Manchester United

Globalisation and sports branding: the case of Manchester United Keywords soccer Manchester United globalisation global brand

John S. Hill Miller Professor International Business Department of Management & Marketing, University of Alabama Box 870225, Tuscaloosa AL 35487-0225, US Tel: +205 348 6103 Fax: +205 348 6695 Email: [email protected]

John Vincent Vincent University of Alabama Email: [email protected]

Peer reviewed

Abstract In 2005 Manchester United was taken over by US businessman Malcolm Glazer, in part because of the club’s brand name prominence in the global sport of soccer. This paper examines how Manchester United rose to a pre-eminent position in world football through its on-field performances and its off-the-field managementt strategies. It shows how the club took its managemen storied history into world markets to take full advantage of globalisation, the opportunities extended through the English Premier League’s reputation and developments in global media technologies. Astute managementt of club resources is identified as the managemen major factor in global brand management.

Executive summary May 2005 will go down as a watershed moment in the storied history of Manchester United, United, when US businessman Malcolm Glazer bought financial control of the fabled English football club. A major reason for the takeover was the club’s position as arguably the most prominent global brand in a sport that has proven worldwide appeal. The purpose of this case study is to examine how Manchester United United evolved out of its position as one of two provincial soccer teams in the city of Manchester to its current status among the best known brands in sport.

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To capture the richness and depth of the Manchester United appeal, Aaker’s (1996) brand identity model was used to cull the major resource factors contributing to the club’s strong global marketplace presence. In addition, and because global sports brands, like their product counterparts, function within their global and industry contexts (Gerrard, 2003), these structural influences were evaluated to provide balanced perspectives on the club’s strategy. The primary methodological tool was document analysis. This involved an extensive review of the literature and in-depth analyses of Manchester

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United’s annual reports (2000-2004). Documentary data reliability and validity were checked and supplemented with information supplied by the club’s marketing director, Peter Draper, and its communications director, Phillip Townsend. Results highlight the interaction between global, industry and resource factors in Manchester United’s evolution from provincial to national to global brand status. Its key success factors are unsurprising for a sports brand – on-field successes. But its commercial success and sports icon image emanate from a club that has combined an attractive on-field playing style with astute off-the-field management. This includes extensive leveraging of the club’s name through branded products and services that raise its market profile nationally and internationally, and proactive marketing that takes prime advantage of industry developments that have moved English football into the global arena through worldwide media. Brand heritage emerges as a critical brand identity factor, with a club history based on local talent development, supplemented with managementinspired signings of star players. This has produced, perhaps uniquely in football annals, a series of player icons that has elevated the Manchester United profile but which was skilfully managed to maintain the club’s core team-oriented concept. The lessons derived from analysis of Manchester United have direct relevance to spor t management: how to raise and maintain club profiles in national and global contexts; how to leverage brand names commercially to complement on-field success with offfield activities; and how to harness technology to broaden appeal. The most critical factors however are resource-based. On the field, management has maintained its focus on producing an attractive product – attacking football. This has endured through continuous renewal of player resources and their moulding within the team concept. Off the field, an alert, marketing-oriented management has taken full advantage of that success. The common denominator has been total commitment to and single-minded pursuit of excellence.

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Introduction May 2005 will go down as a watershed moment in the storied history of Manchester United, when US businessman Malcolm Glazer bought financial control of the fabled English football club. While it is not the intention of this article to argue the pros and cons of this move (summarised in Box 1), it is noteworthy that Glazer’s move was premised on Manchester United’s position as one of the most prominent global brands in a sport that has proven worldwide appeal. In this article we examine how Manchester United evolved out of its position as one of two provincial football teams in the city of Manchester to its current status among the best known brands in sport. Our conceptual centrepiece is Aaker’s (1996) brand identity model that culls the major resource factors that contribute to strong marketplace brands. Complementing this model, to add depth and a more complete analysis, we evaluate two structural factors relevant to corporate strategy-making – global and industry environments. This follows Gerrard’s (2003) assertion that strategic analyses in the spor ts arena should include both structural and resource-based factors for a balanced view.

Methodology The primary methodology employed was document analysis. This involved an extensive review of the literature to gain objective assessments of Manchester United’s activities and operations. Insider perspectives were obtained from analysis of Manchester United’s annual reports and accounts (2000-2004). Data gathered from both sources were checked for accuracy and supplemented with information supplied by the club’s marketing director, Peter Draper, and communications director, Phillip Townsend.


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Structural factors: globalisation, global sports and global branding Effective strategies take account of marketplace developments, and as the 21st century got underway, the trend of globalisation was very much apparent in the world economy. Defined by Aninat (2002, p.4) as “the process through which an increasingly free flow of ideas, peoples, goods and services and capital leads to the integration of economies and societies”, globalisation has resulted in nation states forging links through trade, investments and the activities of international companies participating in the world economy (see Figure 1). The end of the Cold War in the late 1980s and early 1990s decreased world political tensions, and the meteoric rise of the internet and of global communications caused an unprecedent-

ed acceleration in commercial activities outside domestic markets, increasing the variety of goods and services available in the world marketplace (Hill & Holloway, 2001). The integration of world economies has led to increasing competition in many industries (Porter, 1986). In the field of sport, globalisation has added impetus to international rivalries that date in the modern era from the 1896 Olympic Games. Since that time, many sports have benefited as their international media exposure has increased from quadrennial appearances in the Olympics. Sports such as tennis and golf have been global for decades; as have the British and colonies-based sports of cricket, rugby, squash and badminton. Equestrian, motorsport, table tennis (ping-pong), boxing, hockey, ice hockey and lacrosse have all benefited from international exposure. US sports such as basketball, American football and

FIGURE 1 Impact of globalisation on commerce, sport, soccer and Manchester United

GLOBALISATION

GLOBALISATION OF SPORT

GLOBALISATION OF SOCCER

GLOBALISATION OF MANCHESTER UNITED

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GLOBALISATION CATALYSTS: INCREASES IN ∑ 

WORLD TRADE, COMMERCE

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FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENTS

GLOBALISATION OF BUSINESS

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TRADE BLOCS (EU, NAFTA)

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INCREASING COMPETITION

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GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS (SATELLITE TV, MEDIA, INTERNET) 

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DECREASE IN WORLD TENSIONS WITH END OF COLD WAR 

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baseball have established footholds in foreign markets as global media has broadened their appeal beyond domestic markets. But no single sport has benefited from its global exposures as much as soccer (Giulianotti, 2002). Since its first appearance in the 1908 Olympics, the sport has attracted increasing international attention. The first World Cup was organised in 1930 by Jules Rimet in Uruguay. Since then, soccer has consistently drawn more support worldwide than any other pastime. As globalisation trends accelerated after the 1980s, increasing numbers of professional soccer clubs sought to capitalise on the sport’s global appeal, but only two clubs, Manchester United and Real Madrid, emerged as global brands. Although Real Madrid has a very high global awareness and recently overtook Manchester United as the club with the highest turnover, many observers consider that Manchester United’s innovative branding and marketing strategies were at the leading edge of the contemporary trend in sport globalisation. Figure 1 illustrates the link between globalisation, sport, soccer and Manchester United. The club’s pre-eminent position was noted in its 2003 annual report (p. iii): “Manchester United is one of the leading clubs in world football, with a global brand and following that embodies the passion and excitement of the world’s most popular sport.” The report reaffirmed the need to convert more of its 75 million global fans into paying customers. In implementing its international strategy, Manchester United has been the pathfinder for many other sports and clubs seeking to establish global identities in the international marketplace.

Structural factors: industry environment The forming of the English Premier League (EPL – also known as The Premiership) in 1992-93 signalled an era of heightened competitiveness. We analysed additional pressures on soccer using frameworks developed by Porter (1980) and Lonsdale (2004). Upstream pressures – player scarcity effects

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The forming of the EPL in 1992 added pressures to clubs as they competed among a limited supply of talented players. This competition for players intensified further following the Bosman Ruling, instituted in 1995 by the European Court of Justice, that decreed that professional soccer players could become free agents following expiry of their contracts. The ruling also removed the ‘maximum of three foreigners rule’ observed in British soccer clubs. Together, these changes gave European-born players the right to move freely to any club within the European Union (Boyle & Haynes, 2000). As competition for talent escalated, club costs rocketed under the impetus of player salary increases, while attendance receipts and existing television deals were levelling out (Crispin, 2004a). Both the Football Association and individual clubs looked for additional revenue streams to bolster finances and attract star players in inflation-affected transfer markets. These were realised in the widening of soccer’s downstream appeal to spectators, sponsors, spor ts merchandisers and television viewers, both domestic and global. Downstream pressures – broadening spectator appeal Recognising the need for increased gate receipts, in 2004 the English Football League set a goal to increase game attendances from 16 to 21 million by 2010 (Sweney, 2004). This was deemed feasible given a League directive that stadia were to be allseater, following the 1989 Hillsborough disaster, where 95 people were killed in an FA Cup semi-final between Liverpool and Nottingham Forest, played at Hillsborough, Sheffield (Lonsdale, 2004). Although the mandated trend towards creating all-seater stadia initially reduced stadium capacity for some clubs, many made significant investments to expand their stadia capacity. All seater stadia also became more family-friendly, which broadened the game’s appeal among the middle classes (Miller, 2004). Manchester United followed this trend. The current Old Trafford stadium is the largest club facility in England, and is being expanded by a further 7,900 seats to give it a capacity of nearly 76,000 by the


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2006-07 season. Included in the plans are executive suites to accommodate a further 2,400 corporate customers. The club’s emphasis on heightening the matchday experience includes the Old Trafford Chef’s Table dining facility, in-stadium and online betting (courtesy of platinum sponsor Ladbrokes), the club museum (and tour), the Red Café, a megastore and LED perimeter advertising displays. The stadium also houses the MU Finance Advisory Centre and MUTV studios (Manchester United Annual Report, 2004). Downstream pressures – attracting sponsors At European level, the UEFA Champions League has a number of sponsors, including Canon, Amstel (now using its Heineken brand), PlayStation, Mastercard, Ford, Adidas and Sharp (Canon since 2004). In Britain, the FA Premier League was sponsored by Barclays in a £57 million, three-year deal (Kleinman, 2003). At international level, Danish brewer Carlsberg sponsored England’s Euro 2004 team for £10 million (Mistry, 2004). Manchester United had an 18-year primary sponsorship deal with Sharp that started in 1982, which was replaced by a then record-breaking £9 million per year deal with Vodafone that ran from 2000 to 2006. Vodafone pulled out of the sponsorship early, citing its decision to become a Champions League sponsor. There was speculation that the decision was in part due to the club’s failure to progress to the latter stages of the Champions League in recent seasons and some concern about adverse publicity surrounding the Glazer takeover. The club has since signed American International Group (AIG) for a four-year deal worth £56 million, which is the second biggest in club football after Juventus and Tamoil (£15 million per year). The club’s technical sponsorship was originally with Umbro, but in 2002 a 13-year deal worth £303 million was signed with Nike. Downstream pressures – adding merchandising deals Between 10 and 15 years ago, sponsorships and merchandising deals were viewed as minor appendages to club activities (Spor t’s Premiers, 2003). Today they are big business. Premiership clubs

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in 2002 earned £335 million from merchandising operations – this is more than admittance tickets, at £322 million, but less than TV contracts, at £347 million (Deloitte & Touche, 2003). Downstream pressures – competing for TV viewers A key event for English soccer occurred as Rupert Murdoch’s media empire sought to enter the UK television market in the late 1980s. Murdoch’s BSkyB satellite channel offered £304 million – five times ITV’s 1988 deal – to broadcast top-tier games. The four-year follow-on contract to 1997 was worth £670 million, and the two follow-on arrangements were both in excess of £1,000 million (Timeline, 2003). Manchester United supplemented this package when in 1999 it launched its own dedicated television network, MUTV, in conjunction with Granada Media and BSkyB. MUTV had the rights to club games after their airing on the Sky network (Granada, 1999). MUTV also negotiated rights to show archive footage of Manchester United’s UEFA Champions League matches; through its broadband service (MU.tv available through subscription), classic games can be viewed. Under current consideration, and taking advantage of the latest technologies, is the proposal to promote club products and services through MU Interactive, MU Mobile and MU Picture facilities (Manchester United Annual Report, 2004). Downstream pressures – competing for global audiences The BSkyB contract added both benefits and pressures through its international connections as EPL clubs were given global exposure. Murdoch’s ownership of Fox Sports gave the EPL global coverage through its Fox Sports World channel. In the US, Murdoch’s 2004 takeover of Direct TV consolidated this hold in the important North American market, while his agreement with ESPN Star Sports in Asia upped regional audiences of Premiership matches by 150 million households (Crispin, 2004b). Today the EPL reaches an audience of about 1 billion viewers in over 170 countries (Brand Strategy, 2003), giving the league the worldwide marketing platform to reach new


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fans and to sell its wares to broader consumer bases. These measures – increased ticket, advertising and merchandising revenues – increased turnover for the top 20 English clubs from £160 million in 1992 to £1,130 million in 2003 (Deloitte & Touche, 2003). They also provided new opportunities for clubs to build their brand profiles and promote themselves to broader audiences; but it was Manchester United that seized the moment to capitalise on its reputation and establish itself as a global brand and sports icon.

Building brand identity The resource-based view (RBV) of competitive advantage posits that corporate resources – including intangible assets such as brand identities – are key factors in sport (Amis, 2003). A brand identity provides direction, purpose and meaning for the brand – its core values are how it is perceived, what traits it projects and the relationships it engenders (Aaker

1996, p.68). Brand identities comprise the core identity that Aaker defined (p. 85) as “the timeless essence of the brand” – that which makes it unique and valuable. The brand’s extended identity includes those elements that provide “texture and completeness”. In essence, one or more of the extended brand identity characteristics are so dominant that singly, or in concert, they become its core identity. We used Aaker’s brand identity structure concepts to delineate the distinctive features of the Manchester United brand. Figure 2 shows Aaker’s brand identity model and its 12 components. Not all components are relevant for individual brands. Our discussion focuses on 10 of the 12 components under four headings: the brand as product, the brand as organisation, the brand as person and the brand as symbol. The brand as product All brands are parts of broader product classes whose characteristics define the parameters within which the brand operates.

FIGURE 2 The Aaker brand identity nodel

CORE AND EXTENDED BRAND IDENTITIES Y D U T S E S A C

BRAND AS PRODUCT

PRODUCT SCOPE PRODUCT ATTRIBUTES QUALITY/VALUE

BRAND AS ORGANISATION

ORGANISATIONAL ATTRIBUTES

BRAND AS PERSON

BRAND AS SYMBOL

PERSONALITY

BRAND HERITAGE

BRAND-CUSTOMER RELATIONSHIPS

VISUAL IMAGERY AND METAPHORS

GLOBAL VS LOCAL

USES USERS COUNTRY OF ORIGIN

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Product scope Product scope defines the broad industry environment in which the brand operates – in this case, the game of soccer. The global appeal of soccer is based on its history – the fact that many nations and cultures have been playing the sport (or some version of it) for thousands of years. FIFA – the international football governing body – dates the game’s origins to China under the Han dynasty, between the 2nd and 3rd centuries BC. It started out as a military exercise and consisted of kicking a leather ball filled with feathers and hair through an opening of 30-40 centimetres (12-16 inches) backed by a small net. A Japanese version (kemari ) a few hundred years later emphasised passing the ball without it touching the ground. Further versions evolved through the Greeks (episkyros) and the Romans (harpastrum) initiated rectangular fields with boundary lines. The game’s present-day popularity was established in Britain between the 8th and 19th centuries, where rivalries between villages and communities (the forerunner of the club system in today’s game) were played with few rules. At this time, handling the ball was legal, though players handling the ball could only move backwards. The year 1863 was crucial for soccer development. Game rules were formalised and a standard-sized ball was introduced. In 1866, a London-Sheffield fixture was arranged, where the game’s duration was fixed at 90 minutes. The English Football Association was formed in 1871 with a 50-club membership. The Scottish FA came into being in 1873, followed by Ireland in 1880 and Wales in 1895 (www.fifa.com). The early organisation of British football established a blueprint that laid the foundation for the sport. The club-based template quickly took root in Europe and through colonisation the organised game spread to Latin America, Africa and Asia. Product attributes In contrast to some sports, soccer has many attractive features that contribute to its current 300-million player following and a fan base that is

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measured in the billions worldwide (Blatter, 1999). It is action-oriented. It builds stamina and aerobic conditioning. There are few physical size or age limitations. Its rules are relatively simple to understand. It requires minimal equipment (appropriate footwear, shin-guards and uniforms for organised play) and facilities. Soccer is very teamoriented, with many players usually par ticipating in moving the ball up the field. It can be played in many climates; and in contrast to many US spor ts, on-field strategies are largely player-created. Quality/value For a brand to be successful, it must be part of a product group that is perceived to be qualityladen and that provides value for money. In the automobile industry, for example, Mercedes has this image. In football, Manchester United is part of the EPL, widely touted as the most competitive in the world. The reasons for this reputation are rooted in Porter’s (1990) Competitive Advantage of Nations theory of international competitiveness, which posits that within specific industries, clusters of expertise result from highly competitive national environments. This expertise enables them to become extremely competitive in the global marketplace. The strong rivalries within the British club system, from local leagues all the way up to the Premier League, have resulted in a consistent ratcheting up of performance levels in the modern era. Over the past decade, on-field performance has been bolstered through a global commitment to excellence – obtaining the best players and managers regardless of national origin (see Box 1). As a result, to maintain leadership positions, top clubs such as Manchester United must consistently perform to high standards over long periods. This makes them attractive propositions in the international marketplace. Country of origin While the sport of soccer is global, British (and English) football has specific advantages over that of other countries and these have contributed to the global appeal of its clubs. One of these is its history as the home of the modern organised game. International marketers (e.g. Roth & Romeo, 1992)


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have noted that country-of-origin advantages accrue when countries become associated with specific industries, products or services. French champagne, German engineering and cars (Mercedes, Porsche, BMW), Japanese electronics (Sony, Panasonic) and US computers and software (IBM, Microsoft) have all benefited from being centres of excellence for their specific industry sectors. While the sport of soccer did not originate in Britain, British clubs have benefited from being the birthplace of the modern organised game. Many clubs in the UK have been established for more than 100 years and their solid geographic franchises have resulted in strong local fan bases. Manchester United celebrated its centenary in 2002. The brand as organisation Brand identities are often associated with the activities of the parent organisation: its people, culture and values; its organisational attributes, such as innovation and quality; and its outlook (local or global). Organisational attributes The Manchester United organisation has garnered a reputation as one of the best organisations in sport and football management, known for:

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Traditional club values The arrival of manager Alex Ferguson in 1986 revived the traditional club values established by Matt Busby in the 1950s to 1970. The traditional value of developing the best local talent was continued as the bulk of the side, including Ryan Giggs, Paul Scholes, the Neville brothers and David Beckham, moved up through the club’s youth system. Over the championship-laden 1992-2003 period, Manchester United topped the EPL in starting appearances for home-grown talent (Gerrard, 2004). The quest for soccer excellence Increasing competition in the EPL and Ferguson’s perpetual search for the very best talent has resulted in many players being brought in from outside. The current team roster has a number of players bought for

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substantial sums, including Christian Ronaldo, Wayne Rooney, Rio Ferdinand, Louis Saha and Ruud Van Nistelroy, whose combined price tag was £95 million. Over the 1998-2002 period, Manchester United topped the EPL in transfer fees, averaging close to £20 million per year (Gerrard, 2004). Chelsea has since overtaken that spending, but Manchester United has continued to invest at a rate of around £20 million per year. Attacking soccer The club’s potent combination of home-grown and imported talent resulted in an attacking style of football that attracts fans worldwide. Again, over the 1992-2003 period, Manchester United averaged over two goals per game, with most of the remaining EPL clubs languishing at one to oneand-a-half goals per game (Gerrard, 2004). Organisational outlook – local versus global Manchester United has always been one of the more cosmopolitan teams. In the 1950s it was the first British club to par ticipate in European competition (against the best advice of the English Football League at the time). In 1968, it was the first English club to win the European UEFA club championship (the competition which preceded the Champions League). Scotland’s Celtic had won the trophy the previous season to become the first British winner. As soccer became global during the 1990s, the club toured frequently in Asia and North America, as well as being a frequent competitor in Europe. In recent years, the club has signed players from Latin America, Africa, the US and Asia, as well as Europe. The brand as person Brands, like people, take on personal attributes that distinguish them from key competitors. These include personality attributes such as: Youthfulness Matt Busby started Manchester United’s youth orientation in 1953, when he fielded a side with seven teenagers against Huddersfield (Wagg, 2004). This policy was continued over the years, especially


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during the 1990s, when many of the club’s star players (Ryan Giggs, Gary and Phillip Neville, Paul Scholes, Nicky Butt and David Beckham) emerged from the youth side to play key roles in the club’s phenomenal success. Seven of the 2004-05 first team squad were products of the club’s highly successful youth academy, and the youth orientation was maintained with the signings of Christian Ronaldo and Wayne Rooney. The club has augmented its youth talent pipeline through alliances with other European clubs – Bromma, Shelbourne, Nantes, Royal Antwerp and Sporting Lisbon (Manchester United Annual Report, 2004). Excitement While the Manchester United tradition of playing stylish, attacking football has brought in many new fans worldwide, its players have also generated excitement off the field. Just as individual brands add sparks to corporate brand lines [e.g. the ‘silver bullet’ effect of the Mazda RX7 on Mazda’s corporate image (Aaker 1996, Barwise & Robertson, 1992)], so player personalities add excitement to club images. In the 1950s it was teenager Duncan Edwards; in the 1960s, George Best, ably supported by Bobby Charlton and Denis Law, generated on- and off-thefield media coverage to maintain Manchester United’s high news profile. In the 1990s, the charismatic Eric Cantona provided headline sports news, until the crop of more recent stars, including media celebrity icon David Beckham, came on stream. Such talents exemplified and magnified the aura of the club. Competence Delivering on-field success over long periods is a challenge for any team. In this area, Manchester United has few equals. In the modern era, from 1945 to the forming of the Premiership in 1992, the club had top two finishes 15 times, winning top honours five times (Manchester United official website, 2005a). But the forming of the Premiership heralded the club’s most successful era. Over 1993-2003, Manchester United won the premiership eight of out of 11 times and lifted the FA Challenge Cup four times during that same period. In 1999, the club achieved a unique treble: the FA Premiership, the FA Challenge Cup and the European

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Cup Winner’s Cup. This consistency in excellence has earned Manchester United a coveted place in English and European football annals, matched perhaps only by Spanish club Real Madrid. It also paid off: the club topped EPL attendance figures in 1992-2003, at over 53,000 per game, significantly above the average 37,000 (Gerrard 2004); it also increased national fan membership to over 193,000 (Manchester United Annual Report, 2004). Building customer relationships Manchester United has been an active relationshipbuilder throughout much of the post-1945 era. Today, the club maintains a fan base of nearly 200,000 with its One United Membership Scheme in the UK and up to 75 million fans worldwide. Ironically, it was a tragedy that first triggered emotional ties among football fans toward the club. In 1958, eight players were killed in Munich, Germany, as the team aeroplane crashed. A surviving player, Bobby Charlton, noted (Dunphy, 1991, p. 249): “Before Munich, it was Manchester’s club, afterwards, everyone felt they owned a little bit of it.” Since that time, the club has devoted considerable time and expense to nurturing and developing its fan base, both in the UK and outside.

Commercial relationships with fans Manchester United was among the first football clubs to track fan needs through research and cement ties through opportunities to purchase club-branded products and services. As the Premiership got underway in the early 1990s, Manchester United capitalised on its success to launch a stream of non-football-related products and services. Its Champs Cola was launched in 1993 (Manchester Union aims to score, 1993). In the mid1990s, Manchester United added branded wines, lagers and a champagne to the list (Manchester Union tries branded champagne, 1997). Financial services (insurance, loans, credit cards) were added under the MU Finance brand. The club joined with Vodafone to launch MU Mobile, and with Travelcare to provide travel services under the MU Travel brand. In 2003,


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FIGURE 3 The rise of the Manchester United global brand

MANCHESTER UNITED’S RISE TO

RISE OF SOCCER

MANCHESTER

NATIONAL BRAND STATUS

TO INTERNATIONAL

UNITED’S PUSH TO

PROMINENCE

GLOBAL BRAND

TRADITIONAL CLUB CULTURE (SIR MATT BUSBY) - YOUTH ORIENTATION - EXCELLENCE IN TALENT - CLUB>INDIVIDUAL MENTALITY  ATTACKING STYLE  CHARISMATIC PLAYERS (GEORGE BEST, ERIC CANTONA, DAVID BECKHAM)  HISTORY - 1958 MUNICH DISASTER - 1960s ANGLOPHILE ERA (BEATLES, JAMES BOND, 1966 WORLD CUP, 1968 UEFA CHAMPIONS) - 1990s SUCCESS 8/11 EPL CHAMPIONSHIPS BECKHAM ICON ERA

STATUS

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ON-FIELD SUCCESS Y D U T S E S A C

WORLDWIDE APPEAL  ADVANTAGES OF BRITISH SOCCER  INTERNATIONAL MEDIA 

ASIA  NORTH AMERICA 

MANCHESTER UNITED’S BRAND-BUILDING STRATEGIES 

-

SPONSORSHIPS WITH OTHER GLOBAL BRANDS NIKE BUDWEISER PEPSI FUJI VODAFONE (AIG FROM 2006-07)

BUILDING RELATIONSHIPS WITH FANS - ONE UNITED - MANDARIN WEBSITE - PRE-SEASON TOURS 

CREATION OF A NATIONAL BRAND

MANAGING MEDIA RIGHTS - BSKYB - MUTV 

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the Red Cinema Complex was opened in the Salford suburb of Manchester. Building relationships with other global brands Being associated with other international brand names lends global auras to brands as they go worldwide. Rossaaen & Amis (2004) noted that both Manchester United and Nike gained in global stature af ter the announcement of their global tie-in. In recent years Manchester United has formed commercial alliances with a number of global players in other industries: Vodafone, Pepsi, Budweiser and Fuji were all added to the club’s sponsorship list. Under these arrangements the club gains from sponsors’ international reputations and sponsors gain from their association with a marquee sports brand. Building relationships with foreign fans In the home market, British clubs can build relationships with fans from being a part of the national local sports scenes over decades and through week-to-week media exposure during the soccer season (August to May). Taking the Manchester United image and brand into foreign markets poses the challenge of building emotional ties with fans less familiar with the club’s history or who have not witnessed at first hand the excitement of the ‘Theatre of Dreams’ atmosphere at the Old Trafford stadium. Televised broadcasts and print exposures are the entrées, but the all-important follow-ups are where club-fan relationships are built and fans are converted into consumers. Building brand relationships with global consumers works best when not done through conventional mass media. Joachimsthaler & Aaker (1997) noted that the most successful brands are built through experiences in unconventional settings – sponsorships (such as Hugo Boss with Formula One racing, art exhibitions, golf); publicity (Benetton’s controversial non-productrelated AIDS campaigns); or the Cadbury’s Chocolate theme park, Cadbury World, in Bournville, UK. All have one thing in common: customer involvement in the brand-building experience. The involvement factor has been critical to Manchester United’s brand-

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building efforts in Asia and North America. The Asian strategy Manchester United estimates that it has about 40 million fans in Asia. Much of this support has resulted from the increased popularity of the sport within the region. While soccer has been around in Asia for a long time, demand for the sport has been revitalised through: (a) English teams that have periodically visited the region since the 1980s; (b) China qualifying for the 2002 World Cup that was hosted in South Korea and Japan; (c) Asian players signed by Manchester United (Dong Fangzhou and Park Ji-sung), Everton (Li Tie), Crystal Palace (Fan Zhiyi), Manchester City (Sun Jihai) and Tottenham Hotspur (Kazuyuki Toda); (d) live broadcasts through ESS (ESPN Star Sports); and (e) the prospect of Beijing hosting the 2008 Olympic Games (Bowman, 2003; Crispin, 2004b). Manchester United has capitalised on this interest through: 

South-east Asia tour 2001 in which the club played exhibition games in Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand to connect with their Asian fan base and promote their branded products and services. This was followed by a pre-season tour in 2005 comprising four matches in China, Hong Kong and Japan. During this tour, the club signed a sponsorship deal with Malaysia-based budget airline AirAsia, which included plane liveries using Manchester United branding.

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Establishment of foreign outlets – a Theatre of Dreams branded leisure complex in Hong Kong, which houses a museum, interactive games and a café, as well as selling club merchandise (Bawden, 1999). In 2004, the club opened a theme restaurant in the Chinese city of Chengdu. Another 100 outlets are planned for Asia (Crispin, 2004b).

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Club merchandise – in 2002, Manchester United granted Thailand’s Central Marketing Group rights to produce sporting casual wear, stationery, bags, car accessories and souvenirs for distribution in


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department stores, stand-alone outlets and megastores. This arrangement complements similar deals signed in Malaysia, the Philippines and Hong Kong. These producers were to service third-party markets in Asia and Europe (Jitpleecheep, 2002). 

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Website promotions – the club, in conjunction with website specialist Lycos, launched a Chinese language website. Sponsored by Vodafone and listed at manunited.com.cn, the website attracts over 25 million page views per month and aids the club’s sponsorship, e-commerce and betting businesses (Manchester United Annual Report, 2003). Soccer schools – To further the club’s youth development policy, the first of its Asian soccer academies was opened in 2004 in Hong Kong. In the same year the club opened a soccer school in Disneyland, Paris, and this was followed in 2005 by the opening of a facility in Dubai Sports City in the United Arab Emirates. The North American Strategy Manchester United has about 5 million fans in North America, a following enhanced through Rupert Murdoch’s marketing of his Fox Sports World TV channel (now Fox Soccer Channel) in the US.

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In 2002, the club formed an alliance with baseball’s New York Yankees to extend television coverage over the Yankee network and to establish distribution for club merchandise through Yankee outlets.

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In 2004, the club teamed with Master Card International to launch a Manchester United credit card.

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In 2004, the club joined eight other famous European clubs for a series of games to promote the sport throughout the US – a move dubbed the “Manchester United Global Brand Enhancement Tour” (Saporito, 2004). This followed a 2003

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tour, sponsored by Budweiser and Pepsi, that attracted over 250,000 fans. 

In 2003, the club piloted summer soccer schools in Seattle, Washington, a move that has since evolved into year-round youth development programmes (Manchester United Annual Report, 2003).

The brand as symbol Visual imagery and brand heritage become symbolic when they are uniquely associated with a product or service. McDonald’s Golden Arches and the Levi Strauss storied jean history are testaments to the powers of brand symbolism and heritage. For Manchester United, the Red Devil nickname is well known throughout the soccer world, along with the club crest. But it is the club’s history that has always had popular appeal for soccer fans everywhere. Brand heritage, history and development of a distinctive Manchester United culture The club now known as Manchester United was originally formed in 1878 as the Newton Heath Lancashire and Yorkshire Football Club. Financial problems followed and the club was reformed under its present name in 1902. The club moved to its Old Trafford ground in 1910 (Manchester United official website, 2005b). Its move towards national and international prominence can be traced back to the appointment of Matt Busby as manager in 1945. It was Busby who established the traditional corporate culture that characterises the club today (Rossaaen & Amis, 2004). Wagg (2004) noted that Busby’s soccer philosophy established club precedents in many key areas. He established the youth orientation (the ‘Busby Babes’). Busby’s quest for soccer excellence extended nationally as he scoured the country in search of soccer talent. He promoted individuality and flair on the field but encouraged a club-oriented ‘one for all’ camaraderie off the field. He enhanced team unity by arranging off-the-field perks for all players, including golf memberships, local cinema passes and concessions at resort hotels. In 1956, he took the


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club into Europe in defiance of the English Football League. The Busby corporate culture legacy imbued Manchester United with a reputation for youth, talent development, attacking football and individual excellence, all within the framework of a club

steeped in traditional values and atmosphere. During the 1960s and 1970s, the club took advantage of the era’s Beatles, James Bond and Anglophile tendencies (including England’s 1966 World Cup win) to enhance its reputation, garnering

The Takeover of Manchester United In May 2005, US businessman Malcolm Glazer bought a controlling interest in Manchester United for $1.47 billion, of which about $470 million was financed through borrowings against team assets (the club is said to be worth $1.3 billion) and through unsecured loans. Obtaining over 75% of the club’s shares allowed Glazer to list these debts on the club’s financial books. The club’s 2004 profit was $106 million. The servicing of the debts incurred is likely to cost up to $100 million per year, although the club is currently in talks about re-financing the loan to secure more favourable interest rates. In the broader national and international contexts, the Manchester United takeover can be viewed as part of the globalisation of British industry and football. Foreign influences on UK commerce have become pronounced as US, German, Swiss and Dutch banks have made profound impressions on the British financial scene; and as major auto brands have fallen into foreign ownership (Jaguar, Aston Martin and Land Rover to Ford, and Rolls-Royce and the Mini to BMW). In similar measure, the English Premier League has imported many foreign players whose skills have enhanced the EPL’s reputation as the most competitive in the world. The current England manager is Swedish, and the top three clubs (Chelsea, Arsenal, and Manchester United) have Portuguese, French and Scots managers respectively. While the most famous foreign owner of an English club is Chelsea’s Roman Abramovich, Egyptian Mohamed Al Fayed owns Fulham and a Lithuanian business magnate, Vladimir Romanov, recently bought Scottish club Heart of Midlothian.

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The fears: that the servicing of the takeover debt will

cripple club finances, hamstring future efforts to bring in talented players to maintain high standards of play. Additional revenues would become necessary for financial solvency. These may include renegotiated broadcast rights (not likely under current arrangements), raised ticket prices, named rights to the Old Trafford stadium (similar to the Emirates deal with Arsenal for $100 million over 15 years). A sad case history was Leeds United, whose excessive debts led to a player sell-off, relegation, and sale of their stadium. The hopes: the Glazer takeover of the US NFL’s

Tampa Buccaneers yielded increased admission prices but resulted in stable ownership, a capable administration, talented coaches and a state-of-the-art stadium and training facilities. Glazer initiated significant community outreach programmes in Tampa; and the Glazer Family Foundation has made major charitable contributions. Glazer’s connections could give the club leverage in the potential-laden US market that has 1520 million soccer players. Protagonists note that Glazer understands the importance of on-field success in leveraging further value from the global brand. Antagonists claim that Manchester United already has excellent players, management, facilities and community orientation. Sources: Hundley, T. (2005, May 29) "United front opposes soccer sale", Knight Ridder Tribune Business News, 1; The Economist (2005, May 21) "Business: Red Devil, Face Value", 80-81; Sesit, M.R. (2005, May 19): "Going global: soccer deals show why investors like to play in the UK market", Wall Street Journal, C1; Serwer, A. (2005, May 30) "On the radar", Fortune, 27.


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the European Cup in 1968 with charismatic Irishman George Best being voted European Player of the Year. The club languished during the 1970s and 1980s as first Leeds United and then Nottingham Forest and, most notably, Liverpool superseded them as England’s leading club, although Manchester United was still the best supported (Rossaaen & Amis, 2004). The hiring of Alex Ferguson in 1986 heralded a return to traditional club values and a revival in the club’s fortunes, with Manchester United dominating English football through the 1990s, winning the League title eight times over 1992-2003, and being crowned European champions in 1999. As Farred (2004, p. 222) noted: “It was a good decade to dominate English football... The Premier League was formed in 1992... a move that saw television revenues skyrocket and it made the clubs and players... wealthier. With the proliferation of satellite, cable and digital TV the beautiful game became... the truly global game.”

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Key success factors for global sports branding Soccer is a global sport by virtue of its simplicity and its benefits as a player- and team-oriented form of physical exercise. It appeals to both collective and individual instincts that are essential aspects of the human existence (Hofstede, 1980). Its diffusion worldwide can be traced back to European colonial influences of the 19th and 20th centuries. This worldwide appeal is the basis for branding strategies put into motion by a number of European clubs. English football clubs have capitalised on their national birthrights as organisers of the modern game, and on their first mover advantages in establishing competitive leagues to raise national standards of play. In making these moves, the EPL has attracted much media attention that has broadened its appeal both nationally and internationally as global media developments have taken clubs 100 years old and more into worldwide markets. In particular, the Murdoch media

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empire tie-ups have been instrumental in taking EPL and European soccer into over 100 national markets. The League’s August to May season has ensured that its activities are rarely out of the public eye. But why has Manchester United, rather than Liverpool, Real Madrid, or Bayern Munich, become the best known soccer club in the world? All clubs, both in the EPL and worldwide, have been subject to the same industry pressures as Manchester United. Indeed, Manchester United has won Europe’s most prestigious trophy, the European Cup, just twice compared to Liverpool’s five times and Real Madrid’s nine (Barnard, 2002). But the timing of its successes in both the 1960s and the 1990s has been critical. They occurred in eras which saw huge developments in the media industry. In 1968 television had only recently become available on a mass basis. In the 1990s, global communications and media came on stream as part of the globalisation push. Manchester United capitalised on an English football heritage that included tragedy (the Munich disaster), a football culture that emphasised youth, talent development and an attacking style of play, and a number of charismatic, talented players who attracted fans as much with their off-the-field activities as their matchday performances. A resource-based viewpoint (RBV) on Manchester United’s success If many other clubs were exposed to the same industry pressures as Manchester United, why was the Old Trafford club the first to translate sporting success first into national brand-building activities and then into a global reputation? The answer is a critical resource: management. Manchester United executives were the first in the industry to build and leverage their brand marketing capabilities. As Real Madrid president Florentino Perez noted in 2004: “In past years, Manchester United has become the best known club in the world because its marketing policies were ten years ahead of their time.” (Liga Futbol, 2004) Key management additions that gave the club its global impetus were Martin Edwards, who became


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club chairman in 1980, the recruitment of Umbro’s Peter Kenyon as director of international marketing in 1997, and the appointment of Peter Draper, also from Umbro, as director of marketing. The appropriate organisational structures were created. Kenyon put into place a new affiliate, MU International, in 1998 to replicate the Old Trafford experience in international markets. In 2000, advertising agency Cheetham Bell was charged with the creation of a global brand awareness campaign; and in 2003, One United was launched as the club’s global brand initiative. Professionalism in soccer club management is not new – Liverpool was renowned for it from the 1970s, when it enjoyed its greatest success (Taylor & Ward, 1997) – but Manchester United was the first to bring a true marketing-oriented focus to football to capitalise on its reputation as one of England’s premier clubs. In this instance, it was an alert management that initiated strategies to take advantage of the club’s ‘first mover’ advantages in the world game and establish itself in the minds of soccer fans worldwide.

Success in the sports arena by comparison can be ephemeral (e.g. Olympic success), especially for individual athletes, who can rarely sustain sporting excellence over long periods. Athletes and their managers must therefore be alert in taking advantage of limited timeframes of opportunity. 

In contrast, sports teams that demonstrate success over long periods tend to be those that have established corporate cultures, with ‘club above all’ mentalities, while encouraging individuality within the team. Sports teams offer superior opportunities for brand development because of their longevity and their abilities to renew the excitement quotient through player development and acquisitions.

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Technology, especially the internet, gives fans and followers access to club and team activities. It is inexpensive. In almost any sport, youth, local and regional clubs can maintain website connections for information and merchandising purposes. Just as Manchester United creates opportunities for faraway fans to participate in the Theatre of Dreams, so sports club enthusiasts can follow their teams no matter where they are in the world. As webcast technologies develop, opportunities exist for sports fans anywhere to follow their favourite teams, be they local, regional, national or international. Such is the power of technology. With these renewals of club-player-fan relationships come oppor tunities for sales and commercial development.

Lessons from the Manchester United model

Few sporting endeavours can become a Manchester United, but there are lessons to be gleaned. 

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Creating and maintaining global brands requires constant exposure to maintain a worldwide profile. The EPL’s long season and the north-south hemispheric split are major advantages in sustaining enthusiasm among soccer fans worldwide, and in making club-fan connections worthwhile. This gives merchandise year-long sales appeal. Such advantages accrue less easily to sports such as American football with its four-month season, or baseball with its six-month season. Nothing succeeds like success, and success over significant periods has given rise to a Manchester United brand heritage that few can match in commerce or sports. Most of the world’s global brands have been successful for decades – Exxon, Coca-Cola, Marlboro, McDonald’s (Aaker, 1996).

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A theme evident both on- and off-the-field at Manchester United is the commitment to excellence. While this may be expected for on-the-field performances, the club’s expectations of excellence extend to management in providing resources to support club activities. As Gerrard (2004) noted, while other soccer clubs flinch under the onslaught of player wage inflation, Manchester United has maintained a star-studded roster while having one of the lowest wages to revenues ratios in the EPL. Professional management of the club-fan interface is integral for


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two reasons. First, it cements relationships with fans who can tangibly demonstrate their loyalties through merchandise sales and TV audience participation. Second, additional revenues allow clubs to make key reinvestments in player resources and fan facilities. Excellence in club reputation and image management has become a cornerstone for future survival and on-field per formance. 

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Within the academic field, the soccer fan-club interface in particular presents significant potential for research in at least three areas. First, as laid out by Morgan and Hunt (1994), relationship marketing and the forming of major emotional bonds between firms and customers is a fer tile area for research. In few industries are the relationships between fans/customers and clubs as deep as in soccer and sports, generally. Belk, Wallendorf & Sherry (1989) have advocated the notion of ‘consumer devotion’ as extreme forms of brand loyalty. Hunt, Bristol & Bashaw (1999) have noted sports fans as logical extensions of the consumer devotion concept. Its further investigation in the sports or soccer arena would appear inevitable. Second, Manchester United already tracks customer needs in ways similar to many major corporations, but as the stakes rise in professional sports, academics and consumer behaviourists in particular have much to probe as soccer’s appeal broadens from its traditional audience to attract broader fan bases. Third, the depth of fan allegiances should be ideal subject matter for consumer psychologists as a baseline for future market segmentation strategies. As more athletes and clubs seek to leverage their personal or club reputations in the marketplace, the need is to develop a cadre of professional managers with distinctive expertise in spor t. Manchester United is a testament to the difference competent management makes in professional sports. Additionally, with the advent of globalisation, future managers of sports should be fully prepared to deal with the international aspects of their activities.

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As the Glazer takeover starts a new chapter in the Manchester United history, uncertainty prevails. The club’s success has been founded on solid stakeholder principles, with commitments to players, fans, management and the soccer community generally. Taking the club public in 1991 brought shareholders into the equation. As Glazer pulled the club back into private ownership, there were opportunities to maintain and revitalise the traditional values that made the club famous. Whether this course is taken – or another that places the primary emphasis on profiteering – remains to be seen. The club also faces uncertainty from an unexpected source. Roman Abramovich’s huge investment in Chelsea means that despite having the largest turnover and profit in English football, Manchester United can no longer guarantee to have the largest transfer and wage funding. In 2004-05 Chelsea broke the Manchester United /Arsenal stranglehold on the English Premiership and Manchester United finished the season without a trophy. In 2005-06 it would appear that Manchester United will have to be content with football’s equivalent of the wooden spoon – the Carling Cup, having failed in the Champions League and FA Cup earlier than its main competitors and seen Chelsea develop a commanding lead in the Premiership. Similarly, Arsenal’s resurgence on the pitch through the recruitment of promising young players and its move to a new stadium with higher ticket prices than Manchester United could see it compete strongly with Manchester United financially. On the commercial front, Manchester United has successfully replaced Vodafone as its primary shirt sponsor with United States financial services company AIG. Although this also offers potential in leveraging cash from supporters buying AIG products, it is arguable whether it provides the oppor tunities Vodafone delivered to develop the club brand. Being a global communications company, Vodafone helped to promote the club to tens of millions of people and was able to offer incremental revenue streams such as selling subscription mobile services and merchandise.


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On top of its sponsorship fee, these extra benefits have been worth millions to the club. The success the club has had in recruiting fans on a global basis, however, has so far failed to deliver significant revenue benefits with estimates that only 2% of the club’s earnings are derived from overseas markets. In the Far East, club merchandise has to compete with the well established counterfeit industry, which can undercut official product prices by considerable margins. The big challenge for the club, therefore, will be to realise its potential through digital media, in particular through subscription media revenues. There are two issues that could stand in the way. First, will the future on-field performance be strong enough to see fans with arguably only loose ties to the club pay large amounts for subscription access to live match footage? Second, the club will have to see the English Premiership break its collective selling of overseas media rights to be able to cash in on this fully. Professional football changed enormously in the 1990s as vast amounts of money flooded into the game from subscription television, gate receipts, merchandise and hospitality. It is set to undergo further massive change as it enters the unpredictable territory of the global digital revolution. The potential for development for a club such as Manchester United is enormous, but as in any period of major change, those at the forefront at the start are not necessarily those that will emerge as winners. © 2006 International Marketing Reports

John Vincent is Assistant Professor of Sport Management in the Department of Kinesiology at the University of Alabama. A former professional soccer player at Crystal Palace, he has published in numerous journals, including the Journal of Sport Behaviour, Sociology of Sport Journal, the Journal of Sports Sciences, and the International Review for the Sociology of Sport.

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Biographies John S. Hill is Miller Professor of International Business at the University of Alabama. He has published in more than 30 journals, including the Harvard Business Review, the Journal of International Business Studies, the Journal of Advertising Research and the European Journal of Marketing.

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