HAZID

Hazards on an Offshore Platform: A Review 1Rahul 1,2Department

Wadhwani*, 2Vimal Kumar, 3Pankaj Pratap Singh

of Chemical Engineering, Indian Institute of Technology Roorkee, Uttarakhand-247667

3Department

of Civil Engineering, Indian Institute of Technology Roorkee, Uttarakhand-247667

Email Id: [email protected], [email protected], [email protected], [email protected] Phone no.: 21332-285694

Abstract:  Today’s an offshore platform costs billions of dollar to prepare and operate which is one of the costly affairs in the upstream oil sector. As the whole process has to deal with flammable fluids which are very risky and a small hazard in this can cause a big hazard to the industry in terms of money, human life, etc. This requires a detailed study of the possible hazards exists on the offshore platform during the designing phase of them. In this paper an attempt is made to review the possible hazards exists on an offshore platforms and also suggested the safeguards to take proper action to minimize them. The HAZID technique which is used to identify the possible existing hazards is discussed. Keywords: Offshore Keywords: Offshore platform, HAZID, QRA, oil companies. Introduction: Since 1950s, chemical process safety is demanding advanced technology to mitigate the risks. On the consequences of these risks, today safety is also become an important factor in production. Now, it has developed into a scientific discipline that includes many highly technical and complex theories and practices. Process safety emphasizes the use of appropriate technological tools to provide information for making safety decisions with respect to plant design and operation. Chemical process safety is referred with the help of these Safety, hazard, and risk terms. Their definitions follow: • Safety  Safety  or loss prevention is the prevention of accidents by the use of appropriate technologies to identify the hazards of a chemical plant and to eliminate them before an accident occurs. • A hazard is hazard is anything with the potential for producing an accident. • Risk = [consequence of the Risk = [probability (or frequency) of a hazard resulting in an accident] x [consequence accident]. An oil field, especially offshore field, is by its nature very dangerous highly flammable fluids under high pressure are being handled by large complex equipment in a hostile environment. If anything went wrong there is a very high probability of losses in terms of money, death, reputation, environment, etc. There is billions of dollars invested in the production of oil and gas as reservoir, oil platform, wells, equipment, etc.  To protect this great investment of life and property, safety system have been developed and incorporated to reduce the chances of mishap occurring phenomenon and minimize its effect.

Previous work:

*Corresponding author

Previous work done by Harstad has emphasized safety as an integral part of the various stages of plant (platform) design. He has given several examples of this approach; however, no systematic methodology or guidelines were proposed to conduct such integrated design [1]. The work done by Medonos has put forward a methodology for integrated safety engineering, which incorporates HAZOP and other risk assessment techniques in safety assessment and development of an effective safety management [2]. But, Faisal I. Khan, Paul R. Amyotte effort to present a detailed picture of the potential for inherent safety considerations in offshore oil and gas activities [3]. While Henry Orbz emphasized his work on identifying the various possible hazards exists in chemical industry and categorize them in various level of severity [4]. Also Mamoun Naciri, Single Buoy Moorings Inc. and Leen Poldervaart, Single Buoy Moorings Inc. carried out their work on modeling of LNG terminals and emphasized their design work on the HAZID conclusion [5]. While, Kiho Moon, Seok-Ryong Song, Jorge Ballesio, Gary Fitzgerald, Gregory Knight worked to identify potential gas release scenarios by conducting a HAZID that focused on the novel features of the gas turbine propulsion system [6]. Also, F.Faber, A.E.J.Bliault, L.R.Resweber P.S.Jones, summarises Shell's ongoing technology developments aimed at practical, safe and economic floating production systems to deliver oil/condensate and LNG from the same unit [7]. In this paper an attempt is made to review the possible hazards, which exists on an offshore platform. This study also suggested the possible safeguards to adopt proper action for minimizing relevant threats. Finally, HAZID study developed a HAZID worksheet, which helps to identify major hazards on possible causes as well as its consequences with possible safeguards. Risk Analysis and Management Risk analysis is used for the assessment of the hazards in the association of process plant and their storage installations. It can be assess by solving three questions. - What can go wrong? - What are the effects and consequences? - How often will it happen?  The first and basic step of hazard identification (the first question) is purely qualitative and is often called a safety study. Such a study may reveal aspects of the plant or installation which require more consideration. It is then necessary to answer the next two questions in order to complete the risk analysis. The results of the analysis are used for judgment about the acceptability of the risk and for decision making. Qualitative answers are often given to the second and third questions. However, recent developments have involved the application of quantitative techniques for obtaining answers to these two questions. The use of these techniques is termed as quantitative risk analysis (QRA). The whole exercise may be called risk assessment. In earlier years, many companies did not use quantitative techniques after the identification stage. However, decisions were made and actions taken to control specific hazards considering (qualitatively) probabilities and consequences. In a sense this is an elementary form of risk analysis, but at a less sophisticated level than assessments involving quantitative consideration of probabilities and consequences. However, over the years, the use of in-depth risk assessment ranging from hazard identification to computation of individual and societal risk has increased. Now the question arises related to abrupt behavior in the safety of an offshore platform, which are follows as:

•

An act of God (hurricane, earthquake)

•

The failure of surface control or other equipment

• 

Sabotage

•

Human error

•

A fire/explosion which causes failure of surface control

•

Lack of proper safety equipment

•

Collisions such as between a boat and wellhead

Nothing is completely safe in this world. No one will do everything ideal and every piece of equipment will fail eventually one day. So the safety system must be built and operated to reduce the hazards when failure occurs. Offshore oil and gas production also involves traditional hazards with the potential of severe occupational accidents. There are risks of dropped objects in heavy lifting and materials handling in connection with drilling, maintenance and transportation of consumables. Operators work at height or between heavy mobile objects in various drilling, inspection and maintenance operations. Adverse weather conditions may increase the probability of serious accidents further. HAZID  The Hazard Identification (HAZID) study is a tool for hazard identification, which is used early in a project as soon as process flow diagrams, draft heat and mass balances, and plot layouts are available. Existing site infrastructure, weather, and geotechnical data are also required, these being a source of external hazards. The method is a design‐enabling tool, acting to help organize the HSE deliverables in a project. The structured brainstorming technique typically involves designer and client personnel engineering disciplines, project management, commissioning and operations. The main major findings and hazard ratings help to deliver HSE compliance, and form part of the project Risk Register required by many licensing authorities. Key benefits of HAZID study: A well‐organized HAZID study activity will deliver a good identification of hazards and safeguards at an early stage in the design of a facility. The study output helps to ensure that: • Health, Safety and Environment (HSE) hazards are revealed at an early stage in the project, before significant costs have been incurred • Hazards are recorded and action are taken so that they can be avoided, mitigated or highlighted during design •

Action responses are auditable by Management and Legislative Inspectorates

•

Design or Construction delays and budget over ‐runs are avoided

•

Fewer hazards remain un‐revealed at commissioning and operation of plant

HAZID Worksheet:

 This worksheet is prepared for possible hazards on an offshore platform. This study is proposing for aforesaid context, with the help of relevance literature [8]-[13]. In this HAZID worksheet, a detailed study is done by proposing possible threats, and their causes and consequences. It helps to create possible safeguards for relevant threats. Threats and concern

Causes

Consequences

Accidental

release

Dropped object

Damage

from

process

the

equipment

Safeguards to

Fixed/portable

pipe/equipment,

detectors

rupture

of

Emergency

releasing

H2S/Fire

pipe

H 2S

Shutdown/Fire

hazard,

Shutdown (ESD/FSD)

environmental

system

impacts

Certified

crane

operator Foam hose Material

handling

manual Platted main deck Deluge system Inspection

and

certification procedure for crane operation Breathing apparatus Material/

Fire

hazard,

H2S

Fixed/portable

H 2S

mechanical failure

release,

detectors

of valve

environmental

ESD/FSD system

impacts

Breathing apparatus Periodically inspection and maintenance Hydro

&

leak

test

before starting up Platted cellar deck Deluge system Proper

piping

and

fitting Corrosion

Fire

hazard,

H2S

ESD/FSD system

release,

Regular inspection

environmental

Proper

impacts

fitting Painting

piping

and

Corrosion allowance Design error

Fire

hazard,

H2S

Proper

inspection

at

release,

startup

environmental

Quality system in place

impacts Human error

Fire

hazard,

H2S

Safe

operating

release,

conditions

environmental

Skilled operators

impacts

ESD/FSD system Gas detection system Safety

poster

at

various

location

to

impart the knowledge of safety during work Safety interlocks Proper operation as per vendor manual Leakage from the

Fire

hazard,

H2S

ESD/FSD system

instrument

release,

Gas detection system

environmental

Breathing apparatus

impacts Combustible atmosphere process

Insufficient purge in

Potential

fire,

Purging procedure

explosion

equipment

prior to start-up Chemical leakage

Material failure

Equipment damage/

ESD/FSD system health

problem

Proper

fitting

and

piping Eye wash bottles First aid box

Dropped object

Equipment damage/

Hydrogen

formation  Traces of H2 

in the battery room

First aid box health

Certified

crane

problem

operator

Explosion

Natural ventilation

possibility

H2 detectors Explosion equipments electrical lines Fire extinguisher

proof and

Riser

pipeline

External impact

releases

Fire

hazard,

environmental

Riser are internal to  jacket structure

impact, release of

ESD/ FSD and Gas

toxics (H 2S)

detection system Navigation lanterns Breathing apparatus

Corrosion

Fire

hazard,

Corrosion allowances

environmental

Pipeline specification

impact, release of

Sacrificial anode

toxics (H 2S)

Painting Concrete coating Pigging

Material Failure

Well blowout

Loss

of

well

control

Fire

hazard,

ESD/FSD

and

Gas

environmental

detection system

impact, release of

Pipeline specification

toxics (H 2S)

Pipeline design criteria

Fire

hazard,

BOP

during

environmental

intervention/

impact, release of

operation

toxics (H 2S)

and

well drilling

with

SSSV

SSV during

normal operation Adequate

space

provided on the deck for

modular

operation

and

rig other

associated equipment External impact

Fire

hazard,

SSSV fail close

environmental impact, release of toxics Marine Growth

Improper/Failure

Damage to coating

Marine

of coating

causing

preventer

and

corrosion ultimately

weakening

growth

Proper coating

the

structure

Design of the structure by

keeping

consideration

of

marine growth load Fatigue

Potential failure to  joints and structure

Design criteria include fatigue analysis

Cyclic loading on

Regular inspection

structure due to

Proper welding of joints

wind and waves Helicopter

Pilot error

Crash

landing

on  Trained pilot

helideck potentially impact

on

the

structure Extreme weather

Ship collision

Drift off/ drive off

Crash

Safety net Proper

designing

of

helideck

landing

on

Weather restriction on

helideck potentially

helicopter operation

impact

Helicopter rescue kit

on

the

structure

Safety net

Impact to structure

Barge bumper on the boat

landing

side

designed to handle the impact

as

per

structural

design

criteria Boat landing on the predominant downwind side of the installation Loss of visibility due

to

Impact to structure

Navigation lights

fog,

extreme weather,

Location Coordinate of

etc

the

platforms

are

present on the marine charts Extreme wind/ high

Storm / cyclones

tide

Impact to structure

Proper

, drop objects

designing 100+

platform from

years

past

weather

conditions Weather limitation on crane operations Lightning

Storm

Fire at the platform

ESD/FSD system Flame arrestors

Earthquakes

Natural calamity

Impact to structure

Structure is designed

with

as per seismic zone

severe

damages Conclusion:

other

norms

 This study shows a significant step towards hazard identification on an offshore platform. It also incorporates all the possible existing hazard identification systems, which are indeed of changes to make flexible this hazard system. A schema is proposed to resolve most of the risks and an assessment process is quite useful to solve the analyzed risks. In this proposed study, some specific threats are identified such as Combustible atmosphere in process equipment prior to start-up, Riser pipeline releases and well blowout, which are highly sensitive to occur. Therefore, the proper safeguards are taken into consideration to reduce these relevant threats. References: [1] Harstad, E., “Safety as an integrated part of platform design”,  In Proceeding of 1st International Conference on Health, Safety and Environment, Hague, Netherlands (1991). [2] Medonos, S., “Use of advanced methods in integrated safety engineering ”, Offshore Mechanics and Arctic Engineering (OMAE) Conference, Houston, TX, (1994). [3] Faisal I. Khan, Paul R. Amyotte, “Inherent safety in offshore oil and gas activities: a review of the present status and future directions ”,  Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, Vol. 15 No.4, pp.279-89 (2002). [4] H. Ozog, Hazard identification, analysis and control; Chemical Engineering (New York), Volume 92 (18), p. 161 (1985) [5] Mamoun Naciri, Single Buoy Moorings Inc. and Leen Poldervaart, Single Buoy Moorings Inc., “Design Aspects of SPM LNG Terminals in Shallow Water” Offshore Technology Conference, Houston, Texas, 3 May-6 May 2004, ISBN 978-1-55563-251-9 [6] Kiho Moon, Seok-Ryong Song, Jorge Ballesio, Gary Fitzgerald, Gregory Knight, “Fire risk assessment of gas turbine propulsion system for LNG carr iers” Journal of Loss Prevention in the Process Industries, Volume 22, Issue 6, November 2009, Pages 908 – 914 [7] F.Faber, A.E.J.Bliault, L.R.Resweber P.S.Jones, “Floating LNG Solutions from the Drawing Board to Reality”, Offshore Technology Conference, Houston, Texas, 6 May-9 May 2002, ISBN 978-1-55563-249-6. [8] Sinnott, R. K., Safety and loss prevention, in Chemical Engineering (by J. M. Coulson and  J. F. Richardson) (1983) [9] Kavianian, H. R., Rao, J. K. and Brown, G. V., “Application  of Hazard Evaluation  Techniques to the Design of Potentially Hazardous Industrial Chemical Processes ”. (Div. of  Training and Manpower Devel., Nat Inst. Occup Safety and Health, Cincinnati, OH). (1992) [10] McCoy, S. A., Wakeman, S. J., Larkin, F. D., Chung, P. W. H., Rushton, A. G. and Lees, F. P., “HAZID, a computer aid for hazard identification: 2. Unit model system ”, Trans IChemE, Part B, Proc Safe Env Prot, 77(B6): 328 – 334. [11] Rushton, A. G., “Quality Assurance of Hazard and Operability Study Performance in the Context of Offshore Safety ”. Report to HSE, Offshore Division1995, [12] G.L. Wells, C.J. Seagrave, R.N.C. Whiteway; Flowsheeting for Safety, IChemE, London (1977) [13] H.G. Lawley; “Operability studies and hazard analysis”; Loss Prevention, vol.8 AIChE, New York, pp. 105. (1974)