SpecPro Final Case Compilation

Liceo University Law Special Procedings S.Y. 2016-2017

the property in question was issued to Irene. The latter died in 1978.

Rule 73

01

CUIZON v. RAMOLETE GR No. L-51291 May 29, 1984

Topic: Prob Probat ate e Proc Procee eedi ding ngs; s; Orde Orders rs Of Inclusion Inclusion Or Exclusio Exclusion n Of Propertie Propertiess From Administrator’s Inventory Are Provisional, Not Final Doctrine: Probate Probate court court cannot cannot adjudicat adjudicate e or determine title to properties claimed to be part of the estate and equally claimed to belong to outside parties.

Synopsis: In the instant case, the property invo involv lved ed is not not only only clai claime med d by outs outsid ide e parties but it was sold seven years before the death of the decedent and is duly titled in the name of the vendees who are not party to the proceedings. Facts: On 1961, 1961, Marcia Marciano no Cuizon Cuizon applied applied for for the the regi regist stra rati tion on of seve severa rall parc parcel elss of land in Mandaue City docketed as L.R. Case No. No. N-17 N-179. 9. In 1970 1970,, he dist distri ribu bute ted d his his property between his two daughters, Rufina and Irene, to whom the salt beds subject of the contro controver versy sy was was given. given. In 1971, 1971, Irene Irene executed a Deed of Sale with Reservation of Usufruct involving the said salt beds in favor of petitioners Franciso et al. Althou Although gh the decisi decision on in L.R. L.R. Case Case No. N-179 was rendered way back in 1972, the decree of registration and the corr corres espo pond nding ing O.C. O.C.T. T. was was issu issued ed only only in 1976 1976 in the the name name of Ma Marc rcia iano no Cuizo Cuizon. n. In that that same same year, year, T.C.T T.C.T No. 10477 coverin covering g

During During the extrajudic extrajudicial ial settlement settlement of the estate, Rufin fina, the mother of Franci Francisco sco et al., al., adjudi adjudica cated ted to hersel herselff all the property of Irene including the salt beds in question. She then executed a deed of Confirmation of Sale wherein she confirmed and and rati ratifi fied ed the the 1971 1971 deed deed of sale sale and and renounced and waived whatever rights and interests and participation she may have in the the prop proper erty ty in ques questi tion on in favo favorr of the the petit petitio ioner ners. s. The The deed deed was was anno annota tate ted d in T.C.T. T.C.T. No. 10477. 10477. Subsequen Subsequently, tly, T.C.T. T.C.T. No. 12665 was issued in favor of the petitioners. On September 28, 1978, a petition for letters of administrator was filed before the the CFI CFI of Cebu Cebu by resp respon onde dent nt Domi Doming ngo o Antigua, allegedly selected by the heirs of Irene to act administrator. The petition was granted. In Respondent Antigua as admi admini nist stra rato torr filed filed an inve invent ntor ory y of the the estate of Irene. He included in the inventory the property in question, which was being admi admini nist ster ered ed by Juan Juan Arch Arche, e, one one of the the petit petitio ioner ners. s. He filed filed a moti motion on aski asking ng the the court for authority to sell the salt from the property and praying that petitioner Arche be ordered to deliv liver the salt to the administrator. The motion was granted by the court. Issue: Whether a probate court has jurisdiction over parcels of land already covered covered by a Transf Transfer er Certif Certifica icate te of Title Title issu issued ed in favo favorr of owne owners rs who who are are not not parties to the intestate proceedings if the said said parc parcel elss have have been been incl includ uded ed in the the inv invento entory ry of prop proper ertties ies of the the esta estatte prepared by the administrator.

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Case Digested by: Aura Villones

Ruling: No. No. It is a well well-s -sett ettle led d rule rule that that a probate court or one in charge of procee proceedin dings gs whethe whetherr testat testate e or intest intestat ate e cann cannot ot adju adjudi dica cate te or dete determ rmin ine e title title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All said court could do is to determ determine ine wheth whether er they they should should or should should not be included in the inventory of prop proper ertties ies to be admin dminis iste tere red d by the the administrator. If there is dispute, then the admi admini nist stra rato torr and and the the oppo opposi sing ng part partie iess have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so. In the the inst instan antt case case,, the the prop proper erty ty invo involv lved ed is not not only only clai claime med d by outs outsid ide e parties but it was sold seven years before the death of the decedent and is duly titled in the name of the vendees who are not party to the proceedings. In Bolis Bolisay ay v. Alci Alcid, d, the the Cour Courtt held held that “if a property covered by Torrens Title is involved, the presumptive conclusiveness of such such titl title e shou should ld be give given n due due weig weight ht,, and and in the the abse absenc nce e of stro strong ng comp compell ellin ing g evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the owner of the prop proper erty ty in cont contro rove vers rsy y unti untill his titl title e is null nullif ifie ied d or modi modifi fied ed in an appr approp opri riat ate e ordinary action.” Having Havi ng been been appr appris ised ed of the the fact fact that the property in question was covered by a TCT issued in the name of third parties, the respon responden dentt court court should should have have denied denied the motion of the respondent administrator and excluded the property in question from the inventory of the property of the estate.

Mallari v. Mallari GR No. L-4656 February 23, 1953

02

Topic: Topic: Probate Probate Proceedin Proceedings; gs; Descent Descent And Distri Distribut bution ion;; Action Actions; s; Filing Filing Of Ordina Ordinary ry Action On Properties Under Administration.

Doctrine: The The prob probat ate e cour courtt can can only only dete determ rmin ine e whet whethe herr a subj subjec ectt prop proper erty ty shou should ld or shou should ld not not be incl includ uded ed in the the inv inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is a dispute as to the ownership, then the opposing parties and the administrator have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determ determina inatio tion n of the conflic conflictin ting g claims claims of title because the probate court cannot do so. Synopsis: A probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cann cannot ot adju adjudi dica cate te or dete determ rmin ine e titl title e to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determ determine ine whethe whetherr they they should should or should should not be included in the inventory or list of prop proper erti ties es to be adm adminis iniste terred by the the administrator. Facts: Maria Mallari died on April 17, 1949 without issue but leaving nephews and at least one niece. During her lifetime Maria Mallar Mallarii owned owned among among other other things things three three parc parcel el of land land and and oneone-ha half lf of anot anothe herr parcel, in Macabebe, Pampanga.


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On July 12, 1938, she was supposed to have have dona donate ted d the the firs firstt parc parcel el to her her neph nephew ew Domi Domici cian ano o C. Ma Mall llar ari, i, and and the the seco second nd,, third third and and oneone-ha half lf of the the four fourth th parcels of land to the same Domiciano C. Mallari, her nephew Francisco Mallari and her her niec niece e Cata Catali lina na Ma Mall llar ari. i. The The done donees es accepted the donations in the same deed or deed deedss and and new new cert certif ific icat ates es of titl title e were were issued to them. Thereafter, the donees took possession of the parcels donated to them. In 1943 1943 the the don donees ees Domi Domiccian iano, Francisco Francisco and Catalina Catalina executed executed an extraextra judicial partition of their joint properties. In 1946 1946 this this extr extraa-ju judi dici cial al part partit itio ion n was was registered registered and the correspon corresponding ding transfer transfer certificates of title were issued to them. Maria left what purported to be a will and in that instrument the four parcel of land said to have been donated by her to her nephews and niece were still listed as part of her estate. On May 7, 1949, defe defend nda ant Augu ugusto Ma Mall lla ari, ri, ano another ther neph nephew ew of Ma Maria ria filed filed a petit petitio ion n for for the the probate of the will of his aunt in the CFI of Pampan Pampanga ga (Speci (Special al Procee Proceedin dings gs No. 450) 450) and Augusto was appointed speci ecial administrator of the estate. The The heir heir of Domic omicia ian no who had had alread already y died, died, and Franci Francisco sco and Catal Catalina ina filed opposition to the probate of the will based based on statut statutory ory ground groundss and claimi claiming ng that the four parcels of land could no longer be disposed of in the will because they had previously been donated to them. Augu August stus us peti petitio tioned ned the the prob probat ate e cour courtt to orde orderr the the tena tenant ntss of said said four four parcel under penalty of contempt of court to deliver to him that portion of the harvest corresponding to the owner.

On Octo Octobe berr 26, 26, 1949 1949,, Fran Franci cisc sco o Malla Ma llari ri and and the the four four heir heirss of Domi Domici cian ano o named Magdalena, Marcelo, Florentina and Gorgonia, Gorgonia, filed the present action, civil case No. No. 261 261 in the the CFI CFI of Pamp Pampan anga ga clai claimin ming g that the four parcel in question (1/2 of the 4th) 4th) belo belong nged ed to them them by virt virtue ue of the the don donatio ation n mad made by Ma Mari ria a Ma Mall llar ari, i, and allegin alleging g that that August Augusto o claims claims or assert assertss to have an interest in the said lands. Instead of answering the complaint, Augu August sto o filed filed a moti motion on to dism dismis isss on the the grou ground nd that that the the comp compla lain intt did did not not stat state e fact factss suff suffic icie ient nt to cons consti titu tute te a caus cause e of action and that the court had no jurisdiction over over the the subj subjec ectt-ma matt tter er.. His His prin princi cipa pall conten contentio tion, n, howeve however, r, was was that that the court court had had no juri jurisd sdic icti tion on beca becaus use e the the prob probat ate e cour courtt had had alrea lread dy acquir quired ed exc exclusi lusive ve jurisdiction under special proceedings No. 450. The trial court granted the motion to dismiss on the ground that the parties and the subject-matter involved in the probate proceedings and in the ordinary action were the same, and that the present action was in eff effect ect a dup duplic licatio ation n of the the pro probate ate procee proceedin dings gs and that that a final final judgme judgment nt in the probate proceedings will amount to an adjudication of the present action. Issue: Whet Whether her the the tria triall cour courtt in the the civi civill case case erred in dismissing the case on the ground tha that the the pres presen entt case case is simi simila larr to the the probate proceedings. Ruling: No. The The pres presen entt acti action on is not a dupl duplic icat atio ion n of the the prob probat ate e proc procee eedi ding ngss althou although gh the partie partiess and subjec subject-m t-matt atter er may may be iden identi tica cal. l. It is a wellwell-se sett ttle led d rule rule


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that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good; but if there is, then the parties, the administrator and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so. It is therefore evident that the conflicting claims in the present action cannot be adjudicated in the probate proceedings. Name of Digester: Aura Villones

PALMA v. CA GR No. 101383 September 12, 1984

03 1 Topic: Provisional Ownership

Determination

of

Doctrine: A probate court cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to third parties. Synopsis: Petitioners were sold properties that belong to respondents’ deceased estate subject for administration. It is contended by respondents that such sale was done without authority of the probate court which was under its jurisdiction. Sales transactions transpired in 1988 where

special proceedings was filed in 1984 which undoubtedly made the subject property part of the estate of the deceased and under the jurisdiction of the probate court which has the authority to approve any disposition regarding properties under administration. The trial court’s challenged order of June 5, 1990 has become final and executory, and subject property had been sold to Amigo Realty Development Corporation with authority from the trial court. Facts: Subject property is house and lot located at No. 65 Santo Tomas St., Galas, Quezon City, covered by TCT No. 33181. When respondent Yuseco took steps to pay the real estate taxes on the property, she discovered that it had already been sold on May, 9, 1988 by Paulino Taningco, husband of the deceased, to Ireneo B. Zialcita, Jr., and TCT No. 383664 was issued in his name. In turn, the latter sold the property to petitioners Gamaliel B. Palma and Eduardo A. Beltran for P1,000,000.00 through a deed of absolute sale dated 9 June 1988 for which they were issued TCT No. 383686 and Tax Declaration No. 826 in their names. On 8 November 1989, the property was again sold, this time by petitioners, to the Carmelite Theresian Missionaries, Inc., and TCT No. PR-17857 and Tax Declaration No. C-030-00730 were issued in its name. On 2 April 1990, respondent Yuseco filed before the trial court a motion to declare void all the deeds of sale, tax declarations and transfer certificates of title covering the property where Carmelite Theresian Missionaries, Inc. appeared but petitioners did not. On June 5, 1990, the trial court issued the disputed order nullifying the documents with the bases

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that: (a) the property cannot be the subject of any transaction without the approval of the probate court; and (b) the deed of sale dated May 9, 1988 is a clear forgery because Paulino Taningco declared that he died in February 1984. Zialcita, Jr. was able to acquire the property and transfer its ownership to petitioners following the destruction of the surrendered owner’s duplicate copy surrendered to the Register of Deeds when fire razed the Quezon City Hall on June 11, 1988. On June 22, 1990, the trial court denied the probate of the holographic will of Basilia Zialcita Vda. De Taningco for failure to establish the authenticity of the handwriting of the testatrix by at least 3 witnesses and for lack of mental capacity, having established that she was semi-invalid and suffering from senile dementia as of the time the holographic will was executed. On September 24, 1990, petitioners file a motion for intervention and petition for relief. The court refused to take cognizance of the motion and petition on the ground that it had lost jurisdiction over the case considering Zalciata, Jr. already filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus with the Court of Appeals assailing the order of the court. The CA set aside the order of the trial court on the basis that: (a) a probate court cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be part of the estate and equally claimed by outside parties; and (b) Torrens titles cannot be attacked collaterally. Upon motion for reconsideration by respondent Yuseco, CA amended and reversed its decision.

Issue: Whether subject property was under the jurisdiction of the probate court. Held: YES. The Supreme court affirmed decision of the Court of Appeals upon the motion for reconsideration of the respondent on the basis that: (a) sales transactions transpired in 1988 where special proceedings was filed in 1984 which undoubtedly made the subject property part of the estate of the deceased and under the jurisdiction of the probate court which has the authority to approve any disposition regarding properties under administration; and (b) the trial court’s challenged order of June 5, 1990 has become final and executory, and subject property had been sold to Amigo Realty Development Corporation with authority from the trial court. Once a judgment has been executed, it may no longer be amended, modified or altered. The case is deemed terminated once and for all. The same ruling olds in the case of an order which has been enforced. Case Digested By: Merchadel O. Capadocia

Uy v. Capulong, 221 SCRA 87 April 7, 1993

04

Topic: Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons; Probate Court Without Jurisdiction Over Question Of Ownership Where Property Allegedly Belonging To Estate Claimed By Another Person.


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Doctrine: Questions as to ownership of property alleged to be part of the estate of a deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, cannot be determined in the courts of administration proceedings. The trial court, acting as probate court, has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions, which must be submitted to the trial court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction. The failure of respondent judge to apply this basic principle indicates a manifest disregard of well-known legal rules. Synopsis: This case is about the charge filed by Spouses Uy against Judge Capulong of the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela for gross incompetence, gross ignorance of the law and grave misconduct in a complaint relative to Special Proceedings No. 335-V-88 for settlement of the estate of the late Ambrocio C. Pingco. The judge ordered the cancel of the titles issued on the grounds that the signatures on the deed of sale were forged. The probate court has no jurisdiction over declaration of nullity of the sale of a parcel of land under administration and the consequent cancellation of the certificate of title. An independent action must be instituted in the proper court. Facts: On February 1978, two (2) parcels of land belonging to the late Ambrocio C. Pingco and his wife had been sold to complainants, Jose P. Uy and Rizalina C. Uy who registered the sale with the Register of Deeds of Manila in February 1989. The records show that in the petition for

settlement of the estate of Ambrocio C. Pingco, the counsel for the special administratrix filed an urgent motion requesting the court to direct the Register of Deeds of Valenzuela to "freeze any transaction without the signature of Herminia Alvos" involving the several properties formerly owned by Pingco. ROD reported that the titles to the properties subject of the "freeze order;" were under a deed of absolute sale executed by the spouses Ambrocio C. Pingco and Paz Ramirez and that, by virtue of the deed of sale, new transfer certificates of title were issued in the name of complainants Jose P. Uy and Rizalina C. Uy, except for TCT’s which were registered with ROD Caloocan. Counsel for the special administratrix then filed with the court an urgent motion to cancel the titles issued on the grounds that signatures of the vendors in the deed of sale were forged. Judge Capulong ordered the cancellation of the titles in the name of complainant Jose P. Uy and the reinstatement of the names of the spouses Pingco and Ramirez or the issuance of new titles in their name. Sps Uy elevated the case to the CA, which reversed the decision of the RTC. Issue: Whether the RTC, acting as probate court has jurisdiction over question of ownership where property belonging to the estate is claimed by another person? Ruling: No, a probate court has no authority to decide questions of the ownership of property, real or personal. Section 6, Rule 87 of the Rules of Court simply provides that a person who is suspected of having in his possession


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property belonging to an estate, may be cited and the court may examine him under oath on the matter. The only purpose of the examination is to elicit information or to secure evidence from the persons suspected of having possession or knowledge of the property of the deceased, or of having concealed, embezzled, or conveyed away any of the property of the deceased. Said section nowhere gives the court the power to determine the question of ownership of such property. Furthermore, the declaration of nullity of the sale of a parcel of land under administration and the consequent cancellation of the certificate of title issued in favor of the vendee, cannot be obtained through a mere motion in the probate proceedings over the objection of said vendee over whom the probate court has no jurisdiction. To recover the property, an independent action against the vendee must be instituted in the proper court. Caese Digested by: Willard Aperocho

05

TERESITA N. DE LEON v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. No. 128781 August 6, 2002

out in the inventory, it is likewise the court’s duty to hear the observations, with power to determine if such observations should be attended to or not and if the properties referred to therein belong prima facie to the intestate, but no such determination is final and ultimate in nature as to the ownership of the said properties. A probate court, whether in a testate or intestate proceeding, can only pass upon questions of title provisionally. Synopsis: Respondent filed a motion for collation on the ground that subject properties should be part of the inventory of properties in the estate of the deceased by gratuitous title which the probate court issued an order of collation on already registered properties in favor of the petitioners. A probate court has no authority to decide questions of the ownership of property, real or personal, but only the determination of whether such should be included in list of properties to be administered. Facts:

Topic: Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons; Probate Court’s Power to Include or Exclude Properties are Provisional Doctrine: Probate court possess inherent power to determine what properties, rights and credits of the deceased should be included in or excluded from the inventory. Should an heir or person interested in the properties of a deceased person duly call the court’s attention to the fact that certain properties, rights or credits have been left

Petitioner Teresita N. de Leon was appointed administratrix of the estate of Rafael C. Nicolas. Deceased spouses Rafael and Salud Nicolas were the parents of petitioner Teresita N. de Leon, Estrellita N. Vizconde, Antonio Nicolas (deceased husband of petitioner Zenaida Nicolas and predecessor of the petitioners Heirs of Antonio Nicolas), Ramon Nicolas and Roberto Nicolas. Private respondent Ramon G. Nicolas, filed a "Motion for Collation," claiming that deceased Rafael Nicolas, during his lifetime, had given real properties to his children by gratuitous title and that administratrix-petitioner Teresita failed to include the same in the inventory of the estate of the decedent.


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RTC then issued an Order directing Ramon to submit pertinent documents relative to the transfer of the properties from the registered owners during their lifetime for proper determination of the court. An order of collation was issued which included the properties of petitioner de Leon. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration alleging that the properties subject of the Order was already titled in their names years ago but the RTC denied said motion, ruling that it is within the jurisdiction of the court to determine whether titled properties should be collated. The case was then elevated to the CA which upheld the ruling of the RTC on the ground that the decision had already become final for failure of petitioners to appeal within the required period. Issue: Whether the RTC, acting as probate court can pass upon questions of title or ownership in the intestate proceedings? Ruling: No, a probate court has no authority to decide questions of the ownership of property, real or personal. Probate court could only determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is a dispute as to the ownership, then the opposing parties and the administrator have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so. CA likewise committed an error in considering the order of the court as final or binding upon the heirs or third persons who dispute the inclusion of certain properties. Said order is

not a collation order but merely an order including the subject properties in the inventory of the estate of decedent. The determination by the RTC is not conclusive and is subject to final decision in a separate action for final determination of the conflicting claims of title. Name Of Digester: Willard M. Aperocho

06

PIO BARRETTO REALTY DEV INC. VS COURT OF APPEALS, GR L-62431-33, August 31, 1984

Topic: Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons; Approval of the Probate Court of the Conditional Sale Is Not A Conclusive Determination of the Intrinsic or extrinsic Validity of the Conditional Sale. Doctrine: This case involves the approval of the sale by the probate court for the purpose of obtaining the best terms of the estate. The exercise of the probate courts power could not be said to be an act of broadening its jurisdiction but underscores the limited character of its jurisdiction that is it cannot determine the right to the property left by the decedent which depends on the contract. The probate court in rescinding it contract with respondent and approving the sale to petitioner merely sought to enforce the contract executed between the court and respondent, for the purpose of the obtaining the best terms for the estate. Synopsis: The estate of the deceased was saddled with claims from creditors where satisfaction may only be achieved by liquidation of the properties. Before his death, a joint venture was entered into by


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the decedent with GM Management where a balance was not paid by the latter. For failure of GM to comply after several demands, the court authorized the sale of the property to other interested parties. The court approved the sale of the properties in favor of Pio Barretto Realty, Inc. It is within the bounds of the court’s authority to order the sale being part of administration.

failure of GM to comply within the said period, the administrator would be permitted to accept other offers in the best interest of the estate. On July 2, 1980, the court issued the assailed order and authorized the administrator to enter into agreement with any other interested parties on a first paid first served basis without prejudice to GM to continue with its offer and make good the same as an ordinary buyer.

Facts: This case involves the settlement of the estate of Nicolai Drepin (Drepin) consisting of (3) parcels of land with an area approximately eighty hectares and another parcel with an area of eighty-one hectares. The estate was saddled with claims of creditors named in the Drepin will and creditors who have filed within the reglementary period. The only way to pay their claims is to sell the Drepin lots, so that the proceeds of the sale, the debts could be paid, and any remaining balance distributed to the Drepin heirs.

On October 1980, the probate court approved the sale of the said properties in favor of Pio Barretto Realty Inc. GM elevated the case to the CA which issued a temporary restraining order. Barretto filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied, thus, this petition. Issue: Whether the RTC, acted without jurisdiction in approving the sale to Pio Barretto? Ruling:

However, before his death, Drepin entered into a joint venture agreement with GM Management Philippines through its President Moslares. A balance was however not paid, thus GM requested the administrator that he be permitted to pay the balance on the sale. The said proposal was approved by the court with the condition that it had only up to February 28, 1979 to comply with its offer, and failure on their part to comply shall result to the contract with decedent deemed resolved and ineffective. GM was not able to comply with the condition imposed by the court. GM was given an extension of time to comply with the condition and was given until April 25, 1980, with the caveat that the

No, probate court acted within its authority. It is to be noted that the dealings of the respondent with the court arose out of latter bid to sell property under its authority to sell, mortgage to pay or settle against the estate. Thus, respondent bound himself under the agreement with the courts separate and distinct from which he had with the decedent. In rescinding such contract and approving the sale to Barretto, the court merely seeks to enforce its right to put an end to an agreement which had ceased to be a working proposition. The court cannot allow an absurd situation to arise where the Drepin estate will never be settled and liquidated because even if GM cannot pay the agreed purchase price of the


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Drepin lands, still the probate court can no longer sell the lands to other prospective buyer. Though an order of the probate court approving the sale of the decedent’s property is final, the respondent may file a complaint in the proper court for rescission of the sale. Name Of Digester: Willard M. Aperocho

07

VDA. DE RODRIGUEZ V. CA GR No. L-39532, July 20, 1979

Topic: Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons; The exclusion of a property from the inventory is merely interlocutory and not final in character. Doctrine: This case involves an appeal from the decision of the probate court excluding the properties from the inventory and declaring that said properties were not subject to collation. The order of exclusion is interlocutory, however the ruling on collation is not proper as the proceedings have not reached the stage of partition and distribution when the legitimes of the compulsory heirs have to be determined. Synopsis: The probate court ordered the exclusion of subject properties owned by Mrs. Rustia in the estate of Jose Valero. The CA affirmed the decision being interlocutory. The issue of collation was not yet justiciable at that early stage of the testate proceeding. Whether collation may exist with respect to the two lots and whether Mrs. Rustia's Torrens titles thereto are indefeasible are matters that may be raised later or may not be raised at all.

Facts: The issue in this case stems from the ruling of the probate court, in the intestate proceedings of the estate of Jose Valero, excluding the two lots owned by Mrs. Rustia, and declaring further that the said properties can no longer be subject to collation. Aggrieved, petitioner elevated the case to the CA contending that the 2 San Lorenzo Village lots were really conveyed to Mrs. Rustia by way of donation because the consideration for the sale was allegedly only one-fifth of the true value of the lots. Mrs. Rodriguez further contended that the order was final in character. The CA affirmed the RTC decision and held that the order of exclusion was interlocutory and that it could be changed or modified at any time during the course of administration proceedings. It further held that it is immaterial whether the two lots were donated or sold to Mrs. Rustia because only compulsory heirs are required to make collation for the determination of their legitimes, and only heirs are involved in questions as to advancement. Issue: Whether the RTC order of exclusion is final? Whether the order of collation is proper? Ruling: 1. No, the order of the RTC is not final and merely interlocutory. The prevailing rule is that for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto but such determination is not conclusive and is subject to the ﬁnal decision in a separate action regarding ownership which may be instituted by the parties.


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2. No, the order of collation is not proper and premature. The Court held that the dictum of the Court of Appeals and the probate court that the two disputed lots are not subject to collation was a supererogation and was not necessary to the disposition of the case which merely involved the issue of inclusion in, or exclusion from, the inventory of the testator's estate. The issue of collation was not yet justiciable at that early stage of the testate proceeding. It is not necessary to mention in the order of exclusion the controversial matter of collation. Whether collation may exist with respect to the two lots and whether Mrs. Rustia's Torrens titles thereto are indefeasible are matters that may be raised later or may not be raised at all. Name of Digester: Willard M. Aperocho

08

Victorio Reynoso v Vicente Santiago G.R. No. L-3039, December 29, 1949

Topic: Conversion of an Intestate into Testate Proceeding Doctrine: Whether the intestate proceeding already commenced should be discontinued and a new proceeding under a separate number and title should be constituted is entirely a matter of form and lies within the sound discretion of the court. In no manner does it prejudice the substantial rights of any heirs or creditors. Synopsis: The creditors and other heirs of the estate of Salvadora Obispo applied for

the administration of the property of the deceased in an intestate proceeding. The surviving spouse and eldest son of Obispo made an opposition to such application and presented document purporting to be the last will and testament of the deceased. Facts: On April 29, 1947, Leoncio Cadiz and other heirs of Salvadora Obispo presented an application in the Court of First Instance of Quezon for the administration of the property of the deceased, application which was docketed as intestate proceeding no. 2914. Victorio Reynoso and Juan Reynoso, Salavadora Obispo’s surviving spouse and eldest son respectively, opposed the application and presented a document, which purported to be the last will and testament of Salvador Obispo. Upon trial the court rejected the instrument as a forgery, but on appeal the Court of Appeals reversed the finding of the court and found the will authentic and drawn with all the formalities of law. Thereafter, Victorio Reynoso and Juan Reynoso filed two petitions, one in a special proceeding no. 2914 to order special administrator Meliton Palabrica to turn over the properties of the deceased and another under a separate and new docket number for the appointment of Victorio as executor of Salvadora Obispo’s last will and testament. Issue: Whether or not the previous intestate proceedings should be converted into a testate one Ruling: No. Whether the intestate proceeding already commenced should be


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discontinued and and a new proceeding under a separate number and title should be constituted is entirely a matter of form and lies in the sound discretion of the court. In no manner, does it prejudice the substantial rights of creditors and heirs. Prepared by: Abdul Adap

09

Vicente Uriarte v CFI of Negros Occidental G.R. Nos L-21938-39 May 29, 1970

Topic: Rule on Precedence of Probate of Will Doctrine: In order to preclude different courts which may properly assume jurisdiction from doing so, and prevent conflict among the different courts which otherwise may properly assume jurisdiction from doing so, the Rule specifies that “the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. Synopsis: Vicente Uriarte filed a petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Don Juan Uriarte y Gaite claiming that he was a natural son of the latter. Two private respondents, one of which is the nephew of the deceased, filed an opposition thereto questioning the interest and capacity of Vicente. Facts: Vicente Uriarte filed with the CFI of Negros Occidental a petition for the settlement of the estate of the late Don Juan (Special Proceeding No. 6344) alleging that, as a natural son of the latter, he was his sole heir, and that, during the lifetime of

said decedent, Vicente had instituted a civil case in the same Court for his compulsory acknowledgment as such natural son. Higinio Uriarte, nephew of the deceased, filed an opposition to the petition alleging that Don Juan had executed a Will in Spain. He further questioned Vicente's capacity and interest to commence the intestate proceeding. Juan Uriarte Zamacona, the other private respondent, commenced Special Proceeding No. 51396 in the CFI of Manila for the probate of a document alleged to be the last will of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite, and on the same date he filed in Special Proceeding No. 6344 of the Negros Court a motion to dismiss the same on the following grounds: (1) that, as the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite had left a last will, there was no legal basis to proceed with said intestate proceedings, and (2) that Vicente Uriarte had no legal personality and interest to initiate said intestate proceedings, he not being an acknowledged natural son of the decedent. Vicente Uriarte opposed the aforesaid motion to dismiss contending that, as the Negros Court was first to take cognizance of the settlement of the estate of the deceased Juan Uriarte y Goite, it had acquired exclusive jurisdiction over same pursuant to Rule 75, Section 1 of the Rules of Court. The Negros Court sustained Juan Uriarte Zamacona's motion to dismiss and dismissed the Special Proceeding No. 6344 pending before it. Vicente Uriarte filed an Omnibus Motion in Special Proceeding No. 51396 pending in the Manila Court, asking for leave to intervene therein; for the dismissal of the petition and the annulment of the proceedings had in said special proceeding. This motion was denied by said court.


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Issue: Whether or not the Negros Court erred in dismissing the Special Proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased. Ruling: No. While the jurisdiction of Courts of First Instance over "all matters of probate" is beyond question, the matter of venue, or the particular Court of First Instance where the special proceeding should be commenced, is regulated by Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that the estate of a decedent inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, shall be in the court of first instance in the province in which he resided at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the court of first instance of any province in which he had estate. Accordingly, when the estate to be settled is that of a nonresident alien (like the deceased) the Courts of First Instance in provinces where the deceased left any property have concurrent jurisdiction to take cognizance of the proper special proceeding for the settlement of his estate. In this case, these Courts of First Instance are the Negros and the Manila Courts province and city where the deceased left considerable properties. In accordance with settled jurisprudence in this jurisdiction, testate proceedings, for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person take precedence over intestate proceedings for the same purpose. Thus it has been held repeatedly that, if in the course of intestate proceedings pending before a court of first instance it is found it that the decedent had

left a last will, proceedings for the probate of the of the latter should replace the intestate proceedings even if at that stage an administrator had already been appointed, the latter being required to render final account and turn over the estate in his possession to the executor subsequently appointed. This, however, is understood to be without prejudice that should the alleged last will be rejected or is disapproved, the proceeding shall continue as an intestacy. As already adverted to, this is a clear indication that proceedings for the probate of a will enjoy priority over intestate proceedings. Prepared by: Abdul Adap

Sps. Sandejas v Alex Lina G.R. No. 151634 February 5, 2001

10

Topic: Powers and Duties of the Probate Court Doctrine: Where the Motion for approval of sale was meant to settle the decedent’s obligation to respondent; hence, that obligation clearly falls under the jurisdiction of the settlement court. To require respondent to file a separate action – on whether petitioners should convey the title to Eliodoro Sr.’s share of a disputed realty – will unnecessarily prolong the settlement of the intestate estates of the deceases spouses. In settling the estate of the deceased, a probate court has jurisdiction over matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers. Such matters include selling, mortgaging or


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otherwise encumbering realty belonging to the estate.

absolute sale in favor of Alex which was granted by the lower court.

Synopsis: Remedios Sandejas died leaving her husband Eliodoro to administer her estate. Alex Lina filed a motion to intervene claiming that he and Eliodoro, in his capacity as administrator, executed a contract of conditional sale of properties belonging to the estate. Alex wants the probate court to recognize such sale.

Overturning the RTC ruling, the CA held that the contract between Eliodoro Sandejas Sr. and respondent was merely a contract to sell, not a perfected contract of sale. It ruled that the ownership of the four lots was to remain in the intestate estate of Remedios until the approval of the sale was obtained from the settlement court.

Facts:

Issue:

Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. filed a petition in the lower court praying that letters of administration be issued in his favor for the settlement of the estate of his wife, Remedios Sandejas who died. On April 17,1955. Letters of Administration were issued appointing Eliodoro Sr. as administrator; and on the same date, he took his oath as administrator.

Whether or not the probate court has the power to approve the sale of the property of the estate

However, when the 4th floor of the City Hall of Manila burned, his records were burned with it. As a result, he filed a Motion for Reconstitution for the records of the case. An Omnibus Pleading for Motion to intervene and petition-in-intervention was filed by Alex A. Lina alleging among other movant and Administrator Eliodoro P. Sandejas, in his capacity as seller, bound and obligated himself, his heirs, administrators, and assigns to sell forever and absolutely the four (4) parcels of land which formed part of the estate of the late Remedios. When Eliodoro died in Canada, his son Sixto Sandejas later on became administrator of the estate of their parents. Alex Lina filed an omnibus petition to approve the deed of conditional sale to compel the heirs to execute a deed of

Ruling: Yes. The probate court covers all matter relating to the settlement of the estate and the probate of wills of deceased persons, including the appointment and removal of administrators and executors. It also extends to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of a probate court’s recognized powers such as selling, mortgaging, or otherwise encumbering realty belonging to the estate. In the present case, the Motion for Approval was meant to settle the decedent’s obligation to respondent; hence, the obligation falls under the jurisdiction of the settlement court. Prepared by: Abdul Adap

11

Ruiz v CA G.R. No. 118671 January 29 1996

Topic: Settlement of Estate


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Doctrine: Grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of the decedents estate. The law clearly limits the allowance to widow and children and does not extend it to the deceased’s grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity. Synopsis: The right of an executor or administrator to the possession and management of the real and personal properties of the deceased is not absolute and can only be exercised so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of administration. Facts: Hilario Ruiz executed a holographic will naming Edmond, his son, Maria, his adopted daughter, and three granddaughters, as heirs of his estate. Edmond was named as executor. When Hilario died, Edmond did not take any action for the probate of his father’s holographic will, hence, Maria filed before the RTC a petition for the probate and approval of the deceased’s will and for the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond Ruiz. It was found out that the house and lot in which the testator bequeathed to the 3 granddaughters was leased out by Edmond to third persons. The Probate court admitted the will to probate conditioned upon the filing of a bond. Edmond Ruiz, as executor, then filed an “Ex- Parte Motion for release of funds. Maria opposed praying that the release of rent payments be given to the 3 granddaughters. The Probate court granted Maria’s motion. It further ordered the delivery of the titles to and possession of the properties bequeathed to the three granddaughters and respondent Maria upon the filing of a bond. It also ordered the release of funds to Edmond but only to such

amount necessary for the administration of the estate and for the allowance of the 3 granddaughters. CA sustained probate court’s order. Edmond now argues that the CA erred in affirming the probate court’s decision in granting support to the grandchildren and allows premature partition of the estate. He also argued that that the assailed order deprived him of his right to take possession of all the real and personal properties of the estate as the executor. Issues: Whether or not the probate court, after admitting the will to probate but before payment of the estate's debts and obligations, has the authority: 1) to grant an allowance from the funds of the estate for the support of the testator's grandchildren; 2) to order the release of the titles to certain heirs; 3) to grant possession of all properties of the estate to the executor of the will. Ruling: 1) Section 3 of Rule 83 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: Sec. 3. Allowance to widow and family. The widow and minor or incapacitated children of a deceased person, during the settlement of the estate, shall receive therefrom under the direction of the court, such allowance as are provided by law. Grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of the decedents estate. The law clearly limits the allowance to widow and children and does not extend it to


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the deceaseds grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity. 2) In settlement of estate proceedings, as provided in Rule 90, Sec 1 of the Revised Rules of Court, the distribution of the estate properties can only be made: (1) after all the debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and estate tax have been paid; or (2) before payment of said obligations only if the distributees or any of them gives a bond in a sum fixed by the court conditioned upon the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs, or when provision is made to meet those obligations. The estate tax is one of those obligations that must be paid before distribution of the estate. If not yet paid, the rule requires that the distributees post a bond or make such provisions as to meet the said tax obligation in proportion to their respective shares in the inheritance. Notably, at the time the order to release the titles was issued, the properties of the estate had not yet been inventoried and appraised. 3) Petitioner cannot correctly claim that the assailed order deprived him of his right to take possession of all the real and personal properties of the estate. As provided in Section 3 of Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court, the right of an executor or administrator to the possession and management of the real and personal properties of the deceased is not absolute and can only be exercised so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of administration. Case Digested by: Paul W. Hembrador

12

LACHENAL VS SALAS, 71 SCRA 202

Topic: SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE; Jurisdiction as to the Sale of Decedent’s Property and the Complaint for Rescission of such sale Doctrine: An order of the probate court approving the sale of the decedent’s property is final. The heirs of the deceased may file a complaint in another court for the rescission of the sale. No judicial interference by the court where the complaint for rescission was file over the action of a co-equal court is involved. The probate court’s province is the settlement of estate only.. Facts: Petitioner Filomena G. Pizarro, is the surviving spouse of the late Aurelio Pizarro Sr., while the other petitioners as well as respondents Alicia P. Ladisla and Lydia P. Gudani, are their children. Upon the death Aurelio Pizarro, Sr., a Special Proceeding was instituted by petitioners through Atty. Regalado C. Salvador on September 21, 1965 in the CFI of Davao, Branch I. Listed among the properties of the estate were parcels of land situated in Agdao, J. Palma Gil, and Claro M. Recto Streets, Davao City. On December 23, 1965, the probate court, upon agreement of the parties, appointed Gaudencio A. Corias, Clerk of Court of said Court, as Administrator of the estate. The controversy esteemed from the motion for Authority to sell the properties located at Agdao and J. Palma Gil Streets, Davao City, by the administrator,


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through Atty. Salvador, to settle the debts of the estate, including the inheritance and estate taxes. Despite the heirs opposition that the sale would be improvident and greatly prejudicial to them as the claims against the estate had not yet been properly determined and on the ground that the sale of Agdao lot would be more than sufficient to cover the supposed obligations of the estate were according to them, a bit exaggerated, the court upon hearing, authorized the said sale. On the allegation that the vendees in the previously authorized conditional sale did not fully paid the balance of the consideration, the heirs filed their Motion for Cancellation or Rescission of Conditional Contract of sale, which the probate court denied ruling that the relief for rescission of the sale is not within its power to grant, the petitioners, without awaiting the resolution of their motion for reconsideration, filed on October 5, 1967 a verified complaint for their rescission case in the CFI Davao (raffled to Branch III). The trial court however, dismissed the rescission case on the ground that it could not review the actuations of a coordinate Branch of the Court besides the fact that a Motion for Reconsideration was still pending before the probate court. The appellate court upheld the trial court’s decision. Hence, the present petition for Certiorari Issue: Whether or not the petitioner-heirs may file a complaint in another court for the rescission of the sale despite the pending resolution of its motion for reconsideration in the Probate Court.

Yes. As a strict legal proposition, no actuation of the Probate Court had to be reviewed. There is no judicial interference to speak of by one Court in the actuations of another co-equal court. The order authorizing the sale was issued on February 20, 1967, and on July 6, 1967, the Court gave its stamp of approval to the final sale. Title was issued in favor of the vendees on July 10, 1967. To all intents and purposes, therefore, that sale had been consummated; the Order approving the sale is final. But, what petitioners sought to achieve in filing the Rescission Case was to rescind the sale mainly for failure to pay full consideration thereof, which is a valid ground for rescission. The cause of action was within the judicial competence and authority of the trial court (Branch III) as a CFI which has exclusive original jurisdiction over civil cases the subject of which is not capable of pecuniary estimation. It was beyond the jurisdictional bounds of the Probate Court whose main province was the settlement of the estate. As a matter of fact, the Rescission Case was instituted after the Probate Court itself had stated that petitioners’ cause of action was not within its authority to resolve but should filed with the competent court. The cause of action in one is different from that obtaining in the other. It behooved the trial court, therefore, to have taken cognizance of and to have heard the Rescission Case on the merits and it was reversible error for the CA to have upheld its dismissal Case digested by: Michael P. Bajao

Ruling:


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PIZARRO VS CA, 99 SCRA 72

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Topic: SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE; Jurisdiction as to questions of Title of Property Doctrine: As a general rule, questions as to title of property cannot be passed upon in the intestate or testate proceeding; it should be ventilated in a separate action. Facts: Victorio Lachenal died on November 20, 1969. His estate is pending settlement in the CFI of Pasig, Rizal, Branch I (Special Proceeding No. 5836). His son, Ildefonso Lachenal, was named executor of his will. Among the properties included in the inventory of his estate is a fishing boat called Lachenal VII. The executor filed in the proceeding a motion to require the spouses Lope L. Leonio and Flavian Lachenal-Leonio to pay rentals for the lease of Lachenal VII and to return the boat to Navotas, Rizal for repair. Mrs Leonio, who was the daughter of the testator, opposed claiming that she is the owner because she purchased it from her father. Instead of filing their respective answer, the other children of the testator including the executor filed an action for the recovery of the motorboat in the Caloocan City Branch of the CFI Rizal, with the Civil Case No 3597 Issue: Whether or not the probate court should be allowed to continue the hearing on the ownership of the fishing boat. Ruling:

No. The SC hold that the title to the fishing boat should be determined in the ordinary action (Civil Case No. 3597) in the Court of Caloocan because it affect the lessee thereof, Lope L. Leonio, the decedent’s son in law, who, although married to his daughter or compulsory heir, is nevertheless a third person with respect to his estate. “The administrator may not pull against his will, by motion, into the administration proceedings”. This case falls under the general rule that questions as to title of property cannot be passed upon in the testate or intestate proceeding but should be ventilated in a separate action. Case digested by: Michael P. Bajao

RAMOS VS CA 180 SCRA 635 January 31, 1952

14

Topic: JURISDICTION OF THE PROBATE COURT Doctrine: Approval of the probate court of the conditional sale is not a conclusive determination of the intrinsic or extrinsic validity of the contract but a mere recognition of the rights of private respondent as an heir to dispose of her rights and interests over her inheritance even before partition. Probate jurisdiction of the former CFI or the present RTC relates only to matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and probate of wills of deceased persons, but does not extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceeding. A separate action may be the appropriate remedy. Approval of the conditional sale by the probate court was without prejudice to the filing of the proper


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action for consolidation of ownership and/or reformation of instrument in the proper court within the prescriptive period.

Tarlac ruled in her favor and such ruling was affirmed by the CA. Hence, the present petition by petitioners

A probate court acting as a cadastral court acts with limited competence and has no jurisdiction over actions for consolidation of ownership, and such must have been filed in the former CFI, now RTC in the exercise of its general jurisdiction..

Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in holding that both the orders of the probate and cadastral courts are null and void for lack of jurisdiction.. Ruling:

Facts: Adelaida Ramos, private respondent, secured a loan from her brother Oscar Ramos, the herein petitioner. As security for said loan, the private respondent executed in favor of the petitioner, 2 deeds of conditional sale dated May 27, 1959 and August 30, 1959, of her rights, shares, interests and participation respectively over Lot No. 4033 covered by OCT No. 5125 registered in the name of their parents, Valente Ramos and Margarita Denoga, now deceased; and Lot No. 4221 covered by TCT No. 10788 then registered in the names of Socorro Ramos, Josefina Ramos and Adelaida Ramos, said properties being of the Cadastral Survey of Paniqui, Tarlac. Upon the failure of Adelaida as vendor a retro to exercise her right of repurchase within the redemption period, Oscar filed a petition for consolidation & approval of the conditional sale of the 2 lots in the special proceedings entitled “Intestate Estate of late Margarita Denoga” in the CFI of Tarlac acting as well as a cadastral court. Both probate & cadastral court issued orders in favor of Oscar. Adelaida for her part, then filed with the CFI Tarlac for the declaration of nullity of the orders and the reformation of the instrument, recovery of possession with preliminary injunction and damages. Adelaida alleged that the deeds of conditional sale are mere mortgages. CFI

No. A reading of the order of the probate court will show that it is merely an approval of the deed of conditional sale executed by Adelaida in favor of petitioners. There is nothing is said order providing for the consolidation of ownership over the lots allegedly sold to petitioners nor was the issue of the validity of said contract discussed or resolved therein. “To give approval” means in its essential and most obvious meaning, to confirm, ratify, sanction or consent to some act or thing done by another. The approval of the probate court of the conditional sale is not a conclusive determination of the intrinsic or extrinsic validity of the contract but a mere recognition of the right of the private respondent Adelaida Ramos as an heir, to dispose of her rights and interests over her inheritance even before partition. As held in Duran, et al vs Duran, the approval by the settlement court of the assignment pendente lite, made by one heir in favor of the other during the course of the settlement proceedings, is not deemed final until the estate is closed and said order can still be vacated, hence the assigning heir remains an interested person in the proceeding even after said approval. The same jurisdictional flow obtains in the order of consolidation issued by the cadastral court. The CFI or the RTC, acting


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as cadastral courts, acts with limited competence. It has no jurisdiction to take cognizance of an action for consolidation of ownership, much less to issue an order to that effect, such action must have been filed in the CFI, now RTC, in the exercise of its general jurisdiction Case digested by: Michael P. Bajao

15

REYES VS MOSQUEDA, 187 SCRA 661

Topic:JURISDICTION OF PROBATE COURT; Inclusion/Exclusion of Properties Doctrine:Provisional character of the exclusion of the contested properties in the inventory as stressed in the order is within the jurisdiction of probate court. Rule is well-settled that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. For the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto but such determination is not conclusive and is subject to the final decision in a separate action regarding ownership which may be constituted by the parties Facts: This is a three (3) consolidated cases involving one Dr. Emilio Pascual, who died intestate and without issue on November

18, 1972. On December 3, 1973, the heirs of Dr. Pascual filed a Special Proceeding No. 73-30-M in the CFI of Pampanga for the administration of his estate. Ursula Pascual, the sister of the decedent and one of the heirs filed a motion to exclude some properties from the inventory of Dr. Pascual’s estate and to deliver the titles to her. Ursula alleged that Dr. Pascual during his lifetime executed a donation in her favor covering properties which were included in the estate of the latter and therefore should be excluded from the inventory. The probate court granted the exclusion of the properties. One of the petitioners, Pedro Dalusong questioned the jurisdiction of the probate court to exclude the properties allegedly donated to Ursula. Issue: Whether or not the probate court has jurisdiction to exclude the properties donated to Ursula Ruling: Yes. The questioned order of the CFI Pampanga in S.P. No. 73-30-M categorically stated that the exclusion from the inventory of the estate of the deceased Dr. Pascual was “without prejudice to its final determination in a separate action.” The provisional character of the exclusion of the contested properties in the inventory as stressed in the order is within the jurisdiction of the probate court. It is wellsettled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether estate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or


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list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good; but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so. Case digested by: Michael P. Bajao

16

Morales v. CFI of Cavite 146 SCRA 373 DECEMBER 29, 1986

Topic: Orders of Inclusion or Exclution of Properties from Administrator’s Inventory are Provisional, Not Final Doctrine: A probate court cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no dispute, well and good; but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so. Facts: The property is a saltbedfishpond located at Dulongbayan, Bacoor, Cavite, owned by one Simona Pamuti. On February 12, 1968, Simona Pamuti mortgaged the

property in favor of petitioner Princesita Santero Morales. On July 26, 1974, the property, following extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings, was sold at public auction to Princesita. Simona Pamuti was the spouse of Pascual Santero with whom she begot a son named Pablo Santero. During the lifetime of Pablo Santero, he cohabited and had children with three women. Pablo had a child with Adela, seven children with Anselma and five with Feliberta. During the pendency of the proceedings for the settlement of the intestate estates of Pascual and Pablo, Juanito Santero filed a petition for guardianship over the properties of Simona Pamuti. Simona Pamuti died intestate. In the special proceeding, Princesita Santero was allowed to intervene not as heir but as "creditors of the intestate estate, or as co-owners, together with said intestate estates, of certain properties as the interests of said oppositors may appear Issue: Whether or not, a court handling the intestate proceedings has jurisdiction over parcels of land already covered by a TCT issued in favor of owners who are not parties to the intestate proceeding Ruling: No. Supreme Court held that in determination of the question of title to the subject properties in the probate court is merely provisional. Petitioners are not barred from instituting an appropriate action. It is a well-settled rule that a probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are equally claimed to belong to outside parties. All the said court could do is


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to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is dispute, then the administrator and the opposing parties have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because the probate court cannot do so. Probate court cannot adjudicate or determine title to properties claimed to be part of the estate and equally claimed to belong to outside parties Case digested by: Fel Lino Amor Brillantes

17

Pereira v. Court of Appeals 174 SCRA 154 June 20, 1989

Topic: Extrajudicial Settlement agreement between heirs

by

Doctrine: As a general rule, questions as to title of property cannot be passed upon in the intestate or testate proceeding; it should be ventilated in a separate action. Facts: Andres Pereira died leaving his wife Pereira and his sister Nagac as his only heirs. Nagac then instituted special proceedings to be appointed administrator of her brother’s estate to which the widow opposed alleging to estate to be administered and in the alternative she be appointed administratix. The RTC appointed Nagac as administratix which was upheld the CA hence this petition

Whether or not there is a need for a judicial administration and an appointment of an Administrator. Ruling: NO. The general rule is that when a person dies leaving property, the same should be judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified administrator. An exception to this rule is sec. 1 of Rule 74 which provides that when all the heirs are of lawful age and there are no debts due from the estate, they may agree in writing to partition the property without instituting the judicial administration or applying for the appointment of an administrator. However, this does not preclude them from instituting administration proceedings, even if the estate has no debts or obligations, if they do not desire to resort FOR GOOD REASONS to an ordinary action for partition. Now the question is what constitutes “good reason"? The court has time and again refused to sanction administration proceedings when the issues to be resolved can be properly be ventilated in an action for partition as administration proceedings are always long and costly. In the case at bar, the reason why Nagac instituted the spec. Proc. is because she and the widow are not in good terms and she wants to obtain possession of the properties for her own purpose. This is not a compelling reason which will necessitate a judicial administration of the estate. Case digested by: Fel Lino Amor Brillantes

Issue: 22 | P a g e Pr o of re a d

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18

administrator no property or thing of value whatever belonging to said estate.

Mcmicking vs Sy combieng

21 Phil. 211. January 15, 1912

Topic: Liability of distributees and estate. Doctrine: At any time within two years after such settlement and distribution of the estate, that there are debts outstanding against the estate which have not been paid, any creditor may compel the settlement of the estate in the courts in the manner hereinafter provided, unless his debt shall be paid, with interest; and the administrator appointed by the court may recover the assets of the estate from those who have received them, for the purpose of paying the debts Facts: One Engracio Palanca was appointed administrator of the estate of Margarita Jose. Mariano Ocampo became one of the sureties of Palanca. After the bond, said Palanca took possession of all the property of Margarita Jose. Later on, Mariano Ocampo died, testate. Doroteo Velasco was appointed administrator of the estate of Mariano Ocampo while Pio de la Guardia Barretto (defendant) qualified as one of the sureties of said Doroteo Velasco. Doroteo Velasco, administrator, filed with the court an inventory report of the property of the deceased, with a statement of all his debts and liabilities. The Court affirmed and approved the partition. The court approving the same, Doroteo Velasco, delivered to the devisees and legatees of Mariano Ocampo, all of the property of said decedent leaving in the hands of said

Meanwhile, Engracio Palanca was removed from office as administrator of the estate of Margarita Jose, and Jose McMicking (plaintiff) was appointed in his stead. Said Palanca was removed from office by reason of the fact that he failed and refused to render an account of the property and funds of the estate of the said Margarita Jose. For the default of Engracio Palanca, Mcmicking filed a claim in the amount of 30,000 to the estate of Pio de la Guardia Barretto as the surety of Doroteo Velasco who is the administrator of the estate of Mariano Ocampo who in turn is the surety of said Engracio Palanca. The lower court dismissed the case. Issue: Whether plaintiff may claim against the defendant as the surety of Doroteo Velasco Ruling: No. SC affirmed the lower court’s decision. The Court based their decision upon the ground that Doroteo Velasco, for whom the deceased Pio de la Guardia Barretto was surety, would not have been liable himself had this action been commenced against him. If the principal is not liable upon the obligation, the surety cannot be. At the head of the law of administration of the Philippine Islands stand sections 596 and 597 of the Code of Civil Procedure. They are as follows:

"SEC. 596.Settlement of intestate estates, without legal proceedings, in


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certain cases. — Whenever all the heirs of a deceased person are of lawful age and legal capacity, and there are no debts due from the intestate estate, or all the debts have been paid by the heirs, the heirs may, by a family council as known under Spanish law, or by agreement between themselves, duly executed in writing, apportion and divide the estate among themselves, as they may see fit, without proceedings in court. "SEC. 597.In such case distributees liable for debts. — But if it shall appear, at any time within two years after such settlement and distribution of the estate, that there are debts outstanding against the estate which have not been paid, any creditor may compel the settlement of the estate in the courts in the manner hereinafter provided, unless his debt shall be paid, with interest; and the administrator appointed by the court may recover the assets of the estate from those who have received them, for the purpose of paying the debts; and the real estate belonging to the deceased shall remain charged with the liability to creditors for the full period of two years after such distribution, notwithstanding any transfers thereof that may have been made." These sections provide for the voluntary division of the whole property of the decedent without proceedings in court. It is the undisputed policy of every people which maintains the principle of private ownership of property that he who owns a thing shall not be deprived of its possession or use except for the most urgent and imperative reasons and then only so long as is necessary to make the rights which underlie those reasons effective. It is a principle of universal acceptance which declares that one has the instant right to occupy and use that which he owns, and it

is only in the presence of reasons of the strongest and most urgent nature that principle is prevented from accomplishing the purpose which underlies it. The force which gave birth to this stern and imperious principle is the same force which destroyed the feudal despotism and created the democracy of private owners. These provisions should, therefore, be given the most liberal construction so that the intent of the framers may be fully carried out. They should not be straitened or narrowed but should rather be given that wideness and fullness of application without which they cannot produce their most beneficial effects. Standing, as we have said, at the head of the law of administration of these Islands, they are the first provisions to which our attention is directed in seeking a legal method for the division and distribution of the property of deceased persons. They are thus made prominent. And justly so. By permitting the partition and division without proceedings in court no time is lost and substantially all expense and waste are saved. This is as it should be. Where administration is necessary, it ought to be accomplished quickly and at very small expense; and a system which consumes any considerable portion of the property which it was designed to distribute is a failure. It being undoubted that the removal of property from the possession of its owner and its deposit in the hands of another for administration is a suspension of some of his most important rights of property and is attended with an expense sometimes entirely useless and unnecessary, such procedure should be avoided whenever and wherever possible.


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The liability of the principal precedes that of the surety. If Velasco incurred no liability, then his surety incurred none Case digested by: Fel Lino Amor Brillantes

19

Gerona v. De Guzman L-19060 May 29, 1964

Topic:Prescriptive Settlement.

Period

to

Annul

Doctrine: Although, as a general rule, an action for partition among co-heirs does not prescribe, this is true only as long as the defendants do not hold the property in question under an adverse title. The statute of limitations operates, as in other cases, from the moment such adverse title is asserted by the possessor of the property Facts: Ignacio, Maria Concepcion, Francisco and Delfin, all surnamed Gerona, legitimate children of Domingo Gerona and Placida de Guzman. They alleged that their mother, Placida de Guzman, was the legitimate daughter of Marcelo de Guzman and his first wife, Teodora de la Cruz. Apparently, when Teodora died, Marcelo remarried and begot 7 children with Camila Ramos. After his death, his 7 children from Camila executed a deed of "extra-judicial settlement of his estate, fraudulently misrepresenting therein that they were the only surviving heirs of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman, despite knowing that they weren’t. However, they succeeded in fraudulently causing the transfer certificates of title to 7 parcels of land, issued in the name of their late father, to be canceled and new ones issued in their own names. A

year before the institution of the case, the Gerona siblings found out about the de Guzmans’ fraudulent scheme and demanded their share of the properties. However, the de Guzman siblings refused. As result, the Gerona siblings fled a case in court; praying that judgment be rendered nullifying the deed of extra-judicial settlement insofar as it deprives them of their participation of 1/8th of the properties in litigation; that it be ordered to cancel the transfer certificates of titles secured de Guzman siblings; that the de Guzman siblings be ordered to render accounts of the income of said properties and to deliver to them their lawful shares therein; that they pay damages and attorney’s fees. Issue: Whether or not the action to Annul Extrajudicial Settlement made under fraudulent means may, within four years from the discovery, prosper Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court held that the action to annul a deed of extrajudicial settlement upon the ground of fraud may be filed within four years from the discovery of fraud. However, such discovery is deemed to have taken place when said instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds and new certificates of title were issued in the name of respondents respectively. The Registration of the extrajudicial settlement constitute constructive notice to the whole world. In the light of the foregoing it must, therefore, be held that plaintiffs learned, at least constructively, of the allege fraud committed against them by defendants on 25 June 1948 when the deed of extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the deceased


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Marcelo de Guzman was registered in the registry of deeds of Bulacan, Plaintiffs’ complaint in this case was not filed until 4 November 1958, or more than 10 years thereafter. Plaintiff Ignacio Gerona became of age on 3 March 1948. He is deemed to have discovered defendants’ fraud on 25 June 1948 and had, therefore, only 4 years from the said date within which to file this action. Although, as a general rule, an action for partition among co-heirs does not prescribe, this is true only as long as the defendants do not hold the property in question under an adverse title. The statute of limitations operates, as in other cases, from the moment such adverse title is asserted by the possessor of the property. Therefore, all costs against petitioners herein. It is so ordered. Case digested by: Fel Lino Amor Brillantes

Plan v IAC

20

G.R. No. L-65656 28 February 1985

knowledge of only one of the heirs supposedly representing all other heirs. Federico, one of the six heirs of Regino Bautista, filed a petition for annulment of sale of the property sold to Plan, 16 days after the sale. This was denied by the probate court due to filing out of time. He again filed relief from order 56 days after the approval of the sale contending violation of Rule 89, Sec 7. Since there was no movement in the case, it was archived. Few years after, at the time when Milagros, the new administrator, asked that her bond be reduced, Federico filed a separate action for annulment of sale against Plan. This was dismissed without prejudice, ruling that the nullity of sale as to Federico's 1/16 share should be resolved in the intestate proceeding. He filed two more separate actions with same allegations, and these were all dismissed for the same reason. The decision for the third action was appealed. The CA reversed the decision of the RTC by declaring the sale void and ordering the reconveyance of the property. The reconveyance was based on Article 1088 of the CC. Issue:

Doctrine: The purchaser of the property under administration is a forced intervenor in the intestate proceeding and should answer the amended petition for the annulment of the sale. The probate court, having authorized and approved the sale, should resolve the issue as to its validity. Facts: With approval of the court, a property under administration was sold by Florencia to the administratrix for payment of intestate debts. The sale was with the

Whether Federico Bautista could nullify in a separate action, instead of in the intestate proceeding for his deceased father's estate. Ruling: No. Article 1088 of the Civil Code does not justify legal redemption in this case because it refers to sale of hereditary rights, and not to specific properties, for the payment of the debts of the decedent's estate as to which there is no legal redemption.


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In the administration and liquidation of the estate of a deceased person, sales ordered by the probate court for payment of debts are final and not subject to legal redemption. Unlike in ordinary execution sales, there is no legal provision allowing redemption in the sale of property for payment of debts of a deceased person.

Federico's remedy is in the intestate proceeding where his petition for relief has been pending for nearly twenty years. He should amend it by impleading the present administratrix and Plan himself and serving copies of the petition upon them. Plan, as the purchaser of the disputed property, is a forced intervenor in the intestate proceeding. He should answer the amended petition for the annulment of the sale. The probate court has jurisdiction over him. The probate court, having authorized and approved the sale, should resolve the issue as to its validity. Case Digested by: Hazel M. Barbarona

21

Llamas v Moscoso G.R. No. L-7524 31 July 1954

Doctrine: The allegation that the lease has been breached and should therefore be declared terminated … is not within the competence of the court in the exercise of its probate jurisdiction. Facts: Two parcels of land was issued in the name of the spouses Ciriaco and Manuela Enriquez. These identified parcels of land were leased to Gaspar Llamas, the husband of Encarnacion, one of the heirs to

the deceased. During the intestate proceedings, Ciriaco as administrator, subm itted for the approval of the court a project of partial partition. The court approved the partial partition. Among the portions covered by the order were the parcels of land leased to the petitioner Gaspar Llamas where Lot No. 56 was assigned to Ciriaco. Ciriaco then, in his capacity as administrator, filed a petition in the intestate proceedings asking for the rescission of the lease alleging that, by virtue of the said order, he had become the owner of lot 56 and entitled to the possession thereof and that the lease had been breached by lessee's failure to pay rents. He also petitioned for writ of preliminary injunction to restrain the lessee from collecting rents. These the probate court denied, holding that the rescission of the lease should be the subject of a separate action in his own behalf and not as an administrator of the estate. Ciriaco filed a separate ordinary civil action against the lessee Llamas praying that the lease be declared cancelled and terminated and Llamas ousted from the leased premises, alleging as a ground for his action that, as sole and absolute owner of lot 56 by virtue of the decree of partial partition plaintiff had the right to terminate the lease, or to receive the rents to the lot, but that defendant had failed to pay those rents and had also refused to vacate the premises. He then filed a motion with the probate court praying for the issuance of a writ of execution to enforce the said part of the order thereby ejecting Llamas and his wife. Issues:


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1) Whether or not the order approving the partial partition had the effect of terminating the lease; 2) Whether the probate court is the competent court to declare termination of the lease.

Ruling: 1) No. The contention that the lease on lot 56 must be deemed terminated by the order approving the project of preliminary partition which allocated the said lot to Ciriaco Enriquez and authorized him to take possession thereof "with all the corresponding rights and privileges of ownership," is without merit. The lessee was not a party to that partition and the court cannot, without any legal ground and without proper proceedings for the purpose, annul the lease. 2) No. The allegation that the lease has been breached and should therefore be declared terminated is a question that must be ventilated in the civil action for the purpose. The same is not within the competence of the court in the exercise of its probate jurisdiction. Case Digested by: Hazel M. Barbarona

Timbol v Cano

22

G.R. No. L-15445 April 29, 1961

Facts: Jose Cano has been appointed as court administrator of the intestate estate of his deceased sister Mercedes. Mercedes had a sole heir, the minor, Florante Timbol. At the intestate proceedings, Jose Cano petitioned the court that the agricultural land under administration be leased to him for payment of taxes, maintenance of the minor, and other dues. This was approved by the court. The rental was then reduced from P4000 to P2500. Later, when Florante was appointed as the administrator of the properties, he filed a motion, for the approval of the court, alleging, among others, that the area destined for the projected subdivision be increased. The motions were approved but the approval was immediately set aside to give opportunity to the former administrator and lessee Jose Cano to formulate his objections to the motions. One of Cano's objections was that he is in possession under express authority of the court, under a valid contract, and may not be deprived of his leasehold summarily upon a simple petition. The court granted the motions of the administrator. Its order stated that contract of lease is on all forms illegal. Under article 1646 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, — a new provision, — "the persons disqualified to buy referred to in articles 1490 and 1491, are also disqualified to become lessee of the things mentioned therein". Issues:

Doctrine: If the probate court has the right to approve the lease, so may it order its revocation, or the reduction of the subject of the lease.

1) Whether a probate court, has jurisdiction to annul or modify rights under the lease; 2) Whether the probate court has lost its jurisdiction to appoint a new administrator


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or to authorize enlargement of the land when it approved the partition. Ruling:

23

Pereira v. Court of Appeals 174 SCRA 154 June 20, 1989

1) Yes. In probate proceedings the court orders the probate of the will of the decedent (Rule 80, See. 5); grants letters of administration to the party best entitled thereto or to any qualified applicant (Id ., Sec. 6); supervises and controls all acts of administration; hears and approves claims against the estate of the deceased (Rule 87, See. 13); orders payment of lawful debts (Rule 89, Sec. 14); authorizes sale, mortgage or any encumbrance of real estate (Rule 90, Sec.2 ); directs the delivery of the estate to those entitled thereto (Rule 91, See. 1). The contract of lease under which the appellant holds the agricultural lands of the intestate and which he now seeks to protect, was obtained with the court's approval. If the probate court has the right to approve the lease, so may it order its revocation, or the reduction of the subject of the lease. The matter of giving the property to a lessee is an act of administration, also subject to the approval of the court. 2) No. The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the payment of all the debts the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. In the case at bar, the debts had not yet been paid, and the estate had not yet been delivered to the heirs as such heir. Case Digested by: Hazel M. Barbarona


by

Doctrine: A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches. Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. Facts: On July 19, 1948 - the spouses Serafin Tijam and Felicitas Tagalog commenced Civil Case No. R-660 in the Court of First Instance of Cebu against the spouses Magdaleno Sibonghanoy and Lucia Baguio to recover from the sum of P1,908.00, with legal interest, plus costs. A writ of attachment was issued by the court against defendants' properties, but the same was soon dissolved upon the filing of a counter-bond by defendants and the Manila Surety and Fidelity Co. Court of First Instance of Cebu rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiffs and issued a writ of execution against the defendants. Surety moved to quash the writ but the same was denied. Surety appealed to the CA without raising issue of lack of jurisdiction. Surety then filed Motion to Dismiss on the ground


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of lack of jurisdiction against CFI Cebu in view of the affectivity of Judiciary Act of 1948 a month before the filing of the petition for recovery. Same Act placed original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts all civil actions for demands not exceeding 2,000 exclusive of interest. CA set aside its earlier decision and referred the case to SC Issue: WON Surety bond is estopped from questioning the jurisdiction of the CFI Cebu?. Ruling: Yes. A party may be estopped or barred from raising a question in different ways and for different reasons. Thus we speak of estoppel in pais, or estoppel by deed or by record, and of estoppel by laches. Laches, in a general sense is failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of time, to do that which, by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier; it is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. Furthermore, it has also been held that after voluntarily submitting a cause and encountering an adverse decision on the merits, it is too late for the loser to question the jurisdiction or power of the court "undesirable practice" of a party submitting his case for decision and then accepting the judgment, only if favorable, and attacking it for lack of jurisdiction, when adverse. The facts of this case show that from the time the Surety became a quasi-party

on July 31, 1948, it could have raised the question of the lack of jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of Cebu to take cognizance of the present action by reason of the sum of money involved which, according to the law then in force, was within the original exclusive jurisdiction of inferior courts. It failed to do so. Instead, at several stages of the proceedings in the court a quo as well as in the Court of Appeals, it invoked the jurisdiction of said courts to obtain affirmative relief and submitted its case for a final adjudication on the merits. It was only after an adverse decision was rendered by the Court of Appeals that it finally woke up to raise the question of jurisdiction. Were we to sanction such conduct on its part, We would in effect be declaring as useless all the proceedings had in the present case since it was commenced on July 19, 1948 and compel the judgment creditors to go up their Calvary once more. The inequity and unfairness of this is not only patent but revolting. Case digested by: Danilo P. Lagbas

Cruz v Macias

24

G.R. No. L-28054 June 15, 1972

Doctrine: The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estates of the deceased, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. Facts: Manuel Macias, in behalf of Ricardo Cruz, filed a petition for issuance of letters of administration of the estate


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of Wolfson petition for the issuance of letters of administration over the estate in the Philippines of the late Rosina. This was docketed as Special Proceedings No. 63866. The court granted the petition and appointed Ricardo Cruz as Special Administrator. Meanwhile, in the State of California, U.S.A., the will and codicils of Rosina were presented for probate by the Wells Fargo Bank which was named as executor in the will. The Wells Fargo Bank appointed lawyers in the Philippines, as its attorneyinfact, with authority among others to file ancillary administration proceedings for the estate of Rosina and to act as administrator or administrators of the estate. Consequently, Del Rosario, one of the lawyers, appeared at Branch VIII CFI to move for the conversion of the intestate proceedings into a petition for the probate of Rosina's will and codicils, contending that the will and codicils had been duly probated in the Superior Court of California. On the other hand, petitionerappellant Macias, in his own behalf and without informing his client Ricardo Cruz, filed a similar but separate and independent petition, which was docketed as Spec Pro No. 67302 alleging that he has a legal interest in Rosina's estate and praying for the probate of Rosina's will and codicils as well as for his (Macias') appointment as special administrator. He was appointed as Special Administrator. When the proceedings were transferred to Branch VIII, and dismissing his petition, Macias filed motion for reconsideration contending among other , that he is seeking his own appointment as regular, not ancillary, administrator of Rosina's estate, based simply on his interest

in the estate, without need of any authority from Wells Fargo Bank, which does not and cannot possibly have anything to do with these proceedings because its (WelIs Fargo Bank) appointment by the California Superior Court as executor of Rosina's estate does not extend ex proprio vigore to the Philippines, and that the other Special Proceedings, which is an intestate proceeding merely for the administration of Rosina's estate, is not a probate proceeding. Issue: Whether transfer of special proceedings to the first court, not consolidation of proceedings, is proper. Ruling: Yes. Under Section 1 of Rule 73, Rules of Court,'the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estates of the deceased, shall exercise jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts. Therefore all questions concerning the settlement of the estate of the deceased Wolfson should be filed before Branch VIII of the Manila CFI, where Special Proceedings No. 63866 for the settlement of the testate estate of the deceased Wolfson was filed and is still pending”. The salutary purpose of the rule is to prevent confusion and delay. Consequently, every challenge to the validity of the will, any objection to its authentication, every demand or claim by any heir, legatee or party in interest in intestate or testate succession must be acted upon and decided within the same special proceedings, not in a separate action, and the same judge having jurisdiction in the administration of the estate should take cognizance of the


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question raised, for he will be called upon to distribute or adjudicate the property to the interested parties. Section 1 of Rule 73, speaking as it does of "settlement of the estates of the deceased," applies equally to both testate and intestate proceedings. And the conversion of an intestate proceedings into a testate one is "entirely a matter of form and lies within the sound discretion of the court.” Case Digested by: Hazel M. Barbarona

Rule 74 Balbin v Medalla G.R. No. L-46410

25

October 30, 1981

aforesaid was opposed by petitioners on the ground that Petitioners herein were given either free patent or homestead patent, and original certificates of title in their names issued to them, the latest On October 14, 1959. Respondent filed an action for reconveyance and annulment of titles on August 30, 1973. Subsequently, the lower court decided in favor of the respondent, hence, the petition. The petitioners argued that the cause of action for reconveyance had already prescribed because such action can only be instituted within four (4) years after discovery of the alleged fraud. Complaint was filed only on August 30, 1973 which should have been filed on or before October 14, 1963 or four years from the date of the issuance of the petitioners respective titles which was on October 14, 1959. Issue:

Topic: Summary Settlement of Estates Doctrine: An action for reconveyance of real property resulting from fraud may be barred by the statute of limitations, which requires that the action shall be filed within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud. Facts: Private respondents, on June 19, 1962, purchased from the heirs of Juan Ladao, a large parcel of agricultural land. Said respondents on June 14, 1963, filed an application for registration of title of the said parcel of land. They utilized as evidence of ownership, the Deed of Sale executed in their favor by the heirs of Juan Ladao the Informacion Posesoria together with the tax declarations and receipts and has been paying the tax ever since up to the present. The application for registration of title

Whether or not the action for reconveyance had prescribed. Ruling: Yes. An action for reconveyance of real property resulting from fraud may be barred by the statute of limitations, which requires that the action shall be filed within four (4) years from the discovery of the fraud. Such discovery is deemed to have taken place when the petitioners herein were issued original certificate of title through either homestead or free patent grants, for the registration of said patents constitute constructive notice to the whole world. The complaint was filed by the respondents only on August 30, 1973, or more than 14 years had already elapsed from the date of the issuance of the respective titles of the petitioners.


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of reconveyance 11 years after, beyond the prescriptive period.

Case Digested by: Vanica Irish M. Bungco

Issue: Saludares v CA G.R. No. 128254 January 16, 2004

26

Whether or not the action of the private respondents for reconveyance had prescribed.

Doctrine: Prescription cannot be invoked in an action for reconveyance, that is, when the plaintiff is in possession of the land to be reconveyed.

Facts: At the core of the present controversy is a parcel of land, which includes the conjugal properties of spouses Juan Dator and Pomposa Saludares, known as the Tanza estate. Pomposa died leaving herein petitioners, as her compulsory heirs. Heirs and their father Juan executed a deed of extra-judicial partition of the share of Pomposa in the Tanza estate. Sometime in 1988, the Heirs were informed by their tenant that private respondents cut some 50 coconut trees located within the subject lot. Thus, the Heirs sent a letter to private respondents demanding an explanation for their intrusion into their property and unauthorized felling of trees.

Ruling: Yes. There is but one instance when prescription cannot be invoked in an action for reconveyance, that is, when the plaintiff is in possession of the land to be reconveyed. In a series of cases, this Court permitted the filing of an action for reconveyance despite the lapse of ten years and declared that said action, when based on fraud, is imprescriptible as long as the land has not passed to an innocent purchaser for value. The exception was based on the theory that registration proceedings could not be used as a shield for fraud or for enriching a person at the expense of another. In the case at bar, however, it is the rule rather than the exception which should apply because the private respondents who filed an action for reconveyance, was never in possession of the property in issue, hence, their unexplained inaction for more than 11 years rendered their demand for reconveyance as stale. Case Digested by: Vanica Irish M. Bungco

Private respondents retaliated by filing an action for reconveyance against petitioners. Lower court rendered a decision dismissing the action primarily on the ground of prescription of action. CA reversed the lower court’s decision on the ground that the private respondents are the actual possessor of the property in issue. Hence, prescription should not run against them even if they filed the action

Perez v Ong Chua

27

G.R. No. L-36850 September 23, 1982


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Doctrine: Extinctive prescription under the Court of Civil Procedure, the law in force at the time, was only 10 years. Facts: To secure payment of a loan, the Arcilla spouses mortgaged 23 parcels of land registered in their names to Mrs. NanonWorcester who later on foreclosed the mortgage for violation of the terms of the contract and acquired the said properties in an execution sale. Mrs. Worcester secured titles to the parcels of land on November 24, 1930 and two days later she sold the properties to Enrique Ong Chua who obtained new certificates of title thereto. Upon Enrique’s demise the lands in question passed to his heirs, herein defendants-appellees, who have been in continuous, open and adverse possession of the said properties to date. On October 14, 1968, or 38 years later, Plaintiffs-appellants filed an action for reconveyance of the subject parcels of land. The trial court dismissed the complaint on grounds of prescription and laches. On appeal, appellants contend that the judgment rendered by the court in the foreclosure proceedings in 1930 was erroneous because no substitution was made of one of the defendants who died during the pendency of the action; and since the certificates of title obtained by Mrs. Worcester under said judgment were subject to an implied trust, which is continuing and subsisting, the appellants’ action for reconveyance cannot prescribe because prescription does not run against their predecessor’s title registered under Act No. 496. Issue:

Whether or not the for reconveyance had prescribed.

action

Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court held that the continuous and public assertion of title by appellees and their predecessors-ininterest for 38 years was more than sufficient to extinguish appellants’ action since the period of extinctive prescription under the Court of Civil Procedure, the law in force at the time, was only 10 years; and that appellants’ claim is also barred by laches because of their passivity and inaction for almost four decades. It is the established principle in this jurisdiction that inaction and neglect of a party to assert a right can convert what otherwise could be a valid claim into a stale demand. Case Digested by: Vanica Irish M. Bungco

Rule 75 Baluyut v Paño

28

G.R No. L- 42088 May 7, 1976

Topic: Summary Settlement of Estates Doctrine: Probate of the will is mandatory. Intestate case should be consolidated with the Testate Proceedings and the judge assigned to the Testate Proceeding should continue hearing the two cases. Facts: Soltero Baluyot died on January 6, 1975 at the age of 86, leaving an estate valued at not less than Php2M. A few weeks later, his nephew Alfredo Baluyot


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filed a verified petition for the issuance of letters of administration in his favor, alleging that Encarnacion Lopez Baluyot, Soltero’s widow, was mentally incapable of acting as administratrix of the decedent’s estate. Believing that Soltero executed a will, Alfredo prayed that he be appointed as special administrator in the meantime. The CFI granted Alfredo’s petition.

It is necessary to convert the proceeding in the lower court into a testamentary proceeding. The probate of the will cannot be dispensed with and is a matter of public policy. After the will is probated, the prior letters of administration should be revoked and proceedings for the issuance of letters testamentary or of administration under the will should be conducted.

Mrs. Baluyot filed an opposition to the appointment. She claimed that the allegation as to her mental incapacity was libelous, and that she was unaware that her husband executed a will. Finding that Mrs. Baluyot was mentally qualified, the CFI cancelled Alfredo’s appointment. However, upon filing of a motion for reconsideration, Alfredo’s appointment was again appointed as special administrator, together with Jose Espino, an acknowledged natural child of Soltero. Based on the testimony of Mrs. Baluyot herself, the probate court terminated the appointment of Jose and Alfredo as administrators and ordered that the former be appointed as administratrix, due to her preferential right to be appointed as such. Letters of administration were issued in her favor after posting a Php20,000.00 bond. During the course of the proceedings, the alleged will of the decedent was apparently discovered and presented to the court.

Case Digested by: Vanica Irish M. Bungco

Issue: Whether or not the proceeding in the lower court must be converted into a testamentary proceeding after the alleged will has been presented. Ruling: Yes.

29

CONSTANTINO C. ACAIN v. IAC G.R. No. 72706 October 27, 1987

Topic: Principle Applicable Only Where Instrinsic Invalidity On The Face Of Will Doctrine: As stated by respondent Court, the general rule is that the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testator's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law . The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the will. Synopsis: Constantino filed a petition for the probate of the will of the late Nemesio. The will provided that all his shares from properties he earned with his wife shall be given to his brother Segundo (father of Constantino). In case Segundo dies, all such property shall be given to Segundo’s children. Segundo pre-deceased Nemesio. In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must


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have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it. Petitioner is not the appointed executor, neither a devisee or a legatee there being no mention in the testamentary disposition of any gift of an individual item of personal or real property he is called upon to receive. Facts: On May 1984, Constantino Acain (petitioner hereinafter Acain) filed on the RTC of Cebu City, a petition for the probate of the will of the late Nemesio Acain and for the issuance to Acain of letters testamentary. When Nemesio died, he left a will in which Acain and his siblings were instituted as heirs. The will allegedly executed by Nemesio was submitted by petitioner without objection raised by private respondents. Segundo, the brother of Nemesio, was initially instituted as the heir, in case Segundo pre-deceases Nemesio, Segundo’s childrenwould thensucceed. After the petition was set for hearing, the re spondents (Virginia Fernandez, legally adopt ed daughter of Nemesio, and the latter's widow, Rosa Acain) filed a motion to dismiss on the following grounds: for the petitioner has no legal capacity to institute these proceedings; he is merely a universal heir and the Rosa and Fernandez have been preterited. Motion was denied. After the denial, respondents filed w ith the SC a petition for certiorari and prohi bition with preliminary injunction which was subsequently referred to the IAC. The IAC granted the private respondents' petition and ordered the Trail Court to dismiss the petition for the probate of the will of Nemesio. His MR having been denied, Acain filed this present petition forthereviewof IAC’s decision. ISSUE:

1. Whether or not the authority of the probate courts is limited only to inquiring into the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated and it cannot pass upon the intrinsic validity thereof before it is admitted to probate? 2.Whether or not as an instituted heir, petitioner has the legal interest and standing to file the petition in special proceeding for probate of the will of Nemesio Acain? RULING: 1. No. Special Proceedings is for the probate of a will. As stated by respondent Court, the general rule is that the probate court's authority is limited only to the extrinsic validity of the will, the due execution thereof, the testator's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law. The intrinsic validity of the will normally comes only after the Court has declared that the will has been duly authenticated. The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Under exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and passupon certain provisions of the will. Where circumstances demand that intrinsic validity of testamentary provisions be passed upon even before the extrinsic validity of the will is resolved, the probate court should meet the issue. The remedies of certiorari and prohibition were properly availed of by private respondents. Thepetitionis hereby DENIEDforlack of merit. 2. In order that a person may be allowed to intervene in a probate proceeding he must have an interest in the estate, or in the will, or in the property to be affected by it either as executor or as a claimant of the estate and an interested party is one who would be benefited by the


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estate. Acain, at the outset, appears to have an interest in the will as an heir, however, intestacy having resulted from the preterition of Fernandez and the universal institution of heirs, Acain is in effect not an heir of the testator. He has no legal standing to petition for the probate of the will left by the deceased and must thenbe dismissed. Case Digested by: Larra Mae B. Castanares

30

NEPOMUCENO v. CA G.R. No. L-62952 October 9, 1985

Topic: Exception When Probate Court May Pass Upon Intrinsic Validity – The Principle Of “Practical Considerations” Doctrine: Exception; when probate court may pass upon intrinsic validity-The Principle of “Practical Considerations”. In Probate Proceedings, the court’s area of Inquiry is limited to an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the will. The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. When practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue head on. In this case, a devise given by a married man to his concubine is declared void even if the will was not yet probated. Synopsis: Martin Hugo died on 1974 and he left a will wherein he instituted Sofia Nepomuceno as the sole and only executor. Petitioner (Sofia) filed for the probate of the will but the legal wife and her children opposed alleging that the will was procured through improper and undue influence and that there was an admission of concubinage

with the petitioner. The general rule is that the court's area of inquiry is limited to the an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the will. This general rule is however not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and may pass upon certain provisions of the will. The will itself admitted on its face the relationship between the testator and the petitioner. Facts: Martin Jugo left a duly executed and notarized Last Will and Testament before he died. Petitioner was named as sole executor. It is clearly stated in the Will that he was legally married to a certain Rufina Gomez by whom he had two legitimate children, but he had been estranged from his lawful wife. In fact, the testator Martin Jugo and the petitioner were married despite the subsisting first marriage. The testator devised the free portion of his estate to petitioner. On August 21, 1974, the petitioner filed a petition for probate. On May 13, 1975, Rufina Gomez and her children filed an opposition alleging undue and improper influence on the part of the petitioner; that at the time of the execution of the Will, the testator was already very sick and that petitioner having admitted her living in concubinage with the testator. The lower court denied the probate of the Will on the ground that as the testator admitted in his Will to cohabiting with the petitioner. The Will’s admission to probate will be idle exercise because on the face of the Will, the invalidity of its intrinsic provision is evident. Petitioner appealed to CA. On June 2, 1982, the respondent court set aside the decision of the Court of First


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Instance of Rizal denying the probate of the will. The respondent court declared the Will to be valid except that the devise in favor of the petitioner is null and void. Issue: Whether or not the respondent court acted in excess of its jurisdiction when after declaring the last Will and Testament of the deceased Martin Jugo validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the testamentary provision in favor of herein petitioner? Held: No. The respondent court acted within its jurisdiction when after declaring the Will to be validly drawn, it went on to pass upon the intrinsic validity of the Will and declared the devise in favor of the petitioner null and void. The general rule is that in probate proceedings, the court’s area of inquiry is limited to an examination and resolution of the extrinsic validity of the Will. The rule, however, is not inflexible and absolute. Given exceptional circumstances, the probate court is not powerless to do what the situation constrains it to do and pass upon certain provisions of the Will. We see no useful purpose that would be served if we remand the nullified provision to the proper court in a separate action for that purpose simply because, in the probate of a will, the court does not ordinarily look into the intrinsic validity of its provisions. The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue (Nuguid v. Nuguid).

The Will is void under Article 739. The following donations shall be void: (1) Those made between persons who were guilty of adultery or concubinage at the time of the donation; and Article 1028. The prohibitions mentioned in Article 739, concerning donations inter vivos shall apply to testamentary provisions. There is no question from the records about the fact of a prior existing marriage when Martin Jugo executed his Will. The very wordings of the Will invalidate the legacy because the testator admitted he was disposing the properties to a person with whom he had been living in concubinage. Case Digested by: Larra Mae B. Castanares

SAGUISIN V. LINDAYAG G.R. No. L-17759 December 17, 1962

31

Topic: Executors And Administrators; Appointment; Who May Be Appointed Administrator; When Sister Of Decedent May Not Be Appointed. Doctrine: Where it is undisputed that the decedent left a husband and three legally adopted children, a petition for issuance of letters of administration in favor of the sister of said decedent was properly dismissed for lack of interest in the estate, she being neither an heir nor a creditor thereof. An interest party has been defined in this connection as one who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor.


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Synopsis: Petitioner Petitioner filed with with the court a peti petiti tion on for for the the issu issuan ance ce in her her favo favorr of letters of administration over the estate of the the dece decea ased sed whic hich was opp opposed osed by surviving spouse on the ground of lack of inte intere rest st in the the esta estate te as bein being g neit neithe herr a cred credit itor or nor nor a cred credit itor or.. An “int “inter eres este ted d pers person on”” has has been been defi define ned d as one one who who would be benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. The interest must be mate materi rial al and and dire direct ct,, and and not not mere merely ly indire indirect ct or contin contingen gent. t. It is manife manifest st that that she is not an heir of her deceased sister and, ther theref efor ore, e, has has no mate materi rial al and and dire direct ct interest in her estate. Facts: Maria Maria Linday Lindayag ag died died intest intestat ate. e. Her sister, the petitioner herein, filed with the court a petition for the issuance in her favor of letters of administration over the estate of the the dece deceas ased ed.. Late Laterr on, on, Dion Dionis isio io,, the the surviving spouse, in his behalf and repres represent entati ation on of their their 3 legall legally y adopte adopted d minor children, filed a motion to dismiss the petitio petition n on the ground ground lack lack of intere interest st in the the esta estate te,, she she bein being g neit neithe herr heir heir nor nor a creditor thereof alleging that the deceased was survived by her husband and the three children. In her opposition, petitioner argued the the only only the the fact factss alleg alleged ed in the the peti petiti tion on should be considered. The court ruled that here herein in petit petitio ione nerr is not not an heir, heir, thus thus,, no interest in estate and allowed the extraj extrajudi udicia ciall settle settlemen mentt as petitio petitioned ned by Dionisio. Filed a Motion for reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this appeal. Issue:

Whether or not the petiti itioner is an “inte “intere rest sted ed pers person on”” in the the esta estate te of the the deceased? Ruling: No. Pet Petitio ition ner’s er’s int interes erestt in the the estate estate of the deceas deceased ed Maria Maria V. Linda Lindayag yag was disputed, through a motion to dismiss her petition, by the surviving spouse on the ground that said deceased was survived by him and by three legally adopted children — thus excluding petitioner as an heir. In the course of the hearing held in connection with said motion, evidence was int introdu roducced in supp upport ort the thereof reof which hich accord according ing to the lower lower court, court, establ establish ished ed that said deceased was survived not only by her her husb husban and d but but thre three e lega legall lly y adop adopte ted d child childre ren n name named d Jesu Jesus, s, Conc Concep epci cion on,, and and Catherine, all surnamed Lindayag. Upon these facts — which petitioner does not dispute — it is manifest that she is not not an heir heir of her her dece deceas ased ed sist sister er and, and, ther theref efor ore, e, has has no mate materi ria al and dire direcct interest in her estate. Petitio tioner’s view that when a motion to dismiss a complaint or a petition is fil filed, ed, only the facts allege eged in the comp compla lain intt or peti petitio tion n may may be take taken n into into acco accoun untt is not not enti entire rely ly corr correc ect. t. To the the contrary, the rule is that at said hearing said moti motio on may may be prov proved ed or disp dispro rove ved d in accordance with the rules of evidence, and it has been held that, for that purpose, the hearing should be conducted as an ordinary hearing; and the parties should be allowed to pres presen entt evid eviden ence ce,, exce except pt when when the the moti motio on is base based d on the the fail failu ure of the the complaint or of the petition to state a cause of action. In the present case, case, the motion to dism dismis isss the the peti petiti tion on was was grou ground nded ed on


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petitioner’s lack of legal capacity to institute the procee proceedin dings gs which which,, as alread already y stated stated heretofore, was fully substantiated by the evidence presented during the hearing.

Case Digested by: Larra Mae B. Castanares

32

SPS. AJERO v. CA G.R. No. 106720 September 15, 1994

Topic: Remedy of Certiorari Available Doctrine: A Ass a genera eral rule, le, cou courts in probate proceedings are limited l imited to pass only upon the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be proba probated ted.. Howe However ver,, in excep exceptio tiona nal l instan instances ces,, courts courts are are not not powe powerle rless ss to do what what the situa situatio tion n constr constrain ainss them them to do, do, and pass upon certain provisions of the will. In the the case case at benc bench, h, dece decede dent nt hers hersel elf f indubi indubitab tably ly state stated d in her her holog holograp raphic hic will will that that the the Caba Cabadb dbar aran an prop proper erty ty is in the the name of her late father, John H. Sand (which led oppositor Dr. Jose Ajero to question her conv convey eyan ance ce of the the same same in its entir entiret ety. y.). ). Thus, as correctly held by respondent court, she she cann cannot ot valid validly ly disp dispos ose e of the the whol whole e property, which she shares with her father’s other heirs. Synopsis: Private Private responden respondentt opposed opposed the petitio petition n on the ground groundss that: that: neither neither the testament’s body nor the signature therein was in decedent’s handwriting; it contained alterations and corrections which were not duly signed by decedent; and, the will was procured procured by petitioners petitioners through improper improper pressure and undue influence. The petition was also lso conte ontest sted ed by Dr. Dr. Ajero jero with ith respect to the disposition in the will of a house and lot. He claimed that said property could not be conveyed by

decedent in its entirety, as she was not its sole owner. The trial court held that since it must must dec decide ide only only the the que questio stion n of the the identit identity y of the will, its due execut execution ion and the testamentary capacity of the testatrix, it finds no reason for the disallowance of the will ill for for its its fail failu ure to comp comply ly with ith the the formalities prescribed by law nor for lack of testam testament entary ary capac capacity ity of the testat testatrix rix.. A rea readin ding of Artic rticle le 813 813 show hows tha that its its requ requir irem emen entt affe affect ctss the the vali validi dity ty of the the dispos dispositi itions ons contai contained ned in the hologr holograph aphic ic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of the dispositions, the result is that these dispositions cannot be effectuated. Such failure, however, does not render the whole testament void. Facts: On Janu Januar ary y 20, 20, 1983 1983,, peti petitio tione ners rs instit institute uted d for allow allowanc ance e of the late late Annie Annie Sand’s holographic will. They alleged that at the time of its execution, she was of sound and disposing mind, not acting under duress, fraud or undue influence, and was in every respect capacitated to dispose of her estate by will. This was opposed on the grounds that: neither the testament's body nor the sign signa ature ture ther therei ein n was in deced eceden entt's handw handwriti riting; ng; it contai contained ned altera alteratio tions ns and corrections which were not duly signed by deced deceden ent; t; and, and, the the will will was was proc procur ured ed by petitioners through improper pressure and undue influence. The petition was likewise opposed by Dr. Jose Ajero. He contested the dispo disposi siti tion on in the the will will of a hous house e and and lot lot located located in Cabadbar Cabadbaran, an, Agusan Agusan Del Norte. Norte. He claimed that said property could not be conveyed by decedent in its entirety, as she was not its sole owner. The trial court having found that the hologra holographi phicc will will in questi question on was was writte written n entirely, dated and signed in the


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handwriting of the testatrix with three (3) witnesses to have explicitly and categorically identified the handwriting with which the holographic will in question was written to be the genuine handwriting and sign signat atur ure e of the the test testat atri rixx admi admitt tted ed the the proba probate, te, howeve howeverr on appeal appeal with with CA this this was reversed and the petition for probate was dismissed on the ground that it fails to meet the requirements for its validity by not complying articles 813 and 814 of the NCC whic which h read read,, as follo follows ws:: Art. Art. 813: 813: When When a numb number er of disp dispos osit itio ions ns appe appear arin ing g in a hologr holograph aphic ic will will are signed signed withou withoutt being being date dated, d, and the the last last dispo isposi siti tion on has has a signature and date, such date validates the dispositions preceding it, whatever be the time of prior dispositions. Art. 814: In case of inse insert rtio ion n, canc ancella ellati tio on, eras erasur ure e or alteration in a holographic will, the testator must must auth authen enti tica cate te the the same same by his his full full signature. It alluded to certain dispositions in the will which were either unsigned and undate undated, d, or signed signed but but not dated. dated. It also also foun found d that that the the eras erasur ures es,, alte altera rati tion onss and and cancellati cancellations ons made thereon thereon had not been auth authen enti tica cate ted d by dece decede dent nt.. Thus Thus,, this this appeal. Issue: Whether a holographic will can still be admitt admitted ed to probat probate, e, notwit notwithst hstand anding ing nonnon-co comp mplia lianc nce e with with the the prov provis isio ions ns of Article 8113 and 814 of the NCC Held: Yes. A reading of Article 813 shows that its requirement affects the validity of the dispositions contained in the holographic will, but not its probate. If the testator fails to sign and date some of the disp dispo ositio ition ns, the the res result is that that thes these e dispos dispositio itions ns cannot cannot be effect effectuat uated. ed. Such Such failure, however, does not render the whole

testament void. Likewise, a holographic will can still be admitted to probate notwithst notwithstandin anding g non-compli non-compliance ance with the provisions of Article 814. Unless the authenticated authenticated alterations, cancel cancellat lation ionss or insert insertion ionss were were made made on the the dat date of the the holo hologr gra aphic phic will ill or on testat testator’ or’ss signat signature ure,, their their presen presence ce does does not not inva invali lida date te the the will will itsel itself. f. The The lack lack of authentication will only result in disallowance of such changes. This separation and distinction adds support to the interpretation that only the requirements of Article 810 of the NCC – and and not not thos those e found found in Arti Articl cles es 813 813 and and 814 814 – are are esse essent ntia iall to the the prob probat ate e of a holographic will. Section 9, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court enumerate the grounds for disallowance of wills: (a) If not executed and attested as required by law; (b) If the testator was insane, or otherwise otherwise mentally incapable incapable to make a will, at the time of its execution; (c) (c) If it was was exe execu cute ted d und under er dure duress ss,, or or the influence of fear, or threats; (d) If it wa was pro procured by un undue an and improp improper er pressu pressure re and influe influence nce,, on the part part of the the bene benefi fici ciar ary, y, or of some some othe otherr person for his benefit; (e) (e) If the the sig signa natu ture re of the the tes testa tato torr was was procured by fraud or trick, and he did not intend intend that that the instru instrumen mentt should should be his will ill at the the time time of fix fixing ing his his sign signat atur ure e thereto; These These lists lists are exclus exclusive ive;; no other other grounds can serve to disallow a will. Thus, in a peti petiti tion on to admi admitt a holo hologr grap aphi hicc will will to


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probate, the only issues to be resolved are: (1) whether the instrument submitted is, indeed, the decedent’s last will and testament; (2) whether said will was executed in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law; (3) whether the decedent had the necessary testamentary capacity at the time the will was executed; and, (4) whether the execution of the will and its signing were the voluntary acts of the decedents. The object of the solemnities surrounding the execution of wills is to close the door against bad faith and fraud; accordingly, laws on this subject should be interpreted to attain these primordial ends. In the case of holographic wills, what assures authenticity is the requirement that they be totally authographic or handwritten by the testator himself. Failure to strictly observe other formalities will not result in the disallowance of a holographic will that is unquestionable handwritten by the testator. Case Digested by: Larra Mae B. Castanares

33

TIBURCIA MANAHAN v. ENGRACIA MANAHAN G.R. No. 38050,

Topic: Probation of a Will

Doctrine: The decree of probate is conclusive with respect to the due execution thereof and it cannot impugned on any of the grounds authorized by law, except that of fraud, in any separate or independent action or proceedings. Synopsis: Petitioner is the niece of the testatrix and was named the executrix of the will. The date of the hearing was set

with the necessary notices given and published; since there was no opposition, the will was admitted to probated. A year after, appellant filed a motion for reconsideration praying that the order of the probabte to be vacated and the authenticated will to be declared void. Facts: On August 29, 1930, Tiburcia Manahan instituted special proceedings No. 4162, for the probate of the will of the deceased Donata Manahan, who died in Bulacan, Province of Bulacan, on August 3, 1930. The petitioner herein, niece of the testatrix, was named the executrix in said will. The court set the date for the hearing and the necessary notice required by law was accordingly published. On the day of the hearing of the petition, no opposition thereto was filed and, after the evidence was presented, the court entered the decree admitting the will to probate as prayed for. The will was probated on September 22, 1930. The trial court appointed the herein petitioner executrix with a bond of P1,000, and likewise appointed the committed on claims and appraisal, whereupon the testamentary proceedings followed the usual course. One year and seven months later, that is, on My 11, 1932, to be exact, the appellant herein filed a motion for reconsideration and a new trial, praying that the order admitting the will to probate be vacated and the authenticated will declared null and void ab initio. The appellee herein, naturally filed her opposition to the petition and, after the corresponding hearing thereof, the trial court erred its over of denial on July 1, 1932. Engracia Manahan, under the pretext of appealing from this last order, likewise


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appealed from the judgment admitting the will to probate.

any separate or independent action or proceedings.

Issues:

It is not timely to discuss herein the validity and sufficiency of the execution of the will in question as this question can no more be raised in this case on appeal. After due hearing, the court found that the will in question was valid and effective and the order admitting it to probate, thus promulgated, should be accepted and respected by all. The probate of the will in question now constitutes res judicata.

Whether Engarcia’s contentions are meritous. Ruling: The appellant's first contention is obviously unfounded and untenable. She was not entitled to notification of the probate of the will and neither had she the right to expect it, inasmuch as she was not an interested party, not having filed an opposition to the petition for the probate thereof. Her allegation that she had the status of an heir, being the deceased's sister, did not confer on her the right to be notified on the ground that the testatrix died leaving a will in which the appellant has not been instituted heir. Furthermore, not being a forced heir, she did not acquire any successional right. Second contention is puerile. There is no essential difference between the authentication of the will and the probate thereof. All the law requires is that the competent court declared that in the execution of the will the essential external formalities have been complied with and that, in view thereof, the document, as a will, is valid and effective in the eyes of the law. The last contention of the appellant may be refuted merely by stating that, once a will has been authenticated and admitted to probate, questions relative to the validity thereof can no more be raised on appeal. The decree of probate is conclusive with respect to the due execution thereof and it cannot impugned on any of the grounds authorized by law, except that of fraud, in

Case digested by: Michael L. Cutor

34

HEIRS OF LATE JESUS FRAN v. BERNARDO SALAS G.R. L-53546 June 25, 1992

Topic: Distinguish Incompetency of Guardian from Incompetency of Person Under Guardianship Doctrine: Failure to attach original of will to petition not critical where will itself was adduced in evidence. It is not necessary to attach original will to petition for probate. The annexing of the original will to the petition is not a jurisdictional requirement is clearly evident in Sec 1 Rule 76 which allows the filing of a petition for probate by persons named therein, regardless of whether or not he is in possession of the will, or the same is lost or destroyed. Facts: Remedios M. Vda. de Tiosejo died with neither descendants nor ascendants. She left real and personal properties wherein she bequeathed to her collateral relatives


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(brothers, sisters, nephews and nieces) all her properties, and designated Rosario Tan or, upon the latter's death, Jesus Fran, as executor. Jesus Fran filed a petition for the probate of Remedios' last will and testament. The petition alleged that Rosario Tan is not physically well. The court appointed petitioner Jesus Fran as special administrator. Private respondents, filed a manifestation alleging that they needed time to study the petition. However, private respondents did not file any opposition. Instead, they filed a "Withdrawal of Opposition to the Allowance of Probate (sic) of the Will" wherein they expressly manifested that they have no objection to the will. The petition thus became uncontested. During the initial hearing, petitioner Fran introduced the requisite evidence to establish the jurisdictional facts. The probate court rendered a decision admitting to probate the will of the testatrix and appointing petitioner Fran as executor. Subsequently, a Project of Partition based on the dispositions made in the will and signed by all the devisees and legatees was submitted, with the exception of Luis Fran, Remedios C. Mejia and respondent Concepcion M. Espina. Said legatees and devisees submitted certifications wherein they admit receipt of a copy of the Project of Partition together with the notice of hearing. After the hearing on the Project of Partition, the court ordered the administrator to deliver to the said parties their respective shares and decreeing the proceedings closed. Thereafter, the aforesaid Branch VIII of the Court of First Instance of Cebu was

converted to a Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. Branch XVII (Davao City) of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, presided over by herein respondent Judge, was transferred to Cebu City and renumbered as Branch VIII. (so napalitan yung judge na humahawak ng case then yung private respondents biglang naisipang kontrahin yung unang decision ng court—oppose to the allowance of the will) Private respondents filed with the new Branch VIII an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration of the probate judgment and asked the court to declare the proceedings still open and admit their opposition to the allowance of the will. Notwithstanding petitioners' objections, respondent Judge issued an Order setting for hearing the said Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioners filed a Motion to Dismiss the Omnibus and to Reconsider the 26 February 1980 Order setting it for hearing on 17 April 1980, but the respondent Judge denied it for lack of merit Petitioners filed a Supplemental Petition asking this Court to restrain respondent Judge from reopening the case. Respondent Judge issued the impugned order declaring the testamentary dispositions of the will void, and converting the same into an intestate proceeding. Issue: Whether or not it is necessary that the original copy of the will be presented for the court to acquire jurisdiction for the allowance of the will Ruling: Respondent Judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of


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jurisdiction when he granted the Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration and ordered the conversion of the testate proceedings into one of intestacy. private respondents filed on the day of the initial hearing of the petition their "Withdrawal of Opposition To Allowance of Probate (sic) Will" wherein they unequivocally state that they have no objection to the allowance of the will. In testate proceedings, a decision logically precedes the project of partition, which is normally an implementation of the will and is among the last operative acts to terminate the proceedings. Pivate respondents claim that the trial court never acquired jurisdiction over the petition because only the English translation of the will — and not a copy of the same — was attached to the petition; the Court already ruled that it is not necessary that the original of the will be attached to the petition. "The original of said document [the will] must be presented or sufficient reasons given to justify the non-presentation of said original and the acceptance of the copy or duplicate thereof." The annexing of the original will to the petition is not a jurisdictional requirement is clearly evident in Section 1, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court which allows the filing of a petition for probate by the person named therein regardless of whether or not he is in possession of the will, or the same is lost or destroyed.

court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed. Private respondents had lost their right to file a petition for relief from judgment, it appearing that their omnibus motion for reconsideration was filed exactly six (6) years, ten (10) months and twentytwo (22) days after the rendition of the decision, and six (6) years, one (1) month and thirteen (13) days after the court issued the order approving the Project of Partition, to which they voluntarily expressed their conformity through their respective certifications, and closing the testate proceedings. Private respondents' contention that the order approving the Project of Partition and closing the proceedings is null and void because the Project of Partition did not contain a notice of hearing and that they were not notified of the hearing thereon. In truth, in her own certification 55 dated 5 September 1973, private respondent Concepcion M. Espina admitted that she "received a copy of the Project of Partition and the Notice of Hearing in the aboveentitled proceeding, and that she has no objection to the approval of the said Project of Partition." the instant petition and supplemental petitions are GRANTED Case digested by: Romeca Kate Pepito

Rule 76

Sec. 1. Who may petition for the allowance of will. — Any executor, devisee, or legatee named in a will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the 45 | P a g e Pr o of re a d

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(35%) of the property that Rosa may receive upon the probate of the will.

LEVISTE v CA G.R. No. L-29184, January 30, 1989

35

Topic: One who is only indirectly interested in a will may not interfere in its probate Doctrine: The reason for the rule excluding strangers from contesting the will, is not that thereby the court maybe prevented from learning facts which would justify or necessitate a denial of probate, but rather that the courts and the litigants should not be molested by the intervention in the proceedings of persons with no interest in the estate which would entitle them to be heard with relation thereto. Synopsis: The petitioner lawyer entered into a contingency contract with respondent; wherein he will be recovering the 35% of the property that the latter may receive. Respondent sent a letter to Leviste terminating his services for conflict of interest. Thus, prompted the latter to file a claim for attorney’s fees. The contract for contingent attorney’s fees neither gives, nor purports to give, to the lawyer any right whatsoever, personal or real, in and to her aforesaid share in the conjugal partnership. FACTS: On September 7, 1963, the petitioner, a practicing attorney, entered into a written agreement with the private respondent Rosa del Rosario to appear as her counsel in a petition for probate of the holographic will of the late Maxima C. Reselva. Under the will, a piece of real property at Sales Street, Quiapo, Manila, was bequeathed to Del Rosario. It was agreed that petitioner's contigent fee would be thirty-five per cent

On August 20, 1965, Leviste received a letter from Ms. Del Rosario, informing him that she was terminating his services as her counsel due to "conflicting interest." On September 20, 1965, petitioner filed a "Motion to Intervene to Protect His Rights to Fees for Professional Services. The trial court denied his motion on the ground that he had "not filed a claim for attorney's fees nor recorded his attorney's lien. Petitioner then filed a "Formal Statement of Claim for Attorney's Fees and Recording of Attorney's Lien,' which was noted in the court's order of December 20, 1965. Although the order denying his motion to intervene had become final, petitioner continued to receive copies of the court's orders, as well the pleadings of the other parties in the case. He also continued to file pleadings. The case was submitted for decision without the respondents' evidence. On November 23, 1966, Del Rosario and Rita Banu, the special administratrixlegatee, filed a "Motion to Withdraw Petition for Probate" alleging that Del Rosario waived her rights to the devise in her favor and agreed that the De Guzman brothers and sisters who opposed her petition for probate, shall inherit all the properties left by the decedent. In an order of April 13, 1967 the trial court denied the motion to withdraw the petition for being contrary to public . Nonetheless, on August 28, 1967, the court disallowed the will, holding that the legal requirements for its validity were not satisfied as only two witnesses testified that


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the will and the testatrix's signature were in the handwriting of Maxima Reselva. The petitioner filed an appeal bond, notice of appeal, and record on appeal. The private respondents filed a motion to dismiss the appeal on the ground that petitioner was not a party in interest. The petitioner opposed the motion to dismiss his appeal, claiming that he has a direct and material interest in the decision sought to be reviewed. He also asked that he be substituted as party-petitioner, in lieu of his former client, Ms. Del Rosario. On March 28, 1968, the trial judge dismissed the appeal and denied petitioner's motion for substitution. The petitioner filed in the Court of Appeals a petition for mandamus. The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for being insufficient in form and substance as the petitioner did not appear to be the proper party to appeal the decision in Special Proceeding No. 58325. Upon the denial of his motion for reconsideration, petitioner appealed by certiorari. ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioner appears not to be the proper party to appeal the decision in Sp. Proc. No. 58325 of the Court of First Instance of Manila. RULING: Under his first assignment of error, petitioner argues that by virtue of his contract of services with Del Rosario, he is a creditor of the latter, and that under Article 1052 of the Civil Code which provides: ART. 1052. If the heir repudiates the inheritance to the prejudice of his own creditors, the latter may petition the court to authorize them to accept it in the name of the heir.

The acceptance shall benefit the creditors only to an extent sufficient to cover the amount of their credits. The excess, should there be any, shall in no case pertain to the renouncer, but shall be adjudicated to the persons to whom, in accordance with the rules established in this Code, it may belong. The argument is devoid of merit. Article 1052 of the Civil Code does not apply to this case. That legal provision protects the creditor of a repudiating heir. Petitioner is not a creditor of Rosa del Rosario. The payment of his fees is contingent and dependent upon the successful probate of the holographic will. Since the petition for probate was dismissed by the lower court, the contingency did not occur. Attorney Leviste is not entitled to his fee. Furthermore, Article 1052 presupposes that the obligor is an heir. Rosa del Rosario is not a legal heir of the late Maxima C. Reselva. Upon the dismissal of her petition for probate of the decedent's will, she lost her right to inherit any part of the latter's estate. There is nothing for the petitioner to accept in her name. The Court of Appeals did not err in dismissing the petition for mandamus, for while it is true that, as contended by the petitioner, public policy favors the probate of a will, it does not necessarily follow that every will that is presented for probate, should be allowed. The law lays down procedures which should be observed and requisites that should be satisfied before a will may be probated. Those procedures and requirements were not followed in this case resulting in the disallowance of the will. There being no valid will, the motion to withdraw the probate petition was inconsequential.


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Petitioner was not a party to the probate proceeding in the lower court. He had no direct interest in the probate of the will. His only interest in the estate is an indirect interest as former counsel for a prospective heir. WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is denied for lack of merit. Case digested by: Michael L. Cutor

36

G.R. No. 78590 June 20 1988 of

Executor

Facts: Manolito de Guzman died intestate. Elaine de Guzman (surviving spouse) filed petition for settlement of intestate estate of the decedent before RTC Makati, alleging the following: (1) Manolito died in Makati, as a resident of Makati, left properties which were acquired after the marriage of Manolito and Elaine (thus Conjugal property);

DE GUZMAN v ANGELES

Topic: Appointment Administrator

appointed proves his qualifications, and the oppositors contests it.

or

Doctrine: The requirement of a hearing and the notification to all the known heirs and other interested parties as to the date thereof is essential to the validity of the proceeding for the appointment of an administrator "in order that no person may be deprived of his right or property without due process of law. Synopsis: This is a dispute between the surviving spouse as the appointed adminstratrix and the father-in-law as to the properties allegedly belonging to the estate of the deceased but was being claimed by, and was in the possession of, the father in law. Father in law now assails the appointment of daughter in law as special administratrix, as well as the order for writ of possession, even before notice was given to him. Court held that notice is needed, even for the appointment of a special administrator, as it is a position of trust and confidence which needs notice (to inform interested parties) and hearing where the petitioner who seeks to be

(2) The compulsory heirs are Elaine (Surviving Spouse) and 2 minor Children; (3) and

Manolito died intestate (w/o a will);

(4) Elaine isthe most preferred to be the administrator. The special administratrix filed a motion for writ of possession over 5 of Manolito's vehicles (who were in the possession of Manolito's father - Pedro de Guzman - the petitioner) and granted by the probate court. The Petitioner made appearance and sought for extension to file opposition to the Motion for writ of possession. Respondent filed Ex-Parte Motion to be appointed as the Special Administatrix. The motion was set for hearing and all parties directed to be notified but no notice was given to the petitioner. The RTC granted Elaine as the special administratrix and the motion for assistance of some military men and/or policemen to assist Elaine in preserving the estate of Manolito. Elaine tried to enforce order. Pedro de Guzman (petitioner) resisted,


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resulting in a "near shoot-out between members of the Makati Police and CAPCOM soldiers which was diffused by the arrival of Mayor Binay and the agreement that the bulldozer sought to be taken be placed in Mayor Binay's custody while the parties sought for clarification. The order only covers properties of the estate, not those claimed by the petitioner. Pedro then filed a motion, which he gave a list of properties he claimed he owns and also filed this petition to annul the orders given by the court. Issue:

In this case, there was no notice before the court and it acted on the motion of Elaine to be the Special Administratrix and issued a writ of possession of alleged properties of the deceased person. It also granted the motion for assistance to preserve the estate of Manolito.If notice was given, then the creditors and other interested persons could have participated in the proceedings. Since Elaine immediately filed a motion to have herself appointed as administratrix, Pedro, the biggest creditor of the estate who has the largest interest in it, is prejudiced. Case Digested by: Michael L. Cutor

Whether a probate court may appoint a special administratrix and issue a writ of possession of alleged properties of a decedent for the preservation of the estate in a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of the said deceased person even before the probate court causes notice to be served upon all interested parties pursuant to section 3, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules of Court. Held: The probate court, in accordance with Rule 79 Section 3 enunciates that the parties must first cause notice through publication of petition. The purpose is to bring all interested persons within the court's jurisdiction so that the judgment therein becomes binding on all the world. If there is no notice, the proceeding for settlement of estate is void and should be annulled or else, it may deprive a person of his property w/o due process of law. The court orders affecting other persons subsequent to the petition filed are void and subject to annulment.

DE ARANZ v THE HON. NICOLAS GALING G.R. No. 77047 May 28, 1988

37

Topic: Notice of probate proceedings Doctrine: The requirement of the law for the allowance of will was not satisfied by mere publication of notice of hearing. Notice of hearing to the designated heirs, legatees and devisees are required. It is a proceedings in rem and for the validity of such proceedings personal notice or by publication or both to all interested parties must be made. The interested parties in the case were known to reside in the Philippines. The evidence shows that no such notice was received by the interested parties residing in the Philippines. Synopsis: Respondent filed a petition for the probate of the will of Monseratt Infante Y Pola. Thereafter, the probate court issued an order for the requisite hearing and the judge complied with the mandatory three


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week publication of the order. Come hearing date, no oppositor appeared and so the judge reset the hearing date. No oppositor made manifestation on the later date, compelling the judge to request for the submission of evidence ex-parte. Respondent immediately presented evidence that same day. Petitioners made an appearance contesting the probate on the ground that no notice was ever sent to them and requested ten days to file an opposition. Petitioners assert that failure to notify the legatees/devisees deprives the court of jurisdiction. Joaquin opposing, garnered the affirmation of both the RTC and CA

stand. During the proceedings, private respondent was appointed executor.

FACTS:

Thereafter, petitioners filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition which was, however, referred to the Court of Appeals. On 13 January 1987, the Court of Appeals promulgated a decision dismissing the petition. Hence, the instant petition.

On 3 March 1986, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 166, a petition for the probate and allowance of the last will and testament of the late Montserrat R-Infante y G-Pola The petition specified the names and addresses of herein petitioners as legatees and devisees. On 12 March 1986, the probate court issued an order setting the petition for hearing on 5 May 1986 at 8:30 o'clock in the morning. Said order was published in the "Nueva Era" A newspaper of general circulation in Metro Manila once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks. On the date of the hearing, no oppositor appeared. There being no opposition to this instant case, as prayed for, the oner to-receive Branch Clerk of Court is hereby designated Co evidence ex-parte of the petitioner. On the same day (12 May 1986), private respondent presented his evidence ex-parte and placed Arturo Arceo one of the testamentary witnesses, on the witness

On 14 May 1986, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the order of 12 May 1986 alleging that, as named legatees, no notices were sent to them as required by Sec. 4, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court and they prayed that they be given a period of ten (10) days within which to file their opposition to the probate of the will. On 30 May 1986, the probate court, acting on the opposition of private respondent and the reply thereto of petitioners, issued an order denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.

ISSUE: Whether probate may proceed despite the failure of personal notice to the legatees and devisees? RULING: No. The probate proceedings was mired in procedural lapses which deprived the court of jurisdiction. The pertinent rule follows: SEC. 4. Heirs, devisees, legatees, and executors to be notified by mail or personally. — The court shall also cause copies of the notice of the time and place fixed for proving the will to be addressed to the designated or other known heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator resident in the Philippines at their places of


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residence, and deposited in the post office with the postage thereon prepaid at least twenty (20) days before the hearing, if such places of residence be known. A copy of the notice must in like manner be mailed to the person named as executor, if he be not the petitioner; also, to any person named as coexecutor not petitioning, if their places of residence be known. Personal service of copies of the notice at least ten (10) days before the day of hearing shall be equivalent to mailing.

the testate proceeding and the judge assigned to the testate proceeding should continue hearing the two cases.

The CA’s ruling that notification was merely a matter of convenience sits in stark disregard of the law which makes notice mandatory. Probate is a proceeding in rem and for the validity of such proceedings personal notice or by publication or both to all interested parties must be made. The will and the alleged probate thereof cannot be said to have been done in accordance with the accepted basic and fundamental concepts and principles followed in the probate and allowance of wills. The Supreme Court remanded the case to the RTC for further proceedings after nullifying the CA.

Edward M. Grimm, an American Resident of Manila, died at 78 in the Makati Medical Center on November 27, 1977. He was survived by his second wife, Maxine Tate Grimm (Maxine) and their two children, named Edward Miller Grimm II (Pete) and Linda Grimm and by Juanita Grimm Morris and Ethel Grimm Roberts (Ethel), his two children by a first marriage which ended in divorce.

Case digested by: Michael L. Cutor

38

Ethel Grimm Roberts v Judge Ramos R. Leonida G.R. No. L-55509 A ril 27 1984

Topic: Separate wills may be probated jointly Doctrine: It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated with

Synopsis: Edward M. Grimm, an American resident of Manila, died living two wills disposing his properties in California and in the Philippines. His heirs, both in his previous and subsequent marriage, are having a common dispute as to the distribution of properties of the deceased. Facts:

He executed two wills in San Francisco, California. One will disposed of his Philippine estate and the second will disposed of his estate outside of the Philippines which he described as conjugal property of himself and his second wife. The two wills and a codicil were presented for probate by Maxine in the Third Judicial District Court of Utah. Maxine admitted that she received notice of the intestate petition in Manila by Ethel. Grimm’s second wife and two children alleged that the intestate proceeding in Manila is void. Maxine and Ethel, with knowledge of the intestate proceeding in Manila, entered into a compromise agreement in Utah regarding the estate. An intestate proceeding was instituted by Ethel; and Maxine filed an opposition and motion to dismiss the intestate proceeding on the


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ground of pendency of the Utah probate proceedings. She submitted to the court a copy of Grimm’s will. Despite the compromise agreement, Maxine withdrew the opposition and the motion to dismiss. The court ignored the will found in the record and proceeded with the partition of the estate. Maxine then filed a petition praying for the probate of the two wills (already probated in Utah), that the partition approved by the intestate court be set aside and the letters of administration revoked, that Maxine be appointed executrix and Ethel be ordered to account for the properties received by them and return the same to Maxine. Maxine alleged that they were defrauded due to the machinations of Ethel, that the compromise agreement was illegal and the intestate proceeding was void because Grimm died testate so partition was contrary to the decedent’s wills. This prompted Ethel to file a motion to dismiss the petition which was denied by Judge Leonidas for lack of merit. Issue: Whether or not the testate proceedings in Utah should be dismissed Ruling: A testate proceeding is proper in this case because Grimm died with two wills and “No will shall pass either real or personal property unless it is proved or allowed”. The probate of the will is mandatory. It is anomalous that the estate of a person who died testate should be settled in an intestate proceeding. Therefore, the intestate case should be consolidated with the testate proceeding and the judge

assigned to the intestate proceeding should continue hearing the two case. Prepared by: Abdul Adap

Rule 78

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PCIB v. Hon. Venicio Escolin, et. al. G.R. NO. L- 27860 and L-27896 March 29, 1974

Topic: Joint Administration Preferred Doctrine: In order that a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased person may be deemed ready for final closure, (1) there should have been issued already an order of distribution or assignment of the estate of the decedent among or to those entitled thereto by will or by law, but (2) such order shall not be issued until after it is shown that the “debts, funeral expenses, expenses of administration, allowances, taxes, etc. chargeable to the estate” have been paid, which is but logical and proper. (3) Besides, such an order is usually issued upon proper and specific application for the purpose of the interested party or parties, and not of the court. Elementary is the rule that foreign laws may not be taken judicial notice of and have to be proven like any other fact in dispute between the parties in any proceeding. Synopsis: Hodges, an American citizen from Texas and domiciled in the Philippines made a will, leaving her entire estate to her


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husband. However it was also stated in her will that should her husband die, all of the estate will be turned over to her brother and sister. When Mr. Hodges died Magno was the appointed administratrix which was later on replaced by PCIB. PCIB contending that Mrs. Hodges’ will instituting her siblings is not a valid substitution. Facts: The instant cases refer to the estate left by the late Charles Newton Hodges (Mr. Hodges) as well as that of his wife, Linnie Jane Hodges (Mrs. Hodges), both citizens of Texas, U.S.A. Mrs. Hodges predeceased Mr. Hodges. In their respective wills which were executed on different occasions, each one of them provided mutually as follows: "I give, devise and bequeath all of the rest, residue and remainder (after funeral and administration expenses, taxes and debts) of my estate, both real and personal, wherever situated or located, to my beloved (spouse) to have and to hold unto (him/her) — during (his/her) natural lifetime", subject to the condition that upon the death of whoever of them survived the other, the remainder of what he or she would inherit from the other is "give(n), devise(d) and bequeath(ed)" to the brothers and sisters of the latter. Mr. Hodges was appointed special administrator of Mrs. Hodge’s estate. On December 25, 1962, Mr. Hodges died. Avelina A. Magno (Avelina) was then appointed as Administratrix for both Estate of Mr. Hodges and Mrs. Hodges but eventually replaced by PCIB for the estate of Mr. Hodges. PCIB contended that the estate of Mrs. Hodges has already been in effect closed with the virtual adjudication in the previous orders of the court of her whole

estate to Mr. Hodges, and that, therefore, Avelina had already ceased since then to have any estate to administer and the brothers and sisters of Mrs. Hodges have no interests whatsoever in the estate left by Mr. Hodges. Additionally, PCIB maintains that the provision in Mrs. Hodges' will instituting her brothers and sisters in the manner therein specified is in the nature of a testamentary substitution, but inasmuch as the purported substitution is not, in its view, in accordance with the pertinent provisions of the Civil Code, it is ineffective and may not be enforced. It is further contended that, in any event, inasmuch as the Hodges spouses were both residents of the Philippines, the estate left by Mrs. Hodges could not be more than one-half of her share of the conjugal partnership, notwithstanding the fact that she was citizen of Texas, U.S.A. Avelina claimed that the applicable law to the will of Mrs. Hodges is that of Texas under which there is no system of legitime, hence, the estate of Mrs. Hodges cannot be less than her share or one-half of the conjugal partnership properties. Issues: Whether or not the special proceeding for settlement of Mrs. Hodges’ estate should already be closed. Whether or not the Texas law is applicable. Held: No. The court orders furnish no basis for the final adjudication to Mr. Hodges of the estate of Mrs. Hodges, and what is more, at the time said orders were issued, the proceedings had not yet reached the point when a final distribution and adjudication could be made. At best,


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therefore, said orders merely allowed Mr. Hodges to dispose of portions of his inheritance in advance of final adjudication, which is implicitly permitted under Section 2 of Rule 109, there being no possible prejudice to third parties. The provision in the will of Mrs. Hodges made it imperative that the conjugal partnership be promptly liquidated, in order that the "rest, residue and remainder" of Mrs. Hodges’ share thereof, as of the time of Mr. Hodges' death, may be readily known and identified, however, no such liquidation was ever undertaken. The case is remanded for further proceedings and resolution in the first instance by the court a quo. The question of what are the pertinent laws of Texas and what would be the estate of Mrs. Hodges under them is basically one of fact, and considering the respective positions of the parties in regard to said factual issue, it can already be deemed as settled for the purposes of these cases that, indeed, the free portion of said estate that could possibly descend to her brothers and sisters by virtue of her will may not be less than one-fourth of the conjugal estate, it appearing that the difference in the stands of the parties has reference solely to the legitime of Mr. Hodges, PCIB being of the view that under the laws of Texas, there is such a legitime of one-fourth of said conjugal estate and Avelina contending, on the other hand, that there is none. In other words, hereafter, whatever might ultimately appear, at the subsequent proceedings, to be actually the laws of Texas on the matter would no longer be of any consequence, since PCIB would anyway be in estoppel already to claim that the estate of Mrs. Hodges should be less than as contended by it now, for admissions by a

party related to the effects of foreign laws, which have to be proven in our courts like any other controverted fact, create estoppel. Case Digested by: Dafodille Dinero

De Parreno v. Aranzanso G.R. No. L-27657 August 5, 1986

40

Topic: An administrator does not have to be an heir. He can be a stranger to the deceased. Doctrine: In the estate of the deceased, an administration need not be that of the heir of the deceased. It may be a stranger to the deceased. Any person may be an administrator of the deceased estate insofar as it is not contrary to Rule 78, Section 1. Synopsis: During the intestate proceedings of the decedent, the court appointed only special administrators until a person claiming to be her first cousin prayed that she be appointed as the regular administrator. Her appointment as administrator was revoked; appointing another person as administratrix. Facts: Juliana Reyes died in intestate. Her substantial estate is still being settled in Special Proceedings No. 34354 of the First Court of Instance of Manila, Branch IV. The estate had only special administrators until Aranzanso who claims to be first cousin of the decedent asked that she be appointed regular administrator. CFI Manila issued an order appointing Aranzanso as regular


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administrator relieving Arceli Pilapil as special administrator. CA reversed the CFI ruling revoking Aranzanso as regular administrator and appointing the petitioner Paulina R. Santos, adoptive daughter of the decedent. Issue: Whether the CA erred in removing the appellant as regular administrarix of the estate of Juliana Reyes. Ruling: Yes, it stands to reason that the appellant having been appointed as regular administrator can only be removed from her office but only for a cause or caused provided by law which is found on Rule 82, Section 2. Aranzanso, may not have the right to intervene in the settlement proceedings as an heir of Juliana Reyes but an administrator may be a stranger to the estate of the decedent.

Synopsis: Upon the death of the decedent, the court appointed two administratrices, however, Gonzales was removed as coadministrator of the estate on the ground that she had been absent from the country because she was attending to her ailing husband. Facts: Dona Ramona is survived by her four children who are her only heirs namely, Asterio Favis, Beatriz F. Gonzales, Teresa F. Olbes, and Cecilia Favis-Gomez. On 25 October 1983, the court a quo appointed petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales and private respondent Teresa Olbes as coadministratices of the estate. While petitioner was in the US accompanying her ailing husband who was receiving medical treatment in that country, Private Respondent filed motion to remove the Petitioner as co-adminstratrix, on the ground that she is incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust and had committed acts and ommisions detrimental to the interest of the estate and the heirs.

Case Digested by: Erniel Peter G. Dael

Gonzales v. Aguinaldo G.R. No. 74769 September 28, 1990

41

court, which it deems sufficient or substantial to warrant the removal of the administrator. In making such a determination, the court must exercise good judgment, guided by law and precedents.

Topic: Interest in Estate is the Principal Consideration Doctrine: While it is conceded that the court is invested with ample discretion in the removal of an administrator, it however must have some fact legally before it in order to justify a removal. There must be evidence of an act or omission on the part of the administrator not conformable to or in disregard of the rules or the orders of the

Beatriz F. Gonzales was removed as co-administratrix of the estate also on the ground that she had been absent from the country since October 1984 and had not returned as of 15 January 1985, the date of the questioned order, leaving respondent Olbes alone to administer the estate. IN here motion, it appears too that petitioner's absence from the country was known to respondent Olbes, and that the latter and petitioner Gonzales had continually


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maintained correspondence with each other with respect to the administration of the estate during the petitioner's absence from the country; and while in the United States, sent respondent Olbes a letter addressed to the Land Bank of the Philippines dated 14 November 1984, and duly authenticated by the Philippine Consulate in San Francisco, authorizing her (Olbes) to receive, and collect the interests accruing from the Land Bank bonds belonging to the estate, and to use them for the payment of accounts necessary for the operation of the administration. Issue: Whether the removal of the coadminstrator is valid under Rule 82, Section 2 of ROC? Ruling: No. As the appointment of petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales was valid, and no satisfactory cause for her removal was shown, the court a quo gravely abused its discretion in removing her. Stated differently, petitioner Beatriz F. Gonzales was removed without just cause. Her removal was therefore improper. The petitioner had never abandoned her role as co-administratrix of the estate nor had she been remiss in the fullfilment of her duties. Suffice it to state, temporary absence in the state does not disqualify one to be an administrator of the estate. A temporary residence outside of the state, maintained for the benefit of the health of the executors' family, is not such a removal from the state as to necessitate his removal as executor. Case Digested by: Erniel Peter G. Dael

Capistrano v. Nadurata, G.R. No. L-18754 September 26, 1992

42

Topic: Thirty-day Period May Be Waived Doctrine: Just as the order of preference is not absolute, and may be disregarded for a valid cause despite the mandatory tenor in the opening sentence of Rule 78 for its observance, so may the 30-day period be likewisee waived under the permissive tone in the paragraph (b) of said rule which merely provides that said letters as an alternative, “may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors”. Synopsis: Upon appointment of the special administrator, such was opposed by two persons claiming to be the deceased’s nearest relatives; the same was intervened by Nadurata asserting to be the surviving spouse of the latter and praying that the letters of administration be issued to him. The selection of an administrator of the estate of the deceased lies within the discretion of the court. Facts: The lower court appointed Justo Buera as special administrator of the estate of the deceased, Petra delos Santos. The application was opposed by Pedro and Juan de los Santos who prayed that they be appointed as the administrators, which was intervened by Leon Nadurata, asserting himself to be the surviving spouse of the Petra, also praying that the letters of administration be issued in his favor. After a hearing, it decided the controversy, declaring Leon Nadurata not to be the surviving spouse of Petra de los Santos and that the latter’s nearest


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relatives are not the opponents Pedro de los Santos and Juan de los Santos who allege themselves to be, but are not, brothers of the deceased; the applicants Capistrano, who are her true brothers by the same mother. Upon these findings, the lower court confirmed the appointment of Justo Buera as administrator of the estate. Issue: Whether Leon Nadurata is the husband of the said deceased, and whether the applicants, or the opponents Santos, are her nearest relatives.

Mendiola v. CA G.R. No. 92999 October 11, 1990

43

Topic:Co-Administrators Appointed

May

Be

Doctrine: The determination of a person’s suitability for the office of the judicial administrator rests, to a great extent, in the sound judgement of the court exercising the power of appointment and said judgment is not to be interfered with on appeal unless the said court is clearly in error.

Ruling: No.The selection of an administrator of the estate of the deceased lies within the discretion of the court and the record does not contain anything tending to show an abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court, its ruling is right and just; for the evidence shows that Nadurata is not the surviving spouse of Petra de los Santos, and the opponents Pedro de los Santos and Juan de los Santos are not, as they pretend to be brothers of the deceased.

Synopsis: This is a contest between two brothers for the appointment as executor of their father’s estate. The respondents presented evidence against petitioner, Reynaldo, contending that the latter failed to render and accounting of the estate and settle the same in according to law. The petitioner assails the decision of the CA removing him as an executor of the estate of his late father and appointing his brother in his stead. Facts:

However, the declarations of heirs made by the lower court is premature, although the evidence sufficiently shows who are entitled to succeed the deceased. The proceedings have not yet reached the stage of distribution of the estate which must come after the inheritance is liquidated. Hence, the declaration of heirs is still premature and must wait for that stage of the proceedings that heirs may be declared to succeed the deceased. Case Digested by: Erniel Peter G. Dael

Carlos Mendiola died on December 28, 1984 and was survived by his spouse, Florentina and his children namely, Reynaldo, Redentor, Ernistina, Manuel, Enrico, Ricardo, and Marilou all surnamed Mendiola. A Petition for probate of the decedent’s will was filed on March 30, 1987 with RTC-Pasig. Said court allowed the will and issued letters of testamentary in favor of the Petitioner who was declared executor in the will. Later on, private respondents moved for the removal of the executor and subsequently moved for the appointment of Redentor. Sufficient evidence was adduced in the proceedings in


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the RTC, wherein petitioner failed to pay the estate tax; and that petitioner failed to render an accounting of the estate and settle the same according to law. The motion was granted and Petitioner was removed. Redentor was declared executor and a motion for reconsideration was filed by the petitioner but was denied by the RTC. On the CA, it affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Issue: Was the removal of the Petitioner as executor proper? Ruling: Yes, there was sufficient evidence to support his removal namely, the failure to pay the estate tax and to render an accounting of the estate and settle the same according to law, and has involved the other heirs in a suit because of his own deeds. Thus, his removal is valid under Rule 82, Section 2. Under this provision, the court which appointed the executor has the discretion to remove the same. Case Digested by: Erniel Peter G. Dael

Rule 80

44

De Roxas v. Pecson, et. al. G.R. NO. L- 2211 December 20, 1948

Topic: When Special Administrator may be Appointed

Doctrine: As the law does not say who shall be appointed as special administrator and the qualifications the appointee must have, the judge or court has discretion in the selection of the person to be appointed, discretion which must be sound, that is, not whimsical or contrary to reason, justice or equity. Synopsis: Maria Roxas was appointed as special administratrix, however the decedent’s widow filed a petition for probate of an alleged will of her husband and praying for her appointment as executrix. The widow was appointed as special administratrix of all conjugal properties and Maria of the properties belonging exclusively to the deceased. A special administrator is but a temporary administrator who is appointed to act in lieu of the general administrator. Facts: Maria and Pedro Roxas, sister and brother respectively of deceased Pablo M. Roxas (Pablo), filed a petition for the administration of the latter's estate where Maria was appointed as special administratrix. Natividad Vda. de Roxas (Natividad), widow of Pablo, filed a petition for the probate of an alleged will of her deceased husband, and for her appointment as executrix of his estate designated in said will. Upon agreement of both parties, the intestate proceeding was dismissed and ordered closed by the court. Natividad was appointed as special administratrix and qualified as such over the objection Maria and Pedro Roxas, who sought the appointment of Maria as such. Respondent judge, Potenciano Pecson, rendered a decision denying the probate of the will from which Natividad has appealed.


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Maria and Pedro Roxas renewed their petition for the appointment of Maria Roxas as special administratrix or special coadministratrix. Judge Pecson rendered his resolution appointing Natividad as special administratrix only of all the conjugal properties of the deceased, and Maria Roxas as special administratrix of all capital or properties belonging exclusively to the deceased Pablo. Issues: Whether or not the lower court has the power to appoint two special administrators of the estate of deceased Pablo M. Roxas, one of the community property and another of the exclusive property of the decedent. Held: No. It is well settled that the statutory provisions as to the prior or preferred right of certain persons to the appointment of administrator under section 1, Rule 81, as well as the statutory provisions as to causes for removal of an executor or administrator under section 653 of Act No. 190, now section 2, Rule 83, do not apply to the selection or removal of special administrator. There is nothing wrong in that Judge Pecson, in exercising his discretion and appointing Natividad as special administratrix, had taken into consideration the beneficial interest of Natividad in the estate of the decedent and her being designated in the will as executrix thereof. However, Judge Pecson’s subsequent act of appointing her as special administratrix only of the conjugal or community property, and Maria Roxas as special administratrix of the capital or exclusive property of the decedent, does not seem to be in conformity with logic or reason. Natividad have, under the law, the

right of usufruct over one-half of the exclusive property of the decedent, besides her share in the conjugal partnership. The beneficial interest required as a qualification for appointment as administrator of the estate of a decedent is the interest in the whole estate and not only in some part thereof. Natividad being entitled to one-half in usufruct of all the exclusive properties of the decedent, she would have as much if not more interest in administering the entire estate correctly, in order to reap the benefit of a wise, speedy, economical administration of the state, and not suffer the consequences of the waste, improvidence or mismanagement thereof. Under the law only one general administrator may be appointed to administer, liquidate and distribute the estate of a deceased spouse, it clearly follows that only one special administrator may be appointed to administer temporarily said estate, because a special administrator is but a temporary administrator who is appointed to act in lieu of the general administrator. Case Digested by: Dafodille Dinero

Rule 81

45

Luzon Surety Company, Inc. v. Pastor T. Quebrar, et. al. G.R. NO. L- 40517 January 31, 1984

Topics: Administrator’s Bond Doctrine: Administrator’s bond does not cease to be effective with the court’s


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approval of the project of partition and statement of accounts. The surety is liable on the bond for as long as the estate’s administrator/ executor has duties to do and it appears that Pastor still has duties to do as an administrator of the estate even after the approval of the project of partition and statement of accounts for there were still debts and expenses to be paid. The term of a bond does not expire until the administration is closed. Synopsis: Surety company entered into an indemnity agreements wherein they agreed to become sureties to 2 administrator's bond in favor of Pastor Quebar, and the latter agreed to pay them. Quebar submitted a project of partition and accounts which was approved by the court, so Quebar argues that the bond should now be cancelled (thus, not paying anything more to the surety). Surety sues the administrator for amounts due to it. Court held that the administrators bond still exists, coterminous with the probate proceedings. And even if there's already a project of partition, as long as not all of the debts are paid, the administrator's job is not yet done, thus, the bond still subsists and the administrator is still liable to pay the surety. Facts: Luzon Surety Company, Inc. (Luzon Surety) issued two administrator’s bond in behalf of Pastor T. Quebrar (Pastor), as an administrator in two special proceedings. In consideration of the suretyship wherein Luzon Surety was bound jointly and severally with Pastor, the latter, together with Francisco Kilayko (Francisco), executed two indemnity agreements. For the first year, from August 9, 1954 to August 9, 1955, Pastor and Francisco paid the amount agreed in the indemnity agreement.

On June 6, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental approved the amended Project of Partition and Accounts of Pastor. On May 8, 1962, the Luzon Surety demanded from Pastor and Francisco the payment of the premiums and documentary stamps from August 9,1955. Pastor and Francisco filed a motion for cancellation and/or reduction of executor's bonds which the CFI of Negros Occidental granted and ordered the cancellation of the bonds. Luzon Surety demanded payment from Pastor and Francisco for the period of August 9, 1955 to October 20, 1962. Pastor and Francisco contended that the administrator’s bond ceased to be of legal force and effect with the approval of the project of partition and accounts on June 6, 1957. The CFI of Negros Occidental and the Court of Appeals ruled in favor of Luzon Surety. Issue: Whether or not the administrator’s bonds were in force and effect from and after the year they were filed and approved by the court up to 1962, when they were cancelled.

Held: Yes. Section 1 of Rule 81 of the Rules of Court requires the administrator/executor to put up a bond for the purpose of indemnifying the creditors, heirs, legatees and the estate. It is conditioned upon the faithful performance of the administrator's trust. Having in mind the purpose and intent of the law, the surety is then liable under the administrator's bond, for as long as the administrator has duties to do as such administrator/executor. Since the liability of


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the sureties is co-extensive with that of the administrator and embraces the performance of every duty he is called upon to perform in the course of administration, it follows that the administrator is still duty bound to respect the indemnity agreements entered into by him in consideration of the suretyship. It is shown that Pastor still had something to do as an administrator/executor even after the approval of the amended project of partition and accounts on June 6, 1957. Pastor did not cease as administrator after June 6, 1957, for administration is for the purpose ofliquidation of the estate and distribution of the residue among the heirs and legatees. And liquidation means the determination of all the assets of the estate and payment of all the debts and expenses. It appears that there were still debts and expenses to be paid after June 6, 1957. The term of a bond does not usually expire until the administration has been closed and terminated in the manner directed by law. Thus, as long as the probate court retains jurisdiction of the estate, the bond contemplates a continuing liability notwithstanding the non-renewal of the bond by Pastor and Francisco. Case Digested by: Dafodille Dinero

Sandejas vs Lina GR No. 14634 Feb. 5, 2001

46

Topic: DISTRIBUTION OF PARTITION OF THE ESTATE. Synopsis/Doctrine:

In settling the estate of the deceased, a probate court has jurisdiction over matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers. Such matters include selling, mortgaging or otherwise encumbering realty belonging to the estate. Facts: On February 17, 1981, Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. filed a petition in the lower court praying that letters of administration be issued in his favor for the settlement of the estate of his wife, REMEDIOS R. SANDEJAS. Letters of Administration were issued by the lower court appointing Eliodoro as administrator. On November 19, 1981, the 4th floor of Manila City Hall was burned and among the records burned were the records of the Court where Sandejas filed his petition. On April 19, 1983, an Omnibus Pleading for motion to intervene and petition-in-intervention was filed by Alex A. Lina alleging that Sandejas, in his capacity as seller, obligated to sell to Lina 4 parcels of land. Eliodoro died sometime in November 1984 in Canada His counsel is still waiting for official word on the fact of the death of the administrator. He also alleged that the matter of the claim of Alex becomes a money claim to be filed in Eliodoro's estate. the lower court issued an order directing the other heirs of Sandejas to move for the appointment of a new administrator within 15 days from receipt of the order. On January 1986, Alex filed a Motion for his appointment as a new administrator of the Intestate Estate of Remedios R.


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Sandejas on the following reasons: that Alex has not received any motion for the appointment of an administrator in place of Eliodoro; that his appointment would be beneficial to the heirs; that he is willing to give away his being an administrator as long as the heirs has found one. The heirs chose Sixto Sandejas as new administrator. They were reasoning out that it was only at a later date that Sixto accepted the appointment. The lower court substituted Alex Lina with Sixto Sandejas as administrator. On November 1993, Alex filed an Omnibus Motion to approve the deed of conditional sale executed between Alex A. Lina and Elidioro and to compel the heirs to execute a deed of absolute sale in favor of Alex. The lower court granted Alex's motion. Overturning the RTC ruling, the CA held that the contract between Eliodoro Sandejas Sr. and respondent was merely a contract to sell, not a perfected contract of sale. It ruled that the ownership of the four lots was to remain in the intestate estate of Remedios until the approval of the sale was obtained from the settlement court. Issue: What is the jurisdiction?

settlement

court's

Ruling: Court approval is required in any disposition of the decedent's estate per Rule 89 of the Rules of Court. One can sell their rights, interests or participation in the property under administration. A stipulation requiring court approval does not affect the validity and the effectivity of the sale as regards the selling heirs. It merely implies that the property may be taken out of

custodia legis, but only with the court's permission. Section 8 of Rule 89 allows this action to proceed. The factual differences have no bearing on the intestate court's jurisdiction over the approval of the subject conditional sale. Probate jurisdiction covers all matters relating to the settlement of estates (Rules 74 & 86-91) and the probate of wills (Rules 75-77) of deceased persons, including the appointment and the removal of administrators and executors (Rules 7885). It also extends to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of a probate court's recognized powers such as selling, mortgaging or otherwise encumbering realty belonging to the estate. Indeed, the rules on this point are intended to settle the estate in a speedy manner, so that the benefits that may flow from such settlement may be immediately enjoyed by the heirs and the beneficiaries. In the present case, the Motion was meant to settle the decedent's obligation to Alex; hence, that obligation clearly falls under the jurisdiction of the settlement court. To require respondent to file a separate action -- on whether petitioners should convey the title to Eliodoro Sr.'s share of the disputed realty -- will unnecessarily prolong the settlement of the intestate estates of the deceased spouses Case digested by: Iris Paola M. Tabimina

47

Spouses PASTOR Jr. v. CA G.R. No. L-56340,


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Topic: DISTRIBUTION AND PARTITION OF THE ESTATE Doctrine: In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and large is restricted to the extrinsic validity of a will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law (Rules of Court, Rule 75, Section 1; Rule 76, Section 9). As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the Probate Court can not resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should be included in the inventory of estate properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title (Valero Vda. de Rodriguez v. Court of Appeals. 91 SCRA 540 Facts: Alvaro Pastor, Sr. (PASTOR, SR.), a Spanish subject, died in Cebu City on June 5, 1966, survived by his Spanish wife Sofia Bossio (who also died on October 21, 1966), their two legitimate children Alvaro Pastor, Jr. (PASTOR, JR.) and Sofia Pastor de Midgely (SOFIA), and an illegitimate child, not natural, by the name of Lewellyn Barlito Quemada QUEMADA PASTOR, JR. is a Philippine citizen, having been naturalized in 1936. SOFIA is a Spanish subject. QUEMADA is a Filipino by his mother's citizenship. QUEMADA filed a petition for the probate and allowance of an alleged holographic will of PASTOR, SR. with the

Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch I (PROBATE COURT). The will contained only one testamentary disposition: a legacy in favor of QUEMADA consisting of 30% of PASTOR, SR.'s 42% share in the operation by Atlas Consolidated Mining and Development Corporation (ATLAS) of some mining claims in Pina-Barot, Cebu. The PROBATE COURT, upon motion of QUEMADA and after an ex parte hearing, appointed him special administrator of the entire estate of PASTOR, SR.. QUEMADA as special administrator, instituted against PASTOR, JR. and his wife an action for reconveyance of alleged properties of the estate, which included the properties subject of the legacy and which were in the names of the spouses PASTOR, JR. and his wife, Maria Elena Achaval de Pastor, who claimed to be the owners thereof in their own rights, and not by inheritance. PASTOR, JR. and his sister SOFIA filed their opposition to the petition for probate and the order appointing QUEMADA as special administrator. PROBATE COURT issued an order allowing the will to probate. On December 5, 1972, the PROBATE COURT issued an order allowing the will to probate. Appealed to the Court of Appeals, the order was affirmed in a decision dated May 9, 1977. On petition for review, the Supreme Court dismissed the petition in a minute resolution dated November 1, 1977 and remanded the same to the PROBATE COURT after denying reconsideration on January 11, 1978. For two years after remand of the case to the PROBATE COURT, QUEMADA filed pleading after pleading asking for


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payment of his legacy and seizure of the properties subject of said legacy. PASTOR, JR. and SOFIA opposed these pleadings on the ground of pendency of the reconveyance suit with another branch of the Cebu Court of First Instance. All pleadings remained unacted upon by the PROBATE COURT. The PROBATE COURT set the hearing on the intrinsic validity of the will for March 25, 1980, but upon objection of PASTOR, JR. and SOFIA on the e ground of pendency of the reconveyance suit, no hearing was held on March 25. Instead, the PROBATE COURT required the parties to submit their respective position papers as to how much inheritance QUEMADA was entitled to receive. 1. A. Pastor, Jr. ...................................40.5% 2. E. Pelaez, Sr. ...................................15.0% 3. B. Quemada ......................................4.5% While the reconveyance suit was still being litigated in Branch IX of the Court of First Instance of Cebu, the PROBATE COURT issued the now assailed Order of Execution and Garnishment, resolving the question of ownership of the royalties payable by ATLAS and ruling in effect that the legacy to QUEMADA was not inofficious. The order being "immediately executory", QUEMADA succeeded in obtaining a Writ of Execution and Garnishment, the oppositors sought reconsideration thereof on the same date primarily on the ground that the PROBATE COURT gravely abused its discretion when it resolved the question of ownership of the royalties and ordered the payment of QUEMADA's legacy after prematurely passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will.

Issue: Whether the Probate Order of December 5, 1972 resolved with finality the questions of ownership and intrinsic validity of the will. Ruling: NO.In a special proceeding for the probate of a will, the issue by and large is restricted to the extrinsic validity of the will, i.e., whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed the will in accordance with the formalities prescribed by law. (Rules of Court, Rule 75, Section 1; Rule 76, Section 9.) As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the Probate Court cannot resolve with finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be included in the inventory of estate properties, the Probate Court may pass upon the title thereto, but such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate action to resolve title. The rule is that execution of a judgment must conform to that decreed in the dispositive part of the decision Nowhere in the dispositive portion is there a declaration of ownership of specific properties. On the contrary, it is manifest therein that ownership was not resolved. For it confined itself to the question of extrinsic validity of the win, and the need for and propriety of appointing a special administrator. Thus it allowed and approved the holographic win "with respect to its extrinsic validity, the same having been duly authenticated pursuant to the requisites or solemnities prescribed by law." It declared that the intestate estate administration aspect must proceed "


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subject to the outcome of the suit for reconveyance of ownership and possession of real and personal properties in Civil Case 274-T before Branch IX of the CFI of Cebu." [Parenthetically, although the statement refers only to the "intestate" aspect, it defies understanding how ownership by the estate of some properties could be deemed finally resolved for purposes of testate administration, but not so for intestate purposes. Can the estate be the owner of a property for testate but not for intestate purposes?] Then again, the Probate Order (while indeed it does not direct the implementation of the legacy) conditionally stated that the intestate administration aspect must proceed "unless . . . it is proven . . . that the legacy to be given and delivered to the petitioner does not exceed the free portion of the estate of the testator," which clearly implies that the issue of impairment of legitime (an aspect of intrinsic validity) was in fact not resolved. Finally, the Probate Order did not rule on the propriety of allowing QUEMADA to remain as special administrator of estate properties not covered by the holographic will, "considering that this (Probate) Order should have been properly issued solely as a resolution on the issue of whether or not to allow and approve the aforestated will." That the Probate Order did not resolve the question of ownership of the properties listed in the estate inventory was appropriate, considering that the issue of ownership was the very subject of controversy in the reconveyance suit that was still pending in Branch IX of the Court of First Instance of Cebu. What, therefore, the Court of Appeals and, in effect, the Supreme Court affirmed en toto when they reviewed the Probable Order were only the matters properly adjudged in the said Order

It was, therefore, error for the assailed implementing Orders to conclude that the Probate Order adjudged with finality the question of ownership of the mining properties and royalties, and that, premised on this conclusion, the dispositive portion of the said Probate Order directed the special administrator to pay the legacy in dispute. WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed. The Order of execution issued by the probate Court, as well as all the Orders issued subsequent thereto in alleged implementation of the Probate Order dated December 5, 1972, are hereby set aside; and this case is remanded to the appropriate Regional Trial Court for proper proceedings Digested By: Iris Paola Tabimina

Jimoga-on v. Belmonte 84 Phil 545

48

Topic: DISTRIBUTION AND PARTITION OF THE ESTATE Doctrine: While the jurisdiction of the probate court includes the power to entertain the question of whether or not a person is a natural hild acknowledged by the decedent, it is only after, and not before, the payment of all debts, funeral expenses, charges of administration, allowances to the widow, and inheritance tax shall have been effected that the court should make declaration of heirs or of such person as are entitled by law to the residue


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Facts:

Rule 82

This is an appeal from the order of Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental appointing Apolonia Jimoga-on as administratix of the estate of Marcelino Belmonte, and failing to adjudge the movants-appellants Julita and Ulpiano Belmonte to be acknowledged natural children of Marceio Belmonte and to appoint Julita Belmonte as administratix of the properties acquired by the deceased before his marriage to Apolonio Jimoga-on Issue: Whether or not the lower court erred in not making an adjudication to the effect that they are acknowledged natural children of the deceased? Ruling: The petition does not hold merit. First, the matter so far taken up by the lower court was limited to the appointment of the judicial administratix. In other words, while no jurisdiction was made on the status of the appellants, this fact does not preclude future action on the point. And second, while the jurisdiction of the probate court includes the power to entertain the acknowledged by the decedent, it is only after, and not before, the payment of all debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax shall have been effected that the court should make a declaration of heirs or of such persons as are entitled by law to the residue. Case digested by: Iris Paola Tabimina

Cobarubbias v Dizon

49

GR. No. L- 225 February 26 1946

Topic: Removal Administrators

of

Executors

and

Doctrine: The power of the CFI to render ineffective the appointment of an administrator, when the appointment has been obtained through false or incorrect representations, is indisputable. The position of an administrator is one of trust. As soon as you lose your confidence in the integrity of the appointment, the court is fully justified in revoking your appointment as administrator. Facts: The petitioner Magdalena Cobarrubias filed an urgent motion, alleging that the funeral Pilar Leyba had deposited sys alhajas Are worth P4,500 in security section of the Bank of the Philippine Islands; That said bank notified all interested parties that they withdraw the contents of their section within the shortest possible time, so she asked to be appointed special administrator and that she was authorized to withdraw said jewelry from the bank. In her application Magdalena Cobarrubias stated that she was the only forced heiress of the late Pilar Leyba. Accepting as good these allegations, the Honorable Judge Dizon on the same date, July 5, 1945, appointed Magdalena Cobarrubias special administrator on bail of P200. On July 19, the petitioner filed a brief


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alleging that since the Court "has rescinded its order dated 5 of said month and year," requested that the Court order the cancellation of the bond of P200 and its return to the lawyer of the applicant. Issue: Whether or not appointed special administrator can be revoked. Ruling: Yes. Revoking the appointment of the appellant as special administrator and revoking the order authorizing her to withdraw the deposited jewels, the Court does not abuse its discretion, nor work outside its jurisdiction. The Court of First Instance has the power to render ineffective the appointment of an administrator when the appointment has been obtained through false or incorrect representations, is indisputable. When the Court appointed the appellant special administrator with authorization to withdraw from the bank jewels valued at P4,500 under a P200 bond, it took into account its essential claim that "it was the sole forced heiress of the deceased." There was no danger of possible embezzlement; They could even name it without bail. But upon receiving a report that this allegation was inaccurate. Which was confirmed by the motion of the same petitioner who requested the "suspension of publication and postponement of the hearing" because he wished to "have time to arrange an extrajudicial partition with his co-heirs," the court had ample grounds to revoke those orders even Without notification to the administrator: the intestate is not initiated for the benefit of the administrators but of the heirs. The

court should act immediately and not put in danger. With his indifference, the jewels. If he allowed a few hours to pass, without taking drastic action, the jewels valued at P4,500 could be withdrawn by the special administrator who was only secured in P200 to the detriment of the interests of the minors. The zeal shown by the court was well founded. The position of special administrator is one of trust. As soon as it lost its confidence in the integrity of the applicant, the Court was fully justified in revoking its appointment as special administrator and withdrawing its authorization to remove the jewels from the bank. Case Digested by: Paul W. Hembrador

Advincula v. Teodoro GR No. L-9282 May 31,1956

50

TOPIC: Revocation of Administration, Death, Resignation, and Removal of Executors and Administrators Doctrine: The mere discover of a document purporting to be the last will and testament of the decedent after appointment of an administrator and assumption that the decedent died intestate does not, ipso facto nullify the letters of administration already issued or even authorized their revocation until the will had been proved and allowed. Synopsis: Brothers of the deceased wanted to oust surviving spouse/brother in law as administrator of their sister's estate, after the surviving spouse was already appointed as such and after the intestate proceedings already commenced, by showing the will


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which allegedly appointed one of them as executor. The court held that until the will is probated, the provision in the will making one of them as the executor of the estate is not effective. Facts: Emilio Advincula was appointed as special administrator, then later regular administrator of his deceased wife’s estate. After he qualified as administrator, his brothers-in-law submitted a document purporting to be the deceased’s will. Emilio opposed the probate of the will on the ground that the signature was not his wife’s and even if it was, the same was procured by fraud. One of the brothers-in-law Enrique Lacson, prayed that he, be appointed as administrator in lieu of Emilio. During the hearing, it was alleged that Emilio was incompetent, incapable and unsuitable to act as administrator because Emilio is foreign to the estate. The court ruled in favor of Enrique’s motion. Emilio filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied so he instituted the present action for certiorari to annul the lower court’s order.

already issued or even authorized the revocation thereof, until the alleged will is “proved and allowed by the court”. Furthermore, the lower court appears to have followed the argument of the respondents that Emilio, being foreign to the deceased’s estate is incapable of being an administrator. This argument is untenable because from the viewpoint of logic and experience, a stranger may be competent, capable and fit to be administrator of the estate in the same way that a family member can be incompetent, incapable and unfit to do so. Besides, Emilio Advincula as the surviving spouse is a forced heir of the deceased. He is entitled to ½ of all property apart from his share of the other half thereof as heir of the deceased since “all property of the marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership.”

Whether the lower court acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting Lacson’s motion.

Lastly, Advincula has not been found guilty of any specific act or omission constituting one of the legal grounds, enumerated in Rule 83, section 2, of the Rules of Court, for the removal of an executor or administrator. Hence, it is clear that Respondent Judge exceeded his jurisdiction in removing Advincula and appointing Lacson as administrator of the estate of the deceased Josefa Lacson Advincula.

Held:

Case Digested by: Sweet Ross Elumba

Issue:

Yes. The appointment of Lacson as administrator in lieu of Advincula is predicated on the fact that Lacson was named executor of the deceased’s will. This provision, however, cannot be enforced until said will is submitted to probate. The discovery of the will does not ipso facto nullify letters of administration 68 | P a g e Pr o of re a d

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LAO v. GENATO G.R. No. L-56451, June 19, 1985

51

TOPIC: Revocation of Administration, Death, Resignation, and Removal of Executors and Administrators Doctrine: In the discharge of his functions, the administrator should act with utmost circumspection in order to preserve the estate and guard against its dissipation so as not to prejudice its editors and the heirs of the decedents who are entitled to the net residue thereof. Synopsis: Petitioner spouses were promised in a Mutual Agreement of Promise to sell between them and private respondent Sotero Dionisio, Jr., heir and administrator of the intestate estate of deceased mother Rosenda Abuton. The promisor bound himself to sell the subject property to the petitioners. Respondent administrator Sotero DIonisio, Jr., with due notice to all co-heirs, filed a Motion for Authority to sell certain properties of the deceased to settle the outstanding obligations of the estate. The Probate court authorized the administrator to sell. The authorization was made to settle outstanding obligations of the estate. But, the sale to his very son for a grossly low price was indubitable shown to be fictitious. The consideration was never accounted for in the probate court. Facts: On June 25, 1980, Sotero Jr., with due notice to all his co-heirs, moved to sell certain properties of the deceased to pay off certain debts. The motion was granted. So, Sotero Jr. sold to his son, Sotero III, the

subject property which the latter sold to William Go. Respondent-heir Florida Nuqui, moved to annul the sale on the ground that it was made in violation of the court's order and that the consideration of the two sales were grossly inadequate. Sotero Jr. opposed Nuqui’s motion alleging that the actual consideration of the sale was P200,000.00 and they agreed that preference will be given to close family members to keep the property within the family. Nuqui filed a Reply, stating that the two sales were but a single transaction simultaneously hatched and consummated in one occasion. The other heirs joined Nuqui’s motion. Respondent Go moved to intervene and manifested that he paid Sotero III P225,000.00 and being a purchaser in good faith and for value, his title to the property is indefeasible pursuant to law. On February 6, 1981, petitioner spouses moved to intervene and alleged that Sotero Jr, without revealing that the property had already been sold to William Go, entered into a Mutual Agreement of Promise to Sell to them for P270,000 which was reduced to P220,000.00; that they paid earnest money of P70,000; that the balance of P150,000 was to be paid upon the production of the TCT and the execution of the final Deed of Sale; that Sotero III the was merely a nominal party because the negotiation and transactions were between the Sotero Jr. and petitioners; that the contract of sale has been perfected because earnest money was already paid; that the sale in favor of Go was made to defraud the estate and the other heirs. At the hearing, petitioners submitted a copy of the Contract of mortgage executed by Sotero Jr in favor of Juan Lao, one of the petitioners, whereby


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the former mortgaged "all his undivided interest in the estate of his deceased mother”. After several days of hearing, respondent Judge allowed all the interested parties to bid for the property. Go bid P280,000.00. Petitioners bid P282,000.00, spot cash. All the heirs, except the administrator (Sotero Jr.), filed a Motion Ex Parte stated that the offer of William Go appears the highest obtainable price and that of the petitioners was not been made within a reasonable period. So, they submitted an amicable settlement to which the petitioners opposed because they offered to buy the property for 300,000. Despite said opposition, respondent Judge approved the Amicable Settlement. ISSUE: Whether the sale entered into by Sotero, the administrator is valid? HELD: Sotero Jr. as administrator occupies a position of the highest trust and confidence. In the case at bar, the sale was made necessary "in order to settle other existing obligations of the estate. In order to guarantee faithful compliance with the authority granted, respondent Judge ordered him “to submit to this Court for approval the transactions made by him." The sale to his son was for the grossly low price of only P75,000,00. Dionisio III has no income whatsoever and still a dependent of Dionisio, Jr. On top of that, not a single centavo, of the P75,000.00 was ever accounted for nor reported by Dionisio, Jr. to the probate court. Neither did he submit said transaction as mandated by the order for its approval. This sale was

confirmed and legalized by His HONOR's approval of the assailed Amicable Settlement. No doubt, respondent Judge's questioned approval violates Article 1409 of the New Civil Code and cannot work to confirm nor serve to ratify a fictitious contract which is non-existent and void from the very beginning. The heirs’ assent to such an illegal scheme does not legalize the same. The offer by the petitioner of P300,000.00 for the purchase of the property in question does not appear seriously disputed on record. As against the price stated in the assailed Compromise Agreement the former amount is decidedly more beneficial and advantageous not only to the estate, the heirs of the descendants, but more importantly to its creditors, for whose account and benefit the sale was made. No satisfactory and convincing reason appeared given for the rejection and/or non-acceptance of said offer thus giving rise to a well-grounded suspicion that a collusion of some sort exists between the administrator and the heirs to defraud the creditors and the government Case Digested by: Sweet Ross Elumba

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GONZALES V. AGUINALDO G.R. No. 74769, September 28, 1990

TOPIC: Revocation of Administration, Death, Resignation, and Removal of Executors and Administrators Doctrine: The court is invested with ample discretion in the removal of an administrator. However, there must be


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evidence of an act or omission on the part of the administrator not conformable to or in disregard of the rules or the orders of the court, which it deems sufficient or substantial to warrant the removal of the administrator. In making such a determination, the court must exercise good judgment, guided by law and precedents. Synopsis: Olbes filed a motion to remove the former as co-administratrix, on the ground that she is incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust and had committed acts and omissions detrimental to the interest of the estate and the heirs. The Judge cancelled the letters of administration granted to Beatriz and retained Olbes as the administratrix of the estate. The court based the removal of Gonzales on the fact that in the administration of the estate, conflicts and misunderstandings have existed between Gonzales and Olbes which allegedly have prejudiced the estate. A temporary absence from the state on account of ill health, or on account of business, or for purposes of travel or pleasure is not such a removal from the state as to necessitate his removal as executor.

The court issued an Order requiring Beatriz and the other parties to file their opposition. Only Asterio Favia opposed the removal of Beatriz as co-admistratrix, as the latter was still in the United States attending to her ailing husband. The Judge cancelled the letters of administration granted to Beatriz and retained Olbes as the administratrix of the estate. The court reasoned that Beatriz has been absent from the country as she is in the United States and she has not returned even up to this date and her removal is necessary so that the estate will be administered in an orderly and efficient manner. Gonzales moved to reconsider the order but was denied. Gonzales contends that court’s Order should be nullified on the ground of grave abuse of discretion, as her removal was not shown by Olbes to be anchored on any of the grounds provided under Section 2, Rule 82. ISSUE: Whether the court acted with grave abuse of discretion in the removal of Beatriz as administrator. HELD:

Facts: This is an intestate proceeding of the estate of Gonzales Vda. de Favis. The court appointed Beatriz F. Gonzales and Teresa Olbes as co-administratrices of the estate of Gonzales Vda. de Favis.

Yes. The court a quo did not base the removal of Beatriz as co-administrratrix on any of the causes specified in Olbes's motion for relief of Beatriz. Neither did it dwell on, nor determine the validity of the charges brought against Beatriz by Olbes.

While Beatriz was in the US, Olbes filed a motion to remove the former as coadministratrix, on the ground that she is incapable or unsuitable to discharge the trust and had committed acts and omissions detrimental to the interest of the estate and the heirs.

The court based the removal of Gonzales on the fact that in the administration of the estate, conflicts and misunderstandings have existed between Gonzales and Olbes which allegedly have prejudiced the estate.


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The administration of the deceased's estate be marked with harmonious relations between co-administrators. But for mere disagreements between such joint fiduciaries, without misconduct, one's removal is not favored. Conflicts of opinion and judgment naturally, and, perhaps inevitably, occur between persons with different interests in the same estate. Such conflicts, if unresolved by the coadministrators, can be resolved by the probate court to the best interest of the estate and its heirs.

administration. These facts show that Gonzales had never abandoned her role as co-administratrix of the estate nor had she been remiss in the fulfillment of her duties. Suffice it to state, temporary absence in the state does not disqualify one to be an administrator of the estate.

Further, the court a quo failed to find hard facts showing that the conflict were unjustly caused by Beatriz, or that Beatriz was guilty of incompetence in the fulfillment of her duties, or prevented the management of the estate according to the dictates of prudence, or any other act or omission showing that her continuance as co-administratrix of the estate materially endangers the interests of the estate.

Finally, it seems that the court refuge in the fact that two (2) of the other three (3) heirs of the estate of the deceased have opposed the retention or reappointment of Beatriz as co-administratrix of the estate. Suffice it to state that the removal of an administrator does not lie on the whims, caprices and dictates of the heirs or beneficiaries of the estate, nor on the belief of the court that it would result in orderly and efficient administration.

The court removed Gonzales also on the ground that she had been absent from the country. In her motion for reconsideration, Beatriz explained that her absence from the country was due to the fact that she had to accompany her ailing husband to the US. Also, Beatriz's absence from the country was known to Olbes, and that the latter and Beatriz had continually maintained correspondence with each other with respect to the administration of the estate during Gonzales’ absence. As a matter of fact, Beatriz, while in the US, sent Olbes a letter addressed to the Land Bank authorizing her (Olbes) to receive, and collect the interests accruing from the Land Bank bonds belonging to the estate, and to use them for the payment of accounts necessary for the operation of the

A temporary absence from the state on account of ill health, or on account of business, or for purposes of travel or pleasure is not such a removal from the state as to necessitate his removal as executor.

As the appointment of Gonzales was valid, and no satisfactory cause for her removal was shown, the court a quo gravely abused its discretion in removing her. Stated differently, Beatriz F. Gonzales was removed without just cause. Beatriz is ordered reinstated as co-administratrix of said estate. Case Digested by: Sweet Ross Elumba


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Luz Caro made an allegation in a pleading that she acquired by purchase from Benjamin Benito the aforesaid onethird undivided share in each of the two parcels of land. Basilia Lahorra Vda. De Benito a written offer to redeem the said one-third undivided share which was ignored by Caro. Thus, Basilia sought for the annulment of sale and mortgage involving the same parcels of land. The main case was dismissed. Basilia then filed the present case as an independent one to prove that as a joint administrator, she had not been notified of the sale.

Rule 84 Luz Caro v CA

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G.R. No. L-46001 March 25, 1982

Topic: General Powers and Duties of Executors and Administrators

Doctrine: The administrator has the right to the possession of the real and personal estate of the deceased, so far as needed for the payment of the expenses of administration, and the administrator may bring and defend action for the recovery or protection of the property or right of the deceased, such right of possession and administration do not include the right of legal redemption of the undivided share sold to a stranger by one of the co-owners. Facts: Alfredo Benito, Mario Benito and Benjamin Benito were the original coowners of two parcels of land. Mario died sometime in January, 1957. His surviving wife, Basilia Lahorra and his father, Saturnino Benito, were appointed joint administrators of Mario's estate. Benjamin Benito executed a deed of absolute sale of his one-third undivided portion over said parcels of land in favor of herein petitioner, Luz Caro. Caro was issued TCT over LOT I-C upon consent by Saturnino and Alfredo Benito.

The trial court dismissed the complaint on the grounds that: (a) private respondent, as administratrix of the intestate estate of Mario Benito, does not have the power to exercise the right of legal redemption, and (b) Benjamin Benito substantially complied with his obligation of furnishing written notice of the sale of his one-third undivided portion to possible redemptioners. CA ruled that since the right of the co-owner to redeem in case his share be sold to a stranger arose after the death of Mario Benito, such right did not form part of the hereditary estate of Mario but instead was the personal right of the heirs, one of whom is Mario's widow. Thus, it behooved either the vendor, Benjamin, or his vendee, Luz Caro, to have made a written notice of the intended or consummated sale under Article 1620 of the Civil Code. CA reversed the appealed judgment. Issue: Whether Basilia, as administrator of Mario’s estate, could exercise the right of redemption. Ruling:


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No. Sec. 3, Rule 85, Rules of Court, the administrator has the right to the possession of the real and personal estate of the deceased, so far as needed for the payment of the expenses of administration, and the administrator may bring and defend action for the recovery or protection of the property or right of the deceased (Sec. 2, Rule 88), such right of possession and administration do not include the right of legal redemption of the undivided share sold to a stranger by one of the co-owners after the death of another, because in such case, the right of legal redemption only came into existence when the sale to the stranger was perfected and formed no part of the estate of the deceased co-owner; hence, that right cannot be transmitted to the heir of the deceased co-owner. (Butte v. Manuel Uy and Sons, Inc., 4 SCRA 526). Even assuming that redemption exists, private respondent as administratrix, has no personality to exercise said right for and in behalf of the intestate estate of Mario Benito. She is on the same footing as co-administrator Saturnino Benito. Hence, if Saturnino's consent to the sale of the onethird portion to petitioner cannot bind the intestate estate of Mario Benito on the ground that the right of redemption was not within the powers of administration, in the same manner, private respondent as coadministrator has no power exercise the right of redemption — the very power which the Court of Appeals ruled to be not within the powers of administration. Basilia cannot be considered to have brought this action in her behalf and in behalf of the heirs of Mario Benito because the jurisdictional allegations of the complaint specifically stated that she brought the action in her capacity as

administratrix of the intestate estate of Mario Benito. Case Digested by: Paul W. Hembrador

Rule 85

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Intestate Estate of the Deceased Honofre Leyson v. Pablo Silva G.R. NO. L- 4090

January 31, 1952

Topics: Compensation of Administrator Doctrine: The court may fix an administrator’s or executor’s fee more than the fees prescribed by Section 7, Rule 85 of the Rules of Court where the estate is large, and the settlement has been attended with great difficulty, and has required a high degree of capacity on the part of the executor or administrator. Synopsis: The intestate estate of the decedent sues one of the previous administrator for excessive compensation for his services and for invalidly having the administrator's bond cancelled when he had a liability during his service as administrator. As to the excessive compensation, Court held that it is w/n the discretion of the court to raise the compensation if the estate is big and there's difficulty in managing it, and it was shown that the efforts exerted by the administrator was commensurate to the compensation given. As to the bond, it was held that if ever he was liable for misappropriating a land allegedly of the estate, the bond would not cover it but it


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would instead be a personal liability of the administrator. Facts: Pablo Silva (Pablo) resigned as a joint administrator of the intestate estate of Honofre Leyson. On August 19, 1949, the lower court issued an order granting Pablo’s motion and ordered the cancellation of his bond and authorizing him to collect from the estate the sum of six hindered pesos (Php600.00) as his administrator’s fees. Victor Rodriguez, co-administrator, and Margarita Laurente, heiress, questioned the said order of the lower court contending that the latter erred in ordering the cancellation of the bond and authorizing Pablo to collect six hindered pesos (Php600.00) as his fee, it being in excess of the fees prescribed by Section 7 of Rule 85. Facts: Pablo M. Silva (Silva), together with Victorio Rodriguez, were appointed as administrators of the intestate estate of Honofre Leyson. Through Silva's initiative, the holdings of the estate was earning P1,300 from P900 a month and two parcels of land located in San Juan, Rizal, were paid for in full and the corresponding certificates of title secured. He was instrumental in gathering decedent's personal effects.

Honofre Leyson. On August 19, 1949, the lower court issued an order granting Pablo’s motion and ordered the cancellation of his bond and authorizing him to collect from the estate the sum of six hindered pesos (Php600.00) as his administrator’s fees. Victor Rodriguez, co-administrator, and Margarita Laurente, heiress, questioned the said order of the lower court contending that the latter erred in ordering the cancellation of the bond and authorizing Pablo to collect six hindered pesos (Php600.00) as his fee, it being in excess of the fees prescribed by Section 7 of Rule 85. Issues Whether or not the court may fix an administrator’s or executor’s fee in excess of the fees prescribed by Section 7 of Rule 85. Whether or not the cancellation of the bond was proper. Held:

Silva then filed a motion whereby appellant, Margarita Leyson Laurente was not authorized to withdraw advance payment of her share of the inheritance, thereby able to stop an improvident disbursement of a substantial amount without having to employ legal help at an additional expense.

Yes. It can be seen from Section 7, Rule 85 of the Rules of Court that a greater sum may be allowed "in any special case, where the estate is large, and the settlement has been attended with great difficulty, and has required a high degree of capacity on the part of the executor or administrator." And so, it has been held that "the amount of an executor's fee allowed by the Court of first Instance in any special case under the provisions of Section 680 of the Code of Civil Procedure is a matter largely in the discretion of the probate court, which will not be disturbed on appeal, except for an abuse of discretion."

Silva resigned as a joint administrator of the intestate estate of

Yes. In the cancellation of Pablo's bond, there is no showing that Pablo was


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guilty of misappropriation or any of the acts of commission or omission for which his bond could be held liable. The sole ground for the insistence that the cancellation should have been withheld is that Pablo is in possession of a residential lot which belonged to the deceased Honofre Leyson. Pablo claims that the lot was sold to him by Leyson on March 2, 1945. Certainly, it was already in possession when he and Victor Rodriguez took over the administration from the special administratrix. The land therefore did not come into Pablo's hands in pursuance or in the course of his administration and it was not included in the inventory prepared by or in conjunction with the administrator. Even granting then, for the sake of argument, that Pablo has no valid title to the lot, the sureties are not chargeable for it on the bond. Pablo's liability is personal and exclusive of the sureties. Case Digested by: Dafodille Dinero

55

preparation, filing and substitution of his bond as such and as executor of the estate. Issue: WON the expenses incurred by an executor or administrator to procure a bond is a proper charge against the estate. Ruling: No. The expenses incurred by an executor or administrator to procure a bond is not a proper charge against the estate, and that the code of civil procedure does not authorize the executor or administrator to charge against the estate the money spent for the presentation, filing and substitution of a bond. Case Digested By: NUMIE ILLANA

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Uy Tioco v. Imperial

Topic: Accountability and Compensation of Executors and Administratorss

Sulit v. Santos

Topic: Accountability and Compensation of Executors and Administrators

Doctrine: Expenses incurred by the executor or administrator to procure a bond are not considered necessary expenses. Facts: the trial Judge refused to permit the executor of the estate to secure reimbursement from the estate the money paid as premium on the bond filed by him as special administrator, and for the

Doctrine: If judgment is rendered against the administrator and he pays, she may include the fees so paid in his account to the court Facts: Respondent Panis was counsel for the administration of the estate of Yangco, before the final settlement of accounts, he represented a motion in the probate proceeding for the allowance of attorney’s fees. The respondent judge, over the objections in writing presented by the administrator (TIoco), granted the motion


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and allowed the fees claimed by Panis. Tioco did not appeal, however, Yangco in his capacity as guardian ad litem of the minors Pedro and Bruno Uy Tioco, the sons and only heirs of the deceased, presented a motion for reconsideration on the ground that he was not notified. The motion was denied, Tioco was ordered to pay but he refused hence he filed a petition for a writ of prohibition to restrain the respondent judge from compelling him to pay the attorney’s fees. Issue: WON the estate is liable for the payment of attorney’s fees. Ruling: Yes. The attorney cannot hold the estate directly liable for his fees; such fees are allowed to the executor or administrator and not to the attorney. The liability for the payment rests on the executor or administrator, but if the fees paid are beneficial to the estate and reasonable, he is entitled to the reimbursement from the estate. Such payment should be included in his accounts and the reimbursement therefore settled upon the notice prescribed by the law. For the reasons stated, the respondent judge is hereby prohibited from enforcing the payment of the attorney's fees until the appeal taken by Jacinto Yangco, as guardian ad litem for the minor Pedro Uy Tioco, has been passed upon by this court or dismissed Case Digested By: NUMIE ILLANA

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Aldamiz v. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Mindoro

Topic: Accountability and Compensation of Executors and Administrators Doctrine: The attorney also may, instead of bringing such an action file a petition in the testate or intestate proceeding asking that the court, after notice to all persons interested, allow his claim and direct the administrator to pay it as an expense of administration. Facts: Gavino Aldamiz was appointed administrator of the estate of Santiago and as such was represented by respondent Atty. Juan Luna. After 10 years from the date of his appointment, he through his attorney submitted his accounts and also a project of partition with a view to closing the proceedings. The court refused to approve the project of partition unless all debts including attorney’s fees be first paid. Atty. Luna, to cimply with the wishes of the court, without previously preparing and filing a written petition to have his professional fees fixed, and without previous notice to all the interested parties, submitted evidence of his services and professional standing so that the court might fix the amount of his compensation and the administrator may make payment thereof. At the time Atty. Luna’s evidence was submitted to the court, no written claim had ever been notified thereof nor of the hearing, not even Aldamiz who did not know when he was called to testify. The court ordered for the payment of Attorney’s fees and upon Aldamiz’ failure to pay, Atty.


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Luna filed an ex-parte motion for execution which was granted by the respondent court

Topic: Accountability and Compensation of Executors and Administrators

Issue:

Doctrine: WON the order of the court is void.

Ruling: Yes. The correct procedure for the collection of attorney’s fees is for the counsel to request the administrator to make payment and file an action against him in his personal capacity and not as an administrator should he fail to pay. If the judgment is rendered against the administrator and he pays, he may include the fees so paid in his account to the court. The attorney also may, instead of bringing such action, file a petition in the testate or intestate proceeding asking that the court, after notice to all persons interested, allow his claim and direct the administrator to pay it as an expense of administration. And execution may issue only where the devisees, legatees or heirs have entered into possession of their respective portions in the estate prior to settlement and payment of the debts and expenses of the administration and it is later ascertained that there are such debts and expenses to be paid, in which case “the court having jurisdiction of the estate may, by order for that purpose, after hearing, settle the amount of their several liabilities and order how much and in what manner each person shall contribute, and may issue execution if the circumstances require. And this is not the instant case. Case Digested By: NUMIE ILLANA

ALIPIO VS CA GR NO. 134100

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A creditor cannot sue the surviving spouse of a decedent in an ordinary proceeding for the collection of sum of money chargeable against the conjugal partnership. The proper remedy for him is to file a claim in the settlement of the estate of the deceased. Facts: Respondent Romeo Jaring subleased a fishpond, for the remaining period of his lease, to the spouses Placido and Purita Alipio and the spouses Bienvenido and Remedios Manuel. The stipulated amount of rent was P485,600.00, payable in two installments ofP300,000.00 and P185,600.00. However, both the sub lessees failed to pay the second installment. Hence, on October 13, 1989, private respondent sued the Alipio and Manuel spouses for the collection of the said amount. Petitioner Purita Alipio moved to dismiss the case on the ground that her husband, Placido Alipio, had passed away on December 1, 1988.[2] She based her action on Rule 3, 21 of the 1964 Rules of Court which then provided that "when the action is for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon, and the defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in these rules." This provision has been amended so that now Rule 3, 20 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides: When the action is for the recovery of money arising from contract, express or implied, and the defendant dies before entry of final judgment in the court in which the action was pending at the time of such


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deat death, h, it shal shalll not not be dism dismis isse sed d but but shal shalll instead be allowed to continue until entry of final final judg judgme ment nt.. The The tria triall cour courtt deni denied ed petitio petitioner ner's 's motion motion.. The CA affirm affirmed ed trial trial court’s ruling.

de facto administrator such that conveyances made by him of any property belongi belonging ng to the partne partnersh rship ip prior prior to the liq liquidation of the mass of conjugal Partnership Property Is Void.

Issue:

Case Digested By: Numie Illana

WON a creditor can sue the surv surviv ivin ing g spo spouse of a dec deceden edentt in an ordinary proceeding for the collection of a sum sum of mone money y char charge geab able le agai agains nstt the the conjugal partnership Ruling: When When peti petitio tione ner' r'ss husb husban and d died died,, their conjugal partnership was automatically dissolved and debts chargeable against it are to be paid in the sett settle lem ment ent of esta estatte proc procee eedi din ngs in accord accordanc ance e with with Rule Rule 73, 2 which which states states:: Where Where estate estate settle settled d upon upon dissol dissoluti ution on of marria marriage. ge. When When the marria marriage ge is dissol dissolved ved by the death of the husband or wife, the commun community ity proper property ty shall shall be invent inventori oried, ed, administered, and liquidated, and the debts ther thereo eoff paid paid,, in the the test testat ate e or inte intest stat ate e proceedings of the deceased spouse. If both spouses have died, the conjugal partnership shall be liquidated in the tes testate or intestate proceedings of either. As held in Calma v. Taedo, after the death of either of the spouses, no complaint for the collection of inde indebt bted edne ness ss char charge geab able le agai agains nstt the the conjugal partnership can be brought against the the surv surviv ivin ing g spou spouse se.. Inst Instea ead, d, the the clai claim m must be made in the proceedings for the liquidation and settlement of the conjugal property. The reason for this is that upon the the deat death h of one one spou spouse se,, the the powe powers rs of admi admini nist stra rati tion on of the the surv surviv ivin ing g spou spouse se ceases ceases and is passed passed to the admini administr strato atorr appointed appointed by the court having jurisdiction jurisdiction over the settlement of estate proceedings. Indeed, the surviving spouse is not even a

FELICISIMO C. JOSON v. EDUARDO JOSON G.R. No. L-9686 Ma 30, 1961 1961

59

Topic: Topic: EXECUT EXECUTOR OR AND ADMINI ADMINISTR STRATO ATOR; R; EXTENT EXTENT AND SCOPE SCOPE OF RESPON RESPONSIB SIBILI ILITIE TIES S ENUMERATED Doctrine: Section 1 of Rule 86 categorically charges an administrator "with the whole of the estate of the deceased which has come into his possession at the value of appraise appraisemen mentt containe contained d in the inventor inventory; y; with with all all the the proc procee eeds ds of so much much of the the estate as is sold by him, at third price at whic which h sold sold." ." Sect Sectio ion n 8 of the the same same rule rule impo impose sess upon upon him him the the duty duty to rend render er an accou account nt of his adminis administra tratio tion n within within one one year from his appointment, unless the court otherwise directs, as well as to render such further accounts as the court may require until the estate is fully, settled. Section 10 likewise provides that before an account of the administrator is allowed notice shall be given to all persons interested of the time and place place of exam examini ining ng and and allow allowing ing the same. And finally section 9 expressly directs that the court shall examine the admini administr strato atorr upon upon oath oath with with respec respectt to every matter relating to his account except when no objection is made to the allowance of the the acco accou unt and and its its cor correctne ctnesss is


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satisfactorily established by the competent testimony Facts: Tomas Joson died on July 5, 1945 in Quezon Quezon,, Nueva Nueva Ecija Ecija leavin leaving g behind behind heirs heirs and properties. He married three times and was was surv surviv ived ed by nine nine (9) (9) heir heirs: s: two two (2) (2) children and grandchildren by his first wife Eufemia de la Cruz; two (2) daughters by his second wife Pomposa Miguel; and his third wife and surviving widow Dominga M. Joson. Upon his death, his will was presented to the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija by his his son son Feli Felici cisi simo mo Joso Joson n for prob probat ate. e. In Augu August st,, 1945 1945,, said said will will havi having ng been been duly duly probated, probated, Felicisimo Felicisimo Joson was appointed appointed administrator administrator of the estate and, accordingly, he filed an inventory of the properties left by the deceased. On April 15, 1948, the administrator filed filed his first first acco accoun untt for for the the year year 1945 1945-1946. This was ordered by the court to be examined by the clerk of court but the same has never been approved. On July 19, 1948, he filed filed his seco second nd acco accoun untt for for the the year year 1946-1947 which was also referred to the clerk clerk of court court for examinat examination ion.. The same same has never been also approved by the court. On November 11, 1948, the administrat administrator or filed filed anot anothe herr acco accoun untt for for the the year year 1947 1947-1948 and, upon motion of the heirs, he was ordered to file an accounting covering the prop proper erti ties es unde underr his admi admini nist stra rati tion on.. On September 7, 1954, Eduardo Joson, one of the the heir heirs, s, file filed d an oppo opposi siti tion on to all all the the accounts filed by the administrator wherein he alleged that the administrator dimi dimini nish shed ed the the shar shares es of the the heirs heirs in the the yearly yearly produc produce e of the proper propertie tiess and had padded his expenses of administration, and on September 29, 1954, the same heir filed another motion praying the court to order

the the admi admini nist stra rato torr to post post a bond bond in the the amount amount of P50,000 for the reason that from the accounts represented by him to be the tru true inco income me of the the esta estate te from from 1947 1947 to 1953 there was a big difference of P132,600 which the administrator should account for to the the heir heirs. s. On Octo Octobe berr 14, 14, 1954 1954,, the the admi admini nist stra rato torr subm submit itte ted d an amen amende ded d statement of accounts for the same years which were objected by two more heirs on the the grou ground nd that that the the admi admini nist stra rato torr had had repo reporrted ted for for the the years ears 1947 1947-1 -195 952 2 an income short of what was actually received and and expe expens nses es much much bigg bigger er than than tho those actually incurred by him. In the meantime meantime,, or on Decemb December er 30, 1952, the heirs were able to compromise compromise their differences differences and entered entered int into an extr extraj aju udic dicial ial sett settle leme men nt and part partit itio ion n of the the enti entire re esta estate te unde underr the the provisions provisions of Section 1, Rule 74, of the Rules of Court which provides for the settlement of the estate estate withou withoutt court court interv intervent ention ion.. This This sett settle leme ment nt was cont conta ained ined in two two docu docume ment ntss exec execut uted ed on the the same same date date wher wherei ein n they they mani manife fest sted ed that that they they are are entering into it because of their desire to put an end to the judicial proceeding and administration. But, as the court was never informe informed d of this this extra extrajud judici icial al settle settlemen mentt either by the administrator or by the heirs, it issued on May 19, 1954 an order requiring the admini administr strat ator or to file an accou accounti nting ng of his his admi admini nist stra rati tion on from from 1949 1949 to 1954 1954,, which hich accordi ordin ngly gly the the adm adminis inistr tra ator tor complie complied d with with by submit submittin ting g an amende amended d sta stateme temen nt of his his acc accoun ounts as alrea lread dy mentioned above Issue: Whether or not that the duty of an administrator to make an accounting of his


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admini administr strati ation on a mere mere incide incident nt which which can be avoided once the estate has been settled Ruling: We find merit in this contention. To begin with, Section 1 of Rule 86 categorically charges an administrator "with the the whole whole of the the esta estate te of the the dece deceas ased ed which has come into his possession at the value value of appr apprai aise seme ment nt cont contai aine ned d in the the inventory; with all the interest, profit, and inc income ome of suc such a est estate; ate; and with ith the the proceeds of so much of the estate as is sold by him, at the price at which sold." Section 8 of the same rule imposes upon him the duty to render an account of his admi admini nist stra rati tion on with within in one one year year from from his his appoin appointme tment, nt, unless unless the court court otherw otherwise ise direct directs, s, as well well as to render render such further further accounts as the courts may require until the estat estate e is fully fully settle settled. d. Sectio Section n 10 likewi likewise se prov provid ides es that that befo before re an acco accoun untt of the the admi admini nist stra rato torr is allo allowe wed d noti notice ce shal shalll be given to all persons interested of the time and place of examin examining ing and allowi allowing ng the same. And finally Section 9 expressly directs that the court shall examine the admini administr strato atorr upon upon oath oath with with respec respectt to every matter relating to his account except when no objection is made to the allowance of the the acc accoun ount and and its its corre orrecctnes tnesss is sati satisf sfac acto tori rily ly esta establ blis ishe hed d by comp compet eten entt testimony. It thus appears that the duty of an administrator to render an account is not a mere inc incident of an administ istration proceeding ing which can be waived or disregarded when the same is terminated, but that it is a duty that has to be perf perfor orme med d and and duly duly acte acted d upon upon by the the court court before before the admini administr strat ation ion is finall finally y ordere ordered d closed closed and termin terminate ated. d. Here Here the admini administr strato atorr has submit submitted ted his accou accounts nts

for several years not only motu proprio but upon upon requir requireme ement nt of the court, court, to which which accounts the heirs have seasonably submitted their opposition. And when the administrator moved the court to close the proceedings and relieve him of his admi admini nist stra rati tion on and and of his his acco accoun unts ts,, the the heir heirss who obj objecte ected d ther theret eto o obje bjected ted likewise to the closing of the proceedings invok invokin ing g thei theirr righ rightt to be hear heard d but but the the court ignored their opposition and granted the the motion sett etting for forth as reasons therefore what we quoted in the early part of this decision. Verily, the trial court erred in acceding to the motion for in doing so it disreg disregard arded ed the expres expresss provis provision ionss of our rules relative to the settlement of accounts of a judicial administrator. The The fact fact tha that all all the the heir heirss of the the estate estate have have entere entered d into into an extra extrajud judici icial al settlement and partition in order to put an end to their differences cannot in any way be interpreted as a waiver of the objections of the heirs to the accounts submitted by the admini administr strato atorr not only becaus because e to so hold would be a derogation of the pertinent prov provis isio ions ns of our our rule ruless but but also also beca becaus use e there is nothing provided in said partition that the aforesaid accounts shall be deemed waived or condoned. While the attitude of the heirs heirs in conclu concludin ding g said said extraj extrajud udici icial al settlement is plausible and has contributed to the early settlement of the estate, the same same canno cannott howeve howeverr be consid considere ered d as a release of the obligation of the administrator to prove his accounts. This is more so when, according to the oppositors, the the admi admini nist stra rato torr has has comm committ itted ed in his acco accoun unts ts a shor shorta tage ge in the the amou amount nt of P132,600.00 which certainly cannot just be brushed aside by a mere technicality Case digested by: Danilo Lagbas


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probate court nor was there notice given to the beneficiaries of the estate. Despite the opposition of the other parties, the court approved the settlement. The respondents contended that the Amicable Settlement need not be approved by the probate court.

Rule 86

60

Estate of Olave v Rey

Issue:

G.R. No. L- 29407 July 29, 1983

Whether the Amicable Settlement made by the parties need not be approved by the probate court.

Topic: Claims against Estate

Ruling:

Doctrine: The purpose of presentation of claims against decedents of the estate in the probate court is to protect the estate of deceased persons. That way, the executor or administrator will be able to examine each claim determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. Facts: The estate of Amadeo Matute Olave is the owner in fee simple of a parcel of land covered by an OCT. Private respondent Southwest Agricultural Marketing Corporation (SAMCO) filed a case with the respondent CFI against Respondents Matute, in their capacities as coadministrators of the estate of Amadeo Matute Olave, for the collection of an alleged indebtedness. Defendants Matute denied the allegations and questioned the legality of the claim of SAMCO. CFI ordered the administrators to secure first the approval of the probate court before entering into any transaction involving the 17 titles of the estate, of which the property described in OCT is one of them. The parties submitted for Amicable Settlement whereby the property of the estate covered by the OCT was ceded to SAMCO as payment. However, the said settlement was not submitted to and approved by the

No. The purpose of presentation of claims against decedents of the estate in the probate court is to protect the estate of deceased persons. That way, the executor or administrator will be able to examine each claim and determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. Further, the primary object of the provisions requiring presentation is to appraise the administrator and the probate court of the existence of the claim so that a proper and timely arrangement may be made for its payment in full or by pro-rata portion in the due course of the administration, inasmuch as upon the death of a person, his entire estate is burdened with the payment of all of his debts and no creditor shall enjoy any preference or priority; all of them shag share pro-rata in the liquidation of the estate of the deceased. It is clear that the main purpose of private respondent SAMCO in filing Civil Case No. 4623 in the then Court of First Instance of Davao was to secure a money judgment against the estate which eventually ended in the conveyance to SAMCO of more than twenty-nine (29) hectares of land belonging to the estate of the deceased Amadeo Matute Olave in


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payment of its claim, without prior authority of the probate court of Manila, in Sp. Proc. No. 25876, which has the exclusive jurisdiction over the estate of Amadeo Matute Olave. It was a mistake on the part of respondent court to have given due course to Civil Case No. 4623, much less issue the questioned Order, dated November 10, 1967, approving the Amicable Settlement. Case Digested by: Paul W. Hembrador

61

Domingo v Garlitos GR No L-18994 June 29, 1963

Doctrine: The ordinary procedure by which to settle claims of indebtedness against the estate of a deceased person, as an inheritance tax, is for the claimant to present a claim before the probate court so that said court may order the administrator to pay the amount thereof. Facts: It appears that in Domingo v. Moscoso, the Court declared as final and executory the order for the payment by the estate of the estate and inheritance taxes, charges and penalties, amounting to P40, 058.55, issued by the Court of First Instance of Leyte. In order to enforce the claims against the estate, the fiscal presented a petition to the court for the execution of the judgment. The petition was, however, denied by the court which held that the execution is not justifiable as the Government is indebted to the estate under administration in the amount of P262, 200.

Whether the petition for the execution of the claim of the Government against the estate proper. Ruling: No. The ordinary procedure by which to settle claims of indebtedness against the estate of a deceased person, as an inheritance tax, is for the claimant to present a claim before the probate court so that said court may order the administrator to pay the amount thereof. A writ of execution is not the proper procedure allowed by the Rules of Court for the payment of debts and expenses of administration. The proper procedure is for the court to order the sale of personal estate or the sale or mortgage of real property of the deceased and all debts or expenses of administrator and with the written notice to all the heirs legatees and devisees residing in the Philippines, according to Rule 89, section 3, and Rule 90, section 2. And when sale or mortgage of real estate is to be made, the regulations contained in Rule 90, section 7, should be complied with. Another ground for denying the petition of the provincial fiscal is the fact that the court having jurisdiction of the estate had found that the claim of the estate against the Government has been recognized and an amount of P262,200 has already been appropriated for the purpose by a corresponding law (Rep. Act No. 2700). Case Digested by: Norhanifah M. Mambuay

Issue:


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62

De Bautista v De Guzman G.R. No. L-28298 November 25, 1983

Doctrine: The termination of the intestate proceedings and the distribution of the estate to the heirs did not alter the fact that plaintiffs-appellees' claim was a money claim which should have been presented before the probate court. The liability of the deceased arose from the breach of his obligations under the contract of carriage between him and the unfortunate passenger. The obligations are spelled out by law but the liability arose from a breach of contractual obligations. The resulting claim is a money claim. Facts: Numeriano Bautista was a passenger of jeepney owned and operated by Rosendo de Guzman. Eugenio Medrano y Torres was employed by said Rosendo de Guzman as the driver of said jeepney. Said driver drove and managed said in a negligent and reckless manner and, as a result, the jeepney turned turtle and, consequently, passenger Numeriano Bautista sustained physical injuries which caused his death. Eugenio Medrano, the driver, was accused and convicted of homicide through reckless imprudence by the trial court. A writ of execution was issued against said driver, Eugenio but the same was returned to the Court unsatisfied. On May 12, 1952, Rosendo de Guzman died. Because of their failure to collect from the driver Eugenio Medrano filed a complaint against the heirs of Rosendo de Guzman for the payment but they refused to pay the same. The heirs through counsel filed a motion to dismiss alleging that the

suit was for a money claim against the supposed debtor who was already dead and as such it should be filed in testate or intestate proceedings. However, instead of presenting their claims before the intestate proceedings, the plaintiiffs filed another complaint after said intestate proceedings were closed.

Issue: Whether or not the claim of the plaintiffs is already barred for failure on their part to file their claim in the intestate proceedings of the deceased Rosendo de Guzman. Ruling: Yes. Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court is mandatory. The requirement therein is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased. The executor or administrator is informed of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to determine whether it is a proper one which should be allowed. Therefore, upon the dismissal of the first complaint of herein plaintiffs, they should have presented their claims before the intestate proceedings filed in the same. Instead of doing so, plaintiffs slept on their right. They allowed said proceedings to terminate and the properties to be distributed to the heirs pursuant to a project of partition before instituting this separate action. With the exception provided for in the above rule, the failure of herein plaintiffs-appellees to present their claims before the intestate proceedings of the estate of Rosendo de Guzman within the prescribed period constituted a bar to a subsequent claim against the estate or a similar action of the same import.


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Case Digested by: Norhanifah M. Mambuay

63

E. Gaskell & Co., Inc. v Tan Sit G.R. No. 18405 September 23, 1922

Doctrine: There can be no question that the claim of Gaskell & Co. against Dy Poco is properly designated as a contingent claim, which may be defined as a claim in which liability depends on some future event that may or may not happen, and which makes it uncertain whether there will ever be any liability. The expression" is used in contradistinction to the absolute claim, which is subject to no contingency and may be proved and allowed as a debt by the committee on claims. The absolute claim is such a claim as, if contested between living persons, would be proper subject of immediate legal action and would supply a basis of a judgment for a sum certain. Facts: On June 23, 1919, Dy Poco was declared bankrupt in a proceeding instituted by some of his creditors, and shortly thereafter Dy Poco died. Nevertheless, the insolvency proceedings continued their course and in the end an order was made discharging the debtor—or his estate—from all liability upon provable claims, as contemplated in section 69 of the Insolvency Law (Act No. 1956). Meanwhile, Tan Sit, the widow of Dy Poco, had qualified as his administratrix, for the purpose chiefly, of realizing upon a policy of insurance for P25,000 in force upon the life of Dy Poco at the time of his death. As a result, two distinct parallel proceedings with reference to the estate of Dy Poco were

contemporaneously conductedthe proceedings over the estate in insolvency and the proceedings over the estate in administration. Prior to the institution of the bankruptcy proceeding above alluded to, Gaskell & Co., the plaintiff joined with the latter in a written application to the Philippine Guaranty Co., requesting said company to become surety on a bond which the Insular Collector of Customs had required Dy Poco to give in order to secure the delivery of certain merchandise arriving from abroad for which Dy Poco was at that time unable to produce the proper bill of lading. Pursuant to said application the Philippine Guaranty Company executed a bond and merchandise was delivered to Dy Poco by the Collector of Customs. At a later date Dy Poco defaulted in his undertaking to produce the bill of lading corresponding to the merchandise which had been delivered to him, and said document was produced by the Hongkong & Shanghai Banking Corporation, an innocent holder thereof for value; and demand was made by this bank upon the Insular Collector of Customs for the delivery of the same merchandise that had previously been delivered to Dy Poco. When this occurred, the Collector at once made demand upon the Philippine Guaranty Company for payment of the value of the goods for the benefit of the aforesaid bank. In response to this demand, the Guaranty Company paid the amount required, and in turn demanded reimbursement from the present plaintiff, Gaskell & Co. Up to the time when this action was brought, Gaskell & Co. had not complied with this demand of the Guaranty Company, but no question is made as to Gaskell & Company's ultimate liability. Dy Poco was contingently liable to


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exonerate Gaskell & Co. in the event that the latter should be compelled to pay out anything to the Philippine Guaranty Company; for it is undisputed that Dy Poco was primarily responsible. No steps were taken, however, towards proving this contingent claim on the part of Gaskell & Co. against Dy Poco in the insolvency proceedings. At a later date, however, Gaskell & Co. caused said claim to be presented to the commissioners appointed to pass on claims against the estate of Dy Poco in administration; and the same having been rejected by the commissioners, the matter was brought before the Court of First Instance upon appeal, where the claim was again disallowed. Upon this Gaskell & Co. appealed to the Supreme Court. Issue: Whether or not trial court committed error in disallowing the claim of Gaskell & Co. against the administratrix of Dy Poco. Ruling: There can be no question that the claim of Gaskell & Co. against Dy Poco is properly designated as a contingent claim, which may be defined as a claim in which liability depends on some future event that may or may not happen, and which makes it uncertain whether there will ever be any liability. But, although it is thus evident that this claim in favor of Gaskell & Co. against Dy Poco is a contingent claim, it by no means follows that said claim can now be allowed against Dy Poco's estate in administration; for a contingent claim is effected by a discharge in bankruptcy the same as an absolute claim, and that this claim has in fact been so barred is easily

demonstrable, by reference to section 56 of the Insolvency Law, which reads in part as follows: Any person liable as bail, surety, or guarantor, or otherwise, for the debtor, who * * * has not paid the whole of said debt, but is still liable for the same, or any part thereof, may, if the creditor shall fail or omit to prove “such debt, prove the same in the name of the creditor.” From this it will be seen that the claim in question could have been proved by Gaskell & Co. in the bankruptcy proceedings in the name of the creditor, if the latter had failed to present the credit. But, as already stated, the creditor in fact proved in the insolvency proceeding for the very claim for which the present plaintiff is contingently liable; with the result that the present plaintiff will be exonerated to the extent of any amount which the creditor may recover from the insolvent. It necessarily follows that, the claim in question having been discharged in bankruptcy; it cannot serve as the basis of recovery against the estate of Dy Poco in administration. When it happens, as here, that both bankruptcy proceedings and administration proceedings are simultaneously conducted over the estate of a deceased bankrupt, no claim can be proved against the administrator which is provable in bankruptcy. Case Digested by: Norhanifah M. Mambuay

PNB v IPAI

64

G.R. No. L-28046 May 16, 1983


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Doctrine: The creditor has the right to proceed against anyone of the solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously. The choice is undoubtedly left to the solidary creditor to determine against whom he will enforce collection. In case of the death of one of the solidary debtors, he may, if he so chooses, proceed against the surviving solidary debtors without necessity of filing a claim in the estate of the deceased debtors. It is not mandatory for him to have the case dismissed against the surviving debtors and file its claim in the estate of the deceased solidary debtor. Facts: Appeal by the Philippine National Bank (PNB) from the Order of the defunct Court of First Instance of Manila (Branch XX) in its Civil Case No. 46741 dismissing PNB's complaint against several solidary debtors for the collection of a sum of money on the ground that one of the defendants, Ceferino Valencia, died during the pendency of the case and therefore the complaint, being a money claim based on contract, should be prosecuted in the testate or intestate proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased defendant pursuant to Section 6 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. The appellant assails the order of dismissal, invoking its right of recourse against one, some or all of its solidary debtors under Article 1216 of the Civil CodeART. 1216. The creditor may proceed against any one of the solidary debtors or some or all of them simultaneously. The demand made against one of them shall not be an obstacle to those which may subsequently be directed

against the others, so long as the debt has not been fully collected. Issue: Whether or not in an action for collection of a sum of money based on contract against all the solidary debtors, the death of one defendant deprives the court of jurisdiction to proceed with the case against the surviving defendants. Ruling: No. It is now settled that the quoted Article 1216 grants the creditor the substantive right to seek satisfaction of his credit from one, some or all of his solidary debtors, as he deems fit or convenient for the protection of his interests; and if, after instituting a collection suit based on contract against some or all of them and, during its pendency, one of the defendants dies, the court retains jurisdiction to continue the proceedings and decide the case in respect of the surviving defendants. Another ground for denying the petition of the provincial fiscal is the fact that the court having jurisdiction of the estate had found that the claim of the estate against the Government has been recognized and an amount of P262,200 has already been appropriated for the purpose by a corresponding law (Rep. Act No. 2700). Case Digested by: Norhanifah M. Mambuay

SANTOS v MANARANG GR No. L-8235 March 19, 1914

65

Topic: Statute of Non-claims


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Doctrine: This is the so-called Statute of non-claims. The rule requires certain creditors of a deceased person to present their claims for examination and allowance within a specified period, the purpose thereof being to settle the estate with dispatch, so that the residue may be delivered to the persons entitled thereto without their being afterwards called upon to respond in actions for claims, which, under the ordinary statute of limitations, have not yet prescribed. Synopsis: Upon probate of the decent’s will, notices were sent out to his creditors in order for them to file their claims. Santos, being one of his creditors, presented his claim to recover the sums due him beyond the period provided for by law. Facts: Don Lucas de Ocampo died testate, leaving his three children as his heirs. Herein plaintiff- appellant is one of the decedent’s creditor, by which is acknowledged in the decedent’s last will and testament. Upon the probate of the said will, notices were sent to the creditors in order for them to file their claims. However, Santos, being complaisant as his claim was acknowledged in the decedent’s will, filed his belated claim, by which the committee on claims was not able to consider, requiring further that the committee reconvene in order to pass upon his claim. This was denied by the court. He thereafter resorted to filing a claim against the administrator for the recovery of the sums mentioned in the will, but once again, to no avail. Hence this appeal. Issues:

1.Whether the probate court erred in denying refusing to reconvene the committee in order to pass his claim. 2.Whether the probate court erred in denying his complaint for recovery of sum of money against the administrator of the decedent’s estate Ruling: 1.Yes. As to the first assignment of error, the Supreme Court ruled that the probate court was correct in denying petitioner’s request to reconvene the committee in order to pass his claim. Although his claim was acknowledged by the testator in his will, he is not deemed exempted to file his claim after due notice from the court. This is a procedure by which any claimant should observe in order to prevent from being barred of his claims. As to his filing of his belated claim, the Supreme Court ruled that the committee cannot anymore consider such claim because the notice sent to the creditors set forth a limited time for which the claims must be filed in order to be considered. Such already barred herein appellant from having his claim considered and allowed in the probate proceeding. 2.Yes. Regarding his second assignment of error, Section 1 of Rule 87 provides that there can be “no action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; but to recover real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or personal, may be commenced against him.” Clearly, the claim filed by Isidro is one in a nature of recovery of money, by which is expressly prohibited


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by law. Hence, the probate court’s denial of his claim for recovery of sum of money is correct. Case Digested by: Aiza Belle Manla Ramos

SISON v. TEODORO GR No. L-9271 March 29, 1957

66

premiums issued by Visayan Surety & Insurance Corporation for the bonds of Sison for his being a judicial administrator herein. The same was opposed by Narcisa Teodoro, stating that “expense incurred by an executor or administrator to produce a bond is not a proper charge against the estate.” The lower court approved the report of administration of Sision, but disallowed the two objected claims. Hence, this appeal. Issue:

Topic: Section 7, Rule 86 Doctrine: Expense incurred by an executor or administrator to produce a bond is not a proper charge against the estate. Herein appellant, having waived compensation, cannot be heard to complain of the expenses he has incurred incident to his qualification as the administrator. Synopsis: Petitioner was appointed as the judicial administrator without compensation. When he filed an accounting of his administration, two premiums issued for the bonds foe being an administrator were included; such was opposed by the heir stating that expense incurred by an executor or administrator to produce a bond is not a proper charge against the estate”. Facts: Carlos Moran Sison was appointed by the probate court as the judicial administrator of the estate of the late Margarita David. The issued appointment of the court states that Sison is appointed as the judicial administrator, without compensation. Sison then filed a bond of Php 5,000. When Sison filed an accounting of his administration, he included two

Whether a judicial administrator, serving without compensation, is entitled to charge as an expense of administration the premiums paid on his bond. Ruling: No. The premiums paid by an executor or administrator serving without a compensation for his bond cannot be charged against the estate. Court ruled that the "expense incurred by an executor or administrator to produce a bond is not a proper charge agains the estate. The Supreme Court ruled that an executor or administrator, having in mind that being appointed to such position would have him incur expenses, may accept compensation for such as allowed by the law. However, such executor or administrator may choose to waive compensation, as in this case. Therefore, when an executor or administrator files a bond and waives compensation upon his appointment, he cannot anymore claim compensation against the estate for such expenses he has incurred. Case Digested by: Aiza Belle Manla Ramos


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CERNA v CA

67

G.R. No. L-48359 March 30, 1993

FACTS:

Topic: Mortgage Debt Due From Estate; Options Given To Creditors Under Sec. 7, Rule 86, New Rules Of Court Doctrine: A creditor holding a claim against the deceased secured by mortgaged or other collateral security, may abandon the security and prosecute his claim in the manner provided in this rule, and share in the general distribution of the assets of the estate; or he may foreclose his mortgage or realize upon his security, by action in court, making the executor or administrator a party defendant, and if there is a judgment for a deficiency, after the sale of the mortgaged premises, or the property pledged, in the foreclosure or the other proceeding to realize upon security, he may claim his deficiency judgment in the manner provided in the preceding section; or he may upon his mortgage or other security alone, and foreclosure the same at any time within the period of the statue of limitations, and in that event he shall not be admitted as a creditor, and shall receive no share in the distribution of the other assets of the estate. Synopsis: A debtor used the property of a third person to secure his loan. The period lapsed without payment of the loan, the creditor sued for collection against the owner of the security alleging that the mortgage created a solidary relationship between the debtor and the owner of the security.

On or about October 16, 1972, Celerino Delgado (Delgado) and Conrad Leviste (Leviste) entered into a loan agreement which was evidenced by a promissory note. On the same date, Delgado executed a chattel mortgage over a Willy's jeep owned by him. And acting as the attorney-in-fact of herein petitioner, Manolo P. Cerna (petitioner), he also mortgage a "Taunus' car owned by the latter. The period lapsed without Delgado paying the loan. This prompted Leviste to a file a collection suit with the Court of First Instance of Rizal, against Delgado and petitioner as solidary debtors. Herein petitioner filed Motion to Dismiss on grounds of lack of cause of action against petitioner and the death of Delgado. Petitioner claimed that the claim should be filed in the proceedings for the settlement of Delgado's estate as the action did not survive Delgado's death. Moreover, he also stated that since Leviste already opted to collect on the note, he could no longer foreclose the mortgage. This Motion to Dismiss was denied. ISSUE: Whether or not the filing of a collection suit is deemed an abandonment of the security of the chattel mortgage. RULING: The contract of loan, as evidenced by the promissory note, was signed by Delgado only. Petitioner had no part in the


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said contract. Nowhere could it be seen from the agreement that petitioner was solidarily bound with Delgado for the payment of the loan. Hence, Leviste, having chosen to file the collection suit, he could not now run after petitioner for the satisfaction of the debt. This is even truer in this case because of the death of the principal debtor, Delgado. Leviste was pursuing a money claim against a deceased person. Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court Provides: "Sec. 7. Mortgage debt due from estate. — A creditor holding a claim against the deceased secured by mortgaged or other collateral security, may abandon the security and prosecute his claim in the manner provided in this rule, and share in the general distribution of the assets of the estate; or he may foreclose his mortgage or realize upon his security, by action in court, making the executor or administrator a party defendant, and if there is a judgment for a deficiency, after the sale of the mortgaged premises, or the property pledged, in the foreclosure or the other proceeding to realize upon security, he may claim his deficiency judgment in the manner provided in the preceding section; or he may upon his mortgage or other security alone, and foreclosure the same at any time within the period of the statue of limitations, and in that event he shall not be admitted as a creditor, and shall receive no share in the distribution of the other assets of the estate; . . ." "It is clear by the provisions quoted section that a person holding a mortgage against the estate of a deceased person may abandon such security and prosecute his claim before the committee, and share

in the distribution of the general assets of the estate. It provides also that he may, at his own election, foreclose the mortgage and realize upon his security. But the law does not provide that he may have both remedies. If he elects one he must abandon the other. If he fails in one he fails utterly." Case Digested by: James Marfori

68

TOMASA VDA. DE JACOB v. CA GR No. 88602 April 6, 1990

Topic: Mortgage Debt Due From Estate, Options Given to Creditors under SEC. 7, RULE 86

Doctrine: The right of the mortgagee bank to extra judicially foreclose the mortgage after the death of the mortgagor, acting through his attorney-in-fact, did not depend on the authority in the deed of mortgage executed by the latter. The right existed independently of said stipulation. Synopsis: Dr. Jacob, the owner of the lot asked Centenera, the appointed administrator to negotiate for a loan due to problems in paying realty taxes, internal revenue taxes and unpaid wages of farm laborers of the hacienda. Centenera failed to pay the loan due which prompted to the foreclosure of the parcel of land. The surviving spouse, who was subsequently named the administratrix alleged that the documents were forged, thus making the mortgage null and void.


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executed in favor of the respondent bank as the sole and highest bidder. FACTS: Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob was the registered owner of a parcel of land. Because of the problem of paying realty taxes, internal revenue taxes and unpaid wages of farm laborers of the hacienda, Dr. Jacob asked Centenera to negotiate for a loan. For this purpose, a special power of attorney was executed and acknowledged before notary public. Consequently, Centenera secured a loan in the amount of P18,000.00 from the Bicol Savings & Loan Association sometime in September 1972. Centenera signed and executed the real estate mortgage and promissory note as attorney-in-fact of Dr. Jacob. When the loan fell due in 1975 Centenera failed to pay the same but was able to arrange a restructuring of the loan using the same special power of attorney and property as security. Another set of loan documents, namely: an amended real estate mortgage and promissory note dated November 27, 1975 was executed by Centenera as attorney-in-fact of Dr. Jacob. Again, Centenera failed to pay the loan when it fell due and so he arranged for another restructuring of the loan with the bank on November 23, 1976. The corresponding promissory note was again executed by Centenera on behalf of Jacob under the special power of attorney. Centenera again failed to pay the loan upon the maturity date. Thus, the bank foreclosed the real estate mortgage and the corresponding provisional sale of the mortgaged property to the respondent bank was effected. On November 5, 1982 a definite deed of sale of the property was

Tomasa Vda. de Jacob who was subsequently named administratrix of the estate of Dr. Jacob and who claimed to be an heir of the latter, conducted her own investigation and therefore she filed a complaint in the Regional Trial Court of Camarines Sur alleging that the special power of attorney and the documents therein indicated are forged and therefore the loan and/or real estate mortgages and promissory notes are null and void. ISSUE: Whether or not an extrajudicial foreclosure of a mortgage may proceed even after the death of the mortgagor. RULING: Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court provides as follows: Sec. 7. Mortgage debt due from estate. — A creditor holding a claim against the deceased secured by mortgage or other collateral security, may abandon the security and prosecute claim in the manner provided in this rule, and share in the general distribution of the assets of the estate; or he may foreclose his mortgage or realize upon his security, by action in court, making the executor or administrator a party defendant, and if there is a judgment for a deficiency, after the sale of the mortgaged premises, or the property pledged, in the foreclosure or other proceeding to realize upon the security, he may claim his deficiency judgment in the manner provided in the preceding section; or he may rely upon his mortgage or other


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security alone, and foreclose the same at any time within the period of the statute of limitations, and in that event he shall not be admitted as a creditor, and shall receive no share in the distribution of the other assets of the estate; but nothing herein contained shall prohibit the executor or administrator from redeeming the property mortgaged or pledged, by paying the debt for which it is held as security, under the direction of the court, if the court shall adjudge it to be for the best interest of the estate that such redemption shall be made From the foregoing provision of the Rules it is clearly recognized that a mortgagee has three remedies that may be alternately availed of in case the mortgagor dies, to wit: (1) to waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate of the mortgagor as an ordinary claim; (2) to foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove the deficiency as an ordinary claim; and; (3) to rely on the mortgage exclusively, or other security and foreclose the same at anytime, before it is barred by prescription, without the right to file a claim for any deficiency. It is clear that the mortgagee does not lose its light to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage even after the death of the mortgagor as a third alternative under Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. The power to foreclose a mortgage is not an ordinary agency that contemplated exclusively the representation of the principal by the agent

but is primarily an authority conferred upon the mortgagee for the latter's own protection. That power survives the death of the mortgagor. The right of the mortgagee bank to extrajudicially foreclose the mortgage after the death of the mortgagor, acting through his attorney-in-fact, did not depend on the authority in the deed of mortgage executed by the latter. That right existed independently of said stipulation and is clearly recognized in Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court aforecited. Case Digested by: James Marfori

69

AMPARO G. PEREZ v. PNB G.R. No. L-21813 July 30, 1966

Topic: No right to claim deficiency judgment under the third option. Doctrine: A judicial foreclosure virtually wipes out the third alternative conceded by the Rules to the mortgagee creditor, and which would precisely include extra-judicial foreclosures by contrast with the second alternative. Synopsis: The decedent mortgaged the lot in controversy to mortgagee bank. The mortgagor died intestate. Survived by his heirs, they filed an intestate proceedings and notice was given to creditors. However, mortgagee bank failed to file a claim; but foreclosed the mortgage property extra judicially. The widow and the heirs seek to annul the extrajudicial foreclosure claiming that the bank acted in bad faith.


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FACTS: On August 29, 1939, Vicente Perez mortgaged Lot No. 286-E of the Kabankalan Cadastre to the appellant Philippine National Bank, in order to secure payment of a loan of P2,500. On October 7, 1942, Vicente Perez, mortgagor, died intestate, survived by his widow and children (appellees herein). At that time, there was an outstanding balance of P1,917.00.

Three months later, on August 15, 1962, the widow and heirs of Vicente Perez instituted this case against the Bank in the court below, seeking to annul the extra judicial foreclosure sale and the transfer of the Certificate of Title as well as to recover damages, claiming that the Bank had acted illegally and in bad faith. Issue: Whether or not a judicial foreclosure or extra judicial foreclosure bars a right to file claim for deficiency. Ruling:

On October 18, 1956, the widow of Perez instituted Special Proceedings No. 512 of the Court of First Instance of Occidental Negros for the settlement of the estate of Vicente Perez. The widow was appointed Administratrix and notice to creditors was duly published. The Bank did not file a claim. The project of partition was submitted on July 18, 1956; it was approved and the properties distributed accordingly. Special Proceedings No. 512 was then closed. On January 2, 1963, the Bank, pursuant to authority granted it in the mortgage deed, caused the mortgaged properties to be extrajudicially foreclosed. The Provincial Sheriff accordingly sold Lot No. 286-E at auction, and it was purchased by the Bank. In the ordinary course after the lapse of the year of redemption, Certificate of Title No. T-29530 in the name of Vicente Perez was cancelled, and Certificate T32066, dated May 11, 1962, was issued in the name of the Bank. The widow and heirs were not notified.

No. The opinion of the Court refers to section 708 of the Code of Civil Procedure as determining the proposition that, after the death of the mortgagor, foreclosure can be effected only by an ordinary action in court; but if this section be attentively examined, it will be seen that the bringing of an action to foreclose is necessary only when the mortgagee wishes to obtain a judgment over for the deficiency remaining unpaid after foreclosure is effected. In fact this section gives to the mortgagee three distinct alternatives, which are first, to waive his security and prove his credit as an ordinary debt against the estate of the deceased; secondly to foreclose the mortgage by ordinary action in court and recover any deficiency against the estate in administration; and, thirdly, to foreclose without action at any time within the period allowed by the statute of limitations. The third mode of procedure is indicated in that part of section 708 which is expressed in these words:


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"Or he may rely upon his mortgage or other security alone, and foreclose the same at any time, within the period of the statute of limitations, and in that event he shall not be admitted as a creditor, and shall receive no share in the distribution of the other assets of the estate."

in the notice to creditors is not exclusive; that money claims against the estate may be allowed any time before an order of distribution is entered, at the discretion of the court for.

Facts: The alternative here contemplated is, evidently, foreclosure under power of sale contained in the mortgage. It must be so, since there are no other modes of foreclosure known to the law than by ordinary action and foreclosure under power, and the procedure by action is covered in that part of section 708 which immediately precedes the words which we have quoted above. It will be noted that the result of adopting the last mode of foreclosure is that the creditor waives his right to recover any deficiency from the estate Case Digested by: James Marfori

70

ECHAUS, v BLANCO G.R. No. L-30453 December 4, 1989

Topic: Liability of distributees and estate. Doctrine: Upon the death of the defendant, all money claims should be filed in the estate or intestate proceedings to avoid useless duplicity of procedure. The Rules of Court allows a creditor to file his claim after the period set by the court in the notice to creditors, provided the conditions stated in the rules are present. The period prescribed

Petitioner Angelina Echaus instituted Civil case No. 6628 against Charles Newton Hodges praying for the recovery of her share in the profits covering the Ba-Ta subdivision plus damages. During its pendency and before a decision could be rendered by the Regional Trial Court hearing the case, C. N. Hodges died. Upon his death, he was substituted by PCIB as administrator of his estate. A petition for the settlement of the estate of C. N. Hodges was instituted before and docketed as Special Proceedings No. 1672. A notice to creditors was published in "Yuhum" a newspaper of general circulation. A judgment was rendered by the trial court in favor of Echaus and a writ of execution was subsequently issued against PCIB. However, the writ was not enforced as plaintiff opted to file a motion in Special Proceedings No. 1672 for the payment of the judgment. Respondents opposed the motion contending that the judgment rendered in Civil Case No. 6628 is null and void for having been rendered without jurisdiction. It was alleged that money claims against a defendant who dies without a judgment having been rendered in the RTC shall be dismissed and prosecuted as a claim in the estate proceedings as laid down under Section 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. This procedure was not followed in Civil Case No. 6628.


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Issue: Whether judgment in Civil Case No. 6628 is valid and may be satisfied in the special proceedings for the settlement of estate.

Ruling: YES, the judgment is valid and its satisfaction may be obtained in the special proceeding. Being a money claim, Civil Case No. 6628 should have been dismissed and instituted as a money claim in the intestate estate of C. N. Hodges (Sp. Proc. No. 1627) in accordance with Section 21 of Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides: "Sec. 21.Where claim does not survive. — When the action is for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon, and the defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in these rules." However, this is not to suggest that because the claim of petitioner was pursued to its conclusion in Civil Case No. 6682 instead of being dismissed and filed as a money claim in Special Proceedings No. 1672, the judgment rendered therein is null and void. The case of Ignacio v. Pampanga Bus Co., Inc., L-18936, May 23, 1967, 20 SCRA 126, is in point. "2. . . . Now that the judgment has become final, the estate cannot be heard to say that said judgment — reached after a full dress trial on the merits — will now go for naught. The estate has thus waived its right to have Pambusco's claim re-litigated in the estate

proceedings. For, though presentment of probate claims is imperative, it is generally understood that it may be waived by the estate's representative. And, waiver is to be determined from the administrator's 'acts and conduct.' Certainly, the administrator's failure to plead the statute of non-claims, his active participation, and resistance to plaintiff's claim, in the civil suit, amount to such waiver. "3. Courts are loathe to overturn a final judgment. Judicial proceedings are entitled to respect. Non quieta movere. Plaintiffs claim has passed the test in three courts of justice: the Court of First Instance, the Court of Appeals and this Court. The judgment in plaintiff's favor should be enforced. Appellant's technical objection - after judgment had become final in the civil case — that plaintiff's claim should have been litigated in the probate court does not impair the validity of said judgment. For, such objection does not go into the court's jurisdiction over the subject matter." When PCIB as administrator of the estate of C. N. Hodges was ordered to be substituted as defendant, it registered no objection to the order. Thus, even if We admit for the sake of argument that the trial court, after the death of C. N. Hodges has no jurisdiction to render a judgment therein, the argument must fail. PCIB, participated actively in the said case. It did not appeal the decision rendered therein, neither did it raise the issue of jurisdiction at any stage. It has been consistently held by this court that while lack of jurisdiction may be assailed at any stage, a party's active participation in the proceedings before the court without jurisdiction will estop such party from assailing such lack of jurisdiction Case digested by: Danilo P. Lagbas


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71

Gerona v. De Guzman L-19060 May 29, 1964

Topic:Prescriptive Settlement.

Period

to

Annul

Doctrine: When questions arise as to the ownership of property, alleged to be part of the estate of a deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased, but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, such questions cannot be determined in the course of administration proceedings. The CFI acting as probate court, has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions, which must be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions which must be submitted to the curt in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a CFI to try and determine ordinary action. A probate court’s jurisdiction is limited and special. But by taking cognizance of civil case, the court does not assume general jurisdiction over the case but merely makes of record its existence because of the close interrelation of the two cases. Facts: Rafael Dingsalan et al. filed a civil case to recover ownership and possession of a parcel of land against Ang Chia and her two sons. The counsel of for the defendants objected on the ground that there was a pending case in the same court concerning the intestate estate of Lee Liong. The plaintiffs withdrew the motion and filed an amended complaint seeking the inclusion as party-defendant of the administratix of the estate, who is the widow Ang Chia. The

plaintiffs also filed in the intestate proceedings a verified claim in the intervention and a motion praying that a coadministraor of the estate be appointed and the bond of the administratix be increased. The plaintiffs made record the pendency of the civil case and prayed that the intestate proceedings be not closed until said civil case shall have been terminated. Thereafter, the administratix filed a motion to dismiss the claim in the intervention and objected to the abovementioned motions made by the plaintiffs. On august 4, 1948, the trial court: (a) issued an order denying the petition for co-administrator but increasing the bond to P5,000; (b) stated that it would act thereon if a motion to close the intestate proceedings is presented in due time and is objevted to by petitioners; and (c) took cognizance of the pendency of said civil case no. v-331. On July 15, 1949, the CFI of Capiz issued in the intestate proceedings an order holding in abeyance the approval of their petition for an extra judicial partition the closing of said proceedings until after the final termination of the said civil case. Issue: Whether or not the court erred in holding in abeyance the closing of the intestate proceedings pending the termination of the separate civil action filed by the petitioners-appellees Ruling: The act of the lower court in takingcognizance of civil case no. v-331 is not tantamount to assuming jurisdiction over said case nor does it violate the ruling of this court in Guzaman vs Anong which says that “when questions arise as to the ownership of property, alleged to be part of the estate of a deceased person, but


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claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance from the deceased, but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, such questions cannot be determined in the course of administration proceedings. The CFI acting as probate court, has no jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions, which must be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction to adjudicate such contentions which must be submitted to the curt in the exercise of its general jurisdiction as a CFI to try and determine ordinary actions”. The court is justified in taking cognizance of said civil case because of the unavoidable fact that whatever is determined in said civil case will necessarily reflect and have a far reaching consequence in the determination and distribution of the estate. In so taking cognizance of the case no. v-331 the court does not assume general jurisdiction over the case but merely makes of record its existence because of the close interrelation of the two cases and cannot therefore be branded as having acted in excess of its jurisdiction. Appellants’ claim that the lower court erred in holding abeyance the closing of the intestate proceedings pending determination of the separate civil action for the reason that there is no rule or authority justifying the extension of administration proceedings until after the separate action pertaining to its general jurisdiction has been terminated. Sec. 1, Rule 88 of the Rules of Court, expressly provides that ‘action to recover real or personal property from the estate or to enforce lien thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, the real or personal, may be commenced against executor or administrator”. This rule

is but corollary to the ruling when declares that questions concerning ownership of property allege to be part of the estate but claimed by another person should be determined in a separate action and should be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general jurisdiction. A probate court’s jurisdiction is limited and special. But by taking cognizance of civil case, the court does not assume general jurisdiction over the case but merely makes of record its existence because of the close interrelation of the two cases. Case digested by: Danilo P. Lagbas

Rule 87

72

Borromeo vs Borromeo G.R. No. L-41171 July 23, 1987

Doctrine: The heirs acquire a right to succession from the moment of the death of the deceased, by principles established in article 657 and applied by article 661 of the civil Code, according to which the heirs succeed the deceased by the mere fact of death Facts: Vito Borromeo, a widower and permanent resident of Cebu, died on March 13, 1952, in Paranaque, Rizal at the age of


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88, without forced heirs extensive properties in Cebu.

but

leaving

On April 19, 1952, Jose Junquera filed with CFI of Cebu a petition for the probate of one page document as the last will and testament left by the said deceased, devising all his properties his properties to Tomas, Fortunato and Amelia, all surnamed Borromeo, in equal and undivided shares , and designating Junquera as executor thereof. The document, drafted in Spanish was allegedly signed and thumbmark by the deceased in the presence of Cornelio Gandionco, Eusibio Cabiluna, and Felixberto who acted as witnesses. Oppositions to the probate of the will were filed. On may28, 1960, after due trial, the probate court held that the document presented as the will of the deceased was forgery. On April 10, 1969, the trial, invoking Art. 972 of the Civil Code, issued an order declaring nine heirs as the intestate heirs of the deceased Vito Borromeo. The order excluded Fortunato. On August 25, 1972, Fortunato Borromeo, who had earlier claimed as heir under the forged will, filed a motion before the trial court praying that he be declared as one of the deceased and that un the declaration of heirs made by the trial court, he was omitted, in disregard of the law making him a forced heir entitled to receive a legitimate like all other forced heirs. As an acknowledged illegitimate child, stated that he was entitled to a legitimate equal in every case to 4/5 of the legitimate of an acknowledged natural child. The court dismissed his motion. Fortunato Borromeo filed a motion for reconsideration. In the memorandum he

submitted to support his motion foe reconsideration, Fortunato changed the basis for his claim to a portion of the estate. He asserted and incorporated a Waiver if Hereditary Rights dated July 31, 1967, supposedly singed by the heirs. In the waiver, five of the nine heirs relinquished to Fortunato their shares in the disputed estate. The motion was opposed on the ground that the trial court, acting as a probate court, had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of the claim; that respondent Fortunato is estopped from asserting the waiver agreement; the waiver agreement is void as it was executed before the distribution of the estate and before the acceptance of the inheritance; and that it is void ab initio and inexistent for lack of subject matter. It is argued by the petitioner that the document entitled “waiver of Hereditary Rights” executed on July 31, 1967, aside from having been cancelled and revoked on June 29, 1968, by Tomas L. Borromeo, Fortunato and Amelia, is without force and effect because there can be no effective waiver of hereditary rights before there has been valid acceptance of the inheritance to the heirs intend to transfer. Pursuant to Art. 1043 of the Civil Code, to make acceptance or repudiation of inheritance valid, the person must be certain of the death of the one from whom he is to inherit and of his right to the inheritance. Since the petitioner and her coheirs were not certain of their and of his right to the inheritance. Since the petitioner and her co-heirs were not certain of their right to the inheritance. Since the petitioner and her co-heirs were not certain of their right to the inheritance until they were declared heirs, their rights were, therefore , uncertain. This view, according to the


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petitioner, is also supported by Art. 1057 of the same code which directs heirs, devises, and legatees to signify their acceptance or repudiation within thirty days after the court has issued an order has issued for the distribution of the estate. Fortunato Borromeo on the other hand, contends that under Art. 1043 of the Civill Code there is no need for a person to be first declared as heir before he can accept or repudiate an inheritance. What is required is that he must first be certain of the death of the person from whom he is to inherit and that he must be certain of his right to the inheritance. He puts out that at the time of the signing of the waiver document on July 31, 1967, the signatories to the waiver were certain that Vito Borromeo was already dead as wel as of their rights to the inheritance as shown in the waiver document itself Issue: WON Fortunato Borromeo os entitled to 5/9 of the estate of Vito Borromeo under the waiver agreement. Ruling: No. The prevailing jurisprudence on waiver of hereditary rights is that the “the properties included in an existing inheritance cannot be considered as belonging to third person with respect to the heirs, who by fiction of law continue the personality of the former. Nor do such properties have the character of future property, because the heirs acquire a right to succession from the moment of the death of the deceased, by principle established in Art. 657 and 661 of the Civil Code, according to which the heirs succeed the deceased by the mere fact of death. More or less, time may elapse from the

moment of the death of the deceased until the heirs enter into possession of the hereditary property, but the acceptance in any event retroacts to the moment of the death, in accordance of the corresponding hereditary portion. The heirs, therefore, could waive their hereditary rights in 1967 even if the order to partition the estate was issued only on 1969. In this case, however , the purported “Waiver Of Hereditary Rights” cannot considered to be effective. For a waiver to exist, three elements are essential: (1) the existence of a right; (2) the knowledge of the existence therefore; and (3) an intention to relinquish such right. The intention to waive a right or advantage must be shown clearly and convincingly, and when the only proof of intention rests in what a party does, his act should be so manifest consistent with, and indicative of an intent to, voluntarily relinquish the particular right or advantage that no other reasonable explanation of his conduct is possible. The circumstances of this case show that the signatories to the waiver document did not have the clear and convincing intention to relinquish their rights. The supposed waiver of hereditary rights cannot be validated. The essential elements of a waiver, especially the clear and convincing intention to relinquish hereditary rights, are not found in this case.. Case Digested by: Rhino Perez

73

DELA CRUZ v EMILIO CAMON G.R. No. L-21034 April 30, 1966


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Topic: Actions by and against executors and administrators Doctrine: Claims against the administrator may be presented in the administration proceeding but not against third person. Synopsis: The deceased was the owner of 2/4 pro-indiviso share of Hacienda Rosario which was leased to here in appellee. The administrator of the estate moved the court for an order to direct Camon to pay the estate’s 2/4 share of the rentals. The latter challenged the court’s jurisdiction over his person. Facts: The estate of Thomas Fallon and Anne Fallon Murphy was owner of twofourths (2/4) share pro-indiviso of Hacienda Rosario. That whole hacienda was held in lease by Emilio Camon since long before the present intestate proceedings were commenced.

Whether the claim against third persons by the administrator maybe presented in the administration proceedings. Ruling: The demand is for money due allegedly for rentals. Camon is a third person. Hence, the administrator may not pull him against his will, by motion, into the administration proceedings. "When the demand is in favor of the administrator and the party against whom it is enforced is a third party, not under the court's jurisdiction, the demand can not be by mere motion by the administrator, but by an independent action against the third person." Case Digested by: James Marfori

The administrator of the estate moved the court for an order to direct Emilio Camon to pay the estate's two-forths share of the rentals on Hacienda Rosario for the crop years 1948-1949 through 19601961, viz: on the sugar land, P62,065.00; and on the rice land, P2,100.00. Emilio Camon challenged the probate court's jurisdiction over his person. The court ruled that the demand for rentals cannot be made "by mere motion by the administrator but by independent action." Hence, this appeal.

Issue:


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74

DAMASO CABUYAO vs DOMINGO CAGBAY GR NO. L-6636 August 02, 1954

Topic: Right to Assert a Cause of Action as Alleged Heir Doctrine: If the decedent left no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial guardians, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do as in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir or one legatee, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. It shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of administration within two years after the death of the decedent Facts: Damaso Cabuyao alleged that he is the “lone compulsory heir” of the spouses Prudencio Cabuyao and Dominga Caagbay, who died leaving the eleven (11) parcels of land therein described, and that, although plaintiff had adjudicated said properties to himself pursuant to section 1 of Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, the corresponding transfer certificates of title could not be issued in his name because the original owner’s duplicate certificates were being withheld by the defendants, Domingo Caagbay and Eugenio Caagbay, who had also taken possession of said parcels of land,

and would continue unlawfully using the same and committing acts of dispossession thereof, unless enjoined by the court. The lower court ruled in favor of the defendants. Court has arrived at the conclusion that said motion should be, as it is hereby, denied for lack of merit. As stated in the order of the reconsideration of which is prayed, it is impossible for plaintiff to maintain the action in this case because he and the party defendants alleged to be the heir of the same decedents and there has been no showing that they have been judicially declared as heir of the deceased. Once the question of who are the heirs is determined, it may not be necessary for the plaintiff to file the complaint in this case Issue: WON a sole compulsory heir may inherit notwithstanding the absence of a previous declaration of heirship in favor of the heir? Ruling: Yes. There is no legal precept or established rule which imposes the necessity of a previous legal declaration regarding their status as heirs to an intestate estate on those who, being of age and with legal capacity, consider themselves the legal heirs of a person, in order that they may maintain an action arising out of a right which belonged to their ancestor.” If the decedent left no debts and the heirs and legatees are all of age, or the minors are represented by their judicial guardians, the parties may, without securing letters of administration, divide the estate among themselves as they see fit by means of a public instrument filed in the


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office of the register of deeds, and should they disagree, they may do as in an ordinary action of partition. If there is only one heir or one legatee, he may adjudicate to himself the entire estate by means of an affidavit filed in the office of the register of deeds. It shall be presumed that the decedent left no debts if no creditor files a petition for letters of administration within two years after the death of the decedent. Case Digested by: Rhino Perez

1949, rendered In the testate proceedings of the deceased, approving the sale of certain real property in favor of Francisco Dee, and for the annulment of the sale Itself. The complaint was filed against Francisco Dee as vendee and Maria Lao, a co-special administratrix of the estate, also an heir, in her individual capacity. The lower court denied said complaint. Hence this petition. Issue: WON the sale to Defendants were invalid.. Ruling:

75 Topic: Heir Administrator Assigned

May Not Appointed

Sue Until

When Share

Doctrine: An executor or administrator who assumes the trust, takes possession of the property left by the decedent for the purpose of paying debts. While his debts are undetermined and unpaid, no residue may be settled for distribution among the heirs and devisees. Consequently, before distribution is made or before any residue is known, the heirs, or devisees have no cause of action against the executor or administrator for recovery of the property left by the deceased Facts: Ignacia Lao, In her capacity as special administratrix of the estate of the late Albina de los Santos, as well as heir of said deceased, and Domingo Lao, also as heir of the deceased, filed a complaint for the annulment of an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila dated January 38,

The sale was made by express authority of the court on the strength of the petition of the heirs themselves. Including the now appellant Ignacla Lao. The sale was made by the two administratrices of the estate. The terms of the sale were more than what the heirs expected. The authority was to sell the property for P250,000, and yet Francisco Dee paid P260,000. The heirs, therefore, have no reason to complain. In any event, under the rule, only the two administratrices of the estate can Impugn the validity of the sale, and we doubt if this can be done, for the court would not sanction the undoing of what it has been accomplished through its own express authority. This is not, therefore, a case which comes under the exception of the rule that “when the executor or administrator is unwilling or fails or refuses to act, in which event the heirs may act in his place”. “An executor or administrator who assumes the trust, takes possession of the property left by the decedent for the purpose of paying debts. While his debts are undetermined and unpaid, no residue may be settled for distribution among the heirs and devisees. Consequently, before


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distribution is made or before any residue is known, the heirs, or devisees have no cause of action against the executor or administrator for recovery of the property left by the deceased.”. Case Digested by: Rhino Perez

76

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS DE LA RAMA (124 PHIL. 1493)

Topic: Notices Administrator.

to

be

sent

to

Estate’s

Doctrine: When an estate is under administration, notice must be sent to the administrator of the estate, since it is the said administrator, as representative of the estate, who has the legal obligation to pay and discharge all debts of the estate and to perform all orders of the court. Facts: The executor-administrator, Eliseo Hervas, filed on March 12, 1951, income tax returns of the estate corresponding to the taxable year 1950. The Bureau of Internal Revenue later claimed that it had found out that there had been received by the estate in 1950 from the De la Rama Steamship Company, Inc. cash dividends amounting to P86,800.00, which amount was not declared in the income tax return of the estate for the year 1950. The Bureau of Internal Revenue then, on March 7, 1956, made an assessment as deficiency income tax against the estate. The Collector of Internal Revenue wrote a letter to Mrs. Lourdes de la Rama-

Osmeña informing her of the deficiency income tax and asking payment thereof. The latter's counsel wrote to the Collector acknowledging receipt of the assessment but contended that Lourdes de la RamaOsmeña had no authority to represent the estate, and that the assessment should be sent to Leonor de la Rama who was pointed to by said counsel as the administratrix of the estate of her late father. A letter to Leonor de la Rama as administratrix of the estate was sent asking for payment. The deficiency income tax not having been paid, the Republic of the Philippines filed a complaint against the heirs of Esteban de la Rama, seeking to collect from each heir his/her proportionate share in the income tax liability of the estate Issue: Whether the letter sent to Leonor de la Rama as administratrix was proper. Ruling: No. The estate was still under the administration of Eliseo Hervas as regards the collection of said dividends. The administrator was the representative of the estate, whose duty it was to pay and discharge all debts and charges on the estate and to perform all orders of the court by him to be performed (Rule 71, Section 1), and to pay the taxes and assessments due to the Government or any branch or subdivision thereof (Section 7, Rule 89, Old Rules of Court). The tax must be collected from the estate of the deceased, and it is the administrator who is under obligation to pay such claim (Estate of Claude E. Haygood.). The notice of assessment, therefore, should have been sent to the administrator. In this case, notice was first sent to Lourdes de la Rama-Osmeña on and


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later to Leonor de la Rama, neither of whom had authority to represent the estate Case digested by: Dais Elisa Leonore C. Omisol

77

MELGAR v BUENAVIAJE (179 SCRA 196)

Topic: Notices to be sent to Estate’s Administrator and Actions which survive Doctrine: An action for damages may be brought against an executor or administrator Facts: In the early morning of January 11, 1980 a vehicular accident happened along the National Highway of Barangay Agos, Polangui, Albay, whereby a passenger bus owned and operated by the late Felicidad Balla swerved to the left lane and came into head-on-collision with a Ford Fiera owned by Mateo Lim Relucio coming from the opposite direction. It then swerved further to the left this time colliding head-on-with a passenger bus, FUSO driven by Fabian Prades. As a result of the accident, Felicidad Balla, owner and operator of the passenger, and mother of herein petitioners together with Domingo Casin, driver of the bus, died on the spot. Ruben Lim Relucio, driver of the service jeep and Fabian Prades, driver of the other passenger bus died in the same accident. On July 4, 1980 the spouses Oscar Prades and Victoria Prades private respondents herein as the only surviving

forced heirs of the deceased Fabian Prades, filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Camarines Sur against the children of deceased Felicidad Balla, petitioners herein for damages. The defendants in the complaint, petitioners herein, moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action against them, arguing that it is entirely incorrect to hold the children liable for the alleged negligence of their deceased mother and to consider suing the heirs of a deceased person the same as suing the estate of said deceased person. Respondent court denied the motion to dismiss in its order of September 23, 1980 for lack of merit. Plaintiff spouses, private respondents herein, filed their comment and motion to admit amended complaint together with an amended complaint, amending the title of the case naming as defendants the Estate of the late Felicidad Balla as represented by the children named in the original complaint. Respondent court issued its order denying the motion for reconsideration and admitting the amended complaint. Issue: Whether or not the Court of First Instance has the power to entertain a suit for damages arising from the death of a person, filed against the estate of another deceased person as represented by the heirs Ruling: While petitioners may have correctly moved for the dismissal of the case and private respondents have forthwith corrected the deficiency by filing an amended complaint, even before the lower court could act on petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the denial of their


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motion to dismiss, the action which allows the suit against the legal representative of the deceased, that is, the executor or administrator of his estate, would still be futile, for the same reason that there appears to be no steps taken towards the settlement of the estate of the late Felicidad Balla, nor has an executor or administrator of the estate been appointed. From the statement made by the petitioners that "many persons die without leaving any asset at all" which insinuates that the deceased left no assets, it is reasonable to believe that the petitioners will not take any step to expedite the early settlement of the estate, judicially or extra judicially if only to defeat the damage suit against the estate. Under the circumstances the absence of an estate proceeding may be avoided by requiring the heirs to take the place of the deceased. Case digested by: Dais Elisa Leonore C. Omisol

78

ROMUALDEZ VS TIGLAO (105 SCRA 762)

Topic: Notices to be sent to Estate’s Administrator Doctrine: The judgment creditor could not file a claim against the testate estate for the amount of the unsatisfied judgment. The judgment creditors had no alternative but to file an action for revival of judgment to prevent its extinguishment by prescription Facts: Paz G. Romualdez and others sued Antonio Tiglao for the payment of unpaid rentals for the lease of a hacienda and its

sugar quota. Included in the suit were Felisa Tiglao and others who had guaranteed the payment of the rents jointly and severally with Antonio Tiglao. The judgment was not satisfied notwithstanding a writ of execution to enforce it. Accordingly, Paz G. Romualdez, et al. filed another civil case in the Court of First Instance of Rizal against Antonio Tiglao and his sureties in order to revive the judgment above quoted. It should be stated that when the suit to revive judgment was filed, Felisa F. Tiglao had died and her estate was being settled. Accordingly, the one who was made defendant was her estate represented by the Special Administratrix Maningning Tiglao-Naguiat, The administratrix questioned the jurisdiction of the court a quo to entertain the suit to revive judgment. She invoked Sec. 1 of Rule 87 of the Rules of Court that, "No action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; ... ". Brushing aside the posture of the administratrix, the court a quo rendered a decision Issue: Whether the present action is one for the recovery of a sum of money and that it is barred by Sec. I of Rule 87 of the Rules of Court Ruling: The original judgment which was rendered has become stale because of its non-execution after the lapse of five years. (Sec. 6, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.) Accordingly, it cannot be presented against the Estate of Felisa Tiglao unless it is first revived by action. This is precisely why the


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appellees have instituted the second suit whose object is not to make the Estate of Felisa Tiglao pay the sums of money adjudged in the first judgment but merely to keep alive said judgment so that the sums therein awarded can be presented as claims against the estate in Special Proc. No. Q-10731 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal

Vicenta Cacao, by our contract have agreed, that Miguel Orin, The widower, obligates himself to deliver to his brothers-in-law, as guardians and fathers of the heirs of Petra Cacao, the value of one thousand pesos to each of them. The period within which to comply with this contract is until August 15, next; this is the just amount of our inheritance.

Case digested by: Dais Elisa Leonore C. Omisol

Issue:

79

Whether the administrator has right of action against the defendant. Ruling:

ABIERA VS ORIN (8 PHIL. 193).

Topic: Actions which survive Doctrine: The administrator has only the right to institute such actions as pertain to the estate he is administering, and no action dealing with obligations contracted in favor of third persons or others from whom he does not derive such right, can be brought by him as such administrator Facts: Now, the plaintiff, has filed this complaint as special administrator of his deceased father, Juan Abiera, alleging that the defendant has not complied with the said contract and agreement and prays the court to compel the compliance of the defendant therewith." The tenor of this contract, according to the judgment referred to, is as follows: We, having knowledge and information of the inventory of the properties acquired during the married state and life of Miguel Orin and the said

It is not necessary, it being too trivial, to refer to the right of Juan Abiera to represent his children as father or guardian of the same, and that he has not transferred nor could he transfer to the administrator of his estate such right from the mere fact that he was such administrator. As has been stated, the said right attached to parental authority or guardianship was extinguished with the death of Abiera, together with the parental right or the said guardianship — this in fact and law. This was an exclusively personal right that could not survive the person who had such right. Consequently by reason of the considerations expressed above the court below incurred error in taking into consideration the propriety of the complaint herein. This could not have been done legally, the plaintiff not having the right of action and was without such right of action in the suit brought by him, and this is the basis of the exception taken by the appellant and now before this court. It is true that this exception on this point was not brought forward in the Court of First Instance, but it is also true that the


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exception based on the lack of right of action can be submitted during any stage or state of the case, as provided in section 93 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Case by: Dais Elisa Leonore C. Omisol

Rule 87

80

SINFOROSO PASCUAL v. PONCIANO PASCUAL, ET AL

The complaint alleges that plaintiff and defendants are all residents of Malabon, Rizal, and are legitimate children of the testratix, Eduarda de los Santos. Defendants filed of a motion to dismiss, alleging want of cause of action limitation of action, wrong venue and pendency of another action. The trial court granted the motion on the ground that the action should have been brought by the executor or administrator of the estate left by the deceased. The amended complaint was still dismissed due to insufficiency Issue: Whether or not the action can be brought by the heirs despite presence of appointed administrator

Topic: Administrator’s

sole right and prerogative to file action in behalf of the estate; exception.

Doctrine: Upon the commencement of the testate or intestate proceedings the heirs have no standing in court in actions of the above character, except when the executor or administrator is unwilling or fails or refuses to act, in which event to heirs may act in his place. Facts: Plaintiff Sinforoso Pascual instituted in the Court of First Instance of Pampanga against Ponciano S. Pascual and others, an action for the annulment of a contract of sale of a fishpond situated in Lubao, Pampanga. He supposedly executed without consideration by the deceased in her lifetime in favor of the defendants. One of defendants, Miguel S. Pascual, was the executor appointed by the probate court.

Ruling: Under Rule 86, section 1, of the new Rules of Court, actions for the recovery or protection of the property or rights of the deceased for causes which survive may be prosecuted or defended by his executor or administrator. Upon the commencement of the testate or intestate proceedings the heirs have no standing in court in actions of the above character, except when the executor or administrator is unwilling or fails or refuses to act, in which event to heirs may act in his place. The fictitious sale is alleged to have been made to the defendants, one of them, Miguel S. Pascual, being the executor appointed by the probate court. Such executor naturally would not bring an action against himself for recovery of the fishpond. His refusal to act may, therefore, be implied. And this brings the case under the exception


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Case digested by: Gregor Alfonsin Pondoyo

MARIA VELASQUEZ, ET AL., v. WILLIAM GEORGE ET AL

Topic: Administrator’s sole right and prerogative to file action in behalf of the estate; exception Doctrine: In Ramirez v. Baltazar we ruled that since the ground for the present action to annul the aforesaid foreclosure proceedings is the fraud resulting from such insidious machinations and collusion in which the administrator has allegedly participated, it would be far-fetched to expect the said administrator himself to file the action in behalf of the estate. Since the Administrator is a party to the fraud, the heirs may bring an action to annul as an exception to the rule that pending proceedings for the settlement of the estate, the heir have no right to commence an action arising out of the rights belonging to the deceased Facts: Maria Velasquez Vda. De George and her children appealed from the decision of the CFI of Bulacan, which dismissed their complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Plaintiffs are the widow and legitimate children of the late Benjamin George whose estate is under intestate proceedings. In their complaint, plaintiffs alleged that the 5 defendant-mortgagors (D-Mors) are officers of the Islan Associates Inc. Andres Munoz, aside from being the treasurer-director of said corp., was also appointed and qualified

as administrator of the estate of Benjamin George in the above special proceedings. In life, the latter owned 64.8% or 636 shares out of 980 shares of stock in the corp. Without prior approval from the probate court and without notice to the heirs and their counsel, the D-Mors executed a Deed of First Real Estate Mortgage (DFREM) in favor of the defendant-mortgagee (D-Mee) Erlinda Villanueva, covering 3 parcels of land owned by Island Assoc. In said Deed, the D-Mors also expressly waived their right to redeem the said parcels. Subsequently, a power of atty (POA) was executed by the DMors in favor of Villanueva whereby the latter was given full power and authority to cede, transfer and convey the parcels of land within the reglementary period provided by law for redemption. A certificate of sale (CS) was executed in favor of Villanueva after she submitted the highest bids at the public Auction. This led to the execution of a Deed of Sale and Affidavit of Consolidation of Ownership (ACO) by virtue of which TCTs covering the 3 parcels were cancelled and new TCTs were issued in favor of Villanueva. Plaintiffs therefore filed a complaint for the annulment of the DFREM, POA, CS, ACO and the new TCTs. Villanueva contends that the plaintiffs-appellants have no capacity to file the complaint because the general rule laid down in R87, sec3 of the Rules of Court states that only the administrator or executor of the estate may bring actions of such nature as the one in the case at bar. The only exception is when the executor or administrator is unwilling or fails or refuses to act, which exception does not apply in the present case. TC dismissed the complaint. Issue:


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Whether or not the plaintiffsappellants have the capacity to file the complaint? Ruling: Yes. The contention that the proper party to file the complaint is the administrator of the estate of Benjamin George is without merit. The administrator, Andres Munoz, is the same person charged by the plaintiffs-appellants to have voted in the Board of Directors without securing the proper authority from the Probate Court to which he is accountable as administrator. In Ramirez v. Baltazar we ruled that since the ground for the present action to annul the aforesaid foreclosure proceedings is the fraud resulting from such insidious machinations and collusion in which the administrator has allegedly participated, it would be far-fetched to expect the said administrator himself to file the action in behalf of the estate. Who else but the heirs who have an interest to assert and protect would bring the action? Inevitably this case falls under the EXCEPTION [emphasis mine] rather than the general rule that pending proceedings for the settlement of the estate, the heirs have no right to commence an action arising out of the rights belonging to the deceased. This case falls under the exception. Case digested by: Gregor Alfonsin Pondoyo

AGUSTIN REGALA v. COURT OF APPEALS and ORVILLE ODICTA

Topic: Recovery of a sum of money dies when defendant dies; testate or intestate

court becomes recovery

the proper

court for

Doctrine: The reason for the dismissal of the case is that upon the death of the defendant a testate or intestate proceeding shall be instituted in the proper court wherein all his creditors must appear and file their claims which shall be paid proportionately out of the property left by the deceased. The purpose of the rule is to avoid useless duplicity of procedure — the ordinary action must be wiped out from the ordinary court Facts: On 23 November 1988, private respondent Orville Odicta filed against Agustin Regala in the Regional Trial Court of Manila a complaint for recovery of the sum of P503,048.00, representing the balance of the purchase price of assorted knockeddown motor vehicles and spare parts. The court granted the motion of the plaintiff for the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment. Regala died on 1989 during the proceedings. Te court was informed of his death but continued the proceedings and required the plaintiff to comment within 5 days on the defendant's Urgent Motion to Discharge Attachment. On 19 June 1989 the defense filed an Omnibus Motion for reconsideration of the said order and for the dismissal of the complaint pursuant to the above cited rule. This motion was denied. Teresita F. Regala, in representation of her deceased father, then went to the Court of Appeals in a petition for certiorari and mandamus with preliminary injunction to question the said orders of the trial court. Her petition was dismissed Issue:


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Whether the recovery (collection) of sum of money be dismissed upon the death of Agustin Regala

PAULA v. ECSAY ET AL. 97 Phil. 617, 619-620 (1955)

Ruling: It is already a settled rule that an action for recovery of money for collection of a debt is one that does not survive and upon the death of the defendant the case should be dismissed to be presented in the manner especially provided in the Rules of Court (Villegas and Santos v. Zapanta and Zorilla, 104 Phil. 1973). This is explicitly provided in Sec. 21, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court which states that: Sec. 21. Where claim does not survive. — Then the action is for recovery of money, debt or interest thereon, and the defendant dies before final judgment in the Court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner especially provided in these rules.

Topic: Claim of a sum of money; testate and intestate proceedings Synopsis/Doctrine: The practice has been for demands against administrators to be presented in the court of first instance where the special proceeding of administration is pending, if the demand has relation to an act of administration and in the ordinary course thereof. The mere fact that the court in passing upon the claim may order the administratrix to pay the full amount of the demand, does not mean that the total amount which she is compelled to pay could be chargeable against the said estate under administration

The reason for the dismissal of the case is that upon the death of the defendant a testate or intestate proceeding shall be instituted in the proper court wherein all his creditors must appear and file their claims which shall be paid proportionately out of the property left by the deceased. The purpose of the rule is to avoid useless duplicity of procedure — the ordinary action must be wiped out from the ordinary court. In the present case, the money claim arose out of a pure and simple debt, which as aforementioned, under the provisions of Rule 3, Sec. 21 of the Rules of Court shall be dismissed and must be brought before the probate court.

Facts:

Case digested by: Gregor Alfonsin Pondoyo

Ecsay filed his claim averring that the administratrix was indebted to him for P5,418.31 as principal and P2,682.06 as interest. The administratrix opposed the

Jose Ecsay and Rufina de Paula, administratrix of the estate of the late Victor Gaston, entered into a contract of lease over Hacienda Puyas No. 1. Escay stood as the lessee and Paula, the lessor. The contract of lease was executed with the court’s approval. Under the contract of lease the administratrix was obliged to deliver to Ecsay 10% of the sugar, rice and corn produced from the Hacienda from 1943 until the full sum of P7,000 - the estimated cost of the property transferred to the estate - was fully covered.


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claim contending that: the court sitting in probate has no jurisdiction to entertain the claim, especially the same is being controverted; the claim is not chargeable against the estate but against the administratrix in her personal capacity since there was an overpayment of rentals; and she was not given the opportunity to contest the claim’s correctness. The lower court ruled in favor of Ecsay. Issue: (1) Whether or not the court has the jurisdiction to consider the claim in the administration proceedings. (2) Whether or not the claim should be chargeable against the administratrix in her personal capacity. (3) Whether or not the amounts in the claim may still be controverted Ruling: (1) YES. The claim is an ordinary demand for the payment of the balance of an account due under a contract of lease entered into by the administratrix under the court’s approval. In our judicial system, there is only one grade of court of general jurisdiction invested with power to take cognizance of all kinds of cases. There are no probate courts dedicated to the trial of probate cases alone. The practice has been for demands against administrators to be presented in the court of first instance where the special proceeding of administration is pending, if the demand has relation to an act of administration and in the ordinary course thereof.

It can be seen in this case that as the lease contract was entered into by the administratrix with the approval of the court in the ordinary course of administration and with the court’s approval in the administration proceedings, to consider the claim in the same proceedings may not be denied for the claim purpose to make the administratrix comply with the obligations contracted in the course of administration with the court’s consent and approval. The claimant is not prohibited from filing an independent action to recover the claim, but the existence of such a remedy is not a bar to the remedy that he had pursued in this case (2) YES. The consideration of the claim in the administration proceedings, however, does not necessarily mean that the administratrix may not be held personally liable for the excess. The mere fact that the court in passing upon the claim may order the administratrix to pay the full amount of the demand, does not mean that the total amount which she is compelled to pay could be chargeable against the said estate under administration. The court in ordering payment of the excess amount over the rentals would hold the administratrix personally responsible therefor. This however do not deprive the court of power to consider the claim; and the administratrix is estopped from denying that the amounts received in excess of the true rentals were received by her in such capacity. One who contracts with another in a representative capacity cannot claim that amounts received by her in said


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representative capacity are due from her in another capacity. (3) NO. As to the correctness of the amounts stated in the claim, the administratrix never offered to disprove them. The administratrix should have indicated the items the correctness of which she wanted to deny. Thus all the items were deemed admitted. Case by: Gregor AlfonsinC. Pondoyo

Rule 88

84

GOVERNMENT v. PAMINTUAN GR No. L-33139 October 11, 1930

Topic: Types of claims required to be filed. Doctrine: Claims for taxes due and assessed after the death of the decedent need not be presented in the form of a claim. The court in the exercise of its administrative control over the executor or administrator may direct him to pay such taxes. And the heirs even after distribution are liable for such taxes. Synopsis: Decedent died intestate, and after the partition of the properties, the delivery of the shares and inheritance to the heirs were ordered. During the pendency of the proceedings, it was discovered that some tax returns were not paid. Facts: Florentino Pamintuan, died intestate, leaving herein defendants as his heirs.

During the intestate proceedings, a committee on claims and appraisals was established, appointing two commissioners for appraisal of the decedent’s properties. The said committee submitted their report before the court, indicating the valid claims that were to be paid during the proceedings. After which, the partition of the properties of the decedent took place, with the court ordering the delivery of the shares and inheritance of the decedent’s heirs. During the pendency of the proceedings, the administrator of the estate of the deceased filed income-tax returns, and it was discovered that there were certain income tax returns which the decedent was not able to pay during his lifetime. However, the proceedings were already closed by the court, and due to which, the heirs, herein defendants, refused to pay the income tax returns which were not settled by the decedent. Hence, this appeal. Issue: Whether the lower court erred in holding that the failure of the plaintiff to file its claim with the committee on claims and appraisals barred it from collecting the tax in questions in this action, and of absolving the defendants from the complaint. Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that claims for income taxes need not be filed with the committee on claims and appraisals appointed in the course of testate proceedings and may be collected even after the distribution of the decedent's estate among his heirs, who shall be liable therefor in proportion to their share in the inheritance. Income taxes may be collected even after the distribution of the estate, and the heirs of the decedent are liable for the payment of it.


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Case Digested by: Aiza Belle Manla Ramos

Rule 89

85

ROD of Pampanga v PNB GR No. L-1781 September 27, 1949

Topic: Authority of the Court to Approve Sale of Property by Prospective Heir Doctrine: The probate court has no jurisdiction to make pronouncement regarding the existence or non-existence of encumbrances or to cancel a mortgage on real property in its order approving the sale of the estate under administration. Synopsis: A petition was filed by the Register of Deeds of Pampanga to correct an error covering a mortgage in favor of Gonzalo Puyat. The above petition was opposed by the Philippine National Bank on the ground that it will adversely affect the interest of the mortgagee bank. the probate court had no jurisdiction to cancel the mortgage, the order given by it approving the sales of the properties of the estate of Martin Gonzales to appellant Pedro B. Cruz did not and does not, in any manner, affect the existence of the mortgaged executed by Gonzales in favor of Gonzalo Puyat. Facts: This is a petition filed by Rodolfo R. Dimzon as Register of Deeds of Pampanga, whereby he seeks to correct "the error, omission or mistake made in transfer certificate of title No. 16342 by transferring

on the said title the liens on the property covered by said certificate, consisting of a mortgage in favor of Gonzalo Puyat and the lease affecting the portion of the lot. The parcels of land covered by transfer certificate of title No. 5377 of the office of the register of deeds of Pampanga were registered in the name of Martin Gonzales. Among those parcels, there was a lot 1-J which is a portion of lot No. 1 located in the municipality of Lubao. All the parcels of land described in the said certificate No. 5377, as well as those described in certificate No. 5379, original certificate, of title No. 11578 and original certificate of title No. 17261 and other parcels of land located in Bataan, were mortgaged in favor of Gonzalo Puyat. Those parcels of land were leased to one Romualdo Rivera for a period of six agricultural years. The above-mentioned mortgage was registered in the office of the register of deeds of Pampanga, and the corresponding annotation made on the back of the respective certificate of title (5377). Lot No. 1-J was sold by Jose Gonzales Carrion, as administrator of the estate of Martin Gonzales, to private respondent Pedro B. Cruz. On October 17, 1944, Romualdo Rivera sold his rights on the lease over the 2,000,000 square meters of lot No. 1-J to Pedro B. Cruz. By virtue of such sales, transfer certificate of title No. 5377 was partially cancelled as to the whole lot No. 1-J, and transfer certificate of title No. 16342 was issued in the name of Pedro B. Cruz, and the only lien appearing thereon is the milling contract executed in favor of Pampanga Sugar Mills.


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Pedro B. Cruz mortgaged the whole of lot No. 1-J described in transfer certificate of title No. 16342 to PNB. It is contended by the register of deeds that Luis Panaguition, then acting provincial fiscal and ex-officio register of deeds of Pampanga, "overlooked or failed to transfer in the title." the liens referring to the mortgage in favor of Gonzalo Puyat. The above petition was opposed by the Philippine National Bank on the ground that it will adversely affect the interest of the mortgagee bank. During the pendency of the case, PNB executed a release of the mortgage in favor of Pedro Cruz after the later paid his loan. Pedro B. Cruz also filed his opposition to the petition of the register of deeds. He alleges that the probate court of Pampanga authorized the sale of 104 additional hectares of the Hacienda of the late Martin Gonzales, over the objection of Gonzalo Puyat, and notwithstanding a subsequent motion for reconsideration of the order approving the sale, which was denied, it stated that the land was free from all liens and encumbrances. Accordingly, the deeds of sale covering the 200 hectares and the additional 104 hectares show that they were all free from all liens and encumbrances of whatsoever nature, and, therefore, the register of deeds of Pampanga acted correctly in registering the two deeds of sale in the name of Pedro B. Cruz, free from all liens and encumbrances of whatsoever nature. It is contended by appellant Pedro B. Cruz that the order of the probate court in approving the sale of the land is res judicata in the present case.

Issue: Whether the probate court erred in approving the sale of the subject parcel of land. Ruling: Yes. The jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance, whether original or appellate, is provided in the Organic Law of the Judiciary. Formerly, it was the Court of Land Registration that had exclusive jurisdiction over land matters and proceedings. That court was, however, abolished and its jurisdiction and functions were transferred to the Court of First Instance. The special mention made therein of the original jurisdiction given the Court of First Instance in "all matters of probate, both testate and intestate estates," is a clear expression of the legislative intent that when a Court of First Instance is sitting as a probate court it cannot in the same proceeding deal with or adjudicate a matter which has no reference or bearing on the case under its consideration. Gonzalo Puyat was not a party in the proceedings of the Estate of Martin Gonzales, and when the Court of First Instance of Pampanga, as probate court — not as land registration court — authorized the sale to appellant Pedro B. Cruz of a lot belonging to the estate of Martin Gonzales, it acted as such probate court, in accordance with paragraph (e) of section 44 of the Judiciary Act, but its pronouncement regarding the existence or non-existence of encumbrances regarding the lot it authorized to be sold to Pedro B. Cruz, was beyond its jurisdiction as probate court. It is, therefore, undeniable that since the probate court had no jurisdiction to


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cancel the mortgage, the order given by it approving the sales of the properties of the estate of Martin Gonzales to appellant Pedro B. Cruz did not and does not, in any manner, affect the existence of the mortgaged executed by Gonzales in favor of Gonzalo Puyat. Any inasmuch as said mortgage was still in force when Pedro B. Cruz purchased from the estate of Martin Gonzales the property covered by transfer certificate of title No. 5377, which was subsequently replaced by transfer certificate No. 16342, the conclusion is inevitable that the mortgage in favor of Gonzalo Puyat being prior in date than the date of the mortgage executed by Pedro B. Cruz in favor of the Philippine National Bank, in the absence of any showing that the former mortgage of Gonzalo Puyat had been cancelled, the existence thereof cannot be questioned, and it becomes the duty of the register of deeds to annotate that mortgage on transfer certificate of Cruz, in lieu of transfer certificate of title No. 5377. Potior est in tempore, potior est in jeru. (He who is first in time, is preferred in right.) Case Digested by: Aura Villones

86

CARPIZO v. FLORANZA GR No. 4069 December 5, 1908

Topic: Liability of Heirs and DIstributees Doctrine: A Court of First Instance, in the exercise of its probate jurisdiction, has no power to allow the sale of a specific piece of real estate for the purpose of paying off a mortgage lien thereon.

An order made by a Court of First Instance in probate proceedings, for the sale of real property belonging to the estate of a deceased person, is void when no notice of the hearing upon the petition for such sale is given, as required by section 722 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Section 1, Rule 89). Synopsis: A claim against the estate of the decedent was secured by a mortgage on a real property. The administrator presented such claim upon the court and the latter made an order directing the administrator to sell the mortgage property; that the mortgage debt be paid from the proceeds of the sale, and that what remained be distributed among the other creditors. Facts: A certain Balbino Jaucian filed for a claim against the estate of the decedent, Luis Gamboa Carpizo, and upon the committee on claims’ report, such claim of Jaucian is secured by a mortgage on a real property. The same claim was allowed by the court. However, the administrator of the decedent’s estate presented a petition before the probate court, stating the other creditors of the estate were mortgage creditors, and asked for a hearing in order to determine the preference of which the creditors are enjoined. Without such hearing requested by the administrator, the court ordered the sale of the mortgage property in favor of Jaucian, and the remaining proceeds thereof be distributed to the other creditors. When the administrator filed the report of the sale for confirmation before the court, it was found that the mortgaged property did not belong to the decedent’s estate, but to his widow. Hence, this appeal.


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Issue: Whether the probate court erred in issuing an order to sell the mortgaged property in favor of Jaucian. Ruling: Yes. The Supreme Court ruled that the probate court entirely failed to observe the procedures laid by the law. The law provides that upon the submission of the petition by the administrator pertaining to the sale of real estate,” the court shall appoint a time and place for the hear it and shall require notice of the petition and of the time and place of such hearing to be given in a newspaper of general circulation, and that the court may order such further notice given as it deems proper.” None of these were done by the court, rendering the order of the lower court to be void. Hence, the Supreme Court remanded the case to the probate court for further proceedings. Case Digested by: Aiza Belle Manla Ramos

87

Ernestina Ortaliz, et al., v. The Register of Deeds of the Province of Occidental Negros, Philippine National Bank, et a1961.

Topic: EXECUTOR AND ADMINISTRATOR; EXTENT AND SCOPE OF RESPONSIBILITIES ENUMERATED Doctrine: The reason for the mandatory requirement of notice to the heirs before a sale or encumbrance is allowed is that the heirs are the presumptive owners Facts: On October 27, 1923, the plaintiffs were declared by the CFI of Negros Occidental, in

the intestate proceedings of the late Vicente Montilla, as the only legitimate and universal heirs of the said decedent. By virtue of such declaration, they then held all the properties of the deceased as legitimate and absolute owners. Allegedly, some of these properties were illegally mortgaged by the administratrix of the estate for the exclusive benefit of the Maao Sugar Central Company, Inc. without the consent of the heirs, causing serious prejudice to their interests. The ROD was requested by the heirs to cancel the said illegal encumbrances but it refused to do so. On the other hand, PNB refuses to deliver the the original certificate of title of deeds to the registrar of deeds for their proper conveyance to the owners. In the main, PNB alleges that it acquired the registration of the mortgages executed in its favor in good faith and for valuable consideration Issue: Whether the heirs can rightfully demand the conveyance of the subject properties Ruling: Yes. The convenience or benefit to be derived from the sale or mortgage is not the only thing to be considered before a court authorizes a sale or mortgage; the principal requirement is that the heirs give their written consent and approval, for they are the owners of the property to be sold or mortgaged, and cannot be deprived thereof without due process of law. In the case before us, the plaintiffs did not give their consent nor approval to the mortgage in question. Nor does the record show that said mortgage was necessary to pay off the debts and expenses of administration. Neither is there evidence


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that the mortgage has been beneficial to the heirs. Case digested by: Lea Aurora Samaco

88

Adelaida Maneclang, in her capacity as Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the late Margarita Suri Santos v. Juan Baun and Amparo Baun, et a

of the estate, she filed an action for annulment of sales made by the previous administrator. The trial court ruled in favor of the heirs mainly for the reason that no notice of such sale was given to the heirs of the decedent thus, making the sale void Issue: Whether there was sufficient notice of the disputed sale. Ruling:


by

Doctrine: The requirement of notice is not satisfied where only the surviving spouse was notified of the sale or encumbrance and the other heirs, both of legal age and minors, were not notified. Facts: The deceased, Margarita Suri Santos, died intestate and was survived by her husband, Severo Maneclang, and nine children. Margarita left several parcels of land and in the intestate proceedings of her estate, the administrator prayed for a letter of authority to dispose some of the properties necessary to meet the debts enumerated in the petition. While notice thereof was given to Severo Maneclang, through his counsel, no such notice was sent to the heirs of Margarita. It should also be noted at this point that no representatives were assigned for the minor children. Despite the absence of such notice, an authority was issued by the court and some of the properties were sold to the City of Dagupan, which immediately took possession of the lots and constructed thereon a public market. When herein plaintiff took over as the new administrator

No, there was none. There can be no dispute that if the heirs were duly represented by counsel or by the guardian ad litem in the case of minors, the notice may be given to such counsel or guardian ad litem. In this case, however, only the surviving spouses, Severo Maneclang, was notified through his counsel. Two of the heirs, Hector Maneclang and Oscar Maneclang, who were then of legal age, were not represented by counsel. The remaining seven children were still minors having no guardian ad litem. Obviously then, the requirement of notice was not satisfied. The requisite set forth in Rule 89 are mandatory and essential. Without them, the authority to sell, the sale itself and the order approving it would be null and void ab initio. The reason behind this is requirement is that the heirs, as the presumptive owners since they succeed to the all the rights and obligations of the deceased from the moment of the latter’s death, are the persons directly affected by the sale or mortgage and therefore cannot be deprived of the property except in the manner provided by law. Case digested by: Lea Aurora Samaco


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89

Ruling:

Francisca Garcia v. Martin Rivera

Topic: Liability of distributees and estate. Doctrine: Where a party did not object to the order of the court decreeing the sale of a property belonging to the estate but actively participated therein, said party is estopped from subsequently questioning the regularity of the sale to the highest bidder Facts: In the proceedings for the intestate estate of the deceased Martin Rivera, the probate court appointed her widow, Francisca Garcia, as the administratrix. Subsequently, Francisca petitioned the court to allow her to sell some of the properties of the estate to be able to pay its debts. This was granted by the probate court. In the public auction, Francisca asked the court to allow her to purchase the property for which she actively submitted sealed bids. Upon opening the bids, however, the highest bidder was Rodolfo Rivera. Francisca negotiated with Rodolfo to sell the property to her and refused to sign the deed of sale pending such negotiation. The court gave her an order to sign the deed within 48 hours or else she will be relieved as administratrix, Hence, she questioned the regularity of the sale of the subject property.. Issue: Whether Francisca Garcia, under the facts, could validly question the sale..

No. The Rules of Court provides that the court may authorize the executor or administrator to sell property of the estate in a public or private sale, as would be most beneficial to all parties concerned. On this matter the court is given ample discretion. If the court can order the property sold at a private sale it could also order that sealed bids be submitted, this, in order to attain the highest offer. Appellant did not object to this procedure. In facts, she approved of it and even took part in the bidding and submitted her own sealed bid. It was only after she failed to buy the property because her bid was lower that she thought of annulling the sale. We believe that she is now estopped from questioning the regularity of the sale. This apart from the fact that she could not have bought the lot because she was disqualified by the law Case digested by: Lea Aurora Samaco

90

Gerona v. De Guzman L-19060. May 29, 1964

Topic: Prescriptive Settlement.

Period

to

Annul

Doctrine: A purported sale which has not been approved by the probate court and which varies materially from the authority granted cannot be made on the basis of an action by the purchaser for specific performance. .

Facts:


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Six parcels of land subject of the present action were owned pro-indiviso by Maria Lloret and the estate of Francisco Gonzales, which Ricardo Gonzales Lloret is the judicial administrator. By authority of the court, Ricardo negotiated with the legal representative of the petitioner for the sale of the parcels of land as funds were necessary to pay the debts of the estate. Thus, both parties agreed that petitioner would buy the land for P200,000, the first check of P100,000 to be paid to Maria Lloret, and the other P100,000 to be paid to Ricardo Lloret. Many other terms were agreed upon which were not included in the authority granted by the court order. The payment to Ricardo, however, was ordered to be stopped. This prompted him to refuse to deliver the deed of sale of the properties. Fortunato Halili, therefore, brought an action for specific performance. Issue: Whether petitioner has a cause of action for specific performance against the respondents Ruling: No. Both plaintiff and defendants knew well that the properties were subject to judicial administration and that the sale could have no valid effect until it merits the approval of the court, so much so that before the lands were opened for negotiation the judicial administrator, with the conformity of the heirs, secured from the court an authorization to that effect, and yet, as will be stated elsewhere, the terms of the agreement between plaintiff and defendant differ substantially from the conditions prescribed by the court, which indicates that said document cannot have any binding effect upon the parties nor

serve as basis for an action for specific performance, as now pretended by the plaintiff, in the absence of such judicial approval. Case digested by: Leau Auora Samaco

Acebedo v Abesamis, G.R. No. 102380 January 18, 1993

91

Topic: Sales, mortgage, and other encumbrances of property of decedent. Doctrine: A conditional sale made by the heirs without court approval was later on approved by the probate court. The administrator opposed on the ground that the probate court has no jurisdiction to approve such conditional sale. The authority to approve the sale of immovable properties belonging to the estate of the decedent, in a special proceeding, should be made with the approval of the court; this authority is necessarily included in its capacity as a probate court Facts: The late Felix Acebedo left an estate consisting of several real estate properties located in Quezon City and Caloocan City. Petitioner is an heir and administrator of the estate left by the decedent. The properties are commonly owned by 7 other heirs. Because the case was pending for 16 years with the probate court, some of the heirs, respondents herein, filed a motion for approval of the


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conditional sale of the real properties located in Quezon City for an amount of 12 million. They have already a buyer who paid 6 million as earnest money. Hence, they prayed that the court orders the administrator, petitioner herein, to sell the said property. Petitioner assailed the approval of the sale claiming that the price is quite low. The court ordered to find a higher bidder but still no other buyer could provide better terms. Finally, it was agreed by the parties that respondents sell their share to the price already agreed upon with the buyer and that petitioner can negotiate his price with the same buyer. But petitioner still filed a Supplemental Opposition against the approval of the conditional sale. Subsequently, the conditional sale was approved by the court. It also ordered the administrator to sell the remaining portion with the same price. The administrator opposed the sale arguing that it is beyond the jurisdiction of the probate court to approve the said sale Issue: Whether or not the it within the jurisdiction of the lower court, acting as a probate court, to issue an Order approving the Deed of Conditional Sale executed by respondentsheirs without prior court approval and to order herein Administrator to sell the remaining portion of said properties?.

Ruling: Yes. The position maintained by herein petitioners that said conditional sale is null and void for lack of prior court approval is without merit. The sale precisely was made conditional, the condition being

that the same should first be approved by the probate court. The Court further elaborated that although the Rules of Court do not specifically state that the sale of an immovable property belonging to an estate of a decedent, in a special proceeding, should be made with the approval of the court, this authority is necessarily included in its capacity as a probate court. Therefore, it is clear that the probate court in the case at bar, acted within its jurisdiction in issuing the Order approving the Deed of Conditional Sale. Private respondents having secured the approval of the probate court, a matter which is unquestionably within its jurisdiction, and having established private respondents' right to alienate the decedent's property subject of administration, this Petition should be dismissed for lack of merit. Case Digested by: Rheaphil Suralta

92

Dolores Vda. de Gil v. Agustin Cancio, G.R. No. L-21472, July 30, 19651990

Topic: Sales, mortgage, and other encumbrances of property of decedent

Doctrine: An heir can sell whatever right, interest, of participation he may have in the property under administration, a matter which comes under the jurisdiction of the probate court Facts:


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The decedent left a will appointing his widow, Isabel, as administrator of the estate. The will was probated. The widow and the adopted son secured a loan from Cancio and they agreed that the payment thereof is the two parcel of land included in the estate. Subsequently, the adopted son died, so the widow filed a motion in the testate proceedings praying for an order to authorize her to execute the necessary deed of transfer of the two lots to Agustin Cancio or his heirs. This was approved by the probate court on condition that the original of the deed of transfer should be submitted to the court for approval. Before the deed of transfer was executed, Isabel died, hence, Dolores, the co-administrator and appellee in this case, executed the deed of transfer and asked the court for its approval through a motion. The court asked the payment of taxes due on the two lots before passing upon the motion. Apparently, nothing was done on the matter by Dolores, and so on April 1, 1959, Cancio filed a motion in probate proceedings reiterating the petition of the co-administratrix requesting for the approval of the deed of sale. To the surprise of Cancio, Dolores opposed on the ground that the sale was without authority of the probate court. The probate court denied the petition and setting aside its order which requires the submission of the deed of sale for the approval of the court upon the theory that since the obligation for which the properties were sold was personal in character and has no connection with said obligation should be threshed out in a separate action

obligation should be threshed out in a separate action

Ruling: No. the SC ruled that the widow and children of the deceased are entitled to certain allowances for their support out of the estate pending its liquidation and until their shares have been delivered to them. The objection, therefore, of the present administratrix on the ground that the original agreement between the late administratrix Isabel and Cancio was without authority of the court has no actual basis. As a matter of fact, Dolores, coadministratrix of the estate, is now estopped from disputing the sale because she herself in her capacity as coadministratrix filed the petition in court asking for the approval of the same sale which she now disputes for reasons that do not appear in the record. And there is no doubt that an heir can sell whatever right, interest, of participation he may have in the property under administration, a matter which comes under the jurisdiction of the probate court. It is, therefore, error for the court a quo to say that this matter should be threshed out in a separate action. Case Digested by: Rheaphil Suralta

Picardal v Lladas G.R. No. L-21309, December 29, 1967

93

Issue: Whether or not the probate court is correct in denying the petition and the

Topic: Thirty-day Period May Be Waived


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Doctrine: The intestate estate before partition is owned in common by all the heirs. A co-ownership should not suffer the consequences of the unlawful act of any of the co-owners. Hence the estate should not suffer from the consequences of the dispossession perpetrated by only two of the many heirs of the estate. Facts: Petitioner Bernardo Picardal entrusted to respondent Cenon Lladas a piece of land with an area of about seven hectares, planted to some 812 fruit-bearing coconut trees. The said land formed part of the properties belonging to the conjugal partnership between petitioner Bernardo Picardal and his wife, Aurea Burgos, who died in 1941, and was under judicial administration in a Special Proceedings and an administrator was appointed. Subsequently, the relationship of Bernardo and Cenon, the tenant, became unwell and the former evicted the latter. This prompted Cenon to file before the Court of Agrarian Relations a petition against Bernardo Picardal, Sebastian Picardal, the son of Bernardo, and the administrator of the estate for evicting him which caused him to suffer damages. The Court of Agrarian Relations decided in favor of Cenon, hence, the petition. The petitioners Bernardo and Sebastian Picardal alleged that the said land forms part of the estate of the deceased wife and is under administration, hence, they could not have ejected Cenon, much less should they be held exclusively liable for the damages since they were only two of the heirs to the estate and they turned the proceeds of the landholding in question to the estate. They claim that the estate should be the one liable for the damages.

Issue: Whether or not the estate should be held liable for damages and not the petitioners herein. Ruling: No. The SC held that the Petitioners' responsibility for the damages cannot be shifted to the intestate estate for various reasons, namely: First, petitioners' act of dispossessing the tenant was not the act of the estate, for they did not represent the estate. Its representative was the special administrator and it was not the special administrator who perpetrated the ejectment. Second, the fact that the proceeds of the landholding in question, as claimed by petitioners, were turned over to the estate, would neither render the estate liable, because the intestate estate did not really benefit from the dispossession. Third, the intestate estate before partition is owned in common by all the heirs. A co-ownership should not suffer the consequences of the unlawful act of any of the co-owners. Hence the estate should not suffer from the consequences of the dispossession perpetrated by only two of the many heirs of the estate. Fourth, Article 18 of the Civil Code, the application of which to the instant case is authorized both by Section 55 of the Agricultural Tenancy Act and Article 20 of the Civil Code, provides that "every person who, contrary to law, willfully or negligently causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the same." Hence, herein petitioners themselves, and not the intestate estate, should indemnify the


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respondent for the damages suffered by the latter on account of the unlawful dispossession. Petition is dismissed. Case Digested by: Rheaphil Suralta

94

Cea v CA, G.R. No. L-1776, October 27, 1949

Topic: Sales, mortgages, and other encumbrances of property of decedent Doctrine: There is no provision of law which prohibits a coheir from selling to a stranger his share of an estate held in common before the partition of the property is approved by the Court Facts: The spouses Gregorio Natividad and Benedicta, joint owners of a tract of land known as "Hacienda Cabasay," willed their respective half interests therein to their grandson, Alfredo Natividad. After the death of Gregorio Natividad his estate was placed under administration including the Hacienda Cabasay. Subsequently, Alfredo Natividad sold the hacienda to Gerardo Cea. On learning of the sale, the judicial administrator brought suit to have it annulled, but the suit ended in a settlement with Alfredo Natividad ceding half of the hacienda to the heirs of Gregorio Natividad. Gerardo Cea, not being a party to the settlement, sold the whole hacienda to Paz M. Cea, which the latter, in turn, sold one-half of it to Sebastian Moll. Both then initiated proceedings for the registration in

their name of their respective half interests in the hacienda which was opposed by the heirs. The CA granted the application but only as to the half interest which came from Benedicta and denying the applications as to the other half, which came from Gregorio Natividad on the theory that the sale thereof by Alfredo Natividad without judicial sanction was null and void for the reason that the property was in custodia legis. No appeal was taken from this decision of the Court of Appeals. On March 19, 1941, in the proceedings for the administration of the estate of Gregorio Natividad, two sons and seven grandchildren of the deceased petitioned the court that they be declared his heirs and that one-half of the hacienda in question, representing the interest which was devised by the deceased to Alfredo Natividad, be adjudicated to them as such heirs. Paz M. Cea and Sebastian Moll opposed and reasserted their claim to the said half and asked that the same be adjudicated to them instead. The CFI granted the petition and denied the oppositors’ claim based on the CA’s decision in the previous registration cases which it held that the sale made by Alfredo Natividad was null and void. Issue: Whether or not the sale made by Alfredo Natividad was null and void. Ruling: No. The Court of Appeals could not have declared void the sale of Alfredo Natividad’s interest as an heir or legatee in the estate of Gregorio Natividad as there is no provision of law which prohibits a coheir from selling to a stranger his share of an estate held in common before the partition


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of the property is approved by the Court. The said decision does, indeed, declare that the sale by Alfredo Natividad of the half interest bequeathed to him by the deceased Gregorio Natividad was void as a conveyance of property in the custody of the law. But the decision does not declare the said sale void as an assignment of Alfredo Natividad’s interest in the property as a legatee pending the settlement of the estate. The decision leaves the question of title to the contested half of the hacienda for future determination in connection with the final distribution of the estate of the deceased Gregorio Natividad. The case is ordered remanded to the CFI. Case Digested by: Rheaphil Suralta

entitled to receive the same. The finality of the approval of the project of partition by itself alone does not terminate the probate proceeding. Judicial partition is not final and conclusive and does not prevent the heir from bringing an action to obtain his share, provided the prescriptive period therefor has not elapsed. Section 1 of Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964 as worded, which secures for the heirs or legatees the right

to

"demand

and

recover

their

respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any other person having the same in his possession". Synopsis: Jacinta Lopez, executed a will instituting her husband as the sole heir and executor. Spouses Lopez declare legally adopted Juanita which makes her their legal

Rule 90

heir. After her adoption, Jacinta did not execute another will or codicil. Upon probate, Juanita filed a separate action

Guilas vs CFI Pampanga GR No. L-26692 January 31, 1972

951

annulling the partition on the ground of lesion, perpetration and fraud, praying that Alejandro Lopez be directed to deliver to her the actual possession of said lots and its

Topic: Prohibition Against Interference By Other Courts: General Rule

produce Facts :

Doctrine : In the interest of orderly procedure and to avoid confusing and

Jacinta Limson de Lopez was married

conflicting dispositions of a decedent’s

to Alejandro Lopez y Siongco. They had no

estate, a court should not interfere with

children.

probate proceedings pending in a co-equal

executed a will instituting her husband

court. The probate court loses jurisdiction of

Alejandro as her sole heir and executor.

an estate under administration only after

Juanita Lopez, married to Federico Guilas,

the payment of all the debts and the

was declared legally adopted daughter and

remaining estate delivered to the heirs

legal heir of the spouses Jacinta and

On

April

28,

1936,

Jacinta

Alejandro. After adoption the testatrix Doña 125 | P a g e Pr o of re a d

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Jacinta did not execute another will or

shares

until;

after

the

civil

action

codicil so as to include Juanita Lopez as one

aforementioned has been finally settled and

of her heirs.

decided. TC denied Juanita's petition on the ground that the parties themselves agreed

On

March

Testate

to suspend resolution of her petition for the

Proceedings, the will was admitted to

delivery of her shares until after the civil

probate

husband,

action for annulment of the project of

Alejandro Lopez y Siongco, was appointed

partition has been finally settled and

executor without bond by the Court of First

decided. Hence this petition for certiorari

Instance of Pampanga. Neverthless, both

and mandamus.

and

5,

the

1959

in

surviving

Alejandro and Juanita executed a project partition, approved by the lower court and

Issue :

directed that the records of the case be Whether

sent to the archives, upon payment of the

the

project

partition

approved by the trial court ordering it

estate and inheritance taxes.

closed and terminated, terminated the On April 10, 1964, Juanita Lopez-

Probate proceeding.

Guilas filed a separate ordinary action to set aside and annul the project of partition, on

Ruling :

the ground of lesion, perpetration and fraud,

No.

The

jurisdiction

of

and pray further that Alejandro Lopez be ordered to submit a statement of accounts of all the crops and to deliver immediately to Juanita the lots allocated to her. in the Testate Proceedings, Juanita filed a petition praying that Alejandro Lopez be directed to deliver to her the actual possession of said lots and its produce. Alejandro opposed the separate

petition

alleging

the

testate

proceedings had already been closed and terminated and that he ceased as a consequence to be the executor of the estate of the deceased and that Juanita Lopez is guilty of laches and negligence in filing the petition of the delivery of her share 4 years after such closure of the estate. The parties have agreed to suspend action upon the petition for the delivery of

probate an

court

estate

loses under

administration only after the payment of all the

debts

and

the

remaining

estate

delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. The finality of the approval of the project of partition by itself alone does not terminate the probate proceeding. As long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated, because a judicial partition is not final and conclusive and does not prevent the heir from bringing an action to obtain his share, provided the prescriptive period has not elapsed. The remedy for the heir who has not received his share, is to demand his share through a proper motion in the same probate or administration


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proceedings, or for re-opening of the probate or administrative proceedings if it

Doctrine: There is no merit in appellant's

had already been closed, and not through

claim that the intestate proceedings could

an independent action, which would be

no longer be reopened after the expiration

tried by another court or Judge which may

of the two-year period fixed in section 597

thus reverse a decision or order of the

and 598 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It

probate on intestate court already final and

suffices to state that this is an action by the

executed and re-shuffle properties long ago

heirs of the deceased by his second

distributed and disposed of. Sec. 1 of Rule

marriage whose dominion over their share

90 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964 as,

in the inheritance was automatically and by

which secures for the heirs or legatees the

operation of law vested in them upon the

right

their

death of said deceased, subject only to the

respective shares from the executor or

lien of the latter's creditors, for the purpose

administrator, or any other person having

of obtaining relief on the ground of fraud,

the same in his possession". In the case at

which action may be brought within four

bar, the motion filed by petitioner for the

years after the discovery of the fraud, in

delivery of her share was filed on July 20,

accordance with section 43 of the Code of

1964, which is just more than 3 years from

Civil Procedure.

to

"demand

and

recover

August 28, 1961 when the amended project of partition was approve and within 5 years

Synopsis: In an intestate proceedings of a

from April 23, 1960 when the original

deceased, prosecuted by appellants, the

project of partition was approved. Clearly,

latter knowingly concealed the fact that

her right to claim the two lots allocated to

said deceased left a second wife with whom

her under the project of partition had not

he

yet expired. The position of Juanita should

appellees.

be sustained and the writs prayed for

Facts:

had

granted.

two

children,

namely

herein

In an intestate proceedings of a deceased, prosecuted by appellants, the

Case Digested by: Jaynard D. Velarmino

latter knowingly concealed the fact that

961

said deceased left a second wife with whom

QUION v. CLARIDAD G.R. No. L-48541 January 30, 1943

he

had

two

children,

namely

herein

appellees. Issues:

Topic: Action For Relief On The Ground Of Fraud Distinguished From Reopening Of

Whether

intestate

proceedings

could be re-opened after the expiration of

Intestate Proceedings. 127 | P a g e Pr o of re a d

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the two-year perios fixed in sections 597

determining distributive share of heirs

and 598 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

appealable.

Ruling:

The order closing it was already final and Yes. There is no merit in appellants’

executory. The motion to reopen (so as to

claim that the intestate proceedings could

allow a spurious child to present evidence

no longer be reopened after the expiration

on his filiation and to claim his share in the

of the two-year period fixed by sections 597

decedent’s estate) was not filed within the

and 598 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It

thirty-day

suffices to state that this is an action by the

from the date the order of closure was

heirs of the deceased by his second

served on the administratrix. The closure

marriage whose dominion over their share

could not be distributed anymore.

reglementary period

counted

in the inheritance was automatically and by operation of law vested in them upon the

Synopsis: Petition for review on certiorari of

death of said deceased, subject only to the

the order of the Court of First Instance of

lien of the latter’s creditors, for the purpose

Bulacan, presided by respondent Judge,

of obtaining relief on the ground of fraud,

Hon. Emmanuel M. Muñoz, setting aside its

which action may be brought within four

order in a Special Proceedings case entitled

years after the discovery of the fraud, in

"Intestate Estate of Fermina Bello Santos",

accordance with section 43 of the Code of

approving the Amended Project of Partition,

Civil Procedure.

and adjudicating the properties left by the decedent to her forced heirs, Luis U. Santos,

Case Digested by: Jaynard Velarmino

as surviving spouse, and Purificacion Santos Imperial, as adopted daughter, in the sharing

Imperial v Munoz GR. No. L-30787 August 29, 1974

97

proportion

of

5/8

and

3/8,

respectively. Facts: Luis U. Santos, as surviving spouse of

1

the deceased Fermina Bello Santos, who died intestate, filed and instituted Special

Topic: Separate Action not Allowed

Proceeding entitled Intestate Estate of Doctrine: Under Rule 109, section 1, a

Fermina Bello Santos. He was appointed as

person may appeal in special proceedings

the regular Administrator as there was no

from an order of the Court of First Instance

opposition filed by the only other heir,

where such order "determines ... the

petitioner

distributive share of the estate to which

When petitioner Imperial entered her

such person is entitled. Order of court

appearance of intestate proceedings as

Purificacion

Santos-Imperial.


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Oppositor, and filed a motion to require the

further, that in order to put an end to the

regular

an

litigation between the parties, a correct and

accounting which resulted in the approval

legal partition of the property of the estate

by the Court a quo of the project of

is necessary

administrator

to

render

partition where Santos and Imperial were awarded and adjudicated an undivided

Issues:

share of 5/8 and 3/8 respectively, of the properties

which

have

come

to

1. Whether an order of a probate

the

court in testate or intestate proceedings

knowledge of the administrator.

approving a project of partition which Both Santos and Imperial entered

clearly fixed the distributive share to which

a

where

each heir is entitled is merely interlocutory

Santos former agreed to give in full

in nature so that the probate court can

settlement of her 3/8 share in the income

correct and set aside the same anytime; or

of the estate. Santos as administrator-heir

is final and, therefore, appealable within

of the intestate estate filed a Motion for

the 30 day period for appeal; and

into

Compromise-Agreement

Correction of both the Amended Project of Partition and the Final Partial Project of

2.Whether a court can order the

Partition, both approved by the court,

correction of an erroneous final decision

claiming that the partition submitted to the

after it had become final and executory.

Court was erroneous, contending that when intestacy

occurs,

a

surviving

spouse

Held:

concurring with only one legitimate child of 1. The contention of the petitioner

the deceased is entitled to one-half of the estate of the deceased spouse under Article 996

of

the

Civil

Code.

Therefore,

administrator-respondent Santos should get ¾ of the properties partitioned while Imperial, the only child, should get only the

to the effect that the orders of the court a quo , are final as the same have determined the distributive shares of the known forced heirs. The Court held: Appeal in special proceedings; Order of court determining distributive share of heirs appealable. — An

remaining ¼ of the estate.

order of the Court of First Instance which The the Court a quo granted the

determines the distributive shares of the

motion for correction. However, Imperial

heirs of a deceased-person is appealable." It

filed a Motion to Set Aside the order of

is clear that the order of the lower court is

February 18, 1969, which was denied by the

final and, therefore, appealable to this

Court

Court.

because

said

order

is

merely

interlocutory. So, the court has not lost jurisdiction

to

entertain

any

and

all

Under Rule 109, section 1, a person

corrections of the division; considering,

may appeal in special proceedings from an


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order of the Court of First Instance where

administratix's inventory and accounting,

such order "determines ... the distributive

distributing the residue of the estate to the

share of the estate to which such person is

heir, and terminating the proceedings. It is

entitled."

the order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of the estate to the

The two (2) questioned orders,

persons entitled thereto that brings to a

being final in character, should have been

close the intestate proceedings, puts an end

appealed by the party adversely affected

to the administration and thus far relieves

within the 30-day reglementary period

the administrator from his duties.

provided for appeal. This was not done. Synopsis: This involves a case of a late 2. Yes. The contention of the petitioner that an order which has already become final and, therefore, executory is not subject to correction. It was held that an erroneous decree or judgment although granted

without

legal

authority

and

contrary to the express provision of the statute, is not void. Here, as no appeal was taken, the decree must be conceded to have full force and effect. An erroneous decree is not a void decree.

novelist who died a bachelor survived by her maternal aunt, the spinster half-sister of her mother, Celedonia Solivio and paternal aunt, the sister of his late father, Concordia Villanueva. Both aunts decided to place his estate in a foundation.

Celedonia,filed a

petition praying that she be declared sole heir of the deceased. After due publication, the latter sold the properties of the estate to pay the taxes and began to set up the foundation. Concordia filed a motion for reconsideration of the appointment stating

Case Digested by: Jaynard D. Velarmino

that she too was an heir of the deceased. Facts:

981

Solivio v CA GR. No. 83484 February 12,1990

The estate of the late Esteban Javellana, Jr, who died a bachelor without descendants, ascendants, brothers, sisters, nephews or nieces. His only surviving

Topic: When Estate Proceedings May be Reopened

relatives are: 1 his maternal aunt, petitioner Celedonia Solivio, the spinster half-sister of his

mother,

Salustia Solivio;

and the

Doctrine: Filing on another civil case does

respondent, Concordia Javellana-Villanueva,

not terminate the proceeding for the

sister of his deceased father, Esteban

settlement of estate that is pending court,

Javellana, Sr.During his lifetime, Esteban, Jr.

there being as yet no orders for the

had, more than once, expressed to his aunt

submission

Celedonia and some close friends his plan

and

approval

of

the


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to place his estate in a foundation to honor

RTC of Iloilo for partition, recovery of

his mother and to help poor but deserving

possession, ownership and damages.

students obtain a college education. He died of a heart attack without having set up

Issue:

the foundation. Concordia and Celedonia

Whether the RTC of Iloilo had

talked about what to do with Esteban's

jurisdiction to entertain Civil Case for

properties they agreement that Celedonia

partition

would take care of the proceedings leading

Villanueva's share of the estate of Esteban

to

foundation,

Javellana, Jr. even while the probate

Celedonia in good faith and upon the advice

proceedings were still pending in the same

of her counsel, filed a Special Proceeding No.

court;

the

formation

of

the

2540 for her appointment

as special

administratrix of the estate of Esteban

and

recovery

of

Concordia

Held: No. The Regional Trial Court, lacked

Javellana, Jr.. Later, she filed an amended

jurisdiction

to

administration be issued to her that she be

Villanueva's

action

declared sole heir of the deceased and that

recovery of her share of the estate of

after payment of all claims and rendition of

Esteban Javellana, Jr. while the probate

inventory and accounting, the estate be

proceedings Spl, Proc. No. 2540 for the

adjudicated to her.

settlement of said estate are still pending in

petition

praying

that

letters

of

After due publication and hearing of her petition, as well as her amended petition, she was declared sole heir of the estate of Esteban Javellana, Jr. Thereafter, she sold properties of the estate to pay the taxes and other obligations of the deceased

entertain for

Concordia

partition

and

the same court, there being as yet no orders for the submission and approval of the

administratix's

inventory

and

accounting, distributing the residue of the estate to the heir, and terminating the proceedings. It

and proceeded to set up the "SALUSTIA

is

the

order

of

distribution

SOLIVIO VDA. DE JAVELLANA FOUNDATION"

directing the delivery of the residue of the

which she caused to be registered in the

estate to the persons entitled thereto that

Securities and Exchange Commission. Four

brings to a close the intestate proceedings,

months

puts an end to the administration and thus

later,

Villanueva

Concordia

filed

reconsideration

of

Javellana

a

motion

the

court's

declaring Celedonia as "sole

for order

far relieves the administrator from his duties.

heir" of

Esteban, Jr., because she too was an heir of the deceased. Her motion was denied by the court for tardiness. Instead of appealing the denial, Concordia filed a civil case in the

The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs


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entitled to receive the same. The finality of the approval of the project of The probate court, in the exercise of its jurisdiction to make distribution, has power to determine the proportion or parts to which each distributed is entitled. The power to determine the legality or illegality of the testamentary provision is inherent in the jurisdiction of the court making a just and legal distribution of the inheritance.

To

hold that a separate and independent action is necessary to that effect, would be contrary to the general tendency of the jurisprudence of avoiding multiplicity of suits; and is further, expensive, dilatory, and

On the 30th day of July, 1909, the said administratrix with will annexed, presented a report of her administration of said estate, petitioned the court, after due notification to all of the parties interested, to distribute the estate in accordance with the will and the law. So far as the record show no action was taken upon said petition until the 5th day of October, 1910. On the 6th day of August, 1910, the said opponents, through their attorney, A. B. Ritchey, presented the following petition, asking that the will of the said Antonio Ventenilla be annulled on the following grounds:

impractical. Case Digested by: Jaynard D. Velarmino

99

notice, was duly admitted to probate on the 14th of April, 1909, and the said Doña Alejandra Austria was appointed administratrix of his estate, by order of the Honorable James C. Jenkins, judge of the Court of First Instance of the Province of Pangasinan.

AUSTRIA v. VENTENILLA G.R. No. L-6620 January 11, 1912

1.That before his death the deceased always intended to distribute his property in equal shares among his wife and his brothers and their representatives;

Topic: Separate Action to Annul Project of Partition Allowed Doctrine: Section 1 of Rule 90 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964 as worded, which secures for the heirs or legatees the right to "demand and recover their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any other person having the same in his possession," re-states the aforecited doctrines. Facts: Antonio Ventenilla died on the 13th of March, 1909, leaving a will which, after due

2.That the deceased could not read or write Spanish and that therefore on the date of executing said instrument he did not know what the same contained except through translation; 3.That the said instrument was not translated to the testator, or if so, it was not correctly translated, and that said deceased never intended to execute it as his last will and testament in the manner and form of the instrument herein submitted, and that at the time of his death he thought that the instrument executed clearly ordered the distribution in the manner aforesaid;


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4.That by reason of the fraud and deceit practiced upon the testator and a lack of a good translation, the herein submitted is null and void; 5.That the tenth paragraph of said instrument is null because of its obscurity and ambiguity and is in plain contradiction to the proceeding paragraphs, and that the other paragraph have more force and weight; It will be noted that the opponents made no effort to question the legality of he will, even though legal notice had been given until more than fifteen months had expired from the date on which the lower court duly admitted said will to probate. Issue: Whether or not the will, after being probated, may be annulled Ruling: Section 625 of the Code of Procedure in Civil Actions provides that: No will shall either the real or personal estate unless it is proved and allowed in the Court of First Instance or by appeal to the Supreme Court; and the allowance by the court of a will of real and personal estate shall be conclusive as to its due execution. This court has held, under the provision of this section, that "the probate of a will is conclusive as to its due execution, and as to the testamentary capacity of the testator." When no appeal is taken from an order probating a will, the heirs can not, in subsequent litigation in the same proceedings, raise question relating to its due execution.

The opponents not having appealed from the order admitting the will to probate, as they had a right to do, that order is final and conclusive, unless some fraud sufficient to vitiate the proceedings is discovered. In the present case, however, the alleged fraud, in view of all the facts contained in the record, in our opinion, is not sufficiently proved to justify a reopening of the probate of the will in question, especially in view of the long delay of the parties interested. The said section 625 was evidently taken from section 2356 of the Statutes of Vermont. In most of the states of the United States certain number of months is given to the interested parties to appeal from an order of the court admitting to probate a will. Under said section 625 and the decisions of the court, it seems that the only time given the parties who are displeased with the order admitting a will to probate, is the time given for appeals in ordinary actions. Without deciding whether or not the order admitting a will to probate can be open for fraud, after the time allowed for an appeal has expired, we hold in the present case simply that the showing as to fraud is not sufficient to justify a reopening of the proceedings. The judgment of the lower court is, therefore, hereby affirmed with costs Case digested by: Romeca Kate Pepito

100

VDA. DE BALUYOT v. LUCIANO G.R. No. 153883 January 13, 2004


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Topic: Distinguish Incompetency of Guardian from Incompetency of Person Under Guardianship Doctrine: Incompetency to act as executor or administrator cannot be equated with the incompetency that justifies the placing of a person under guardianship. From the fact that a person may be incompetent to act as executor or administrator, it does not follow that he could be placed under guardianship. But if a person is incompetent to act as executor or administrator, then he is not the incompetent person envisaged in the law of guardianship. Facts: In the Court of First Instance of Quezon City, probate proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased Sotero Baluyut was instituted by his alleged nephew, Alfredo Baluyut claiming mental incapacity of the surviving widow, Encarnacion vda. de Baluyut, to administer her affairs and that of the decedent's estate. He prayed for appointment as administrator. However, upon a counter petition, the widow was appointed administratrix and qualified as such. This appointment, was set aside by the Supreme Court in Baluyut v. Judge Paño, etc., G.R. L-42088, May 7, 1976, because the persons contesting her capacity to act were not given an adequate opportunity to be heard and to present evidence. Meantime, in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City, two successive petitions were filed to declare Mrs. Baluyut an incompetent and to place her under guardianship. The first petition, which was filed by Alfredo Baluyut, was dismissed. The second, which was filed by her sisters, were given due course. Acting on the latter petition, the court summarily declared the widow as

incompetent on the basis of a report of a psychiatrist who was not cross-examined, and without hearing the evidence of the parties, particularly Mrs. Baluyut. The court denied a motion for reconsideration of the order making such declaration. Hence, this petition Issue: 1. Whether the resolution in the guardianship proceeding of the question as to Mrs. Baluyut's alleged incompetency should await the adjudication in the administration proceeding (pending in the probate court) of the issue as to her competency to act as administratrix. 2. Whether Mrs. Baluyot was denied due process of law when the guardianship court summarily announced its verdict on her incompetency notwithstanding that her lawyer had not cross-examined the psychiatrist. Ruling: Yes. In consonance with the last sentence of section 29-A of the Charter of Quezon City which divests the Juvenile and Domestic Relation Court of jurisdiction or authority to resolve questions already in issue as an incident in any case pending in the ordinary court, the guardianship proceeding should be suspended and shouldawait the jurisdiction of the issue of petitioner's competency to act as administratrix pending with the probate court. 2. Yes. A finding that a person is incompetent should be anchored on clear, positive and definite evidence (Yangco v. Court of First Instance of Manila, 29 Phil. 183, 190). That kind of proof has not yet been presented to the guardianship court


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to justify its precipitate conclusion that Mrs. Baluyut is an incompetent. In the nature of things, the guardianship court should have first set for hearing the psychiatrist's report and examined Mrs. Baluyut before prematurely adjudging that she is an incompetent. Its hasty and premature pronouncement, with its derogatory implications, was not the offspring of fundamental fairness which is the essence of due process. Moreover, the lower court should have adhered strictly to the procedure laid down in Rule 93 of the Rules of Court for appointment of guardians. Rule 93 provides that after the filing of the petition, the court should fix a time and place for hearing and give the proper notices. At the hearing, "the alleged incompetent must be present if able to attend, and it must be shown that the required notice has been given. Thereupon, the court shall hear the evidence of the parties in support of their respective allegations" (Sec. 5, Rule 93). Case digested by: Oliveros

101

IN RE: GUARDIAN OF JOSEFA PONCE v. JOSE PONCE

G.R. No. L-8488 November 21, 1995

Topic: Next of kin Doctrine: Next of Kin Defined. "Next of kin" is denned to mean not the next of kindred but those relatives who share in the estate according to the statute of distribution, including those claiming per stripes or by representation.

Ignacia Zabate was the step-grandmother (the second wife of the great grandfather) of the minor Jose Ponce. There was an ongoing guardianship proceeding of the minor Jose Ponce. No notice was given to Ignacia Zabate, she thus filed a motion for annulment of previous orders: Authorizing the mortgage of minor's interests in 2 lots and the sale of the minor's interests in the 2 lots on the ground of lack of notice to Zabate, the trial court denied the motion, the reason being that the movant is merely the step-grandmother, hence not a relative therefore not entitled to notice of the guardianship proceedings Issue: Whether or not a step-grand-grandmother is entitled to receive notice in a guardianship proceeding? Ruling: No. only the next of kin of the ward are entitled to notice of the guardianship proceedings. As held in Lopez vs Teodoro , the next of kin are “those relatives whose relationship is such that they are entitled to share in the minor's estate as distributees”, Ignacia Zabate is the second wife of the minor's great grandfather thus she absolutely has no interest, not even a remote heir in case of the minor's death being not related by blood to the minor. Even if true that the properties mortgaged and sold belonged to her and her children, she should have filed a separate action in the court of proper jurisdiction Case digested by: Oliveros

Facts:


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102

NATIVIDAD DEL ROSARIO VDA. DE ALBERTO v. CA G.R. No. L-29759 May 18, 1989

Topic: DISTRIBUTION OF PARTITION OF THE ESTATE. Synopsis: Presentation for rescission of the agreement of partition among petitioners already barred by prescription. Minority does not stop the running of the prescriptive period for minors who have parents, guardians or legal representatives. The negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time warrants a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. This case falls within one of the recognized exceptions to the rule.. Facts: The case originated from a complaint for acknowledgment and partition filed on September 8, 1960 with the then Court of First Instance of Manila by the herein private respondent, a minor, 18 years of age, assisted by his mother, Andrea Jongco, as his natural guardian, against the herein petitioners (Record on Appeal, pp. 28). In the said Complaint, private respondent alleged, in substance, that in 1941 his alleged father, Antonio C. Alberto, and his mother, Andrea Jongco, lived together as husband and wife and as a result of which, he was born on September 10, 1942; that during the time that his alleged father and mother lived together as husband and wife and up to the time of his birth, both were single and had no legal impediment to marry each other; that after his birth, his father and mother continued living together as husband and wife, his

father supporting them and introducing him to the public as his natural child; that even the family of his father recognized him as such; that on or about the year 1944, his father and mother separated, and subsequently, his father married herein petitioner Natividad del Rosario; that as a result of the marriage, two (2) children were born—herein petitioners Lourdes Alberto and Antonio Alberto, Jr.; that although his father was separated from his mother, he continued to support him and recognized him as his own child; that on July 3, 1949, his father died, and without notice to him, petitioner Natividad del Rosario Vda. de Alberto, on July 17, 1949, instituted before the then Court of First Instance of Manila an intestate proceedings for the estate of his deceased father, docketed therein as Special Proceedings No. 9092; that in the said intestate proceedings, petitioners deliberately omitted him as one of the heirs and for this reason they succeeded in having the properties of his deceased father adjudicated and partitioned among themselves; that the said intestate proceedings were terminated on November 9, 1953; that his father left properties valued at P74,963.81, and accordingly, as a natural child of his father, he is entitled to at least P18,000.00; and that he had absolutely no previous knowledge of the intestate proceedings and came to know about it only recently and thereupon made a demand from the petitioners who refused to give him his share. Accordingly, he prays that the petitioners be ordered to acknowledge him as the natural child of Antonio C. Alberto; that his one-fourth share be turned over to him; and that petitioners be sentenced to pay him the sum of P5,000.00 as attorney’s fee and the cost of suit (Record on Appeals, pp. 2-9).


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The Court orders the dismissal of the complaint without pronouncement as to the costs. The counterclaim is also dismissed. Private respondent, not satisfied with the decision, appealed to respondent Court, and in a Decision promulgated on August 31, 1968 (Ibid, pp. 61-75), respondent Court reversed the decision of the trial court Issue: Whether The Court of Appeals erred in reversing the decision of the Lower Court? Ruling: Yes, the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby Reversed and the decision of the trial court is Reinstated. This Court has already ruled that the question of jurisdiction not raised in the trial court cannot be raised on appeal (Dalman v. City Court of Dipolog City, Branch II, 134 SCRA 243 [1985]). Besides, a party who had voluntarily participated in the trial, like the herein petitioners, cannot later on raise the issue of the court’s lack of jurisdiction (Philippine National Bank v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 143 SCRA 299 [1986]. Petitioners alleged that the intestate proceedings for the settlement of estate of the deceased Antonio C. Alberto (Special Proceedings No. 9092) had already been terminated on November 9, 1953 by the order of distribution directing the delivery of the residue of the estate to the persons entitled thereto and that in said proceedings the court also declared who are the heirs of the deceased. Consequently, the instant case which seeks to secure the recognition of Antonio J. Alberto, Jr. as an

acknowledged natural child of the deceased in order to establish his rights to the inheritance is already barred by prior judgment (Petitioners’ Brief, p. 47) despite private respondent’s insistence that he had no knowledge or notice of the intestate proceedings of his alleged natural father (Record on Appeal, p. 21). his Court has invariably ruled that insolvency proceedings and settlement of a decedent’s estate are both proceedings in rem which are binding against the whole world. All persons having interest in the subject matter involved, whether they were notified or not, are equally bound (Philippine Savings Bank v. Lantin, 124 SCRA 483 [1983]). The court acquires jurisdiction over all persons interested, through the publication of the notice prescribed . . . and any order that may be entered therein is binding against all of them (Ramon v. Ortuzar, 89 Phil. 741 [1951] citing in re Estate of Johnson, 39 Phil. 156). It was ruled further that a final order of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in the distributees; and that the only instance where a party interested in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside is when he is left out by reason of circumstances beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence. As to the issue of prescription, the Civil Code of the Philippines clearly provides: "Art. 1100. The action for rescission on account of lesion shall prescribe after four years from the time the partition was made." This Court has consistently declared that laches is the failure or neglect, for an unreasonable and unexplained length of


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time, to do that which by exercising due diligence, could or should have been done earlier. The negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warrants a presumption that the party entitled to assert it either has abandoned it or declined to assert it. Finally on the merits of this case, petitioners would have this Court review and reverse the conclusions of fact of the Court of Appeals. As a general rule, this is a function this Court does not undertake. The established principle is that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are final and may not be reviewed on appeal to this Court; except: (1) when the conclusion is grounded entirely on speculation, surmises and conjectures; (2) when the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd and impossible; (3) where there is grave abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when the Court in making its findings went beyond the issues of the case, and the same are contrary to the admissions of both the appellant and the appellee; (6) when the findings of the Appellate Court are contrary to those of the trial court; (7) when the findings are without citation of specific evidence on which they are based (Manlapaz v. C.A., 147 SCRA 238-239 [1987]; Guita v. C.A., 139 SCRA 576 [1985]; Sacay v. Sandiganbayan, 147 SCRA 593 [1986]). It is readily evident that this case falls within one of the recognized exceptions to the rule, specifically that the findings of the Appellate Court are contrary to those of the trial court. In any event, it is a fundamental rule that conclusions and findings of fact by the trial court are entitled to great weight on appeal and should not be disturbed unless

for strong and cogent reasons because the trial court is in a better position to examine real evidence, as well as to observe the demeanor of the witnesses while testifying in the case (People v. Pimentel, 147 SCRA 29, 30 [1987]; People v. Grefiel, 125 SCRA 108 [1983]; Chase v. Buencamino, 136 SCRA 381 [1985]; People v. Fernandez, 124 SCRA 248 [1983]; Olangco v. C.F.I. of Misamis Oriental, 121 SCRA 338 [1983]; Minuchechi v. C.A., 129 SCRA 479 [1984]). Case digested by: Emily B. Unson

103

MARCELA DE BORJA VDA. DE TORRES v. THE HONORABLE DEMETRIO B. ENCARNACION G.R. No. L-4681 , July 31, 1951

Topic: DISTRIBUTION AND PARTITION OF THE ESTATE Synopsis/Doctrine: A party can not, in law and in good conscience, be allowed to reap the fruits of a partition, agreement or judgment, and repudiate what does not suit him. Where a piece of land has been included in a partition, and there is no allegation that the inclusion was effected through improper means or without the claimant’s knowledge, the partition barred any further litigation on the title to said land, and operated to bring the property under the control and jurisdiction of the court for proper disposition according to the tenor of the partition. To all intents and purposes, the property was in custodia legis. Facts: The petitioners contest the jurisdiction of the respondent Judge to issue the order herein sought to be reviewed


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directing them to deliver to the administrator of the intestate estate of Marcelo de Borja, (Special Proceeding No. R-2414 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal) a certain parcel of land which is in petitioners' possession and to which they assert exclusive ownership. They contend that the administrator's remedy to recover that property is an action at law and not by motion in the intestate proceeding. It appears that in the above-entitled intestate estate, the commissioners appointed by the court submitted on February 8, 1944, a project of partition, in which the land in question, which is and was then in the possession of the herein petitioners, was included as property of the estate and assigned to one Miguel B. Dayco, one of Marcelo de Borja's heirs. Over the objection of the petitioners, surviving children of Quintin de Borja who was one of Marcelo's children, the proposed partition was approved in February, 1946, and the order of approval on appeal was affirmed by this Court in 1949. Although the administratrix of Quintin de Borja's estate was the party named in the partition in behalf of the estate, the proceeding for the reason that they had been declared their father's sole heirs in the settlement of their father's estate. Moreover, one of these children was herself the duly appointed administratrix of the last named intestate estate.

Ruling: No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligation above mentioned has been made or provided for, unless the distributes, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said obligations such time as the court directs. The court had only the partition to examine, to see if the questioned land was included therein. The inclusion being shown, and there being no allegation that the inclusion was effected through improper means or without the petitioners' knowledge, the partition barred any further litigation on said title and operated to bring the property under the control and jurisdiction of the court for proper disposition according to the tenor of the partition. To all intents and purposes, the property was in custodia legis. What the petitioners could have done was to ask for a reconsideration or modification of the partition on the grounds of fraud, excusable mistake, inadvertence, etc. if they could substantiate such allegations. They can not attack the partition collaterally, as they are trying to do in this case. The petition is denied with costs against the petitioners. Case digested by: Emily B. Unson

Issue: Whether or not If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to distributive share to which each person is entitled under the law, the testimony as to such controversy shall be taken in writing by the judge, under oath.?

104

RALLA V. UNTALAN G.R. Nos. 63253-54, April 27, 1989


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This petition seeks to nullify the Order of respondent Judge Romulo P. Untalan, excluding from the probate proceedings 63 parcels of land, as well as the Orders issued by respondent Judge Domingo Coronel Reyes, denying the petitioner's motions for reconsideration of the same Order of Judge Untalan.

proceedings were to be dismissed because then he would not be compelled to submit for inclusion in the inventory of the estate of Rosendo 149 parcels of land from which he alone had been collecting rentals and receiving income, to the exclusion and prejudice of his brother, Pedro who was deprived of his successional rights over the said properties. The denial of this motion to dismiss was likewise affirmed by SC (in G.R. No. L-26253). On November 3, 1966, the petitioner reiterated his lack of interest in the probate of the subject will. Consequently, the court, through Judge Perfecto Quicho, declared Pedro and Pablo Ralla the only heirs of Rosendo who should share equally upon the division of the latter's estate, and thereupon converted the testate proceedings into one of intestacy.

On January 27, 1959, when Rosendo Ralla filed a petition for the probate of his own will in CFI of Albay docketed as SP No. 564. In his will he left his entire estate to his son, Pablo leaving nothing to his other son, Pedro.

Meanwhile, the brothers agreed to partition the 63 parcel of land forming the estate of their deceased mother, Paz Escarella, which were amicably divided between the two of them. This project of partition was approved by Judge Grageda.

In the same year, Pedro filed an action for the partition of the estate of their mother, Paz Escarella; docketed as Civil Case No. 2023.

On November 3, 1966, the probate judge converted SP 564 into an intestate proceeding. Eleven years later, On February 28, 1978, a creditor of the deceased filed a petition for the probate of Rosendo's will in SP 1106, which was heard jointly with SP 564. On August 3, 1979, the order of November 3, 1966, was set aside.

Topic: DISTRIBUTION AND PARTITION OF THE ESTATE Synopsis/Doctrine: After a Partition has become a judgment of the court, and distribution thereof fully carried out, with the heirs receiving the properties assigned to them, the latter are precluded from attacking the validity of said partition or any part there. Facts:

In the course of the hearing of the probate case (SP No. 564), Pablo Ralla filed a motion to dismiss the petition for probate on the ground that he was no longer interested in the allowance of the will of his late father, Rosendo for its probate would no longer be beneficial and advantageous to him. The motion was denied, and the denial was denied by the Court of Appeals. (The latter court agreed with the lower court's conclusion that, indeed, the petitioner stood to gain if the testate

On June 11, 1981, the private respondents filed a "Petition To Submit Anew For Consideration Of The Court The Exclusion Of 63 Parcels of Land Subject Of The Project Of Partition In Civil Case No. 2023." 5 In his Order of July 16,1981, Judge Untalan reconsidered his earlier Order, to wit: The Project of Partition should,


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therefore, be respected and upheld. Hence, the sixty-three (63) parcels referred to therein should be excluded from the probate proceedings and, likewise from the administration of Special Administrator Teodorico Almine, Jr. Thereafter, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing order but the same was denied by respondent Judge Reyes, to whose sala Special Proceedings No. 564 and No. 1 1 06 were apparently transferred. Still, a second motion for reconsideration was filed. Issue: WON the extrajudicial partition of the 63 parcels made after the filing of the petition for the probate of the Will, and before said Will was probated, is a NULL considering that such was already decided by this Court in the case of Ernesto M. Guevara, v. Rosario Guevara et al., Vol. 74 Phil. Reports, there can be no valid partition among the heirs till after the Will had been probated. Ruling: The above argument is obviously flawed and misleading for the simple reason that the aforementioned partition was made in the civil case for partition of the estate of Paz Escarella, which is distinct from, and independent of, the special proceedings for the probate of the will of Rosendo Ralla. Verily, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs till after the will has been probated. This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are the same properties embraced in the win. Thus the rule invoked is inapplicable in this instance where there

are two separate cases (Civil Case No. 2023 for partition, and Special Proceedings No. 564 originally for the probate of a will), each involving the estate of a different person (Paz Escarella and Rosendo Ralla, respectively) comprising dissimilar properties. Case digested by: Emily B. Unson.

105

DY CAY V. CROSSFIELD & O'BRIEN G.R. No. L-12375 August 30, 1918

Topic: DISTRIBUTION AND PARTITION OF THE ESTATE Synopsis/Doctrine: If a Judge fails to act within a reasonable period after the filing of a timely and proper motion to set aside a judgment and grant a new trial, and after the thirty days named by the law have expired, his silence must be taken as tantamount to a denial of justice; mandamus would undoubtedly lie, not to interfere with the exercise of his judicial discretion, but to compel him to exercise his discretion..

Facts: A Chinaman by the name of Dy Cay was appointed administrator of the estate of the Chinaman Dy Kiu, deceased. The administrator desired to prosecute an action against the firm of Dy Buncio & Co. for the liquidation of the partnership business in which the deceased had been interested. To initiate and push the


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necessary legal proceedings, the administrator, apparently under authority from the court, entered into a contract with Attorneys Crossfield & O'Brien with the agreement that they will give 10% of what can be collected from the company, as payment, to the firm. Crossfield and O’Brien contracted with a certain Macleod to determine the share of Dy Kiu in the company. Their contract, which was signed by the other partners, also stated that each will be bound by the findings of Macleod and that the other partners were to be given the opportunity to purchased the shares of Dy Kiu in order to prevent liquidation. The contract was signed by Crossfield and O’Brien in behalf of the estate. Macleod’s findings revealed that the deceased owned 40,636 of the partnership. After this was released, the administrator said that he was not bound by the contract because The contract executed by the administrator and Attorneys Crossfield & O'Brien was valid and reasonable. The attorneys, having performed the task assigned to them, should receive the payment expressly authorized. The order of the Court of First Instance of August 17, 1916, is affirmed, with costs against appellant. Issue: Whether section 145 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2347, relating to new trials, should be construed as fixing a time limit within which a judge of first instance can set aside a judgment and grant a new trial? (2) whether the law firm of Crossfield & O'Brien should be paid for their professional services in certain intestate proceedings on a quantum meruit basis or

on the basis of the terms of the contract with their client? Ruling: Judgment and grant a new trial," as these words are used in code section 145, as amended. The precise question is, therefore, whether, on a motion made in time, a judgment, setting aside a former judgment but not filed for more than four months after notice of the first judgment, is valid. On the other hand, the right of a defeated party to have an error in a judgment corrected should not be taken away from him by a mere delay on the part of the judge in deciding the motion, a delay for which the defeated party would in no way be responsible. (See Santos v. Villafuerte [1906], 5 Phil., 739.) The time during which a court considers a motion to set aside a judgment or for a new trial should not be counted in determining the statutory period. To say that all motions of this character must be decided within thirty days after notice of a decision, regardless of their importance or difficulty, or of the time of submission, would be subversive of justice. If the provision of law is to be held rigid and mandatory, the effect will be to require many motions to be decided without due consideration, a result which will defeat the spirit of the code. (See Gomer v. Chaffe [1880], 5 Colo., 383.) Actually applying these views to our present facts, since the motion was presented in time, the court even after the expiration of the thirty day period had jurisdiction to consider the motion and to modify or set aside its judgment. 2. Compensation of Attorneys. The second and third assignments of error assail the action of the Court in allowing


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Crossfield & O'Brien the full amount provided for in the contract, as attorney's fees. The contract executed by the administrator and Attorneys Crossfield & O'Brien was valid and reasonable. The attorneys, having performed the task assigned to them, should receive the payment expressly authorized. The order of the Court of First Instance of August 17, 1916, is affirmed, with costs against appellant. Case digested by: Emily B. Unson

the deceased acquired properties during the union and that they have a claim on the one half of such properties as it belongs to their father. Marcosa Rivera counters the petition alleging that those properties acquired by their father is her paraphernal property she also prays that Arminio Rivera be the administrator of the estate of the deceased. The Lower court decided in favor of Marcosa and declared her as the only heir of the deceased despite the pendency of the Special Proceedings for the settlement of the estate the Rafael Litam because there was still no partition. Issue:

106

Did the Lower Court erred in declaring Marcosa as the only heir in the civil case filed despite the pending special proceedings of the estate of the deceased?

Litam vs Rivera, 100 Phil 354

Ruling: Topic: Authority of Probate Court Is Exclusive Doctrine: A court should not interfere with the probate proceeding pending in a coequal court. The pronouncement of another court despite the pendency of the special proceeding is improper, it being within the exclusive competence of the court in the special proceeding.

Yes. The lower court should not have declared that Marcosa Rivera is the only heir of the decedent, for such declaration is improper in Civil Case it being within the exclusive competence of the court in Special Proceeding, in which it is not as yet, in issue, and, will not be, ordinarily, in issue until the presentation of the project of partition. Case digested by: Ivy B. Villanueva

Facts: A civil case was filed in connection with the pending probate proceedings for the administration and settlement of the estate of Rafael Litam who died intestate. His son Gregorio among with his other siblings claims that they are the children of the deceased by a marriage celebrated in China in 1911. When their father died, they came to know that he was married to Marcosa Rivera in the Philippines and that

107

Siguion vs Tecson, 89 Phil 28-30


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Topic: Separate Action to Annul Project of Partition Allowed

as administrator because the administration proceedings had already been closed..

Doctrine: As long as the order of the distribution of the estate has not been complied with, the probate proceedings cannot be deemed closed and terminated because a judicial partition is not final and conclusive

Issue:

The probate court loses jurisdiction of an estate under administration only after the payment of all the debts and the remaining estate delivered to the heirs entitled to receive the same. The finality of the approval of the project of partition by itself alone does not terminate the probate proceeding Facts: On October 1, 1927, Paulino P. Gochecho mortgaged to Paz E. Siguion a piece of registered real property in the City of Manila to secure a debt of P30,000. Some ten years later, he constituted a second mortgage on the same property in favor of Paz E. Siguion’s son, Alberto Maximo Torres, to secure a debt of P20,000. Both mortgages were duly registered. Gochecho died in 1943 without having discharged either mortgage. The following year, proceedings for the settlement of his estate were instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila, and Go Tecson was appointed judicial administrator. On February 3, 1949, the present actions were filed against the administrator Go Tecson for the foreclosure of the two mortgages, and judgment having been rendered against him in both, he has elevated the cases here by way of appeal, contending that the lower court erred in not holding that he could no longer be sued

Is the administrative proceedings already closed despite the fact that the distribution of the estate has not yet been complied with Ruling: No. As long as the distribution of the estate has yet been complied with the administrative proceedings cannot be considered as closed. It appeared from the certificate of the Clerk of the Court of First Instance of Manila that the order for the distribution of the estate among the heirs has not as yet been complied with thus it cannot be claimed that the probate proceedings are closed. In fact, counsel for appellant even admitted in his brief that, technically speaking; the administration proceedings are still pending. Digested By: Ivy B. Villanueva.

108

Mari vs Bonilla 83 Phil 137

Topic: Separate Action to Annul Project of Partition Allowed Doctrine: A judicial partition is not final and conclusive and does not prevent the heir from bringing an action to obtain his share provided the prescriptive period therefor has not elapsed The better practice for the heir who has not received his share is to demand his share in a proper motion in the


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same probate or administrative proceedings or for reopening of the probate proceedings if it had already been closed and not through an independent action. Facts: Casimiro Evangelista is a registered owner of a parcel of land (homestead) as evidenced by Original Certificate of Title No. 4905, of the register of deeds of Nueva Ecija, consisting of 7.0652 hectares, more or less situated at Valdefuente, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija. He was married to Leonida Mari, plaintiff herein on February 7, 1920 at Rizal, Nueva Ecija, and during their marriage and while living together as spouses, they begot two children, Caridad and Deogracias Evangelista. He died intestate. On January 10, 1944, Deogracias Evangelista alleging to be the only heir of Casimiro Evangelista, executed a declaration of heirship. For the sum of P2,400, Deogracias Evangelista sold on the same date, the property in question to the defendants, spouses, Isaac Bonilla and Silvina Ordafiez. Original certificate of title No. 4905 was cancelled and in lieu thereof transfer certificate of title No. 19991 was issued to the spouses. An independent action was brought to recover Leonida Mari and Caridad Evangelista’s combined 3/4, share in the parcel of land sold by Deogracias. Issue: Whether the judicial partition in favor of Deogracias bound Leonida Mari and Caridad Evangelista..

Ruling: No. If the defendants relied on the court's order adjudicating to Deogracias Evangelista the entire estate in the

distribution held under Rule 74 of the Rules of Court, their innocence avails them less as against the true owners of the land for that was a summary settlement made on the faith and strength of the distributor’s selfserving affidavit and section 4 of the abovementioned rule provides that, "If it shall appear at any time within two years after the settlement and distribution of an estate * * * that an heir or other person has been unduly deprived of his lawful participation in the estate, such heir or other person may compel the settlement of the estate in the court in the manner herein provided for the purpose of satisfying such participation." Far from shielding defendants against loss, the adjudication and the rule under which it was made gave them a clear warning that they were acting at their peril. "A judicial partition in probate proceedings does not bind the heirs who were not parties thereto. No partition, judicial or extrajudicial, could add one iota or particle to the interest which the partitioners had during the joint possession. Partition is of the nature of a conveyance of ownership, and certainly none of the co-owners may convey to the others more than his own true right. A judicial partition in probate proceedings is not final and conclusive, and not being of such definitive character as to stop all means of redress for a co-heir who has been deprived of his lawful share, such coheir may still, within the prescriptive period, bring an action for reivindicacion in the province where any of the real property of the deceased may be situated. Broad perspectives of public policy are set out in the opinion of the court in support of the wisdom of allowing a co-heir the benefits of the law of prescription even after a partition, judicial or extrajudicial, has been had”.


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Digested By: Ivy B. Villanueva.

109

Roman Catholic vs Agustines 107 Phil 455, 460-461

Topic: Separate Action to Annul Project of Partition Allowed Doctrine: The heirs or legatees have the right to demand and recover their respective shares of the estate from the executor or administrator or any other person having the same in his possession. The better practice, however, for the heir who has not received his share, is to demand his share through a proper motion in the same probate or administration proceedings, or for reopening of the probate or administrative proceedings if it had already been closed, and not through an independent action, which would be tried by another court or Judge which may thus reverse a decision or order of the probate on intestate court already final and executed and re-shuffle properties long ago distributed and disposed of

deceased, together with some nephews and nieces, opposed the probate of the will. However, on February 8, 1935 oppositors withdrew their opposition and as a result they executed with the surviving spouse an agreement to give 1 hectare of the land to the Roman Catholic Church as a legacy. Severo Valenzuela, the universal heir, failed to carry out the mandate and the oppositors filed a civil case in court. The Roman Catholic Church, on learning of the legacy in its favor, filed a complaint alleging that the deceased, in instituting her husband as universal heir, charged him with the obligation of donating to it a portion of her land not exceeding nine hectares but that said husband failed to execute the necessary deed of donation. Repentant of what he has done, Severo then executed a motion to donate the entire 9 hectares of land to the Church and was approved by the court. The oppositors opposed contending that it is absurd to donate the whole 9 hectares of land instead of only 1 hectare. Meanwhile, the Roman catholic Church already registered the land in is name. Issue: Is the donation to the Roman Catholic Church of the property as a legacy proper?

Facts:

Ruling:

The land herein involved consists of nine hectares belonging to Generosa Agustines who inherited it from her father Lucino Agustines. When Generosa died in 1934, she left a will instituting her surviving spouse Severo Valenzuela as her universal heir because she does not have any child or descendant. The will was admitted to probate at the Court of First Instance of Bulacan. Josefa Agustines, sister of the

Yes. As mandated, the church has been instituted as a legacy and thus is entitled to have its share from the estate of the deceased. It has the right to claim such share from the administrator or any person having the possession of the same. As in the case, the oppositors cannot anymore validly oppose since aside from being a legacy to the estate, there was already a deed of donation issued by Severo in favor of the Roman Catholic Church. This donation was


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accepted, and the document was registered in the Office of the Register of Deeds of Bulacan. Digested by Ivy B. Villanueva

110

DIVINAGRACIA v. ROVIRA 72 scra 307 Au ust 10 1976

Topic: Separate Action Not Allowed. Doctrine: The probate court erred in reopening the intestate proceeding, a proceeding in rem of which the petitioner is deemed to have constructive notice.52 The order closing it was already final and executory. Facts: Feliciano Divinagracia died in Iloilo City on February 1, 1964. He was survived by his wife, Salud and their four daughters named Emilia, Dolores, Rosario, and Juanita. The notice of his death was published in two local periodicals and in the Manila times. Two days after his death, a petition was filed in the Court of First Instance of Iloilo for the settlement of his estate the order setting the petition for hearing was published. Emilia Divinagracia qualified as administratrix on May 22, 1964. She administered the estate for seven years. She paid the estate and inheritance taxes. In April, 1971 she submitted to the court a final accounting and project of partition with a prayer for the closure of the proceeding. Judge Castrense C. Velosoin his order of April 17, 1971 approved the final accounting and project of partition and

declared the proceeding "closed and terminated, subject to the condition that the heirs shall assume all the outstanding obligations of the estate". The partition was duly registered. On June 8, 1971 or after the order closing the intestate proceeding had become final Camilo Divinagracia filed a motion to reopen it and to set aside the order of closure. He alleged that he was an illegitimate child of the decedent; that he was born on November 9, 1930, and that he came to know of the intestate proceeding only when he was transferred as a government employee from Masbate to Iloilo a few days before June 8. He prayed for the determination of his share in the decedent's estate. The administratrix in her opposition to the motion contended that the proceeding could no longer be reopened; that its expediente had already been archived; that there is no allegation in the motion that Camilo's filiation was acknowledged by the decedent. The motion remained unresolved for more than four years. Judge Veloso did not act on it before he retired in the early part of 1975. The case was re-raffled to respondent Judge Valerie V. Rovira who issued the questioned order dated October 18, 1975 reopening the intestate proceeding. The probate court set aside its prior order of closure because it assumed that there was no liquidation of the conjugal partnership of the spouses Feliciano Divinagracia and Salud Bretaña that there was no declaration of heirs, and that an interested party, who was left out in the partition, should be allowed to secure relief in the intestate proceeding by filing the


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proper motion within the reglementary period. Issue: Whether or not an intestate proceeding, which had already been closed, can still be reopened so as to allow a spurious child to present evidence on his filiation and to claim his share in the decedent's estate Ruling: No. The probate court erred in reopening the intestate proceeding, a proceeding in rem of which Camilo Divinagracia is deemed to have had constructive notice. The order closing it was already final and executory. The motion to reopen it was not filed within the thirty-day reglementary period counted from the date the order of closure was served on the administratrix. The closure order could not be disturbed anymore. Moreover, the order for the reopening of the intestate proceeding was predicated on the false assumption that there had been no liquidation of the conjugal partnership and no declaration of heirs. The truth is that the project of partition and distribution, with final accounting, which was submitted by the administratrix and approved by the probate court, contained a liquidation of the conjugal partnership and a statement as to who were the decedent's heirs and what were their respective hereditary shares. The probate court further erred in entertaining Camilo Divinagracia's motion to reopen the intestate proceeding. It erred because that motion involved the determination of his status as the decedent's spurious child. That question falls within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations

Court of Iloilo. The rule prohibiting the splitting of a cause of action (Sec. 4, Rule 2, Rules of Court) is not violated by the holding that the action to establish plaintiff's filiation as an illegitimate child should be filed in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court and cannot be joined to the action of the illegitimate child for partition and recovery of his hereditary share in his putative father's estate, which is cognizable by the Court of First Instance. In view of the foregoing considerations, the probate court's order of October 18, 1975, reopening the intestate proceeding for the settlement of the estate of Feliciano Divinagracia, is set aside. Case Digested by: Ancheden J. Pacamalan

111

VALERA v. VILLANUEVA June 29, 1954 95 Phil 248

Topic: DISTRIBUTION AND PARTITION OF THE ESTATE Doctrine: Judgments; Annulment on ground of fraud must be extrinsic or collateral; Penalty, not ground for assailing judgment unless fraud refers to jurisdiction; when fraud considered extrinsic.-- An action to annul a judgment, upon the ground of fraud, will not lie unless the fraud be extrinsic or collateral and the facts upon which it is based have not been controverted or resolved in the case where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered: and false testimony or perjury is not a ground for assailing said judgment, unless the fraud refers to jurisdiction. Fraud is regarded as extrinsic or collateral, where it has


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prevented a party from having a trial or from presenting all of his case to the court. Facts: Mariano R. Valera died in Batangas on Sept. 5, 1940. Intestate proceedings were instituted in the CFI of Batangas on Sept. 16, 1940 by his first cousin, Jose Villanueva. The petition alleged that Mariano Valera was single at the time of his death and left as the sole heir his brother, Andres Valera y Villanueva, who had been absent from the Philippines since many years ago and last resided at No. 1343, 122nd St, New York City, USA. Efforts were immediately exerted by Jose Villanueva, through Rafael Villanueva, and by Marcelo P. Alay, a servant and protégé of the deceased, to contact Andre, enlisting the aid and good offices of Francisco Varona, then attached to the Philippine Resident Commissioner in Washington, D.C. & other gov’t agencies connected with both the US & Philippine Gov’t. The whereabouts of Andres however, remained unknown. In the meantime, the petition in the intestate proceeding having been duly published, various collateral relatives of the deceased had entered their appearances. A compromise agreement was later executed by some of the aforementioned collateral relatives. On Mar. 25, 1941, a motion was filed by one Carmelo Bautista, praying that he be declared the sole heir of the deceased, entitled to inherit all his properties, on the basis of the compromise agreement executed between the so-called collateral relatives. On Oct. 29, 1942, the administrator filed a petition for the delivery of the properties to Carmelo Bautista and for the closing of the intestate proceedings, which the probate court approved on Feb. 1, 1943 and ordering Bautista to file a bond to secure the

payment under the compromise. However, on Jan. 2, 1946, Andres A. Valera appeared and filed a complaint in the CFI Batangas against Jose Villanueva & others, praying in the main the annulment of the aforementioned intestate proceeding & be declare as sole heir of the deceased brother. Plaintiff’s theory is that all the mentioned collateral relatives conspired together in fraudulently causing the probate court to order the intestate proceedings decision in their favor. The trial court ruled in favor of the herein defendants. Hence, the present petition Issue: WON fraud existed in the intestate proceedings which would justify the plaintiff’s action for annulment of judgement Ruling: No. To start with, we may state that the present action was filed 3 years after the final closing of the intestate proceedings of Mariano Valera, and that the rule is that an action to annul a judgment, upon the ground of fraud, will not lie unless the fraud be extrinsic or collateral and the facts upon which it is based have not been controverted or resolved in the case where the judgment sought to be annulled was rendered, and that false testimony or perjury is not ground for assailing said judgment, unless the fraud refers to jurisdiction; that fraud has been regarded as extrinsic or collateral, where it has prevented a party from having a trial or from presenting all of his case to the court. Suffice it to say, that plaintiff-appellant failed to demonstrate, notwithstanding his elaborate efforts, that there was such extrinsic or collateral fraud as would justify the setting aside of the order. As noted, he


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cannot be said to have been prevented from having a fair trial. On the contrary, it may be said that plaintiff was rather indifferent to his interest, because, although he had been absent from the Philippines since 1910, he never took the trouble or precaution of informing his brother of his whereabouts from time to time, and likewise failed to give any instructions to anybody who could protect his rights, knowing that, as early as 1933, he was, as regard his brother Mariano, the nearest kin who might succeed in his estate in case of death. The implication that follows is that the plaintiff in effect had abandoned his hereditary rights in the Philippines. In addition, as already stated, at the start of the intestate proceedings, a thorough search for his whereabouts was made, and all available agencies were asked to lend their assistance in locating him, to no avail. Case Digested by: Lalaine Delima

112

DE JESUS v. DAZA August 31, 1946 77 Phil 152

Topic: Thirty-day Period May Be Waived Doctrine: Descent and Distribution; Sale or assignment of share of inheritance by heirs; Power of probate court to order delivery of possession to purchaser in testate proceeding.-- The probate court has jurisdiction, within the testate proceeding, to order the delivery of the possession of a portion of the inheritance to the person who has bought it from the heirs entitled thereto,

after approval of the sale by the probate court within the same estate proceeding upon petition of the buyer and notice to the other interested parties Facts: Petitioners are some of the testamentary heirs of the late Gavino de Jesus whose estate is the subject matter of the special proceeding No. 3174. Respondent Justina S. Vda de Manglapus purchased from Sixto de Jesus and Natalia Alfonga, co-heirs of the petitioners, the rights, interest and participation of the said Sixto & Natalia, in the said testate estate, 2 parcels of land assigned to them as their shares in the project of partition which was already submitted to the probate court for approval. On Sept. 4, 1945, when the project of partition was approved, respondent filed a petition for approval by the probate court the sale to her of the rights, interests and participation of Sixto & Natalia of the said 2 parcels of land which the probate court approved. After learning of the aforesaid sale, petitioners instituted an action in the CFI of Batangas against respondent for legal redemption under Art. 1067 of the Civil Code. While the case for legal redemption is still pending, respondent petitioned the probate court to order the provincial sheriff of the province of Batangas to take immediate possession of the parcels of land in question and to deliver them to her afterwards through her authorized representative Gregorio Leynes. The said court approved the respondent’s petition. Hence, the present issue Issue: WON the respondent judge, presiding the probate court, had jurisdiction to order the delivery of the possession of the aforesaid parcels of land to respondent


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Manglapus, represented by her authorized representative, within the same estate proceeding and not in an independent ordinary action. Ruling: Yes. The SC concurred with the probate court’s decision and provided several reasons supporting its conclusion, to wit:

portion of the inheritance which has already been assigned to a certain person w/n the estate proceeding, the probate court lacks jurisdiction to make the order w/n the same proceeding, but should require the institution of an independent ordinary action. Case Digested by: Lalaine Delima

1. The very interposition of the action for legal redemption necessarily implies admission of the validity of the sale; 2. Article 1067 of the Civil Code, rather than justifying the withholding of the possession from the purchaser, clearly sanctions his taking possession of what he has purchased, as his rights are absolute until and unless resolved by the timely and valid exercise of the right of redemption; 3. The sale to respondent of the 2 parcels of land in question by Sixto & Natalia took place after the project of partition had been approved by the court, on account of which Art. 1067 of the Civil Code cannot support petitioner’s claim, said article referring to a sale by any of the heirs of his hereditary right to a stranger before partition. But even supposing that the approval of the project of partition by the court was made after the sale to respondent of the parcels of land, still that approval related back to the date of the project of partition. In addition, if, even the action for compulsory recognition of a natural child may be instituted and decided w/n the proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased, it would be absurd were We to declare now that for the mere object of ordering the delivery of possession of a

Rule 96

113

Cui v Piccio G.R. No. L-5131 July 31, 1952

Doctrine: The purpose of the provision is to secure evidence from persons suspected of embezzling, concealing or conveying away any property of the ward or of the deceased so as to enable said guardian or administrator to institute the appropriate action to obtain the possession of and secure title to said property, all for the protection of the interests of the wards and the estate of the deceased. Facts: Don Mariano Cui, widower, sold three lots to three of his children named Rosario C. de Encarnacion, Mercedes C. de Ramas and Antonio Ma. Cui, pro indiviso. Rosario was unable to pay her share of the purchase price so her share was concealed and one-third of the property corresponding to her returned to the vendor. Because of the sale of these lots pro indiviso and because of the cancellation of the sale to one of the three original vendees, Don Mariano and his children


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Mercedes and Antonio became co-owners of the whole mass in equal portions. Mercedes and Antonio borrowed money from Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, subject to mortgage of the land. Mariano allowed the mortgage, with the condition that all the rentals will go to him. The two other children of Don Mariano named Jesus and Jorge brought an action in the CFI for the purpose of annulling the deed of sale of the three lots in question on the ground that they belonged to the conjugal partnership of Don Mariano and his deceased wife. This petition was denied. Rosario filed a petition to declare her father incompetent and to have a guardian appointed for his property. The petition was granted and Victorino Reynes was appointed as guardian of the property. Reynes filed a motion seeking authority to collect the rentals from the three lots in question. Judge Piccio denied the motion. He filed another motion asking for the delivery of the rentals of the commercial building. Judge Piccio granted the second motion. Antonio and Mercedes filed a Motion to Reconsider but was denied in an order. Hence, this petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction. Issue: Whether Judge Piccio acted in grave abuse of discretion in allowing such delivery of rental payments to the ward. Ruling: Yes. The respondent Judge had no jurisdiction to issue his order in the guardianship proceedings requiring the petitioners to deliver the rentals collected by them to the guardian and authorizing the

latter to collect rentals in the future, for the reason that the jurisdiction of the court guardianship proceedings, ordinarily, is to cite persons suspected of having embezzled, concealed or conveyed property belonging to the ward for the purpose of obtaining information which may be used in an action later to be instituted by the guardian to protect the right of the ward; and that only in extreme cases, where property clearly belongs to the ward or where his title thereto has already been judicially decided, may the court direct its delivery to the guardian. Case Digested by: Sheba D. Arancon

114

Zubeldia v. Hermanos GR No. 45380 July 19, 1940

Topic: Personal Management of the Estate Doctrine: The Guardian must give his personal care and attention to the maintenance of the ward’s estate and to keep the funds and property of the ward under his own control. If he attempts to delegate his duties to another, he is responsible for the other’s actions in the premises and for any resulting loss, although he may employ clerks and servants to assist him in his duties without liability for their acts provided he has used reasonable care and discretion in the manner of selecting those whom he employs. Digested by: Sheba D. Arancon


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FACTS:

Rule 97

115

CARBONELL CARBONELL v DE RIBAYA RIBAYA G.R. No. L-48895 July 16, 1943

TOPIC: Ge General Guardians and Guardianship: termination of Guardianship; Conflict of Interest Doctrine: Wh When the deceased left cons consid ider erab able le prop proper ertie tiess and and asse assets ts and and some some debts, debts, and and that that witho without ut instit instituti uting ng intestate proceedings his widow appears to have have assi assign gned ed to hers hersel elff the the usuf usufru ruct ct of some properties belonging to the deceased, leavin leaving g the rest rest of the deced decedent ent's 's asset assetss with the liabilities to his only son, the minor in question. For the guidance of the parties and and of the the tria triall cour court, t, we decl declar are e such such extrajudicial settlement void and of the no legal effect. The widow, as legal heir of her deceased deceased husband, husband, could could not validly validly enter enter into into an agre agreeme ement nt with with hersel herselff as natur natural al guardian of her minor son for the determin determination ation and apportion apportionmen mentt of their respective shares in the inheritance. Synopsis: The The dece decede dent nt died died inte intest stat ate e leavi leaving ng as lega legall heir heirss his son son and and wido widow. w. The widow widow was appointe appointed d as the minor’s minor’s legal guardian, however, it was opposed by the paternal grandmother; alleging that her mana manag gemen ementt had had been been waste astefu full and extravagant.

Vice Vicent nte e Riba Ribaya ya died died inte intest stat ate e on Sept Septem embe berr 29, 29, 1935 1935,, leav leavin ing g as his his only only legal heirs his minor son Luis and his widow Adela Adela Carbo Carbonel nell. l. No intest intestat ate e procee proceedin ding g has been been instit institute uted d for the settle settlemen mentt of the estate. Adela Carbonell applied for her appointment as guardian of the person and prop proper erty ty of her her mino minorr son son Luis Luis Riba Ribaya ya,, statin stating g in her applic applicati ation on that that said said minor minor had had prop proper erty ty wort worth h abou aboutt P10, P10,00 000. 0. The The court appointed her guardian of the person and property of said minor. Agustina R. Vda. de Ribaya, the paternal grandmother of the minor minor filed filed a motio motion n for the remo remova vall of Adela Carbonell Carbonell as guardian guardian of the property of the the min minor, or, on the the grou groun nds tha that her her management and administration had been wasteful and extravagant, and that she had refused to obey the order of the court to depo deposi sitt the the sum sum of P1,5 P1,574 74.3 .30 0 with with the the Philippine National Bank. The court granted the the remo remova vall and and subs substtitu itutio tion of said said guar guardi dian an.. With With respe respect ct,, howe howeve ver, r, to the the usufructuary right of the widow, the court declared that the same should be resolved in an inters interstat tate e procee proceedin ding g in accor accordan dance ce with articles 834-839 of the Civil Code. ISSUE: Whether or not the widow, as legal heir of her deceased husband, could validly enter enter into into an agre agreem emen entt with with hers hersel elff as natural guardian of her minor son for the determinat determination ion and apportion apportionment ment of their respective shares in the inheritance. RULING: No. Deduced Deduced from from the record record that that the deceased Vicente Ribaya left cons consid ider erab able le prop proper erti ties es and and asse assets ts and and some some debts, debts, and that that withou withoutt instit instituti uting ng


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inte intest stat ate e proc proceed eedin ings gs his his wido widow w Adel Adela a Carb Carbon onel elll appe appear arss to have have assi assign gned ed to herself the usufruct of some sixty hectares of coconut land belonging to the deceased, leavin leaving g the rest rest of the deceden decedent's t's asset assetss with the liabilities to his only son, the minor in question. For the guidance of the parties and and of the the tria triall cour court, t, we decl declar are e such such extrajudicial settlement void and of the no legal effect. The widow, as legal heir of her deceased husband, could not validly enter into into an agreem agreement ent with with hersel herselff as natura naturall guardian of her minor son for the determinati determination on and apportion apportionment ment of their respective shares in the inheritance. Moreover, the widow's usufructuary share cannot be determined until after the debt debtss of the the esta estate te are are liqu liquid idat ated ed.. It is impe impera rati tive ve that that she she inst instit itut ute e inte intest stat ate e proceedings in court so that the debts may be paid and the net assets distributed to the heirs in accordance with law. The right of the the widow idow is gover overn ned by the the sec second ond paragraph of article 834 of the Civil Code, which reads as follows: If only one legi egitim timate child or descendant survives, the widower or widow shall have the usufruct of the third available for betterment, such child or descendant to have have the the nake naked d owne owners rshi hip p unti until, l, on the the death death of the surviving surviving spous spouse, e, the whole whole title is merged in him. The The reco record rd of this this case case evin evince cess a conflict of interests between the appellant and the minor as heirs of the deceased. This fac fact alon lone, inde indepe pen ndent dently ly of the the five five ground groundss specif specified ied by the trial court court in its order substituting the appellant as guardian of the property of the minor, suggests the prop proper erty ty and and advi advisa sabi bili lity ty of reli reliev evin ing g appellant as such guardian.

Case Digested by: ALBERTO C. BANGHAL

Adoption

116 Topic:

CANG v CA G.R. No. 105308, September 25, 1998

Adoption:

Meaning

Of

Abandonment Doctrine: Doctrine: The The libe libera rali lity ty with with whic which h this this Court Court treats treats matte matters rs leadin leading g to adopti adoption on inso insofa farr as it carr carrie iess out out the the bene benefi fice cent nt purposes of the law l aw to t o ensure the rights and privileges of the adopted child arising therefrom, ever mindful that the paramount cons consid ider erat atio ion n is the the over overal alll bene benefit fit and and inte intere rest st of the the adop adopte ted d chil child, d, shou should ld be unde underrsto stood in its its proper per con contex text and perspective. The Courts position should not be miscon misconstr strued ued or misint misinterp erpre reted ted as to extend to inferences beyond the contem contempla platio tion n of law and and jurisp jurisprud ruden ence. ce. The The disc iscretion to approve adoption proceedings is not to be anchored solely on best interests of the child but likewise, with due due rega regard rd to the the natu natura rall righ rights ts of the the parents over the child. Synopsis: The brothe brotherr and sister-in sister-in-la -law w of Anna Anna Ma Mari rie e soug sought ht to adop adoptt her her thre three e minor children without the written consent of the the fath father er.. The The fath father er,, cont contes este ted d the the adop adopti tion on but but was was gran grante ted d by the the cour court. t. Howeve However, r, the consent consent of the parent parent who who abandons his children is not necessary.


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Facts: Anna Marie filed a petition for legal separation upon learning of her husband's extram extramar arita itall affair affairs, s, which which the trial trial court court appr approv oved ed the the peti petitio tion. n. Herb Herber ertt soug sought ht a divo divorc rce e from from Anna Anna Ma Mari rie e in the the Unit United ed States States.. The court court grante granted d sole sole custod custody y of the 3 minor children to Anna, reserving the rights of visitation to Herbert. The The brot brothe herr and and sist sister er-i -inn-la law w of Anna filed for the adoption of the 3 minor childre children. n. Herber Herbertt contes contests ts the adopti adoption, on, but the petition was already granted by the court. CA affirmed the decree of adoption, holding that Art. 188 of the FC requires the written written consent consent of the natura naturall parent parentss of the children to be adopted, but the consent of the parent who has abandoned the child is not necessary. It held that Herbert failed to pay pay mont monthl hly y supp suppor ortt to his child childre ren. n. Herbert elevated the case to the Court.

his his pare paren ntal tal duti dutie es and and reli relinq nqui uish sh all all pare parent ntal al clai claims ms over over his his chil childr dren en as to constitute abandonment. Physical abandonment alone, without financial and mora morall dese desert rtio ion, n, is not not tant tantam amou ount nt to abandonment. While Herbert was physically absent, he was not remiss in his natural and legal obligations of love, care and support for his his child childre ren. n. The Cour Courtt find find piec pieces es of documentary evidence that he maintained regular communications with his wife and children through letters and telephone, and send them packages catered to their whims. Case Digested By: Gayle S. Bulawan

117

RP v. VALENCIA G.R. No. L-32181, March 5, 1986

Issue: Whether or not the 3 minor children be legal legally ly adop adopte ted d with withou outt the the writt written en consent of a natural parent on the ground of abandonment. Ruling: In refere reference nce to abando abandonme nment nt of a child by his parent, the act of abandonment imports "any conduct of the parent which evin evince cess a sett settle led d purp purpos ose e to fore forego go all all parental parental duties and relinquish all parental parental claims to the child." It means "neglect or refu refusa sall to perf perfor orm m the the natu natura rall and and lega legall obli obliga gati tion onss of care care and and supp suppor ortt whic which h parents owe their children." In this this case, case, howeve however, r, Herber Herbertt did not manifest any conduct that would forego

Topic: Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry: Appropriate Adversary Proceedings Doctrine: If Doctrine: If the subject matter of a petition is not for the correction of clerical errors of a harmle harmless ss and innocu innocuous ous natur nature, e, but but one one involving nationality or citizenship, which is ind indisputably substantial as well as controver controverted, ted, affirmati affirmative ve relief relief cannot cannot be granted in a proceeding summary in nature. This Court adheres to the principle that even substantial errors in a civil registry may be corre correcte cted d and and the true true facts facts estab establish lished ed provided the parties aggrieved by the error ava avail the themselv selves es of the the approp ropria riate adversary proceeding. proceeding.


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Synopsis: This is a petition filed by a mother in behalf of her children for the cancellation/correction of entries of their births; admitting that what she seeks to change is the nationality or citizenship of her children from Chinese to Filipino and their statuses from legitimate to illegitimate. The Local Registrar of Cebu filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the corrections sought are not merely clerical but substantial, as it involves the citizenship and status of the petitioning minors and the status of their mother. Facts: Respondent Leonor Valencia filed a petition for the cancellation and/or correction of entries of birth of her two minor children as well the correction of her civil status. The Solicitor General filed an opposition to the petition alleging that the petition for correction of entry in the Civil Registry pursuant to Article 412 of the New Civil Code of the Philippines in relation to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court, contemplates a summary proceeding and correction of mere clerical errors and not changes or corrections involving civil status, nationality, or citizenship which are substantial and controversial. The petition being sufficient in form and substance, the trial court issued an order directing the publication of the petition and the date of hearing in a newspaper of general circulation in the city and province of Cebu, once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks, and notice thereof, duly served on the Solicitor General, the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City and Go Eng.

The Local Civil Registrar of Cebu filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that since the petition seeks to change the nationality or citizenship from Chinese to Filipino and their statuses from legitimate to illegitimate as weel as the changing of the status of the mother from married to single, the corrections sought are not merely clerical but substantial, involving as they do the citizenship and status of the petitioning minors and the status of their mother. After trial on the merits, the lower court rendered a decision in favor of the respondent. Hence the Republic appealed as oppositor-appellant by way of petition for review on Certiorari. Issue: Whether or not the Lower Court erred in ordering the correction of citizenship and civil status using Article 412 of the Civil Code in relation to Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court which the petitioner contemplates as a summary proceeding. Ruling: The pertinent sections of Rule 108 provide:

SEC. 3. Parties — When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding. SEC. 4. Notice and publication.— Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an orde, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice


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thereof thereof to be given to the persons persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once in a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. SEC, 5. Opposition 5. Opposition.. — The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest unde underr the the entr entry y whose hose canc cancel ella lati tion on or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days days from from notice notice of the petition petition,, or from from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto. If all these procedural requirements have been followed, a petition for correction and/or cancellation of entries in the reco ecord of birth even even if fil filed and conducted under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court can no longer be described as "summary". There can be no doubt that when an opposition to the petition is filed either by the Civil Registrar or any person havi havin ng or claim laimin ing g any any int interes erestt in the the entr entrie iess soug sought ht to be canc cancel elle led d and and/or /or corr correc ected ted and and the the oppo opposi sitio tion n is activ actively ely pros prosec ecut uted ed,, the the proc procee eedi ding ngss ther thereo eon n become adversary proceedings. We are of the the opin opinio ion n tha that the the peti petiti tion on file filed d by the the resp respon onde dent nt in the the lower court by way of a special proceeding for cancellation and/or correction of entries in the civil register with the requisite notice and publication and the recorded proc procee eedi din ngs tha that actua tually lly too took pla place thereafter could very well be regarded as that proper suit or appropriate action. Case Digested by: Gayle S. Bulawan

118

RP vs TOLEDANO TOLEDANO G.R. No. 94147 June 8, 1994

Topic: Requir Requirem ement ent Of Joint Joint Adopti Adoption on by Husband And Wife Doctrine: Ar Articl ticle e 185 185 requ equires ires a join joint t adop adopti tio on by the the husba sband and wife ife, a condition that must be read along together with Article 184. Joint adoption by husband and wife is mandato mandatory. ry. This is in consonance consonance with the concept of joint parental authority over the child, which is the ideal situation. Synopsis: Spou Spouse sess soug sought ht to adop adoptt the the youn younge gerr brot brothe herr of resp respon onde dent nt Evel Evelyn yn Clouse Clouse follow following ing the requis requisite itess for a valid valid adoption; adoption; stating that they are financially financially,, ment mental ally ly,, phys physic ica ally lly and and emot emotio iona nall lly y capa capable ble of adop adopti ting ng the the mino minor. r. Desp Despite ite finding all the qualifications and none of the disqua disqualifi lificat cation ions, s, Presid President ential ial Decree Decree No. No. 603, had thus made it mandatory for both the spouses to jointly adopt when one of them was an alien. The law was silent when both spouses were of the same nationality. FACTS: Private respondents spouses Clouse sought to adopt the minor, Solomon Joseph Alca Alcala la,, the the youn younge gerr brot brothe herr of priv privat ate e respon responden dentt Evelyn Evelyn A. Clouse Clouse.. In an Order Order issued on March 12, 1990, the petition was set for hearing on April 18, 1990. The said Orde Orderr was was publ publis ishe hed d in a news newspa pape perr of gene genera rall circ circul ulat atio ion n in the the prov provin ince ce of Zambales and City of Olongapo for three (3) consecutiv consecutive e weeks. weeks. The principal principal evidence evidence disclo disclose se that that privat private e respon responden dentt Alvin Alvin A.


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Clous louse e is a nat natura ural bor born citiz itizen en of the the Unit United ed Stat States es of Amer Americ ica. a. He marr marrie ied d Evelyn lyn, a Fili ilipino on June 4, 198 1981 at Olongapo City. On August 19, 1988, Evelyn became a naturalized citizen of the United Sta States of Ameri mericca in Guam Guam.. They They are are physically, mentally, morally, and financially capable of adopting Solomon, a twelve (12) year old minor. Finding that private respondents have all the qualifications and none none of the disqua disqualif lifica icatio tions ns provid provided ed by law and that the adoption will redound to the best interest and welfare of the minor, respon responden dentt judge judge render rendered ed a decisi decision on in favor of the spouses. ISSUE: Whet Whethe herr or not not the the lowe lowerr cour courtt erred in granting the petition for adoption of Alvin and Evelyn Clouse because they are not qualified to adopt under Philippine Law.

adopt Solomon Joseph Alcala on February February 21, 1990 1990,, priv privat ate e resp respon onde dent nt Evel Evelyn yn A. Clouse was no longer a Filipino citizen. She lost lost her Filipin Filipino o citize citizensh nship ip when when she was was naturalized as a citizen of the United States in 1988 1988.. Priv Privat ate e resp respon onde dent nt Evel Evelyn yn A. Clouse, on the other hand, may appear to qualify pursuant to paragraph 3(a) of Article 184 of E.O. 209. She was a former Filipino citize citizen. n. She sough soughtt to adopt adopt her younge youngerr brot brothe her. r. Unfo Unfort rtun unat ately ely,, the the peti petitio tion n for for adop adopti tion on cann cannot ot be gran grante ted d in her her favo favorr alone alone witho without ut violat violating ing Articl Article e 185 which which mandates a joint adoption by the husband and and wife. ife. Art Article icle 185 185 req require uiress a join jointt adop adopti tio on by the the husb husba and and and wife, ife, a condition that must be read along together with Article 184. As amended by Executive Order 91, Presidential Decree No. 603, had thu thus made made it mand andatory tory for for bot both the the spouses to jointly adopt when one of them was an alien. The law was silent when both spouses were of the same nationality.

RULING: Case Digested by: ALBERTO BANGHAL No. Under Articles 184 and 185 of Executive Executive Order (E.O.) (E.O.) No. 209, otherwise otherwise known as "The Family Code of the Philippines Philippines", ", private private responden respondents ts spouses spouses Clou Clouse se are are clea clearly rly barr barred ed from from adop adopti ting ng Solomon Joseph Alcala. The There can be no question ion that privat private e respon responden dentt Alvin Alvin A. Clouse Clouse is not qualifi qualified ed to adopt adopt Solomo Solomon n Joseph Joseph Alcala Alcala under any of the exceptional cases in the aforequoted provision. In the first place, he is not a former Filipino citizen but a natural born citizen of the United States of America. In the second place, Solomon Joseph Alcala is neither his relative by consanguinity nor the the legi legitim timat ate e child child of his his spou spouse se.. In the the thir third d plac place, e, when when priv privat ate e resp respon onde dent ntss spouses Clouse jointly filed the petition to

Habeas Corpus

119

Sombon Sombong g v CA G.R. No. 111876 31 January 1996

Doctrine: It has been held that in custody case casess invo involv lvin ing g mino minors rs,, the the ques questi tion on of illegal and involuntary restraint of liberty is not not the the under derlyin lying g ratio ation nale for for the the availability of the writ as a remedy; rather the writ of habeas corpus is prosecuted for


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the the purp purpos ose e of dete determ rmin inin ing g the the righ rightt of custody over the child. The controversy does not involve involve personal personal freedom, freedom, because because an infa infant nt is pres presum umed ed to be in cust custod odyy of some someon one e until until he atta attain inss majo majori rity ty age, age, rather ther the the welfa elfarre of the the chil child d is the the supreme consideration. consideration. Facts:

Grace Grace Neri Neri was found. found. Sombon Sombong g claime claimed d the the chil child d to be hers hers even even if she she wasn wasn’t ’t entirely sure that it was Arabella. Petitio Petitioner ner then filed filed a petitio petition n for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpu orpuss with ith the the RTC RTC. The The cour courtt rule ruled d in Sombong’s favor and ordered the respondents to deliver the child.

Petitioner was the mother of Arabella O. Sombong. Arabella, then only six months old, was brought to the Sir John Clinic, owned by Ty for treatment. Petitio Petitioner ner did not have enough enough money to pay pay the the hos hospita ital bill bill in the the bala balan nce of P300.00. Arabella could not be discharged as a result.

Issue:

Petiti Petitione onerr said said that that she paid paid 1,700 1,700 for the release even if the bill was only 300. The The spou spouse sess Ty, Ty, who who had had cust custod ody y of the the daughter, would not give Arabella to her.

The evidence in this case does not support a finding that the child, Cristina, is in trut truth h and and in fact fact her her chil child, d, Arab Arabel ella la;; neit neithe herr is ther there e suff suffic icie ient nt evid eviden ence ce to support the finding that private respondents custody of Cristina is so illegal as to warrant the grant of a Writ of Habeas of Habeas Corpus.

Petiti Petitione onerr filed filed a petiti petition on with with the RTC for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus against the spouses Ty. She alleged that Arabella was being unlawfully detained and imprisoned at the Ty residence. The The pet petitio ition n was den denied ied on the the ground of lack of jurisdiction given that the detention was in Caloocan. Ty claime claimed d that that Arabel Arabella la was was with with them for some time, but given to someone who claimed to be their guardian. The Offic Office e of the the City City Pros Prosec ecut utor or of Kalookan City, on the basis of petitioner’s compla complaint int,, filed filed inform informati ation on agains againstt the spou spouse sess Ty for for Kidn Kidna appin pping g and Ille Illega gall Detention of a Minor before the Regional Tria Triall Court ourt of Kalo Kalook oka an City. ity. Ty then then reve reveal aled ed that that the the child child may may be foun found d in Quezon City. When Sombong reached the resi reside denc nce, e, a smal smalll girl girl name named d Chri Christ stin ina a

Whet eth her proper legal back Arabella.

habeas corpus remedy for

is the taking

Ruling: No.

To justi justify fy the the gran grantt of the the writ writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. This is the bas basic requ requis isit ite e und under the the firs firstt part part of Section 1, Rule 102, of the Revised Rules of Cour Court, t, whic which h prov provid ides es that that “exc “excep eptt as otherw otherwise ise expres expressly sly provid provided ed by law, law, the writ writ of habe habeas as corp corpus us shal shalll exte extend nd to all all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty. Howe Howeve ver, r, Ha Habe beas as Corp Corpus us may may be resor resorte ted d to in case casess wher where e “the “the right rightfu full custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.” Thus, although the Writ Writ of Ha Habe beas as Corp Corpus us ough oughtt not not to be issued if the restraint is voluntary, we have


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held time and again that the said writ is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third person of her own free will. The foregoing principles considered, the grant of the writ in the instant case will all depend on the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) That the petitioner has the right of custody over the minor; (2) that the rightful custody of the minor is being withheld from the petitioner by the respondent; and (3) that it is to the best interest of the minor concerned to be in the custody of petitioner and not that of the respondent. Not all of these requisites exist in this case. Case Digested by: Muaminah O. Camama

120

Galvez v CA G.R. No. 114046 October 24, 1994

Topic: The writ does not lie where there is remedy of appeal. Doctrine: In a case, what has to be resolved is the corollary issue of whether the petition for habeas corpus was properly filed together with their present petition for certiorari and mandamus. The Court held the writs of habeas corpus and certiorari may be ancillary to each other where necessary to give effect to the supervisory powers of the higher courts. A writ of habeas corpus reaches the body and the jurisdictional matters, but not the record. A writ of certiorari reaches the record but not the body. Hence, a writ of habeas corpus

may be used with the writ of certiorari for the purpose of review. Synopsis: The petitioners were charged of frustrated homicide. The petition for Habeas corpus is predicated mainly on petitioners’ asservation that the court which issued the warrant for their arrest had no jurisdiction over the case, hence their detention should be deemed illegal.

Facts: On November 12, 1993, petitioners Honorato Galvez, the incumbent Mayor of San Ildefonso, Bulacan, and one Godofredo Diego were charged in three separate information with homicide and two counts of frustrated homicide for allegedly shooting to death Alvin Calma Vinculado and seriously wounding Levi Calma Vinculado and Miguel Reyes Vinculado, Jr. On December 15, 1993, before petitioners could be arraigned, respondent prosecutor filed an Ex Parte Motion to Withdraw Information of the original information. This motion was granted by Judge Villajuan also on December 15, 1993 and the cases were considered withdrawn from the docket of the court. On the same day, Prosecutor Villa-Ignacio filed four new information against herein petitioners for murder, two counts of frustrated murder, and violation of Presidential Decree No. 1866 for illegal possession of firearms. Thereafter, a Motion to Quash the new information for lack of jurisdiction was filed by petitioners before Judge Pornillos on January 3, 1994. At the court session set for the arraignment of petitioners on January 24, 1994, Judge Pornillos issued an order denying the motion to quash.


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In the meantime, and prior to the arraignment of herein petitioners before Judge Pornillos, an order was issued on January 20, 1994 by Judge Villajuan granting the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioners, ordering the reinstatement of the original information, and setting the arraignment of the accused therein for February 8, 1994. On said date, however, the arraignment was suspended and, in the meanwhile, petitioners filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with respondent Court of Appeals, assailing the order dated January 24, 1994 issued by Judge Pornillos which denied petitioners’ motion to quash filed for the new information. As earlier stated, respondent court dismissed the petition in its questioned resolution of February 18, 1994, hence this petition.

with their present petition for certiorari and mandamus.

Issue:

A writ of habeas corpus is not intended as a substitute for the functions of the trial court. In the absence of exceptional circumstances, the orderly course of trial should be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted before the writ may be invoked. Habeas corpus is not ordinarily available in advance of trial to determine jurisdictional questions that may arise. It has to be an exceptional case for the writ of habeas corpus to be available to an accused before trial. In the absence of special circumstances requiring immediate action, a court will not grant the writ and discharge the prisoner in advance of a determination of his case in court. 58 In the case under consideration, petitioners have dismally failed to adduce any justification or exceptional circumstance which would warrant the grant of the writ, hence their petition therefor has to be denied.

Whether the writ of habeas corpus is proper in the instant case. Held: No. This petition is predicated mainly on petitioners' asseveration that the court which issued the warrant for their arrest had no jurisdiction over the case, hence their detention should be deemed illegal. We have earlier declared that Branch 10 of the trial court acquired jurisdiction over the new set of information. Consequently, the warrant of arrest issued on the bases of said information filed therein and the subsequent detention of herein petitioners pursuant thereto are valid. What instead has to be resolved is the corollary issue of whether the petition for habeas corpus was properly filed together

The writs of habeas corpus and certiorari may be ancillary to each other where necessary to give effect to the supervisory powers of the higher courts. A writ of habeas corpus reaches the body and the jurisdictional matters, but not the record. A writ of certiorari reaches the record but not the body. Hence, a writ of habeas corpus may be used with the writ of certiorari for the purpose of review. However, habeas corpus does not lie where the petitioner has the remedy of appeal or certiorari because it will not be permitted to perform the functions of a writ of error or appeal for the purpose of reviewing mere errors or irregularities in the proceedings of a court having jurisdiction over the person and the subject matter.

Case Digested by: Merchadel O. Capadocia


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favor to me, the net result and effect of management action would be a punitive one.” She asked for deferment thereafter. Since the company didn’t respond, she filed for a writ of habeas data in the Bulacan RTC due to Meralco’s omission of providing her with details about the report of the letter. To her, this constituted a violation of her liberty and security. She asked for disclosure of the data and measures for keeping the confidentiality of the data.

Habeas Data

1211

Meralco v. Gopez Lim GR No 184769 October 5,2010

Topic: Applicability of Habeas Data Doctrine: Habeas data is designated to protect by means of judicial complaint the image, privacy, honor, information and freedom of information of an individual. It is meant to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the constitutional guarantees of a person’s right to life, liberty and security against abuse in this age of information technology. There is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners committed any unjustifiable or unlawful violation of respondents right to privacy, life, liberty or security. Facts: A letter was sent to the Meralco admin department in Bulacan denouncing Lim, an administrative clerk. She was ordered to be transferred to Alabang due to concerns over her safety. She complained under the premise that the transfer was a denial of her due process. She wrote a letter stating that: “It appears that the veracity of these accusations and threats to be [sic] highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if they existed at all.” She added, “instead of the management supposedly extending

Meralco filed a reply saying that the jurisdiction was with the NLRC and that the petition wasn’t in order. Trial court ruled in her favor. In the SC, Meralco petitioned that Habeas Data applies to entities engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding an aggrieved party’s person, family or home Issue: Whether Habeas Data the right remedy for Lim. Held: No, petition dismissed. In “Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party”. It’s a forum for enforcing one’s right to the truth. Like Amparo, habeas data was a response to killings and enforced disappearances.


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In Castillo v Cruz-habeas data will NOT issue to protect purely property or commercial concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are vague or doubtful. Employment is a property right in the due process clause. Lim was concerned with her employment, one that can be solved in the NLRC. There was no violation of respondent’s right to privacy. Respondent even said that the letters were mere jokes and even conceded the fact that the issue was labor related due to references to “real intent of management”. Case Digested By: Merchadel O. Capadocia

Rule 103

1221

Republic v Wong G.R. No. 97906 21 May 1992

Topic: Change of Name Doctrine: Section 1 of Rule 103, in specifying the parties who may avail of said remedy, uses the generic term "persons" to signify all natural persons regardless of status. If a legitimate person may, under certain judicially accepted exceptional circumstances, petition the court for a change of name, we do not see any legal basis or logic in discriminating against the

availment of such a remedy by an adopted child. In other words, Article 365 is not an exception, much less can it bar resort, to Rule 103.

Facts: Private respondent Maximo Wong is the legitimate son of Maximo Alcala, Sr. and Segundina Y. Alcala. When he was two and a half years old and then known as Maximo Alcala, Jr., and his sister Margaret Alcala, they were, with the consent of their natural parents and by order of the court adopted by spouses Hoong Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong, both naturalized Filipinos. Upon reaching the age of twentytwo, herein private respondent, filed a petition to change his name to Maximo Alcala, Jr. It was averred that his use of the surname Wong embarrassed and isolated him from his relatives and friends, as the same suggests a Chinese ancestry when in truth and in fact he is a Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslim community, and he wants to erase any implication whatsoever of alien nationality; This also hampers his business and social life; and that his adoptive mother does not oppose his desire to revert to his former surname. The matter was resolved in favor of private respondent, the trial court decreeing that, the jurisdictional requirements having been fully complied with, petitioner's prayer to change his name from Maximo Wong to Maximo Alcala, Jr. was granted. CA affirmed RTC’s decision. The Solicitor General contends that private respondent's allegations of ridicule and/or isolation from family and friends were unsubstantiated and cannot justify the


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petition for change of name. He claims that for private respondent to cast aside the name of his adoptive father is crass ingratitude to the memory of the latter and to his adoptive mother who is still alive, despite her consent to the petition for change of name. Further, the Solicitor General posits that the reversion of Maximo Wong to his old name violates Articles 341 and 365 of the Civil Code, which requires an adopted child to use the surname of the adopter, and would identify him with his parents by nature, thus giving the impression that he has severed his relationship with his adoptive parents. Issue: Whether the reasons given by Maximo Wong in his petition for change of name are valid, sufficient and proper to warrant the granting of said petition. Ruling: Yes. Maximo Wong may legally change his name to Maximo Alcala, Jr. His reasons are valid, sufficient and proper. The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for the purpose of identification, and a change of name is not a matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of reasons adduced and the consequences that will likely follow; It is a privilege, which may be granted only upon a showing of a proper or reasonable cause or compelling reason therefor. Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) When the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) When the change results as a legal

consequence, as in legitimation; (c) When the change will avoid confusion; (d) Having continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, unaware of her alien parentage; (e) A sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) When the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest. While it is true that the statutory fiat under Article 365 of the Civil Code is to the effect that an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter, it must nevertheless be borne in mind that the change of the surname of the adopted child is more an incident rather than the object of adoption proceedings. Change of name does not define or effect a change in one's existing family relations or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom. It does not alter one's legal capacity, civil status or citizenship; what is altered is only the name. Case Digested by: Muaminah O. Camama

123

Republic v Zosa G.R. No. L-48762 September 12,1988

Doctrine: This is a proceeding for a change of name. Since this is a proceeding in rem, jurisdiction to hear and determine the petition for a change of name is acquired after due publication of the order containing certain data, hence, jurisdictional


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requirements in publication of order must be valid and effective. Facts: Respondent Lee King Sing filed a petition with the CFI for change of name. The lower court issued an order setting the petition for hearing. Said order was subsequently published. Herein petitioner, through the Solicitor General filed a motion to dismiss the petition on the ground that the name sought to be adopted by respondent and other names by which he is known are not indicated in the title of the petition. Respondent filed an opposition to the motion to dismiss. The lower court denied the motion. After the trial and hearing, the court granted the petition. Issue: Whether petition for Change of Name be granted despite substantial defect in the petition and publication of the notice of hearing. Ruling: No. Considering that the title of the petition in this case and the order setting it for hearing are defective, the lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over the proceeding. In the present case, the petition itself, as well as the order published, carries the following title “ In Re : Petition for Change of Name Lee King Sing, Petitioner.” It does not contain the name (Antonio C. Lee) sought to be adopted and the names by which petitioner was known to his friends and associates. The title should have

read “In the matter of the Change of Name of Lee King Sing, otherwise known as Antonio or Tony to Antonio C. Lee, Lee King Sing, Petitioner.” The petition does not indicate in its title or caption that herein respondent desires to change his name to Antonio C. Lee. The published order setting his petition for hearing reproduced that defective title. The failure to include the name sought to be adopted in the title of the petition nor in the title or caption of the notices published in the newspapers renders the trial court without jurisdiction to hear and determine the petition. The rule requires the inclusion of the name sought to be adopted by and the other names or aliases of the applicant in the title of the petition or in the caption of the published order is that the ordinary reader only glances fleetingly at the caption of the published order or the title of the petition in a special proceeding. Only if the caption or the title strikes him does he proceed to read the contents of the order. And the probability is great that he does not at all notice the other names or aliases of the applicant in the caption of the order or in the title of the petition defeats the very purpose of the required publication. Case Digested by: Mamonie M. Natangcop

Laperal v. Republic

1241

G.R. No. L-18008 October 30, 1962

Doctrine: The fact of legal separation alone is not sufficient ground to justify change of name of petitioner, for to hold otherwise


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would be to provide an easy circumvention of the mandatory provisions of Art. 372. Facts: Elisea Laperal filed in CFI a petition for change of name. She prayed that since she has been legally separated from Mr. Enrique Santamaria, it is desirable that she be allowed to change her name and/or be permitted to resume using her maiden name of Elisea Laperal. The petition was opposed by the city attorney on the ground that the same violates the provisions of Art. 372 of the Civil Code and that it is not sanctioned by the Rules of Court. Issue: Whether the change of name by reason of legal separation is a valid ground. Ruling: No. Art. 372 of the Civil Code provides that when legal separation has been granted, the wife shall continue using her name and surname employed before the legal separation. This is so because her married status is unaffected by the separation, there being no severance of vinculum. The procedure prescribed in Rule 103 of the Rules of Court for change of name has been observed. But from the petition quoted in full at the beginning of these opinion, the only reason relied upon for the change of name is the fact that petitioner is legally separated from her husband and has, in fact, ceased to live with him for many years. Even, however, applying Rule 103 to this case, the fact of

legal separation alone is not a sufficient ground to justify a change of name of herein petitioner, for to hold otherwise would be to provide an easy circumvention of the mandatory provisions of Art. 372. Case Digested by: Ziur D. Ruiz

1251

CHIU HAP CHIU v REPUBLIC GR No. L-20018 April 30, 1966

Topic: Change of Name; No Proof of Prejudice by Use of Official Name Doctrine: CHANGE OF NAME; NATURE. — The state has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification, and a change of name is a privilege and not a matter of right. REQUISITES OR GROUNDS FOR GRANT OF PETITION. — Before a person can be authorized to change the name given to him either in his certificate of birth or in the civil registry, he must show proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason which may justify. such change. Otherwise, the request should be denied. The following may be considered, among others, as proper and reasonable causes that may warrant the grant of a petition for change of name: (1) when the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or is extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2) when the request for change is a consequence of a change of status, such as when a natural child is acknowledged or legitimized; and (3) when the change is necessary to avoid confusion.


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Synopsis: Chiu Hap Chui, a Chinese citizen, petitioned for a change of his name to Lo Hap Chiu, stating that from elementary to college he has been called by his classmates as Lo Hap Chiu; for which he desires to adopt the same to avoid confusion. Facts: Chiu Hap Chiu, 30 years old, single, a doctor of medicine and a resident of Davao City seeks to change his name to Lo Hap Chiu. He claimed that the name Lo Hap Chiu was given him at birth and that during his school days, elementary to college, he was called by his classmates as such; for which reason he desires to adopt said name to avoid confusion. At the reception of evidence, the court a quo granted the petition. It was found out that he was born on February 1, 1930 at Fuken, China; that he is a Chinese citizen holding an alien certificate of residence, that he is a physician by profession of no criminal record; that he has paid all his taxes to the government; and that he desires to change his name from Chiu Hap Chiu to Lo Hap Chiu for the reason that the latter is the name he used while studying in the school and because his present name and surname are the same. The government opposed the petition in view of it’s failure to find sufficient justification for the change of name. Hence, this appeal. Issue: Whether the ground stated by Petitioner is sufficient for the change of name. Ruling:

No. State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification and that a change of name is a privilege and not a matter of right. So that before a person can be authorized to change the name given him either in his certificate of birth or in the civil registry he must show proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason which may justify such change. Otherwise, the request should be denied. The following may be considered, among others, as proper and reasonable causes that may warrant the grant of petition for change of name: (1) when the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or is extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (2) when the request for change is a consequence of a change of status, such as when a natural child is acknowledged or legitimized; and (3) when the change is necessary to avoid confusion. Petitioner has not shown any proper or compelling reason that may justify the request for change of name other than his desire to use the name Lo Hap Chiu on the alleged reason that that is the name given him in his birth certificate and in the schools he attended, but this claim was not satisfactorily proven, for aside from his own testimony and a photostatic copy of a certification issued in his favor as Doctor of Medicine by the University of Santo Tomas wherein it appears that his name is Lo Hap Chiu, there is nothing in the record to show that he used said name from grade school to college for he failed to present any documentary evidence to prove it. He has not shown that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name, and as a matter of fact he was referred to as Dr. Chiu Hap Chiu. Since the State has an interest in the name borne by an individual, especially


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an alien, and the latter’s identity as a rule is established by the name appearing in his alien certificate of registration, thus, finding no plausible reason for authorizing the change of name desired by petitioner. Case Digested by: Paula Marie Pacana

Del Prado v Republic G.R.No.L18127 April 5, 1967

1261

Doctrine: A petition to change the surname of a child out of a bigamous marriage should be granted only where to do so is clearly for the best interest of the child. A change of name as authorized under Rule 103 does not by itself define, or affect a change in, one's existing family relations, or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom; nor does it create new family rights and duties where none before was existing. It does not alter one's legal capacity, civil status, or citizenship. What is altered is only the name, which is that word or combination of words by which a person is distinguished from others and which he bears as a label or appellation for the convenience of the world at large in addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him.

Calderon." It is alleged in the petition that the petitioner is an illegitimate child, out of a bigamous marriage contracted by Manuel del Prado with Corazon Adolfo; that the surname "Del Prado" which the petitioner carries is a stigma of illegitimacy, by reason of which she has become the subject of unfair comments; that the surname which the petitioner carries would constitute a handicap in her life in later years, and would give cause for constant irritation in her social relations with other people; that petitioner is living with her mother who is now married to Engineer Romeo C. Calderon; and that it is the desire of the petitioner to have her surname changed from "Del Prado" to "Calderon "which is the surname of her foster father, the husband of her mother. After hearing the court a quo issued an order, granting the petition and ordering the change of the name of the petitioner from "Gertrudes Josefina, del Prado," to "Gertrudes Josefina Calderon." The dispositive portion of the order of the court further states: "This order, however, shall not operate to deprive the petitioner of her status, rights and obligations as recognized by law. Issue: Whether the change of the surname of the petitioner by reason that present surname carries the stigma of illegitimacy is a proper and reasonable ground. Ruling:

Facts:

Yes.

Josefina del Prado, a minor, through her mother and natural guardian, Corazon Adolfo Calderdon, filed a petition in the Court of First Instance of Davao, praying that her name "Gertrudes Josefina del Prado" be changed to "Getrudes Josefina

A petition to change the name of an infant, as in this case, should be granted only where to do so is clearly for the best interest of the child. When the mother of the petitioner filed the instant petition she


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had in mind what she believed was for the best interest of her child considering that her husband Romeo C. Calderon is the one supporting the child and that he is agreeable to the child's using his surname. The mother had considered the generous attitude of her husband as an opportunity for her to promote the personality, and enhance the dignity, of her daughter, by eliminating what constitutes a stigma of illegitimacy which her child would continue to bear if her surname is that of her illegitimate father. Case Digested by: Khay Joyce Oliverio

Republic v. Marcos G.R. No. L-31065 February 15, 1990

1271

Doctrine: The caption must include the name sought to be adopted and the other names or aliases of the applicant in the title of the petition, or in the caption of the published order. Failure to comply with the requisite is a jurisdictional defect. The petition for change of name must be filed by the person desiring to change his/her name as provided in Sections 1 and 2, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, even if it may be signed and verified by some other person in his behalf. Facts: Pang Cha Quen was previously married to Sia Bian, both citizens of China. They have a daughter named May Sia born in the City of Manila. Subsequently, Sia Bian abandoned Pang Cha Quen and her daughter which caused her to register May

Sia, alias Manman Huang, as an alien under the name of Mary Pang, using her maternal surname “Pang”. On August 16, 1966, Pang Cha Quen married Alfredo De la Cruz. Because Mary Pang has grown to love and recognize her stepfather, she wanted to adopt and use his surname “De la Cruz”. Hence, Pang Cha Quen filed a petition before the CFI of Baguio and Benguet and prayed that her daughter be allowed to change her name from May Sia, alias Manman Huang, to Mary Pang De la Cruz. Respondent Judge issued an order setting the hearing of the petition and also directed that it be published in a newspaper of general circulation in Baguio City and Mountain Province. The respondent judge, after publication and hearing, granted the petition. However, the Solicitor General opposed on the ground that the court's order is contrary to law on the ground that the respondent judge did not acquire jurisdiction and the petition failed to adduce proper and reasonable cause for the change of name. Issues: 1. Whether the court had acquired jurisdiction over the case; and 2. Whether or not the respondent Judge erred in granting the petition although private respondent Pang Cha Quen failed to adduce proper and reasonable cause for changing the name of the minor "May Sia" alias Manman Huang.” Ruling: 1. No.


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The court did not acquire jurisdiction over the petition on the ground that the captions of the petition and of the published order of the court did not include the name "Mary Pang" as one of the names that the minor has allegedly been using, hence, the petition and the published order contain a fatal jurisdictional defect. The reason for the rule requiring the inclusion of the name sought to be adopted and the other names or aliases of the applicant in the title of the petition, or in the caption of the published order is that the ordinary reader only glances fleetingly at the caption of the published order or the title of the petition in a special proceeding for a change of name. Only if the caption or the title strikes him because one or all of the names mentioned are familiar to him, does he proceed to read the contents of the order. The probability is great that he will not notice the other names or aliases of the applicant if they are mentioned only in the body of the order or petition. The omission of her other alias-- "Mary Pang"-- in the captions of the court's order and of the petition defeats the purpose of the publication. In view of that defect, the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the subject of the proceedings. 2. Yes. The petitioner failed to offer valid reason for the change of name of May Sia. The following have been considered valid grounds for a change of name: 1) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable, or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;

4) having continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, unaware of his alien parentage; or 5) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage all in good faith and not to prejudice anybody. However, petitioner, for the change of name of May Sia, offered only the following reasons: 1) That her "her daughter grew up with, and learned to love and recognize Alfredo de la Cruz as her own father"; 2) To afford her daughter a feeling of security; and 3) that "Alfredo de la Cruz agrees to this petition, and has signified his conformity at the foot of this pleading". Clearly, these are not valid reasons for a change of name. Another reason for disallowing the petition for change of name is that it was not filed by the proper party. As provided in Sections 1 and 2, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court, the petition for change of name must be filed by the person desiring to change his/her name, even if it may be signed and verified by some other person in his behalf. In this case, however, the petition was filed by Pang Cha Quen not by May Sia. Hence, only May Sia herself, alias Manman Huang, alias Mary Pang, when she shall have reached the age of majority, may file the petition to change her name. Wherefore, the Petition for Change of Name of May Sia is denied. Case Digested by: Ray Marvin A. Palma

2) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; 3) when the change will avoid confusion; 170 | P a g e Pr o of re a d

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128

Wang v Cebu City Civil Registrar GR No 159966 March 30, 2005

Doctrine: The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification, and that a change of name is a privilege and not a right.

right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, and there is no reason why this right should be taken from Julio considering that he was still a minor. When he reaches majority age he could then decide whether to change his name by dropping his middle name, added the RTC. Issue: Whether the court is correct in denying the petition.

Facts:

Ruling:

Julian is the son of Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who were then not yet married to each other. When his parents subsequently got married on September 22, 1998, they executed a deed of legitimation of their son so that the child’s name was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian Lin Carulasan Wang.

Yes. Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further distinguish him from others who may have the same given name and surname as he has. When an illegitimate child is legitimated by subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father in a public instrument or private handwritten instrument, he then bears both his mother's surname as his middle name and his father's surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an acknowledged natural child. The registered name of a legitimate, legitimated and recognized illegitimate child thus contains a given name, a middle name and a surname.

Since the couple planned to live in Singapore where Julian will study together with a sister who was born in Singapore, Anna Lisa decided to file a petition in the RTC seeking to drop his middle name and have his registered name in the Civil Registry changed from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to Julian Lin Wang. The reason given for the change of name sought in the petition is that Julian may be discriminated against when he studies in Singapore because of his middle name since in Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the mother is not carried in a person's name. RTC denied the petition because the reason given did not fall within the grounds recognized by law. The RTC ruled that since the State has an interest in the name of a person it cannot just be changed to suit the convenience of the bearer of the name. The RTC said that legitimate children have the

The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification, and that a change of name is a privilege and not a right, so that before a person can be authorized to change his name given him either in his certificate of birth or civil registry, he must show proper or reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such change. Otherwise, the request should be denied.


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To justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest. In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle name is convenience. However, how such change of name would make his integration into Singaporean society easier and convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of his middle name would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete name. Case Digested by: Queenie Joy Faelnar

129

Silverio v Republic G.R. No. 174689 October 22, 2007

Doctrine: No law allows the change of entry in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex reassignment. Facts: On November 26, 2002, Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name “Rommel Jacinto” to “Mely” and his sex from male to female in his birth certificate in the RTC for reason of his sex reassignment. He alleged that he is a male transsexual, he is anatomically male but thinks and acts like a female. The Regional Trial Court ruled in favor of him, explaining that it is consonance with the principle of justice and equality. The Republic, through the OSG, filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals alleging that there is no law allowing change of name by reason of sex alteration. Petitioner filed a reconsideration but was denied. Hence, this petition. Issue: Whether the change in name and sex in birth certificate are allowed by reason of sex reassignment. Ruling: No. A change of name is a privilege and not a right. It may be allowed in cases where the name is ridiculous, tainted with dishonor, or difficult to pronounce or write; a nickname is habitually used; or if the change will avoid confusion. The petitioner’s basis of the change of his name is that he intends his first name compatible with the sex he thought he transformed himself into thru surgery. The Court says that his true name does not prejudice him at all, and no law allows the change of entry


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in the birth certificate as to sex on the ground of sex reassignment. Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. In addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name. Case Digested by: Queenie Joy Faelnar

130

In Re: Jesus Ng Yao Siong v. RP GR No. L-20306 March 31, 1996

Topic: Name in Civil Register is Official Doctine: Failure in the heading of the application to give the true name sought to be changed is fundamental; such failure is non-compliance with the strict requirements of publication; it is fatal; and the court did not acquire jurisdiction to hear the case. Synopsis: For purposes of an application for change of name under Article 376 of the Civil Code, the only name that may be changed is the true or official name recorded in the civil register. actual publication thereof, the title of this case was printed as follows: In the matter of the change of name of Jesus Ng Yao Siong, Jesus Ng Yao Siong, petitioner, But Jesus Ng Yao Siong the name appearing in the petition, the order of publication, and the publication itself, which is merely "Jesus Ng" not Jesus Ng Yap Siong, thus result that there is no name to be changed in the petition.

FACTS:

Petitioner, a Chinese resident of Dumaguete City, bears a number of names: (1) Jesus Ng, in his birth certificate and certificate of residence, (2) Jesus Uy, Keng Lee, in his school records, (3) Uy Keng Lee Jesus, also in his school records, (4) Keng Lee Uy, to his friends and to the general public, (5) Uy Keng Lee, in his income tax returns, and (6) Jesus Ng Yao Siong, in his alien certificate of registration. These diverse names, so his petition avers, "had caused much confusion in his school records and unnecessary delay and embarrassment to him in his dealing with the public". To obviate all these, petitioner would want to be known only by one name — Keng Lee Uy — and accordingly petitioned that the Negros Oriental court authorize the change of all the other names to Keng Lee Uy. The city attorney of Dumaguete opposed the petition, alleged that there is no necessity for the change of name and that petitioner is guilty of a violation of the laws regarding the use of names and surnames. The judgment — after hearing — went for petitioner. The Republic appealed. Issues: 1. Whether or not there was valid publication 2. Whether there is a reasonable ground for the change of name. RULING: 1. NO. The court held that for purposes of an application for change of name under Article 376 of the Civil Code, the only name that may be changed is the true or official name recorded in the civil register. Change of name is a judicial proceeding in rem. Jurisdiction to hear and


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determine a petition therefor, by law, is acquired after publication of the "order reciting the purpose of the petition" and the "date and place for the hearing thereof" — for three (3) successive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation. But, for that publication to be effective, it must give a correct information. To inform, the publication should recite, amongst others, the following facts: (1) the name or names of the applicant, (2) the cause for which the change of name is sought, and (3) the new name asked for. By Article 408 of the Civil Code, a person's birth must be entered in the civil register. So it is, that the civil register records his name. That name in the civil register, for legal purposes, is his real name. And correctly so, because the civil register is an official record of the civil status of persons. A name given to a person in the church records or elsewhere or by which he is known in the community — when at variance with that entered in the civil register — is unofficial and cannot be recognized as his real name. The title of this case was there printed as follows: "In the matter of the change of name of Jesus Ng Yao Siong, Jesus Ng Yao Siong, petitioner." But Jesus Ng Yao Siong the name appearing in the petition, the order of publication, and the publication itself, is not the true name of petitioner. As heretofore stated, his name appearing in the civil register is merely "Jesus Ng" without the Yao Siong. The name is to be changed, if any, Jesus Ng — not Jesus Ng Yao Siong. It thus results that there is no name to be changed in the petition. It is our view that this failure in the heading of the application to give the true name sought to be changed is fundamental; such failure is noncompliance with the strict requirements of publication; it is fatal; and the court did not acquire jurisdiction to hear the case.

2. No. The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be "proper and reasonable cause" for which the change is sought. The petition and petitioner's testimony are one in the claim that his various names caused much confusion in the school records and unnecessary delay and embarrassment to him in his dealings with the public. This does not constitute proper and reasonable justification to legally authorize a change of name for him. For indeed he had been using these names all along. And that use naturally facilitates his transactions with others who knew him by the one name or the other. Again we say that the petition not being supported by weighty reasons, the condition for the grant thereof is nonexistent; and, nothing is left for the court but to dismiss the petition. Case Digested by: Maongco

131

In Re: Emmanuel Yu Nam v. RP GR No. L-20016 April 29, 1966

Topic: Purpose of Publication Doctrine: Proper publication of the petition being a primordial step in proceedings of this nature. The purpose of the requirement of publication is "to apprise the public of the pendency of the petition so that those who may know of any legal objection to it might come forward with the information in order to determine the fitness of petitioner.


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Synopsis: If

petitioner's true name is Emmanuel Yu Nam, while the notices published give his name as Emmanuel Ong, persons who might have derogatory information against Emmanuel Yu Nam might not come forward with it in the belief that Emmanuel Yu Nam, the applicant, is someone else. The purpose of the publication would thus be defeated, and the road would be laid open to fraudulent subterfuges through the use of aliases.

FACTS: The Republic challenges the correctness of the decision of the Cebu Court of First Instance granting the petition for naturalization of Emmanuel Yu Nam. Several errors are assigned in its printed brief the most important of which refers to petitioner's use of aliases without judicial authority. The petition alleges that applicant's full name is Emmanuel Yu Nam; and such petition was published under such name. However, his birth certificate shows that he is Emmanuel Ong, and his school records listed him as Manuel Ong y Lim. These other names were not mentioned in his petition. ISSUE: WON failure to mention the use of aliases is fatal to the application of change of name. RULING: YES. The omission taints the whole proceeding, to such extent as practically to deprive the court of jurisdiction over the matter. The purpose of the requirement of publication is "to apprise the public of the pendency of the petition so that those who may know of any legal objection to it might come forward with the information in order to determine the fitness of petitioner for Philippine citizenship”. The purpose of the

publication would thus be defeated, and the road would be laid open to fraudulent subterfuges through the use of aliases. Case Digested by: Maongco

132

Yu v. Republic GR No. L-20874 May 25, 1966

Topic: Change of Name Doctrine: Rule 103 does not say that only citizens of the Philippines may petition for a change of name. The word "person" is a generic term which is not limited to Filipino citizens, but embraces all natural persons. Synopsis: Joselito Yu, a Chinese citizen, filed a petition for change of name. It was denied on the ground that Rule 103 may not be invoked by aliens. However, on appeal, the SC held that a petition for change of name under Rule 103 can be invoked aliens there being no Filipino citizenship requirement under the said rule. Facts: In the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court, Joselito Yu, represented by his guardian ad litem Juan S. Barrera, filed a petition to have his name changed to Ricardo Sy. Petitioner avers in his petition that he is a minor of 13 years, and a Chinese citizen who has been a resident of Manila for more than three years prior to the filing of the petition. As grounds for the change of name he alleges that as far as he can remember has been using the name "Ricardo Sy," that he grew up under the care and custody of Juan Sy Barrera, his


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guardian ad litem; that he is enrolled in school under the said name and that he was baptized "Ricardo Sy with his real name also stated." Without a hearing being had, the court motu propio dismissed the petition on the ground that Rule 103 of the Revised Rules of Court may not be invoked by aliens. Issue: Whether an alien can avail himself of the provisions of the rules of court relating to change of name. Ruling: Yes. Rule 103 does not say that only citizens of the Philippines may petition for a change of name. Section 1 provides that "a person desiring to change his name shall present the petition to the Court of First Instance of the province in which he resides, or, in the City of Manila to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court." Here the word "person" is a generic term which is not limited to Filipino citizens, but embraces all natural persons. The rule does not even require that the citizenship of the petitioner be stated in his petition. It is enough that the petition be verified, signed by the petitioner or some other person in his behalf, and set forth (a) that the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of filing; (b) the cause for which the change of name is sought; and (c) the name asked for (Section 2). The rule is clear and affords no room for interpretation. It sets forth all the requirements, and Filipino citizenship is not one of them. The Court a quo ruled that since the use of surnames is based on family rights,

and since under Article 15 of the Civil Code laws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon citizens of the Philippines even though living abroad, the converse of the principle must be recognized, that is to say, the same matters in respect of an alien must be governed by the laws of his own country. But a change of name as authorized under Rule 103 does not by itself define, or effect a change in, one's existing family relations, or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom; nor does it create new family rights and duties where none before were existing. It does not alter one's legal capacity, civil status or citizenship. What is altered is only the name, which is that word or combination of words by which a person is distinguished from others and which he bears as the label of appellation for the convenience of the world at large in addressing him, or in speaking of or dealing with him (38 Am. Jur. 596). The situation is no different whether the person whose name is changed be a citizen or an alien. Case Digested by: Aura Villones

133

Ong Huan Tin v. Republic GR No. L-20997 April 27,1967

Topic: Change of Name Doctrine: Philippine citizenship of the applicant is not a prerequisite for a petition to change name; and, that, accordingly an alien may petition for a change of name. Synopsis: Ong Huan Tin, an alien, filed a petition to change her name. It was denied on the ground that she is an alien. SC held


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that, as a rule, aliens may file a petition for change of name since citizenship is not a requirement. However, such rule applies only to aliens domiciled in the Philippines. Facts: Ong Huan Tin filed a petition to change her name to Teresita Tan before the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court. The petition was set for hearing. But, before the petition could be heard on the merits, the court, motu proprio, in its order expressed the opinion "that an alien cannot avail himself of the provisions of our Rules of Court relating to change of name" and thereupon denied the petition. Issue: 1.Whether an alien may petition for a change of name under Rule 103. 2.Whether every alien in this country may petition for a change of name. Ruling: 1. Yes. As held in the case of In the Petition for the Change of Name of JOSELITO YU, the SC held that Philippine citizenship of the applicant is not a prerequisite for a petition to change name; and, that, accordingly, an alien may petition for a change of name. Rule 103 does not say that only citizens of the Philippines may petition for a change of name. [Neither does Public Act No. 1386 of the Philippine Commission (enacted September 1, 1905) from which the Rule has been adopted.] Section 1 provides that "a person desiring to change his name shall present the petition to the Court of First Instance of the province in which he resides, or, in the City of Manila, to the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court." Here the word

"person" is a generic term which is not limited to Filipino citizens, but embraces all natural persons. The rule does not even require that the citizenship of the petitioner be stated in his petition. It is enough that the petition be verified, signed by the petitioner or some other person in his behalf, and set forth (a) that the petitioner has been a bona fide resident of the province where the petition is filed for at least three (3) years prior to the date of filing; (b) the cause for which the change of name is sought; and (c) the name asked for (Section 2). The rule is clear and affords no room for interpretation. It sets forth all the requirements, and Filipino citizenship is not one of them. 2. No. Change of name — under our own law — is a special proceeding to establish the status of a person involving his relations with others, that is, his legal position in, or with regard to, the rest of the community. The petition therefor is directed against all. It is in rem. So it is, that under Section 3 of Rule 103, publication of the petition is required. The broad general doctrine is that the status of an alien individual is governed and controlled by the lex domicilii. Implicit in this precept is that an alien may be allowed to change his name here only if he be domiciled in the Philippines. And "domicile" means "permanent home, the place to which, whenever absent for business or pleasure, one intends to return, and depends on facts and circumstances, in the sense that they disclose intent." An alien who temporarily stays in the Philippines may not there avail of the right to change his name. It would not be of much benefit to him; court proceedings for the purpose could yet be a useless


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ceremony; that salutary effects flowing from a change of his social relation and condition may not thus be achieved. And then, stock should be taken of the fact that in a change of name, third persons and the State are concerned. Thus, the SC lays down the rule that only alien domiciled in the Philippines may apply for change of name in the courts thereof.

Respondent Amanda Cruz (Amanda) who, along with her husband Francisco G. Cruz (Spouses Cruz), leased a parcel of land situated at Barrio Guinhawa, Malolos (the property), refused to vacate the property, despite demands by the lessor Provincial Government of Bulacan (the Province) which intended to utilize it for local projects. Several cases were filed by both parties to enforce their rights over the property. The pertinent case among the filed cases was the issuance by the MTC an alias Writ of Demolition in favor of the Province. Respondents filed a motion for TRO in the RTC, which was granted. However, the demolition was already implemented before the TRO issuance.

Case Digested by: Aura Villones

Writ of Amparo

134

Facts:

CASTILLO, ET AL. v. CRUZ G.R. No. 182165, November 25, 2009

Topic: Petition for issuance of Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data Doctrine: The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party.

On February 21, 2008, petitioners Police Superintendent Felixberto Castillo et al., who were deployed by the City Mayor in compliance with a memorandum issued by Governor Joselito R. Mendoza instructing him to “protect, secure and maintain the possession of the property,” entered the property. Amanda and her co-respondents refused to turn over the property, however. Insisting that the RTC Order of Permanent Injunction enjoined the Province from repossessing it, they shoved petitioners, forcing the latter to arrest them and cause their indictment for direct assault, trespassing and other forms of light threats. Thus, respondents filed a Motion for Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data. Issue: a.Whether or not the petition for the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data is proper to property rights; and,


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b.Whether or not the petition for the Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data is proper when there is a criminal case already filed.

confinement or detention was present. In fact, respondents were even able to post bail for the offenses a day after their arrest.

Ruling:

On the 2nd issue: No.

On the 1st issue: No.

Respondents’ filing of the petitions for writs of amparo and habeas data should have been barred, for criminal proceedings against them had commenced after they were arrested in flagrante delicto and proceeded against in accordance with Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court. Validity of the arrest or the proceedings conducted thereafter is a defense that may be set up by respondents during trial and not before a petition for writs of amparo and habeas data.

Section 1 of the Rules of Writ of Amparo and Habeas Data provides that the coverage of the writs is limited to the protection of rights to life, liberty and security, and the writs cover not only actual but also threats of unlawful acts or omissions. Secretary of National Defense v. Manalo teaches: “As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of “extralegal killings” and “enforced disappearances.” Tapuz v. Del Rosario also teaches: “What it is not is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. Neither is it a writ that we shall issue on amorphous and uncertain grounds.” To thus be covered by the privilege of the writs, respondents must meet the threshold requirement that their right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with an unlawful act or omission. Evidently, the present controversy arose out of a property dispute between the Provincial Government and respondents. Absent any considerable nexus between the acts complained of and its effect on respondents’ right to life, liberty and security, the Court will not delve on the propriety of petitioners’ entry into the property. It bears emphasis that respondents’ petition did not show any actual violation, imminent or continuing threat to their life, liberty and security. Bare allegations of petitioners will not suffice to prove entitlement to the remedy of the writ of amparo. No undue

Case digested by: Sherrie U. Cutab

135

SEC. OF NATIONAL SECURITY v. MANALO G.R. No. 180906 October 7, 2008

Topic: Supreme Court’s First Writ of Amparo Case Doctrine: On October 24, 2007, the Court promulgated the Amparo Rule in light of the prevalence of extralegal killing and enforced disappearances.It was an exercise for the first time of the Courts expanded power to promulgate rules to protect our peoples constitutional rights, which made its maiden appearance in the 1987 Constitution in response to the Filipino experience of the martial law regime.] As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or


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to threats thereof. Extralegal killings are killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings.On the other hand, enforced disappearances are attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law.

official assignment of two military officials involved, and produce all medical reports and records of the Manalo brothers while under military custody. The Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP appealed to the SC seeking to reverse and set aside the decision promulgated by the CA

Facts:

Yes. The right to the security of person is not merely a textual hook in Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution. At its core is the immunity of one’s person against government intrusion. The right to security of person is “freedom from fear,” a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity and security.

Brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were abducted by military men belonging to the CAFGU on the suspicion that they were members and supporters of the NPA. After 18 months of detention and torture, the brothers escaped on August 13, 2007. Ten days after their escape, they filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order to stop the military officers and agents from depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights. While the said case was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on October 24, 2007. The Manalos subsequently filed a manifestation and omnibus motion to treat their existing petition as amparo petition. On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the privilege of the writ of amparo. The CA ordered the Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP to furnish the Manalos and the court with all official and unofficial investigation reports as to the Manalos’ custody, confirm the present places of

Issue: Whether or not the right to freedom from fear is or can be protected by the Writ of Amparo Ruling:

In upholding the CA decision, the Supreme Court ruled that there is a continuing violation of the Manalos right to security. xxx The Writ of Amparo is the most potent remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty, and security has been violated or is threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission by public officials or employees and by private individuals or entities. xxx Understandably, since their escape, the Manalos have been under concealment and protection by private citizens because of the threat to their life, liberty, and security. The circumstances of respondents’ abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably support a conclusion that there is an apparent threat that they will again be abducted, tortured, and this time, even executed. These constitute threats to their


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liberty, security, and life, actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo,” the Court explained. Case digested by: Sherrie U. Cutab

136

Revised Rules of Summary Procedure applied and thus required an Answer. The Writ of Amparo was issued. Thus, petitioners came to this Court assailing the RTC decision via Rule 45.

Issue:

SEC. DE LIMA v. GATDULA,

Whether or not the Writ of Amparo can be executed?.

G.R. No. 204528 February 19, 2013

Ruling: Topic: WRIT OF AMPARO. Doctrine: The remedy of Writ of Amparo is an equitable and extraordinary remedy to safeguard the right of the people to life, liberty and security as enshrined in the 1987 Constitution. It was issued as an exercise of the Supreme Court’s power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of Constitutional rights. It aims to address concerns such as, among otehrsm extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. Facts: Gatdula filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Amparo in the RTC of Manila directed against Sec De Lima, et al. "to cease and desist from framing up Gatdula for the fake ambush incident. Instead of deciding on the writ, judge summons De Lima, et al. to Answer and set for hearing for determining whether a temporary protection order may be issued. During that hearing, De Lima, et al. manifested that a Return, not an Answer, is appropriate for Amparo cases. The judge insisted that "[s]ince no writ has been issued, return is not the required pleading but answer"; that Rules of Court apply suppletorily in Amparo cases and; that the

No. the RTC committed procedural erros in issuing the writ. The granting of the writ is not the judgment or final order contemplated under the rules thus, Petition for Review under Rule 45 is not the proper remedy. The remedy of the Writ of Amparo is an equitable and extraordinary remedy to safeguard the right of the people to life, liberty and security as enshrined in the 1987 Constitution. The Rule on the Writ of Amparo was issued as an exercise of the Supreme Court's power to promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights. It aims to address concerns such as, among others, extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. PROCESS OF ISSUANCE: 1. It is initiated through a petition to be filed in RTC, SB, CA, or SC, the judge or justice then makes an "immediate" evaluation of the facts as alleged, after, the judge decides on the issuance or dismissal. Dismissal is proper if the petition do not show that the petitioner's right to life, liberty or security is under threat or the acts complained of are not unlawful. 2. Return is filed after to serve as the responsive pleading. If the respondents are


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public officials or employees, they are required to state the actions they had taken to: verify the identity of the aggrieved party; recover and preserve evidence related to the death or disappearance of the person identified in the petition; identify witnesses and obtain statements concerning the death or disappearance; determine the cause, manner, location, and time of death or disappearance as well as any pattern or practice that may have brought about the death or disappearance; and bring the suspected offenders before a competent court. 3. Summary hearing is done after the Return is filed. If not filed, the hearing will be done ex parte. The court will render the judgment if the allegations are proven with substantial evidence. It is this judgment that could be subject to appeal to the Supreme Court via Rule 45. The confusion of the parties arose due to the procedural irregularities in the RTC: (1) the insistence on filing of an Answer was inappropriate as it is the Return that serves as the proper responsive pleading. Filing of Answer is contrary to the intention speedy remedy. This type of summary procedure only applies to MTC/MTCC/MCTCs, not to RTC. Also, the application of summary procedure is limited to certain civil and criminal cases. A writ of Amparo is a special proceeding, (2) the holding of a hearing on the main case prior to the issuance of the writ and the filing of a Return, without which, the issues could not have been properly joined; (3) it required a memorandum in lieu of a responsive pleading when a Return in Amparo cases allows the respondents to frame the issues subject to a hearing thus should be done prior to the hearing, not after. A memorandum is a synthesis of the

claims of the party litigants and is a final pleading usually required before the case is submitted for decision. One cannot substitute for the other; (4) in the "Decision" which stated:"Accordingly this court GRANTS the privilege of the writ and the interim reliefs prayed for by the petitioner.", this gives the impression that the decision was the judgment since the phraseology is similar to Section 18 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo: The procedural irregularities in the RTC affected the mode of appeal that petitioners used in elevating the matter to this Court. When it is the judge himself who disregards the rules of procedure, delay and confusion result. Digested by: Janirah A. Sangulingan

137

NAVIA v. PARDICO G.R. No. 184467 June 19, 2012

Doctrine: Enforced or involuntary disappearance of persons means the arrest, detention, or abduction of persons by, or with authorization, support or acquiescence of a State or a political organization followed by a refusal to acknowledge that deprivation of freedom or to give information on the fate or whereabouts of those persons, with the intention of removing from the protection of the law for a prolonged period of time. Facts: Two uniformed guards disembarking from the vehicle of Asian Land Strategies Corporation (Asian Land) arrived at the


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house of Lolita M. Lapore. One of them told Bong that he and Ben should go with them to the security office of Asian Land because a complaint was lodged against them for theft of electric wires and lamps in the subdivision Shortly thereafter, Bong, Lolita and Ben were in the office of the security department of Asian Land also located in Grand Royale Subdivision. Exasperated with the mysterious disappearance of her husband, Virginia filed a Petition for Writ of Amparo before the RTC. A Writ of Amparo was accordingly issued and served on the petitioners. The trial court issued the challenged Decision granting the petition. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the trial court. Petitioners contend that the writ of amparo is available only in cases where the factual and legal bases of the violation or threatened violation of the aggrieved party’s right to life, liberty and security are clear. Petitioners assert that in the case at bench, Virginia miserably failed to establish all these. This petition for review on certiorari challenges the decision of the RTC. The petition does not contain any allegation of State complicity, and none of the evidence presented tend to show that the government or any of its agents orchestrated Ben’s disappearance. In fact, none of its agents, officials or employees were impleaded or implicated in Virginia’s amparo petition whether as a responsible or accountable persons. Issue:

Whether the issuance of A Writ of Amparo is proper. Ruling: No. SC pointed out that “in an amparo petition, proof of disappearance alone is not enough. It is likewise essential to establish that such disappearance was carried out with the direct authorization, support or acquiescence or threats thereof. This indispensable element of State participation is not present in this case. The petition does not contain any allegation of State complicity, and none of the evidence presented tend to show that the government or any of its agents orchestrated Ben’s disappearance. In fact, none of its agents, officials, or employees were impleaded or implicated in Virginia's amparo petition whether as responsible or accountable persons. Thus, in the absence of an allegation or proof that the government or its agents had a hand in Ben’s disappearance or that they failed to exercise extraordinary diligence in investigating his case, the Court will definitely not hold the government or its agents either as responsible or accountable persons. Here, petitioners are mere security guards at Grand Royale Subdivision in Brgy. Lugam, Malolos City and their principal, the Asian Land, is a private entity. They do not work for the government and nothing has been presented that would link or connect them to some covert police, military or governmental operation. To fall within the ambit of A.M. No. 07-9-12-SC in relation to RA No. 9851, the disappearance must be attended by some governmental involvement. This hallmark of State


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participation differentiates an enforced disappearance case from an ordinary case of a missing person. Case Digested by: Drusilla L. Dalapu

138

Tapuz v Del Rosario G.R. No. 182484 June 17, 2008

that the heirs of Antonio Tapuz Reported acts of terrorism committed against them by armed men who executed the demolition. It is alleged that the armed men torched two houses of the petitioners to ashes. Issue: Whether the issuance of a Writ of Amparo is proper

Doctrine: The Court sees no point in separately and directly intervening through a Writ of Amparo in the absence of any clear prima facie showing that the right to life, liberty or security- the personal concern that the writ is intended to protect- is immediately in danger or threatened, or that the danger or threat is continuing. Facts: Private respondents Gregorio Sanson and Ma. Lourdes Sanson filed with the MCTC an action for forcible entry against the petitioners Daniel Masangkay Tapuz, et al. regarding a parcel of land located in a certain Sitio in Boracay, Aklan. That they are both claiming. In their complaint, they made the following allegations: 1) that they are the registered owners of the land and 2) that they were the disputed land’s prior possessors when Tapuz, et al. entered the land with force and intimidation without their permission. The MCTC ruled in their favor. Upon appeal, the RTC affirmed this decision and even issued a writ of demolition. The petitioners thereafter appealed to the CA.

Ruling: No. Writ of Amparo is intended to address violations of or threats to the right to life, liberty, or security, as an extraordinary and independent remedy beyond those available under the prevailing Rules, or as a remedy supplemental to these Rules. What it is not, is a writ to protect concerns that are purely property or commercial. The issuance of the Writ of Amparo in the present case is anchored on the factual allegations brought about in the petition. Notably, none of the supporting affidavits compellingly show that the threat to the right to life, and security of the petitioners is imminent or is continuing. If the petitioners wish to seek redress and hold the alleged perpetrators criminally liable, the remedy may lie more in the realm of ordinary criminal prosecution rather than on the use of the extraordinary remedy of the Writ of Amparo. Case Digested by: Drusilla L. Dalapu

A Notice to Vacate and for Demolition was issued. Petitioners thus filed the present petition praying for the remedy of Writ of Amparo on the ground


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139

Reyes v CA G.R. No. 182161 Deceber 3, 2009

Doctrine: Restriction on right to travel as a result of a pending criminal case is not unlawful and thus not a valid ground to invoke issuance of writ of amparo. Facts: Petitioner was among those arrested, in the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege on November 30, 2007, and was detained awaiting inquest proceeding. Upon the request of DILG, respondent DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzales issued Hold Departure Order (HDO) No. 45 ordering respondent Commissioner of Immigration to include in the Hold Departure List of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) the name of petitioner and 49 others relative to the aforementioned case in the interest of national security and public safety.

the whole gamut of liberties protected by the Constitution. Part of the right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution is the right of a person to travel. Petitioner invokes this extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo for the protection of his right to travel. He insists that he is entitled to the protection covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo because the HDO is a continuing actual restraint on his right to travel. Respondent argued that the lifting of HDO No. 45 is premature in view of public respondents pending Motion for Reconsideration filed by the respondents of the Order of the RTC dismissing Criminal Case for Rebellion for lack of probable cause. Issue: Whether the right to travel is covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo. Ruling: No. The rights that fall within the protective mantle of the Writ of Amparo under Section 1 of the Rules thereon are the following: (1) right to life; (2) right to liberty; and (3) right to security.

DOJ Panel of Prosecutors filed an Information of Rebellion against petitioner. The RTC dismissed the charge for Rebellion against petitioner and 17 others for lack of probable cause. Petitioners requested the DOJ for lifting the HDO No. 45, but the request was denied. Petitioner then filed the instant petition for issuance of writ of amparo before the CA claiming that despite the dismissal of the rebellion case against petitioner, HDO No. 45 still subsists. The CA dismissed the petition.

The right to travel refers to the right to move from one place to another. As we have stated in Marcos v. Sandiganbayan, a person’s right to travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed by the very necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. In such cases, whether the accused should be permitted to leave the jurisdiction for humanitarian reasons is a matter of the courts sound discretion.

Petitioner maintains that the writ of amparo does not only exclusively apply to situations of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances but encompasses

Here, the restriction on petitioner’s right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of the criminal case filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has also


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failed to establish that his right to travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it amounted to a serious violation of his right to life, liberty and security, for which there exists no readily available legal recourse or remedy. Case Digested by: Aljalil E. Diego

140

Rubrico v Arroyo G.R. No. 183871 February 18, 2010

Doctrine: It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to hold military/police commanders liable for extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances or threats, may be made applicable to this jurisdiction on the theory that the command responsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle of international law or customary international law in accordance with the incorporation clause of the Constitution. Still, it would be inappropriate to apply to these proceedings the doctrine of command responsibility, as the CA seemed to have any, is beyond the reach of amparo. In other words, the Court does not rule in such proceedings on any issue of criminal culpability, even if incidentally a crime or an infarction of an administrative rule may have been committed. Facts: On April 3, 2007, armed men abducted Lourdes and brought to, and detained at, the air base without charges. Following a week of relentless interrogation - conducted alternately by hooded individuals - and what amounts to verbal abuse and mental harassment, Lourdes,

was released at Dasmariñas, Cavite, her hometown, but only after being made to sign a statement that she would be a military asset. After Lourdes’ release, the harassment, coming in the form of being tailed on at least two occasions at different places. Lourdes’ two daughters were also allegedly subjected to harassment. Lourdes filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a criminal complaint for kidnapping and arbitrary detention and administrative complaint for gross abuse of authority and grave misconduct against Capt. Angelo Cuaresma, Ruben Alfaro, Jimmy Santana and a certain Jonathan, but nothing has happened; and the threats and harassment incidents have been reported to the Dasmariñas municipal and Cavite provincial police stations, but nothing eventful resulted from their respective investigations. Karapatan conducted an investigation on the incidents. The investigation would indicate that those men belonging to the Armed Forces of the Philippines (AFP). The AFP denied that those men belong to AFP/PAF. Petitioner Rubrico filed petition for issuance of writ of amparo, ordering the individual respondents to desist from performing any threatening act against the security of the petitioners and for the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB) to immediately file information for kidnapping qualified with the aggravating circumstance of gender of the offended party. The CA rendered partial judgment DISMISSING the instant petition with respect to respondent Pres. Gloria Macapagal Arroyo, Gen. Hermogenes Esperon, P/Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon, Supt. Edgar B. Roquero, P/Sr. Insp. Arsenio C. Gomez (ret.) and the Office of the Ombudsman. Petitioner questioned the CA’s decision. Petitioner argued that Gen.


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Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Razon were included in the case on the theory that they, as commanders, were responsible for the unlawful acts allegedly committed by their subordinates against petitioners. Issue: Whether the privilege of the writ of amparo is available to petitioner as against respondents Gen. Hermogenes Esperon and P/Dir. Gen. Avelino Razon based on command responsibility doctrine. Ruling: No. It may plausibly be contended that command responsibility, as legal basis to hold military/police commanders liable for extra-legal killings, enforced disappearances, or threats, may be made applicable to this jurisdiction on the theory that the command responsibility doctrine now constitutes a principle of international law or customary international law in accordance with the incorporation clause of the Constitution. Still, it would be inappropriate to apply to these proceedings the doctrine of command responsibility, as the CA seemed to have done, as a form of criminal complicity through omission, for individual respondents’ criminal liability, if there be any, is beyond the reach of amparo. In other words, the Court does not rule in such proceedings on any issue of criminal culpability, even if incidentally a crime or an infraction of an administrative rule may have been committed. Case Digested by: Aljalil E. Diego

RULE 103 CHANGE OF NAME PUBLICATION AND CONTENTS OF PETITION

141

IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME. MARIO PABELLAR G.R. No. 153883. January 13, 2004

Topic: Need for Publication for Court to Obtain Jurisdiction Doctrine: CONTINUED USE OF NAME; JUDICIAL AUTHORITY NOT NECESSARY WHEN PETITIONER HAS BEEN USING IT SINCE CHILDHOOD; ALLOWED BY COMMONWEALTH ACT NO. 142. The proceeding for a change of name is a proceeding in rem. Jurisdiction to hear and determine the petition for change of name is acquired after due publication of the order containing certain data, among which is the name sought to be adopted, a matter which should be indicated in the title of the petition Facts: Petitioner Mario Pabellar was born on November 11, 1937 at Lucena, Tayabas. Presumably, no record of his birth in the civil register is available for none was presented in evidence. His record at the Lucena Catholic Church shows that when he was baptized on May 27, 1938 as the illegitimate child of Teofila Pabellar with an unknown father and paternal grandparents, he was given the name Mario Pabellar. He testified that his father is Esteban Carandang who is married to Rufina Marasigan. They were separated. She lived in Batangas. Esteban Carandang took Teofila Pabellar as his common-law wife and lived with her in Lucena. The petitioner has lived with his parents in Lucena since birth. He has always used the name Mario Carandang. Mario has always used the surname Carandang in his official record


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and dealings and with other public documents. His father urged him to see a lawyer so that he could change his surname from Pabellar to Carandang. On February 28, 1966 the petitioner filed the instant petition for change of name. He used in the petition the name, Mario Pabellar. The City Fiscal opposed the petition on the grounds that the change of name was not justified and that since the petitioner is an illegitimate child he has no right to use his father’s surname. the petitioner merely indicated therein his name, Mario Pabellar, but he did not specify his supposed alias, Mario Carandang, and the name which he sought to adopt. And in the lower court’s order setting the petition for hearing, which order was published, the cause for which the change of name was sought was not stated. The lower court’s finding that the petitioner’s name in the civil register of Lucena is Mario Pabellar is unfounded because, as above stated, no certified copy of the entry in the civil register as to petitioner’s name was presented in evidence,It erroneously assumed that the petitioner’s name in the civil register at Lucena is Mario Pabellar although that factum probandum was not established by any factum probans. The Solicitor General in this appeal contends that the petitioner failed to show any reasonable justification for the change of name and that there was no compliance with the jurisdictional requirements Issue: 1. Whether or not the change of name is proper 2. Whether or not failure to include aliases and the name to be adopted in the title pf the petition for change of name is a fatal defect.

Ruling: The change of name is devoid of factual and legal justification. In the petition for change of name, the only name that maybe changed is the true and official name recorded in the civil registry, a name that was not proven by the petitioner. In reality what the petitioner seeks is not the change of name but the judicial authority for his continued used of the surname Carandang which use is allowed in Commonwealth Act No. 142. A change of name is a proceeding in rem. Jurisdiction to hear and determine is acquired after due publication and the order containing certain data. “In a petition for change of name the title of the petition should include: (1) the applicant’s real name, (2) his aliases or other names, if any, and (3) the name sought to be adopted even if these data are found in the body of the petition. For the publication to be valid and effective, the published order should reproduce the title of the petition containing the data already stated and should contain correct information as to (1) the name or names of the applicant, (2) the cause for the change of name, and (3) the new name asked for” In this case, the petition does not contain the alias/es of the petitioner and the name sought to be adopted. Thus, the order of the court was defective and deficient. The lower court did not acquire jurisdiction over the proceeding. Case digested by: Winona Mae M. Naive

142

REPUBLIC v. REYES G.R. No. L-29850 June 30, 1972


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Topic: Contents of petition Doctrine: In a petition for change of name the title of the petition should include: (1) the applicant's real name, (2) his aliases or other names, if any, and (3) the name sought to be adopted even if these data are found in the body of the petition. For the publication to be valid and effective, the published order should reproduce the title of the petition containing the data already stated and should contain correct information as to: (1) the name or names of the applicant; (2) the cause for the change name; and (3) the new name asked for

non-compliance with the strict requirements of publication that renders the petition fatally defective and the court has no jurisdiction to try the case. Respondent argues that since the name Rolando Deangkinay is not an alias, he was therefore not obliged to place the same in the title or caption of his petition Issue: Whether or not the respondent is correct in his argument that Rolando Deangkinay having been not an alias should not be necessarily included in the title of the petition. Ruling:

Facts: On October 18, 1967 petitioner-respondent filed a verified petition for change of name in the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City. Hermogenes Diangkinay (petitioner-respondent) sought to change his name to Rolando Deangkinay. The evidence discloses that the name registered in the local civil registrar of San Pablo City is Hermogenes Diangkinay, however the petitioner-respondent has since his boyhood used Rolando Deangkinay on the belief that it is his true name; the same name which he has used in his official record and dealings. The lower court granted his petition. The fiscal in representation of the Solicitor General opposes the petition on the ground that the same is not justified. The name which appears in the registry is Hermogenes Diangkinay; it is his official records and Baptismal Certificate that should be the ones corrected, in this regard the trial court acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction. It is also noted that the name Rolando Deangkinay did not appear in the title of the petition, hence the failure to include such is

The name Rolando Deangkinay is not an alias within the purview of Commonwealth Act No. 142 known as the Anti-Alias Law, it being the name by which respondent was baptized and known since childhood, but this of no moment. Such name being admittedly the name sought to be adopted, the same must be included in the title of the p ti on. It is indeed a pity that this flaw of jurisdiction exists, for its seems quite fair and reasonable that the confusion resulting from the variance between the name used by respondent in all his activities and transactions since childhood, including many public records related thereto, in the one hand, and the one appearing in his record of birth, on the other, should be avoided by allowing respondent to legalize the name by which he has been known since his infancy. We have stressed that petitions for change of name being proceedings in rem, strict compliance with the requirements of publication is essential, for it s by such means that the court acquires jurisdiction. . Case digested by: Winona Mae N. Naive


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143

that the minor be able to use the name Moore after his family name Velarde

HEIRS OF JESUS FRAN v. HON. BERNARDO SALAS G.R. No. L-53546 June25, 1992

Issue:

Topic: Change of Name Not a Matter of Right

1) Whether or not a minor may be permitted to adopt and use the surname of the second husband of his mother under our laws;

Doctrine: The change is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will likely follow.

2) Whether or not there are justifiable reasons exist to allow such change of name; and whether petitioner, as mother of the minor, has the authority or personality to ask for such a change.

Facts:

Ruling:

Elaine A. Moore filed a petition before the Court of First Instance of Rizal praying that her child by a former marriage, William Michael Velarde, be permitted to change his name so as to read William Michael Velarde Moore.

1) No. The government provides that the reason that our laws do not authorize a legitimate child to use the surname of a person who is not his father is because Article 364 of Civil Code specifically provides that legitimate children shall principally use the surname of their father. Also, Article 369 of the same Code provides that in case of annulment of avoidable marriage the children conceived before the annulment she principally use the surname of the father, and considering by analogy the effect of a decree of divorce, it concluded that the children who are conceived before such a decree should also be understood as carrying the surname of the real father, which, in this case, is Velarde.

Petitioner is an American citizen formerly married to Joseph P. Velarde, also an American citizen, out of whose wedlock a child by the name of William Michael Velarde was born. The child was born on January 19, 1947 at Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. The marriage of petitioner to Velarde was subsequently dissolved by a decree of divorce issued by the Superior Court of the State of California on May 31, 1949. After said decree became final, petitioner contracted a second marriage with Don C. Moore on September 29, 1956 at Los Angeles, California, U.S.A., and thereafter the minor lived continuously with the spouses up to the present time. He was supported by Moore who has always treated him with love and affection as if he were his true father. In view of this harmonious relation it is petitioner's desire

Indeed, if a child born out of a lawful wedlock be allowed to bear the surname of the second husband of the mother, should the first husband die or be separated by a decree of divorce, there may result a confusion to his real paternity. In the long run the change may redound to the prejudice of the child in the community. Another factor to be reckoned with is the fact that the child concerned is still a


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minor who for the present cannot fathom what would be his feeling when he comes to mature age. If the time comes, he may decide the matter for himself and take such action as our law may permit. For the present we deem the action taken by petitioner premature. WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is affirmed. No costs Case digested by: Ma. Alyssa D. Roa

Padilla. The five minor children, who had been living with said spouses, were generously supported by Padilla and were treated by him with affection as if they were his own children. This harmonious relation existing between said minors and their stepfather prompted Dolores Gemora to file the instant petition for change of the minors' surname from "Copuaco" or "Co" to "Padilla", which petition was granted by the lower court. Issue:

144

PADILLA v. REPUBLIC 113 SCRA 789

Whether or not the 5 children should be allowed to use the surname of Padilla Ruling:

Topic:The Rule in Changing the Name of Minors Doctrine: Our laws do not authorize legitimate children to adopt the surname of a person who is not their father. Article 364 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that "legitimate children ... shall principally use the surname of their father." To allow said minors to adopt the surname of their mother's second husband, who is not their father, could result in confusion in their paternity. Facts: Dolores Gemora and Vincent Co were married in 1954. The union begot 5 children, namely: Michael, Abigail, Rafael, Gabriel, and Annabelle. In 1960, Vincent left the conjugal home and has since never returned or visited his family. Because of his continued absence, Dolores filed a petition declaring Vincent an absentee, which was granted by the court. In 1965, Dolores contracted a second marriage with Edward

No. Our laws do not authorize legitimate children to adopt the surname of a person who is not their father. Said minors are the legitimate children of Vincent Co and thus, Article 364 of the Civil Code explicitly provides that "legitimate children ... shall principally use the surname of their father." To allow said minors to adopt the surname of their mother's second husband, who is not their father, could result in confusion in their paternity. It could also create the suspicion that said minors, who were born during the coverture of their mother with her first husband, were in fact sired by Edward Padilla, thus bringing their legitimate status into discredit. If a child born out of a lawful wedlock be allowed to bear the surname of the second husband of the mother, should the first husband die or be separated by a decree of divorce, there may result a confusion as to his real paternity. In the long run the change may redound to the


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prejudice of the child in the community. While the purpose which may have animated petitioner, the minor's mother, is plausible and may run along the feeling of cordiality and spiritual relationship that pervades among the members of the family of her second husband, there is a legal barrier which cannot at present be overlooked or brushed aside. Apart from the legal obstacles discussed above, We consider the instant action taken by petitioner in behalf of her minor children to be premature. Indeed, the matter of change of their surname should better be left to the judgment and discretion of the children themselves when they reach the age of maturity. If in their adulthood they want to change their surname, then they themselves or any of them may take such appropriate action as the law may permit. Petition dismissed

Facts: This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court stemmed from a petition for correction of entries under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court filed by respondent Chule Y. Lim with the Regional Trial Court of Lanao del Norte, Branch 4, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 4933. Respondent claimed that she was born on October 29, 1954 in Buru-an, Iligan City. She alleged that both her Kauswagan and Iligan City records of birth have four erroneous entries, and prays that they be corrected.

Case digested by: Ma. Alyssa D. Roa

First, she claims that her surname Yu was misspelled as Yo. She has been using Yu in all her school records and in her marriage certificate. Second, she claims that her father’s name in her birth record was written as Yo Diu To (Co Tian) when it should have been Yu Dio To (Co Tian).

Rule 108 CANCELLATION OR CORRECTION OF ENTRIES IN THE CIVIL REGISTRY

145

Doctrine: The doctrine that disallows such change of name as would give the false impression of family relationship remains valid but only to the extent that the proposed change of name would in great probability cause prejudice or future mischief to the family whose surname it is that is involved or to the community in general

REPUBLIC v. CHULE Y. LIM G.R. No. 153883 January 13, 2004

Topic: SETTLEMENT OF ESTATE; Jurisdiction as to the Sale of Decedent’s Property and the Complaint for Rescission of such sale

Third, her nationality was entered as Chinese when it should have been Filipino considering that her father and mother never got married. Only her deceased father was Chinese, while her mother is Filipina. She claims that her being a registered voter attests to the fact that she is a Filipino citizen. Finally, it was erroneously indicated in her birth certificate


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that she was a legitimate child when she should have been described as illegitimate considering that her parents were never married because the latter had a prior subsisting marriage contracted in China. On February 22, 2000, the trial court granted respondents petition. So, The Republic of the Philippines appealed the decision to the Court of Appeals which affirmed the trial court’s decision Issue: W/N CA erred in ordering the correction of Respondent’s citizenship from Chinese to Filipino even though the respondent never demonstrated any compliance with the legal requirements for election of citizenship. W/N CA erred in allowing respondent to continue using her father’s surname even though she is an illegitimate child. Ruling: 1.To the first issue, the court ruled in the negative. Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings under said rule may either be summary or adversary in nature. If the correction sought to be made in the civil register is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary. Republic failed to cite this error amounts to a recognition that this case properly falls under Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court considering that the

proceeding can be appropriately classified as adversarial. Moreover, the republic erred in its first assignment of error in relying with the constitutional requirement of electing Filipino citizenship when she reached the age of majority as this applies only to legitimate children. Hence, it does not apply in this case since the respondent was concededly an illegitimate child. By being an illegitimate child of a Filipino mother, respondent automatically became a Filipino upon birth. To the second issue, the court ruled in the negative. The Court of Appeals did not allow respondent to use her father’s surname. What it did allow was the correction of her fathers misspelled surname which she has been using ever since she can remember. In this regard, respondent does not need a court pronouncement for her to use her father’s surname. Moreover, while judicial authority is required for a change of name or surname, there is no such requirement for the continued use of a surname which a person has already been using since childhood. Case digested by: Angela N. Honor

146

SISON v. REPUBLIC G.R. No. L-58087 December 27, 1982

Doctrine: The proceedings were not summary, considering the publication of the petition made by order of the court in order to give notice to any person that might be interested, including direct service on the Solicitor General himself.


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Facts: This Petition for Review on certiorari seeks the reversal of the Decision of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch XXIV, dismissing an Amended Petition (Sp. Procs Case No. 8934) for correction of surname in records of birth. Antonio eloped and married Gloria Ibarra, he used the surname "de la Cruz" in the Marriage Contract. The couple begot two children, herein petitioner. Their births were recorded under the family name "de la Cruz". However, when they were baptized their surnames were stated to be "Sison". They became known to relatives and friends by such names. Their mother Gloria, now works as a nurse in Detroit, Michigan, U.S.A. It appears that when the minors were to go to the States to join their mother it was discovered during the processing of their travel papers, that their surname in their birth registry was "de la Cruz". Antonio, the petitioner’s late father was one of the two children of Gertrudes Reyes with her first husband Aurelio Sison, whom she married in 1931. Antonio was born on May 10, 1935. Gertrudes was married thrice. She married her second husband Laurencio de la Cruz in 1942. Her third husband is now Jose Delgado On February 6, 1979, petitioners, assisted by their grandmother, Gertrudes Reyes, as they were minors, submitted an Amended Petition to respondent Court for correction of their surnames from "de la Cruz", as entered in their respective Birth Certificates, to "Sison". The Trial Court issued an Order setting the case for hearing. Copy of this Order was served on the Civil Registrar and

on the Solicitor General. However, the state, through the Solicitor General, filed an Opposition alleging that the corrections requested were substantial or controversial in nature and that the summary procedure for correction of entry in the Civil Registry under Art. 412 of the Civil Code in relation to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is confined to mere clerical errors or harmless or innocuous changes. Trial Court denied the Petition on the grounds raised in the Government's opposition. Petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration was similarly denied. Hence, the instant recourse Issue: W/N The trial court erred in denying herein petition because the corrections requested were substantial or controversial in nature and that the summary procedure for correction of entry in the Civil Registry under Art. 412 of the Civil Code in relation to Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is confined to mere clerical errors or harmless or innocuous changes. Ruling: The court ruled in the negative. Petitioners have proved that their correct surname is "Sison". It was error for their father, Antonio, to have entered "de la Cruz" as his surname in his marriage contract and in the Birth Certificates of his children, for, at the time of Antonio's birth on May 10, 1935, his mother was then the wife of Aurelio Sison, whom she had married in 1931. Antonio's father was Aurelio Sison. Although at the time of his marriage in 1962, Antonio's mother was then the wife of Laurencio de la Cruz, whom she married in 1942, our laws do not authorize legitimate children to adopt the


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SpecPro Final Case Compilation

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