PROPERTY COMPILATION OF CASE DIGESTS
1. Faustino Ignacio vs Director of Lands GR No. L-12958 May 30, 1960 Facts: Ignacio applied for the registration of a parcel of a mangrove land in Rizal. It was stated in the application that he owned the parcelby right of accretion. The director of land opposed the registration for the reason that the land to be registered is an area of public domain and that the applicant nor his predecessor-in-interes possessed sufficient title for the land. The parcel of land appliedwas acquired from the government by the virtue of a free patent title. However, the land in question was formed by accretion and alluvial deposists caused by the action of the Manila bay. The petition was denied by the lower court and decided that the land to be registered are part of the public domain. Faustino, however, contended that the court could have declared the land not to be part of the public domain. Issue: Whether or not the courts have the power to reclassify a land Ruling: No, the courts do not have the power to reclassify a land. The courts are primarily called upon to determine whether a land is to be used for public purpose. However, it is only limited there. A formal declaration of reclassification of land should come from the government, specifically from the executive department or the legislature. These bodies should declare that a land in question is no longer needed for public use, some public use or for the improvement of national wealth.
2. Ancheta vs. Guersey-Dalaygon, GR No. 139868 June 8, 2006 Facts: 2 American citizens have resided in the Philippines. They have an adopted daughter. The wife died and left a will where she left her entire estate to her husband. 2 years after the wife's death, the husband married a Candelaria. 4 years after, Richard died and left a will where he left his entire estate to Candelaria except for some of his shares in a company which he left to his adopted daughter. Audrey‘s will was admitted to probate in CFI Rizal. Inventory was taken on their conjugal properties. Ancheta, as the administrator, filed for a partition of the first wife's estate. The will was also admitted in a court in her native land (Maryland). Issue: Whether or not the properties in issue should be governed by the law where the property is situated Ruling: Yes, properties in issue should be governed by the law where the property is situated. However, since the first wife is a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of her will is governed by her national law. The national law of the person who made the will shall regulate whose succession is in consideration whatever the nature of the property and regardless of the country
where the property maybe found (Art 16 CC). The first wife's properties may be found in the Philipppines, however the successional rights over those properties are governed by the national law of the testator.
3. City Government of Quezon vs. Judge Ericta GR No. L-34915 June 24, 1983 Facts: An ordinance was promulgated in Quezon city which approved the the regulation ofestablishment of private cemeteries in the said city. According to the ordinance, 6% of the total area of the private memorial park shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of QC. Himlayang Pilipino, a private memorial park, contends that the taking or confiscation of property restricts the use of property such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner of all beneficial use of his property. It also contends that the taking is not a valid exercise of police power, since the properties taken in the exercise of police power are destroyed and not for the benefit of the public. Issue: Whether or not the ordinance made by Quezon City is a valid taking of private property Ruling: No, the ordinance made by Quezon City is not a valid way of taking private property. The ordinace is actually a taking without compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaing a public cemeteries. State's exercise of the power of expropriation requires payment of just compensation. Passing the ordinance without benefiting the owner of the property with just compensation or due process, would amount to unjust taking of a real property. Since the property that is needed to be taken will be used for the public's benefit, then the power of the state to expropriate will come forward and not the police power of the state.
4. Spouses Custodio vs. CA, GR No. 116100 February 9, 1996 Facts: Mabasa owns a parcel of land with a 2 door apartment. The property is surrounded by other immovables. When Mabasa bought the land, there were tenants who were occupying the property. One of the tenants vacated the land. Mabasa saw that thhere had been built an adobe fence in the apartment in the first passageway that made it narrower. The fence was constructed by the Santoses. Morato constructed her fence and extended it to the entire passageway, therefore, the passageay was enclosed. The case was broguth to the trial court and ordered the custodios and the Santoses to give Mabasa a permanet ingress and eggress to the punlic street and asked Mabasa to pay Custodios and Santoses for damages. Issue: Whether or not Mabasa has the right to demand for a right of way Ruling:
Yes, Mabasa has the right to demand for a right of way. A person has a right to the natural use and enjoyment of his own property, according to his pleasure, for all the purposes to which such property is usually applied. As a general rule, therefore, there is no cause of action for acts done by one person upon his own property in a lawful and proper manner, although such acts incidentally cause damage or an unavoidable loss to another, as such damage or loss is damnum absque injuria. When the owner of property makes use thereof in the general and ordinary manner in which the property is used, such as fencing or enclosing the same as in this case, nobody can complain of having been injured, because the inconvenience arising from said use can be considered as a mere consequence of community life
5. German Management Services vs. CA, GR No. 76217 September 14, 1989 Facts: Spouses Jose are the owners of a parcel of land in Antipolo. They executed a special power of attorney authorizing German management Services to develop their property into a residential subdivision. However, the property was being occupied by private respondents and twenty other persons. They were asked to vacate but refused. PR filed an action for forcible entry and alleged that they are mountainside farmers of the area and have occupied and tilled their farmholdings prior to the promulgation of PD 27. They stated that they have been deprived of their property without due process of law by means of force, violence and intimidation. Issue: Whether or not petitioner forcibly entered the property of the PR ( I know this is RPC- but involved and prop) Ruling: Yes, the petitioner forcibly entered the property of the PR. In forcible entry, ownership is not an issue. It may be a fact that the German Management was duly authorised by the owners to develop the subject property, the actual possessors of the land, the Prs, can commence a forcible entry case against the petitioner. Forcible entry is merely a quieting process and never determines the actual title to an estate.
6. Lopez vs. Orosa and Plaza Theatre, 103 SCRA 98 FACTS: Orosa invited Lopez to invest with him in building a theatre. Lopez supplied lumber for the construction of the said theatre. The materials totaled 62k but Orosa was only able to pay 20k thus leaving a balance of almost 42k. Later on respondents acquired a bank loan of 30k, with Luzon Surety Company as their surety and the land and building were mortgaged as countersecurity. Petitioner sued to collect the unpaid amount for the materials and was able to get a judgment against the respondents making them jointly liable to pay the remaining amount. Also, he was able to obtain a materialman‘s lien on the building of the theatre. The stocks amounting to 42k shall be sold in public auction in case the respondents default. Petitioner wasn‘t happy
because he also wanted a lien on the land, urging that the judgment lien should include it since the building and the land are inseparable. ISSUE: Whether or not the building and the land are inseparable? HELD: No. The contention that the lien embraces both the land and the building or structure adhering thereto is without merit. While it is true that generally, real estate connotes the land and the building constructed thereon, it is obvious that the inclusion of the building, separate and distinct from the land, in the enumeration of what may constitute real properties (Article 415 of the new Civil Code) could mean only one thing — that a building is by itself an immovable property. Moreover, and in view of the absence of any specific provision of law to the contrary, a building is an immovable property, irrespective of whether or not said structure and the land on which it is adhered to belong to the same owner. 7. Associated Insurance and Surety Company vs. Iya, et al, 103 SCRA 972 FACTS: Spouses Valino were the owners of a house, payable on installments from Philippine Realty Corporation. To be able to purchase on credit rice from NARIC, they filed a surety bond subscribed by petitioner and therefor, they executed an alleged chattel mortgage on the house in favor of the surety company. The spouses didn‘t own yet the land on which the house was constructed on at the time of the undertaking. After being able to purchase the land, to be able to secure payment for indebtedness, the spouses executed a real estate mortgage in favor of Iya. The spouses were not able to satisfy obligation with NARIC, petitioner was compelled to pay. The spouses weren‘t able to pay the surety company despite demands and thus, the company foreclosed the chattel mortgage. It later learned of the real estate mortgage over the house and lot secured by the spouses. This prompted the company to file an action against the spouses. Also, Iya filed another civil action against the spouses, asserting that she has a better right over the property. The trial court heard the two cases jointly and it held that the surety company had a preferred right over the building as since when the chattel mortgage was secured, the land wasn‘t owned yet by the spouses making the building then a chattel and not a real property. ISSUE: Whether or not the building can be considered personal property? HELD: No. A building is an immovable property irrespective of where or not said structure and the land on which it is adhered to belong to the same owner. A building certainly cannot be divested of its character of realty by the fact that the land on which it is constructed belongs to another. To hold it the other way, the possibility is not remote that it would result in
confusion, for to cloak the building with an uncertain status made dependent on ownership of the land, would create a situation where a permanent fixture changes its nature or character as the ownership of the land changes hands. In the case at bar, as personal properties may be the only subjects of a chattel mortgage, the execution of the chattel mortgage covering said building is null and void. 8. Bicerra vs. Tenezza, 6 SCRA 648 FACTS: The Bicerras were the owners of a house built on a lot owned by them and situated in the municipality of Lagangilang. Tenezza forcibly demolished the house, asserting that they are the rightful owners of the land. Failure to restore the house and to deliver the materials by the defendants, plaintiffs were forced to file an action against them for damages as well as praying that the court hold them as the proper owners of the house. The court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction. ISSUES: Whether or not the house demolished is still considered an immovable property? HELD: No. A house is classified as immovable property by reason of its adherence to the soil on which it is built. The classification holds true regardless of the fact that the house may be situated on land belonging to another owner. But once the house is demolished, it ceases to exist as such and the hence its character as immovable likewise ceases. 9. Leung Yee vs. F.L. Strong Machinery Co. And Williamson, 37 SCRA 644 FACTS: Compania Agricola Filipina bought rice-cleaning machinery from the machinery company and this was secured by a chattel mortgage on the machinery and the building to which it was installed. Upon failure to pay, the chattel mortgage was foreclosed, the building and machinery sold in public auction and bought by the machinery company. Then Compania Agricola Filipina executed a deed of sale over the land to which the building stood in favor of the machinery company. This was done to cure any defects that may arise in the machinery company‘s ownership of the building. On or about the date to which the chattel mortgage was executed, Compania executed a real estate mortgage over the building in favor of Leung Yee, distinct and separate from the land. This is to secure payment for its indebtedness for the construction of the building. Upon failure to pay, the mortgage was foreclosed. The machinery company then filed a case, demanding that it be declared the rightful owner of the building. The trial court held that it was the machinery
company which was the rightful owner as it had its title before the building was registered prior to the date of registry of Leung Yee‘s certificate.
ISSUE: Whether or not the building in question is an immovable? HELD: The building made out of strong materials in which the machinery was installed is real property. The mere fact that the parties dealt with it as separate and apart from the land (or as personal property) does not change its character as real property. In this case, it follows that neither the original registry in the chattel mortgage of the building and the machinery installed therein, nor the annotation in the registry of the sale of the mortgaged property had any legal effect. 10. Standard Oil Co. of New York vs. Jaramillo, 44 SCRA 630 FACTS: De la Rosa was the lessee of a piece of land, on which a house she owns was built. She executed a chattel mortgage in favor of the petitioner—purporting the leasehold interest in the land and the ownership of house. After such, the petitioner moved for its registration with the Register of Deeds, for the purpose of having the same recorded in the book of record of chattel mortgages. After said document had been duly acknowledge and delivered, the petitioner caused the same to be presented to the respondent, Joaquin Jaramillo, as register of deeds of the City of Manila, for the purpose of having the same recorded in the book of record of chattel mortgages. Upon examination of the instrument, the respondent was of the opinion that it was not a chattel mortgage, for the reason that the interest therein mortgaged did not appear to be personal property, within the meaning of the Chattel Mortgage Law, and registration was refused on this ground only. ISSUE:
Whether
or
not
respondent‘s
position
is
tenable?
HELD: No. The respondent‘s duties, as a register of deeds, in respect to the registration of chattel mortgage are of a purely ministerial character; and no provision of law can be cited which confers upon him any judicial or quasi-judicial power to determine the nature of any document of which registration is sought as a chattel mortgage. Generally, he should accept the qualification of the property adopted by the person who presents the instrument for registration and should place the instrument on record, upon payment of the proper fee, leaving the effects of registration to be determined by the court if such question should arise for legal determination. The Civil Code supplies no absolute criterion in discriminating between real
property and personal property for purposes of the application of the Chattel Mortgage Law. The articles state general doctrines, nonetheless, it must not be forgotten that under given conditions, property may have character different from that imputed to it in the said articles. It is undeniable that the parties in a contract may by agreement treat as personal property that which by nature would be real property.
11. Punsalan vs. Lacsamana, 21 SCRA 331 FACTS: Punsalan was the owner of a piece of land, which he mortgaged in favor of PNB. Due to his failure to pay, the mortgage was foreclosed and the land was sold in a public auction to which PNB was the highest bidder. On a relevant date, while Punsalan was still the possessor of the land, it secured a permit for the construction of a warehouse. A deed of sale was executed between PNB and Punsalan. This contract was amended to include the warehouse and the improvement thereon. By virtue of these instruments, respondent Lacsamana secured title over the property in her name. Petitioner then sought for the annulment of the deed of sale. Among his allegations was that the bank did not own the building and thus, it should not be included in the said deed. Petitioner‘s complaint was dismissed for improper venue. The trial court held that the action being filed in actuality by petitioner is a real action involving his right over a real property. ISSUE: W/N the warehouse is an immovable and must be tried in the province where the property lies. HELD: Warehouse claimed to be owned by petitioner is an immovable or real property. Buildings are always immovable under the Code. A building treated separately from the land on which it is stood is immovable property and the mere fact that the parties to a contract seem to have dealt with it separate and apart from the land on which it stood in no wise changed its character as immovable property.
12. Prudential Bank vs. Panis 153 SCRA 390
FACTS: Spouses Magcale secured a loan from Prudential Bank. To secure payment, they executed a real estate mortgage over a residential building. The mortgage included also the right to occupy the lot and the information about the sales patent applied for by the spouses for the lot to which the building stood. After securing the first loan, the spouses secured another from the same bank. To secure payment, another real estate mortgage was executed over the same properties. The Secretary of Agriculture then issued a Miscellaneous Sales Patent over the land which was later on mortgaged to the bank. The spouses then failed to pay for the loan and the REM was extrajudicially foreclosed and sold in public auction despite opposition from the spouses. The respondent court held that the REM was null and void.
ISSUE: Whether or not a valid REM mortgage can be constituted on the building erected on the belonging to another. HELD: A real estate mortgage can be constituted on the building erected on the land belonging to another. The inclusion of building distinct and separate from the land in the Civil Code can only mean that the building itself is an immovable property. While it is true that a mortgage of land necessarily includes in the absence of stipulation of the improvements thereon, buildings, still a building in itself may be mortgaged by itself apart from the land on which it is built. Such a mortgage would still be considered as a REM for the building would still be considered as immovable property even if dealt with separately and apart from the land. The original mortgage on the building and right to occupancy of the land was executed before the issuance of the sales patent and before the government was divested of title to the land. Under the foregoing, it is evident that the mortgage executed by private respondent on his own building was a valid mortgage. As to the second mortgage, it was done after the sales patent was issued and thus prohibits pertinent provisions of the Public Land Act. 13. Tumalad vs. Vicencio FACTS: Vicencio and Simeon executed a chattel mortgage in favor of plaintiffs Tumalad over their house, which was being rented by Madrigal and company. This was executed to guarantee a loan, payable in one year with a 12% per annum interest. The mortgage was extrajudicially foreclosed upon failure to pay the loan. The house was sold at a public auction and the plaintiffs were the highest bidder. A corresponding certificate of sale was issued. Thereafter, the plaintiffs filed an action for ejectment against the defendants, praying that the latter vacate the house as they were the proper owners. ISSUE: W/N the chattel mortgage was null and void ab initio because only personal properties can be subject of a chattel mortgage. HELD: Certain deviations have been allowed from the general doctrine that buildings are immovable property such as when through stipulation, parties may agree to treat as personal property those by their nature would be real property. This is partly based on the principle of estoppel wherein the principle is predicated on statements by the owner declaring his house as chattel, a conduct that may conceivably stop him from subsequently claiming otherwise. In the case at bar, though there be no specific statement referring to the subject house as personal property, yet by ceding, selling or transferring a property through chattel mortgage could only have meant that defendant conveys the house as chattel, or at least, intended to treat the same as such, so that they should not now be allowed to make an inconsistent stand by claiming otherwise.
14. Makati Leasing and Finance Corporation vs Wennever Texttile Mills FACTS: To obtain financial accommodations from Makati Leasing, Wearever Textile discounted and assigned several receivables under a Receivable Purchase Agreement with Makati Leasing. To secure the collection of receivables, it executed a chattel mortgage over several raw materials and a machinery – Artos Aero Dryer Stentering Range (Dryer). Wearever defaulted thus the properties mortgaged were extrajudicially foreclosed. The sheriff, after the restraining order was lifted, was able to enter the premises of Wearever and removed the drive motor of the Dryer. The CA reversed the order of the CFI, ordering the return of the drive motor since it cannot be the subject of a replevin suit being an immovable bolted to the ground. Thus the case at bar. ISSUE: Whether the dryer is an immovable property HELD: NO. The SC relied on its ruling in Tumalad v. Vicencio, that if a house of strong materials can be the subject of a Chattel Mortgage as long as the parties to the contract agree and no innocent 3rd party will be prejudiced then moreso that a machinery may treated as a movable since it is movable by nature and becomes immobilized only by destination. And treating it as a chattel by way of a Chattel Mortgage, Wearever is estopped from claiming otherwise. 15. Serg‘s Products and Gaquiloy vs. PCI Leasing and Finance 338 SCRA 499 FACTS: PCI filed a case for collection of a sum of money as well as a writ of replevin for the seizure of machineries, subject of a chattel mortgage executed by petitioner in favor of PCI. Machineries of petitioner were seized and petitioner filed a motion for special protective order. It asserts that the machineries were real property and could not be subject of a chattel mortgage. Issue: Whether or not the machineries become real property by virtue of immobilization. HELD: The machineries in question have become immobilized by destination because they are essential and principal elements in the industry, and thus have become immovable in nature. Nonetheless, they are still proper subjects for a chattel mortgage. Contracting parties may validly stipulate that a real property be considered as personal. After agreement, they are consequently estopped from claiming otherwise. 16. MANARANG AND MANARANG V. OFILADA AND ESTEBAN 99 SCRA 108 FACTS: Manarang secured a loan from Esteban guaranteed by a chattel mortgage over a house of mixed materials. Due to failure to pay the chattel mortgage was foreclosed. Before the sale of the property, Manarang tried to pay for the property but the sheriff refused to accept tender unless there is payment for the publication of the notice of sale in the newspapers. This prompted Manarang to bring this suit to compel the sheriff to accept
payment. He averred that the publication was unnecessary as the houses hold be considered as personal property per agreement in the chattel mortgage, and the publication for notice of sale is unnecessary ISSUE: Whether or not the fact that the parties entering into a contract regarding a house gave said property the consideration of personal property in their contract. HELD: Yes. There is no question that a building of mixed materials may be a subject of chattel mortgage, in which case it is considered as between the parties as personal property. The mere fact that a house was the subject of chattel mortgage and was considered as personal property by the parties doesn‘t make the said house personal property for purposes of the notice to be given for its sale in public auction. It is real property within the purview of Rule 39, Section 16 of the Rules of Court as it has become a permanent fixture on the land, which is real property.
17. NAVARRO VS. PINEDA 9 SCRA 631 FACTS: Pineda and his mother executed real estate and chattel mortgages in favor of Navarro, to secure a loan they got from the latter. The REM covered a parcel of land owned by the mother
while
the
chattel
mortgage
covered
a
residential house. Due to the failure to pay the loan, they asked for extensions to pay for the loan. On the second extension, Pineda executed a promise wherein in case of default in payment, he wouldn‘t ask for any additional extension and there would be no need for any formal demand. In spite of this, they still failed to pay. Navarro then filed for the foreclosure of the mortgages. The court decided in his favor.
ISSUE: Whether or not the deed of real estate mortgage and chattel mortgage appended to the complaint is valid notwithstanding the fact that the house was made subject of chattel mortgage for the reason that it is erected on a land that belongs to a third person.
HELD:
Yes. Where a house stands on a rented land belonging to another person, it may be the subject matter of a chattel mortgage as personal property if so stipulated in the document of mortgage, and in an action by the mortgagee for the foreclosure, the validity Of the chattel mortgage cannot be assailed by one of the parties to the contract of mortgage. Furthermore, although in some instances, a house of mixed materials has been considered as a chattel the
between
contract
between
the them,
parties has
been
and
that
recognized,
the it
has
validity been
a
of
constant
criterion that with respect to third Persons, who are not parties to the contract, and especially in execution proceedings, the house is considered as immovable property. 18. DAVAO SAWMILL V. CASTILLO G.R. No. L-40411
August
7,
1935
FACTS: Davao Sawmill Co., operated a sawmill. However, the land upon which the business was conducted was leased from another person. On the land, Davao Sawmill erected a building which housed the machinery it used. Some of the machines were mounted and placed on foundations of cement.. The contract of lease stated that on the expiration of the period agreed upon, all the improvements and buildings introduced and erected by Davao sawmill shall pass to the exclusive ownership of the lessor without any obligation on its part to pay any amount for said improvements and buildings; which do not include the machineries and accessories in the improvements. In another action, a writ of execution was issued against the company and the properties in question were levied upon. The company assailed the said writ contending that the machineries and accessories were personal in nature, hence, not subject to writ of execution. The trial judge ruled in favour of the company.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the machineries and equipment
were
personal property
HELD Yes, the subject properties are personal in nature. Art.415 (NCC) provides that real property consists of (5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works. Machinery is naturally movable. However, machinery only becomes immovable when placed in a land by the owner of the property or land but not when so placed by a tenant or any person having only a temporary right, unless such person acted as the agent of the owner. In the case at bar, the machinery is intended not by the owner of the land but by the saw mill company for use in connection with its trade
19. TSAI V. CA Gr. No. 120098, October 2, 2001 FACTS: Ever Textile Mills, Inc. (EVERTEX) obtained loan from Philippine Bank of Communications (PBCom), secured by a Real and Chattel Mortgage over the lot where its factory stands, and the chattels located therein as enumerated in a schedule attached to the mortgage contract. PBCom again granted a second loan to EVERTEX which was secured by a Chattel Mortgage over personal properties similar to those listed in the first mortgage deed. During the execution of the second mortgage, EVERTEX purchased various machines and equipment. Upon EVERTEX's failure to meet its obligation. PBCom, commenced extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage. PBCom leased the entire factory premises to Ruby Tsai and sold to the same the factory, lock, stock and barrel including the contested machineries. EVERTEX filed a complaint for annulment of sale, reconveyance, and damages against PBCom, alleging that the extrajudicial foreclosure of subject mortgage was not valid, and that PBCom, without any legal or factual basis, appropriated the contested properties which were not included in the Real and Chattel Mortgage of the first mortgage contract nor in the second contract which is a Chattel Mortgage, and neither were those properties included in the Notice of Sheriff's Sale. ISSUE: Whether or not the machineries and equipment were personal properties HELD: YES, the machineries and equipment are personal properties. The nature of the disputed machineries, i.e., that they were heavy, bolted or cemented on the real property mortgaged does not make them ipso facto immovable under Article 415 (3) and (5) of the New Civil Code. While it is true that the properties appear to be immobile, a perusal of the contract of Real and Chattel Mortgage executed by the parties herein reveal their intent, that is - to treat machinery and equipment as chattels. If the machineries in question were contemplated to be included in the real estate mortgage, there would have been no necessity to ink a chattel mortgage specifically with a listing of the machineries covered thereby. Assuming that the properties in question are immovable by nature, nothing detracts the parties from treating it as chattels to secure an obligation under the principle of estoppel, where an immovable may be considered a personal property if there is a stipulation as when it is used as security in the payment of an obligation where a chattel mortgage is executed over it.
20. MINDANAO BUS CO. V. CITY ASSESSOR DIGEST G.R. No. L-17870 29 September 1962 FACTS: Petitioner is a public utility company engaged in the transport of passengers and cargo by motor vehicles. Petitioner likewise owned a land where it maintains a garage, a repair shop and blacksmith or carpentry shops. The machineries are placed thereon in wooden and cement platforms. The City Assessor of CDO then assessed a P4,400 realty tax on said machineries and repair equipment. Petitioner appealed on the ground that the same are not real properties.
ISSUE: Whether or not the machineries and equipment are considered immobilized and thus subject to a realty tax HELD: NO. The Supreme Court held that said machineries and equipment are not subject to the assessment of real estate tax. Art. 415 of the NCC classifies the following as immovable property xxx (5) Machinery, receptacles, instruments or implements intended by the owner of the tenement for an industry or works which may be carried on in a building or on a piece of land, and which tend directly to meet the needs of the said industry or works; Said equipment are not considered immobilized as they are merely incidental, not essential and principal to the business of the petitioner. The transportation business could be carried on without repair or service shops of its rolling equipment as they can be repaired or services in another shop belonging to another Aside from the element of essentiality the Art.415 (5) also requires that the industry or works be carried on in a building or on a piece of land. As such, the equipment in question are not deemed real property and not subject to realty tax, because the transportation business is not carried on in a building or permanently on a piece of land, as demanded by law.
21. BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS V. MERALCO G.R. No. L-15334. January 31, 1964 FACTS: Meralco‘s electric power is generated by its hydro-electric plant located at Botocan Falls, Laguna and is transmitted to the City of Manila by means of electric transmission wires, running from the province of Laguna to the said City. These electric transmission wires which carry high voltage current, are fastened to insulators attached on steel towers. Meralco has constructed 40 of these steel towers within Quezon City, on land belonging to it. The QC City Assessor declared the MERALCO's steel towers subject to real property tax. After the denial of MERALCO's petition to cancel these declarations, an appeal was taken to the QC Board of Assessment Appeals, which required respondent to pay real property tax on the said steel towers for the years 1952 to 1956. MERALCO paid the amount under protest, and filed a petition for review in the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) which rendered a decision ordering the cancellation of the said tax declarations and the refunding to MERALCO by the QC City Treasurer. ISSUE: Whether or not the steel towers of an electric company constitute real property for the purposes of real property tax. HELD: NO. The steel towers of an electric company do not constitute real property for the purposes of real property tax. Steel towers are not immovable property under paragraph 1, 3 and 5 of Article 415 (NCC) because they do not constitute buildings or constructions adhered to the soil. As per description, given by the lower court, they are removable and merely attached to a square metal frame by means of bolts, which when unscrewed could easily be dismantled and moved from place to place.
They cannot be included under paragraph 3, as they are not attached to an immovable in a fixed manner, and they can be separated without breaking the material or causing deterioration upon the object to which they are attached. These steel towers or supports do not also fall under paragraph 5, for they are not machineries or receptacles, instruments or implements, and even if they were, they are not intended for industry or works on the land. Petitioner is not engaged in an industry or works on the land in which the steel supports or towers are constructed.
22. MANILA ELECTRIC CO. V. CENTRAL BOARD OF ASSESSMENT APPEALS 114 SCRA 273 FACTS: Petitioner owns two oil storage tanks, made of steel plates wielded and assembled on the spot. Their bottoms rest on a foundation consisted of compacted earth, sand pad as immediate layer, and asphalt stratum as top layer. The tanks are within the Caltex refinery compound. They are used for storing fuel oil for Meralco's power plants. The municipal treasurer of Batangas made an assessment for realty tax on the two tanks, based on the report of the Board of Assessors. Meralco contends that the said oil storage tanks do not fall within any of the kinds of real property enumerated in article 415 of the Civil Code the tanks are not attached to the land and that they were placed on leased land, not on the land owned by Meralco.
ISSUE : Whether or not the oil storage tanks constitute real property for the purposes of real property tax HELD: YES. While the two storage tanks are not embodied in the land, they may nevertheless be considered as improvements in the land, enhancing its utility and rendering it useful to the oil industry. It is undeniable that the two tanks have been installed with some degree of permanence as receptacles for the considerable quantities of oil needed by Meralco for its operations. For purposes of taxation, the term real property may include things, which should generally be considered as personal property. It is a familiar phenomenon to see things classified as real property for purposes of taxation which on general principle may be considered as personal property.
23. PIANSAY VS. DAVID, 12 SCRA 227 FACTS: David obtained a loan of P3,000 with 12% interest from Uy Kim. To secure the payment of the same, he executed a chattel mortgage on a house in Tondo. Upon David‘s failure to pay, it was foreclosed and Uy Kim bought the house at the public auction and thereafter sold the same to Salvador Piansay. Later on, Marcos Mangubat filed a complaint against David before the CFI Manila for the collection of the loan of P2,000. The complaint was later amended to implead Uy Kim and Piansay praying that the auction sale and deed of absolute sale executed by Uy Kim in favor of Piansay be annulled. CFI Manila ordered David to pay and annulled the chattel mortgage. CA affirmed. David was ordered to pay and the house was levied upon. To prevent the sale at the public auction, Piansay and Uy Kim filed a petition before the CA but it was denied. Subsequently, the latter instituted an action against David and Mangubat praying that judgment be rendered declaring Piansay as the true owner and restrain the levy and sale to public auction. David demanded from Piansay the payment of the rentals for the use and occupation of the house; the latter claims it is his property. Mangubat, on one hand, moved to dismiss the complaint which was granted. CA affirmed it by explaining that Uy Kim had no right to foreclose the chattel mortgage because it was in reality a mere contract of an unsecured loan. Piansay assailed Mangubat‘s right to levy execution upon the house alleging that the same belongs to him, he having bought it from Uy Kim who acquired it at the auction sale. ISSUE: Whether or not the chattel mortgage and sale are valid HELD: No. Upon the theory that the chattel mortgage and sale in favor of Uy Kim had been annulled in the original decision, as affirmed by the CA, the fact is that said order became final and executory upon the denial of the petition for certiorari and mandamus. Hence, Uy Kim and Piansay are now barred from asserting that the chattel mortgage and sale are valid. At any rate, regardless of the validity of a contract constituting a chattel mortgage on a house, as between the parties to said contract, the same cannot and does not bind third persons, who are not parties to the contract of their privies. As a consequence, the sale of the house in question in the proceedings for the extrajudicial foreclosure of said chattel mortgage, is null and void insofar as defendant Mangubat is concerned, and did not confer upon Uy Kim, as buyer in said sale, any dominical right in and to said house, so that she could not have transmitted to her assignee Piansay any such right as against Mangubat. In short, they do not have a cause of action against Mangubat and David
24. SIBAL VS. VALDEZ, 50 PHIL 512 FACTS: As a first cause of action the plaintiff alleged that the defendant Vitaliano Mamawal, deputy sheriff of the Province of Tarlac, by virtue of a writ of execution issued by the Court of
First Instance of Pampanga, attached and sold to the defendant Emiliano J. Valdez the sugar cane planted by the plaintiff and his tenants on seven parcels of land. Within one year from the date of the attachment and sale the plaintiff offered to redeem said sugar cane and tendered to the defendant Valdez the amount sufficient to cover the price paid by the latter, the interest thereon and any assessments or taxes which he may have paid thereon after the purchase, and the interest corresponding thereto. But Valdez refused to accept the money and to return the sugar cane to the plaintiff. As a second cause of action, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant Emiliano J. Valdez was attempting to harvest the palay planted in four of the seven parcels and that he had harvested and taken possession of the palay in one of said seven parcels and in another parcel, amounting to 300 cavans; and that all of said palay belonged to the plaintiff. After hearing and on 28 April 1926, the judge (Lukban) rendered judgment in favor of the defendant holding that the sugar cane in question was personal property and, as such, was not subject to redemption; among others. Hence, the appeal ISSUE: Whether the sugar cane in question is personal or real property HELD: Manresa, the eminent commentator of the Spanish Civil Code, in discussing section 334 of the Civil Code, in view of the recent decisions of the supreme Court of Spain, admits that growing crops are sometimes considered and treated as personal property. Moreover, from an examination of the reports and codes of the State of California and other states we find that the settle doctrine followed in said states in connection with the attachment of property and execution of judgment is, that growing crops raised by yearly labor and cultivation are considered personal property. On the other hand, Act No. 1508, the Chattel Mortgage Law, fully recognized that growing crops are personal property. Section 2 of said Act provides: "All personal property shall be subject to mortgage, agreeably to the provisions of this Act, and a mortgage executed in pursuance thereof shall be termed a chattel mortgage." Section 7 in part provides: "If growing crops be mortgaged the mortgage may contain an agreement stipulating that the mortgagor binds himself properly to tend, care for and protect the crop while growing. It is clear from the foregoing provisions that Act No. 1508 was enacted on the assumption that "growing crops" are personal property. This consideration tends to support the conclusion hereinbefore stated, that paragraph 2 of article 334 of the Civil Code has been modified by section 450 of Act No. 190 and by Act No. 1508 in the sense that "ungathered products" as mentioned in said article of the Civil Code have the nature of personal property. In other words, the phrase "personal property" should be understood to include "ungathered products."
We may, therefore, conclude that paragraph 2 of article 334 of the Civil Code has been modified by section 450 of the Code of Civil Procedure and by Act No. 1508, in the sense that, for the purpose of attachment and execution, and for the purposes of the Chattel Mortgage Law, "ungathered products" have the nature of personal property. 25. RUBISO VS. RIVERA, 37 PHIL 72 FACTS: Bonifacio Gelito sold his share in the pilot boat Valentina, consisting of 2/3 interest therein, to the Chinaman Sy Qui, the co-owner of the other 1/3 interest in said vessel; wherefore this vendor is no longer entitled to exercise any action whatever in respect to the boat in question. After the sale of the boat to the defendant Rivera, suit having been brought in the justice of the peace court against the Chinaman Sy Qui to enforce payment of a certain sum of money, the latter‘s creditor Fausto Rubiso. Rubiso later acquired said vessel at a public auction sale and for the sum of P55.45. The certificate of sale and adjudication of the boat in question was issued by the sheriff on behalf of Fausto Rubiso, in the office of the Collector of Customs, on 27 January 1915 and was also entered in the commercial registry on 14 March 1915. On 10 April 1915, the plaintiffs brought suit in the CFI and alleged in the complaint that his clients were the owners of the pilot boat named Valentina, which had been in bad condition since 1914 and was stranded in Tingloy, Bauan, Batangas; and that Florentino E. Rivera took charge or possession of said vessel without the knowledge or consent of the plaintiffs and refused to deliver it to them, under claim that he was the owner thereof. After the hearing of the case and the introduction of documentary evidence, the judgment of 6 September 1915, was rendered, , in which the defendant and appellant was ordered to place at the disposal of the Fausto Rubiso the pilot boat in litigation. No special finding was made for costs. The defendant appealed and moved for a new trial. This motion was denied and appellant excepted. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, with the costs against the appellant. ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the requisite of registration in the registry, of the purchase of the vessel, is necessary and indispensable in order that the purchaser‘s rights may be maintained against a third person 2. Whether or not the boat is a real property HELD: 1. The legal rule set down in the Mercantile Code subsists, inasmuch as the amendment solely refers to the official who shall make the entry; but, with respect to the rights of the two purchasers, whichever of them first registered his acquisition of the vessel is the one entitled to enjoy the protection of the law, which considers him the absolute owner of the purchased boat, and this latter to be free of all encumbrance and all claims by strangers for, pursuant to article 582 of the said code, after the bill of the judicial sale at auction has been executed and recorded
in the commercial registry, all the other liabilities of the vessel in favor of the creditors shall be considered canceled. 1awphil.net The purchaser at public auction, Fausto Rubiso, who was careful to record his acquisition, opportunely and on a prior date, has, according to the law, a better right than the defendant Rivera who subsequently recorded his purchase. The latter is a third person, who was directly affected by the registration which the plaintiff made of his acquisition. 2. Ships or vessels, whether moved by steam or by sail, partake, to a certain extent, of the nature and conditions of real property, on account of their value and importance in the world commerce; and for this reason the provisions of article 573 of the Code of Commerce are nearly identical with those of article 1473 of the Civil Code.
26. PHIL. REFINING CO. VS. JARQUE, 61 PHIL 229 FACTS: On varying dates the Philippine Refining Co., Inc., and Francisco Jarque executed three mortgages, denominated as ―chattel mortgage‖ on the motor vessels Pandan and Zaragoza. The first two mortgages do not have an appended affidavit of good faith, while the third contains such. The third mortgage was subscribed by Jarque and MN Brink (in what capacity the latter signed is not disclosed) and was not registered in the customs house until 17 May 1932, or within the period of 30 prior to the commencement of insolvency proceedings against Jarque. A fourth mortgage was executed by Jarque and Ramon Aboitiz on the motorship Zaragoza and was entered in the chattel mortgage registry of the register of deeds on 12 May 1932, or again within the 30-day period before the institution of insolvency proceedings. A petition was filed with the CFI Cebu on 2 June 1932 in which it was prayed that Francisco Jarque be declared an insolvent debtor, with the result that an assignment of all the properties of the insolvent debtor, was executed in favor of Jose Corominas. The petition on the matter of Jarque‘s insolvency was granted. However, the judge declined to order the foreclosure of the mortgages, but on the contrary sustained the special defenses of fatal defectiveness of the mortgages. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment, with costs against appellant ISSUE: 1. Whether or not the vessel is a personal property 2. Whether or not an affidavit of good faith is needed to enforce a chattel mortgage on a vessel HELD:
1. Vessels are considered personal property under the civil law. (Code of Commerce, article 585.) Similarly under the common law, vessels are personal property. Under the common law, vessels are personal property although occasionally referred to as a peculiar kind of personal property. Since the term ―personal property‖ includes vessels, they are subject to mortgage agreeably to the provisions of the Chattel Mortgage Law. (Act 1508, section 2.) Indeed, it has heretofore been accepted without discussion that a mortgage on a vessel is in nature a chattel mortgage. The only difference between a chattel mortgage of a vessel and a chattel mortgage of other personality is that it is not now necessary for a chattel mortgage of a vessel to be noted in the registry of the register of deeds, but it is essential that a record of documents affecting the title to a vessel be entered in the record of the Collector of Customs at the port of entry. Otherwise a mortgage on a vessel is generally like other chattel mortgages as to its requisites and validity. 2. Section 5 of the Chattel Mortgage Law deemed it a requirement to have an affidavit of good faith appended to the mortgage and recorded therewith. The absence of the affidavit vitiates a mortgage as against creditors and subsequent encumbrancers. As a consequence a chattel mortgage of a vessel wherein the affidavit of good faith required by the Chattel Mortgage Law is lacking, is unenforceable against third persons.
27. US vs. CARLOS 21 PHIL 553
FACTS:
Carlos stole about 2273 kilowatts of electricity worth 909 pesos from Meralco. The court issued a warrant of arrest. Carlos demurred and refused to enter a plea. He claimed that what he did failed to constitute an offense. His counsel further asserted that the crime of larceny applied only to tangibles, chattels and objects that can be taken into possession and spirited away, hence a movable property. Deliberation quickly followed at the court which subsequently sentenced him to over a year in jail. Mr. Carlos contested saying that electrical energy cannot be stolen (how can one steal an incorporeal thing?). He filed an appeal on such grounds and the court of first instance affirmed the decision. The case reached the Supreme Court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the court erred in declaring that electrical energy can be stolen?
RULING: Yes. Analogically, electricity can be considered as ‗gas‘ which can be stolen. However, the true test of what constitutes the proper subject of larceny is not whether the subject is corporeal or incorporeal, but whether it is capable of appropriation by another other than the owner. It is a valuable article of merchandise, a force of nature brought under the control of science. Mr. Carlos secretly and with intent to deprive the company of its rightful property, used jumper cables to appropriate the same for his own use. This constitutes larceny.
28. US vs. TAMBUNTING 41 PHIL 364 FACTS:
The Manila Gas Company installed equipment for the transmission of gas in a house at Evangelista. After the original subscriber left, the apparatus was sealed and the services discontinued. Later Mr. Tambunting moved in. He was a cheapskate and spliced the tubing to leech free gas for household use. Alas, the crime was discovered by the gas company. The prosecutor filed charges and hailed Mr. Tambunting to court.
ISSUE:
Whether or not gas can be the subject of larceny.
RULING:
Yes. Gas is a substance which lends itself to felonious appropriation. It is a valuable merchandise that can be bought and sold like other personal property, susceptible of being siphoned from a larger mass and transported from place to place.
29. INVOLUNTARY INSOLVENCY OF PAUL STROCHECKER vs. RAMIREZ 44 PHIL 933
FACTS:
The half-interest in the business (Antigua Botica Ramirez) was mortgaged with Fidelity & Surety Co. on March 10, 1919, and registered in due time in the registry of property, while another mortgage was made with Ildefonso Ramirez on 22 September 1919 and registered also in the registry. Raised in the lower court, the trial court declared the mortgage of Fidelity & Surety Co. entitled to preference over that of Ildefonso Ramirez and another mortgage by Concepcion Ayala. Ayala did not appeal, but Ramirez did.
ISSUE:
Whether or not half-interest over a business is a movable property. RULING: Yes. Interest in business may be subject of mortgage With regard to the nature of the property mortgaged which is one-half interest in the business, such interest is a personal property capable of appropriation and not included in the enumeration of movable properties in Article 414 of the Civil Code, and may be the subject of mortgage.
30. CHAVEZ vs. PUBLIC ESTATES AUTHORITY 384 SCRA 152
FACTS: The Public Estates Authority is the central implementing agency tasked to undertake reclamation projects nationwide. It took over the leasing and selling functions of the DENR insofar as reclaimed or about to be reclaimed foreshore lands are concerned. PEA sought the transfer to AMARI, a private corporation, of the ownership of 77.34 hectares of the Freedom Islands. PEA also sought to have 290.156 hectares of submerged areas of Manila Bay to AMARI.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the transfer is valid. RULING: No. To allow vast areas of reclaimed lands of the public domain to be transferred to PEA as private lands will sanction a gross violation of the constitutional ban on private corporations from acquiring any kind of alienable land of the public domain. 31. REPUBLIC V. COURT OF APPEALS 281 SCRA 639
FACTS: Morato filed for a patent on a parcel of land located in Calauag, Quezon, which was approved, provided that the land shall not be encumbered or alienated within a period of five years from the date of the issuance of the patent. Later on, the land was established to be a portion of Calauag Bay, which was five to six feet deep during high tides and three feet deep on low tides. The water level rose because of the ebb and flow of tides from the bay and the storms that frequently passed through the area. Furthermore, it was observed by the Director of Lands from his investigation, that the land of Morato was leased to Advincula and it was also mortgaged to Co. The government sought for the revocation of the patent issued. The trial court and appellate court decided in favor of the respondents.
ISSUE: Whether or not the land granted under patent which was later on leased and mortgaged should be revert back to the ownership of the State it being a foreshore land.
HELD: Yes, foreshore lands have been defined to be that part of the land which is between the high and low water and left dry by the flux and reflux of the tides. This is the strip of land that lies between the high and low watermarks and that is alternatively wet and dry according to the flow of the tide. Foreshore lands may not anymore be the subject of issuance of free patents. Under property of public ownership or dominion are foreshore lands, as provided for in the Civil Code. It is to be noted that when the sea moved towards the estate and the tide invaded it, the invaded property became foreshore land and passed to the realm of public domain. In accordance with
this land reclassification, the land can no longer be subject to a pending patent application and must be returned to the State.
32. LANZAR V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS 78 SCRA 130 FACTS: Lanzar filed for application for registration of title over a parcel of land, to which the Director of Lands objected to as the land in question, according to him, was part of the foreshore lands. The trial court adjudicated the land to Lanzar as the said land wasn‘t necessary for public utility or establishment of special industries.
ISSUE: Whether or not the trial court erred in its decision.
HELD: Yes, lands added to the shore by accretion and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea, form part of the public domain; it cannot be appropriated nor can it be acquired by prescription. When they are no longer washed by the water of the sea and are not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries, or for coastguard services, then the Government shall declare them to be property of the owners of the estate adjacent thereto and as increment thereof.
33. IGNACIO V. DIRECTOR OF LANDS 108 PHIL 335 FACTS: Ignacio filed for the registration of title over a mangrove to which he later said that he acquired right to the mangrove through accretion.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ignacio has the right to declare that such land can be subject to registration and does not anymore form part of the public dominion.
HELD: No, only the executive and possibly the legislative departments have the authority and power to make the declaration that any land so gained by the sea is not necessary for purposes of public utility, or for the establishment of special industries or for Coast Guard Service otherwise, the property continues to be property of public dominion ,further, it cannot be subject to acquisitive prescription notwithstanding the fact that it is not actually devoted for such use or service. If no such declaration has been made by said departments, the lot in question forms part of the public domain. Under Art. 4 of the Spanish Law of Waters of Aug. 3, 1866. “lands added to the shores by accretions and alluvial deposits caused by the action of the sea, form part of the public domain.” Since alluvial formation along the seashore is part of the public domain, it is not open to acquisition by adverse possession by private persons.
34. VILLARICA V. COURT OF APPEALS 309 SCRA 193 FACTS: Spouses Teofilo and Maxima Villarica, filed an application for confirmation of the title over a parcel of land which they allege they bought from Teofilo‘s father. Said application was opposed by the Director of Forestry contending that the said land forms part of the public domain as it is within the unclassified area in Meycauayan and is not available for private appropriation. The trial court dismissed the case since the property forms part of the public domain therefore the certificate of title is void.
ISSUE: Whether or not the land still forms part of the public domain
HELD: Yes, there has been no showing that a declassification has been made of the land in question as disposable or alienable. And the record indeed disclosed that applicants have not introduced any evidence which would have led the court a quo to rule otherwise. Forest lands cannot be owned by private persons. Possession thereof, no matter how long doesn‘t ripen to a registrable title. The adverse possession which may be the basis of a grant or title or confirmation of an imperfect title refers only to alienable or disposable portions of the public domain. Thus, if the land in question still forms part of the public forest, then possession thereof, however long, cannot convert it into private property as it is beyond the power and jurisdiction of the cadastral court to register under the Torrens System.
35 36 37 38
39. Chiao Liong Tan vs CA Nov.19,1993 GR no.106251 Facts: Petitioner claims that he is the owner of a motor vehicle, relying on the fact that such was registered in his name.Petitioner's brother private respondent averred that the vehicle was for their family business use for the delivery of machinery to its customers.Prior to such dispute private respondent asked Petitioner to look for a vehicle and give the latter P5,000 as down payment,after a month private respondent himself paid the whole price out of a loan of P140,000 although receipts for down payment as well as the payment of balance of the purchase price was issued in the name of Petitioner.Allegations of private respondent has been corroborated by witnesses. Issue: Whether or not Petitioner is the lawful owner of the vehicle? Whether or not Petitioner action for Replevin proper? Ruling: The NCC recognizes cases of Implied trust other than those enumerated therein.Thus although no specific provision could be cited to apply to the parties,it is undeniable that an implied trust
was created when the Certificate of Registration of the motor vehicle was placed in the name of petitioner although the price thereof was not paid by him but by private respondent.The principle that a trustee who puts a Certificate of Registration in his name cannot repudiate the trust by relying on the registration is one of the well known limitations upon a title. A trust which derives its strength from the confidence one reposes on another especially between brothers,does not lose that character simply because of what appears in a legal document. It is true that the judgment in a replevin suit must only resolve in whom is the right of possession.Primarily, the action of replevin is possessory in character and determines nothing more than the right of possession.However when the title to the property is distinctly put in issue by the defendant's plea and by reason of this policy to settle in one action all the conflicting claims on the property in controversy,the question of ownership may be resolved in the same proceeding.
40. Felipe Calub vs CA April 27,2000 GR no.115634 Facts: The Petitioner from DENR apprehended two motor vehicles which was carrying illegally sourced lumber in violation of the Revised Forestry Code,and thereafter confiscated them.The owners of the subject vehicles filed an action for replevin to recover such vehicles.They succeed in the trial court averring on the ground that the Petitioner did not act in accordance with the law.Petitioner appeals on the ground that the replevin in this case is a suit against the State and therefore invalid. Issue: Whether or not Replevin may be instituted for the reconveyance of the vehicles under custodia legis? and whether such replevin in the case is a suit against the State? Ruling: No.Writ of Replevin cannot be issued to recover a property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process and considered in the custody of law. This suit is not valid because the State may not be sued without its consent or when the public official acted in bad faith in the discharge of his duties.It has been established that the DENR acted within its authority as provided by the applicable law.Hence,its action is the action of the State.
41 . Sarmiento vs CA Nov.16,1995 GR no.116192 Facts: The Private respondent owns a parcel of land adjacent to this lot is one wherein petitioner had a house built on.Trying to cause relocation of her lot,Private respondent found out that petitioner
was encroaching on her property.When the latter talked to petitioner about constructing a new fence, which will cover her true property,petitioner refused and threatened private respondent with legal action.For fear of being sued,she sought judicial relief.Trial court decided in her favor.Petitioner assailed that the issue was on ownership of the portion of land thus,the action should have been an Accion Reivindicatoria and not forcible entry. Issue: Whether or not Accion Reivindicatoria the proper remedy? Ruling: Yes.The facts reveal that the action is neither of forcible entry nor of unlawful detainer,but essentially involves a boundary dispute which must be resolved in an Accion Reivindicatoria on the issue of ownership over the portion of the land. Forcible entry and unlawful detainer cases are distinct actions.Private respondent cannot belatedly claim that Petitioner's possession of the controverted portion was by mere tolerance.Complaint did not characterize Petitioner's alleged entry on the land whether legal or illegal.Complainant admitted also the fact that the fence had already pre-existed on the lot when she acquired the same.
42. Bongato vs Malvar 387 SCRA 327 Facts: Private respondent spouses filed a complaint for forcible entry against Petitioner for alledging unlawful entry in a parcel of land and constructed a house of light materials thereon. Trial court ordered Petitioner to vacate the lot and issued an order as to determine the location of the houses involved in the civil cases the same with the one in criminal case for antisquatting.Judge made a warning that there will be no extension to be granted for the submission of the survey and failure to do so would prompt the issuance of the writ of execution. Upon failure of petitioner to submit a survey report,the judge ordered the return of the records of the case to the court of origin for disposal. Issue: Whether or not Forcible entry the proper action? Ruling: In Forcible entry ,one employs FISTS (fraud,intimidation,strategy,threat,stealth) to deprive another physical possession of land or building thus,plaintiff must allege and prove prior physical possession of the property in litigation until deprived thereof by the defendant. Sole question for resolution hinges on the physical or material possession of the property.Neither a claim of juridical possession nor an averment of ownership by the defendant can outrightly prevent the court from taking cognizance of the case.Ejectment cases proceed independently of any claim of ownership and the plaintiff needs merely to prove prior possession on de facto and undue deprivation thereof.
In the present case,the lower court lacked jurisdiction .First,the house of petitioner was actually situated in the lot subject of the anti-squatting case and not on the lot of the spouses.Second,house has been in existence prior to the alleged forcible entry.Third,respondent's had knowledge of the existence of the house long before the alleged date of entry.
43. Cagayan De Oro Landless Residents vs CA 254 SCRA 220 Facts: A lot in dispute was formerly classified as timber land until the time it was reclassified by the government as public land. Petitioner were authorized to survey the land for subdivision into residential lots. Meanwhile, NHA initiated expropriation proceeding into the lot. Petitioner intervened and said that instead of being paid through money it preferred acquisition of any housing area of NHA.Upon learning of the annulment of the title over the same land NHA sought the suspension of expropriation proceeding.Thereafter,SC finally resolved by annulling the title and declaring the subject lot to be public land.The Bureau was furnished with the decision and according to the investigation,members of the Petitioner was found settling in the land. A presidential proclamation was then issued reserving entire subject land for a slum improvement project of the NHA,leading to the rejection of the survey submitted by the Petitioner and the demolition of settlement constructed by the members of Petitioner,and prompted the latter to file a case for forcible entry on which trial court decided on its favor.During the pendency of the civil case, a special patent was issued for the entire subject land.The petitioner sought the execution of the decision which was countered by a case for quieting of title by NHA. Issue: Whether or not writ of injunction is proper in this case? Ruling: NHA was entitled to the Writ of Injunction because of the pendency of an appeal for forcible entry; the special patent issued to it by the president over the parcel of land.As an extraordinary remedy,injunction is calculated to preserve or maintain the status quo of things and is generally availed of to prevent actual or threatened acts until the merits of the case can be heard.As such injunction is accepted as a strong arm of equity or a transcendent remedy to be used cautiously,as it effects the respective rights of the parties and only upon full conviction on the part of the court of its extreme necessity. 44. De la Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, 286 SCRA 230 FACTS: Petitioner contracted a loan from Villanueva‘s parents, mortgaging the subject parcel of land as security. Years after, the parcel of land became the subject for an application for registration by the Ramos brothers. They insisted that they had a better claim over the land
than petitioner. After trial, the case was dismissed as the land has not been reclassified for other purposes and remained a part of the forest reserve. Consequently, the brothers were able to secure reclassification of the land and the same was registered in their name as owners, and they later sold the land to Villanueva. Thereafter, petitioner came to know of the registration and filed a complaint, which was dismissed. HELD: Petitioner possessed and occupied the land after it had been declared by the government as part of the forest reserve. In fact, the land remained as part of the forest reserve until such time it was reclassified into alienable or disposable land at the behest of the Ramoses. A positive act of the government is needed to declassify land which is classified as forest, and to convert it into alienable and disposable land for other purposes. Until such lands have been properly declared to be available for other purposes, there is no disposable land to speak of. Absent the fact of reclassification prior to the possession and cultivation in good faith by petitioner, the property occupied by him remained classified as forest or timberland, which he could not have acquired by prescription
45. Philippine Economic Zone Authority vs. Fernandez, 358 SCRA 489 FACTS: The subject parcel of land was subject of an expropriation proceeding entered into by EPZA and the newly registered owners of the land. Private respondents sought the nullity of the documents executed as he alleged that he was excluded from the extrajudicial partition of the estate, originally owned by their predecessors. Petitioner sought the dismissal of the complaint as it was allegedly barred by prescription. This was denied by the trial court and the CA. HELD: An action for reconveyance resulting from fraud prescribes 4 years from the discovery of the fraud; such discovery is deemed to have taken place upon the issuance of the certificate of title over the property. Registration of real property is considered constructive notice to all persons, and thus, a four-year period shall be counted therefrom. The action for reconveyance based on fraud has already prescribed. Even an action for reconveyance based on an implied constructive trust would have already prescribed. The imprescriptibility of an action for reconveyance based on implied trust applies only when the plaintiff is in possession of the property. However, private respondents are not in possession of the disputed property. In fact, they don‘t even claim to be in possession of it, even if to so would enable them to justify the imprescriptibility of their action. Furthermore, reconveyance is a remedy to those whose property has been wrongfully registered in the name of another. Such recourse however cannot be availed of once the property has passed to an innocent purchaser for value. For an action for reconveyance to prosper, the property should not have passed into the hands of an innocent purchaser for value.
46. IDOLOR V CA (351 SCRA 402) FACTS: Teresita Idolor executed in favor of private respondent Gumersindo De Guzman a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage with right of extra-judicial foreclosure upon failure to redeem the mortgage. Upon the failure of the petitioner to settle her mortgage, respondents went to the Barangay whic h resulted into a ―Kasunduang Pag-aayos‖ which noted that the petitioner shall pay within 90 d ays and her failure would warrant the foreclosure of the property with the right to repurchase wit hin one year without interest.
Petitioner failed to comply with her undertaking; thus respondent Gumersindo De Guzman filed an extra judicial foreclosure of the real estate mortgage. The property was sold in a public auctio n to respondent Gumersindo and the Certificate of Sale was registered. After more than a year, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 220, a complaint for annulment of Sheriff‘s Certificate of Sale with prayer for the issuance of a tempor ary restraining order (TRO) and a writ of preliminary injunction.Trial court subsequently issued t he TRO and the writ. CA anulled the writ ISSUES: 1. Whether or not the Petitioner has proprietary rights to the writ of preliminary injunction 2. Whether or not the Kasunduan was a form of novation HELD: Injunction is a preservative remedy aimed at protecting substantive rights and interests. Before an injunction can be issued, it is essential that the following requisites be present: 1. there must be a right in esse or the existence of a right to be protected; 2. the act against which the injunction is to be directed is a violation of such right. Petitioner had one year redemption period from the registration of the sheriff‘s sale to redeem th e property but she failed to exercise this right. Hence, the right no longer exists. There was no novation that was brought by the Kasunduan, since it is essentially the same agre ement as the first, only that the conditions were changed a little. Novation requires the extinguis
hment of the obligation, here the original obligation was not extinguished. 47. Lucero vs. Luot GR L-16995 October 28, 1968 Facts: The movant-appellant (Lucero) and oppositors-appellants (Luot, et al) are parties in a land regist ration proceedings. The land registration court awarded the subject property to Lucero and was granted a writ of possession. The oppositors claim that there were defects in the reconstitution o f records and that the motion was not under oath. However, the court claimed this was untenabl e. It is the ministerial duty of the court to issue a writ of possession to whom the subject property was to be awarded, in accordance with Land Registration Act 496, as amended. ISSUE: Whether or not the writ of posessesion should be awarded to Lucero HELD: Yes, it should be awarded. It was in accordance with the law."the issuance of a writ of po ssession is only a matter of course if nothing in the past has been issued in favor of the register ed owner." It is equally true, as likewise mentioned therein, that there is "no period of prescriptio n as to the issuance of a writ of possession, ..." There would be an avoidance of the inconvenience and the further delay to which a successful li tigant would be subjected if he were compelled "to commence other actions in other courts for th e purpose of securing the fruits of his victory." We have heretofore held that a writ of possession may be issued not only against the person wh o has been defeated in a registration case but also against anyone adversely occupying the lan d or any portion thereof during the land registration proceedings ... The issuance of the decree o f registration is part of the registration proceedings. In fact, it is supposed to end the said procee dings. Consequently, any person unlawfully and adversely occupying said lot at any time up to t he issuance of the final decree, may be subject to judicial ejectment by means of a writ of posse ssion and it is the duty of the registration court to issue said writ when asked for by the successf ul claimant.
48. VENCILAO V. VANO 182 SCRA 492 FACTS: Three consolidated cases are resolved, given that there are same parties and parcels of l and in question.
On the first case, it was tackled that the heirs of the late Juan Reyes filed an application for r egistration of the subject parcel of land. A reconveyance case was filed against th em by petitioners on the ground that they are true owners of thereof. The second case involved the death of the administratix of the estate of the owner of the subject land. After her death, a TCT was issued in the name of Pedro Luspo, and another was issued i n the name of several persons. A writ of possession was issued by the trial court against the pe titioners. Issue: WON a writ of possession may be issued against unlawful and adverse occupants in the l and HELD:Yes. Petitioners contend that they were not claimants-oppositors nor defeated oppositors in the said land registration case, as their names don‘t appear in the amended application for registrati on. They have occupied the subject parcels of land for more than 30 years which began l ong before the application for registration; and that even after registration, they continued to po ssess the land. In a registration case, the judgment confirming the title of the applicant and ordering its re gistration in his name necessarily carried with it the right of ownership. The issuance of the writ of possession is therefore sanctioned by existing laws in this jurisdiction and by the generally accepted principle upon which the administration of justice rests. A writ of possession may be issued not only against the person who has been defeated in a registration cas e but also against anyone unlawfully and adversely occupying the land or any portion th ereof during the land registration proceedings up to the issuance of the final decree.
49. GERMAN MANAGEMENT AND SERVICES V. COURT OF APPEALS 177 SCRA 495 FACTS: Spouses Jose issued a power of attorney in favor of petitioner for the development of th eir parcel of land into a subdivision. Private respondents were occupying the land and petitio ner advised them to vacate but they refused. Thereafter, petitioner continued their d evelopment and construction. Respondents then filed a case for forcible entry. The tri al court dismissed the complaint and this was reversed by the CA.
Issue: WON the possessors of a land may file a case of forcible entry even against the owner hi mself Held: Notwithstanding petitioner‘s claim that it was duly authorized by the owners to develop th e subject property, private respondents as actual possessors, can commence a forcible entr y case against petitioner because ownership is not in issue. Forcible entry is merely a quieting process, and never determines the actual title to an estate. Title is not involved. Although admittedly petitioner may validly claim ownership based on the muniment of title i t presented, such evidence doesn‘t responsively address the issue of prior actual possession rai sed in a forcible entry case. It must be stated that regardless of the actual condition of title to th e property, the party in a peaceable quiet possession shall not be turned out by a strong hand, v iolence or terror. Thus, a party who can prove prior possession can recover such possession ev en against the owner himself. Whatver may be the character of his prior possession, if he has i n favor priority in time, he has security that entitles him to remain on the property until he has been lawfully ejected by a p erson having a better right by accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria.
50. CAISIP V PEOPLE 36 scra 17 FACTS: Spouses Gloria Cabalag and Marcelino Guevarra are people who cultivated a parcel of land kno wn as Lot 105-A of Hacienda Palico situated in sitio Bote-bote, barrio Tampisao, Nasugbu, Bata ngas. The overseer of the hacienda is petitioner Felix Casipi and the owner of the same is Roxa s y Cia. The latter acquired a court ruling against the spouses Gloria and Marcelino for forcible e ntry which orders them to vacate the premises within 20 days. The order was carried out June 6 , 1959 (so they had until June 26 to vacate it.) On June 17, Gloria was seen by Felix Caisip harv esting their crops in Lot 105-A. The Latter bade her to stop what she was doing and to leave the premises. When Gloria refused, Caisip called for Sgt. Rjales and Cpl. Villadelrey to help him sho o her away. Gloria stuck to her attitude and still refused to stop and leave so the two police offic ers, by means of force, stopped her and dragged her away (they also tried to threaten her by dr awing their guns :). As a result, the clothes of Gloria got torn. One of Gloria‘s neighbours caught sight of the event and asked the officers to release her. Gloria was later turned over to the polic e on duty for interrogation.
A case filed against the petitioners, Caisip and the officers, for Grave Coercion (Petitioners also filed grave coercion and unjust vexation against Gloria after 8 days maybe just to get back at he r- just in case sir asks.) One of their defenses was ART. 429 (including the doctrine of self help.) The petitioners were found guilty by the lower court thus this appeal. ISSUE: 1) Whether or not Art. 429 can be used as a defense?
RULING: Article 429 is inapplicable to the case at bar. The complainant didn‘t usurp or invade said lot. S he had merely remained in possession thereof, even though the hacienda owner may have bec ome its co-possessor. Appellants didn‘t repel or prevent an actual or threatened unlawful physic al invasion or usurpation of the property. They expelled the complainant from a property on which she and her husband were in possession even before the action for forcible entry was filed against them.
51 52 53 54 55
