ase definitions on leicographer (what is a o leicographer A person who studies leicography$ Ghat is leicography then Analyes semantic relationships between leicon and language 0 not important$ 5e!er mind " 0 ang 1ulitS 4he whole point of this part is to construe the whole statute and its part together (actually 1ahit ito nalang tandaan hanggang matapos 1asi ito lang yung sinasabi ng boo1" o
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Intent ascertained from statute as whole Legislati!e meaning and intent should be • etracted=ascertained from statutes as a whole (hence the title" Ghy 'ecause the law is the best epositor of o itself •
Optima Statuti Interpretatio est ipsum statutum 3 the best interpreter of a statute is the statute itself
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Aisporna v. CA pointed out that words, clauses, phrases should not be • studied as detached=isolated epressions &onsider e!ery part in understanding the o meaning of its part to produce a harmonious whole )eaning of the law is borne in mind and not o to be etracted from a single word )ost important E!ery part of the statute must o be interpreted with reference to the contet Aboiti' S*ipping Corp v. City of Ceb% Described that if the words or phrases of statute be • ta1en indi!idually it might con!ey a meaning different form the one intended by the author$ Interpreting words or phrases separately may limit the • etent of the application of the pro!ision ,aanan v. /ntermediate Appe##ate Co%rt • &ase of wire tapping • 4here is a pro!ision which states that B it shall be unlawful for any person, not being authoried by all the parties to any pri!ate communication or spo1en word to tap any wire or cable or by using any other de!ice or arrangement, to secretly o!erhear, intercept, or record such communication or spo1en word by using such de!ice commonly 1nown as dictagraphC Issue whether the phrase de!ice or arrangement • includes party line and etension %tatcon it should not be construed in isolation$ Rather • it should be interpreted in relation to the other words (tap, to o!erhear" thus party line or telephone etension is not included because the words in the pro!ision limit it to those that ha!e a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of de!ice to o!erhear$ (Remember the maim noscitus a sociis because in here they applied an association with other words in construing the intention or limitation of the statute" +ationa# Tobacco Administration v. COA Issue whether educational assistance gi!en to • indi!iduals prior to the enactment of RA 87; should be continued to be recei!ed @eld Mes$ Proper interpretation of section*: RA 87; • depends on the combination of first and second paragraph •
/irst sentence states that Bsuch other additional compensation not otherwise specified as may be determined by the D') shall be deemed included in the standardied salary rates herein prescribed$C 4he
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second sentence states Bsuch other additional compensation, whether in cash or in 1ind, being recei!ed by incumbents only as of #uly *, *+;+ not integrated into the standard shall continue to be authoried$C (you can as1 cheery na lang to eplain it, ang haba ng nasa boo1 " statcon do not isolate or detach the parts$ &onstruing a statute as a whole includes reconciling and harmoniing conflicting pro!isions
Purpose or contet as controlling guide construe whole statute and ascertain the meaning of • the words or phrases base on its contet, the nature of the sub2ect, and purpose or intention of the legislati!e body who enacted the statute gi!e it a reasonable construction • Leeway are accepted on grammatical construction, • letters of the statutes, rhetorical framewor1 if it can pro!ide a clear and definite purpose of the whole statute ( as long as it can produce a clear and definite statutes, it is sometimes affected to be la on the construction of grammar" @armonie the parts of each other and it should be • consistent with its scope and ob2ect Ki!ing effect to statute as a whole Ghy construe a statute as a whole 3 'ecause it • implies that one part is as important as the other Ghat if the pro!ision=section is unclear by itself 3 • One can ma1e it clear by reading and construing it in relation to the whole statute @ow do you properly and intelligently construe a • pro!ision=statute 3 - ways (*" Fnderstand its meaning and scopeH (:" apply to an actual caseH (-" courts should consider the whole act itself • Ghy should e!ery part of the statute be gi!en effect 3 'ecause it is enacted as an integrated measure not a hodgepodge of conflicting pro!isions •
Gays on how the courts should construe a statute (according to "ep%b#ic v. "eyes" Interpret the thought con!eyed by the statute o as whole &onstrue constituent parts together o Ascertain legislati!e intent form whole part o &onsider each and e!ery pro!ision in light of o the general purpose )a1e e!ery part effecti!e, harmonious and o sensible (adopt a construction which would gi!e effect to e!ery part of the of the statute" Ft res magis !aleat .uam pereat 3 the construction is to be sought which gi!es effect to the whole of the statute 3 of its e!ery word$
Apparently conflicting pro!isions reconciled included in the rule of construing statute as a whole, is • the reconciling and harmoniing conflicting pro!isions because it is by this that the statute will be gi!en effect as a whole$
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Ghy is it a must for courts to harmonie conflicting pro!ision 3 'ecause they are e.ually the handiwor1 of the same legislature
"P v. CA Issue whether or not an appeal of cases in!ol!ing 2ust • compensation should be made first by DARA' before R4& under %ec$ 7 @eld %& said that the contention of the Republic and • the Land 'an1 in the affirmati!e side has no merit because although DARA' is granted a 2urisdiction o!er agrarian reform matters, it does not ha!e 2urisdiction o!er criminal cases$ Sa-onas v. CA Issue what period an ad!erse claim annotated at the • bac1 of a transfer certificate effecti!e • @eld In construing the law %ec$ 6 of PD *7:+ (ad!erse claim shall be effecti!e for a period of -6 days from the date of the registration" care should be ta1en to ma1e e!ery part effecti!e %pecial and general pro!isions in same statute special would o!errule the general • special must be operati!eH general affect only those it • applies ecept to general pro!ision • &onstruction as not to render pro!ision nugatory another conse.uence of the rule pro!ision of a statute • should not be construed as to nullify or render another nugatory in the same statute • Interpretatio fienda est et res magis !aleat .uam pereat 3 a law should be interpreted with a !iew to upholding rather than destroying o Do not construe a statute wherein one portion will destroy the other A!oid a construction which will render to o pro!ision inoperati!e Reason for the rule because of the presumption that the legislature has • enacted a statute whose pro!isions are in harmony and consistent with each other and that conflicting intentions is the same statute are ne!er supported or regarded ualification of rule Ghat if the parts cannot be harmonied or reconciled • without nullifying the other 3 Rule is for the court to re2ect the one which is least in accord with the general plan of the whole statute Ghat if there is no choice 3 the latter pro!ision must • !acate the formerH last in order is fre.uently held to pre!ail unless intent is otherwise • Ghat if the conflict cannot be harmonied and made to stand together 3 one must in.uire into the circumstances of their passage &onstruction as to gi!e life to law
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pro!ide sensible interpretation to promote the ends of which they were enacted construct them in a reasonable and practical way to gi!e life to them Interpretatio fienda es ut res magis !aleat .uam pereat 3 interpretation will gi!e the efficacy that is to be adopted$
&onstruction to a!oid surplusage • construe the statute to ma1e no part or pro!ision thereof as surplasage each and e!ery part should be gi!en due effect and • meaning do not construe a legal pro!ision to be a useless • surplusage and meaningless • eert all efforts to pro!ide the meaning$ Ghy 'ecause of the presumption that the legislature used the word or phrase for a purpose Application of rule Me-ia v.a#a#ong Issue how to constru Bnet general electionC in %ec$ • ;; of the &ity &harter of Dagupan &ity •
@eld the phrase refers to the net general election after the city came into being and not the one after its organiation by Presidential Proclamation$
+iere v. CF/ of +egros Occidenta# • Issue does the city mayor ha!e the power to appoint a city engineer pursuant to %ec$ * of the &ity &harter of La &arlote @eld no, the city mayor does not ha!e such power$ • 4he phrase Band other heads and other employees of such departments as may be createdC whom the mayor can appoint, refers to the heads of city departments that may be created after the law too1 effect, and does not embrace the city engineer$ 4o rule otherwise is to render the first con2unction BandC before the words Bfire departmentC a superfluity and without meaning at all 1ytengs% v "ep%b#ic Issue whether the re.uirement the re.uirement for • naturaliation that the applicant Bwill reside continuously in the Philippines from the date of the filing of the petition up to the time of his admission to Philippine citienshipC refers to actual residence or merely to legal residence or domicile • @eld such re.uirement refers to actual or physical residence because to construe it otherwise is to render the clause a surplusage$ An applicant for naturaliation must be actually • residing in the Philippines from the filing of the petition for naturaliation to its determination by the court Mani#a Lodge +o. =>? v. CA Issue whether the reclaimed land is patrimonial or • public dominion
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@eld to say that the land is patrimonial will render nugatory and a surplusage the phrase of the law to the effect that the &ity of )anila Bis hereby authoried to lease or sellC A sale of public dominion needs a legislati!e authoriation, while a patrimonial land does not$
%tatute and its amendments construed together rule applies to the construction and its amendments • • Ghate!er changes the legislature made it should be gi!en effect together with the other parts$ A#meda v. F#orentino Law 0 Bthe municipal board shall ha!e a secretary who • shall be appointed by it to ser!e during the term of office of the members thereofC • Amendment 0 Bthe !ice3mayor shall appoint all employees of the board who may be suspended or remo!ed in accordance with lawC &onstruction of both Law and Amendment 0 the • power of the !ice3mayor to ma1e appointment pursuant to the amendatory act is limited to the appointment of all employees of the board other than the board secretary who is to be appointed by the board itself STATUTE CONSTRUED IN RELATION CONSTITUTION AND OTHER STATUTES
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%tatute construed in harmony with the &onstitution &onstitution3 the fundamental law to which all laws • are subser!ient Keneral Rule Do not interpret a statute independent • from the constitution • &onstrue the statute in harmony with the fundamental law Ghy 'ecause it is always presumed that the legislature adhered to the constitutional limitations when they enacted the statute It is also important to understand a statute in light of • the constitution and to a!oid interpreting the former in conflict with the latter Ghat if the statute is susceptible to two constructions, • one is constitutional and the other is unconstitutional A 4he construction that should be adopted should be the one that is constitutional and the one that will render it in!alid should be re2ected$ • 4he &ourt should fa!or the construction that gi!es a statute of sur!i!ing the test of constitutionality 4he &ourt cannot in order to bring a statute within the • fundamental law, amend it by construction Taada v. T%vera this is the case regarding Art$ : of the &i!il &ode • especially the phrase Bunless otherwise pro!idedC$ •
%tatcon one should understand that if the phrase refers to the publication itself it would !iolate the constitution (since all laws should be made public" Yif malabo, !ague, eh huh 0 cherry will eplain it na lang Z
%tatutes in Pari Materia pari materia 3 refers to any the following • same person or thing o same purpose of ob2ect o same specific sub2ect matter o • Later statutes may refer to prior laws$ Ghat if the later law ha!e no reference to the prior • law, does that mean they are not in pari materia 3 5o$ It is sufficient that they ha!e the same sub2ect matter$ Ghen is a statute not in pari materia 3 4he conditions • abo!e are the determinants of ascertaining if a statute is in pari materia, thus e!en if two statutes are under the same broad sub2ect as along as their specific sub2ects are not the same, they are 5O4 in pari material @ow statutes in Pari Materia construed • Interpretare et concordare leges legibus est optimus interpretandi modus 0 e!ery statute must be so construed and harmonied with other statutes as to form a uniform system of 2urisprudence (parang ganun din nung first part, construe it as a whole$ 'ut also bear in mind that it should also be in harmony with other eisting laws" &onstrue statutes in pari materia together to attain the • purpose of an epress national policy Ghy should they be construed together 3 'ecause of • the assumption that when the legislature enacted the statutes they were thin1ing of the prior statute$ Prior statutes relating to the same sub2ect matter are to be compared with the new pro!isions$ • Again it is important to harmonie the statutes$ &ourts should not render them in!alid without ta1ing the necessary steps in reconciling them
2da de 1rbano v. ,S/S • there were no facts gi!en in the boo1 ecept that it was in this case that in pari materia was eplained well$ 4he eplanation are the same in the aforementioned •
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Other things to consider in constructing statutes which are in pari materia @istory of the legislation on the sub2ect o Ascertain the uniform purpose of the o legislature Disco!er the policy related to the sub2ect o matter has been changed or modified o &onsider acts passed at prior sessions e!en those that ha!e been repealed Distingue tempora et concordabis 2ura 0 distinguish times and you will harmonie laws In cases of two or more laws with the same sub2ect matter uestion is usually whether the later act o impliedly repealed the prior act$ Rule the only time a later act will be repealed o or amended is when the act itself states so (that it supersedes all the prior acts" or when
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there is an irreconcilable repugnancy between the two$ In the case of BimpliedC the doubt will be resol!ed against the repeal or amendment and in fa!or of the harmoniation of the laws on the sub2ect (later will ser!e as a modification"
Reasons why laws on same sub2ect are reconciled : main reasons • 4he presumption that the legislature too1 into o account prior laws when they enacted the new one$ Borbiter dict%m ni c*erry t*is c*apter keeps pointing o%t t*at t*e #egis#at%re are kno;#edgeab#e on t*e #a; b%t / ;onder *o; t*e actors fitG /m not discriminating b%t *o; did Lito Lapid Loi E-ercito etc kne; t*e prior #a;sG / *eard t*ey *ave researc*ers ;*o do it for t*em. @*y dont ;e vote t*ose researc*ers insteadG 4%n #ang. / *ave been reading t*e ;*o#e pres%mption t*at t*e #egis#at%re is kno;#edgeab#e. Madaming namamatay sa aka#a. /s agpa#o sti## a#iveG*a*a*a " o
'ecause enactments of the same legislature on the same sub2ect are supposed to form part of one uniform system (Ghy 'ecause later statutes are supplementary to the earlier enactments" If possible construe the two statutes wherein the pro!isions of both are gi!en effect
Ghere harmoniation is impossible Earlier law should gi!e way to the later law because it • is the BcurrentC or later epression of the legislati!e will
Illustration of the rule (in pari materia" Lacson v. "o$%e Issue the phrase unless sooner remo!ed of a statute • that states Bthe mayor shall hold office for four years unless sooner remo!edC statcon the court held that the phrase should be • construed in relation to remo!al statutes$ 4hus the phrase meant that although the mayor cannot be remo!ed during his term of office, once he !iolates those that are stated in remo!al statutes$ C*in O* Foo v. Concepcion •
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criminal case Article *:(*" eempting circumstance (imbecile or insane" %tatcon the phrase Bshall not be permitted to lea!e without first obtaining permission of the same courtC should be reconciled with another statute that states Bany patient confined in a mental institution may be released by the Director of @ealth once he is cured$ 4he Director shall inform the 2udge that appro!ed the confinementC$ 4hese two statutes refers to a person
who was criminally charged but was pro!en to be an imbecile or insane, thus they should be construed together$ 4heir construction would mean that in order for the patient to be release there should be an appro!al of both the court and the Director of @ealth$ 0ing v. !ernae' • %tatcon relation of RA **;6 (Retail 4rade 5ationaliation Act" to &ommonwealth Act *6; (Anti Dummy Law" Dia#das v. Percides /acts a alien who operated a retail store in &ebu • decided to close his &ebu store and transfer it to Dumaguete$ R4L (retail trade law" and 4a &ode %ec$ *++ were the statutes ta1en into consideration in this case$ 4he former authories any alien who on )ay *7, *+79 is actually engaged in retail, to continue to engage therein until his !oluntary retirement from such business, but not to establish or open additional stores for retail business$ 4he latter pro!ides that any business for which the pri!ilege ta has been paid may be remo!ed and continued in any other place without payment of additional ta$ Issue whether the transfer by the alien from &ebu to • Dumaguete can be considered as a !oluntary retirement from business$ • @eld 5o$ Although the trial court affirmed the .uestion, the %& ruled otherwise stating that R4& o!erloo1ed the clear pro!ision of %ec$ *++$
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is part, as a bureau, of the reorganied DILK, as to form a unified system of 2urisprudence %tatcon if RA' fails to decide an appealed case within 86 days from receipt of the notice of appeal, the appealed decision is deemed final and eecutory, and the aggrie!ed party may forthwith appeal therefrom to the %ecretary of DILK$ Li1ewise, if the RA' has decided the appeal within 863day reglementary period, its decision may still be appealed to the %ecretary of DILK
Mani#a 6ockey C#%b /nc. v. CA Issue who was entitled to brea1ages (*6N di!idend of • winning horse race tic1ets" %tatcon 4here are two statutes that should be • considered$ RA -6+ (amended by 88-* ?88-:" is silent on the matter but the practice is to use brea1ages for anti boo1ie dri!e and other sale promotions$ E$O$ ;; ? ;+ which allocated brea1ages therein specified$ 4hese two should be construed in pari materia, thus all brea1ages deri!ed from all races should be distributed and allocated in accordance with Eecuti!e Orders because no law should be !iewed in isolation$ (supplementary"
C 3 C Commercia# Corp v. +ationa# @ater;orks and Se;erage A%t*ority • /acts R$A$ +*: (:" states that in construction or repair wor1 underta1en by the Ko!ernment, Philippine made materials and products, whene!er a!ailable shall be used in construction or repair wor1$ • /lag Law (&ommonwealth Act *-;" gi!es nati!e products preference in the purchase of articles by Ko!ernment, including go!ernment owned or controlled corporations$ • Issue interpretation of two statutes re.uiring that preference be made in the purchase and use of Phil$ )ade materials and products @eld 4he %& relates the two statutes as in pari materia • and they should be construed to attain the same ob2ecti!e that is to gi!e preference to locally produced materials$
Keneral and special statutes Keneral statutes3 applies to all of the people of the • state or to a particular class of persons in the state with e.ual force$ Fni!ersal in application o %pecial statutes3 relates to particular persons or things • of a class or to particular portion or section of the state only &onsidered as statutes in pari materia thus they should • be read together and harmonied (and gi!en effect" • Ghat if there are two acts which contain one general and one special If it produces conflict, the special shall o pre!ail since the legislati!e intent is more clear thus it must be ta1en as intended to constitute an eception$ 4hin1 of it as one general law of the land o while the other applies only to a particular case • Ghat if the special law is passed before the general law It doesnt matter because the special law will still be considered as an eception unless epressly repealed$
Cabada v. A#%nan /// Issue whether or not an appeal lies from the decision • of regional appellate board (RA'" imposing disciplinary action against a member of the P5P under %ec$ 97 of RA 8+7 regarding finality of disciplinary action 4he court held that the BgapC in the law which is silent • on filing appeals from decisions of the RA' rendered within the reglementary period should be construed and harmonied with other statutes, i$e$ %ec :(*", Article I3' of the *+; &onstitution because the P5P
So#id !omes /nc. v. Paya;a# /irst statute pro!ides that 5ational @ousing Authority • shall ha!e eclusi!e 2urisdiction to hear and decide cases in!ol!ing unsound real estate (P$D$ 5o$ +7+"$ %econd statute grants R4& general 2urisdiction o!er • such cases$ Issue Ghich one will pre!ail • @eld 4he first statute will pre!ail because it is a • special law, as compared to the latter which is general law, thus it is an eception to the Bgeneral 2urisdictionC of the R4&
Magta-as v. Pryce Properties Corp /acts P$D$ 5o$ *;8+ authoried PAK&OR to • centralie and regulate all games of chance$ LK& of *++*, a later law, empowers all go!ernment • units to enact ordinances to pre!ent and suppress gambling and other games of chance$ %tacon 4hese two should be harmonied rather than • annulling one and upholding the other$ &ourt said that the solution to this problem is for the go!ernment units to suppress and pre!ent all 1inds of gambling ecept those that are allowed under the pre!ious law Leveri'a v. /ntermediate Appe##ate Co%rt RA 8 empowers the general manager of the &i!il • Aeronautics Administration to lease real property under its administration$ Administrati!e &ode authories the President to • eecute a lease contract relating to real property belonging to the republic • @ow do you apply the rule 3 In this case, the prior (special" law should pre!ail Reason for the rule • the special law is considered an eception to the general law (as long as same sub2ect" ualification of the rule • 4he rule aforementioned is not absolute$ • Eceptions If the legislature clearly intended the general o enactment to co!er the whole sub2ect and to repeal all prior laws inconsistent therewith Ghen the principle is that the special law o merely establishes a general rule while the general law creates a specific and special rule Reference statutes • a statute which refers to other statutes and ma1es them applicable to the sub2ect of legislation used to a!oid encumbering the statute boo1s of • unnecessary repetition should be construed to harmonie and gi!e effect to • the adopted statute$ %upplemental statutes Intended to supply deficiencies in eisting statutes • %upplemental statutes should be read with the original • statute and construed together Reenacted statutes statute which reenacts a pre!ious statute or pro!ision$ • Reproducing an earlier statute with the same or • substantially the same words$ Monte#ibano v. Ferrer Issue application of %ec$ - fo the &ity &harter of • )anila is !alid in the criminal complaint directly file by an offended party in the city court of 'acolod
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@eld 4he court ruled that the criminal complaint filed directly by the offended party is in!alid and it ordered the city court to dismiss it$ 4he pro!isions of the &ity &harter of )anila 'acolod on the same sub2ect are identically worded, hence they should recei!e the same construction$ RFLE two statutes with a parallel scope, purpose and terminology should each in its own field, ha!e a li1e interpretation
Adoption of contemporaneous construction in construing the reenacted statute, the court should • ta1e into account prior contemporaneous construction and gi!e due weight and respect to it$ ualification of the rule • rule that is aforementioned is applicable only when the statute is capable of the construction gi!en to it and when that construction has become a settled rule of conduct Adopted statutes a statute patterned after a statute of a foreign country$ • &ourt should ta1e into consideration how the courts of • other country construe the law and its practices
CHAPTER SEVEN: Str!t or L!*era' Construt!on IN GENERAL
Kenerally Ghether a statute is to be gi!en a strict or liberal • construction will depend upon the following 4he nature of the statute 4he purpose to be subser!ed 4he mischief to be remedied Purpose to gi!e the statute the interpretation that will • best accomplish the end desired and effectuate legislati!e intent %trict construction, generally • &onstruction according to the letter of the statute, which recognies nothing that is not epressed, ta1es the language used in its eact meaning, and admits no e.uitable consideration 5ot to mean that statutes are construed in its narrowest • meaning • It simply means that the scope of the statute shall not be etended or enlarged by implication, intendment, or e.uitable consideration beyond the literal meaning of its terms • It is a close and conser!ati!e adherence to the literal or tetual interpretation 4he antithesis of liberal construction • Liberal construction, defined
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E.uitable construction as will enlarge the letter of a statute to accomplish its intended purpose, carry out its intent, or promote 2ustice 5ot to mean enlargement enlargement of a pro!ision which is clear, clear, unambiguous and free from doubt It simply means that the words should recei!e a fair and reasonable interpretation, so as to attain the intent, spirit and purpose of the law
Liberal construction applied, generally Ghere a statute is ambiguous, the literal meaning of • the the word wordss used used may may be re2e re2ect cted ed if the the resu result lt of adopting said meaning would be to defeat the purpose of the law •
1t res magis va#eat $%am pereat & that construction is to be sought sought which gi!es gi!es effect effect to the whole whole of the statute 0 its e!ery word
Liberal &onstruction E.uit E.uitabl ablee constr construct uction ion as will enlarge the letter of a stat statut utee to acco accomp mpli lish sh its its intended purpose, carry out its intent, or promote 2ustice Legi Legiti tima mate te eer eerci cise se of 2udicial power
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#udicial Interpretation Act of the court in engr ngrafti afting ng upon upon a law law something which it belie!es ought to ha!e been embraced therein /orbidden /orbidden by the tripartite tripartite di!isi di!ision on of powers powers among among the - departments of go!ernment A statute may not be liberally liberally construed to read into it it something which its clear and plain language re2ects
&onstruction to promote social 2ustice %oci %ocial al 2ust 2ustic icee must must be ta1e ta1en n into into acco accoun untt in the the • interpretation interpretation and application of laws • %ocial 2ustice mandate is addressed or meant for the three departments the legislati!e, eecuti!e, and the 2udicial %ocial 2ustice (included in the &onstitution" was meant • to be a !ital, articulate, compelling principle of public policy It should be obser!ed in the interpretation not only of • future legislations, but also of laws already eisting on 5o!ember *7, *+-7$ *+-7$ • It was intended to change the spirit of our laws, present and future$
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STATUTES STRICTLY CONSTRUED
Penal statutes, generally Penal Penal statutes statutes are those that define crimes, treat of • their nature and pro!ide for their punishment Acts of legislature which prohibit certain acts o and establish penalties for their !iolation 4hos 4hosee whic which h impo impose se puni punish shme ment nt for for an offe offens nsee • commit committed ted agains againstt the state, state, and which which the chief chief eecuti!e has the power to pardon A statute which decrees the forfeiture in fa!or of the • state state of unepl uneplain ained ed wealt wealth h ac.uir ac.uired ed by a public public official while in office is criminal in nature
Penal statutes, strictly construed Penal statutes are strictly construed against the %tate • and liberally construed in fa!or of the accused o Penal statutes cannot be enlarged or etended by intendment, implication, or any e.uitable consideration 5o person should be brought within its terms o if he is not clearly made so by the statute o 5o act should be pronounces criminal which is not clearly made so Peo v. Atop •
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&onstr &onstruct uction ion ta1ing ta1ing into into consid considera eratio tion n genera generall welfar welfaree or growth ci!iliation &onstrue to attain the general welfare • •
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Sa#%s pop%#i est s%prema #e) & the !oice of the people is the supreme law Stat%ta Stat%ta pro p%b#ico p%b#ico commodo commodo #ate interpretant% interpretant%rr & statutes enacted for the public good are to be construed liberally 4he reason of the law is the life of the lawH the reason lies in the soil of the common welfare 4he 2udge must go out in the open spaces of actuality and dig down deep into his common soil, if not, he becomes subser!ient subser!ient to formalism formalism
&onstrue in the light of the growth of ci!iliation and !arying conditions 4he interpretation that Bif the man is too long o for the bed, his head should be chopped off rather than enlarge the old bed or purchase a new oneC should 5O4 be gi!en to statutes
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%ec$ ** of RA 87+, which amended Art$ --7 of the RP&, pro!ides that the death penalty for rape may be imposed if the Boffender is a parent, ascendant, step3 parent, guardian, relati!e by consanguinity or affinity within the -rd ci!il degree, or the common3law spouse of the parent of the !ictimC Is the common3law husband of the girls grandmother included 5oS &ourts must not bring cases within the pro!isions of the law which are not clearly embraced by it$ 5o act can be pronounced criminal which is o not clearly within the terms of a statute can be brought within them$ Any reason reasonabl ablee doubt doubt must must be resol resol!ed !ed in o fa!or of the accused %trict construction but not as to nullify or destroy the ob!ious purpose of the legislature If penal statute is !ague, it must be construed o with such uch str strictn ictneess as to caref arefu ully lly %A/EKFARD the RIK@4% of the defendant and at the same time preser!e the ob!ious intention of the legislature &ourts &ourts must endea!or to effect effect substanti substantial al o 2ustice
Centeno v. 2i##a#onPorni##os 2i##a#onPorni##os PD *789, *789, which which punish punishes es a person person who who solici solicits ts or • recei!es contribution for Bcharitable or public welfare purposesC without any permit first secured from the Depar Departme tment nt of %ocial %ocial %er!i %er!ices ces,, DID DID 5O4 5O4 includ includee Breligious purposesCC in the acts punishable, the law &A55O4 be construed to punish the solicitation of contributions for religious purposes, such as repair or reno!ation of the church Reason why penal statutes are strictly construedg • 4he 4he law law is tend tender er in fa!o fa!orr of the the righ rights ts of the the indi!idualH 4he ob2ect is to establish a certain rule by conformity • to which man1ind would be safe, and the discretion of the court limited • Purpose of strict construction is 5O4 to enable a guilty person to escape punishment through technicality but to pro!ide a precise definition of forbidden acts Acts ma#a in se and ma#a pro*ibita Keneral rule to constitute a crime, e!il intent must • combine with an act •
Act%s non facit re%m nisi mens sit rea & the act itself does not ma1e a man guilty unless his intention were so
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Act%s me invite invite fact%s non est me%s me%s act%s & an an act done by me against my my will is not not my act
)ala in se &riminal &riminal intent, intent, apart apart from the act itself is re.uired RP& •
)ala prohibita 4he only in.uiry is, has the law been !iolated %pecial penal laws
@owe!e @owe!er, r, if specia speciall penal penal laws laws use such words words as Bwillfully, !oluntarily, and 1nowinglyC intent must be pro!edH thus good faith or bad faith is essential before con!iction
Application of rule Peo v. 4adao A stat statut utee whic which h pena penali lie ess a Bper Bperso son n assi assist stin ing g a • claimant claimantCC in connectio connection n with the latters latters claim for !eterans benefit, does not penalie Bone who O//ER% to assistC
S%y v. Peop#e Ghere Ghere a statut statutee penali penalies es a store store owner owner who sells • commodities beyond the retail ceiling price fied by law, law, the ambigu ambiguity ity in the EO classi classifyi fying ng the same same commodity into : classes and fiing different ceiling prices for each class, class, should be resol!ed in fa!or fa!or of the accused Peo v. Terreda Terreda %horter prescripti!e period is more fa!orable to the • accused
Peo v. Manantan 4he 4he rule rule that that pena penall stat statut utes es are are gi!e gi!en n a stri strict ct • constr construct uction ion is not the only only factor factor contro controlli lling ng the interpretation of such laws Instead, the rule merely ser!es as an additional single • factor to be considered as an aid in detrmining the meaning of penal laws Peo v. P%risima P%risima 4he language of the a statute which penalies the mere • carrying outside of residence of bladed weapons, i$e$, a 1nife or bolo, not in connection with ones wor1 or occupation, with a !ery hea!y penalty ranging from 73 *6 years years of impris imprisonm onment ent,, has been been narrow narrowed ed and strict strictly ly constr construed ued as to includ include, e, as an additi additiona onall element of the crime, the carrying of the weapon in furtheranc furtherancee of rebellio rebellion, n, insurrect insurrection ion or sub!ersion sub!ersion,, such being the e!il sought to be remedied or pre!ented by the statute as as disclosed in its its preamble A'arcon v. Sandiganbayan Sandiganbayan Issue whether a pri!ate person can be considered a • public officer by reason if his being designated by the 'IR as a depository of distrained property, so as to ma1e the con!ersion thereof the crime of mal!ersation • @eld @eld 5OS 5OS the 'IRs 'IRs power power author authorii iing ng a pri!at pri!atee indi!idual to act as a depository cannot include the power to appoint him as public officer officer A pri!ate indi!idual who has in his charge any of the • public funds or property enumerated in Art ::: RP& and commits any of the acts defined in any of the pro!isions of &hapter 9, 4itle of the RP&, should li1ewise be penalied with the same penalty meted to erring public officers$ officers$ 5owhere in this pro!ision is it epressed or implied implied that a pri!ate indi!idual indi!idual falling falling under said Art ::: is to be deemed a public officer Limitation of rule Limitation * 0 Ghere a penal statute is capable of : • interpretations, one which will operate to eempt an accused from liability for !iolation thereof and another which which will gi!e effect effect to the manifest manifest intent intent of the statute and promote its ob2ect, the latter interpretation should be adopted 1S v. ,o C*ico A law punishes the display of flags Bused duringC the • insurrection against the F% may not be so construed as to eem eempt pt from from crim crimin inal al liab liabil ilit ity y a pers person on who who displays a replica of said flag because said replica is not the one BusedC BusedC during during the rebel rebellio lion, n, for to so construe it is to nullify the statute together Ko &hico is liable though flags displayed were 2ust • replica of the flags Bused duringC insurrection against F% •
Limita Limitatio tion n : 0 strict strict constr construct uction ion of penal penal laws laws applies only where the law is ambiguous and there is doubt as to its meaning
Peo v. ,atc*a#ian ,atc*a#ian A stat statut utee re.u re.uir ires es that that an empl employ oyer er shal shalll pay pay a • minimum wage of not less than a specified amount and punishes any person who willfully !iolates any of its pro!isions 4he fact that the nonpayment of the minimum wage is • not specifically declared unlawful, does not mean that an employer who pays his employees less than the prescribed minimum wage is not criminally liable, for the nonpayme nonpayment nt of minimu minimum m wage wage is the !ery act sought to be en2oined by the law %tatutes in derogation of rights Rights are not absolute, and the state, in the eercise of • police power, may enact legislations curtailing or restricting their en2oyment • As these these statut statutes es are in deroga derogatio tion n of common common or general rights, they are generally strictly construed and rigidly confined to cases clearly within their scope and purpose • Eamples %tatut %tatutes es author authorii iing ng the eprop epropria riatio tion n of o pri!ate land or property Allowing the ta1ing of deposition o /iing the ceiling of the price of commodities o Limiting the eercise of proprietary rights by o indi!idual citiens %uspen %uspendin ding g the period period of prescr prescript iption ion of o actions Ghen : reasonably possible constructions, one which • would would diminish diminish or restrict restrict fundamenta fundamentall right of the people and the other if which would not do so, the latter construction must be adopted so as to allow full en2oyment of such fundamental right %tatutes authoriing epropriations Power of eminent domain is essentially legislati!e in • nature • )ay be delegated to the President, LKFs, or public utility company • Epropriation plus 2ust compensation • A derogation of pri!ate rights, thus strict construction is applied %tatutes epropriating or authoriing the epropriation • of prop proper erty ty are are stri strict ctly ly cons constr true ued d agai agains nstt the the eprop epropria riatin ting g author authority ity and liber liberall ally y in fa!or fa!or of property owners
%tatutes granting pri!ileges %tatut %tatutes es granti granting ng ad!ant ad!antage agess to pri!at pri!atee person personss or • enti entiti ties es ha!e ha!e in many many inst instan ance cess crea create ted d spec specia iall pri!ileges or monopolies for the grantees and ha!e thus been !iewed with suspicion and strictly construed •
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Privi#egia recipient #argam interpretationem vo#%ntati conso onson nam conce oncede dent ntis is & pri!ileges are to be interpreted in accordance with the will of him who grants them And he who fails to strictly comply with the will of the grantor loses such pri!ileges
%t%an Sa;mi## Sa;mi## /nc. v. ayvie; ayvie; T*eater T*eater /nc • Ghere an entity is granted a legislati!e franchise to operate electric light and power, on condition that it should should start start operation operation within a specifie specified d period, period, its failure to start operation within the period resulted in the forfeiture of the franchise Legislati!e grants to local go!ernment units • Kran Krants ts of powe powerr to loca locall go!e go!ern rnme ment nt are are to be construed construed strictly, strictly, and doubts doubts in the interpre interpretatio tation n should be resol!ed in fa!or of the national go!ernment and against the political subdi!isions concerned Reason there is in such a grant a gratuitous donation • of public money or property which results in an unfair ad!antage to the grantee and for that reason, the grant should be narrowly restricted in fa!or of the public %tatutory grounds for remo!al of officials • %tatutes relating to suspension or remo!al of public officials are strictly construed Reason the remedy of remo!al is a drastic one and • penal in nature$ In2ustice and harm to the public interest would li1ely emerge should such laws be not strictly interpreted against the power of suspension or remo!al Oc*ate v. De#ing Krounds for remo!al 0 Bneglect of duty, oppression, • corrup corruptio tion n or other other forms forms of malad maladmin minist istra ratio tion n in officeC Bin officeC 0 a .ualifier of all acts$ o )ust be in relation to the official as an officer o and not as a pri!ate person !ebron v "eyes "eyes Procedure for remo!al or suspension should be strictly • construed %tatute local electi!e officials are to be remo!ed or • suspended, after in!estigation, by the pro!incial board, sub2ect to appeal to the President President has no authority on his own to conduct the • in!estigation and to suspend such electi!e official 5aturaliation 5aturaliation laws 5aturaliation 5aturaliation laws are strictly construed against the • applicant and rigidly followed and enforced 5aturaliation 5aturaliation is statutory than than a natural right right • %tatutes imposing taes and customs duties 4a statutes must be construed construed strictly strictly against against the • go!ernment and liberally in fa!or of the tapayer • Power to ta in!ol!es power to destroy • 4aing act are not to be etended by implication • 4a 4a stat statut utes es shou should ld be clea clearl rly, y, epr epres essl sly, y, and and unambiguously imposed • Reason for strict construction taation is a destructi!e power which interferes with the personal property rights of the people and ta1es from them a portion of their property for the support of the go!ernment
%tatutes granting ta eemptions Law frowns against eemption from taation because • taes are the lifeblood of the nation •
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Laws Laws granti granting ng ta eempt eemption ionss are thus thus constr construed ued strictissimi -%ris against -%ris against the tapayer and liberally in fa!or of the taing authority 'urden 'urden of proof proof 0 on the tapaye tapayerr claimi claiming ng to be eempted 'asis for strict construction 0 to minimie the different treatment and foster impartiality, fairness, and e.uality of treatment among tapayers 4a eemptions are not fa!ored in law, nor are they presumed$
C/" v. CA Issue whether containers and pac1aging materials can • be credited against against the millers millers deficiency ta 'IR claimed that there should be no ta credit • @eld @eld pro!iso pro!iso should should be strictly strictly construed construed to apply • only only to raw raw mate materi rial alss and and not not to cont contai aine ners rs and and pac1ing materials which are not raw materialsH hence, the miller is entitled to ta credit Restri Restricti ction on in the pro!is pro!iso o is limi limited ted only only to sales, sales, • millers ecise taes paid Ton raw materials used in the milling process eng%et Corporation Corporation v. Cenrtra# Cenrtra# oard of Assessment Assessment Appea#s Appea#s • PD *+77 withdrew all ta eemptions, ecept those embodi embodied ed in the Real Prope Property rty &ode, &ode, a law which which grants grants certain certain industrie industriess real estate ta eemption eemptionss under the Real Estate &ode •
&ourts cannot epand eemptiom
Esso Standard Eastern Eastern /nc. v Acting Commissioner Commissioner of C%stoms C%stoms Ghere Ghere a statut statutee eempt eemptss from from specia speciall impor importt ta, ta, • e.uipment Bfor use of industries,C the eemption does not etend to those used in dispensing gasoline at retail in gasoline stations C/" v. Mani#a 6ockey C#%b /nc. • %tatute %tatute Bracing Bracing club holding these races shall be eempt from the payment of any municipal or national taC &annot be construed to eempt the racing club from • paying income ta on rentals paid to it for use of the race trac1s and other paraphernalia, for what the law eempts refers only to those to be paid in connection with said races L#adoc v. C/" C/" %tat %tatut ute e eem eempt ptio ion n from from taa taati tion on char charit itab able le • inst instit itut utio ions ns,, chur church ches es,, pars parson onag ages es or co!e co!ena nant ntss appu appurt rten enan antt ther theret eto, o, mos. mos.ue ues, s, and and non3 non3pr prof ofit it cemeteries, and all lands buildings, and impro!ements actually, directly, and eclusi!ely used for religious or charitable purposes Eemption only refer to property taes and not from • all 1inds of taes
La Car#ota S%gar Centra# v. 6imene' 6imene' • %tatute ta pro!ided shall not be collected on foreign echange used for the payment of Bfertiliers when imported imported by planters planters or farmers farmers directly or through through their cooperati!esC • 4he importation of fertiliers by an entity which is neither a planter nor a farmer nor a cooperati!e of planters or farmers is not eempt from payment of the ta, e!en though said entity merely acted as agent of planter or farmer as a sort of accommodation without ma1ing any profit from the transaction, for the law uses the word BdirectlyC which means without anyone inter!ening in the importation and the phrase Bthrough their cooperati!esC as the only eemption C/" v. P*i#. Acety#ene Co. • %ee page -67 •
Power of taation if a high prerogati!e of so!ereignty, its relin.uishment is ne!er presumed and any reduction or diminution thereof with respect to its mode or its rate must be strictly construed
P*i#. Te#egrap* Te#egrap* and Te#ep*one Corp. Corp. v. COA • On Bmost fa!ored treatment clauseC : franchisee are not competitors • 4he first franchisee is will not en2oy a reduced rate of • ta on gross receipts ualification of rule %trict construction does not apply in the case of ta • eemptions eemptions in fa!or fa!or of the go!ernmen go!ernmentt itself itself or its agencies Pro! Pro!is isio ions ns gran granti ting ng eem eempt ptio ions ns to go!e go!ern rnme ment nt • agencies may be construed liberally in fa!or of non3ta liability of such agencies • 4he epress eemption should not be construed with the the same same degr degree ee of stri strict ctne ness ss that that appl applie iess to eemptions contrary to policy of the state, since as to such property eemption is the rule and the taation is the eemption E$g$ ta eemption in fa!or of 5APO&OR 0 whether • direct or indirect taes, eempted %tatutes concerning the so!ereign Restri Restricti cti!e !e statut statutes es which which impose impose burden burdenss on the • public treasury or which diminish rights and interests are strictly construed$ • Fnless Fnless so specif specified ied,, the go!ern go!ernme ment nt does does not fall fall within the terms of any legislation A##iance of ,overnment @orkers v. Minister of Labor and Emp#oyment •
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PD ;7* 0 re.uires BemployersC to pay a *- th month pay to their employees employees BemployersC does not embrace the RP, the law not ha!ing epressly included it within its scope
%tatutes authoriing suits against the go!ernment
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Art$ >I, %ec$ -, *+; &onstitution 0 B4he %tate may not be sued without its consentC Keneral rule so!ereign is eempt from suit o o Eception in the form of statute, state may gi!e its consent to be sued %tatute is to be strictly construed and wai!er from immunity from suit will not be lightly inferred +%##%m temp%s occ%rrit regi & there can be no legal right as against the authority that ma1es the law on which the right depends Reason for non3suability 0 not to sub2ect the state to incon!enience and loss of go!ernmental efficiency
Mobi# P*i#. E)p#oration /nc. v. C%stoms Arrastre Services 4he law authoriing the 'ureau of &ustoms to lease • arrastre operations, a proprietary function necessarily incident to its go!ernmental function, may 5O4 be construed to mean that the state has consented to be sued, when it underta1es to conduct arrastre ser!ices itself, for damage to cargo •
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%tate3immunity may not be circum!ented by directing the action against the officer of the state instead of the state itself 4he states immunity may be !alidly in!o1ed o against the action A% LO5K A% I4 &A5 'E %@OG5 that the suit really affects the property, rights, or interests of the state and not merely those of the officer nominally made party defendant E!en if the state consents, law should 5O4 be interpreted to authorie garnishment of public funds to satisfy a 2udgment against go!ernment property Reason o Public policy forbids it Disbursement of public funds must be co!ered by a corresponding appropriation as re.uired by law /unctions and ser!ice cannot be allowed to be paralyed or disrupted by the di!ersion of public funds from their legitimate and specific ob2ects, as appropriated by law
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STATUTES LI-ERALLY CONSTRUED
Keneral social legislation Keneral welfare legislations • 4o implement the social 2ustice and o protection3to3labor pro!isions of the &onstitution &onstrued liberally o Resol!e any doubt in fa!or of the persons o whom the law intended to benefit Includes the following 0 labor laws, tenancy o laws, land reform laws, and social security laws Tamayo v. Mani#a !ote# Law grants employees the benefits of holiday pay • ecept those therein enumerated %tatcon 0 all employees, whether monthly paid or not, • who are not among those ecepted are entitled to the holiday pay •
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%tatutes prescribing formalities of the will %trictly construed, which means, wills must be • eecuted in accordance with the statutory re.uirements, otherwise, it is entirely !oid • 4he court is see1ing to ascertain and apply the intent of the legislators and not that of the testator, and the latters intention is fre.uently defeated by the non3 obser!ance of what the statute re.uires Eceptions and pro!isos • %hould be strictly but reasonably construed • All doubts should be resol!ed in fa!or of the general pro!ision rather than the eceptions @owe!er, always loo1 at the intent of o legislators if it will accord reason and 2ustice
not to apply the rule that Ban epress eception ecludes all othersC 4he rule on eecution pending appeal must be strictly construed being an eception to the general rule %ituations which allows eceptions to the re.uirement of warrant of arrest or search warrant must be strictly construedH to do so would infringe upon personal liberty and set bac1 a basic right A preference is an eception to the general rule A pro!iso should be interpreted strictly with the legislati!e intent %hould be strictly construed o Only those epressly eempted by the pro!iso o should be freed from the operation of the statute
Labor laws construed 0 the wor1ingmans welfare should be the primordial and paramount consideration Article 9 5ew Labor &ode 0 Ball doubts in the o implementation and interpretation of the pro!isions of the Labor &ode including its implementing rules and regulations shall be resol!ed in fa!or of laborC Liberal construction applies only if statute is !ague, otherwise, apply the law as it is stated
Keneral welfare clause • : branches One branch attaches to the main trun1 of o municipal authority 0 relates to such ordinances and regulations as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon local legislati!e bodies by law Other branch is much more independent of o the specific functions enumerated by law 0 authories such ordinances as shall seem necessary and proper to pro!ide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, impro!e
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the morals, peace, good order of the LKF and the inhabitants thereof, and for the protection of the property therein &onstrued in fa!or of the LKFs 4o gi!e more powers to local go!ernments in promoting the economic condition, social welfare, and material progress of the people in the community &onstrued with proprietary aspects, otherwise would cripple LKFs )ust be elastic and responsi!e to !arious social conditions )ust follow legal progress of a democratic way of life
Krant of power to local go!ernments Old rule municipal corporations, being mere creatures • of law, ha!e only such powers as are epressly granted to them and those which are necessarily implied or incidental to the eercise thereof • 5ew rule RA ::89 BLocal Autonomy ActC %ec *: 0 Bimplied power of a pro!ince, a city, o or a municipality shall be liberally construed in its fa!or$ Any fair and reasonable doubt as to the eistence of the power should be interpreted in fa!or of the local go!ernment and it shall be presumed to eistC %tatutes granting taing power (on municipal corporations" • 'efore *+- &onstitution 0 inferences, implications, and deductions ha!e no place in the interpretation of the taing power of a municipal corporation 5ew &onstitution 0 Art$ , %ec 7 *+; &onstitution 0 • Beach local go!ernment unit shall ha!e the power to create its own sources of re!enue and to le!y taes, fees, and charges sub2ect to such guidelines and limitations as the &ongress may pro!ide, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomyC %tatutes prescribing limitations on the taing o power of LKFs must be strictly construed against the national go!ernment and liberally in fa!or of the LKFs, and any doubt as to the eistence of the taing power will be resol!ed in fa!or of the local go!ernment %tatutes prescribing prescripti!e period to collect taes • 'eneficial for both go!ernment and tapayer 4o the go!ernment 0 ta officers are obliged o to act promptly in the ma1ing of the assessments 4o the tapayer 0 would ha!e a feeling of o security against unscrupulous ta agents who will always find an ecuse to inspect the boo1s of tapayers Laws on prescription 0 remedial measure 0 interpreted • liberally affording protection to the tapayers
%tatutes imposing penalties for nonpayment of ta liberally construed in fa!or of go!ernment and strictly • construed against the tapayer
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intention to hasten ta payments or to punish e!asions or neglect of duty in respect thereto liberal construction would render penalties for delin.uents nugatory
Election laws Election laws should be reasonably and liberally • construed to achie!e their purpose • Purpose 0 to effectuate and safeguard the will of the electorate in the choice of their representati!es • - parts Pro!isions for the conduct of elections which o election officials are re.uired to follow Pro!isions which candidates for office are o re.uired to perform Procedural rules which are designed to o ascertain, in case of dispute, the actual winner in the elections Different rules and canons or statutory construction go!ern
such pro!isions of the election law •
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Rules and regulations for the conduct of elections 'efore election 0 mandatory (part *" After election 0 directory (part -" Kenerally 0 the pro!isions of a statute as to the manner of conducting the details of an election are 5O4 mandatoryH and irregularities in conducting an election and counting the !otes, not preceding from any wrongful intent and which depri!es no legal !oter of his !otes, will not !itiate an election or 2ustify the re2ection of the entire !otes of a precinct Against disenfranchisement Remedy against election official who did not do his duty 0 criminal action against them Pro!isions which candidates for office are re.uired to perform are mandatory 5on3compliance is fatal
Part - Procedural rules which are designed to ascertain, in case of dispute, the actual winner in the elections are liberally construed 4echnical and procedural barriers should not o be allowed to stand if they constitute an obstacle in the choice of their electi!e officials /or where a candidate has recei!ed popular mandate, o!erwhelmingly and clearly epressed, all possible doubts should be resol!ed in fa!or of the candidates eligibility, for to rule otherwise is to defeat the will of the electorate o
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Amnesty proclamations
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Amnesty proclamations should be liberally construed as to carry out their purpose Purpose 0 to encourage to return to the fold of the law of those who ha!e !eered from the law E$g$ in case of doubt as to whether certain persons come within the amnesty proclamation, the doubt should be resol!ed in their fa!or and against the state %ame rule applies to pardon since pardon and amnesty is synonymous
%tatutes prescribing prescriptions of crimes Liberally construed in fa!or of the accused • Reason 0 time wears off proof and innocence • %ame as amnesty and pardon • Peo v. "eyes • Art$ +* RP& 0 Bperiod of prescription shall commence to run from the day the crime is disco!ered by the offended, authorities, C Ghen does the period of prescription start 0 day of • disco!ery or registration in the Register of Deeds @eld /rom the time of registration • 5otice need not be actual for prescription to runH • constructi!e notice is enough • )ore fa!orable to the accused if prescripti!e period is counted from the time of registration Adoption statutes • Adoption statutes are liberally construed in fa!or of the child to be adopted Paramount consideration 0 child and not the adopters • >eteran and pension laws • >eteran and pension laws are enacted to compensate a class of men who suffered in the ser!ice for the hardships they endured and the dangers they encountered in line of duty Epression of gratitude to and recognition of o those who rendered ser!ice to the country by etending to them regular monetary benefit >eteran and pension laws are liberally construed in • fa!or of grantee
De# Mar v. P*i#. 2eterans Admin Ghere a statute grants pension benefits to war • !eterans, ecept those who are actually recei!ing a similar pension from other go!ernment funds %tatcon 0 Bgo!ernment fundsC refer to funds of the • same go!ernment and does not preclude war !eterans recei!ing similar pensions from the F% Ko!ernment from en2oying the benefits therein pro!ided
oard of Administrators 2eterans Admin v. a%tista >eteran pension law is silent as to the effecti!ity of • pension awards, it shall be construed to ta1e effect from the date it becomes due and 5O4 from the date the application for pension is appro!ed, so as to grant
the pensioner more benefits and to discourage inaction on the part of the officials who administer the laws C*ave' v. Mat*ay Ghile !eteran or pension laws are to be construed • liberally, they should be so construed as to pre!ent a person from recei!ing double pension or compensation, unless the law pro!ides otherwise Santiago v. COA Eplained liberal construction or retirement laws • Intention is to pro!ide for sustenance, and hopefully • e!en comfort when he no longer has the stamina to continue earning his li!elihood @e deser!es the appreciation of a grateful go!ernment • at best concretely epressed in a generous retirement gratuity commensurate with the !alue and length of his ser!ice Orti' v. COMELEC • Issue whether a commissioner of &O)ELE& is deemed to ha!e completed his term and entitled to full retirement benefits under the law which grants him 73 year lump3sum gratuity and thereafter lifetime pension, who Bretires from the ser!ice after ha!ing completed his term of office,C when his courtesy resignation submitted in response to the call of the President following ED%A Re!olution is accepted @eld MesS Entitled to gratuity • Liberal construction • &ourtesy resignation 0 not his own will but a mere • manifestation of submission to the will of the political authority and appointing power /n "e App#ication for ,rat%ity enefits of Associate 6%stice Efren / P#ana • Issue whether #ustice Plana is entitled to gratuity and retirement pay when, at the time of his courtesy resignation was accepted following ED%A Re!olution and establishment of a re!olutionary go!ernment under the /reedom &onstitution, he lac1ed a few months to meet the age re.uirement for retirement under the law but had accumulated a number of lea!e of credits which, if added to his age at the time, would eceed the age re.uirement • @eld yes, entitled to gratuityS Liberal construction applied /n "e Pineda • Eplained doctrine laid down in the pre!ious case • 4he crediting of accumulated lea!es to ma1e up for lac1 of re.uired age or length of ser!ice is not done discriminately only if satisfied that the career of the retiree was • mar1ed by competence, integrity, and dedication to the public ser!ice /n "e Martin Issue whether a 2ustice of the %&, who a!ailed of the • disability retirement benefits pursuant to the pro!ision that Bif the reason for the retirement be any permanent disability contracted during his incumbency in office
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and prior to the date of retirement he shall recei!e only a gratuity e.ui!alent to *6 years salary and allowances aforementioned with no further annuity payable monthly during the rest of the retirees natural lifeC is entitled to a monthly lifetime pension after the *63year period @eld MesS *63year lump sum payment is intended to assist the stric1en retiree meeting his hospital and doctors bills and epenses for his support 4he retirement law aims to assist the retiree in his old age, not to punish him for ha!ing sur!i!ed
Cena v. CSC Issue whether or not a go!ernment employee who has • reached the compulsory retirement age of 87 years, but who has rendered less than *7 years of go!ernment ser!ice, may be allowed to continue in the ser!ice to complete the *73year ser!ice re.uirement to enable him to retire with benefits of an old3age pension under %ec **(b" PD **98 @owe!er, &%& )emorandum &ircular 5o : pro!ides • that Bany re.uest for etension of compulsory retirees to complete the *73years ser!ice re.uirement for retirement shall be allowed only to permanent appointees in the career ser!ice who are regular members of the K%I% and shall be granted for a period not eceeding * year @eld &%& )emorandum &ircular 5o : • unconstitutionalS It is an administrati!e regulation which should be in harmony with the lawH liberal construction of retirement benefits Rules of &ourt R& are procedural 0 to be construed liberally • Purpose of R& 0 the proper and 2ust determination of a • litigation Procedural laws are no other than technicalities, they • are adopted not as ends in themsel!es but as means conduci!e to the realiation of the administration of law and 2ustice R& should not be interpreted to sacrifice substantial • rights at the epense of technicalities Case v. 6%go Lapses in the literal obser!ance of a rule of procedure • will be o!erloo1ed when they do not in!ol!e public policyH when they arose from an honest mista1e or unforeseen accidentH when they ha!e not pre2udiced the ad!erse party and ha!e not depri!ed the court of its authority Literal stricture ha!e been relaed in fa!or of liberal • construction Ghere a rigid application will result in o manifest failure or miscarriage of 2ustice Ghere the interest of substantial 2ustice will o be ser!ed Ghere the resolution of the emotion is o addressed solely to the sound and 2udicious discretion of the court Ghere the in2ustice to the ad!erse party is not o commensurate with the degree of his
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thoughtlessness in not complying with the prescribed procedure Liberal construction of R& does not mean they may be ignoredH they are re.uired to be followed ecept only for the most persuasi!e reasons
Other statutes &urati!e statutes 0 to cure defects in prior law or to • !alidate legal proceedings which would otherwise be !oid for want of conformity with certain legal re.uirementsH retroacti!e Redemption laws 0 remedial in nature 0 construed • liberally to carry out purpose, which is to enable the debtor to ha!e his property applied to pay as many debtors liability as possible %tatutes pro!iding eemptions from eecution are • interpreted liberally in order to gi!e effect to their beneficial and humane purpose • Laws on attachment 0 liberally construed to promote their ob2ects and assist the parties obtaining speedy 2ustice Garehouse receipts 0 instrument of credit 0 liberally • construed in fa!or of a bona fide holders of such receipts Probation laws 0 liberally construed • Purpose to gi!e first3hand offenders a second o chance to maintain his place in society through the process of reformation %tatute granting powers to an agency created by the • &onstitution should be liberally construed for the ad!ancement of the purposes and ob2ecti!es for which it was created CHAPTER EIGHT: Man"ator) an" D!retor) Statutes IN GENERAL
Kenerally • )andatory and directory classification of statutes 0 importance what effect should be gi!en to the mandate of a statute )andatory and directory statutes, generally )andatory statute 0 commands either positi!ely that • something be done in a particular way, or negati!ely that something be not doneH it re.uires O'EDIE5&E, otherwise !oid Directory statute 0 permissi!e or discretionary in • nature and merely outlines the act to be done in such a way that no in2ury can result from ignoring it or that its purpose can be accomplished in a manner other than that prescribed and substantially the same result obtainedH confer direction upon a personH non3 performance of what it prescribes will not !itiate the proceedings therein ta1en Ghen statute is mandatory or directory 5o absolute test to determine whether a statute is • directory or mandatory • /inal arbiter 0 legislati!e intent
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Legislati!e intent does not depend on the form of the statuteH must be gi!en to the entire statute, its ob2ect, purpose, legislati!e history, and to other related statutes )andatory in form but directory in nature 0 possible Ghether a statute is mandatory or directory depends on whether the thing directed to be done is of the essence of the thing re.uired, or is a mere matter of form, what is a matter of essence can often be determined only by 2udicial construction &onsidered directory 0 compliance is a matter o of con!enienceH where the directions of a statute are gi!en merely with a !iew to the proper, orderly and prompt conduct of businessH no substantial rights depend on it &onsidered mandatory 0 a pro!ision relating o to the essence of the thing to be done, that is, to matters of substanceH interpretation shows that the legislature intended a compliance with such pro!ision to be essential to the !alidity of the act or proceeding, or when some antecedent and prere.uisite conditions must eist prior to the eercise of the power, or must be performed before certain other powers can be eercised
4est to determine nature of statute 4est is to ascertain the conse.uences that will follow in • case what the statute re.uires is not done or what it forbids is performed • Does the law gi!e a person no alternati!e choice 0 if yes, then it is mandatory Depends on the effects of compliance • If substantial rights depend on it and in2ury o can result from ignoring itH intended for the protection of the citiens and by a disregard of which their rights are in2uriously affected 0 mandatory Purpose is accomplished in a manner other o than that prescribed and substantially the same results obtained 3 directory %tatutes couched in mandatory form but compliance is • merely directory in nature If strict compliance will cause hardship or o in2ustice on the part of the public who is not at fault If it will lead to absurd, impossible, or o mischie!ous conse.uences If an officer is re.uired to do a positi!e act but fails because such actions will lead to the aforementioned, he will only be sub2ect to administrati!e sanction for his failure to do what the law re.uires
Language used Kenerally mandatory 0 command words • %hall or %hall not o
)ust or )ust not o Ought or Ought not %hould or %hould not o o &an or &annot Kenerally directory 0 permissi!e words )ay or )ay not o o
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Fse of BshallC or BmustC Kenerally, BshallC and BmustC is mandatory in nature • If a different interpretation is sought, it must rest upon • something in the character of the legislation or in the contet which will 2ustify a different meaning • 4he import of the word ultimately depends upon a consideration of the entire pro!ision, its nature, ob2ect and the conse.uences that would follow from construing it one way or the other Loyo#a ,rand 2i##a !omeo;ners BSo%t* Assn. /nc. v. CA BmustC construed as directory • &orporation &ode %ec 98 reads B e!ery corporation • formed under this &ode )F%4 within one month after receipt of official notice of the issuance of its certification of incorporation with the %E&, adopt a code of by3laws for its go!ernment not inconsistent with this &odeC •
PD +6:3A which is in pari materia# with the &orporation &ode states that the non3filing of the by3 laws does not imply the BdemiseC of the corporationH that there should be a notice and hearing before the certificate of registration may be cancelled by the failure to file the by3laws
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One test whether mandatory or directory compliance must be made 0 whether non3compliance with what is re.uired will result in the nullity of the actH if it results in the nullity, it is mandatory
Director of Land v. CA Law re.uires in petitions for land registration that • Bupon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing to be published in the OK and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the PhilippinesC • Law epressly re.uires that the initial hearing be published in the OK A5D in the newspaper of general circulation 0 reason OK is not as widely read of the newspaper of general circulation • BshallC is imperati!e= mandatory • Githout initial hearing being published in a newspaper of general circulation is a nullity Fse of BmayC • An auiliary !erb showing opportunity or possibility • Kenerally, directory in nature Fsed in procedural or ad2ecti!e lawsH liberally • construed • Eample %ec 8- of the corporation &ode 0 Bshares of stoc1 so issued are personal property and )AM be transferred by deli!ery of the certificate or certificated endorsed by the owner
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BmayC is merely directory and that the transfer of the shares may be effected in a manner different from that pro!ided for in law
Ghen BshallC is construed as BmayC and !ice !ersa Rule BmayC should be read BshallC • where such construction is necessary to gi!e o effect to the apparent intention of the legislature where a statute pro!ides for the doing os o some act which is re.uired by 2ustice r public duty where it !ests a public body or officer with o power and authority to ta1e such action which concerns for the public interest or rights of indi!iduals Rule BshallC should be read BmayC • o Ghen so re.uired by the contet or by the intention of the legislature Ghen no public benefit or pri!ate right o re.uires that it be gi!en an imperati!e meaning Diokno v. "e*abi#itiation Finance Corp %ec$ : RA -69 reads Bban1s or other financial • institutions owned or controlled by the Ko!ernment %@ALL, sub2ect to a!ailability of funds accept at a discount at not more than :6N for *6 years of such bac1pay certificateC • B%hallC implies discretion because of the phrase Bsub2ect to a!ailability of fundsC ,overmnent v. E# !ogar Fi#ipino •
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&orporation &odes reads B%@ALL, upon such !iolation being pro!ed, be dissol!ed by $%o ;arranto proceedingsC B%hallC construed as BmayC
erces Sr. v. ,%ingona %ec$ 8; Ra *86 (LK&" pro!ides that an appeal from • an ad!erse decision against a local electi!e official to the President B%@ALL not pre!ent a decision from becoming final and eecutorC • B%hallC is not mandatory because there is room to construe said pro!ision as gi!ing discretion to the re!iewing officials to stay the eecution of the appealed decision Fse of negati!e, prohibitory or eclusi!e terms • A negati!e statute is mandatoryH epressed in negati!e words or in a form of an affirmati!e proposition .ualified by the word BonlyC BonlyC eclusionary negation • Prohibiti!e or negati!e words can rarely, if e!er, be • discretionary
MANDATORY STATUTES
%tatutes conferring power • Kenerally regarded as mandatory although couched in a permissi!e form %hould construe as imposing absolute and positi!e • duty rather than conferring pri!ileges Power is gi!en for the benefit of third persons, not for • the public official • Kranted to meet the demands of rights, and to pre!ent a failure of 2ustice • Ki!en as a remedy to those entitled to in!o1e its aid %tatutes granting benefits &onsidered mandatory • /ailure of the person to ta1e the re.uired steps or to • meet the conditions will ordinarily preclude him from a!ailing of the statutory benefits •
2igi#antib%s et non dormientib%s -%ra s%bveni%nt & the laws aid the !igilant, not those who slumber on their rights
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Potior est in tempoe potior est in -%re 0 he who is first in time is preferred in right
%tatutes prescribing 2urisdictional re.uirements • &onsidered mandatory Eamples • Re.uirement of publication o Pro!ision in the 4a &ode to the effect that o before an action for refund of ta is filed in court, a written claim therefore shall be presented with the &IR within the prescribed period is mandatory and failure to comply with such re.uirement is fatal to the action %tatutes prescribing time to ta1e action or to appeal Kenerally mandatory • • @eld as absolutely indispensable to the pre!ention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge or business, and are necessary incident to the proper, efficient, and orderly discharge of 2udicial functions %trict not substantial compliance • 5ot wai!able, nor can they be the sub2ect of • agreements or stipulation of litigants "eyes v. COA %ec$ *; RA *86 0 process of appeal of dissatisfied • tapayer on the legality of ta ordinance Appeal to the %ec of #ustice within -6 days of o effecti!ity of the ta ordinance If %ec of #ustice decides the appeal, a period o of -6 days is allowed for an aggrie!ed party to go to court If the %ec of #ustice does not act thereon, after o the lapse of 86 days, a party could already proceed to see1 relief in court • Purpose of mandatory compliance to pre!ent delays and enhance the speedy and orderly discharge of 2udicial functions
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Fnless the re.uirements of law are complied with, the decision of the lower court will become final and preclude the appellate court from ac.uiring 2urisdiction to re!iew it
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/nterest reipiciae %t sit finis #iti%m & public interest re.uires that by the !ery nature of things there must be an end to a legal contro!ersy
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,ac*on v. Devera 6r •
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Issue whether %ec 8 of the Rule on %ummary Procedure, which reads B should the defendant fail to answer the complaint within the period abo!e pro!ided, the &ourt, mot% proprio, or on motion of the plaintiff, %@ALL render 2udgment as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and limited to what is prayed for therein,C is mandatory or directory, such that an answer filed out of time may be accepted @eld mandatory )ust file the answer within the reglementary o period Reglementary period shall be Tnon3 o etendible Otherwise, it would defeat the ob2ecti!e of o epediting the ad2udication of suits
%tatutes prescribing procedural re.uirements • &onstrued mandatory Procedure relating to 2urisdictional, or of the essence • of the proceedings, or is prescribed for the protection or benefit of the party affected Ghere failure to comply with certain procedural • re.uirements will ha!e the effect of rendering the act done in connection therewith !oid, the statute prescribing such re.uirements is regarded as mandatory e!en though the language is used therein is permissi!e in nature De Mesa v. Mencias •
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%ec *, Rule - R& 0 Bafter a party dies and the claim is not thereby etinguished, the court shall order, upon proper notice, the legal representati!e of the deceased to appear and to be substituted $ If legal representati!e fails to appear , the court )AM order the opposing party to produce the appointment of a legal representati!e C Although )AM was used, pro!ision is mandatory Procedural re.uirement goes to the !ery 2urisdiction of the court, for Bunless and until a legal representati!e is for him is duly named and within the 2urisdiction of the trial court, no ad2udication in the cause could ha!e been accorded any !alidity or the binding effect upon any party, in representation of the deceased, without trenching upon the fundamental right to a day in court which is the !ery essence of the constitutionally enshrined guarantee of due process
Election laws on conduct of election &onstrued as mandatory • 'efore election 0 mandatory •
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After election 0 directory, in support of the result unless of a character to affect an obstruction to the free and intelligent casting of the !otes, or to the ascertainment of the result, or unless it is epressly declared by the statute that the particular act is essential to the !alidity of an election, or that its omission shall render it !oid (whew, and habaS" Ghen the !oters ha!e honestly cast their ballots, the same should not be nullified simply because the officers appointed under the law to direct the elections and guard the purity of the ballot ha!e not done their duty /or where a candidate has recei!ed popular mandate, o!erwhelmingly and clearly epressed, all possible doubts should be resol!ed in fa!or of the candidates eligibility, for to rule otherwise is to defeat the will of the electorate
De#os "eyes v. "odrig%e' • 4he circumstance that the coupon bearing the number of the ballot is not detached at the time the ballot is !oted, as re.uired by law, does not 2ustify the court in re2ecting the ballot Election laws on .ualification and dis.ualification • 4he rule of Bbefore3mandatory and after3directoryC in election laws only applies to procedural statutesH • 5ot applicable to pro!isions of the election laws prescribing the time limit to file certificate of candidacy and the .ualifications and dis.ualifications of electi!e office 0 considered mandatory e!en after election %tatutes prescribing .ualifications for office Eligibility to a public office is of a continuing nature • and must eist at the commencement of the term and during the occupancy of the office • %tatutes prescribing the eligibility or .ualifications of persons to a public office are regarded as mandatory Eample in the boo1 0 lawyer32udgeH 2udge3disbarment • as lawyer %tatutes relating to assessment of taes • Intended for the security of the citiens, or to insure the e.uality of taation, or for certainty as to the nature and amount of each others ta 0 )A5DA4ORM E$g$ %tatutes re.uiring the assessor to notify o the tapayer of the assessment of his property within a prescribed period 4hose designed merely for the information or direction • of officers or to secure methodical and systematic modes of proceedings 3 DIRE&4ORM %tatutes concerning public auction sale • &onstrued mandatory • Procedural steps must be strictly followed • Otherwise, !oid
DIRECTORY STATUTES
%tatutes prescribing guidance for officers Regulation designed to secure order, system, and • dispatch in proceedings, and by a disregard of which the rights of parties interested may not be in2uriously affected 0 directory Eception 0 unless accompanied by negati!e o words importing that the acts re.uired shall not be done in any other manner or time than that designated
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@eld yes, otherwise is to defeat the administration of 2ustice upon factors beyond the control of the partiesH would defeat the purpose of due processH dismissal will constitute miscarriage of 2usticeH speedy trial would be turned into denial of 2ustice /ailure of 2udge to ta1e action within the said o period merely depri!es him of their right to collect their salaries or to apply for lea!es, but does not depri!e them of the 2urisdiction to act on the cases pending before them
&onstitutional time pro!ision directory %tatutes prescribing manner of 2udicial action &onstrued directory • Procedure is secondary in importance to substanti!e • right • Kenerally, non3compliance therewith is not necessary to the !alidity of the proceedings %tatutes re.uiring rendition of decision within prescribed period • %ec *7(*" Art$ >III, *+; &onstitution 0 the maimum period within which a case or matter shall be decided or resol!ed from the date of its submission shall be :9 months 0 %& o *: months 0 lower collegiate courts o - months 0 all other lower courts o %ec Art$ I3A, *+; &onstitution 0 • 86 days from the date of its submission for o resolution 0 for all &onstitutional &ommissions 'efore the &onstitution too1 effect 3 %tatutes re.uiring • rendition of decision within prescribed period 0 Directory Ecept o intention to the contrary is manifest time is of the essence of the thing to be done language of the statute contains negati!e words designation of the time was intended as a limitation of power, authority or right always loo1 at intent to ascertain whether to gi!e the • statute a mandatory or directory construction basis EPEDIE5&M 0 less in2ury results to o the general public by disregarding than enforcing the little of the law and that 2udges would otherwise abstain from rendering decisions after the period to render them had lapsed because they lac1ed 2urisdiction tot do so H%er%bin v. CA %tatute appeals in election cases Bshall be decided • within - months after the filing of the case in the office of the cler1 of courtC • Issue whether or not &A has 2urisdiction in deciding the election case although the re.uired period to resol!e it has epired
Marce#ino v. Cr%' %ec *7(*" Art$ >III, *+; &onstitution 0 the maimum • period within which a case or matter shall be decided or resol!ed from the date of its submission shall be :9 months 0 %& o *: months 0 lower collegiate courts o - months 0 all other lower courts o %ec *7(*" Art$ >III, *+; &onstitution 0 directory • Reasons • %tatutory pro!isions which may be thus o departed from with impunity, without affecting the !alidity of statutory proceedings, are usually those which relate to the mode or time of doing that which is essential to effect the aim and purpose of the legislature or some incident of the essential act 0 thus directory Liberal construction 0 departure from strict o compliance would result in less in2ury to the general public than would its strict application &ourts are not di!ested of their 2urisdiction o for failure to decide a case within the +63day period Only for the guidance of the 2udges manning o our courts /ailure to obser!e said rule constitutes a o ground for administrati!e sanction against the defaulting 2udge A certification to this effect is re.uired before 2udges are allowed to draw their salaries CHAPTER NINE: Pros#et!.e an" Retroat!.e Statutes IN GENERAL
Prospecti!e and retroacti!e statutes, defined • Prospecti!e 0 operates upon facts or transactions that occur o after the statute ta1es effect loo1s and applies to the future$ o • Retroacti!e 0 Law which creates a new obligation, imposes o a new duty or attaches a new disability in respect to a transaction already past$ A statute is not made retroacti!e because it o draws on antecedent facts for its operation, or
part of the re.uirements for its action and application is drawn from a time antedating its passage$ 1ma#i vs. Estanis#ao A law may be made operati!e partly on facts that • occurred prior to the effecti!ity of such law without being retroacti!e$ • %tatute RA *83 granting increased personal eemptions from income ta to be a!ailable thenceforth, that is, after said Act became effecti!e and on or before the deadline for filing income ta returns, with respect to compensation income earned or recei!ed during the calendar year prior to the date the law too1 effect$ Castro v. Saga#es • A retroacti!e law (in a legal sense" one which ta1es away or impairs !ested rights o ac.uired under eisting laws creates a new obligation and imposes a new o duty attaches a new disability in respect of o transactions or considerations already past Laws operate prospecti!ely, generally • It is a settled rule in statutory construction that statutes are to be construed as ha!ing only prospecti!e operation, unless the intendment of the legislature is to gi!e them a retroacti!e effect, epressly declare or necessarily implied from the language used$ 5o court will hold a statute to be retroacti!e when the • legislature has not said so$ Art$ 9 of the &i!il &ode which pro!ides that BLaws • shall ha!e no retroacti!e effect, unless the contrary is pro!ided$C •
Le) prospicit non respicit & the law loo1s forward, not bac1ward
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Le) de f%t%re -%de) de praeterito & the law pro!ides for the future, the 2udge for the past$ If the law is silent as to the date of its application and that it is couched in the past tense does not necessarily imply that it should ha!e retroacti!e effect$
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,rego v. Come#ec • A statute despite the generality of its language, must not be so construed as to o!erreach acts, e!ents, or matters which transpired before its passage %tatute %ec$96 of the LK& dis.ualifying those • remo!ed from office as a result of an administrati!e case from running for local electi!e positions cannot be applied retroacti!ely$ • @eld It cannot dis.ualify a person who was administrati!ely remo!ed from his position prior to the effecti!ity of said &ode from running for an electi!e position$ • Rationale a law is a rule established to guide actions with no binding effect until it is enacted$
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+ova constit%tion f%t%ris formam imponere debet non praeteretis & A new statute should affect the future, not the past$
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Prospecti!ity applies to %tatutes o Administrati!e rulings and circulars o #udicial decisions o 4he principle of prospecti!ity of statutes, original or amendatory, has been applied in many cases$ 4hese include
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%yco v. P+ • %tatute RA *78 which di!ested the P5' of authority to accept bac1 pay certificates in payment of loans • @eld does not apply to an offer of payment made before effecti!ity of the act$
Lagardo v. Masaganda @eld RA :8*-, as amended by RA -6+6 O5 #une • *++*, granting inferior courts 2urisdiction o!er guardianship cases, could not be gi!en retroacti!e effect in the absence of a sa!ing clause$ Larga v. "anada 6r. @eld %ec$ + ? *6 of E$O$ +6 amending %ec 9 of P$D$ • *7: could ha!e no retroacti!e application$ Peo v. H%e Po Lay @eld a person cannot be con!icted of !iolating • &ircular :6 of the &entral 'an1, when the alleged !iolation occurred before publication of the &ircular on the Official Kaette$ a#ta'ar v. CA @eld It denied retroacti!e application to PD : • decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil, ? PD -*8, prohibiting e2ectment of tenants from rice ? corn farmholdings pending promulgation of rules ? regulations implementing PD : +i#o v CA @eld remo!ed Tpersonal culti!ation as the ground for • e2ectment of a tenant cant be gi!en retroacti!e effect in absence of statutory statement for retroacti!ity$ •
Applied to administrati!e rulings ? circulars
ASC+ roadcasting v. CTA @eld a circular or ruling of the &IR cannot be gi!en • retroacti!e effect ad!ersely to a tapayer$ Sanc*e' v. COMELEC @eld the holding of recall proceedings had no • retroacti!e application
"om%a#de' v. CSC • @eld &%& )emorandum &ircular 5o$ :+ cannot be gi!en retrospecti!e effect so as to entitle to permanent appointment an employee whose temporary appointment had epired before the &ircular was issued$ Applied to 2udicial decisions for e!en though not laws, • are e!idence of what the laws mean and is the basis of Art$; of the &i!il &ode wherein laws of the &onstitution shall form part of the legal system of the Philippines$ Presumption against retroacti!ity Presumption is that all laws operate prospecti!ely, • unless the contrary clearly appears or is clearly, plainly and une.ui!ocally epressed or necessarily implied$ In case of doubt resol!ed against the retroacti!e • operation of laws If statute is susceptible of construction other than that • of retroacti!ity or will render it unconstitutional3 the statute will be gi!en prospecti!e effect and operation$ Presumption is strong against substanti!e laws • affecting pending actions or proceedings$ 5o substanti!e statute shall be so construed retroacti!ely as to affect pending litigations$ Gords or phrases indicating prospecti!ity • Indicating prospecti!e operation A statute is to apply BhereafterC o BthereafterC Bfrom and after the passing of this ActC o Bshall ha!e been madeC o Bfrom and afterC a designated date o •
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STATUTES GIVEN PROSPECTIVE EFFECT
Penal statutes, generally Penal laws operate prospecti!ely$ • Art$ :* of the RP& pro!ides that Bno felony shall be • punishable by any penalty not prescribed by law prior to its commission$ Pro!ision is recognition to the uni!ersally accepted • principle that no penal law can ha!e a retroacti!e effect, no act or omission shall be held to be a crime, nor its author punished, ecept by !irtue of a law in force at the time the act was committed$ •
E) post facto law •
&onstitution pro!ides that no e) post facto law shall be enacted$ It also prohibits the retroacti!e application of penal laws which are in the nature of e) post facto laws$
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E) post facto laws are any of the following Law ma1es criminal an act done before the o passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such act Law which aggra!ates a crime, ma1es it o greater than it was, when committed Law which changes the punishment ? inflicts o a greater punishment than that anneed to the crime when committed Law which alters the legal rules of e!idence, o authories con!iction upon less or different testimony than the law re.uired at the time of the commission of the offense Law which assumes to regulate ci!il rights o and remedies only, but in effect imposes penalty or depri!ation of a right for something which when done was lawful Law which depri!es a person accused of a o crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as protection of a former con!iction or ac.uittal, or proclamation of amnesty$
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4est if e) post facto clause is !iolated Does the law sought to be applied retroacti!ely ta1e from an accused any right !ital for protection of life and liberty %cope applies only to criminal or penal matters It does 5O4 apply to laws concerning ci!il proceedings generally, or which affect or regulate ci!il or pri!ate rights or political pri!ilege
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B%hallC implies that the law ma1es intend the enactment to be effecti!e only in f%t%re. %tatutes ha!e no retroacti!e but prospecti!e effect BIt shall ta1e effect upon its appro!alC o %hall ta1e effect on the date the President o shall ha!e issued a proclamation or E$O$, as pro!ided in the statute
Retroacti!e statutes, generally •
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4he &onstitution does not prohibit the enactment of retroacti!e statutes which do not impair the obligation of contract, depri!e persons of property without due process of law, or di!est rights which ha!e become !ested, or which are not in the nature of e) post facto laws$ %tatutes by nature which are retroacti!e Remedial or curati!e statutes o %tatutes which create new rights o %tatute epressly pro!ides that it shall apply o retroacti!ely Ghere it uses words which clearly indicate its o intent Problem in construction is when it is applied retroacti!ely, to a!oid frontal clash with the &onstitution and sa!e the law from being declared unconstitutional$
+%##%m crimen sine poena n%##a poena sine #egis & there is no crime without a penalty, there is no penalty without a law$
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A#via v. Sandiganbayan •
Law as of the date of the effecti!ity of this decree, any case cogniable by the Sandiganbayan is not an e) post facto law because it is not a penal statute nor dilutes the right of appeal of the accused$
'ill of attainder
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&onstitution pro!ides that no bill of attainder shall be enacted$ 'ill of attainder 0 legislati!e act which inflicts punishment without 2udicial trial Essence substitution of a legislati!e for a 2udicial determination of guilt %er!es to implement the principle of separation of powers by confining the legislature to rule3ma1ing ? thereby forestalling legislati!e usurpation of 2udicial functions$ @istory 'ill of Attainder was employed to suppress unpopular causes ? political minorities, and this is the e!il sought to be suppressed by the &onstitution$ @ow to spot a 'ill of Attainder %ingling out of a definite minority o Imposition of a burden on it o o A legislati!e intent retroacti!e application to past conduct suffice o to stigmatie
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'ill of Attainder is ob2ectionable because of its e) post facto features$
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Accordingly, if a statute is a 'ill of Attainder, it is also an e) post facto law$
Ghen penal laws applied retroacti!ely Penal laws cannot be gi!en retroacti!e effect, ecept • when they are fa!orable to the accused$ Art$:: of RP& Bpenal laws shall ha!e a retroacti!e • effect insofar as they fa!or the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 7 Art 8: of the &ode , although at the time of the application of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the con!ict is ser!ing the same$ • •
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4his is not an e) post facto law$ Eception to the general rule that all laws operate prospecti!ely$ Rule is founded on the principle that the right of the state to punish and impose penalty is based on the principles of 2ustice$ Favorabi#ia s%nt amp#ianda adiiosa restrigenda & &onscience and good law 2ustify this eception$ Eception was inspired by sentiments of humanity and accepted by science$ : laws affecting the liability of accused In force at the time of the commission of the o crime 0 during the pendency of the criminal action, a statute is passed reducing the degree of penalty eliminating the offense itself remo!ing subsidiary imprisonment in case of insol!ency to pay the ci!il liability prescription of the offense • such statute will be applied retroacti!ely and the trial court before the finality of 2udgment or the appellate court on appeal from such
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2udgment should ta1e such statute in consideration$ Enacted during or after the trial of the criminal action
Director v. Director of Prisons •
Ghen there is already a final 2udgment ? accused is ser!ing sentence, remedy is to file petition of *abeas corp%s alleging that his continued imprisonment is illegal pursuant to said statute ? praying that he be forthwith released$
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Eceptions to the rule Ghen accused is habitual delin.uent o Ghen statute pro!ides that it shall not apply o to eisting actions or pending cases Ghere accused disregards the later law ? o in!o1es the prior statute under which he was prosecuted$ Keneral rule An amendatory statute rendering an illegal act prior to its enactment no longer illegal is gi!en retroacti!e effect does not apply when amendatory act specifically pro!ides that it shall only apply prospecti!ely$
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%tatutes substanti!e in nature • %ubstanti!e law creates, defines or regulates rights concerning o life, liberty or property, or the powers of agencies or instrumentalities for administration of public affairs$ that part of law which creates, defines ? o regulates rights, or which regulates rights or duties which gi!e rise to a cause of action that part of law which courts are established o to administer when applied to criminal law that which o declares which acts are crimes and prescribe the punishment for committing them &annot be construed retroacti!ely as it might o affect pre!ious or past rights or obligations %ubstanti!e rights • One which includes those rights which one o en2oys under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations$ • &ases with substanti!e statutes To#entino v. A'a#te In the absence of a contrary intent, statutes which lays • down certain re.uirements to be complied with be fore a case can be brought to court$ Espirit% v. Cipriano • /reees the amount of monthly rentals for residential houses during a fied period Spo%ses Tirona v. A#e-o • Law &omprehensi!e Land Reform Law granting complainants tenancy rights to fishponds and pursuant to which they filed actions to assert rights which
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subse.uently amended to eempt fishponds from co!erage of statute @eld Amendatory law is substanti!e in nature as it eempts fishponds from its co!erage$ 4est for procedural laws if rule really regulates procedure, the 2udicial o process for enforcing rights and duties recognied by substanti!e law ? for 2ustly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them If it operates as a means of implementing an o eisting right 4est for substanti!e laws If it ta1es away a !ested right o If rule creates a right such as right to appeal o
Fabian v. Desierto • Ghere to prosecute an appeal or transferring the !enue of appeal is procedural Eample • Decreeing that appeals from decisions of the o Ombudsman in administrati!e actions be made to the &ourt of Appeals Re.uiring that appeals from decisions of the o 5LR& be filed with the &ourt of Appeals Kenerally, procedural rules are retroacti!e and are • applicable to actions pending and undermined at the time of the passage of the procedural law, while substanti!e laws are prospecti!e Effects on pending actions • %tatutes affecting substanti!e rights may not be gi!en retroacti!e operation so as to go!ern pending proceedings$ /b%ran v. Labes Ghere court originally obtains and eercises • 2urisdiction, a later statute restricting such 2urisdiction or transferring it to another tribunal will not affect pending action, unless statute pro!ides ? unless prohibitory words are used$
substanti!e laws that affect pending actions or proceedings$ ualification of rule A substanti!e law will be construed as applicable to • pending actions if such is the clear intent of the law$ • 4o promote social 2ustice or in the eercise of police power, is intended to apply to pending actions As a rule, a case must be decided in the light of the law • as it eists at the time of the decision of the appellate court, where the statute changing the law is intended to be retroacti!e and to apply to pending litigations or is retroacti!e in effect 4his rule is true though it may result in the re!ersal of • a 2udgment which as correct at the time it was rendered by the trial court$ 4he rule is sub2ect to the limitation concerning constitutional restrictions against impairment of !ested rights %tatutes affecting !ested rights • A !ested right or interest may be said to mean some right or interest in property that has become fied or established and is no longer open to doubt or contro!ersy • Rights are !ested when the right to en2oyment, present or prospecti!e, has become the property of some particular person or persons, as a present interest 4he right must be absolute, complete and • unconditional, independent of a contingency A mere epectancy of future benefit or a contingent • interest in property founded on anticipated continuance of eisting laws does not constitute a !ested right Inchoate rights which ha!e not been acted on are not • !ested
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Lagardo v. Masagana •
Ghere court has no 2urisdiction o!er a certain case but ne!ertheless decides it, from which appeal is ta1en, a statute enacted during the pendency of the appeal !esting 2urisdiction upon such trial court o!er the sub2ect matter or such case may not be gi!en retroacti!e effect so as to !alidate the 2udgment of the court a $%o, in the absence of a sa!ing clause$
"ep%b#ic v. Prieto Ghere a complaint pending in court is defecti!e • because it did not allege sufficient action, it may not be !alidated by a subse.uent law which affects substanti!e rights and not merely procedural matters$ •
Rule against the retroacti!e operation of statutes in general applies more strongly with respect to
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A statute may not be construed and applied retroacti!ely under the following circumstances if it impairs substanti!e right that has become o !estedH as disturbing or destroying eisting right o embodied in a 2udgmentH creating new substanti!e right to fundamental o cause of action where none eisted before and ma1ing such right retroacti!eH by arbitrarily creating a new right or liability o already etinguished by operation of law Law creating a new right in fa!or of a class of persons may not be so applied if the new right collides with or impairs any !ested right ac.uired before the establishment of the new right nor, by the terms of which is retroacti!e, be so applied if it ad!ersely affects !ested rights o unsettles matter already done as re.uired by o eisting law wor1s in2ustice to those affected thereby o
eng%et Conso#idated Mining Co v. Pineda
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Ghile a person has no !ested right in any rule of law entitling him to insist that it shall remain unchanged for his benefit, nor has he a !ested right in the continued eistence of a statute which precludes its change or repeal, nor in any omission to legislate on a particular matter, a subse.uent statute cannot be so applied retroacti!ely as to impair his right that accrued under the old law$ %tatutes must be so construed as to sustain its constitutionality, and prospecti!e operation will be presumed where a retroacti!e application will produce in!alidity$
Peo v. Pata#in 4he abolition of the death penalty and its subse.uent • re3imposition$ 4hose accused of crimes prior to the re3 imposition of the death penalty ha!e ac.uired !ested rights under the law abolishing it$ &ourts ha!e thus gi!en statutes strict constriction to • pre!ent their retroacti!e operation in order that the statutes would not impair or interfere with !ested or eisting rights$ Accused3appellant Ts rights to be benefited by the abolition of the death penalty accrued or attached by !irtue of Article :: of the Re!ised Penal &ode$ 4his benefit cannot be ta1en away from them$ %tatutes affecting obligations of contract Any contract entered into must be in accordance with, • and not repugnant to, the applicable law at the time of eecution$ %uch law forms part of, and is read into, the contract e!en without the parties epressly saying so$ Laws eisting at the time of the eecution of contracts • are the ones applicable to such transactions and not later statutes, unless the latter pro!ide that they shall ha!e retroacti!e effect$ Later statutes will not, howe!er, be gi!en retroacti!e • effect if to do so will impair the obligation of contracts, for the &onstitution prohibits the enactment of a law impairing the obligations of contracts$ Any law which enlarges, abridges, or in any manner • changes the intention of the parties necessarily impairs the contract itself • A statute which authories any de!iation from the terms of the contract by postponing or accelerating the period of performance which it prescribes, imposing conditions not epressed in the contract, or dispensing with those which are howe!er minute or apparently immaterial in their effect upon the contract, impairs the obligation, and such statute should not therefore be applied retroacti!ely$ As between two feasible interpretations of a statute, • the court should adopt that which will a!oid the impairment of the contract$ If the contract is legal at it inception, it cannot be • rendered illegal by a subse.uent legislation$ A law by the terms of which a transaction or • agreement would be illegal cannot be gi!en retroacti!e effect so as to nullify such transactions or agreement eecuted before said law too1 effect$
1.S. Tobacco Corp. v. Lina • 4he importation of certain goods without import license which was legal under the law eisting at the time of shipment is not rendered illegal by the fact that when the goods arri!ed there was already another law prohibiting importation without import license$ 4o rule otherwise in any of these instances is to impair the obligations of contract$
Illustration of rule Peop#e v. 5eta Eisting law authoriing a lawyer to charge not more • than 7N of the amount in!ol!ed as attorneys fees in the prosecution of certain !eterans claim$ /acts A lawyer entered into a contract for • professional ser!ices on contingent basis and actually rendered ser!ice to its successful conclusion$ 'efore the claim was collected, a statute was enacted$ 5ew statute Prohibiting the collection of attorneys • fees for ser!ices rendered in prosecuting !eterans claims$ • Issue /or collecting his fees pursuant to the contract for professional ser!ices, the lawyer was prosecuted for !iolation of the statute$ @eld In eonerating the lawyer, the court said the • statute prohibiting the collection of attorneys fees cannot be applied retroacti!ely so as to ad!ersely affect the contract for professional ser!ices and the fees themsel!es$ • 4he 7N fee was contingent and did not become absolute and unconditional until the !eterans claim had been collected by the claimant when the statute was already in force did no alter the situation$ /or the Bdistinction between !ested and absolute rights • is not helpful and a better !iew to handle the problem is to declare those statutes attempting to affect rights which the courts find to be unalterable, in!alid as arbitrary and unreasonable, thus lac1ing in due process$C • 4he 7N fee allowed by the old law is Bnot unreasonable$ %er!ices were rendered thereunder to claimants benefits$ 4he right to fees accrued upon such rendition$ Only the payment of the fee was contingent upon the appro!al of the claimH therefore, the right was contingent$ /or a right to accrue is one thingH enforcement thereof by actual payment is another$ 4he subse.uent law enacted after the rendition of the ser!ices should not as a matter of simple 2ustice affect the agreement, which was entered into !oluntarily by the parties as epressly directed in the pre!ious law$ 4o apply the new law to the case of defendant3appellant s as to depri!e him of the agreed fee would be arbitrary and unreasonable as destructi!e of the in!iolability of contracts, and therefore in!alid
as lac1ing in due processH to penalie him for collecting such fees, repugnant to our sense of 2ustice$C
re.uire payment of the ta on such business for the period prior to the amendment
Repealing and amendatory acts %tatutes which repeal earlier or prior laws operate • prospecti!ely, unless the legislati!e intent to gi!e them retroacti!e effect clearly appears$ Although a repealing state is intended to be retroacti!e, • it will not be so construed if it will impair !ested rights or the obligations of contracts, or unsettle matters that had been legally done under the old law$ Repealing statutes which are penal in nature are • generally applied retroacti!ely if fa!orable to the accused, unless the contrary appears or the accused is otherwise not entitled to the benefits of the repealing act$ • Ghile an amendment is generally construed as becoming a part of the original act as if it had always been contained therein , it may not be gi!en a retroacti!e effect unless it is so pro!ided epressly or by necessary implication and no !ested right or obligations of contract are thereby impaired$ 4he general rule on the prospecti!e operation of • statutes also applies to amendatory acts
%yco v. P*i#ippine +ationa# ank Issue can 'uyco compel the P5' to accept his • bac1pay certificate in payment of his indebtedness to the ban1 April :9, *+783 RA ;+ ga!e 'uyco the right to ha!e • said certificate applied in payment of is obligation thus at that time he offered to pay with his bac1pay certificate$ #une *8, *+78, RA *78 was enacted amending the • charter of the P5' and pro!ided that the ban1 shall ha!e no authority to accept bac1pay certificate in payment of indebtedness to the ban1$ @eld 4he &ourt fa!ored 'uyco$ All statutes are • construed as ha!ing prospecti!e operation, unless the purpose of the legislature is to gi!e them retroacti!e effect$ 4his principle also applies to amendments$ RA *78 • does not contain any pro!ision regarding its retroacti!e effect$ It simply states its effecti!ity upon appro!al$ 4he amendment therefore, has no retroacti!e effect, and the present case should be go!erned by the law at the time the offer in .uestion was made 4he rule is familiar that after an act is amended, the • original act continues to be in force with regard to all rights that had accrued prior to such amendment$
San 6ose v. "e*abi#itation Finance Corp •
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RA 96* which condoned the interest on pre3war debts from #anuary *, *+9: to December -*, *+97 amended by RA 8* on #une *8, *+7* by !irtually reenacting the old law and pro!iding that 9if t*e debtor *o;ever makes vo#%ntary payment of t*e entire pre;ar %npaid principa# ob#igation on or before December I? ?JK t*e interest on s%c* principa# ob#igation corresponding from 6an%ary ? ?J> to day of payment are #ike;ise condoned C @eld a debtor who paid his pre3war obligation together with the interests on )arch *9, *+7* or before the amendment was appro!ed into law, is not entitled to a refund of the interest paid from #anuary *, *+98 to )arch *9, *+7* the date the debtor paid the obligation$ Reason Bma1es !oluntary paymentC 0 denotes a o present or future actH thereby not retroacti!ely Bunpaid principal obligationC and BcondoneC o 0 imply that amendment does not co!er refund of interests paid after its appro!al$
C/" v. La Tondena • %tatute imposes ta on certain business acti!ities is amended by eliminating the clause pro!iding a ta on some of such acti!ities, and the amended act is further amended, after the lapse of length of time, by restoring the clause pre!iously eliminated, which re.uires that the last amendment should not be gi!en retroacti!e effect so as to co!er the whole period$ /mperia# v. C/" • An amendment which imposes a ta on a certain business which the statute prior to its amendment does not ta, may not be applied retroacti!ely so as to
/ns%#ar ,overnment v. Frank Ghere a contract is entered into by the parties on the • basis of the law then pre!ailing, the amendment of said law will not affect the terms of said contract$ 4he rule applies e!en if one of the contracting parties • is the go!ernment STATUTES GIVEN RETROACTIVE EFFECT
Procedural laws 4he general law is that the law has no retroacti!e • effect$ Eceptions • procedural laws o curati!e laws, which are gi!en retroacti!e o operation Procedural laws • ad2ecti!e laws which prescribe rules and o forms of procedure of enforcing rights or obtaining redress for their in!asion they refer to rules of procedure by which o courts applying laws of all 1inds can properly administer in2ustice they include rules of pleadings, practice and o e!idence Applied to criminal law, they pro!ide or o regulate the steps by which one who commits a crime is to be punished$ Remedial statutes or statutes relating to o modes of procedure3 which do not create new or ta1e away !ested rights, but only operate in
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furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of the rights already eisting, do not come within the legal conception of a retroacti!e law, or the general rule against the retroacti!e operation of statutes$ A new statute which deals with procedure o only is presumpti!ely applicable to all actions 0 those which ha!e accrued or are pending$ %tatutes regulating the procedure of the courts o will be construed as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage$ 4he retroacti!e application of procedural laws is not !iolati!e of any right of a person who may o feel that he is ad!ersely affectedH nor constitutionally ob2ectionable$ o "ationa#e no !ested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws$ A person has no !ested right in any particular remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the application to the trial of his case, whether ci!il or criminal, of any other than the eisting rules of procedure
A#day v. Cami##on Pro!ision 'P *:+3 Bnor record or appeal shall be • re.uired to ta1e an appeal$C (procedural in nature and should be applied retroacti!ely" • Issue Ghether an appeal from an ad!erse 2udgment should be dismissed for failure of appellant to file a record on appeal within -6 days as re.uired under the old rules$ • %uch .uestion is pending resolution at the time the 'P 'lg too1 effect, became academic upon effecti!ity of said law because the law no longer re.uires the filing a of a record on appeal and its retroacti!e application remo!ed the legal obstacle to gi!ing due course to the appeal$ Castro v. Saga#es A statute which transfers the 2urisdiction to try certain • cases from a court to a .uasi32udicial tribunal is a remedial statute that is applicable to claims that accrued before its enactment but formulated and filed after it too1 effect$ • @eld 4he court that has 2urisdiction o!er a claim at the time it accrued cannot !alidly try to claim where at the time the claim is formulated and filed, the 2urisdiction to try it has been transferred by law to a .uasi32udicial tribunal$ •
"ationa#e for e!en actions pending in one court may be !alidly be ta1en away and transferred to another and no litigant can ac.uire a !ested right to be heard by one particular court$
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An administrati!e rule which is interpretati!e of a pre3 eisting statue and not declarati!e of certain rights with obligations thereunder is gi!en retroacti!e effect as of the date of the effecti!ity of the statute$
At#as Conso#idated Mining 3 Deve#opment Corp. v. CA
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Issue whether a trial court has been di!ested of 2urisdiction to hear and decide a pending case in!ol!ing a mining contro!ersy upon the promulgation of PD *:;* which !ests upon the 'ureau of )ines Original and eclusi!e 2urisdiction to hear and decide mining contro!ersies$ @eld Mes$ PD *:;* is a remedial statute$ It does not create new rights nor ta1e away rights that are already !ested$ It only operates in furtherance of a remedy or confirmation of rights already in eistence$ It does not come within the legal pur!iew of a prospecti!e law$ As such, it can be gi!en retrospecti!e application of statutes$ 'eing procedural in nature, it shall apply to all actions pending at the time of its enactment ecept only with respect to those cases which had already attained h character of a final and eecutor 2udgment$ Gere it not so, the purpose of the Decree, which is to facilitate the immediate resolution of mining contro!ersies by granting 2urisdiction to a body or agency more adept to the technical compleities of mining operations, would be thwarted and rendered meaningless$ Litigants in a mining contro!ersy cannot be permitted to choose a forum of con!enience$ #urisdiction is imposed by law and not by any of the parties to such proceedings$ /urthermore, PD *:;* is a special law and under a well3accepted principle in stat con, the special law will pre!ail o!er a stature or law of general application$
S%bido 6r. v. Sandiganbayan •
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&ourt ruled that RA +7, in further amending PD *868 as regards the %andiganbayans 2urisdiction, mode of appeal, and other procedural matters, is clearly a procedural law, i.e. one which prescribes rules and forms of procedure enforcing rights or obtaining redress for their in!asion, or those which refer to rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all 1inds can properly administer 2ustice$ 4he petitioners suggest that it is li1ewise curati!e or remedial statute, which cures defects and adds to the means of enforcing eisting obligations$ As a procedural and curati!e statute, RA +7 may !alidly be gi!en retroacti!e effect, there being no impairment of contractual or !ested rights$
Martine' v. Peop#e %tatutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be • construed as applicable to actions pending and undermined at the time of their passage$ Ghere at the time the action was filed, the Rules of • &ourt Ba petition to be allowed to appeal as pauper shall not be entertained by the appellate courtC • 4he subse.uent amendment thereto deleting the sentence implies that the appellate court is no longer prohibited from entertaining petitions to appear as pauper litigants, and may grant the petition then pending action, so long as its re.uirements are complied with$
Eceptions to the rule • 4he rule does not apply where the statute itself epressly or by necessary o implication pro!ides that pending actions are ecepted from it operation, or where to apply it to pending proceedings would impair !ested rights &ourts may deny the retroacti!e application o of procedural laws in the e!ent that to do so would not be feasible or would wor1 in2ustice$ 5or may procedural laws be applied o retroacti!ely to pending actions if to do so would in!ol!e intricate problems of due process or impair the independence of the courts$ Tayag v. CA Issue whether an action for recognition filed by an • illegitimate minor after the death of his alleged parent when Art :;7 of the &i!il &ode was still in effect and has remained pending Art *7 of the /amily &ode too1 effect can still be prosecuted considering that Art *7, which is claimed to be procedural in nature and retroacti!e in application, does not allow filing of the action after the death of the alleged parent$ • @eld 4he rule that a statutory change in matters of procedure may affect pending actions and proceedings, unless the language of the act ecludes them from its operation, is not so per!asi!e that it may be used to !alidate or in!alidate proceedings ta1en before it goes into effect, since procedure must be go!erned by the law regulating it at the time the .uestion of procedure arises especially where !ested rights maybe pre2udiced$ • Accordingly, Art *7 of the /amily &ode finds no proper application to the instant case since it will ineluctably affect ad!ersely a right of pri!ate respondent and, conse.uentially, of the minor child she represents, both of which ha!e been !ested with the filing of the complaint in court$ 4he trial court is, therefore, correct in applying the pro!isions of Art :;7 of the &i!il &ode and in holding that pri!ate respondents cause of action has not yet prescribed$C &urati!e statutes curati!e remedial statutes are healing acts • they are remedial by curing defects and adding to the • means of enforcing eisting obligations the rule to curati!e statutes is that if the thing omitted • or failed to be done, and which constitutes the defect sought to be remo!ed or made harmless, is something which the legislature might ha!e dispensed with by a pre!ious statute, it may do so by a subse.uent one • curati!e statutes are intended to supply defects, abridge superfluities in eisting laws, and curb certain e!ils$ 4hey are designed and intended, but has failed of epected legal conse.uence by reason of some statutory disability or irregularity in their own action$
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4hey ma1e !alid that which, before the enactment of the statute, was in!alid$ 4heir purpose is to gi!e !alidity to acts done that would ha!e been in!alid under eisting laws, as if eisting laws ha!e been complied with
Friva#do v. COMELEC (rested the definition of curati!e statutes" • •
4olentino those which underta1e to cure errors? o irregularities, thereby !alidating 2udicial 2udicial or administrati!e proceedings, acts of public officers, or pri!ate deeds or contracts which otherwise would not produce their intended conse.uences by reason of some statutory disability or failure to comply with some technical re.uirement
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curati!e statutes are healing acts curing defects and adding to the means of enforcing eisting obligations and are intended to supply defects abridge o superfluities in eisting laws? curb certain e!ils by their !ery nature, curati!e statutes are o retroacti!e and reach bac1 to the past e!ents to correct errors or irregularities ? to render !alid ? effecti!e attempted acts which would be otherwise ineffecti!e for the purpose the parties intended • &urati!e statutes are forms of retroacti!e legislations which reach bac1 on past e!ents to correct errors or irregularities ? to render !alid ? effecti!e attempted acts which would be otherwise ineffecti!e for the purpose the parties intended$ Erectors /nc. v. +L"C (hahhha for the petitioner" • %tatute EO ***, amended Art :* of the Labor &ode to widen the wor1ers, access to the go!ernment for redress of grie!ances by gi!ing the Regional Directors ? the Labor Arbiters concurrent 2urisdiction o!er cases in!ol!ing money claims Issue Amendment created a situation where the • 2urisdiction of the RDs and LAs o!erlapped$ Remedy RA 8*7further amended Art :* by • delineating their respecti!e 2urisdictions$ Fnder RA 8*7, the RD has eclusi!e 2urisdiction o!er cases in!ol!ing claims, pro!ided the claim is presented by an employer or o person employed in domestic or household ser!ices or household help under the &ode$ the claimant no longer being employed does o not see1 reinstatement the aggregate money claim of the employee o or househelper doesnt eceed P7,666$ All other cases are within the eclusi!e 2urisdiction of the Labor Arbiter$ @eld EO *** ? RA 8*7 are therefore curati!e • statutes$ o
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A curati!e statute is enacted to cure defects in a prior law or to !alidate legal proceedings, instruments or acts of public authorities which would otherwise be !oid for want of conformity with certain eisting legal re.uirements
Adong v. C*eong Seng ,ee %tatutes intended to !alidate what otherwise !oid or • in!alid marriages, being curati!e, will be gi!en retroacti!e effect$ Santos v. D%ata %tatute which pro!ides that a contract shall presumed • an e.uitable mortgage in any of the cases therein enumerated, and designed primarily to curtail e!ils brought about by contracts of sale with right of repurchase, is remedial in nature ? will be applied retroacti!ely to cases arising prior to the effecti!ity of the statute$ •
Abad v. P*i# American ,enera# /nc. • Ghere at the time action is filed in court the latter has no 2urisdiction o!er the sub2ect matter but a subse.uent statute clothes it with 2urisdiction before the matter is decided$ 4he statute is in the nature of a curati!e law with • retroacti!e operation to pending proceedings and cures the defect of lac1 of 2urisdiction of the court at the commencement of the action$
Legarda v. Masaganda Ghere a curati!e statute is enacted after the court has • rendered 2udgment, which 2udgment is naturally !oid as the court has at the time no 2urisdiction o!er the sub2ect of the action, the enactment of the statute conferring 2urisdiction to the court does not !alidate the !oid 2udgment for the legislature has no power to ma1e a 2udgment rendered without 2urisdiction of a !alid 2udgment$ Friva#do v. COMELEC (an eample considered curati!e ? remedial as well as • one which creates new rights ? new remedies, generally held to e retroacti!e in nature3 PD :7, which liberalies the procedure of repatriation" • @eld PD :7 ? the re3ac.uisition of the /ilipino citienship by administrati!e repatriation pursuant to said decree is retroacti!e$ De Castro v. Tan •
@eld what has been gi!en retroacti!e effect in Friva#do is not only the law itself but also Phil$ &itienship re3ac.uired pursuant to said law to the date of application for repatriation, which meant that his lac1 of /ilipino citienship at the time he registered as a !oter, one of the .ualification is as a go!ernor, or at the time he filed his certificate of candidacy for go!ernorship, one of the .ualification is as a go!ernor,
was cured by the retroacti!e application of his repatriation$ "ep%b#ic v. Atencio &urati!e statute one which confirms, refines and • !alidate the sale or transfer of a public land awarded to a grantee, which a prior law prohibits its sale within a certain period ? otherwise in!alid transaction under the old law$ M%nicipa#ity of San +arciso H%e'on v. Mende' • %tatute %ec$ 99:(d" of the Local Ko!ernment &ode of *++*, pro!ides that municipal districts organied pursuant to presidential issuances or eecuti!e orders ? which ha!e their respecti!e sets of electi!e municipal officials holding at the time of the effecti!ity of the code shall henceforth be considered as a regular municipalities • 4his is a curati!e statute as it !alidates the creation of municipalities by EO which had been held to be an in!alid usurpation of legislati!e power$ Tatad v. ,arcia 6r. Issue Ghere there is doubt as to whether go!ernment • agency under the then eisting law, has the authority to enter intoa negotiated contract for the construction of a go!ernment pro2ect under the build3lease3and transfer scheme • @eld 4he subse.uent enactment of a statute which recognies direct negotiation of contracts under such arrangement is a curati!e statute$ As all doubts and procedural lapses that might ha!e • attended the negotiated contract ha!e been cured by the subse.uent statute Limitations of rule • remedial statutes will not be gi!en retroacti!e effect if to do so would impair the obligations of contract or disturb !ested rights only administrati!e or curati!e features of the statute • as will not ad!ersely affect eisting rights will be gi!en retroacti!e operation the eception to the foregoing limitations of the rule is • a remedial or curati!e statute which is enacted as a police power measure • %tatutes of this type may be gi!en retroacti!e effect e!en though they impair !ested rights or the obligations of contract, if the legislati!e intent is to gi!e them retrospecti!e operation •
"ationa#e 4he constitutional restriction against impairment against obligations of contract or !ested rights does not preclude the legislature from enacting statutes in the eercise of its police power
Police power legislations • as a rule, statutes which are enacted in the eercise of police power to regulate certain acti!ities, are applicable not only to those acti!ities or transactions coming into being after their passage, but also to those already in eistence
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"ationa#e the non3impairment of the obligations of contract or of !ested rights must yield to the legitimate eercise of power, by the legislature, to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order, safety and general welfare of the people Any right ac.uired under a statute or under a contract is sub2ect to the condition that it may be impaired by the state in the legitimate eercise of its police power, since the reser!ation of the essential attributes of so!ereign power is deemed read into e!ery statute or contract as a postulate of the legal order
%tatutes relating to prescription Keneral rule a statute relating to prescription of • action, being procedural in nature, applies to all actions filed after its effecti!ity$ In other words, such a statute is both o prospecti!e in the sense that it applies to causes that accrued and will accrue after it too1 effect, and retroacti!e in the sense that it applies to o causes that accrued before its passage @owe!er, a statute of limitations will not be gi!en • retroacti!e operation to causes of action that accrued prior to its enactment if to do so will remo!e a bar of limitation which has become complete or disturb eisting claims without allowing a reasonable time to bring actions thereon +agrampa v. +agrampa %tatute Art$ ***8 of the &i!il &ode Bprescription • already running before the effecti!ity of this &ode shall be go!erned by laws pre!iously in forceH but if since the time this &ode too1 effect the entire period herein re.uired for prescription should elapse, the present &ode shall be applicable e!en though by the former laws a longer period might be re.uired$C @eld 4he pro!ision is retroacti!e since it applied to a • cause that accrued prior to its effecti!ity which when filed has prescribed under the new &i!il &ode e!en though the period of prescription prescribed under the old law has not ended at the time the action is filed in court 4he fact that the legislature has indicated that the • statute relating to prescription should be gi!en retroacti!e effect will not warrant gi!ing it if it will impair !ested rights %tatute of limitations prescribing a longer period to file • an action than that specified under the law may not be construed as ha!ing retroacti!e application if it will re!i!e the cause that already prescribed under the old statute for it will impair !ested rights against whom the cause is asserted$ %tatute which shorten the period of prescription ? • re.uires that causes which accrued prior to its effecti!ity be prosecuted or filed not later than a specific date may not be construed to apply to eisting causes which pursuant to the old law under which they accrued, will not prescribe until a much longer period than that specified in the later enactment because the
right to bring an action is founded on law which has become !ested before the passage of the new statute of limitations Apparently conflicting decisions on prescription i##ones v. C/" •
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Issue whether %ec$ A of &ommon wealth Act *99, amended by RA *++-, to the effect that Bany action to enforce an cause (i.e. non payment of ;ages or overtime compensation under this Act shall be commenced within - years after such cause of action accrued, otherwise it shall be fore!er barred$ Provided *o;ever that actions already commenced before the effecti!e day of this Act shall not be affected by the period herein prescribed$ As statute shortened the period of prescription from 8 to - yrs$ from the date the cause of action accrued, it was contended that to gi!e retroacti!e effect would impair !ested rights since it would operate to preclude the prosecution of claims that accrued more than - but less than 8 yrs$ @eld a statute of limitations is procedural in nature and no !ested right can attach thereto or arise therefrom$ Ghen the legislature pro!ided that Bactions already commenced before the effecti!ity of this Act shall not be affected by the period herein prescribed,C it intended to apply the statute to all eisting actions filed after the effecti!ity of the law$ 'ecause the statute shortened the period within which to bring an action ? in order to !iolate the constitutional mandate, claimants are in2uriously affected should ha!e a reasonable period of * yr$ from time new statute too1 effect within which to sue on such claims$
Cora#es v. Emp#oyees Compensation Commission %ame issue on 'illones but &ourt arri!ed at a different • conclusion$ Issue Ghether a claim for wor1mens compensation • which accrued under the old Gor1mens &ompensation Act (G&A" but filed under after )arch -*, *+7 is barred by the pro!ision of the 5ew Labor &ode which repealed the G&A$ • G&A re.uires that Bwor1mens compensation claims accruing prior to the effecti!ity of this &ode shall be filed with the appropriate regional offices of the Department of Labor not later than )arch -*, *+7, otherwise shall be barred fore!er$C @eld Pro!ision doesnt apply to wor1mens • compensation that accrued before Labor &ode too1 effect, e!en if claims were not filed not later than )arch -*, *+7$ •
"ationa#e prescripti!e period for claims which accrued under G&A as amended *6 yrs$ which is Ba right found on statuteC ? hence a !ested right, that cannot be impaired by the retroacti!e application of the Labor &ode$
&omparison of 'illones and &orales 'illones
&orales
Ghile &ourt said that such right to bring an action accrued under the old law is not !ested right, it did not say that the right is one protected by the due process clause of the &onstitution$
&ourt considered the right to prosecute the action that accrued under the old law as one founded on law ? a !ested right$
/or 'O4@ cases In sol!ing how to safeguard the right to bring action whose prescripti!e period to institute it has been shortened by law Ka!e the claimants whose rights ha!e been affected, one year from the date the law too1 effect within which to sue their claims$
&ourt construed the statute of limitations as inapplicable to the action that accrued before the law too1 effect$ (It is generally held that the court has no power to read into the law something which the law itself did not pro!ide epressly or impliedly$ Cora#es case seems to be on firmer grounds$ Prescription in criminal and ci!il cases • Keneral rule laws on prescription of actions apply as well to crimes committed before the enactment as afterwards$ 4here is, howe!er, a distinction between a statute of limitations in criminal actions and that of limitations in ci!il suits, as regards their construction$ In &I>IL %FI43 statute is enacted by the legislature as • an impartial arbiter, between two contending parties$ In the construction of such statute, there is no intendment to be made in fa!or of either party$ 5either grants right to the otherH there is therefore no grantor against whom no ordinary presumptions of construction are to be made$ &RI)I5AL &A%E% the state is the grantor, • surrendering by act of grace its right to prosecute or declare that the offense is no longer sub2ect of prosecution after the prescripti!e period$ %uch statutes are not only liberally construed but are applied retroacti!ely if fa!orable to the accused$ %tatutes relating to appeals 4he right to appeal from an ad!erse 2udgment, other • than that which the &onstitution grants, is statutory and may be restricted or ta1en away • A statute relating to appeals is remedial or procedural in nature and applies to pending actions in which no 2udgment has yet been promulgated at the time the statute too1 effect$ • %uch statute, li1e other statutes, may not howe!er be construed retroacti!ely so as to impair !ested rights$ @ence, a statute which eliminates the right to appeal and considers the 2udgment rendered in a case final and unappealable, destroys the right to appeal a decision rendered after the statute went into effect, but 5O4 the right to prosecute an appeal that has been perfected before the passage of the law, for in the latter case, the right of the appellant to appeal has become
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!ested under the old law and may not therefore be impaired$ %tature shortening the period for ta1ing appeals is to be gi!en prospecti!e effect and may not be applies to pending proceedings in which 2udgment has already been rendered at the time of its enactment ecept if theres clear legislati!e intent$
er#iner v. "oberts • Ghere a statute shortened the period for ta1ing appeals form thirty days to fifteen days from notice of 2udgment, an appeal ta1en within thirty days but beyond fifteen days from notice of 2udgment promulgated before the statute too1 effect is deemed seasonably perfected$ CHAPTER TEN: A&en"&ent, Re.!s!on, Co"!%!at!on an" Re#ea' AMENDMENT ♥
Power to Amend 4he legislature has the authority to amend, sub2ect to constitutional re.uirements, any eisting law$ Authority to amend is part of the legislati!e power to enact, alter and repeal laws$ 4he %& in the eercise of its rule3ma1ing power or of its power to interpret the law, has no authority to amend or change the law, such authority being the eclusi!e to the legislature$
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@ow amendment effected Amendment 0 the change or modification, by deletion, alteration, of a statute which sur!i!es in its amended form$ 4he amendment of a statute is effected by the enactment of an amendatory act modifying or altering some pro!isions of a statute either epressly or impliedly$ Epress amendment 0 done by pro!iding in the amendatory act that specific sections or pro!isions of a statute be amended as recited therein or as common indicated, Bto read as follows$C
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Amendment by implication E!ery statute should be harmonied with other laws on the same sub2ect, in the absence of a clear inconsistency$ Legislati!e intent to amend a prior law on the same sub2ect is shown by a statement in the later act that any pro!ision of law that is inconsistent therewith is modified accordingly$ Implied Amendment3 when a part of a prior statute embracing the same sub2ect as the later may not be enforced without nullifying the pertinent pro!ision of the latter in which e!ent, the prior act is deemed amended or modified to the etent of repugnancy$
H%impo v. Mendo'a Ghere a statute which re.uires that the annual realty ta on lands or buildings be paid on or
before the specified date, sub2ect to penalty of a percentage of the whole amount of ta in case of delayed payment, is amended by authoriing payment of the ta in four e.ual installments to become due on or before specified dates$ 4he penalty pro!ision of the earlier statute is modified by implication that the penalty for late payment of an installment under the later law will be collected and computed only on the installment that became due and unpaid, and not on the whole amount of annual ta as pro!ided in the old statute$ Legislati!e intent to change the basis is clear when the later law allowed payment in four installments$ Peop#e v. Macatanda A statute punishing an act which is also a crime under the RP& pro!ides a penalty as prescribed in the said &ode, such statute is not a special law but an amendment by implication$ ♥
Ghen amendment ta1es effect *7 days following its publication in the Official Kaette or newspaper of general circulation, unless a date is specified therein after such publication$
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@ow amendment is construed, generally %tatute and amendment 0 read as a whole Amendment act is ordinarily construed as if the original statute has been repealed and a new independent act in the amended form had been adopted$ Amended act is regarded as if the statute has been originally enacted in it amended form$ Read in a connection with other sections as if all had been enacted in the same statute$ Ghere an amendment lea!es certain portions of an act unchanged, such portions are continued in force, with the same meaning and effect they ha!e before the amendment$ Ghere an amendatory act pro!ides that an eisting statute shall be amended to read as recited in the amendatory act, such portions of the eisting law as are retained either literally or substantially
Estrada v. Caseda Ghere a statute which pro!ides that it shall be in force for a period of four years after its appro!al, the four years is to be counted from the date the original statute was appro!ed and not from the date the amendatory act was amended$ ♥
)eaning of law changed by amendment An amended act should be gi!en a construction different from the law prior to its amendment, for its is presumed that the legislature would not ha!e amended it had not it not wanted to change its meaning$ Prior to the introduction of the amendment, the statute had a different meaning which the amendment changed in all the particulars touching which a material change in the language of the later act eists$
Deliberate selection of language in the amendatory act different from that of the original act indicates that the legislature intended a change in the law or in its meaning$
2ictorias Mi##ing Co. v. SSS A statutory definition of term containing a general rule and an eception thereto is amended by eliminating the eception, the legislati!e intent is clear that the term should now include the eception within the scope of the general rule$ Parras v. Land "egistration Commissions %ection of a statute re.uiring the eact payment of publication fees in land registration proceedings, ecept in cases where the !alue of the land does not eceed P76,666 is amended by deleting the ecepting clause, it means that the statute as amended now re.uires payment of the publication fees regardless of the !alue of the land in!ol!ed %uppression of the ecepting clause amount to the withdrawal of the eemption allowed under the original act$
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Amendment Operates Prospecti!ely An amendment will not be construed as ha!ing a retroacti!e effect, unless the contrary is pro!ided or the legislati!e intent to gi!e it a retroacti!e effect is necessarily implied from the language used and only if no !ested right is impaired$
/mperia# v. Co##ector of /nterna# "even%e A statute amending a ta law is silent as to whether it operates retroacti!ely, the amendment will not be gi!ing retroacti!e effect so as to sub2ect to ta past transactions not sub2ect to ta under the original act$ Di% v. Co%rt of Appea#s %tatutes relating to procedure in courts are applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage$ ♥
Effect of Amendment on >ested Rights After a statute is amended, the original act continues to be in force with regard to all rights that had accrued prior to the amendment or to obligations that were contracted under the prior act and such rights and obligations will continue to be go!erned by the law before its amendment$ 5ot applied retroacti!ely so as to nullify such rights$
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Effect of amendment on 2urisdiction #urisdiction of a court to try cases is determined by the law in force at the time the action is instituted$ #urisdiction remains with the court until the case is finally decided therein$
"i##aro'a v. Arciaga Absence of a clear legislati!e intent to the contrary, a subse.uent statute amending a prior act with the effect of di!esting the court of 2urisdiction may not be construed to operate but to oust 2urisdiction that has already attached under the prior law$ /b%raan v. Labes Ghere a court originally obtains and eercises 2urisdiction pursuant to an eisting law, such 2urisdiction will not be o!erturned and impaired by the subse.uent amendment of the law, unless epress prohibitory words or words of similar import are used$
Applies to .uasi32udicial bodies
Erectors /nc v. +L"C PD *8+* and *-+* !ested Labor Arbiters with original and eclusi!e 2urisdiction o!er all cases in!ol!ing employer3employee relations, including money claims arising out of any law or contract in!ol!ing /ilipino wor1ers for o!erseas employment /acts An o!erseas wor1er filed a money claim against his recruiter, and while the case is pending, EO + was enacted, which !ested POEA with original and eclusi!e 2urisdiction o!er all cases, including money claims, arising out of law or contract in!ol!ing /ilipino wor1ers for o!erseas employment$ Issue whether the decision of the labor arbiter in fa!or of the o!erseas wor1er was in!alid @eld the court sustained the !alidity of the decision and ruled that the labor arbiter still had the authority to decide the cease because EO +b did not di!est the labor arbiter his authority to hear and decide the case filed by the o!erseas wor1er prior to its effecti!ity$ #urisdiction o!er the sub2ect matter is determined by the law in force at the time of the commencement of the actionH laws should only be applied prospecti!ely unless the legislati!e intent to gi!e them retroacti!e effect is epressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used$ ♥
Effect of nullity of prior or amendatory act Ghere a statute which has been amended is in!alid, nothing in effect has been amended 4he amendatory act, complete by itself, will be considered as an original or independent act$
,overnment v. Agonci##o the amendatory act is declared Ghere unconstitutional, it is as if the amendment did not eist, and the original statute before the attempted amend remains unaffected and in force$ REVISION AND CODIFICATION
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Kenerally Purpose to restate the eisting laws into one statute and simply complicated pro!isions, and ma1e the laws on the sub2ect easily found$ &onstruction to harmonie different pro!isions Presumption author has maintained a consisted philosophy or position$ 4he different pro!isions of a re!ised statute or code should be read and construed together$ Rule a code enacted as a single, comprehensi!e statute, and is to be considered as such and not as a series of disconnected articles or pro!isions$
Lic*a%co 3 Co. v. Aposto# A irreconcilable conflict between parts of a re!ised statute or a code, that which is best in accord with the general plan or, in the absence of circumstances upon which to base a choice, that which is later in physical position, being the latest epression of legislati!e will, will pre!ail$ ♥
Ghat is omitted is deemed repealed all laws and pro!isions of the old laws that are omitted in the re!ised statute or code are deemed repealed, unless the statute or code pro!ides otherwise Reason re!ision or codification is, by its !ery nature and purpose, intended to be a complete enactment on the sub2ect and an epression of the whole law thereon, which thereby indicates intent on the part of the legislature to abrogate those pro!isions of the old laws that are not reproduced in the re!ised statute or code$ Possible only if the re!ised statute or code was intended to co!er the whole sub2ect to is a complete and perfect system in itself$ Rule a subse.uent statute is deemed to repeal a prior law if the former re!ises the whole sub2ect matter of the former statute$ Ghen both intent and scope clearly e!ince the idea of a repeal, then all parts and pro!ision of the prior act that are omitted from the re!ised act are deemed repealed$
Mecano v. Commission on A%dit &laim for reimbursement by a go!ernment official of medical and hospitaliation epenses pursuant to %ection 8++ of the Re!ised Administration &ode of *+*, which authories the head of office to case a reimbursement of payment of medical and hospital epenses of a go!ernment official in case of sic1ness or in2ury caused by or connected directly with the performance of his official duty$ &oA denied the claim on the ground that A& of *+; which re!ised the old A&, repealed %ec$ 8++ because it was omitted the re!ised code$ %& ruled that the legislature did not intend, in enacting the new &ode, to repeal %ec$ 8++ of the old code$
BAll laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulation, or portions thereof, inconsistent with this &ode are hereby repealed or modified accordingly$C 5ew code did not epressly repeal the old as the new &ode fails to identify or designate the act to be repealed$ 4wo categories of repeal by implication Pro!isions in the two acts on the same sub2ect matter that are in irreconcilable conflict$ [ Later act to the etent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier If the later act co!ers the whole sub2ect of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a statute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law$ 4here is no irreconcilable conflict between the two codes on the matter of sic1ness benefits because the pro!ision has not been restated in the 5ew &ode$ 4he whereas clause is the intent to co!er only those aspects of go!ernment that pertain to administration, organiation and procedure, and understandably because of the many changes that transpired in the go!ernment structure since the enactment of the old code$ ♥
&hange in phraseology It is a well settled rule that in the re!ision or codification of statutes, neither an alteration in phraseology nor the admission or addition of words in the later statute shall be held necessarily to alter the construction of the former acts$ Gords which do not materially affect the sense will be omitted from the statute as incorporated in the re!ise statute or code, or that some general idea will be epressed in brief phrases$ If there has been a material change or omission, which clearly indicates an intent to depart from the pre!ious construction of the old laws, then such construction as will effectuate such intent will be adopted$
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&ontinuation of eisting laws$ A codification should be construed as the continuation of the eisting statutes$ 4he codifiers did not intend to change the law as it formerly eisted$ 4he rearrangement of sections or parts of a statute, or the placing of portions of what formerly was a single section in seprate sections, does not operate to change the operation, effect of meaning of the statute, unless the changes are of such nature as to manifest clearly and unmista1ably a legislati!e intent to change the former laws$
REPEAL ♥
Power to repeal Power to repeal a law is as complete as the power to enact one$ 4he legislature cannot in and of itself enact irrepealable laws or limit its future legislati!e acts$
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Repeal, generally Repeal total or partial, epress or implied 4otal repeal 0 re!o1ed completely Partial repeal 0 lea!es the unaffected portions of the statute in force$ A particular or specific law, identified by its number of title, is repealed is an epress repeal$ All other repeals are implied repeals$ /ailure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any eisting law, unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy eist in the terms of the new and old laws, latter situation falls under the category of an implied repeal$ Repealed only by the enactment of subse.uent laws$ 4he change in the condition and circumstances after the passage of a law which is necessitated the enactment of a statute to o!ercome the difficulties brought about by such change does not operate to repeal the prior law, nor ma1e the later statute so inconsistent with the prior act as to repeal it$
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Repeal by implication Ghere a statute of later date clearly re!eals an intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the sub2ect, that intention must be gi!en effect$ 4here must be a sufficient re!elation of the legislati!e intent to repeal$ Intention to repeal must be clear and manifest Keneral rule the latter act is to be construed as a continuation not a substitute for the first act so far as the two acts are the same, from the time of the first enactment$ 4wo categories of repeals by implication Ghere pro!isions in the two acts on the same sub2ect matter are in an irreconcilable conflict and the later act to the etent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier$ If the later act co!ers the whole sub2ect of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate similarly as a repeal of the earlier act$
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Irreconcilable inconsistency Implied repeal brought about by irreconcilable repugnancy between two laws ta1es place when the two statutes co!er the same sub2ect matterH they are so clearly inconsistent and incompatible with each other that they cannot be reconciled or harmonied and both cannot be gi!en effect, once cannot be enforced without nullifying the other$ Implied repeal 0 earlier and later statutes should embrace the same sub2ect and ha!e the same ob2ect$ In order to effect a repeal by implication, the later statute must be so irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant with the eisting law that they cannot be made to reconcile and stand together$ It is necessary before such repeal is deemed to eist that is be shown that the statutes or statutory
pro!isions deal with the same sub2ect matter and that the latter be inconsistent with the former$ the fact that the terms of an earlier and later pro!isions of law differ is not sufficient to create repugnance as to constitute the later an implied repeal of the former$ Ag%-etas v. Co%rt of Appea#s /act that %ec :; of RA *88 pertaining to can!assing by boards of can!assers is silent as to how the board of can!assers shall prepare the certificate of can!ass and as to what will be its basis, w=c details are pro!ided in the second paragraph of %ec:-* of the Omnibus Election &ode, an earlier statute, Brespecti!e boards of can!assers shall prepare a certificate of can!ass duly signed and affied with the imprint of the thumb of the right hand of each member, supported by a statement of the !otes and recei!ed by each candidate in each polling place and on the basis thereof shall proclaim as elected the candidates who obtained the highest number of !otes coast in the pro!inces, city, municipality or barangay, and failure to comply with this re.uirement shall constitute an election offenseC Did not impliedly repeal the second paragraph of %ec :-* of OE& and render the failure to comply with the re.uirement no longer an election offense$
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Irreconcilable inconsistency between to laws embracing the same sub2ect may also eist when the later law nullifies the reason or purpose of the earlier act, so that the latter law loses all meaning and function$ [
Smit* e## 3 Co. v. Estate of Maroni##a A prior law is impliedly repealed by a later act where the reason for the earlier act is beyond perad!enture remo!ed$
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Repeal by implication 0 based on the cardinal rule that in the science of 2urisprudence, two inconsistent laws on the same sub2ect cannot co3eist in one 2urisdiction$ 4here cannot be two conflicting law on the same sub2ect$ Either reconciled or later repeals prior law$
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Leges posteriores priores contrarias abrogant (a later law repeals the prior law on the sub2ect which is repugnant thereto" Mecano v. Commission on A%dit Issue whether %ec$ 8++ of the Re!ised Administrati!e &ode has been repealed by the *+; Administrati!e &ode$ *+; Administration &ode pro!ides that BAll laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or portions thereof, inconsistent with this code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly &ourt ruled that the new &ode did not repeal %ec 8++ [ Implied repeal by irreconcilable inconsistency ta1es place when two statutes co!er the same sub2ect matter, they are so clearly inconsistent
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and incompatible with each other that they cannot be reconciled or harmonied, and both cannot be gi!en effect, that one law cannot be enforced without nullifying the other$ 4he new &ode does not co!er not attempt to the co!er the entire sub2ect matter of the old &ode$ 4here are se!eral matters treated in the old &ode that are not found in the new &ode$ (pro!isions on notary publicH lea!e law, public bonding law, military reser!ations, claims for sic1ness benefits under section 8++ and others" &oA failed to demonstrate that the pro!isions of the two &odes on the matter of the sub2ect claim are in an irreconcilable conflict$ 4here can no conflict because the pro!ision on sic1ness benefits of the nature being claimed by petitioner has not been restated in old &ode$ 4he contention is untenable$ 4he fact that a later enactment may relate to the same sub2ect matter as that of an earlier statute is not of itself sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the prior act new statute may merely be cumulati!e or a continuation of the old one$ %econd &ategory possible only if the re!ised statute or code was intended to co!er the whole sub2ect to be a complete and perfect system in itself$ Rule a subse.uent is deemed to repeal a ♦ prior law if the former re!ises the whole sub2ect matter of the former statute$ Ghen both intent and scope clearly e!ince the idea of a repeal, then all parts and pro!isions of the prior act that are omitted from the re!ised act are deemed repealed$ 'efore there can be an implied repeal under this category, it must be the clear intent of the legislature that later act be the substitute of the prior act$ Opinion - s$*++* of the %ecretary of #ustice what appears clear is the intent to co!er only those aspects of go!ernment that pertain to administration, organiation and procedure, understandably because of the many changes that transpired in the go!ernment structure since the enactment of RA&$ Repeals of statutes by implication are not fa!ored$ Presumption is against the inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to 1now the eisting laws on the sub2ect and not to ha!e enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes$
Ty v. Trampe
Issue whether PD +:* on real estate taes has been repealed impliedly by RA *86, otherwise 1now as the Local Ko!ernment &ode of *++* on the same sub2ect$ @eld that there has been no implied repeal
emoluments in accordance with the appro!ed compensation structure of the &orporation$C [ %ec$8 PD *7+ 0 B eemptions notwithstanding, agencies shall report to the President, through the 'udget &ommission, on their position classification and compensation plans, policies, rates and other related details following such specifications as may be prescribed by the President$C Issue whether %ec8 of PD*7+, the two laws being reconcilable$ Ghile the Philippine Postal &orporation is allowed to fi its own personnel compensation structure through its board of directors, the latter is re.uired to follow certain standards in formulating said compensation system, and the role of D') is merely to ensure that the action ta1en by the board of directors complies the re.uirements of the law$
&ourt it is clear that the two law are not coetensi!e and mutually inclusi!e in their scope and purpose$ [ RA *86 co!ers almost all go!ernmental functions delegated to local go!ernment units all o!er the country$ [ PD +:* embraces only )etropolitan )anila Area and is limited to the administration of financial ser!ices therein$ [ %ec$+ PD+:* re.uires that the schedule of !alues of real properties in the )etropolitan )anila Area shall be prepared 2ointly by the city assessors states that the schedules shall be prepared by the pro!incial, city and municipal assessors of the municipalities within )etropolitan )anila Area for the different classes of real property situated in their respecti!e local go!ernment units for enactment by ordinance of the sanggunian concerned$
!agad v. ,o'oDado#e %ec$*+ RA 886, the Ombudsman Act grants disciplinary authority to the Ombudsman to discipline electi!e and appointi!e officials, ecept those impeachable officers, has been repealed, RA *86, the Local Ko!ernment &ode, insofar as local electi!e officials in the !arious officials therein named$ @eld both laws should be gi!en effect because there is nothing in the Local Ko!ernment &ode to indicate that it has repealed, whether epressly or impliedly$ [ 4he two statutes on the specific matter in .uestion are not so inconsistent, let alone irreconcilable, as to compel us to uphold one and stri1e down the other$ [ 4wo laws must be incompatible, and a clear finding thereof must surface, before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn$ [ /nterpretare et concordare #eges #egib%s est optim%s interpretandi mod%s i. e (e!ery statute must be so construed and harmonied with other statutes as to form uniform system of 2urisprudence$ [ the legislature should be presumed to ha!e 1nown the eisting laws on the sub2ect and not to ha!e enacted conflicting statutes$ /nitia 6r v. CoA implied repeal will not be decreed unless there is an irreconcilable inconsistency between two pro!isions or laws is RA -79 in relation to PD *7+$ [ RA -79 0 in part of the Postmaster Keneral, sub2ect to the appro!al of the 'oard of Directors of the Philippines Postal &orporation, shall ha!e the power to Bdetermine the staffing pattern and the number of personnel, define their duties and responsibilities, and fi their salaries and
Ceb% /nstit%te of Tec*no#ogy v. Op#e %ec$ -(a" PD 97* and %ec$ 9: of 'P :-: illustrates repeal by implication$ [ %ec -(a" pro!ides Bno increase in tuition or other school fees or charges shall be appro!ed unless 86N of the proceed is allocated to increase in salaries or wages of the member of the faculty$C [ 'P :-: Beach pri!ate school shall determine its rate of tuition and other school fees or charges$ 4he rates or charges adopted by schools pursuant to this pro!ision shall be collectible, and their application or use authoried, sub2ect to rules and regulations promulgated by the )inistry of Education, &ulture and %ports$C Issue whether %ec$ 9: of 'P :-: impliedly repealed %ec$ -(a" of PD 97* @eld there was implied repeal because there are irreconcilable differences between the two laws$ ♥
Implied repeal by re!ision or codification Re!ised statute is in effect a legislati!e declaration that whate!er is embraced in the new statute shall pre!ail and whate!er is ecluded there from shall be discarded$ )ust be intended to co!er the whole sub2ect to be a complete and perfect system in itself in order that the prior statutes or part thereof which are not repeated in the new statute will be deemed impliedly repealed$
Peop#e v. en%ya Ghere a statute is re!ised or a series of legislati!e acts on the same sub2ect are re!ised or consolidated into one, co!ering the entire field of sub2ect matter, all parts and pro!isions of the former act or acts [ that are omitted from the re!ised act are deemed repealed$ 6oa$%in v. +avarro
Ghere a new statute is intended to furnish the eclusi!e rule on a certain sub2ect, it repeals by implication the old law on the same sub2ect, Ghere a new statute co!ers the whole sub2ect matter of an old law and adds new pro!isions and ma1es changes, and where such law, whether it be in the form of an amendment or otherwise, is e!idently intended to be a re!ision of the old act, it repeals the old act by implication$ Peop#e v. A#m%ete Re!ision of the Agricultural 4enancy Act by the Agricultural Land Reform &ode$ %ec -+ of A4& (RA **++" Bit shall be unlawful for either the tenant or landlord without mutual consent, to reap or thresh a portion of the crop at any time pre!ious to the date set, for its threshing$C An action for !iolation of this penal pro!ision is pending in court, the Agricultural Land Reform &ode superseded the Agricultural 4enancy Act, abolished share tenancy, was not reproduced in the Agricultural Land Reform &ode$ 4he effect of such non3reenactment is a repeal of %ection -+$ It is a rule of legal hermeneutics that an act which purports to set out in full all that it intends to contain, operates as a repeal of anything omitted which was contained in the old act and not included in the act as re!ised$ A substitute statute, and e!idently intended as the substitute for it, operates to repeal the former statute$
T%ng C*in !%i v. "odrig%e' Issue whether %ec$*; Rule 9* of the pre3*66 Rules of &ourt, which pro!ided the appeal in habeas corpus cases to be ta1en within 9; hours from notice of 2udgment, has been replaced by the *++ Rules of &i!il Procedure, which pro!ides in %ec$ - Rule 9* thereof, that appeal from 2udgment or final order shall be ta1en within *7 days from receipt thereof, in !iew of the fact that the %ec$ *; was repealed, in accordance with the well3settled rule of statutory construction that pro!isions of an old law that were not reproduced in the re!ision thereof co!ering the same sub2ect are deemed repealed and discarded @eld %& in this case to abrogate those pro!isions of the old laws that are not reproduced in the re!ised statute or &ode$ ♥
Repeal by reenactment Ghere a statute is a reenactment of the whole sub2ect in substitution of the pre!ious laws on the matter, the latter disappears entirely and what is omitted in the reenacted law is deemed repealed$
Parras v. Land "egistration Commission
Ghere a law amends a specific section of a prior act by pro!iding that the same is amended so as to read as follows, which then .uotes the amended pro!ision, what is not included in the reenactment is deemed repealed$ 4he new statute is a substitute for the original section and all matters in the section that are omitted in the amendment are considered repealed$ ♥
Other forms of implied repeal 4he most powerful implication of repeal is that which arises when the later of two laws is epressed in the form of a uni!ersal negati!e$ 4here is a clear distinction between affirmati!e and negati!e statutes in regard to their repealing effects upon prior legislation$ Affirmati!e statute does not impliedly repeal the prior law unless an intention to effect a repeal is manifest, A negati!e statute repeals all conflicting pro!isions unless the contrary intention is disclosed$ Legislati!e intent to repeal is also shown where it enacts something in general term and afterwards it passes another on the same sub2ect, which though epressed in affirmati!e language introduces special conditions or restrictions 4he subse.uent statute will usually be considered as repealing by implication the former regarding the matter co!ered by the subse.uent act$ 4he epress repeal of a pro!ision of law from which an eecuti!e official deri!es his authority to enforce another pro!ision of the same law operates to repeal by implication the latter and to depri!e the official of the authority to enforce it$ 4he enactment of a statute on a sub2ect, whose purpose or ob2ect is diametrically opposed to that of an earlier law on the same sub2ect which thereby depri!es it of its reason for being, operates to repeal by implication the prior law, e!en though the pro!isions of both laws are not inconsistent$
♥
BAll laws or parts thereof which are inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly,C construed$ 5ature of repealing clause 5ot epress repealing clauses because it fails to identify or designate the act or acts that are intended to be repealed$ A clause, which predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be found on eisting and prior acts of the same sub2ect matter$ 4he presumption against implied repeal and the rule on strict construction regarding implied repeal apply e proprio !igore$ Legislature is presumed to 1now the eisting law so that if repeal of particular or specific law or laws is intended, the proper step is to so epress it$
Issue whether &entral 'an1 &ircular 9*8 has impliedly repealed or amended Art ::6+ of the &i!il &ode @eld in answering the issue in the negati!e, the court ruled that repeals or e!en amendments by implication are not fa!ored if two laws can be fairly reconciled$ 4he statutes contemplate different situations and apply to different transactions in!ol!ing loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits, as well as 2udgments relating to such load or forbearance of money, goods, or credits, the &entral 'an1 &ircular applies$ In cases re.uiring the payment of indemnities as damages, in connection with any delay in the performance of an obligation other than those in!ol!ing loan or forbearance of money, goods or credits, Art ::6+ of the && applies &ourts are slow to hold that one statute has repealed another by implication and they will not ma1e such ad2udication if they can refrain from doing so, or if they can arri!e at another result by any construction which is 2ust and reasonable$ &ourts will not enlarge the meaning of one act in order to decide that is repeals another by implication, nor will they adopt an interpretation leading to an ad2udication of repeal by implication unless it is ine!itable and a clear and eplicit reason thereof can be adduced$
2a#de' v. T%ason Bsuch a clause repeals nothing that would not be e.ually repealed without it$ Either with or without it, the real .uestion to be determined is whether the new statute is in fundamental and irreconcilable conflict with the prior statute on the sub2ect$ %ignificance of the repealing clause the presence of such general repealing clause in a later statute clearly indicates the legislati!e intent to repeal all prior inconsistent laws on the sub2ect matter whether or not the prior law is a special law$ A later general law will ordinarily not repeal a prior special law on the same sub2ect, as the latter is generally regarded as an eception to the former$ Gith such clause contained in the subse.uent general law, the prior special law will be deemed repealed, as the clause is a clear legislati!e intent to bring about that result$ ♥
Repeal by implication not fa!ored Presumption is against inconsistency or repugnancy and, accordingly, against implied repeal Legislature is presumed to 1now the eisting laws on the sub2ect and not to ha!e enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes$ A construction which in effect will repeal a statute altogether should, if possible, be re2ected$ In case of doubt as to whether a later statute has impliedly repealed a prior law on the same sub2ect, the doubt should be resol!ed against implied repeal$
1S v. Pa#acio Repeals by implication are not fa!ored, and will not be decreed unless it is manifest that the legislature so intended$ As laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation and with full 1nowledge of all eisting ones on the sub2ect It is but reasonable to conclude that in passing a statute it was not intended to interfere with or abrogate any former law relating to some matter Fnless the repugnancy between the two is not only irreconcilable, but also clear and con!incing, and flowing necessarily form the language used, the later act fully embraces the sub2ect matter of the earlier, or unless the reason for the earlier act is beyond perad!enture remo!ed$ E!ery effort must be used to ma1e all acts stand and if, by any reasonable construction, they can be reconciled, the later act will not operate as a repeal of the earlier$ +APOCO" v. Angas Illustrates the application of the principle that repeal or amendment by implication is not fa!ored$
♥
As between two laws, one passed later pre!ails
Leges posteriors priores contrarias abrogant (later statute repeals prior ones which are not repugnant thereto$" Applies e!en if the later act is made to ta1e effect ahead of the earlier law$ As between two acts, the one passed later and going into effect earlier will pre!ail o!er one passed earlier and going into effect later$
Mani#a Trading 3 S%pp#y Co. v. P*i#. Labor 1nion
an act passed April *8th and in force April :* st was held to pre!ail o!er an act passed April + th and in effect #uly 9th of the same year$ And an act going into effect immediately has been held to pre!ail o!er an act passed before but going into effect later$ Ghene!er two statutes of different dates and of contrary tenor are of e.ual theoretical application to a particular case, the statute of later date must pre!ail, being a later epression of legislati!e will$ P*i#ippine +ationa# ank v. Cr%' As between the order of preference of credit set forth in Articles ::9* to ::97 of the && and that of Article **6 of the Labor &ode, gi!ing first preference to unpaid wages and other monetary claims of labor, the former must yield to the latter, being the law of the later enactment$
4he later law repeals an earlier one because it is the later legislati!e will$ Presumption the lawma1ers 1new the older law and intended to change it$ In enacting the older law, the legislators could not ha!e 1nown the newer one and could not ha!e intended to change what they did not 1now$ && laws are repealed only by subse.uent ones, not the other way around$
David v. COMELEC %ec$ * of RA 88+ pro!ides that the term of barangay officials who were to be elected on the second )onday of )ay *++9 is 7 years
4he later act RA *86 %ec 9- (c" states that the term of office of barangay officials who were to be elected also on the : nd )onday of )ay *++9 is - years$ 4here being a clear inconsistency between the two laws, the later law fiing the term barangay officials at - years shall pre!ail$ ♥
Keneral law does not repeal special law, generally A general law on a sub2ect does not operate to repeal a prior special law on the same sub2ect, unless it clearly appears that the legislature has intended by the later general act to modify or repeal the earlier special law$ Presumption against implied repeal is stronger when of two laws, one is special and the other general and this applies e!en though the terms of the general act are broad enough to include the matter co!ered by the special statute$
,enera#ia specia#ib%s non derogant & a general law does not nullify a specific or special law 4he legislature considers and ma1es pro!ision for all the circumstances of the particular case$ Reason why a special law pre!ails o!er a general law the legislature considers and ma1es pro!ision for all the circumstances of the particular case$ Keneral and special laws are read and construed together, and that repugnancy between them is reconciled by constituting the special law as an eception to the general law$ Keneral law yields to the special law in the specific law in the specific and particular sub2ect embraced in the latter$ Applies irrespecti!e of the date of passage of the special law$ ♥
Application of rule
Sto. Domingo v. De #os Ange#es 4he court in!ariably ruled that the special law is not impliedly repealed and constitutes an eception to the general law whene!er the legislature failed to indicate in unmista1able terms its intent to repeal or modify the prior special act$
+APOCO" v. Arca Issue whether %ec$ : of &om$ Act *:6 creating the 5APO&OR, a go!ernment3owned corporation, and empowering it Bto sell electric power and to fi the rates and pro!ide for the collection of the charges for any ser!ices rendered Pro!ided, the rates of charges shall not be sub2ect to re!ision by the Public %er!ice Act has been repealed by RA :8 amending the Public %er!ice Act and granting the Public %er!ice &ommission the 2urisdiction to fi the rate of charges of public utilities owned or operated by the go!ernment or go!ernment3owned corporations$ @eld a special law, li1e &om$ Act *:6, pro!iding for a particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subse.uent statute, general in its terms, li1e RA :8, although the general statute are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special law, in the absence of a clear intent to repeal$ 4here appears no such legislati!e intent to repeal or abrogate the pro!isions of the earlier law$ 4he eplanatory note to @ouse 'ill 96-6 the later became RA :8, it was eplicit that the 2urisdiction conferred upon the Republic %er!ice &ommission o!er the public utilities operated by go!ernment3owned or controlled corporations is to be confined to the fiing of rates of such public ser!ices 4he harnessing and then distribution and sale of electric power to the consuming public, the contingency intended to be met by the legal pro!ision under consideration would not eist$ 4he authority of the Public %er!ice &ommission under RA :8 o!er the fiing of rate of charges of public utilities owned or operated by KO&&s can only be eercised where the charter of the go!ernment corporation concerned does not contain any pro!ision to the contrary$ P*i#ippine "ai#;ay Co. v. Co##ector of /nterna# "even%e PR& was granted a legislati!e franchise to operate a railway line pursuant to Act 5o$ *9+ %ec$ *which read BIn consideration of the premises and of the operation of this concession or franchise, there shall be paid by the grantee to the Philippine Ko!ernment, annually, an amount e.ual to one3half of one per centum of the gross earnings of the grantee $C %ec :7+ of Internal Re!enue &ode, as amended by RA -+, pro!ides that Bthere shall be collected in respect to all eisting and future franchises, upon the gross earnings or receipts from the business co!ered by the law granting a franchise ta of 7N of such taes, charges, and percentages as are specified in the special charters of the corporation upon whom suc franchises are conferred, whiche!er is higher, unless the pro!isions hereof preclude the imposition of a higher ta $
Issue whether %ection :7+ of the 4a &ode has repealed %ection *- of Act *9+, stand upon a different footing from general laws$ Once granted, a charter becomes a pri!ate contract and cannot be altered nor amended ecept by consent of all concerned, unless the right to alter or repeal is epressly reser!ed$ Reason the legislature, in passing a special charter, has its attention directed to the special facts and circumstances in the particular case in granting a special charter, for it will not be considered that the legislature, by adopting a general law containing the pro!isions repugnant to the pro!isions of the charter, and without any mention of its intention to amend or modify the charter, intended to amend, repeal or modify the special act$ 4he purpose of respecting the ta rates incorporated in the charters, as shown by the clause$
Sto. Domingo v. De#os Ange#es 4he &i!il %er!ice law on the procedure for the suspension or remo!al of ci!il ser!ice employees does not apply with respect to the suspension or remo!al of members of the local police force$ ♥
Ghen special or general law repeals the other$ 4here is always a partial repeal where the later act is a special law$
2a#era v. T%ason A subse.uent general law on a sub2ect has repealed or amended a prior special act on the same sub2ect by implication is a .uestion of legislati!e intent$ Intent to repeal may be shown in the act itself the eplanatory note to the bill before its passage into law, the discussions on the floor of the legislature,
LLDA v. CA
Issue which agency of the go!ernment, LLDA or the towns and municipalities compromising the region should eercise 2urisdiction o!er the Laguna La1e and its en!irons insofar as the issuance of permits for fishery pri!ileges is concerned$ 4he LLDA statute specifically pro!ides that the LLDA shall ha!e eclusi!e 2urisdiction to issue permits for the use of all surface water for any pro2ects in or affecting the said region, including the operation of fish pens$ RA *86 the LK& of *++* grants the municipalities the eclusi!e authority to grant fishery pri!ileges in municipal waters$ @eld two laws should be harmonied, and that the LLA statute, being a special law, must be ta1en as an eception to RA *86 a general law, ,arcia v. Pasc%a# &ler1s of courts municipal courts shall be appointed by the municipal 2udge at the epense of the municipality and where a later law was enacted pro!iding that employees whose salaries are paid out of the municipal funds shall be appointed by the municipal mayor, the later law cannot be said to ha!e repealed the prior law as to !est in the municipal mayor the power to appoint municipal clec1 of court, as the subse.uent law should be construed to comprehend only subordinate officials of the municipality and not those of the 2udiciary$ ,ordon v. CA A city charter gi!ing real estate owner a period of one year within which to redeem a property sold by the city for nonpayment of realty ta from the date of such auction sale, being a special law, pre!ails o!er a general law granting landowners a period of two years to ma1e the redemption$
Intent to repeal the earlier special law where the later general act pro!ides that all laws or parts thereof which are inconsistent therewith are repealed or modified accordingly If the intention to repeal the special law is clear, then the rule that the special law will be considered as an eception to the general law does not applyH what applies is the rule that the special law is deemed impliedly repealed$ A general law cannot be construed to ha!e repealed a special law by mere implication admits of eception$ City ,overnment of San Pab#o v. "eyes %ec$ * PD 77* pro!ides that any pro!ision of law or local ordinance to the contrary, the franchise ta payable by all grantees of franchise to generate, distribute, and sell electric current for light, heat, and power shall be :7 of their gross receipts$ %ec$ *- of the LK& states 5otwithstanding any eemption granted by any law or other special law, the pro!ince may impose a ta on business en2oying a franchise at a rate not eceeding 76N of *N of the gross annul receipts$ @eld the phrase is all3encompassing and clear that the legislature intended to withdraw all ta eemptions en2oyed by franchise holders and this intent is made more manifest by %ec$ *+- of the &ode, when it pro!ides that unless otherwise pro!ided in this code ta eemptions or incenti!es granted to or presently en2oyed by all persons, ecept local water districts, cooperati!es, and non3 stoc1 and non3profit hospitals and educational institutions, are withdrawn upon the effecti!ity of the &ode$ ,aer#an v. Cat%big Issue whether %ec$ *: of RA *6 as amended, the &ity &harter of Dagupan &ity, which fied the minimum age .ualification for members of the
city council at :- years has been repealed by %ec$8 of RA ::7+ @eld there was an implied repeal of %ec$ *: of the charter of Dagupan &ity because the legislati!e intent to repeal the charter pro!ision is clear from the fact that Dagupan &ity, unli1e some cities, is not one of those cities epressly ecluded by the law from its operation and from the circumstance that it pro!ides that all acts or parts thereof which are inconsistent therewith are repealed$ 4he last statute is so broad in its terms and so clear and eplicit in its words so as to show that it was intended to co!er the whole sub2ect and therefore to displace the prior statute$
other source of prestation in!ol!ing a local go!ernment unit shall be go!erned by the original terms and conditions of said contracts or the law in force at the time such rights were !ested$ ♥
On 2urisdiction, generally 5either the repeal nor the eplanation of the law depri!es the court or administrati!e tribunal of the authority to act on the pending action and to finally decide it$ Keneral rule where a court or tribunal has already ac.uired and is eercising 2urisdiction o!er a contro!ersy, its 2urisdiction to proceed to final determination of the cause is not affected by the new legislation repealing the statute which originally conferred 2urisidiction$ Rule once the court ac.uires 2urisdiction o!er a contro!ersy, it shall continue to eercise such 2urisdiction until the final determination of the case and it is not affected by subse.uent legislation !esting 2urisdiction o!er such proceedings in another tribunal admits of eceptions$ Repeal or epiration of a statute under which a court or tribunal originally ac.uired 2urisdiction to try and decide a case, does not ma1e its decision subse.uently rendered thereon null and !oid for want of authority, unless otherwise pro!ided$ In the absence of a legislati!e intent to the contrary, the epiration or repeal of a statute does not render legal what, under the old law, is an illegal transaction, so as to depri!e the court or tribunal the court or tribunal of the authority to act on a case in!ol!ing such illegal transaction$ Ghere a law declares certain importations to be illegal, sub2ect to forfeiture by the &ommissioner of &ustoms pursuant to what the latter initiated forfeiture proceedings, the epiration of the law during the pendency of the proceedings does not di!est the &ommissioner of &ustoms of the 2urisdiction to continue to resol!e the case, nor does it ha!e the effect of ma1ing the illegal importation legal or of setting aside the decision of the commissioner on the matter$
♥
On 2urisdiction to try criminal case Once a 2urisdiction to try a criminal case is ac.uired, that 2urisdiction remains with the court until the case is finally determined$ A subse.uent statute amending or repealing a prior act under which the court ac.uired 2urisdiction o!er the case with the effect of remo!ing the courts 2urisdiction may not operate to oust 2urisdiction that has already attached$
♥
On actions, pending or otherwise Rule repeal of a statute defeats all actions and proceedings, including those, which are still pending, which arose out of or are based on said statute$ 4he court must conform its decision to the law then eisting and may, therefore, re!erse a 2udgment which was correct when pronounced in the subordinate tribunal, if it appears that pending appeal a statute
agatsing v. "amire' A charter of a city, which is a special law, may be impliedly modified or superseded by a later statute, and where a statute is controlling, it must be read into the charter, notwithstanding any of its particular pro!isions$ A subse.uent general law similarly applicable to all cities pre!ails o!er any conflicting charter pro!ision, for the reason that a charter must not be inconsistent with the general laws and public policy of the state$ %tatute remains supreme in all matters not purely local$ A charter must yield to the constitution and general laws of the state$
P*i#ippine /nternationa# Trading Corp v. CoA &oA contended that the PI4& charter had been impliedly repealed by the %ec$ *8 RA 87; @eld that there was implied repeal, the legislati!e intent to do so being manifest$ PI4& should now be considered as co!ered by laws prescribing a compensation and position classification system in the go!ernment including RA 87;$ ♥
Effects of repeal, generally Appeal of a statute renders it inoperati!e as of the date the repealing act ta1es effect$ Repeal is by no means e.ui!alent to a declaration that the repealed statute is in!alid from the date of its enactment$ 4he repeal of a law does not undo the conse.uences of the operation of the statute while in force, unless such result is directed by epress language or by necessary implication, ecept as it may affect rights which become !ested when the repealed act was in force$
"amos v. M%nicipa#ity of Daet 'P -- 1nown as the LK& was repealed by RA *86 1nown as LK& of *++*, which too1 effect on #anuary *, *++:$ %ec$ 7 (d" of the new code pro!ides that rights and obligations eisting on the date of the effecti!ity of the new code and arising out of contracts or any
which was necessary to support the 2udgment of the lower court has been withdrawn by an absolute repeal$ ♥
On !ested rights repeal of a statute does not destroy or impair rights that accrued and became !ested under the statute before its repeal$ 4he statute should not be construed so as to affect the rights which ha!e !ested under the old law then in force, or as re.uiring the abatement of actions instituted for the enforcement of such rights$ Rights accrued and !ested while a statute is in force ordinarily sur!i!e its repeal$ 4he constitution forbids the state from impairing, by enactment or repeal of a law, !ested rights or the obligations of contract, ecept in the legitimate eercise of police power$
%yco v. P+ Ghere a statute gi!es holders of bac1pay certificates the right to use said certificates to pay their obligations to go!ernment financial institutions, the repeal of the law disallowing such payment will not depri!e holders thereof whose rights become !ested under the old law of the right to use the certificates to pay their obligations to such financial institutions$
%imultaneous repeal and reenactment of a statute does not affect the rights and liabilities which ha!e accrued under the original statute, since the reenactment neutralies the repeal and continues the law in force without interruption$ 4he repeal of a penal law, under which a person is charged with !iolation thereof and its simultaneous reenactment penaliing the same act done by him under the old law, will not preclude the accuseds prosecution, nor depri!e the court of the 2urisdiction to try and con!ict him$ Peop#e v. A#m%ete Ghere the reenactment of the repealed law is not simultaneous such that the continuity of the obligation and the sanction for its !iolation form the repealed law to the reenacted law is bro1en, the repeal carries with it the depri!ation of the court of its authority to try, con!ict, and sentence the person charged with !iolation of the old law to its repeal$ ♥
Effect of repeal of penal laws Ghere the repeal is absolute, so that the crime no longer eists, prosecution of the person charged under the old law cannot be had and the action should be dismissed$ Ghere the repeal of a penal law is total and absolute and the act which was penalied by a prior law ceases to be criminal under the new law, the pre!ious offense is obliterated$ 4hat a total repeal depri!es the courts of 2urisdiction to try, con!ict, and sentence, persons, charged with !iolations of the old law prior to the repeal$ Repeal of a statute which pro!ides an indispensable element in the commission of a crime as defined in the RP& li1ewise operates to depri!e the court of the authority to decide the case, rule rests on the same principle as that concerning the effect of a repeal of a penal law without .ualification$ Reason the repeal of a penal law without dis.ualification is a legislati!e act of rendering legal what is pre!iously decreed as illegal, so that the person who committed it is as if he ne!er committed an offence Eception where the repealing act reenacts the statute and penalies the same act pre!iously penalied under the repealed law, the act committed before reenactment continues to be a crime, and pending cases are not thereby affected$ Ghere the repealing act contains a sa!ing clause pro!iding that pending actions shall not be affected, the latter will continue to be prosecuted in accordance with the old law$
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Distinction as to effect of repeal and epiration of law In absolute repeal, the crime is obliterated and the stigma of con!iction of an accused for !iolation of the penal law before its repeal is erased$
1n Pak Le%ng v. +igorra A statute gi!es an appellant the right to appeal from an ad!erse decision, the repeal of such statute after an appellant has already perfected his appeal will not destroy his right to prosecute the appeal not depri!e the appellate court of the authority to decide the appealed case$ "ep%b#ic v. Migrino Issue whether prosecution for uneplained wealth under RA *-+ has already prescribed$ @eld Bin his pleadings, pri!ate respondent contends that he may no longer be prosecuted because of the prescription$ It must be pointed out that %ec$ : RA *-+ should be deemed amended or repealed by Art$ I, %ec$ *7 of the *+; &onstitution$ ♥
On contracts Ghere a contract is entered into by the parties on the basis of the law then obtaining, the repeal or amendment of said law will not affect the terms of the contract nor impair the right of the parties thereunder$
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Effect of repeal of ta laws Rule fa!oring a prospecti!e construction of statutes is applicable to statutes which repeal ta laws$ %uch statute is not made retroacti!e, a ta assessed before the repeal is collectible afterwards according to the law in force when the assessment or le!y was made$
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Effect of repeal and reenactment
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Effect of repeal of municipal charter 4he repeal of a charter destroys all offices under it, and puts an end to the functions of the incumbents$ 4he con!ersation of a municipality into a city by the passage of a charter or a statute to that effect has the effect of abolishing all municipal offices then eisting under the old municipality offices then the eisting under the old municipality, sa!e those ecepted in the charter itself$
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&onstitution construed as enduring for ages • &onstitution is not merely for a few years but it also needs to endure through a long lapse of ages •
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Repeal or nullity of repealing law, effect of Ghen a law which epressly repeals a prior law is itself repealed, the law first repealed shall not thereby re!i!ed unless epressly so pro!ided Ghere a repealing statute is declared unconstitutional, it will ha!e no effect of repealing the former statute, the former or old statute continues to remain in force$
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CHAPTER ELEVEN: Const!tut!ona' Construt!on
&onstitution defined fundamental law which sets up a form of go!ernment • and defines and delimits the powers thereof and those of its officers, reser!ing to the people themsel!es plenary so!ereignty written charter enacted and adopted by the people by • which a go!ernment for them is established permanent in nature thus it does not only apply to • eisting conditions but also to future needs basically it is the fundamental laws for the go!ernance • and administration of a nation absolute and unalterable ecept by amendments • • all other laws are epected to conform to it Origin and history of the Philippine &onstitutions *+-7 &onstitution • Peop#e v. Linsangan 0 eplained as to how this &onstitution came about 4ydings3)cduffie Law3 allowed the /ilipinos to adopt • a constitutions but sub2ect to the conditions prescribed in the Act$ Re.uired - steps o drafting and appro!al of the constitution must be authoried it must be certified by the President of the F% it must be ratified by the people of the Philippines at a plebiscite *+- &onstitution • o adopted in response to popular clamor to meat the problems of the country )arch *8, *+8 &ongress passed Resolution o 5o$:, which was amended by Resolution 5o$ 9, calling a con!ention to propose amendments to the &onstitution • *+; &onstitution after ED%A Re!olution o also 1nown as the *+; &harter o Primary purpose of constitutional construction
primary tas1 of constitutional construction is to ascertain the intent or purpose of the framers of the constitution as epressed in its language purpose of our &onstitution to protect and enhance the peoples interests
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WHY/ 'ecause it go!erns the life of the people not only at the time of its framing but far into the indefinite future it must be adaptable to !arious crisis of human affairs but it must also be solid permanent and substantial Its stability protects the rights, liberty, and property of the people (rich or poor" It must be construed as a dynamic process intended to stand for a great length of time to be progressi!e and not static Ghat it is 5O4 It should 5O4 change with emergencies or o conditions o It should 5O4 be infleible It should 5O4 be interpreted narrowly o Gords employed should not be construed to yield fied and rigid answers because its meaning is applied to meet new or changed conditions as they arise &ourts should construe the constitution so that it would be consistent with reason, 2ustice and the public interest
@ow language of constitution construed • primary source in order to ascertain the constitution is the LA5KFAKE itself • 4he words that are used are broad because it aims to co!er all contingencies Gords must be understood in their common or • ordinary meaning ecept when technical terms are employee G@M 'ecause the fundamental law if o essentially a document of the people • Do not construe the constitution in such a way that its meaning would change • Ghat if the words used ha!e both general and restricted meaning Rule general pre!ails o!er the restricted unless the • contrary is indicated$ Ordi##o v. COMELEC Issue whether the sole pro!ince of Ifugao can be • !alidly constituted in the &ordillera Autonomous Region under %ection *7, Article *6 • @eld 5o$ the 1eywords pro!inces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas connotes that a region consists of more than one unit$ In its ordinary sense region means two or more pro!inces, thus Ifugao cannot be constituted the &ordillera Autonomous Region Marcos v. C*ief of Staff
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Issues the meaning or scope of the words any court in %ection * Article * of the *+-7 &onstitution Gho are included under the terms inferior o court in section : Article @eld %ection * of Article * prohibits any members of the &ongress from appearing as counsel in any criminal case $ 4his is not limited to ci!il but also to a military court or court martial since the latter is also a court of law and 2ustice as is any ci!il tribunal$ Inferior courts are meant to be construed in its restricted sense and accordingly do not include court martials or military courts for they are agencies of eecuti!e character and do not belong to the 2udicial branch unli1e the term inferior court is$
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Another RFLE words used in one part are to recei!e the same interpretation when used in other parts unless the contrary is applied=specified$
Lo'ada v COMELEC • the term B'atasang Pambansa,C which means the regular national assembly, found in many sections of the *+- &onstitution refers to the regular, not to the interim 'atasang Pambansa •
words which ha!e ac.uired a technical meaning before they are used in the constitution must be ta1en in that sense when such words as thus used are construed
Aids to construction, generally apart from its language courts may refer to the • following in construing the constitution history o proceedings of the con!ention o prior laws and 2udicial decisions o contemporaneous constructions o conse.uences of alternati!e interpret3tations o •
these aids are called etraneous aids because though their effect is not in precise rules their influence describes the essentials of the process (remember preamble ganito lang din yun"
Realities eisting at time of adoptionH ob2ect to be accomplished @istory basically helps in ma1ing one understand as to • how and why certain laws were incorporated into the constitution$ In construing constitutional law, the history must be • ta1en into consideration because there are certain considerations rooted in the historical bac1ground of the en!ironment at the time of its adoption (Legaspi !$ )inister of /inance" A$%ino v. COMELEC Issue what does the term Bincumbent president in sec$ • - of Article * of the *+- &onstitution refer to
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@eld @istory shows that at that time the term of President )arcos was to terminate on December -6, *+-, the new constitution was appro!ed on 5o!ember -6, *+: still during his incumbency and as being the only incumbent president at the time of the appro!al it 2ust means that the term incumbent president refers to )r$ )arcos #ustice Antonio concurring opinion states the only rational way to ascertain the meaning and intent is to read its language in connection with the 1nown conditions of affairs out of which the occasion for its adoption had arisen and then construe it$
/n re erm%de' incumbent president referred to in section 7 of Article • *; of the *+; constitution refers to incumbent President A.uino and >P Doy Laurel Civi# Liberties 1nion v. E)ec%tive Secretary • issue whether EO :;9, which authories a cabinet member, undersecretary and assistant secretary to hold not more than two positions in the go!ernment and KO&&s and to recei!e corresponding compensation therefore, !iolates %ec$ *-, Art$ of the *+; &onstitution • court eamined the history of the times, the conditions under which the constitutional pro!isions was framed and its ob2ect held before the adoption of the constitutional • pro!ision, Bthere was a proliferation of newly3created agencies, instrumentalities and KO&&s created by PDs and other modes of presidential issuances where &abinet members, their deputies or assistants were designated to head or sit as members of the board with the corresponding salaries, emoluments, per diems, allowances and other prere.uisites of office • since the e!ident purpose of the framers of the *+; &onstitution is to impose a stricter prohibition on the President, >ice President, members of the &abinet, their deputies and assistants with respect to holding multiple go!ernment offices or employment in the Ko!ernment during their tenure, the eception to this prohibition must be read with e.ual se!erity on its face, the language of %ec *- Art$ is prohibitory • so that it must be understood as intended to be a positi!e and une.ui!ocal negation of the pri!ilege of holding multiple go!ernment offices or employment Proceedings of the con!ention • RFLE If the language of the constitutional pro!ision is plain it is not necessary to resort to etrinsic aids E&EP4IO5 when the intent of the framer doesnt • appear in the tet or it has more than one construction$ Intent of a constitutional con!ention member doesnt • necessarily mean it is also the peoples intent 4he proceedings of the con!ention are usually in.uired • into because it sheds light into what the framers of the constitution had in mind at that time$ (refers to the debates, interpretations and opinions concerning particular pro!isions"
L%' Farms v. Secretary of DA" Ghether the term BagricultureC as used in the • &onstitution embraces raising li!estoc1, poultry and swine 4ranscript of the deliberations of the &onstitutional • &ommission of *+;8 on the meaning of BagricultureC clearly shows that it was ne!er the intention of the framers of the &onstitution to include li!estoc1 and poultry industry in the co!erage of the constitutionally3 mandated agrarian reform program of the Ko!ernment • Agricultural lands do not include commercial industrial, and residential lands @eld it is e!ident in the foregoing discussion that %ec • : of RA 887 which includes Bpri!ate agricultural lands de!oted to commercial li!estoc1, poultry and swine raisingC in the definition of Bcommercial farmsC is I5>ALID, to the etent of the aforecited agro3 industrial acti!ities are made to be co!ered by the agrarian reform program of the %tate Monte-o v. COMELEC Ghether the &O)ELE& has the power to transfer, by • resolution, one or more municipalities from one congressional district to another district within a pro!ince, pursuant to %ec : of the Ordinance appended to the *+; &onstitution 4he &ourt relied on the proceedings of the • &onstitutional &ommission on Bminor ad2ustmentsC which refers only to the instance where a municipality which has been forgotten (ano ba Tto1inalimutan ang municipality" is included in the enumeration of the composition of the congressional district and not to the transfer of one municipality from one district to another, which has been considered a substanti!e or ma2or ad2ustment &ontemporaneous construction and writings may be used to resol!e but not to create ambiguities • In construing statutes, contemporaneous construction • are entitled to great weight howe!er when it comes to the constitution it has no weight and will not be allowed to change in any way its meaning$ Gritings of delegates 0 has persuasi!e force but it • depends on two things if opinions are based on fact 1nown to them o and not established it is immaterial on legal hermeneutics, their conclusions may o not be a shade better in the eyes of the law$
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,a#man v. Pamaran the phraseC no person shall be compelled in a • criminal case be a witness against himselfC is changed in such a way the words criminal cases had been deleted simply means that it is not limited to criminal cases only$ &onse.uences of alternati!e constructions conse.uences that may follow from alternati!e • construction of doubtful constitutional pro!isions constitute an important factor to consider in construing them$ if a pro!ision has more than one interpretation, that • construction which would lead to absurd, impossible or mischie!ous conse.uences must be re2ected$ e$g$ directory and mandatory interpretation Art$ ; %ec • *7(*" re.uires 2udges to render decision within specific periods from date of submission for decision of cases (construed as directory because if otherwise it will cause greater in2ury to the public" &onstitution construed as a whole pro!ision should not be construed separately from the • rest it should be interpreted as a whole and be harmonied with conflicting pro!isions so as to gi!e them all force and effect$ sections in the constitution with a particular sub2ect • should be interpreted together to effectuate the whole purpose of the &onstitution$ To#entino v. Secretary of Finance • >A4 Law, passage of bill • in!ol!ed are article 8 %ec$ :9 and RA *8 (>A4 Law" • contention of the petitioner RA *8 did not originate eclusi!ely from the @OR as re.uired by the &onstitution because it is the result of the consolidation of two distinct bills$ •
Pre!ious laws and 2udicial rulings framers of the constitution is presumed to be aware of • pre!ailing 2udicial doctrines concerning the sub2ect of constitutional pro!isions$ 4@F% when courts adopt principles different from prior decisions it is presumed that they did so to o!errule said principle &hanges in phraseology 'efore a constitution is ratified it undergoes a lot of • re!isions and changes in phraseology (e$ deletion of words" and these changes may be in.uired into to
ascertain the intent or purpose of the pro!ision as appro!ed @OGE>ER mere deletion, as negati!e guides, cannot pre!ail o!er the positi!e pro!isions nor is it determinati!e of any conclusion$ &ertain pro!isions in our constitution (from *+-7 to the present" are mere reenactments of prior constitutions thus these changes may indicate an intent to modify or change the meaning of the old pro!isions$
&ourt re2ected such interpretation$ (guys alam niyo na naman to, that it should originate from @OR but it could still be modified by the %enate"
)andatory or directory • RFLE constitutional pro!isions are to be construed as mandatory unless a different intention is manifested$ • Ghy 'ecause in a constitution, the so!ereign itself spea1s and is laying down rules which for the time
