MUTUC VS. COMELEC 36 SCRA 228
FACTS: Petitioner Mutuc was a candidate for delegate to the Constitutional Convention. He filed a special civil action against the respondent COMELEC when the latter informed him through a telegram that his certificate of candidacy was given due course but he was prohibited from using jingles in his mobile units equipped with sound systems and loud speakers. The petitioner accorded the order to be violative of his constitutional right to freedom of speech. COMELEC justified its prohibition on the premise that the Constitutional Convention act provided that it is unlawful for the candidates ―to ―to purchase, produce, request or distribute sample ballots, or electoral propaganda gadgets such as pens, lighters, fans (of whatever nature), flashlights, athletic goods or materials, wallets, bandanas, shirts, hats, matches, cigarettes, and the like, whether of domestic or foreign origin.‖ COMELEC origin.‖ COMELEC contended that the jingle or the recorded or taped voice of the singer used by petitioner was a tangible propaganda material and was, under the above statute, subject to confiscation.
ISSUE: Whether or not the usage of the jingle by the petitioner form part of the prohibition invoked by the COMELEC.
HELD: The Court held that ―the general words following any enumeration being applicable only to things thing s of the same kind or class as those specifically referred to‖. The COMELEC’s contention that a candidate’s jingle form part of the prohibition, categorized under the phrase ―and the like‖, could not merit the court’s approval by principle of Ejusdem Generis. It is quite apparent that what was contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a favorable vote for the candidate responsible for its distribution. Furthermore, the COMELEC failed to observe construction of the statute which should be in consonance to the express terms of the constitution. The intent of the COMELEC for the prohibition may be laudable but it should not be sought at the cost of the candidate’s constitutional rights.
GAANAN VS INTERMIDIATE APELLATE COURT 145 SCRA 112 FACTS: This is a petition for certiorari for
an interpretation of RA 4200 or Anti-wiretapping Act In the morning of of October 22, 22, 1975, complainant Atty. Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon Montebon were were in the living room of complainant's residence discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for direct assault That same morning, Laconico, Laconico, another another lawyer, telephoned the the appellant to come to his his office and and advise him on the settlement of the direct assault case because his regular lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a business trip. When complainant called up, up, Laconico requested appellant appellant to secretly listen to the telephone telephone conversation conversation through through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the settlement Twenty minutes later, complainant complainant called up again to ask Laconico Laconico if he he was agreeable agreeable to the conditions, conditions, which which the latter answered in affirmative. Complainant then told Laconico to wait for instructions on where to deliver the money, he told Laconico to give the money to his wife but the latter insisted that complainant himself should receive the money. And when he received the money at a restaurant, complainant was arrested by agents of the Philippine Constabulary. Appellant Laconico executed on the following day an affidavit stating ng that he heard heard complainant complainant demand P8, 000.00 000.00 for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. assault. Complainant then charged charged Laconico with violation of RA 4200 for listening to the telephone conversation without complainant's consent. The lower lower court found both Gaanan Gaanan and Laconico guilty guilty of violating violating Section Section 1 of of Republic Act No. 4200. 4200. The two were each sentenced to one (1) year imprisonment with costs The Th e Intermediate Appellate ate Court affirmed the the decision decision of the trial court, court, holding holding that the communication between the complainant and Laconico was private in nature therefore was covered by RA 4200; and that the petitioner overheard such communication without the knowledge and consent of the complainant; and that the extension telephone which was used by the petitioner to overhear the telephone conversation between complainant and Laconico is covered in the term "device' as provided in Rep. Act No. 4200.
he ther er or not no t the th e extension extension telephon telephone e is among among the the prohibite prohibited d devices ces in Sectio Section n 1 of the Act, Act, such such that its its use ISSUE: W heth to overhear a private conversation would constitute unlawful interception of communications between the two parties using a telephone line.
HELD: No. RULING: Our lawmakers intended to discourage, through punishment, persons such as government authorities or representatives of organized groups from installing devices in order to gather evidence for use in court or to intimidate blackmail or gain some unwarranted advantage over the telephone users. Consequently, the mere act of listening, in order to be punishable shable must strictly strictly be with the the use of the enume enumerated rated devic devices es in RA No. No. 4200 or others others of sim si milar il ar natu na ture re.. There is no question that the telephone conversation between complainant Atty. Pintor and accused Atty. Laconico was "private" made between one person and another as distinguished from words between a speaker and a public; the affordance of the criminal conviction would, in effect, mean that a caller by merely using a telephone line can force the listener to secrecy no matter how obscene, criminal, or annoying the call may be. It would be the word of the caller against the listener's. Such that an unwary citizen who happens to pick up his telephone and who overhears the details of a crime might hesitate to inform police authorities if he knows that he could be accused under Rep. Act 4200 of using his own telephone to secretly overhear the private communications of the would be criminals. Surely the law was never intended for such mischievous results. Telephones or extension telephones are not included in the enumeration of "commonly known" listening or recording devices, nor do they belong to the same class of enumerated electronic devices contemplated by law. Telephone party lines were intentionally deleted from the provisions of the Act. What the law refers to is a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or arrangement" for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictograph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA 4200. There must be either a physical interruption interruption
through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words. In statutory construction, in order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. Hence, the phrase "device or arrangement" in Section 1 of RA4200, should be construed to comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature that is, instruments the use of which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. It refers to instruments whose installation or presence cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of common usage and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting or recording a telephoneconversation. The court also ruled that the conduct of the party would differ in no way if instead of repeating the message he held out his hand-set so that another could hear out of it and that there is no distinction between that sort of action and permitting an outsider to use an extension telephone for the same purpose. Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused. Thus, in case of doubt as in the case at bar, on whether or not an extension telephone is included in the phrase "device or arrangement", the penal statute must be construed as not including an extension telephone as ruled in PP vs. Purisima Wherefore, the petition is granted, decision of the IAC is annulled and set aside and petitioner is acquitted for the crime of violating RA 4200.
HELD: No. The law refers to a ―tap‖ of a wire or cable or the use of a ―device or arrangement‖ for the purpose of secretly overhearing, intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words. An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictograph or the other devices enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as ―tapping‖ the wire or cable of a telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for ordinary office use.
STATUTE: There is a provision which states that ― it shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or spoken word to tap any wire or cable or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using such device commonly known as dictograph …‖
ISSUE: whether the phrase device or arrangement includes party line and extension RULING: it should not be construed in isolation. Rather it should be interpreted in relation to the other words (tap, to overhear) thus party line or telephone extension is not included because the words in the provision limit it to those that have a physical interruption through a wiretap or the deliberate installation of device to overhear.
SANTOS TO VS. CRUZ PANO 120 SCRA 8
PEDRO SANTOS TO, petitioner, vs. HON. ERNANI CRUZ-PAÑO, Presiding Judge, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch XVIII, and JUAN Y. OCAMPO, respondents. DE CASTRO, J.:
Petitioner was convicted by respondent judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City Branch) of the crime of estafa for having issued a bouncing check for P5,000.00, and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of from seven years and eight months of prision mayor as minimum, to nine years and four months of prision mayor , as maximum. 1 He appealed to the Court of Appeals which reduced the penalty to one year and one day of prision correccional as minimum, to one year and eight months as maximum. 2 Upon the Court of Appeals decision becoming final, petitioner not having appealed there from, he filed a petition for probation 3 with respondent judge, who, despite the favorable recommendation of the Probation Office, denied the petition on July 24, 1980, on the following grounds: A. To grant probation to petitioner will depreciate the seriousness of the offense committed, and B. Petitioner is not a penitent offender. A motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner having been denied by the respondent judge, the present proceeding was resorted to, petitioner averring that the respondent judge erred in denying his petition for probation despite the recommendation for its approval by the Probation Office. We find for the petitioner. At the outset, it might be stated that the Solicitor General whose comment was required by this Court, recommends the granting of probation. As he points out, petitioner is not among the offenders enumerated in the probation law (Presidential Decree No. 968) from availing of the benefits of probation. Under Section 9 of said law, the disqualified offenders are the following: A. those sentenced to serve a maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years; B. those convicted of any offense against the security of the State; C. those who have previously been convicted by final judgment of an offense punished by imprisonment of not less than one month and one day and/or a fine of not less than two hundred pesos; D. those who have been once on probation under the provisions of the decree; and
E. those who were already serving sentence at the time the substantive provisions of the decree became applicable, pursuant to Section 33. Under the above quoted provision, petitioner may not be disqualified from being entitled to the benefits of probation. Some other provisions have to be sought, if any, upon which to deny petitioner the benefits of probation which, from a reading of the law in its entirety, should with liberality, rather than undue strictness, be extended to anyone not listed as disqualified. In expressly enumerating offenders not qualified to enjoy the benefits of probation, the clear intent is to allow said benefits to those not included in the enumeration. If only for the above observation as to how the law should be applied in order that its objective could be realized and achieved, We cannot but find respondent judge's reasons for his denial of the petition for probation insufficient to justify a deviation from a policy of liberality with which the law should be applied. The first reason given by the judge is that "probation win depreciate the seriousness of the offense committed." According to him, the State has shown serious concern with the above of checks as a commercial paper, as shown by various measures taken to curb the pernicious practice of issuing bouncing checks. For purpose of probation, what the law gives more importance to is the offender, not the crime. The inquiry is more on whether probation will help the offender along the lines for which the probation system has been established, such as giving the first-time offender a second chance to maintain his place in society through a process of reformation, which is better achieved, at least as to one who has not committed a very serious offense, when he is not mixed with hardened criminals in an atmosphere not conducive to soul-searching as within prison walls. The consciousness of the State's benignity in giving him that second chance to continue in peaceful and cordial association with his fellowmen will advance, rather than retard, the process of reformation in him. If, therefore, reformation is what the law is more, if not solely, concerned with, not the prevention by means of punitive measures, of the commission of the offense, it is readily seen that the respondent judge has fallen into a wrong obsession. He would, in effect, disqualify all those who commit estafa through bouncing checks from enjoying the benefits of probation. He would thereby add to the crimes expressly mentioned in the law which are not subject to probation. Thus, the only crimes mentioned in the law based on the nature thereof are those against national security (Section 9, paragraph b), the other crimes being those punished by more than six years imprisonment. Respondent judge would thus be writing into the law a new ground for disqualifying a first-offender from the benefits of probation, based on the nature of the crime, not on the penalty imposed as is the main criterion laid down by the law in determining who may be granted probation. That crime would be estafa only by issuing bouncing check, but not all forms of estafa, which, incidentally, is one offense the criminal liability for which is generally separated by a thin line from mere civil liability. For those who would commit the offense a second time or oftener, or commit an offense of manifest gravity, it is the long prison term which must be served that will act as
deterrent to protect society. In protecting society, the family of the offender which might be dependent or the latter to a greater or lesser extent for support or other necessities of life should not be lost sight of, it being the basic unit of that society. By the relative lightness of the offense, as measured by the penalty imposed, more than by its nature, as the law so ordains, the offender is not such a serious menace to society as to be wrested away therefrom, as the more dangerous type of criminals should be. The second reason of respondent judge for denying petition petitioner's bid for probation is that petitioner is allegedly not a penitent offender, as shown by his protestation of innocence even after his conviction by the trial court and the affirmance of his conviction by the Court of Appeals. We find the respondent judge, likewise, in error in assuming that petitioner has not shown repentance in committing the crime of which he has been found guilty by both the trial and appellate courts. If petitioner appealed the decision of the respondent judge to the Court of Appeals, he cannot be blamed for insisting on his version by which he could hope either to be acquitted or at least given a lighter penalty that would entitle him to the benefits of probation. 1äwphï1.ñët The recourse he took has, indeed, proved to be well worth the effort. His penalty was reduced on appeal which placed him within the benign purpose of the Probation Law. By the move he took by which to achieve this objective, acquittal not quite being within reach, petitioner cannot be said to be a nonpenitent offender, under serving of probation benefits. Once the opportunity was laid open to him, he grasped it; for instead of appealing further to the Supreme Court, he promptly applied for probation, made possible only by the reduced penalty imposed by the Court of Appeals. The penalty imposed by respondent court placed petitioner beyond the pale of the Probation Law. How can he be said to be a non-penitent offender, as the law would judge one to be so, just because he appealed, as he could not have them applied for probation even if he wanted to? Who knows but that if the penalty imposed by the trial court is that imposed by the Court of Appeals petitioner would have applied for probation forthwith? Under the circumstances as just pointed out, We find no sufficient justification for respondent judge's holding petitioner to be a non-penitent offender. We find, instead, that the liberality with which the Probation Law should be applied in favor of the applicant for its benefits affords the better means of achieving the purpose of the law, as indicated in Our decision in the case of Balleta Jr. vs. Hon. Leviste, G.R. No. L-49907, August 21, 1979, 92 SCRA 719, cited by the Solicitor-General who, as earlier stated, recommends granting of the instant petition for probation. WHEREFORE, the order of the respondent judge denying probation is set aside, and petitioner is hereby declared admitted to probation, subject to the terms and conditions as are prescribed by the law, and recommended by the probation officer. Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero and Abad Santos, JJ., concur. Aquino and Escolin, JJ., concur in the result.
GO-TAN VS. TAN 567 SCRA 231
SHARICA MARI L. GO-TAN, Petitioner, vs. SPOUSES PERFECTO C. TAN and JUANITA L. TAN, Respondents. AUSTRIA -MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the 1 Resolution dated March 7, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 94, Quezon City in Civil Case 2 No. Q-05-54536 and the RTC Resolution dated July 11, 2005 which denied petitioner's Verified Motion for Reconsideration. The factual background of the case: 3
On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan (petitioner) and Steven L. Tan (Steven) were married. Out of 4 5 this union, two female children were born, Kyra Danielle and Kristen Denise. On January 12, 2005, barely six years into the marriage, petitioner filed a Petition with Prayer for the Issuance of a Temporary 6 Protective Order (TPO) against Steven and her parents-in-law, Spouses Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita L. Tan (respondents) before the RTC. She alleged that Steven, in conspiracy with respondents, were causing verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her in violation of Section 5, paragraphs 7 8 (e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i) of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004." 9
On January 25, 2005, the RTC issued an Order/Notice granting petitioner's prayer for a TPO. On February 7, 2005, respondents filed a Motion to Dismiss with Opposition to the Issuance of 10 Permanent Protection Order Ad Cautelam and Comment on the Petition, contending that the RTC lacked jurisdiction over their persons since, as parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not covered by R.A. No. 9262. 11
On February 28, 2005, petitioner filed a Comment on Opposition to respondents' Motion to Dismiss arguing that respondents were covered by R.A. No. 9262 under a liberal interpretation thereof aimed at promoting the protection and safety of victims of violence. 12
On March 7, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution dismissing the case as to respondents on the ground that, being the parents-in-law of the petitioner, they were not included/covered as respondents under R.A. 13 No. 9262 under the well-known rule of law "expressio unius est exclusio alterius." 14
On March 16, 2005, petitioner filed her Verified Motion for Reconsideration contending that the doctrine of necessary implication should be applied in the broader interests of substantial justice and due process. 15
On April 8, 2005, respondents filed their Comment on the Verified Motion for Reconsideration arguing that petitioner's liberal construction unduly broadened the provisions of R.A. No. 9262 since the relationship between the offender and the alleged victim was an essential condition for the application of R.A. No. 9262. 16
On July 11, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution denying petitioner's Verified Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC reasoned that to include respondents under the coverage of R.A. No. 9262 would be a strained interpretation of the provisions of the law. Hence, the present petition on a pure question of law, to wit:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS-SPOUSES PERFECTO & JUANITA, PARENTS-IN-LAW OF SHARICA, MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF A PROTECTIVE ORDER, IN ACCORDANCE WITH REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9262, OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "ANTIVIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN ACT OF 2004". Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 9262 must be understood in the light of the provisions of Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 which explicitly provides for the suppletory application of the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and, accordingly, the provision on "conspiracy" under Article 8 of the RPC can be suppletorily applied to R.A. No. 9262; that Steven and respondents had community of design and purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial support; harassing and pressuring her to be ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically; that respondents should be included as indispensable or necessary parties for complete resolution of the case. On the other hand, respondents submit that they are not covered by R.A. No. 9262 since Section 3 thereof explicitly provides that the offender should be related to the victim only by marriage, a former marriage, or a dating or sexual relationship; that allegations on the conspiracy of respondents require a factual determination which cannot be done by this Court in a petition for review; that respondents cannot be characterized as indispensable or necessary parties, since their presence in the case is not only unnecessary but altogether illegal, considering the non-inclusion of in-laws as offenders under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262. The Court rules in favor of the petitioner. Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines '' violence against women and their children'' as "any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty." While the said provision provides that the offender be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the RPC. Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides for the suppletory application of the RPC, thus: SEC. 47. Suppletory Application. - For purposes of this Act, the Revised Penal Code and other applicable laws, shall have suppletory application. (Emphasis supplied)
Parenthetically, Article 10 of the RPC provides: ART. 10. Offenses not subject t o the provisions of this Code. – Offenses which are or in the future may be punishable under special laws are not subject to the provisions of this Code. This Code shall be supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should specially provide the contrary. (Emphasis supplied) Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code may be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes punished under special laws, such as R.A. No. 9262, in which the special law is silent on a particular matter. 18
Thus, in People v. Moreno, the Court applied suppletorily the provision on subsidiary penalty under Article 39 of the RPC to cases of violations of Act No. 3992, otherwise known as the "Revised Motor Vehicle Law," noting that the special law did not contain any provision that the defendant could be sentenced with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
19
In People v. Li Wai Cheung, the Court applied suppletorily the rules on the service of sentences provided in Article 70 of the RPC in favor of the accused who was found guilty of multiple violations of R.A. No. 6425, otherwise known as the "Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972," considering the lack of similar rules under the special law. 20
In People v. Chowdury, the Court applied suppletorily Articles 17, 18 and 19 of the RPC to define the words "principal," "accomplices" and "accessories" under R.A. No. 8042, otherwise known as the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995," because said words were not defined therein, although the special law referred to the same terms in enumerating the persons liable for the crime of illegal recruitment. 21
In Yu v. People, the Court applied suppletorily the provisions on subsidiary imprisonment under Article 39 of the RPC to Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg . 22, otherwise known as the "Bouncing Checks Law," noting the absence of an express provision on subsidiary imprisonment in said special law. 22
Most recently, in Ladonga v. People, the Court applied suppletorily the principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC to B.P. Blg . 22 in the absence of a contrary provision therein. With more reason, therefore, the principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262 because of the express provision of Section 47 that the RPC shall be supplementary to said law. Thus, general provisions of the RPC, which by their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied suppletorily. Thus, the principle of conspiracy may be applied to R.A. No. 9262. For once conspiracy or action in concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act of all the conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all the conspirators 23 are principals. It must be further noted that Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly recognizes that the acts of violence against women and their children may be committed by an offender through another, thus: SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against W omen and Their Children. - The crime of violence against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts: (h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct, personally or through another, that alarms or causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited to, the following acts: (1) Stalking or following the woman or her child in public or private places; (2) Peering in the window or lingering outside the residence of the woman or her child; (3) Entering or remaining in the dwelling or on the property of the woman or her child against her/his will; (4) Destroying the property and personal belongings or inflicting harm to animals or pets of the woman or her child; and (5) Engaging in any form of harassment or violence; x x x. (Emphasis supplied) In addition, the protection order that may be issued for the purpose of preventing further acts of violence against the woman or her child may include individuals other than the offending husband, thus: SEC. 8. Protection Orders. – x x x The protection orders that may be issued under this Act shall include any, some or all of the following reliefs: (a) Prohibition of the respondent from threatening to commit or committing, personally or through another , any of the acts mentioned in Section 5 of this Act; 1avvphi1.net (b) Prohibition of the respondent from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise communicating with the petitioner, directly or indirectly; x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Finally, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9262 calls for a liberal construction of the law, thus: SEC. 4. Construction. - This Act shall be liberally construed to promote the protection and safety of victims of violence against women and their children. (Emphasis supplied) 24 It bears mention that the intent of the statute is the law and that this intent must be effectuated by the courts. In the present case, the express language of R.A. No. 9262 reflects the intent of the legislature for liberal construction as will best ensure the attainment of the object of the law according to its true intent, meaning and spirit - the protection and safety of victims of violence against women and children. Thus, contrary to the RTC's pronouncement, the maxim "expressio unios est exclusio alterius" finds no application here. It must be remembered that this maxim is only an "ancillary rule of statutory construction." It is not of universal application. Neither is it conclusive. It should be applied only as a means of discovering legislative intent which is not otherwise manifest and should not be permitted to 25 defeat the plainly indicated purpose of the legislature. The Court notes that petitioner unnecessarily argues at great length on the attendance of circumstances evidencing the conspiracy or connivance of Steven and respondents to cause verbal, psychological and economic abuses upon her. However, conspiracy is an evidentiary matter which should be threshed out in a full-blown trial on the merits and cannot be determined in the present petition since this Court is not a 26 trier of facts. It is thus premature for petitioner to argue evidentiary matters since this controversy is centered only on the determination of whether respondents may be included in a petition under R.A. No. 9262. The presence or absence of conspiracy can be best passed upon after a trial on the merits. Considering the Court's ruling that the principle of conspiracy may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262, the Court will no longer delve on whether respondents may be considered indispensable or necessary parties. To do so would be an exercise in superfluity.
WHEREFORE , the instant petition is GRANTED . The assailed Resolutions dated March 7, 2005 and July 11, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 94, Quezon City in Civil Case No. Q-05-54536 are hereby PARTLY REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as the dismissal of the petition against respondents is concerned.
SO ORDERED .
PEOPLE VS. MANANTAN 5 SCRA 684
FACTS: Guillermo Manantan was charged with a violation of Section 54, Revised Election Code. However, Manantan claims that as "justice of peace", the defendant is not one of the officers enumerated in the said section. The lower court denied the motion to dismiss holding that a justice of peace is within the purview of Section 54. Under Section 54, "No justice, judge, fiscal, treasurer, or assessor of any province, no officer or employee of the Army, no member of the national, provincial, city, municipal or rural police force and no classified civil service officer or employee shall aid any candidate, or exert any influence in any manner in a election or take part therein, except to vote, if entitled thereto, or to preserve public peace, if he is a peace officer.". Defendant submits that the said election was taken from Section 449 of the Revised Administration Code wherein, "No judge of the First Instance, justice of the peace, or treasurer, fiscal or assessor of any province and no officer or employee of the Philippine Constabulary, or any Bureau or employee of the classified civil service, shall aid any candidate or exert influence in any manner in any election or take part therein otherwise than exercising the right to vote.". He claims that the words "justice of peace" was omitted revealed the intention of Legislature to exclude justices of peace from its operation.
ISSUE: Is justice of peace included in the prohibition of Section 64 of the Revised Election
Code?
HELD: Yes. It is included in Section 54. Justices of the peace were expressly included in Section 449 of the Revised Administrative Code because the kinds of judges therein were specified, i.e., judge of the First Instance and justice of the peace. In Section 54, however, there was no necessity therefore to include justices of the peace in the enumeration because the legislature had availed itself of the more generic and broader term, "judge.", which includes all kinds of judges. A "justice of the peace" is a judge. A "judge" is a public officer, who, by virtue of his office, is clothed with judicial authority. This term includes all officers appointed to to decide litigated questions while acting in that capacity, including justices of the peace, and even jurors, it is said, who are judges of facts. From the history of Section 54 of REC, the first omission of the word "justice of the peace" was effected in Section 48 of Commonwealth Act No. 357 and not in the present code as averred by defendant-appellee. Whenever the word "judge" was qualified by the phrase "of the First Instance', the words "justice of the peace" were omitted. It follows that when the legislature omitted the words "justice of the peace" in RA 180, it did not intend to exempt the said officer from its operation. Rather, it had considered the said officer as already comprehended in the broader term "judge".
The rule of "casus omisus pro omisso habendus est" is likewise invoked by the defendant-appellee. Under the said rule, a person, object or thing omitted from an enumeration must be held to have been omitted intentionally. However, it is applicable only if the omission has been clearly established. In the case at bar, the legislature did not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the enumeration of officers precluded from engaging in partisan political activities. In Section 54, justices of the peace were just called "judges". Also, the application of this rule does not proceed from the mere fact that a case is criminal in nature, but rather from a reasonable certainty that a particular person, object or thing has been omitted from a legislative enumeration. In the case at bar, there is no omission but only substitution of terms. The rule that penal statutes are given a strict construction is not the only factor controlling the interpretation of such laws; instead, the rule merely serves as an additional, single factor to be considered as an aid in determining the meaning of penal laws. Also, the purpose of the statute s to enlarge the officers within its purview. Justices of the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, and various judges, such as the judges of the Court of Industrial Relations, judges of the Court of Agrarian Relations, etc., who were not included in the prohibition under the old statute, are now within its encompass. The rule "expressio unius est exclusion alterius" has been erroneously applied by CA and lower courts because they were not able to give reasons for the exclusion of the legislature for the term "justices of peace".
AMADORA VS. COURT OF APPEALS 160 SCRA 315 (1988) Civil Law – Torts and Damages – Article 2180 – Liability of Schools of Arts and Trades and Academic Schools – Liability of Teachers and Heads of School
JOSE S. AMADORA, LORETA A. AMADORA, JOSE A. AMADORA JR., NORMA A. YLAYA PANTALEON A. AMADORA, JOSE A. AMADORA III, LUCY A. AMADORA, ROSALINDA A. AMADORA, PERFECTO A. AMADORA, SERREC A. AMADORA, VICENTE A. AMADORA and MARIA TISCALINA A. AMADORA, petitioners ,vs. HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, COLEGIO DE SAN JOSE-RECOLETOS, VICTOR LLUCH SERGIO P. DLMASO JR., CELESTINO DICON, ANIANO ABELLANA, PABLITO DAFFON thru his parents and natural guardians, MR. and MRS. NICANOR GUMBAN, and ROLANDO VALENCIA, thru his guardian, A. FRANCISCO ALONSO, respondents. FACTS: In April 1972, while the high school students of Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos were in the school auditorium, a certain Pablito Daffon fired a gun. The stray bullet hit Alfredo Amadora. Alfredo died. Daffon was convicted of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide. The parents of Alfredo sued the school for damages under Article 2180 of the Civil Code because of the school ’s negligence. The trial court ruled in favor of Amadora. The trial court ruled that the principal, the dean of boys, as well as the teacher-in-charge are all civilly liable. The school appealed as it averred that when the incident happened, the school year has already ended. Amadora argued that even though the semester has already ended, his son was there in school to complete a school requirement in his Physics subject. The Court of Appeals ruled in favor of the school. The CA ruled that under the last paragraph of Article 2180, only schools of arts and trades (vocational schools) are liable not academic schools like Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos.
ISSUE: Whether or not Colegio de San Jose-Recoletos, an academic school, is liable under Article 2180 of the Civil Code for the tortuous act of its students.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court made a re-examination of the provision on the last paragraph of Article 2180 which provides: Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students or apprentices so long as they remain in their custody. The Supreme Court said that it is time to update the interpretation of the above law due to the changing times where there is hardly a distinction between schools of arts and trade and academic schools. That being said, the Supreme Court ruled that ALL schools, academic or not, may be held liable under the said provision of Article 2180.
The Supreme Court however clarified that the school, whether academic or not, should not be held directly liable. Its liability is only subsidiary. For non-academic schools, it would be the principal or head of school who should be directly liable for the tortuous act of its students. This is because historically, in nonacademic schools, the head of school exercised a closer administration over their students than heads of academic schools. In short, they are more hands on to their students. For academic schools, it would be the teacher-in-charge who would be directly liable for the tortuous act of the students and not the dean or the head of school. The Supreme Court also ruled that such liability does not cease when the school year ends or when the semester ends. Liability applies whenever the student is in the custody of the school authorities as long as he is under the control and influence of the school and within its premises, whether the semester has not yet begun or has already ended at the time of the happening of the incident. As long as it can be shown that the student is in the school premises in pursuance of a legitimate student objective, in the exercise of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student right, and even in the enjoyment of a legitimate student privilege, the responsibility of the school authorities over the student continues. Indeed, even if the student should be doing nothing more than relaxing in the campus in the company of his classmates and friends and enjoying the ambience and atmosphere of the school, he is still within the custody and subject to the discipline of the school authorities under the provisions of Article 2180. At any rate, the REMEDY of the teacher, to avoid direct liability, and for the school, to avoid subsidiary liability, is to show proof that he, the teacher, exercised the necessary precautions to prevent the injury complained of, and the school exercised the diligence of a bonus pater familias. In this case however, the Physics teacher in charge was not properly named, and there was no sufficient evidence presented to make the said teacher-in-charge liable. Absent the direct liability of the teachers because of the foregoing reason, the school cannot be held subsidiary liable too.
MAPA VS. ARROYO 175 SCRA 76 (1989)
Jose Antonio Mapa vs. Hon. Joker Arroyo and Labrador Development Corporation G.R. No. 78585 (July 5, 1989)
FACTS: Mapa bought lots from Labrador Development Corporation which are payable in ten years. Mapa defaulted to pay the installment dues and continued to do so despite constant reminders by Labrador. The latter informed Mapa that the contracts to sell the lots were cancelled, but Mapa invoked Clause 20 of the four contracts. Said clause obligates Labrador to complete the development of the lots, except those requiring the services of a public utility company or the government, within 3 years from the date of the contract. Petitioner contends that P.D. 957 requires Labrador to provide the ―facilities, improvements, and infrastructures for the lots, and other forms of development‖ if offered and indicated in the approved subdivision plans.
ISSUE: Whether or not Clause 20 of the said contracts include and incorporate P.D. 957 through the doctrine of last antecedent, making the cancellation of the contracts of sale incorrect.
HELD: No. Labrador has every right to cancel the contracts of sale, pursuant to Clause 7 of the said contract for the reason of the lapse of five years of default payment from Mapa. P.D. 957 does not apply because it was enacted long after the execution of the contracts involved, and, other than those provided in Clause 20, no further written commitment was made by the developer. The words ―which are offered and indicated in the subdivision or condominium plans‖ refer not only to ―other forms of development‖ but also to ―facilities, improvements, and infrastructures‖. The word ―and‖ is not meant to separate words, but is a conjunction used to denote a joinder or a union.
REGALADO, J.:
We are called upon once again, in this special civil action for certiorari , for a pronouncement as to whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the executive branch of Government, particularly in the adjudication of a controversy originally commenced in one of its regulatory agencies. Petitioner herein seeks the reversal of the decision of the Office of the President, rendered by the Deputy 1 Executive Secretary on April 24, 1987, which dismissed his appeal from the resolution of the Commission Proper, Human Settlements Regulatory Commission (HSRC, for short), promulgated on January 10, 1986 and affirming the decision of July 3, 1985 of the Office of Adjudication and Legal Affairs (OAALA, for brevity) of HSRC. Petitioner avers that public respondent "gravely transcended the sphere of his discretion" in finding that Presidential Decree No. 957 is inapplicable to the contracts to sell involved in 2 this case and in consequently dismissing the same. The established facts on which the assailed decision is based are set out therein as follows:
Records disclose that, on September 18, 1975, appellant Jose Antonio Mapa and appellee Labrador Development Corporation (Labrador, for short), owner/developer of the Barangay Hills Subdivision in Antipolo, Rizal, entered into two contracts to sell over lots 12 and 13 of said subdivision. On different months in 1976, they again entered into two similar contracts involving lots 15 and 16 in the same subdivision. Under said contracts, Mapa undertook to make a total monthly installment of P2,137.54 over a period of ten (10) years. Mapa, however, defaulted in the payment thereof starting December 1976, prompting Labrador to send to the former a demand letter, dated May 5, 1977, giving him until May 18, 1977, within which to settle his unpaid installments for the 4 lots amounting to P15,411.66, with a warning that non-payment thereof will result in the cancellation of the four (4) contracts. Despite receipt of said letter on May 6,1977, Mapa failed to take any action thereon. Labrador subsequently wrote Mapa another letter, dated
June 15, 1982, which the latter received on June 21, 1982, reminding him of his total arrears amounting to P180,065.27 and demanding payment within 5 days from receipt thereof, but which letter Mapa likewise ignored. Thus, on August 16, 1982, Labrador sent Mapa a notarial cancellation of the four (4) contracts to sell, which Mapa received on August 20, 1982. On September 10, 1982, however, Mapa's counsel sent Labrador a letter calling Labrador's attention to, and demanding its compliance with, Clause 20 of the four (4) contracts to sell which relates to Labrador's obligation to provide, among others, lighting/water facilities to subdivision lot buyers.
On September 10, 1982, Labrador issued a certification holding the implementation of the letter dated August 16, 1982 (re notarial cancellation) pending the complete development of road lot cul de sac within the properties of Mapa at Barangay Hills Subdivision.' Thereafter on October 25,1982, Labrador sent Mapa a letter informing him 'that the construction of road, sidewalk, curbs and gutters adjacent to Block 11 Barangay Hills Subdivision are already completed' and further requesting Mapa to 'come to our office within five (5) days upon receipt of this letter to settle your account. On December 10, 1982, Mapa tendered payment by means of a check in the amount of P 2,137.54, but Labrador refused to accept payment for the reason that it was agreed 'that after the development of the cul de sac, he (complainant) will pay in full the total amount due,' which Labrador computed at P 260,138.61. On December 14, 1982, Mapa wrote Labrador claiming that 'you have not complied with the requirements for water and light facilities in lots 12, 13, 15 & 16 Block 2 of Barangay Hills Subdivision.' The following day, Mapa filed a complaint against Labrador for the latter's neglect to put 1) a water system that meets the minimum standard as specified by HSRC, and 2) electrical power supply. By way of relief, Mapa requested the HSRC to direct Labrador to provide the facilities aforementioned, and to issue a cease and desist order enjoining Labrador from cancelling the contracts to sell. After due hearing/investigation, which included an on-site inspection of the subdivision, OAALA, issued its decision of July 3, 1985, dismissing the complaint and declaring that after the lapse of 5 years from complainant's default respondent had every right to rescind the contract pursuant to Clause 7 thereof. . . Per its resolution of January 10, 1986, the Commission Proper, HSRC, affirmed the aforesaid 3 OAALA decision.
It was petitioner's adamant submission in the administrative proceedings that the provisions of 4 Presidential Decree No. 957 and implementing rules form part of the contracts to sell executed by him and respondent corporation, hence the obligations imposed therein had to be complied with by Labrador within the period provided. Since, according to petitioner, Labrador failed to perform the aforementioned obligations, it is precluded from rescinding the subject contracts to sell since petitioner consequently did not incur in delay on his part. Such intransigent position of petitioner has not changed in the petition at bar and unyielding reliance is placed on the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 957 and its implementing rules. The specific provisions of the Decree which are persistently relied upon read: SEC. 20. Time of Completion. — Every owner or developer shall construct and provide the facilities, improvements, infrastructures and other forms of development, including water supply and lighting facilities, which are offered and indicated in the approved subdivision or condominium plans, brochures, prospectus, printed matters letters or in any form of advertisements, within one year from the date of the issuance of the license for the subdivision or condominium project or such other period of time as may be fixed by the Authority.
SEC. 21. Sales Prior to Decree. — In cases of subdivision lots or condominium units sold or disposed of prior to the effectivity of this Decree, it shall be incumbent upon the owner or developer of the subdivision or condominium project to complete compliance with his or its obligations as provided in the preceding section within two years from the date of this Decree unless otherwise extended by the Authority or unless an adequate performance bond is filed in accordance with Section 6 hereof. Failure of the owner or developer to comply with the obligations under this and the preceding provisions shall constitute a violation punishable under Sections 38 and 39 of this Decree. Rule V of the implementing rules, on the other hand, requires two (2) sources of electric power, two (2) deep-well and pump sets with a specified capacity and two standard fire hose flows with a capacity of 175 5 gallons per minute. The provision, in said contracts to sell which, according to petitioner, includes and incorporates the aforequoted statutory provisions, is Clause 20 of said contracts which provides: Clause 20. SUBDIVISION DEVELOPMENT — To insure the physical development of the subdivision, the SELLER hereby obliges itself to provide the individual lot buyer with the following: a) b) c) d) e)
PAVED ROADS UNDERGROUND DRAINAGE CONCRETE CURBS AND GUTTERS WATER SYSTEM PARK AND OPEN SPACE
These improvements shall apply only to the portions of the subdivision which are for sale or have been sold. All improvements except those requiring the services of a public utility company or the government shall be completed within a period of three (3) years from date of this contract. Failure by the SELLER to reasonably comply with the above schedule shall permit the BUYER/ S to suspend his monthly installments without any penalties or interest charges until such time that these improvements shall have 6 been made as scheduled. As recently reiterated, it is jurisprudentially settled that absent a clear, manifest and grave abuse of discretion amounting to want of jurisdiction, the findings of the administrative agency on matters falling 7 within its competence will not be disturbed by the courts. Specifically with respect to factual findings, they are accorded respect, if not finality, because of the special knowledge and expertise gained by these tribunals from handling the specific matters falling under their jurisdiction. Such factual findings may be disregarded only if they "are not supported by evidence; where the findings are vitiated by fraud, imposition or collusion; where the procedure which led to the factual findings is irregular; when palpable 8 errors are committed; or when grave abuse of discretion, arbitrariness or capriciousness is manifest." A careful scrutiny of the records of the instant case reveals that the circumstances thereof do not fag under the aforesaid excepted cases, with the findings duly supported by the evidence. Petitioner's insistence on the applicability of Presidential Decree No. 957 must be rejected. Said decree was issued on July 12, 1976 long after the execution of the contracts involved. Obviously and necessarily, what subsequently were statutorily provided therein as obligations of the owner or developer could not have been intended by the parties to be a part of their contracts. No intention to give retrospective application to the provisions of said decree can be gathered from the language thereof. Section 20, in relation to Section 21, of the decree merely requires the owner or developer to construct the facilities, improvements, infrastructures and other forms of development but only such as are offered and indicated in the approved subdivision or condominium plans, brochures, prospectus, printed matters, letters or in any form of advertisements. Other than what are provided in Clause 20 of the contract, no further written commitment was made by the developer in this respect. To read into the contract the matters desired by petitioner would have the law impose additional obligations on the parties to a contract executed before that very law existed or was contemplated.
We further reject petitioner's strained and tenuous application of the so-called doctrine of last antecedent in the interpretation of Section 20 and, correlatively, of Section 21. He would thereby have the enumeration of "facilities, improvements, infrastructures and other forms of development" interpreted to mean that the demonstrative phrase "which are offered and indicated in the approved subdivision plans, etc." refer only to "other forms of development" and not to "facilities, improvements and infrastructures." While this subserves his purpose, such bifurcation whereby the supposed adjectival phrase is set apart from the antecedent words, is illogical and erroneous. The complete and applicable rule is ad proximum 9 antecedens fiat relatio nisi impediatur sentencia. Relative words refer to the nearest antecedent, unless it be prevented by the context. In the present case, the employment of the word "and" between "facilities, improvements, infrastructures" and "other forms of development," far from supporting petitioner's theory, enervates it instead since it is basic in legal hermeneutics that "and" is not meant to separate words but is a conjunction used to denote a joinder or union. Thus, if ever there is any valid ground to suspend the monthly installments due from petitioner, it would only be based on non-performance of the obligations provided in Clause 20 of the contract, particularly the alleged non-construction of the cul-de-sac. But, even this is unavailing and is obviously being used only to justify petitioner's default. The on-site inspection of the subdivision conducted by the OAALA and 10 its subsequent report reveal that Labrador substantially complied with its obligation. Furthermore, the initial non-construction of the cul-de-sac, as private respondent Labrador explained, was because petitioner Mapa requested the suspension of its construction since his intention was to purchase 11 the adjoining lots and thereafter enclose the same. If these were not true, petitioner would have invoked that supposed default in the first instance. As the OAALA noted, petitioner "stopped payments of his monthly obligations as early as December, 1976, which is a mere five months after the effectivity of P.D. No. 957 or about a year after the execution of the contracts. This means that respondent still has 1 and 1/2 years to comply with its legal obligation to develop the subdivision under said P.D. and two years to do so under the agreement, hence, it was improper for complainant to have suspended payments in December, 1976 on the ground of non-development since the period allowed for respondent's obligation 12 to undertake such development has not yet expired." ON THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the petition should be, as it is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
MTRCB VS. ABS BROADCASTING CORP. 448 SCRA 575
FACTS: On October 15, 1991, at 10:45 in the evening, respondent ABS-CBN aired "Prosti-tuition," an episode of the television (TV) program "The Inside Story" produced and hosted by respondent Legarda. It depicted female students moonlighting as prostitutes to enable them to pay for their tuition fees. In the course of the program, student prostitutes, pimps, customers, and some faculty members were interviewed. The Philippine Women’s University (PWU) was named as the school of some of the students involved and the facade of PWU Building at Taft Avenue, Manila conspicuously served as the background of the episode. The showing of "The Inside Story" caused uproar in the PWU community. Dr. Leticia P. de Guzman, Chancellor and Trustee of the PWU, and the PWU Parents and Teachers Association filed letter-complaints3 with petitioner MTRCB. Both complainants alleged that the episode besmirched the name of the PWU and resulted in the harassment of some of its female students.
ISSUE: Is
a
prior
submission
to
MTRCB
a
case
of
prior
restraint?
HELD: Petitioner MTRCB through the Solicitor General, contends inter alia: first, all television programs, including "public affairs programs, news documentaries, or sociopolitical editorials," are subject to petitioner’s power of review under Section 3 (b) of P.D. No. 1986 and pursuant to this Court’s ruling in I glesia ni Cristo vs. Court of Appeals ;25second, television programs are more accessible to the public than newspapers, thus, the liberal regulation of the latter cannot apply to the former; third, petitioner’s power to review television programs under Section 3(b) of P. D. No. 1986 does not amount to "prior restraint;" and fourth, Section 3(b) of P. D. No. 1986 does not violate respondents’ constitutional freedom of expression and of the press.
Sando val-Gutierrez, J.
ABS-CBN aired ―Prosti-tuition,‖ an episode of The Inside Story produced and hosted by Loren Legarda. It depicted of female students moonlighting as prostitutes to enable them to pay for their tuition fees and interviewed student prostitutes, pimps, customers and some faculty members. Philipp ine Women’s University (PWU) was named as the school of some of the students involved and the façade of PWU served as the background of the episode. It caused uproar in the PWU community. Dr. Leticia de Guzman (Chancellor and Trustee of PWU) and PWU Parents and Teachers Association file letter complaints with petitioner MTRCB, alleging that the episode be smirched the name of the PWU and resulted in the harassment of some of its female students. MTRCB Legal Counsel initiated a formal complaint with the MTRCB Investigating Committee alleging that respondents:
a) did not submit The Inside Story to MTRCB for review b) exhibited the same without its permission, violating Sec. 7of PD 1986 and Sec. 3, Chapter III and Sec. 7, Chapter IV of MTRCB Rules and Regulations Respondents: The Inside Story is a public affairs program, news documentary and socio-political editorial, the airing of which is protected by the constitutional provision on freedom of expression and of the press. MTRCB has no power, authority and jurisdiction to impose any form of prior restraint Upon respondents .MTRCB Investigating Committee ordered respondents to payP20, 000 for non-submission of the program and declared that all subsequent programs of the The Inside Story and all other programs of the ABSCBN Ch 2 of the same category shall be submitted to the Board of Review and Approval before showing. On appeal, the Chairman of MTRCB issued a Decision affirming the ruling of the Investigating Committee. Respondents filed a special civil action for certiorari with the RTC and sought to:-declare unconstitutional certain provisions of PD 1986and MTRCB Rules and Regulations a) (alternative) exclude The Inside Story from the coverage of such provisions b) annul and set aside MTRCB Decision and Resolution … because they constitute prior restraint on respondents’ exercise of freedom of expression and of the press, and those provisions do not apply to The Inside Story because it falls under the category of ―public affairs program, news documentary or socio-political editorials‖ governed by standards similar to those governing newspapers.RTC decided in favor of ABSCBN: a) -annulled Decision and Resolution of the MTRCB b) -declared that assailed provisions do not cover The Inside Story and other similar programs for being public affairs programs which can be equated to newspapers Hence, this petition for review on certiorari by MTRCB.
ISSUE: Whether or not the MTRCB has the power/authority to review the ―The Inside Story‖ prior to its exhibition or broadcast by television.
HELD: YES. MTRCB/SG: (1) all TV programs including public affairs programs, news documentaries or socio-political editorials are subject to MTRCB’s power of review, (2) TV programs are more accessible to the public than newspapers, thus liberal regulation cannot apply, (3) power to review TV programs does not amount to prior restraint, (4) Sec. 3(b) of PD 1986 does not violate respondents’ constitutional freedom of expression and of the press.SC: Rule in statutory construction:
U b i l e x n o n d i s t i n g u i t n e c d i s t i n g u e r e d e b e m o s ( w h e r e t h e l aw d o e s n o t m a k e a n y exception, courts may not except something there from, unless there is c o m p e l l i n g r e a s o n a p p a r e n t i n t h e l a w t o j u s t i f y i t ). When the law sa ys ―all television
programs,‖ the word ―all‖ covers all TV programs, whether religious, public affairs, news documentary, etc. Since The Inside Story is a TV program, it is within the jurisdiction of the MTRCB over which it has power of review. There also has been no declaration by the framers of the Constitution that freedom of expression and of the press has a preferred status. If the SC did not exempt religious programs from the jurisdiction and review power of MTRCB, with more reason, there is no justification to exempt there from The Inside Story. The only exceptions are TV programs imprinted or exhibited by the Philippine Government and/or its departments and agencies, and newsreels. WON The Inside Story falls under the category of Newsreels. Respondents: Yes.SC: NO. It is not defined in PD 1986 but Webster’s dictionary defines it as short motion picture films portraying or dealing with current events; mostly reenactments of events that had already happened. The MTRCB Rules and Regulations define it as straight news reporting, as distinguished from new analyses, commentaries and opinions. The Inside Story is more of a public affairs program, a variety of news treatment; across between pure tv news and news-related commentaries, etc. within MTRCB’s r eview power. MTRCB did not disapprove or ban the showing of the program nor did it cancel respondents’ permit. The latter was merely penalized for their failure to submit the program to MTRCB for its review and approval. Therefore, there is no need to resolve whether certain provisions of PD 1986 and MTRCB Rules and Regulations contravene the Constitution. No question involving the constitutionality or validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the court unless there is compliance with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry: -proper party -actual case or controversy -question raised at the earliest possible opportunity -the decision on the constitutional or legal question must be necessary to the determination of the case itself Petition of MTRCB Granted. RTC Decision Reversed. MTRCB Decision Affirmed.
GUERRERO VS. COMELEC 336 SCRA 458
FACTS: Guillermo Ruiz filed a petition to disqualify respondent Rodolfo Fariñas as a candidate for the position of Congressman in the First District of Ilocos Norte. Ruiz alleged that Fariñas had been campaigning as a candidate for Congressman in the May 11, 1998 polls, despite his failure to file a certificate of candidacy for said office. On May 8, 1998 or 3 days before the election, Farinas filed his certificate of candidacy substituting candidate Chevylle Farinas who withdrew on April 3, 1998. On May 10, 1998, the COMELEC dismissed the petition of Ruiz. After the election, Farinas was duly proclaimed winner. Ruiz filed a motion for reconsideration, contending that Farinas could not validly substitute for Chevylle Farinas, since the latter was not the official candidate of LAMMP, but was an independent candidate. On June 3, 1988, Farinas took his oath of office as a member of the House of Representatives. Comelec dismissed the MR on the ground that the matter is now within the exclusive jurisdiction of the House of Representative Electoral Tribunal.
ISSUES: Did the COMELEC commit grave abuse of discretion in holding that the determination of the validity of the certificate of candidacy of respondent Fariñas is already within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Electoral Tribunal of the House of Representatives?
HELD: There is no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC when it held that its jurisdiction over the case had ceased with the assumption of office of respondent Farinas as Representative for the first district of Ilocos Norte. While COMELEC is vested with the power to declare valid or invalid a certificate of candidacy, its refusal to exercise that power following the proclamation and assumption of the position by Farinas is recognition of the jurisdictional boundaries separating the COMELEC and the HRET. Under Art. VI, Sec. 17 of the Constitution, the HRET has sole and exclusive jurisdiction over all contests relative to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the House of Representatives. Thus, once a winning candidate has been proclaimed, taken his oath, and assumed office as a member of the House of Representatives, COMELEC’s jurisdiction over election contests relating to his election, returns and qualifications ends, and the HRET’s own jurisdiction begins. Thus, the COMELEC’s decision to discont inue exercising jurisdiction over the case is justifiable, in deference to the HRET’s own jurisdiction and functions. In an electoral contest where the validity of the proclamation of a winning candidate who has taken his oath of office and assumed his post as Congressman is raised, that issue is best addressed to the HRET. The reason for this ruling is self-evident, for it avoids duplicity of proceedings and a clash of jurisdiction between constitutional bodies, with due regard to the people’s mandate.
CHUA VS. CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION 206 SCRA 65
FACTS: In line with the policy of streamlining and trimming the bureaucracy, R.A.6683 was enacted to provide for the early retirement and voluntary separation of government employees affected due to reorganization, those who may avail were regular, casual, temporary and emergency employees, with rendered service minimum of two years. Petitioner Lydia Chua was hired by the National Irrigation Administration Authority (NIA) for over 15 years as a coterminous employee of 4 successive NIA projects. She availed of the above mentioned law only to be denied as the CSC who deemed her unqualified, being a coterminous employee. She was instead offered a severance of ½ monthly basic pay for each year of service.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was entitled to avail of the early retirement benefit as a coterminous employee.
HELD: It was stated that a coterminous employee is a non-career civil servant like casual and emergency employees, because of that they are entitled to the same benefits as long as they complied with the requirements of the law, which in this case, was done by Linda Chua. On that note, the court believes that the denial of petitioner’s application for early retirement benefits by the NIA and CSC is unreasonable, unjustified and oppressive due to the fact that she is entitled to the benefits of the same law because she served the government not only for two (2) years which is the minimum requirement under the law but for fifteen (15) years. In four (4) governmental projects. Wherefore, the petition is granted.
