STA STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CONSTRUCT ION REVIEWER to include subect matter or territory which was not included therein as enacted, such excision is 0udicial legislation1 and not 0statutory construction1.
University of Sto. Tomas Tomas Faculty of Civil Law Reviewer in Statutory Construction By : Kylie Power Notes
Chater ! " Preliminary Consi#erations Statutory Construction$ %efine# a. &Blac' &Blac'(s (s Const Construc ructio tion n an# !nter !nterre retat tation ion)) • Art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful, among others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law. *. &+us &+usti tice ce ,art ,artin in)) • Art of seeking the intention of the legislature in enacting a statute and applying it to a given state of facts. Calte- v Palomar
-
Calte Caltex x annou announce nced d a Calte Caltex x Hood Hooded ed Pump Pump Contes Contestt Calte Caltex x sough soughtt help help from from Phil Philipp ippine ine Postal Postal ffice ffice !nri !nrico co Palo Paloma mar" r"Po Post st mast master er## denie denied d the re$ue re$uest st due due to that it is a violation to the postal law Calte Caltex x invok invokes es that that their their cont contest est is not a lott lottery ery %ssue & '.
whethe whetherr or not Caltex Caltex(s (s peti petitio tion n for declar declarato atory ry relief proper ). whet whethe herr or not not the Cal Caltex tex cont conteest is a gift ift enterprise and*or lottery Held & '.
).
+es +es , the the petitio petition n is proper proper.. Constr Constructi uction on of a law is in order what is in issue is an in$uiry , into the intended meaning of the words used in a certain law o, the the contes contestt is not a lotte lottery ry,, the conte contenti ntion on of Calt Caltex ex is well well take taken. n. %t is not not also also a gift gift enterprise
!nterretation &Blac'(s Construction an# !nterretation) • Art or process of discovering and expounding on the intended signification of the language used, that is, the meaning which the authors of the law designed to convey to others. Construction an# !nterretation$ %istin/uishe# Construction
!nterretation
Drawing of conclusions with respect to subjects that are beyond the direct expression of the text from elements known and given in the text.
Process of discovering the true meaning of the language used.
Goes beyond the language of the statute and seeks the assistance of extrinsic aids in order to determine whether given case falls within the statute.
Ascertain the meaning of a word found in a statute, may reveal a meaning different from that apparent word is considered abstractly or when given its usual meaning.
Drawing of conclusions, respecting subjects that lie beyond the direct expression of the text, from elements known from and given in the text conclusion which are in the spirit, though not within the letter, of the text. !Dr."ieber !Dr."ieber##
Art in finding out the true sense of any form of words, that is, the sense which their author intended to convey, and of enabling others to derive from them the same idea which the author intended to convey !Dr."ieber#
A u#icial function is re$uired when a statute is invoked and different interpretations interpretations are in contention. iff iffer eren ence ce betw betwee een n construction&
udi udici cial al
legi legisl slat atio ion n
and and
stat statut utor ory y
/here legislature attempts attempts to do several several things one which is invalid, it may be discarded if the remainder of the act is workable and in no way depends upon the invalid portion, but if that portion is an integral part of the act, and its excision changes the manifest intent of the act by broadening its scope 1
MAKASIAR Notes
STA STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CONSTRUCT ION REVIEWER - %t is based on the principle that once a $uestion of law has been examined and decided it should be deemed, settled and closed further argument "2ing v 3ele5 2ing# Situs of Construction an# !nterretation 2he purpose of construction and interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent. Le/islative
0-ecutive
+u#iciary
$ongress of the Philippines !%enate and &ouse of the 'epresentatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.#
President of the Philippines.
(ne %upreme $ourt and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Article )*, %ec. +, Philippine $onstitution
Article )**, %ec. +, Philippine $onstitution
akes the law
-xecutes the law
- %t is the doctrine that, when court has once laid down a principle, and apply it to all future cases, where facts are substantially the same, regardless of whether the parties and properties are the same. Stare %ecisis. 6ollow past precedents precedents and do not disturb disturb what has been settled. 7atters already decided decided on the merits cannot cannot be relitigated again and again. !Stare decisis et non "uieta movere# "follow movere# "follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled. ) kinds of 4tare ecisis •
•
Article )***, %ec. +, Philippine $onstitution *nterprets the law
2he situs of construction and interpretation of written laws belong to the udicial department. department. 2hus under the principle principle of checks and balances, courts may declare legislative measures or executive acts unconstitutional. unconstitutional.
1ertical 8 deals with the duty of lower courts to apply the decisions of the higher courts to cases involving the same facts. 2ori3ontal 8 re$uires that high courts must follow its own precedents a. Constitutional 8 involves udicial interpretations of statutes b. Statutory- involves interpretation of statutes
9easons why courts apply stare decisis
- !conomical - :udicial stability 8 to not diminish the respect for the courts
4tare decisis from foreign countries 8 not accepted
Article 3%%, 4ec. ', Philippine Constitution& The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to to settle actual controversies controversies involving rights rights which are are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the overnment.
!xemption 8 from the country * law where we adopted some of our present laws /hen to apply stare decisis- when similar on critical "substantial similarity# Critical facts- anything that is similar on material facts of the case biter dicta 8 not needed 9atio decidendi 8 relevant to the issues
Stare %ecisis " enoins adherence by the lower courts to doctrinal rules established by the lower courts in its final decision
4$uarely applicable 8 almost all angles of ) cases are the same
2
MAKASIAR Notes
STA STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CONSTRUCT ION REVIEWER - %t is based on the principle that once a $uestion of law has been examined and decided it should be deemed, settled and closed further argument "2ing v 3ele5 2ing# Situs of Construction an# !nterretation 2he purpose of construction and interpretation is to ascertain and give effect to the legislative intent. Le/islative
0-ecutive
+u#iciary
$ongress of the Philippines !%enate and &ouse of the 'epresentatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.#
President of the Philippines.
(ne %upreme $ourt and in such lower courts as may be established by law.
Article )*, %ec. +, Philippine $onstitution
Article )**, %ec. +, Philippine $onstitution
akes the law
-xecutes the law
- %t is the doctrine that, when court has once laid down a principle, and apply it to all future cases, where facts are substantially the same, regardless of whether the parties and properties are the same. Stare %ecisis. 6ollow past precedents precedents and do not disturb disturb what has been settled. 7atters already decided decided on the merits cannot cannot be relitigated again and again. !Stare decisis et non "uieta movere# "follow movere# "follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled. ) kinds of 4tare ecisis •
•
Article )***, %ec. +, Philippine $onstitution *nterprets the law
2he situs of construction and interpretation of written laws belong to the udicial department. department. 2hus under the principle principle of checks and balances, courts may declare legislative measures or executive acts unconstitutional. unconstitutional.
1ertical 8 deals with the duty of lower courts to apply the decisions of the higher courts to cases involving the same facts. 2ori3ontal 8 re$uires that high courts must follow its own precedents a. Constitutional 8 involves udicial interpretations of statutes b. Statutory- involves interpretation of statutes
9easons why courts apply stare decisis
- !conomical - :udicial stability 8 to not diminish the respect for the courts
4tare decisis from foreign countries 8 not accepted
Article 3%%, 4ec. ', Philippine Constitution& The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by law. Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to to settle actual controversies controversies involving rights rights which are are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the overnment.
!xemption 8 from the country * law where we adopted some of our present laws /hen to apply stare decisis- when similar on critical "substantial similarity# Critical facts- anything that is similar on material facts of the case biter dicta 8 not needed 9atio decidendi 8 relevant to the issues
Stare %ecisis " enoins adherence by the lower courts to doctrinal rules established by the lower courts in its final decision
4$uarely applicable 8 almost all angles of ) cases are the same
2
MAKASIAR Notes
STA STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION CONSTRUCT ION REVIEWER
:udicial ;egislation the prohibition against against udicial legislation is rooted on the doctrine of separation of powers which under this doctrine, doctrine, legislation legislation is only vested on the congress , execution is vested on the executive and interpretation and*or application is vested on the udiciary
Held & +es, 2here is a hiatus in the law and the rules of court. 2he purpose of e$uity urisdiction in this case is to prevent unust enrichment of 9e yes at the expense of ;im
•
•
transgender, filed a petition for - 9ommel 4ilverio , a transgender, change of name and sex"gender# %ssue & /hether or not the petitioner(s essential claim to change his name and gender in his birth certificate allowed by the law Held & o '.
Change Change of name name is prima primari rily ly admin administ istrat rative ive in nature ).
?@ =>?@ , name name need to be ridiculous or habitually used . o law law allows allows the the chang changee of entry entry in in the birt birth h certificate as to sex on the ground of sex reassignments - /ill shatter the census( records Reu*lic v. 4r*eci#o B& %s there udicial legislation applied in this case A& +es , 2he court read something that is not there, when you expand the meaning of the law , then its udicial legislation legislation 2he ruling is to be applied only for mixed marriages 2he courts could have ust used other reasons Reyes v Lim
- 9eyes and ;im had an agreement to sell - Php '> 7 was paid by ;im as a down payment for the property - 9eyes sold the property to ;ine ne 6ood Corporation %ssue& /hether or not e$uity urisdiction be applicable
•
Policy arguments- arguments that arise from conse$uences
Provisional remedies 8 given on pending litigations '. ). . ?. D.
Prel Prelim imin inar ary y att attac achm hmen entt Prelimin Preliminary ary inunc inunction tion 8 prohibi prohibits ts the the action action of the the defendant 9eplevin 9eceivership 4upport
- Provisional remedies are given to prevent paper udgment that may may happen
2he 4upreme Court is the one and only Constitutional Court and all other lower courts are statutory courts or one established by statute. evertheless, the 4upreme Court and such lower courts have the power to construe and interpret written laws. uty of the Courts to Construe and %nterpret the ;awE 9e$uisites "CA# '. ).
2here 2here must must be an actual actual case case or or controversy. 2here is ambiguity in the law involved in the controversy. Ambiguity 8 doubtfulness, doubleness of meaning, duplicity, indistinctiveness, indistinctiveness, or uncertainty of meaning of an expression used in a written instrument. Ambiguity exists if reasonable persons can find different meanings in a statute, document, etc. 2he first kind of ambiguity is verbal ambiguity. ambiguity. %n verbal ambiguity there is a $uestion on the definition of the word. A sample of which is the word 0love1. 2he second type of ambiguity is grammatical or syntactic ambiguity. ambiguity. %n this case ambiguity results from the structuring of words and usage of punctuations. A sample of which is in the phrase, 0 nly %, love you 0 1a/uene 1a/ueness ss 8 you know what it means but you cannot say what degree or to what extent
!x& tall, rich , probable cause 3
MAKASIAR Notes
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION REVIEWER
Ambigous words- not intentional 3ague words 8 intentional, a hint to construe or interpret easier Can the courts resort to statutory construction *ecause of va/ueness5
- +!4, it can , as long as the law is doubtful, it can fall under the statutory interpretations Construction and interpretation of law come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inade$uate without them. 6*ello vs C!R
- Petition for certiorari - Political or electoral contributions considered gift and are not subect to donor(s tax - ACC9A law firm contributed Php @@), FF'.' for Angara(s campaign funds %ssue& /hether or not the contribution is liable to donor(s tax Held & +es, %t is taxed , ;9C sec =' 8 donor(s tax 8 gift 9A G'FF has no retroactive effect
$erba %egis 8 2he duty of the court is to apply the law. /hen the law is clear and une$uivocal, the Court has no other alternative but to apply the law and not to interpret. &ura %ex Sed %ex ' 2he court cannot shy away from appl ying the law when no interpretation is needed no matter how harsh the law may be. /here the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation, or e0uivocation, there is room only for application.1 Peole of the Philiines 1s. ,ario ,aa 7 ,aulon/ 8R. L9;<=$ 6u/ust ;<$ =>?@ Ponente: F0RN6N%4$ +. 2A$3%4 Petitioner was found to be in violation of 4ection @G@ in connection with 4ection )F=) of the 9evised Administrative Code, as amended by Commonwealth Act o. DF and as further amended by 9epublic Act o. ?. Petitioner willfully and unlawfully have in his possession and under his custody and control one home-made revolver "Paltik#, Cal. )), without serial number, with six "F# rounds of ammunition, without first having secured the necessary license or permit therefor from
the corresponding authorities. 2he lower court rendered a decision convicting the accused of the crime of illegal possession of firearms 2he only $uestion being one of law, the appeal was taken to the 4upremeI Court. *%%5-4 /hether or not the appointment to and holding of the position of a secret agent to the provincial governor would constitute a sufficient defense to a prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearm and ammunition. &-"D4 . 2he udgment appealed from was affirmed. 'A3*(4 2he law "4ec. @G@ as amended b y 9epublic Act o. ?, 9evised Administrative Code# is explicit that except as thereafter specifically allowed& 0it shall be unlawful for any person to . . . possess any firearm, detached parts of firearms or ammunition therefor, or any instrument or implement used or intended to be used in the manufacture of firearms, parts of firearms, or ammunition.1 2he law cannot be any clearer. o provision was made for a secret agent. 2he first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. 0Construction and interpretation come only after it has been demonstrated that application is impossible or inade$uate without them.1 ";i5arraga Hermanos v. +ap 2ico, "'='# )? Phil. D>?, D'#. 2he conviction of the accused must stand. %t cannot be set aside. 3he duty of the $ourts is to apply the law disregarding their feeling of sympathy or pity for the accused.1 Peole of the Philiines vs Patricio 6mi/o 8R. ==?@=>$ +anuary =A$ =>>? 2acts4 Accused-Appellant Patricio Amigo was charged and convicted of murder by the regional trial court, avao City and was sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. *ssue4 /hether or not that the penalty or reclusion perpetua is too cruel and harsh and pleads for sympathy. &eld4 2he duty of court is to apply the law disregarding their feeling of sympathy or pity for the accused. Jura lex sed lexJ. %ifferent Kin#s of Construction an# !nterretation 2ermeneutics • 2he science or art of construction and interpretation. • 2he systematic body of rules which are recogni5ed as applicable to the construction and interpretation. Classification of the %ifferent Kin#s of !nterretation &%r. Lie*er) F00L9PC '. Free or unrestricted interpretation 8 proceeds simply on the general principles of interpretation in good faith, not bound by an y specific or superior principle. 4
MAKASIAR Notes
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION REVIEWER ).
.
?.
D.
F.
0xtensive interpretation 8 also called liberal interpretation, adopts a more comprehensive signification of the words. 0xtravagant interpretation 8 is that which substitutes a meaning evidently beyond the true one. %t is therefore not genuine interpretation. Limited or restricted interpretation - is when we are influenced by other principles than the strictly hermeneutic ones. Predestined interpretation 8 takes place if the interpreter, laboring under a strong bias of mind, makes the text subservient to his preconceived views and desires. 2his include artful interpretation by which the interpreter seeks to give a meaning to the text other than the one be knows to have been intended. Close interpretation 8 is adopted if ust reasons connected with the character and formation of the text induce as to take the words in their narrowest meaning. 2he specie of interpretation is also generally called 0literal.1
Chater !! " Statutes Le/islative Proce#ures Article 3%, 4ec. ', Philippine Constitution& The legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the (hilippines which shall consist of a Senate and a )ouse of *epresentatives, except to the extent reserved to the people by the provision on initiative and referendum.
'.
).
.
?.
D.
;egislative department of the government has the authority to make laws and to alter or repeal the same. •
Kill 8 draft of a proposed law from the time of its
•
introduction in a legislative body through all the various stages in both houses. raft 8 form of proposed law before it is enacted into law by a vote of the legislative body. Act 8 is the appropriate term for a bill after it has
•
•
•
been acted on and passed by the legislature. 4tatute 8 the written will of the legislature solemnly expressed according to the form necessary to constitute it as the law of the state. 4tatute ;aw 8 includes not only statutes but also the udicial interpretation and application of the enactment.
2ow a *ill *ecomes a Law " Stes &Father SB$ Pastor SS FR.S%9PTR.SS) " Base# on 6tty. %ellosa(s %iscussion
F.
G.
@.
First 9eading - Any member of either house may present a proposed bill, signed by him, for 6irst 9eading and reference to the proper committee. uring the 6irst 9eading, the principal author of the bill may propose the inclusion of additional authors thereof. R eferral to Appropriate Committee 8 %mmediately after the 6irst 9eading, the bill is referred to the proper committee*s for study and consideration. %f disapproved in the committee, the bill dies a natural death unless the House decides otherwise, following the submission of the report. Second 9eading 8 %f the committee reports the bill favorably, the bills is forwarded to the Committee on 9ules so that it may be calendared for deliberation on 4econd 9eading. At this stage, the bill is read for the second time in its entirely, together with the amendments, if any, proposed by the committee, unless the reading is dispensed with by a maority vote of the House. %ebates 8 A general debate is then opened after the 4econd 9eading and amendments may be proposed by any member of Congress. 2he insertion of changes or amendments shall be done in accordance with the rules of either House. 2he House may either 0kill1 or pass the bill. Printing and istribution 8 After approval of the bill on 4econd 9eading, the bill is then ordered printed in its final form and copies of it are distributed among the members of the House three da ys before its passage, except when the bill was certified by the President. A bill approved on 4econd 9eading shall be included in the calendar of bills for 2hird 9eading. Third 9eading 8 At this stage, only the title of the bill is read. Lpon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto is allowed and the vote thereon is taken immediately thereafter, and yeas and nays entered in the ournal. A member may abstain. As a rule, a maority of the members constituting a $uorum is sufficient to pass a bill. R eferral to ther House 8 %f approved, the bill is then referred to the other House where substantially the same procedure takes place. Submission to :oint Kicameral Committee 8 ifferences, if any, between the House(s bill and the 4enate(s amended version, and vice versa are submitted to a conference committee of members of both Houses for compromise. %f either House accepts the changes made by the other, no compromise is necessary. 5
MAKASIAR Notes
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION REVIEWER =.
Submission to the President 8 a bill approved on 2hird 9eading by both Houses shall be printed and forthwith transmitted to the President for his action 8 approval or disproval. %f the President does not communicate his veto of any bill to the House where it originated within > days from receipt thereof, it shall become a law as if he signed it. Kill repassed by Congress over the veto of the President automatically becomes a law.
Constitutional Test in the Passa/e of a Bill Mo ex post facto law or bill of attainder shall be enacted. 2hree very important constitutional re$uirements& "Art. 3%, 4ec )F and 4ec. )G 'I, '=@G Constitution# %. Article 3%, 4ection )F "'#, '=@G Constitution& +very bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof. 2he purposes of this constitutional re$uirements are& &2S6) '. 2o prevent hodge-podge or log-rolling legislationE ). 2o prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislatureE and . 2o fairly a pprise the people, through such publications of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subects of legislation that are being considered, in other that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire. %%. Article 3%, 4ection )F ")#, '=@G Constitution& o bill passed by either )ouse shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its -embers three days before its passage, except when the (resident certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. pon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in the Journal. !2hree-reading1 and 0o amendment1 rules %%%. Article 3%, 4ection )G "'#, '=@G Constitution& +very bill passed by the Congress shall, before it becomes a law, be presented to the (resident. /f he approves the same he shall sign it0 otherwise, he shall veto it and return the same with his objections to the )ouse where it originated, which shall enter the objections at large in its Journal and proceed to reconsider it. /f, after such
reconsideration, two1thirds of all the -embers of such )ouse shall agree to pass the bill, it shall be sent, together with the objections, to the other )ouse by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two1thirds of all the -embers of that )ouse, it shall become a law. /n all such cases, the votes of each )ouse shall be determined by yeas or nays, and the names of the -embers voting for or against shall be entered in its Journal. The (resident shall communicate his veto of any bill to the )ouse where it originated within thirty days after the date of receipt thereof, otherwise, it shall become a law as if he had signed it. Parts of Statute &TiP90Bo#9RSS0) '. Title 8 the title of a statute is the heading on the preliminary part, furnishing the name by which the act is individually known. ). Preamble 8 the part of a statute explaining the reasons for its enactment and the obects sought to be accomplishedE declaration by the legislature of the reasons for the passage of the statute and is helpful in the interpretation of any ambiguities within the statute to which it is prefixed. . 0nacting Clause 8 that part of the statute which declares its enactment and serves to identify it as an act of legislation proceeding from the proper legislative authority. ?. Bo#y 8 2he main and operative part of the statute containing its substantive and even procedural provisions. D. R epealing Clause 8 2hat part of the statute which announces the prior statutes or specifies provisions which have been abrogated by reason of the enactment of the new law. F. Saving Clause 8 A restriction in a repealing act, which is intended to save rights, pending proceedings, penalties, etc., from the annihilation which would result from an unrestricted repeal. G. Separability Clause 8 that part of the statute which provides that in the event the one or more provisions are declared void or unconstitutional, the remaining provisions shall still be in force. @. 0ffectivity clause 8 that part of the statute which announces the effective date of the law. Kin#s of Statute &8S9LPP9RPC9P6R,) '. 8eneral ;aw 8 affects the community at large. 2hat which affects all people of the state or all of a particular class. ). S pecial ;aw 8 designed for a particular purpose, or limited in range or confined to a prescribed field of action on operation. 6
MAKASIAR Notes
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION REVIEWER .
Local ;aw 8 relates or operates over a particular locality instead of over the whole territory of the state. ?. Public ;aw 8 a general classification of law, consisting generally of constitutional, administrative, criminal, and international law, concerned with the organi5ation of the state, the relations between the state and the people who compose it, the responsibilities of public officers of the state, to each other, and to private persons, and the relations of state to one another. Public law may be general, local or special law. D. Private ;aw 8 defines, regulates, enforces and administers relationships among individuals, associations and corporations. F. R emedial 4tatute 8 providing means or method whereby causes of action may be affectuated, wrongs redressed and relief obtained. G. Curative 4tatute 8 a form of retrospective legislation which reaches back into the past to operate upon past events, acts or transactions in order to correct errors and irregularities and to render valid and effective many attempted acts which would otherwise be ineffective for the purpose intended. @. Penal 4tatute 8 defines criminal offenses specify corresponding fines and punishments. =. Prospective ;aw 8 applicable only to cases which shall arise after its enactment. '>. R etrospective ;aw 8 looks backward or contemplates the pastE one which is made to affect acts or facts occurring, or rights occurring, before it came into force. ''. 6ffirmative 4tatute 8 directs the doing of an act, or declares what shall be done in contrast to a negative statute which is one that prohibits the things from being done, or declares what shall not be done. ''. ,andatory 4tatutes 8 generic term describing statutes which re$uire and not merely permit a course of action. Concet of 1a/ue Statute 4tatues or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards those men 0of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. 4tatute is repugnant to the Constitution in two ")# respects& &%u%is) '. %t violates #ue process for failure to accord persons fair notice of conduct to avoidE and ). %t leaves law enforcers unbridled #iscretions.
2he 4upreme Court held that the 0vagueness1 doctrine merely re$uires a reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld--- not absolute precision or mathematical exactitude. 6lexibility, rather than meticulous specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly delineated.
Reeals of Statute may *e 0-resse# or !mlie# • 0-ress reeal 8 is the abrogation or annulling of a previously existing law by the enactment of a subse$uent statute which declares that the former law shall be revoked and abrogated. •
!mlie# reeal 8 when a later statute contains provisions so contrary to irreconcilable with those of the earlier law that only one of the two statutes can stand in force.
The repeal of a penal law deprives the court of jurisdiction to punish persons charged with a violation of the old penal law prior to its repeal. 2nly a law can repeal a law. 3rticle 4 of the 6ew $ivil $ode of the Philippines provides "aws are repealed only by subse0uent ones, and their violation or non7observance shall not be excused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.1 2he intention to repeal must be clear and manifest, otherwise, at least, as a general rule, the later act is to be construed as a continuation of, and not a substitute for, the first act. •
• •
2wo ")# categories of repeal by implication& &CS) '.
/here provision in the two acts on the same subect matter are in an irreconcila*le conflictE ). %f the later act covers the whole su*ect of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute 8 to be a complete and perfect system in itself. 4r#inance rdinance 8 an act passed by the local legislative body in the exercise of its law-making authority.
Test of 1ali# 4r#inance &CU%9CUR) '. 7ust not contravene the Constitution or any statuteE ). 7ust not be unfair or oppressiveE . 7ust not be partial or #iscriminatoryE ?. 7ust not prohibit but may regulate tradeE D. 7ust be general and consistent with public policyE and F. 7ust not be unreasonable. Reason hy an 4r#inance shoul# not Contravene a Statute '. 7unicipal governments only exercise delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national law making body. ). 2he delegate cannot be superior to the principal. Role of Forei/n +urisru#ence Philippine laws must necessarily be construed in accordance with the intention of its own law makers and such intent may 7
MAKASIAR Notes
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION REVIEWER be deduced from the language of each law and the context of other local legislation related thereof.
. ?.
ote5 6oreign jurisprudence may only used for general reference, particularly when there is no applicable local jurisprudence.
D. F.
Chater !!! " Basic 8ui#elines in the Construction an# !nterretation of Laws Statutory 6nalysis 8 a process which allows you to approach the matter in a way that efficiently solves the problem in the least amount of time, with least confusion and with the greatest accuracy
4teps in 4tatutory Analysis '.
etermine whether the statute applies in any way - ;ocate all possible applicable statute - etermine which statutes apply ). Analy5e the statute - 9ead the statute " full text # - %dentify the statutory elements 8 what does the statute specifically declare, re$uire or prohibit - ;ist all the various conditions and exceptions . 2o apply the statute to the legal problem of issue - Chart format "mostly used# 8 can easily identify the elements of law and compare it with the facts cited by the client and meet with the re$uirements etc. - arrative format "paragraph form# Canon of construction 8 are not rules of law thus are instead general presumption about how legal the text should interpreted
- Are analogous to the rules of syntax like the rules governing word order in !nglish 4ources of plain meaning '. ).
;ay usage "layman(s term# ictionary definitions - rdinary words - 2echnical words "legal argons# . efinitional sections of statutes
hen not to aly lain meanin/ rule
'. ).
/hen it leads to absurdity " golden rule of construction# /hen it operates unustly
/hen it leads to unreasonable conse$uences Contradicts the evident meaning of the statute taken as a whole /hen the word has taken a technical meaning /hen the word is ambiguous or vague
Pa#ua v Peole
- Provisions of comprehensive drugs act - 2he accused is a minor from a plea of not guilty , the counsel advised the accused to plead guilty - After conviction 8 applied for probation - 2he plea was denied
Kaisanan n/ m/a man//a/awa v ,anila Rail roa#
- 2he union wants something more - %nvokes that law gives them priority "Napisanan# - %n conflict with the rules on concurrences and preferences on credits
Secretary of +ustice v Koru*a
- %n line with immigration act - 2he law governing on prohibited drugs - Applied the golden rule 8 deported Noruba hole act rule 8 in as much as the language of statute constitutes the dispository
- 9ead the whole context 0u#sem 8eneris
C%2%4 K!69! !:L4!7
8
MAKASIAR Notes
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION REVIEWER 2he particular and specific words constitute class or are of the same kind !numeration of the particular and specific words is not exhaustive or is not merely by examplesE o indication of legislative intent to give the general words or phrases a broader meaning.
6(%$*35' a %($**%4
/here a particular word or phrase is ambiguous in itself or is e$ually susceptible of various meanings, its correct construction may be made clear and specific by considering the company of words in which it is found or with it is associated.
-8P'-%%*( 56*5% -%3 -8$"5%*( A"3-'*5%4 2he express mention of one person, thing or conse$uence implies the exclusion of all others. Le/islative !ntent 2he obect of all interpretation and construction of statutes is to ascertain the meaning and intention of the legislature, to the end that the same may be enforced. "egislative intent is determined principally from the language of the statute.1 10RB6 L08!S %f the language of the statute is plain and free from ambiguity, and express a single, definite, and sensible meaning, that meaning is conclusively presumed to be the meaning which the legislature intended to convey. Plain eaning 'ule or )erba "egis1 8lo*e ,ac'ay Ca*le an# Ra#io Communications 1S. NLRC an# !mel#a Sala3ar 8R AD==$ ,arch ;$ =>> 6acts& %n 7ay '=@), private respondent was employed by
4ometime in '=@?, petitioner <7C9, prompted by reports that company e$uipment and spare parts worth thousands of dollars under the custody of 4aldivar were missing, caused the investigation of the latterOs activities. 2he report dated 4eptember )D, '=@? prepared by the companyOs internal auditor, 7r. Agustin 7aramara, indicated that 4aldivar had entered into a partnership styled Concave Commercial and %ndustrial Company with 9ichard
A. +ambao, owner and manager of !lecon !ngineering 4ervices "!lecon#, a supplier of petitioner often recommended by 4aldivar. 2he report also disclosed that 4aldivar had taken petitionerOs missing 6edders airconditioning unit for his own personal use without authori5ation and also connived with +ambao to defraud petitioner of its property. 2he airconditioner was recovered only after petitioner <7C9 filed an action for replevin against 4aldivar. %t likewise appeared in the course of 7aramaraOs investigation that %melda 4ala5ar violated company reglations by involving herself in transactions conflicting with the companyOs interests. !vidence showed that she signed as a witness to the articles of partnership between +ambao and 4aldivar. %t also appeared that she had full knowledge of the loss and whereabouts of the 6edders airconditioner but failed to inform her employer. Conse$uently, in a letter dated ctober @, '=@?, petitioner company placed private respondent 4ala5ar under preventive suspension for one "'# month, effective ctober =, '=@?, thus giving her thirty "># days within which to, explain her side. Kut instead of submitting an explanations three "# days later or on ctober '), '=@? private respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for illegal suspension, which she subse$uently amended to include illegal dismissal, vacation and sick leave benefits, 'th month pay and damages, after petitioner notified her in writing that effective ovember @, '=@?, she was considered dismissed Jin view of "her# inability to refute and disprove these findings 4ometime in '=@?, petitioner <7C9, prompted by reports that company e$uipment and spare parts worth thousands of dollars under the custody of 4aldivar were missing, caused the investigation of the latterOs activities. 2he report dated 4eptember )D, '=@? prepared by the companyOs internal auditor, 7r. Agustin 7aramara, indicated that 4aldivar had entered into a partnership styled Concave Commercial and %ndustrial Company with 9ichard A. +ambao, owner and manager of !lecon !ngineering 4ervices "!lecon#, a supplier of petitioner often recommended by 4aldivar. 2he report also disclosed that 4aldivar had taken petitionerOs missing 6edders airconditioning unit for his own personal use without authori5ation and also connived with +ambao to defraud petitioner of its property. 2he airconditioner was recovered only after petitioner <7C9 filed an action for replevin against 4aldivar. %t likewise appeared in the course of 7aramaraOs investigation that %melda 4ala5ar violated company reglations by involving herself in transactions conflicting with the companyOs interests. !vidence showed that she signed as a witness to the articles of partnership between +ambao and 4aldivar. %t also appeared that she had full knowledge of the loss and whereabouts of the 6edders airconditioner but failed to inform her employer. 9
MAKASIAR Notes
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION REVIEWER Conse$uently, in a letter dated ctober @, '=@?, petitioner company placed private respondent 4ala5ar under preventive suspension for one "'# month, effective ctober =, '=@?, thus giving her thirty "># days within which to, explain her side. Kut instead of submitting an explanations three "# days later or on ctober '), '=@? private respondent filed a complaint against petitioner for illegal suspension, which she subse$uently amended to include illegal dismissal, vacation and sick leave benefits, 'th month pay and damages, after petitioner notified her in writing that effective ovember @, '=@?, she was considered dismissed Jin view of "her# inability to refute and disprove these findings n appeal, public respondent ational ;abor 9elations, Commission in the $uestioned resolution dated ecember )=, '=@G affirmed the aforesaid decision with respect to the reinstatement of private respondent but limited the backwages to a period of two ")# years and deleted the award for moral damages. Hence, this petition assailing the ;abor 2ribunal for having committed grave abuse of discretion in holding that the suspension and subse$uent dismissal of private respondent were illegal and in ordering her reinstatement with two ")# yearsO backwages. Held& Art. )G= of the ;abor Code, as amended, provides& Security of Tenure. %n cases of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a ust cause or when authori5ed by this 2itle. 3n employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances, and to his other benefits or their monetary e$uivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. Corollary thereto are the following provisions of the %mplementing 9ules and 9egulations of the ;abor Code& 4ec. ). Security of Tenure. %n cases of regular employments, the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a ust cause as provided in the ;abor Code or when authori5ed by existing laws. 4ec. . *einstatement . 3n employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall by entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to backwages.J %n the case at bar, the law is on the side of private respondent. %n the first place the wording of the ;abor Code is clear and unambiguous& JAn employee who is unustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement. . . . and to his full backwages. . . .J Lnder the principlesof statutory construction, if a statute is clears plain and free from ambiguity, it must be
given its literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. 2his plain-meaning rule or verba legis derived from the maxim index animi sermo est "speech is the index of intention# rests on the valid presumption that the words employed by, the legislature in a statute correctly express its intent or will and preclude the court from construing it differently. 2he legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to&have used words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute. $erba legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure. either does the provision admit of any $ualification. %f in the wisdom of the Court, there may be a ground or grounds for non-application of the above-cited provision, this should be by way of exception, such as when the reinstatement may be inadmissible due to ensuing strained relations between the employer and the employee. NLRC Resolution 6ffirme# /hen the language of the law is clear, it should be given its natural meaning.1 Felicito Bas*acio 1s. 4ffice of the Secretary$ %eartment of +ustice 8R. =<>EED$ Novem*er @$ =>>E Ponente: ,0N%46$ 9. 2A$3%4
Petitioner 6elicito Kasbacio and his son-in-law, /ilfredo Kalderrama, were convicted of frustrated murder and of two counts of frustrated murder. Petitioner and his son-in-law were sentenced to imprisonment and ordered immediately detained after their bonds had been cancelled. Petitioner and his son-inlaw appealed. 2he Court of Appeals rendered a decision ac$uitting petitioner on the ground that the prosecution failed to prove conspiracy between him and his son-in-law. Kased on his ac$uittal, petitioner filed a claim under 9ep. Act o. G>=, 4ec. "a#, which provides for the payment of compensation to 0any person who was unustly accused, convicted, imprisoned but subse$uently released by virtue of a udgment of ac$uittal.12he claim was filed with the Koard of Claims of the epartment of :ustice, but the claim was denied on the ground that while petitioner(s presence at the scene of the killing was not sufficient to find him guilty beyond reasonable doubt, yet, considering that there was bad blood between him and the deceased as a result of a land dispute and the fact that the convicted murderer is his son-in-law, there was basis for finding that he was 0probably guilty.1 Petitioner brought this 10
MAKASIAR Notes
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION REVIEWER petition for review on certiorari as a special civil action under 9ule FD of the 9ules of Court. *%%5-4
/hether or not petitioner is entitled of the claim under 9.A. o. G>=. &-"D4
. Petitioner(s contention has no merit. 'A3*(4 )erba legis non est recedendum 8 from the words of a statute there should be no departure.
2o say then that an accused has been 0unustly convicted1 has to do with the manner of his conviction rather than with his innocence. An accused may on appeal be ac$uitted because he did not commit the crime, but that does not necessarily mean that he is entitled to compensation for having been the victim of an 0unust conviction.1 %f his conviction was due to an error in the appreciation of the evidence the conviction while erroneous is not unust. 2hat is why it is not, on the other hand, correct to say as does respondent, that under the law liability for compensation depends entirely on the innocence of the accused.
Statutes as a hole
A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that legislative intent must be ascertained from a consideration of the statute as a whole and not merely of a particular provision. A word or phrase might easily convey a meaning which is different from the one actually intended. A statute should be construed as a whole because it is not to be presumed that the legislature has used any useless words, and because it is dangerous practice to base the construction upon only a part of it, since one portion may be $ualified by other portions. *n interpreting a statute, care should be taken that every part be given effect.1
conse$uences, or would thwart or contravene the manifest purpose of the legislature in its enactment, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding or modifying, so far as may be necessary, the strict letter of the law. A construction that gives to the language used in a statute a meaning that does not accomplish the purpose for which the statute was enacted should be rejected.1 ,anuel T. %e 8uia 1s. C4,0L0C 8R. => Ponente: B0LL4S!LL4 9. 2A$3%4
CIongress passed 9.A. G'FF, signed into law by the President on ovember )F, '=='. %t is 0An Act Providing for 4ynchroni5ed ational and ;ocal !lections and for !lectoral 9eforms, Authori5ing Appropriations 2herefor, and for ther Purposes.1 9espondent Commission on !lections "C7!;!C# issued 9esolution o. )', adopting rules and guidelines in the apportionment, by district, of the number of elective members of the 4angguniang Panlalawigan in provinces with only one "'# legislative district and the 4angguniang Kayan of municipalities in the 7etro 7anila Area for the preparation of the Proect of istrict Apportionment by the Provincial !lection 4upervisors and !lection 9egistrars, 9esolution o. )G=, approving the Proect of istrict Apportionment submitted pursuant to 9esolution o. )', and 9esolution L. =)->'> holding that pars. "a#, "b# and "c#, and the first sentence of par. "d#, all of 4ec. , 9.A. G'FF, apply to the 7ay '', '==) elections. Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to C7!;!C in promulgating the aforementioned resolutions, and maintained that election of 4anggunian members be 0at large1 instead of 0by district1. *%%5-4
/hether or not the petitioner(s interpretation of 4ec. of 9.A. G'FF is correct in assailing the aforementioned C7!;!C 9esolutions. &-"D4
Sirit an# Purose of the Law. /hen the interpretation of a statute according to the exact and literal import of its words would lead to absurd or mischievous
. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit 11
MAKASIAR Notes
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION REVIEWER 'A3*(4 Sirit an# urose of the law 8 2he reason for the promulgation of 9.A. G'FF is shown in the explanatory note of 4enate Kill o. '@F', and that respondent C7!;!C is cogni5ant of its legislative intent.
o law is ever enacted that is intended to be meaningless, much less inutile. /e must therefore, as far as we can, divine its meaning, its significance, its reason for being. As it has oft been held, the key to open the door to what the legislature intended which is vaguely expressed in the language of a statute is its purpose or the reason which induced it to enact the statute.
Iefendant
2he true import of Par. "d# is that 4angguniang Panlungsod of the single-district cities and the 4angguniang Kayan of the municipalities outside 7etro 7anila, which remained singledistricts not having been ordered apportioned under 4ec. of 9.A. G'FF will have to continue to be elected at large in the 7ay '', '==), elections, although starting '==D they shall all be elected by district to effect the full implementation
:etween two statutory interpretations, that which better serves the purpose of the law should prevail.1 Casus 4missus /hen a statute makes specific provisions in regard to several enumerated cases or obects, but omits to make any provision for a case or obect which is analogous to those enumerated, or which stands upon the same reason, and is therefore within the general scope of the statute, and it appears that such case or obect was omitted by inadvertence or because it was overlooked or unforeseen, it is called a 0casus omissus1. 4uch omissions or defects cannot be supplied by the courts. 3he rule of ;casus omissus pro omisso habendus est< can operate and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly established.1
/hether or not a ustice of the peace was included in the prohibition of 4ection D? of the 9evised !lection Code.
&-"D4
+!4. 2he order of dismissal entered by the trial court should be set aside and this case was remanded for trial on the merits. 'A3*(4
2he application of the rule of casus omissus does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, obect or thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration. %n the present case, and for reasons already mentioned, there has been no such omission. 2here has only been a substitution of terms. n law reason and public policy, defendant-appellee(s contention that ustices of the peace are not covered by the inunction of 4ection D? must be reected. 2o accept it is to render ineffective a policy so clearly and emphatically laid down by the legislature.
Peole of the Philiines 1s. 8uillermo ,anantan 8R. L9=E=>$ +uly ;=$ =>? Ponente: R086L6$ 9. 2A$3%4
Although it was observed that both the Court of Appeals and the trial court applied the rule of 0expressio unius, est exclusion alterius1 in arriving at the conclusion that ustices of the peace are not covered by 4ection D?, the rule has no application. %f the legislature had intended to exclude a ustice of the peace from the purview of 4ection D?, neither the trial court nor the Court of Appeals has given the reason for the exclusion. %ndeed, there appears no reason for the alleged 12
MAKASIAR Notes
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION REVIEWER change. Hence, the rule of expressio unius est exclusion alterius has been erroneously applied.
. 2he trial court was directed to dismiss Civil Case @=? with preudice and without costs. 'A3*(4
2ollow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled. atters already decided on the merits cannot be relitigated again and again.1 +, Tuason an# Co. !NC.$ 0T 6L. 1s. 2on. 2erminio C. ,ariano$ ,anuel 6Guial$ ,aria 6Guial$ Souses +ose ,. Cor#ova an# Saturnina C. Cor#ova 8R. L9;;=E<$ 4cto*er ;$ =>@A Ponente: 6HU!N4$ 9. 2A$3%4
2he case began when 7anuela A$uial and 7aria A$uial filed a complaint in forma pauperis in the Court of 6irst %nstance of 9i5al Pasig Kranch Q, wherein they prayed that they be declared the owners of a parcel of land located at Kalara, 7arikina, 9i5al, docketed as Civil Case o. @=?. 2hey alleged that sometime in '=F>, or after :. 7. 2uason R Co., %nc. had illegally entered upon that land, they discovered that it had been fraudulently or erroneously included in C2 o. GD of the 9egistry of eeds of 9i5al. 2hey further alleged that transfer certificates of title, derived from C2 o. GD, were issued to :. 7. 2uason R Co., %nc., et.al. :.7. 2uason R Co., %nc. filed a motion to dismiss on the grounds of lack of urisdiction, improper venue, prescription, laches and prior udgment. 2he plaintiffs opposed that motion. 2he lower court denied it. 2he grounds of the motion to dismiss were pleaded as affirmative defenses in the answer of 2uason and :. 7. 2uason R Co., %nc. 2hey insisted that a preliminary hearing be held on those defenses. 2he 2uason and :. 7. 2uason R Co., %nc. filed the instant civil actions of certiorari and prohibition praying, inter alia, that the trial court be ordered to dismiss the complaint and enoined from proceeding in the said case, and a writ of preliminary injunction was issued. *%%5-4
/hether or not C2 o. GD and the titles derived therefrom can be $uestioned at this late hour by respondents A$uial and Cordova. &-"D4
Considering the governing principle of stare decisis et non 0uieta movere "follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled#, respondents A$uial and Cordova cannot maintain their action in Civil Case o. @=? without eroding the long settled holding of the courts that C2 o. GD is valid and no longer open to attack.%t is against public policy that matters already decided on the merits be relitigated again and again, consuming the court(s time and energies at the expense of other litigants.
8eneral an# Secial Terms • ?= Ponente: 8UT!0RR0 %61!%$ 9. 2A$3%4
2he petitioner Colgate-Palmolive Philippines imported from abroad various materials such as irish moss extract, sodium ben5oate, sodium saccharinate precipitated calcium carbonate and dicalcium phosphate, for use as stabili5ers and flavoring of the dental cream it manufactures. 6or every importation made of these materials, the petitioner paid to the Central Kank of the Philippines the 'GS special excise tax on the 13
MAKASIAR Notes
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION REVIEWER foreign exchange used for the payment of the cost, transportation and other charges incident thereto, pursuant to 9epublic Act o. F>', as amended, commonly known as the !xchange 2ax ;aw. 2he petitioner filed with the Central Kank three applications for refund of the 'GS special excise tax it had paid. 2he auditor of the Central Kank, refused to pass in audit its claims for refund fixed by the fficer-in-Charge of the !xchange 2ax Administration, on the theory that toothpaste stabili5ers and flavors are not exempt under section ) of the !xchange 2ax ;aw. Petitioner appealed to the Auditor
*%%5-4
number of articles that may be classified as food or food products, but it is likewise true that the other items immediately following it do not belong to the same classification. 2he rule of construction that general and unlimited terms are restrained and limited by particular recitals when used in connection with them, does not re$uire the reection of general terms entirely. %t is intended merely as an aid in ascertaining the intention of the legislature and is to be taken in connection with other rules of construction.
8eneral Terms Followin/ Secial Terms &0us#em 8eneris) %t is a general rule of statutory construction that where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same general kind or class as those specifically mentioned. Kut this rule must be discarded where the legislative intention is plain to the contrary.
/hether or not the foreign exchange used by petitioner for the importation of dental cream stabili5ers and flavors is exempt from the 'GS special excise tax imposed by the !xchange 2ax ;aw "9epublic Act o. F>'#.
2his rule is commonly called the 0ejusdem generis1 rule, because it teaches us that broad and comprehensive expressions in an act, such as 0and all others1, or 0any others1, are usually to be restricted to persons or things 0of the same kind1 or class with those specially named in the preceding words.
&-"D4
9ule of ejusdem generis merely a tool of statutory construction resorted to when legislative intent is uncertain.
+!4. 2he decision under review was reversed. 'A3*(4 General and special terms. 2he ruling of the Auditor
Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem generis, that is where general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular, and specific meaing, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned.1 Reu*lic 1. ,i/rinio 8R. A>EA; 6u/. ;< =>>< Ponente: C4RT0S$ 9 . 2A$3%4
14
MAKASIAR Notes
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION REVIEWER 2he ew Armed 6orces Anti-'=, as amended, and 9ep. Act o. 'G=, as amended. Private respondent moved to dismiss. 2he Koard opposed. Private respondent filed a petition for prohibition with preliminary inunction with the 9egional 2rial Court in Pasig, 7etro 7anila. According to petitioners, the PC<< has the power to investigate and cause the prosecution of private respondent because he is a 0subordinate1 of former President 7arcos. 9espondent alleged that he is not one of the subordinates contemplated in !xecutive rders ', ), '? and '?-A as the alleged illegal acts being imputed to him, that of alleged amassing wealth beyond his legal means while 6inance fficer of the Philippine Constabulary, are acts of his own alone, not connected with his being a crony, business associate, etc. or subordinate as the petition does not allege so. Hence the PC<< has no urisdiction to investigate him. *%%5-4
/hether or not private respondent acted as a 0subordinate1 under !.. o.' and related executive orders. &-"D4
. Civil Case decision dismissed and nullified. 29 was made permanent.
preudice to his investigation and prosecution by the appropriate prosecution agency.
'ule of ejusdem generis merely a tool of statutory construction resorted to when legislative intent is uncertain.1 Peole 1. 0chave3 8R. L9E@@D@9?= +an. A$ =>A< Ponente4 A=5*6( 2A$3%4
Petitioner !llo filed with the lower court separate informations against sixteen persons charging them with s$uatting as penali5ed by Presidential ecree o. GG). Kefore the accused could be arraigned, respondent :udge !chaves motu proprio issued an omnibus order dismissing the five informations "out of 'F raffled# on the grounds "'# that it was alleged that the accused entered the land through 0stealth and strategy1, whereas under the decree the entry should be effected 0with the use of force, intimidation or threat, or taking advantage of the absence or tolerance of the landowner1, and ")# that under the rule of ejusdem generis the decree does not apply to the cultivation of a gra5ing land. 6rom the order of dismissal, the fiscal appealed to this Court under 9epublic Act o. D??>. *%%5-4
'A3*(4
Applying the rule in statutory construction known as ejusdem generis, that is 8 wIhere general words follow an enumeration of persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to be construed in their widest extent, but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the same kind or class as those specifically mentioned. 2he term 0subordinate1 as used in !.. os. ' and ) would refer to one who enoys a close association or relation with former Pres. 7arcos and*or his wife, similar to the immediate family member, relative, and close associate in !.. o. ' and the close relative, business associate, dummy, agent, or nominee in !.. o. ). 2he PC<< is !:%! from proceeding with the investigation and prosecution of private respondent, without
/hether or not P.. o. GG) which penali5es s$uatting and similar acts, "also# apply to agricultural lands. &-"D:
. Appeal was devoid of merit.2rial court(s dismissal was affirmed.
'A3*(4
2Ihe lower court correctly ruled that the decree does not apply to pasture lands because its preamble shows that it was intended to apply to s$uatting in urban communities or more particularly to illegal constructions in s$uatter areas made by 15
MAKASIAR Notes
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION REVIEWER well-to-do individuals. 2he s$uating complained of involves pasture lands in rural areas. 2he rule of ejusdem generis "of the same kind or species# invoked by the trial court does not apply to this case. Here, the intent of the decree is unmistakable. %t is intended to apply only to urban communities, particularly to illegal constructions. 2he rule of ejusdem generis is merely a tool of statutory construction which is resorted to when the legislative intent is uncertain.
3he familiar rule of -jusdem Generis1 1era 1. Cuevas 8R. L ;;?>;9>E ,ay ;=$ =>@> 2acts4 Consolidated Philippines %nc.,
0-ress ,ention an# !mlie# 0-clusion. !-xpressio 5nius -st -xclusio Alterius# • %t is a general rule of statutory construction that the express mention of one person, thing, or conse$uence is tantamount to an express exclusion of all others. !+xpressio unius est exclusio alterius#. • %t is based upon the rules of logic and natural workings of the human mind. • %t is useful only as a guide in determining the probable intention of the legislature. !xcept& • /hen there is manifest inustice • /hen there is no reason for exception. 3he express mention of one person, thing, act, or conse0uence excludes all others. -xpressio unuis est exclusion alterius1 SP,C 1. Commission of !nternal Revenue 8R. =E@@E> +une $ <
4an Pablo 7anufacturing Corporation "4P7C# is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of milling, manufacturing and exporting of coconut oil and other allied products. %t was assessed and ordered to pay b y the Commissioner of %nternal 9evenue miller(s tax and manufacturer(s sales tax, among other deficiency taxes, for taxable year '=@G particularly on 4P7C(s sales of crude oil to Lnited Coconut Chemicals, %nc. "L%CH!7# while the deficiency sales tax was applied on its sales of corn and edible oil as manufactured products. 4P7C opposed the assessments. 2he Commissioner denied its protest. 4P7C appealed the denial of its protest to the Court of 2ax Appeals "C2A# by way of a petition for review. docketed as C2A Case o. D?). %t insists on the liberal application of the rules because, on the merits of the petition, 4P7C was not liable for the S miller(s tax. %t maintains that the crude oil which it sold to L%CH!7 was actually exported by L%CH!7 as an ingredient of fatty acid and glycerine, hence, not subect to miller(s tax pursuant to 4ection 'F@ of the '=@G 2ax Code. 4ince L%CH!7, the buyer of 4P7C(s milled products, subse$uently exported said products, 4P7C should be exempted from the miller(s tax. *%%5-4 16
MAKASIAR Notes
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION REVIEWER /hether or not 4P7C(s sale of crude coconut oil to L%CH!7 was subect to the S miller(s task. &-"D4
. Petition was denied. 'A3*(4
2he language of the exempting clause of 4ection 'F@ of the '=@G 2ax Code was clear. 2he tax exemption applied only to the exportation of rope, coconut oil, palm oil, copra by products and dessicated coconuts, whether in their original state or as an ingredient or part of any manufactured article or products, by the proprietor or operator of the factory or by the miller himself. /here the law enumerates the subect or condition upon which it applies, it is to be construed as excluding from its effects all those not expressly mentioned. -xpressio unius est exclusio alterius. Anything that is not included in the enumeration is excluded therefrom and a meaning that does not appear nor is intended or reflected in the very language of the statute cannot be placed therein. 2he rule proceeds from the premise that the legislature would not have made specific enumerations in a statute if it had the intention not to restrict its meaning and confine its terms to those expressly mentioned. 2he rule of expressio unius est exclusio alterius is a canon of restrictive interpretation. %ts application in this case is consistent with the construction of tax exemptions in strictissimi juris against the taxpayer. 2o allow 4P7C(s claim for tax exemption will violate these established principles and unduly derogate sovereign authority.
6ssociate# or#s "Noscitur Sociis# • !xplain and limit each other. • /hen a word used in a statute is ambiguous or vague, its meaning may be clear and specific by considering the company in which it is found and the meaning of the terms which are associated with it. • 2he meaning of a doubtful word or phrase may be ascertained by reference to the meaning of other words or phrases with which it is associated and that, where several things are referred to, they are presumed to be of the same class when connected by
a copulative conunction, unless a contrary intent plainly appears.
Use of Ne/ative or#s. 6egative words and phrases regarded as mandatory while those affirmative are mere directory .# Fule 1. Court of 6eals 8R. L9@><>E +une $ =>AA Ponente: ,0L0NC!4920RR0R6$ 9. 2A$3%4
2his is a Petition for 9eview on certiorari of the ecision of respondent Appellate Court, which affirmed the udgment of the 9egional 2rial Court, ;ucena City, Kranch ;%3, convicting petitioner "the accused-appellant# of 3iolation of Katas Pambansa Klg. )) "2he Kouncing Checks ;aw# on the basis of the 4tipulation of 6acts entered into between the prosecution and the defense during the pre-trial conference in the 2rial Court. At the hearing of August ), '=@D, only the prosecution presented its evidence. At the subse$uent hearing on 4eptember 'G, '=@D, petitioner-appellant waived the right to present evidence and, in lieu thereof, submitted a 7emorandum confirming the 4tipulation of 6acts. 2he 2rial Court convicted petitioner-appellant. n appeal, respondent Appellate Court upheld the 4tipulation of 6acts and affirmed the udgment of conviction. Hence, this recourse, with petitioner-appellant contending that the Honorable 9espondent Court of Appeals erred in the decision of the 9egional 2rial Court convicting the petitioner of the offense charged, despite the cold fact that the basis of the conviction was based solely on the stipulation of facts made during the pre-trial on August @, '=@D, which was not signed by the petitioner, nor by his counsel. %n 4ec.? of the 9ules on Criminal Procedures& S+C. :. Pre9trial a/reements must *e si/ne# . ; o agreement or admission made or entered during the pre1trial conference shall be used in evidence against the accused unless reduced to writing and signed by him and his counsel. 8*ule <<=9 >+mphasis supplied? Having been effective since :anuary >', '=@D, the above rule is applicable. *%%5-4 17
MAKASIAR Notes
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION REVIEWER /hether or not the omission of the signature of the accused and his counsel, as mandatorily re$uired by the 9ules, renders the 4tipulation of 6acts inadmissible in evidence. &-"D4
+!4. :udgment of respondent Appellate Court is 9!3!94! and this case is hereby ordered 9!-P!! and 9!7A! to the appropriate Kranch of the 9egional 2rial Court of ;ucena City, for further reception of evidence. 'A3*(4
Ky its very language, the 9ule is mandatory. Lnder the rule of statutory construction, negative words and phrases are to be regarded as mandatory while those in the affirmative are merely directory "7c '=D?I#. 2he use of the term 0shall1 further emphasi5es its mandatory character and means that it is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced "Kersabal vs. 4alvador, o. ;D='>, :uly )', '=G@, @? 4C9A 'GF#. And more importantly, penal statutes whether substantive and remedial or procedural are, by consecrated rule, to be strictly applied against the government and liberally in favor of the accused "People vs. 2errado o. ;-)F)D, ovember )D, '=@, ')D 4C9A F?@#.
Courts of 6irst /nstance shall decide such appealed cases on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted from the city or municipal courts5 (rovided, That the parties may submit memoranda and@or brief with oral argument if so re"uested A . 8+mphasis supplied9. A decision was rendered by said Court which decision was appealed by the petitioner to the respondent Court. 2he respondent :udge dismissed petition on August ?, '=G' upon failure of defendant'appellant to prosecute her appeal , with costs against her. Petitioner filed her memorandum. 2he respondent Court denied the motion for reconsideration on ctober >, '=G'. Petitioner filed a motion for leave to file second motion for reconsideration which was likewise denied by the respondent court on 7arch 'D, '=G). *%%5-4
/hether or not, in the light of the provisions of the second paragraph of 4ection ?D of 9epublic Act o. )=F, as amended by 9.A. o. F>', the mere failure of an appellant to submit on time the memorandum mentioned in the same paragraph would empower the Court of 6irst %nstance to dismiss the appeal on the ground of failure to Prosecute. &-"D4
The use of the wor# ImayJ an# IshallJ in the statute I5se of word may1 in the statute generally connotes permissible thing while the word ;shall< is imperative1 Bersa*al 1. Salva#or 8R. L9;D>=< +uly =$ =>@A Ponente: ,6K6S!6R$ 9. 2A$3%4
PIetitioner Purita Kersabal seeks to annul the orders of respondent :udge and to compel said respondent :udge to decide petitioner(s perfected appeal on the basis of the evidence and records of the case submitted by the City Court of Caloocan City plus the memorandum already submitted by the petitioner and respondents. 2he second paragraph of 4ection ?D of 9.A. o. )=F, otherwise known as the Philippine :udiciary Act of '=?@, as amended by 9.A. o. F>' provides, in part, as follows&
. 2he challenged orders of 9espondent :udge dated August ?, '=G', ctober >, '=G', and 7arch 'D, '=G) are set aside as null and void. 'A3*(4
2he above cited provision is clear and leaves no room for doubt. %t cannot be interpreted otherwise than that the submission of memoranda is optional on the part of the parties. Keing optional on the part of the parties, the latter may so choose to waive submission of the memoranda. And as a logical concomitant of the choice given to the Parties, the Court cannot dismiss the appeal of the party waiving the submission of said memorandum the appellant so chooses not to submit the memorandum, the Court of 6irst %nstance is left with no alternative but to decide the case on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted from the city or municipal courts. %n other words, the Court is not empowered by law to dismiss the appeal on the mere failure of an appellant to submit his memorandum, but rather it is the Court(s 18
MAKASIAR Notes
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION REVIEWER mandatory duty to decide the case on the basis of the available evidence and records transmitted to it. As a general rule, the word ImayJ when use# in a statute is ermissive only and operates to confer discretionE while the word IshallJ is imerative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced "i5on vs. !ncarnacion, ;-'@F'D, ec. )?, '=F, = 4C9A G'?, G'F-G'G#. 2he implication is that the Court is left with no choice but to decide the appealed case either on the basis of the evidence and records transmitted to it, or on the basis of the latter plus memoranda and*or brief with oral argument duly submitted and*or made on re$uest.
2he 4outh Association appealed to the Appeals Koard of the H%
*%%5-4
/hether or not the failure of a corporation to file its by-laws within one month from the date of its incorporation, as mandated by 4ection ?F of the Corporation Code, result in its automatic dissolution. &-"D4
Use of the or# I,ustJ 3he word must1 in a statute like shall1 is not always imperative and may be consistent with an exercise discretion.1 L8126! 1. Court of 6eals 8R. ==@=AA 6u/. @ =>>@ Ponente: R4,0R4$ 9. 2A$3%4
2Ihis is a petition for review on certiorari of the ecision of the Court of Appeals affirming the decision of the Home %nsurance and
. Petition !%!. ecision of the Court of Appeals A66%97!. 'A3*(4
LInder the principle that the best interpreter of a statute is the statute itself "optima statuli interpretatix est ipsum statutum#, 4ection ?F of the Corporation Code reveals the legislative intent to attach a directory, and not mandatory, meanin/ for the wor# ImustJ in the first sentence thereof. ote should be taken of the second paragraph of the law which allows the filing of the b y-laws even prior to incorporation. 2his provision in the same section of the Code rules out mandatory compliance with the re$uirement of filing the by-laws 0within one "'# month after receipt of official notice of the issuance of its certificate of incorporation by the 4ecurities and !xchange Commission.1 %t necessarily follows that failure to file the by-laws within that period does not imply the 0demise1 of the corporation. Ky-laws may be necessary for the 0government1 of the corporation but these are subordinate to the articles of incorporation as well as to the Corporation Code and related statutes. %If the languages of a statute considered as a whole and with due regard to its nature and obect reveals that the legislature intended to use the words IshallJ and ImustJ to be directory, they should be given that meaning.
3he use of the word may1 clearly shows it is directory in nature and not mandatory.1 4m*u#sman 1s. %e Saha/un %i/est 8R. =?@>A$ 6u/ust =;$ <
MAKASIAR Notes
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION REVIEWER *ssue4 /hether or not 4ection )> "D# of 9.A. o. FGG> prohibits administrative investigation in cases filed more than one year after commission. &eld4 /ell-entrenched is the rule that administrative offenses do not prescribe. Administrative offenses by their very nature pertain to the character of public officers and employees. %n disciplining public officers and employees, the obect sought is not the punishment of the officer or employee but the improvement of the public service and the preservation of the public(s faith and confidence in our government.
9espondents insist that 4ection )> "D# of 9.A. o. FGG>, to wit& 4!C. )>. +xceptions. 8 2he ffice of the mbudsman may not conduct the necessary investigation of any administrative act or omission complained of if it believes that& xxx "D# 2he complaint was filed after one year from the occurrence of the act or omission complained of. "!mphasis supplied# proscribes the investigation of any administrative act or omission if the complaint was filed after one year from the occurrence of the complained act or omission. %n -elchor v. ironella the Court held that the period stated in 4ection )>"D# of 9.A. o. FGG> does not refer to the prescription of the offense but to the discretion given to the 2mbudsman on whether it would investigate a particular administrative offense. 2he use of the word 0may1 in the provision is construed as permissive and operating to confer discretion. /here the words of a statute are clear, plain and free from ambiguity, they must be given their literal meaning and applied without attempted interpretation. %n 6ilipino v. -acabuhay& the Court interpreted 4ection )> "D# of 9.A. o. FGG> in this manner& Petitioner argues that based on the abovementioned provision 4ection )>"D# of 9A FGG>#I, respondentOs complaint is barred by prescription considering that it was filed more than one year after the alleged commission of the acts complained of. PetitionerOs argument is without merit. 2he use of the word JmayJ clearly shows that it is directory in nature and not mandatory as petitioner contends. /hen used in a statute, it is permissive only and operates to confer discretionE while the word JshallJ is imperative, operating to impose a duty which may be enforced. Applying 4ection )>"D#, therefore, it is #iscretionary uon the 4m*u#sman whether or not to con#uct an investi/ation on a comlaint even if it was file# after one year from the occurrence of the act or omission comlaine# of. !n fine$ the comlaint is not *arre# *y rescrition. "!mphasis supplied# 2he declaration of the CA in its assailed decision that while as a general rule the word 0may1 is directory, the negative phrase 0may not1 is mandatory in tenorE that a directory word, when $ualified by the word 0not,1 becomes prohibitory and therefore becomes mandatory in
character, is not plausible. %t is not supported by urisprudence on statutory construction. Administrative rder o. 'G, which amended Administrative rder o. >G, otherwise known as the 9ules of Procedure of the ffice of the 2mbudsman. 4ection ?, 9ule %%% of the amended 9ules of Procedure of the ffice of the 2mbudsman reads& 4ection ?. +valuation. - Lpon receipt of the comlaint , the same shall be evaluated to determine whether the same may *e& a) #ismisse# outri/ht for any /roun#s state# un#er Section < of Reu*lic 6ct No. ?@@<$ rovi#e#$ however$ that the #ismissal thereof is not man#atory an# shall *e #iscretionary on the art of the 4m*u#sman or the %euty 4m*u#sman concerne# %t is, therefore, discretionary upon the 2mbudsman whether or not to conduct an investigation of a complaint even if it was filed after one year from the occurrence of the act or omission complained of. The Use of the Term I6n#J an# the or# I4rJ 0And1 means conunction connecting words or phrases expressing the idea that the latter is to be added or taken along with the first. • %t basic in legal hermeneutics that the word 0and1 is not meant to separate words but is a conunction used to a oinder or union. 0r1 is a disunctive particle used to express as alternative or to give a choice of one among two or more things. %t is also used to clarify what has already been said, and in such cases, means 0in other words,1 0to wit,1 or 0that is to say.1 • 2he word 0or1 is to be used as a function word to indicate an alternative between different or unlike things. 3he word only1 means exclusive1 Roos !n#ustrial Construction 1s. NLRC Roos !n#ustrial Construction 1s. NLRCRoss !n#ustrial Construction 1s. NLRC 8.R. No. =@E<>$ Fe*ruary E$ <>), private respondent :ose 7artillos "respondent# filed a complaint against petitioners for illegal dismissal and money claims such as the pa yment of separation pay in lieu of reinstatement plus full backwages, service incentive leave, 'th month pay, litigation expenses, underpayment of holiday pay and other e$uitable reliefs before the ational Capital Arbitration Kranch of the ational ;abor 9elations Commission ";9C#, docketed as ;9C C9 4outh 4ector Case o. >->?->'@DF->). 2he ;abor Arbiter ruled that respondent had been illegally dismissed after finding that he had ac$uired the status of a regular employee as he was hired as a driver with little 20
MAKASIAR Notes
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION REVIEWER interruption from one proect to another, a task which is necessary to the usual trade of his employer. Petitioners received a copy of the ;abor Arbiter(s decision on 'G ecember )>>. n )= ecember )>>, the last day of the reglementary period for perfecting an appeal, petitioners filed a 7emorandum of Appeal before the ;9C and paid the appeal fee. However, instead of posting the re$uired cash or surety bond within the reglementary period, petitioners filed a 7otion for !xtension of 2ime to 4ubmit*Post 4urety Kond. Petitioners stated that they could not post and submit the re$uired surety bond as the signatories to the bond were on leave during the holiday season, and made a commitment to post and submit the surety bond on or before F :anuary )>>?. 2he ;9C did not act on the motion. 2hereafter, on F :anuary )>>?, petitioners filed a surety bond e$uivalent to the award of the ;abor Arbiter. %n a 9esolution dated :uly )=, )>>?, the 4econd ivision of the ;9C dismissed petitioners( appeal for lack of urisdiction. 2he ;9C stressed that the bond is an indispensable re$uisite for the perfection of an appeal by the employer and that the perfection of an appeal within the reglementary period and in the manner prescribed by law is mandatory and urisdictional. %n addition, the ;9C restated that its 9ules of Procedure proscribes the filing of any motion for extension of the period within which to perfect an appeal. 2he ;9C summed up that considering that petitioners( appeal had not been perfected, it had no urisdiction to act on said appeal and the assailed decision, as a conse$uence, has become final and executor. 2he ;9C likewise denied petitioners( 7otion for 9econsideration for lack of merit in another 9esolution. n '' ovember )>>?, the ;9C issued an entry of udgment declaring its resolution final and executory as of = ctober )>>?. n respondent(s motion, the ;abor Arbiter ordered that the writ of execution be issued to enforce the award. n )F :anuary )>>D, a writ of execution was issued. Petitioners elevated the dismissal of their appeal to the Court of Appeals by way of a special civil action of certiorari. 2hey argued that the filing of the appeal bond evinced their willingness to comply and was in fact substantial compliance with the 9ules. 2hey likewise maintained that the ;9C gravely abused its discretion in failing to consider the meritorious grounds for their motion for extension of time to file the appeal bond. ;astly, petitioners contended that the ;9C gravely erred in issuing an entry of udgment as the assailed resolution is still open for review. n ') :anuary )>>F, the Court of Appeals affirmed the challenged resolution of the ;9C. Hence, the instant petition. *ssue4 /hether or not the motion for extension of time to file cash or surety bond before the ;9C toll the reglementary period to appeal. &eld4
2he Court reiterates the settled rule that an appeal from the decision of the ;abor Arbiter involving a monetary award is only deemed perfected upon the posting of a cash or surety bond within ten "'># days from such decision. Article )) of the ;abor Code states& A92. )). 3ppeal.; ecisions, awards or orders of the ;abor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten "'># calendar days from receipt of such decisions, awards, or orders. T %n case of a udgment involving a monetary award, an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount e$uivalent to the monetary award in the udgment appealed from. Contrary to petitioners( assertion, the appeal bond is not merely procedural but urisdictional. /ithout said bond, the ;9C does not ac$uire urisdiction over the appeal. %ndeed, non-compliance with such legal re$uirements is fatal and has the effect of rendering the udgment final and executor. %t must be stressed that there is no inherent right to an appeal in a labor case, as it arises solely from the grant of statute. !vidently, the ;9C did not ac$uire urisdiction over petitioners( appeal within the ten "'>#-day reglementary period to perfect the appeal as the appeal bond was filed eight "@# days after the last day thereof. 2hus, the Court cannot ascribe grave abuse of discretion to the ;9C or error to the Court of Appeals in refusing to take cogni5ance of petitioners( belated appeal. /hile indeed the Court has relaxed the application of this re$uirement in cases where the failure to comply with the re$uirement was ustified or where there was substantial compliance with the rules. the overpowering legislative intent of Article )) remains to be for a strict application of the appeal bond re$uirement as a re$uisite for the perfection of an appeal and as a burden imposed on the employer. As the Court held in the case of Borja +state v. Ballad5 2he intention of the lawmakers to make the bond an indispensable re$uisite for the perfection of an appeal by the employer is underscored by the provision that an appeal may be perfected 0only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond.1 2he word 0only1 makes it perfectly clear that the ;A/7AN!94 intended the posting of a cash or surety bond by the employer to be the exclusive means by which an employer(s appeal may be considered completed. 2he law however does not re$uire its outright payment, but only the posting of a bond to ensure that the award will be eventually paid should the appeal fail. /hat petitioners have to pay is a moderate and reasonable sum for the premium of such bond.
21
MAKASIAR Notes
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION REVIEWER Comutation of Time /hen the laws speak of years, months, days or nights, it shall be understood that years are of three hundred sixty five days eachE months of thirty daysE days of twenty 8four hoursE and nights from sunset to sunrise. %f months are designated by their name, they shall be computed by the number of days which they respectively have. %n computing a period, the first day shall be excluded, and the last day included "Art. ', ew Civil Code#.
/H!9!69!, the petitions for certiorari and intervention are hereby dismissed and the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed in toto. Function of the Proviso Proviso is a clause or part of a clause in the statute, the office of which is either to except something from the enacting clause, or to $ualify or restrain its generality, or to exclude some possible ground of misinterpretation of its extent. Provided1 is the word used in introducing a proviso.
A ;week< means a period of seven consecutive days without regard to the day of the week on which it begins.1 PNB 1. Court of 6eals SCR6 =;E ,ay =@ =>>; 2acts4 2wo parcels of land under the common names of the respondent !pifanio dela Cru5, his brother and sister were mortgaged to the Petitioner Philippine ational Kank. 2he lots were mortgaged to guarantee the by three promissory notes. 2he first two were not paid by the respondent. 2he third is disputed by the respondent who claims that the correct date is :une >, '=F'E however, in the bank records, the note was really executed on :une >, '[email protected]K presented under Act o. 'D a foreclosure petition of the mortgaged lots. 2he lots were sold or auctioned off with PK as the highest bidder. A 6inal eed of 4ale and a Certificate of 4ale was executed in favor of the petitioner. 2he final eed of 4ale was registered in 9egistry of Property. %nasmuch as the respondent did not buy back the lots from PK, PK sold on the same in a Jeed of Conditional 4aleJ. 2he otices of 4ale of foreclosed properties were published on 7arch )@, April '' and April '), '=F= in a newspaper. 9espondent brought a complaint for the re conveyance of the lands, which the petitioner allegedly unlawfully foreclosed. 2he petitioner states on the other hand that the extraudicial foreclosure, consolidation of ownership, and subse$uent sale were all valid. 2he C6% rendered its ecisionE the complaint against the petitioner was dismissed. Lnsatisfied with the udgment, respondent interposed an appeal that the lower court erred in holding that here was a valid compliance in regard to the re$uired publication under 4ec. of Act. 'D. 9espondent court reversed the udgment appealed from by declaring void, inter alia, the auction sale of the foreclosed pieces of realty, the final deed of sale, and the consolidation of ownership. Hence, the petition with 4C for certiorari and intervention. *ssue4 / the re$uired publication of 2he otices of 4ale on the foreclosed properties under 4ec. of Act 'D was complied. 'uling4 o. 2hefirst datefalls on a 6riday whilethe second andthird dates are on a 6riday and 4aturday, respectively. 4ection of Act o. 'D re$uires that the notice of auction sale shall be Jpublished once a week for at least three consecutive weeksJ. !vidently, petitioner bank failed to comply with this legal re$uirement.2he 4upreme Court held that& 2he rule is that statutory provisions governing publication of notice of mortgage foreclosure sales must be strictly complied with, and those even slight deviations therefrom will invalidate the notice and render the sale at least voidable.
6LU9TUCP 1. NLRC 8R. =<>>< 6u/. $ =>>E Ponente: F0L!C!6N4$ 9. 2A$3%4
PIetitioners, as employees of private respondent ational 4teel Corporation "4C#, filed separate complaints for unfair labor practice, regulari5ation and monetary benefits with the ;9C, 4ub-9egional Arbitration Kranch Q%%, %ligan City. 2he complaints were consolidated and after hearing, the ;abor Arbiter declared petitioners 0regular project employees who shall continue their employment as such for as long as such proectI activity exists,1 but entitled to the salary of a regular employee pursuant to the provisions in the collective bargaining agreement. %t also ordered payment of salary differentials. 2he ;9C in its $uestioned resolutions modified the ;abor Arbiter(s decision. %t affirmed the ;abor Arbiter(s holding that petitioners were project employees since they were hired to perform work in a specific undertaking the 6ive +ears !xpansion Program, the completion of which had been determined at the time of their engagement and which operation was not directly related to the business of steel manufacturing. 2he ;9C, however, set aside the award to petitioners of the same benefits enoyed by regular employees for lack of legal and factual basis. 2he law on the matter is Article )@> of the ;abor Code, where the petitioners argue that they are 0regular1 employees of 4C because& "i# their obs are 0necessary, desirable and workrelated to private respondent(s main business, steel-making1E and "ii# they have rendered service for six "F# or more years to private respondent 4C. *%%5-4 22
MAKASIAR Notes
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION REVIEWER /hether or not petitioners are considered 0permanent employees1 as opposed to being only 0proect employees1 of 4C. &-"D4
. Petition for Certiorari dismissed for lack of merit. ;9C 9esolutions affirmed. 'A3*(4 2unction of the proviso. Petitioners are not considered 0permanent employees1. However, contrary to petitioners( apprehensions, the designation of named employees as 0proect employees1 and their assignment to a specific proect are effected and implemented in good faith, and not merely as a means of evading otherwise applicable re$uirements of labor laws.
n the claim that petitioners( service to 4C of more than six "F# years should $ualify them as 0regular employees1, the 4upreme Court believed this claim is without legal basis. 2he simple fact that the employment of petitioners as proect employees had gone beyond one "'# year, does not detract from, or legally dissolve, their status as 0proect employees1. 2he second paragraph of Article )@> of the ;abor Code, $uoted above, providing that an employee who has served for at least one "'# year, shall be considered a regular employee, relates to casual employees, not to proect employees. Chater 1 " Presumtion in 6i# of Construction an# interretation PR0SU,PT!4NS %n construing a doubtful or ambiguous statute, the Courts will presume that it was the intention of the legislature to enact a valid, sensible and ust law, and one which should change the prior law no further than may be necessary to effectuate the specific purpose of the act in $uestion. Presumtion 6/ainst Unconstitutionality • ;aws are presumed constitutional. 2o ustify nullification of law, there must be a clear and une$uivocal breach of the C onstitution. 2he theory is that, as the oint act of the legislative • and executive authorities, a law is supposed to have been carefully studied and determined to be constitutional before it was finally enacted. 6ris !NC 1s. NLRC 8R. >>= Ponente: %61!%0$ +R.$ +.
2A$3%4
n '' April '=@@, private respondents, who were employees of petitioner, aggrieved by management(s failure to attend to their complaints concerning their working surroundings which had become detrimental and ha5ardous, re$uested for a grievance conference. Private respondents lost no time in filing a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner with ;9C of C9. After due trial, Aris "Phils.#, %nc. is hereby ordered to reinstate within ten "'># days from receipt private respondents to their former respective positions or any substantial e$uivalent positions if already filled up, without loss of seniority right and privileges but with limited backwages of six "F# months. Private respondents filed a 7otion 6or %ssuance of a /rit of !xecution pursuant to 4ection ') of 9.A. o. FG'D. Petitioner and complainants filed their own Appeals. Petitioner filed an pposition to the motion for execution alleging that 4ection ') of 9.A. o. FG'D on execution pending appeal cannot be applied retroactively to cases pending at the time of its effectivity because it does not expressly provide that it shall be given retroactive effect and to give retroactive effect to 4ection ') thereof to pending cases would not only result in the imposition of an additional obligation on petitioner but would also dilute its right to appeal since it would be burdened with the conse$uences of reinstatement without the benefit of a final udgment. *%%5-4
/hether or not the provision under 4ection ') of 9.A. o. FG'D is constitutional. &-"D4
+!4. Petition was dismissed for lack of merit. Costs against petitioners. 'A3*(4 Presumption against unconstitutionality. 2he validity of the $uestioned law is not only supported and sustained by the foregoing considerations. As contended by the 4olicitor
MAKASIAR Notes
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION REVIEWER preservation of the lives of the citi5ens is a basic duty of the 4tate, that is more vital than the preservation of corporate profits. 2hen, by and pursuant to the same power, the 4tate may authori5e an immediate implementation, pending appeal, of a decision reinstating a dismissed or separated employee since that saving act is designed to stop, although temporarily since the appeal may be decided in favor of the appellant, a continuing threat or danger to the survival or even the life of the dismissed or separated employee and its family. 7oreover, the $uestioned interim rules of the ;9C can validly be given retroactive effect. 2hey are procedural or remedial in character, promulgated pursuant to the authority vested upon it under Article )'@"a# of the ;abor Code of the Philippines, as amended. 4ettled is the rule that procedural laws may be given retroactive effect. 2here are no vested rights in rules of procedure. A remedial statute may be made applicable to cases pending at the time of its enactment.
All laws are presumed valid and constitutional until or unless otherwise ruled by the $ourt.1 Lim 1s. PacGuin/ Ponente: P6%!LL6$ +. 2A$3%4 2he Charter of the City of 7anila was enacted by Congress on '@ :une '=?= "9.A. o. ?>=#. • n ' :anuary '=D', !xecutive rder o. =) was issued transferring the authority to regulate ai-alais from local government to the G 4eptember '=G', however, the 7unicipal Koard of 7anila nonetheless passed rdinance o. G>FD entitled 0An rdinance Authori5ing the 7ayor 2o Allow And Permit 2he Associated evelopment Corporation 2o !stablish, 7aintain And perate A :ai-Alai %n 2he City f 7anila, Lnder Certain 2erms And Conditions And 6or ther Purposes.1 • n )> August '=GD, Presidential ecree o. GG' was issued by then President 7arcos. 2he decree, entitled 09evoking All Powers and Authority of ;ocal
facilities "including :ai-Alai# by local governments. AC assails the constitutionality of P.. o. GG'. *%%5-4 /hether or not P.. o. GG' is violative of the e$ual protection and non-impairment clauses of the Constitution. &-"D4 . P.. o. GG' is valid and constitutional. 'A3*(4 Presumption against unconstitutionality. 2here is nothing on record to show or even suggest that P o. GG' has been repealed, altered or amended by any subse$uent law or presidential issuance "when the executive still exercised legislative powers#. either can it be tenably stated that the issue of the continued existence of AC(s franchise by reason of the unconstitutionality of P o. GG' was settled in <.9. o. ''D>??, for the decision of the Court(s 6irst ivision in said case, aside from not being final, cannot have the effect of nullifying P o. GG' as unconstitutional, since only the Court +n Banc has that power under Article 3%%%, 4ection ?")# of the Constitution. And on the $uestion of whether or not the government is estopped from contesting AC(s possession of a valid franchise, the well-settled rule is that the 4tate cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors, if any, of its officials or agents. " *epublic v. /ntermediate 3ppellate Court , )>= 4C9A =>#
3he burden of proving the invalidity of a law rests on those who challenge it.1 +ovencio Lim an# Teresita Lim 1s. Peole 8R. =E>@?$ Setem*er @$ << *ssue4 2he constitutionality of P @'@, a decree which amended Article 'D of the 9PC by increasing the penalties for +stafa committed by means of bouncing checks, is being challenged in this petition for certiorari, for being violative of the due process clause the right to bail and the provision against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment enshrined under the constitution. &eld4 /hen a law is $uestioned before the Court, the presumption is in favor of its constitutionality. ustify its nullification, there must be a clear and unmistakable breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one. 2he burden of proving the invalidity of a law rests on those who challenge it. %n this case, petitioners failed to present clear and convincing proof to defeat the presumption of constitutionality of P @'@.
24
MAKASIAR Notes
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION REVIEWER Presumtion 6/ainst !nustice. • 2he law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause inustice as this never within the legislative intent. • /e interpret and apply the law in consonance with ustice. • 2he law and ustice is inseparable, and we must keep them so. • :udges do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and conse$uence. *n case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail.1 Salvacion 1s. Central Ban' of the Philiines Ponente4 3(''-%, 9'. 2A$3%4 9espondent D as its answer to it. eputy 4heriff sent his reply to CKC saying that the garnishment did not violate the secrecy of bank deposits since the disclosure is merely incidental to a garnishment properly and legally made by virtue of a court order which has placed the subect deposits in custodia legis. CKC replied and invoked 4ection '' of Central Kank Circular o. =F> to the effect that the dollar deposits of and 4ec. @ of 9A F?)F amended by P ')?F otherwise known as the 06oreign Currency eposit Act1 be made applicable to a foreign transient. &-"D4 . 2he provisions of 4ection '' of CK Circular o. =F> and P o. ')?F, insofar as it amends 4ection @ of 9.A. o. F?)F are hereby held to be %APP;%CAK;! to this case because of its peculiar circumstances. 'A3*(4 2Ihe application of the law depends on the extent of its ustice. !ventually, if we rule that the $uestioned 4ection '' of Central Kank Circular o. =F> which exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any
court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient, inustice would result especially to a citi5en aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused of the ew Civil Code which provides that 0in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and ustice to prevail. 6inguno non deue enri0uecerse torti>eramente con dano de otro.1 4imply stated, when the statute is silent or ambiguous, this is one of those fundamental solutions that would respond to the vehement urge of conscience. %t would be unthinkable, that the $uestioned 4ection '' of Central Kank o. =F> would be used as a device by accused @@ of the ew Civil Code. &-"D4 +!4. ecision of respondent court was reversed and that of trial court reinstated. 'A3*(4 25
MAKASIAR Notes
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION REVIEWER 2he co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in writing was given them. And there is no doubt either that the >-day period began and ended during the '? years between the sales in $uestion and the filing of the complaint for redemption in '=GG, without the co-heirs exercising their right of redemption. 2hese are the ustifications for this exception. /hile courtsI may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, courtsI nevertheless have the right to read out of it the reason for its enactment. %n doing so, courtsI defer not to !the letter that killeth# but to !the spirit that vivifieth,# to give effect to the law maker(s will. Presumtion 6/ainst !mlie# Reeals. • 2he two laws must be absolutely incompatible, and clear finding thereof must surface, before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn. • /nterpretare et concordare le"ibus est optimus interpretendi • !very statute must be so interpreted and brought into accord with the other laws as to form a uniform system of urisprudence. • %n order to effect a repeal by implication, the latter statute must be so irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant with the existing law that they cannot be made to reconcile and stand together. *n the absence of an express repeal, a subse0uent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior l aw unless an irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exists in terms of the new and old laws.1 Berces 1s. 8uin/ona Ponente: HU!6S4N 2A$3%4 Petitioner filed with the 4angguniang Panlalawigan two administrative cases against respondent incumbent 7ayor and obtained favorable decision suspending the latter. 9espondent 7ayor appealed to the ffice of the President $uestioning the decision and at the same time prayed for the stay of execution in accordance with 4ec. FG"b# of the ;ocal repealed 4ec. F of Administrative rder o. '@. &-"D4 . Petition was dismissed. 04tay of execution1 applied.
'A3*(4 2he first sentence of 4ection F@ merely provides that an 0appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final or executory.1 As worded, there is room to construe said provision as giving discretion to the reviewing officials to stay the execution of the appealed decision. 2here is nothing to infer therefrom that the reviewing officials are deprived of the authority to order a stay of the appealed order. %f the intention of Congress was to repeal 4ection F of Administrative rder o. '@, it could have used more direct language expressive of such intention. An implied repeal predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be found between the new and prior laws. %n the absence of an express repeal, a subse$uent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior law unless an irreconcible inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old laws. Presumtion 6/ainst !neffectiveness. • %t is presumed that the legislature intends to impart to its enactments such a meaning as will render them operative and effective, and to prevent persons from eluding or defeating them. • %n case of any doubts or obscurity, the construction will be such as to carry out those obects. *n the interpretation of a statute, the $ourt should start with the assumption that the legislature intended to enact an effective statute.1 Paras 1s. C4,0L0C Ponente: FR6NC!SC4 2A$3%4 Petitioner was the incumbent Punong Karangay who won during the last regular barangay election. A petition for his recall as Punong Karangay was filed by the registered voters of the barangay. At least )=.>S of the registered voters signed the petition, well above the )DS re$uirement provided by law. Acting on the petition for recall, public respondent Commission on !lections "C7!;!C# resolved to approve the petition and set recall election date. 2o prevent the holding of recall election, petitioner filed before the 9egional 2rial Court a petition for inunction which was later dismissed. Petitioner filed petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for inunction, insisting that the recall election is barred by the 4angguniang Nabataan "4N# election under 4ec. G?"b# of ;ocal
26
MAKASIAR Notes
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION REVIEWER . Kut petition was dismissed for having become moot and academic. R6T!4: 9ecall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local government unit necessitating additional expenses, hence the prohibition against the conduct of recall election one year immediately preceding the regular local election. 2he proscription is due to the proximity of the next regular election for the office of the local elective official concerned. 2he electorate could choose the official(s replacement in the said election who certainly has a longer tenure in office than a successor elected through a recall election. %t would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to construe regular local election as one referring to an election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the electorate. Ky the time of udgment, recall was no longer possible because of the limitation stated under the same 4ection G?"b# now referred to as Karangay !lections. $(6$5''*6G (P*6*(64 &3$/&+5 A regular election, whether national or local, can only refer to an election participated in by those who possess the right of suffrage, are not otherwise dis$ualified by law, and who are registered voters. ne of the re$uirements for the exercise of suffrage under 4ection ', Article 3 of the Constitution is that the person must be at least '@ years of age, and one re$uisite before he can vote is that he be a registered voter pursuant to the rules on registration prescribed in the mnibus !lection Code "4ection ''-''@#. Lnder the law, the 4N includes the youth with ages ranging from 'D to )' "4ec. ?)?, ;ocal .>>. %t was granted a tax credit b y the Commissioner accordingly on '=F?. However, !44s payment of its income tax for '=F> was found to be short by PFG,==?.>>. 2he Commissioner "of %nternal 9evenue# wrote to !44 demanding payment of the deficiency tax, together with interest thereon for the period from '=F' to '=F?. !44 paid under protest the amount alleged to be due, including the interest as reckoned by the Commissioner. %t protested the computation of interest, contending it was more than that properly due. %t claimed that
it should not have been re$uired to pay interest on the total amount of the deficiency tax, PFG,==?.>>, but only on the amount of P'?F,=F'.>>representing the difference between said deficiency, PFG,==?.>>, and !44s earlier overpayment of P))',>.>> "for which it had been granted a tax credit#. !44 thus asked for a refund. 2he %nternal 9evenue Commissioner denied the claim for refund. !44 appealed to the Court of 2ax Appeals which ordered payment to !44 of its refund-claim representing overpaid interest. 2he Commissioner argued the tax credit of P))',>.>> was approved only on year '=F?, it could not be availed of in reduction of !44s earlier tax deficiency for the year '=F>E as of that year, '=F>, there was as yet no tax credit to speak of, which would reduce the deficiency tax liability for '=F>. %n support of his position, the Commissioner invokes the provisions of 4ection D' of the 2ax Code. *%%5-4 /hether or not the interest on delin$uency should be applied on the full tax deficiency of PFG,==?.>> despite the existence of overpayment in the amount of P))',>.>>. &-"D4 . Petition was denied. ecision of C2A was affirmed. 'A3*(4 2he fact is that, as respondent Court of 2ax Appeals has stressed, as early as '=F>, the .>> representing excess payment. Having been paid and received by mistake, as petitioner Commissioner subse$uently acknowledged, that sum un$uestionably belonged to !44, and the
MAKASIAR Notes
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION REVIEWER Court found the petitioner guilty of violating 4ec.' of C.A. o. '?) as amended by 9.A. o. F>@D otherwise known as 1 3n 3ct to *egulate the se of 3liases0. 2he Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction with some modification of sentence. *%%5-4 /hether or not the use of alias in isolated transaction falls within the prohibition of Commonwealth Act o. '?). &-"D4 . 2he $uestioned decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the 92C was reversed and set aside and petitioner was ac$uitted of the crime charged 'A3*(4 AIn alias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or bapti5ed the first time or substitute name authori5ed by a competent authority. A man(s name is simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish him but sometimes a man is known by several different names and these are known as aliases. Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to another person in a single instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name in addition to his real name from that day forth does not fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. o. '?) as amended. 2his is so in the case at bench. 2ime and again courtsI have decreed that statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. 2hus in construing a statute the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind and the statute should be construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose. 2he court may consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, inustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers. /hile the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law, such does not constitute an offense within the concept of C.A. o. '?) as amended under which he is prosecuted. 7oreover, as C.A. o. '?) is a penal statute, it should be construed strictly against the 4tate and in favor of the accused. 2he reason for this principle is the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals and the obect is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court limited. Presumtion 6/ainst 1iolation of !nternational Law. Philippines as democratic and republican state adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, e$uality, ustice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations. "Art. %%, 4ec. ), '=@G Phil. Constitution#.
P0N6L ST6TUT0S
Penal laws are to be construed strictly against the state and in favor of the accused. Hence, in the interpretation of a penal statute, the tendency is to subect it to careful scrutiny and to construe it with such strictness as to safeguard the right of the accused. Peole v. Temora#a
-
Correct application of the indeterminate sentence law 2he one favorable to the accused should be upheld 2he rule penal statutes should be construed 4trict construction protects the individual against arbitrary discretion
9ule on lenity
- %n constructing penal statutes, as between two reasonable but contradictory construction , the one more favorable should be upheld 1illasenor v. San#i/an Bayan
- Preventive suspension was said to be sec. ', of 9A >'= on preventive suspension is not penal but procedural in nature - Procedural statutes are legally*liberally construed - 2est to determine penal statutes& is there a penalty that is inurious to the accuses %f the statute is ambiguous and admits of two reasonable but contradictory constructions, that which operates in favor of a party accused under its provisions is to be preferred. T3E %3FS 2axation is a destructive power which interferes with the personal and property rights of the people and takes from them a portion of their property for the support of the government. Accordingly, in case of doubt, tax statutes must be construed strictly against the government and liberally in favor of the taxpayer, for taxes, being burdens, are not to be presumed beyond what the applicable statute expressly and clearly declares. Any claim for exemption from a tax statute is strictly construed against the taxpayer and liberally in favor of the state.
C429LC2% 6 42A2L2!4 28
MAKASIAR Notes
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION REVIEWER '.
). . ?. D.
2ax exemption 8 should be liberally construed in favor of the government and it(s agencies and strictly construed against the people 2ax exclusions 8 strictly construed against tax payer and in favor of the government eductions exclusions 8 strictly construed against tax payer and in favor of the government 2ax amnesty exclusions 8 strictly construed against tax payer and in favor of the government Prescriptive period for payment should be liberally construed in favor of the tax payers and strictly construed against the government 2ax sales 8 the government may be sold for a creation for reasons of tax delin$uency
Reu*lic flour mills v. C!R
- 2ax deductions should be strictly construed against tax payers - 2he court applied the plain meaning rule Serfino v. C6
- 2he court held tax - 2he prescribed procedures should be followed continuously Peole v. Castane#a
- 2ax amnesty case - 2he people were stopped from getting benefits of tax amnesty 7inisterial duty- they cannot refuse the payment C!R v. C6
- 6or the purpose of safeguarding tax payers, the law on prescription should be strictly construed against the government 6A35'A"*?A3*(6 "A/
aturali5ation laws should be rigidly enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant. Reu*lic v 4n/
- 6ailed to present the $ualifications re$uired under the revised naturali5ation law 1elasco v. Reu*lic
- 6ailed to present the $ualifications re$uired under the revised naturali5ation law - /ent on cross examination *6%5'A6$- "A/
Contracts of %nsurance are to be construed liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the insurer. 2hus, ambiguity in the words of an insurance contract should be interpreted in favor of its beneficiary. 6lha insurance v. Castor
- 2he word damage is construed to protect malicious laws - 2he terms of the policy are ambiguous 8 the policy was construed in favor of the insured and against the insurance company 6ielmens %nsurance v. 3da. e 4ongco
- Common carrier liability insurance - Private vehicle was the one involved in this case - 2he company was already estopped %octrine of estoel
-bar or impediment raised by the law, which precludes a man from alleging or from denying a certain fact or state of facts, in conse$uence of his previous allegation or denial or conduct or admission, or in conse$uence of a final adudication of the matter in a court of law "A:(' A6D %($*A" "-G*%"A3*(6% oubts in the interpretation of /orkmen(s Compensation and ;abor Code should be resolved in favor of the worker. %t should be liberally construed to attain their laudable obective, i.e., to give relief to the workman and*or his dependents in the event that the former should die or sustain in an inury.
2he sympathy of the law on social security is towards its beneficiaries and the law by its own terms, re$uires a construction of utmost liberality in their favor. 1illavert v. 0CC 29
MAKASIAR Notes
