PARTICULAR LATIN RULES
Mens legislatoris 1.Matabuena v. Cervantes It is a fundamental principle n statutory construction construction that what is within the spirit of the law is as much a part of the law as what what is writt written en.. Since Since the the reason reason for the the ban on donations between between spouses during the marriage is to prevent the possibility of undue influence and improper pressure being exerted by one spouse on the other, there is no reason why this this proh prohib ibit itio ion n shou should ld not not also also appl apply y to comm common on-l -law aw relat relation ionshi ships ps.. Reas Reason on and and moral morality ity alike alike dema demand nd that that disabilities attached to marriage should likewise attached to concubinage. Otherwise, one would be putting a premium on immoral relationship and place them on a better footing than a lawful and moral relationship. •
Dura Lex Sed Lex 2.People v. Mapa The law cannot be any clearer. No provision is made for a secret agent. As such, he is not exempt. Our task is equally clear. The first and fundamental duty of courts is to apply the law. “Construction and interpretation come only after it has been been demo demons nstr trat ated ed that that appl applic icat atio ion n is impo imposs ssib ible le or inadequate without them.” •
Expressio Unius est exclusio alterius 4.People v. Estenzo Under Under the legal maxim maxim in Statuto Statutory ry Constru Constructio ction n of EXPRESS EXPRESSIO IO UNIUS UNIUS EST EXCLUS EXCLUSIO IO ALTERIUS ALTERIUS,, the express express mention of one thing in a law, as a general rule, means the exclusio exclusion n of others others not expressly expressly mention. mention. This rule, rule, as a guide to probable legislative intent, is based upon the rules of logic and the natural workings of the human mind. If R.A. No. 6236 had intended that the extension it provided for applies also to re-opening of Cadastral Proceedings, it would have so provided in the same way that it had provided the extension of time to file the two other proceedings. The respondent judge had concluded that R.A. No. 6236 is applicable also to the re-opening of cadastral proceedings, •
thereby altering R.A. No. 6236. That cannot be done by the judicia judiciary; ry; that that is a function function that properly properly pertains pertains to the legislative branch. As was pointed out in Gonzaga v. Court of Appeals, “It has been repeated time and again that where the statutory norm speaks unequivocally, there is nothing for the courts to do except to apply it. The law, leaving no doubt as to the scope of its operation, must be obeyed.” Our decisions have consistently been to that effect. Likewise, it is a cardinal rule of Statutory Construction that that wher where e the the term terms s of the the stat statu ute are are clea clearr and and unambiguous, no interpretation is called for, and the law is appli applied ed as writt written en,, for appli applica catio tion n is the the first first duty duty of the the courts, and interpretations, interpretations, only where literal application is impossible or inadequate. FOR DISCUSSION: Apparently, Judge Estenzo knew that not all three remedies had been extended. What possible rationale did he have in mind when he included re-opening re-opening of cadastral cadastral proceedings in the remedies that were extended? Ejusdem Generis 5.Mutuc v. COMELEC Applying the principle of EJUSDEM EJUSDEM GENERIS, ‘general words following any enumeration being applicable to things of the same kind or class as those specifically referred to.’ It is quite apparent that what was contemplated in the Act was the distribution of gadgets of the kind referred to as a means of inducement to obtain a favourable vote for the candidate. •
Casus Omissus Casus omissus omissus pro omisso omisso habendu habendus s est (restric (restrictiv tive e Casus rule) 6.People v. Manantan The rule of “casus omissus pro omisso habendus est” can operate and apply only if and when the omission has been clearly established. In the case at bar, the Legislature did not exclude or omit justices of the peace from the enumeration of officers precluded from engaging in partisan political activities. Rather, they were merely called by another term – “judges.” The rule, therefore, has no applicability to the instant case. •
Permissive rule 7.Lopez v. CTA Under the rule of CASUS OMISSUS, words and phrases may be furnished by the court where that is essential to eliminate repugnancy and inconsistency in the statutes, to give effect to the intention of the Legislature manifested therein. Here, in this case, the error was clear. It is within the province of the courts to correct said error so as to give undue course to the intention of the Legislature.
Noscitur a sociis 8.Sanciangco v. Rono When the language of a particular section of a statute admits of more than one construction, that construction which gives effect to the evident purpose and object sought to be attained by the whole statute, must be followed. A statute’s clauses and phrases should not be considered as isolated and detached expressions but rather, the whole must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. •
9.Caltex Phil. V. Palomar Taking this cue, we note that in the Postal Law, the term in question is used in association with the word ‘lottery’. With the meaning of lottery settled, and consonant with the well-known principle of legal hermeneutics NOSCITUR A SOCIIS – which Opinion217 aforesaid also relied upon although only insofar as the element of chance is concerned – it is only logical that the term under a construction should be accorded no other meaning than that which is consistent with the nature of the word associated therewith. Hence, if lottery is prohibited only if it involves a consideration, so also must the term ‘gift enterprise’ be so construed. Significantly, there is not in the law the slightest indicium of any intent to eliminate that element of consideration from the ‘gift enterprise’ therein included.
CONSTRUCTION OF WORDS AND PHRASES
“May” and “Shall” 10.Capati v. Ocampo •
It is well settled that the word “may” is merely permissive and operates to confer discretion upon a party. Under ordinary circumstances, the term “may be” connotes possibility; it does not connote certainty. “May” is an auxillary verb indicating liberty, opportunity, permission or possibility. “And” and “Or” 11.Amon Trading Corp. V. Court of Appeals The term “and/or” was held to mean that effect shall be given to both the conjunctive “and” and disjunctive “or”; or that one word or the other may be taken accordingly as one or the other will best effectuate the intended purpose. It was accordingly ordinarily held that in using the term “and/or” the word “and” and the word “or” are to be used interchangeably. •
12.GMCR v. Bell Telecommunications The conjunctive word “and” is not without legal significance. It is not, by any chance, a surplusage in the law. It means “in addition to”. The word “and”, whether it is used to connect words, phrases or full sentences, must be accepted as binding together and as relating to one another. “Principally” and “Exclusively” 13.Alfon v. Republic The only reason why the lower court denied the petition was because of Article 364. The word “principally” as used in said article is not equivalent to “exclusively” so that there is no legal obstacle if a legitimate or legitimated child should choose to use the surname of its mother to which it is equally entitled. •
“Previously” 14.Rura v. Lopena The statute relates “previously” to the date of conviction and not to the date of the commission of the crimes. Although he was convicted of estafa on five counts, there was only one decision. Therefore, when Rura applied for probation, he had no previous conviction by final judgment and the only conviction against him was the final judgment which was the subject of his application. •
“Every” 15.NHA v. Juco “Every” means each one of a group, without exception. It means all possible and all, taken one by one. Of course, our decision in this case refers to a corporation created as a government-owned or controlled entity. It does not cover cases involving private firms taken over by the government in foreclosure or similar proceedings. We reserve judgment on these latter cases when the appropriate controversy is brought to this court. •
•
“Surplusage”
16.Demafiles v. COMELEC Here is a clear case of a failure to express a meaning and a becoming sense of judicial modesty forbids the court from assuming and, consequently, from supplying. “Punctuations” 17.Arabay v. CFI of Zamboanga Del Norte A reasonable and practical interpretation of the terms of the proviso results in the conclusion that Congress had intended to exclude gasoline from the prohibition against both sales and specific taxes. Obviously, the phrase “except gasoline” also applies to sales tax (in fact more so than specific tax) because gasoline is of no practical use to the produces unless it is sold. •
“Other examples” 18.People v. Mejia The word “is killed” makes no distinction between homicide and murder. The phrase “is killed” only refers to consummated murder, not merely frustrated murder. It is not a separate crime. It is still absorbed as a complex crime. Not carnapping with murder but carnapping committed by means of violence, with the lower penalty of imprisonment for not less than 17 years and 4 months and not more than 30 years. •
SPECIAL OVER GENERAL
What is the rule regarding conflicting provisions of the same statute? 70. Manila Railroad Company v. Insular Collector of Customs It is the general rule in the interpretation of statutes levying taxes or duties not to extend their provisions beyond the clear import of the language used. In every case of doubt, such statutes are construed most strongly against the Government and in favor of the citizen, because burdens are not to be imposed, nor presumed to be imposed, beyond what the statutes expressly and clearly import. In the case at bar, taking account the purpose of the article, it is acknowledged that in reality, it is used as a detached part of railway vehicles. Paragraph 141 is a general provision while paragraph 197 is a special provision. Where there is in the same statute a particular enactment and also a general one which in its most comprehensive sense would include what is embraced in the former, the particular enactment must be operative, and the general enactment must be taken to effect only such cases within its general language as are not within the provisions of the particular enactment. •
71. Almeda v. Florentino There is no indication that the legislature repealed any section of R.A. No. 183 other than that of Section 12, par. 1. The provision touching on the Secretary being appointed by the Board is particular while the power granted to the ViceMayor is very general, embracing all employees. There is no other alternative but to interpret the charter as limiting the power of the Vice-Mayor under Section 12 (as amended) to the appointment of all employees of the Board other than the Board Secretary, who is to be appointed by the Board itself as specifically prescribed by Section 14 of the Pasay City Charter. Where there is a specific law and a general law dealing with the same subject, the specific law should prevail over the general one.
What is the rule regarding conflicting provisions of different statutes? 72. Laxamana v. Baltazar •
Even disregarding their origin, the allegedly conflicting sections, could be interpreted in the light of the principle of statutory construction that when a general and a particular provision are inconsistent the latter is paramount to the former (Sec. 288, Act 190). Where one statute deals with a subject in general terms, and another deals with a part of the same subject in a more detailed way, the two should be harmonized if possible; but if there is any conflict, the latter will prevail, regardless of whether it was passed prior to the general statute. In the case at bar, section 2195 referring particularly to vacancy in the office of mayor, must prevail over the general terms of section 21(a) as to vacancies of municipal (local) offices. Otherwise stated, section 2195 may be deemed an exception to or qualification of the latter.
73. Butuan Sawmill v. City of Butuan Where there are two statutes, the earlier special and the later general — the terms of the general broad enough to include the matter provided for in the special — the fact that one is special and the other is general creates a presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining an exception to the general, one as a general law of the land, the other as the law of a particular case.
It is true that, insofar as its territorial application is concerned, Republic Act No. 409 is a special law and the Civil Code a general legislation; but, as regards the subject-matter of the provisions above quoted, Section 4 of Republic Act 409 establishes a general rule regulating the liability of the City of Manila for: "damages or injury to persons or property arising from the failure of" city officers "to enforce the provisions of" said Act "or any other law or ordinance, or from negligence" of the city "Mayor, Municipal Board, or other officers while enforcing or attempting to enforce said provisions." Upon the other hand, Article 2189 of the Civil Code constitutes a particular prescription making "provinces, cities and municipalities . . . liable for damages for the death of, or injury suffered by any person by reason" ? specifically ? "of the defective condition of roads, streets, bridges, public buildings, and other-public works under their control or supervision." In other words, said section 4 refers to liability arising from negligence, in general, regardless of the object thereof, whereas Article 2189 governs liability due to "defective streets," in particular. Since the present action is based upon the alleged defective condition of a road, said Article 2189 is decisive thereon.
EXTERNAL AIDS
74. Arayata v. Joya The provisions of the Civil Code referring to conjugal property cannot be applied in this case, as was done by the trial court, because the law regulating the acquisition, disposition, and transmission of rights to the friar lands acquired by the Insular Government, lays down rules in conflict with the aforesaid provisions of the Civil Code; and as the said Code is of a general character, while Act No. 1120 is a special law, the latter should prevail.
What is the rule in case of conflict between a special provision of a general law and a general provision of a special law? 75. City of Manila v. Teotico •
Legislative Debates 77. Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila v. SSC The rule ejusdem generis applies only where there is uncertainty. It is not controlling where the plain purpose and intent of the Legislature would thereby be hindered and defeated. In the case at bar, it is apparent that the coverage of the Social Security Law is predicated on the existence of an employer-employee relationship of more or less permanent nature and extends to employment of all kinds except those expressly excluded. The definition of the term “employer” is, thus, sufficiently comprehensive as to include religious and charitable institutions or entities not organized for profit within its meaning. Had the Legislature really intended to limit the operation of the law to entities organized for profit or gain, it would not have defined an “employer” in such a way as to •
include the Government and yet make an express exception of it. Contemporaneous Acts of the Legislature 78. David v. COMELEC David argues that RA 7160, while it is alter enactment, is a general law as it applies to all local elective officials while RA 6679 applies specifically to barangay officials. David further argues that RA 7160 violates the Constitution which mandates a term for barangay officials of a term other than 3 years. First of all, the Supreme Court had already ruled (although indirectly) in Paras v. COMELEC, when it stated that “the next regular election involving the barangay office is barely 7 months away, the same having been scheduled in May 1997.” Also Congress confirmed this interpretation when it passed the General Appropriations Act which provided for a budget for barangay elections for May 1997. Further, David is stopped from questioning RA 7160. He was elected directly as barangay captain pursuant to RA 7160. Under No. 6653, there was no provision for direct election of the barangay captain. Finally, there is violation of the Constitution. Sec. 8, Art. X of the Constitution. •
01. Vera v. Cuevas As stated in the early part of this decision, with the repeal of Sections 141 and 177 of the Tax Code, Section 169 has lost its tax purpose. Since Section 169 is devoid of any tax purpose, petitioner Commissioner necessarily lost his authority to enforce the same. This was so held by his predecessor immediately after Sections 141 and 177 were repealed in General Circular No. V-85 as stated in paragraph IX of the Partial Stipulation of facts entered into by the parties, to wit: ... As the act of sewing skimmed milk without first paying the specific tax thereon is no longer unlawful and the enforcement of the requirement in regard to the placing of the proper legend on its immediate containers is a subject which does not come within the jurisdiction of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, the penal provisions of Section 177 of the said Code having been repealed by Republic Act No. 463. (p. 102, Rollo).
Legislative history 1. Commissioner of Customs v. ESSO Standard Eastern Inc. It is a well accepted principle that where a statute is ambiguous, as Republic Act No. 1394 appears to be, courts may examine both the printed pages of the published Act as well as those extrinsic matters that may aid in construing the meaning of the statute, such as the history of its enactment, the reasons for the passage of the bill and purposes to be accomplished by the measure. In order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. In fact every statute should receive such construction as will make it harmonize with the pre-existing body of laws. Antagonism between the Act to be interpreted and existing or previous laws is to be avoided, unless it was clearly the intention of the legislature that such antagonism should arise and one amends or repeals the other, either expressly or by implication. Another rule applied by this Court is that the courts may take judicial notice of the origin and history of the statutes which they are called upon to construe and administer, and of facts which affect their derivation, validity and operation. •
2. Palanca v. City of Manila Statues which are plain and specific should be applied without attempted construction and interpretation. Legislative intention is most eloquently demonstrated by a comparison of the law as it existed in 1914 to 1916 and as it now exists. And the fact that the Legislature found it necessary, in order to effect that purpose, to modify the terms of the original statute when reenacting it as a part of the Administrative Code, by the insertion of the words "at the place of production," shows that prior to the introduction of that amendment the statute had a different meaning. It is an express recognition on the part of the legislative branch of the government that without the use of such words of limitation the license to the distiller would permit him to sell the products of the distillery at places other than "the place of production."
03. National Police Commission v. De Guzman Courts are not without recourse in determining the construction of the statute with doubtful meaning for they may avail themselves of the actual proceedings of the legislative body. In case of doubt as to what a provision of a statute means, the meaning put to the provision during the legislative deliberations may be adopted. Courts should not give a literal interpretation to the letter of the law if it runs counter to the legislative intent.
The time-honored doctrine is that all laws (PD No. 771 included) are presumed valid and constitutional until or unless otherwise ruled by this Court. We need not go to this extent, however, since the rule is that laws must be presumed valid, constitutional and in harmony with other laws. Thus, the relevant provisions of Rep. Acts Nos. 409 and 954 and Ordinance No. 7065 should be taken together and i t should then be clear that the legislative powers of the Municipal Board should be understood to be regulatory in nature and that Republic Act No. 954 should be understood to refer to congressional franchises, as a necessity for the operation of jai-alai.
PRESUMPTIONS
In favor of validity of legislative acts 79. NHA v. Reyes One of the basic postulates in constitutional law is the presumption of validity of legislative or executive acts. In Angara v. Electoral Commission the leading case on the subject until now, Justice Laurel, in speaking of judicial review, made clear that it is not for the judiciary to "pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of legislation." His landmark opinion continues: "More than that, courts accord the presumption of constitutionality to legislative enactments, not only because the legislature is presumed to abide by the Constitution but also because the judiciary in the determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the government. •
1. Aris (Phils) Inc. v. NLRC, et. al. The theory is that, as the joint act of the legislative and executive authorities, a law is supposed to have been carefully studied and determined to be constitution before it was finally enacted. Hence, as long as there is some other basis that can be used by the courts for its decision, the constitutionality of the challenged law will not be touched upon and the case will be decided on other available grounds. 02. Lim v. Pacquing and Associated Development Corp.
• In favor of beneficial operation of statutes 80. Paat v. CA It is, thus, clear from the foregoing provision that the Secretary and his duly authorized representatives are given the authority to confiscate and forfeit any conveyances utilized in violating the Code or other forest laws, rules and regulations. The phrase “to dispose of the same” is broad enough to cover the act of forfeiting conveyances in favor of the government. The only limitation is that it should be made “in accordance with pertinent laws, regulations or policies on the matter.” In the construction of statutes, it must be read in such a way as to give effect to the purpose projected in the statute.[33] Statutes should be construed in the light of the object to be achieved and the evil or mischief to be suppressed, and they should be given such construction as will advance the object, suppress the mischief, and secure the benefits intended.
In favor of right and justice 1. Salvacion v. Central Bank In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 which exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This •
would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code which provides that "in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. "Ninguno non deue enriquecerse tortizeramente con dano de otro." Simply stated, when the statute is silent or ambiguous, this is one of those fundamental solutions that would respond to the vehement urge of conscience. (Padilla vs. Padilla, 74 Phil. 377). 02. Alonzo v. IAC It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice. Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a balance between the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed. As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond them." While we admittedly may not legislate, we nevertheless have the power to interpret the law in such a way as to reflect the will of the legislature. While we may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, we nevertheless have the right to read out of it the reason for its enactment. In doing so, we defer not to "the letter that killeth" but to "the spirit that vivifieth," to give effect to the law maker's will. The spirit, rather than the letter of a statute determines its construction, hence, a statute must be read according to its
spirit or intent. For what is within the spirit is within the letter but although it is not within the letter thereof, and that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not within the statute. Stated differently, a thing which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the letter; and a thing which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless within the intent of the lawmakers.
REPEALS
Rule on retroactivity of repeals 81. Tac-an v. CA The Acopiado brothers being non-Christians fall under the scope of Sec. 145 of the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu, which requires the approval of the provincial Governor for all contracts relating to payment affecting any real property. Under Sec. 146 of the same Code, contracts or agreements made in violation of Sec. 145 shall be null and void. It appears that the approval of the Provincial Governor to the Deed of Quitclaim was revoked by the Governor of Zamboanga del Norte on the ground that the signature of Governor Ascuna was obtained through false representation, that the alleged transaction was legal when in truth, it was the subject matter of a court litigation. Petitioner’s argument that the Administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu was repealed on June 19, 1965, by Republic Act No. 4252 making the approval of the Provincial Governor unnecessary, is untenable since at times material to the case, i.e., when the Deed of Quitclaim was executed, when the approval of the provincial governor was given and when the approval was revoked, Sections 145 and 146 of the administrative Code of Mindanao and Sulu were in full force and effect and since they were substantive in nature, the repealing statute cannot be given retroactive effect •
Implied repeals 82. Villegas v. Subido . Implied repeals not favored; Standard to determine repeal Repeals by implication are not favored and will not be so declared unless it be manifest that the legislature so intended •
(See US v. Reyes, 1908). It is necessary then before such a repeal is deemed to exist that it be shown that the statutes or statutory provisions deal with the same subject matter and that the latter be i nconsistent with the former. There must be a showing of repugnancy clear and convincing in character. The language used in the latter statute must be such as to render it irreconcilable with what had been formerly enacted. An inconsistency that falls short of that standard does not suffice. What is needed is a manifest indication of the legislative purpose to repeal. PROSPECTIVE AND RETROACTIVE STATUTES
Definition 01.Laceste v. Santos The principle underlying our laws granting to the accused in certain cases an exception to the general rule that laws shall not be retroactive when the law in question favors the accused, has evidently been carried over into the Revised Penal Code at present in force in the Philippines through article 22, quoted above. This is an exception to the general rule that all laws are prospective, not retrospective, variously contained in the following maxims: Lex prospicit, non respicit (the law looks forward, not backward); lex de futuro, judez de praeterito (the law provides for the future, the judge for the past); and adopted in a modified form with a prudent limitation in our Civil Code (article 3). Conscience and good law justify this exception, which is contained in the well-known aphorism: Favorabilia sunt amplianda, odiosa restringenda. It is believed that the Revised Penal Code, Act No. 3815, article 344, last paragraph, applies to the case of the herein petitioner, and that he should be discharged from prison. All penal laws have been declared retroactive by the Honorable Supreme Court in the cases of People vs. Moran (44 Phil., 433); People vs. Parel (44 Phil., 437). And the Legislature, under section 366 of the New Penal Code, has clearly intended to give retroactive effect to article 22. ART. 22. Retroactive effect of penal laws. ? Penal laws shall have a retroactive effect in so far as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is defined in rule 5 of article 62 of this Code, although at the •
time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been pronounced and the convict is serving the same. 02. Camacho v. Court of Industrial Relations No retrospective effect would be given to said provision of section 8 of the Act No. 4054, as amended by section 3 of the Republic Act No. 34 relating to share basis, if applied to the rice harvested during agricultural year 1946-1947; because said Act No. 34 became effective on September 30, 1947, for "agricultural year shall mean the length of time necessary for the preparation of the land sowing, planting and harvesting a crop" (section 6, Act No. 4054), and the crop in question had been, according to the conclusion of fact of the lower court, planted during May and harvested during the months from October to December, 1946, and even January, 1947. And it is a well established rule recognized by all authorities without exception, that a retrospective or retroactive law is that which creates a new obligation, imposes a new duty or attaches a new disability in respect to a transaction already past; but that statute is not made retrospective because it drawns on antecedent facts for its operation, or in other words part of the requirements for its action and application is drawn from a time antedating its passage (See cases cited in 37 Words and Phrases, pp. 530533). Our Constitution does not in terms prohibit the enactment of retrospective laws which do not impair the obligations of contract or deprive a person of property without due process of law, that is, which do not divest rights of property and vested rights.
Prospectivity of statutes 01.Nilo v. Court of Appeals Article 3 of the old Civil Code (now Article 4 of the New Civil Code) provides that: "Laws shall not have a retroactive effect unless therein otherwise provided." According to this provision of law, in order that a law may have retroactive effect it is necessary that an express provision to this effect be made in the law, otherwise nothing should be understood •
which is not embodied in the law. Furthermore, it must be borne in mind that a law is a rule established to guide our actions with no binding effect until it is enacted, wherefore, it has no application to past times but only to future time, and that is why it is said that the law looks to the future only and has no retroactive effect unless the legislator may have formally given that effect to some legal provisions (Lopez and Lopez v. Crow, 40 Phil. 997). The Act contains, as is seen, no express words giving it a retrospective or retroactive effect, nor is there anything found therein which indicates an intention to give it such an effect. Its effect is, rather, by clear intendment, prospective. It is a rule of statutory construction that all statutes are to be construed as having only a prospective operation unless the purpose and intention of the Legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used. In every case of doubt, the doubt must be solved against the retrospective effect. The cases supporting this rule are almost without number. In construing statutes in regard to whether their action is to be prospective or retrospective, all the adjudicated cases and all the text-writers with unbroken uniformity unite in declaring 'that they are to operate prospectively and not otherwise unless the intent that they are to operate in such an unusual way, to wit, retrospectively, is manifested on the face of the statute in a manner altogether free from ambiguity. 02. Segovia v. Noel A sound canon of statutory construction is that a statute operates prospectively only and never retroactively, unless the legislative intent to the contrary is made manifest either by the express terms of the statute or by necessary implication. Following the lead of the United States Supreme Court and putting the rule more strongly, a statute ought not to receive a construction making it act retroactively, unless the words used are so clear, strong, and imperative that no other meaning can be annexed to them, or unless the intention of the legislature cannot be otherwise satisfied. No court will hold a statute to be retroactive when the legislature has not said so.
Retroactivity of statutes 1. Castro v. Sagales A retrospective law, in a legal sense, is one which takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation and imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect of transactions or consideration already past. Hence, remedial statutes, or statutes relating to remedies or modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing, do not come within the legal conception of a retrospective law, or the general rule against the retrospective operation of statutes •
2. Hosana v. Diomano Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to causes of action accrued, and actions pending and undetermined, at the time of their passage, unless such actions are expressly excepted, or unless vested rights would be disturbed by giving them a retrospective operation. (Black on Interpretation of Laws, p. 265.) Laws Relating to Procedure and Legal Remedies. Statutes relating to procedure or legal remedies are undoubtedly within the general rule against retrospective construction where the effect of giving them a retroactive operation will be to impair the obligation of contracts or to disturb vested rights. But the rule does not prevent the application of statutes to proceedings pending at the time of their enactment where they neither create new, nor take away vested, rights. When a new statute deals with procedure only, prima facie, it applies to all actions ? those which have accrued or are pending and future actions. A law prescribing the form of pleadings will apply to all pleadings filed after its enactment, although the action is begun before that time. 3. Gregorio v. CA Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to causes of action accrued, and actions pending and undetermined, at the time of their passage, unless such actions are expressly excepted or unless vested rights would be disturbed by giving them a retrospective operation.
Retroactivity of laws that are remedial in nature is not prohibited.
AMENDMENT, REVISION, CODIFICARION AND REPEAL
Amendment 01.Occena v. COMELEC The only station is that it shall not exercise its treaty ratification powers provided in Article VIII, Section 14(1) of the Constitution. The legislative power has described generally as being a power to make, alter and laws. 1 It is the peculiar province of the legislature to probe general rules for the government of society. The e of the legislative function is the determination of the legislative policy and its formulation and promulgation as a defined and binding rule of conduct. 2 It is a recognized principle in constitutional law that the legislative body possesses Plenary power for all purposes of civil government. It is a well established rule that where no exception is made in terms, none will be made by mere implication or construction. The wordings of a constitutional provision do not have a narrow or contracted meaning, but are used in a broad sense, with a view of covering all contingencies. In the search for the meaning of the language of the Constitution, reference may be made to the historical basis of the provisions. The historical events and circumstances which led to the ratification of Amendments Nos. I to 9 of the constitution show the manifest intent and desire of the people to establish, during the period of transition, a government that can effectively provide for the nation's peaceful and orderly transition from a crisis to a full parliament system of government. •
04. Buyco v. Philippine National Bank It is said that the law looks to the future only and has no retroactive effect unless the legislator may have formally given that effect to some legal provisions; that all statutes are to be construed as having only prospective operation, unless the purpose and intention of the Legislature to give them a retrospective effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used; and that every case of doubt
must be resolved against retrospective effect. These principles also apply to amendments of statutes. Republic Act No. 1576 does not contain any provision regarding its retroactivity, nor such may be implied from its language. It simply states its effectivity upon approval. The amendment, therefore, has no retroactive effect, and the present case should be governed by the law at the time the offer in question was made. The rule is familiar that after an act is amended, the original act continues to be in force with regard to all rights that had accrued prior to such amendment Revision and Codification 1. Sanchez v. Rigos This view has the advantage of avoiding a conflict between Articles 1324 ? on the general principles on contracts ? and 1479 ? on sales ? of the Civil Code, in line with the cardinal rule of statutory construction that, in construing different provisions of one and the same law or code, such interpretation should be favored as will reconcile or harmonize said provisions and avoid a conflict between the same. Indeed, the presumption is that, in the process of drafting the Code, its author has maintained a consistent philosophy or position. Moreover, the decision in Southwestern Sugar & Molasses Co. v. Atlantic Gulf & Pacific Co., 10 holding that Art. 1324 is modified by Art. 1479 of the Civil Code, in effect, considers the latter as an exception to the former, and exceptions are not favored, unless the intention to the contrary is clear, and it is not so, insofar as said two (2) articles are concerned. What is more, the reference, in both the second paragraph of Art. 1479 and Art. 1324, to an option or promise supported by or founded upon a consideration, strongly suggests that the two (2) provisions intended to enforce or implement the same principle. •
02. People v. Benuya The rule is that where a statute is revised, or a series of legislative acts on the same subject are revised and consolidated into one, all parts and provisions of the former act or acts, that are omitted from the revised act, are repeated. •
Repeal
1. Duarte v. Dade "A state legislature has a plenary law-making power over all subjects, whether pertaining to persons or things, within its territorial jurisdiction, either to introduce new laws or repeal the old, unless prohibited expressly or by implication by the federal constitution or limited or restrained by its own. It cannot bind itself or its successors by enacting irrepealable laws except when so restrained. Every legislative body may modify or abolish the acts passed by itself or its predecessors. This power of repeal may be exercised at the same session at which the original act was passed; and even while a bill is in its progress and before it becomes a law. This legislature cannot bind a future legislature to a particular mode of repeal. It cannot declare in advance the intent of subsequent legislatures or the effect of subsequent legislation upon existing statutes." 2. David v. Dancel Under Article 7 of the Civil Code, "laws are repealed only by subsequent ones and their violation or non-observance shall not be excused by disuse or custom or practice to the contrary. 3. People v. Castro A penal law may, like any other statute, be repealed either expressly or by necessary implication; and such statute is repealed by implication if the later statute is so repugnant to the earlier one that the two cannot stand together or if the whole subject of the earlier statute is covered by the latter one having the same object, and which was clearly intended to prescribe the only rule applicable to the subject. In order, however, that two penal statutes may be repugnant, they must relate to the same subject; in other words, where each statute is directed against a distinct offense, there can be no repugnancy and no repeal. Furthermore, it is necessary to the implication of a repeal that the objects of the two statutes be the same, and if the objects are not the same both statutes will stand, although they may refer to the same subject. Subsequent legislation repeals previous inconsistent legislation whether it expressly declares such repeal or not. In the nature of things it would be so, not only on the theory of intention, but because contradictions cannot stand together.
The intention to repeal admitted, unless the inconsistency is unavoidable, and only to the extent of the repugnance. A statute may be repealed by implication as well as in direct terms; and it is well settled, that where a subsequent act is repugnant to a prior one, the last operates, without any repealing clause, as a repeal of the first; and where two acts, passed at different times, are not in terms repugnant, yet if it is clearly evident that the last was intended as a revision or substitute of the first, it will repeal the first to the extent in which its provisions are revised or substituted. Where the later or revising statute clearly covers the whole subject-matter of antecedent acts, and it plainly appears to have been the purpose of the legislature to give expression in it to the whole law on the subject, the latter is held to be repealed by necessary implication. 4. Phil. American Management Co, Inc. v. Phil. American Management Employees Association "It has been the constant holding of this Court that repeals by implication are not favored and will not be so declared unless it be manifest that the legislature so intended. Such a doctrine goes as far back as United States v. Reyes, a 1908 decision. It is necessary then before such a repeal is deemed to exist that it be shown that the statutes or statutory provisions deal with the same subject matter and that the latter be inconsistent with the former. There must be a showing of repugnancy clear and convincing in character. The language used in the latter statute must be such as to render it irreconcilable with what had been formerly enacted. An inconsistency that falls short of that standard does not suffice. What is needed is a manifest indication of the legislative purpose to repeal." 5. Mecano v. COA The question of whether a particular law has been repealed or not by a subsequent law is a matter of legislative intent. The lawmakers may expressly repeal a law by incorporating therein a repealing provision which expressly and specifically cites the particular law or laws, and portions thereof, that are intended to be repealed. A declaration in a statute, usually in its repealing clause, that a particular and
specific law, identified by its number or title, is repealed is an express repeal; all others are implied repeals. Sec. 27. Repealing Clause. ? All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or portions thereof, inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. The question that should be asked is: What is the nature of this repealing clause? It is certainly not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the act or acts that are intended to be repealed. Rather, it is an example of a general repealing provision, as stated in Opinion No. 73, S. 1991. It is a clause which predicates the intended repeal under the condition that substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior acts. The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless an irreconcilable inconcistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old laws. This latter situation falls under the category of an implied repeal. Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be given effect. Hence, before there can be a repeal, there must be a clear showing on the part of the lawmaker that the intent in enacting the new law was to abrogate the old one. The intention to repeal must be clear and manifest; 8 otherwise, at least, as a general rule, the later act is to be construed as a continuation of, and not a substitute for, the first act and will continue so far as the two acts are the same from the time of the first enactment. There are two categories of repeal by implication. The first is where provisions in the two acts on the same subject matter are in an irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one. The second is if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law. Implied repeal by irreconcilable inconsistency takes place when the two statutes cover the same subject matter; they are so clearly inconsistent and incompatible with each other that they cannot be reconciled or harmonized; and both cannot be given effect, that is, that one law cannot be enforced without nullifying the other.
National Power Corporation v. Arca For it is now the settled rule in this jurisdiction that "a special statute, providing for a particular case or class of cases, is not repealed by a subsequent statute, general in its terms, provisions and applications, unless the intent to repeal or alter is manifest, although the terms of the general law are broad enough to include the cases embraced in the special law." Where there are two statutes, the earlier special and the later general ? the terms of the general broad enough to include the matter provided for in the special ? the fact that one is special and the other is general creates a presumption that the special is to be considered as remaining an exception to the general: one as a general law of the land, the other as the law of a particular case. 6.
09. US v. Soliman The rule of interpretation of English and American common law, by virtue of which the repeal of a law prescribing penalties is held to have the effect of remitting or extinguishing any penalty, loss of rights or responsibility incurred under such law, as to all persons who have not been convicted and sentenced under the provisions of such law prior to the enactment of the repealing law, is not and has not been the accepted doctrine in these Islands. When a penal law is enacted repealing a prior law, such repeal does not have the effect of relieving an offender in whole or in part of penalties already incurred under the old law, unless the new law favors the defendant by diminishing the penalty or doing away with it altogether, and then only to the extent to which the new law is favorable to the offender. In other words, that the enactment of new penal laws, notwithstanding the fact that they contain general repealing clauses, doe not deprive the courts of jurisdiction to try, convict and sentence persons charged with violations of the old law prior to the date when the repealing law goes into effect, unless the new law wholly fails to penalties the acts which constituted the offense defined and penalized in the repealed law. We conclude therefore that in any case in which a statute prescribing a penalty for the commission of a specific
offense is repealed, and in which the new statute provides new and distinct penalties for the commission of such offense, the penalty which must be imposed on one who committed the offense prior to the enactment of the repealing statute is that one which is more favorable to the convict.
