Constitutional Law II: Due Process Mayor Bayani Alonte vs Judge Maximo Savellano, NBI & People of the Philippines Due Process in Criminal Proceedings – Waiver of Right to Due Process FACTS: Alonte was accused of raping JuvieLyn Punongbayan with accomplice Buenaventura Concepcion. It was alleged that Concepcion befriended Juvie and had later lured her into Alonete’s house who was then the mayor of Biňan, Laguna. The case was brought before RTC Biňan. The counsel and the prosecutor later moved for a change of venue due to alleged intimidation. While the change of venue was pending, Juvie executed an affidavit of desistance. The prosecutor continued on with the case and the change of venue was done notwithstanding opposition from Alonte. The case was raffled to the Manila RTC under J Savellano. Savellano later found probable cause and had ordered the arrest of Alonte and Concepcion. Thereafter, the prosecution presented Juvie and had attested the voluntariness of her desistance the same being due to media pressure and that they would rather establish new life elsewhere. Case was then submitted for decision and Savellano sentenced both accused to reclusion perpetua. Savellano commented that Alonte waived his right to due process when he did not cross examine Juvie when clarificatory questions were raised about the details of the rape and on the voluntariness of her desistance. ISSUE: Whether or not Alonte has been denied criminal due process. HELD: The SC ruled that Savellano should inhibit himself from further deciding on the case due to animosity between him and the parties. There is no showing that Alonte waived his right. The standard of waiver requires that it “not only must be voluntary, but must be knowing, intelligent, and done with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” Mere silence of the holder of the right should not be so construed as a waiver of right, and the courts must indulge every reasonable
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presumption against waiver. Savellano has not shown impartiality by repeatedly not acting on numerous petitions filed by Alonte. The case is remanded to the lower court for retrial and the decision earlier promulgated is nullified. NOTES: Due process in criminal proceedings (a) that the court or tribunal trying the case is properly clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter before it; (b) that jurisdiction is lawfully acquired by it over the person of the accused; (c) that the accused is opportunity to be heard; and
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(d) that judgment is rendered only upon lawful hearing. Section 3, Rule 119, of the Rules of Court “Sec. 3. Order of trial. The trial shall proceed in the following order: “(a) The prosecution shall present evidence to prove the charge and, in the proper case, the civil liability. “(b) The accused may present evidence to prove his defense, and damages, if any, arising from the issuance of any provisional remedy in the case. “(c) The parties may then respectively present rebutting evidence only, unless the court, in furtherance of justice, permits them to present additional evidence bearing upon the main issue. “(d) Upon admission of the evidence, the case shall be deemed submitted for decision unless the court directs the parties to argue orally or to submit memoranda. “(e) However, when the accused admits the act or omission charged in the complaint or information but interposes a
Constitutional Law II: Due Process lawful defense, the order of trial may be modified accordingly.” Aniag vs. Commission on Elections [GR 104961, 7 October 1994] En Banc, Bellosillo (J): 6 concur, 3 on leave Facts: In preparation for the synchronized national and local elections scheduled on 11 May 1992, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) issued on 11 December 1991 Resolution 2323 (”Gun Ban”), promulgating rules and regulations on bearing, carrying and transporting of firearms or other deadly weapons, on security personnel or bodyguards, on bearing arms by members of security agencies or police organizations, and organization or maintenance of reaction forces during the election period. Subsequently, on 26 December 1991 COMELEC issued Resolution 2327 providing for the summary disqualification of candidates engaged in gunrunning, using and transporting of firearms, organizing special strike forces, and establishing spot checkpoints. On 10 January 1992, pursuant to the “Gun Ban,” Mr. Serapio P. Taccad, Sergeant-at-Arms, House of Representatives, wrote Congressman Francisc B. Aniag Jr., who was then Congressman of the 1st District of Bulacan requesting the return of the 2 firearms issued to him by the House of Representatives. Upon being advised of the request on 13 January 1992 by his staff, Aniag immediately instructed his driver, Ernesto Arellano, to pick up the firearms from his house at Valle Verde and return them to Congress. Meanwhile, at about 5:00 p,.m. of the same day, the Philippine National Police (PNP) headed by Senior Superintendent Danilo Cordero set up a checkpoint outside the Batasan Complex some 20 meters away from its entrance. About 30 minutes later, the policemen manning the outpost flagged down the car driven by Arellano as it approached the checkpoint. They searched the car and found the firearms neatly packed in their gun cases and placed in a bag in the trunk of the car. Arellano was then apprehended and detained. He explained
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that he was ordered by Aniag to get the firearms from the house and return them to Sergeant-at Arms Taccad of the House of Representatives. Thereafter, the police referred Arellano’s case to the Office of the City Prosecutor for inquest. The referral did not include Aniag as among those charged with an election offense. On 15 January 1992, the City Prosecutor ordered the release of Arellano after finding the latter’s sworn explanation meritorious. On 28 January 1992, the City Prosecutor invited Aniag to shed light on the circumstances mentioned in Arellano’s sworn explanation. Aniag not only appeared at the preliminary investigation to confirm Arellano’s statement but also wrote the City Prosecutor urging him to exonerate Arellano. He explained that Arellano did not violate the firearms ban as he in fact was complying with it when apprehended by returning the firearms to Congress; and, that he was Aniag’s driver, not a security officer nor a bodyguard. On 6 March 1992, the Office of the City Prosecutor issued a resolution which, among other matters, recommended that the case against Arellano be dismissed and that the “unofficial” charge against Aniag be also dismissed. Nevertheless, on 6 April 1992, upon recommendation of its Law Department, COMELEC issued Resolution 92-0829 directing the filing of information against Aniag and Arellano for violation of Sec. 261, par. (q), of BP 881 otherwise known as the Omnibus Election Code, in relation to Sec. 32 of RA 7166; and Aniag to show cause why he should not be disqualified from running for an elective position, pursuant to COMELEC Resolution 2327, in relation to Secs. 32, 33 and 35 of RA 7166, and Sec. 52, par. (c), of BP 881. On 13 April 1992, Aniag moved for reconsideration and to hold in abeyance the administrative proceedings as well as the filing of the information in court. On 23 April 1992, the COMELEC denied Aniag’s motion for reconsideration. Aniag filed a petition for
Constitutional Law II: Due Process declaratory relief, certiorari prohibition against the COMELEC.
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Issue: Whether the search of Aniag’s car that yielded the firarms which were to be returned to the House of Representatives within the purview of the exception as to the search of moving vehicles. Held: As a rule, a valid search must be authorized by a search warrant duly issued by an appropriate authority. However, this is not absolute. Aside from a search incident to a lawful arrest, a warrantless search had been upheld in cases of moving vehicles and the seizure of evidence in plain view, as well as the search conducted at police or military checkpoints which we declared are not illegal per se, and stressed that the warrantless search is not violative of the Constitution for as long as the vehicle is neither searched nor its occupants subjected to a body search, and the inspection of the vehicle is merely limited to a visual search. As there was no evidence to show that the policemen were impelled to do so because of a confidential report leading them to reasonably believe that certain motorists matching the description furnished by their informant were engaged in gunrunning, transporting firearms or in organizing special strike forces. Nor was there any indication from the package or behavior of Arellano that could have triggered the suspicion of the policemen. Absent such justifying circumstances specifically pointing to the culpability of Aniag and Arellano, the search could not be valid. The action then of the policemen unreasonably intruded into Aniag’s privacy and the security of his property, in violation of Sec. 2, Art. III, of the Constitution. Consequently, the firearms obtained in violation of Aniag’s right against warrantless search cannot be admitted for any purpose in any proceeding. PHILCOMSAT VS ANIAG. FACTS:
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• By virtue of R.A No. 5514, philcomsat was granted a franchise to establish, construct, maintain and operate in the Philippines, at such places the grantee may select, station or stations and or associated equipment andinternational satellite communications. under this franchise, it was likewise granted the authority to "construct and operate such ground facilities as needed to deliver telecommunications Services from the communications satellite system and the ground terminals. • The satellite service thus provided by petitioner enable international carriers to serve the public with indespensible communications service • Under sec. 5 of RA 5514, petitioner was exempt from the jurisdiction of the then Public Service commission. Now respondent NTC • Pursuant EO 196 petitioner was placed under the jurisdiction and control and regulation of the respondent NTC • Respondent NTC ordered the petitoner to apply for the requisite certificate of public convenience and necessity covering its facilities and the services it renders, as well as the corresponding authority to charge rates •September 9, 1987, pending hearing, petitioner filed with the NTC an application to continue operating andmaintaining its facilities including a provisional authorityto continue to provide the services and the charges it wasthen charging •September 16, 1988 the petitioner was granted a provisional authority and was valid for 6 months, when the provisional authority expired, it was extended for another6 months. •However the NTC directed the petitioner to charge modified reduced
Constitutional Law II: Due Process rates through a reduction of 15% on the authorized rates Issues: 1. WON EO 546 and EO 196 are unconstitutional on the ground that the same do not fix a standard for the excercise of the power therein conferred? NO 2. WON the questioned order violates Due process because it was issued without notice to petitioner and without the benefit of a hearing? YES 3. WON the rate reduction is confiscatory in that its implementation would virtually result in a cessation of its opeartions and eventual closure of business? YES Held: a. Fundamental is the rule that delegation of legislative power may be sustained only upon the ground that some standard for its exercise is provided and that the legislature in making the delegation has prescribed manner of the exercise of the delegated power. Therefore, when the administrative agency concerned, respondent NTC in this case, establishes a rarte, its act must be both nonconfiscatory and must have been established in the manner prescribed by the legislature; otherwise , in the absence of a fixed standard, the delegation of power becomes unconstitutional. In case of a delegation ofrate-fixing power, the only standard which the legislature is required to prescribe for the guidance of the administrative authority is that the rate be reasonable and just . However, it has been held that even in the absence of an express requirement as to reasonableness, this standard may be implied. b) under Sec. 15 EO 546 and Sec. 16 thereof, Respondent NTC, in the exercise of its rate-fixing power, is limited by the requirements of public safety, public interest, reasonable feasibility and reasonable rates, which conjointly more
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than satisfy the requirements of a valid delegation of legislative power. 2.a)The function involved in the rate fixing power of the NTC is adjudicatory and hence quasi-judicial, not quasi legislative; thus hearings are necessary and the abscence thereof results in the violation of due process. b)The Central Bank of the Philippines vs. Cloribal " In so far sa generalization is possible in view of the great variety of administrative proceedings, it may be stated as a general rule that the notice and hearing are not essential to the validity of administrative action where the administrative body acts in the excercise of executive, administrative, or legislative functions; but where public adminitrative body acts in a judicial or quasi-judicial matter, and its acts ar eparticular and immediate rather than general and prospective, the person whos rights or property may be affected by the action is entitiled to notice and hearing" c)Even if respondents insist that notice of hearing are not necessary since the assailed order is merely incidental to the entire proceedings and therefore temporary in nature, it is still mot exempt from the statutory procedural requirements of notice and hearing as well as the requirement o reasonableness. d.) it is thus clear that with regard to rate-fixing, respondent has no authority to make such order without first giving petitioner a hearing, whether the order the be temporary or permanent, and it is immaterial wheter the same is made upon a complaint, a summary investigation, or upon the comissions own motion. 3. a.) What the petitioner has is a grant or privilege granted by the State and may revoke it at will there is no question in that, however such grant cannot be
Constitutional Law II: Due Process unilaterally revoked absent a showing that the termination of the opeartion of said utility is required by common good. The rule is that the power of the State to regulate the conduct and business of public utilities is limited by the consideration that it is not the owner of the property of the utility, or clothed with the general power of management incident to ownership, since the private right of ownership to such property remains and is not to be destroyed by the regulatory power. The power to regulate is not the power to destroy useful and harmless enterprises, but is the power to protect, foster, promote, preserve, and control with due regard for the interest, first and foremost, of the public, then of the utility and its patrons. any regulation, therefore, which operates as an effective confiscation of private property or constitutes an arbitrary or unreasonable infringerement of property rights is void, because it is repugnant to the constitutional guaranties of due process and equal protection of the laws. b.)A cursory persual of the assailed order reveals that the rate reduction is solely and primarily based on the initial evaluation made on the financial statements of petitioner, contrary to respondent NTC's allegation that it has several other sources. Further more, it did not as much as make an attempt to elaborate on how it arrived at the prescribed rates. It just perfunctorily declared that based on the financial statements, there is merit for a ratereduction without any elucidation on what implifications and conclutions were necessariy inferred by it from said staements. Nor did it deign to explain how the datareflected in the financial statements influenced its decision to impose rate reduction.
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c.) The challenged order, particularly on the rates provided therein, being violative of the due process clause is void and should be nullified. Ang Tibay vs Industrial Relations
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Due Process – Admin Bodies – CIR FACTS: Teodoro Toribio owns and operates Ang Tibay a leather company which supplies the Philippine Army. Due to alleged shortage of leather, Toribio caused the lay off of members of National Labor Union Inc. NLU averred that Toribio’s act is not valid as it is not within the CBA. That there are two labor unions in Ang Tibay; NLU and National Worker’s Brotherhood. That NWB is dominated by Toribio hence he favors it over NLU. That NLU wishes for a new trial as they were able to come up with new evidence/documents that they were not able to obtain before as they were inaccessible and they were not able to present it before in the CIR. ISSUE: Whether or not there has been a due process of law. HELD: The SC ruled that there should be a new trial in favor of NLU. The SC ruled that all administrative bodies cannot ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process. They are; (1) The right to a hearing which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. (2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. (3) While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having
Constitutional Law II: Due Process something to support its decision. A decision with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached. (4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion but the evidence must be “substantial.” Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. (5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. (6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. (7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the vario issues involved, and the reasons for the decisions rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it. ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY VS. HON. JUDGE IGNACIO CAPULONG [222 SCRA 644; G.R. 99327; 27 MAY 1993] Facts: Leonardo H. Villa, a first year law student of Petitioner University, died of serious physical injuries at Chinese General Hospital after the initiation rites of Aquila Legis. Bienvenido Marquez was also hospitalized at the Capitol Medical Center for acute renal failure occasioned by the serious physical injuries inflicted upon him on the same occasion. Petitioner Dean Cynthia del Castillo created a Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee which was tasked
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to investigate and submit a report within 72 hours on the circumstances surrounding the death of Lennie Villa. Said notice also required respondent students to submit their written statements within twenty-four (24) hours from receipt. Although respondent students received a copy of the written notice, they failed to file a reply. In the meantime, they were placed on preventive suspension. The Joint Administration-Faculty-Student Investigating Committee, after receiving the written statements and hearing the testimonies of several witness, found a prima facie case against respondent students for violation of Rule 3 of the Law School Catalogue entitled "Discipline." Respondent students were then required to file their written answers to the formal charge. Petitioner Dean created a Disciplinary Board to hear the charges against respondent students. The Board found respondent students guilty of violating Rule No. 3 of the Ateneo Law School Rules on Discipline which prohibits participation in hazing activities. However, in view of the lack of unanimity among the members of the Board on the penalty of dismissal, the Board left the imposition of the penalty to the University Administration. Accordingly, Fr. Bernas imposed the penalty of dismissal on all respondent students. Respondent students filed with RTC Makati a TRO since they are currently enrolled. This was granted. A TRO was also issued enjoining petitioners from dismissing the respondents. A day after the expiration of the temporary restraining order, Dean del Castillo created a Special Board to investigate the charges of hazing against respondent students Abas and Mendoza. This was requested to be stricken out by the respondents and argued that the creation of the Special Board was totally unrelated to the original petition which alleged lack of due process. This was granted and reinstatement of the students was ordered. Issue: Was there denial of due process against the respondent
Constitutional Law II: Due Process students. Held: There was no denial of due process, more particularly procedural due process. Dean of the Ateneo Law School, notified and required respondent students to submit their written statement on the incident. Instead of filing a reply, respondent students requested through their counsel, copies of the charges. The nature and cause of the accusation were adequately spelled out in petitioners' notices. Present is the twin elements of notice and hearing. Respondent students argue that petitioners are not in a position to file the instant petition under Rule 65 considering that they failed to file a motion for reconsideration first before the trial court, thereby by passing the latter and the Court of Appeals. It is accepted legal doctrine that an exception to the doctrine of exhaustion of remedies is when the case involves a question of law, as in this case, where the issue is whether or not respondent students have been afforded procedural due process prior to their dismissal from Petitioner University. Minimum standards to be satisfied in the imposition of disciplinary sanctions in academic institutions, such as petitioner university herein, thus: (1) the students must be informed in writing of the nature and cause of any accusation against them; (2) that they shall have the right to answer the charges against them with the assistance of counsel, if desired: (3) they shall be informed of the evidence against them (4) they shall have the right to adduce evidence in their own behalf; and (5) the evidence must be duly considered by the investigating committee or official designated by the school authorities to hear and decide the case.
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