VIGAN ELECTRIC ELECTRIC LIGHT COMPANY, COMPANY, INC. vs. THE PUBLIC PUBLIC SERVICE SERVICE COMMISSION G.R. No. L-19850 January 30, 1964 FACTS: FACTS: This is an origin original al action action for certio certiorar rarii to annul annul an order order of respondent Public Service Commission ordering the reduction of rates of Vigan Electric Electric Light Co. PSC averred averred that Vigan Electric Electric making a net operating profit in excess of the allowable return of 12% on its invested capital, and that it is in the public interest and in consonance with Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3043 that reduction of its rates to the extent of its excess revenue be put into effect immediately. Vigan Electric contended that the reduction of rate is unconstitutional because it has been ordered without notice and hearing, thus issued without due process of law. In defense, PSC maintains maintains that rate-fixin rate-fixing g is a legislati legislative ve function; function; that legislati legislative ve or rulemaking powers may constitutionally be exercised without previous notice of hearing; and that the decision in Ang Tibay vs. Court of Industrial Relations (69 Phil., 635) — in which we held that such notice and hearing are essential to the validity of a decision of the Public Service Commission — is not in point because, unlike the order complained of — which respondent claims to be legislative in nature — the Ang Tibay case referred to a proceeding involving the exercise of judicial functions. ISSUE: Whether or not the Congress validly delegated legislative power to the PSC? HELD: HELD: No. Congress has not delegated, delegated, and cannot cannot delegate delegate legislative legislative powers to the Public Service Commission. Consistently with the principle of separation of powers, which underlies our constitutional system, legislative powers powers may not be delegated delegated except except to local local governmen governments, ts, and only to matter matters s purely purely of local local concer concern. n. Howev However, er, Congre Congress ss may delega delegate te to administrative agencies of the government the power to supply the details in the execution or enforcement of a policy laid down by it which is complete in itself. Such law is not deemed complete unless it lays down a standard or pattern sufficiently fixed or determinate, or, at least, determinable without requiring another legislation, to guide the administrative body concerned in the performance of its duty to implement or enforce said Policy. Otherwise, there would be no reasonable means to ascertain whether or not said body has acted within the scope of its authority, and, as a consequence, the power of legislation would eventually be exercised by a branch of the Government other than thatin which it is lodged by the Constitution, in violation, not only of the allocation of powers therein made, but, also, of the principle of separation of powers. Although the rule-making power and even the power to fix rates — when such rules and/or rates are meant to apply to all enterprises of a given given kind kind throug throughou houtt the Philip Philippin pines es — may partak partake e of a legisl legislati ative ve character, such is not the nature of the order complained of. Indeed, the same applies exclusively to petitioner herein. What is more, it is predicated upon the finding of fact — based upon a report submitted by the General Auditing Office — that petitioner is making a profit of more than 12% of its invested capital, which is denied by petitioner. Obviously, the latter is entitled
to cross-examine the maker of said report, and to introduce evidence to disprove the contents thereof and/or explain or complement the same, as well as to refute the conclusion drawn therefrom by the respondent. In other words ords,, in maki making ng said said find findin ing g of fact fact,, resp respon onde dent nt perf perfor orme med d a functionpartaking of a quasi-judicial character the valid exercise of which demands previous notice and hearing. NHA V. PASCUAL G.R. No. 158364
November 28, 2007
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 2616 was enacted providing for the expropriation of the Tatalon Estate and the sale of the lots to present bonafide occupants. Therea Thereafte fter, r, the Natio National nal Housi Housing ng Author Authority ity (NHA) (NHA) was desig designat nated ed as administrator of the Tatalon Estate Housing Project by virtue of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1261. Pursuant thereto, petitioner NHA awarded in 1983 Lot 3, Block 12 of the Tatalon Estate Urban Bliss Project (TEUBP) to Dolores Marana Maranan, n, since since she was includ included ed in the 1958 1958 Aranet Araneta a Censu Census s List List of Occupants. On May 25, 1983, a Transfer Notice was given to Maranan and a Deed of Sale with Mortgage was executed on May 31, 1983. The Register of Deeds of Quezon City issued TCT No. 303230 in favor of Maranan. Respondent Pascual however, assailed the award of the subject lot to Maranan by filing a letter-complaint before the General Manager of NHA, alleging that she is the rightful beneficiary of the said lot being the actual occupant thereof and for having resided in the Tatalon Estate since 1968. The Inspector General of NHA recommended to the General Manager that the subject lot be awarded to Pascual considering that she was included in the 1976 1976 Census Census and her house structur structure e appear appeared ed in the aerial aerial photo.8 On the other hand, the Project Manager recommended to award the lot to Maranan and to transfer respondent to an inner lot. The General Manager Manager sustaine sustained d the position position of the Project Project Manager to award the lot to Maranan and to relocate respondent to an inner lot and dismissed respondent’s complaint for lack of merit. Respondent appealed to the Office of the President. President. In its 1st Indorseme Indorsement, nt, NHA maintained maintained the propriety of the award of the lot to Maranan. The Presidential Staff Director of the Malacañang Public Assistance Center wrote a letter to the General Manager of NHA to reconsider the case of respon responden dentt in view view of the allega allegatio tions ns that that Marana Maranan n was was an absent absentee ee awardee. The Public Complaints Assistance and Action Center reviewed the case and recommended that respondent be awarded another front lot to settle the matter. Pascual filed a Complaint for declaration declaration of nullity, reconveyance,
NHA, Maranan, Canedo, and the Register of Deeds of Quezon City. She prayed for the declaration of nullity of the award of the subject lot to Maranan; declaration of nullity of the issuance of TCT No. 303230 in the name of Maranan; reconveyance of the subject lot; and for payment of damages. the trial court rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner. Respondent’s motion for reconsideration was denied hence, she appealed the case to the Court of Appeals THEN issued the assailed Decision setting aside the Decision of the trial court. The NHA filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution. Hence, the instant petition for review on certiorari ISSUE: whether the award of the subject lot to Dolores Maranan can still be nullified and set aside by the courts. HELD: It is well-established in our jurisprudence that the decisions and orders of administrative agencies, rendered pursuant to their quasi-judicial authority, have upon their finality, the force and binding effect of a final judgment within the purview of the doctrine of res judicata.25 In the case at bar, since petitioner’s decision was seasonably appealed by respondent, the same has not attained finality and the principle of res judicata does not apply. Consequently, the ruling of the trial court dismissing respondent’s complaint on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies must be reversed. Respondent correctly resorted to the remedy of appeal to the Office of the President and obtained a favorable decision therefrom. Nevertheless, petitioner failed to reconsider and review, as directed by the Office of the President, the qualification and/or disqualification of respondent and Dolores Maranan. The record is bereft of any evidence that petitioner reviewed the qualification of Maranan and issued a ruling thereon. Instead of correcting its own lapse or mistake by reviewing the case, particularly on the qualifications of the intended beneficiaries, it sustained its decision by conducting several conferences and hearings for a possible swapping of homelots between the parties.
