CHIANG KAI SHEK COLLEGE, and CHIEN YIN SHAO, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF APPEALS; HON. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION; HON. COMMISSIONER VICTORIANO R. CALAYLAY, HON. PRESIDING COMMISSIONER RAUL T. AQUINO, and HON. COMMISSIONER ANGELITA A. GACUTAN; and MS. DIANA P. BELO, respondents. G.R. No. 152988 August 24, 2004 Case No. 14 Facts: Private respondent Belo was employed as a permanent teacher by petitioner CKSC for 15 years. Belo had to take a leave of absence for the S.Y. 1992 – – 1993 due to personal reasons. Petitioner informed her that they could not guarantee her a teaching load when she would return and that only teachers in service may enjoy the privilege and benefits provided by the school. When she signified her intention to return to teach for the S.Y. 1993 – – 1994, petitioner reasoned that it already hired non – permanent teachers to take her load. The Labor Arbiter reasoned that she was not dismissed but there was simply no available teaching load for her. The NLRC reversed the LA’s decision and ordered her reinstatement with full back wages. The Court of Appeals declared that Belo was constructively dismissed; the dismissal, illegal, for being violative of her security of tenure. Issue: Whether private respondent was constructively dismissed and there fore entitled to reinstatement and back wages Held: It must be noted at the outset that Ms. Belo had been a full-time teacher in petitioner CKSC continuously for fifteen years or since 1977 until she took a leave of absence for the school year 19921993. Under the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools, for a private school teacher to acquire a permanent status of employment and, therefore, be entitled to a security of tenure, the following requisites must concur: (a) the teacher is a full-time teacher; (b) the teacher must have rendered three consecutive years of service; and (c) such service must have been satisfactory. Since Ms. Belo has measured up to these standards, she therefore enjoys security of tenure. The fundamental guarantees of security of tenure and due process dictate that no worker shall be dismissed except for just and authorized cause provided by law and after due notice and hearing. Case law defines constructive dismissal as a cessation from work because continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable, or unlikely; when there is a demotion in rank or a diminution in pay or both; or when a clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer becomes unbearable to the employee. It, therefore, blows our mind why the petitioners would require Ms. Belo, a permanent teacher since 1977 with a satisfactory service record, to signify her intention to teach in March 1993. Plainly, the petitioners violated their avowed policies. Since Ms. Belo was not retiring, resigning or filing another leave of absence after the school year 1992-1993, the petitioners should have considered her as consenting to teach for the incoming school year 1993-1994. In fact, they should not have required her to re-apply to teach. In accordance with the written statement of policies dated 12 March 1993, 1993, only probationary teachers are required by the petitioners to re-apply in March. Failure of probationary teachers to re-apply in March is an indication of their lack of interest to te ach again at the school. Petitioners’ Petitioners’ invocation of the third policy – that of giving teaching assignments to probationary teachers in April – – to justify their refusal to provide Ms. Belo a teaching load is, therefore, a lame excuse that rings of untruth and dishonesty. Patently clear is the illegal manner by which the petitioners eased out Ms. Belo from the teaching cor ps.
VIRGILIO CALLANTA, petitioner, vs. CARNATION PHILIPPINES, INC., and NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION [NLRC], respondents. G.R. No. 70615 October 28, 1986 Case No. 30 Facts: Petitioner was employed by private respondent Carnation. Carnation then filed with the Ministry of Labor and Employment an application for clearance to terminate the employment of Callanta on the alleged grounds of serious misconduct and misappropriation of company funds. His employment was terminated. More than 3 years later, he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with claims for reinstatement, backwages and damages. The Labor Arbiter ruled for petitioner. The NLRC declared the action to have prescribed per Art. 291 and 292 of the Labor Code which provides for a 3 year prescriptive period. Issue: Whether the action has prescribed Held: No. Verily, the dismissal without just cause of an employee from his employment constitutes a violation of the Labor Code and its implementing rules and regulations. Such violation, however, does not amount to an "offense" as understood under Article 291 of the Labor Code. In its broad sense, an offense is an illegal act which does not amount to a crime as defined in the penal law, but which by statute carries with it a penalty similar to those imposed by law for the punishment of a crime. 3 It is in this sense that a general penalty clause is provided under Article 289 of the Labor Code which provides that "... any violation of the provisions of this code declared to be unlawful or penal in nature shall be punished with a fine of not less than One Thousand Pesos [P1,000.00] nor more than Ten Thousand Pesos [10,000.00], or imprisonment of not less than three [3] months nor more than three [3] years, or both such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court." [Emphasis supplied.] The confusion arises over the use of the term "illegal dismissal" which creates the impression that termination of an employment without just cause constitutes an offense. It must be noted, however that unlike in cases of commission of any of the probihited activities during strikes or lockouts under Article 265, unfair labor practices under Article 248, 249 and 250 and illegal recruitment activities under Article 38, among others, which the Code itself declares to be unlawful, termination of an employment without just or valid cause is not cate gorized as an unlawful practice. It is a principle in American jurisprudence which, undoubtedly, is well-recognized in this jurisdiction that one's employment, profession, trade or calling is a "property right," and the wrongful interference therewith is an actionable wrong. 11 The right is considered to be property within the protection of a constitutional guaranty of due process of law. 12 Clearly then, when one is arbitrarily and unjustly deprived of his job or means of livelihood, the action instituted to contest the legality of one's dismissal from employment constitutes, in essence, an action predicated "upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff," as contemplated under Art. 1146 of the New Civil Code, which must be brought within four [4] years. Even on the assumption that an action for illegal dismissal falls under the category of "offenses" or "money claims" under Articles 291 and 292, Labor Code, which provide for a three-year prescriptive period, still, a strict application of said provisions will not destroy the enforcement of fundamental rights of the employees. As a statutory provision on limitations of actions, Articles 291 and 292 go to matters of remedy and not to the destruction of fundamental rights. 13 As a general rule, a statute of limitation extinguishes the remedy only. Although the remedy to enforce a right may be barred, that right may be enforced by some other available remedy which is not barred.
