Sombong v CA G.R. No. 111876. January 31, 1996
Facts: Petitioner was the mother of Arabella O. Sombong who was born on April 23, 1987 in Taguig, Metro Manila. Sometime in November, 1987, Arabella, then only six months old, was brought to the Sir John Clinic, owned by Ty located at Caloocan City, for treatment. Petitioner did not have enough money to pay the hospital bill in the balance of P300.00. Arabella could not be discharged as a result. Petitioner said that she paid 1,700 for the release even if the bill was only 300. The spouses Ty, who had custody of the daughter, would not give Arabella to her. Petitioner filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus against the spouses Ty. She alleged that Arabella was being unlawfully detained and imprisoned at the Ty residence. The petition was denied due course and summarily dismissed, without prejudice, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction given that the detention was in Caloocan. Ty claimed that Arabella was with them for some time, but given to someone who claimed to be their guardian. The Office of the City Prosecutor of Caloocan City, on the basis of petitioner’s complaint, filed an information against the spouses Ty for Kidnapping and Illegal Detention of a Minor before the Regional Trial Court of Caloocan City. Ty then revealed that the child may be found in Quezon City. When Sombong reached the residence, a small girl named Christina Grace Neri was found. Sombong claimed the child to be hers even if she wasn’t entirely sure that it was Arabella. On October 13, 1992, petitioner filed a petition for the issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus with the Regional Trial Court. The court ruled in Sombong’s favor and ordered the respondents to deliver the child. The Appellate Court took cognizance of the following issues raised by respondent: (1) The propriety of the habeas corpus proceeding vis-a-vis the problem respecting the identity of the child subject of said proceeding; (2) If indeed petitioner be the mother of the child in question, what the effect would proof of abandonment be under the circumstances of the case; and (3) Will the question of the child’s welfare be the paramount consideration in this case which involves child custody. The TC decision was reversed. Hence, this petition.
Issue: Is habeas corpus the proper remedy for taking back Arabella?
Held: Yes but requisites not met. Petition dismissed.
Ratio: In general, the purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to determine whether or not a particular person is legally held. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus, in fact, is an actual and effective, and not merely nominal or moral, illegal restraint of liberty. “The writ of habeas corpus was devised and exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint, and as the best and only sufficient defense of personal freedom. A prime specification of an application for a writ of habeas corpus is restraint of liberty. The essential object and purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to inquire into all manner of involuntary restraint as distinguished from voluntary, and to relieve a person therefrom if such restraint is illegal. Any restraint which will preclude freedom of action is sufficient. To justify the grant of the writ of habeas corpus, the restraint of liberty must be in the nature of an illegal and involuntary deprivation of freedom of action. This is the basic requisite under the first part of Section 1, Rule 102, of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides that “except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty.” In the second part of the same provision, however, Habeas Corpus may be resorted to in cases where “the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.” Thus, although the Writ of Habeas Corpus ought not to be issued if the restraint is voluntary, we have held time and again that the said writ is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor child even if the latter be in the custody of a third person of her own free will. It may even be said that in custody cases involving minors, the question of illegal and involuntary restraint of liberty is not the underlying rationale for the availability of the writ as a remedy; rather, the writ of habeas corpus is prosecuted for the purpose of determining the right of custody over a child. The foregoing principles considered, the grant of the writ in the instant case will all depend on the concurrence of the following requisites: (1) that the petitioner has the right of custody over the minor; (2) that the rightful custody of the minor is being withheld from the petitioner by the respondent; and (3) that it is to the best interest of the minor concerned to be in the custody of petitioner and not that of the respondent. 1. The evidence adduced before the trial court does not warrant the conclusion that Arabella is the same person as Cristina. It will be remembered that, in habeas corpus proceedings, the question of identity is relevant and material, subject to the usual presumptions including those as to identity of person. The ponente noticed that there was no show of emotion on the mother when she met her lost daughter. Evidence must necessarily be adduced to prove that two persons, initially thought of to be distinct and separate from each other, are indeed one and the same. The process is both logical and analytical. In the instant case, the testimonial and circumstantial proof establishes the individual and separate existence of petitioner’s child, Arabella, from that of private respondents’ foster child, Cristina. According to one witness, there were several babies left in the clinic and it wasn’t certain if Arabella was given to the petitioner.
2. Petitioner has not been established by evidence to be entitled to the custody of the minor Cristina on account of mistaken identity, it cannot be said that private respondents are unlawfully withholding from petitioner the rightful custody over Cristina. Moreover, the way the respondents obtained custody isn’t material to the habeas corpus issue. 3. Private respondents are financially, physically and spiritually in a better position to take care of the child, Cristina. They have the best interest of Cristina at heart. On the other hand, it is not to the best interest of the minor, Cristina, to be placed in the custody of petitioner due to her lack of a stable job and her separation from a married man.
Velasco v. CA July 7, 1995 FACTS: a warrant of arrest was issued, against accused Lawrence Larkins in for violations of B.P. Blg. 22.a certain Desiree Alinea executed and filed before the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) a complaint-affidavit accusing Larkins of the crime of rape allegedly committed against her .Acting on the basis of the complaint of Alinea, petitioners Special Investigators proceeded to the office of Larkins in Makati, Metro Manila, arrested the latter, who was thereupon positively identified by Alinea as her rapist. Larkins was then detained at the Detention Cell of the NBI, Taft Avenue, Manila. On 22 November 1994, Larkins posted his bail of P4,000.00 in Criminal Cases Nos. 101189-92. Judge Padolina forthwith issued an order recalling and setting aside the warrant of arrest issued and directing the Jail Warden of the NBI Detention Cell to release Larkins from confinement "unless otherwise detained for some other cause. "Special Investigators Resurreccion and Erum refused to release Larkins because he was still detained for another cause, specifically for the crime of rape for which he would be held for inquest. A complaint against Larkins for rape was executed by Alinea. Larkins, through his, filed an Urgent Motion for Bail wherein he alleged, inter alia, that the evidence of guilt against him for rape is not strong, as he had no carnal knowledge of the complainant and the medical report indicates that her hymen was neither lacerated nor ruptured; that he is entitled as a matter of right to bail; and that he has no intention of going out of the country or hiding away from the law. Larkins, through his new counsel, filed in an Urgent Omnibus Motion for the Dismissal of the Complaint and for Immediate Release, principally based on the alleged illegality of his warrantless arrest. Court of Appeals issued a resolution Ordering the respondents therein to appear and produce Lawrence A. Larkins before the court on. And to show cause why Larkins' liberty is being restrained. The petitioners insist that the respondent court erred in granting the petition for habeas corpus because Larkins had already been charged with the crime of rape and the trial court had denied his application for bail. They further claim that the warrantless arrest in this case is valid for it was made under Section 5(b), Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Even if the arrest of a person is illegal, supervening events may bar his release or discharge from custody. What is to be inquired into is the legality of his detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for a writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application. Among such supervening events is the issuance of a judicial process preventing the discharge of the detained person? It may also be said that by filing his motion for bail,
Larkins admitted that he was under the custody of the court and voluntarily submitted his person to its jurisdiction. In De Asis vs Romero This Court stated: DE Asis could have, right after his arrest, objected to the regularity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest in question. Instead he not only filed a petition for bail with the lower court, thereby accepting the court's jurisdiction over his person, but he also pleaded, on arraignment, to the information filed against him. (Emphasis supplied)The filing of a petition or motion for bail in cases where no bail is recommended has the same legal import and effect as the posting of bail in cases where bail is recommended. It is settled that the giving or posting of bail by the accused is tantamount to submission of his person to the jurisdiction of the court. While it may be true that on 6 December 1994, or four days after the filing of the Urgent Motion for Bail, Larkins, thru a new counsel, filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion for Dismissal of the Complaint and for Immediate Release based on the alleged illegality of his warrantless arrest, the said motion was a mere afterthought which came too late in the day. By then, the trial court had firmly acquired jurisdiction over his person. The instant petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby SET ASIDE and ANNULLED.
NURHIDA JUHURI AMPATUAN vs. JUDGE VIRGILIO V. MACARAIG G.R. No. 182497, 29 June 2010
FACTS: Atty. Alioden D. Dalaig, Head of the COMELEC Legal Department, was killed at the corner of M. H. Del Pilar and Pedro Gil Streets, Ermita, Manila. Investigation conducted by the Manila Police District Homicide Section yielded the identity of the male perpetrator as PO1 Ampatuan. Consequently, PO1 Ampatuan was commanded to the MPD District Director for proper disposition. Likewise, inquest proceedings were conducted by the Manila Prosecutor’s Office.
On 18 April 2008, Police Senior Superintendent Guinto, rendered his Pre-Charge Evaluation Report against PO1 Ampatuan, finding probable cause to charge PO1 Ampatuan with Grave Misconduct (Murder) and recommending that said PO1 Ampatuan be subjected to summary hearing.
Meanwhile, on 21 April 2008, the City Prosecutor of Manila recommended that the case against PO1 Ampatuan be set for further investigation and that the latter be released from custody unless he is being held for other charges/legal grounds.
Armed with the 21 April 2008 recommendation of the Manila City’s Prosecution Office, petitioner, who is the wife of PO1 Ampatuan, filed a Petition for the Issuance of a Writ of Habeas Corpus before the RTC of Manila on 22 April 2008.
On 24 April 2008, RTC ordered the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus commanding therein respondents to produce the body of PO1 Ampatuan and directing said respondents to show cause why they are withholding or restraining the liberty of PO1 Ampatuan.
Seeking the reversal of RTC, the respondents averred that the filing of the administrative case against PO1 Ampatuan is a process done by the PNP and this Court has no authority to order the release of the subject police officer. The petitioner countered that the letter resignation of PO1 Ampatuan has rendered the administrative case moot and academic. Respondent however stressed that the resignation has not been acted by the appropriate police officials of the PNP, and that the administrative case was filed while PO1 Ampatuan is still in the active status of the PNP. The RTC reversed and dismissed the petition.
ISSUE: THE RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE ARREST AND DETENTION OF PO1 BASSER B. AMPATUAN WAS MADE WITHOUT ANY WARRANT AND THEREFORE, ILLEGAL.
HELD: The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a person's detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application
In this case, PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under Restrictive Custody. Republic Act No. 6975 (also known as the Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990), as amended by Republic Act No. 8551 (also known as the Philippine National Police Reform and Reorganization Act of 1998), clearly provides that members of the police force are subject to the administrative disciplinary machinery of the PNP.
Given that PO1 Ampatuan has been placed under restrictive custody, such constitutes a valid argument for his continued detention. This Court has held that a restrictive custody and monitoring of movements or whereabouts of police officers under investigation by their superiors is not a form of illegal detention or restraint of liberty.
Restrictive custody is, at best, nominal restraint which is beyond the ambit of habeas corpus. It is neither actual nor effective restraint that would call for the grant of the remedy prayed for. It is a permissible precautionary measure to assure the PNP authorities that the police officers concerned are always accounted for.
In sum, petitioner is unable to discharge the burden of showing that she is entitled to the issuance of the writ prayed for in behalf of her husband, PO1 Ampatuan. The petition fails to show on its face that the latter is unlawfully deprived of his liberty guaranteed and enshrined in the Constitution.
Adonis vs Tesoro June 5, 2013
Facts: Alexander Adonis, a reporter, was convicted in Criminal Case No. 48679-2001 for libel by the RTC of Davao City Branch 17, and sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of five months and one day of arrest mayor maximum to four years six months and one day of prision correcional. Another case, Criminal Case No. 48719-2001 remain pending at the RTC. On January 25, 2008, the Supreme Court issued Administrative Circular No. 08-2008, which provided for the imposition of fine as an alternative penalty for libel. Alexander also became eligible for parole as of December 11, 2007, which order was received by the NBP Davao in May 2, 2008. In view of the issuance of Supreme Court Administrative Circular No, 08-2008, Alexander filed a Motion to Reopen Case with the RTC Branch 17 praying for his immediate release and modification of his penalty to payment of fine in accordance with the circular. The trial court granted his motion and he was allowed to post bail in the amount of P5, 000.00. The trial court also issued an Order of Release, which was served to the respondent, but the latter did not act on it, hence, he filed a petition for issuance of the writ of habeas corpus before the Supreme Court, praying that he be immediately released, and that the Supreme Court apply its Administrative Circular 08-2008 in his favor. By letter of February 11, 2009, the respondent informed the Court that Alexander had been released from confinement after acceptance of the condition of his parole.
Issue: WON Adonis is entitled to the writ of habeas corpus – NO
Held: The petition is without merit. The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from unlawful restraint. The writ exists as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint and as an effective defense of personal freedom. It is issued only for the lone purpose of obtaining relief for those illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient legal basis. It is not issued when the person is in custody because of a judicial process or a valid judgment. Section 4, Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court provides when a writ must not be allowed or discharge authorized, to wit: SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. – If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment. In the instant case, Adonis was convicted for libel by the RTC Branch 17, in Criminal Case No. 48679-2001. Since his detention was by virtue of a final judgment, he is not entitled to the Writ of Habeas Corpus. He was serving his sentence when the BPP granted him parole, along with six (6) others, on December 11, 2007. While it is true that a convict may be released from prison on parole when he had served the minimum period of his sentence; the pendency of another criminal case, however, is a ground for the disqualification of such convict from being released on parole. Notably, at the time he was granted the parole, the second libel case was pending before the RTC Branch 14. In fact, even when the instant petition was filed, Criminal Case No. 48719-01 was still pending. The issuance of the writ under such circumstance was, therefore, proscribed. There was basis for the respondent to deny his immediate release at that time. Further, Adonis seeks the retroactive application of Administrative Circular No. 08-2008, citing Fermin v. People, where the Court preferred the imposition of the fine rather than imprisonment under the circumstances of the case. Administrative Circular No. 08-2008, was issued on January 25, 2008 and provides the “guidelines in the observance of a rule of preference in the imposition of penalties in libel cases.” The pertinent portions read as follows: All courts and judges concerned should henceforth take note of the foregoing rule of preference set by the Supreme Court on the matter of the imposition of penalties for the crime of libel bearing in mind the following principles: 1. This Administrative Circular does not remove imprisonment as an alternative penalty for the crime libel under Article 355 of the Revised Penal Code; 2. The Judges concerned may, in the exercise of sound discretion, and taking into consideration the peculiar circumstances of each case, determine whether the imposition of a fine alone would best serve the interests of justice or whether forbearing to impose imprisonment would depreciate the seriousness of the offense, work violence on the social order, or otherwise be contrary to the imperative of justice;
3. Should only a fine be imposed and the accused be unable to pay the fine, there is no legal obstacle to the application of the Revised Penal Code provision on subsidiary imprisonment. (Emphasis ours) A clear reading of the Administrative Circular No. 08-2008 and considering the attendant circumstances of the case, the benefits of the administrative circular cannot be given retroactive effect in Criminal Case No. 48679-2001. It is too late in the day for Adonis to raise such argument considering that Criminal Case No. 48679-2001 has already become final and executory; and he had, in fact, already commenced serving his sentence. Eventually, he was released from confinement on December 23, 2008 after accepting the conditions of the parole granted to him. Petition dismissed.
Chavez v.CA August 19, 1968
Facts: Judgment of conviction was for qualified theft of a motor vehicle (thunderbird car together with accessories). An information was filed against the accused together with other accused that they conspired, with intent to gain and abuse of confidence without the consent of owner Dy Lim, took the vehicle. All the accused plead not guilty. During the trial, the fiscal grecia (prosecution) asked roger Chavez to be the first witness. Counsel of the accused opposed. Fiscal Grecia contends that the accused (Chavez) will only be an ordinary witness not a state witness. Counsel of accused answer that it will only incriminate his client. But the judge ruled in favor of the fiscal. Petitioner was convicted.
ISSUE: Whether or not constitutional right of Chavez against self – incrimination had been violated – to warrant writ of HC?
HELD: YES. Petitioner was forced to testify to incriminate himself, in full breach of his constitutional right to remain silent. It cannot be said now that he has waived his right. He did not volunteer to take the stand and in his own defense; he did not offer himself as a witness; Juxtaposed with the circumstances of the case heretofore adverted to, make waiver a shaky defense. It cannot stand. If, by his own admission, defendant proved his guilt, still, his original claim remains valid. For the privilege, we say again, is a rampart that gives protection – even to the guilty
Habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ. It is traditionally considered as an exceptional remedy to release a person whose liberty is illegally restrained such as when the accused’s constitutional rights are disregarded. Such defect results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction and therefore invalidates the trial and the consequent conviction of the accused whose fundamental right was violated. That void judgment of conviction may be challenged by collateral attack, which precisely is the function of habeas corpus. This writ may issue even if another remedy which is less effective may be availed of by the defendant. Thus, failure by the accused to perfect his appeal before the Court of Appeals does not preclude a recourse to the writ. The writ may be granted upon a judgment already final. For, as explained in Johnson vs. Zerbst, the writ of habeas corpus as an extraordinary remedy must be liberally given effect so as to protect well a person whose liberty is at stake. The propriety of the writ was given the nod in that case, involving a violation of another constitutional right, in this wise:
A court’s jurisdiction at the beginning of trial may be lost “in the course of the proceedings” due to failure to complete the court — as the Sixth Amendment requires — by providing Counsel for an accused who is unable to obtain Counsel, who has not intelligently waived this constitutional guaranty, and whose life or liberty is at stake. If this requirement of the Sixth Amendment is not complied with, the court no longer has jurisdiction to proceed. The judgment of conviction pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, and one imprisoned thereunder may obtain release of habeas corpus. Under our own Rules of Court, to grant the remedy to the accused Roger Chavez whose case presents a clear picture of disregard of a constitutional right is absolutely proper. Section 1 of Rule 102 extends the writ, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, “to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.
Enrile v. Salazar June 5, 1990
FACTS: In February 1990, Senator Juan Ponce Enrile was arrested for the crime of rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder. The warrant of arrest was issued by Judge Jaime Salazar. Said crime arose from the failed coup attempts against then president Corazon Aquino. There was no bail set for Enrile due to the seriousness of the crime charged against him. Enrile was then brought to Camp Karingal. Enrile later filed a petition for habeas corpus questioning his detention and alleging that the crime being charged against him is nonexistent. He insists that there is no such crime as rebellion with murder and multiple frustrated murder. Enrile invoked the ruling in the landmark case of People vs Hernandez where it was ruled that rebellion cannot
be complexed with common crimes such as murder; as such, the proper crime that should have been charged against him is simple rebellion – which is bailable.
Enrile also questioned the regularity of the issuance of the warrant of arrest against him. He claimed that it only took Judge Salazar one hour and twenty minutes (from the raffling of the case to him) to issue the warrant. Enrile claimed that such period is so short that it was impossible for the judge to have been able to examine the voluminous record of the case from the prosecution’s office – that being, the constitutional provision that a judge may only issue a warrant of arrest after personally determining the existence of probable cause has not been complied with.
For the prosecution, the Solicitor General argued that the Hernandez ruling should be abandoned and that it should be ruled that rebellion cannot absorb more serious crimes like murder.
ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the Hernandez ruling should be abandoned. 2. Whether or not Judge Salazar personally determined probable cause in the case at bar.
HELD: 1. No, The said case is still good law. The Supreme Court also noted that there was actually a previous law (P.D. 942) which sought to abandon the Hernandez doctrine. The said law provided that graver crimes may not be complexed with rebellion. However, President Corazon Aquino repealed said law (by virtue of the power granted to her by the 1986 Freedom Constitution). That being, the Hernandez doctrine, which reflects the rebellion law under the Revised Penal Code, still stands. The courts cannot change this because courts can only interpret laws. Only Congress can change the rebellion law (which the SC suggested in order to strengthen the rebellion law). But as it stands, Enrile is correct, there is no such crime as rebellion with murder. Common crimes such as murder are absorbed. He can only be charged with rebellion – which is bailable.
2. Yes. There is nothing irregular on the fact that Judge Salazar only took an hour and twenty minutes to issue the warrant from the time the case was raffled to him despite the fact that the prosecution transmitted quite a voluminous record from the preliminary investigation it conducted. It is sufficient that the judge follows established procedure by personally evaluating the report and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor. Just because Judge Salazar had what some might consider only a relatively brief period within which to comply with that duty, gives no reason to assume that he had not, or could not have, so complied; nor does that single circumstance suffice to overcome the legal presumption that official duty has been regularly performed.
Sotto v. Director of Prisons May 30, 1962
Facts:
Together with Rocindo Brillantes, Eligio Iturralde and Alfredo Valencia, petitioner Eduardo Sotto was convicted upon a plea of guilty, by the CFI of Zamboanga, for the crime of robbery, and sentenced to serve an imprisonment of from 12 years and 1 day to 18 years, 2 months and 21 days of reclusion temporal; to return the articles robbed or pay the corresponding value of P465.60 to the offended party Leona Kuan Tan, with the accessories of the law and to pay 1/4 of the costs (CFI—Crim. Case No. 1873, Zamboanga City). He started serving his sentence on December 17, 1953, and up to the date of his petition for habeas corpus, filed on December 8, 1958, he has already served an aggregate term of 4 years, 11 months and 21 days, excluding good conduct time allowance, earned under article 97 of the Revised Penal Code. He alleged in his petition that the penalty imposed is excessive and not in accordance with law, as the proper penalty imposable, for the offense charged in the information should be that of Article 302, and not article 299 of the Revised Penal Code; that at the time of conviction, petitioner was a minor, 16 years old, and as such he was entitled to a penalty next lower than the one prescribed for the crime committed, to wit, arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, or from 4 months and 1 day to 2 years and 4 months, and that having served sentence for a period of 4 years, 11 months and 21 days, he should already be ordered released from custody and control of the Respondent Director of Prisons or his representative and that he has no other adequate, legal and speedy remedy in law except the present proceeding. He, therefore, prayed that the respondent be ordered to release him. Respondent, answering, alleged in his special defense that admitting, but not granting that the sentence is not in accordance with law, the petition for habeas corpus, is not the proper remedy.
Issue: WON Habeas Corpus is the proper remedy
Held: 1. HABEAS CORPUS; NOT TO BE MADE TO PERFORM FUNCTION OF WRIT OF ERROR. — When a court has jurisdiction of the offense charged and the person of the accused, its judgment, order or decree is valid and is not subject to collateral attack by Habeas Corpus, for this cannot be made to perform the function of a writ of error, and this holds true even if the judgment, order or decree was erroneous (Vda. de Talavera v. Supt. etc. 67 Phil., 538; Cruz v. Martin, Et Al., 75 Phil., 11) The trial court issued an Order the dispositive portion of which runs —
"The petitioner is seeking relief from that error. This Court believes that the trial Judge—Hon. Pablo Villalobos who imposed the sentence in criminal case No. 1873, was right; and therefore, this case of habeas corpus will not lie and same is here denied" ‘.
Petitioner appealed, assigning as error of the trial court in not holding that the penalty imposed upon the accused was excessive and contrary to law. Considering that the issues involved are purely of law, the Court of Appeals certified the case to Us for determination. The Solicitor General has not filed any brief.
At the bottom of the petition, the petitioner desires to revise errors of law or fact, if ever there were such errors, which the trial court had supposedly incurred in the criminal case aforementioned. It is already a settled rule that when a court has jurisdiction of the offense
charged and the person of the accused, its judgment, order or decree is valid and is not subject to collateral attack by habeas corpus, for this cannot be made to perform the function of a writ of error, and this holds true even if the judgment, order or decree was erroneous (Vda. de Talavera v. Supt. etc. 67 Phil. 538; Cruz v. Martin. Et. Al., 75 Phil. 11). In a recent case, (Cuenca v. Superintendent, etc. L-17400, Dec. 30, 1961), this Court said —
". . . This Court has repeatedly held that a writ of habeas corpus is not a writ of error, or a writ for the purpose of review (Felipe v. Director of Prisons, 27 Phil. 378; Pomeroy v. Director of Prisons, G.R. Nos. L-14284-14285, prom. Feb. 24, 1960. 1 In the Pomeroy case, we stated that —
‘With reference to persons in custody pursuant to a final judgment, the rule is that the writ of habeas corpus can issue only for want of jurisdiction of the sentencing court, and cannot function as a writ of error. Hence, the writ will not lie to correct mere mistake of fact or of law which do not nullify the proceedings taken by a court in the exercise of its functions, if the court has jurisdiction over the crime and over the person of the defendant.’ . . . The second error, on the other hand, attacks the Municipal Court’s appreciation of the number of appellant’s previous convictions for theft."
Again, this is merely an error of judgment by said court, which did not in any way affect its jurisdiction, or could nullify its proceedings, but was correctible only by a seasonal appeal.
In the Felipe case, supra, we pointed out: ‘But the writ of habeas corpus is not a remedy provided for the correction of such errors. Courts cannot, in habeas corpus proceedings, review the record in a criminal case after a judgment of conviction has been rendered, and the defendants have entered on the execution of the sentence imposed, to ascertain whether the facts found by the trial court were in accordance with the evidence disclosed by the record, or in order to pass upon the correctness of the conclusions of law by the trial court based on the facts thus found. Under the statute, a commitment in due form based on a final judgment convicting and sentencing a defendant in a criminal case is conclusive of the legality of his detention under such commitment, unless it appears that the court exceeded its jurisdiction in imposing the penalty. Mere errors of law or of fact, which did not have the effect of depriving the trial court of its jurisdiction over the cause and the person of the defendant, if corrected at all, must be corrected on appeal in the form and manner prescribed by law."
In the case at bar, the trial court undoubtedly had jurisdiction over the cause, over the person of the accused, and to impose the penalty provided for by law. What is here questioned is only the correctness of the exercise of that jurisdiction. The mistake committed by the trial court, if any, refers to the appreciation of the facts and/or in the appreciation of the law, which, in the light of the authorities heretofore cited, cannot be corrected by habeas corpus.
The writ is denied, and the decision appealed from is affirmed. No costs.
Matter of Habeas Corpus of Kunting April 19, 2006
Facts: This is a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus directing Police Chief Superintendent Ismael R. Rafanan and General Robert Delfin, Philippine National Police (PNP) Intelligence Chief, to bring petitioner Ashraf Kunting before this Court and show cause why he is illegally detained. On October 19, 2001, petitioner Kunting was arrested in Malaysia for violation of the Malaysian Internal Security Act. On June 12, 2003, the Royal Malaysian Police in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, turned over Kunting to the PNP-IG and Task Force Salinglahi pursuant to warrants for his arrest issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Isabela City. Kunting was charged with four counts of Kidnapping for Ransom and Serious Illegal Detention with the RTC. Petitioner was immediately flown to the Philippines and brought to the PNP-IG at Camp Crame for booking and custodial investigation. In a letter dated July 3, 2003, the Police Superintendent and Chief of the Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, informed the Branch Clerk of Court of the RTC that Kunting was already in the custody of the PNPIG. Atty. Danipog requested for Kunting’s temporary detention at the PNP -IG, Camp Crame, Quezon City due to the high security risks involved and prayed for the issuance of a corresponding commitment order. On September 15, 2003, the RTC issued an Order directing the Police Superintendent and Chief, Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, to immediately turn over Kunting to the trial court since Kunting filed an Urgent Motion for Reinvestigation.
On November 5, 2003, PNP-IG Director wrote a letter to Chief State Prosecutor requesting for representation and a motion to be filed for the transfer of the venue of the trial from Isabela City, Basilan to Pasig City, for the following reasons: (1) Several intelligence reports have been received by the PNP-IG stating that utmost effort will be exerted by the Abu Sayyaf Group (ASG) to recover the custody of Kunting from the PNP considering his importance to the ASG; and (2) There is a big possibility that Kunting may be recovered by the ASG if he will be detained in Basilan due to inadequate security facility in the municipal jail and its proximity to the area of operation of the ASG.
On August 13, 2004, the RTC rendered a decision against petitioner’s co-accused. On February 11, 2005, the RTC issued an Order denying Kunting’s Motion to Set Case for Preliminary Investigation since the PNP-IG has not turned over Kunting. The trial court reiterated its Order. In a letter dated February 22, 2005, Police Chief Superintendent reiterated the request to Chief State Prosecutor to facilitate the transfer of the venue of the trial of Kunting’s case. He added that if Kunting had been transferred to Isabela City, Basilan, he could have been one of the escapees in a jail break that occurred on April 10, 2004 as suspected ASG members were able to go scot-free. On March 15, 2005, Legal Affairs Division, PNP-IG, filed with the RTC a Motion to Defer Implementation of the Order dated February 11, 2005, citing, among other grounds, the existence of a pending motion for the transfer of the venue of the trial against Kunting, which was allegedly filed by the DOJ before this Court. Police Inspector Barbasa prayed that the Order
of the RTC, directing the turnover of Kunting to the court, be suspended until the motion for the transfer of venue is resolved. On March 14, 2005, Kunting, by counsel, filed this petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
Kunting stated that he has been restrained of his liberty since June 12, 2003 by the PNP-IG led by the Police Chief Superintendent and assisted by PNP Intelligence Chief. He alleged that he was never informed of the charges filed against him until he requested his family to research in Zamboanga City. It was discovered in the RTC of Isabela City, Basilan that his name appeared in the list of accused who allegedly participated in the kidnapping incident which occurred on June 2, 2001 in Lamitan, Basilan. Kunting asserted that he never participated in the kidnapping incident, so he promptly filed an Urgent Motion for Reinvestigation on September 8, 2003. He was aware that the PNP-I requested the Chief State Prosecutor for representation to file a motion with this Court for the transfer of venue of his case from Isabela City, Basilan to Pasig City. Having no further information on the status of his case, he filed a Motion to Set Case for Preliminary Investigation on January 26, 2005. He stated that since no action was taken by the trial court or the DOJ, he filed this petition to put an end to his illegal detention classified in the records as "for safekeeping purposes only."
ISSUE: The main issue is whether the petition for habeas corpus can prosper.
HELD: Under Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, the writ of habeas corpus extends to "all case of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto." The remedy of habeas corpus has one objective: to inquire into the cause of detention of a person, and if found illegal, the court orders the release of the detainee. If, however, the detention is proven lawful, then the habeas corpus proceedings terminate.
Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides when the writ is not allowed: SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment. In this case, Kunting’s detention by the PNP-IG was under process issued by the RTC. He was arrested by the PNP by virtue of the alias order of arrest issued by RTC Isabela City, Basilan. His temporary detention at PNP-IG, Camp Crame, Quezon City, was thus authorized by the trial court. Moreover, Kunting was charged with four counts of Kidnapping for Ransom and Serious Illegal Detention. In accordance with the last sentence of Section 4 above, the writ cannot be issued and Kunting cannot be discharged since he has been charged with a criminal offense.
Bernarte v. Court of Appeals holds that "once the person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his detention by a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus." WHEREFORE, the instant petition for habeas corpus is hereby DISMISSED.
Go Sr. v Ramos September 4, 2009
Facts: These petitions stemmed from the complaint-affidavit for deportation initiated by Luis T. Ramos before the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (now Bureau of Immigration) against Jimmy T. Go alleging that the latter is an illegal and undesirable alien. Luis alleged that while Jimmy represents himself as a Filipino citizen, Jimmy’s personal circumstances and other records indicate that he is not so. To prove his contention, Luis presented the birth certificate of Jimmy, issued by the Office of the Civil Registrar of Iloilo City, which indicated Jimmy’s citizenship as “Chinese.”
Luis argued that although it appears from Jimmy’s birth certificate that his parents, Carlos and Rosario Tan, are Filipinos, the document seems to be tampered, because only the citizenship of Carlos appears to be handwritten while all the other entries were typewritten. He also averred that in September 1989 or thereabout, Jimmy, through stealth, machination and scheming managed to cover up his true citizenship, and with the use of falsified documents and untruthful declarations, was able to procure a Philippine passport from the Department of Foreign Affairs. Jimmy refuted the allegations in his counter-affidavit, erring that the complaint for deportation initiated by Luis was merely a harassment case designed to oust him of his rightful share in their business dealings. Jimmy maintained that there is no truth to the allegation that he is an alien, and insisted that he is a natural-born Filipino. Jimmy alleged that his father Carlos, who was the son of a Chinese father and Filipina mother, elected Philippine citizenship in accordance with Commonwealth Act 625. In resolution dated Feb. 14 2001, Associate Comm. Linda L. Malinab Hornilla dismissed the complaint for deportation against Jimmy. On March 8 2001, The Board of Commissioner reversed the decision. Their contention is that Carlos election of citizenship was made out of time. The board issued a decision dated April 17 2002 for apprehension and deportation of Jimmy Go to China. Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in RTC but was denied by the said court. They questioned the said decision and filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of appeals. The petition was granted. Their motion for reconsideration was denied at Bureau of immigration.
Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether the petition for habeas corpus should be dismissed.
RULING: A petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is a special proceeding governed by Rule 102 of the Revised Rules of Court. The objective of the writ is to determine whether the confinement or detention is valid or lawful. If it is, the writ cannot be issued. What is to be inquired into is the legality of a person’s detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for the writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of some supervening events, such as the instances mentioned in Section 4 of Rule 102, be no longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application. Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his detention through a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus. His remedy would be to quash the information and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued. The writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after the party sought to be released had been charged before any court. The term “court” in this context includes quasi-judicial bodies of governmental agencies authorized to order the person’s confinement, like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration. Likewise, the cancellation of his bail cannot be assailed via a petition for habeas corpus. When an alien is detained by the Bureau of Immigration for deportation pursuant to an order of deportation by the Deportation Board, the Regional Trial Courts have no power to release such alien on bail even in habeas corpus proceedings because there is no law authorizing it.
Given that Jimmy has been duly charged before the Board, and in fact ordered arrested pending his deportation, coupled by this Court’s pronouncement that the Board was not ousted of its jurisdiction to continue with the deportation proceedings, the petition for habeas corpus is rendered moot and academic. This being so, we find it unnecessary to touch on the other arguments advanced by respondents regarding the same subject.
Kiani v. BID February 27, 2006
FACTS: This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari for the nullification of the decision CA, dismissing the appeal of Jeany-Vi G. Kiani, which assailed the Order of RTC, dismissing her Petition for Habeas Corpus. Kiani was arrested for violation of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940. A Summary Deportation Order revoking the visa issued to Kiani was then issued. The next day, Kiani’s wife filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus. The BIO officers contend that since Kiani has already been charged and ordered deported the petition had become moot and academic.
ISSUE: Will WHC be availing if the detainee is lawfully charged later?
HELD: No. As held in Caballes v. CA, habeas corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error; nor intended as substitute for the trial court’s function. It cannot take the place of appeal, certiorari or writ of error. The writ cannot be used to investigate and consider questions of error that might be raised relating to procedure or on the merits. The inquiry in a habeas corpus proceeding is addressed to the question of whether the proceedings and the assailed order are, for any reason, null and void. The writ is not ordinarily granted where the law provides for other remedies in the regular course, and in the absence of exceptional circumstances. Moreover, habeas corpus should not be granted in advance of trial. The orderly course of trial must be pursued and the usual remedies exhausted before resorting to the writ where exceptional circumstances are extant. In another case, it was held that habeas corpus cannot be issued as a writ of error or as a means of reviewing errors of law and irregularities not involving the questions of jurisdiction occurring during the course of the trial, subject to the caveat that constitutional safeguards of human life and liberty must be preserved, and not destroyed. It has also been held that where restraint is under legal process, mere errors and irregularities, which do not render the proceedings void, are not grounds for relief by habeas corpus because in such cases, the restraint is not illegal.
In this case, when petitioner filed her Petition for Habeas Corpus with the RTC in behalf of her husband, a Charge Sheet had already been filed against him. The filing of the Charge Sheet cured whatever irregularities or infirmities were attendant to his arrest.
Matter of Habeas Corpus of Eufemia Rodriguez January 29, 2008
FACTS: This is a petition for review1 of the resolutions February 2, 2005 and September 2, 2005 of the C.A.where the petition for habeas corpus was denied. The nephew of Eufemia E. Rodriguez was a 94-year old widow, allegedly suffering from a poor state of mental health and deteriorating cognitive abilities filed for habeas corpus after demanding the return of Eufemia from her adopted daughters. The C.A. ruled that petitioner failed to present any convincing proof that respondents (the legally adopted children of Eufemia) were unlawfully restraining their mother of her liberty. He also failed to establish his legal right to the custody of Eufemia as he was not her legal guardian. Thus, in a resolution dated February 2, 2005, the C.A. denied his petition. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but it was also denied.7 hence, this petition. Petitioner claims that, in determining whether or not a writ of habeas corpus should issue, a court should limit itself to determining whether or not a person is unlawfully being deprived of liberty and that there is no need to consider legal custody or custodial rights. Thus, a writ of habeas corpus can cover persons who are not under the legal custody of another. According to petitioner, as long as it is alleged that a person is being illegally deprived of liberty, the writ of habeas corpus may issue so that his physical body may be brought before the court that will determine whether or not there is in fact an unlawful deprivation of liberty. However, respondents state that they are the legally adopted daughters of Eufemia and her deceased spouse, Maximo Rodriguez. Respondents point out that it was petitioner and his family who were staying with Eufemia, not the other way around as petitioner claimed. Eufemia paid for the rent of the house, the utilities and other household needs. Sometime in the 1980s, petitioner EDGARDO E. VELUZ was appointed as administrator of the properties of Eufemia and her deceased spouse. By this appointment, he took charge of collecting payments from tenants and transacted business with third persons for and in behalf of
Eufemia and the respondents who were the only compulsory heirs of the late Maximo. Eufemia and the respondents demanded an inventory and return of the properties entrusted to petitioner. His failure to heed gave rise to a complaint of estafa. Consequently, and by reason of their mother’s deteriorating health, respondents decided to take custody of Eufemia on January 11, 2005. She willingly went with them. Petitioner failed to prove either his right to the custody of Eufemia or the illegality of respondents’ action.
ISSUE: Whether or not habeas corpus should be granted. RULING: Petition Denied. – Application: The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty or by which the rightful custody of a person is being withheld from the one entitled thereto. It is issued when one is either deprived of liberty or is wrongfully being prevented from exercising legal custody over another person. Thus, it contemplates two instances: (1) deprivation of a person’s liberty either through illegal confinement or through detention and (2) withholding of the custody of any person from someone entitled to such custody. According to the S.C., if the respondents are not detaining or restraining the applicant or the person in whose behalf the petition is filed, the petition should be dismissed In this case, the C.A. made an inquiry into whether Eufemia was being restrained of her liberty. It found that she was not. Petition was DENIED.
Andal v People May 26, 1999
Facts: Petitioners convicted of rape with homicide seek a writ of habeas corpus on the basis of a claim of mistrial and/or that the decision if the RTC was void. The petitioners argue that the trial court was ousted of jurisdiction to try their case since the pre-trial identification of the accused was made without the assistance of counsel and without a valid waiver from the accused.
Issue: WON a writ of habeas corpus should be granted.
Held: No. The extraordinary writ of habeas corpus is the appropriate remedy to inquire into questions of violation of the petitioners’ constitutional rights and that this court has jurisdiction to entertain this review. The jurisdiction of this court has been expanded to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.
Rule 102, Sec. 1. To what habeas corpus extends. - Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by
which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.
He may also avail himself of the writ where as a consequence of a judicial proceeding (a) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; (b) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (c) an excessive penalty has been imposed, as such sentence is void as to such excess.
In this case findings show that there was no violation of the constitutional rights of the accused and a resultant deprivation of liberty or due process of law. The accused were sentenced to the supreme penalty of death as a result of a valid jurisdiction, after a fair and equitable trial.
Salientes v Abanilla August 29, 2006
Facts: Loran Abanilla and Marie Salientes are the parents of the minor, Lorenzo. They loved with Marie's parents. Due to in-law problems, Abanilla suggested to his wife that they transfer to their own house, but Salientes refused. Abanilla left the house, and was thereafter prevented from seeing his son. Abanilla, in his personal capacity and as a representative of his son, filed a petition for habeas corpus and custody before the RTC of Muntinlupa City. The trial court ordered the Salienteses to produce and bring before the court the body of Lorenzo, and to show cause why the child should not be discharged from restraint. • Salienteses filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, but it was dismissed. CA stated that the order of the trial court did not award custody but was simply a standard order issued for the production of restrained persons. The trial court was still about to conduct a full inquiry. A subsequent MR was likewise denied. • Salienteses filed the current appeal by certiorari.
Issue: 1. Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari against the trial court's order 2. Whether the remedy of the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus is available to the father
Ruling: 1. The CA rightfully dismissed the petition for certiorari • Salientes: o the order is contrary to the Family Code which provides that no child under seven years of age shall be separated from the mother
unless the court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise o even assuming that there were compelling reasons, the proper remedy for private respondent was simply an action for custody, but not habeas corpus. Petitioners assert that habeas corpus is unavailable against the mother who, under the law, has the right of custody of the minor. They insist there was no illegal or involuntary restraint of the minor by his own mother. There was no need for the mother to show cause and explain the custody of her very own child. Abanilla: o the writ of habeas corpus is available against any person who restrains the minor’s right to see his father and vice versa. He avers that the instant petition is merely filed for delay, for had petitioners really intended to bring the child before the court in accordance with the new rules on custody of minors o under the law, he and petitioner Marie Antonette have shared custody and parental authority over their son. He alleges that at times when petitioner Marie Antonette is out of the country as required of her job as an international flight stewardess, he, the father, should have custody of their son and not the maternal grandparents. The CA was correct in holding that the order of the trial court did not grant custody of the minor to any of the parties but merely directed petitioners to produce the minor in court and explain why they are restraining his liberty. The assailed order was an interlocutory order precedent to the trial court’s full inquiry into the issue of custody, which was still pending before it. an interlocutory order is not appealable but the aggrieved party may file an appropriate special action under Rule 65. The aggrieved party must show that the court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the interlocutory order. In the present case, it is incumbent upon petitioners to show that the trial court gravely abused its discretion in issuing the order. 2. Habeas corpus is available to the father • Habeas corpus may be resorted to in cases where rightful custody is withheld from a person entitled thereto. Under Article 211 of the Family Code, respondent Loran and petitioner Marie Antonette have joint parental authority over their son and consequently joint custody. Further, although the couple is separated de facto, the issue of custody has yet to be adjudicated by the court. In the absence of a judicial grant of custody to one parent, both parents are still entitled to the custody of their child. In the present case, private respondent’s cause of action is the deprivation of his right to see his child as alleged in his petition. Hence, the remedy of habeas corpus is available to him. But it is not a basis for preventing the father to see his own child. . Petitioners can raise it as a counter argument for private respondent’s petition for custody. Moreover. Article 213 of the Family Code deals with the judicial adjudication of custody and serves as a guideline for the proper award of custody by the court. Nothing in the said provision disallows a father from seeing or visiting his child under seven years of age.
Saulo v Cruz March 19, 1959
Facts: After successfully evading arrest since September, 1950, in connection with three criminal cases (Nos. 13681, 19166 and 39253, CFI, Manila) one for inciting to rebellion with murders, arsons, robberies and kidnappings, Alfredo B. Saulo, in whose behalf the present petition for a writ of habeas corpus has been presented, finally showed up at the Indonesian Embassy, Manila, on November 12, 1958, to seek refuge therein. As a result of negotiations had, the Indonesian Embassy surrendered him to the Philippine Government on November 18, 1958, since which date he has remained in the custody of the Philippine Constabulary at Camp Crame, Quezon City. One of the two criminal cases for rebellion having been dismissed with respect to him on motion of the prosecution, Saulo put up bail in the two remaining cases (Nos. 13681 and 39253). When the corresponding order for his temporary release was served, the herein respondent Commanding General of the Philippine Constabulary commanded one of his subordinates to withhold the release of Saulo on account of Criminal Case No. 46410 the Court of First Instance of Manila. Said criminal case is a complaint against Saulo, filed on November 19, 1958, by the Fiscal of Manila, for alleged violation of Republic Act No. 1700, otherwise known as the Anti-Subversion Act, punishable by prision mayor to death, so that the said Court of First Instance might conduct
the corresponding preliminary investigation, as provided in the Act. While said preliminary investigation was still going on, that is, on December 23, 1958, petitioner applied for a writ of habeas corpus with the Supreme Court, as already stated, on the ground that his detention, without warrant of arrest, by reason of the pendency of the aforesaid Criminal Case No. 46410, is illegal and void. Said court gave due course to the application and directed the respondent Commanding General of the Philippine Constabulary to file answer, returnable to the Court of First Instance of Manila. Respondent filed answer, as directed, admitting practically all the facts above related and alleged in the application, with the plea that "the pendency of Criminal Case No. 46410 for violation of Republic Act No. 1700 filed before the Court of First Instance of Manila is sufficient reason for continuing the detention of the petitioner, in the absence of an order of the Court for his discharge under the case aforesaid."
Issue: Whether or not denial of the privilege of writ of habeas corpus is illegal and void.
Ruling: Petitioner’s appeal has been filed out of time. The records disclose that the notice of appeal was filed eleven (11) days after a copy of the lower court’s decision, denying the petition, was served upon petitioner’s counsel (on May 12, 1959 as per sheriff's return). As provided by Section 18, Rule 41 of the Rules of Court, petitioner should have perfected his appeal within twenty-four (24) hours from notice of judgment: Sec. 18. Appeal in habeas corpus cases, how taken. — An appeal in habeas corpus case shall be perfected by filing with the clerk of the court or the judge who rendered the judgment, within twenty-four (24) hours of notice of such judgment, a statement that the person making it appeals from the judgment rendered. The appeal is hereby dismissed.
