The Things That Were To Make Our Lives Easy: Technology Reconsidered
James Michael Iddins
“In a technological age, to be sure, any proposal to bracket the world of artifacts will inevitably sound suspect, as a nostalgic romanticism longing for a return to a simpler world that never was – and not without reason. There is something disingenuous about Thoreau’s retreat to Walden Pond, a condescending self-righteousness...” -Erazim Kohak
2
Technology critic Jerry Mander (Mander , 1978) claims that, contrary to popular belief, technologies are not simply neutral tools that may be used for better or for worse by individuals and institutions. More precisely, he makes two distinct claims: first, that technology in general embodies a certain philosophical worldview, and second, that each particular technology adds yet another layer of philosophical presuppositions to the technological worldview, further determining our perceptions of the world and the philosophies under which we operate on a daily basis. My aim in this paper is to test Mander’s unexamined, seemingly extreme, conclusions. The question of whether or not n ot a technology embodies or entails a worldview has bearing on our lives even if we believe it has none. Ayn Rand (Rand, 1984, 5-12) points out that either we become a student of philosophy and thereby enable ourselves to consciously choose a set of philosophical principles or we default to the somewhat random conglomeration of beliefs and behaviors which are daily sold to us in one form or another. While there is also the question of the extent to which aspects of rational choice might come under scrutiny (via the nature/nurture continuum), we may presume that, for our purposes, it is generally helpful to know more rather than less about the processes through which one comes to incorporate ideas into his or her worldview and make sense of the world. Friends, family, acquaintances, and various institutions all come into our orbit toting their philosophical principles, sometimes overtly and sometimes in stealth. Often, we must dig to discover what axioms or fundamental principles if any these people and institutions hold to be true. Further complicating the matter is the fact that people often claim one set of principles for their social or implied selves, but upon investigation we find that a more subtle set of principles (or lack thereof) lurks behind this facade. In our search for an accurate philosophical p hilosophical picture of
3 any basis of behavior, technological or otherwise, we must take into account not only the spoken word, but more importantly actual lived behavior. The true test as to anyone’s worldview is to watch how they live. While we are not always conscious of the philosophical belief systems that govern our behavior, our behavior carries belief with it nonetheless. Often we rationalize behavior that if put in a logical philosophical context would prove ridiculous. Rand’s po int is that in educating ourselves about philosophy, we in large part free ourselves from what otherwise might come to be a random assortment of contradictory, meaningless, or misdirected beliefs and behavior. It is important to note that philosophical belief systems might not necessarily guide behavior per se, but that in studying philosophy we use these categories of belief so we might come to understand the logical conclusions inherent in certain patterns of thought and behavior. I assume, along with Rand, that having a logically consistent philosophy about the world helps one und erstand the world and form beliefs that lead to meaningful behavior. As novelist William Gibson observes (Neale, 2001), “What I am most aware of is the extent to which people are unaware of the extent to which they’ve been interpenetrated and coopted by their technology.” He notes that our technologies are often so close to us that we fail to realize how they have actually become a part of us. While this is certainly true of technology in general and a number of specific technologies, there are definitely those technologies that a re options, which can be adopted or discarded. I am concerned with testing Mander’s claims in all three of these categories: first, with regard to technology in general; second, with regard to an example of a specific technology which has become “part of us”, and which we therefore use largely unconsciously; and, finally, with regard to an example of an optional technology, which we may use at our discretion. Through this analysis, I hope to learn how each aspect of
4 technology influences or has the potential to influence our individual behavior and American Culture more broadly.
Technology in General Technology as a cultural force, especially in its modern industrial manifestation, has an underlying essence and logic from which all else flows. Particularly helpful to us in attempting to extract the essence of any cultural phenomenon is a discussion of the notion of worldview. Ludwig von Mises discusses this term and its relationship to human a ction: If we look at all the theorems and theories guiding the conduct of certain individuals and groups as a coherent complex and try to arrange them as far as is feasible into a system, i.e., a comprehensive body of knowledge, we may speak of it as a worldview. A worldview is, as a theory, an interpretation of all things, and as a precept for action, an opinion concerning the best means for removing uneasiness as much as possible. (Human Action, 177, emphasis mine). I emphasize “interpretation” and “opinion” because they point to a crucial distinction, which we must take into account if we are to gain a clear understanding of technology and its relationship to our culture and our individual lives. It is important to realize that what I will describe as “the technological worldview” is one worldview among many and that it is, in fact, a fairly recent development, though it’s seeds lie in earlier ages. The technological worldview comes to describe a comprehensive core philosophy from which we draw conclusions about reality and comes to recommend to us a specific type of rationality – the technological rationality. Most often this worldview, like all others, is adopted unconsciously and from a young age. In his work One-Dimensional Man, Herbert Marcuse convincingly shows how the origin of the technological worldview dates back to the time when man began to quantify nature. He notes that at this point reality was separated from all inherent ends. The true was separated from the good. Science was necessarily separated from ethics. From this initial quantification of nature
5 by a few individuals, the seeds were planted for what has become the dominant worldview in the western world. Marcuse goes on to say that the more values were separated from objective reality, the more subjective they became and the more they needed some kind of either metaphysical or practical sanction to make them seem valid. This seems to be the only way values, which do not themselves refer to the technological worldview, might come to coexist with the technological rationality, thus replacing visible phenomena with purely mental operations. Since quantification, the world is no longer seen as it is, but as it could be. Roles were reversed. Nature, which had traditionally grounded humans came to be grounded in the human mind. Values which were previously seen as inherent to objects became relative to what the human mind could imagine. The quantification of nature, which brings it largely under human control, transforms physical reality into a mere extension of the human mind. This shift marks the birth of the technological worldview an d continues to be its most distinguishable characteristic. Marcuse then delves further into how the technological rationality comes to subjectify objective reality. He says that all modern science, with the possible exception of basic geometry, suspends judgment on what reality itself might be, thus freeing itself from commitment to any substance outside its operational context. It seems from this conclusion we move to the assumption that the only value we may assign to physical reality is how functional the onceobjective reality can become in any given context. As Marcuse shows, the technological rationality does not look to nature for its purpose or end, but presupposes a godlike experience of and mastery over physical reality. He puts this fact most succinctly: “The science of nature develops under the technological a priori which projects nature as possible instrumentality, stuff of control and organization (153).” This assumption comes before any particular technical
6 organization or development (specific technologies) and even goes so far as to “project a historical totality” or comprehensive worldview that is independent of physical reality. As a mental projection, this worldview is purely a subjective mental phen omenon. Marcuse notes that the technological worldview and the rationality that springs from it are themselves extensions of the logic of domination and mastery, which has been present in the world throughout written history. He makes the claim that the technological transformation of nature merely shifts the base of domination already present in various social systems. Rather than the serf being dependent on the lord, we all become dependent on the market and its whims. By necessity, a society which begins to focus on the quantification of nature and starts to develop various technological innovations to master nature starts down a road of dependence on those very technologies and their means of procurement. As these productive energies shift, the social systems associated with the old forms of domination begin to prove themselves ineffectual when placed in competition with new technologies. While Marcuse seems to view this new form of domination negatively (presumably because it is still domination of human be ings), it seems the results are far more ambiguous and hard to classify than the earlier forms of domination. It seems the impersonal nature of this new form of domination and the widespread options it spawned changed the nature of the domination so much that people find it much more palatable, so much so that they no longer view it as domination. Regardless, we may say that for the time being this less personal form of domination has won out. For better or worse, it seems that human social institutions exchanged personal domination for economic and bureaucratic domination. Since the rise of this technological system, humans are subject to the whims of individuals like the Chairman of the Federal Reserve and various other government and private organizations rather than kings, queens, lords, and chiefs.
7 Marcuse perhaps illustrates for us most clearly how the worldview with which one comes to the table predetermines our relationship to nature. Without the existence of a worldview, we find it difficult to make meaning out of reality. Without this meaning-making, any action we may take is either completely and utterly random or, at the very least, simply impulsive. As Americans, we are in large part products of the technological worldview. Once we have incorporated into ourselves a worldview, we may then use the meaning we have made as the basis for further decision and action. It is important to realize how our conception of reality is based on a set of assumptions. If we realize this, then we may from time to time reconsider how much these assumptions correspond to reality and, if possible, dispense with those that no longer make sense in this “new light” or work for us any longer. This awareness is extremely important given the tendency of so many to accept their created, learned or educated worldviews as absolute. Presumably many problems they encounter lie primarily in this assumption that their worldview is the only one or the best one. Equally valuable as an awareness of one’s particular worldview is an awareness of how one’s culture functions within that worldview. There are always various ideological and individual differences that come to crystallize in one form or another in any given culture. Once one has this knowledge in mind, he or she may come to understand why certain characteristics of a society develop as they do. Particularly of interest in this investigation are observations that relate to a culture’s use of technology. Sociologist Georg Simmel takes o n this aspect of modern culture. As Todd Gitlin explains, Simmel argues that “People treat other people, as well as things in a utilitarian fashion, and ‘money is the most extreme example of means becoming an end’” (37). From this point, Gitlin shows that since we function in the context of a money economy,
8 one can only make the most of his or her situation if he or she comes to think categorically and to hone his or her skills of calculation. Gitlin argues that this excessive utilitarian focus on calculation not on ly represses emotion and sentiment, but leads to our pursuit of disposable feelings and disposable sentiment, which fit easily into our heavily rationalized and routinized society (41). Have an hour in between meetings? Turn on the radio or TV. Browse the Internet. Call a friend. With the ON/OFF switch always within our reach, emotions begin to come largely under our control (so we think) and mesh perfectly with our schedules and utilitarian calculation. Since we can never develop complete control over our emotions, these same mediums provide distraction from this fact. If the modern age of calculation produced a culture devoted to sentiment, the object of our devotion then begins to determine what types of technology we invest both time an d money toward. While our focus on earning money is highly utilitarian, our focus on spending that money once our basic needs are met becomes largely a function of our emotions repressed in the process of calculation. So we come to discover that generally speaking: the human element + the technological worldview = excessive calculation and repressed emotion, which in turn = technologies devoted to the exploitation of emotion and sentiment. Evidence of this fact is present in all the elaborate psychological research commissioned by professionals involved in marketing any number of products1.
Mandatory Technologies and Philosophical Implications Just as a technological culture is the product of a very specific worldview, specific technologies are the products of particular philosophies within that worldview. Perhaps even more important than this realization is the knowledge that regardless of the philosophies under 1
For a current example of this trend in marketing see the work of Clotaire Rapaille and Archetype Discoveries Worldwide.
9 which certain technologies are conceived, their hardware and software either entail a philosophy or at the very least have inherent philosophical biases. Contrary to popular belief, there is no such thing as a neutral technology. As Jerry Mander points out (Mander, 1991), when it comes to the use of some technologies, we could hardly consider our interaction with them a choice (if we plan on continuing to coexist with others in our current social context). Once a technology has not only become a social norm, but become a necessary pre-requisite to securing our daily well-being, we may definitely consider this technology mandatory. The technology of the clock is a perfect example because it undergirds almost every technology to follow. This technology enables men to coordinate their actions in such a way never seen before its appearance on the social stage. The modern money system and the clock work together to form the basis of all modern social and economic activity. The clock, even more than the modern money system though, frames our lives through the technological worldview from the time we rise to the time we sleep. In the novel, The Surrounded, Darcy McNickle provides a beautiful context in which he can address the clashing worldviews of the Native American and the American settler. This clashing of the traditional Native American ways with the technological worldview is a subplot of the entire novel, but one of the most striking statements is perhaps what is said from the Native American side regarding the clock: “The clock was a new thing and, small as it was, it was mighty. It made a man march around. A woman marched too” (72). I believe this statement captures the essence of what it would feel like to encounter for the first time a technology so radically different in its approach to life that it made men behave differently. This technology is not merely just a logical extension of the technological worldview. It adds quite a gigantic layer of philosophy to the worldview. Just as nature is viewed as raw material with virtually unlimited
10 creative potential, time, rather than being limited by the ebb and flow of nature, is seen as yet another realm of life that can be quantized and thus further capitalized upon. The clock is one of the most powerful technologies of the modern and post-modern eras. It is a tool for social control and co-coordinating the actions of men, just as printed currency, the legalistic bureaucracy, and the modern media. Perhaps the clock even makes these latter three possible. Occasionally we hear the phrase, “Time is money.” In fact, this seems to be the mantra to which American Society (for the most part) subscribes at least five days out o f the week. If we go with Georg Simmel’s pointed analysis, we see that anything up on which a dollar amount is placed is accordingly lessened in value. High or low moral ideals mean only as much as the money each will earn in any given situation when this is done. As Max Weber points out, the protestant ethic meshed very nicely with modern capitalism and because of this has survived many social changes. Most likely this is due to the fact that the two phenomena share the same technological worldview, though ideologies may vary within each . The only way dollar amounts can be placed on time, though, is if time is somehow quantified. The technology of the clock makes this possible, thus creating an artificial reality to which we all march, as though hypnotized. Similar to Simmel’s conclusions regarding money, I wish to argue that time, once quantified, looses it value precisely because even if it is not being used to make money, we still approach it in terms of expenditure. Perhaps Native Americans sensed this fact, or perhaps it was extremely obvious to them who had previously operated under very little time constraint. We carry the time/money philosophy into our free time too. Arnold Benn ett’s How to Live On 24 Hours a Day (written in the late 1800s) is the perfect example of this trend towards the quantification and expenditure mindset. In this short book of essays, he actually coached one to
11 adopt such a mindset before it was ever so popular as it is today. Whether or not Bennett realized it, he was coaching us to extend our adoption of the technological worldview one more large step. It seems somewhat obvious now that if one consciously adopts the technological worldview, he or she will go far in a society which holds as its highest value that very worldview. With the actions of men finally coordinated, calculated, and quantified, the technological worldview found perhaps its most firm hold on humanity. Put simply, life comes to us dynamic and flowing. It is not served up in rigid blocks. As Marcuse noted, we must impose some type of external machination and quantification for it to appear as such. McNickle seems to argue, through his Native American characters, that attempting to live by the clock is cause of much unneeded stress. This is true if we really have the option of selecting the alternative Native American worldview and do so outside of the technological society. One quickly discovers how stressful it is to attempt to live w ithout the clock within the technological society. It may also b e that as human animals, attempting to force ourselves into molds which we do not fit (quantified forms) harms of our primary natures, the emotions. As Todd Gitlin notes, from the moment of our birth, we are creatures in search of love, connection and meaning. We, of course, must repress these things as none of them operate according to quantified time. They are qualitative experiences and as such deny being stuffed into minutes or hours. They happen when they happen regardless of what the clock says and continue to flow in and out of our lives for the rest of our days. The clock, while definitely modeled after the regular patterns we see in nature, gives time a rigidity not found in nature. In this sense, it seems that the Native American worldview may correspond better to at least the temporal reality of our existence, though it quickly encounters problems when dealing with
12 practical concerns like dealing with serious illness. After all, despite the increasing space that technology comes to occupy, life is still largely a mystery to us. Lewis Mumford, continuing McNickle’s discussion of the clock, add resses what was perhaps the forerunner to the clock in terms of converting Native Americans to the technological worldview: the monastery. He says, “One is not straining the facts when one suggests that the monasteries…helped to give human enterprise the regular collective beat and rhythm of the machine; for the clock is not merely a means of keeping track of the hours, but of synchronizing the actions of men…” (Mumford, 1963). This statement perhaps cuts more to the heart of the issue - the philosophical views entailed in such a technology. As we have seen, the clock - once adopted as a social norm - does carry with it the technological worldview, but a lso as Mander claims adds another additional layer of mandatory philosophy on us. Not only does the adoption of the clock drastically further the technological worldview, but it redirects our attention away from the light and dark which used to define “day” and reconstructs our experience in such a way as to take our focus away from our natural environment and place emphasis on our artificial environment. In our current social context, we may of course choose to ignore the demands of the clock, but the consequences of such a choice will be quickly felt. Even artists, perhaps the most free of all the professions must eventually confront the demanding hands of the clock. While the clock is a great example of a mandatory technology, we encounter many others to which this philosophical analysis may be applied. Some of these others include the car (which brings with it the highway system), the generation of gas and electric energy, the modern medical establishment, modern government and its tax demands (just ask Wesley Snipes). Technologies on their way to being mandatory are things such as the computer, TV, cellular phones and other telephone technology, iPod technology, Internet access, automated/robot
13 technology, and industrial farm implements. All of these are currently in the process of accumulating social and economic weight in favor of making them mandatory. The clock, like these technologies, was at one time an option. Widespread adoption for social and economic reasons (sometimes by force) and the general direction of the technological worldview combined to secure this technology, though now virtually invisible, as mandatory to our way of life.
Optional Technologies and Philosophical Implications Perhaps the phrase that best explains the status of the technologies in this category most worthy of critique is expected use. These seem to be the technologies closest to the dividing line of mandatory versus optional. The cell phone and the traditional television are perfect examples of this phenomenon. I personally do not own or use either cellular phones or television, a fact which elicits a reaction of shock in many of my social interactions. It is almost as if people do not consider the use of either of these technologies an option regardless of the fact that they actually are. Quickly one comes becomes aware of the social stigma and other social consequences that lack of ownership entails. Due to space and time constraints, I will only look at the example of television in my discussion of optional technologies within the technological worldview. As I write this paper, the technology of television is undergoing profound transformation. It may not be too far from the truth to say that television as we know it will become obsolete in the very near future as it merges more and more with the computer. Both in its entertainment and informational functions, the traditional television cannot compete for long with the computer. It seems almost inevitable that the two would come to merge. I personally believe that this innovation is for the better and because of this have begun to partake in its pastimes. The computer’s virtually unlimited capacity for viewing content, its capacity for interaction, and its
14 resistance to monopoly capital (so far) are all huge advantages. While these new developments do change Mander’s critique in some ways, many of his arguments regarding this optional technology still hold true. In 1991, Mander was arguing that television was “audiovisual training for the modern world” (75). Due to the pervasiveness of television and the amount of hours spent watching this optional technology, it is not far-fetched for Mander to make that statement at all. But because of the currently evolving computer technology which will come to replace television, the nature of this training changes. Whereas in traditional television the programming was fairly static and pre-determined, the new computer technology allows one to essentially program the television him or herself. This seems to be a move in favor of democracy, but it is anyone’s guess how individuals who undertake their own “audiovisual” training will turn out. On the optimist’s side, we may see more appreciation of diversity (within the technological worldview of course). On the pessimist’s side, we may also see the rise of more and more narcissists and disparate groups with seemingly irreconcilable differences. Now that we have a brief discussion of some possible outcomes of the new technology, we may dissect the technology itself to see if Mander is correct in his discussion of inherent biases and inherent philosophical implications. One of the first points Mander addresses is the funding of television media. Since traditional television still holds prominence over the computer as we speak, Mander’s point that television is “freedom of speech for the wealthy” still rings true. As the computer technology evolves, it will be interesting to see the ways in which advertisers attempt to buy our attention. Perhaps they will resort to all-out funding of films or will rely more on product placement within films and programs, but any way we look at it, advertising is still the dominant way to fund entertainment and information. As Mander notes, “ All advertising is saying this: whether you
15 buy this commodity or that one, satisfaction in life comes from commodities” (79). The practical economic need for funding still places a premium on advertising-friendly content, but the now relative ease of virtual distribution and individual selection make large inroads to the advertising monopoly on content. Another of Mander’s concerns comes more as a critique of the television viewing experience in general rather than the actual content viewed, though it naturally involves content as a variable. He argues that unlike both written and auditory information and en tertainment experiences, the technology associated with viewing experience induces passivity. He argues that the sheer amount of time spent in front of both the television (and by extension the computer) ought to be “de facto proof” of the hypnotic and addictive nature of the viewing experience. He remarks that visual images more often than not come at their own speed and that any effort on our part to stop and contemplate any one image within what he calls this “image stream” causes us to fall behind. He says, “So there are two choices: surrender to the images or withdraw from the experience. But if you are going to watch television (or film) at all, you must allow the images to enter you at their own speed” (81). As I write this paper, this critique still holds true and looks as if it will continue to hold true barring the development and widespread use of any type of variable-speed viewing experience (which is not out of the question). The most immediate and relevant variable is the individual’s ability to choose the content which may end up negating Mander’s concern with regard to passivity, but as of right now his critique still holds water. Following this train of thought, Mander considers the television as a mood-altering device. This section is very close in nature to Gitlin’s point that our excessive focus on calculation in this culture has led to a fascination with mood-altering entertainment technology,
16 that the emotions repressed in our utilitarian acts of providing for ourselves actually predetermine the direction of our technological bent. Mander cites one study by the Australian National University which found definite correlations between television watching and hyperactivity. In other words, this activity or pastime which gives the illusion of sedating us and altering our moods after a long day in pursuit of our livelihoods actually creates suppressed physical tension which may come to be released in fairly unpredictable ways in our daily lives. These findings have implications for many behaviors which serve to undermine our reasoning abilities, such as the phenomenon of increasing ADD in children and impulsive behaviors like spending sprees by adults. Mander also notes that these findings have far-reaching implications for things such as imagination and creativity as well. Where pre-television kids were prompted to come up with creative solutions to their boredom, television kids are often encouraged to spend their time in front of the screen, thus eliminating time spent in creative endeavors. Mander addresses yet another result of the mediated environment – the way in which it serves to dull our senses to the natural world around us. Mander says, Having lived in the amazingly rapid world of television imagery, ordinary life is dull by comparison, and far too slow. But consider how it affects one’s ability to be in nature. The natural world is really slow. Save for the waving of trees in the wind, or the occasional animal movement, things barely happen at all. To experience nature, to feel its subtleties, requires human perceptual ability that is capable of slowness. It requires that human beings approach the experience with patience and calm. Life in the modern world does not encourage that; it encourages the opposite (86). Due to this incompatibility with slowness, with natural rhythms, the technology of television (as well as the technological worldview from which it sprung) proves itself incompatible with worldviews which appreciate such things. Despite the efforts of public television and companies like National Geographic (which is owned by a major media conglomerate) and as Mander
17 himself discovered in the process of a Native American advertising campaign, television cannot accurately portray alternative worldviews. Many authors and ecologists have taken on the case that this very inability to comprehend or even squarely confront the world in which we reside may eventually threaten our existence. Gitlin makes a similar but more intricate critique. He notes that while this dullness factor is indeed experienced in some sections of society, that in actuality speed and slowness coexist. Gitlin observes, “With wind-tunnel vision, our chroniclers of the rush of everyday life commonly lose sight of one essential thing about the culture of speed. Harnessed to the love of speed is its contrary: resistance to speed” (108). This helpful extension of Mander’s critique allows us to paint a more accurate picture of the situation. We see that while the speed driven culture, of which television is a part, has immense sway, the very nature of the alternatives make them hard to measure or nail down. Gitlin goes on to say that one of society’s defining characteristics is indeed the tension between the two. Technology critics Albert Borgmann and Matthew Crawford give us yet another perspective on the issue, making the distinction between focal things and practices versus the device. These authors point out that focal things and practices bring out uniquely human aspects of ourselves whereas devices are often throwaway techno logies that have little or nothing to do with furthering these uniquely human attributes (such as community and craftsmanship). Much as Gitlin claims that speed and slowness coexist, these authors claim that focal things and practices coexist with devices and that actually this fact makes the focal things and practices more valuable – not less. Borgmann and Crawford both seem to make the case that it is precisely because we are surrounded with so much speed and hype that we can appreciate focal things and practices like hiking, fishing, canoeing, or even fixing things. In fact many modern psychological
18 treatment programs are built around this very idea. While the television would definitely fit into the device paradigm, it seems that especially in its evolving form it has the potential to bec ome a focal thing or practice despite its classification as a device. An example might be a family who gets together to watch a documentary, pausing it to discuss various issues it brings to the table. It may be a fair critique to see this as the exception rather than the rule though. One last critique of Mander’s which was taken up by the late Neil Postman in greater depth is the bias of all electronic media toward the non-rational, or rather purely emotional approach to reality. Postman draws a distinction between what he calls The Age Of Exposition (typography) and The Age of Show Business (electronic media). Postman elaborates: Almost all of the characteristics we associate with mature discourse were amplified by typography, which has the strongest possible bias toward exposition: a sophisticated ability to think conceptually, deductively, and sequentially; a high valuation of reason and order; an abhorrence of contradiction; a large capacity for detachment and objectivity; and a tolerance for delayed response (63). Postman then notes how The Age of Show Business entails almost the exact opposite of these qualities. Because of this, we move into an age ripe for persuasion, which must not necessarily be informed by reason, which in fact goes further if it tugs at the strings of the heart. While it seems clear that the technology of television is definitely not a neutral technology, some of Mander’s critiques of its biases and philosophical implications which may have been true when his books were written seem to be called into question. One of these is the way it was thought to devalue nature. Still true are his assertions that the viewing experience is a passive experience and that virtual stimulation has hypnotic a nd addictive qualities. The viewing experience still seems to promote suppression of action and thus further hyperactivity. Television, as Mander is right to point out, automatically excludes accurate portrayal of worldviews other than the dominant technological paradigm. Advertising still largely determines
19 program content and a commodity-based approach to life. Uncertain variables at this time seem to be future interactivity, the future role advertising will play in computer technology, further psychological research documenting the relationship between nature and well-being, and of course educational and other public policy relating to these changes.
Conclusions and Some Recommendations Upon completion of the research necessary for this paper, I am firmly in agreement with philosopher Erazim Kohak when he says, “ High technology is indeed irrevocably part of our life. We could surrender it, not only at a high cost in luxuries, but in genuinely human values like health and freedom” (23). This conclusion coincides with William Gibson’s criticism of what he terms the “Rousseau-esque” argument among technology critics - that it is somehow possible to return to our natural state. It now seems somewhat obvious (after dissecting these issues) how closely we are connected to technology, so close that this technology is made all but invisible to us. Indeed it is not possible to go back as a society. Though this is true, we must not dismiss technology’s critics so fast. Mander and some of the other scholars cited bring immensely important issues to the table and add a great deal to the conversation. From Mander, Marcuse, and Mises we learn about the technological worldview we occupy. Through study and dissection of this phenomenon we become conscious of the philosophies that circumscribe our actions. Once we hav e brought these things into the conscious realm, it is possible to be more accepting of other worldviews, such as that of the traditional Native American. Consciousness of our technological worldview also gives us the insight necessary to alleviate many of the negative consequences of this very worldview. The ecological bent of many technology critics may actually stem from this very practical awareness of our worldview rather than some far-out romanticized notions like those of Thoreau. If we continue to
20 remain ignorant of our environment (something that the technological worldview encourages), we may very well be participating in our own demise. Nature has much to teach us that might better ground our daily actions. From Mander we also learn that specific technologies add other layers of philosophical conclusions to the technological worldview. McNickle an d Mumford assisted us in our investigation of one mandatory technology – the clock. Borgmann, Crawford, and Postman helped us understand some of the implications entailed in the “optional” technology of television. But upon completion we realize that regardless of being mandatory or optional these technologies change the way we see the world. They take us down a very specific path within the technological worldview. Perhaps one of the best examples of this fact was Postman’s observation that the increasing dominance of electronic media has even changed the way we communicate, so much so that reason is no longer held in such high regard. Over all, we must realize that awareness and education still have the potential to help us change ourselves for the better. We learn this much from all the voices considered in the technology debate.
Bibliography Borgmann, Albert. “The Device Paradigm” in Technology and the Character of Contemporary Life. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984. Crawford, Matthew B. Shop Class As Soulcraft: An Inquiry Into the Value of Work. New York: Penguin Books, 2009.
21 Gitlin, Todd. Media Unlimited: How the Torrent of Images and Sounds Overwhelms Our Lives. New York: Metropolitan Books, 2001. Kohak, Erazim. The Embers and The Stars: A Philosophical Inquiry Into The Moral Sense of Nature. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1984. Mander, Jerry. “Argument Four: The Inherent Biases of Television” in Four Arguments for the Elimination of Television. New York: William Morrow and Company, 1978. Mander, Jerry. “Part One: Questions We Should Have Asked About Techn ology”. In In the Absence of the Sacred: The Failure of Technology & the Survival of the Indian Nations. San Francisco: Sierra Club Books, 1991. Marcuse, Herbert. “From Negative to Positive Thinking: Technological Rationality and the Logic of Domination” in One-Dimensional Man. Boston: Beacon Press, 1964. McNickle, D’arcy. The Surrounded. New York: Fire Keepers, 1936. Mises, Ludwig von. “The Role of Ideas: Worldview and Ideology” in Human Action. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund Inc., 2010. Mumford, Lewis. Technics and civilization New York: Harcourt, Brace & World, 1963. .
Neale, Michael. William Gibson: No Maps for These Territories. Docurama, 2001. Postman, Neil. Amusing Ourselves to Death: Public Discourse in the Age of Show Business. New York: Penguin Books, 1985. Rand, Ayn. Philosophy: Who Needs It? New York: Signet Books, 1984.
