Chapter 8 – DUE PROCESS OF LAW 1. Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association v. City of Manila, 20 SCRA 849 2. Rubi v. Prov. Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660 3. Nebbia v. State of New York, 291 U.S. 502 4. Tumey v. Ohio, 273 U.S. 510 5. Ichong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 6. Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 80 SCRA 114 7. Javier v. Commission on Elections, 144 SCRA 194 8. Tanada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446 9. NASECORE v. Energy Regulatory Commission and Meralco, 481 SCRA 480
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL & MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOC. V. CITY OF MANILA [20 SCRA 849] Facts: The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of the lower court in an action for prohibition is whether Ordinance No. Of the City of Manila is violating of due process clause. It was alleged that Sec. 1 of the challenged ordinance is unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violate of due process insofar as it would impose P6T fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500 for second class motels, that Sec. 2, prohibiting a person less than 18 years from being accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and making it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of such establishments to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours runs counter to due process guaranty for lack of certainty and for its unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive character. Issue: Whether or not the ordinance is violative of the due process clause? Held: A Manila ordinance regulating the operation of hotels, motels and lodging houses is a police measure specifically aimed to safeguard public morals. As such it is immune from any imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the less limitable of powers extending as it does to all great public needs. Much discretion is given to municipal corporations in determining the amount of license fees to be imposed for revenue. The mere fact that some individuals in the community may be deprived of their present business or a particular mode of earning a living cannot prevent the exercise of police power. There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard to which governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. The standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural and as substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or any governmental action for that matter, from imputation of legal infirmity is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. It would be an affront to reason to stigmatize an ordinance enacted precisely to meet what a municipal lawmaking body considers an evil of rather serious proportions as an arbitrary and capricious exercise of authority. What should be deemed unreasonable and what would amount to an abduction of the power to govern is inaction in the face of an admitted deterioration of the state of public morals. The provision in Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila, making it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of any hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern or common inn or the like, to lease or rent any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases full payment shall be charged, cannot be viewed as a transgression against the command of due process. The prohibition is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary, because there appears a correspondence between the undeniable existence of an undesirable situation and the legislative attempt at correction. Moreover, every regulation of conduct amounts to curtailment of liberty, which cannot be absolute.
RUBI VS. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO [39 PHIL 660; NO. 14078; 7 MAR 1919] Facts: The provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 wherein non-Christian inhabitants (uncivilized tribes) will be directed to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands. It is resolved that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. Further, Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this reservation providing that said homestead applications are previously recommended by the provincial governor. In that case, pursuant to Section 2145 of the Revised Administrative Code, all the Mangyans in the townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, were ordered to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake. Also, that any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not exceed in sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code. Said resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro were claimed as necessary measures for the protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they roam, and to introduce civilized customs among them. It appeared that Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished. It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of that province. Rubi and hiscompanions are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away from the reservation. Issue: Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code deprive a person of his liberty pf abode. Thus, WON Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional. Held: The Court held that section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his liberty of abode and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement inreservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. The Court is further of the opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional. Assigned as reasons for the action: (1) attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian people of the province; and (2) the only successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) The protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes. One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the generalgood of the Philippines. “Liberty regulated by law": Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases.
None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law. Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue.
NEBBIA v. PEOPLE OF STATE OF NEW YORK [291 U.S. 502 (1934)] Decided March 5, 1934 Mr. Justice ROBERTS delivered the opinion of the Court. The Legislature of New York established by chapter 158 of the Laws of 1933, a Milk Control Board with power, among other things to 'fix minimum and maximum ... retail prices to be charged by ... stores to consumers for consumption off the premises where sold.' The board fixed nine cents as the price to be charged by a store for a quart of milk. Nebbia, the proprietor of a grocery store in Rochester, sold two quarts and a 5-cent loaf of bread for 18 cents; and was convicted for violating the board's order. At his trial he asserted the statute and order contravene the equal protection clause and the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and renewed the contention in successive appeals to the county court and Court of Appeals. Both overruled his claim and affirmed the conviction. The question for decision is whether the Federal Constitution prohibits a state from so fixing the selling price of milk. We first inquire as to the occasion for the legislation and its history. During 1932 the prices received by farmers for milk were much below the cost of production. The decline in prices during 1931 and 1932 was much greater than that of prices generally. The situation of the families of dairy producers had become desperate and called for state aid similar to that afforded the unemployed, if conditions should not improve. On March 10, 1932, the senate and assembly resolved, 'That a joint Legislative committee is hereby created ... to investigate the causes of the decline of the price of milk to producers and the resultant effect of the low prices upon the dairy industry and the future supply of milk to the cities of the State; to investigate the cost of distribution of milk and its relation to prices paid to milk producers, to the end that the consumer may be assured of an adequate supply of milk at a reasonable price, both to producer and consumer.' The committee organized May 6, 1932, and its activities lasted nearly a year. The conscientious effort and thoroughness exhibited by the report lend weight to the committee's conclusions. In part those conclusions are: Milk is an essential item of diet. It cannot long be stored. It is an excellent medium for growth of bacteria. These facts necessitate safeguards in its production and handling for human consumption which greatly increase the cost of the business. Failure of producers to receive a reasonable return for their labor and investment over an extended period threaten a relaxation of vigilance against contamination. The production and distribution of milk is a paramount industry of the state, and largely affects the health and prosperity of its people. Dairying yields fully one-half of the total income from all farm products. Dairy farm investment amounts to approximately $1,000,000,000. Curtailment or destruction of the dairy industry would cause a serious economic loss to the people of the state. In addition to the general price decline, other causes for the low price of milk include a periodic increase in the number of cows and in milk production, the prevalence of unfair and destructive trade practices in the distribution of milk, leading to a demoralization of prices in the metropolitan area and other markets, and the failure of transportation and distribution charges to be reduced in proportion to the reduction in retail prices for milk and cream. Various remedies were suggested, amongst them united action by producers, the fixing of minimum prices for milk and cream by state authority, and the imposition of certain graded taxes on milk dealers proportioned so as to equalize the cost of milk and cream to all dealers and so remove the cause of pricecutting.
The Legislature adopted chapter 158 as a method of correcting the evils, which the report of the committee showed could not be expected to right themselves through the ordinary play of the forces of supply and demand, owing to the peculiar and uncontrollable factors affecting the industry. The provisions of the statute are summarized in the margin. The more serious question is whether, in the light of the conditions disclosed, the enforcement of section 312(e) denied the appellant the due process secured to him by the Fourteenth Amendment. Under our form of government the use of property and the making of contracts are normally matters of private and not of public concern. The general rule is that both shall be free of governmental interference. But neither property rights nor contract rights are absolute; for government cannot exist if the citizen may at will use his property to the detriment of his fellows, or exercise his freedom of contract to work them harm. Equally fundamental with the private right is that of the public to regulate it in the common interest. As Chief Justice Marshall said, speaking specifically of inspection laws, such laws form 'a portion of that immense mass of legislation which embraces everything within the territory of a state, ... all which can be most advantageously exercised by the states themselves. Inspection laws, quarantine laws, health laws of every description, as well as laws for regulating the internal commerce of a state, ... are component parts of this mass.' This court from the early days affirmed that the power to promote the general welfare is inherent in government. Touching the matters committed to it by the Constitution the United States possesses the power, as do the states in their sovereign capacity touching all subjects jurisdiction of which is not surrendered to the federal government, as shown by the quotations above given. These correlative rights, that of the citizen to exercise exclusive dominion over property and freely to contract about his affairs, and that of the state to regulate the use of property and the conduct of business, are always in collision. No exercise of the private right can be imagined which will not in some respect, however slight, affect the public; no exercise of the legislative prerogative to regulate the conduct of the citizen which will not to some extent abridge his liberty or affect his property. But subject only to constitutional restraint the private right must yield to the public need. The Fifth Amendment, in the field of federal activity, and the Fourteenth, as respects state action, do not prohibit governmental regulation for the public welfare. They merely condition the exertion of the admitted power, by securing that the end shall be accomplished by methods consistent with due process. And the guaranty of due process, as has often been held, demands only that the law shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary, or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained. It results that a regulation valid for one sort of business, or in given circumstances, may be invalid for another sort, or for the same business under other circumstances, because the reasonableness of each regulation depends upon the relevant facts. The milk industry in New York has been the subject of long-standing and drastic regulation in the public interest. The legislative investigation of 1932 was persuasive of the fact that for this and other reasons unrestricted competition aggravated existing evils and the normal law of supply and demand was insufficient to correct maladjustments detrimental to the community. The inquiry disclosed destructive and demoralizing competitive conditions and unfair trade practices which resulted in retail price cutting and reduced the income of the farmer below the cost of production. We do not understand the appellant to deny that in these circumstances the Legislature might reasonably consider further regulation and control desirable for protection of the industry and the consuming public. That body believed conditions could be improved by preventing destructive price-cutting by stores which, due to the flood of surplus milk, were able to buy at much lower prices than the larger distributors and to sell without incurring the delivery costs of the latter. In the order of which complaint is made the Milk Control Board fixed a price of 10 cents per
quart for sales by a distributor to a consumer, and 9 cents by a store to a consumer, thus recognizing the lower costs of the store, and endeavoring to establish a differential which would be just to both. In the light of the facts the order appears not to be unreasonable or arbitrary, or without relation to the purpose to prevent ruthless competition from destroying the wholesale price structure on which the farmer depends for his livelihood, and the community for an assured supply of milk. So far as the requirement of due process is concerned, and in the absence of other constitutional restriction, a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its purpose. The courts are without authority either to declare such policy, or, when it is declared by the legislature, to override it. If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect renders a court functus officio. 'Whether the free operation of the normal laws of competition is a wise and wholesome rule for trade and commerce is an economic question which this court need not consider or determine.' And it is equally clear that if the legislative policy be to curb unrestrained and harmful competition by measures which are not arbitrary or discriminatory it does not lie with the courts to determine that the rule is unwise. With the wisdom of the policy adopted, with the adequacy or practicability of the law enacted to forward it, the courts are both incompetent and unauthorized to deal. Tested by these considerations we find no basis in the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment for condemning the provisions of the Agriculture and Markets Law here drawn into question. The judgment is affirmed. Dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS, joined by Mr. Justice VAN DEVANTER, Mr. Justice SUTHERLAND, and Mr. Justice BUTLER. Nebbia v. New York Brief Fact Summary. New York’s Milk Control Board’s price control regulation survived a Constitutional attack because it was not found to be arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably irrelevant to the policy adopted by the legislature. Synopsis of Rule of Law. Price controls that are arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably irrelevant to the policies of the legislature, are unconstitutional because they are unnecessary and unwarranted interferences with individual liberty. Facts. The New York legislature established a Milk Control Board that was vested with the power to “fix minimum and maximum retail prices” for milk sold within the state. Appellant, Mr. Nebbia, an owner of a New York grocery store, was convicted of selling milk for prices in excess of the price set by the Board. Issue. Whether the Constitution prohibits a state from fixing the selling price of milk? Held. No. Judgment affirmed. The production and distribution of milk is a paramount industry of the state and largely affects the health and prosperity of its people. Property rights and contract rights are not absolute in nature and may be subject to limitations. Since the price controls were not “arbitrary, discriminatory, or demonstrably irrelevant” to the policy adopted by the legislature to promote the general welfare, it was consistent with the Constitution. Dissent. This statute not only interferes arbitrarily with the rights of the little grocer to conduct his business, but it also takes away the liberty of twelve million consumers to buy a necessity of life in an open market.
Discussion. This decision marked a significant shift from the Lochner era by reducing the judicial role in scrutinizing the means employed in economic regulations – both in its announced standard that “the means selected shall have a real and substantial relation to the object sought to be attained” and in its examination of the background of the legislation.
Tumey vs. Ohio [273 US 510, 7 March 1927] Taft (CJ): Facts: Tumey was arrested at White Oak, and was brought before Mayor Pugh, of the village of North College Hill, charged with unlawfully possessing intoxicating liquor. He moved for his dismissal because of the disqualification of the mayor to try him under the 14th Amendment. The mayor denied the motion, proceeded to the trial, convicted Tumey of unlawfully possessing intoxicating liquor within Hamilton county as charged, fined him $100, and ordered that he be imprisoned until the fine and costs were paid. Tumey obtained a bill of exceptions and carried the case on error to the court of common pleas of Hamilton county. That court heard the case and reversed the judgment, on the ground that the mayor was disqualified as claimed. The state sought review by the Court of Appeals of the First Appellate District of Ohio, which reversed the common pleas and affirmed the judgment of the mayor. On 4 May 1926, the state Supreme Court refused Tumey’s application to require the Court of Appeals to certify its record in the case. Tumey then filed a petition in error in that court as of right, asking that the judgment of the mayor’s court and of the appellate court be reversed on constitutional grounds. On 11 May 1926, the Supreme Court adjudged that the petition be dismissed for the reason that no debatable constitutional question was involved in the cause. The judgment was then brought to the US Supreme Court upon a writ of error allowed by the Chief Justice of the state Supreme Court, to which it was rightly directed. Issue: Whether the pecuniary interest of the Mayor and his village, and the system of courts in prosecuting violations of the Prohibition Act, renders the mayor disqualified from hearing the case. Held: All questions of judicial qualification may not involve constitutional validity. Thus matters of kinship, personal bias, state policy, remoteness of interest would seem generally to be matters merely of legislative discretion. But it certainly violates the 14th Amendment and deprives a defendant in a criminal case of due process of law to subject his liberty or property to the judgment of a court, the judge of which has a direct, personal, substantial pecuniary interest in reaching a conclusion against him in his case. Herein, the mayor has authority, which he exercised in the case, to order that the person sentenced to pay a fine shall remain in prison until the fine and costs are paid. The mayor thus has a direct personal pecuniary interest in convicting the defendant who came before him for trial, in the $12 of costs imposed in his behalf, which he would not have received if the defendant had been acquitted. This was not exceptional, but was the result of the normal operation of the law and the ordinance. The system by which an inferior judge is paid for his service only when he convicts the defendant has not become so embedded by custom in the general practice, either at common law or in this country, that it can be regarded as due process of law, unless the costs usually imposed are so small that they may be properly ignored as within the maxim de minimis non curat lex. The Court cannot regard the prospect of receipt or loss of such an emolument in each case as a minute, remote, trifling, or insignificant interest. It is certainly not fair to each defendant brought before the mayor for the careful and judicial consideration of his guilt or innocence that the prospect of such a prospective loss by the mayor should weigh against his acquittal. But the pecuniary interest of the mayor in the result of his judgment is not the only reason for holding that due process of law is denied to the defendant here. The statutes were drawn to stimulate small municipalities, in the country part of counties in which there are large cities, to organize and maintain courts to try persons accused of violations of the Prohibition Act everywhere in the county. The inducement is offered of dividing between the state and the village the large fines provided by the law for its violations. The trial is to be had before a mayor without a jury, without opportunity for retrial, and with a review confined to questions of law presented by a bill of exceptions, with no opportunity by the reviewing court to set aside the judgment on the weighing of evidence, unless it should appear to be so manifestly against the evidence as to indicate mistake, bias, or willful disregard of duty by the trial court. Thus, no matter what the evidence was against him, the
defendant had the right to have an impartial judge. He seasonably raised the objection, and was entitled to halt the trial because of the disqualification of the judge, which existed both because of his direct pecuniary interest in the outcome, and because of his official motive to convict and to graduate the fine to help the financial needs of the village. There were thus presented at the outset both features of the disqualification. The judgment of the Supreme Court of Ohio is reserved, and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent with the present opinion. Tumey v. Ohio was a case considered by the United States Supreme Court in 1927. The court struck down an Ohiol aw that denied citizens their constitutionally guaranteed right to due process by financially rewarding public officials for successfully prosecuting cases related to Phohibition. Following the adoption of the Eighteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution in 1919, the Ohio government implemented stringent measures to enforce Prohibition within the state's borders. One law, the Crabbe Act, compensated mayors, justices of the peace, various judges, and other law enforcement officials with additional money beyond their normal pay whenever they arrested, convicted, and fined violators of the Eighteenth Amendment. Many legal officials sought to extend their jurisdiction into nearby cities to arrest and prosecute more violators and to enhance the judges' own paychecks. This particular law became the foundation for Tumey v. Ohio , a case before the United States Supreme Court, in1927. In North College Hill, Ohio, a man was arrested for illegally possessing alcohol, a violation of the Eighteenth Amendment. This man contended that the law compensating officials with additional money for liquor cases violated the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution by depriving him of "due process of law." Attorneys for the accused man claimed that judges were more likely to convict accused people because convictions increased the judges' and other law enforcement officials' salaries. In March 1927, the Supreme Court ruled in favor of the plaintiff over the defendant, the State of Ohio. Upon losing the case before the Supreme Court, the Ohio legislature attempted to enact another law that would compensate judges for hearing additional cases beyond a normal number. It would not matter how the judges ruled in the cases; the state and local governments would guarantee the judges' additional pay. This legislation was never implemented. Ohio voters defeated the measure in a referendum in the autumn of 1927 by a two-to-one advantage. Tumey v. Ohio and the events that resulted from it illustrate the divisions among Ohioans over Prohibition.
ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ [101 PHIL 1155; L-7995; 31 MAY 1957] Facts: Republic Act 1180 or commonly known as “An Act to Regulate the Retail Business” was passed. The said law provides for a prohibition against foreigners as well as corporations owned by foreigners from engaging from retail trade in our country. This was protested by the petitioner in this case. According to him, the said law violates the international and treaty of the Philippines therefore it is unconstitutional. Specifically, the Treaty of Amity between the Philippines and China was violated according to him. Issue: Whether or Not Republic Act 1180 is a valid exercise of police power. Held: According to the Court, RA 1180 is a valid exercise of police power. It was also then provided that police power can not be bargained away through the medium of a treaty or a contract. The Court also provided that RA 1180 was enacted to remedy a real and actual danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and control. If ever the law infringes upon the said treaty, the latter is always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law and the same may never curtain or restrict the scope of the police power of the state.
G.R. Nos. L-68379-8: Evelio Javier vs COMELEC & Arturo Pacificador Due Process – impartial and competent court Javier and Pacificador, a member of the KBL under Marcos, were rivals to be members of the Batasan in May 1984 in Antique. During election, Javier complained of "massive terrorism, intimidation, duress, votebuying, fraud, tampering and falsification of election returns under duress, threat and intimidation, snatching of ballot boxes perpetrated by the armed men of Pacificador." COMELEC just referred the complaints to the AFP. On the same complaint, the 2nd Division of the Commission on Elections directed the provincial board of canvassers of Antique to proceed with the canvass but to suspend the proclamation of the winning candidate until further orders. On June 7, 1984, the same 2nd Division ordered the board to immediately convene and to proclaim the winner without prejudice to the outcome of the case before the Commission. On certiorari before the SC, the proclamation made by the board of canvassers was set aside as premature, having been made before the lapse of the 5-day period of appeal, which the Javier had seasonably made. Javier pointed out that the irregularities of the election must first be resolved before proclaiming a winner. Further, Opinion, one of the Commissioners should inhibit himself as he was a former law partner of Pacificador. Also, the proclamation was made by only the 2nd Division but the Constitute requires that it be proclaimed by the COMELEC en banc. In Feb 1986, during pendency, Javier was gunned down. The Solicitor General then moved to have the petition close it being moot and academic by virtue of Javier’s death. ISSUE: Whether or not there had been due process in the proclamation of Pacificador. HELD: The SC ruled in favor of Javier and has overruled the Sol-Gen’s tenor. The SC has repeatedly and consistently demanded "the cold neutrality of an impartial judge" as the indispensable imperative of due process. To bolster that requirement, we have held that the judge must not only be impartial but must also appear to be impartial as an added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. The litigants are entitled to no less than that. They should be sure that when their rights are violated they can go to a judge who shall give them justice. They must trust the judge, otherwise they will not go to him at all. They must believe in his sense of fairness, otherwise they will not seek his judgment. Without such confidence, there would be no point in invoking his action for the justice they expect. Due process is intended to insure that confidence by requiring compliance with what Justice Frankfurter calls the rudiments of fair play. Fair play calls for equal justice. There cannot be equal justice where a suitor approaches a court already committed to the other party and with a judgment already made and waiting only to be formalized after the litigants shall have undergone the charade of a formal hearing. Judicial (and also extrajudicial) proceedings are not orchestrated plays in which the parties are supposed to make the motions and reach the denouement according to a prepared script. There is no writer to foreordain the ending. The judge will reach his conclusions only after all the evidence is in and all the arguments are filed, on the basis of the established facts and the pertinent law.
Tanada vs. Tuvera 146 s 446 Facts: Petitioners Lorenzo M. Tanada, et. al. invoked due process in demanding the disclosure of a number of Presidential Decrees which they claimed had not been published as required by Law. The government argued that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was otherwise provided, as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon approval. The court decided on April 24, 1985 in affirming the necessity for publication of some of the decrees. The court ordered the respondents to publish in the official gazette all unpublished Presidential Issuances which are of general force and effect. The petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction between laws of general applicability and those which are not. The publication means complete publication, and that publication must be made in the official gazette. In a comment required by the solicitor general, he claimed first that the motion was a request for an advisory opinion and therefore be dismissed. And on the clause “unless otherwise provided” in Article 2 of the new civil code meant that the publication required therein was not always imperative, that the publication when necessary, did not have to be made in the official gazette. Issues: (1) (2)
Whether or not all laws shall be published in the official gazette. Whether or not publication in the official gazette must be in full.
Held: (1)
The court held that all statute including those of local application shall be published as condition for their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature. (2) The publication must be full or no publication at all since its purpose is to inform the public of the content of the laws.
Substantive Due Process Tanada v. Tuvera, 136 S 27 (1985) FACTS: Invoking the people's right to be informed on matters of public concern, a right recognized in the Constitution, as well as the principle that laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the OG or otherwise effectively promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish, and/or cause the publication in the OG of various PDs, LOIs, general orders, proclamations, EOs, letters of implementation and administrative orders. Respondents contend, among others that publication in the OG is not a sine qua non requirement for the effectivity of laws where the laws themselves provide for their own effectivity dates. It is thus submitted that since the presidential issuances in question contain special provisions as to the date they are to take effect, publication in the OG is indispensable for their effectivity. The point stressed is anchored on Art. 2 of NCC. HELD: The interpretation given by respondent is in accord w/ this Court's construction of said article. In a long line of decisions, this Court has ruled that publication in the OG is necessary in those cases where the legislation itself does not provide for its effectivity date-- for then the date of publication is material for determining its date of effectivity, w/c is the 15th day following its publication-- but not when the law itself provides for the date when it goes into effect. Respondent's argument, however, is logically correct only insofar as it equates the effectivity of laws w/ the fact of publication. Considered in the light of other statutes applicable to the issue at hand, the conclusion is easily reached that said Art. 2 does not preclude the requirement of publication in the OG, even if the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. xxx The publication of all presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is mandated by law. The clear object of the law is to give the general public adequate notice of the various
laws w/c are to regulate their actions and conduct as citizens. W/o such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim ignorantia legis non excusat. It would be the height of injustice to punish or otherwise burden a citizen for the transgression of a law of w/c he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one. It is needless to say that the publication of presidential issuances "of a public nature" or "of general applicability" is a requirement of due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and specifically informed of its contents. RAM.
Due Process; Procedural vs. Substantive (1999) No VIII – A. Give examples of acts of the state which infringe the due process clause: 1. in its substantive aspect and (1%) 2. in its procedural aspect? (1%) SUGGESTED ANSWER: 1.) A law violates substantive due process when it is unreasonable or unduly oppressive. For example, Presidential Decree No. 1717, which cancelled all the mortgages and liens of a debtor, was considered unconstitutional for being oppressive. Likewise, as stated in Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. v. City Mayor of Manila, 20 SCRA 849, a law which is vague so that men of common intelligence must guess at its meaning and differ as to its application violates substantive due process. As held in Tanada v. Tuvera, 146 SCRA 446, due process requires that the law be published. 2.) In State Prosecutors v. Muro, 236 SCRA 505, it was held that the dismissal of a case without the benefit of a hearing and without any notice to the prosecution violated due process. Likewise, as held in People v. Court of Appeals, 262 SCRA 452, the lack of impartiality of the judge who will decide a case violates procedural due process.
