Hazop & Hazid Report - Cng Gas Plant - Tambak Lorok Rev b

Project Title :

ENGINEERING PROCUREMENT AND CONSTRUCTION COMPRESSED NATURAL GAS - TAMBAK LOMBOK

HAZOP AND HAZID STUDIES REPORT

DOCUMENT STATUS Approved : Approved : as Noted Not Approved

B

24 JUL 2013

REISSUED FOR REVIEW

YS

MTH

MEF

A

28 JUN 2013

ISSUED FOR REVIEW

YS

MTH

MEF

REV

DATE

DESCRIPTION

PREPARED

CHECKED

APPROVED

COMPANY

PT. Enviromate Technology International PT Pertadaya Gas

HAZOP/HAZID of CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1

INTRODUCTION

7

1.1 1.2 1.3 1.4

BACKGROUND STUDY OBJECTIVES SCOPE OF HAZOP/HAZID STUDY REPORT LAYOUT

7 7 8 8

2

PROJECT DESCRIPTION

9

2.1 OVERVIEW 2.1.1 Inlet scrubber (V-100) 2.1.2 Station Inlet metering (M-100 A/B) 2.1.3 Dryer Unit (D-100 A/B) 2.1.4 Compressor (K-101 / … / K-109) 2.1.5 CNG Cooler ( E-100) 2.1.6 CNG storage cylinders (V-200 1/../ 82) 2.1.7 Double pipe Exchanger 2.1.8 CNG Heat Exchanger (E-200) 2.1.9 Pressure reducing system (PV-0501 A/B) 2.1.10 Storage and Decanting process 2.1.11 Station Outlet Metering (M-200 A/B) 2.1.12 Waste Heat recovery Unit (E-300) 2.1.13 Fuel Gas 2.1.14 Instrument air 2.1.15 Cooling water (E-400) 2.1.16 Fire water system 2.1.17 Water treatment system (W-001) 2.1.18 Insulation 2.1.19 Vent System

9 9 9 10 10 11 11 12 12 12 12 13 13 13 13 14 14 14 14 14

3

STUDY METHODOLOGY

16

3.1 HAZOP 3.1.1 Overview 3.1.2 Worksheet Definition 3.2 HAZID 3.2.1 Overview 3.2.2 Worksheet Definitions

16 16 16 16 16 17

4

HAZOP/HAZID REVIEW SESSIONS

18

4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4 4.5

INTRODUCTION THE HAZOP/HAZID TEAM GUIDE WORDS DRAWINGS REVIEWED SELECTED NODES

18 18 18 19 20

HAZOP & HAZID REPORT - CNG GAS PLANT - TAMBAK LOROK REV BB

JULY 2013

PT. Enviromate Technology International PT Pertadaya Gas


5

HAZOP/HAZID RESULTS

21

5.1 5.2

ACTIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS MAJOR HAZARD SCENARIO

21 23

6

HAZOP/HAZID FOLLOW-UP

25

7

REFERENCES

26

APPENDIX A APPENDIX B APPENDIX C APPENDIX D

HAZOP/HAZID SUMMARY RECOMMENDATIONS HAZOP REVIEW WORKSHEETS HAZID REVIEW WORKSHEETS DRAWINGS


JULY 2013

PT. Enviromate Technology International PT. Pertadaya Gas

PT. PROSIM

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY The PT Perta Daya Gas has awarded to PT. Enviromate Technology International (PT. ETI) to conduct and construction of Compressed Natural Gas (CNG) facility. The plant will be located at Tambak Lorok, Central Java, Indonesia. The CNG facility is consisting of following equipment: Gas-Liquid separation system, Gas Drying & H2S adsorption system, Gas Compression system, CNG Cylinders storage package, Heat Exchangers and Metering systems. The Utility for supporting CNG Plant are consisting Fuel Gas System, Gas power generation, Air Instrument Package, Waste Heat Recovery Unit, Pumps, Cooling towers, Water treatment Package and Sump system. The incoming gas is taken from existing pipe then being compressed to CNG storage cylinders by CNG Compressors. Storage CNG will be performed maximum at 20 hours/day and decanting phase will be performed on the peak load within 4 hours/day (18.00 to 23.00). The design capacity of CNG Plant is 19.88 MMSCFD gas to the CNG storage cylinders. Waste heat recovery Unit is provided to utilize the energy from exhaust compressor gas engine to reduce Joule Thompson effect on the pressure reducing system. The WHRU will heat water from tank which will be utilized as heating media of the CNG gas on CNG heat exchanger. Cooling water system which consisting of Cooling Tower, Circulation pumps and CNG cooler will be pro-vided to optimize the requirement of CNG cylinders. The HAZOP/HAZID review sessions were carried out at the Istana Karang Laut office in Plaza Citivew Kemang, Jakarta, utilizing 2 days for review, over the period 17th, and 21st June 2013. The study identified 40 HAZOP recommendations and 18 HAZID recommendations. The recommendations would reduce potential safety or operability problems associated with the process or improve the clarity of the process drawings. HAZOP Design It was noted in the HAZOP It identified during the review and also with discussion with Tambak Lorok, some of the valve arrangement need to be lock open to ensure that it doesn’t block due to human error (eg. at upstream BDV, by pass line). General comments also noted to provide setting for all the instrumentation system (e.g. PIC, PSHH, PSV) It’s been reviewed that gas from suction compressor can be directed to downstream of E-200 to metering M-200 resulting in double counting of sales gas from Gundih meter with M-100. It was recommended to install additional check valve to PG-2"-3C-027 to prevent that case. It recommended to provide SOP to accommodate gas release from vent of sump tank due to gas blow by from V-100, to ensure equipment purchase suitable as per hazardous area classification and also to nsure vent stack at sump tank is located high enough to prevent exposure to personnel/operator at Incoming Scrubber System.


4

JULY 2013


PT. PROSIM

In the Waste Heat Recovery Unit, it was recommended to provide PSHH at downstream P-500A/B to trip P-500A/B in the case of manual valve at upstream E-300 inadvertenly close resulting in overpressure of the system. The existing fire water capacity need to be reviewed to ensure source of water and its amount is adequate to handle fire on the CNG plant in addition with existing fire water requirement in Tambak Lorok. It was discussed also that the design of floating valve T-600 to be radar type. Maintenance and Operational Based on the discussion raised up, it’s required to develop operating manual for delivery gas including showing correlation between pressure and flow at storage period and operation of redundant equipment such as compressor. To control corrosion at basin cooling tower, it was recommended to provide SOP to control PH at cooling tower periodically. HAZID In the HAZID session, location of the lightning stack has not identified yet, therefore it is recommended to review the location of the lightning stack to be away from the venting stack to reduce the probability of fire on the vent stack It was reviewed also that high noise level around the compressor area will potentially injured the personnel who operate the plant in daily basis. It was recommended to have noise study and provide warning sign the area to use ear plug protection. Fire and Gas detection was also reviewed in the HAZID, it is recommended to provide the philosophy of the fire and gas detection system of the plant in formal documentation and provide clear actions of each detector, which one create alarm or shut down/blowdown of the plant. Fire detection philosophy was not provided in the building, specifically in the electrical room such as control room/MCC/batery room. It is recommended to provide clear philosophy, e.g. providing early warning system for smoke detection in electrical room (High Sensitivity Smoke Detector), including fire suppression system such as portable fire extinguisher or automatic fire suppresion system (e.g. FM-200,etc) The scenario of fire and explosion in the CNG plant was not established yet during the review especially in relation position of the processing facility to location where stand by personnel available such as control room. Therefore, review of this scenario is recommended to justify design and location of the control room building. It is include also the fire and explosion impact to surrounding facility at Tambak Lorok. In the discussion also identified that the control room will not provided with glass windows to avoid explosion effect from the plant, hence that CCTV is recommended to be provided in the control room to monitor the plant. During the review, location of the vent stack has not been identified yet. Therefore, dispersion and radiation analysis need to be done to define safe location and height required for the vent stack. Consideration for emergency situation was also reviewed, and it is recommended to review emergency evacuation plan including emergency route, muster point location, safety equipment lay out and emergency lighting. HAZOP & HAZID REPORT - CNG GAS PLANT - TAMBAK LOROK REV BB

5

JULY 2013


PT. PROSIM

Good communication among parties involved (Tambak Lorok and Gundih) also important to make sure operability and deliverability of the process plant, especially to handle emergency situation. Therefore a procedure defining internal and external communication need to be established among parties to make sure the plant is operated safely. MAJOR HAZARD SCENARIO The Major Hazard of this plant is : •

Process Hazard : 1. High Pressure Gas containment in the CNG Storage Tanks 2. Gas Compression System 3. Hot water circulation system 4. Cold Venting

•

Non Process Hazard : 1. Control Room located in hazardous area 2. Human Error - Alarm 3. Communication between ETI, IP, Gundih 4. Transportation


6

JULY 2013


PT. PROSIM

1 INTRODUCTION

1.1 BACKGROUND PT. Perta Daya Gas is planning to develop CNG Plant Project. The plant will be located at Tambak Lorok, Central Java province, Indonesia. PT. Perta Daya Gas therefore commissioned an independent Chairman and Scribe for a series of safety studies to review and identify hazards and operability issues related to operation of Compressed Natural Gas Plant Project. This report details the Hazard and Operability (HAZOP) and Hazard Identification (HAZID) review and includes a summary of the recommendations identified during the review, as well as the HAZOP/HAZID review worksheets. 1.2 STUDY OBJECTIVES The objectives of the HAZOP study are to: •

Identify safety related hazards and operability problems related to the process that could directly threaten the safety of production personnel or cause operational problems;

•

Determine the seriousness of the consequences for the identified problems;

•

Identify engineering and procedural safeguards already incorporated into the design that will reduce the likelihood or the severity of consequences related to the identified problem;

•

Evaluate the adequacy of existing engineering and procedural safeguards; and

•

Recommend additional safeguards or operational procedures where necessary.

The objectives of the HAZID study include: •

Assess changes and consider new requirements that have emerged since the last PHA;

•

Identification of new hazard causes or initiating factors associated with the modifications with a potential to result in major accident events (MAEs), which may give rise to serious and immediate risk to health and safety of personnel;

•

Assessment of the consequences of these new MAEs;

•

Determination of risk based on the likelihood and the severity of the consequences for each identified MAEs;

•

Identification of existing safeguards that may include engineering or operational controls and measures included in the design for prevention and/or mitigation of the MAEs;

•

Evaluation of the residual risk taking into account the existing control and mitigation measures; and

•

Recommendation of additional safeguards or procedures, where necessary to demonstrate as Low as Reasonable Practicable (ALARP).


7

JULY 2013


PT. PROSIM

1.3 SCOPE OF HAZOP/HAZID STUDY The HAZOP/HAZID study covers these packages in detail: 1. Main Proces System: ·

V-100 : Gas Scrubber

·

M -100A/B & M -200A/B : Station Inlet & Outlet Metering

·

D-100A/B : Gas Dryer

·

K-101 to K109 : CNG Compressors

·

E-100 : CNG Cooler & E-200 : CNG Heat Exchager

·

V-200-1 to V-200-80 : CNG Compartement

·

V-400 : Sump Tank

2. Utilities ·

WHRU and Hot Water circulation

·

Water Treatment Facilities and Cold water circulation

·

Open & Close Drains

·

Venting system

·

Instrument Air System

·

Fuel Gas System

·

Fire Water Ring

·

Engine Generator

1.4 REPORT LAYOUT This HAZOP/HAZID report is structured as follows: •

Section 1 gives an introduction, defining the objectives and scope of the study;

•

Section 2 describes the process;

•

Section 3 describes the HAZOP/HAZID methodology;

•

Section 4 describes the HAZOP/HAZID workshops;

•

Section 5 lists the references given in the report;

•

Appendix A presents the summary HAZOP & HAZID recommendations;

•

Appendix B presents the HAZOP review worksheets;

•

Appendix C presents the HAZID review worksheets; and

•

Appendix D presents the Drawings used, outlining the nodes.


8

JULY 2013


PT. PROSIM

2 PROJECT DESCRIPTION 2.1 OVERVIEW The CNG facility is consisting of following equipment: Gas-Liquid separation system, Gas Drying & H2S adsorption system, Gas Compression system, CNG Cylinders storage package, Heat Exchangers and Metering systems. The Utility for supporting CNG Plant are consisting Fuel Gas System, Gas power generation, Air Instru-ment Package, Waste Heat Recovery Unit, Pumps, Cooling towers, Water treatment Package and Sump system. The incoming gas is taken from existing pipe then being compressed to CNG storage cylinders by CNG Compressors. Storage CNG will be performed maximum at 20 hours/day and decanting phase will be performed on the peak load within 4 to 5 hours/day (18.00 to 23.00). The design capacity of CNG Plant is 19.88 MMSCFD gas to the CNG storage cylinders. Waste heat recovery Unit is provided to utilize the energy from exhaust compressor gas engine to reduce Joule Thompson effect on the pressure reducing system. The WHRU will heat water from tank which will be utilized as heating media of the CNG gas on CNG heat exchanger. Cooling water system which consisting of Cooling Tower, Circulation pumps and CNG cooler will be pro-vided to optimize the requirement of CNG cylinders. 2.1.1 Inlet scrubber (V-100) The gas scrubber (V-100) will be installed on incoming gas to remove any hydrocarbon liquid from upstream facility. The liquid level on the gas scrubber will be controlled by control valve LV-0101 to avoid liquid carried over to the CNG Plant. High liquid level on the scrubber will initiate the valve to open, then if liquid level has reached normal condition valve will be closed, so the valve will be as on/off mode. The gas scrubber is provided with PSV-0101A/B with set pressure of 34 barg for overpressure protection, One PSV will be on operation and another one as spare. Inlet line will be provided with SDV-0101 in order to isolate the plant in emergency condition. The initiators of SDV-0101 closing refer to Cause & effect diagram. 2.1.2 Station Inlet metering (M-100 A/B) The metering will measure natural gas inlet to CNG plant. Total gas inlet is 19.88 MMSCFD. Gas inlet would be 19.88 MMSCFD and flows to inlet compressor and 1.1 MMSCFD flows to auxiliary fuel gas. Metering type is 2x100% custody orifice meter. Metering will be operated in continous operation. Flow and accumulation flow should be monitored by flow computer. Gas inlet to metering tends to consist of high moisture. Orifice should be designed for wet gas condition. HAZOP & HAZID REPORT - CNG GAS PLANT - TAMBAK LOROK REV BB

9

JULY 2013


PT. PROSIM

2.1.3 Dryer Unit (D-100 A/B) The outlet gas from gas scrubber (V-100) will be dried through Gas Drying Unit (D-100A/B). Unit consist of two Gas Dryer + H2S absorber, i.e D-100A/B and D-200A/B. These will be operated on parallel configuration. Maximum capacity of drying Unit is 10 MMSCFD. The range of inlet pressure is 20.6-25 barg. One bed will be on drying mode and the other one is on regenerating mode. Gas dryer will remove water and H2S content on the feed gas to produce moisture dew point to -40oC and maximum 3 ppm H2S. Dew point meter and H2S meter should be installed within Dryer package unit. Adsorption time is 4-8 hours and the regeneration time is 4-8 hours (heating, cooling and standby). Gas dryer pre filter (F-100) will be provided at upstream of desiccant gas dryer (D-100A/B) to ensure that gas goes to molecular sieve is clean and no hydrocarbon liquid carried over. One filter will be operated and bypass line opened during filter maintenance, pressure differential indicator will be provided across the filter such that operator will able to determine the switching operation. Gas dryer after filter (F-110) will be provided on the downstream of desiccant gas dryer (D-100A/B) to ensure that are there is no solid particle carried over on the gas before entering the CNG compressor. One filter will be operated and bypass line opened during filter maintenance, pressure differential indicator will be provided across the filter such that operator will able to determine the switching operation. Blower, electric heater, air cooler and liquid knocked out drum will be provided on the regeneration line. A portion of dried gas will be utilized as regeneration gas. The regeneration gas will be heated by an electric heater then after removing the water on the desiccants, the regent gas will be cooling downed via the air cooler then liquid will be removed on the liquid knocked out drum. After removing liquid on the knocked out drum, regent gas will be re-injected on the main gas line. The valve sequences on the dryer unit will be controlled by a microprocessor on the dryer unit package. Running and fault status on the dryer package will be transferred to Plant Control System (PCS) for monitoring only. This system is auto mode. No interlock system to main PCS. 2.1.4 Compressor (K-101 / … / K-110) The dry gas from dryer with operating pressure of 20.6-25 barg at 26.7-51.7 oCwill be transferred to the storage cylinder at pressure of 250 barg through CNG compressors (K101/102/103/104/105/106/107/108/109/110). There are 10 (ten) compressor trains with 9 (nine) compressors will be operated in parallel and 1 (one) compressor on standby mode. Each compressor will be operated with outlet capacity of 2.3 MMSCFD at inlet pressure of 24 barg.


10

JULY 2013


PT. PROSIM

The compressor is reciprocating type in three stages compression, air coolers will be provided on each discharge stage to enhance the efficiency of compressor. The maximum discharge pressure and temperature from CNG compressor are 250 barg and 48OC respectively. The compressor will be supplied by vendor as a skid including electrical and instrumentation inside. Control system of CNG compressor is provided with PLC by vendor, the operating parameter will be transferred to Plant Control System (PCS) for monitoring purpose. Shutdown system of the compressors will be managed by PLC, trigger of shutdown such as lube oil pressure low, suction pressure low, discharge pressure high, discharge temperature high and High vibration will be further developed by vendor. Compressors are driven by Gas Engine drive with fuel gas that supplied from upstream of dryer skid. 2.1.5 CNG Cooler ( E-100) Compressed gas from CNG compressor with temperature of 48oC will be cooled down to 35oC before entering to CNG cylinders. Cooling water system is closed loop cooling system which involving CNG cooler (E-100), Cooling water circulation pump (P-200A/B) and Cooling Tower (E400). The compressed natural gas need to be cooled down to 35oC for optimizing the requirement of cylinder storage capacity. The temperature of cooling water inlet to CNG cooler (E-100) is 30oC and temperature cooling water outlet at 39oC. To avoid prolonged overpressure due to tube rupture, CNG Compressor would be shut downed by PSHH-0503 then CNG gas would be release to cooling water return line to Cooling tower (E-400). DURING DECANTING PERIOD: Cooling water to CNG Cooler will be discontinued to produce CNG stream with temperature 48oC and it will be commingled with CNG stream from compartment (Temperature 35 oC). If pressure decreases and disturbing performance of CNG compressor then CNG stream could be flowed through E-100 bypass line. Restriction orifice installed in this bypass line to giving sufficient backpressure for CNG compressor. 2.1.6 CNG storage cylinders (V-200 1/../ 82) CNG from E-200 will be stored at CNG storage cylinders. The CNG storage cylinders are consisting of 95 compartment (base on 20 hours storage time at 18.7 MMSCFD CNG inlet). Each compartment is consisting of 8 tube cylinders. One cylinder has capacity of 2.38 m3. Three CNG compartment will be arranged in 1 (one) bank. Each bank will be provided 1 unit manual valve for incoming and outgoing CNG. Pressure relief device (PSV) protect respectives cylinders. Discharge PSV will be released to atmosphere and no additional pipe is required for PSV discharge line.


11

JULY 2013


PT. PROSIM

2.1.7 Double pipe Exchanger Double pipe exchanger would be installed at downstream of PV-0501 to minimize temperature drop during CNG depressuring by PV-0501 A/B. Heating media is using Hot water in outer pipe side and CNG stream in inner pipe. Timer valve (KV) would be opened to supply hot water to outer pipe of double pipe exchanger. Restriction orifice (RO) is provided on hot water inlet to restrict capacity of hot water to exchanger. If temperature at downstream PV-0501 close with -25o C, Hot water supply could be discontinued this condition occur when pressure in compartments was dropped. 2.1.8 CNG Heat Exchanger (E-200) The CNG Heat exchanger is required during decanting stage, this is to reheat CNG on the downstream of pressure reducing valve. The temperature decrease due to large pressure drop in PV0501A/B, this is called Joule Thompson effect. Temperature on the downstream can be lower than the dew point of CNG such that condensation may occurs. The CNG heat exchanger (E-200) maximum duty is 4100 kW (basis 4 hours decanting time) then duty will decrease gradually as the upstream pressure is reduced during decanting process. The initial stage of decanting, the temperature of CNG will be increased from -38oC to about 30oC. The heating media for this heat exchanger is hot water system with temperature of 90oC. Hot water circulation flowrate is 140 m3/hr and the flowrate to E-200 will be controlled by (TV0502). Temperature control Valve (TV-0502) will manipulate hot water flowrate to E-200 to maintain CNG export to the pipeline at temperature of 30oC. Temperature control is using cascade with TIC-0502. 2.1.9 Pressure reducing system (PV-0501 A/B) The pressure of CNG outlet to PLN will be maintained at 28 barg and temperature of 30oC. PIC0501A/B are used for controlling CNG outlet pressure. Pressure reducing system will be provided by two control valves ( PV0501A/B) with one operating and one standby. This valve is designed base on 4 hours decanting time (96 MMSCFD). 2.1.10 Storage and Decanting process The storage and decanting process will be performed by opening and closing delivery valve (KV0501A/B) downstream of CNG storage cylinders. Storage CNG will be carried out fixed maximum 20 hours per day and decanting will be performed 4 to 5 hours per day. During decanting period the CNG Cooler (E-100) will be bypassed to reduced joule thomphson effect on the downstream of PV0501A/B.


12

JULY 2013


PT. PROSIM

Duration of decanting can be resetted from the control room, but changing setting time shall refer to operating pressure on the CNG storage cylinders. Over pressure on the CNG cylinders will initiate high pressure on the discharge compressor then process shutdown can be triggered. 2.1.11 Station Outlet Metering (M-200 A/B) The metering system with 2x100% with crossover will measure natural gas outlet from CNG plant. Total gas outlet is 113 MMSCFD for 4 hours. Metering is used as custody meter. Flow and accumulation flow should be monitored in main PLC. For Gas composition analysis, one sampling connection is installed at the upstream of Outlet Metering (M200A/B). Gas Flow would be measured for 4 hours per day during decanting time. Totalizer would count total value base on measured gasflow. 2.1.12 Waste Heat recovery Unit (E-300) The exhaust gas from gas engines ducting will be utilized as source of energy to increase the temperature of hot water from 63oC to 90oC. Exhaust gas from each turbine will be commingled on header before entering WHRU, and water will be heating up on the WHRU boiler. Hot water from WHRU will be stored on the hot water storage Tank at temperature of 90oC. During storage phase (20 hours), WHRU would heat water in Hot water tank (T-200) for approximately 10 hours from 30o to 90o C. The water circulating pump (P-500 A/B) with capacity of 45m3/hr is used to circulate water from T-200 through WHRU heater (E-300) and back to T-200. During decanting phase (4 hours), Hot water pump (P-300 A/B) with capacity of 140 m3/h will circulate hot water from T-200 to E-200 and back to T-200. Temperature of hot water in the Hot water tank (T-200) is controlled by manipulating damper position on each exhaust gas Turbine of CNG compressors. 2.1.13 Fuel Gas Fuel gas is supplied for two (2) units gas engine generators (1 operation & 1 stand by) thru Fuel gas strainer and for ten (10) units gas engine compressors (9 operation and 1 unit standby). The fuel gas strainer is designed based on capacity of less than 1.5 MMSCFD. Fuel Gas metering (FQI-0901) is provided to measure auxilary fuel gas consumption in CNG facility. 2.1.14 Instrument air The instrument air will be provided on CNG plant to enhace the overall reliability of the Plant. Instrument air requirement is calculated based on the number of control valves and on-off control valves plus a design margin of 20%. Three (3) Air compressors will be provided with two operating as lead and lag basis and one compressor as a standby. HAZOP & HAZID REPORT - CNG GAS PLANT - TAMBAK LOROK REV BB

13

JULY 2013


PT. PROSIM

Instrument air system will be provided with a drying unit such that the dew point of instrument air is less than -40oC. 2.1.15 Cooling water (E-400) Water as cooling media will be utilized for CNG Cooler (E-100) before storage stage, The CNG from gas compressor with temperature of 48oC will be cooled down to 35oC using cooled water. Cooling water is supplied to the heat exchangers through the Cooling Tower Pump (P-200 A/B) at flowrate of 35m3/hr. After taking heat of CNG, cooling water leaves heat exchanger at temperature of 30oC is re-circulated to the Cooling Tower ( E-400) for cooling down and reused. Make-up water will be provided to compensate water losses on the Cooling Tower (E-400). 2.1.16 Fire water system Fire water will be taken from existing fire water system in front of CNG plant. Fire hydrants and monitors will be located based on equipment layout during detail engineering. 2.1.17 Water treatment system (W-001) Auxiliary water for CNG plant will be taken from well in plant. Well water will be treated by Reverse osmisis (RO) technology prior to be used as make up water. Total consumption for make up water is 3.2 m3/h. The feedwater to the RO unit will be design accordingly based on input from vendor. 2.1.18 Insulation Personnel Protection Insulation (PP) shall be specified on all lines with normal operating temperatures above 70°C. This will be applied only to sections of pipe that personnel could come into contact with during normal operation. Heat Conservation Insulation (HC) shall be specified for heated systems above 65°C (e.g. hot water from WHRU). Noise Abatement Insulation (NI) shall be specified on compressor suction and discharge lines, subject to vendor confirmation. 2.1.19 Vent System Relief Gas from Pressure safety valves and Blow down system would be collected to vent header then to vent stack. Automatic drain would be provided to controlling liquid level at bottom vent stack. Flame arrester would be installed at upstream of vent stack to avoid flame due to lightning or other fire source.


14

JULY 2013


PT. PROSIM

Relief gas from CNG cylinders would be free vent to atmosphere instead of to vent header line as per client and manufacture requirement. The vent stack with providing water seal at the bottom of the vent stack to prevent air ingress.


15

JULY 2013


PT. PROSIM

3 STUDY METHODOLOGY

3.1 HAZOP 3.1.1 Overview The study was carried out using the traditional HAZOP Guide Word method, where the system is broken down into manageable sections and a set of standard Guide Words applied. The methodology requires exhaustive consideration of each process activity to determine if there are any potential problems in relation to safety or operations that may arise due to deviations in the process. The Causes and Consequences of each deviation are identified. The HAZOP team evaluates the severity of the problem and adequacy of existing safeguards, and where necessary, recommends additional safeguards as Actions. The hazard and operability problems highlighted in the course of the review were captured in the HAZOP Review worksheets (Appendix A). 3.1.2 Worksheet Definition All concerns raised are documented in the HAZOP Review Worksheets, which include the column headers as described in Table 3.2a. Table 3.1a

HAZOP Review Worksheet

Column Heading No.

Description Reference Number

Guide word/Deviation

A set of standard guide words used to analyse and determine potential problems that arise

Possible Causes

Causes or problems identified

Possible Consequences

Description of the consequences of the possible impact of the cause

Type

Types of issues that are involved, either Drawing Error/Comment, Engineering, Operability, Safety, Financial and Regulatory

Safeguard

Description of the safeguards in place

Recommendations/Comment

Description of the recommendation(s) that could be in place

Action Party

Relevant party taking responsibility for action(s) identified

The completed HAZOP review worksheets are attached in Appendix A. 3.2 HAZID 3.2.1 Overview HAZID review is used as a means to identifying potential hazards, determining the associated consequences and evaluating means of preventing the hazard or controlling the consequences. They should not be confused with a HAZOP review which looks at specific areas of the process to identify potential design/operating problems and determine ways of improving the process design to HAZOP & HAZID REPORT - CNG GAS PLANT - TAMBAK LOROK REV BB

16

JULY 2013


PT. PROSIM

prevent such incidents from occurring. A HAZID review is based on a combination of identification, analysis and brainstorming activities. The technique exhaustively considers each review area, by reference to an agreed set of guidewords. During the review, each facility was considered in turn with the facility broken down according to specific areas or enclosed buildings, e.g., Main Deck. 3.2.2 Worksheet Definitions All findings during the HAZID sessions are recorded by the scribe using HAZID worksheets. These worksheets contain the column headings given in Table 3.3b. Table 3.3b

HAZID Record Sheet Headings

Column Heading

Description

No.

Reference number

Category / Guideword

Initiating event and guideword used to generate hazard scenario

Event Description

Description of scenario and mode of realization

Consequence

Description of the consequences of the hazard or possible impact and escalation of the scenario

Prevention

Existing measures to prevent the hazard from occurring

Control

Existing measures to control or mitigate the hazard to prevent escalation

Recommendation / Comments

Actions generated during the review. Comments on the protective systems in place, justification of the design are also included in italics.

Action Party

Responsibility for addressing each action item will be assigned to the design team or to the project team

Ranking

Qualitative ranking of the frequency and consequence of the hazard (carried out after the review is completed to save time during the review itself)


17

JULY 2013


PT. PROSIM

4 HAZOP/HAZID REVIEW SESSIONS

4.1 INTRODUCTION The HAZOP/HAZID review sessions were carried out at the Istana Karang Laut office in Plaza Citiview Kemang, Jakarta, utilizing 2 days for review, over the period 17th and 21st June 2013. 4.2 THE HAZOP/HAZID TEAM The HAZOP/HAZID team comprises a multidisciplinary team of personnel involved with the design and operation of the facilities, led by a safety consultant from PT PROSIM The names and attendance records of the HAZOP/HAZID team members for each of the systems are tabulated in Table 4.2a. Table 4.2a

HAZOP/HAZID Team Attendance

Name

Co.

Role

June 2013

June 2013

17

21 Ö

Margaretha T

PT PROSIM

Chairman

Ö

Yulia Tirtasiwi

PT PROSIM

Scribe

Ö

Ö

Sugiyanto

PT ETI

Process Engineer

Ö

Ö

Bernardo

PT ETI

Ö

Ö

Rudolf S

PT ETI

Ö

Ö

Suarno

PT ETI

Ö

Ö

Cut Julia

PT IKL

Project Manager

Ö

Ö Ö

Warno Abdullah

PT IKL

Engineering Manager

Ö

Suseno

PT IKL

Process Engineer

Ö

Ö

Irvan N

PT IKL

Ö

Ö

Haidar

PT IKL

Ö

Ö

Gigin Ginanjar

PT IKL

Ö

Ö

PT IKL

Ö

Ö

Isa

Process Engineer

4.3 GUIDE WORDS The full set of Guide Words used in the HAZOP/HAZID Review is listed in Table 4.3a & b. It should be noted that if not found to be applicable or not to produce any problem of concern that had not already been raised, the Guide Word was not recorded in the Worksheets for that node. Table 4.3a No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7

HAZOP Guide Words

Guide Word No Flow Less Flow More Flow Reverse Flow Misdirected Flow Less Level More Level


18

JULY 2013


8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21

PT. PROSIM

Less Pressure More Pressure Less Temperature More Temperature Contaminants Composition Corrosion / Erosion Instrumentation Relief Personnel Safety External Factors Operations Maintenance Drawing

Table 4.3b

HAZID Guide Words

Safety System

Guide Word

No.

Comments

Non Process

Structural Failures

1

Extreme weather/subsidence/fatigue

Events

Impact

2

Collisions

Transportation

3

Helicopter/personnel baskets/vessels

Lifting

4

Dropped Objects

Non Process Fires

5

Fires/escalated fires

Toxic Release

6

Chemical spill

Security

7

Pirates/fishermen

Noise

8

High noise areas/vibration

Health hazards

9

Diseases/working condition/chemicals

Loss of containment

Ignition

1

Fires from individual process systems

Safety Systems

Ignition Sources

1

—

Escape/ Refuge

2

Personnel escape to TR

Communication

3

Hotlines/radio, etc

Emergency Lighting

4

Lighting during escape/ evacuation

Discharge to air

1

Vent/ flare/ relief, etc

Discharge to water

2

Produced water, etc

Discharge to soil

3

Gas/ water injection , etc

Waste disposal

4

Hazardous material/ solids/ sanitary waste, etc.

Environmental Hazards

4.4 DRAWINGS REVIEWED A basic Piping and Instrumentation (P&ID) for the process acted as a basis for discussion during the review, along with the operating procedures. The drawings used are attached in Appendix B.


19

JULY 2013


PT. PROSIM

4.5 SELECTED NODES The process was initially broken down according to the step and then by each action comprising the step. Each action was considered separately with the full list of Guide Words applied. Thus each action becomes a “node”, so, for instance, each feed line into a reactor was considered as a separate node. The nodes used are presented in Table 4.5a & b while the associated worksheets are given in Appendix A (HAZOP) and Appendix B (HAZID). Table 4.5a

Nodes Reviewed in HAZOP

Node

Section

Drawing Number

Rev

N1

Incoming Gas from Gundih field through Gas Scrubber V100 to Station Inlet Metering M100A/B

TS78-P-PID-001 TS78-P-PID-002

B B

N2

Outlet Station Inlet Metering to Gas Dryer Prefilter F-100, Gas Dryer 100A/B, Gas Dryer After Filter F-110 including Regenerator Filter

TS78-P-PID-003

B

N2R N3

Regeneration System Compression System K101 (typical for K102 to K109), including Blowdown Tank VE301A

TS78-P-PID-003 TS78-P-PID-004

B B

N4

Inlet CNG Cooler E-100 to CNG Compartment (STORAGE TIME) Inlet CNG Heat Exchanger E-200 to Station Outlet Metering M-200A/B (DECANTING)

TS78-P-PID-005 Sheet 1 of 2

B


B

TS78-P-PID-006

Hot water circulation including Hot Water Tank T-200, Hot Water Pump P300A/B and circulation to E-100 and E-200 Waste Heat Recovery Unit include Water circulation pump P-500A/B and WHRU Water Treatment Plant

TS78-P-PID-007 TS78-P-PID-005 sheet 2 of 2

B B

N5 N6

B

TS78-P-PID-007

B

TS78-P-PID-012

B

TS78-P-PID-011

B

N10

Cooling System, including Make up Water Tank T-400, Make Up Water Pump P-100, Cooling Tower E-400 and Cooling Tower Pump P-200 A/B Sump Tank V-400 including Sump Tank P-400

TS78-P-PID-010

B

N11

Fuel Gas System

TS78-P-PID-009

B

N12

Instrument Air System

B

N13

Fire Water System

TS78-P-PID-008 Sheet 1 of 2 TS78-P-PID-008 Sheet 2 of 2 TS78-P-PID-013

N14

Power Generation system

TS78-P-PID-014

B

N15

Vent Gas System, including discharge of pressure relieving device and BDVs vent header, KO Drum V-600, up to Vent Stack VS-100

TS78-P-PID-015

B

N7 N8 N9

Table 4.5b

Node Reviewed in HAZID

Node N1

B

Section

Drawing Number

CNG Plant – Tambak Lorok

TS78-L-LY-001


20

Rev B1

JULY 2013


PT. PROSIM

5 HAZOP/HAZID RESULTS

5.1 ACTIONS/RECOMMENDATIONS A total of 40 HAZOP recommendations and 18 HAZID recommendations were generated during the review. The recommendations would reduce potential safety or operability problems associated with the process or improve the clarity of the process drawings (P&ID’s). A complete list of the recommendations made by the team during the review itself is tabulated in Appendix A. A unique number is assigned to each recommendation and the node identification number is included so that it may easily be traced back to the review worksheets (Appendix B & C). Brief summary of highlighted recommendations are presented below. HAZOP Design It was noted in the HAZOP It identified during the review and also with discussion with Tambak Lorok, some of the valve arrangement need to be lock open to ensure that it doesn’t block due to human error (eg. at upstream BDV, by pass line). General comments also noted to provide setting for all the instrumentation system (e.g. PIC, PSHH, PSV) It’s been reviewed that gas from suction compressor can be directed to downstream of E-200 to metering M-200 resulting in double counting of sales gas from Gundih meter with M-100. It was recommended to install additional check valve to PG-2"-3C-027 to prevent that case. It recommended to provide SOP to accommodate gas release from vent of sump tank due to gas blow by from V-100, to ensure equipment purchase suitable as per hazardous area classification and also to nsure vent stack at sump tank is located high enough to prevent exposure to personnel/operator at Incoming Scrubber System. In the Waste Heat Recovery Unit, it was recommended to provide PSHH at downstream P-500A/B to trip P-500A/B in the case of manual valve at upstream E-300 inadvertenly close resulting in overpressure of the system. The existing fire water capacity need to be reviewed to ensure source of water and its amount is adequate to handle fire on the CNG plant in addition with existing fire water requirement in Tambak Lorok. It was discussed also that the design of floating valve T-600 to be radar type. Maintenance and Operational Based on the discussion raised up, it’s required to develop operating manual for delivery gas including showing correlation between pressure and flow at storage period and operation of redundant equipment such as compressor. To control corrosion at basin cooling tower, it was recommended to provide SOP to control PH at cooling tower periodically.


21

JULY 2013


PT. PROSIM

HAZID In the HAZID session, location of the lightning stack has not identified yet, therefore it is recommended to review the location of the lightning stack to be away from the venting stack to reduce the probability of fire on the vent stack It was reviewed also that high noise level around the compressor area will potentially injured the personnel who operate the plant in daily basis. It was recommended to have noise study and provide warning sign the area to use ear plug protection. Fire and Gas detection was also reviewed in the HAZID, it is recommended to provide the philosophy of the fire and gas detection system of the plant in formal documentation and provide clear actions of each detector, which one create alarm or shut down/blowdown of the plant. Fire detection philosophy was not provided in the building, specifically in the electrical room such as control room/MCC/batery room. It is recommended to provide clear philosophy, e.g. providing early warning system for smoke detection in electrical room (High Sensitivity Smoke Detector), including fire suppression system such as portable fire extinguisher or automatic fire suppresion system (e.g. FM-200,etc) The scenario of fire and explosion in the CNG plant was not established yet during the review especially in relation position of the processing facility to location where stand by personnel available such as control room. Therefore, review of this scenario is recommended to justify design and location of the control room building. It is include also the fire and explosion impact to surrounding facility at Tambak Lorok. In the discussion also identified that the control room will not provided with glass windows to avoid explosion effect from the plant, hence that CCTV is recommended to be provided in the control room to monitor the plant. During the review, location of the vent stack has not been identified yet. Therefore, dispersion and radiation analysis need to be done to define safe location and height required for the vent stack. Consideration for emergency situation was also reviewed, and it is recommended to review emergency evacuation plan including emergency route, muster point location, safety equipment lay out and emergency lighting. Good communication among parties involved (Tambak Lorok and Gundih) also important to make sure operability and deliverability of the process plant, especially to handle emergency situation. Therefore a procedure defining internal and external communication need to be established among parties to make sure the plant is operated safely.


22

JULY 2013


PT. PROSIM

5.2 MAJOR HAZARD SCENARIO The Major Hazard of this plant is : •

Process Hazard : 1. High Pressure Gas containment in the CNG Storage Tanks 2. Gas Compression System 3. Hot water circulation system 4. Cold Venting

•

Non Process Hazard : 5. Control Room located in hazardous area 6. Human Error - Alarm 7. Communication between ETI, IP, Gundih 8. Transportation


23

JULY 2013


PT. PROSIM

The hazard management plant can be shown as follow:


24

JULY 2013


PT. PROSIM

6 HAZOP/HAZID FOLLOW-UP The project, design and operation team should conduct a HAZOP/HAZID follow up session to response the HAZOP/HAZID recommendations. The response and action plan shall be back up with the relevant data and justification whether the recommendation is agreed or rejected. At the end, the team shall formulate action plans, steward all action items and ensure that the relevant changes are made to the design to address hazard and operability concerns identified as part of this HAZOP/HAZID.


25

JULY 2013

PT. Enviromate Technology International


7 REFERENCES

/1/

Process Plan Description - TS78 - P - BD - 001

/2/

Drawing List :

No

Drawing Title

Drawing Number

Rev

1 2 3 4 5

PID - Incoming Scrubber System PID - Station Inlet Metering (M-100A/B) PID - Gas Dryer (Vendor Package) PID - Compressor System / K-101 (Vendor Package) PID - Storage and Decanting System

B B B B B

6

PID - CNG Heat Exchanger

7 8 9

PID - Station Outlet Metering (M-200A/B) PID - Waste Heat Recovery Unit PID - Instrument Air System

10

PID - Instrument Air Network

11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 19 20

PID - Fuel Gas System PID - Sump System PID - Cooling System PID - Water Treatment Plant PID - Fire Water System PID - Power Generator System PID - Vent Gas System General Plant Lay Out PFD – Inlet Metering and Dryer PFD – Gas Compression System PFD – CNG Storage and Pressure Reducing System PFD – Waste Heat Recovery Unit PFD – Cooling Water System PFD – Heat Material Balance UFD – Fuel Gas System UFD – Instrument air system

TS78-P-PID-001 TS78-P-PID-002 TS78-P-PID-003 TS78-P-PID-004 TS78-P-PID-005 Sheet 1 of 2 TS78-P-PID-005 Sheet 2 of 2 TS78-P-PID-006 TS78-P-PID-007 TS78-P-PID-008 Sheet 1 of 2 TS78-P-PID-008 Sheet 2 of 2 TS78-P-PID-009 TS78-P-PID-010 TS78-P-PID-011 TS78-P-PID-012 TS78-P-PID-013 TS78-P-PID-014 TS78-P-PID-015 TS78-L-LY-001 TS78-P-PFD-001 TS78-P-PFD-002 TS78-P-PFD-003 TS78-P-PFD-004 TS78-P-PFD-005 TS78-P-PFD-006 TS78-P-UFD-001 TS78-P-UFD-002

HAZOP & HAZID REPORT - CNG GAS PLANT - TAMBAK LOROK REV BA26

B B B B B B B B B B B B B1 B B B B B B B B

JULY 2013



Appendix A

HAZOP/HAZID Summary Recommendation

PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA

PT ISTANA KARANG LAUT

Appendix B - HAZOP Review Worksheet

SUMMARY HAZOP RECOMMENDATION NODE 1

Causes / Concerns SDV 0101 at upstream V-100 close due to failure

Consequences Comments / Recommendations Potential overpresurization of upstream plant (Santos Ensure existing pipeline design pressure is higher Facility ) resulting in hydrocarbon release leading to than maximum discharge pressure from Gundih fire or fatality facility

Rec Number CNG-HP-1

1

SDV 0101 at upstream V-100 close due to failure

Loss of Production

CNG-HP-2

1

Any of manual valve at incoming line to V-100 inadvertently close PV 0105 stuck close or manual valve around the PV 0105 inadvertently close Control loop malfunction causing LV-0101 to open fully

Potential overpresurization of upstream plant (Santos Provide operating manual for delivery gas Facility ) resulting in hydrocarbon release leading to fire or fatality Potential overpressurization of V-100 resulting in Provide setting pressure PIC-0105 to show at PID hydrocarbon release leading to fire or fatality TS78-P

CNG-HP-3

Gas blowby to Sump Tank V-400 leading to potential Provide SOP to accommodate gas release from vent vessel damage (design pressure 3.5 barG), fire and of sump tank due to gas blow by from V-100 explosion

CNG-HP-5

1

Control loop malfunction causing LV-0101 to open fully

Ensure equipment purchase suitable as per hazardous area classification

CNG-HP-6

1

Control loop malfunction causing LV-0101 to open fully

Gas blowby to Sump Tank V-400 leading to potential vessel damage (design pressure 3.5 barG), fire and explosion Gas blowby to Sump Tank V-400 leading to potential vessel damage (design pressure 3.5 barG), fire and explosion

Ensure vent stack at sump tank is located high enough to prevent exposure to personnel/operator

CNG-HP-7

1

Sour Gas (H2S) and water content in the production gas Manual by pass valve at downstream line PG-10-30-053 from metering M100A/B to Compressor unit unit is inadvertenly open Manual valve upstream BDV0301 inadvertenly close in the event of ESD and BDV-0301 required to open Blower E-101 at regeneration unit damage/ not in operation

Internal corrosion of piping and vessel leading to release of hydrocarbon gas and potential fire Potential wet gas to Gas Compression system resulting in equipment damage

Consider to provide corrosion coupon at upstream V-100 LC by pass manual valve 10" at downstream line PG-10-30-053 and update PID

CNG-HP-8

1

1

2

2

Review availability of isolation valve (SDV) from Gundih facility in the case of overpressure from pipeline

CNG-HP-4

CNG-HP-9

Overpresurization of upstream equipment leading to Provide Lock Open (LO) at manual valve upstream fire/fatality BDV-0301

CNG-HP-10

No regeneration process causing wet gas going to compressor

Ensure interlock system install to prevent overtemperature/overpressure in the case P-101 shutdown, Electric Heater should also shutdown (Check with vendor)

CNG-HP-11

D-200 A-B shutdown

Potential reverse flow leading to equipment damage

Ensure D-200 A-B including regeneration system has adequate design to accomadate reverse flow

CNG-HP-12

3

Switch operation between compressors

Potential human error to operate manual valve and safety devices

Provide operating manual for operating redundant equipments, including compressors

CNG-HP-13

4

One of running compressor fails Less of CNG production to operate

Review sizing of manual valve incoming CNG compartment to be available at market or provide spare manual valve in the case of maintenance required

CNG-HP-14

4

Fouling/Plugging at E-100 or loss of cooling water

Provide portable temperature detector to check skin temperature of CNG compartment

CNG-HP-15

4

Loss of containment/piping leak Tube leak at E-100 due to corrosion

Provide SOP to control PH at cooling tower periodically

CNG-HP-16

5

SDV0601 fails close or manual valve in the metering station inadvertenly closed Gas from suction compressor going to downstream of E-200 to metering M-200 Manual valve upstream BDV0505 inadvertenly close in the event of ESD and BDV-0505 required to open Hot Water Pump P-300A/B stop due to failure OR Strainer at upstream P-300A/B blockage

Show setting point of PV 0501A/B

CNG-HP-17

2R

2R

5

5

6

Inefficiency in cooling resulting in high temperature leading to less CNG production

Potential overpressurization of CNG HE E-200 leading to hydrocarbon release and potential fire

Double counting of sales gas from Santos meter with Install additional check valve at line PG-2"-3C-027 M-100

CNG-HP-18

Overpresurization of upstream equipment leading to Provide Lock Open (LO) manual valve at upstream fire/fatality BDV-0505

CNG-HP-19

Loss of hot water supply leading to inefficient heat transfer and lower gas sales temperature

CNG-HP-20

Provide low temperature switch at line PG-12"-3C021 to close KV-0503 A to prevent low temperature in the gas sales

6

Hot Water Pump P-300A/B stop High temperature in the circulation water around the Provide low temperature alarm at line PG-12"-3Cdue to failure OR Strainer at waste heat recovery unit 021 to alert operator upstream P-300A/B blockage

CNG-HP-21

6

Three way valve TV-0502 to E- Loss of hot water supply leading to inefficient heat 200 is inadvertenly close transfer and lower gas sales temperature Any manual valve at upstream E- Potential overpressure of downstream pump 300 inadvertenly close or check One or more gas engine driver Less of flue gas to E-300 resulting in lower shutdown temperature generated for water circulation

CNG-HP-22

7 7

7

Start up

7

Condense water from flue gas at Corrosion at E-300 leading to equipment damage E-300

CNG PLANT TAMBAK LOROK

Provide Temperature Control Valve at bypass line of E-200 Vendor to provide minimum flow recycle line at P500A/B Review requirement set point of TIA-0704

Low gas temperature from exhaust gas compressor to Provide drain line at lowest point gas ducting E-300 WHRU resulting condensation at gas ducting E-300

Page 1 of 2

Review requirement TIA-0705

CNG-HP-23 CNG-HP-25

CNG-HP-26

CNG-HP-27

SUMMARY HAZOP RECOMMENDATION


NODE 7 9

9

9

10

Causes / Concerns Drawing Manual valve at outlet T-100 is inadvertenly close or strainer blocked Manual valve or strainer at inlet Basin cooling water is inadvertently close Manual valve at upstream P200A/B inadvertenly close or strainer blocked Liquid control valve failure at individual equipments (V-300, Compressor K-101-109, V-100)



Consequences

Comments / Recommendations Revise drawing TS78-P-PID-007 to show setting point of all instrumentation alarm and trip

Rec Number CNG-HP-28

Loss of pump suction and potential pump damage

Provide lock open (LO) for manual valve upstream P-100 and P-600

CNG-HP-29

Potential overflow at T-600

Review design of floating valve T-600 to be radar type

CNG-HP-30

Loss of pump suction and potential pump damage

Provide lock open (LO) for manual valve upstream P-200

CNG-HP-31

Build up pressure in Sump Tank V-400 leading to potential overpressurization

Review outlet line at venting V-400 to be sufficient for case high pressure gas introduced from upstream equipment to this vessel

CNG-HP-32

11

3" Manual valves at Loss of fuel gas supply leading to compressor incoming/outgoing line Fuel shutdown Gas filter is inadvertently closed

Provide lock open (LO) for 3" manual valves at upstream and downstream Fuel Gas Filter

CNG-HP-33

12

Manual valve upstream of Instrument Air Receiver V-300 inadvertently closed

Potential overpressurization of upstream piping

Confirm availability of high pressure trip at internal of Air Compressor C300A/B/C package to shut down compressor in the case of block of discharge

CNG-HP-34

12

Loss of instrument air supply potentially leading to PSD

Lock Open (LO) for manual valve downstream Instrument Air Receiver V-310

CNG-HP-35

13

Manual valve downstream Instrument Air Receiver V-310 inadvertently closed Operation

Review existing Tambak Lorok’s fire water capacity to be adequate for fire water handling in CNG Plant

CNG-HP-36

13

Operation

Consider to provide additional flowmeter to measure fire water consumption for Tambak Lorok

CNG-HP-37

14

Any manual valve down stream Overheating at GE-100A leading to equipment GE-100A to cooling system damage inadvertenly close

Confirm availability of TSHH to trip Gas Generator GE-100A in case of high temperature has been included in the generator package.

CNG-HP-38

14

Any manual valve down stream Overheating at GE-100A leading to equipment GE-100A to cooling system damage inadvertenly close Lighting struck during Fire at vent stack PSV/BDV release

Lock Open (LO) for manual valve downstream GE100A

CNG-HP-39

Consider to install CO2 snuffing system at VS-100 to extinguish fire at vent stack completed with fusible plug

CNG-HP-40

15


Page 2 of 2

SUMMARY HAZOP RECOMMENDATION

PT. ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONAL


Appendix A SUMMARY HAZOP/HAZID

SUMMARY HAZID RECOMMENDATION HAZID No. 4.1.3

Hazard Description

Consequences

Lightning

Possible damage to the equipment and potential fire

Prevention

4.3.1

Light vehicles impact e.g. Car

Potential impact to piping/equipment leading to hydrocarbon release, fire, personnel injury/fatality and asset damage High noise level from Potential personnel ear compressor and gas injury engine area Toxic Material during Personnel injury MSDS provided in the handling chemical: for storage facility cooling water, corrosion inhibitor e.g. oxygen scavanger

4.7.1

4.8.1

Control

Recommendation/ Comment

Rec Number

Co.

Pr

Ri

Type

S (4) C(3)

4

S (H16) C(H12)

Design

S (4) C(4)

2

S (H8) C(H8)

Operation / Maintenance

CNG-HD- 3

S (1) C(-)

3

S (H3) C(-)

Design

Ensure portable eye wash station CNG-HD- 4 provided during chemical handling (e.g : at control room, loading area and water treatment area)

S (1) C(-)

3

S (H3) C(-)

Design

Grounding provided for each equipment

Update EQL drawing to show CNG-HD- 1 Lightning protection at CNG compartment area (lightning stack) in process/utility area vehicle park area away Operation cars shall be equipped CNG-HD- 2 from process area with flame arrestor and diesel engine

Provide SOP to wear ear plug around noise area

4.8.3

Hazardous waste disposal

Personnel injury during PPE - hand gloves, handling waste disposal face shield

-

Alocate waste disposal resulting from operation/construction activity in safe area (third party)

CNG-HD- 5

S (1) C(-)

3

S (H3) C(-)


4.9.6

Hot Surfaces at exhaust gas, WHRU and heat exchanger (E200) Leak from Process Equipment

Potential injury due to exposure to heat

PPE

Provide warning sign around hot surface equipment and pipings

CNG-HD- 6

S (2) C(-)

2

S (M4) C(-)

Design

4.10.1

Loss of Containment

personal protection insulation provided

Release of hydrocarbon Unit SD by low resulting in potential pressure trip fire/explosion leading to injury/fatality Release of hydrocarbon NA resulting in potential fire/explosion leading to injury/fatality

Gas detection system at process area

Define philosophy of fire and gas detection system and develop fire and gas detection area at process plant Fire hydrant provided Regularly to check temperature with source from in the MCC cabinet and DCS existing IP panel to monitor short circuit and provide portable fire extinguisher

CNG-HD- 7

S (4) C(4)

2

S (H8) C(H8)

Design

CNG-HD- 8

S (4) C(4)

2

S (H8) C(H8)


Heat & Smoke detector, Portable Fire Extinguisher provided at control room & MCC room Lightning protection provided at CNG compartment area

Regularly to check temperature in the MCC cabinet and DCS panel to monitor short circuit and provide portable fire extinguisher Define safe location and minimum height required for vent stack and vent location to be suitable with wind directions so that dispersed gas will not be exposed to process plan

CNG-HD- 9

S (4) C(4)

2

S (H8) C(H8)


CNG-HD- 10

S (4) C(4)

2

S (H8) C(H8)

Design

ERP

-

Provide emergency evacuation risk analysis to determine safe evacuation route and location of muster area

CNG-HD- 11

S (4) C(4)

3

S (H8) C(H8)

Design

-

-

CNG-HD- 12

S (4) C(4)

4

S (H8) C(H8)


-

Heat and Smoke detector

Form emergency response team (ERT) and conduct emergency drill Review scenario of fire and explosion from gas plant to the area of standby personnel such as control room and provide mitigation plan (design and location of the building) to anticipate fire/explosion

CNG-HD- 13

S (4) C(4)

2

S (H8) C(H8)

Design

-

-

S (4) C(4)

3

S (H8) C(H8)

Design

-

-

Define safety requirement on CNG-HD- 14 control room specification to accommodate fire/explosion scenario e.g. door, wall and window specifications Consider to provide CCTV in the CNG-HD- 15 control room for monitoring purpose Define internal and external CNG-HD- 16 communication system (PABX) for connecting operator in the control room to outside parties

S (4) C(4)

5

S (H8) C(H8)

Design

S (4) C(4)

2

S (H8) C(H8)

Design

Define safety layout at CNG plant to show ESD push button, fire hydrant, etc

S (4) C(4)

2

S (H8) C(H8)

Design

4.11.1

Battery

Fire/explosion in the event of hydrocarbon release.

4.11.2

Vent

Fire/explosion in the event of hydrocarbon release in process area if stroke by lightning

4.12.1

Fire on Plant area

Personnel trap/ unable to evacuate leading to injury/fatality

4.14.1

Control room

Fire or explosion from process area impact to control room leading to potential personnel injury/fatality

Inability to monitor process area

Battery room is located in non hazardous area

4.15.1

Inability to contact control room within emergency

Inability to coordinate Each operator response leading to provided with hand potential major accident held radio leading to personnel injury/fatality and asset loss

F&G alarm system

4.16.1

Inability to initiate ESD

Inability to control fire Local ESD push leading to potential button at control major accident leading to room personnel injury/fatality and asset loss

-

4.18.3

Blowdown of water from cooling tower, discharge RO

Potential contamination from process fluid


Discharge water is Define Sampling point Define Sampling point to connected to existing to monitor discharge monitor discharge water canal (IP) water

Page 1 of 1

CNG-HD- 17

CNG-HD- 18

HAZID Worksheet Summary



Appendix B

HAZOP Review Worksheets



Node 1 Review date 17-Jun-13 Client Project Facility Section

Comment Design Intent

Abbreviations

PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONAL Compressed Natural Gas Plant Tambak Lorok Incoming Gas from Gundih field through Gas Scrubber V-100 to Station Inlet Metering M100A/B

PT. ISTANA KARANG LAUT

SOP IM

Standard Operating Procedures Inspection & Maintenance

PM USD PSD ESD H,M,L Co Pr Ri S C

Preventative Maintenance Unit Shutdown Process Shutdown Emergency Shutdown High, Medium, Risk Consequence Probability Risk Safety Risk Commercial Risk

To remove any hydrocarbon liquid from upstream facility and measure natural gas inlet to CNG plant

Design DP : 34 barG Conditions:

DT: 65 deg C

Opt. Conditions

OP : 20.6-30.9 barG

Drawing

PID - Incoming Scrubber System PID - Station Inlet Metering (M-100A/B)

No.

Guide Words Parameter: Flow 1.1.1 No

Deviation

No Flow

OT : 26.7-51.7 deg C

Capacity Flowrate : 20 MMSCFD TS78-P-PID-001 TS78-P-PID-002

Causes / Concerns

SDV 0101 at upstream V-100 close due to failure

Consequences

Safeguards

Potential overpresurization Pressure regulator (PV) at of upstream plant (Gundih upstream facility to adjust Facility ) resulting in discharge pressure hydrocarbon release leading to fire or fatality

Initiating L

Co

Pr

S (4) C(4)

1

Ri Ri

S (M4) C(M4)

Loss of Production

1.1.2

No

No Flow

Any of manual valve at incoming line to V-100 inadvertently close

Potential overpresurization Pressure regulator (PV) at of upstream plant (Gundih upstream facility to adjust Facility ) resulting in discharge pressure hydrocarbon release leading to fire or fatality

S (4) C(4)

1

S (M4) C(M4)

Comments / Recommendations

B B

Rec. No.

Ensure existing pipeline design pressure is higher than maximum discharge pressure from Gundih facility

CNG-HP-1

Review availability of isolation valve (SDV) from Gundih facility in the case of overpressure from pipeline

CNG-HP-2

Provide operating manual for delivery gas

CNG-HP-3

Loss of Production


Page 1 of 53

HAZOP Node N1


No. 1.1.3

1.1.4

Guide Words No

No


Deviation No Flow

No Flow

Causes / Concerns

Co

Pr

Ri

PV 0105 stuck close or manual valve Potential PIH-0103 set at 31 barg as around the PV 0105 inadvertently overpressurization of V-100 high pressure alarm to close resulting in hydrocarbon alert operator release leading to fire or fatality PIHH-0103 set at 33 barG to close SDV-0101 PSV 0101A/B set at 34 barG is sized for fire case

S (4) C(4)

1

S (M4) C(M4)

Any of manual valves at Station Inlet Potential overpresurization PIH-0103 set at 30 barg as Metering M100A/B inadvertently of upstream M-100A/B high pressure alarm to close resulting to fire or fatality alert operator

S (4) C(4)

1

S (M4) C(M4)

S (-) C(2)

1

S (-) C(L2)

1.2.1

Less

Less Flow

Refer to No Flow - manual valves partially closed

1.3.1

More

More Flow

Slugging

1.4.1

Reverse

Reverse Flow

1.5.1

Part of

Misdirected Flow No additional significant issues of concerns identified

1.5.1

Part of


No additional significant issues of concerns identified

Consequences

Safeguards


Initiating L

Comments / Recommendations Provide setting pressure PIC-0105 to show at PID TS78-P

Rec. No. CNG-HP-4

Note : maximum upstream pressure from Gundih is not more than 34 barG

PIHH-0103 set at 33 barG to close SDV-0101 PSV 0101A/B set at 34 barG is sized for block discharge

High level at V-100 leading Slug Catcher provided at to liquid carry over to Gundih facility metering skid M-100 and downstream equipment LV-0101 will maintain level in Gas Scrubber V100 LIH-0102 as high level alarm to alert operator LIHH-0102 will close SDV0102

Parameter: Level


Page 2 of 53

HAZOP Node N1


No. 1.6.1

Guide Words Less


Deviation Less Level

Causes / Concerns

Consequences

Safeguards

Control loop malfunction causing LV- Gas blowby to Sump Tank LIL-0102 alarm to alert 0101 to open fully V-400 leading to potential Operator vessel damage (design pressure 3.5 barG), fire and explosion LILL-0102 to initiate shutdown of SDV-0102


Initiating L

Co

Pr

Ri


S (4) C(4)

1

S (M4) C(M4)

Provide SOP to accommodate gas release from vent of sump tank due to gas blow by from V-100

CNG-HP-5

Ensure equipment purchase suitable as per hazardous area classification

CNG-HP-6

Ensure vent stack at sump tank is located high enough to prevent exposure to personnel/operator

CNG-HP-7

Sump Tank open to atmosphere 1.6.2

Less

Less Level

1.7.1

More

More Level

1.7.2

1.7.3

1.7.4

More

More

More

More Level

More Level

More Level


Manual valve at bypass line LV-0101 or manual drain valves inadvertently open, leak at liquid lines

Gas blowby to Sump Tank LIL-0102 alarm to alert V-400 leading to potential Operator vessel damage (design pressure 3.5 barG), fire and explosion LILL-0102 to initiate shutdown of SDV-0102 Sump Tank open to atmosphere Control loop malfunction causing LV- High level at V-100 leading LIH-0102 as high level 0101 to stuck close to liquid carry over to alarm to alert Operator to metering skid M-100 and open by pass line downstream equipment

Any of manual valve upstream/downstream LV-0101 inadvertently close

SDV-0102 fails closed

Slugging

LIHH-0102 to initiate shutdown of SDV-0101 High level at V-100 leading LIH-0102 as high level to liquid carry over to alarm to alert Operator to metering skid M-100 and open by pass line downstream equipment

S (4) C(4)

1

S (M4) C(M4)

S (-) E (2) C(2)

1

S (-) E (L2) C(L2)

S (-) C(2)

1

S (-) C(L2)

S (-) C(2)

1

S (-) C(L2)

Rec. No.

LIHH-0102 to initiate shutdown of SDV-0101 High level at V-100 leading LIH-0102 as high level to liquid carry over to alarm to alert Operator to metering skid M-100 and open by pass line downstream equipment LIHH-0102 to initiate shutdown of SDV-0101 High level at V-100 leading LIH-0102 as high level to liquid carry over to alarm to alert Operator to metering skid M-100 and open by pass line downstream equipment

Page 3 of 53

HAZOP Node N1


No.

Guide Words

Deviation


Causes / Concerns

Consequences

Safeguards


Initiating L

Co

Pr

Ri

S (4) C(4)

1

S (M4) C(M4)

S (-) E (2) C(2)

1

S (-) E (L2) C(L2)

S (-) C(2)

1

S (-) C(L2)

S (4) C(4)

1

S (M4) C(M4)


Rec. No.

LIHH-0102 to initiate shutdown of SDV-0101 as 1.8.1

1.8.2 1.9.1

Less

Less More

Less Pressure

Less Pressure More Pressure

Loss of containment/piping leak due to corrosion

Release of hydrocarbon PIL-0102 as low pressure leading to environmental alarm at incoming V-100 pollution and potential fire to alert operator PILL-0102 at incoming V100 will initiate closure of SDV 0101 Fire and Gas Detector at V100

Refer to Misdirected Flow 1.5.1 Refer to No Flow 1.1.1, 1.1.2, 1.1.3, 1.1.4 ; Less Level 1.6.1, 1.6.2 PV-0105 stuck open

Manual valve at by pass line PV0105 inadvertently open

Potential overpressure at Metering M100A/B and downstream equipment

PIH-S01 set at 30 bar as high pressure alarm to alert operator

Potential overpressure at Metering M100A/B and downstream equipment

PSH 0301A/B at 32 barG to close SDV-0101 PIH-S01 set at 30 bar as high pressure alarm to alert operator PSH 0301A/B at 32 barG to close SDV-0101

Parameter: Temperature 1.10.1 Less Less Temperature No additional significant issues of concerns identified 1.11.1

More

More temperature No additional significant issues of concerns identified

Parameter: Contamination 1.12.1 As Well Contamination As


Parameter: Composition 1.13.1 Other Composition Than


Parameter: Corrosion / Erosion 1.14.1 Other Corrosion / Than Erosion

Sour Gas (H2S) and water content in Internal corrosion of piping the production gas and vessel leading to release of hydrocarbon gas and potential fire

Wall thickness of piping and equipment already considered sour gas condition

Consider to provide corrosion coupon at upstream V-100

CNG-HP-8

Parameter: Instrumentation


Page 4 of 53

HAZOP Node N1


No. 1.15.1

Guide Words Other Than

Parameter: Relief 1.16.1 Other Than Parameter: Safety 1.17.1 Other Than

Deviation


Causes / Concerns

Instrumentation


Relief


Occupational Safety


Parameter: External Factor 1.18.1 Other External Factors Than Parameter: Operation & Maintenance 1.19.1 Other Operations Than

Fire at plant

Overpresurization of piping leading to equipment damage

Safeguards

Fire and Gas Detector at V100

Initiating L

Co

Pr

Ri

S (-) C(2)

1

S (-) C(L2)


Rec. No.


1.20.1

Other Than

Maintenance

Single isolation valve for Maintenance of PSV-0101A/B

1.20.2

Other Than

Maintenance


Parameter: Drawing 1.21.1 Other Than

Consequences


Potential exposure of high NA pressure to personnel during maintenance of PSV0101A/B

Note: Certification/testing of PSV is conducted during online operation without dismantle of PSV itself. Dismantle of PSV can only be conducted if there is a risk assessment for single valve at upstream of the PSV

Drawing


Page 5 of 53

HAZOP Node N1


Node


2

Abbreviations

Review date 17-Jun-13 Client Project Facility Section


SOP

Standard Operating Procedures

IM

Inspection & Maintenance

PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONAL Compressed Natural Gas Plant Tambak Lorok Outlet Station Inlet Metering to Gas Dryer Prefilter F-100, Gas Dryer 100A/B, Gas Dryer After Filter F-110 including Regenerator Filter

PM Preventative Maintenance USD Unit Shutdown PSD Process Shutdown ESD Emergency Shutdown H,M,L High, Medium, Risk Co Consequence Pr Probability Ri Risk S Safety Risk C Commercial Risk One bed of dryer will be on drying mode and the other one is on regenerating mode. Adsorption time is 4-8 hours and the regeneration time 4-8 hours (heating, cooling and standby) To remove water and H2S content on the feed gas to produce moisture dew point to -40 deg C and max 3 ppm H2S

Design DP : 34 barG Conditions: Opt. OP : 20.6-30.9 barG Conditions Drawing


DT: 250 deg C OT : 26.7-51.7 deg C

PID - Gas Dryer (Vendor Package)

No.


Deviation

No Flow

Capacity Flowrate : 20 MMSCFD TS78-P-PID-003

Drawing No.

Causes / Concerns

Any of manual valve at Gas Dryer package is inadvertenly close

Consequences

Safeguards

Potential PIH 0102 alarm set at 30 overpressurization of barG to alert Operator upstream equipment of D100 leading to rupture and potential fire event PIHH 0102 set at 33 barG to initiate closure of SDV 0101

Initiating L

Co

Pr

Ri

S (4) C(4)

1

S (M4) C(M4)

S (4) C(4)

1

S (M4) C(M4)


Rev:

Action Party

B

Rec. No.

PSV 0101A/B set at 33 barg 2.2.1

Less

Less Flow

F-100 Blockage

Potential PIH 0102 alarm set at 30 overpressurization of barG to alert Operator upstream equipment of D100 leading to rupture and potential fire event PIHH 0102 set at 33 barG to initiate closure of SDV 0101 PSV 0101A/B set at 33 barg PDI at F-100 as local indicator for operator


Page 6 of 53

HAZOP Node N2


No.

2.2.2

Guide Words

Less

Deviation

Less Flow


Causes / Concerns

D-100A/B Blockage (caking)

Consequences

Co

Pr

Ri

S (4) C(4)

1

S (M4) C(M4)

S (4) C(4)

1

S (M4) C(M4)

Depressurization of the BDV position indication system, loss of gas to flare and alarm and loss of production

S (-) C(3)

1

S (-) C(M3)

S (4) C(4)

1

S (M4) C(M4)

Potential wet gas to Gas Compression system resulting in equipment damage Potential overpressurization of upstream equipment of D100 leading to rupture and potential fire event

Safeguards

Initiating L



Action Party

Rec. No.

AIH (dew point alarm) at downstream of Dryer unit

PSH 0301A set at 32 bar at Gas Dryer D-100A/B to close SDV-0101

PSV 0301A set at 34 barG is sized for block discharge PDSH for Local indicator at D-100A/B for operator AIH (dew point alarm) at downstream of Dryer unit

Potential wet gas to Gas Compression system resulting in equipment damage Potential PSV 0301A set at 34 barG is overpressurization of sized for block discharge upstream equipment of D100 leading to rupture and potential fire event PDI at F-110 as local indicator for operator Potential wet gas to Gas AIH (dew point alarm) at Compression system downstream of Dryer unit resulting in equipment damage

2.2.3

Less

Less Flow

F-110 Blockage

2.2.4

Less

Less Flow

see No Flow 2.1.1 For partial blockage

2.3.1

More

More Flow

BDV-0301 open due to failure

2.4.1

Reverse

Reverse Flow


2.5.1

Part of

Misdirected Flow Refer to More Flow 2.3.1

2.5.2

Part of

Misdirected Flow Manual valve at 1/2-in drain line inadvertently open/leak or liquid trap at F-100 and F-110 stuck open

Gas blowby to Sump Tank SOP/Maintenance of liquid leading to gas cloud and trap potential fire and explosion

2.5.3

Part of

Misdirected Flow Manual bypass line of F-100 is inadvertenly open

Potential condense liquid carry over to D-100 resulting in equipment damage


SOP

Page 7 of 53

HAZOP Node N2


No. 2.5.4

Guide Words Part of

2.5.5

Part of

2.5.6

Part of

Deviation


Causes / Concerns

Consequences

Misdirected Flow Manual bypass line of F-110 is inadvertenly open

Safeguards

Potential condense liquid carry over to compressor unit resulting in equipment damage Misdirected Flow Manual valve to regeneration unit is Ineffective regeneration inadvertenly open process in Gas Dryer D100A/B

SOP

Misdirected Flow Manual by pass valve at downstream line PG-10-30-053 from metering M100A/B to Compressor unit unit is inadvertenly open

SOP

Parameter: Level 2.6.1 Less 2.7.1 More

Less Level More Level

Refer to Misdirected Flow 2.5.2 Liquid trap of F-100 stuck close

Parameter: Pressure 2.8.1 Less

Less Pressure

Loss of containment/leak on D-100 due to corrosion

2.8.2 2.9.2

Less More


Refer to More Flow 2.3.1 See No Flow 2.1.1, 2.1.2, 2.2.1, Misdirected Flow 2.5.2

2.9.1

More

More Pressure

Liquid trap of F-100 stuck open

2.9.

More

More Pressure

Potential wet gas to Gas Compression system resulting in equipment damage

Initiating L


Co

Pr

Ri


S (-) C(3)

2

S (-) C(M6)

LC by pass manual valve 10" at downstream line PG-10-30-053 and update PID

S (4) C(4)

1

S (M4) C(M4)

S (4) C(4)

1

S (M4) C(M4)

Action Party

Rec. No.

PSV 0301B set at 34 barG is sized for block discharge CNG-HP-9

High level at F-100 leading SOP to open by pass to liquid carry over to Gas manual valve 1/2" Dryer D-100A/B

Release of hydrocarbon leading to environmental damage and potential fire

Fire and gas detection system

Low level at F-100 leading Sump tank connected to to gas blow by to Sump atmospheric Tank Manual valve upstream BDV-0301 Overpresurization of NA inadvertenly close in the event of upstream equipment ESD and BDV-0301 required to open leading to fire/fatality

Provide Lock Open (LO) at manual valve upstream BDV0301

CNG-HP-10


More






Parameter: Corrosion / Erosion


Page 8 of 53

HAZOP Node N2


No. 2.14.1



Deviation Corrosion / Erosion

Causes / Concerns


Parameter: Instrumentation 2.15.1 Other Instrumentation Than


Parameter: Relief 2.16.1 Other Than

Relief


Occupational Safety


Parameter: Safety 2.17.1 Other Than

Parameter: External Factor 2.18.1 Other External Factors Than Parameter: Operation & Maintenance 2.19.1 Other Operations Than 2.20.1

Other Than


Fire

Safeguards Wall thickness of piping and equipment already considered sour gas condition

Overpresurization of drier F & G leading to equipment damage

Initiating L

Co

Pr

Ri

S (3) C(4)

1

S (M3) C(M4)

S (-) C(2)

2

S (-) C(M4)


Action Party

Rec. No.


Maintenance


Drawing



Consequences


Page 9 of 53

HAZOP Node N2



2R Node Review date 17-Jun-13 Client Project Facility Section

Comment Design Intent Design Opt. Drawing

Abbreviations


SOP IM


PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONAL Compressed Natural Gas Plant Tambak Lorok Regeneration System

PM Preventative Maintenance USD Unit Shutdown PSD Process Shutdown ESD Emergency Shutdown H,M,L High, Medium, Risk Co Consequence Pr Probability Ri Risk S Safety Risk C Commercial Risk One bed of dryer will be on drying mode and the other one is on regenerating mode. Adsorption time is 12 hours and the regeneration time 12 hours (heating, cooling and standby) To collect water from the dryer and refresh molecular sieves to be ready to absorb DP : 34 barG OP : 20.6-30.9 barG PID - Gas Dryer (Vendor Package)

No.

Guide Words Parameter: Flow 2R.1.1 No

Deviation

No Flow

DT: 250 deg C OT : 26.7-51.7 deg C

Capacity Flowrate : 20 MMSCFD TS78-P-PID-003

Drawing No.

Causes / Concerns

Consequences

Manual valve to regeneration system No regeneration process inadvertenly close causing wet gas going to compressor

Safeguards

F-101 to collect any condense liquid

Initiating L

Co

Pr

Ri

S (-) C(3)

1

S (-) C(M3)

S (-) C(3)

1

S (-) C(M3)

S (-) C(3)

1

S (-) C(M3)


Rev:

Action Party

B

Rec. No.

AIH (dew point alarm) at downstream of Dryer unit Back up dryer available

2R.1.2

2R.1.3

No

No

No Flow

No Flow

Blower E-101 at regeneration unit damage/ not in operation

F-102 blockage

No regeneration process causing wet gas going to compressor

Potential AIH (dew point alarm) at overtemperature/overpres downstream of Dryer unit sure at gas regeneration system Back up dryer available Pump cavitation Regular Filter mainentance

Overpressurization of equipment upstream of F102 leading to equipment damage


F-102 to collect any condense liquid

Ensure interlock system install to prevent overtemperature/overpressure in the case P-101 shutdown, Electric Heater should also shutdown (Check with vendor)

CNG-HP-11

PSH-0301B alarm to alert Operator

Page 10 of 53

HAZOP Node N2R


No. 2R.2.1

Guide Words Less

Deviation Less Flow

2R.2. 2R.3.1

Less More

Less Flow More Flow

2R.4.1

Reverse

Reverse Flow

2R.5.1

Part of

2R.5.

Part of

#N/A Part of Parameter: Level 2R.6.1 Less 2R.7. More


Causes / Concerns F-102 partially blocked

Consequences

Safeguards

Pump cavitation

Regular Filter maintenance

Overpressurization of equipment upstream of F102 leading to equipment damage

PSH-0301B alarm to alert Operator

Initiating L


Co

Pr

Ri

S (-) C(3)

1

S (-) C(M3)

S (-) C(3)

1

S (-) C(M3)

S (4) C(4)

1

S (M4) C(M4)

S (4) C(4)

1

S (M4) C(M4)

S (-) C(3)

1

S (-) C(M3)

S (4) C(4)

1

S (M4) C(M4)


Action Party

Rec. No.

No additional significant issues of concerns identified D-200 A-B shutdown

Potential reverse flow leading to equipment damage

potential more flow at D- AIH (dew point alarm) at 100 A-B resulting potential downstream of Dryer unit offspec to compressor leading to compressor damage PIL 501 at SS-101 as Low pressure alarm to alert operator PILL 501 at SS-101 to shutdown SDV-151 Misdirected Flow Manual valve at drain line of F-102 Gas blowby to Sump Tank Sump Tank connected to or separator after cooler leading to gas cloud and Atmospheric inadvertently open/leak potential fire and explosion Misdirected Flow Liquid trap at F-102 or at separator after cooler stuck open

Gas blowby to Sump Tank Sump Tank connected to leading to gas cloud and Atmospheric potential fire and explosion

Ensure D-200 A-B including regeneration system has adequate design to accomadate reverse flow

CNG-HP-12

Liquid trap maintenance Less Level More Level

See Misdirected flow 2R.5.2 Liquid trap of F-102 or at drain line of separator stuck close

High level at F-102 leading Manual by pass valve on to liquid carry over to Gas around liquid trap Dryer D-100A/B Second liquid trap provided on the pipe to Sump Tank AIH (dew point alarm)-0301 at downstream of F-101

Parameter: Pressure 2R.8.1 Less

2R.8.2

Less

Less Pressure

Loss of containment/leak on Release of hydrocarbon regeneration system due to corrosion leading to environmental damage and potential fire

Less Pressure

See Misdirected flow 2R.5.1


F & G system

Page 11 of 53

HAZOP Node N2R


No. 2R.8.3

Guide Words Less

Deviation Less Pressure


Causes / Concerns Regeneration pump loss of power due to mechanical problem

2R.9.1 More More Pressure See Now Flow 2R.1.3 Parameter: Temperature 2R.10.1 Less Less Temperature Electric heater stop due to mechanical failure

2R.11.1

More

More temperature Cooler stop due to motor failure

Parameter: Contamination 2R.12.1 As Well Contamination As


Parameter: Composition 2R.13.1 Other Composition Than


Parameter: Corrosion / Erosion 2R.14.1 Other Corrosion / Than Erosion


Parameter: Relief 2R.16.1 Other Than

Relief


Occupational Safety


Parameter: External Factor 2R.18.1 Other External Factors Than


Parameter: Operation & Maintenance 2R.19.1 Other Operations Than


2R.20.1

Other Than

Parameter: Drawing 2R.21.1 Other Than

Maintenance


Drawing



gas cannot circulate to regeneration system resulting in wet gas to compressor

Safeguards AIH (dew point alarm) at downstream of Dryer unit

In efficient heat absorbtion Maintenance to D-100

liquid cannot be condense and separated to the separator


Parameter: Instrumentation 2R.15.1 Other Instrumentation Than

Parameter: Safety 2R.17.1 Other Than

Consequences

AIH (dew point alarm) at downstream of Dryer unit AIH (dew point alarm) at downstream of Dryer unit

Wall thickness of piping and equipment already considered sour gas condition

Page 12 of 53

Initiating L


Co

Pr

Ri

S (-) C(3)

1

S (-) C(M3)

S (-) C(3)

1

S (-) C(M3)

S (-) C(3)

1

S (-) C(M3)

S (4) C(4)

1

S (M4) C(M4)


Action Party

Rec. No.

HAZOP Node N2R



Node 3 Review date 17-Jun-13

Abbreviations

Client Project Facility Section

PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONAL Compressed Natural Gas Plant Tambak Lorok Compression System K101 (typical for K102 to K110), including Blowdown Tank VE301


Nine (9) compressor online and One (1) stand by; reciprocating type compressor, three-stages To compress natural gas and transfer to the storage cylinder

SOP IM




Design Shut Off Pressure : Conditions:

Design Capacity: 2.17 MMSCFD each compressor

Opt. Conditions

Suction Pressure : 26 barG Discharge Pressure : 250 barG

Drawing

PID - Compressor System / K-101 (Vendor Package)

No.


Deviation

No Flow


Flowrate : 20 MMSCFD Power : TBA KW (each compressor)

Causes / Concerns

SDV W151 fails close

Drawing No.

Consequences

Safeguards

Potential overpressurization of upstream equipment and piping leading to loss of integrity and fire event

TS78-P-PID-004


Rev:

Action Party

B

Rec. No.

PSH-0301A at Gas Dryer D100A/B to close SDV-0101

PSV 0301A/B at dryer unit Low suction pressure to compressor leading to compressor damage and production loss

PT-501 displayed in control room

PIL 501 at SS-101 as Low pressure alarm to alert operator


Page 13 of 53

HAZOP Node N3


No.

3.2.1

Guide Words

Less

Deviation

Less Flow



Causes / Concerns

Blockage of filter FF-201

Consequences

Safeguards

Potential overpressurization of upstream equipment and piping leading to loss of integrity and fire event



Action Party

Rec. No.

PILL 501 at SS-101 to shutdown SDV-151 PSH-0301A at Gas Dryer D100A/B to close SDV-0101

PDI - S01 provided around FF 201 PSV 0301A/B at dryer unit

Page 14 of 53

HAZOP Node N3


Node


Abbreviations

4

Review date 17-Jun-13 Client Project Facility Section


Standard Operating Procedures

IM

Inspection & Maintenance

PM USD PSD ESD H,M,L Co Pr Ri S C CNG Storage cylinder consist of 95 compartments. 5 compartments will be arranged in 1 bank (each has 40 tubes). Operation : 19-20 hours storage time, 4-5 hours decanting time


To cooling down compressed gas and storage to CNG compartment

PID - Storage and Decanting System

No.


4.2.1

SOP

PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONAL Compressed Natural Gas Plant Tambak Lorok Inlet CNG Cooler E-100 to CNG Compartment (STORAGE TIME)

Design CNG Cooler : DP (shell) : 7 barG; (tube) : 263 barG Conditions: CNG Compartment : DP : 374 barG Opt. CNG Cooler : Storage Period (Inlet /Outlet Shell side) : OP : 3 barG Conditions CNG Cooler : Storage Period (Inlet /Outlet tube side) : OP : 249 barG Drawing


Less

Deviation

Causes / Concerns

No Flow

Manual valves at inlet CNG Compartement inadvertenly close

Less Flow

See no flow partially


CNG Cooler DT : 65 deg C CNG Compartment DT : 70 deg C

Duty CNG Cooler: 201 kW

CNG Cooler : Storage Period (Inlet /Outlet Shell side) 2.38 m3 each cylinder : OT : 30 deg C/ 39 deg C CNG Cooler : Storage Period (Inlet /Outlet tube side) : OT : 48 deg C/35 deg C Drawing No. TS78-P-PID-005 Sheet 1 of 2

Consequences

Less of CNG production

Page 15 of 53

Safeguards


Rev:

Action Party

B

Rec. No.

Local pressure indicator provided each compartment

HAZOP Node N4


No. 4.2.2

Guide Words Less

Deviation Less Flow


Causes / Concerns One of running compressor fails to operate

Consequences Less of CNG production

Safeguards Indicator of online compressor in control room


Comments / Recommendations Review sizing of manual valve incoming CNG compartment to be available at market or provide spare manual valve in the case of maintenance required

Action Party

Rec. No. CNG-HP-14

Standby compressor available

Indication of pressure and flow of storage period by graph to shown loss of production 4.3.1

More

More Flow


4.4.1

Reverse

Reverse Flow


4.5.1

Part of

Misdirected Flow KV-0503A leak or fails open (storage No adverse consequence condition)

Parameter: Level 4.6.1 Less 4.7.1 More Parameter: Pressure 4.8.1 Less 4.9.1 More 4.9.2 More

Less Level More Level

Not relevant Not relevant

Less Pressure More Pressure More Pressure

Refer to Less Flow Refer to No Flow Storage time more than 20 hours

PV-0501A/B will hold the pressure PIHH 0509 set at 33 barG will open XV-0506 and circulate gas to suction compressor

Potential over pressure at overall plant PIH-S01 set 30 barG alarm to alert Operator PIHH-S01 set 32 barG to close SDVSV-101/102/103 set@ 78/165/294 barg


Page 16 of 53

HAZOP Node N4


No.

Guide Words

Deviation


Causes / Concerns

Consequences

More

More Temperature


Parameter: Composition 4.13.1 Other Composition Than Parameter: Corrosion / Erosion 4.14.1 Other Corrosion / Than Erosion Parameter: Instrumentation 4.15.1 Other Instrumentation Than


Relief



Action Party

Rec. No.

Maximum discharge pressure of Compressor 255 barG is less than MAWP Tube storage design 373 barG


Safeguards


Fouling/Plugging at E-100 or loss of Inefficiency in cooling TIH-0503/TIH 0508/TIH cooling water resulting in high 0509 alarm will alert temperature leading to less operator CNG production

Provide portable temperature detector to check skin temperature of CNG compartment

CNG-HP-15

Tube leak at E-100

Provide SOP to control PH at cooling tower periodically

CNG-HP-16

Gas contamination to cooling water system leading to gas release at cooling tower Gas trapped at shell side resulting in eficient heat transfer

Gas detector at cooling tower fan

Explosion-proof motor of cooling tower TIH-0503/TIH 0508/TIH 0509 alarm will alert operator

No additional significant issues of concerns identified See contamination

Instrument air failure

Unable to supply gas to customer

Nitrogen back up is provided to open KV0501 to deliver gas from CNG compartement to tambak lorok


Page 17 of 53

HAZOP Node N4


No.

Guide Words Parameter: Safety 4.17.1 Other Than

Deviation

Occupational Safety


Causes / Concerns


Parameter: Operation & Maintenance 4.19.1 Other Operations Than


Other Than


Maintenance


Drawing



Safeguards


Action Party

Rec. No.


Parameter: External Factor 4.18.1 Other External Factors Than

4.20.1

Consequences


Page 18 of 53

HAZOP Node N4




Abbreviations


SOP IM





PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONAL Compressed Natural Gas Plant Tambak Lorok Inlet CNG Heat Exchanger E-200 to Station Outlet Metering M200A/B (DECANTING)


E-200 and M-200A/B will be operated during decanting time only. Decanting Time 4-5 hours. To avoid condensation on the upstream of pressure reducing valve and to measure natural gas outlet from CNG Plant

Design CNG Heat Exchanger : DP (shell) : 5.5 barG; (tube) : 34 barG Conditions: M-200A/B : DP : 34 barG

CNG Heat Exchanger DT : 120 deg C M-200A/B DT : 65 deg C

Duty CNG Heat Exchanger 3860 kW Capacity M-200A/B: 113 MMSCFD

Opt. Conditions

CNG Heat Exchanger : Inlet /Outlet Shell side : OP : 2 barG / 1.4 barG CNG Heat Exchanger : Inlet /Outlet tube side : OP : 26.7 barG / 26 barG

CNG Heat Exchanger : Inlet /Outlet Shell side : OT : 90 deg C / 65 deg C CNG Heat Exchanger : Inlet /Outlet tube side : OT- 38 deg C / 30 deg C

Decanting : 113 MMSCFD

Drawing

PID - CNG Heat Exchanger


PID - Station Outlet Metering (M-200A/B)

TS78-P-PID-006

No.

Guide Words Parameter: Flow 5.1.1

No

Deviation

No Flow


Causes / Concerns

Consequences

Safeguards


Rev:

B B

Action Party

Rec. No.

Any of manual valves on the Compressor shut off PIH 0502 set at 250psig to decanting line to E-200 inadvertenly pressure is 255 barg vs alert operator close or PV0501A/B stuck close design pressure of equipment is 263 barg - no adverse consequence identified

Page 19 of 53

HAZOP Node N5


No.

Guide Words

Deviation


Causes / Concerns

Consequences

Safeguards



Action Party

Rec. No.

PIHH 0502 set at 255 psig to shutdown compressor

Loss of gas to customer

FT-0601A/B at M-200A/B displayed at control room FILL 0601 A/Bset at 5 MMSCFD for alarm to alert operator

5.1.2

No

No Flow

5.2.1

Less

Less Flow

SDV0601 fails close or manual valve Potential PV0501 A/B to regulate the Show setting point of PV 0501A/B in the metering station inadvertenly overpressurization of CNG pressure closed HE E-200 leading to hydrocarbon release and potential fire PIH 0509 set at 31 psig to alert operator PSHH 0509 set at 33 barG to close KV 0501A Refer to No Flow - valve partially closed

5.3.1

More

More Flow

PV0501A/B stuck open

5.4.2

Reverse

Reverse Flow

5.5.1

Part of

Gas from suction compressor going to downstream of E-200 to metering M-200 Misdirected Flow BDV-0505 fails open

5.5.2

Part of

Misdirected Flow XV-0506 fails open

Parameter: Level 5.6.1 Less

Less Level


Potential PIH 0509 set at 31 psig to overpressurization of CNG alert operator HE E-200 and downstream piping PSHH 0509 set at 33 barG to close KV 0501A Double counting of sales Install additional check valve at gas from Gundih meter line PG-2"-3C-027 with M-100 Loss of gas to vent BDV position indicator and alarm in control room Loss of gas back to system instead to customer

CNG-HP-17

CNG-HP-18

Valve position indicator and alarm in control room


Page 20 of 53

HAZOP Node N5


No. 5.7.1

Guide Words More


5.9.1 5.9.

More More

Deviation


Causes / Concerns

More Level


Less Pressure

Loss of containment/leak on Decanting Line

More Pressure More Pressure

see no flow and more flow

Consequences

Release of hydrocarbon leading to environmental damage and potential fire

Manual valve upstream BDV-0505 Overpresurization of inadvertenly close in the event of upstream equipment ESD and BDV-0505 required to open leading to fire/fatality

Safeguards



Action Party

Rec. No.

F&G

NA

Provide Lock Open (LO) manual valve at upstream BDV-0505

CNG-HP-19


More



Tube leak at E-200








Relief


Occupational Safety



Gas contamination to hot Atmospheric venting at Hot water system leading to gas Water Tank T-200 release at WHRU

Parameter: External Factor


Page 21 of 53

HAZOP Node N5


No. 5.18.1


Deviation External Factors

Parameter: Operation & Maintenance 5.19.1 Other Operations Than 5.20.

Other Than



Causes / Concerns

Safeguards


Action Party

Rec. No.

No additional significant issues of concerns identified No additional significant issues of concerns identified

Maintenance


Drawing



Consequences


Page 22 of 53

HAZOP Node N5




Abbreviations


PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONAL Compressed Natural Gas Plant Tambak Lorok Hot water circulation including Hot Water Tank T-200, Hot Water Pump P300A/B and circulation to E-200

Comment

Circulation to E-200 will be on decanting time only

Design Intent

To heat compressed gas from storage facility to be ready for sales gas

Design E-500 DP : 2 barG Conditions: T-200 DP : 0.17 barG Source Pressure : atm; Discharge Pump : 3.35 barG

Drawing

PID - Waste Heat Recovery Unit PID - CNG Heat Exchanger


6.1.2

No

Deviation

No Flow

No Flow


SOP IM




Temperature: 120 deg C

Opt. Conditions

No.


T-200 : 290 m3 P-300 : 140 m3/hr E-500 : 127 kW Power : 36.8 kW

CNG Heat Exchanger : Inlet /Outlet Shell side : OT : 90 deg C / 65 deg C

TS78-P-PID-007 TS78-P-PID-005 sheet 2 of 2

Drawing No.

Causes / Concerns

Hot Water Pump P-300A/B stop due to failure OR Strainer at upstream P-300A/B blockage

Manual valve on the downstream P300A/B inadvertently closed

Consequences

Safeguards

Loss of hot water supply leading to inefficient heat transfer and lower gas sales temperature

TT-0512 as low temperature alarm to alert operator

High temperature in the circulation water around the waste heat recovery unit

TIC 0703 set at 85 deg C to control exhaust gas supply from compressor

TAH 0703 set at 85 deg C alarm to alert operator TAH 0706 set at 85 deg C alarm to alert operator Low discharge pressure for SOP to operate standby hot water circulation pump P-300B leading to inefficient heat transfer Loss of hot water supply TT-0512 as low temperature leading to inefficient heat alarm to alert operator transfer and lower gas sales temperature

Page 23 of 53

Iniating L

Rev:

S

L

R


S (-) C(2)

1

S (-) C(L2)

Provide low temperature switch at line PG-12"-3C-021 to close KV-0503 A to prevent low temperature in the gas sales

CNG-HP-20

Provide low temperature alarm at line PG-12"-3C-021 to alert operator

CNG-HP-21

S (-) C(2)

1

Action Party

B B

Rec. No.

S (-) C(L2)

HAZOP Node N6


No.

Guide Words

Deviation


Causes / Concerns

Consequences High temperature in the circulation water around the waste heat recovery unit

6.2.1

Less

Less Flow

Potential overpressurization of upstream piping Three way valve TV-0502 to E-200 is Loss of hot water supply inadvertenly close leading to inefficient heat transfer and lower gas sales temperature High temperature in the circulation water around the waste heat recovery unit

Safeguards

Iniating L


S

L

R


S (-) C(2)

1

S (-) C(L2)

Provide Temperature Control Valve at bypass line of E-200

S (-) C(2)

1

S (-) C(L2)

S (-) C(2)

1

S (-) C(L2)

S (-) C(2)

1

S (-) C(L2)

S (-) C(2)

1

S (-) C(L2)

Action Party

Rec. No.

TIC 0703 set at 85 deg C to control exhaust gas supply from compressor TAH 0703 set at 85 deg C alarm to alert operator TAH 0706 set at 95 deg C alarm to alert operator PSHH 0703A set at 4.5 barG to close P-300A/B TT-0512 as low temperature alarm to alert operator

CNG-HP-22

TIC 0703 set at 85 deg C to control exhaust gas supply from compressor TAH 0703 set at 85 deg C alarm to alert operator

Three way valve TV-0502 to by pass Not adverse consequence line E-200 is inadvertenly close 6.3.1

More

More Flow

Hot Water Pump P-300A andB running simultaneously

Excess hot water supply to TIC-0502 as high E-200 resulting in potential temperature alarm to alert overheating operator Pump running status indication at control room

6.4.1

Reverse

Reverse Flow

6.5.1

Part of

Misdirected Flow 2-in manual valve at T-200 to open drain inadvertently open

Parameter: Level 6.6.1 Less 6.6.2 Less

6.7.1

More

Less Level Less Level

More Level


No additional significant issues of concerns identified Loss of hot water supply SOP leading to inefficient heat transfer Overheating of water to E- LSL-0702 to shutdown P300 system 500A/B

see misdirected flow 6.5.1 More evaporation with less make up Loss of hot water supply water leading to inefficient heat transfer

Make up water activated

Vapor Condenser E-500 provided

LSL 0701 to start P-600 pump for make up water Overheating of water to E- LSL-0702 to shutdown P300 system 500A/B Potential overflow to open LSH 0701 to stop make up drain water and provide warning to operator Overflow line to Open Drain

Page 24 of 53

HAZOP Node N6



No.

Guide Deviation Causes / Concerns Words Parameter: Pressure 6.8.1 Less Less Pressure refer to No Flow 6.1.1 6.9.1 More More Pressure Refer to No Flow Parameter: Temperature 6.10.1 Less Less Temperature Leak at hot water system at discharge P-300A/B

6.10.2

Less

Less Temperature Fouling/Plugging at E-200

6.10.3

Less

Less Temperature Refer to No Flow

6.11.1

More

More Temperature Parameter: Contamination 6.12.1 As Well Contamination As


Consequences

Loss of hot water supply leading to inefficient heat transfer and lower gas sales temperature High temperature in the circulation water around the waste heat recovery unit

Inefficiency in heating resulting in lower gas temperature

Safeguards

TT-0512 as low temperature alarm to alert operator

Iniating L


S

L

R

S (-) C(2)

1

S (-) C(L2)

S (-) C(2)

1

S (-) C(L2)

S (-) C(2)

1

S (-) C(L2)


Action Party

Rec. No.

TIC 0703 set at 85 deg C to control exhaust gas supply from compressor TAH 0703 set at 85 deg C alarm to alert operator TAH 0706 set at 85 deg C alarm to alert operator TT-0512 as low temperature alarm to alert operator

Refer to More Flow

E-200 Tube/tube sheet leak

Gas introduce to hot water T-200 is venting to system leading to potential atmosphere overpressure of hot water system


d 6.14.1

Other Than

Corrosion / Erosion





Relief


Occupational Safety






Page 25 of 53

HAZOP Node N6


No.

Guide Deviation Words Parameter: Operation & Maintenance 6.19.1 Other Operations Than 6.20.1

Other Than



Causes / Concerns

Safeguards

Iniating L

S

L

R


Action Party

Rec. No.


Maintenance


Drawing



Consequences


Page 26 of 53

HAZOP Node N6




Abbreviations

PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONAL Compressed Natural Gas Plant Tambak Lorok Waste Heat Recovery Unit include Water circulation pump P500A/B and WHRU


SOP IM





To recover heat from exhaust gas of compressor and heating water for heating media E-100 and E-200

Design Conditions:

Pressure: WHRU : 18 Barg

Temperature: WHRU : 545 deg C

P-500 : 48 m3/hr

Opt. Conditions

Shell / Coil : 0.03 barG / 3 barG

Shell / Coil OT : 490 deg C / 63 to 90 deg C

Power : 1283 kW

Drawing

PID - Waste Heat Recovery Unit

No.


Deviation

No Flow

TS78-P-PID-007

Drawing No.

Causes / Concerns

Water Circulation Pump P-500A/B stop due to failure OR Strainer at upstream P-500A/B blockage

Consequences

Loss of water circulation leading to overheating of hot water circulation to T200

Safeguards

TIC-0703 to close dampener from compressor flue gas

Iniating L

S

L

R

S (-) C(2)

1

S (-) C(L2)


Rev:

Action Party

B

Rec. No.

TIC-0703 as high temperature alarm to alert operator PSV-0701 as thermal relief routed to open drain Pump running status indication at control room

Low discharge pressure for SOP to operate standby water circulation leading to pump P-500B inefficient heat transfer


Page 27 of 53

HAZOP Node N7


No. 7.1.2

Guide Words No

Deviation No Flow


Causes / Concerns

Consequences

Any manual valve at upstream E-300 Loss of water circulation inadvertenly close or check valve leading to overheating of blockage hot water circulation to T200

Safeguards TIC-0703 to close dampener from compressor flue gas

Iniating L


S

L

R

S (-) C(2)

1

S (-) C(L2)

Less

Less Flow

Any manual valve on the water circulation line at WHRU system partially closed

7.3.1

More

More Flow

Water Circulation Pump P-500A/B running simultaneously

7.4.1

Reverse

Reverse Flow


7.5.1

Part of

Misdirected Flow 3/4" manual valve to open drain inadvertenly open

7.5.2

Part of

Parameter: Level 7.6.1 Less 7.7.1

More

Misdirected Flow Manual valve to venting open

Less Level


More Level




Action Party

Rec. No.

TIC-0703 as high temperature alarm to alert operator PSV-0701 as thermal relief

Potential overpressure of downstream pump 7.2.1


Vendor to provide minimum flow recycle line at P-500A/B TIC-0703 to close dampener from compressor flue gas

S (-) C(2)

1

S (-) C(L2)

S (-) C(2)

1

S (-) C(L2)

S (-) C(2)

1

S (-) C(L2)

CNG-HP-23


Excess water circulation to Pump running status E-300/T-200 - no safety indication at control room consequence







Page 28 of 53

HAZOP Node N7



No.

Guide Deviation Causes / Concerns Words Parameter: Pressure Refer to No Flow 6.1.1 7.8.1 Less Less Pressure Refer to No Flow 7.9.1 More More Pressure Parameter: Temperature 7.10.1 Less Less Temperature Refer to No Flow One or more gas engine driver shutdown

Start up

7.11.1

More

More Temperature

Parameter: Contamination 7.12.1 As Well As Contamination

Refer to No Flow, Less Flow, Misdirected Flow



Condense water from flue gas at E300




Relief


Occupational Safety






7.20.1

Other Than

Maintenance

Safeguards

Iniating L

S

L

R

Less of flue gas to E-300 TIA 0704 to alert operator resulting in lower temperature generated for water circulation Low gas temperature from exhaust gas compressor to WHRU resulting condensation at gas ducting E-300

S (-) C(2)

1

S (-) C(L2)

Corrosion at E-300 leading Check with vendor the to equipment damage requirement of TIA-0705 as low temperature alarm

S (-) C(2)


Action Party

Rec. No.

Review requirement set point of TIA-0704

CNG-HP-25

Provide drain line at lowest point gas ducting E-300

CNG-HP-26

Review requirement TIA-0705

CNG-HP-27




Consequences


2

S (-) C(M6)


Parameter: Drawing


Page 29 of 53

HAZOP Node N7


No. 7.21.1 7.21.2 7.21.3

Guide Words Other Than Other Than Other Than

Deviation


Causes / Concerns

Consequences

Safeguards

Iniating L


S

L

R


Action Party

Rec. No.

Drawing Drawing Drawing


Revise drawing TS78-P-PID-007 to show setting point of all instrumentation alarm and trip

Page 30 of 53

CNG-HP-28

HAZOP Node N7




Abbreviations

PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONAL Compressed Natural Gas Plant Tambak Lorok Water Treatment Plant


SOP IM





to treat sea water and provide potable water for cooling media

Design Pressure : 7 barG Conditions:


Opt. Conditions

Pressure : 4 barG

Temperature : ambient

Drawing

PID - Water Treatment Plant

No.


8.1.2

8.1.3

No

No

Deviation

No Flow

No Flow

No Flow

TS78-P-PID-012

Drawing No.

Causes / Concerns

Manual valve at inlet Feed Pump P701 inadvertenly close

Pump P701 stop due to failure

MOV-1201 (valve on duty) inadvertenly close

Consequences

Safeguards

Iniating L

No make up water supply SOP to monitor Water for cooler/heater leading Treatment Plant (WTP) to low performance of heat transfer Low suction pressure of PSL1209 to stop P702 P702 resulting in pump damage No make up water supply Pump maintenance for cooler/heater leading to low performance of heat transfer Low suction pressure of PSL1209 to stop P702 P702 resulting in pump damage No make up water supply SOP to monitor Water for cooler/heater leading Treatment Plant (WTP) to low performance of heat transfer Low suction pressure of P702 resulting in pump damage


Flow : 3.2 m3/hr

S

L

R

S (-) C(1)

2

S (-) C(L2)

S (-) C(1)

2

S (-) C(L2)

S (-) C(1)

2

S (-) C(L2)


Rev:

Action Party

B

Rec. No.

PSL1209 to stop P702

Page 31 of 53

HAZOP Node N8


No. 8.1.4

Guide Words No

No Flow

High Pressure Pump P702 failure

No make up water supply Pump maintenance for cooler/heater leading to low performance of heat transfer

8.1.5

No

No Flow

Manual valve downstream P702 inadvertenly close

No make up water supply SOP to monitor Water for cooler/heater leading Treatment Plant (WTP) to low performance of heat transfer

8.1.6

8.1.7

No

No

Deviation


No Flow

No Flow

Causes / Concerns

S

L

R

S (-) C(1)

2

S (-) C(L2)

S (-) C(1)

1

S (-) C(L1)

LS-1201 to stop Hi press Pump PU-201 High Pressure Pump PU-201 failure No make up water supply Pump maintenance for cooler/heater leading to low performance of heat transfer

S (-) C(1)

2

S (-) C(L2)

Manual valve downstream PU-201 inadvertenly close

S (-) C(1)

2

S (-) C(L2)

Manual valve downstream Buffer Tank TK-02 inadvertenly close

Consequences

Safeguards

Iniating L


Potential overpressure of PSH 1211 to stop P702 and upstream equipment P701 Potential overfilling TK02 LS-1201 to stop Feed Pump P701

No make up water supply SOP to monitor Water for cooler/heater leading Treatment Plant (WTP) to low performance of heat transfer Potential overpressure of upstream equipment Potential overpressure of upstream equipment

PSH 1216 to stop PU-201 PI 1201, PI 1202 and PI 1203 to monitor differential pressure

S (-) C(1)

2

S (-) C(L2)

8.2.1

Less

Less Flow

Filter F-1A//B blockage

8.2.2

Less

Less Flow

Filter FX-01/02 blockage

Potential overpressure of upstream equipment

PDI 1201 to monitor differential pressure

S (-) C(1)

2

S (-) C(L2)

8.2.3

Less

Less Flow

RO-A blockage

Potential overpressure of upstream equipment

PSH 1211 to stop P702 and P701

S (-) C(1)

2

S (-) C(L2)

8.3.1

More

More Flow

Control valve upstream FM 1205 stuck open

Potential overflow to TK01 LS01 to stop FEED pump P701

S (-) C(1)

1

S (-) C(L1)

8.4.1

Reverse

Reverse Flow


8.5.1

Part of

8.5.2

Part of

Misdirected Flow Manual valve for sample inadvertenly open Misdirected Flow Manual drain valve from RO-A to open ditch inadvertenly open

Parameter: Level 8.6.1 Less 8.7.1 More Parameter: Pressure 8.8.1 Less

Less Level


More Level

see more flow

Less Pressure

see no flow


Loss of make up water to environment Loss of make up water to environment


Action Party

Rec. No.

SOP SOP

Page 32 of 53

HAZOP Node N8


No.

8.9.1

Guide Words More

Deviation

More Pressure


Causes / Concerns

Consequences

Safeguards

Iniating L

S


L

R


Action Party

Rec. No.

see no flow and less flow


More

More Temperature





Manual valve from chemical source Low make up water inadvertenly close quality leading to scale






Relief


Occupational Safety







8.20.1

Other Than


Maintenance

SOP


Drawing


Page 33 of 53

HAZOP Node N8




Abbreviations

PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONAL Compressed Natural Gas Plant Tambak Lorok Cooling System, including Make up Water Tank T-100, Make Up Water Pump P-100, Cooling Tower E-400 and Cooling Tower Pump P-200 A/B


SOP IM





To provide cooling media for E-100

Design Conditions:

Pressure: Cooling Tower : 3.5 Barg


Capacity T-100 : 54 m3

Opt. Conditions

Pressure : ATM

Temperature : 30 - 45 deg C

Power P-100 : 0.85 kW; P-200A/B : 5.88 kW

Drawing

PID - Cooling System

No.


9.1.2

9.1.3

No

No

Deviation

No Flow

No Flow

No Flow


TS78-P-PID-011

Drawing No.

Causes / Concerns

Manual valve at inlet T-100 is inadvertenly close

Manual valve at outlet T-100 is inadvertenly close or strainer blocked

Make up water pump P-100 broken or stop

Consequences

Safeguards

Low level at T-100 leading LSL 1101 to shutdown to loss of pump suction and Pump P-600 potential pump damage

Loss of make up water for Temperature alarm at cooling media and make up WHRU, E-100 and E-200 T-200 leading to ineffective heat transfer Loss of pump suction and potential pump damage Loss of make up water for cooling media and make up T-200 leading to ineffective heat transfer Loss of make up water for cooling media leading to ineffective heat transfer

Iniating L

S

L

R

S (-) C(2)

2

S (-) C(M4)

S (-) C(2)

2

S (-) C(M4)

S (-) C(2)

1

S (-) C(L2)


Provide lock open (LO) for manual valve upstream P-100 and P-600

Rev:

Action Party

B

Rec. No.

CNG-HP-29

Temperature alarm at WHRU, E-100 and E-200

Pump running status indication at control room

Page 34 of 53

HAZOP Node N9


No.

9.1.4

Guide Words No

Deviation

No Flow


Causes / Concerns

Manual valve or strainer at inlet Basin cooling water is inadvertently close

Consequences

Loss of make up water for cooling media leading to ineffective heat transfer

Safeguards Pump maintenance Temperature alarm at E-100

Iniating L


S

L

R

S (-) C(2)

1

S (-) C(L2)

Potential overflow at T-600 Floating valve at T-600 to start/stop pump P-100 9.1.5

No

No Flow

Cooling water pump P-200A/B broken or not in operation

9.1.6

No

No Flow

9.1.7

No

9.2.1


S (-) C(2)

1

S (-) C(L2)

Manual valve at upstream P-200A/B Loss of pump suction and inadvertenly close or strainer potential pump damage blocked Loss of make up water for cooling media leading to ineffective heat transfer

Strainer Maintenance periodically

S (-) C(2)

2

S (-) C(M4)

No Flow

Manual valve at downstream P200A/B inadvertently close

PSH 1108A to stop P200A/B

S (-) C(2)

1

S (-) C(L2)

Less

Less Flow

Refer to No Flow - valve partially closed

9.3.1

More

More Flow

9.4.1

Reverse

Reverse Flow

Cooling Tower Pump P-200 A and B More of water cooling running simultenaously media - no adverse consequence No additional significant issues of concerns identified

9.5.1

Part of

Misdirected Flow 3" manual valve at T-100/E-400 to open drain inadvertenly open

Low level at T-100 leading LSL 1101 to shutdown to loss of pump suction and Pump P-600 potential pump damage

9.5.1

Part of

Misdirected Flow 2" manual valve at E-400 to open drain inadvertenly open

Low level at E-400 leading Floating valve will flow to loss of pump suction and water from T-600 potential pump damage

Less Level

see no flow 9.1.1, 9.1.2,9.1.3,9.5.1

Less Level

Make up water pump P-100 fails to stop

Loss of water for cooling media resulting insufficent heat absorbed during heat transfer leading to CN gas offspec Low level at T-100 leading LSL 1101 to shutdown to loss of pump suction and Pump P-100 potential pump damage

S (-) C(2)

2

S (-) C(M4)


9.6.2

Less


Loss of make up water for cooling media leading to ineffective heat transfer

Potential overpressurization of piping at pump discharge


Action Party

Rec. No.

Review design of floating valve T600 to be radar type

CNG-HP-30

Provide lock open (LO) for manual valve upstream P-200

CNG-HP-31


Page 35 of 53

HAZOP Node N9


No.

Guide Words

Deviation


Causes / Concerns

Consequences

Safeguards

S

L

R

S (-) C(2)

1

S (-) C(L2)

S (-) C(2)

2

S (-) C(M4)

S (-) C(2)

1

S (-) C(L2)


Action Party

Rec. No.

High level at Cooling Tower basin T-600

9.7.1

More


More Level

Less Pressure

Float valve will stop incoming flow to cooling tower Float valve at Cooling Tower basin E- Potential overflow to open SOP 400 failure drain

Iniating L


Leak in water supply line to E-100

9.9.1 More More Pressure see no flow 9.1.1, 9.1.2,9.1.3 Parameter: Temperature 9.10.1 Less Less Temperature No additional significant issues of concerns identified 9.11.1

More

More Temperature


Motor at E-400 fails to run







Relief


Occupational Safety






9.20.1

Other Than

Maintenance


high temperature of water supply to E-100 leading to less production

TT-0503 at E-100 as high temperature alarm to alert operator




Loss of water for cooling media resulting insufficent heat absorbed during heat transfer leading to CN gas offspec


Page 36 of 53

HAZOP Node N9


No.

Guide Words Parameter: Drawing 9.21.1 Other Than

Deviation


Causes / Concerns

Consequences

Safeguards

Iniating L


S

L

R


Action Party

Rec. No.

Drawing


Page 37 of 53

HAZOP Node N9




Abbreviations

PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONAL Compressed Natural Gas Plant Tambak Lorok Sump Tank V-400 including Sump Tank P-400


SOP IM





To collect liquid drain from vessel (closed drain system)

Design Conditions:

Pressure : 3.5 barG


P-400 Capacity : 1.2 m3/hr

Opt. Conditions

Tank Ops Pressure : ATM; P Pump Suc Pressure : Atm, Disch Pressure : 2 barG

Temperature : AMB

Power P-400 : 0.3 kW

Drawing

PID - Sump System

No.


Deviation

TS78-P-PID-010

Drawing No.

Causes / Concerns

No Flow

4" manual valve at inlet V-400 inadvertenly closed

Consequences

Safeguards

Iniating L

S

L

R

High level at source vessel Safeguards at source vessel

S (-) C(1)

1

S (-) C(L1)

10.2.1

Less

Less Flow


10.3.1

More

More Flow

Liquid control valve failure at individual equipments (V-300, Compressor K-101-109, V-100)

Build up pressure in Sump Open venting to atmosphere Tank V-400 leading to potential overpressurization

S (-) C(1)

1

S (-) C(L1)

10.3.2

More

More Flow

Manual drain valves at individual equipments inadvertently open during online operation

Build up pressure in Sump Open venting to atmosphere Tank V-400 leading to potential overpressurization Loss of level at the source LT at individual equipment vessel as low level alarm to alert operator; and as low level trip to initiate USD

S (-) C(1)

1

S (-) C(L1)


Page 38 of 53


Review outlet line at venting V400 to be sufficient for case high pressure gas introduced from upstream equipment to this vessel

Rev:

Action Party

B

Rec. No.

CNG-HP-32

HAZOP Node N10


No.

Guide Words

Deviation


Causes / Concerns

Consequences

Safeguards

Iniating L


S

L

R


Action Party

Rec. No.

Double-valve provided at drain line of the individual equipments 10.4.1

Reverse

Reverse Flow

10.5.1

Part of



10.7.1

More


Less Level

Sump Pump P-400 fails to stop due to LT-1001 failure to function

Loss of liquid level leading Pump will be stopped to Sump Pump P-400 during no signal (FC) damage due to cavitation

S (-) C(1)

1

S (-) C(L1)

More Level

Pump stopped due to no power supply or pump damage

Overfilling of Sump Tank V-400 and liquid release from vent to environment

S (-) C(1)

1

S (-) C(L1)

LAH 1001 as high level alarm to alert operator

SOP - draining activity is attended by operator Standby portable pump will be provided and connected to available spare nozzle Parameter: Pressure 10.8.1 Less 10.9.1 10.9.2

More More

Less Pressure


More Pressure More Pressure

Refer to More flow Blockage of flame arrestor at vent line

Potential overpressurization of V400

Bug screen provided


More

More Temperature










Page 39 of 53

HAZOP Node N10


No.

Guide Words Parameter: Relief 10.16.1 Other Than Parameter: Safety 10.17.1 Other Than

Deviation


Causes / Concerns

Relief


Occupational Safety






10.20.1

Other Than


Maintenance

Consequences

Safeguards

Iniating L


S

L

R


Action Party

Rec. No.


Drawing


Page 40 of 53

HAZOP Node N10




Abbreviations

PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONAL Compressed Natural Gas Plant Tambak Lorok Fuel Gas System


SOP IM





To provide fuel to compressor

Design Conditions:

Pressure : 13.5 barG


Opt. Conditions Drawing

Pressure : 10 barG

Temperature : 21 deg C

PID - Fuel Gas System

No.


Deviation

Capacity : 1.5 m3

TS78-P-PID-009

Drawing No.

Causes / Concerns

Consequences

Safeguards

Iniating L

S

L

R

No Flow

3" Manual valves at incoming/outgoing line Fuel Gas filter is inadvertently closed

Loss of fuel gas supply leading to compressor shutdown

PT-0902 as low pressure alarm to alert operator

S (-) C(4)

1

S (-) C(M4)

PT-0902 as low pressure alarm to alert operator

S (-) C(4)

1

S (-) C(M4)

Standby PCV available PDI 0901A/B to monitor differential pressure

S (-) C(2)

1

S (-) C(L2)

Back up fuel gas filter available PT-0902 as low pressure alarm to alert operator PT-0902 as high pressure alarm to alert operator

S (-) C(1)

1

S (-) C(L1)

11.1.2

No

No Flow

PCV-0901A/B stuck closed

Loss of fuel gas supply leading to compressor shutdown

11.2.1

Less

Less Flow

Pump N4 stop due to failure

Less of fuel gas supply leading to compressor shutdown

11.3.1

More

More Flow

PCV-0901A/B stuck open

11.4.1

Reverse

Reverse Flow



Potential overpressurization of downstream equipment

Page 41 of 53


Provide lock open (LO) for 3" manual valves at upstream and downstream Fuel Gas Filter

Rev:

Action Party

B

Rec. No.

CNG-HP-33

HAZOP Node N11


No. 11.5.1

Guide Words Less

Parameter: Level 11.6.1 Less 11.7.1

More

Deviation


Causes / Concerns

Consequences

Safeguards

Iniating L


S

L

R


Action Party

Rec. No.

Misdirected Flow No additional significant issues of concerns identified Less Level


More Level


Parameter: Pressure Refer to No Flow and Less Flow 11.8.1 Less Less Pressure Refer to More Flow 11.9.1 More More Pressure Parameter: Temperature 11.10.1 Less Less Temperature No additional significant issues of concerns identified 11.11.1

More

More Temperature










Relief


Occupational Safety







11.20.1

Other Than


Maintenance


Drawing


Page 42 of 53

HAZOP Node N11




Abbreviations

PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONAL Compressed Natural Gas Plant Tambak Lorok Instrument Air System


SOP IM





To provide instrument air for instrumented system

Design Pressure : 12 barG Conditions: Opt. Conditions

Pressure : 6 - 10 barG

Drawing

PID - Instrument Air System PID - Instrument Air Network

No.


Deviation

No Flow


Capacity 183.63 SCFM (each)

Temperature : AMB - 40 deg C

Power: 30 kW (each)

Causes / Concerns

Manual valve upstream of Instrument Air Receiver V-300 inadvertently closed

Consequences

No

No Flow


Any manual valve upstream of Air Dryer Prefilter F300A/B inadvertently closed

Safeguards

Loss of instrument air Instrument air supply from supply potentially leading Instrument Air Receiver Vto PSD 300 is provided for 5 minutes in operation

Potential overpressurization of upstream piping

12.1.2

TS78-P-PID-008 Sheet 1 of 2 TS78-P-PID-008 Sheet 2 of 2

Drawing No.

Iniating L

S

L

R

S (-) C(2)

1

S (-) C(L2)

PT-0803 set at 7 barg as low pressure alarm to alert Operator NA

Loss of instrument air Instrument air supply from supply potentially leading Instrument Air Receiver Vto PSD 300 is provided for 5 minutes in operation

Page 43 of 53


Confirm availability of high pressure trip at internal of Air Compressor C300A/B/C package to shut down compressor in the case of block of discharge S (-) C(2)

1

Rev:

Action Party

B B

Rec. No.

CNG-HP-34

S (-) C(L2)

HAZOP Node N12


No.

12.1.3

12.1.4

12.1.5

12.1.6

Guide Words

No

No

No

No

12.1.7

12.2.1

Deviation

No Flow

No Flow

No Flow

No Flow

No Flow

Less

Less Flow



Causes / Concerns

Consequences

Safeguards PSV 0801 set at 12 barG release air to atmosphere

Any manual valve upstream of Air Dryer D300A/B inadvertently closed

Potential overpressurization of upstream piping Loss of instrument air supply potentially leading to PSD

PSV 0801 set at 12 barG release air to atmosphere

Any manual valve upstream Air Dryer after filter F301A/B inadvertently closed


Instrument air supply from Instrument Air Receiver V300 is provided for 5 minutes in operation PSV 0802 release air to atmosphere


PSV 0802 release air to atmosphere

Manual valve downstream Instrument Air Receiver V-310 inadvertently closed

Air Dryer Prefilter F300A/B blockage

S

L

R

S (-) C(2)

1

S (-) C(L2)

S (-) C(2)

1

S (-) C(L2)

S (-) C(2)

1

S (-) C(L2)

S (-) C(2)

1

S (-) C(L2)


Action Party

Rec. No.

Instrument air supply from Instrument Air Receiver V300 is provided for 5 minutes in operation

Potential overpressurization of upstream piping Any manual valve downstream Air Loss of instrument air Dryer after filter F301A/B supply potentially leading inadvertently closed to PSD

Air Compressors package trip/broken

Iniating L


Instrument air supply from Instrument Air Receiver V300 is provided for 5 minutes in operation

Auto start of standby compressor by PSLL-0803 Nitrogen back up at downstream F-310A/B

Loss of instrument air Instrument air supply from supply potentially leading Instrument Air Receiver Vto PSD 310 is provided for 5 minutes in operation Potential overpressurization of upstream piping Less of instrument air PDI 0801 to monitor supply potentially leading differential pressure to PSD Wet instrument air quality Dew Point Meter D0801 resulting in instrumentation damage leading to potential shutdown Spare Air Dryer Prefilter available

Page 44 of 53

Lock Open (LO) for manual valve downstream Instrument Air Receiver V-310

CNG-HP-35

HAZOP Node N12


No.

Deviation


12.2.2

Guide Words Less

Causes / Concerns

Less Flow

Air Dryer D-200A/B blockage

12.2.3

Less

Less Flow

Air Dryer After Filter F301A/B blockage

12.3.1

More

More Flow

12.4.1

Reverse

Reverse Flow

All Air Compressor running simultaneously - no adverse consequence No additional significant issues of concerns identified

12.5.1

Part of

Misdirected Flow 3/4" manual drain valve at V-300 inadvertently close

Consequences

Safeguards

S

L

R

Less of instrument air PDI 0802A/B to monitor supply potentially leading differential pressure to PSD Wet instrument air Dew Point Meter DE 0801 resulting in instrumentation damage leading to potential shutdown Spare Air Dryer available Less of instrument air PDI 0802 to monitor supply potentially leading differential pressure to PSD Wet instrument air quality Dew Point Meter D0801 resulting in instrumentation damage leading to potential shutdown Spare Air Dryer After filter available

S (-) C(2)

1

S (-) C(L2)

S (-) C(2)

1

S (-) C(L2)

High pressure air blowby to sump tank V-400

S (-) C(2)

1

S (-) C(L2)

S (-) C(2)

1

S (-) C(L2)

Sump Tank V-400 is open to atmosphere

Iniating L



Action Party

Rec. No.

Less of instrument air supply potentially leading to PSD Parameter: Level 12.6.1 Less 12.7.1

More

Parameter: Pressure 12.8.1 Less 12.9.1

More

Less Level


More Level

Water condensation in V-300 and lube oil entrainment from compressors

Less Pressure

see no flow, less flow, misdirected flow

More Pressure

see no flow

Low quality of instrument SOP to monitor LG 0801 air leading to potential instrument damage and shutdown


More

More Temperature


Parameter: Contamination


Page 45 of 53

HAZOP Node N12


No. 12.12.1

Guide Words As Well As

Deviation Contamination


Causes / Concerns







Relief


Occupational Safety






12.20.1

Other Than

Parameter: Drawing 12.21.1 Other Than 12.21.2

Other Than

Maintenance


Drawing


Drawing



Safeguards

Iniating L

S

L

R


Action Party

Rec. No.




Consequences


Page 46 of 53

HAZOP Node N12




Abbreviations


PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONAL Compressed Natural Gas Plant Tambak Lorok Fire Water System

Comment

Fire water is supplied from existing facility

Design Intent

to provide cooling system and extinguish fire from the process plant and building

Design Conditions:

Pressure : ATM


Opt. Conditions

Pressure : ATM

Temperature : ambient

Drawing

PID - Fire Water System

No.


Deviation

Causes / Concerns

Any of manual valve at fire water ring inadvertently close/stuck close

Existing fire water pump inoperation Fail to supply fire water in case of fire leading to fire escalation Any of manual valve at fire water Lack of fire water supply ring partially close resulting in inadequate water to extinguishing fire

13.1.2

No

No Flow

13.2.1

Less

Less Flow

13.3.1

More

More Flow


13.4.1

Reverse

Reverse Flow


13.5.1

Part of



Less Level


SOP IM




Drawing No.

TS78-P-PID-013

Consequences

No Flow

Lack of fire water supply resulting in inadequate water to extinguishing fire


Safeguards

SOP

SOP

Iniating L

S

L

R

S (3) C(3)

1

S (M3) C(M3)

S (3) C(3)

1

S (M3) C(M3)

S (3) C(3)

1

S (M3) C(M3)


Rev:

Action Party

B

Rec. No.


Page 47 of 53

HAZOP Node N13


No. 13.7.1

Guide Words More

Parameter: Pressure 13.8.1 Less 13.9.1 More

Deviation


Causes / Concerns

More Level



see less flow No additional significant issues of concerns identified

Consequences

Safeguards

Iniating L


S

L

R


Action Party

Rec. No.


More

More Temperature










Relief


Occupational Safety





Parameter: Operation & Maintenance 13.19.1 Other Operations Than 13.19.2

Other Than

Operations

13.20.1

Other Than

Maintenance


Review existing Tambak Lorok’s fire water capacity to be adequate for fire water handling in CNG Plant

CNG-HP-36

Consider to provide additional flowmeter to measure fire water consumption for Tambak Lorok

CNG-HP-37


Drawing


Page 48 of 53

HAZOP Node N13




Abbreviations


PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONAL Compressed Natural Gas Plant Tambak Lorok Power Generation system

Comment

GE-100 A is main generator and GE-100B is back up generator (emergency???)

Design Intent

to provide power for CNG plant

Design Conditions: Opt.

Pressure :

Temperature:

Pressure :

Temperature :

Conditions Drawing

PID - Power Generator System

No.


Deviation

No Flow


SOP IM




Capacity : 600 kW TS78-P-PID-014

Drawing No.

Causes / Concerns

Power Generator unable to operate due to damage

Consequences

Safeguards

No power generated Standby Generator leading to plant shutdown provided

Iniating L

S

L

R

S (-) C(3)

1

S (-) C(M3)


Rev:

Action Party

B

Rec. No.

Back up power supply from PLN available XV 1401 or XV 1402 or XV - 1403 inadvertenly close PV 1401 or PV-1402 stuck close Manual valve up stream GE-100A inadvertenly close No additional significant issues of concerns identified

14.2.1

Less

Less Flow

14.3.1

More

More Flow


14.4.1

Reverse

Reverse Flow


14.5.1

Part of

Misdirected Flow 2-in manual valve to drain system open

14.6.1

Less

Less Level

Hydrocarbon gas release to environment

v



Page 49 of 53

HAZOP Node N14


No. 14.7.1

Guide Words More

Deviation More Level


Causes / Concerns

Consequences

Safeguards

Iniating L


S

L

R


S (-) C(3)

1

S (-) C(M3)

Confirm availability of TSHH to trip Gas Generator GE-100A in case of high temperature has been included in (LO) the generator package. Lock Open for manual valve

Action Party

Rec. No.


Parameter: Pressure see less flow 14.8.1 Less Less Pressure see more flow 14.9.1 More More Pressure Parameter: Temperature 14.10.1 Less Less Temperature No additional significant issues of concerns identified 14.11.1

More

More Temperature

Any manual valve down stream GE- Overheating at GE-100A 100A to cooling system inadvertenly leading to equipment close damage, plant shutdown

CNG-HP-38

CNG-HP-39

downstream GE-100A Parameter: Contamination 14.12.1 As Well As Contamination









Relief


Occupational Safety







14.20.1

Other Than


Maintenance


Drawing



Page 50 of 53

HAZOP Node N14




Abbreviations


PT ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONAL Compressed Natural Gas Plant Tambak Lorok Vent Gas System, including discharge of pressure relieving device and BDVs vent header, KO Drum V-600, up to Vent Stack VS-100

Comment

Normally Flare system has no hydrocarbon gas flowing Drain and liquid outlet of Vent Stack is normally close

Design Intent

To gather release gas from process relief valves and BDV and routing gas to safe area

Design Conditions:

Pressure : 5.5 barG


Opt. Conditions

Pressure : ATM - 2 barG

Temperature : 10-60 deg C

Drawing

PID - Vent Gas System

No.


Deviation


SOP IM




Capacity Vent Stack : 12.5 MMSCFD

TS78-P-PID-015

Drawing No.

Causes / Concerns

No Flow


Consequences

Safeguards

Iniating L

S

L

R

15.2.1

Less

Less Flow


15.3.1

More

More Flow

PSV or BDV passing

Loss of gas to atmosphere Flame arrestor installed resulting gas cloud around process area and potential fire if ignited

S (4) C(4)

1

S (M4) C(M4)

15.4.1

Reverse

Reverse Flow

Air ingress to venting system

Potential fire/explosion inside piping

S (4) C(4)

1

S (M4) C(M4)

15.5.1

Part of



Water seal at bottom of vent stack to prevent air ingress to venting system

Page 51 of 53


Rev:

Action Party

B

Rec. No.

HAZOP Node N15


No.

Guide Words Parameter: Level 15.6.1 Less 15.7.1

More

Parameter: Pressure 15.8.1 Less 15.9.1

More

Deviation


Causes / Concerns

Less Level


More Level

Liquid carry over from PSV/BDV

Less Pressure


More Pressure


Consequences

release of hydrocarbon liquid to environment

Safeguards

Vent stack is equipped by dead leg to collect liquid and drain to Sump Tank V400

Iniating L


S

L

R

S (-) C(2)

1

S (-) C(L2)

S (4) C(3)

1

S (M4) C(M3)


Action Party

Rec. No.


More

More Temperature









Parameter: Relief 15.16.1 Other Than Parameter: Safety 15.17.1 Other Than

Relief


Occupational Safety



Lighting struck during PSV/BDV release



15.20.1

Other Than

Maintenance

Fire at vent stack

Consider to install CO2 snuffing system at VS-100 to extinguish fire at vent stack completed with fusible plug

CNG-HP-40


Parameter: Drawing


Page 52 of 53

HAZOP Node N15


No. 15.21.1 15.21.2

Guide Words Other Than Other Than

Deviation


Causes / Concerns

Consequences

Safeguards

Iniating L


S

L

R


Action Party

Rec. No.

Drawing Drawing


Page 53 of 53

HAZOP Node N15



Appendix C

HAZID Review Worksheets

PT. ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INDONESIA

Node Review date Client Project Area Comment

Drawing

No.


Appendix C HAZID Review Worksheet SAA Co Consequency

Abbreviations

1 17-Jun-13 PT. ENVIROMATE TECHNOLOGY INTERNATIONAL COMPRESSED NATURAL GAS PLANT TAMBAK LOROK The plan is located beside Indonesia Power Company. The North side is sea side. The South side is Turbine Generator belong by IP. General Lay Out CNG Plant

P Ri Rec S C H,M,L Drawing No.

Hazard Description

Consequences

Prevention

4.1.1

Category/ Guideword Natural Events

Earthquake

Potential of loss of plant integrity leading to damage and hydrocarbon release

-

4.1.2

Natural Events

Rob in process area

Potential damage to process equipment

4.1.3

Natural Events

Lightning

Possible damage to the equipment and potential fire

Control

Probabitliy Risk Recommendation Safety Risk Commercial Risk High, Medium, Low TS78-L-LY-001


Plant, equipment, building and foundation design anticipated to accommodate earthquake factor (0.15G), referring to UBC-1997 and soil investigation result Plant is designed NA above Rob posistion (80 cm above average ground level vs 70 cm average rob) and in high position Grounding provided for each equipment

Update EQL drawing to show Lightning protection at CNG compartment area (lightning stack) in process/utility area

Rec Number

CNG-HD- 1

Rev.

B1

Action Party

Co.

S (4) C(3)

Pr

Ri

4

S (H16) C(H12)

Lightning protection at CNG compartment area (lightning stack) in process/utility area


Page 1 of 7

HAZID Worksheet Node 1


No. 4.1.4

Category/ Guideword Natural Events

Hazard Description

Consequences

Prevention

Settlement

Possible damage to the equipment and potential fire No major concern Damage to the equipment, loss of production

-

Control


4.1.5 4.2.1

Natural Events External Events

4.3.1

Transportation

4.3.2

Transportation

4.4.1

Lifting

4.5.1

Non Process Fires Bush fire


4.6.1

Security

Loss of production. Fence line around Security's Officer stand Potential major the plant area by 24 hrs at plant area accident leading to personnel injury/fatality

Pile foundation (block design) provided to withstand settlement Land slide External corrosion Painting & Periodic maintenance coating for piping and inspection for all and equipment surface vessels and pipings Light vehicles impact Potential impact to vehicle park area away Operation cars shall be equipped with flame e.g. Car piping/equipment from process area arrestor and diesel engine leading to hydrocarbon release, fire, personnel injury/fatality and asset damage Heavy equipment to Potential impact to Concrete road Pipe bridge provided gas plant e.g. mobile piping/equipment to connect each crane leading to equipment across road hydrocarbon release, fire, personnel injury/fatality and asset damage Lifting equipment Potential damage to SOP for lifting (mobile crane, forklift) pipeline and activity including failure equipment certified personnel to conduct the lifting

Theft/sabotage



Appendix C HAZID Review Worksheet

-

Page 2 of 7

Rec Number

CNG-HD- 2

Action Party

Co.

Pr

Ri

S (-) C(3)

2

S (-) C(H9)

S (4) C(4)

2

S (H8) C(H8)

S (4) C(4)

2

S (H8) C(H8)

S (-) C(2)

2

S (-) C(M4)

S (4) C(4)

2

S (H8) C(H8)

S (4) C(4)

2

S (H8) C(H8)



No.

Category/ Guideword

Hazard Description

Consequences

4.6.2

Security

Vandalism


4.6.3

Security

Wild animals (tiger, crocodile and snake)


4.7.1

Noise

4.8.1

Health Hazards

High noise level from Potential personnel compressor and gas ear injury engine area Toxic Material during Personnel injury handling chemical: for cooling water, corrosion inhibitor e.g. oxygen scavanger

Prevention

Control

SOP for control personnel incoming to the plant -

-

-

-


Health Hazards

Handling molecular sieve at dryer system

Rec Number

Action Party

Co.

Pr

Ri

S (4) C(4)

2

S (H8) C(H8)

-

-

Provide SOP to wear ear plug around noise area

CNG-HD- 3

S (1) C(-)

3

S (H3) C(-)

MSDS provided in the storage facility

Ensure portable eye wash station provided during chemical handling (e.g : at control room, loading area and water treatment area)

CNG-HD- 4

S (1) C(-)

3

S (H3) C(-)

S (1) C(-)

3

S (H3) C(-)

S (1) C(-)

3

S (H3) C(-)

S (1) C(-)

4

S (M4) C(-)

PPE - hand gloves, face shield SOP for chemical handling 4.8.2



Personnel exposure PPE - hand to H2S resulting in gloves, face personnel injury shield

JSA

SOP for handling molecular sieve at dryer system 4.8.3

Health Hazards

Personnel hygiene and Health impact to living activity operator


Toilet and pantry Medical emergency are provided in provided (clinic) for control room operation personnel building

Page 3 of 7



No. 4.8.3

4.9.1



Category/ Guideword Health Hazards

Hazard Description

Consequences

Prevention

Control

Hazardous waste disposal

Personnel injury during handling waste disposal

PPE - hand gloves, face shield

-

Maintenance/ construction

Working at high Fall and slip location such as resulting in lightning pole, WHRU injury/fatality

Maintenance access provided at WHRU

Recommendation/ Comment Alocate waste disposal resulting from operation/construction activity in safe area (third party)

Rec Number

Action Party

Co.

Pr

Ri

S (1) C(-)

3

S (H3) C(-)

Permit to works system

S (4) C(-)

2

S (H8) C(-)

permit to works system

S (4) C(4)

2

S (H8) C(H8)

permit to works system

S (4) C(-)

2

S (H8) C(-)

ELCB (Earth Leakage Circuit Breaker) provided for electrical equipment/devices e.g. welding machine PPE Provide warning sign around hot surface equipment and pipings

S (4) C(-)

2

S (H8) C(-)

S (2) C(-)

2

S (M4) C(-)

CNG-HD- 5

SOP for working at height during maintenance and construction, including competent personnel 4.9.2


Hot/cold Work

4.9.3


Confined Space Entry

4.9.5


Electrical Hazards

4.9.6


Hot Surfaces at Potential injury due exhaust gas, WHRU to exposure to heat and heat exchanger (E200)


Fire and potential fatality

SOP for hot/cold work activity during construction, including competent personnel Potential fatality SOP for confined due to asphyxiation space entry during maintenance and construction, including Potential Proper insulation electrocution for resulting in cabling/wiring injury/fatality personal protection insulation provided

Page 4 of 7

CNG-HD- 6



No. 4.10.1

Category/ Guideword Loss of Containment



Hazard Description

Consequences

Prevention

Control

Recommendation/ Comment Define philosophy of fire and gas detection system and develop fire and gas detection area at process plant

Rec Number

Leak from Process Equipment

Release of hydrocarbon resulting in potential fire/explosion leading to injury/fatality

Unit SD by low pressure trip

Gas detection system at process area

-

Fire hydrant provided Regularly to check temperature in the MCC with source from cabinet and DCS panel to existing IP monitor short circuit and provide portable fire extinguisher

CNG-HD- 8

CNG-HD- 7

Action Party

Co.

Pr

Ri

S (4) C(4)

2

S (H8) C(H8)

4.10.2

Loss of Containment

Diesel Leak


4.11.1

Ignition Sources

Battery


Battery room is located in non hazardous area

Heat & Smoke detector, Portable Fire Extinguisher provided at control room & MCC room

Regularly to check temperature in the MCC cabinet and DCS panel to monitor short circuit and provide portable fire extinguisher

CNG-HD- 9

S (4) C(4)

2

S (H8) C(H8)

4.11.2

Ignition Sources

Vent

Fire/explosion in the event of hydrocarbon release in process area if stroke by lightning

-

Lightning protection provided at CNG compartment area

Define safe location and minimum height required for vent stack and vent location to be suitable with wind directions so that dispersed gas will not be exposed to process plan

CNG-HD- 10

S (4) C(4)

2

S (H8) C(H8)

S (4) C(4) S (4) C(4)

2

S (H8) C(H8) S (H8) C(H8)

4.11.3

Ignition Sources

Static electricity from external vehicle



-

vehicle park area away from process area

Page 5 of 7

2



No. 4.12.1

Category/ Guideword Escape/ Refuge

Hazard Description

Consequences

Fire on Plant area

Personnel trap/ ERP unable to evacuate leading to injury/fatality

4.13.1

Emergency Lighting

Personnel trap in wrong way

4.14.1

Manned Building Control room




Personnel injury/fatality

Prevention

Control

Recommendation/ Comment Provide emergency evacuation risk analysis to determine safe evacuation route and location of muster area

-

-

-

-

-

Form emergency response team (ERT) and conduct emergency drill

Rec Number

Co.

Pr

Ri

CNG-HD- 11

S (4) C(4)

3

S (H8) C(H8)

CNG-HD- 12

S (4) C(4)

4

S (H8) C(H8)

S (4) C(4) S (4) C(4)

5

S (H8) C(H8) S (H8) C(H8)

Emergency lighting for evacuation is provided in control room and evacuation route

Fire or explosion from process area impact to control room leading to potential personnel injury/fatality

Action Party

6

Heat and Smoke detector

Review scenario of fire and explosion from gas plant to the area of standby personnel such as control room and provide mitigation plan (design and location of the building) to anticipate fire/explosion

CNG-HD- 13

S (4) C(4)

2

S (H8) C(H8)

-

-

Define safety requirement on control room specification to accommodate fire/explosion scenario e.g. door, wall and window specifications

CNG-HD- 14

S (4) C(4)

3

S (H8) C(H8)

-

-

4

Inability to monitor process area

-

S (4) C(4) S (4) C(4)

S (H8) C(H8) S (H8) C(H8)

Consider to provide CCTV in the control room for monitoring purpose

Page 6 of 7

CNG-HD- 15

5



No.

Hazard Description

Consequences

Prevention

Control

4.15.1

Category/ Guideword Communication

Inability to contact control room within emergency

Each operator provided with hand held radio

F&G alarm system

4.16.1

Shutdown

Inability to initiate ESD

Local ESD push button at control room

-

4.16.2

Shutdown

Loss of power

Inability to coordinate response leading to potential major accident leading to personnel injury/fatality and asset loss Inability to control fire leading to potential major accident leading to personnel injury/fatality and asset loss Plant shutdown resulting loss of production Uncontrolled process upset

ESD is fail safe action -

Rec Number

Action Party

Co.

Pr

Ri

S (4) C(4)

2

S (H8) C(H8)

CNG-HD- 17

S (4) C(4)

2

S (H8) C(H8)

UPS is provided

S (-) C(4)

2

S (-) C(H8)

S (-) C(4)

3

S (-) C(H8)

S (-) C(-)

-

S (-) C(-)

S (-) C(-)

4

S (-) C(-)

Define safety layout at CNG plant to show ESD push button, fire hydrant, etc

4.17.1

Other

Plant layout

-

4.18.1

Discharge to air

Note: venting only for emergency situation

-

-

4.18.3

Discharge to water

Blowdown of water from cooling tower, discharge RO

Potential contamination from process fluid

4.18.4

Discharge to soil

No additional significant issue of concern identified

4.18.5

Waste disposal

Disposal of operation/ Potential construction waste e.g. environmental plant, log disturbance

-

Recommendation/ Comment Define internal and external communication system (PABX) for connecting operator in the control room to outside parties

CNG-HD- 16

Alternative power source from PLN for emergency equipment -




Discharge water is connected to existing canal (IP)

Define Sampling point to monitor discharge water

CNG-HD- 18

-

Alocate waste disposal resulting from operation/construction activity in safe area (third party)

CNG-HD- 5

Page 7 of 7



Appendix D

Drawings Reviewed


NODE 1

NODE 2 2 NODE

NODE 2R

NODE 3

NODE 4

NODE 6 NODE 5

NODE 5

NODE 7

NODE 6

NODE 12

NODE 12

NODE 11

NODE 10

NODE 9

NODE 8

NODE 13

NODE 14

NODE 15

Hazop & Hazid Report - Cng Gas Plant - Tambak Lorok Rev b

Recommend Documents